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Research Memorandum

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research

May 3, 1991

Russians Favor Political Pluralism, Some Private Ownership

This report presents findings from a USIA-commissioned survey of the adult population of the RSFSR, the largest of the Soviet republics. Interviews were conducted with 1,989 adults, 18 years of age and older, between February 15 and March 1. Russians comprise 82 percent of the RSFSR's population.

Key Findings:

- Seven-in-ten RSFSR residents have at least a fair amount of confidence in the Soviet Army. Half have such confidence in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and in RSFSR leader Boris Yeltsin. About a third have confidence in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in Soviet President Gorbachev.

- Support for the ruling Communist Party (CPSU) remains weak. Only a quarter have confidence in the CPSU, and just a third view it as the sole political force capable of governing in the decade ahead.

- Support for a free press and political pluralism has risen over the past year. Today, three-quarters of RSFSR adults say that citizens should have the right to publish newspapers with any political orientation, and six-in-ten say the country needs a multiparty system.

- A majority of RSFSR residents favor a mixed economy with limited private enterprise. Six-in-ten feel the government should allow peasants to own, buy, and sell land and permit citizens to own small- and medium-sized businesses. Only three-in-ten, however, feel the government should permit citizens to own large businesses employing 200 or more workers.

- Half deem it permissible for some people to become very wealthy if they contribute to the society's well-being. On the other hand, two-fifths believe that no one should become much richer than others.

Background

This survey was conducted in the weeks preceding the March 17 Soviet referendum on a "renewed federation of sovereign republics." Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had pressed for the plebiscite in the hope of obtaining a mandate for

his proposed Union treaty.[1] During this period, the political conflict between President Gorbachev and RSFSR leader Boris Yeltsin sharpened. In a February 19 television address, Yeltsin called for Gorbachev's resignation and the transfer of power to the Federation Council made up of republic leaders.

Public Has Confidence in Army, RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and Yeltsin

RSFSR residents were asked how much confidence they have in various Soviet institutions and leaders. Seven-in-ten have at least a fair amount of confidence in the Soviet Army. Half have such confidence in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and in RSFSR Chairman Yeltsin. About a third have confidence in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in Soviet President Gorbachev, and only a fourth have confidence in the CPSU. (Figure 1, Table 1)

Figure 1: Confidence in Institutions



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[1] Although a majority of all eligible voters voted "yes" on the referendum, the outcome revealed deep divisions in society. Six of the 15 republics boycotted the referendum, and parallel balloting in Russia and Ukraine showed substantial support for Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian independence. See "Gorbachev's Mandate for Stalemate," USIA Research Memorandum (M-54-91), April 17, 1991.

A comparison of these ratings with results of USIA-commissioned surveys conducted in the RSFSR in March and July 1990 reveals the following (Table 2):

- Confidence in the Soviet Army has remained relatively constant. In each survey, about two-thirds of the RSFSR citizens polled said they had at least a fair amount of confidence in the Army.

- Confidence in the Russian and Soviet legislatures has increased over the past year. The proportion expressing at least a fair amount of confidence in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet rose from 37 percent in March to 51 percent in February. Confidence in the USSR Supreme Soviet rose from 42 percent to 51 percent during the same period.

- Confidence in President Gorbachev dropped from 44 percent last July to 35 percent in February. (The question on confidence in the President was not asked in March, when the office was created.)

- Confidence in the CPSU has remained low and, if anything, may have declined slightly (30% last March, 27% this February).

Majority Supports Press Freedom and Political Pluralism

During the past year, a number of steps have been taken to create the legal basis for a more pluralistic political order. In February 1990, the CPSU relinquished its claim to being the leading political force in society, and the following month the USSR Congress of People's Deputies removed the reference to the CPSU's leading role from Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution. In June, the USSR Supreme Soviet enacted the Law on the Press which, on paper, banned censorship and created the legal basis for the establishment of independent newspapers. In October, the Soviet legislature passed the Law on Public Associations which provided procedures for the registration of political parties in 1991.

The latest poll results show wider support for freedom of the press and political pluralism in the RSFSR than there was last March:

- Three-quarters (73%) now agree that citizens should have the right to publish newspapers with any political orientation (55% strongly support this view). The proportion endorsing freedom of political expression stood at 56 percent last March.[2] (Figure 2, Table 3)

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[2]On the leadership's recent efforts to restrict the media's freedom, see "Whither Glasnost?," USIA Research Memorandum (M-61-91), April 26, 1991.

- Six-in-ten (60%) believe the country needs a genuine multiparty system; a quarter does not. The proportion saying a multiparty system is needed stood at 49 percent last March. (Figure 2, Table 3)

- Six-in-ten (57%) reject the view that the CPSU is the only political force capable of governing the country in the decade ahead. A third accepts this position. These results are much the same as those in the July survey (the question was not asked in March). (Table 3)

Figure 2: Support for Political Pluralism, 1990-91



RSFSR Public Favors Mixed Economy With Limited Private Ownership

Opinion polls show that many Russians have become disillusioned with the Soviet Union's centralized socialist economy. According to the latest survey, half the RSFSR adult population feels either that Soviet socialism was flawed from the beginning and could never meet the people's needs (18%) or that socialism's possibilities are exhausted (31%). However, about four-in-ten (37%) maintain that socialism is sound and has a future.[3] (Table 4)

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[3]The proportion saying that socialism was a mistake or has exhausted its possibilities is at the same level that it was last July, up from 37 percent in March. The proportion saying that socialism has a future is above the July level (28%) and is close to the level last March (40%). The percentage with no opinion has declined (23% in March and July, 14% in February).

Over the past year, laws have been enacted which expand the opportunities for private enterprise in the USSR to a limited degree. In March 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet approved Principles of Legislation on Land which liberalized the laws governing the use of agricultural land, but stopped short of legalizing private ownership of farms. In December 1990, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet passed a law which legalized private ownership of agricultural land, but stipulated that owners could only sell land to the state. In April 1991, the USSR Supreme Soviet enacted legislation permitting the establishment of private businesses, the hiring and firing of workers, and other business practices.[4]

When asked what kind of economic system they prefer, a majority (55%) of RSFSR adults favor improving the existing system and having a "mixed" economy based on private as well as state and cooperative property. The remainder are divided. A fifth (19%) want to strengthen the socialist system and prohibit all private property. About the same number (16%) take the opposite position, asserting that the country should dismantle the socialist system and move to an economy based primarily on private ownership. (Table 5)

Majority Endorses Private Farms and Small- to Medium-Sized Businesses

Support for a mixed economy is reflected in responses to questions about particular types of ownership. Six-in-ten RSFSR adults believe the government should allow peasants to own, buy, and sell land and should permit citizens to own small- and medium-sized businesses.[5] Half say the government should promote the

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[4]The "General Principles of Entrepreneurship" have the declared objective of "creating conditions for the broad manifestation of citizens' economic initiative and enterprise based on the realization of the principle of equality of all forms of ownership and freedom to dispose of property and to select spheres of activity." The law supplants the USSR law on individual labor activity adopted in 1986. *Pravda*, April 11, 1991, p. 2.

[5]A survey conducted in the RSFSR in late February 1991 by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) also finds majority support for private ownership of farms. Six-in-ten (57%) of those surveyed feel that the recent RSFSR legislation permitting private ownership of land is in the people's interests; two-in-ten (19%) think it is not. Although a majority endorses the buying and selling of land by private owners, the Russian public is divided over the conditions of its sale: four-in-ten of all respondents (39%) think that private owners should be permitted to sell their land only to the state, as stipulated by the RSFSR legislation; three-in-ten (28%) say they should be free to sell it to anyone. R. Volkova and N. Popov, "How Much Land Should One Person Own?," *Izvestiia*, April 3, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91-068, 8 April 1991, pp. 20-21).

further development of cooperatives.[6] Only three-in-ten, however, feel the government should permit citizens to own large businesses employing 200 or more workers. (Figure 3, Table 6)



Half Say It is Permissible for Some to Be Very Wealthy

When asked whether it is acceptable for some people to become much richer than others, half (49%) the RSFSR residents say it is permissible for some people to be very wealthy if their activity contributes to the society's well-being. On the other hand, a sizable minority (40%) maintain that under no circumstances should a person be allowed to get much richer than others because such inequality would be unjust.[7] (Table 7)

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[6]Russians have had more experience with cooperatives than with private businesses. Many criticize them for price-gouging and other unsavory practices.

[7]Not surprisingly, persons who support various forms of private ownership are much more likely to countenance inequality in wealth than are those who oppose private ownership.

Research Memorandum

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research

July 12, 1991

AMERICAN AID TO RUSSIA
Failures and Successes in a Century of Controversy

Summary:

At the "G-7" summit in London, Western leaders confront the problem of whether and how best to help the USSR in a time of crisis. The problem has been a recurrent one, going back to Tsarist times. The efficacy of past U.S. aid programs has largely been determined by the ups and downs of Russian internal politics:

- U.S. credits in 1917 failed to keep Russia fighting World War I or save its fledgling democracy.
- The sharp reversibility of Kremlin policies was dramatized in 1927, when Stalin revoked Lenin's 1921 market reforms and then drove out Western businessmen.
- Clarity of purpose and strong leadership from Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt enabled two U.S. emergency programs -- famine relief in 1921-23, lend-lease in 1941-45 -- to succeed. Both are still warmly remembered.
- For four decades after 1944, the Kremlin's repressive domestic and aggressive foreign policies precluded significant economic relations with the West.
- Aid to *perestroika* thus far has been vitiated by Communist political maneuvers and bureaucratic resistance. Even now, as Gorbachev woos Western aid, top Kremlin officials openly oppose it, while Baltic and some other Soviet reformers urge the West to exact political concessions.

The Soviet situation today resembles politically unsettled 1917 more than it does the emergencies of 1921 or 1941. Despite the promising accords between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, traditional Communist power structures continue to impede reform and seek to limit or manipulate Western aid. Before considering a "new Marshall Plan" for the USSR, therefore, Western leaders have been insisting on further Soviet progress toward democracy, devolution and arms reduction.

-- **End Summary**

Feuds With the Tsars

From 1882 on, every year saw resolutions introduced in the U.S. Congress to curb trade with Russia in protest against Tsarist political repression and official anti-Semitism. In 1891, the Congress declined to respond to an appeal by Tolstoy and others for relief to famine victims in the Volga valley. (Private agencies provided some aid.) In a precursor of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the Senate in 1911 voted to abrogate the U.S.-Russian commercial treaty; President Taft promised to negotiate a new one addressing Congressional human-rights concerns.

1917: Too Little, Too Late

President Wilson was quick to hail the March 1917 revolution that overthrew Tsarism, to recognize Russia's new Provisional Government, and to offer "all moral and material assistance." Credits were offered even before Wilson's April 6 address to the Congress urging a declaration of war on Germany, in which he described Russia as "a fit partner for a league of honor."

U.S. aid efforts were aimed, almost exclusively, at keeping Russia in the war (the Allies blocked the new Russian Government's efforts to promote a general peace "without annexations or indemnities"). Wilson sent a high-level civilian-military commission headed by Elihu Root, former Secretary of State and War, to Petrograd in June 1917 but largely ignored its political recommendations.[1]

Russian leaders sought $5 billion in credits to continue the war through 1917: $1 billion from the U.S., the rest from Britain and France. The U.S. extended $325 million in credits between May and October, but these efforts proved too little, too late once the Germans repelled a Russian Army offensive and launched their own advance. A right-wing coup attempt opened the way to Lenin, who had vowed in 1914 to "turn the imperialist war into a civil war" and in 1918 did so.

ARA Famine Relief, 1921-23

After a devastating civil war, worker, peasant and sailor revolts in March 1921 forced Lenin to abandon his policies of "War Communism," but his turn toward market reforms came too late to avert widespread famine and a typhus epidemic. In response to a public appeal for relief from novelist Maxim Gorky, a dramatic U.S. aid program saved millions of Russian lives. The American Relief Administration's efforts between September 1921 and July 1923 were recognized as a model of

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[1] Alarmed by the torrent of anti-war propaganda financed by Germany, Root urged creation of a Russian news agency to distribute U.S. news, mass distribution of pamphlets and leaflets, and organization of YMCA units in the Russian Army. Root sought immediate outlay of $100,000. The State Department ignored his request. Commission members were eventually reimbursed for $30,000 expended out of pocket.

effective humanitarian aid by Soviet leaders of the day[2] as well as the outside world. ARA's effectiveness in Russia owed much to Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, and the experience he and ARA had earlier gained elsewhere in war torn Europe.

At a cost of some $80 million[3] and with an in-country, largely volunteer staff of some 300 Americans, the ARA and U.S. volunteer agencies working with it:

- Fed more than 20 million Russians between Petrograd and Odessa (at the peak in August 1922, some 6.3 million children, and almost as many adults);
- Carried out what Hoover called "the greatest foreign peacetime medical crusade ever undertaken" (1.6 million people were vaccinated, 6.8 million were inoculated; millions of tons of medical supplies were supplied to 16,000 Soviet hospitals and other institutions caring for a million patients);
- Provided millions of tons of cloth and clothing; 166,000 tons of vital seed grain; and $10.7 million in special assistance to Russian intellectuals.

Clarity of purpose, rapid response, attention to detail and unified command characterized the ARA's efforts:

- The mission was defined as aid to the peoples, especially the children, of Russia. Hoover distinguished "between 140,000,000 terrorized Russian people and the one or two million Communists who oppressed them."
- Hoover offered ARA aid "subject to certain conditions." The conditions, embodied in the Riga Agreement of August 20, 1921, compare favorably with those negotiated with Soviet authorities in later circumstances.[4]
- President Harding stipulated that "the distribution in Russia of all charity arising in the U. S." be carried on solely through ARA, which coordinated

[2] A scroll presented to ARA in July 1923 by the Soviet Government, signed by acting Premier Lev Kamenev, declared that "the people inhabiting the USSR will never forget the help given them by the American people, through the ARA, seeing in it a pledge of the future friendship of the two nations." Under Stalin, who executed Kamenev and other moderate Communists as traitors, Soviet media and Communists worldwide vilified Hoover, minimized ARA relief and linked it to "spies" and "saboteurs."

[3] Resources included Congressional appropriations ($18.6 million); Army medical supplies ($5 million); ARA funds ($10 million); the American Red Cross ($4.9 million); voluntary agencies ($15.3 million); individual food drafts ($9.3 million); volunteer staff services ($5 million); and $11,357,325 in Soviet gold.

[4] They included full freedom of movement for ARA staff; "complete freedom" to hire their own Russian employees and organize local ARA units; cost-free provision of offices, store-rooms and residential quarters; "complete freedom" in the use of all communications facilities; free transportation, etc.

the work of reputable volunteer agencies and excluded dubious operators.

- Various Communist efforts to control or disrupt ARA work were repelled by prompt protests to higher officials. ARA terminated its program on learning that Moscow intended to export an expected grain surplus in 1923.

Many Soviet children saved by ARA in 1921-23 fought in the war of 1941-45. At recent USIA exhibits in the USSR, American visitors have been thanked anew for ARA relief, as well as World War II aid, by Soviet survivors or their families.

Americans and the NEP

The 1920s showed how sharply Soviet policies could be reversed, absent democratic institutions and the rule of law. Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), proclaimed in March 1921, restored a free market in agriculture, created a gold-backed parallel currency (the *chervonets*), encouraged small private enterprise and offered "concessions" on 20-year lease to foreign companies to develop Soviet resources. Armand Hammer and W. Averell Harriman were among U.S. entrepreneurs who took part. Ford equipped a major auto plant at Nizhny Novgorod; U.S. engineers helped design the Magnitogorsk steel plant and other key installations.

In 1927, however, Stalin began dismantling the NEP to pursue rapid industrialization and forcible farm collectivization. Western companies and experts were soon forced out of the country. During the 1932-33 famine induced by his policies, Stalin sought no foreign relief but exported grain; 10 million Soviet citizens perished.

Lend-lease, 1941-45

Within days after the Nazi attack on the USSR June 22, 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt pledged all-out aid to the Soviet war effort. Both were determined not to repeat World War I tragedies: collapse of the Russian front, murderous trench war on the Western front. They also recognized the threats posed to effective aid by Nazi submarine war, rival resource claimants and their own bureaucracies. FDR personally set aid priorities in 1941-42; a key lieutenant, Harriman, served him first in London, then (1943-45) in Moscow.

In the summer and fall of 1941, Stalin was desperate for political as well as material support[5]; Western special envoys extracted political concessions.[6] Allied

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[5] On July 31, he asked Harry Hopkins to tell FDR that he would "welcome American troops on any part of the Russian front under the complete command of the American Army." Later, he urged Britain to "land in Archangel 25 to 30 divisions or transport them across Iran to the southern regions of the USSR."

[6] *E.g.*, renunciation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the Soviet release of 60,000 Polish prisoners to the West.

aid began flowing to the USSR long before Pearl Harbor. Hundreds of British Spitfires and other allied war planes helped halt the Wehrmacht at the gates of Moscow. (By mid-1942, Britain had sent Russia 1,800 planes and 2,400 tanks.) As the tide of battle turned, however, Stalin became increasingly less responsive.

By 1943, U.S. war production and aid deliveries, hampered at first by domestic bottlenecks and Nazi U-boats, were in high gear. By mid-1943, the U.S. had sent 4,100 planes, 138,000 trucks and jeeps, and 912,000 tons of steel to the USSR. The Kremlin later disparaged Allied aid but, as independent Soviet media have recently confirmed, millions of Russians have always understood that U.S. lend-lease played a decisive role in averting defeat and winning victory on the Russian front.[7]

Four Decades of Cold War

Communist policies of "international class struggle," based on an autarchic war economy, dictated Soviet economic relations with the West for the next 40 years. At the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, the USSR rejected participation in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In 1947, Stalin kept the USSR and Eastern Europe out of the Marshall Plan, which drew successfully on Hoover, Harriman and many of the personnel as well as the cumulative experiences of ARA and Lend-lease.

Stalin's heirs sought limited Western aid and trade (*e.g.*, importing U.S. grain) while pursuing traditional political priorities. Moscow's bid for U.S. aid under the Nixon-Brezhnev *détente* of 1972 was nullified by the Jackson-Vanik amendment and other laws prompted by the Soviet Iron Curtain. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), sought by Moscow to stabilize East-bloc frontiers, generated manifold challenges to Soviet human-rights practices but little economic aid. The invasion of Afghanistan brought a U.S. grain embargo and other sanctions. All-out pursuit of the arms race led to economic and political crisis.

***Perestroika* and Beyond**

Five years' talk of *perestroika* produced little change in the primacy of Kremlin politics over economics, including prospects for Western aid. "Ideological" scruples prevented privatization of land or a NEP-like monetary reform to establish a convertible currency. Since 1988, the Soviet Government has been printing paper

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[7] Between October 1, 1941 and May 31, 1945, at a cost of $11 billion, 1,660 ships left from U.S. ports with 16.5 million tons of supplies for Russia; 15.2 million tons arrived safely. U.S. aid included 14,700 planes, 7,000 tanks, 415,000 field telephones, 375,000 trucks, 52,000 jeeps, 35,000 motorcycles, four million tires, 1,900 steam locomotives, 11,000 freight cars, 2.6 million tons of petroleum products, hundreds of thousands of tons of armorplate, aluminum, copper, zinc, explosives and chemicals, 4.5 million tons of foodstuffs, 107 million yards of cloth and 15 million pairs of army boots. (The British sent another five million pairs of boots.)

money to avoid choosing among conflicting domestic priorities (military-industrial demands, consumer goods, minimal social welfare standards) -- thereby devaluing the ruble, spurring inflation and increasing foreign debt.

The "war of laws" since 1990 between the traditionalist Union "Center" and the rebellious Soviet republics has been as much a struggle over the pace and breadth of economic liberalization as it has been over the devolution of power and resources. Not surprisingly, the "secessionist" republics have been most radical in this respect, with autonomy-minded Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakh leaders not far behind.

While political uncertainties may inhibit large-scale credits from Western governments, the Union Government has yet to create economic conditions attractive to private investment. With some notable exceptions reflecting near-heroic efforts (*e.g.*, McDonalds on Pushkin Square), two-thirds of Western and local Soviet attempts at "joint ventures" have been frustrated by the central economic bureaucracies.

Kremlin politics have also affected humanitarian aid. President Reagan's dispatch of medical aid after the Chernobyl disaster (1986) and relief after the Armenian earthquake (1988) were warmly welcomed, but the impact of such aid was soon overshadowed by Moscow's politics-first approach to both tragedies.[8] The primacy of politics over economics was also evident in three more recent episodes:

- West European offers of $10 billion in credits to reequip Soviet consumer goods industries in 1988-89 mostly went unused. The Soviet Government, primarily responsive to military and energy interests, had few consumer projects to propose. Last winter, $5 billion of the offered credits were taken up to meet overdue payments on prior Soviet debts.

- After 1989 the Kremlin "punished" East European countries that had rejected Communism by insisting that future transactions be at world prices in hard currency. This cut East European-Soviet trade by half, penalizing Soviet consumers who relied on East European goods to relieve Soviet shortages.

- Last summer and fall, as Gorbachev wavered on economic reform, Western grain imports piled up on the docks of Odessa while nearly half of the record domestic harvest failed to reach Soviet consumers. One reason for this calamity, according to liberal Soviet media, was that the Army had commandeered limited railway capacity to move thousands of tanks and armored vehicles beyond the Urals in an effort to evade an arms-reduction treaty.

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[8] Amid protests from Ukrainians and Belorussians, Moscow ministries enlisted pro-nuclear experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of their efforts to minimize continuing dangers from Chernobyl. On arriving in the Armenian earthquake zone, Gorbachev's first move was to order the arrest of local nationalist leaders. (One of them has since become Armenia's President.)

Such episodes help explain widespread Soviet popular distrust of the Union "Center" and support for Boris Yeltsin and other republic leaders urging devolution and more rapid reform. The popular pressures reflected in the miners' strikes and Yeltsin's election as Russian President led Gorbachev once more to contemplate reforms and to seek assistance from the West. As Gorbachev sought such aid, however, his Premier, Defense Minister and KGB chief variously disparaged or warned against it (KGB chief Kryuchkov alleged a CIA plot, dated 1977, to "occupy" the USSR through intellectual agents of influence). Meanwhile, Baltic leaders and some of the more radical democratic spokesmen like chess champion Gary Kasparov urged the West to demand basic political changes before giving a dime.

Historical Lessons

While designers of future U.S. aid programs for Russia can learn much from the conduct of ***ARA, Lend-lease,*** the Marshall Plan and later aid endeavors that drew on the earlier programs, the current situation in the USSR is not comparable to the crises of 1921 or 1941. No one is starving, and the main military threat in the country is to Baltic and Transcaucasian peoples from Kremlin armed forces.[9] Moreover, one clear lesson of the rise and fall of the *NEP* is that Western leaders must look beyond plans for economic reform to the power-political context in which they arise.

Since 1989, Soviet analysts have compared their historically "open" situation to that of the summer of *1917* or winter of 1916-17, with the old imperial order crumbling and revolutionary forces on the rise. Again, Western expressions of interest in stability (albeit in a new, evolving framework) have sometimes struck observers as incongruent with popular aspirations for radical discontinuity (or resumption of pre-Communist continuities) -- particularly those aspirations that invoke Wilson's promise of self-determination. 1991 differs from 1917, however, in the absence of war and in the existence of skeletal if imperfect constitutional frameworks, and internationally recognized standards, that may enable "post-Communist" forces to achieve their objectives through democratic elections and/or referendums.

The current aid discussion arises largely from the hopes for a peaceful Soviet transition raised by the latest Gorbachev-Yeltsin "truce." The scenario outlined in the April 23 accord signed by nine republic leaders and Gorbachev called for conclusion of a new Union Treaty this summer, adoption of a new Constitution six months later, and new free elections in 1992. But even Step One has not been easy. Hardliners have denounced the current treaty draft as a "sellout" of Union prerogatives, while pro-independence demonstrations led the Ukrainian parliament to defer discussion until September. Nor did the "9 + 1" accord address the crisis in the Baltic states.

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[9] Kremlin renunciation of force toward these peoples has already emerged as a "silent" precondition for even minimal Western aid. More formal guarantees, perhaps the actual withdrawal of Soviet forces, may be required to reconcile Western publics to the large-scale assistance needed to renew Soviet society.

Western good wishes and technical aid alone seem unlikely to forestall new dramas. It is to be hoped, although it is by no means inevitable, that the outcome will be happier than it was in 1917.

The current situation in the USSR and Eastern Europe also recalls ***Western Europe in 1945-46***, to which the U.S. responded in 1947 with the Marshall Plan. Then, too, after years of devastation, social stability seemed at the mercy of a harsh winter, and problems transcended national boundaries. However, the war damage then posed relatively simpler problems than the deformation of Soviet and East European societies since 1914 and 1939 respectively. (The West European private sector, independent labor movements and democratic political parties were largely intact in 1945; their equivalents are only now being recreated in the East.) There have also been major changes in Western financial balance sheets: The U.S. economy is burdened by debts and deficits; West Europeans are no longer poor relations.

These changed conditions largely explain the Western tendency, apparent since 1988, to spread the effort of aiding the USSR beyond bilateral frameworks and to involve various multilateral institutions. The World Bank, IMF, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Development Bank did a joint survey of the Soviet economy last year and will likely become more involved. The European Community and CSCE will also doubtless have roles to play.

However, basic political decisions will be made by Western political leaders, and the most glaring difference between the Soviet-East European scene today and the Western Europe of 1947 is political: In 1947 Nazism and Fascism were certifiably "dead." But the continuity of Communist power structures in the USSR, including the party, KGB and a huge military machine, remains unbroken. These unreformed structures continue to impede peaceful domestic evolution and (despite the "new thinking," for months now under hardline fire in Moscow) to cast an ambiguous shadow westward, as witness uneasy Kremlin relations with Poland.

These historical perspectives help explain why Western leaders, in reviewing Gorbachev's new reform plans and aid proposals, have also been looking for fairly firm commitments to further Soviet progress toward democracy, devolution and arms reduction. It remains to be seen whether Gorbachev can make such commitments.

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Department of Justice

"THE RULE OF LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION: A NECESSARY FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM"

REMARKS

BY

DICK THORNBURGH
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE THE

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

WASHINGTON, DC
TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1990

Whether or not the present 28th Communist Party Congress in Moscow is, as some predict and more hope, a true precursor to the "withering away of the party," the extraordinary debate which is taking place in that forum parallels in important ways President Gorbachev's stated desire to create a "law-based state" -- a Soviet Union founded on the rule of law.

Heritage Analyst Leon Aron has identified the creation of "a government vested with authority and having enough legitimacy to administer the very bitter pill of radical economic reform. . .as the central and most urgent issue of Soviet politics today."

It is my view, in the context of recent exchanges between the Department of Justice and our Soviet counterparts, that the rule of law provides the only basis upon which such a government can eventuate from the upheaval presently under way in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Our October 1989 trip to the Soviet Union -- the very first by a sitting United States Attorney General -- occurred at the very beginning of the Supreme Soviet's effort at institutional reform -- and enabled us to open an historic, and continuing, dialogue on the rule of law and human rights.

It was a remarkable experience. At the invitation of Soviet Minister of Justice, Venyamin F. Yakovlev, we met for a week with Soviet leaders in the fields of law enforcement and the

administration of justice -- ministers, jurists, law students, even the Chief of the K.G.B., Vladimir Kryuchkov. Our agenda was a full one, devoted to topics central to what makes our democracy work: our Bill of Rights, our federal system, the principle of separation of powers, with its checks and balances, our two-party political process -- all from that curriculum of liberties we teach (but don't always learn) in our basic high school civics courses.

And I have to credit our Soviet hosts, even at that early juncture, with a bold exercise in pursuing political discussions which were open and free-ranging, covering everything from our mutual interest in stopping international terrorism to their obligation -- as we see it, and they increasingly recognize it -- to allow freer emigration of Soviet Jews. But our talks still took place within an historical legal context that must be understood, if their present difficulties are to be fully recognized, or ever surmounted.

To summarize abruptly a great deal of history, Soviet justice derives from three legal traditions: customary law among the peasantry, the imperial law of the Czars, and, much later, the Romanist law of civil codes. Customary and imperial law have had by far the overwhelming impact, creating a government of men above the law, from the Mongols to the boyars to the Czars and

beyond. Various formal codifications of imperial law did appear. But the operative legal power was still vested in what we commonly know as the ukase. "A proclamation of a Russian Czar," as Webster's says, "having the force of law."

This violently changed -- yet did not really change -- when the Bolsheviks came to power. Initially Lenin abolished imperial law, along with private property, and set up the people's courts. Judges were instructed to follow the decrees of the revolution -- or their "socialist conscience." Later, Lenin and his successors moved to keep authoritarian sway over the courts by what became known as "telephone justice." Party officials frequently rang up judges, who then ruled in particular cases according to what the party told them to do. The ukase had been reduced, by 20th century technology, to a phone call. The legalistic way was prepared for Stalin's Moscow show trials during the Great Terror and, thereafter, the habitual subordination of the law to party interests.

Against this unpromising background, so-called "new thinkers" in the Soviet Union have now embarked upon what appears to be a truly idealistic and laudable attempt to establish the rule of law -- or in Gorbachev's words, a "law-based state." Could it actually happen? So often you hear it optimistically

said: remember that Mikhail Gorbachev was trained as a lawyer. Yes, but so was Lenin.

The chances are certainly there -- as we saw during that week, and continue to see as we visit with Soviet officials and lawyers, both here and in the Soviet Union. Indeed, we are presently preparing for a return visit by Minister Yakovlev next month to extend our dialogue on democracy. But chances of success in this endeavor must always be measured against the long fatigues of history -- the institutional neglect and political disrespect for what we know as the rule of law.

What is really missing is what might be called a "legal culture." Time and again, for example, we found an almost naive belief that all that was needed was to pass the correct statutes, to get the right laws on the books to create a "rule of law." We did our best to try to disabuse them of this legalistic and somewhat simplistic notion. Laws on the books, we explained, must be conscientiously obeyed and impartially enforced within a structure, and through a process, recognized and acknowledged by all. . .citizen and bureaucrat alike.

The rule of law works in a democracy, we pointed out, because of the supremacy of the judiciary, because men adhere to

a government of laws, and act to see that the laws are enforced, in such ways that no man is above -- or below -- the law.

Happily, the very things the Russians found most curious about our democracy let us discuss those practices in our law that really make our democratic process work. Our Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Jack Matlock, reports this phenomenon is common -- as Soviet citizens seek him out to gain insight into the functioning of the most basic of American institutions. Soviets quiz him on remarkably practical questions. If the Russians are writing a law on the press, they might query, for example, "How do Americans treat libel law? What can your press say? What can it not say?"

One of the first, most insistent questions I was asked by nearly everyone was, inevitably, a constitutional one: how does your federal system work? How did you weld together the separate states as the United States? How do you keep things from falling apart through incessant struggles between the national government and 50 different state governments?

Obviously, they are worrying about the unrest among their own Republics. You only need look at the independence movements in Lithuania and the other Baltic states -- as well as similar secessionist rumblings in the Republic of Russia, under Boris

Yeltsin, and most recently, in Uzbekistan -- to understand their anxiety. They are also looking to us for ways, if you will, to deal with their own diversity.

We gave them a very pragmatic answer to these inquiries. We did our best to explain, "Look, this is the way we do it, but the central thing about our system is its accommodation to change. Most of the mechanisms and components of our government are designed to accommodate change. And mastering that process is going to require far more than just the passage of new laws by the Supreme Soviet." It is going to take a commitment to the lawful, democratic process, and we tried to emphasize legal process -- due process of law -- even over substantive rights, as the true safeguard of the people's liberties.

Again, they asked us often, and in much confusion, about the separation of powers. The idea of deliberately building in a tension between separate branches of government -- our concept of checks and balances -- was extremely puzzling to them and, to some, utterly incomprehensible. Accustomed to their own monolithic system, they would have to struggle hard to understand, for example, Justice Brandeis' observation that we adopted the separation of powers in 1787 "not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable friction incident to the

distribution of government powers among the [branches], to save the people from autocracy."

* * *

We called attention to their own guarantees of civil rights under the Soviet constitution. There they are, all fully documented, like our own Bill of Rights. Only there is also the carefully worded escape clause: "Civil rights shall be protected by law --" Just as our rule of law would hold -- but with this kicker. "-- Except as they are exercised in contradiction to their purpose in socialist society in the period of communist construction."

That, of course, admits the ubiquitous specter of party tyranny. Attempts are being made to toss this offensive language off the train by the new thinkers. But it's not litter down the tracks of history yet. And still to come is the <u>real</u> test as to whether the Soviet courts themselves can and will act to protect the people's rights. In short, will respect for legal process eliminate the prior abuses of "telephone justice"?

True reform must reach down into the legal culture itself, and create an inherent respect not only for individual rights, but for legal procedure and due process. In a statement before

the Communist Party Congress last Monday, K.G.B. Chief Kryuchkov affirmed this elemental truth:

> We cannot speak in favor of the universal development of democracy and at the same time refrain from speaking in favor of law and order, and the supremacy of the law. A society which allows the law to be mocked is a diseased society. . . .

Fine words indeed, but one problem is that much of the motivation for legal reform is coming from a different direction altogether.

The Soviets face one great, dire urgency -- besides national unrest -- and that is their economy. To survive, they must enter the free world marketplace. To do that, they realize they must position themselves to recognize -- and take advantage of -- the rules of free commerce. The rule of law is the fundamental prerequisite for turning away from a **command** economy -- to a **market** economy.

One of the Soviets' principal reasons for their great interest in the rule of law is **just** that -- they have an immediate and pressing need to jump-start their participation in the world economy, to attract foreign know-how and investment. To do that, they realize they must display the predictability and stability that can only emerge from a body of commercial law --

which, in turn, respects the sanctity of contracts and, yes, recognizes property rights as well. Fear of abrogation of contract rights or expropriation of investments can stunt otherwise attractive commercial and industrial initiatives.

This is one reason why property rights have been so hotly debated in the Soviet Union. A young reformer, whom my wife and I met last year, Ilya Saslavski, is involved in a property battle which typifies the disputes taking place on a local level across the Soviet Union. Saslavski, an elected member of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, who is visiting here this week, has announced the take-over -- for ordinary families -- of an apartment building built for the party elite. Though the controversy will be settled in court, such a confrontation would never have been attempted were Saslavski not assured of a favorable hearing from a pro-reform judge. The action taken by Saslavski is but one manifestation of the myriad crises arising as local leaders vie for power in the Communist system which has an endemic antagonism to property rights reform.

On the very day we visited the Supreme Soviet -- a semi-democratically elected legislature, and a developing seat of power -- debate on the subject of property rights went on seemingly endlessly, and with very good cause. The Soviet Constitution says that property belongs to the state alone. But

might such state property be legally leased to cooperative, joint ventures? And how does a Soviet citizen without ownership "act like an owner," as Gorbachev has instructed, or even enjoy "something close to ownership" as espoused by Boris Yeltsin? As we watched, the late Dr. Andrei Sakharov, among others, rose to voice his objections to the Government's bill. Finally, two bills, partially in conflict, were sent off to a commission for a further massaging ... which continues to this day.

* * *

Adept legal accommodation can also be seen in the liberalization of their emigration policies. We are convinced they are now doing their legal utmost to facilitate the issuance of emigration visas -- as a new exodus follows hard upon a rise in anti-semitism in Russia -- but, here again, their interest is not wholly altruistic. They would like to meet the strictures of our Jackson-Vanik legislation in order to secure the most-favored nation status that would much enhance their prestige in world markets.

Still, we must be convinced -- as in so much else undertaken in the name of Soviet legal reform -- that not just the letter, but the spirit, of the law has taken root in the Soviet Union. That is the essence of the agreement reached between Presidents

Bush and Gorbachev during the recent summit, that any trade agreement remains contingent upon legislative action by the Supreme Soviet in support of free emigration. We are, in short, watching to see that opportunities to emigrate are institutionalized in law and practice, and are not just episodic, in the present uncertain flux of Soviet democratization.

All that being said, at the same time, I do not want to downplay their efforts to achieve the rule of law, or underestimate the modern-day difficulties of democratization. Two hundred years ago, we could call upon our English, common law heritage, and an American over-abundance of legal talent, to create our written Constitution, even in crisis. Also, we were then only four million, relatively homogeneous Americans, mostly concentrated on the Atlantic Coast -- not 290 million multi-cultured Soviet citizens, spread across eleven time zones. Moreover, our Constitutional Convention deliberated in secret -- not under glasnost. Imagine, if you will, George Washington on worldwide television, in the midst of a currency crisis, trying to suppress Shay's Rebellion, letting Vermont and New Hampshire pursue Yankeeism in their own way, negotiating with Quaker Solidarity, while trying to cut an arms deal with the British and French to put a cap on heavy frigates. George Washington, you will recall, said not one single word while presiding at Philadelphia.

The Soviets suffer all the drawbacks of history, including their own, most recent, flawed history. But do they now recognize these flaws, particularly in law, and do they sincerely want to counter them by establishing, for example, an independent judiciary -- an institution they have never known, from Czarist times forward? The ultimate answers to those questions are unknown, but there are a few signs of an incipient legality. They have doubled judicial salaries, formerly below the average wage. And -- good news to the Soviet law students I addressed at Moscow State University -- they are allowing lawyers to charge real fees -- instead of a scale of meagre fixed fees (plus money under the table) -- and are taking steps to allow them, actually, to represent their clients.

They have also been struggling to establish a rudimentary mechanism for judicial review -- not unlike our Supreme Court, but far less august and lawfully empowered. A constitutional oversight committee is to review the constitutionality of Soviet law -- in a sharp break with the past. But there are strict limitations upon their powers. The committee is advisory only, and it can rule on Soviet federal law, but not on the laws of the separate republics. In one curious anomaly, if any Soviet law is found to violate human rights -- presumably as defined by the United Nations Charter -- the committee is empowered to declare said law unconstitutional. There is much confusion over how the

constitutional oversight committee will actually operate -- let alone, legally prevail. What is needed -- as Professor John Hazard of Columbia Law School says -- is another John Marshall to arrive on the scene and guide their deliberations.

So there appears to be a will to a rule of law, if still much wandering in pursuit of untried, democratic ways. Going for such high stakes means that it is far too early to determine their chances of success. But I do remind you of two highly successful, post-war experiments in democratic reformations: Germany and Japan. Again, there are large differences in national circumstances -- whole histories, wartime sufferings, other relevant factors. But we have seen the political adaptability of West German democracy overcome many obstacles from the totalitarian German past, and witnessed -- sometimes to our chagrin -- the Japanese experiment's continuing, modern triumph over centuries of emperor-worship. And both experiments were undertaken in similar adversity: by an undone people -- even a conquered people -- in economic extremis, at a moment of deep disillusionment with their own society. Could something far different, yet alike, happen again? For the sake of world harmony, we can hope so, while also providing whatever encouragement is possible.

One final, positive observation. In 1979, when I visited the Soviet Union as a state governor, I found each official session invariably opened with an almost obligatory denunciation of the United States and our system of government. Ten years later, nearly every meeting with our counterparts began with a litany of woes -- their recitation of the shortcomings of their system -- and an almost wistful yearning for more knowledge about how our democracy works.

So I come away from my most recent visit to the Soviet Union -- and our subsequent contacts with their legal delegations -- well aware that Soviet justice does not yet embody what we know as the rule of law, but convinced that patience and example, and even some advocacy, might help certain determined Soviet officials to establish their own rule of law.

Like everybody else's democratic experiment, it will have to be attempted and achieved within their own society. If ever we needed dramatic reinforcement of that truth, it has come from the recent elections in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, East Germany has all but reunited with West Germany after its first free parliamentary election in four decades. On the other hand, Romania seems to have reverted to a government-sponsored vigilantism in the streets following the electorate's return to office of former Communists.

We cannot count upon constitutionalism simply to arise as virtue triumphant from the totalitarian ruins of Europe. Even where constitutionalism seems likely to prevail, the rule of law will be formalized differently by the Czechs, or the Poles, or the Hungarians -- and most certainly, by the Russians. Nobody else but their own judges, lawyers, ministers and citizens can evolve the judicial fairness and institute the legal restraint that underpin any rule of law. And it is only inherent respect for the law -- such as we have seen people steadfastly demanding in the open squares and open parliaments and newly open societies -- that will bring to a tolerable end the last vestiges of tyranny in these formerly closed Communist monoliths.

In sum, only the rule of law can provide a sturdy bridge over the yawning political chasm between upheaval and democracy.

And we will know it when, and if, it appears. By the human rights the rule of law protects, by the governmental powers it limits, by the judicial independence it preserves. We will know it, constitutionally, when we see it. After more than two hundred years of experience and experiment on our own -- who better to judge its emergence elsewhere?

arch Memorandum
J States Information Agency
shington, D.C. 20547
Office of Research

May 28, 1991

Russian Public Divided Over Private Enterprise

This report examines support for private enterprise in the RSFSR, using data from a USIA-commissioned survey of the adult population of the RSFSR, the largest of the Soviet republics. Interviews were conducted with 1,989 adults, 18 years of age and older, between February 15 and March 1, 1991. Russians comprise 82 percent of the RSFSR's population.

Key Findings:

- The Russian public is divided over the extent to which private enterprise should be allowed in the country. Half of all RSFSR adults are "strong proponents" (24%) or "cautious backers" (27%) of greater private enterprise. Slightly less than half are "resisters" (24%) or "hardline opponents" (20%) of private enterprise.

- Young, better-educated, urban, and male RSFSR residents are more inclined to favor private enterprise than are older, less-educated, rural, and female residents.

- Advocates of private enterprise tend to believe that Soviet socialism either was flawed from the beginning or has exhausted its possibilities. Conversely, hardline opponents of private enterprise tend to believe that Soviet socialism is sound and has a future.

- Supporters of private enterprise are inclined to think that large differences in wealth in society are permissible. Opponents of private enterprise more often think it unjust for some citizens to be much richer than others.

- Champions of private enterprise favor political pluralism and democratic reforms. They are more likely than opponents of private enterprise to endorse a free press and a multiparty system, to want further democratization, and to countenance secession by the Baltic republics.

The Question of Private Enterprise in the USSR

One of the most hotly debated issues in Soviet society today concerns how much private enterprise should be permitted. At one extreme are those advocating the dismantlement of the centralized command economy, the breakup of collective

farms, and the privatization of state enterprises. At the other extreme are Communist hardliners who view any moves toward greater private enterprise as a betrayal of socialism.

Faced with a deepening economic crisis, the USSR and RSFSR governments have taken modest steps during the past year to promote limited private enterprise. In March 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet liberalized the law governing the use of agricultural land, but stopped short of legalizing private ownership of farms. In December, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet passed a law which legalized private ownership of agricultural land, but stipulated that owners could sell land only to the state.

In April 1991, the USSR Supreme Soviet enacted "General Principles of Entrepreneurship" which provide legal guidelines for private businesses. This legislation has the declared objective of "creating conditions for the broad manifestation of citizens' economic initiative and enterprise based on the realization of the principle of equality of all forms of ownership and freedom to dispose of property and to select spheres of activity." In the first quarter of 1991, according to official statistics, about 5 percent of the RSFSR's employed population (73 million) worked in the private sector (almost exclusively small-scale farming) and in cooperatives producing goods and services.

RSFSR Public Is Divided Over How Much Private Enterprise to Allow

Results of the latest survey show that the Russian public is more supportive of some forms of private enterprise than others. Six-in-ten RSFSR adults say the government should allow peasants to own, buy, and sell land and should permit citizens to own small- and medium-sized businesses. Half say the government should promote the further development of cooperatives, but only three-in-ten feel the government should permit citizens to own large businesses employing 200 or more workers. Finally, only about one-in-five calls for the wholesale dismantlement of the socialist economic system and the shift to an economy based primarily on private ownership.[1]

According to their responses to five survey questions on private enterprise, RSFSR adults can be divided into four groups. Half of them are supporters of greater private enterprise: **"strong proponents"** (24%) or **"cautious backers"** (27%). Slightly less than half are against private enterprise: **"resisters"** (24%) or **"hardline opponents"** (20%). (About 6 percent of the respondents could not be

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[1]See "Russians Favor Political Pluralism, Some Private Ownership," USIA Research Memorandum, M-67-91, May 3, 1991.

classified because they did not express an opinion on at least three of the five questions. For further details, see the appendix.) (Figure 1, Table 1)

Figure 1: Groups For and Against Private Enterprise



Young, Urban, Better-Educated Residents Back Private Enterprise

RSFSR citizens' attitude toward private enterprise varies by sex, urban/rural residence, age, and education. Men are slightly more likely than women to support private enterprise, and persons living in large and medium-size towns are more likely to do so than residents of villages and small towns. Likewise, persons under 40 and those with higher education are more inclined to favor private enterprise than are older and less-educated RSFSR residents. (Table 2)

As a result, the groups for and against private enterprise differ in their social composition. (Table 3) The sharpest contrast is between the two extreme groups, strong proponents and hardline opponents:

- Strong proponents of private enterprise are mainly men (54%) and persons from large and medium-size towns (60%). Hardline opponents are mainly women (61%) and residents of villages and small towns (69%).

- Half the strong proponents are under 40 years of age; three-in-ten are 50 years old or older. In contrast, only a fifth of the hard-line opponents are under 40; three-fifths are 50 or older.

- Only 15 percent of the strong proponents have a less than a full secondary education, but nearly half (46%) the hardline opponents do.

Supporters of Private Enterprise Lack Faith in Socialism, Say It's All Right for Some to Be Wealthy

Not surprisingly, proponents of private enterprise tend to take a dim view of Soviet socialism. Seven-in-ten strong proponents of private enterprise believe that Soviet socialism either was flawed from the outset (34%) or has exhausted its possibilities (37%). In contrast, a majority (60%) of the hardline opponents of private enterprise feel that Soviet socialism is sound and has a future. (Table 4)

Supporters of private enterprise are more likely than opponents to say it is permissible for some people to be very wealthy if their activity contributes to the society's well-being. Fully three-quarters of the strong proponents of private enterprise hold this opinion. At the other extreme, three-quarters of the hardline opponents of private enterprise consider it unjust for anyone to be much richer than others. (Figure 2, Table 5)

Figure 2: Opinion on Inequality in Wealth



Champions of Private Enterprise Support Democratic Political Reform

Based on their answers to four survey questions, respondents can be classified according to how much they support, or oppose, political pluralism and democratic reform. The strongest supporters of pluralism and democratic reform are those who say the country needs a multiparty system, endorse free political expression in the press, advocate further democratization and a reduction in the central

government's power, and favor allowing the Baltic republics to regain their independence if their peoples want to. The strongest opponents of democratic reform are those who see no need for a multiparty system, disapprove of a free press, say an "iron hand" is needed to restore order in the country, and assert that the Baltic republics must not be allowed to secede. (For further details, see the appendix.)

Advocates of private enterprise mainly support pluralism and democratic reform. Roughly three-in-four strong proponents of private enterprise are supporters of democratic reform. The proportion supporting reform declines to three-fifths among cautious backers of private enterprise, two-fifths among resisters, and one-fifth among hardline opponents. Eight-in-ten hardline opponents of private enterprise oppose pluralism and democratic reform. (Figure 3, Table 6)

Figure 3: Attitude Toward Political Pluralism and Democratic Reform



Prepared by: Richard B. Dobson, R/SU (202-619-5131)
Approved by: Ronald H. Hinckley, Director of Research

M-77-91

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Tony Snow –

The attached language on our Economic initiatives may be helpful for the Moscow speech.

Nick

American Cultural Products Available in the USSR

TELEVISION:

1. Nineteen hours of American programming ran on Soviet Central Television during the week of July 1, timed to coincide with Independence Day. The deal was arranged by William Peck, Managing Director of Worldvision Enterprises, Ltd (UK), one of the largest American distributors of television programming in the world. The programs were provided to Central Television in exchange for advertising time. Chiquita was the only company to purchase time. The series featured popular American network programs, such as:

DALLAS
AMERICAN CHRONICLES (A documentary series produced by David Lynch and Mark Frost)
LITTLE HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE
HIGHWAY TO HEAVEN
BARNABY JONES
Hanna-Barbara animated films

2. The Super Channel and numerous religious broadcasters have sold programs to independent producers who purchase from one to several hours per week of programming from Central Television and the Republic Stations.

3. Cable - American companies are beginning to establish cable networks in major cities of the USSR. International Telcell, Inc. of Greenwich, CT, in a venture with the Moscow Soviet, plans to make eight western cable channels available to the Moscow area this year.

4. USIS distributes quantities of programs (as many as we can buy the rights to) on economics, science and American culture. The PBS series THE AMERICAN SHORT STORY will air later this year.

FILM:

1. HBO will be filming a major project in Moscow later this year starring Robert Duvall.

2. Disney Studios plans to use Moscow as a site for the remake of AROUND THE WORLD IN EIGHTY DAYS.

BOOKS:

1. Recent serious American fiction is hard to find. The following individuals/titles provide some indication of what has been published:

What about Millie?

a. George Bush, LOOKING FORWARD (sold out in two weeks)
b. Gore Vidal
c. Dale Carnegie, HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE (sold 6 million copies)
d. Ray Bradbury
e. Mario Puzo, THE GODFATHER
f. A collection of mystery stories by Ed McBain, Raymond Chandler and Rex Stout
g. Dashell Hammett
h. Ross McDonald
i. Ronald Reagan, SPEAKING MY MIND

2. Contracts that have been signed, but not yet printed:

a. John Irving, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO GARP
b. Richard Nixon memoirs
c. Ronald Reagan memoirs

3. Contracts being negotiated:

a. Tom Clancy, all books
b. Martin Cruz Smith, GORKY PARK

4. Selected USIS titles (we purchase the rights and/or provide subsidy for publication)

a. Herman Wouk, THE CAINE MUTINY
b. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
c. Hine, AMERICA WEST
d. Berger, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION
e. Bell, COMING OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
f. Vaill, MANAGEMENT AS A PERFORMING ART
g. Rhodes, FARM
h. Salisbury, A JOURNEY FOR OUR TIMES
i. Hawken, GROWING A BUSINESS
j. Currie, CONSTITUTION
k. Roan, OZONE CRISIS
l. ReVelle and ReVelle, ENVIRONMENT
m. Blaug, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT
n. Alderman, IN OUR DEFENSE

MAGAZINES:

1. Joint Ventures (published in Russian)

a. READER'S DIGEST
b. BUSINESS WEEK (first western magazine to be printed and distributed in the USSR)
c. INC. (planned to begin publishing in June 1991, not sure if on the shelves yet)
d. OMNI
e. PC WORLD USSR

2. English-language publications available in small quantities for hard currency

a. TIME
b. NEWSWEEK
c. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
D. USA TODAY