Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
S

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Speech File Backup Files
Subseries: Chron File, 1989-1993

OA/ID Number: 13766
Folder ID Number: 13766-007

Folder Title:
USSR Trip 7/26/91 [OA 8326] [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	26	21	5	5

OBERLIN

January 10, 1989

Ms. Peggy Dooley
Old Executive Office Building, Room 111
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Dooley:

This is the paper on Communications Technologies by S. Frederick Starr which you requested. As I mentioned it is included as a chapter in a book on Soviet Science and Technology soon to be published by the Harvard University Press in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Mr. Starr suggested that I might also include two of his more recent articles.

If I can be of any further help, please do not hesitate to ask.

Sincerely,

Betsy Young

Betsy Young
Assistant to the President

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT • COX ADMINISTRATION BUILDING 201, OBERLIN COLLEGE • OBERLIN, OHIO 44074-1090
216/775-8400 • FAX: 216/775-2460 • TELEX: 3734492 OBRLN

Feeling low at the Higher School.

POOPED PARTY

By S. Frederick Starr

The Higher Party School in Moscow is to the Communist Party what the Pontifical Institute in Rome is to the Catholic Church. Since Lenin's day it has been codifying the Communist faith and passing it on to new generations of leaders. So when the scholars of the Higher Party School assembled on September 5 to debate "The Party and Perestroika," it was an event worth noting. The meeting was confidential, but a stenographer was there to record the proceedings. Several participants were stunned by what they heard and slipped a typescript to interested persons. The text reveals that in the course of a few brief hours the Higher Party School all but declared bankruptcy.

The professors gathered amid profound gloom. An economist estimated that it will take the U.S.S.R. 300 years to catch up with the United States in manufacturing and 600 years in agriculture. Professor Kuleshov, a department chairman, spoke of maternity hospitals without showers and toilets, clinics without medicine, and shops without goods. "I believe a worker [who sees all this] will not want to play around with definitions of 'capitalism' and 'socialism,' " he declared. "He wants to live in a society where people live well, regardless of what it calls itself. [He wants] a high standard of living, a degree of social justice, democracy, and humane social relations. I doubt there is even one person in this hall who would be so bold as to claim these exist in our country."

The mood of crisis was general, but it focused particularly on the Communist Party itself. One scholar spoke of "ritualized elections," another railed against the Party's "totalitarian structure," and still another denounced Soviet communism as "a social mutant with many absurd and illogical structures." Secretive in its operations and closed to public scrutiny, the Party "is not, strictly speaking, a political organization at all," announced the school's rector, V. N. Shostakovsky. Speaker after speaker zeroed in on the Party's administrative apparatus. Rigid and inflexible, this vast bureaucracy serves not the people but itself; any ties with society are purely one-directional, from the top down.

Perhaps, it was suggested, this isn't surprising, given what the Party has to work with. The rector observed, "If one speaks of the type of [person who becomes a] Communist, about the typical member of our organization, then one must acknowledge that . . . most are conformists . . . ill-disposed to independence or nonconformity, disinclined to criticize the leadership, lacking in initiative, etc." Such people, he said, are incapable of participating in a democracy.

The chairman of the "Department of Scientific Communism" added a devastating historical dimension. Down to the 1917 revolution, he argued, the Bolsheviks were an illegal conspiratorial group with no notion at all of true democracy. Lenin's task after 1917 was to transform this band of professional revolutionaries into a democratic party. But as this early *perestroika* failed, Lenin turned not to democracy but to the Chekha, the notorious secret police. How can this anti-democratic failed reformer continue in his traditional role as national icon?

Looming over this grim party was the memory of untold numbers of monstrous crimes, the full extent of which are only now becoming known to the Soviet public. Who bears responsibility for this barbarism? The professors at the Higher Party School heard their rector draw a comparison between the U.S.S.R. and Hitler's Germany. He went on to quote Karl Jaspers in defense of the proposition that only by assuming full "metaphysical responsibility" for Stalin's crimes can today's Party hope to take responsibility also for the fate of *perestroika*.

These are hardly the views one would expect from a senior official of a political party facing possible humiliation at the polls in a few weeks. But the savage candor continued, with a young docent arguing that "if the people refuse to trust us, we have obviously earned it." Lest there be any doubt that disaster lies just around the corner, the vice rector, N. M. Blinov, brought forward a recent survey showing that no more than five percent of voters would support candidates backed by the Party bureaucracy (as opposed to party reformers), and that Communists stand to be thrown out of office in two-thirds of the large cities of the U.S.S.R.

But what about Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, which guarantees the Communist Party's "leading role" in Soviet society, come what may? The rector assured his audience that today no mere law can guarantee a role for the Party. A professor of industrial organization noted: "The experience of other socialist countries shows that if the Communist Party tries to preserve [its privileges] it will lose its leading role entirely."

Speaker after speaker took the podium to lay out a path by which the Party could draw back from the brink. All called for an overhaul of the system, so that it might actually reflect the views of workers. In planning this overhaul, the professors seemed to be guided not by Marx and Lenin, but by Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, all of whom they cited by name. The rector himself clinched an argument in favor of diversity of opinion by invoking the authority of "the American founding fathers."

In defending their proposals, several speakers conjured up likely scenarios. V. I. Mitrokhin, secretary of the Institute's Party Committee, saw five possibilities: the breakup of the Soviet Union into several dozen fully independent states; a federal system granting each republic much control over its own fate; a humane form of

socialism that "out of political considerations" would not call itself either communist or socialist; capitalism; or some combination of the above. Others posed the choice between driving the "radical" followers of Andrei Sakharov and Boris Yeltsin out of the Party or expelling the Party's traditionalist staff, the infamous "*apparat*." No speaker accepted the radicals' seemingly unqualified embrace of individual interests as opposed to communal interests. Yet virtually all of them, including several who submitted their statements in writing after the meeting, embraced the rest of the radical program, including a multiparty system.

But what about the middle ground, where Gorbachev himself stands? As L. M. Ovrutsky, identified only as a "publicist," put it: "The field of maneuver between the conservative *apparat* and the radicalizing masses of Party members is shrinking." In other words, the U.S.S.R. may soon have to choose between radicals and conservatives.

Many speakers called for full democratization, which led them to try to define just what that would mean. On many points, there was a surprising amount of agreement. "Bottom up" democracy requires protection of minority rights; after all, the rector reasoned, minority views are often "the most constructive and bold." All wanted to throw the *apparat* out of the Party. (Even though, as Ovrutsky acknowledged, this could give rise to a separate party of neo-Stalinists and anti-Semites. The platform for such a party "already exists," he warned without elaborating.) Once emancipated from its own bureaucracy, the Communist Party will then be free to pull back from day-to-day supervision of the government and of the economy. The speakers argued that it is the failure of the economy above all that is driving workers away from communism, and this failure can be traced directly to oafish meddling by Party bureaucrats, who have killed competition and destroyed the market mechanism.

The importance and inevitability of political pluralism was virtually taken for granted. Gorbachev has struggled to confine the emerging pluralism to the Communist Party, but, as several speakers agreed, this is no longer possible. Other parties already exist, de facto if not de jure. A department head named I. A. Malmygin lamely proposed that the Communist Party divide itself into three new parties, red, orange, and green, and then close up shop. Not one speaker held out hope that the U.S.S.R. could remain a one-party system.

This is precisely the point at which these solid members of the *nomenklatura* revealed their sympathy for the radicalism of Yeltsin and Sakharov. As Shostakovsky put it, one-party rule condemns the monopolist party to stagnation; the only way the Communist Party can now revitalize itself is through the stimulation that comes from competition.

Virtually every speaker understood that the U.S.S.R. is groping toward becoming a "civil society" even though, as the rector acknowledged, the very idea of civil society remains terra incognita for many Russians. The tempo of change is rising, however. The sole future for the Communist Party, he asserted, is to become "one of the bridges between civil society and the state." So much for Lenin's heritage.

What bearing does this feast of iconoclasm have on Gorbachev's reforms? Many speakers professed their support for *perestroika* and Gorbachev. At the least, they are willing to back him against the Party's own bureaucrats. However, the clear thrust of the entire exchange at the Higher Party School was criticism of Gorbachev on grounds that he lags behind the sentiments and needs of an increasingly democratic society.

One speaker petulantly criticized Western writers for speaking of "Gorbachev's new thinking," when in fact nearly all his ideas have been borrowed from others, and reluctantly at that. Dr. I. M. Kliamkin, a guest from a related institute, ripped into Gorbachev on more fundamental grounds. Citing chapter and verse from Gorbachev's speeches, he attacked the leader's unwillingness to disengage the Party fully from the economy; if full disengagement is a "false thesis," as Gorbachev claims, then "all talk of democratization is empty words." Kliamkin also criticized Gorbachev's contention that private property is "unacceptable" in the U.S.S.R.; if so, the country will never have efficient light industries or a functioning service sector. Above all, Kliamkin took aim at Gorbachev's opposition to a multiparty system, claiming that the president's position on this was more appropriate to the 20th (i.e., Stalin's) century than to the 21st.

It is hard to convey in a few lines the mood of desperation that emanates from the stenographic report of this discussion. The rector set the tone at the beginning when he noted that "we fear terms like 'political pluralism,' 'private property,' and 'confederation,' but for some reason we don't fear the collapse of the economy, crime waves, and moral erosion; nor do we fear the fact that everyone lives badly in our society except speculators and thieves." From this point it was downhill all the way. N. I. Travkin, a deputy to the new congress, warned that "we are talking about the preservation in this country of a Communist Party as such. Will it justify itself or not?"

Toward the end of this solemn conclave of professors, an elderly doorkeeper named Claudia Timofeeva asked for the floor. She explained that she is a simple worker, far from the world of learning. But she is loyal to the Party, which she joined in 1942. She had listened with interest to all the talk of how the Party should evolve. But the plain truth, she asserted, is that "the Party today has lost its authority. You hear this on every street corner."

Presumably, the purpose of the meeting at the Higher Party School was to reverse the erosion she described, to help the Party regain its authority. As news gets out on what was actually said, though, Party loyalists in Donetsk, Minsk, or Novosibirsk must surely feel abandoned. But by then maybe no one will care.

S. FREDERICK STARR is the president of Oberlin College.

Gorbachev's Slipping Grip

By S. Frederick Starr

One week ago Mikhail Gorbachev beat back a move in the Congress of Peoples Deputies to consider the abolition of Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, the clause which protects the Communist Party's monopoly in politics. Among the supporters of the motion was Andrei Sakharov, who died three days later, while drafting a further speech on the same issue. Mr. Gorbachev's victory, his Soviet and Western backers claim, frees him to sort out the country's economic mess. Reformist experts and technocrats will now be able to work their wonders without the messy intrusion of democratic politics.

Such a view is wishful thinking. Mr. Gorbachev had to make crucial concessions. On many occasions before now he has declared that the Communist Party's monopoly of power is non-negotiable. The Soviet Union can have all the pluralism it needs, he has argued, merely by permitting greater diversity within the communists' vast organization. Mr. Gorbachev has now had to permit the decriminalization of alternative parties at least to be discussed, if only "at some later date." His ideological chief, Vadim Medvedev, has also acknowledged that the subject of political pluralism is no longer "taboo."

Only Three Votes

Had it not been for the large bloc of ex-officio members of party organizations in the Congress, Mr. Gorbachev would have lost outright. A similar motion last month in the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet legislature's upper house, failed by only three votes. And that slim electoral margin appears doomed: Elections to local councils are impending. Article VI has become the great test issue everywhere. Numerous polls, including one reported to the party's own Higher Party School, predict cataclysmic defeat for old-line party candidates. Should this happen at the local level, it will be impossible to hold the line in Moscow.

Only a few days ago Mr. Medvedev boasted smugly that Kremlin leaders "don't have to act under the pressure of emotional public gatherings." Strange words. When the Lithuanian parliament voted last week to remove Article VI from the constitution of that republic, the vote was preceded and followed by large and emotional public gatherings. While Mr. Gorbachev was meeting President Bush at Malta, huge demonstrations against Article VI took place in the Armenian capital of Erevan. The Armenian parliament seized the opportunity to drop both "Soviet" and "Socialist" from the name of the Armenian Republic. Not to be outdone, the Azerbaijanis also demonstrated for the legalization of their Popular Front as a political party, as did supporters of the fastest-growing political organization in the Ukraine, "Rukh." Most of the public meetings and vigils associated with these moves have been peaceful. But not all of them. When a large crowd of young Moldavians demonstrated outside party and militia headquarters in Kishinev, they could barely be restrained.

Nor is the movement to disestablish the Communist Party confined to the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union. The coal miners who went on strike last summer may have been hungry but their first demand was not for consumer goods but a multi-party system. A few weeks ago a new "Russian People's Front" was launched in the ancient Russian city of Yaroslavl, where representatives of eighty local popular fronts gathered to decry the communists' opposition to pluralism. On Nov. 20 a new "USSR All-Union Student Forum" issued a similar call for political pluralism, as well as true self-determination for all the peoples of the Soviet Union and the unrestricted right to travel abroad. In the same spirit, the Russian head of Komosomol, the party's feeder organization for youth, has pleaded for the abolition of his group's monopoly status, to slow the mass resignations now occurring.

At one level, the entire debate over the constitutional protection of the communists' monopoly of power is beside the point. *De facto*, other parties already exist in every major city and republic of the Soviet Union. Some are devoted to environmental issues, others focus on economic, cultural or religious goals. Sociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaya and other members of Mr. Sakharov's "Inter-regional Group" in the Congress of Peoples' Deputies still claim it is premature to move toward establishing a separate party. Nonetheless, they are establishing newspapers, building a funding base and setting up support organizations, indistinguishable from those of an independent political party.

As long as independent political movements were a cheering section for his faction in the party, Mr. Gorbachev egged them on. But he no longer trusts the public.

Given the surging numbers and growing power of unsanctioned political groups in the Soviet Union, why is Mr. Gorbachev trying to hold back the tide? The answer is that he no longer trusts the public. As long as independent political movements were simply a cheering section for his faction within the party, Mr. Gorbachev gladly egged them on. Now that they have moved beyond him, he is trying to rein them in. Mr. Gorbachev champions change in order to save the Communist Party and its system, not to destroy it.

For several years Mr. Gorbachev worried mainly about the Stalinist opposition within the Party. Sensing an alternative power base in the elective organs, he flirted for a year with the Congress of Peoples' Deputies and the newly elected Supreme Soviet. Then, as he lost the political initiative to an ever more radicalized public, he cooled to popular sovereignty.

To make matters worse, Mr. Gorbachev must bear Russia's fatal heritage of empire. All these Baltic republics have made absolutely clear their intention of moving toward full sovereignty. Armenia, too, has moved fast in this direction. The Azerbaijan Popular Front has also raised the banner of sovereignty, as have several groups within the republics of Georgia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan and the western part of the Ukraine. This unsettles Russian settlers in these regions. Many Russian and other Slavic immigrants to Moslem Central Asia have begin moving back home, and up to a third of the Russians living in the Baltic republics are expected to repatriate themselves in the next few years.

Far from seeing the efforts of the non-Russian peoples as part of a worldwide movement towards self-determination and popular sovereignty, many of Mr. Gorbachev's admirers in the West view them as an irksome threat to the orderly process of change being fostered from the Kremlin. If only the hotheads in the non-Russian republics would understand Mr. Gorbachev's intentions, it is argued, they would moderate their demands. But these movements are not led by ethnic zealots—they are led, quite often, by communist reformers and honest democrats who seek nothing more than their own room in Mr. Gorbachev's "common European home."

It is worth noting that the Lithuanian parliament that denied the party its "leading force" role a week ago Thursday is still dominated by its Communist Party members. Their opposition to Article VI is eminently reasonable: If the Party insists on retaining its legal monopoly of power in their republic it will lose everything. Only by agreeing to play on a level field with other parties can the communists hope to survive. Mr. Gorbachev offers no adequate response to this argument from his fellow communists and reformers.

Still less does he have a response to those communists in the non-Russian republics who want to separate their parties from that of Moscow, for similar reasons of self-preservation. The Latvian communists have pointed out that communist parties are more likely than any alternative party to retain links with Moscow, but that these non-Russian communists have no chance of winning at the polls unless they are both independent from Moscow's direct control and freed from the taint of monopoly created by Article VI.

Since Lenin's day, the Soviet Union has nominally been a federation, but one ruled by a monopolistic Communist Party. As a former regional party chief, Mr. Gorbachev despises the Moscow-based ministries, whose mismanagement of the economy he believes has brought the country to ruin. So bitterly does he dislike the central ministries that he has assented to the

ization worked out in Estonia and now being applied to several other republics.

But what is acceptable for the economy is not yet deemed appropriate for the political system. In his simultaneous defense of economic decentralization and continued political centralization Mr. Gorbachev apparently hopes to distinguish the political "superstructure" from the economic base. It is highly unlikely that this astonishingly un-Marxist ploy will succeed. The decision this week to create for the first time a separate Communist Party organization for the Russian Republic indicates that the same breezes are blowing in politics as in economics, and among Russians as non-Russians. The result, whatever Mr. Gorbachev may wish, will likely be either a looser federation or a confederation of fully independent states.

Tradition of Federation

Is this an impossible dream? Not really, for despite the Russian chauvinism that first appeared in the late nineteenth century, Russia has far more of a tradition of decentralization and even federalism than many suspect. For more than a century the czars permitted the entire Baltic area virtual autonomy in legal and economic affairs. Many Russian thinkers have also been drawn toward true federalism as an alternative to their unitary empire. Russia's first revolutionaries, the so-called "Decembrists" of 1825, wanted to break up the empire into thirteen states, modeled after the new American federation. So popular was the idea of decentralized federalism at the time of the Bolshevik revolution that Lenin had no choice but to adopt the term into his program even as he subverted its meaning.

Today, groupings of loosely confederated states are being planned in many parts of the world, notably Western Europe. Most are built on the principle that only those things which cannot readily be accomplished by the local powers should be assigned to the center. Totalitarian centralism is dying everywhere, but at the same time modern communications and trade are breaking down the idea that any country can be an economic or political island unto itself. Why should the Soviet Union be immune to these developments?

The Soviet radicals are right; the only way the Communist Party can preserve a significant role for itself is to compete openly and actively with other legally constituted parties. Once this happens, the path will be open for whatever balance between autonomy and integration is desired by the various peoples who now comprise the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev—and the West as well—has more to lose if he attempts to thwart this natural development than if he permits it to take place. As Marju Lauristin of the Estonian Popular Front said on Tuesday, Article VI is "obsolete." Its deletion from the Soviet constitution is the *sine qua non* to the success of the social and economic emancipation underway in the Soviet Union today.

Mr. Starr is the president of Oberlin College and a specialist on Soviet affairs.

NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE USSR

S. Frederick Starr

I. The Problem.

Few aspects of Soviet life today are untouched by change. Social organization, administrative structures, basic principles governing the economy, cultural values, and media of expression are all in the midst of apparently fundamental transformations. The rapid pace at which all this is occurring, combined with the participatory nature of the process, suggests that the very nature of change in Soviet life is changing.[1]

Communications stand prominently among those areas undergoing transformation in the USSR. Taking both the complex and simple technologies into account, it is evident that in communications in general the USSR lags far behind other advanced industrial societies, especially in computerization but also, to a lesser extent, in telecommunications.[2] It is undeniable that this lag holds great importance for the future. Yet to concentrate on it to the neglect of other developments in communications, let alone of the inevitability of eventual computerization in the USSR, is to severely undervalue the changes that have occurred. Telephone, radio, television, photocopiers, print journalism, audio and video cassette recordings, automobile transport, international travel, and trans-border transmissions of various sorts are among the many areas of Soviet communications in which rapid development has occurred. The purpose of this essay is to identify those changes and determine their likely impact on the political system.

A rich body of theoretical literature can be brought to bear on this topic. As early as 1957 Karl W. Deutsch studied the process by which communications stimulate the integration of societies.[3] Lucien W. Pye subsequently presented a body of theoretical writings on Communications and Political Development[4], Marshall McLuhan stimulated thought on the media as such through "The Medium is the Massage,"[5] and literally hundreds of writers have pondered the question, posed by Oswald H. and Gladys Gantey, of whether the tendency of the new media is To Inform or To Control?[6]

Nearly all of these writers tend toward deterministic views on the impact of communications on politics. However, few bother to analyze closely the question of just how deterministic communications technologies might actually be.[7] Daniel Lerner offered an important caution on this point in his essay "Toward a Communications Theory":

> The mass media, as a distinctive index of the participant society, flourish only where the mass has sufficient skill in literacy, sufficient motivation to share "borrowed experience," sufficient cash to consume the mediated product . . ."[8]

Many forces besides communications are fostering political change in the USSR. Indeed, the capacity of that country to assimilate and exploit new conduits of information is arguably as much the effect as the cause of change in other areas of the society. Undeniably, communications and overall social change are closely bound up with one another. At the least, developments in communications are a good index of social transformations.

We will therefore ask a range of questions, by no means all of which can be answered conclusively. Is the Soviet communications system made up of multiple simple systems, or is it moving toward fewer, more complex and integrated systems? How interactive are Soviet communications? Are the new technologies more readily controlled by the state than the old? Do they protect or erode Soviet notions of national sovereignty? Above all, does the evolution of communications foster vertical or horizontal human networks in the USSR?

This last question, posed by Deutsch a generation ago, provides the backbone of the following analysis.[9] It presupposes that autocratic and authoritarian regimes one-sidedly develop vertical communication links ("transmission belts," in Lenin's phrase), while democratic societies require elaborated horizontal networks, as well as vertical ones. These requirements are not absolute, since all societies need multiple links in both directions, and since both types of linkage are more fully developed in complex societies than in simple ones. Our objective, then, must be to determine whether vertical or horizontal integration is proceeding more rapidly in the USSR.

The evolution of communications in Western Europe and the United States provide an inevitable context for such a study. Yet the level of development in such countries is so far in advance of the USSR that comparisons minimize the importance of incremental change on the Soviet side. To avoid this problem, developments in the Soviet Union today will be presented in the context of the earlier history of communications in Russia itself. The initial section of this paper briefly characterizes that development over several centuries. The proposed periodization lays great stress on the exceptional character of the specifically Soviet phase of that process as it has existed until recently. Against this background, it will be proposed that in communications, as perhaps in other areas, current developments in the USSR contribute principally to the strengthening of horizontal communication, and hence foster the development of a civil society in that country.

II. The Vertical Tradition of Tsarist Communications

Beginning in the eleventh century, written chronicles recorded and standardized the deeds of Russia's church and state leaders. Because they were maintained for centuries, chronicles systematized history over time; since copies were made and preserved in various towns, the chronicles imparted regularity to important data over geographical space as well. At the most local level, village church bells provided a simple signal system, while in the ancient Russian city of Novgorod birch bark "papyri" were employed to document commercial transactions. The latter are particularly important as an early example of non-governmental horizontal communication in society. The fact that channels for such communication did not significantly expand until the advent of modern technologies attests to the extent to which vertical communication dominated in both Kievan Rus and Muscovy.

Movable type printing and hand-carved wood block broadsides (lubki), both of which appeared in Russia in the sixteenth century, present an interesting contrast of vertical and horizontal linkages. In Western Europe, as Marshall McLuhan reminds us, moveable type printing fostered for pluralism, individuation, and autonomy.[10] The Muscovite state's exclusive patronage of Ivan Fedorov, Russia's first printer, and its subsequent suppression of all publishing outside of the central Printing Court (pechatnyi dvor) indicates the very different function the same technology fulfilled in Russia. It is revealing that one of the first uses to which moveable type printing was put in Russia was not to publish locally edited Bibles for a literate public, as occurred in Germany, but to issue authorized service books in great number so that priests in the isolated parishes across the newly-conquered Tatar areas of the upper Volga basin would not fall into heresy.[11] Notwithstanding this effort, freshly edited scriptural texts issued in the seventeenth century by a handful of independent presses in the Ukraine gave rise to a major schism in the Orthodox church. However, by the end of Peter I's reign these presses, too, were muzzled and print technology limited to the dissemination of acts of state, official documents, scientific treatises, and Orthodox Christian liturgical books in forms approved by the state-church.

Contrasting to the state's domination of the "high technology" of moveable type printing, independent firms in Moscow and elsewhere dominated the "low" technology of wood block printing. Technologically primitive, lubki by the late seventeenth century were nonetheless established as an important conduit of horizontal communication in Russian society, disseminating the first printed satires, alphabet books, folk stories, popular religious tales, and pornography.[12] Thanks to its technological simplicity and portability, lubok technology was virtually uncontrollable and came eventually to flourish in the very shadow of the Kremlin, at the Lubianka.

Postal service was established in the late-seventeenth century with the help of Swedish and German experts. While postal messengers were able to transmit letters between Moscow and Kiev or Arkhangelsk in something over a week, their services were used exclusively by the court and bureaucracy.[13] By contrast, the development of roads and canals facilitated autonomous economic and social intercourse. Following the French pattern, the Russian government established a state engineering school to prepare

specialists in bridge, road, and canal construction.[14] The canal system begun by Peter I linked the major European Russian waterways and was designed according to the needs of commerce at the time. Roads, by contrast, were designed first to meet the state's military needs, and only secondarily to enhance private communications.[15] Typically, the first macadamized road in Russia was built in 1816 by Count Arakcheev as a purely military venture.

Military considerations also figured large in Nicholas I's decision to engage American engineers to build the first railroad link between St. Petersburg and Moscow.[16] The objective in this case was to move troops quickly between the two capitals should further crises like the 1825 Decembrist revolt occur. To be sure, the first Russian railroad between St. Petersburg and the Summer Palace had been privately constructed and the St. Petersburg-Moscow line itself was built by foreign concessionaires. Nonetheless, the state's deep suspicion of this new channel of communication -- both Baron Toll, supervisor of the Directorate of Communication, and Count Kankrin, the Minister of Finances, opposed railroads as "democratic"[17] -- assured that railroads would remain firmly under state control, if not ownership. Military considerations figure large in the design of the rail grid, even if the decision to use the broader American gauge was made to facilitate speed rather than security, as is often claimed.[18] The slow development of steamboat transport in Russia -- there were only 97 steam-propelled crafts in 1850[19] -- can probably be traced to the disinterest of the military in this technology and to the slow development of internal commerce.

No substantial and autonomous medium of communication developed in Russia before the mid-nineteenth century. Pressed by a depleted treasury, Catherine II had opened the door to private publishing in the 1760s.[20] But even the nominally independent entrepreneur who responded to her call used mainly state-owned presses and was subjected to heavy censorship. Further progress was slow. When private printing began to expand in the early nineteenth century, censorship laws were extended in order to regulate it. Moreover, publishing devoting to lateral communication, e.g. private printing, remained technologically backward. Whereas in Great Britain the first steam press had been introduced by the Times of London, it fell to the tsar's Ministry of Internal Affairs to introduce that technology to Russia.[21]

Thus, down to the mid-nineteenth century the Russian state provided the main locus for technological innovation in communications. Naturally, its aim was primarily to provide systems that met its own military and administrative needs, and only secondarily to develop society locally or to link its components horizontally. Suffice it to say that the Provincial News (provintsialnye vedomosti) published by the government in each administrative district were conduits mainly for official information, much to the chagrin of local society.[22] Only when urban society itself began to develop in the late-nineteenth century did pluralism and horizontality in communications begin to flourish.

III. New Technologies and Horizontal Communication.

The communication technologies that dominated the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to foster the increase of centralized control but they also stimulated more decentralized initiatives. Postal services, for example, had initially been designed to meet official needs. The Russian postal system began selling stamps to the public for domestic mail in 1857 and for foreign mail by 1864. The number of all letters mailed in 1854 had been only 34 million, but soared to just under two hundred million per annum by 1878.[23] Since this increase far outstrips the growth of governmental services, one can assume that private communications comprised the bulk of the growth.

Aside from a few such successes, however, Russian communications lagged. The Russian road network by mid-century was less than a fifth as long as that in France or Germany.[24] Shipbuilding expanded fitfully, with only fifteen percent of the tonnage passing through Russian ports being carried in Russian bottoms.[25]

Such instances of retardation can be traced to the slow development of private commerce and, importantly, to the severe shortage of capital. Since the government could not fund projects on a large scale, it had no choice but to turn to private and foreign investors. This occurred even in the militarily important area of railroads. The General Company of Russian Railroads was established in 1857 in order to tap Dutch, British, and French banks at a time when the tsar's finances were in disarray. The resulting concessions brought about a twelve-fold increase in railroad mileage by 1880. In that year the state, having recovered from earlier fiscal crises, began repurchasing domestic and foreign concessions from their owners. By 1912 only a third of Russian railroad mileage was privately owned.[26]

Even if ownership of this important channel of communication remained largely in state hands, the actual movement of people and goods in Russia was increasingly determined not by the state but by a myriad of private and individual -- e.g. "horizontal" -- decisions. For example, the peopling of western Siberia, while not discouraged by the government, occurred largely because hungry peasants used the new rail network to escape famine and communal control.[27]

Publishing also felt the effects of public initiative, with the state-owned sector decreasing steadily as a proportion of the whole after the 1860s. Autonomous publishing houses strove to meet the interests of the public. Revised censorship laws instituted in the 1860s defined the limits of glasnost' (the term entered the Russian political vocabulary in the course of these debates), yet they did not attempt to reinstitute the degree of vertical control that formerly existed.[28] Independent forces rushed in to exploit the situation. The great Moscow publisher Alexander Suvorin first introduced the rotary press to Russia for his newspaper, Novoe vremia, while the entrepreneur Ivan Sytin pioneered the exploitation of linotype and rotogravure presses in Russia after 1900, enabling his newspaper, Russkoe slovo, to achieve the

largest circulation in Russia between 1900 and 1917.[29] The kinds of mass entertainment literature that had earlier been produced only on broadsides now spewed forth from presses in the form of penny newspapers and fugitive journals, with little or no effective state control.[30] Only when local self-governing councils (zemstva) tried to link horizontally their separate printing activities did the government intervene harshly by imposing strict censorship.[31] In much the same way "societal organizations" today frequently enjoy extensive freedom to publish but have only recently gained limited rights to disseminate their magazines and journals beyond the immediate district in which they are licensed.

The telegraph and telephone are among the nineteenth century's most sophisticated new communication technologies and Russians played a prominent role in the development of both.[32] P.L. Schilling, a German from Russia's Baltic provinces, invented electric telegraphy before Morse; B.S. Jacobi in 1839 invented the "writing telegraph"; E.Ia. Slonimskii was the first to send two telegraphic messages over the same line, in 1858; S.M. Berdichevskii-Apostolovyi invented the first automatic telephone switch in 1895; and Alexander Pavlov constructed a working radio telegraph in 1895. Russians had also established the longest optical telegraph line in the world in the 1840s and the longest telegraph line in the world, in 1871.[33]

Notwithstanding these achievements in research, the practical development of both telegraphy and telephones was retarded in Russia. Governmental offices in Moscow and St. Petersburg could not communicate with one another by telegraph at the time of the Crimean War, and in 1863 there were fewer than three hundred telegraph stations in the entire empire.[34] As late as 1900 the Russian telegraph system was only half as long as Germany's and a third that of England.[35] Again, the cause was a shortage of capital, which also accounts for the decision to grant private telegraph concessions to the public. Seeking to maintain control over what it did not actually own, the government passed a telegraphic charter which imposed strict punishments against those transmitting anything deemed threatening to life and health, and the death sentence for telegraph agents who willfully violated the code. The Directorate of Communications also hosted an international convention in 1875 which endorsed punishments against those transmitting across national borders telegraphic messages "hostile to the interests of states, against the laws, the social order, and morality."[36] By such means the state tried its best to regulate strictly the individuating aspects of telegraphy, even when it did not own the systems.

A similar process occurred with the telephone, but in the decades after 1880 in which that technology developed the state was willing to allow concessionary firms to dominate the field.[37] It was widely held that privatization sped the development and lowered the cost of telephone services. Such arguments no doubt served to justify the fact that the entire local systems in Odessa and other cities were privately owned.[38]

Railroads, telegraphy, and telephones developed in chronological sequence. Comparing them, one notes the nationalization of railroads before 1913, the steady but not increasing role of the state in telegraphy, and the prominent role of private and concessionary ownership in telephones. Besides

the growing privatization of their ownership, all three technologies increasingly served horizontal communication in society. Usage soared when semi-constitutional rule was instituted after the Revolution of 1905. Between 1903 and 1913 the number of telegraph stations grew by almost as much as it had in the entire forty years previous, while the number of telegrams transmitted increased by an even greater figure.[39] Between 1900 and 1910 the number of inter-city telephone lines quintupled, with still larger growth in the following half-decade.[40] The new technologies assumed a role in the new politics. The reactionary politician Konstantin Pobedonotsev listed his phone number in the St. Petersburg directory by 1900 as did the newly-formed political parties a few years later; during the revolutions of both 1905 and 1917 the public at large used telegrams to communicate its demands to the government.[41] Private publishing also grew phenomenally in these years, the number of titles nearly quadrupling between 1907 and 1913 alone.[42]

A Yiddish proverb reminds us that "An example is not a proof." Nonetheless, such instances, multiplied by hundreds, suggest the way in which Russia's developing society seized upon new technologies to enhance both horizontal communication among its members and vertical communication upward from society to the state. The evidence does not permit us to ascribe the rise of constitutional rule in Russia to a prior growth in horizontal communications, nor does it prove the reverse. What is clear is that they arose together before 1917 and that each fostered the other.

IV. The Vertical Structure of Bolshevik Communications

Lenin, asked why bourgeois ideology prevailed whenever there existed an open competition of ideas, responded that it "has at its disposal immeasurably more means of dissemination."[43] Faced with this, Lenin, like other authoritarian rulers in the twentieth century, siezed control of the vertical conduits of communication and used them to transmit Bolshevik ideas to the public.[44] In addition to this positive step, he also systematically suppressed horizontal communication, thus isolating individuals and groups from one another and atomizing the society as a whole. All this left individuals more readily subject to control from above.[45] This was the easier due to the virtual collapse of electronic communications, printing, and railroad transport after the Bolshevik Revolution. The number of telephones in use in Russia shrank from 232,000 in 1917 to 127,000 by 1921.[46] The mass evacuation of cities reduced drastically the number of people with access to telegraph stations. The combination of Menshevik domination of the printers' unions and plummeting paper production after 1914 led to drastic declines in the publication of books and newspapers.[47] By the end of 1920, in the words of a recent student of the subject, "even the smallest private printing shops had disappeared,"[48] while by 1923 three-quarters of all Russian bookstores and daily newspapers existing in 1917 had closed.[49] Rail transport, too, was severely disrupted, although surviving photographs showing hordes of people clambering on those few trains still running indicate that public demand had, if anything increased.

In its effort to reestablish the priority of vertical channels of communication, the Soviet state pursued policies reminiscent of the tsarist state in the seventeenth century, namely, to seize the channels of communication, focus production of information in the capital, and regulate closely its dissemination. In printing this meant, in addition to the abolition of private printing and the establishment of the state press, the concentration of printing facilities in a few readily controllable locales, the elimination of autonomous distributors, and the nationalization of existing inventories of books.[50] In telegraphy and telephones this meant the creation of the state telegraph agency (ROSTA) as an instrument of top-down communication and propaganda. Internal passports were eventually introduced as a means of controlling access to railroad transport.

In addition to laying hold of existing channels of communication, the new Bolshevik state suppressed the development of potentially individuating new technologies. Private automobiles, which had been produced in small numbers in the last years of tsarist rule, virtually ceased to exist in Russia at the moment they were becoming ubiquitous in the West. International telephone communication, first considered by the Soviet state in 1923, grew very slowly and was limited to a few official calling points. Direct telephone lines linking Moscow with Warsaw and Berlin were opened only in 1927, while the line to Paris opened in 1930, was not direct.[51] All international telephone lines from the USSR were subjected to close surveillance. In a burst of utopian enthusiasm, free postage was established in 1919 but quickly discontinued.[52] As controls over mail were strengthened, the volume of mail began to fall.

The result of these various policies was to restrict severely all areas of horizontal communication. It is worth noting that this process was well advanced even before Stalin's Cultural Revolution completed the task. The growth of urbanization required an absolute expansion of communication facilities in the 1930s, but the USSR ended that decade relatively even further behind the West than ten years before. During the post-War era the decline became absolute as well as relative. The number of both letters and packages sent by Soviet citizens in 1950 was less than in 1940, while the slight increase in inter-city telephone calls can be traced to official rather than private use. By contrast, since the content of books and newspapers could readily be controlled, their production was allowed to increase.

Along with controlling existing technologies of communication, the Soviet regime tried to exploit new technologies to enhance vertical top-down communication. Loudspeakers, introduced in the late-1920s, were well-suited to this purpose and were produced in quantity. Lenin had a keen appreciation for the potential of film, but insisted that this technology, too, be closely controlled from above. Private filmmaking collapsed during the Civil War,[53] to be replaced by the State Film Agency (Goskino later Sovkino).

The Bolshevik government also seized on radio technology. Introduced first by the Imperial Navy to improve communications during the Russo-Japanese War, radio remained a military monopoly down to the revolution, by which time there were twenty stations in Russia, all under the navy's control. By the end of the 1920s there were nearly sixty stations broadcasting in the USSR and plans were afoot to build millions of receivers.[54]

Authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century are said to lay special importance on controlling and developing communications technology. This certainly occurred in Hitler's Germany and in Mussolini's Italy.[55] Russia's centralizing leaders, too, were determined to place the various new technologies of communication in the service of their cause. Lenin and a host of practitioners in various media developed an impressively detailed body of theoretical writings to undergird their hopes. State control of existing communications developed rapidly and steadily throughout the 1920s. New technologies like radio, film, and loudspeakers were exploited to strengthen the regime's ability to transmit messages downward to the populace. Such potentially individuating technologies as private automobiles, international telephones, and sound recordings were suppressed or limited. The result was a thoroughly authoritarian and even totalitarian system of communications, in which the state controlled both the conduits of information and the messages carried by those conduits.

Acknowledging this, one cannot help but be struck by the relatively primitive fashion in which the Soviet state developed and exploited communications technologies. For all their monopoly in film, the regime's filmmakers achieved far lower levels of public saturation than were achieved by Hollywood or the leading studios of the major western nations. Not surprisingly, Goskino was chronically under-funded and had to rely on receipts from popular foreign films for its revenue. Moreover, there existed only 900 projectors in the entire country in 1925, half of these being broken and hence idle.[56] Only in the 1930s did the production and distribution of Soviet films

begin to meet public demand, and then only imperfectly.

Having gained a monopolistic position in radio, the regime again failed to exploit its new position. Notwithstanding a 1932 plan to build fourteen million receivers, only 3.5 million were in operation in 1937, or a mere twenty-five receivers per thousand population.[57] A key retardant of radio communications was the USSR's inability to produce vacuum tubes in the quantities needed. As a result, production of popularly-priced models like the EChS-4 (1934) and SUD-9 (1939) fell far short of targets.[58] This,

along with the desire to restrict access to the open airways, led to the extraordinary development of cable ("wired") radios with fixed tuning to the two official stations. As late as 1952 two out of three radio receivers in the USSR were of this type, with fewer than six million wave radio receivers available for the entire Soviet population.[59]

Only in the technologically less innovative areas of book and newspaper publishing did the regime achieve distinctively high levels of production. Hence, Professor Peter Kenez did not exaggerate when he concluded that "Soviet leaders had much to learn from Westerners in the field of mass communications and almost nothing to teach them."[60]

It is clear that state-dominated "top-down" communications were vastly strengthened under Soviet rule, and at the expense of horizontal communication in society. However, this was achieved as much through the vigorous suppression of the latter as through the intensive development of the former. It is striking that in the years between the Bolshevik Revolution and the death of Stalin in 1953 Soviet citizens achieved no breakthroughs in communication technology comparable to the earlier achievements of Jacobi, Schilling, or Popov. Lacking them, a regime that placed great theoretical emphasis upon communication became a consumer of other nations' technologies rather than an innovator itself. This stands as clear evidence of the relatively conservative record of the Soviet government in the field of communications, its claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

It goes without saying that the content of messages transmitted over the vertical media strongly supported the regime. However, two qualifications must be introduced. First, a cursory review of the Soviet press and of Soviet films of the 1930s and '40s suggests that while virtually nothing anti-Soviet in character was transmitted, only a part of the production focused directly on regime goals. Far from the relentless bombardment of propaganda anticipated in Brave New World, much of the content was comprised of ideologically bland and even unassimilable data. Second, at least as much attention was devoted to what was not communicated as to what was. Stated differently, Soviet communications policy under Stalin emphasized more the suppression of data judged harmful than the effective dissemination of positive messages. As in the communications system as a whole, far more concern seems to have been devoted to the elimination of autonomous horizontal channels than to the full exploitation of vertical channels. Closer comparisons with fascist Germany would be instructive on this point.

For all the force Stalin devoted to suppressing horizontal communications, he never managed to destroy the ideal of a more pluralistic communications culture like that which had begun to appear on the eve of the revolution. As soon as the harshest controls began to be relaxed in the 1950s, horizontal channels of communication, both official and unofficial, came once more to the fore.

V. Toward a Horizontal Information Culture

The post-Stalin era has been the victim of hyperbole. Dubbed "The Thaw" after the title of a novel written before any thaw had occurred, the early years of dramatic change are said to have given way to torpor and "stagnation," to use Mr. Gorbachev's self-serving term. In terms of social change, however, the evolution was both more steady and more basic than either supporters or critics admit. Collective farmers constituted almost half of the population on the eve of World War II but had shrunk to a fifth by 1971, a smaller percentage than that constituted by members of the white collar intelligentsia.[61] The number of post-secondary students soared, from 6.2 million in 1957-58 to 25 million in 1964-65.[62] Corresponding changes occurred in the rates of literacy and urbanization as the population grew younger and geographically more concentrated. Such shifts, accompanied by the USSR's steadily improving technological capacity, prepared the way for a fundamental change in social communications. The fact that the law governing communications was extensively revised as early as 1954 suggests that leaders themselves understood change to be impending.[63]

As will be seen, changes in communications occurred both through the addition of new technologies and the expansion and alteration of older technologies so as to make them capable of fulfilling new functions. Together, these shifts brought about a transformation far more extensive than is evident by examining only the separate parts. On the one hand, they extended and strengthened vertical channels of communication in Soviet society. However, they also rendered those channels more interactive than formerly and gave them a stronger role in horizontal communications. More important, they vastly expanded the ability of individuals and groups to communicate directly with one another, unmediated by the state. All of these changes presupposed a reduction, albeit partial, of the Stalinist controls on horizontal communications. As soon as these controls were cut back somewhat in the 1950s, Soviet society showed itself eager to exploit existing and new technologies of communication, as indeed it has ever since.

We will consider the implications of these changes for the Soviet polity in the concluding section of this essay. For now, let us review the elements contributing to the new horizontality of Soviet communications.

A. The Expansion and Alteration of Old Technologies

The Soviet postal system provides a good example of the impact of social change on communications. Between 1940 and 1974 the number of letters grew from three to nine million per annum.[64] The number of packages quadrupled in the same period. Most of this expansion was concentrated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, coinciding with a phase of rapid urbanization, increased literacy, and greater openness.[65] Increased efficiency also stimulated public use of the mails. Today, when sixty percent of Soviet mail is shipped by air, the volume of letters has grown so rapidly as to cause a shortage of postmen and an increase in postal theft.[66]

Communication by telephone has also soared. Twice the number of new phones were installed between 1965 and 1974 as between 1940 and 1965, with the number of urban telephones trebling in the period.[67] Nearly all the new urban phones were automatic and thus increased privacy. Today there are 24 million telephones in the USSR, half the total being in urban apartments. By contrast, only two million private rural residences have phones.[68] The nearly two billion intercity calls made annually today and the seven-fold increase of international calls in the decades before 1974 attest to rapidly changing public access to this medium.[69]

As the USSR became less of an "information poor" society, the content of communications grew less readily controllable. The sheer growth in the number of phone calls makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the state to monitor their contents, just as the quantity of private mail has rendered it impossible for the KGB to maintain former levels of surveillance over that medium. It is no surprise that persons in many fields as early as the 1970s came to regularly use both domestic and international telephone lines for unofficial and purely personal purposes. Among such users were those with agendas different from the state's. As one student of the subject put it,

> The international telephone, despite continued control that amounts to persecution, has given Russia's dissidents the means for immediate direct contact with the outside world, something quite unthinkable not much more than twenty years ago.[70]

The growth of mail and telephone usage facilitated horizontal communication. The rapid growth of publishing and the press, by contrast, benefitted both vertical and horizontal linkages. The number of periodicals nearly doubled between 1958 and 1965,[71] with Pravda going from a four-page format to six pages in 1970. The central press grew with particular speed, with nearly all major Moscow newspapers being printed simultaneously in thirty-five cities by 1966.[72]

If such changes served uniformity and "top-down" communication, other changes in traditional print media enhanced interaction. The much-heralded rise of "letters to the editor" columns indicate that Soviet newspapers were becoming vehicles for interactive communication from bottom to top, providing feedback to the government in the process. Moreover, the appearance of job ads, lonely hearts announcements, and other forms of personal notices in various local newspapers reflect the public's growing interest in exploiting traditional print technology to enhance horizontal linkages among individuals.

Radio, too, gradually became more interactive. Rare is the student of Soviet affairs who cannot regale friends with a few "Radio Armenia" jokes. Few pause to realize these have their origin in programs begun in the 1960s in which listeners were invited to call in their questions. Such programs, aired on most Soviet domestic stations, constituted the first sign of "bottom-up" use of the vertical medium of radio, and provide the same kind of feedback to the regime as letters columns in newspapers.

So much has been written about the USSR's failures in the mass dissemination of personal computers that it is easy to forget the dramatic

increases that have been registered in many other electronic media of communication, particularly in the 1960s. Nowhere is this more striking than in radio.[73] For all the emphasis on top-down communications in the Stalin era, there were only 17.5 million radios in the entire USSR in the year before Stalin's death.[74] By 1968 this number had risen to 89.5 million.[75] While the ratio of cable to wave radio in 1952 had been approximately 2:1, by 1968 the ratio slightly favored wave sets.

The proliferation of wave radios in the population at large during the 1960s made it all but inevitable that the public should become interested in receiving international as well as domestic broadcasts. Short wave transmissions had greatly multiplied since the early 1950s, with stations in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Iran beaming broadcasts to the USSR. Receivers capable of tuning in such broadcasts were constructed in large numbers by amateurs, while others were imported unofficially through diplomatic channels. Transistors enabled such equipment to be miniaturized during the 1970s and made it readily importable through informal channels. By the end of the 1960s Radio Liberty could claim that 27 million radios in the USSR were capable of receiving its broadcast.[76] Even if this figure is exaggerated, as seems likely, the number was great enough for the Soviet government to decide that it should itself manufacture such equipment so at least to co-opt what it could not control. Selective jamming limited access to certain foreign transmissions, but the manufacture of short wave radios indicates the government's acceptance of trans-border broadcasts as an unavoidable feature of modern communications.

B. The USSR's Mixed Record in New Major Technologies of Communication

No less important than the expansion and transformation of existing channels of communication are the major new media introduced in the past twenty years. Among these, television is the most prominent. Developed by a government confident in its ability to control the social impact of the medium, Soviet television burgeoned quickly, expanding from 2.5 million sets in 1958 to 30 million sets a decade later.[77] By the end of the 1970s television was all but universal in Soviet households. During the decade ending in 1974 the number of transmitters trebled.[78] Cable television, by contrast, has made very slow progress in the USSR, partly because it requires such great investments but doubtless also because it introduces a greater element of choice than the government is yet prepared to reckon with.[79] That the latter consideration is significant is suggested by the fact that the USSR did not shirk from the large investment required to transmit its few channels by satellite, which it has done since 1967.[80]

In contrast to the Soviets' wholehearted acceptance of television, their attitude towards the private automobile has been more ambiguous. On the one hand, production grew from 64,000 cars in 1965 to over 1.3 million in 1982, and would have grown still more had the Kama River Truck Works not gobbled up more than half the rubles designated for the motor vehicle industry in the late 1970s.[81] On the other hand, retail prices were set extra-ordinarily high, and were only reduced in 1985.[82] Frequent articles in the press have

warned of the negative social impact of private automobiles, leading to charges that more than simple inefficiency lies behind the refusal of ministries to provide the necessary infrastructure for private automobile owners. Only in 1984 did the government announce plans to increase the number of gas stations for private cars from 1200 to 3000.[83] However, this more positive attitude has since spread rapidly, extending to the expansion of partial credit programs for car-buyers,[84] reductions in the prices of certain models,[85] and even to discussions of possible sports cars for Soviet citizens.[86]

Since the retarded growth of computerization in the USSR has been widely discussed in the western press, it is not necessary to repeat the story here. Suffice it to say that while microchip technologies have made substantial progress in the military sphere and in certain areas of industrial planning, they have made little headway at the crucial level of desktop personal computers. With no modems, few printers, and inferior floppy disks, this situation in the USSR will not change rapidly.[87] Networking of all sorts is proceeding slowly at best,[88] even though a system linking institutes of the Academy of Sciences in three cities is now in place.

The introduction of a single "gateway" for all computerized data entering the USSR reflects the government's concern to control information transmitted for use by this new medium -- eighty percent of all data bases, after all, originated in the US.[89] Resistance to demand-based systems stems from a similar concern to maintain at least some central control. However, the adherence of the USSR to international architectural standards in computing, the rapidly declining costs of transmitting data within the USSR,[90] along with the great and positive publicity given to the interactive nature of the Academy of Sciences' new network, suggests that an environment more hospitable to the computer revolution is beginning to emerge, albeit slowly. Even the ideal of a single "gateway" in Moscow for computerized data from abroad may prove so clumsy or so difficult to enforce that it will eventually have to be abandoned.

The record of the USSR in adopting the major communications technologies of private automobile, television, and computing is mixed. Television, the most vertical and hence controllable technology, has progressed most rapidly, while the private automobile and personal computer have made only slow advances, development of the former having been retarded by more than half a century and the latter by at least a decade. Yet this is not to say that the advance even of these technologies will be permanently thwarted. The Soviet government has officially committed itself to rapid advances in both automobile and computer production, which will have the effect of stimulating public demand. In the concluding section of this paper it will be argued that such demand is becoming increasingly difficult to resist.

C. The Inexorable Advance of New "Small" Technologies

No journalistic account of Soviet life today seems complete without tales of VCRs, home movies, and black market audio and video tapes. Rarely, though, do such accounts go beyond the level of anecdotes. Yet the "small

technologies" of the past generation are uniquely suited to foster horizontal communications, just as film, radio, and loudspeakers represented new means of facilitating vertical communications in the 1920s and 1930s. The history of such "small technologies" dramatically highlights the fundamental changes occurring in Soviet communications over the past decades.

The rise of such minor technologies as home photography, cassette recording, ham radio, and video cassettes share certain common features. All benefitted greatly from public demand, which in turn was stimulated by the public's knowledge of how the given medium was being exploited abroad. All gave rise to simple networks of officianados, and all became the object of official efforts at co-optation. Eventually, all gained legitimate places in Soviet society as a whole. To see these patterns in action, let us review more closely the copying and transmission of static visual images; reproduction of sound; and the replication of movie images.

Various stencil, xerography, and ditto systems existed in the USSR prior to the 1960s. All were considered printing presses in law, however, and hence could not be owned privately. In practice, access to stencils was widespread, and materials as diverse as music and architectural drawings were being unofficially reproduced for select private audiences as early as the mid-1950s. As is well known, the USSR maintains strict controls over all xerox machines, including the cumbersome domestically-produced models. However, in the 1960s and 1970s a number of samizdat publishers in various fields gained access to such machines, and used them extensively. The example of the Voronezh engineer Iurii Vermenich is typical, in that he succeeded in reproducing translations of several dozen books on jazz on primitive machines owned by his institute.[91]

Many voluntary (obshchestevnnye) organizations beginning in the late 1960s gained official permission to issue informal newsletters and magazines for local distribution; most of these publications, such as the Leningrad quarterly Kvadrat, were reproduced on photocopying machines. The independent Ukrainian journal Ukrainsky visnik and the religious journal Vybor are both reproduced in the same semi-legal fashion today.

Attempts to control access to xerox machines have failed to repress the demand for horizontal print communication. Private photography was always available to fill the gap. An article in the autonomous journal Svobodnaia mysl in 1971 presented detailed instructions on how inexpensive and widely available photographic equipment could be used as a surrogate printing press.[92] Such techniques were made readily accessible by the excellent and inexpensive single-lense reflex cameras manufactured in the USSR with equipment taken from the Zeiss factories in Jena, the Zenit-E being the model of choice for unofficial printing on account of its high close-up resolution. Negatives were easily transmitted by mail and could be read with the help of a lense for viewing filmstrips available in children's stores for 35 kopeks. Countless manuscripts, reports, poems, lyrics and other documents were independently transmitted throughout the USSR by this means.

The spread of radio stimulated interest in recording. Wire recorders were manufactured in the USSR in the 1940s but were rarely available to

private citizens. Instead, amateurs constructed simple machines capable of recording sound or the emulsion of discarded x-ray plates. Such recordings were of poor quality and had a short life expectancy but had the double advantage of being inexpensive and readily transmittable through the mails. By the early 1950s this "Roentgenizdat" was widely exploited for recording both music and voice, leading eventually to a 1958 law making it illegal "to produce home-made records of the criminal trend."[93] Meanwhile, Soviet-made open reel tape recorders appeared in the 1950s with the large El Fa-6 model, which was followed before 1960 by the lumbering Dnepr-3 and Spalis models. More compact foreign-made cassette machines entering the country in great numbers in the early 1960s forced the authorities to choose between losing all control over the technology or attempting to co-opt it by producing a home-grown portable product. They chose the latter course. Sales of Yauza series tape recorders reached half a million by 1965 and over one million by 1970.[94] The social impact was enormous. The late Anatolii Kuznetsov described the situation:

> Soviet ideological organs, busy in the field of radio production . . . completely failed to pay attention to such a seemingly innocent technical branch as the production of tape recorders. A demand existed and it was satisfied, and when at last ideological firemen discovered the catastrophic breakthrough, it was too late. Now it is a rare home without a tape recorder, and an evening party or get-together without one is unthinkable.[95]

Cassette tape recordings, shipped through the domestic and international mails, provided a channel of horizontal communication that was at once inexpensive, legal, and virtually beyond control. Ham radio operators seized upon another means of sound transmission that was equally efficient, equally inexpensive, and nearly as difficult to control.[96] It is estimated that there were up to twenty thousand licensed radio amateurs in the USSR in the late 1960s. According to Gayle Hollander, the number of illegal operators increased dramatically in the 1960s, when a do-it-yourself handbook for amateur radio operators was published. While details of this medium are lacking, it is known that ham radio operators in the Ukraine warned of the Soviet troop build-up on the eve of the Czech invasion of 1967, that hams in the Ukraine spread lurid reports at the time of the Chernobyl disaster and helped force the government to release authoritative information, that a ham operator in Vilnius was given three years incarceration in the early 1970s, and that more than a thousand hams in the Donetsk region were detained in 1974.[97]

Photography, tape recording, and ham radio were all exploited by Soviet citizens to create more adequate horizontal conduits for information than official media could provide. Much the same process is going forward today with video cassette recorders. Great quantities of these inexpensive and compact instruments were being unofficially imported into the Soviet Union by the late 1970s. Crew members of a Soviet cruise ship that made frequent stops in New Orleans were known to purchase several hundred VCRs at a time from dealers in that city, to be resold on the Odessa and Leningrad black markets. Dubbing machines, essential if the medium is to respond to market demands, were bringing 1000 rubles at Riga commission stores visited by the author in

September, 1986.

What Izvestiia terms the "currently fashionable passion for videotapes" led police in Riga to confiscate 415 imported and domestically-produced videos depicting "cruelty, violence, mysticism, and superstition" that were being shown by independent operators to paying audiences of local students. The operators of this library were charged under an article of the Latvian civil code that banned the distribution of videotapes "harmful to the state or to public order, health, or morals . . .."[98] The analogous law in the Russian Republic was invoked to punish a Moscow piano teacher caught trading in video tapes and equipment.[99]

VCRs by 1986 had spread so far that it would have been impossible to reign them in completely. Instead, the government limited its intervention to co-opting the medium and policing its most objectionable excesses.[100] The worst danger lay in the seemingly uncontrolled nature of trans-border communications. Dish receivers have until recently been all but nonexistent, and any that might find their way into private hands could easily be controlled. Video tapes, by contrast, are as disrespectful of national borders as audio cassette tapes. Because they are so readily imported, reproduced, and disseminated, they effectively destroy the state's autarkic control over both television and film production.[101] Whether or not Soviet citizens produce their own original videos, the exercise of independent choice over what is imported and disseminated creates a kind of video samizdat. It is for this reason that the Soviet government began producing its own "Elektronika VM-12" VCR. Reportedly costing from twelve to fourteen hundred rubles, the Soviet machines may be less expensive than imports but have the overriding disadvantage of being unable to play standard western tapes without modification. It is doubtful that more than 10,000 Elektronika VM-12 units had been manufactured before the end of 1986.[102]

A second attempt to preempt the video import boom was the decision in 1985 to produce large numbers of video cassettes in the USSR. Manufactured at the same Elektronika plant in Voronezh which produced the VM-12, the Soviet video cassette library consists mainly of mainstream popular music (Pugacheva, Vysotskii, etc.) and old films, mainly Soviet. By the end of 1985 the library included 450 titles which were distributed mainly at electronic stores in such ports of entry as Riga, Moscow, Odessa, and Tallinn, where the black market in foreign tapes was most active. Production remained low, however, because the only source of tape was the Soviet film industry (Soiuzkinofond), which jealously hoarded all videotape to meet its own needs.[103] Moreover, the Soviet press candidly admitted that many customers were buying the local product solely to re-record imported films and programs for their own use.[104] No wonder that private video traders have concluded, as the official press acknowledges, "that, for the time being, there is no threat of competition."[105]

With the exception of audio tape recording, all of the "small technologies" of communication that have appeared in the USSR remain by western standards, fairly limited in their reach. Yet together the VCRs, ham radio stations, audio cassettes, photographic labs, and xerographic machines touch the lives of tens of millions of Soviet citizens. Responding to market

demand, these media have expanded rapidly in recent years and will doubtless continue to do so. Inevitably, this produced a strong reaction in the form of efforts to co-opt and control. None of these attempts have met with success, however, for the "small" technologies are too decentralized for their use to be more than marginally shaped from above.

D. Toward an Information Revolution in the USSR

The USSR's stagnant economy, coupled with its stumbling approach to personal computers, have caused observers there and in the West to conclude that in the 1970s and 1980s it missed out on the information revolution. The foregoing overview of the expansion and transformation of old technologies, the emergence of major new large-scale conduits of information, and the rise of small technologies suggests this generalization is overstated. However stagnant the Soviet economy as a whole, the realm of communications has been steadily, radically, and irreversibly changed those otherwise stagnant decades.

To be sure, different groups and regions of the USSR have sharply different levels of access to the transformed or new media. As has been noted, urban families are three times more likely to have telephones than rural families,[106] while major cities and international points of entry have far greater access to new communications than secondary and interior cities. Overall access to public media correlates closely with the differing level of economic development among the republics.

Whatever their unevenness, the changes are profound and show every sign of continuing. Repeated statements by Gorbachev from his arrival in office heralded his hope of increasing investment in telecommunications and computing. Moreover, there is ample evidence of a suppressed demand for communications so great that it can scarcely be avoided. Twelve million citizens were waiting for telephones to be installed in their homes in 1985, with a quarter million more waiting to receive long distance service.[107] The total of twenty-five million civilian phones in the Soviet Union compares with 170 million for the less populous United States, suggesting that even the addition of twelve million more phones may eventually not be enough.[108] With only thirty-two automobiles for every thousand Soviets, as compared with 471 for Americans and nearly the same ratio for West Germans, there is a clear likelihood that demand in that area, too, will continue to rise.[109] Only in computing has the Soviet state escaped market demand, and this is bound to change as a core of civilian computer buffs is formed.

Together, these many changes are beginning to create a horizontal information culture in the Soviet Union, supplementing but not replacing the vertical structure inherited from the Stalin era. At the same time, that vertical structure itself is being revived and altered as more messages flow both downward and upward through it and as the number of interactive or feedback elements increase. Indeed, one of the most important innovations that can be traced directly to Mikhail Gorbachev is the infusion of new vitality into the heretofore moribund sphere of vertical communications, both downward and upward.

Needless to say, strengthening of horizontal communications has evoked concern in some quarters. Mr. Chebrikov of the KGB denounced the exploitation of Soviet citizens by foreign media conspirators,[110] while he and other Soviet commentators have singled out as evidence of such manipulation the nationalist demonstrations held in the Baltic republics in June, 1987, as well as the larger protests in Armenia and the Baltic states in the first half of 1988.[111] To check such untoward occurrences, Stalinist traditionalists mounted efforts to influence the drafting of new laws so as to limit the right of assembly and suppress independent publications as well.[112]

Compared with the extraordinary tenacity and initiative shown by Soviet citizens seeking greater access to modern communications, however, such accusations and measures seem quite tame, mild rearguard actions rather than a serious campaign of suppression. The failure of efforts to maintain the old controls raises the question of whether horizontal communications could actually have been suppressed in the late 1980s? Of course they could, but as we will see, only at a very high price. For now, it is worth noting that the Gorbachev government through 1988 took no drastic measures against any medium deemed subversive, even though it moved against single publications in several instances. Until the government makes such a counter-threat and until it succeeds, it is reasonable to conclude, first, that a kind of communications revolution is under way in the USSR; second, that that revolution is modifying the received communication culture by stressing horizontality and interaction among and across levels where "top-down" verticality once reigned unchallenged; and, third, that the new communications order in the USSR benefits from the government's acquiescence, if not approval.

VI. TECHNOTRONIC GLASNOST'" AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE USSR

The Soviet newspaper Literary Gazette in 1987 carried a long article on "The American and the Computer," in which the author charged that Americans want nothing better than for the USSR to wallow in the same "technotronic openness" (glasnost') that exists in the United States.[113] Information, he admitted, is power. For the USSR to suspend all controls on information would be to weaken the country for no better purpose than to satisfy the demands of Americans. In spite of such grumbling, a kind of "technotronic glasnost'" already exists in the Soviet Union and will have profound implications for the political culture of that country.

We have characterized this new information culture in terms of the rise of horizontal links and systems. While acknowledging that vertical conduits not only continue to exist but have been strengthened by new technologies and the new leadership, we have stressed the relatively greater impact in the USSR of the new horizontal communications in recent years. In many ways this recalls the situation in late nineteenth century Russia, when fresh technologies also stimulated horizontal communication within society. Today's developments in horizontal communication outstrip those of the past both in the diversity of new channels and in the number of people affected. It is therefore important to evaluate the impact of these developments on political life. This impact can be detected in at least six areas.

A. Privatized Information Stimulates the Formation of Public Opinion.

Far more information is available to the Soviet public than ever before. The public's capacity to acquire, preserve, and transmit information has grown sufficiently to enable one to speak of at least partial privatization in this area. Stated differently, improved horizontal communications and advances in education have almost certainly increased the percentage of all Soviet information that is now generated outside the Party and state and circulating freely in society.

This means that the regime must reckon with more numerous and more diverse sources of inputs than formerly. At the least, this more pluralistic situation places greater burdens on "the attention-giving, information processing, and decision-making capabilities of administrators, political elites, [and] legislatures."[114] No wonder that in 1988 the Gorbachev government moved to establish two new institutes for the systematic study of Soviet public opinion.

B. Information in the Soviet Union is Increasingly Internationalized.

Both high and "small" technologies foster communication across the borders of the USSR. This is true of both unofficial and official channels. At the level of popular culture, contraband songs by the emigres V. Tokarev and A. Rozenbaum gained great popularity even during the late Brezhnev era through tapes widely distributed at sanatoriums and vacation spas.[115]

Similarly, nearly forty percent of all films showing in the provinces are foreign-made, while the percentage of VCR films from abroad is even higher.[116] Telephone calls, letters, and trans-border radio all attest to this internationalization of information.

A century-and-a-half ago, the notorious French traveller, the Marquis de Custine, wrote that "the political system of Russia could not survive twenty years' free communication with the west of Europe."[117] Clearly, de Custine's observation overstates the case today. But if the regime has survived greater trans-border communication, it has increasingly to respond to information from abroad, the importation of which it can no longer control. No longer willing to pay the price necessary fully to control international conduits, the state attempts merely to minimize the negative impact of the information they convey. Implicitly, it acknowledges that the internationalization of information is inevitable.

C. Communications Technology Induces Individuation and Turns Subjects into Citizens.

Much has been written about the way cassette recorders, VCRs, photography, and other "small" technologies not only privatize communications but individuate the communicators. Such individuation is one of the strongest currents in Soviet society today, and helps explain phenomena as diverse as the rising prestige of careers in writing and the burgeoning fashion industry.

Existing "small technologies" in the USSR foster individuation because they enable people to exercize choice of the oral and visual sources from which they draw information. Desk top personal computers have the same impact, since they enable people to choose and, if necessary, generate data pertinent to their personal interests.

Individuation extends even to such "top-down" media as television. Viewing a movie in a theater places limits on one's response. Viewing the same movie at home frees the individual to react actively and independently. While it is true that all three Soviet television stations still air the news program Vremia (Time) at the same time, this practice has been attacked publicly in the Soviet press on the grounds that it suppresses choice.[118] Similarly, the state controls nearly all newspapers and periodicals, but their sheer proliferation enables readers to seek out what interests them, again expanding the realm of choice.

The exercise of choice over information emancipates the individual from his surroundings. A cassette tape of a foreign pop tune that finds its way into the hands of some provincial teenager may conjure up the existence of an alternative life, of some "other" world where freedom and eros are untrammeled. Suddenly, his immediate environment becomes nothing more than the drab setting from which the taped tune emancipates him.

Choosing among the welter of information carried over new technologies, a subject is transformed into a citizen, eager to exercise broader choice over all life decisions. Eventually, the political system must accommodate that citizen and the individuated personality which is his essence.

D. New Conduits Foster the Growth of Networks and Groups.

Amateur builders of outlandish home-made aircraft held a convention at an airport outside Moscow in September, 1987. Convened at the urging of scientists in the capital, these inventors and their craft attested to the existence of a nation-wide network of Soviet Rube Goldbergs, most of them known to one another and communicating through the mails, telephones, and personal travel.

Such networks exist in hundreds of fields in the USSR. Those interested in unusual sports, various forms of collecting, and virtually every marginal field of culture have organized themselves into informal lateral networks with little or no support from the state and often wholly independent of it. Hundreds of groups are chartered as societal (obshchestvennye) organizations. Others thrive without official recognition. While less institutionalized than the major formal organizations, they have the advantage of being sustained by the members' genuine enthusiasm. The proliferation of such organizations owes much to social and educational change, but it could not have occurred without vastly improved conduits of horizontal communication.[119]

This mode of self-organization is ideally suited to those promoting special interests. When Moscow's city planners Posokhin proposed to cut the new Kutuzovskii Prospekt through the historic core of the city, opponents organized the now-notorious Memory (Pamiat) group. Over the fifteen years of its existence, Memory has gained branches in Leningrad and Novosibirsk and maintained informal communication on issues pertaining to historic preservation through inter-city telephones and open mails.[120]

Similar groupings in the ecological field have existed for years, only the best-known of which deal with the problems of Lake Baikal. In a typical effort at co-optation, the Leningrad Komsomol organized the association BER, which quickly aligned itself with a coalition of unofficial youth groups publishing a samizdat journal and advocating, among other projects, a monument to the victims of Stalin. The Moscow Perestroika Club made similar demands, and in August, 1987, had the opportunity to express them at a convention of similar self-initiated organizations held in the capital under the patronage of the Moscow branch of the Community Party.[121]

Unlike the 19th-century zemstva, whose efforts to federate nationally were easily thwarted, the new groupings can proliferate and federate easily, albeit informally, simply by using the networking potential of the new communications media. In their informality, their horizontality, their openness to all supporters of a given cause, and in their participatory character made possible by the telephone, such groups contrast sharply with both the Communist Party and the organs of state. As such, they pose a fundamental problem to the Soviet leadership. In the autumn of 1987 V.M. Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB, delivered an astonishing and measured assessment of these organizations:

> A characteristic feature of our time is the marked increase in the Soviet people's social activeness, clearly manifested, in particular,

> in the creation of independent associations whose participants seek to contribute to the development of this or that aspect of public life. The CPSU regards the activity of such associations as a concrete manifestation of socialist democratism.[122]

The KGB chief then went on to decry the fact that "extremist elements" have penetrated the leadership of certain of these associations, "taken to the streets to make unwarranted protests in public, advanced provocative demands, and fulminated against those who disagree." Yet while he charged that these extremists were under the sway of "foreign subversive centers," the KGB head, like the Leningrad Komsomol, seems to have accepted the inevitability of autonomous organizations. Indeed, by mid-1988 Communist officials advocating Gorbachev's reforms were themselves proposing the establishment of mass organizations independent of the Party as a means of strengthening their cause. Such entities were actually created in Latvia and elsewhere and represent the Communist Party's acknowledgment of the existence of change in the nation's political culture.

E. Proliferating Communications Technologies Thwart Surveillance.

Governmental surveillance of private communications was simple in a society in which potentially significant communications were limited to a few educated people using a limited number of public technologies. Now the numbers of communicators has soared, and numerous private technologies serve their individual and group needs.

Even before Chernobyl there was ample evidence that an autonomous and internationally-linked communication culture had grown up among the Soviet people. To be sure, this culture has not broken through a number of barriers which in Poland were penetrated early by the Solidarity movement. It has not, for example, created its autonomous radio beyond the level of ham operators; it has not launched publishing efforts on the scale of Poland's NOWA enterprise; it has not exploited videotape and film to the extent done by Video NOWA; and it has not managed to establish an independent newspaper on the scale of Poland's Robotnik, with a national circulation of 20,000.[123] Nonetheless, the autonomous communications culture of the USSR has shown sufficient strength for officials to deem it unwise to attempt to destroy it.

For such an effort to succeed, it would have to cut back much of the officially-sanctioned communications system as well. Since jamming cannot blot out all international broadcasts, legally acquired short-wave receivers would have to be banned. The use of inter-city telephones and mails would have to be severely restricted, and inter-city travel sharply reduced so as to thwart the transmission of independently reproduced sound, video, and print data. All this could be done, but it would require vast expenditures in money and manpower to reach anything like the former level of surveillance. The economic cost of this would be staggering, while the price the regime would pay in terms of public support would be greater still, particularly if it resorted to force, as would probably be necessary.

f. New Communications Have Undermined the Party's Role as Culture-Maker.

Such considerations suggest that the new communications culture is largely irreversible, even if the Soviet regime would wish to abolish it. And who would staff a Party or government that would undertake such an effort? The same process of individuation and pluralization that has affected society at large has been felt among those running official media. When the volunteer civil defense organization DOSAAF recently ecried the erosion of Communist values, it attacked not the independent "small" technology media but the entire television, film, and radio industries of the Soviet state.[124] In effect, it acknowledged that the masters of these official conduits had come to share the same individuated and pluralistic values that permeated the broader culture. This being the case, there would appear to be too few Bolshevik traditionalists -- "Stalinists," in the reformers' terminology -- to staff the input end of Lenin's conveyor belts today.

No careful reader of the Soviet press in recent years would be surprised by this assertion. As early as 1982 Soviet cultural leaders were publicly debating "mass culture." It is clear, declared the staunchly Leninist head of the Moscow Union of Writers, that mass culture is unrelated and even hostile to Socialist culture and the Socialist way of life -- "it is it's polar opposite."[125] Yet in the course of the 1982 debate it became clear that mass culture was already a reality in the Soviet Union, and that this more independent and market-related phenomenon represented a loss of the Party's cultural leadership.[126] By no means everyone did considered this bad. One writer saw the freer operation of market mechanisms in publishing as likely to benefit good literature as much as bad, since they provided an alternative to the moribund bureaucracy in publishing.[127]

Through such debates, Soviet commentators struggled toward accepting the new reality of public opinion. Their conclusion can be easily summarized: that "mass culture" is not controllable "from above"; that many, if not most Soviet citizens are drawn to it; and that such attraction is the obverse of the public's alienation from those cultural values promoted by the Communist Party.[129]

This 1982 debate came increasingly to focus on the new technological media as such. In the process, the position of the old intelligentsia came very close to that of conservative Party leaders, for both feared the way their status as shapers of public values was being eroded by television and film. Both understood that the vanguard role which the Russian revolutionary movement had assigned variously to the intelligentsia and the Party was being eroded by the new technologies. Writer Andrei Bitov's fulminations against mass culture thus paralleled those of Party apologists, although they began from radically different premises. Both look to the age of democratization with deep skepticism.[130] This is not to deny that intellectuals, especially those of the generation that reached maturity in the late 1950s, have played a central role in Gorbachev's reform movement. But the very nature of the changes they advocate will eventually broaden the degree of public participation in political life and hence weaken their own role, as has in

fact occured in the younger generations in the USSR. This helps explain the frequent attacks on the young by reformist intellectuals who realize that popular culture is incompatible with their own role as an independent source of values.

That the realm of culture and values has gradually gained independence from Communist Party edicts in the Soviet Union is evident from recent developments in virtually every field of expression. What remains to be seen is the extent to which the Party will accept this reality by reducing its expectations of control.

What if it fails to do so? It can attempt to reimpose Stalinist controls on horizontal communication, which we have acknowledged to be possible but only at an exceedingly high price. Alternatively, it can simply adapt received institutions to deal with it. This, too, seems unlikely, for such a policy, carried to its logical limit, would deeply undermine the position of the Communist Party in Soviet society. Admittedly, this is the effect of various proposals put forward by Gorbachev at the June, 1988 Party conference, but he balanced them by calling for the strengthening of the central executive power. Finally, it can choose to move neither backward or forward, in which case state and society will remain at loggerheads, as was the case prior to Gorbachev.

Given both the need for change and the strong opposition to it in some quarters, some combination of the first two variants seems most likely, with a strong movement towards accepting the new realities limited by the Party's commitment to maintaining as much initiative and power as the changed circumstances allow.

VII. CONCLUSION

This overview of communications in Russian history suggests several conclusions. At the least, it demonstrates the close relationship in Russia between political development and the state of communications technology. In most eras the two have been closely connected, with progress in one inseparable from progress in the other. Many anomalies in Russian social development -- the slow appearance of an urban elite in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the isolation of the peasantry from politics in the nineteenth century; and the diminished role of the bourgeoisie from 1917 down through the 1950s -- are reflected in, and amplified by, the communications system. This history suggests an answer to the question of whether the Soviet Union's large new technical and managerial class will develop communications technologies capable of serving its own needs, as distinct from those of the Communist Party. Against the background of earlier history, the burden of proof would lie on the side of anyone claiming it would not.

Our overview of Russian and Soviet history from the standpoint of communications technologies suggests the need to revise accepted notions of several important eras in this century.

First, the march of communications technologies in the late imperial era contrasts sharply with historians' arguments about the internal decay of the social structure that supported semi-constitutional government in Russia. There is no evidence that the emerging communications system of the period 1900-1917 was collapsing from within and ample evidence that it was burgeoning. The present era appears as the lineal descendant of the late imperial phase, after two missing generations.

Second, it is hard to view the era of the New Economic Policy as representing something wholely separate from the Stalin era in the sphere of communications, as is often claimed in the area of political philosophy. The abolition of private printing, film, and record production, the cessation of private automobile production and the thwarting of telecommunications at both the inter-city and international levels all went forward as rapidly as the Party could promote it, the process beginning under Lenin himself. The pace at which the Party severed horizontal communications was defined less not by philosophical or legal limits than by raw power. While a careful review of Lenin's writings may reveal differences between his and Stalin's approach to communications technologies, their actions differ more in degree than kind.

Third, the reconstruction of horizontal communications and development of feedback systems and interactive media after 1953 proceeded steadily throughout the Brezhnev era. Whatever stagnation might have occurred in the broader economy, modern horizontal communications continued to develop rapidly down to Brezhnev's death. Indeed, the pronounced breakdown of vertical communications in the late Brezhnev era actually stimulated the development of horizontal links within society and hastened the creation of the situation existing today. What is taking place today can thus be seen as the fulfillment of changes begun in the 1960s and 1970s, rather than their refutation.

What, finally, is the essence of this fulfillment? The expansion of communications technologies in the USSR has fostered both horizontal and vertical links. In terms of social impact, however, the horizontal have predominated, and are reinforced by the increasingly interactive nature of the old vertical ties. This has created a kind of information pluralism in the Soviet Union quite unlike anything existing since 1917. Old monistic models of Soviet politics seem less and less appropriate as new patterns of communication deepen. Each network and group arising from the new pluralism boasts its own body of information and each is therefore capable of providing an independent input to the political process. Together, these changes are creating what is recognizably a "civil society" in the USSR.

As has been noted, this "technotronic glasnost'" still lags far behind what exists in Poland, which in turn remains far removed from the style of communications prevailing in the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Nonetheless, it is far closer to these prototypes than to anything existing in Russia since 1917 and may eventually lead to a very different type of political order than has heretofore existed. Gorbachev acknowledges as much when he speaks of democratization not as a goal but as a fact. He also affirmed it when in the spring of 1988 he appealed to the public to support his reforms in the face of opposition of many in the Party and state. Under such a new order, society may remain partially controlled, but it in turn exercises control of its own, thanks to the existence of autonomous channels of communication. Such circumstances impose absolute limits on absolute power. They limit the government's ability to shape society and introduce the possibility of society shaping government.

This situation exists today only in embryo. However, even in its present form it exhibits many characteristics commonly associated with the notion of "civil society," e.g. the free flow of information within society; the ability of individual groups to articulate their demands; a government subject to control by the governed; and the existence of rights against the state as well as duties to it. "Technotronic glasnost'" does not itself create these conditions, but it provides fertile soil in which they can grow, and therefore represents a profoundly significant source of change in Soviet politics in the waning twentieth century.

FOOTNOTES

[1]S. Frederick Starr, "The Changing Nature of Change in the USSR," in Change in the Soviet Union and American Foreign Policy, Seweryn Bialer, ed., New York, 1988, Ch. 1.

[2]"The USSR Confronts the Information Revolution," proceedings of a conference held at Airlie House, Virginia, 12-13 November 1986, U.S. Government, Directorate of Intelligence; "Communications and Control in the USSR," research memorandum, 24 November 1986, United States Information Agency; Alex Beam, "Atari Bolsheviks," The New Republic, March, 1986, pp. 28 ff.; Hans Heymann, Jr., "Commentary: A Note on the Critical Telecommunications Lag," 27 April 1987, The Hudson Institute; Richard W. Judy, et al., Soviet Informatics Project Phase I draft report, H.I. 3884-DP, 12 February, 1987, The Hudson Institute; Loren Graham, "The Computer Revolution is Bypassing the Soviet Union," The Washington Post, 2 April 1984, pp. 24-25.

[3]Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, 1957, p. 54.

[4]Lucien W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development, Princeton, 1963.

[5]Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York, 1964.

[6]Oswald H. and Gladys Gantey, To Inform or To Control? The New Communications Networks, New York, 1982.

[7]Among exceptions are C.F. Margorie Ferguson, ed., New Communications Technologies and the Public Interest, Beverly Hills and London, 1986, p. 53. Cf. also Daniel Bell, "The Social Framework of the Information Society," The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year View, M.L. Dertouzos and J. Moses, eds., Cambridge, 1979.

[8]Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communications Theory," Communications and Political Development, p. 328.

[9]Deutsch, Political Community..., p.51.

[10]Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, New York, 1962, pp. 141, 220, 240, 246; also Walter J. Ong, S.J. The Presence of the Word, New Haven and London, 1967, p. 64.

[11]A. S. Zernova, Nachalo knigopechataniia v Moskve i na Ukraine, Moscow, 1946, Ch. I-III; M.N. Tikhomirov, Nachalo moskovskogo knigopechataniia, Moscow, 1947, Ch. I-II.

[12] Iurii Ovsiannikov, Lubok; russkie narodnye kartinki XVII-XVIII vv., Moscow, 1967, pp. 24 ff.

[13]I. P. Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty i pochmeistery v Moskovskom

gosudarstve, 2 vols., Warsaw, 1913, I, Ch. 1-4.

[14]Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia i deiatelnost' vedomstva Putei soobshcheniia za sto let ego sushchestvovaniia 1798-1898, St. Petersburg, 1898, pp. 13-30.

[15]Ibid.

[16]S. A. Urodkov, Peterburgo-moskovskaia zheleznaia doroga; istoriia stroitelstva 1842-1851, Leningrad, 1951, pp. 34-35.

[17]William L. Blackwell, The Beginnings of Industrialization, Princeton, 1968, pp. 273-74.

[18]Ibid., p. 283, 294.

[19]Ibid., p. 269.

[20]D.D. Blagoi, Istoriia russkoi literatury XVIII veka, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1955, pp. 212 ff.

[21]400 let knigopechataniia, A.A. Sidorov, ed., 2 vols, Moscow, 1964, I, Ch. 4.

[22]S. Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia 1830-1870, Princeton, 1972, p. 333-34.

[23]Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation, 2 vols., New York, 1968, II, p. 937.

[24]Ibid., II, p. 789.

[25]Ibid., II, p. 937.

[26]Ministervstvo vnutrennykh del za sto let, St. Petersburg, 1901.

[27]Donald W. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration; Government and Peasant in Resettlement From Emancipation to the First World War, Princeton, 1957.

[28]M. Lemke, Epokha tsenzurnykh reform 1859-1865, St. Petersburg, 1904; also Charles A. Ruud, The Russian Censorship, 1855-1865: A Study in the Formation of Policy, Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, 1966.

[29]Charles A. Ruud, "Russian Entrepreneur: The Publisher Ivan Sytin of Moscow, 1851-1934," unpublished MS.

[30]Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917, Princeton, 1985.

[31]Starr, Decentralization ..., pp. 333-34. Franking privileges were suspended in this situation as well.

[32]On Russian investors of this era see V.S. Virginskii, Tvortsy novoi tekhniki v krepostnoi Rossii, Moscow, 1962, pp. 298-317.

[33]Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. XVIII, 1974, p. 451.

[34]Razvitie sviazi v SSSR, N.D. Psurtsev, ed., Moscow, 1967, p. 26.

[35]F.A. Brokgauz, I.A. Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar, St. Petersburg, vol. XXXII, 1901, p. 793.

[36]Brokgaus, Efron, vol. XXXII, p. 793.

[37]Psurtsev, p. 31.

[38]Brokgauz, Efron, vol. XXXII, pp. 814-15.

[39]Psurtsev, p. 26.

[40]Ibid., p. 33.

[41]Marc Ferro, The Russian Revolution of February, 1917, J.L. Richards, transl, Englewood Cliffs, 1972, pp. 87 ff.

[42]V. V. Uchenova, Partiino-sovetskaia pechat; vosstanovitelnogo perioda, Moscow, 1964, p. 5.

[43]V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed., Moscow, 1967-70, vol V, 39-41.

[44]Cf. Richard R. Fagan, Politics in Communications, Boston, 1966, p. 34.

[45]Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization 1917-1929, Cambridge, London, 1985, p. 254.

[46]Psurtsev, p. 82. For a stimulating analysis of Russian telephones in the 1920s see Steven L. Solnick, "Soviet Telephones, 1917-1927: An Early Case Study in Modernization and Economic Reform," unpublished MS, SSRC Summer Workshop on Soviet Domestic Politics, University of Toronto, 1988.

[47]Jeffrey Brooks, "The Breakdown in Production and Distribution of Printed Material 1917-1927," Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution, Abbott Gleason, Peter Kenez, Richard Stites, eds., Bloomington, 1985, pp. 151 ff.

[48]Kenez, p. 101.

[49]Brooks, "The Breakdown . . .," pp. 155-66.

[50]Kenez, p. 104.

[51]Psurtsev, p. 178.

[52]Ibid., p. 66.

[53]Kenez, pp. 105 ff.

[54]Psurtsev, pp. 38, 188.

[55]Lilian-Dorette Rimmele, Der Rundfunk in Norddeutschland 1933-1945: Ein Beitrag Zur Nationale Organizations-Personal-und Kultur-Politik, Hamburg, 1977; Franco Monteleone, La Radio Italiana Nel Periodo Fascista, Venice, 1976.

[56]Purtsev, p. 221.

[57]Ibid., pp. 222-27.

[58]Ibid., pp. 222-23.

[59]Narodnoe khoziaistvo v 1962 godu, Moscow, 1963, p. 422.

[60]Kenez, p. 252.

[61]Gayle Durham Hollander, "Political Communication and Dissent in the Soviet Union," Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People, Rudolf L. Tokes, ed., Baltimore and London, 1975, p. 251.

[62]Ellen Proffer Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System, New Haven, 1967, pp. 8 ff.

[63]Ustav sviaz SSSR, Moscow, 1954.

[64]Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. XXIII, 1976, p. 94.

[65]Psurtsev, p. 269, table 26.

[66]R. Volkova, Pravda, 18 March 1985, p. 7, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), 1985, no. 11, p. 20.

[67]Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 23, 1976, p. 93; also Psurtsev, pp. 268 ff.

[68]"Sziaz sluzhit vsem," Pravda, 28 May 1984, p. 1.

[69]International Telecommunications Union, Yearbook of Common Carrier Telecommunications Statistics, cited in Heymann, p. 5.

[60]Gerald Stanton Smith, Songs to Seven Strings; Russia's Guitar Poetry and Soviet "Mass Song," Bloomington, 1984, p. 94.

[71]Psurtsev, p. 269, table 26.

[72]Ibid., p. 331. [73]Psurtsev, p. 273.

[74]Narodnoe khozaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu, Moscow, 1963, p. 422.

[75]Narodnoe khozaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu, Moscow, 1969, p. 506.

[76]Lewis Feuer, "The Intelligentsia in Opposition," Problems of Communism, vol. 19, no. 6.

[77]Narodnoe khozaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu, Moscow, 1968, p. 506.

[78]Psurtsev, p. 94 ff.

[79]Aleksandr Petrov, Izvestiia, 3 September 1985, p. 2 (CDSP, XXXVII, no. 35, p. 27.)

[80]Psurtsev, pp. 94 ff.

[81]"Russian Cars," The Economist, 3 December 1983, p. 79.

[82]Izvestiia, 10 January 1985, p. 2.

[83]N. Tolstova, Izvestiia, 1 August 1984, p. 3 (CDSP, vol. XXXVI, no. 31, p. 23.)

[84]Reply to a letter to the editor, Sovetskaia Rossiia, 9 April 1985, p. 3.

[85]Izvestiia, 10 January 1984, p. 2.

[86]Photographs and accompanying captions, Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 14 January 1985, p. 4.

[87]S. E. Goodman and Alan Ross Stapleton, "Microcomputing in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," Abacus 3, 1985, no. 1, pp. 6-22.

[88]Ivan Selin, "Trip Report," unpublished MS, 2 April 1984, p. 2; also "Update," unpublished MS, 6 January 1986.

[89]Ganley and Ganley, p. 85.

[90]E. Jakubitis, "Po puti tekhnicheskogo progressa," Trud, 21 June 1986, p. 2. [91]S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, New York, 1983, pp. 263, 278.

[92]K. Glukhov, "Fotografiia kak sposob reproduksii . . .," Svobodnaia mysl, 20 December 1971.

[93]Quoted by Timothy Ryback, Rock Around the Bloc, New York, 1988, p. 00.

[94]Narodnoe khoziaistvo, Moscow, 1970, p. 251.

[95]"Talks by Anatole Kuznetsov," Radio Liberty, no. 17, March 10-11, 1973. See also Gene Sosin, "Magnitizdat: Uncensored Songs of Dissent," Tokes, ch.

8.

[96]The best accounts of this phenomenon are F. Gayle Durham, Amateur Radio Operation in the Soviet Union, Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge, 1965. See also Gayle Durham Hollander, "Political Communication and Dissent," pp. 262-263.

[97]Ibid. Also Smith, p. 95; and anon. "Radiozdat," Russkaia mysl, 6 February 1975, p. 5.

[98]"Iu. Kishchik and E. Vostrukhov," Izvestiia, 15 October 1986, p. 30. (CDSP vol. XXXVII, no. 41, p. 25.)

[99]D. Pilipenko, Komsomolskaia pravda, 20 September 1986, p. 4. (CDSP vol. XXXVII, no. 4, p. 23.)

[100]Radio Liberty, "Video in the Soviet Union: Trouble with a Capricious Step-child," no. 129-86, 21 March 1986; Viktor Yasman, "The Collectivization of Videos?," Radio Liberty, no. 335-86, 22 September 1986. [101]Cf. Chuck Anderson, Video Power: Grass Roots Television, New York, 1975.

[102]"Communications and Control in the USSR," p. 3.

[103]K. Abaiev, Izvestiia, 23 June 1985, p. 6 (CDSP vol. XXXVI, no 25, 1985, July).

[104]Kishchik and Vostrukhov, p. 3.

[105]Sovetskaia kultura, 10 June 1986, quoted by Yasman, p. 3.

[106]Aleksandr Petrov, "Medlennyi progress," Izvestiia, 3 September 1985, p. 2. [107]Ibid., p. 2.

[108]Yearbook of Common Carrier Telecommunications Statistics, quoted in Heymann, p. 5.

[109]"Russian Cars," The Economist, 3 December 1983, p. 79.

[110]V.M. Chebrikov address on the 110th anniversary of the birth of F. E. Dzherzhinskii, Pravda, 11 September 1987, p. 3.

[111]M. Vulfson, in Sovetskaia Latviia, 18 June 1987, p. 3. (CDSP, vol. XXIX, no. 27).

[112]Mark D'Anastasio, "Soviets are Preparing Measures to Stop Expansion of Independent Publishers," The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 1987, p. 29.

[113]Vladimir Simonov, "Amerikanets i kompiuter," Literaturnaia gazeta, 24 June 1987, p. 14.

[114]Deutsch, p. 41.

[115]E. Zlain, Komsomolskaia pravda, 18 October 1985, p. 4 (CDSP vol. XXXVII, no. 44).

[116]Liudmila Kazymova, Sovetskaia Rossiia, 18 July 1985, p. 2 (CDSP vol. XXXVII, no. 4).

[117]Marquis de Custine, Russia, New York, 1854, p. 83.

[118]"Vremia na ekrane," Pravda, 19 May 1986, p. 3.

[119]Cf. Fagan, p. 39.

[120]Bill Keller, "Soviet Political Clubs on Unofficial Stage," New York Times, 9 October 1987, p. 4.

[121]V.M. Chebrikov, p. 3; Also Jonathan Steele, "Moscow Opens the Door to Reform Groups," The Guardian, 12 September 1987, p. 1.

[122]V. M. Chebrikov, p. 3.

[123]Reinventing Civil Society: Poland's Quiet Revolution, 1981-1986, The US-Helsinki Watch Committee, New York, 1986, pp. 43, 53 ff., 71-78.

[124]"Dolg kazhdogo grazhdanina," Pravda, 14 September 1987, p. 1.

[125]Feliks Kuznetsov, "Kultura: narodnost' i massovost'," Literaturnain gazeta, 5 January 1983, p. 3.

[126]Vladimir Simonov, "Khaiping i ego iznanki," Literaturnaia gazeta, 23 June 1982, p. 15. [127]Vladimir Soloukhin, "Skazki mogut i umeret," Literaturnaia gazeta, 22 September 1982, p. 3.

[129]These views are conveniently summarized in Stanislav Kunyaev, "Ot velikogo do smeshnogo," Literaturnaia gazeta, 9 June 1982, p. 3.

[130]Andrei Bitov, "'Net! Nikogda ia zavisti ne znal. . .," Literaturnaia gazeta, 7 July 1982, p. 3.

[131]See Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory, Cambridge, London, 1977, p. 234.

Peggy –
Talk w/ Jennifer + BOB +
CAROL to split things
somehow. Let's get some
interns on it, too.
We need info ASAP
D. McG

McG. 7/22/91

July 22, 1991

RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR USSR TRIP:

Exchanges

status of US-Soviet exchange programs -- how much increase since 1985, 1988 to now? (students, professionals, artists/academics, etc.)

//////////////////////

American culture in the USSR

What American movies are playing in Moscow? Are there movie houses specializing in American films?

What American TV shows appear on Soviet TV? Which is most popular (Dallas??)?

Which American magazines/newspapers are most popular? Where are they most widely available?

Favorite American actors/actresses, bands, etc.

Evidence of American consumer culture -- McDonald's, Mickey Mouse, etc. -- and Soviet reaction towards it....

////////////////

How many independent radio stations are there in Moscow (-- in the Republic, in the USSR...)? Is Moscow Echo the best known??

Names of most popular independent news programs/newspapers -- trusted reporters, journalists....

What is the biggest story in the Pop Culture there -- the equivalent of making the cover of People Mag. here....?

////////////////////////////////

Russian Proverbs, Sayings --

Related to:

-- journey/travels.

-- visitors/guests.

-- friends.

-- challenges/great tasks.

-- the future....

McGroarty/Dooley
July 26, 1991
3:30 pm
[MOSCOW]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.
JULY 30, 1991
3:00 P.M.

[Introductory acknowledgements.]

It is a privilege to meet with you at this critical moment in the history **of your nation** -- at this time of great hope **for all the world.** //

For four long decades, our two nations stood locked in conflict, as the Cold War cast its shadow across an armed and uneasy peace. This Summit marks a new beginning: the prospect that we can put an end to a long era as adversaries, write a new chapter in the history of our two nations -- forge a new partnership and a sturdy peace. //

We have reason to hope. One by one, the cruel realities of the Cold War are crumbling -- and a new world of opportunities calls us forward. **In Europe** -- for four long decades the fault-line of East-West conflict -- the nations of the East, like their neighbors in the West, are finding a common home in democracy. Far beyond the confines of this continent -- from Afghanistan to the horn of Africa, from Angola to Central America -- **regional conflicts** no longer threaten to become flashpoints for superpower confrontation. **Worldwide**, the risk of war stands lower now than at any point in the post-war era. //

The challenge we face at this summit -- the challenge you face as present and future leaders of this great nation -- lies in this: together, our two nations must overcome a half-century of mistrust to seize this moment to build a lasting peace. //

Already, we've made progress. The easing of tensions between our nations has created new opportunities for **arms control.** Last fall, in Paris, we set in motion deep reductions in **conventional forces** stationed in Europe. Tomorrow, in the Kremlin, President Gorbachev and I will sign the historic **START Treaty** that will cut our strategic arsenals by a full one-third. //

Lower tensions have also made it possible for our two nations to **normalize economic relations.** / In May, the Supreme Soviet removed the key impediment to increased trade: Soviet restrictions on free emigration. The new Soviet emigration law stands as a major step forward -- **a victory for all who value human rights.** // As a consequence of this progress, I am pleased to announce that when I return to Washington, I will submit to Congress the **U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement** we signed one year ago. In addition, I will urge the Congress to **remove restrictions that impede trade** -- and **grant the Soviet Union Most Favored Nation status.** //

Beyond two-way trade, the U.S. is working to open doors to Soviet entry into the global economy. // For more than forty years, the Soviet Union stood apart from the world market -- stood aside as free market forces sparked an **era of unprecedented**

Peggy --
Research requests from Dan for all researchers.
-JAB

July 22, 1991

RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR USSR TRIP:

Exchanges

status of US-Soviet exchange programs -- how much increase since 1985, 1988 to now? (students, professionals, artists/academics, etc.)

//////////////////////

American culture in the USSR

What American movies are playing in Moscow? Are there movie houses specializing in American films?

What American TV shows appear on Soviet TV? Which is most popular (Dallas??)?

Which American magazines/newspapers are most popular? Where are they most widely available?

Favorite American actors/actresses, bands, etc.

Evidence of American consumer culture -- McDonald's, Mickey Mouse, etc. -- and Soviet reaction towards it....

////////////////

How many independent radio stations are there in Moscow (-- in the Republic, in the USSR...)? Is Moscow Echo the best known??

Names of most popular independent news programs/newspapers -- trusted reporters, journalists....

What is the biggest story in the Pop Culture there -- the equivalent of making the cover of People Mag. here....?

////////////////////////////////

Proverbs/folk legends, Sayings --

Related to:

-- journey/travels.

-- visitors/guests.

-- friends.

-- challenges/great tasks.

-- the future....

WWII Martin Gilbert timeline
203/432-4771
1933 7/29-8/1 1941

this time of turbulent change. For anyone interested in the vicissitudes of perestroika and glasnost it is essential reading, bringing the personalities and the forces alive with a clarity unmatched by any source I know.

This posthumous book also underscores the immense tragedy of Sakharov's death. It came too soon, cruelly depriving the opposition of its one figure of undoubted international stature. Allowing for the differences of detail, Sakharov's position before his death was analogous to that of other prominent former dissidents and human rights activists who have achieved power in ex-Communist Europe: Walesa, Mazowiecki, Havel, Dienstbier, Goncz, Tudjman, and Petrle. All these men were in the forefront of the ideological struggle against communism during the 1970s and 1980s, all made the leap from dissident to political leader, all progressed from wrestling with ethical, social, and human issues to grappling with affairs of state and the temptations of power, and all unexpectedly inherited the fruits of a lifetime of struggle, often against their own desires.

Sakharov did not exercise direct political power himself. The democratic revolution in the Soviet Union had made only partial gains by the time he died in December 1989. It has since been put into reverse. It is difficult to know exactly what Sakharov would have done when confronted with recent events in the Baltics. My guess is that he would have brought Russians out of their houses in the hundreds of thousands and challenged Gorbachev in the streets and the squares of the large cities. For he had predicted this outcome to Gorbachev's face, when he warned against his accumulation of power, and he would have fought it with his usual directness and stubbornness.

But in his absence, and in the present reaction in Russia, there seems to be no single figure with the moral authority and bravery to take his place. What is left are these memoirs, and his example. And there are signs of a Sakharov cult developing in the Soviet Union. In Yerevan, a street and a university fellowship have already been named for him. In Moscow, the city council has announced a competition for a public statue, and a Sakharov museum is being planned. The Academy of Sciences, which treated him so badly while he was alive, has announced plans for a Sakharov medal to be struck, and is also setting up a scholarship fund in his name. (In Israel, at the urging of Soviet Jewish immigrants, a public park has been named for him.)

These memorials are all richly deserved. And yet, as Pushkin noted more than a century and a half ago, Russians have a penchant for honoring famous men after their death, having spat upon them while they lived. There can be little doubt that this noble, modest man would have abhorred a cult, and been indifferent to empty invocations of his memory. The monument that Sakharov would have preferred, as these memoirs show, is a democratic and peaceful Russia in a democratic and peaceful world.

MICHAEL SCAMMELL is professor of Russian literature at Cornell University and the author of Solzhenitsyn: A Biography (W. W. Norton).

GRAPHIC: portrait; Caption: Andrei Sakharov. portrait

TYPE:
review

SUBJECT:
Books, reviews, etc.

LOAD-DATE-MDC: April 01, 1991

36TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

February 25, 1991

SECTION: Vol. 204; No. 8; Pg. 29

LENGTH: 8265 words

HEADLINE: The prophet and the wilderness: how the idea of human rights crippled communism

BYLINE: Scammell, Michael

BODY:

The Prophet and the Wilderness

I.

Not nearly enough has been understood about the role of human rights movements in promoting the recent political transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the discussion of communism's downfall, a great deal has been written about the overextension of empire, the failure of central planning, the lack of industrial development, the weakness of agriculture, the evils of bureaucracy, and the breakdon of the Party; and it would be foolish to deny the importance of any of these factors in contributing to this epochal collapse. Still, most of these shortcoming were present in the Communist system since at least the Second World War, and many of them date back all the way to the October Revolution. How is it that they assumed such importance in the mid-1980s, and became decisive in 1989?

There was clearly a major failure of will at the top: the governing apparatus grew fatigued, the Party sclerotic, the nomenklatura coccupted by its absolute power. Still, someone was needed to notice the fatigue, to probe the sclerosis, to contest the power, and finally to offer a viable alternative to the system, thereby undermining its legitimacy and preparing its downfall. The Reaganites and the neoconservatives would like us to believe that it was American resolve that accomplished these things; and American intrasigence certainly played its part in encouraging and hastening certain internal processes.

Yet the largest shareof the historical credit, it seems to me, should go to the human rights activists throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, to the "dissidents," as they came to be called. It was they who first perceived the gravity of the crisis into which the Communist system had brought itself; they who sacrificed their work, their careers, their families, and sometimes their lives to challenge its hegemony; they who unfailingly drew attention to the appalling mess caused by the disintegration of the system; and they who prodded a quiescent population into supporting a plausible opposition. Many of them have now reaped the reward, if reward it be, of replacing their former oppressors in the highest reaches of government, or of leading the opposition in the merging consitutional democracies.

The true magnitude of thei achievement, however, goes beyond the practical and the pragmatic. What has been consistently overlooked, in the East and the West, is the vital role the human rights has played as an ideological force.

Throughout its history, and almost until the end of the Brezhnev period of "stagnation," communism miraculously retained a moral edge. Somehow the suspicion remained that it was ethically superior to the ideologies and the systems that opposed it, especially to capitalism. It is not so very long since even Brezhev's functionaries enjoyed that smug sense of ideological superiority that came with being "on the side of history," which was Marxism-Lenism's great gift, of course, the confidence that put so many of its opponents on the defensive, even when reason told them otherwise. Nobody could have guessed, when Brezhnev became First Secretary of the Party in 1964, that the still inchoate, unsystematized, and wimpish doctrine of human rights, which was just beginning to take shape in parts of Europe, would flourish and expand until it challenged and then overthrew the invicible doctrine of clas struggle, economic rights, and universal equality.

The strength of human rights as an idea and an ideal derived from the fact that it was deeply rooted in notions of the dignity and the autonomy of the individual, who could not be arbitrarily abused or persecuted in the name of any group or collective. Thus, when Amnesty International was founded in London in 1962, its organizers anchored themselves to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression"), and them set about applying its principles to all individuals everywhere, whatever their status, class, race, religion, or nationality, or the political complexion of their governments. Amnesty also established a miraculously simple mechanism whereby individuals in countires where these principles were respected could intercede for those in places where they were not. It became a grassroots organization of a new type, domestic and personal in its day-to-day operations (individuals writing petitions for individuals), global in its application.

Amnesty spawned a multitude of similar or more specialized groups and galvanized existing organizations into fresh activism. By the mid-170s there was a rapidly growing network of highly motivated and increasingly efficient human rights bodies that united activists from the more or less democratic countries into a powerful extraterritorial citizens' lobby. They would not have had anything like the impact they ultimately achieved, however, had persecuted minorities in other parts of the world not begun simultaneously to grope their way toward a similar doctrine of individual rights, and to see in these ideas the only possible platform on which to oppose abuses of overwhelming power.

This was especially true in two areas of the world that, according to the political categories of the cold war, appeared to be ideological opposites: Latin America, with its fascist-type military dictatorships of the right, and the Soviet bloc, with its Communist dictatorships of the left. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the tasks of the opposition were very different from those in Latin America. Civil society, as most of the world knows it, had been destroyed and supplanted by a Communist Party whose organizations and representatives penetrated every social organism, every street, and every building. No group or organization was allowed to operate independently of the Party or its control, not even the church (although the degree of control of the different churches varied from faith to faith and country to country, Poland being the freest in this respect). Every attempt to maintain an independent point of view, or to create an independent organization of any kind, was ipso facto subversive, counterrevolutionary ("he who is not with us is against us"), the result of false consciousness and "bourgeois" thinking--in a word, treason.

What the idea of human rights offered individuals confronted by this crusingly monolithic system was a seemingly non-subversive ("non-ideological") platform from which to oppose it. There was nothing obviously contradictory between the rights of the individual to freedom of opinion, belief, assembly, and so on, and the rights that were supposedly conferred by Communist ideology. From Stalin onward, Communist Party leaders took great care to include these rights in their written constitutions, even if they had invariably reserved to themselves the crucial "righ" to determine how all those other rights should be interpreted. And so, in the early 1960s, when a more universal idea of human rights began to gain ground in Western countries, there seemed some hope that the Communist interpretation of human rights might converge with it. Indeed, the strategy of early Soviet dissidents like Alexander Esenin-Volpin and Valery Chalidze was precisely to force the Soviet authorities to observe their own laws, their own legal enshrinement of some of these rights.

After the invasion of Czecholsovakia in 1968, it became clear that "convergence" was out of the question. It was then that other dissidents, not only in the Soviet Union but also in Poland and (somewhat later) in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, set out on the long march to create an ethical and social alternative to communism, to establish an informal set of institutions parallel to, and independent of, official structures in their countries--to create, in other words, a civil society. In every case, their guide and their goal was the protection of the human rights of the individual.

For these stirrings to take place, there had to be a long period or growth and development, during which individuals and groups appeared who grasped the essential principles of human rights, assimilated them, and began to apply them in their own surroundings. Many of these individuals seemed to come out of nowhere and achieved public notice for the first time as already fully fledged "dissidents," usually as a result of being persecuted or put on trial or jailed. But others came from established positions in all walks of life; their transformation into opponents of the regime was a personal response to the ethical dilemmas posed by their ways of living and working. They emerged slowly, step by step. The moment of their transportation from "loyal citizen" to "dissident" is impossible to determine. What is certain, however, is that such people almost never turned back.

II.

Among these latter individuals, no example is more dramatic than that of Andrei Sakharov. What makes Sakharov's career so absorbing and so emblematic, as both volumes of these memoirs demonstrate, is not simply the fame that he won at the end of his life as the Soviet Union's most eminent and powerful "dissiden," or the enormous distance that he traveled from darling of the establishment to persecuted pariah, but the really heroic grandeur of his psychological and introspective theoretical physicist to a fearless public defender of human rights.

There seemed to be little in sakharo's brilliant early career as a scientist to indicate the crises that lay ahed. In 1948, at the age of 27, one year before the Soviet Union exploded its first atom bomb, he was invited to join the research team of Igor Tamm, which was already working to develop an even more powerful weapon. For twenty years, in Moscow and at a secret research center in Turkmenia in Central Asia, known by the Orwellian code name of the Installation, Sakharov labored loyally in the service of this cause. Owing to

the secrecy of the operation, he lived in virtual anonymity. But his role was pivotal, and he came to be known as the "father" of the Soviety H-bomb.

He was loaded with honors. In 1953, when the first Soviety thermonuclear device was exploded (trailing the Americans by about nine months), Sakharov was rewarded with the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, a Stalin Prize worth half a million rubles, an expensive dacha in an exclusive suburb of Moscow, and access to luxury stores reserved for top members of the nomenklatura. That same year he became the first person ever to be elected to the Soviety Academy of Sciences by a unanimous vote. Two years later, in November 1955, Sakharov and his fellow scientists successfully tested their first H-bomb, this time about a year and a half behind the Americans. It was a stnning achievement for the generally backward Soviety scientific estabishment, and it landed Sakharov a second Hero of Socialist Labor medal and a Lenin Prize.

But it was then that Sakharov experienced his first twinges of doubt about the morality of nuclear weapons. In 1958 he published a scholarly article on the genetic effects of radioactive fallout from weapon testing, in which he calculated that the nuclear bombs tested by both sides up to 1957 would probably result in the untimely deaths of a half-million people. Sakharov also took issue with Edward Teller's views on the efficacy of mutually assured deterrence, and argued that "peacful coexistence, disarmament, and, above all, a halt to nuclear testing" was the best route to "a better life for all of mankind" (the latter phrase was taken from one of Teller's books). But his qualms were stated in an article commissioned and disseminated by the Soviet government. It hardly qualified as dissent.

Still, a seed had been planted. Three years later Sakharov experienced his first real crisis, when Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would break a previously agreed-on moratorium with the West, which Sakharov wholeheartedly supported, and resume nuclear testing unilaterally. In 1961, at a Kremlin meeting between government leaders and nuclear scientists, Sakharov boldly sent a note to Khrushchev suggesting that such a step might jeopardize the test ban negotiations and the cause of disarmament and world peace. Khrushchev angrily responded with a reprimand in front of the other guests:

Sakharov . . . has moved beyond science into politics. Here he's poking his nose where it doesn't belong. You can be a good scientist without understanding a thing about politics . . . Leave politics to us--we're the specialists. You make your bombs and test them and we won't interfere with you, we'll help you.

Sakharov, well aware of his special status, was suitably chastened by Khrushchev's remarks, and for the time being he chose to obey his political masters, though not without misgivings. At a meeting the following month, Khrushchev inquired whether Sakharov realized his error. "My opinion hasn't changed," replied Sakharov, "but I do my work and carry out orders." The orders this time were to test a device of record-breaking power nicknamed "Big Bomb." Sakharov agreed to the test, on the condition that he could test a "clean" version of the bomb, which would reduce its absolute power and also the amount of radioactive fallout produced. The bomb was successfully exploded in 1961, and a few months later Sakharov was awarded his third Hero of Socialist Labor medal, which was personally pinned on by Khrushchev, with a Russian bearhug and a kiss.

In 1962, however, Sakharov experienced a more serious crisis. East and West were testing again. The Soviets had set up two nuclear fission installations in place of one, on the principle that competition between the two experiments would accelerate progress, and they proposed to test their next device also in two versions. Sakharov was appalled. He was prepared to accept a single test, but he calculated that a second test would cause at least 100,000 unnecessary deaths from the extra fallout. He fought the decision all the way up to the Politburo, and even called Khrushchev to oppose it. But he failed, and his memoir reveals that "it was a terrible defeat for me. A terrible crime was about to be committed, and I could do nothing to prevent it. I was overcome by my impotence, unbearable bitterness, shame, and humiliation. I put my face down on my desk and wept."

All of this was, of course, far from the public eye. Sakharov was still virtually unknown outside the Soviet scientific establishment, and the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963 allowed him to assuage his doubts and to maintain his loyalty without doing further violence to his conscience. Apart from a brief and fiery campaign to defeat the election of a Lysenko protege to the Academy of Sciences, he retired into the shadows of anonymity again to devote himself to studying the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, and to exploring the intricacies of "grand" cosmology. But he could not insulate himself entirely from weapons development, nor could he ignore continuing Soviet discussions throughout the 1960s about military strategy. He came to the conclusion that thermonuclear war was being discussed as a real possibility, as a "fact of life":

I could not stop thinking about this, and I came to realize that the technical, military, and economic problems are secondary; the fundamental issues are political and ethical. Gradually, subconsciously, I was approaching an irrevocable step--a wide-ranging public statement on war and peace and other global issues. I took that step in 1968.

The step in question was the publication of Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom, Sakharov's first and most celebrated book. It made him a celebrity and a "dissident" overnight, although he and his family and his friends were hardly aware of it at the time.

How did it come about that it was Sakharov who broke out of the charmed circle of privilege and power and declared his public opposition to the government's policies, rather than, say, his distinguished mentor Tamm, or any of the other equally brilliant and skeptical colleagues described in these pages? Few of them, according to Sakharov, had any genuine illusions about the political masters they served, yet not one was prepared to push his dissent to the point of public disagreement.

A recurring theme of Sakharov's memoirs is his singular apartness from the mainstream of Soviet life. His background was typical enough for a member of the Soviet intelligentsia. There were lawyers, priests, and teachers among his forebears. Both his parents were teachers, and after the October Revolution the family had been "compressed" into an overcrowded communal apartment, with primitive services and very little space or comfort. Unlike most people in their predicament who were forced to share with strangers, four branches of the Sakharov family were able to live together, thus preserving a modicum of privacy and intimacy. Andrei (who was born in 1921) and his younger brother Georgi grew up in a cozy, protected environment that cushioned them from many of the

rigors of life in postrevolutionary Moscow.

There was also the larger-than-life-size figure of his successful father. Although he taught physics until almost the end of his life, Dmitri Sakharov was best known as the author of popular scientific works such as The Struggle for Light, and of textbooks such as Problems in Physics, which went through thirteen editions and brought him considerable sums of money. The son adored the father, whom he describes as gentle, wise, and compassionate, with a great sense of humor and a capacity for enjoying life. He was fond of that most un-Russian saying, "a sense of moderation is the greatest gift of the gods," which was to have considerable influence on his son.

Dmitri was deeply devoted to his children, and determined to give them the best education possible. Still, it comes as something of a shock to learn that Sakharov received the first seven years of his education almost entirely from private tutors, and continued to be tutored at home even after entering high school in 1934. One of those tutors was his father, who took it for granted that the son would study physics--which he did, graduating from high school as one of only two honors students in his class and thus gaining entry to the physics department of Moscow University. In 1942 he graduated from the university with a brilliant record, completing a five-year course in four years owing to the outbreak of the war.

Sakharov's sheltered background appears to have endowed him from the beginning with a certain aloofness. He writes that he made "no friends and no enemies" at high school, and no friends at the university until his last year there. He hardly noticed when several of his classmates left to dig anti-tank ditches, or when several failed to return. When called for enlistment himself, he failed both the aptitude test for the air force and the medical test for general military service, and was eventually assigned to a cartridge factory, where he was so maladroit that he was sent out to chop trees. When he was transferred to quality control in the blanking shop, he enraged his bosses by refusing to turn a blind eye to rusty shell casings. Only when he made it into the laboratory did he distinguish himself: he invented a device for testing the hardness of armor-piercing shells, for which he received 3,000 rubles and a patent for his design.

There is a curious paradox in this mild-mannered young physicist's attraction to working with armaments. In wartime, this was perhaps inevitable, and Sakharov spent the rest of the war perfecting shell designs. But after the war, too, while working on relativity theory at the Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, he kindled to news of the atom bomb, and dreamed of improving upon existing devices. When nuclear fission research was introduced into the Physics Institute, he did not hesitate to join, and threw himself with zeal into the quest for a superbomb.

In his memoirs, he offers a variety of explanations for his single-minded obsession of the time. One is summed up in Fermi's famous remark that research on thermonuclear explosions was "great physics," or, as Sakharov puts it, "a genuine theoretician's paradise." A second reason was the freshness of the memory of the recent world war: it, too, was an "exercise in barbarity," so that the inhuman nature of the bombs that he was trying to build seemed no worse than what had gone before. And third, the Soviets shared American beliefs about strategic parity and the value of deterrence--for their own side, of course.

The New Republic (c) 1991 IAC

But ultimately something more intangible was involved:

Our initial zeal . . . was inspired more by emotion than by intellect. The monstrous destructive force, the scale of our enterprise and the price paid for it by our poor, hungry, war-torn country, the casualties resulting from the neglect of safety standards and the use of forced labor in our mining and manufacturing activities, all these things inflamed our sense of drama and inspired us to make a maximum effort so that the sacrifices--which we accepted as inevitable--would not be in vain. We were possessed by a true war psychology, which became still more overpowering after our transfer to the Installation.

So it was a matter of politics all along. The memoirist, to his credit, does not skirt his own cold war attitudes, or his personal responsibility for developing the bomb, and some of his most fascinating pages are devoted to the morality of this issue, particularly when he comes to discuss the Oppenheimer-Teller conflict.

Sakharov sympathizes with Oppenheimer in these pages. He is aware of the resemblance of his own later behavior to Oppenheimer's. And yet he decides, paradoxically, in favor of Teller, on the grounds that the Soviet government of the time would never have honored an American-Soviet agreement to abandon research on the H-bomb. "Any U.S. move toward abandoning or suspending work on a thermonuclear weapon would have been perceived either as a cunning, deceitful maneuver, or as evidence of stupidity or weakness." In Sakharov's view, it was not the principle of Oppenheimer's dissent, but its timing, that was wrong:

I cannot help but feel deeply for and empathize with Oppenheimer, whose personal tragedy has become a universal one. Some striking parallels between his fate and mine arose in the 1960s, and later I was to go even further than Oppenheimer had. But in the 1940s and 1950s my position was much closer to Teller's, practically a mirror image . . . so that, in defending his actions, I am also defending what I and my colleagues did at the time.

The publication of Reflections in 1968 might be described as Sakharov's abandonment of Teller's position for Oppenheimer's. It started him down the path that was to take him "even further" than the latter's. And his timing, in retrospect, was also not fortuitous. The "thaw" that had begun in all areas of Soviet life after Stalin's death, and especially after Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956, had ground to a halt by the early 1960s, and it was beginning to be reversed even before Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964. The trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966 indicated a decisive turn by Brezhnev's regime toward neo-Stalinism.

It also demonstrated, however, that a significant number of Soviet intellectuals, including many form among the scientific elite, were not ready to reverse themselves easily. It was the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, together with a series of connected trials of Ginzburg, Bukovsky, Litvinov, and others, that radicalized the Soviet intelligentsia, and led to the formation of what was to become a powerful and vocal dissident movement, with civil and human rights as its battle cry. Sakharov was still remote from those circles, but he signed at least a couple of the protest letters that began to circulate at that time (including one on behalf of Sinyavsky and Daniel), and he wrote Reflections under the immediate influence of the Prague Spring, on which so many Soviet intellectuals had pinned their hopes for liberalization at home. When

Czechoslovakia was brutally crushed, and Sakharov was dismissed from the Installation on security grounds, he was brought face to face not only with his own powerlessness, but also with the powerlessness of Soviet intellectuals generally to influence the course of political and social events. And he finally understood how devoid of rights, whether human or civil, the individual in Soviet society was.

The subsequent speed of his transformation into a dissident and human rights activist was breathtaking. In 1969 he still considered himself a part of the establishment: "Although I had bluntly criticized many official actions and offered advice concerning future polity, deep down I still felt that the government I criticized was my government." In 1970 he was still expecting to be able to get Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, on the telephone. As late as 1971 he had plans for a personal meeting with Brezhnev. With Reflections, however, he had crossed A Rubicon.

In no time at all he was swiftly sought out by some of the most prominent dissidents in the land. Solzhenitsyn, himself officially silenced by censorship, sent Sakharov his criticism of Reflections and visited him to discuss them. Valentin Turchin (the author of a work, similar to Sakharov's, called The Inertia of Fear) enlisted Sakharov's support in writing an appeal to Soviet leaders for democracy and intellectual freedom. roy Medvedev, whom Sakharov had first met in 1966, and who also signed the Turchin appeal, persuaded him to intervene on behalf of his twin brother, Zhores, who had just been incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital. And Valery Chalidze accompanied Sakharov on his first trip to observe a political trial and later enrolled him, somewhat against his will, in Chalidze's newly founded Committee on Human Rights.

It was through Chalidze that Sakharov met Elena Bonner, the woman who was to have a profound influence on his further development. It appears to have been love at first sight. He was emotionally ripe for it: his first wife, Klava, had died of cancer in March 1969. Although he is reticent on the subject, it would appear that their marriage was less than happy; there are amply hints that Sakharov's relations not only with her two children were not very close. Sakharov himself had been remote emotionally and physically, having spent many years closeted at the Installation in Central Asia, swallowed up by research and professional duties. Perhaps he recalled the troubling last words of his father, who died in 1961: "When you were at the university, you said that uncovering the secrets of nature could make you happy. We don't choose our fate, but I'm sorry that yours took a different turn; I imagine you could have been happier." It was not clear whether his father was speaking of personal or professional matters, but after the appearance of Reflections his Aunt Tusya told Sakharov that his father would have been proud of him.

Bonner, a pediatrician, was the daughter of two distinguished Old Bolsheviks, the Armenian revolutionary leader Gevork Alikhanov and Ruth Bonner, a descendant of Siberian Jews. In 1937 her parents were arrested in one of Stalin's purges and Alikhanov was killed in the camps (Ruth survived and died in 1987), wrenching the 14-year-old Elena and her brother from their privileged home and depositing them with their impoverished grandmother. Despite this tragic, though typical, background, Elena was a loyal Soviet citizen; she had even joined the Party in the mid-1960s. But the invasion of Czechoslovakia radicalized her, too, and in 1970, when Sakharov met her, she had just involved herself in the Leningrad hijacking trial, in which one of the principal

defendants was her friend Edward Kuznetsov. The Kuznetsov and two others were condemned to death, Bonner displayed incredible energy and ingenuity in organizing their defense. Sakharov was drawn into it, and their joint efforts in that passionate, humanitarian campaign seem to have cemented their love. In January 1972, mainly at Sakharov's insistence, they were married.

Thereafter there was hardly a case or a cause in which Sakharov and Bonner were not engaged: the incarceration of healthy people in insane asylums, the expulsion of the Crimena Tatars, freedom of religion, freeedom to emigrate, repression of the ethnic Germans, censorship, suppression of the samizdat Chronicle of Current Events, the Borisov-Fainberg case, the Bukovsky case, the Krasnov-Levitin trial, the Yakir-Krasin trial. From composing another closely reasoned missive to the authorities on economic, social, and foreign policy (the "Memorandum" of 1971), Sakharov progressed to writing statements on violations of human rights, letters of protest, and appeals for persecuted individuals.

The culmination of this first burst of activity came in 1973 when Sakharov, together with Solzhenitsyn, became the object of a virulent hate campaign in the Soviet press, as well as the victim of numerous provocations. By now the two giants of the dissident movement had become a factor in foreign policy. those were the days of detente ("a polite form of the cold war," Sakharov called it), when Nixon and Kissinger were cozying up to Brezhnev and moving toward a form of condominium based on the superior force of the two superpowers. Brezhnev wanted access to American credits and technology, but Congress and the American people had their eyes on the Soviet government's treatment of its dissidents and its suppression of human rights, and preferred to listen to Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, whose message was that that Soviet leadership was cruel, unprincipled, and unreliable. how could one trust the foreign policy, they argued, of a government that persecuted its own citizens? It didn't cut much ice with the White House, but Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment and Brezhnev's version of detente virtually collapsed.

Sakharov is exceedingly interesting on the subject of his relation with Solzhenitsyn during this period. The two men respected one another, but Solzhenitsyn was irritated by Sakharov's openness to all comers and by his readiness to espouse all forms of protest, and Sakharov found Solzhenitsyn unduly calculating in his campaigns. Sakharov reports that he was chilled, as early as 1970, by Solzhenitsyn's response to a question about what to do on behalf of two celebrated and harshly persecuted dissidents: "Nothing! They attacked the enemy with a battering ram. They chose their own fate and can't be saved. The attempt would only harm them and others." Later, in 1973, when both men were under fire, Solzhenitsyn sent his second wife to remonstrate with Sakharov over the jackson-Vanik amendment, saying that it was biased in favor of the Jews and did nothing to solve Russia's other problems. At their last meeting in the Soviet Union, a few months later, Solzhenitsyn reproached Sakharov for his alleged willingness to emigrate, ignoring the fact that Sakharov's plan to go abroad was motivated by a desire to save his stepchildren from persecution. His intention, undoubtedly unrealistic, was to return to the Soviet Union immediately.

The two men were vastly different in background, upbringing, temperament, character, and personal convictions. It was inevitable that they would disagree about almost everything, and they did. In 1973 Solzhenitsyn published his Letter to the Soviet Leaders, which was in essence a reply to, and a polemic with, Sakharov's Reflections. Sakharov responded with a criticism of the

Letter, to which Solzhenitsyn replied again. The debate between the conservative, traditionalist author and the liberal, democratic scientist re-enated in many ways the old battle between Slavophiles and Westerners. It continues to this day: Solzhenitsyn's latest recommendations for political change, How Are We to Reorder Russia? , appeared in the Komsomolskaya Pravda in November, while the anniversary of Sakharov's death last month brought admiring recapitulations of his philosophy.

The personal fates of the two protagonists also diverged after 1973. In January 1974 Solzhenitsyn was arrested and deported to West Germany. Sakharov remained to continue his personal crusade, and it is typical of his single-mindedness that, having embraced the cause of human rights, he should carry his campaign to its logical conclusions. It was not sufficient for him to write articles and protests, telephone, lobby, talk to foreign journalists, attent trials, even demonstrate in support of his goals, as someone of his eminence might be expected to do. In Junu 1974, during President Nixon's visit to Moscow, he decided on the extreme measure of a hunger strike. Had he been a writer, one might have suspected him of seeking material--and it is not difficult to understand some of Solzhenitsyn's exasperation with the seeming naivete and pig-headedness of some of Sakharov's tactics. But as these memoirs show, they were brilliantly of a piece with the man.

Sakhavov had thoroughly assimilated the principles that were painfully worked out by the pioneers of the dissident movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. The principles were these: that to oppose the Soviet regime successfully, one had to be absolutely true to one's convictions, never compromise where moral values were concerned, maintain complete openness in a society obsessed by secrecy, and above all hold fast to one's inner freedom whatever the cost. Similar principles were being worked out by dissidents in many of the other countries of Eastern Europe, in a movement that would acquire an irresistible momentum in the years to come. In the early 1970s, however, there was nothing inevitable about that momentum.

These exacting principles were fiendishly difficult to live up to in daily life. almost a saintly patience and devotion to the cause were requred, the qualities that so many of hte dissidents displayed, at least in their finest moments. In the event, the principles withstood the test of practice and fueled all the leaders of the human rights movements throughout the Soviet bloc, endowing them with amazing strength and durability. Sakharov was to become one of the finest of those leaders, in the courage of his personal behavior and in the clarity of his thinking. He quickly grasped that the dissidents were engaged in a mortal struggle with a dying ideology, and that, although that ideology would, in its death throes, continue to claim many victims, the idea of human rights was intrinsically superior.

This was a truth that Jimmy Carter, drawing on the experience of the civil rights movement in the United States, also intuited when he threw the weight of the American government behind the drive for human rights and welcomed their entrenchment as a natural and rightful extension of the ideas of American democracy. sakharov immediately recognized the importance of this step when he heard about Carter's inaugural address, with its statement that "our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for human rights." Though he did not approve of Carter's inconsistency in his subsequent policies toward the Soviet Union, Sakharov writes that "the fact remains striking that for the first time the head of a

great power had announced an unambiguous commitment to the international defense of human rights."

The Soviet leaders, too, had recently been forced to pay lip service to human rights by agreeing to "basket three," the provision about respect for human rights established by the signatory sattes of the Helsinki Final Act in the fall of 1975--the same year that Sakharov published My country and the World and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "his love of truth and strong belief in the inviolability of the human being." The Soviets had done everything they could to water down and to restrict the provisions of basket three, but they had not foreseen that they would be faced with an American government (backed by Western European leaders) that was serious about human rights for the first time since the war. Basket three presented human rights groups throughout the Communist bloc with an unexpected polical lever with which to pressure their repressive governments.

The Helsinki Final Act gave the West an ideological edge. the words "human rights" began to appear with increasing frequency on the fron pages of Pravda and other Soviet newspapers, and no matter how they were twisted and turned inside out to mean their opposite, or unfavorably contrasted with the "economic rights" supposedly guaranteed by the Soviet citizens to read and to digest. As Simon Leys recently noted about China, you know you have won the debate when your opponent begins to use your ideas; and so it was in the Soviet case, although few realized it at the time. The very readiness of the Soviet press to argue the merits of human rights was a battle lost, even if the larger war was to continue for another ten years. For this reason, if any American administration deserves the historical credit for promoting the democratic revolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it is Carter's more than Reagan's.

But ten years is a very long time. Sakharov was obliged to embark on many more hunger strikes, to endure unspeakable privations before the goal was reached. The middle section of his Memoirs reads like a Who's Who of the dissident world, like an encyclopedia of Soviet trials and Soviet repression. Sakharov was to see close friends imprisoned, exiled, sent abroad, or killed. His children and step-children were victimized and forced to emigrate. His wife had her near-blindness exploited and was herself humiliated before she could obtain medical treatment. The culmination came with Sakharov's public opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan, his exile to Gorky, and his six years of dreadful persecution and blackmail, including hospitalization and brutal force-feeding. Bonner has already written eloquently about the Gorky period in Alone Together, her book on the same subject; Sakharov adds new details on those harrowing events, but he does not change our understanding of them.

III.

The Memoirs end with Gorbachev's historic phone call to Sakharov in Gorky in December 1986, informing him that the decree on his banishment had been rescinded and that he and Elena Bonner could return to Moscow. The next (and last) three years of Sakharov's life are described in Moscow and Beyond, which Sakharov completed literally on the eve of his death. Moscow and Beyond is more than a coda to the Memoirs. It is a dramatic eyewitness account of the birth of the parliamentary process in the Soviet Union, and of Sakharov's participation, first reluctant and then selflessly energetic, in that process as the uncrowned leader of the opposition.

By the time Sakharov returned to Moscow, Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika were reasonably well advanced, and Gorbachev himself, in his speeches and in his book Perestroika, was expressing many of the very ideas for which Sakharov had been punished and sent into exile. Sakharov was skeptical at first. But unlike many of his fellow dissidents, he did not console himself with bitter jokes and personal recriminations against the Soviet leaders, nor did he take a pessimistic view of the political processes under way in his country. He concluded that Gorbachev meant business, that the reforms were serious and genuine, that the dissidents had in effect won their initial battle against the system. The important thing was to build on that victory, to entrench the gains that had been made.

Some of Sakharov's dissident friends feared that he was badly informed and gullible in his support for Gorbachev, but not for a moment did Sakharov lose his head or allow himself to be co-opted. From Gorky he had mailed Gorbachev a long list of political prisoners whose release he demanded as a sign of Gorbachev's good intentions, and whom he referred to again in their telephone conversation. Many were being set free, but Sakharov continued to pressure the government for swifter action. Although his ill treatment in gorky and already in his mid-60s, he was indefatigable in championing the rights of the uprooted Crimean Tatars, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Sumgait, the Georgians slaughtered in the streets of Tbilisi, the Meskhetians in Uzbekistan, the independence movements in the Baltic states, and countless individuals. He traveled personally to Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of a fact-finding mission, to Komi in Siberia in support of an imprisoned dissident. He became an active member of the governing council of the Memorial Society, an unofficial organization set up in early 1988 to commemorate the millions of political prisoners who had died in the Soviet Union during Soviet rule. He supported demands for full openness about the Chernobyl disaster, and he championed the publication of The Gulag Archipelago.

Everyone wanted his views on every conceivable aspect of Soviet policy, and his answers were treated with as much respect as if he had headed a party of millions. Finally, in January 1989, he bowed to the inevitable and acceded to multiple requests to stand for elections to the reorganized Congress of People's Deputies. There were some near-farcical maneuverings at the Academy of Sciences to deny him the nomination, but in May he was comfortably voted in with a group of similarly liberal colleagues. Almost at once he became one of five chairmen of the main parliamentary opposition, the Interregional Group of Deputies. (Yeltsin was, and remains, another.)

By this time Sakharov had met Gorbachev face to face, once at a meeting of the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity (" . . . he appeared intelligent, self-possessed, and quick-witted in discussion, and the policies he was pursuing at the time impressed me as consistently liberal"), and again at a meeting between Gorbachev and leading representatives of the intelligentsia, where Sakharov angered the president by his spirited defense of the Armenians. In the Soviet parliament, however, the two men clashed repeatedly. It began on the very first day of the Congress, when Sakharov opposed the automatic election of Gorbachev as president without a proper debate, and demanded that the Congress be given increased powers for its work. A testy Gorbachev responded by announcing that all speeches, including Sakharov's, would be limited to five minutes, in effect cutting him off in mid-flow. It was a pattern that was repeated at future sessions of the Congress, culminating in the famous incident when Gorbachev switched off the

loudspeakers while Sakharov was still speaking. (He had already switched off the television cameras when challenged from the floor by a member of the Interregional Group of

Deputies.)

Sakharov's account of the Congress fills the last chapter of Moscow and Beyond and is a wonderful climax to the memoirs as a whole. In these last pages, we observe Sakharov emerging as the undisputed leader of the Soviet opposition, the only man in the Congress with the courage, the vision, the depth of knowledge, and the breadth of understanding to go head to head with Gorbachev. Gorbachev himself seems to have recognized the fact; when Sakharov walked out during the voting for president, Gorbachev sought him out to ask why. Sakharov was approached by Gorbachev's closest aides, Alexander Yakovlev and Anatoly Lukyanov, to discuss contentious issues on the agenda, and finally, at the beginning of the second week, Gorbachev acceded to Sakharov's request for a personal meeting to discuss some of their main differences. The old dissident, with his usual bluntness, went straight to the point:

Mikhail Sergeyevich . . . there's a crisis of trust in the leadership and the Party. Your personal authority has dropped almost to zero . . . The country, and you personally, are at a crossroads--either accelerate the process of change to the maximum, or try to retain the administrative-command system in all of its aspects. In the first case you will have to rely on the left and you'll be able to count on the support of many brave and energetic people. In the second case, you know yourself whose support you'll have, but they will never forgive you for backing perestroika.

Gorbachev replied that he was tied to the policy of perestroika forever, but that he was against "big leaps" and dramatic gestures, and he was convinced that the people would understand him.

After some further discussion, Sakharov returned to his main point: "I'm very concerned that the only political result of the Congress will be your achievement of unlimited personal power--the 18th Brumaire in contemporary dress. You got this power without elections, you weren't even on the slate of candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and you became its chairman without even being a member."

Gorbachev: "What's the matter, didn't you want me to be elected?"

Sakharov: "You know that's not the case, that in my opinion no alternative to you exists. But I'm talking about principles, not personalities. And besides, you're vulnerable to pressure, to blackmail by people who control the channels of information. Even now they're saying that you took bribes in Stavropol, 160,000 rubles has been mentioned. A provocation? Then they'll find something else. Only election by the people can protect you from attack."

Gorbachev: "I'm absolutely clean. And I'll never submit to blackmail--not from the right, not from the left!"

The frankness of Sakharov's account of these meetings is extraordinary in the context of official Soviet reticence and the half-truths that pass for political memoirs in that country. One of the great virtues of his second volume is the light it throws on the negotiations of the Soviet political establishment in

this time of turbulent change. For anyone interested in the vicissitudes of perestroika and glasnost it is essential reading, bringing the personalities and the forces alive with a clarity unmatched by any source I know.

This posthumous book also underscores the immense tragedy of Sakharov's death. It came too soon, cruelly depriving the opposition of its one figure of undoubted international stature. Allowing for the differences of detail, Sakharov's position before his death was analogous to that of other prominent former dissidents and human rights activists who have achieved power in ex-Communist Europe: Walesa, Mazowiecki, Havel, Dienstbier, Goncz, Tudjman, and Petrle. All these men were in the forefront of the ideological struggle against communism during the 1970s and 1980s, all made the leap from dissident to political leader, all progressed from wrestling with ethical, social, and human issues to grappling with affairs of state and the temptations of power, and all unexpectedly inherited the fruits of a lifetime of struggle, often against their own desires.

Sakharov did not exercise direct political power himself. The democratic revolution in the Soviet Union had made only partial gains by the time he died in December 1989. It has since been put into reverse. It is difficult to know exactly what Sakharov would have done when confronted with recent events in the Baltics. My guess is that he would have brought Russians out of their houses in the hundreds of thousands and challenged Gorbachev in the streets and the squares of the large cities. For he had predicted this outcome to Gorbachev's face, when he warned against his accumulation of power, and he would have fought it with his usual directness and stubbornness.

But in his absence, and in the present reaction in Russia, there seems to be no single figure with the moral authority and bravery to take his place. What is left are these memoirs, and his example. And there are signs of a Sakharov cult developing in the Soviet Union. In Yerevan, a street and a university fellowship have already been named for him. In Moscow, the city council has announced a competition for a public statue, and a Sakharov museum is being planned. The Academy of Sciences, which treated him so badly while he was alive, has announced plans for a Sakharov medal to be struck, and is also setting up a scholarship fund in his name. (In Israel, at the urging of Soviet Jewish immigrants, a public park has been named for him.)

These memorials are all richly deserved. And yet, as Pushkin noted more than a century and a half ago, Russians have a penchant for honoring famous men after their death, having spat upon them while they lived. There can be little doubt that this noble, modest man would have abhorred a cult, and been indifferent to empty invocations of his memory. The monument that Sakharov would have preferred, as these memoirs show, is a democratic and peaceful Russia in a democratic and peaceful world.

MICHAEL SCAMMELL is professor of Russian literature at Cornell University and the author of Solzhenitsyn: A Biography (W. W. Norton).

GRAPHIC: portrait; Caption: Andrei Sakharov. portrait

TYPE:
biography

SUBJECT:
Human rights, Soviet Union; Social change, Soviet Union; Soviet Union, Politics and government

GEOGRAPHIC:
Soviet Union

LOAD-DATE-MDC: April 01, 1991

43RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

January 21, 1991

SECTION: Vol. 204; No. 3; Pg. 29

LENGTH: 5320 words

HEADLINE: Czars and commiczars: what time is it in Soviet history

BYLINE: Tucker, Robert C.

BODY:

Western Sovietology and official Soviet thought have differed greatly in their accounts of Soviet history. The standard Soviet texts-they are now under reconsideration-tell a story of the rise of socialism," and then "developed socialism," on the road to full "communism." The Western version, by contrast, describes what arose under Lenin and Stalin as "Communist totalitarianism." These opposing viewpoints share a premise. Both believe that the October Revolution of 1917, in which Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks took power, marked a fundamental rupture with earlier Russian history.

A longtime dissenter from that view, I believe that what took place after 1917 was a reversion to the Russian past. What emerged under Lenin and Stalin, in fact, was a kind of neo-czarist order that called itself "socialist." This means that certain earlier Russian historical patterns reappeared, albeit under new names. The names are not easy to read, and the patterns are not easy to decipher, for those who are not versed in Russian history, as very many Soviet-educated people are not, as many Western Sovietologists are no t.

The view that a revival of old Russian patterns took place after 1917 is now finding favor, however, among various knowledgeable contemporaries on the Soviet side, who, thanks to glasnost, have been voicing in print their thoughts on the relation between the Soviet period and the Russian past. Not surprisingly, this re-evaluation of the past in the Soviet Union is not unanimous. There are those who persist in seeing-now in an anti-Soviet light-a disjunction between the Soviet period and what came before it in Russia. According to the painter Ilya Glazunov, a "chasm" lies between old Russia, which was based on Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality, and the Soviet Union, which is based on atheism, proletarian dictatorship, and internationalism. And the philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko, writing in Moscow News, considers the Soviet period a kind of hiatus in history:

> We probably deceive ourselves in thinking
>
> that we lived in the twentieth century. Maybe
>
> history just performed an experiment on
>
> us, freezing our brains, thoughts, and feelings,
>
> compelling us to wander about the

world asleep, committing a mass of idiocies,

murdering one another, doing no end of

atrocious things.

Hence the present task for Russia is to "return to the movement of historical time." Some of Tsipko's fellow citizens carry placards that say: "Seventy years on the road to nowhere!"

Still, a different view is widespread among many Soviet intellectuals. As they see it, the seventy tragic years traversed roads previously taken in Russian history. "Feudalism" is the term that some use to express the notion that history in the Soviet period went forward in a backward way-that czarist absolutism, and centralized bureaucratic statism, made a comeback in the framework of the Communist party-state. According to Mikhail Gorbachev's close colleague Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Socialism hasn't really been built in the country. What we have is department feudalism." Fyodor Burlatsky, the editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, calls the Soviet system "feudal socialism." The theater director Mark Zakharov calls it "our feudal-patriarchal way of life." And the historian A. Mertsalov refers to the "feudal traditions" of the Soviet Academy of Science, whose thoroughly bureaucratized historical division might be called an "administrative echelon for affairs of historical science."

The revival of old Russian patterns began at the outset of the Soviet period, these thinkers tell us. The nationalization of the country's resources transformed them into state property, which led to a rebirth of historic Russian statism. The forcible retention by the new regime of the great bulk of the minority-inhabited territories on the periphery of the Russian empire meant the factual rebirth of empire under the title of " Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. " And whatever was claimed for the establishment of "Soviet power" by the October Revolution, what actually emerged was a new line of czars under another name, starting with Lenin.

"Soviet power, from the very first days, showed its autocratic and absolutist character, only under different slogans," rites Yuri Feofanov in Izvestia. "Rejecting the division of three powers as a bourgeois principle, our state authority took all of them unto itself." Elsewhere he cites the new mayor of Leningrad, the former professor Anatoly Sobchak, as saying, "In Russia, both in the Soviet period and through the centuries, it was not laws that ruled, but persons." So it was, says Feofanov, from Lenin through Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, to Gorbachev. And this primacy of the "First Persons" over laws and institutions extends back through "whole layers" of the history of Russia, whose sixteenth- and seventeenth-century "assemblies of the land" (zemskie sobory) had less resemblance to actual parliaments than to Soviet Party congresses, which have simply "sanctified the sovereign's will." Thus it was not the Party, or its apparatus, or even a small group of Party progressives that inaugurated perestroika: it was a new First Person, named Gorbac hev.

The declared goal of perestroika has been to dismantle the "administrative-command system" handed down from Stalin's time. The writer Anatoly Ananiev argues that this system had a czarist predecessor, which originated in the second half of the sixteenth century under the "terrible" czar Ivan Grozny: "At the base of the administrative-command system lies a situation in which the people were estranged from the state. It was Ivan Grozny who

began this. "

The critic Yakov Gordin, writing in Literaturnaya Gazeta, finds in the Soviet order historical patterns going back to the time of Peter I, in the early eighteenth century, and to the "Iron Czar" Nicholas I (1825-55):

> I do not share the widespread opinion that
>
> 1917 marked a great rupture in our history.
>
> I daresay that what we call the Soviet period
>
> has been, in basic features and significance,
>
> a restoration of state principles that ruled
>
> from Peter I through Nicholas 1, principles
>
> that were pressed back after the Great Reforms
>
> and reforms of 1905.

One such state principle was serfdom. It prevailed from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries down to the Great Reforms of the 1860s, which began with the emancipation of the serfs. In the system of serfdom, the serf rendered compulsory service to the landowner either in the form of working time (barshchina) or produce (obrok). This pattern arose again as a result of the collectivization of the peasantry in 1929-33. According to K. Liubenchenko, the vice chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Legislation, "We returned to what existed before 1861, that is, to serfdom, all the way to such a detail as the attachment of the peasants to the land." Vladimir Tikhonov, an agricultural specialist, writes of "serfdom" in the Soviet countryside and describes the contemporary bosses and defenders of that system, such as V. Starodubtsev of the self-styled Peasant Union, as self-owners (krepostniki) and little czars (tsar'ki).

Cultural life was also enserfed. The literary scholar Yuri Burtin asserts that "just as our collective-farm countryside, unlike the old serf countryside, where there was either barshchina or obrok, has had to bear a double burden of both at once, so our literature, unlike most others, has had to go through both a multi-level preliminary censorship and then a punitive censorship afterward." And the theater director Oleg Efremov observes that after the shock wave of collectivization came

> smaller-scale actions aimed at the complete
>
> and total statification and enserfment of
>
> the count 's spiritual life . . . They created
>
> a state for officials and a theater for officials . . .
>
> We now stand on the threshold of

The New Republic (c) 1991 IAC

the abolition of theatrical serfdom, which

developed in the depths of the Stalinist regime,

where the theatrical setup was part

and parcel of the whole system.

One pillar of the czarist administrative-command system that reappeared under a Soviet name was the rank order of higher officialdom. In 1722 Czar Peter I promulgated a Table of Ranks, which established a hierarchy of fourteen military and corresponding civilian ranks, and made service to the autocratic state a highroad to noble status. Starting on the bottom rung of the ladder, a military officer or civil servant could obtain personal and eventually hereditary nobility on reaching the requisite higher rungs classes one to four carried hereditary nobility). The Table created an aristocracy of rank chin) and organized the czarist ruling elite as a corps of uniformed holders of rank (chinovniki). Vladen Sirotkin, a Soviet historian, finds that in essence this system rose again in the Soviet period.

Its name was nomenklatura, and it differed from the czarist system in that it was not made public in the czarist way. In numbers, it became many times larger than the czarist structure. The nomenklatura, as is well known, comprises the system of higher Party and Party-controlled governmental ranks and appointments. Sirotkin tells us that Stalin's subordinates back in the 1920s even went to old czarist official records for particulars on how to organize the nomenklatura, whose predecessor was the higher rank-holding class comprising the top four ranks, subject to appointment by the czar.

How history turned full circle, and the dark postwar Stalin years came to resemble the repressive 1830s and '40s of Nicholas I, came home to some of us in Moscow's foreign colony at the time. In 1948, in a secondhand book shop in Moscow, I picked up an out-of-print Russian translation of Russia in 1839 by the Marquis de Custine. It was published in 1930 by the Society of Former Political Prisoners and Exiles, Which Stalin had disbanded in 1935. Custine, who was no supporter of the French Revolution, came to Russia in 1839 as a sort of monarchist fellow traveler, and was graciously received in the closed Petersburg court society, much as the fellow-traveling Gide was received in Stalin's Moscow of the later 1930s. As with Gide, even a visit of four months under close surveillance showed Custine enough to disillusion him.

In his book, written in the form of letters home to France, Custine found that Nicholas I's Russia was not the civilized monarchy he had imagined, but a true tyranny, a serf state with a czar-cult upheld by officialdom. "The Russian Empire," he wrote in a typical passage, "is an enormous theatrical hall where, from all the boxes, people try to follow what is happening behind the scenes." Of the czar: "There is no man on earth with such unlimited power." Of chin: "A military regime applied to society as a whole." Of the mode of govern ment:

Absolute monarchy moderated by murder." The book went through many editions in Western Europe, but czarist censorship prevented it from being published in Russia. Some educated Russians, however, read it in French, and one of them, a dissident£ of the day named Aleksandr Herzen, called it "the most entertaining and intelligent book on Russia by a foreigner." Higher Russian circles were indignant. By covert arrangement with Count Benckendorf, chief of the Third

The New Republic (c) 1991 IAC

Department of His Majesty's Chancellery, the Russian secret police of that time, a semi-official publicist named N. I. Grech wrote an anti-Custine tract in French for circulation abroad.

Custine's Nicholaian Russia was so strikingly similar in some ways to the Stalinist Russia that we foreigners observed in 1948 that the book seemed to us to be A Journey for Our Time, the title given it in an English translation made by Phyllis Kohler, wife of the U.S. deputy chief of mission in Moscow, Foy Kohler, and published in America in 1953. Walter Bedell Smith, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow between 1946 and 1949, wrote in a foreword to it: "I could have taken many pages from his journal and, after substituting present-day names and dates for those of a century ago, have sent them to the State Department as my own official reports. "

The Soviet Nicholaian period extended from Stalin's final years through the neo-Stalinist administration of Brezhnev. This comes through in a memoir published in 1990 in Qganyok by the Soviet filmmaker El'dar Riazanov. In 1978 he and a colleague, Grigory Gorin, set out to make a film to which they gave the title "Say a Word for a Poor Hussar." Their purpose was to say something by means of hints and allusions about Stalin's terror-filled time, but to do it in a film ostensibly about the time of the Iron Czar, when blue-uniformed gendarmes from the Third Department spied on an oppressed Russian society and made life very hard even for a great poet like Lermontov. Goskino, the Soviet cinema ministry, rejected the script and treated the authors, in its customary way, as serfs. But Gosteleradio, the ministry of television, decided to take up the project as a way of making a bureaucratic move against Goskino.

It was then, writes Riazanov, that there began the process of polishing up by censorship that "so edits a branchy pine tree that it becomes a telegraph pole." At one point he and Gorin were informed that their script paid too much attention to the Third Department and portrayed it too negatively. Riazanov comments:

> Good Lord! Did Benckendorf ever think
>
> that a hundred and some years later, his
>
> honor would be upheld by Communists at
>
> the head of Soviet television! Of course,
>
> their solicitude for the Third Department
>
> was understandable: they were terribly
>
> afraid of distressing the department over
>
> on Dzerzhinsky Square. They didn't seem
>
> to realize that by equating the Third Department
>
> with contemporary State Security
>
> they were giving themselves away. In their

thoughts they equated these two

organization and they were striving to stand up for

the KGB by whitewashing the Nicholaian

gendarmerie.

Later, the two filmmakers were forced to drop the idea of having a hero of their film declaim, before his execution, Lermontov's classic quatrain: "Farewell unwashed Russia, / land of slaves, land of masters, / and you in those blue uniforms, and / you the people that obey them."

The higher chinovnik from Gosteleradio explained: "No verses needed. Not those anyway." Riazanov broke in to say: "But that's Lermontov. That's a classic. We learned those verses in third grade." "Nothing doing," replied the chinovnik. "And you understand why." Such was the czarist Soviet Russia of 1980, a land from whose airways the Lermontov of "Farewell unwashed Russia, land of slaves, land of masters" was banished. Riazanov says that the emasculation of the original film was "an indictment of everything on which the Russian social system rested and still rests. For we are the true and faithful heirs of all that was worst in czarism."

Nicholas I was succeeded by Alexander II, whose Great Reforms, starting with the abolition of serfdom, caused him to be remembered as the "czar-liberator." But this reforming czar was also a tragic one. As he drove in his carriage to the palace in 1881 to sign a draft of the first Russian Constitution, he was blown to bits by a bomb hurled by revolutionary extremists from a group calling itself the People's Will. Reaction set in under Alexander III. If the Soviet Nicholaian period lasted through the early 1980s, what happened in 1985, as various present-day Russians see it, was the accession of a new czar-liberator. His name was Mikhail Gorbachev. For was it not, asks historian Yuri Korolev, the earlier one, Alexander II, who in 1861, for the first time in Russia, proclaimed glasnost?

All this may cast light on a notable phenomenon: the keen interest that Russians are showing nowadays in czarism and czars. Nicholas II, who was executed with members of his family in 1918, is mourned by many as a martyr. Merezhkovsky's play Paul I, written in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1905, is showing to full houses in Moscow and arouses some sympathy for this non-reforming czar. Announced for the new season in Moscow's theaters are plays about Ivan Grozny, Czar Fyodor, Boris Godunov, Peter I, Catherine II, and Nicholas II. And Glinka's opera, revived under Stalin as Ivan Susanin, is now playing in the Bolshoi Theater under its nineteenth-century title, A Life for the Czar. What does all this mean? The drama critic Andrei Karaulov, in commenting on a current play about a czar, suggests that "the audience is mainly interested in the parallel with the current reforming czar, Go rbachev."

The new reforming czar soon proclaimed the need for perestroika, a deep-seated reformation of the Soviet political culture. But he could not carry through such a project by his own governing efforts alone. Success in dismantling the administrative-command system and creating a new one depends on the ability and the willingness of society to adopt new ways of thinking and acting, and on the willingness of a still privileged and powerful governing elite to foster such new ways, or at least not to resist them.

Thus, what happened in the later 1980s, according to the historian Sirotkin, bears comparison with what happened under the reforming czar Alexander II in the 1860s and 1870s. It was then that a schism opened up within the czarist nomenklatura between reformers who supported Alexander II's perestroika and conservatives who opposed it. Something similar, Sirotkin says, has happened within the Soviet nomenklatura. Those earlier conservatives were opposed to all talk of a constitution or parliament; the contemporary ones oppose all talk of private property.

Now, in the sixth year of perestroika, the "serf-owners" still dominate the countryside, and the remnants of Stalinist serfdom have yet to be abolished. Izvestia, these days a reformist paper, evokes the later nineteenth century with a resounding headline: "Give the peasant land and freedom." The writer Boris Mikhailov bids the intelligentsia to "go to the people." New Westernizers fend off attacks by new Slavophiles of various persuasions. One of the claimants to Slavophile leadership, of course, is the Vermont-dwelling Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who, in a huge homily printed in 26 million copies in the Soviet press, tells Mother Russia how to put her crumbling house in order. And V. Lakshin publishes a lengthy "inter-view" in Izvestia with the great nineteenth-century Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin, drawn exclusively from the latter's critical writings about czarist Russia, on the manifold ills and problems of contemporary Soviet life.

The neo-czarist Soviet order has almost ceased to function. Still, it has not yet been displaced, or it has only begun to be displaced, by new political and economic structures that work. The situation reminds one Soviet writer of something that Herzen observed in the later nineteenth century about Russia having shed an old skin but not yet having grown a new one. The Soviet era as we have known it is ending, but a post-Soviet order has only started to appear. And so we arrive at the question: What time is it, now, in the Soviet cycle of Russia's history?

Voices over there offer two answers, which are really two versions of one. According to the first, Russia is entering a new Time of Troubles, or smuta, comparable to the one that afflicted Muscovy between 1598 and 1613. After Ivan Grozny died, the influential courtier Boris Godunov became de facto ruler during the reign of Ivan's son Fyodor, and became czar in his own right in 1598. A famine and a plague in 1601-02 were followed by Boris's death, political unrest, a breakdown of the state order, a succession of pretenders to the throne, civil war, and Polish intervention. Only with the election of Mikhail Romanov to the throne in 1613 was a new dynasty established and stability restored.

Nowadays, as economic and political turmoil mounts and the empire disintegrates, predictions of a new smuta, or the start of one, proliferate. Ruslan Skrynnikov of Leningrad University, who recently gave a paper on the first smuta at the World Congress of Soviet and East European Studies in England, mentioned in discussion that his audiences at public lectures on this subject in Leningrad have grown much larger of late. The people, he explained, have a "premonition of smuta."

The writer Viacheslav Kostikov goes further. He writes that Russia has experienced several times of troubles in its history. Their deeper cause, he suggests, lies always in a state power that deadens society, represses glasnost, and turns citizens into slaves who are easy to rule. Thus it was under Ivan Grozny, and the reasonable leader who came afterward in the person of Boris

The New Republic (c) 1991 IAC

Godunov (a Gorbachev of his time, the author hints) was unable to prevent the collapse at the end of the seventeenth century. The tragedy of Russian history, Kostikov concludes, lies in the fact that "the times of troubles arise after the deaths of tyrants and dictators. So it was with Ivan Grozny, with Stalin."

There is another answer to our question. The Soviet Union, it is said, is now in the early years of the twentieth century. Some proponents of this position point to the time following Nicholas II's October Manifesto of 1905, when the Duma came into being as a Russian parliament and legal political parties emerged. So, now, a semi-elective parliament has appeared in the new Congress of People's Deputies and its Supreme Soviet, and various small parties are emerging, including Social Democrats, Constitutional Democrats, Russian Democrats, anarcho-syndicalists, and monarchists.

Further, as Sirotkin observes, the democratic developments of then and now are accompanied by another, ominous parallel: the rise of arch-nationalist, anti-Semitic movements of the radical right. Then there was the "Union of the Russian People," to which Nicholas II gave his blessing. Its slogan, "Beat the Jews and save Russia, " was implemented by the thugs of the Black Hundreds, who perpetrated pogroms against the Jews in 1905-07. Now the threat of pogroms by the fascist Pamyat society, which has the support of prominent Russian nationalist literary figures, is among the reasons that Soviet Jews are leaving in large numbers.

Pyotr Stolypin, the czarist prime minister who inaugurated a land reform in 1906 that aimed to end communal land tenure and to establish peasants as individual farmers, is now receiving favorable attention from Soviet advocates of a similar land reform that could enable Soviet peasants to leave their collectives and become individual farmers who own the land they till. G. Bystrov, a Soviet law professor, considers the 1906 Stockholm congress of the Russian Marxist party to be very topical. It was at that meeting that Lenin and Plekhanov clashed over the land question. Lenin wanted the nationalization of land to be a part of the party's program. Plekhanov opposed him, warning that it would lead to centralization and bureaucratization. His plan was to give peasants property rights to their land and to turn over the landlords' estates to municipalities, which would rent them out to peasants. "Today, we know who was right in that dispute," the professor observes, "and it's time to recognize it honestly and not pay homage to that utopian project of nationalization." Out goes Lenin.

The Soviet period has reached its 1917, according to some proponents of the second answer to our question. The historian Pavel Volobuev finds the situation in the fall of 1990 stunningly similar to "the time between February and October." Now, as then, the country is in a condition of total crisis. Just as that earlier systemic crisis was a result of centuries of czarist absolutism, the present one is an outgrowth of an even more ferocious administrative-command system. Now, as then, the country is in the midst of a stormy democratization, with Petrograd and Moscow again in the lead. Mass-meeting democracy, with all its heated passions, was and is again going full blast; all sorts of new parties are again appearing; politicized social forces are polarizing, depriving the reformists (now called "centrists") of hope for national conciliation.

In 1917, continues Volobuev, some politicized army generals were moving toward the Kornilov revolt, which paved the way for revolutionary extremists-that is, for the Bolsheviks-to take power. In 1990, however, it

would be a good idea for generals to stay out of politics. In 1917, to the dismay of conservative forces, the country was moving to the left. In 1990 it is moving in that direction again, to the dismay of the main conservative force again, which is the Communist Party. Never before 1917 was there such mass responsiveness in Russia to astrologers, magicians, prophets, and faith healers; and so there is again today.

The present situation also reminds the philosopher Nikolai Mikhailov of the post-February situation in 1917. The February Revolution and the rise of the Provisional Government, he says, were the perestroika of that time, or the start of it. The parallel, he says, raises several questions. Can the post-February democratic coalition, meaning those on the left today, forestall the loss of their popularity? Can the new governing structures avoid the errors of the Provisional Government? How real is the possibility, today or tomorrow, of an attempted neo-Kornilov generals' revolt? And can a new October be avoided? Here Mikhailov explains that the October 1917 coup was "the price paid for the opportunism of the fathers of the February perestroika, for their inconsistency, their shifting first to the left and then to the right, their fear of radical reform and action."

By this analogy, Gorbachev's regime is the contemporary Provisional Government, perestroika is the course toward an evolutionary, democratic development of the country, and the danger is that this Provisional Government will go the way of its predecessor-that it will fail to pursue, consistently and firmly, a line toward radical systemic change. The threat that looms in 1990 is either a new military putsch like the Kornilov rising in 1917, or a new October, that is, a new takeover by today's Bolsheviks.

And who might today's Bolsbeviks be? They are, according to A. Uliukaev, the ultraradicals, the extremists, the intolerant and the impatient ones, those prepared to fight for human happiness to the last man, whose "genetic Bolshevism" takes the form of a fanatical anti-Bolshevism. The "genetic Bolsheviks," says Liudmilla Saraskina, have representatives in the extremist "Democratic Union," whose organ, The Free Word, uses epithets like "political prostitute" to refer to liberals or centrists-in the polemical style, she adds, of that ultraleft Bolshevik Ulyanov-Lenin, who despised liberals.

The two answers to our question, I suggest, are really one. The revolutionary period, with the ending of the Romanov dynasty, the disintegration of the empire, internal collapse, disorder, civil war, and foreign intervention, was a new Time of Troubles. This is not the way that we in the West have generally thought of it. We have been influenced, perhaps overinfluenced, by Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution, which appeared in 1938, in which Russia's twentieth-century revolution was analyzed along with England's revolution of the seventeenth century and America's and France's revolution of the eighteenth as a paradigmatically modern, hence modernizing, phenomenon. Some Russians who lived through the revolutionary years, however, thought differently. For them, that period was another Russian breakdown, another dynastic interregnum, another smuta. That is how P. B. Struve characterized it in 1918 and how Iurii Got'e saw it in his diary of 1917-22. (Terence Emmons has given the title Time of Troubles to his English-language edition of Got'e's diary. And Lars Lih has likened the revolutionary period to a smuta in his new book, Bread and

Authority in Russia, 1914-1921.)

The New Republic (c) 1991 IAC

If we see the Revolution as a second Time of Troubles, and hence the rise of the Soviet regime as the emergence of a new dynasty (the Bol'sheviki), it ceases to seem strange that a new cycle of Russia's history has unfolded in our century, and that a new smuta threatens now. Such a reading of the Soviet era might have two strengths from a scholarly and political standpoint. By showing that czarism rose again in what seemed, somewhat illusorily, an epoch of modernization through urbanization and industrial development, this reading can render the present systemic breakdown more comprehensible: it is a largely archaic system that has nearly ceased to function. This way of thinking may help us comprehend the tenacity of the elements of the old order that still exist. For Russia, the system that we glibly call "Communism" has roots that go deep into the centuries, and are not so easily pulled up.

Can Russia at long last escape from the cycle of administrative-command systems followed by times of troubles? That, of course, is the most pressing question. Our historically-minded contemporaries in the Soviet Union are asking it in their own manner. One of them, A. Sabov, human rights editor for Literaturnaya Gazeta, writes: "If you take a close look, all our Russian and Soviet perestroikas came exclusively from above and were just as easily withdrawn by the next oncoming authority. And the whole question is: Why? Why have they never come from below in any other form than that of an all-destroying tornado?" And here is the writer Viktor Erofeev's form ulation:

> Can it be that this sixth part of the globe has
>
> its own special relationship to time and social
>
> development, so that stagnation and
>
> misfortune are the constant elements not
>
> only of the regimes of Brezhnev and Nicholas
>
> I but of Russian national history in general,
>
> a history that moves in circles? If so,
>
> what historical swamp will eventually swallow
>
> up perestroika and all the hopes connected
>
> with it? How can we break out of the
>
> vicious circle?

It is hard to answer, except to say that it will take much time and much effort, no little good fortune, and maybe substantial assistance from the United States, which came to the Soviet Union's aid with Lend-Lease in World War II, and has as much reason to want Russia to emerge democratically victorious this time as it had for wanting Russia to emerge militarily victorious last time.

If fortune smiles, this reforming czar will go down as the founder of a presidency. This Provisional Government will stop wavering and seek systemic change that can stabilize the national situation. This Duma will stand. The incipient law-governed state will evolve further, and Benckendorf's agency

will become a normal intelligence service. The imperial structure will be replaced by that of a commonwealth of nations or confederation. Russian generals will respect the supremacy of civil authority. Peasants will become proprietors of the land they till if they wish, and the defenders of the collective-farm system will go into retirement. A de-statified economy will emerge and with it a modicum of prosperity for the people. Russian culture will prosper in freedom. The government will continue cooperating with other governments to establish an orderly world under international law, in which the demographic, technological, economic, and cultural forces now making for human catastrophe can be checked before it is too late.

If fortune frowns, however, we pretty well know from history what that will mean. Another round of the cycle, after another full-scale Russian smuta climaxed by civil war. When he was asked whether he thought the latter outcome likely, the historian Ruslan Skrynnikow simply exclaimed, "May God forbid!"

SUBJECT:
Soviet Union, History; Social change, Soviet Union; Nationalism and communism, Soviet Union

GEOGRAPHIC:
Soviet Union

LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 04, 1991

48TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Policy Review

1991 Winter

SECTION: No. 55, Pg. 60

LENGTH: 4302 words

HEADLINE: "POISONING OF THE SOUL"; New Leaders of Russia and Central Europe Talk About the Evil Empire

BYLINE: COMPILED BY KEVIN ACKER

BODY:

One of the unintended consequences of Bolshevism was the awe-inspiring emergence of a literature of liberty. The works of Solzhenitsyn, Pasternak, Mandelstam, Sakharov, Sharansky, and many others plumbed the depths of totalitarian horror and gave testimony to the power of human reason and the human soul in the face of tyranny. To their great works must now be added the speeches and essays of the new leaders of Russia and what is rightly called again Central Europe -- President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, President-elect Lech Walesa of Poland, Mayors Anatoly Sobchak and Gavriil Popov of Leningrad and Moscow, President Boris Yeltsin of Russia -- as well as some of the reformist intellectuals of the Soviet "glasnost" movement, among them Yuri Afanasyev, Alexander Yakovlev, and Tatyana Zasavskaya. Some of their more eloquent statements about their totalitarian legacy and their dreams of the future have been compiled by Kevin Acker, a senior at Dartmouth College.

"Our Conscience Is Sick"

[Prague Spring] was the first perestroika in the socialist countries, and we crushed and slandered that perestroika. It was collective murder. How many lives and fates have been destroyed, and how much disillusion, anger, and grievance have accumulated over the years toward your own dogmatic, triumphant Stalinists, and toward us, their sponsors and protectors.

Our conscience is sick: the Berlin Wall, the war in Afghanistan, Prague.
-- Daniil Granin, Soviet novelist, in open letter to Czechoslovaks, Moscow News, November 19, 1989

In the 10 years of that [Afghanistan] war, we not only lost in some degree the prestige that the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces enjoyed after the victorious Great Patriotic War, but also in some degree inflicted terrible pain on the families and friends, our own Soviet people. With hindsight, we are obliged to offer apologies once again and regret that it happened.
-- Dmitir Yazov, Soviet Defense Minister, June 1, 1990

The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan merits moral and political condemnation. . . . By this action we set ourselves against the majority of the world community and against the norms of conduct, which should be accepted and observed in international relations.
-- Alexander Dzasokhov, reporting the conclusions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, December 24, 1989

Having embarked upon the path of dividing the loot with the [Nazi] predators, Stalin began to speak with the neighboring, especially small, countries in the language of ultimatums and threats. He did not consider it shameful to resort to force. This happened in the argument with Finland. With great power arrogance he brought Bessarabia back within the borders of the union, and restored Soviet power in the Baltic republics. All this deformed Soviet policy and state morality. . . . The whole truth, even the bitterest, must be told some time.

The [Hitler-Stalin] secret protocol of 23 August 1939 reflected precisely the inner essence of Stalinism. This is not the only one, but one of the most dangerous delayed-action mines from the minefield we have inherited, and which we are now trying to clear with such difficulty and complexity. It is necessary to do this. The public mines do not simply fade away on their own.
-- Alexander Yakovlev, member of Soviet Politburo, December 23, 1989

"The System Invites Lies"

When people are compelled to look only one way, when they are deprived of information and the possibility to compare things, they stop thinking. Well-informed people, ones who have access to versatile information, inevitably begin to think.

The very system invites lies.
-- Oleg Kalugin, former KGB major-general and USSR People's Deputy, Moscow News, July 1, 1990

In Afghanistan, I discovered for myself that what appeared in our newspapers was the complete opposite of the truth. We really were fighting. thousands of people were killed and injured on both sides. The contrast between what I saw and what I read made me completely distrust our government. It was very difficult to tell our soldiers what we were doing there, whom we were fighting, what was right and what was wrong. Nothing made sense.
-- Valery Ryumin, major of Ryazan, a Russian provincial capital, Washington Post, November 14, 1990

For the past 40 years on this day you have heard my predecessors utter different variations on the same theme, about how our country is prospering, how many more billion tons of steel we have produced, how happy we all are, how much we trust our government, and what beautiful prospects lie ahead of us. I do not think you appointed me to this office for me, of all people, to lie to you.
-- Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, in New Year's address to nation, January 1, 1990.

If you and all others whom we are burying today are without guilt, as we have always known and professed, and as today the immediate inheritors of the power of your executioners also admit that the accusations were fabricated, the witnesses false, the trial conceptional, then those who sent you to the gallows were nothing but murderers. . . . Let their punishment be the contempt of the nation, which has become one for the first time since 1956; let their punishment be that they have lived to see, can see, and hear what is happening today; let their punishment be that their illusions have disappeared and they can guess the judgment of as yet unwritten history books of future generations will mete out to them.
-- Tibor Meray, Hungarian writer (at the reburial of Imre Nagy and his

associates), June 16, 1989

Sooner or later the truth will win out on God's earth and deception will be unlocked. Without such moral cleansing the development of civilization is inconceivable.
-- Alexander Yakovlev, member of Soviet Politburo, December 23, 1989

"Enormous Human Humiliation"

The Communist type of totalitarian system has left both our nations, Czechs and Slovaks -- as it has all the nations of the Soviet Union and the other countries the Soviet Union subjugated in its time -- a legacy of countless dead, an infinite spectrum of human suffering, profound economic decline, and above all enormous human humiliation. It has brought us horrors that fortunately you have not known.
-- Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, before the U.S. Congress, February 21, 1990

The totalitarian system has a special bacterial property. The system is strong not only in its repressive police methods but, more, in fact that it positions people's souls and demoralizes them.
-- Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, Izvestia, February 23, 1990

Several German intellectuals and politicians had heard words for the fellow citizens who flung themselves on the West German shops as soon as they could. . . . These could only be the words of people who have forgotten, or never knew, the personal humiliation inflicted by the permanent lack of the most elementary consumer goods: the humiliation of silent and hostile lines, the humiliation inflicted upon you by salespeople who seem angry to see you standing there, the humiliation of always having to buy what there is, not what you need. The systematic penury of material goods strikes a blow at the moral dignity of the individual.
-- Tzvetan Todorov, Bulgarian author, New Republic, June 25, 1990

We are living in a decade moral environment. We have become morally ill, because we have become accustomed to saying one thing and thinking another. We have learned not to believe in anything, not to have consideration for one another, and only to look after ourselves. Notions such as love, friendship, compassion, humility, and forgiveness have lost their depth and dimension, and for many of us they merely represent some kind of psychological idiosyncracy, or appear to be some kind of stray relic from times past, something rather comical in an era of computers and space rockets.

. . . The previous regime, armed with its arrogant and intolerant ideology, denigrated man into a production force and nature into a production tool. In this way it attacked their very essence and the relationship between them. It made talented people who were capable of managing their own affairs and making an enterprise living in their own country into cogs in some kind of monstrous, ramshackle, smelly machine whose purpose no one can understand. It can do nothing more than slowly but surely wear itself down, and all the cogs in it.
-- Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, in New Year's address to nation, January 1, 1990

The primary reasons for the need for perestroika were not the sluggish economy and the rate of technological development but an underlying mass

alienation of working people from significant social goals and values. This social alienation is rooted in the economic system formed in the 1930s, which made state property, run by a vase bureaucratic apparatus, the dominant form of ownership. . . . For 50 years it was said that this was public property and belonged to everyone, but no way was ever found to make workers feel they were the co-owners and masters of the factories, farms, and enterprises. They felt themselves to be cogs in a gigantic machine.
-- Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Soviet sociologist, in Voices of Glasnost

In a totalitarian situation people conform outwardly to the prevailing morals and isolate themselves in microsocieties where they live, work, and die. People act according to moral double standards, an unwritten social contract that everyone knows. Workers are allowed to idle and steal, as long as they come to party meetings and applaud. Only a small mafia of the party bosses and enterprise bosses took it seriously; the rest of the people cut themselves off.
-- Valtr Komarek, deputy prime minister of Czechoslovakia, NRC Handelsblad (Rotterdam), February 6, 1990

A Civic Society

Our immediate aims are to form a civic society in which the law will guarantee the individual a free choice of the forms of his social, political, and economic existence . . . where there will be no monopoly of a single ideology or worldview, but freedom of conscience will prevail.
-- Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School, at the 28th CPSU Congress, July 6, 1990

The task today is to learn democracy and feel deeply and recognize in practice the entire distinctiveness and self-worth of each human life, each personality. That is, to become a truly humane society -- in being and consciousness and basis and superstructure, without the feverish, paranoid thirst for the blood of one's neighbors.
-- Alexander Yakovlev, member of Soviet Politburo, Literaturnaya Gazeta, February 14, 1990

The wall that was separating people from freedom has collapsed. And I hope that the nations of the world will never let it be rebuilt.
-- Lech Walesa, Solidarity leader, addressing the U.S. Congress, November 15, 1989

Outdated Ideology

Marxism-Leninism as a state of ideology is outdate. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat and social revolution as a transition from one state of society to another is a vision of the world that is today not consonant with reality, and accordingly Marxism-Leninism can invite us only into the 19th century, while we need an invitation into the 21st century. And finally, Marxism-Leninism is an aggregate of certain theories that have not been confirmed by social practice. . . . The main thing is that Marxism-Leninism has failed utterly to justify itself, namely, that capitalism as a system is coming to an end and that it has no prospects for society, is completely outdated. . . . It turns out that new stages have appeared in capitalism, and the opportunity for its self-development have turned out to be such that now no sensible person would dare to predict the end of this social system in the foreseeable future.
-- Yuri Afanasyev, USSR People's Deputy and rector of the Moscow Historical

Archival Institute, quoted in Sovietskaya Estoniya (Talinn, Estonia), January 18, 1990

We wanted to create a new man, with only unselfish thoughts. I am afraid it is no possible.
-- Vaclav Klaus, finance minister of Czechoslovakia, before group of Wall Street investors, March 1, 1990

If we seriously want to engage in perestroika then we cannot rely on methods of an organization which has permeated every pore of our social organism and which interferes -- at the Party's will -- in any affairs of state and social life, the economy and culture, sport and religion. There is not one sphere of life free from the KGB's hand or shadow.
-- Oleg Kalugin, former KGB major-general and USSR People's Deputy, June 20, 1990

The Essence of Stalinism Is Leninism

Force -- the use of force, violence -- is what our history is all about.

If our leader and founder [Lenin] created foundations for anything, it is the elevation of the state policy of mass coercion and terror into principle. And besides, he elevated lawlessness into a principle of state policy. This was continued throughout the whole Stalinist period and created numerous victims; this went through the Brezhnev period, when in a drunken stupor the national wealth was squandered wholesale and retail.
-- Yuri Afanasyev, USSR People's Deputy and rector of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute, before the Congress of People's Deputies, March 12, 1990

When you read Lenin, you can understand everything that has happened in this country.
-- Valery Ruyumin, mayor of Ryazan, a Russian provincial capital, Washington Post, November 14, 1990

We cannot talk about bad Stalin and good Lenin. It is more productive to recognize the Leninist essence of Stalinism.
-- Yuri Afanasyev, USSR People's Deputy and rector of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute, quoted in Sovietskaya Estoniya (Talinn, Estonia), January 18, 1990

Economic Liberty

We decided to build a market economy in Poland, not for doctrinal reasons -- we have said goodbye to those forever, I hope -- but because no one has yet invented a more efficient one.
-- Leszek Balcerowicz, finance minister of Poland, on Polish television, June 7, 1990

We are consciously limiting the role of the state in the economy. It is no longer the supermanager of a superfactory, the main boss and the main controller, the main storekeeper and the main distributor of goods and services. Several dozen years of costly experience have shown that the state cannot do this well, and, in particular, cannot inspire energy in people so that they may work productively, efficiently, and economically.
-- Tadeusz Mazowiecki, prime minister of Poland, before the Sejm (Polish

parliament), January 18, 1990

We categorically favor the concept of private initiative. The economic foundation of totalitarianism has been the absolute power derived from the monopoly on property. We shall never have political pluralism without economic pluralism. But some of those who still have Communist leanings try to equate private initiative with "exploitation" and maintain that the emergence of rich entrepreneurs would be a catastrophe. In the same way they try to play on the feelings of those who are lazy and would therefore envy the wealthy, and those who -- having once enjoyed the privileges of the Communist system -- are afraid of the effort of working.
-- Timisoara Declaration, Romania, March 11, 1990

We cannot talk of freedom unless we have private property.
-- Gavriil Popov, mayor of Moscow, Cato Institute/Soviet Academy of Sciences conference, September 10, 1990

How can you say you have a motherland when you don't own a single square meter of land which you can leave to your grandchildren?
-- Suyatoslav Fyodorov, Soviet laser scientist, New York Times, March 11, 1990

For decades in our country, we have fostered a beggar/consumer mentality: the state will provide and decide everything for you -- poorly, perhaps, but provide equally for everyone, give you all the basic necessities. And this parasitic mentality is very widespread here. Yet a market economy, in order to function, requires a very different type of mentality: enterprise, initiative, responsibility, every person solving his own problems. The government does nothing more than create the conditions in which one can employ one's initiative and enterprise; the rest is up to the individual.
-- Anatoly Sobchak, mayor of Leningrad, Cato Institute/Soviet Academy of Sciences conference, September 11, 1990

A most important task of the initial stage of the transition to the market consists of the creation of the proper conditions for the development of the key figure of market relations -- the entrepreneur. For many years enterprise was not valued here but punished. Now it has to be acknowledged that the sole resource on which we can count upon transition to the market is the potential of human assertiveness based on people's aspirations to secure for themselves normal living conditions.
-- "500 Day Play" for Soviet economic reform.

No Third Way

We don't want to try out a third way. We will leave it to the richer countries to try out a third way and if they succeed maybe we will follow.
-- Leszek Balcerowicz, finance minister of Poland, Washington Post, November 30, 1989

To speak of any future for socialism in this country is nonsense. . . . Our goal now is to lead Bulgaria to a modern, democratic capitalism.
-- Zhelyo Zhelev, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces (and future president), December 18, 1989

We want a market economy without any adjectives. Any compromises will only fuzzy up the problems we have. To pursue a so-called third way is foolish.

We had our experience with this in the 1960s when we looked for socialism with a human face. It did not work, and we must be explicit when we say that we are not aiming for a more efficient version of a system that has failed. the market is indivisible; it cannot be an instrument in the hands of central planners.
-- Vaclav Klaus, finance minister of Czechoslovakia, Reason, June 1990

Learning from the West

It is a paradox that in the 20th century the ideas of socialism have not been realized in the socialist countries, but in other countries, the capitalist countries. In the countries which call themselves socialist, socialism has been distorted to the degree where it causes disgust.
-- Yuri Afanasyev, USSR People's Deputy and rector of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute, Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), January 3, 1990

I have been to the West and have become convinced that we can use many things from the Western democracies, including the attitude to property, the parliamentary system, and much more. There is no reason to renounce all this because it is capitalist. Why should we do that if it is rational and useful?
-- Boris Yeltsin, USSR People's Deputy (and future president of the Russian Republic), Det Fri Aktuelt (Copenhagen), December 2, 1989

I was told that capitalism is in the process of rotting away. New York was described as a pile of gravestones piled upon one on the other. That's not true at all. Some of what are, in the United States, called "slums" would pass for pretty decent housing in the Soviet Union.
-- Boris Yeltsin, USSR People's Deputy (and future president of the Russian Republic), at Columbia University, September 11, 1989

The people of [America] are able to work with excellence and relax with good taste. They are not obsessive, they are quite free, and they live without looking back. On the streets, I met many polite, smiling people. Did I see any of the social problems in America? That is not what I went there for -- I have seen enough social problems at home to make me sick. I was not looking for the speck of dust in someone else's eye.
-- Boris Yeltsin, USSR People's Deputy (and future president of the Russian Republic), Sovietskaya Molodezh, January 4, 1990 (interviewed on November 25, 1989)

Spiritual Revival

I do not know what a miracle is. Nonetheless, I daresay at this moment I am a party to a miracle: a man who only six months ago was taken prisoner as an enemy of his own state is welcoming today, as president, the first Pope in the history of the Catholic Church ever to set foot in this country. For many decades the spirit . . . has been banished from our country. I have the honor to be a witness to the moment when its soil is being kissed by the apostle of spirituality.
-- Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, welcoming Pope John Paul II, April 21, 1990

Freedom of conscience and religion is a basic human right, . . . a prerequisite for renewing a political system . . . that reflects a pluralism of ideas in society.
-- from the Hungarian "Law on Freedom of Conscience, Religion, and the

Churches," passed January 24, 1990

Thank You, America

The world remembers the wonderful principle of the American democracy: "government of the people, by the people, for the people."

. . . The ideals which underline this glorious American republic and which are still alive here are also living in faraway Poland.
-- Lech Walesa, Solidarity leader, addressing the U.S. Congress, November 15, 1989

Ladies and gentlemen, from this podium, I'm expressing words of gratitude to the American people. It is they who supported us in the difficult days of marital law and persecution. It is they who sent us aid, they who protested against violence. Today, when I am able to freely address the whole world from this elevated spot, I would like to thank them with special warmth.

It is thanks to them that the word "Solidarity" soared across boarders and reached every corner of the world. Thanks to them the people of Solidarity were never alone.
-- Lech Walesa, Solidarity leader, addressing the U.S. Congress, November 15, 1989

[Reagan] turned out not to be such a simpleton as we were led to believe.
-- Boris Yeltsin, future president of the Russian Republic, New York Times Magazine, September 23, 1989

The Artificial Soviet Union

The USSR is not a country, nor is it a state. The Eurasian territory is marked as such on maps is a world of worlds made of different cultures and civilizations. It is a neighborhood of states and nations that are tired of their colonial and colonizing past, that there have been tortured and humiliated by Stalinist efforts at unification.
-- Yuri Afanasyev, USSR People's Deputy and rector of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute, Time, March 12, 1990

We witnessed the artificial creation of a society, something like a gigantic human machine in which 280 million people of different cultures and different civilizations, geographics, and language were forcibly meshed together into one huge conglomerate. And this gigantic human machine was based on mass violence, on centralized control and planning.

Naturally, the colossus turned out to be standing on feet of clay. It is doomed to destruction. Now this natural process of collapse is going on. it looks as though it were planned, but no one was really aware of how it would take place or when.
-- Yuri Afanasyev, USSR People's Deputy and rector of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute, Washington Post, November 16, 1989

With regard to the natural desire of the Balts to distance themselves from the center, the [reasons include] the thousands upon thousands of ruined lives and the . . . outrageous method by which these peoples were made part of the union. . . . Freedom and independence have been so suppressed that now people

need to feel that they are in an independent state and sovereign as much as they need air.
-- Yuri Afanasyev, USSR People's Deputy and rector of the Moscow Historical Archival Institute, quoted in Sovietskaya Estoniya (Talinn, Estonia), January 18, 1990

Renouncing World Revolution

Less security for the United States compared to the Soviet Union would not be in our interest, since it could lead to mistrust and produce instability.
-- Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR General Secretary, Time, May 23, 1988

We are not keen on the export of revolution as we must deal with the monstrous deformations of socialism in our own country.
-- Stanislav Kondrashov, Soviet political commentator, Izvestia, May 12, 1989

It is no secret that many Third World recipients of Soviet aid are notorious for their authoritarian or dictatorial methods of rule, the cults of their leaders, a ruthless suppression of the opposition, and for corruption. . . .

In mapping out future aid programs, there is a need to discard as soon as possible the Cold War stereotypes, when any anti-American regime in the Third World, declaring allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, could count on Soviet support.
-- Andrei Kortunov, Soviet intellectual and journalist, Moscow News, December 10, 1989

If a people strives for independence, you cannot restrain them by force. And the more pressure the authorities exert, the stronger the people's resistance will be. In our own Russia an analogous situation is taking shape with certain autonomous republics. But we will operate not be means of pressure and threats. . . . Let the republic itself decide within what limits it will really be able to realize its independence.
-- Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic, Komsomolskaya Pravda, August 8, 1990

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

GRAPHIC: Photo, no caption, AP/Wide World Photos; Picture, no caption, Reurers/Bettmann

11TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

June 1, 1991

SECTION: Business, finance and science; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; Pg. 81 (U.K. Edition Pg. 97)

LENGTH: 1479 words

HEADLINE: The song of the Soviet scientist

DATELINE: MOSCOW

BODY:

THE Soviet Union, based as it is on Marx's science of society, has always been keen on scientific progress and its technological fruits. It launched the world's first satellite, and followed it with the first man into orbit. It designs and builds nuclear bombs, space shuttles and superconductors. Its top scientists have a long list of ambitious projects in mind, and a fair-sized budget to pay for them (see chart). But has socialism really served science well?

No. To listen to Soviet scientists is to hear that Soviet science is in crisis. Scientists are leaving the country in droves. Equipment is out of date. Organisation is shambolic. The money for research is so uncertain that people running projects spend all their time wondering where their next rouble is coming from. As Nikolai Slyunkov, once a politburo member in charge of science, said at the end of 1990: "There is no tangible scientific progress. In the five years since 1985 . . . scientific and technical progress has not worked."

The debate abut the quality of Soviet science centres on the Academy of Sciences. This organisation is a little like Britain's Royal Society -- a club for the country's top scientists. Its 300 full and 800 corresponding members are the best in the land. They enjoy privilege and influence. Unlike the Royal Society, though, the academy has power as well as influence. Most of the Soviet Union's research goes on at the 250 institutes and laboratories it controls. Soviet universities do not do research. They teach.

This arrangement gives rise to two problems. First, the separation of the academy from the universities means that the best minds are siphoned off to pure research, and second-raters are left to teach the next generation at the university. The result has been a gradual decline in the quality of scientists at lower levels. The apex of the pyramid is affected by the crumbling of the base: there are now too few top-notch candidates to fill junior research posts in the academy's institutes.

That replenishment is sorely needed. Poor teaching has made Soviet science slow to recover from Stalin's influence, under which the most overriding distinction was between "socialist" and "bourgeois" science (guess which was better). Many of today's academicians -- especially senior ones -- are products of those dark days. The cost of allowing the politically astute, rather than the scientifically excellent, to get the lion's share of resources can be seen in the small number of Nobel prizes for science won by Soviet citizens since 1960 -- only four, and two of those were for work done before the second world

war. All were in physics, which is less amenable to ideological tampering than biology. Stalin knew physicists made bombs, whereas biologists trifled in agriculture and medicine.

The second problem is characteristic of most monopolies: bureaucracy. In the West, choices about what fundamental research to do are always influenced by scientists, and often left to them to make. In applied research, the decisions are more likely to be taken by businesses or, less satisfactorily, by governments. In Russia the decisions are all made by bureaucrats. They dictate how much money the institutes receive and what it should be spent on. They say who should be promoted. This means that a lot of money is spent on administration and on applied science, which the bureaucrats' political bosses approve of. The amount left for pure science is far from enough to suit the scientists. The academy's deputy director, Vladimir Kudryatsev, says that little more than one-sixth of its budget goes on pure science.

Pluto's Academy?

In response, some scientists have declared independence. In 1989 a group of them set up their own Union of Scientists to provide research grants. They also want to encourage a television-based extra-mural university, like Britain's Open University, as a new source of further education. It would be supported by members' dues, consultation fees and the sale of publications. Moreover, the Physics Society of the USSR wants to finance projects rejected by the government, and also campaigns for better education.

Reforms like these, though useful, are less valuable than attempts to change the way the academy works. In the past the academy depended wholly on the state's largesse. Institutes would draw up budgets, and the academy's general assembly (consisting of its 300 full members) would pass them on to the government. In return, the government was free to direct academicians down whatever paths it chose.

In August 1990, however, a presidential decree made the academy independent. It was given the equipment and resources used by its institutes, and allowed to determine for itself what use it wanted to put them to. In return, it is supposed to forgo the public purse and use its resources and revenues to pay for its research.

This was something of a sham. An academy of sciences is not a money-making concern, any more than an army is. Like defence, pure science is a public good -- something that, while beneficial to the country as a whole, would not be undertaken for profit by individual members. The implications of the decree were that the academy must either turn itself into an industrial-research consultancy, close down, or continue to be financed by the government. The scientists recognised this. Last September the country was treated to the unusual sight of top boffins staging a protest on the steps of the academy's palatial headquarters in Moscow. They were demanding that the decree be repealed.

In response to the decree and the opposition to it, some much-needed restructuring is going on. This autumn will see the first meeting of a new decision-making body (called the "second chamber"), composed of employees of the institutes who do not have the right to attend sessions of the academy's general assembly. It is intended to give a voice to younger scientists and offset the power of the general assembly, which is dominated by conservative

academicians. Perhaps a more powerful reform is the splitting up of the over-large institutes, which were the creations of the bureaucrats. The Institute of Physics recently broke up into five separate parts, in the belief that smaller laboratories do better work.

It is too early to say how well these reforms will work, but they are unquestionably steps in the right direction. Eventually, the academy's monopoly over pure science must be broken. Universities that teach and foster research are healthier and better institutions than those that merely turn out graduates. Such grand concerns, though, can wait. The immediate problem is to make today's tentative work, given uncertainties over money.

If the academy is independent, said last September's protesters, it will go broke. Already, they said, scientists are leaving the country, with its poor equipment, bureaucracy and low wages (see box). To an extent, the state is responding. According to the director of research and development funding of the USSR state committee for science and technology, investment in basic and applied scientific research in 1990 was 765m roubles ($ 1.3 billion at the official rate of exchange). That is 77% more than in 1989. The vice-president of the academy says that this year spending will not be cut in real terms. In addition to that, the science and technology committee, which oversees central-government spending on science, has used 60m roubles to set up two new funds. One of them -- the innovation fund -- is supposed to concentrate entirely on fundamental science. Compared with other countries, this is small beer. America's Department of Energy wants to spend almost as much on high-energy physics alone as the Soviet Union spends on all things scientific.

There is nothing so small, though, that it cannot be cut. It would be foolish for any Soviet scientist not to worry about the future of scientific spending. Scientific projects will be a prime target for economic reformers when they get round to the critical task of balancing the budget. No scientific work can withstand the impact of a huge and sudden cut in its money. If that happens, then Soviet science is indeed likely to wither away. At the moment, however, the main problem is not the absolute amount of money but the way it is being used. This organisational weakness is at least being tackled, if not solved. Moreover, science is still one of those rare areas in which the country is at, or near, international standards. Most parliamentarians recognise this. That is why Soviet investment in science has so far been protected from the general chaos in the rest of the economy. Without reorganisation, Soviet science cannot hope to keep its protection much longer.

GRAPHIC: Graph, Big ideas, Investment in basic and applied sciences, Source: Tribuna; Pictures 1 and 2, no caption

17TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

May 25, 1991

SECTION: Special; THINK-TANKS; Pg. 23 (U.K. Edition Pg. 23)

LENGTH: 3100 words

HEADLINE: The carousels of power

HIGHLIGHT:

"Those who desire to win the favour of princes generally endeavour to do so by offering them those things which they themselves prize most, or such as they observe the prince to delight in most." Niccolo Machiavelli

BODY:

WHEN Machiavelli sat down to write "The Prince", he was feeling anxious. Unemployed after many years in government service, he wrote his handbook of advice to new rulers in an attempt to win a job with the incoming Medici administration.

The Machiavelli problem would be instantly recognisable to hordes of would-be and once-were government officials in today's world: "policy intellectuals", as Americans call them. They would not recognise his workplace. Displaced from power, he had to toil in a humble farmhouse outside Florence. Today he would sit in a think-tank, cosseted by secretaries and flattered by a stream of calls from talk-show producers.

The "policy intellectuals" still strive to present their conclusions as impartial expertise. But, like Machiavelli, they are forever tugging at the sleeves of politicians. Think-tanks, sitting uneasily half-way between government and universities, are institutions that embody this ambiguity.

Societies in which a broad consensus dominates political thinking -- such as Germany and Japan today and the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s -- tend to respect the think-tanks' claim of neutrality. But when consensus breaks down, as it did in Britain and the United States in the late 1970s, think-tanks become more avowedly ideological. The new role is to challenge conventional wisdom. They can articulate the instincts of dissidents in the language of the academy, and suggest ideas that bridge the gap between instinct and policy.

Many American think-tanks, such as the Washington-based Institute for International Economics, still cling to an aura of academic detachment. But an increasing number, typified by the conservative Heritage Foundation, define themselves above all by the fact that they hold a coherent body of ideas, and want to spread them.

Think-tanks sprout in America to an extent undreamed of elsewhere. A recent book -- "The Idea Brokers", by James Smith -- identifies over 1,000 private ones, around 100 in Washington alone. They range from the Brookings Institution, with its vast battleship of a building on Massachusetts Avenue, to tiny lobbying outfits with offices the size of a doctor's waiting room.

They thrive in America for two good reasons. First, a lot of rich foundations are ready to pay good money to people to sit and think. Second, the American system of government is peculiarly open to such chosen thinkers. Each new administration in Washington appoints not only the heads of its departments, or ministries, but also a lot of people further down the departmental ladder. Groups like the Council of Economic Advisers and the State Department's Policy Planning Staff -- government think-tanks, in effect -- absorb more outsiders. The two houses of Congress employ a bureaucracy with a huge appetite for independent research. Plenty of work here for thinkers who can catch the political tide.

The revolving door between government and think-tanks is well-established. Both Zbigniew Brzezinski, who headed the National Security Council under Jimmy Carter, and Robert McFarlane, who did the same job for Ronald Reagan, joined the Centre for Strategic and International Studies on leaving office. Brent Scowcroft, now head of the NSC, once worked there.

When Ronald Reagan took office, no fewer than 20 of the research fellows at the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI) joined his administration. Now that Mr Reagan has left power, many of his appointees, such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Richard Perle, are working at AEI. Every American think-tank director has a dream and a nightmare. The dream is to house the next administration; the nightmare is to house the last one. AEI seems to have managed both in the course of a decade.

The first lot of American research institutes, just before the first world war, was more politically innocent. It was not until the 1960s, when "think-tank" entered the popular vocabulary, that these bodies became a natural bridge between universities and government. In those days think-tanks were intoxicated by the new sophistication they could apply to their work by way of computers, games theory and other novelties. The Rand Corporation, based in Santa Monica in California, pioneered the application of "systems analysis". Like the Urban Institute, founded in Washington in 1968 after racial riots across America, it thrived not on private philanthropy but on research contracts from the government.

The rise and fall of technocracy

With a sociologist, Daniel Bell, proclaiming "the end of ideology", technocrats were in vogue. To President Kennedy the great issues related "not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology but to ways and means of reaching common goals -- to research for sophisticated solutions to complex and obstinate issues." It was up to the politicians to define the ends: an end to urban poverty, victory in Vietnam. The think-tanks would provide the means.

Failure both in Vietnam and in the war on poverty discredited technocracy. Conservatives, in particular, argued that the "liberal establishment" and the think-tanks it favoured -- Brookings, the Rand Corporation, even the grand old Council on Foreign Relations in New York -- embodies a stifling and wrong-headed orthodoxy.

They set about building what Sidney Blumenthal, a journalist, calls a "counter-establishment". Because the old think-tanks were dominated by liberals, conservative alternatives were required. During the 1970s the AEI expanded, and new organisations such as the Heritage Foundation and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research were founded. The latter was created

by William Casey, who became Ronald Reagan's campaign director and then head of the CIA. The conservative think-tanks set about the prevailing wisdom on welfare policy at home, detente with Russia abroad. By 1981 much of the intellectual spadework for the Reagan, presidency had been done.

Their apparent success prodded Democrats to start building a counter-counter-establishment. The Progressive Policy Institute was set up by the Democratic Leadership Council, which is on the right wing of the Democratic Party. The Economic Policy Institute, born in 1986, is a bit further left: like the Heritage Foundation, but the other way round, it sees itself as a rebel fighting conventional wisdom.

Britain's gadflies

The shift from an above-it-all "objectivity" to an open confession of partisanship took place in Britain too, at around the same time. Thatcherism, like Reaganism, drew heavily upon the work of bright neo-conservatives outraged by the "years of stagnation" in the prime ministerships of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan.

There were British think-tanks before Margaret Thatcher became prime minister. But, with the notable exception of the free-market Institute of Economic Affairs (widely regarded in the 1960s, by people who now wish they hadn't, as a home for impractical crackpots), they were guardians of the chalice of consensus. The big three -- the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), the Policy Studies Institute and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research -- still see themselves as purveyors to well-researched common sense. The director of the Policy Studies Institute, Bill Daniel, acknowledges a belief that consensus is attainable if you "establish the facts and get people of good will together."

To Britain's neo-conservatives that was, at best, naive. Together with Sir Keith Joseph, Mrs Thatcher founded the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 1974. Its current director of studies, David Willets, says the CPS started by assuming that "a lot of the research put out by established think-tanks had a basic bias in favour of increased government spending and an essential belief in the rationality of government."

With a tiny staff (currently seven, including secretaries), the CPS sponsored pioneering work on many of the ideas that came to define Thatcherism -- privatisation, the "enterprise culture", a monetary explanation for inflation. Its close links to the policy unit in the prime minister's office (staff members swapped jobs between the two places) ensured that its arguments were heard.

As in America, the success of Britain's neo-conservative think-tanks prompted imitation from the other side. In 1988 a group of left-wing luminaries, led by Lady (Tessa) Blackstone, launched the Institute for Public Policy Research. This is formally independent of the Labour Party, but has close links with its leaders.

The fall of Mrs Thatcher seems to leave Britain's neo-conservative think-tanks out on the end of a creaking branch. Bill Daniel sees them as "gadflies who flourished while their princelings were in power", and foresees a steep decline in their influence. The CPS, seeking to prove him wrong, has installed Britain's new prime minister, John Major, as its patron. But sticking with the Conservative establishment may mean that the CPS loses its claim to

radicalism. The organisation's uncertainty is shown by its decision not to have any particular points of view on the future of the European Community: a decision that makes more jaws than Mrs Thatcher's drop.

Oddly, the think-tank that seems closest to catching the next intellectual wave is the one whose collapse seemed most logical a year ago. The Social Market Foundation was set up to serve David Owen's Social Democrats, a party that no longer exists. But its name contains the latest buzz-word.

The Conservative Party's new chairman, Chris Patten, has told Marxism Today of his interest in the German idea of a "social market", which believes it is possible to unleash capitalism's efficiency but also to keep it under the supervising eye of society: to combine the engine or individualism and a communal conscience. Mr Patten even mused that the Conservative Party might set up a think-tank on the lines of Germany's Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the research arm of the governing Christian Democrats.

If Germany is indeed to be the model, British think-tanks may soon be scrambling back towards technocracy and the politics of boring old consensus.

No ideology please, we're German

At first sight, it is surprising that German think-tanks should be notable for unideological pragmatism. The biggest institutes -- the publicly financed research departments of the Konrad Adenauer foundation and its Social Democratic equivalent, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation -- are, after all, the offspring of political parties. Partisanship should be their middle name. In fact, their relations with the parties they serve sharply restrict their ability to tackle controversial topics. Conclusions, even subjects, embarrassing to the party are unlikely to be pursued.

Immigration is a pressing and difficult issue. It would naturally commend itself to an American think-tank. The party ones in Germany are reluctant to consider so awkward a matter: almost anything you say is liable to embarrass the particular group of politicians you have to worry about.

Asked about research into immigration quotas, Josef Tiessing of the Adenauer foundation shifts uneasily on his leather sofa. "This is a political question," he says, "it is not a scientific question." Those tempted to wander over that dividing line can be forcefully reminded of it. One research project, into who would control Soviet nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union broke up, was abruptly abandoned last year. Too political.

The distinction between "scientific" and "political" research is not just a dodge to help the big German foundation avoid embarrassing their patrons. It is observed, almost as carefully, by the think-tanks that are not dependent on party money or approval. Something German is at work here. There is a tendency to insist that a researcher's work should be "value-free". This reflects two German habits: an old one, an academic tradition that takes the "science" bit in social science very seriously; and a newer yearning for consensus, for believing that all sensible people really agree with each other.

Since 1959, when the Social Democrats embraced capitalism, German politics has been a large clustering around the centre, with only a few dissenters on the margins. Meinhard Miegel, once a Christian Democratic politician, who heads

the Institut fur Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Institute for Economics and Society) in Bonn, could think of no influential German think-tank -- even the one run by Greens -- that did not accept the basic tenets of the social market. Mr Miegel set up his think-tank in 1977. He was not out to break the mould, just to collect better data. He recalls thinking: "This is crazy, we are trying to run a party without facts."

His institute works on issues ranging from demography to labour shortages. Inevitably, given his background, its research has found its most appreciative audience among Christian Democrats. But its deliberately non-partisan approach is no pose: it helps to shape the institute's choice of research subjects, the way its conclusions are presented, and so, indirectly, the whole tone of debate in the country. In Germany interest groups like to present their views as the product of exhaustive research rather than of a distinctive philosophy.

Will German think-tanks ever go the way of some of their English-speaking counterparts, and plunge into the deep waters of ideology? Some see signs of a tendency in that direction. They look in particular at the appointment in 1988 of Michael Sturmer, a conservative historian with a philosophical bent, as head of the Stiftung fur Wissenschaft und Politik (Foundation for Science and Politics) in Ebenhausen, near Munich. This institute, with over 150 researchers, does a lot of work for the federal government: it specialises in data, not policy recommendations. The appointment of Mr Sturmer, a friend of Chancellor Kohl and a man often seen on television, made some of the staff fear they were going to be "politicised". So far, they seem to have feared wrongly: Ebenhausen stays in the good, solid German tradition.

The Germans have not yet created what Americans and Britons would call a real think-tank. That requires the revolving door. People with bright ideas must not only carry their opinions out of politics and into the research institutions, but must regularly move back the opposite way when the call comes. In Germany, so far, the door separates two largely distinct worlds.

East is east but Moscow is west

If American think-tankers would find Germany odd, they would be floored by Japan -- but would cock an interested eyebrow when they went to the Soviet Union.

In Japan, as in Germany, love of consensus and the absence of a revolving door leave little room for unorthodox views peddled by independent institutes. The main think-tanks are offshoots of big firms or finance houses: the Nomura Research Institute, the Daiwa Research Institute, the Mitsubishi Research Institute. These bodies produce voluminous reports crammed with data on subjects that interest their sponsors. They are good at description, less so at analysis, which might disagree with the boss's views. The research arms of Japan's securities firms have been relentlessly bullish throughout a 48% decline in the value of the Tokyo stockmarket.

The curious process of Japan's decision-making reverse the usual relationship between government and "policy intellectuals". In America and Britain, even to some extent in Germany, think-tanks set out to influence the government. In Japan the government tends to see academics as a useful way of influencing public opinion: how handy if they can be persuaded to open public discussion of a policy change the politicians want to make.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, there is no longer any pretence that academics can be above the tumult of political conflict. If consensus breeds academic complaisance, chaos does the opposite. Many members of the Moscow research institutes have hurled themselves into politics, as advisers to Mikhail Gorbachev or Boris Yeltsin or as politicians in their own right.

The big think-tanks are still the state-financed offshoots of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These include the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute (TSEMI) and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). But, since glasnost, they have lived in a different world. Compare the role of TSEMI under Brezhnev and Mr Gorbachev.

In the mid-1960s the Kremlin, seeing that the economic system was not working, briefly flirted with the idea of changing it. TSEMI was given the job of producing an alternative to the ideas of the state planning agency, Gosplan. But the Kosygin reforms, as they came to be known, were ditched. TSEMI dutifully fell quiet. A quarter of a century later, when Mr Gorbachev was feeling reform-minded, it was a head of department at TSEMI, Stanislav Shatalin, who drafted the "500-day plan", a proposal for sweeping free-market reforms. They eventually proved too sweeping for Mr Gorbachev. But this time the TSEMI man kept on talking, and threw in his lot with Mr Yeltsin. Most of the Moscow think-tanks have now aligned themselves with Mr Yeltsin.

The revolving door has begun to rotate. When Edward Shevardnadze resigned as foreign minister, he at once set up the first privately financed think-tank in the Soviet Union, the Foreign Policy Association. This is expected to be a ginger group for "new thinking" in foreign policy.

The oddity is that, just when the Soviet Union is discovering the merit of think-tanks engaged in ideological combat, the American scene has gone quiet. It was Michael Dukakis who said that what matters is "not ideology, but competence". Yet it is George Bush who seems to have adopted that numbing proposition as a personal creed. In today's Washington, where ideology is a murmur of distant guns but technocrats have not quite recovered their old authority, the think-tanks seem at a loss; many of them are cutting the size of their staffs.

The dog-days will not last. The United States of the 1990s has a manifest need for independent thought. The great issues of domestic policy -- the budget, the proper handling of welfare, education, race relations -- stay unsolved. That grand-sounding "new world order" is still a phrase in search of a meaning. Modern Machiavellis have plenty to think about.

GRAPHIC: Picture 1, no caption; Picture 2, Callaghan watches consensus collapse; Picture 3, Now Shevardnadze think-tanks while Gorbachev sinks

23RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Byte

April, 1991

SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT; Vol. 16, No. 4; Pg. 120

LENGTH: 3502 words

HEADLINE: Computing in the U.S.S.R.

BYLINE: IGOR AGAMIRZIAN ; Igor Agamirzian received his undergraduate and doctoral degrees at Leningrad University. He is currently a senior research fellow at the Leningrad Institute of Informatics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, as well as an assistant professor for the computer science department at the Electrical Engineering Institute, Leningrad. You can reach him on BIX c/o ''editors.''

HIGHLIGHT:
Soviet ''informatics,'' suffering from years of official policy that has hindered hardware and software development, looks toward the future

BODY:

On December 7, 1988, the academician Andrei Petrovich Ershov died in a Moscow hospital at the age of 57. His death went unnoticed in a country concerned with the tragic consequences of the Armenian earthquake. However, for specialists routinely dealing with computer science in their work, the event signified the end of an era.

This article is not an obituary of Ershov. It may, however, be the obituary of Soviet computer science, a demise that threatens to become the straw that breaks the back of our collapsing economy. In the Beginning... The first computers appeared in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the U.S., Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. The cold war between the East and West caused an avalanche in the development of military equipment, and the creation of new arms required ever-increasing calculations. Thus, the first generation of computers was intended to solve the problems of ballistics and nuclear physics.

In the 1950s, however, the U.S. began using computers to solve business problems. Work began to automate programming and create high-level languages; programming in machine codes had become too time- and money-consuming. The first valve-operated monsters were replaced with solid-state devices. Backing, main, and internal storage volumes grew significantly. Performance became thousands of times faster.

Progress in the development of high-level programming languages and their compilers predetermined the look of programming. In the 1960s, ALGOL occupied the leading role in the U.S.S.R. Classical Soviet developments of compilers were associated then with ALGOL.

A series of computers called BASM (the Russian abbreviation for large electronic computing machines) was created under the guidance of S. A. Lebedev. In the mid-1960s, this led to the construction of the first line of Soviet program-compatible computers, called the M-20. The family included the M-20, BASM-3M, BASM-4, M-220, and M-222. The first compilers engineered for these

computers were called Alpha, TA-1, and TA-2. Ershov, S. S. Lavrov, and M. R. Shoura-Boura headed teams of programmers that created the first Soviet ALGOL compilers for the family of M-20 computers.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S.S.R. established centers for the development of informatics and computer science. (Informatics deals with information processing, including mass media, publishing, and intelligence activities. Here, however, I use the term to mean a sphere of problems associated with data processing involving the use of technical aids.)

In the U.S., the motivation for developments in computer science shifted from military applications to the search for methods of increasing labor productivity. Advances in microelectronics led to the creation of ICs, which permitted the development of a third generation of computers. Software became more complicated, and operating systems replaced the second-generation master-control programs.

At the same time, informatics and computer science in the U.S.S.R. again came under the influence of politics. (The golden age of Soviet informatics fell within the years of Khrushchev's thaw -- you cannot imagine cosmonautics without computer science, and the attention Khrushchev paid to cosmonautics is well known.) Conservative forces that came to power were interested only in preserving the status quo and unavoidably contributed conservatism to policies regarding technology. Developments were curtailed all over the country. The American IBM Model 360 (1965) was suddenly adopted as the Unified Computer System by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), or Eastern European countries.

The era of developments ended in 1968 with the appearance of the last computer in the BASM family, the BASM-6. After that, there was nothing. Millions of rubles were invested in the development of computer science to no end. The country once again took the fruitless road of copying Western models and assumed that by copying another technical innovation it would save so much that the products would surpass those of competitors. (Edsger Dijkstra, a classic software engineer who visited the U.S.S.R. in the late 1970s, said in a public speech delivered in the Grand Hall of the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad that he regarded the fact that the U.S.S.R. produced IBM computers as the biggest U.S. victory in the cold war.)

You might think that the history of informatics in the U.S.S.R. after 1965 is that of a thoroughly planned strategy against the Soviet people. But this strategy was planned not by bad Americans but by good and experienced Soviet leaders trying to improve the public welfare. The cause was indifference, selfishness, apathy toward tomorrow's problems, an absence of responsibility to the people -- everything associated with what we now call the administrative system.

That system failed not only in informatics and computer science but in agriculture, industry, transportation, and communications. One example: Why did the shuttle Buran take off so late? Undoubtedly, one reason was the absence of the computers required to simulate its aerodynamics. Americans made calculations for their shuttle on computers of the 1970s, which surpassed Soviet computers of the 1980s. The Soviet Seventies In the early 1970s, the most popular computers in the U.S.S.R. were the M-222 and the Minsk-32. Scientists at the Nuclear Physics Institute in Dubna created one of the first Soviet FORTRAN compilers,

and FORTRAN for the M-20 appeared. A new line of Soviet computers was announced -- the Elbrus -- whose design was suspiciously similar to that of systems from the American company Burroughs. Everyone looked forward to the appearance of ES (''Unified System'') computers, which were to be compatible with the IBM Model 360.

I first saw an ES computer when I was studying informatics and computer science at the faculty of mathematics and mechanics at Leningrad University. My fellow students and I were proud of Soviet software engineering, convinced that there were positive aspects in our dated computer hardware: It was a training factor that enabled us to engineer applications that were better than American programs. Americans, we thought, did not care about efficiency, but we had to, so we were better programmers. (It was true, to a certain degree. At least, the West always treated Soviet programming schools with respect, and a Soviet programmer emigrating to the West could find a job with ease.)

At that time, programming was becoming a mass specialty in our country, and the need for automatic-control equipment for thousands of plants required new software. As the ES computers were put into use, more users preferred FORTRAN and PL/I, and the ALGOL traditions in the U.S.S.R. faded away. System programming became devalued, as Soviet clones of foreign computers and ''borrowed'' copyright software became available.

Few people realized that further progress in informatics was impossible without system developments. We naively hoped that small groups of highly qualified software engineers scattered all over the country would be able to withstand the powerful stream of copyrighted software. We did not understand that the creation of successful software is another science, for which understanding optimum translation algorithms is insufficient.

The late 1970s saw the development of CM computers, a family of small computers, bringing a CMEA program for the creation of computers modeled after the most successful American minicomputer, the PDP-11 from DEC. As the system's mass production was organized, the country soon filled with new Western software. There followed a period of conversion (i.e., the adjustment of Western software to Soviet computers, involving the translation of program messages into Russian.)

Soon, we forgot our own system development traditions. It was much more convenient and profitable to steal than to create something of your own. A whole generation of programmers was unable to create its own programs but could readily understand and improve other programs.

How could borrowing (or more honestly, stealing) foreign intellectual efforts become almost a state policy for informatics and computer science? The reason lies in the deepest contempt for intellectual creative work. In developed countries, copyright laws protect the humanitarian as well as scientific and technological spheres. In the U.S.S.R. , the product of intellectual work does not belong to its author; it does not even belong to the organization within which it is developed.

Unfortunately, this is one of the main reasons for our decline in these disciplines. Why should we invest in products if we can obtain everything free? At first glance, it might seem more profitable to use stolen programs. Most Soviet software is only produced in a few copies, and some programs are used

only by their authors or programming organizations. A special fund of algorithms and programs, state and regional, has existed for many years in the U.S.S.R. Programmers are well aware of the complications they must overcome to incorporate software into this fund.

Some readers may object to my thesis that the cause of all mishaps in Soviet informatics and computer science lies in copying. What about the international tendency toward unification of computer architectures and software? Clones of the Intel 8086 chip are produced not only in the Soviet Union (the KM1810BM86) but also in Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. IBM PCcompatible computers are produced not only in the Soviet Union (where they are called Iskra-1030 and ES-1840) but by hundreds of companies in dozens of other countries.

But there are differences: Unlike companies in the U.S.S.R. , other countries' companies buy licenses and technologies. Buying technologies gives them a lead in time (Southeast Asia begins to copy new American products within several months, while the U.S.S.R. waits several years) and quality (the reliability of Taiwan-made microcircuits surpasses that of masterpieces produced by the Soviet Ministry of Electronic Industry).

Long ago the U.S.S.R. brought itself into information dependence on the U.S. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was little support for the rare attempts at independent hardware and software development. The absence of competition led to the loss of objective quality criteria and the attempt to improve the product.

There is a saying among Soviet programmers: Programs may be bad, good, or working. We like good programs very much. Americans prefer working programs. Because the working programs and hardware are useful, the Soviet dependence on American information technologies grew, and that dependence became marked when personal computers appeared on the scene. Bypassed by the Personal Computer Revolution With the advent of personal computers, a revolution broke out in the world, but it bypassed the U.S.S.R. Its leaders noticed nothing. Soviet industries, infamous for their immobility and habit of copying foreign models, failed to produce decent computers. Even substandard computers were manufactured in such small lots that you could not speak seriously about the computerization of the country.

Alarm was raised. Many famous specialists expressed apprehension and offered constructive steps. Legislative acts were issued, new departments were formed, production plans were set up and failed. Ershov, who was well aware of the danger of further decline in informatics and computer science, put forward a slogan: ''Programming is the second literacy.''

That slogan did the trick: It drew attention to the problems of computerization and education in informatics. A vast educational program was started, and informatics became an obligatory school subject. However, the pioneers of this process assumed that industry would provide schools with the necessary equipment within two to three years. Industry failed, and in most schools, the subject is taught on paper only. Students are lucky if they are able just to look at a computer two or three times a year. Thus, the students become indifferent, or they do not like the subject. In many cases, the teachers set the tone: Informatics and computer science are usually presented by teachers of physics or mathematics who often have only vague knowledge of the subject.

In a paper published in an American magazine several years ago, comparative figures were given on computerization in the U.S., Japan, Great Britain, and other countries. The author was disturbed that the U.S. did not occupy the leading position in the computerization of education. ''We are lagging behind, which may lead to a tragic end,'' the author concluded -- a funny and sad conclusion for the Soviet reader. The U.S.S.R. is not just lagging behind; it is facing the risk that a generation of Soviet citizens will be unable to understand citizens of all but the least developed countries. We Soviets risk separating ourselves with a new curtain -- not an iron curtain this time, but a steel curtain of ignorance. We risk finding ourselves alone, because even our CMEA partners are ahead of us by more than two or three years (computerization in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria -- although they do have certain problems -- is decent enough and is improving much faster than the U.S.S.R. 's). A Few Hopeful Signs In recent years, some positive tendencies appeared. Unfortunately, all processes are too slow, and we lack time. Solutions to certain problems are not efficient and often hinder, rather than accelerate, resolution of the problem. However, fine efforts exist, such as the temporary science and technology team, Start, set up in 1985 to design a new generation of hardware and software. The result of this effort is a working model of an original and very promising multiprocessor computer and accompanying original software. Unfortunately, the project ended in spring 1988, and our industries seem to be uninterested in the results of this development.

Nor has there been much interest in the Soviet Academy of Sciences' project Shkola (School), headed by E. P. Velikhov. Shkola was a serious attempt to solve the problems of computerization. Regrettably, no progress has been made. That cannot happen until the national economy is restructured.

But most Soviet enterprises, even in modern spheres like microelectronics, are not interested in developing and improving their production capability. Unfortunately, developments in informatics and computer science require powerful material, information, and technological bases; and it is useless to hope that new Soviet computers may -- even if the developers enjoy the most favorable conditions -- be created in university laboratories or institutes of the Academy of Sciences.

When a successful model is made, there arises a need for large-scale ICs, whose design requires equipment the U.S.S.R. doesn't have. We cannot obtain CAD systems as our foreign counterparts do because we do not have adequate technical resources -- that is, computers and peripherals (e.g., high-resolution displays). These systems belong to enterprises that are uninterested in the introduction of new products. The vicious circle is closed. It may be opened again only as a result of deep restructuring of the economy.

The beginnings of economic self-regulation (a socialist market) is the only chance to catch up in informatics. However, the market mechanism cannot correct the decline. Given the existing (or more accurately, nonexisting) copyright laws, it is more profitable for enterprises to copy products or to buy licenses for production from abroad, primarily from the U.S.

Therefore, together with economic changes (here, let me be a little naive and expect that the ruble will be convertible in two to three years), we urgently need state stimulation of promising areas of science and technology. The state should create economic conditions under which the use of domestic products would be more profitable than the use of foreign products. This may be achieved by a

combination of actions, including judicial, financial, and tax measures. It should be done as quickly as possible; in fact, it should have been done yesterday.

While the creation of hardware requires considerable resources, personal computers greatly reduce such requirements for software. Unfortunately, the U.S.S.R. suffers from a deficit of equipment, and its prices are 150 times higher than those of the U.S. (neglecting the symbolic exchange rate and considering real wages, the state price for a professional personal computer is about 40,000 to 50,000 rubles, while a qualified programmer earns about 300 rubles a month).

This was why programming and mediator cooperatives and Centers of Scientific and Technological Creative Work of the Youth were created for the development of software products. It is curious that mediator organizations, although charging up to 50 percent of the contract cost for establishing relations between a customer and a developer, found themselves in very favorable conditions.

Currently in the economy, such mediators are necessary. However, in the future, programming should be recognized as a free, creative trade, and the organizations should be able to conclude direct contracts with the programmers. (This is possible today, but the job is paid from the organization's wage fund, and this is highly unprofitable for the organization.) A Soviet ACM In the U.S., public organizations like the Association of Computer Machinery have had a great effect on computer science. The absence of such an organization in the U.S.S.R. has hurt the development of informatics and computer science. The functions of such an organization were often borne by state working groups and committees of the Academy of Sciences, especially the Commission for System and Mathematical Software for Computers (the so-called Ershov's commission, headed by Andrei Ershov). Such organizations could deal with scientific and technical problems, but not with the social and judicial aspects of informatics development. Until recently, the creation of a public organization that could deal with all the existing problems was impossible, because such an organization could threaten the departments' monopolies.

On February 17, 1989, the All Union Society of Informatics and Computer Science was convened. About 200 voting delegates and 700 guests gathered for the inaugural congress and were handed the new society's draft charter (anonymous, as usual). Unfortunately, its authors thought traditionally; the charter did not address problems like the protection of authors' rights, public examinations, the organization of an information exchange, and so on. The only new idea was the creation of self-supporting Centers of Scientific and Technical Services run by the society; that is, another group of mediator organizations. The society was to be a consultative body of the State Committee for Informatics and Computer Science of the U.S.S.R. , the same body that had initiated the formation of the society. The state committee had decided to create a society in its pocket, and the draft charter left departmental interests associated with informatics and computer science intact.

The absence of openness and democracy at the congress resulted in an organization that was composed of delegates who had no idea how or when they were elected to their positions. I. N. Bukreev, a deputy chairman of the state committee, who is now the chairman of the presidium of the society, told one of the congress delegates, ''You were elected by voting secret from you!'' What resulted was a congress made up of delegates representing the leadership of

large enterprises, institutions, or ministerial departments, while the areas of science and technology were poorly represented. Some of the leading scientists in informatics and computer science were not invited, while, as the report of the credentials committee stated, there were 14 delegates without higher education.

Time will show the vitality and usefulness of the All-Union Society for Informatics and Computer Science. I will be glad if it improves informatics and computer science in the U.S.S.R. For now, it seems that users groups -- which in the 1970s played a significant role in spreading information, forming public opinion, and evaluating new software products -- might be more useful. Perhaps they should take on another form, but public initiative is necessary to ensure consolidation of forces at the upper level. Some timid, positive attempts have been made, such as the creation of clubs of professional programmers in Leningrad and other cities, which may be the basis for uniting efforts by the leading qualified developers.

This article contains words of sorrow. The current state of Soviet informatics is not happy, and there are no promising perspectives for tomorrow. Those involved in informatics and computer science can only look to the future for some hope. --

35TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

February 25, 1991

SECTION: Vol. 204; No. 8; Pg. 29

LENGTH: 8265 words

HEADLINE: Moscow and Beyond: 1986 to 1989; Book reviews

BYLINE: Scammell, Michael

BODY:

Moscow and Beyond: 1986 to 1989

I.

Not nearly enough has been understood about the role of human rights movements in promoting the recent political transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the discussion of communism's downfall, a great deal has been written about the overextension of empire, the failure of central planning, the lack of industrial development, the weakness of agriculture, the evils of bureaucracy, and the breakdon of the Party; and it would be foolish to deny the importance of any of these factors in contributing to this epochal collapse. Still, most of these shortcoming were present in the Communist system since at least the Second World War, and many of them date back all the way to the October Revolution. How is it that they assumed such importance in the mid-1980s, and became decisive in 1989?

There was clearly a major failure of will at the top: the governing apparatus grew fatigued, the Party sclerotic, the nomenklatura coccupted by its absolute power. Still, someone was needed to notice the fatigue, to probe the sclerosis, to contest the power, and finally to offer a viable alternative to the system, thereby undermining its legitimacy and preparing its downfall. The Reaganites and the neoconservatives would like us to believe that it was American resolve that accomplished these things; and American intrasigence certainly played its part in encouraging and hastening certain internal processes.

Yet the largest shareof the historical credit, it seems to me, should go to the human rights activists throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, to the "dissidents," as they came to be called. It was they who first perceived the gravity of the crisis into which the Communist system had brought itself; they who sacrificed their work, their careers, their families, and sometimes their lives to challenge its hegemony; they who unfailingly drew attention to the appalling mess caused by the disintegration of the system; and they who prodded a quiescent population into supporting a plausible opposition. Many of them have now reaped the reward, if reward it be, of replacing their former oppressors in the highest reaches of government, or of leading the opposition in the merging consitutional democracies.

The true magnitude of thei achievement, however, goes beyond the practical and the pragmatic. What has been consistently overlooked, in the East and the West, is the vital role the human rights has played as an ideological force.

The New Republic (c) 1991 IAC

Throughout its history, and almost until the end of the Brezhnev period of "stagnation," communism miraculously retained a moral edge. Somehow the suspicion remained that it was ethically superior to the ideologies and the systems that opposed it, especially to capitalism. It is not so very long since even Brezhev's functionaries enjoyed that smug sense of ideological superiority that came with being "on the side of history," which was Marxism-Lenism's great gift, of course, the confidence that put so many of its opponents on the defensive, even when reason told them otherwise. Nobody could have guessed, when Brezhnev became First Secretary of the Party in 1964, that the still inchoate, unsystematized, and wimpish doctrine of human rights, which was just beginning to take shape in parts of Europe, would flourish and expand until it challenged and then overthrew the invicible doctrine of clas struggle, economic rights, and universal equality.

The strength of human rights as an idea and an ideal derived from the fact that it was deeply rooted in notions of the dignity and the autonomy of the individual, who could not be arbitrarily abused or persecuted in the name of any group or collective. Thus, when Amnesty International was founded in London in 1962, its organizers anchored themselves to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression"), and them set about applying its principles to all individuals everywhere, whatever their status, class, race, religion, or nationality, or the political complexion of their governments. Amnesty also established a miraculously simple mechanism whereby individuals in countires where these principles were respected could intercede for those in places where they were not. It became a grassroots organization of a new type, domestic and personal in its day-to-day operations (individuals writing petitions for individuals), global in its application.

Amnesty spawned a multitude of similar or more specialized groups and galvanized existing organizations into fresh activism. By the mid-170s there was a rapidly growing network of highly motivated and increasingly efficient human rights bodies that united activists from the more or less democratic countries into a powerful extraterritorial citizens' lobby. They would not have had anything like the impact they ultimately achieved, however, had persecuted minorities in other parts of the world not begun simultaneously to grope their way toward a similar doctrine of individual rights, and to see in these ideas the only possible platform on which to oppose abuses of overwhelming power.

This was especially true in two areas of the world that, according to the political categories of the cold war, appeared to be ideological opposites: Latin America, with its fascist-type military dictatorships of the right, and the Soviet bloc, with its Communist dictatorships of the left. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the tasks of the opposition were very different from those in Latin America. Civil society, as most of the world knows it, had been destroyed and supplanted by a Communist Party whose organizations and representatives penetrated every social organism, every street, and every building. No group or organization was allowed to operate independently of the Party or its control, not even the church (although the degree of control of the different churches varied from faith to faith and country to country, Poland being the freest in this respect). Every attempt to maintain an independent point of view, or to create an independent organization of any kind, was ipso facto subversive, counterrevolutionary ("he who is not with us is against us"), the result of false consciousness and "bourgeois" thinking--in a word, treason.

What the idea of human rights offered individuals confronted by this crusingly monolithic system was a seemingly non-subversive ("non-ideological") platform from which to oppose it. There was nothing obviously contradictory between the rights of the individual to freedom of opinion, belief, assembly, and so on, and the rights that were supposedly conferred by Communist ideology. From Stalin onward, Communist Party leaders took great care to include these rights in their written constitutions, even if they had invariably reserved to themselves the crucial "righ" to determine how all those other rights should be interpreted. And so, in the early 1960s, when a more universal idea of human rights began to gain ground in Western countries, there seemed some hope that the Communist interpretation of human rights might converge with it. Indeed, the strategy of early Soviet dissidents like Alexander Esenin-Volpin and Valery Chalidze was precisely to force the Soviet authorities to observe their own laws, their own legal enshrinement of some of these rights.

After the invasion of Czecholsovakia in 1968, it became clear that "convergence" was out of the question. It was then that other dissidents, not only in the Soviet Union but also in Poland and (somewhat later) in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, set out on the long march to create an ethical and social alternative to communism, to establish an informal set of institutions parallel to, and independent of, official structures in their countries--to create, in other words, a civil society. In every case, their guide and their goal was the protection of the human rights of the individual.

For these stirrings to take place, there had to be a long period or growth and development, during which individuals and groups appeared who grasped the essential principles of human rights, assimilated them, and began to apply them in their own surroundings. Many of these individuals seemed to come out of nowhere and achieved public notice for the first time as already fully fledged "dissidents," usually as a result of being persecuted or put on trial or jailed. But others came from established positions in all walks of life; their transformation into opponents of the regime was a personal response to the ethical dilemmas posed by their ways of living and working. They emerged slowly, step by step. The moment of their transportation from "loyal citizen" to "dissident" is impossible to determine. What is certain, however, is that such people almost never turned back.

II.

Among these latter individuals, no example is more dramatic than that of Andrei Sakharov. What makes Sakharov's career so absorbing and so emblematic, as both volumes of these memoirs demonstrate, is not simply the fame that he won at the end of his life as the Soviet Union's most eminent and powerful "dissiden," or the enormous distance that he traveled from darling of the establishment to persecuted pariah, but the really heroic grandeur of his psychological and introspective theoretical physicist to a fearless public defender of human rights.

There seemed to be little in sakharo's brilliant early career as a scientist to indicate the crises that lay ahed. In 1948, at the age of 27, one year before the Soviet Union exploded its first atom bomb, he was invited to join the research team of Igor Tamm, which was already working to develop an even more powerful weapon. For twenty years, in Moscow and at a secret research center in Turkmenia in Central Asia, known by the Orwellian code name of the Installation, Sakharov labored loyally in the service of this cause. Owing to

the secrecy of the operation, he lived in virtual anonymity. But his role was pivotal, and he came to be known as the "father" of the Soviety H-bomb.

He was loaded with honors. In 1953, when the first Soviety thermonuclear device was exploded (trailing the Americans by about nine months), Sakharov was rewarded with the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, a Stalin Prize worth half a million rubles, an expensive dacha in an exclusive suburb of Moscow, and access to luxury stores reserved for top members of the nomenklatura. That same year he became the first person ever to be elected to the Soviety Academy of Sciences by a unanimous vote. Two years later, in November 1955, Sakharov and his fellow scientists successfully tested their first H-bomb, this time about a year and a half behind the Americans. It was a stnning achievement for the generally backward Soviety scientific estabishment, and it landed Sakharov a second Hero of Socialist Labor medal and a Lenin Prize.

But it was then that Sakharov experienced his first twinges of doubt about the morality of nuclear weapons. In 1958 he published a scholarly article on the genetic effects of radioactive fallout from weapon testing, in which he calculated that the nuclear bombs tested by both sides up to 1957 would probably result in the untimely deaths of a half-million people. Sakharov also took issue with Edward Teller's views on the efficacy of mutually assured deterrence, and argued that "peacful coexistence, disarmament, and, above all, a halt to nuclear testing" was the best route to "a better life for all of mankind" (the latter phrase was taken from one of Teller's books). But his qualms were stated in an article commissioned and disseminated by the Soviet government. It hardly qualified as dissent.

Still, a seed had been planted. Three years later Sakharov experienced his first real crisis, when Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would break a previously agreed-on moratorium with the West, which Sakharov wholeheartedly supported, and resume nuclear testing unilaterally. In 1961, at a Kremlin meeting between government leaders and nuclear scientists, Sakharov boldly sent a note to Khrushchev suggesting that such a step might jeopardize the test ban negotiations and the cause of disarmament and world peace. Khrushchev angrily responded with a reprimand in front of the other guests:

Sakharov . . . has moved beyond science into politics. Here he's poking his nose where it doesn't belong. You can be a good scientist without understanding a thing about politics . . . Leave politics to us--we're the specialists. You make your bombs and test them and we won't interfere with you, we'll help you.

Sakharov, well aware of his special status, was suitably chastened by Khrushchev's remarks, and for the time being he chose to obey his political masters, though not without misgivings. At a meeting the following month, Khrushchev inquired whether Sakharov realized his error. "My opinion hasn't changed," replied Sakharov, "but I do my work and carry out orders." The orders this time were to test a device of record-breaking power nicknamed "Big Bomb." Sakharov agreed to the test, on the condition that he could test a "clean" version of the bomb, which would reduce its absolute power and also the amount of radioactive fallout produced. The bomb was successfully exploded in 1961, and a few months later Sakharov was awarded his third Hero of Socialist Labor medal, which was personally pinned on by Khrushchev, with a Russian bearhug and a kiss.

In 1962, however, Sakharov experienced a more serious crisis. East and West were testing again. The Soviets had set up two nuclear fission installations in place of one, on the principle that competition between the two experiments would accelerate progress, and they proposed to test their next device also in two versions. Sakharov was appalled. He was prepared to accept a single test, but he calculated that a second test would cause at least 100,000 unnecessary deaths from the extra fallout. He fought the decision all the way up to the Politburo, and even called Khrushchev to oppose it. But he failed, and his memoir reveals that "it was a terrible defeat for me. A terrible crime was about to be committed, and I could do nothing to prevent it. I was overcome by my impotence, unbearable bitterness, shame, and humiliation. I put my face down on my desk and wept."

All of this was, of course, far from the public eye. Sakharov was still virtually unknown outside the Soviet scientific establishment, and the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963 allowed him to assuage his doubts and to maintain his loyalty without doing further violence to his conscience. Apart from a brief and fiery campaign to defeat the election of a Lysenko protege to the Academy of Sciences, he retired into the shadows of anonymity again to devote himself to studying the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, and to exploring the intricacies of "grand" cosmology. But he could not insulate himself entirely from weapons development, nor could he ignore continuing Soviet discussions throughout the 1960s about military strategy. He came to the conclusion that thermonuclear war was being discussed as a real possibility, as a "fact of life":

I could not stop thinking about this, and I came to realize that the technical, military, and economic problems are secondary; the fundamental issues are political and ethical. Gradually, subconsciously, I was approaching an irrevocable step--a wide-ranging public statement on war and peace and other global issues. I took that step in 1968.

The step in question was the publication of Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom, Sakharov's first and most celebrated book. It made him a celebrity and a "dissident" overnight, although he and his family and his friends were hardly aware of it at the time.

How did it come about that it was Sakharov who broke out of the charmed circle of privilege and power and declared his public opposition to the government's policies, rather than, say, his distinguished mentor Tamm, or any of the other equally brilliant and skeptical colleagues described in these pages? Few of them, according to Sakharov, had any genuine illusions about the political masters they served, yet not one was prepared to push his dissent to the point of public disagreement.

A recurring theme of Sakharov's memoirs is his singular apartness from the mainstream of Soviet life. His background was typical enough for a member of the Soviet intelligentsia. There were lawyers, priests, and teachers among his forebears. Both his parents were teachers, and after the October Revolution the family had been "compressed" into an overcrowded communal apartment, with primitive services and very little space or comfort. Unlike most people in their predicament who were forced to share with strangers, four branches of the Sakharov family were able to live together, thus preserving a modicum of privacy and intimacy. Andrei (who was born in 1921) and his younger brother Georgi grew up in a cozy, protected environment that cushioned them from many of the

rigors of life in postrevolutionary Moscow.

There was also the larger-than-life-size figure of his successful father. Although he taught physics until almost the end of his life, Dmitri Sakharov was best known as the author of popular scientific works such as The Struggle for Light, and of textbooks such as Problems in Physics, which went through thirteen editions and brought him considerable sums of money. The son adored the father, whom he describes as gentle, wise, and compassionate, with a great sense of humor and a capacity for enjoying life. He was fond of that most un-Russian saying, "a sense of moderation is the greatest gift of the gods," which was to have considerable influence on his son.

Dmitri was deeply devoted to his children, and determined to give them the best education possible. Still, it comes as something of a shock to learn that Sakharov received the first seven years of his education almost entirely from private tutors, and continued to be tutored at home even after entering high school in 1934. One of those tutors was his father, who took it for granted that the son would study physics--which he did, graduating from high school as one of only two honors students in his class and thus gaining entry to the physics department of Moscow University. In 1942 he graduated from the university with a brilliant record, completing a five-year course in four years owing to the outbreak of the war.

Sakharov's sheltered background appears to have endowed him from the beginning with a certain aloofness. He writes that he made "no friends and no enemies" at high school, and no friends at the university until his last year there. He hardly noticed when several of his classmates left to dig anti-tank ditches, or when several failed to return. When called for enlistment himself, he failed both the aptitude test for the air force and the medical test for general military service, and was eventually assigned to a cartridge factory, where he was so maladroit that he was sent out to chop trees. When he was transferred to quality control in the blanking shop, he enraged his bosses by refusing to turn a blind eye to rusty shell casings. Only when he made it into the laboratory did he distinguish himself: he invented a device for testing the hardness of armor-piercing shells, for which he received 3,000 rubles and a patent for his design.

There is a curious paradox in this mild-mannered young physicist's attraction to working with armaments. In wartime, this was perhaps inevitable, and Sakharov spent the rest of the war perfecting shell designs. But after the war, too, while working on relativity theory at the Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, he kindled to news of the atom bomb, and dreamed of improving upon existing devices. When nuclear fission research was introduced into the Physics Institute, he did not hesitate to join, and threw himself with zeal into the quest for a superbomb.

In his memoirs, he offers a variety of explanations for his single-minded obsession of the time. One is summed up in Fermi's famous remark that research on thermonuclear explosions was "great physics," or, as Sakharov puts it, "a genuine theoretician's paradise." A second reason was the freshness of the memory of the recent world war: it, too, was an "exercise in barbarity," so that the inhuman nature of the bombs that he was trying to build seemed no worse than what had gone before. And third, the Soviets shared American beliefs about strategic parity and the value of deterrence--for their own side, of course.

But ultimately something more intangible was involved:

Our initial zeal . . . was inspired more by emotion than by intellect. The monstrous destructive force, the scale of our enterprise and the price paid for it by our poor, hungry, war-torn country, the casualties resulting from the neglect of safety standards and the use of forced labor in our mining and manufacturing activities, all these things inflamed our sense of drama and inspired us to make a maximum effort so that the sacrifices--which we accepted as inevitable--would not be in vain. We were possessed by a true war psychology, which became still more overpowering after our transfer to the Installation.

So it was a matter of politics all along. The memoirist, to his credit, does not skirt his own cold war attitudes, or his personal responsibility for developing the bomb, and some of his most fascinating pages are devoted to the morality of this issue, particularly when he comes to discuss the Oppenheimer-Teller conflict.

Sakharov sympathizes with Oppenheimer in these pages. He is aware of the resemblance of his own later behavior to Oppenheimer's. And yet he decides, paradoxically, in favor of Teller, on the grounds that the Soviet government of the time would never have honored an American-Soviet agreement to abandon research on the H-bomb. "Any U.S. move toward abandoning or suspending work on a thermonuclear weapon would have been perceived either as a cunning, deceitful maneuver, or as evidence of stupidity or weakness." In Sakharov's view, it was not the principle of Oppenheimer's dissent, but its timing, that was wrong:

I cannot help but feel deeply for and empathize with Oppenheimer, whose personal tragedy has become a universal one. Some striking parallels between his fate and mine arose in the 1960s, and later I was to go even further than Oppenheimer had. But in the 1940s and 1950s my position was much closer to Teller's, practically a mirror image . . . so that, in defending his actions, I am also defending what I and my colleagues did at the time.

The publication of Reflections in 1968 might be described as Sakharov's abandonment of Teller's position for Oppenheimer's. It started him down the path that was to take him "even further" than the latter's. And his timing, in retrospect, was also not fortuitous. The "thaw" that had begun in all areas of Soviet life after Stalin's death, and especially after Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956, had ground to a halt by the early 1960s, and it was beginning to be reversed even before Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964. The trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966 indicated a decisive turn by Brezhnev's regime toward neo-Stalinism.

It also demonstrated, however, that a significant number of Soviet intellectuals, including many form among the scientific elite, were not ready to reverse themselves easily. It was the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, together with a series of connected trials of Ginzburg, Bukovsky, Litvinov, and others, that radicalized the Soviet intelligentsia, and led to the formation of what was to become a powerful and vocal dissident movement, with civil and human rights as its battle cry. Sakharov was still remote from those circles, but he signed at least a couple of the protest letters that began to circulate at that time (including one on behalf of Sinyavsky and Daniel), and he wrote Reflections under the immediate influence of the Prague Spring, on which so many Soviet intellectuals had pinned their hopes for liberalization at home. When

Czechoslovakia was brutally crushed, and Sakharov was dismissed from the Installation on security grounds, he was brought face to face not only with his own powerlessness, but also with the powerlessness of Soviet intellectuals generally to influence the course of political and social events. And he finally understood how devoid of rights, whether human or civil, the individual in Soviet society was.

The subsequent speed of his transformation into a dissident and human rights activist was breathtaking. In 1969 he still considered himself a part of the establishment: "Although I had bluntly criticized many official actions and offered advice concerning future polity, deep down I still felt that the government I criticized was my government." In 1970 he was still expecting to be able to get Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, on the telephone. As late as 1971 he had plans for a personal meeting with Brezhnev. With Reflections, however, he had crossed A Rubicon.

In no time at all he was swiftly sought out by some of the most prominent dissidents in the land. Solzhenitsyn, himself officially silenced by censorship, sent Sakharov his criticism of Reflections and visited him to discuss them. Valentin Turchin (the author of a work, similar to Sakharov's, called The Inertia of Fear) enlisted Sakharov's support in writing an appeal to Soviet leaders for democracy and intellectual freedom. roy Medvedev, whom Sakharov had first met in 1966, and who also signed the Turchin appeal, persuaded him to intervene on behalf of his twin brother, Zhores, who had just been incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital. And Valery Chalidze accompanied Sakharov on his first trip to observe a political trial and later enrolled him, somewhat against his will, in Chalidze's newly founded Committee on Human Rights.

It was through Chalidze that Sakharov met Elena Bonner, the woman who was to have a profound influence on his further development. It appears to have been love at first sight. He was emotionally ripe for it: his first wife, Klava, had died of cancer in March 1969. Although he is reticent on the subject, it would appear that their marriage was less than happy; there are amply hints that Sakharov's relations not only with her two children were not very close. Sakharov himself had been remote emotionally and physically, having spent many years closeted at the Installation in Central Asia, swallowed up by research and professional duties. Perhaps he recalled the troubling last words of his father, who died in 1961: "When you were at the university, you said that uncovering the secrets of nature could make you happy. We don't choose our fate, but I'm sorry that yours took a different turn; I imagine you could have been happier." It was not clear whether his father was speaking of personal or professional matters, but after the appearance of Reflections his Aunt Tusya told Sakharov that his father would have been proud of him.

Bonner, a pediatrician, was the daughter of two distinguished Old Bolsheviks, the Armenian revolutionary leader Gevork Alikhanov and Ruth Bonner, a descendant of Siberian Jews. In 1937 her parents were arrested in one of Stalin's purges and Alikhanov was killed in the camps (Ruth survived and died in 1987), wrenching the 14-year-old Elena and her brother from their privileged home and depositing them with their impoverished grandmother. Despite this tragic, though typical, background, Elena was a loyal Soviet citizen; she had even joined the Party in the mid-1960s. But the invasion of Czechoslovakia radicalized her, too, and in 1970, when Sakharov met her, she had just involved herself in the Leningrad hijacking trial, in which one of the principal

defendants was her friend Edward Kuznetsov. The Kuznetsov and two others were condemned to death, Bonner displayed incredible energy and ingenuity in organizing their defense. Sakharov was drawn into it, and their joint efforts in that passionate, humanitarian campaign seem to have cemented their love. In January 1972, mainly at Sakharov's insistence, they were married.

Thereafter there was hardly a case or a cause in which Sakharov and Bonner were not engaged: the incarceration of healthy people in insane asylums, the expulsion of the Crimena Tatars, freedom of religion, freeedom to emigrate, repression of the ethnic Germans, censorship, suppression of the samizdat Chronicle of Current Events, the Borisov-Fainberg case, the Bukovsky case, the Krasnov-Levitin trial, the Yakir-Krasin trial. From composing another closely reasoned missive to the authorities on economic, social, and foreign policy (the "Memorandum" of 1971), Sakharov progressed to writing statements on violations of human rights, letters of protest, and appeals for persecuted individuals.

The culmination of this first burst of activity came in 1973 when Sakharov, together with Solzhenitsyn, became the object of a virulent hate campaign in the Soviet press, as well as the victim of numerous provocations. By now the two giants of the dissident movement had become a factor in foreign policy. those were the days of detente ("a polite form of the cold war," Sakharov called it), when Nixon and Kissinger were cozying up to Brezhnev and moving toward a form of condominium based on the superior force of the two superpowers. Brezhnev wanted access to American credits and technology, but Congress and the American people had their eyes on the Soviet government's treatment of its dissidents and its suppression of human rights, and preferred to listen to Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, whose message was that that Soviet leadership was cruel, unprincipled, and unreliable. how could one trust the foreign policy, they argued, of a government that persecuted its own citizens? It didn't cut much ice with the White House, but Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment and Brezhnev's version of detente virtually collapsed.

Sakharov is exceedingly interesting on the subject of his relation with Solzhenitsyn during this period. The two men respected one another, but Solzhenitsyn was irritated by Sakharov's openness to all comers and by his readiness to espouse all forms of protest, and Sakharov found Solzhenitsyn unduly calculating in his campaigns. Sakharov reports that he was chilled, as early as 1970, by Solzhenitsyn's response to a question about what to do on behalf of two celebrated and harshly persecuted dissidents: "Nothing! They attacked the enemy with a battering ram. They chose their own fate and can't be saved. The attempt would only harm them and others." Later, in 1973, when both men were under fire, Solzhenitsyn sent his second wife to remonstrate with Sakharov over the jackson-Vanik amendment, saying that it was biased in favor of the Jews and did nothing to solve Russia's other problems. At their last meeting in the Soviet Union, a few months later, Solzhenitsyn reproached Sakharov for his alleged willingness to emigrate, ignoring the fact that Sakharov's plan to go abroad was motivated by a desire to save his stepchildren from persecution. His intention, undoubtedly unrealistic, was to return to the Soviet Union immediately.

The two men were vastly different in background, upbringing, temperament, character, and personal convictions. It was inevitable that they would disagree about almost everything, and they did. In 1973 Solzhenitsyn published his Letter to the Soviet Leaders, which was in essence a reply to, and a polemic with, Sakharov's Reflections. Sakharov responded with a criticism of the

Letter, to which Solzhenitsyn replied again. The debate between the conservative, traditionalist author and the liberal, democratic scientist re-enated in many ways the old battle between Slavophiles and Westerners. It continues to this day: Solzhenitsyn's latest recommendations for political change, How Are We to Reorder Russia? , appeared in the Komsomolskaya Pravda in November, while the anniversary of Sakharov's death last month brought admiring recapitulations of his philosophy.

The personal fates of the two protagonists also diverged after 1973. In January 1974 Solzhenitsyn was arrested and deported to West Germany. Sakharov remained to continue his personal crusade, and it is typical of his single-mindedness that, having embraced the cause of human rights, he should carry his campaign to its logical conclusions. It was not sufficient for him to write articles and protests, telephone, lobby, talk to foreign journalists, attent trials, even demonstrate in support of his goals, as someone of his eminence might be expected to do. In Junu 1974, during President Nixon's visit to Moscow, he decided on the extreme measure of a hunger strike. Had he been a writer, one might have suspected him of seeking material--and it is not difficult to understand some of Solzhenitsyn's exasperation with the seeming naivete and pig-headedness of some of Sakharov's tactics. But as these memoirs show, they were brilliantly of a piece with the man.

Sakhavov had thoroughly assimilated the principles that were painfully worked out by the pioneers of the dissident movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. The principles were these: that to oppose the Soviet regime successfully, one had to be absolutely true to one's convictions, never compromise where moral values were concerned, maintain complete openness in a society obsessed by secrecy, and above all hold fast to one's inner freedom whatever the cost. Similar principles were being worked out by dissidents in many of the other countries of Eastern Europe, in a movement that would acquire an irresistible momentum in the years to come. In the early 1970s, however, there was nothing inevitable about that momentum.

These exacting principles were fiendishly difficult to live up to in daily life. almost a saintly patience and devotion to the cause were requred, the qualities that so many of hte dissidents displayed, at least in their finest moments. In the event, the principles withstood the test of practice and fueled all the leaders of the human rights movements throughout the Soviet bloc, endowing them with amazing strength and durability. Sakharov was to become one of the finest of those leaders, in the courage of his personal behavior and in the clarity of his thinking. He quickly grasped that the dissidents were engaged in a mortal struggle with a dying ideology, and that, although that ideology would, in its death throes, continue to claim many victims, the idea of human rights was intrinsically superior.

This was a truth that Jimmy Carter, drawing on the experience of the civil rights movement in the United States, also intuited when he threw the weight of the American government behind the drive for human rights and welcomed their entrenchment as a natural and rightful extension of the ideas of American democracy. sakharov immediately recognized the importance of this step when he heard about Carter's inaugural address, with its statement that "our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for human rights." Though he did not approve of Carter's inconsistency in his subsequent policies toward the Soviet Union, Sakharov writes that "the fact remains striking that for the first time the head of a

great power had announced an unambiguous commitment to the international defense of human rights."

The Soviet leaders, too, had recently been forced to pay lip service to human rights by agreeing to "basket three," the provision about respect for human rights established by the signatory sattes of the Helsinki Final Act in the fall of 1975--the same year that Sakharov published My country and the World and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "his love of truth and strong belief in the inviolability of the human being." The Soviets had done everything they could to water down and to restrict the provisions of basket three, but they had not foreseen that they would be faced with an American government (backed by Western European leaders) that was serious about human rights for the first time since the war. Basket three presented human rights groups throughout the Communist bloc with an unexpected polical lever with which to pressure their repressive governments.

The Helsinki Final Act gave the West an ideological edge. the words "human rights" began to appear with increasing frequency on the fron pages of Pravda and other Soviet newspapers, and no matter how they were twisted and turned inside out to mean their opposite, or unfavorably contrasted with the "economic rights" supposedly guaranteed by the Soviet citizens to read and to digest. As Simon Leys recently noted about China, you know you have won the debate when your opponent begins to use your ideas; and so it was in the Soviet case, although few realized it at the time. The very readiness of the Soviet press to argue the merits of human rights was a battle lost, even if the larger war was to continue for another ten years. For this reason, if any American administration deserves the historical credit for promoting the democratic revolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it is Carter's more than Reagan's.

But ten years is a very long time. Sakharov was obliged to embark on many more hunger strikes, to endure unspeakable privations before the goal was reached. The middle section of his Memoirs reads like a Who's Who of the dissident world, like an encyclopedia of Soviet trials and Soviet repression. Sakharov was to see close friends imprisoned, exiled, sent abroad, or killed. His children and step-children were victimized and forced to emigrate. His wife had her near-blindness exploited and was herself humiliated before she could obtain medical treatment. The culmination came with Sakharov's public opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan, his exile to Gorky, and his six years of dreadful persecution and blackmail, including hospitalization and brutal force-feeding. Bonner has already written eloquently about the Gorky period in Alone Together, her book on the same subject; Sakharov adds new details on those harrowing events, but he does not change our understanding of them.

III.

The Memoirs end with Gorbachev's historic phone call to Sakharov in Gorky in December 1986, informing him that the decree on his banishment had been rescinded and that he and Elena Bonner could return to Moscow. The next (and last) three years of Sakharov's life are described in Moscow and Beyond, which Sakharov completed literally on the eve of his death. Moscow and Beyond is more than a coda to the Memoirs. It is a dramatic eyewitness account of the birth of the parliamentary process in the Soviet Union, and of Sakharov's participation, first reluctant and then selflessly energetic, in that process as the uncrowned leader of the opposition.

By the time Sakharov returned to Moscow, Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika were reasonably well advanced, and Gorbachev himself, in his speeches and in his book Perestroika, was expressing many of the very ideas for which Sakharov had been punished and sent into exile. Sakharov was skeptical at first. But unlike many of his fellow dissidents, he did not console himself with bitter jokes and personal recriminations against the Soviet leaders, nor did he take a pessimistic view of the political processes under way in his country. He concluded that Gorbachev meant business, that the reforms were serious and genuine, that the dissidents had in effect won their initial battle against the system. The important thing was to build on that victory, to entrench the gains that had been made.

Some of Sakharov's dissident friends feared that he was badly informed and gullible in his support for Gorbachev, but not for a moment did Sakharov lose his head or allow himself to be co-opted. From Gorky he had mailed Gorbachev a long list of political prisoners whose release he demanded as a sign of Gorbachev's good intentions, and whom he referred to again in their telephone conversation. Many were being set free, but Sakharov continued to pressure the government for swifter action. Although his ill treatment in gorky and already in his mid-60s, he was indefatigable in championing the rights of the uprooted Crimean Tatars, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Sumgait, the Georgians slaughtered in the streets of Tbilisi, the Meskhetians in Uzbekistan, the independence movements in the Baltic states, and countless individuals. He traveled personally to Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of a fact-finding mission, to Komi in Siberia in support of an imprisoned dissident. He became an active member of the governing council of the Memorial Society, an unofficial organization set up in early 1988 to commemorate the millions of political prisoners who had died in the Soviet Union during Soviet rule. He supported demands for full openness about the Chernobyl disaster, and he championed the publication of The Gulag Archipelago.

Everyone wanted his views on every conceivable aspect of Soviet policy, and his answers were treated with as much respect as if he had headed a party of millions. Finally, in January 1989, he bowed to the inevitable and acceded to multiple requests to stand for elections to the reorganized Congress of People's Deputies. There were some near-farcical maneuverings at the Academy of Sciences to deny him the nomination, but in May he was comfortably voted in with a group of similarly liberal colleagues. Almost at once he became one of five chairmen of the main parliamentary opposition, the Interregional Group of Deputies. (Yeltsin was, and remains, another.)

By this time Sakharov had met Gorbachev face to face, once at a meeting of the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity (" . . . he appeared intelligent, self-possessed, and quick-witted in discussion, and the policies he was pursuing at the time impressed me as consistently liberal"), and again at a meeting between Gorbachev and leading representatives of the intelligentsia, where Sakharov angered the president by his spirited defense of the Armenians. In the Soviet parliament, however, the two men clashed repeatedly. It began on the very first day of the Congress, when Sakharov opposed the automatic election of Gorbachev as president without a proper debate, and demanded that the Congress be given increased powers for its work. A testy Gorbachev responded by announcing that all speeches, including Sakharov's, would be limited to five minutes, in effect cutting him off in mid-flow. It was a pattern that was repeated at future sessions of the Congress, culminating in the famous incident when Gorbachev switched off the

loudspeakers while Sakharov was still speaking. (He had already switched off the television cameras when challenged from the floor by a member of the Interregional Group of

Deputies.)

Sakharov's account of the Congress fills the last chapter of Moscow and Beyond and is a wonderful climax to the memoirs as a whole. In these last pages, we observe Sakharov emerging as the undisputed leader of the Soviet opposition, the only man in the Congress with the courage, the vision, the depth of knowledge, and the breadth of understanding to go head to head with Gorbachev. Gorbachev himself seems to have recognized the fact; when Sakharov walked out during the voting for president, Gorbachev sought him out to ask why. Sakharov was approached by Gorbachev's closest aides, Alexander Yakovlev and Anatoly Lukyanov, to discuss contentious issues on the agenda, and finally, at the beginning of the second week, Gorbachev acceded to Sakharov's request for a personal meeting to discuss some of their main differences. The old dissident, with his usual bluntness, went straight to the point:

Mikhail Sergeyevich . . . there's a crisis of trust in the leadership and the Party. Your personal authority has dropped almost to zero . . . The country, and you personally, are at a crossroads--either accelerate the process of change to the maximum, or try to retain the administrative-command system in all of its aspects. In the first case you will have to rely on the left and you'll be able to count on the support of many brave and energetic people. In the second case, you know yourself whose support you'll have, but they will never forgive you for backing perestroika.

Gorbachev replied that he was tied to the policy of perestroika forever, but that he was against "big leaps" and dramatic gestures, and he was convinced that the people would understand him.

After some further discussion, Sakharov returned to his main point: "I'm very concerned that the only political result of the Congress will be your achievement of unlimited personal power--the 18th Brumaire in contemporary dress. You got this power without elections, you weren't even on the slate of candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and you became its chairman without even being a member."

Gorbachev: "What's the matter, didn't you want me to be elected?"

Sakharov: "You know that's not the case, that in my opinion no alternative to you exists. But I'm talking about principles, not personalities. And besides, you're vulnerable to pressure, to blackmail by people who control the channels of information. Even now they're saying that you took bribes in Stavropol, 160,000 rubles has been mentioned. A provocation? Then they'll find something else. Only election by the people can protect you from attack."

Gorbachev: "I'm absolutely clean. And I'll never submit to blackmail--not from the right, not from the left!"

The frankness of Sakharov's account of these meetings is extraordinary in the context of official Soviet reticence and the half-truths that pass for political memoirs in that country. One of the great virtues of his second volume is the light it throws on the negotiations of the Soviet political establishment in