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TURKEY

Embassy Greeting
Ankara

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July 2, 1991

**TALKING POINTS: EMBASSY GREETING / AMERICAN EMBASSY
ANKARA, TURKEY
SATURDAY, JULY 20, 1991**

Sheppie

- o Ambassador Mort Abramowitz, [wife?], members of the Embassy staff and the American community. It's a pleasure to be here with all of you. Barbara and I had the similar privilege of representing the United States -- a few years and a couple of jobs ago -- when I was Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. As a result of that experience, we have a great appreciation for the amount of work that goes into a Presidential visit. We thank you for it.
- o For the last year, this Embassy has been working at full tilt. Turkey was at the strategic center in Desert Storm, and you played a key role in our operations. Your hard work and tireless dedication truly made a difference in defeating Saddam Hussein.
- o I see many members of the armed forces here today -- and I know that many of you are from the top-notch force that came back to Turkey after the war ended to assist with Operation Provide Comfort. The world watched as you and thousands of Turkish airmen and soldiers helped the Kurdish people as they returned from the refuge of the mountains to their own homes. I salute you and your colleagues.
- o In these two Operations, Desert Storm and Provide Comfort, we showed the world what Turkish-American cooperation can

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OK*

achieve. And you showed what one Embassy can achieve. For your exceptional service to the United States, it is my honor^{xo} to announce that the State Department has awarded the Superior Honor Award to this Embassy as a whole.

Congratulations on a job well done. //

- o I am also pleased to announce that the State Department has awarded the Distinguished Honor Award to Ambassador Abramowitz, for his commitment and leadership.

Congratulations, Mr. Ambassador. //

- o Mort, I hear you are retiring in a few days, after reaching the highest rank in the Foreign Service -- Career Ambassador. You have my best wishes in your new position as head of the Carnegie Institute for International Peace. Of course, you will leave behind many friends in Turkey -- from the President on down. But try to think of it this way: when you get to Washington, you will find many friends there -- from the President on down, I might add.

- o Finally, I want to thank each and every one of you -- Foreign Service and military personnel, spouses, and children -- for the many sacrifices you've made to serve your country overseas. I know it can be tough: long hours, distant deployments, terrorist threats, and living conditions that are no picnic ... not to mention the strain of being far from family and friends back in the States. But all of you can look with pride at your historic

accomplishments over the last year and conclude that the sacrifices were worth it.

- o Barbara and I look forward to our visit here in Turkey, and once again, we thank you for your hard work and dedication in making this visit possible.

#

FROM HEATH LOWRY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TURKISH INSTITUTE

The Turkish people are very excited about this visit. They have an enormous amount of respect for the President, as they saw his face on the television everyday during Desert Storm. His remarks will be very well-received.

Turks are extremely proud of their reputation as gracious hosts, and pride themselves on the best hospitality that any country has to offer. Any references to the generous hospitality of the Turkish people will go over very well in a toast or embassy greeting.

The Turkish people are also very proud of their cuisine. There is a saying that "the three best cuisines in the world are French, Chinese, and Turkish." If the President were to make reference to that phrase, and then further comment on the cuisine anticipated at the state dinner, the crowd would love it.

There is a phrase whose English translation goes something like this: "Good friends become apparent on black days." If the President were to say this in English, the translator would know exactly what phrase he is talking about. The Turkish people would appreciate this, because they believe their country played a pivotal role in Desert Storm, and consider the USA a valuable ally.

Here's another warm and fuzzy phrase: "A shared cup of coffee results in forty years of memories."

**FROM BRUCE KUNIHOLM, DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES AT DUKE UNIVERSITY**

He suggests that for the state dinner toast, it would be wise to emphasize the US-Turkish connection that goes back to 1945-46, and to note that it has weathered the adversities that confront all alliances. It's important to mention the reciprocal notion of the alliance: that each side has both given something to it and received something from it, and that, while it hasn't been perfect, it has stood the test of time and been beneficial to both sides.

Professor Kuniholm met extensively with Ozal when he visited Duke University. Here are some facts about him that might lend to jokes, stories, etc....

He is an electrical engineer with a Master's from Istanbul Technical University; he has served as Deputy General of the State Electrical Authority overseeing projects on the electrification of Turkey, including Turkey's main hydroelectric power stations; he served as Deputy Prime Minister and helped see the country through terrible times; he encouraged the lifting of martial law, all the while encouraging the opening of the Turkish economy to trade and competition.

As President, he has had the vision to be creative about Turkey's post Cold War era, advocating trade and direct investment links with the nations of the Black Sea. During the Gulf crisis, Ozal, at considerable political risk, was unwavering in his support of U.N. principles and the coalition's policies. He stopped the flow of oil in the Iraqi pipeline, supported the U.N. sanctions, extended the DECA agreement with the U.S., deployed forces along his border with Iraq, and allowed allied troops to use Turkish bases.

Turkey is the only Muslim country in the Near East that is secular and democratic, and it serves as an important model to other countries in the region striving to transform their structures for political participation. Turkey is keenly aware of who its allies are; it is loyal to its responsibilities, and it expects the same from its partners.

Turkey was there when we needed her, as was President Ozal. This was most recently recognized when President Bush after returning from Camp David with President Ozal, thanked Ozal for "the best communications any two countries could possibly have had, for his advice, and for his steadfast adherence to principle from day one."

least desirable available, for 13 years and there displayed his extraordinary capacities as an administrator, reformer, and economist. In 1766 he published his best known work, *Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses*, to which he was to add—among other famous works—*Lettres sur la liberté du commerce des grains* (1770; "Letters on the Freedom of the Grain Trade"). He introduced new methods to the peasant region he administered, substituting a small tax in money for the *corvée* (unpaid work required of peasants for the upkeep of roads); compiling a land register (*cadastre*) for tax purposes; and combatting the famine of 1770–71, during which—despite opposition—he maintained the free commerce in grain. He was appointed comptroller general by Louis XVI on August 24, 1774.

Ministry. Turgot was all that a successful courtier should not be. Large and fat, with regular and quite distinguished features, he was nevertheless a shy and awkward bachelor who blushed easily, spoke with hesitation, and was rarely convivially gay. Though his customary serious manner was tinged with humour, he was not persuasive and could irritate a questioner with the brusqueness of his statements, his theoretical cast of thought, and the suppressed irony of his half smile.

Realizing that the young king was inexperienced and wishing to avoid political storms, Turgot temporized during the first days of his ministry, but later, feeling himself threatened by his adversaries, a frenzy for public service drove him to accumulate reforms. He introduced his Six Edicts in 1776. Four of them (suppressing certain dues and offices) were of no great importance, and the fifth (suppressing the guilds of Paris) encountered no serious opposition. It was against the sixth edict, that abolishing the *corvée*, that his enemies, who defended privilege, concentrated their attack. Appealing in vain to the good sense and courage of the young king from whom he had been alienated by a coalition of financiers, place-holders, privileged classes, and the religious party at court, he saw his reforms abandoned and, after his dismissal on May 12, 1776, forgotten. Five years later, on March 18, 1781, having published nothing after his public disgrace, he died in Paris attended by a few friends.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. The best modern work on Turgot is by the French politician EDGAR FAURE, *La Disgrâce de Turgot*, 2 vol. (1961). Earlier but nevertheless useful works are W. WALKER STEPHENS (ed.), *The Life and Writings of Turgot* (1895); and DOUGLAS DAKIN, *Turgot and the Ancien Régime in France* (1939). Other significant works are the biography by Turgot's contemporary, P.S. DUPONT DE NEMOURS, *Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de M. Turgot* (1782); H. HAUSER, "Turgot," in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, vol. 31; GUSTAVE SCHELLE, *Turgot* (1909); and F. ALENGRY, *Turgot (1727–1781) homme privé, homme d'État* (1942). The complete works of Turgot have been edited by GUSTAVE SCHELLE, 5 vol. (1913–33). B. CAZES has published extracts from his works under the title *Turgot, écrits économiques* (1970).

(Je.B.)

Turkey

Turkey (Türkiye) is a country of the Middle East lying partly in Asia and partly in Europe. Its location in two continents has been a central factor in its history, culture, and politics; Turkey has often been called a bridge between East and West. The country's area of 300,948 square miles (779,452 square kilometres) includes 9,150 square miles in European Turkey, known as Thrace (Turkish: Trakya), and a larger area of 291,798 square miles in Asia, called Anatolia (Turkish: Anadolu, derived from the Greek word *anatolē*, "sunrise"—i.e., eastern land). İmroz Adası (ancient Imbros) and Bozca (ancient Tenedos) islands in the Aegean Sea belong to Turkey.

Turkey is bounded on the east by Iran and the Soviet Union, on the south by Iraq and Syria, and on the west by Greece and Bulgaria. Turkey in Europe is separated from Anatolia by the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles Strait (in ancient times, called the Hellespont), which form the only sea passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. During the 17th century, when Turkish expansion was at its peak, the Ottoman Empire reached into central Europe to include what is

now Romania, Hungary, and most of present-day Yugoslavia. It also included what is now Syria, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, and North Africa as far west as Algeria. For information on the history of Turkey, see the article OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY, HISTORY OF THE.

THE LANDSCAPE

The natural environment. *Relief.* Turkey includes part of the belt of young mountain ranges that run from the Balkan Peninsula to Iran. The mean altitude of the country is more than 3,600 feet (1,097 metres), and it increases eastward to more than 6,560 feet. Lofty mountains are interspersed with depressions surrounded by steep slopes and high plateaus. Less than nine percent of Turkey's area consists of level or gently sloping lands. Lowlands are mainly in the coastal areas. Turkey's rugged relief was formed in relatively recent geological times, and it is still a very active region of the Earth's crust, as is shown by frequent tremors and occasional destructive earthquakes.

The mountainous relief is dominated in the north and south by ranges of more than 10,000 feet that encircle the Central Anatolian Plateau and separate it from the narrow coastal lowlands. North of the central plateau the Pontic Mountains follow the contour of the southern shore of the Black Sea, their altitude increasing eastward to the highest peak in Kaçkar Dağı (12,900 feet [3,932 metres]), where traces of Quaternary glaciation (occurring during the last 2,500,000 years) are extensive and where even today small glaciers are found. South of the central plateau are the Taurus Mountains, composed of several ranges that extend in broad arches along the Mediterranean coast and north of Syria. Their highest points are Mor Dağı (12,490 feet [3,807 metres]) and the heavily glaciated Cilo Dağı (13,504 feet [4,116 metres]) in the eastern Taurus. The Taurus system is composed mainly of limestone and therefore is full of caves, potholes, and underground streams.

Central Anatolia is a semi-arid plateau with a core of older rocks overlain by horizontal or slightly tilted Tertiary deposits (formed from 65,000,000 to 2,500,000 years ago). It is divided into several basins, some of which were prehistoric lakes. Today the greater part of the region is an interior basin with a number of shallow salt lakes (e.g., Tuz Gölü, covering 579 square miles with a depth of only one or two feet) and extensive eroded areas—as around Ürgüp, near the middle course of the Kızıl İrmak (Kızıl River), where there are cave dwellings, underground churches, and subterranean villages. The region is rich in young volcanic features, like the glacier-crowned Erciyes Dağı (12,851 feet [3,917 metres]), the highest point of central Anatolia; many volcanic cones, crater lakes, and explosion pits lie between Konya and Kumköy.

Eastern Anatolia is composed of lofty ranges and recent volcanic cones, such as Mt. Ararat (Ağrı Dağı, the highest peak in Turkey with an altitude of 16,853 feet [5,137 metres])—the legendary site where Noah's Ark came to rest) and Süphan Dağı (13,313 feet [4,058 metres]). These rise above high plateaus often covered by extensive lava flows. The plateaus are interrupted by basins, one of which is occupied by Lake Van (Van Gölü), a salt lake formed by the extinct volcano of Nemrut Dağı, which last erupted in 1441.

Western Anatolia, known as the Aegean region, has elongated mountain ridges separated by depressed floors: a system of young, roughly parallel fault lines running east and west. It includes, from north to south, the valleys of Bakır Çayı (ancient Caicus); Gediz (Hermus); Küçük Menderes (Cayster), with the ruins of Ephesus; and Büyük Menderes (Maeander), where there are the remains of several ancient towns, including Miletus. These valleys lead from the Aegean up to the plateau.

The landforms of northwestern Turkey around the Sea of Marmara are simple. Thrace is a large basin bounded by mountains of moderate height on the north (Istranca Dağları) and south (Ganos Dağı) and by low plateaus 300 to 500 feet in altitude around the Bosphorus on the east. The semi-arid central part of Thrace, filled by recent deposits, forms a rolling plain. The plateaus around Istanbul are deeply dissected by valleys. One of these, the

Bosporus, a former river valley drowned by the rising sea level after the last glaciers melted, is now the channel between the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. The Dardanelles, linking the Sea of Marmara at its other end to the Aegean, originated in the same way.

Drainage and soils. The water divide between the drainage basins of the Atlantic and Indian oceans runs obliquely through eastern Anatolia. The land east of the divide drains to the Caspian through the Kuruçay and Aras rivers and to the Persian Gulf through the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The country west and north of the main divide drains to the Black Sea through the Kızıl Irmak (Halys) and Sakarya rivers. The Yeşil Irmak (Iris) also empties into the Black Sea. The western regions of the country drain to the Sea of Marmara through the Susurluk (Macestus) river and to the Aegean through the Gediz (Hermus) and the Büyükmenderes (Maeander) rivers. The principal rivers of the Mediterranean basin are the Göksu (Calycadnus), Seyhan (Sarus), Ceyhan (Pyramus), and the lower course of the Orontes (Asi). Approximately one-seventh of Turkey has no exterior drainage. Turkish rivers have generally irregular and shallow beds, and their seasonal changes in depth make them unsuitable for navigation.

The principal lakes of the country are Lake Van, 1,443 square miles, over 330 feet deep, and highly saline, in eastern Anatolia; Tuz Gölü (Salt Lake), 635 square miles and only one or two feet deep, in central Anatolia; and the freshwater lakes Beyşehir, Eğirdir, and Burdur, northeast of the Gulf of Antalya.

Turkey has a variety of soil types, reflecting great differences in climate, geology, and vegetation. An outer belt of red and reddish-brown podzolic soils extends over the humid northern and southern marginal regions. The extremely humid eastern Black Sea coasts have strongly acid red soils, whereas the drier northwestern part of the country is covered by slightly acid brown and yellowish-brown podzolic soils. In the Mediterranean area, red and podzolic soil alternates frequently with patches of red clayey soil and in the northwest with rich limy soil. Most of the interior is covered by alkaline, brown and reddish-brown steppe soils. In the driest core of central Anatolia even patches of desertic gray soils occur, and saline soils cover considerable areas. The transitional regions between the dry interior and the humid margins are generally occupied by a belt of brown forest soils. Turkey faces a serious problem in soil erosion, resulting from extensive deforestation that began in the Hellenistic and Roman periods and continued in later times.

Climate. The climate is varied, depending largely on geographic factors. The coastal areas are generally humid, while the interior is semi-arid because it is cut off from the rain-bearing winds by mountain ranges. The northern slopes of the Black Sea mountains receive heavy rain even during summer. Annual rainfall in the coastal areas is more than 27 inches and as much as 96 inches in the eastern Black Sea region. In most of central Anatolia average annual precipitation varies between 10 and 14 inches. Areas of moderate rainfall (15 to 24 inches) include the Marmara and Aegean regions and southeastern and eastern Anatolia.

The low coastal areas have relatively high annual temperatures and warm winters. Along the Mediterranean coast frosts are rare, and snowfall is almost unknown. In the interior, on the other hand, winter temperatures are often below freezing, and in the northeastern plateaus the winters are very cold. Snow cover lasts 20 to 40 days in central Anatolia and more than 120 days in the northeast. The regional differences are much less marked in summer. Four climatic regions can be distinguished. The south and west coasts have a Mediterranean climate with hot, dry summers and mild, rainy winters; the mean annual temperature is about 68° F (20° C) and ranges from 53° F (11° C) in the coldest month to 84° F (29° C) in the warmest month. The Black Sea coast enjoys warm summers, mild winters, and a fair amount of rainfall throughout the year; the mean annual temperature is about 58° F (14° C), ranging from 44° F (7° C) in the coldest month to 73° F (23° C) in the warmest month.

The high northeastern plateaus have fairly warm summers but very severe winters, with maximum precipitation in the summer; the mean annual temperature is about 39° F (4° C), ranging from 10° F (-12° C) in the coldest month to 64° F (18° C) in the hottest. The semi-arid interior and southeast have cold, moist winters and hot, dry summers; the mean annual temperature is about 53° F (12° C), ranging from 32° F (0° C) in the coldest month to 74° F (23° C) in the warmest.

Plant and animal life. Large areas in the south, west, and northwest are covered by a Mediterranean vegetation, consisting mainly of thick, scrubby underbrush in the lowlands and deciduous or coniferous forests at higher altitudes up to the timberline (6,000 or 7,000 feet). The humid northern margins of the country are the most densely wooded region of Turkey. On the eastern Black Sea there are subtropical forests. The Anatolian interior is a region of steppes. Forests, mostly oak and coniferous trees, occur only on the elevated parts.

Turkey is fairly rich in wild animals and game birds. The wolf, fox, boar, wildcat, beaver, marten, jackal, hyena, bear, deer, gazelle, and mountain goat are among the animals still found in secluded and wooded regions. Domestic animals include the buffalo, Angora goat (on the Central Plateau), and camel. Major game birds are partridge, wild goose, quail, and bustard.

Geographic regions. *The Black Sea Coast.* Extending along the northern margins of the country from the Soviet frontier in the east to the lower course of the Sakarya River in the west is a mountainous area with abundant precipitation at all seasons. It is densely wooded, comprising more than one-fourth of Turkey's forested areas. It also has the highest rural population density, in some local areas exceeding 500 inhabitants per square mile. The region is mainly agricultural, corn (maize) being the dominant field crop and staple food. Tea is grown in the most eastern coastal strip, hazelnuts around Giresun and Ordu, and tobacco in Samsun and Trabzon. West of Sinop and south of the mountains, the transition toward the Marmara region and the Anatolian interior is marked by increasing acreage in wheat and fallow land. The principal mineral resources of the region are copper in the east (at Murgul) and coal in the west (the Ereğli-Zonguldak Basin). Samsun, Zonguldak, and Trabzon (site of a university) are the leading towns and ports.

The Marmara region. The areas adjacent to the Sea of Marmara, including Thrace, are the most heavily urbanized of the country. The principal cities are, in decreasing order of size, Istanbul (formerly Constantinople), Bursa, Izmit, Adapazarı, and Edirne. Istanbul, situated at the Bosporus, is Turkey's leading industrial, commercial, and cultural centre. The Marmara region is economically the most developed area of Turkey. Its agriculture is variegated, including tobacco, wheat, rice, sunflower, corn, olives, grapes, and natural silk. On the straits and coasts of the Sea of Marmara fishing is well developed. The leading manufacturing districts are around Istanbul and in a narrow coastal strip between Istanbul and İzmit.

The Aegean region. The coastal area from the Dardanelles on the north to the vicinity of Rhodes on the south is densely populated and economically one of the most advanced regions of the country. Its wealth rests on the production of several export crops, including tobacco (more than 50 percent of Turkey's total production), cotton (30 percent of the total), high-quality grapes suitable for drying, olives (more than 50 percent of the Turkish output), and figs. The main cities are İzmir (the leading export outlet of Turkey and site of a university), Manisa, and Aydın. The area draws many tourists with its beaches and historical sites (Pergamum, Ephesus, Miletus). Between the Aegean region and central Anatolia there is a high, thinly populated area specializing in grain and livestock production; in the 1960s it also produced much of the Western world's supply of opium.

Mediterranean region. Turkey's Mediterranean region extends from Rhodes to the Syrian frontier, and is occupied largely by the Taurus Mountains. Principal passes in the Taurus Mountains connecting the interior plateaus with the narrow coastal strip are the Külek Boğazı, lead-

The Taurus
Mountains

The rivers
of Turkey

Central
Anatolia

The
climatic
regions

ing to Tarsus and Adana; the Sertavul Pass, between Karaman and Silifke; and the Çubukboğazi pass, between the lake district and Antalya in the west. The Amanus Dağları (mountains) bordering the Gulf of Iskenderun are crossed by the Belen Pass. The region has several subregions: the sparsely populated limestone plateaus of Taşeli in the middle; the lake district in the west with its continental climate, where grain is grown; and the intensively cultivated, densely populated coastal plains. Principal cities of the region include Adana, an important commercial and industrial centre; Mersin; Iskenderun (Alexandretta); Antalya; and Gaziantep. The coastal areas produce crops such as cotton (60 percent of Turkey's output), sesame, citrus fruits (more than 90 percent of the country's production), early vegetables, and bananas. The higher parts of the region have relatively little arable land and much soil erosion; grain and livestock are produced, and there is pastoral nomadism among the Yürüks.

Central Anatolia. The middle of the Anatolian plain has a continental steppe climate and scanty rainfall. Grain occupies over 90 percent of the arable land (40 percent of the country's wheat production). More than one-third of Turkey's sheep and nearly all of its Angora goats are raised there. The chief commercial and industrial centres are Ankara (capital of Turkey), Eskişehir, Konya, Kayseri, and Sivas.

Eastern Anatolia. The eastern part of the interior is a high and extremely rugged region with coniferous forests and mountain pastures in the northeast and wooded steppes in the south. Eastern Anatolia is the most thinly populated region of the country, with population densities as low as 13 people per square mile in some areas. Farming is difficult because of the long, severe winters, steep slopes, and eroded soil. Grain, chiefly summer wheat and barley, is the dominant crop. In the humid northeast, beef and dairy cattle are raised; in the south there are pastoral nomads who raise sheep and goats. Eastern Anatolia is rich in mineral resources (iron ore at Divriği, copper at Ergani, chrome at Guleman). The principal cities are Erzurum, Malatya, Elâzığ, and Van.

Southeastern Anatolia. At the foot of the Taurus mountains is a barren plateau drained by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Agriculture is confined mainly to irrigated valleys and basins (wheat, rice, vegetables, grapes). Much of the population is nomadic or seminomadic. Turkey's only oil fields are at Raman and Garzan, linked by pipeline to the port of Iskenderun. The principal urban centres are Gaziantep, Urfa, and Diyarbakır.

Cultural landscape. *Rural settlements.* Turkey is essentially an agricultural country, and more than 60 percent of its population live in rural areas. There are around 35,000 rural settlements. In physical form these differ from region to region: wooden houses are typical in the Black Sea area; sun-dried bricks and flat roofs prevail in the semi-arid interior, and stone is the dominant building material in the Taurus Mountains, the Aegean region, and parts of eastern Anatolia.

Rural settlement types range from single-residence units and several types of temporarily occupied settlements to agglomerated villages. The types correspond to different natural and economic conditions and to different stages in the evolution of land occupancy. Single rural settlement units and dispersed settlements occur in the eastern and western Black Sea regions, in eastern Anatolia, and in the Taurus Mountains. In eastern Anatolia they are associated with stock raising, while in the eastern Black Sea region they are small farmsteads, based on a subsistence agriculture. In the karst (limestone sink) regions of the Taurus area, the scattered distribution of soil in small depressions accounts for the occurrence of dispersed settlements and single-residence units. In the Mediterranean coastal strip, single rural settlement units usually consist of a two-story dwelling surrounded by a large field in which cash crops such as bananas, citrus fruits, and early vegetables are cultivated; the lower story of the house is used for storage.

Between the single rural settlement units and the more prevalent agglomerated villages, there are many transitional types. A *mahalle* consists of a group of single

rural settlement units. *Divans*, occurring mainly in northern Anatolia, comprise a number of *mahalles* organized into a single administrative unit. *Mezraas* are settlements founded on agricultural lands that were originally inhabited only temporarily during plowing and harvesting but later became permanently settled villages or towns. Among temporary settlements, *koms* are usually smaller than *mezraas*. *Yaylas* are temporary summer rural settlements, associated with nomadism. Every nomadic group in southeastern Anatolia or in the Taurus Mountains has its own *yayla*, used solely for pasture. The practice of migrating between summer-dry lowlands and humid mountain pastures has resulted in most permanently inhabited villages in many regions of Turkey possessing one or more *yaylas*. *Kışlas* (literally, "winter quarters") are the sheltered winter quarters of nomads or former nomads. A considerable number of *yaylas* and *kışlas* have in time been transformed into permanent settlements.

Urban settlements. Approximately 40 percent of Turkey's population is located in municipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants. The percentage of urban population is relatively high in the northwestern and western parts of the country, in northwestern central Anatolia, and around the Gulf of Iskenderun. Most towns have fewer than 25,000 inhabitants. Only 20 had more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1970.

Table 1: Cities with More Than 100,000 Inhabitants (1970)

population		population	
Ankara*	1,209,000	Erzurum	135,000
Istanbul	2,248,000	Samsun	134,000
İzmir	521,000	Sivas	133,000
Adana	356,000	Malatya	130,000
Bursa	276,000	İzmit	123,000
Gaziantep	226,000	Mersin	114,000
Eskişehir	216,000	Elâzığ	108,000
Konya	201,000	Maraş	105,000
Kayseri	168,000	Adapazarı	102,000
Diyarbakır	139,000	Urfa	100,000

*Capital city.

More than half of the towns with more than 25,000 inhabitants are concentrated around the Sea of Marmara, in the western coastal region, and in the Adana subregion. Most are so old that they may be traced back to pre-Roman or Roman times. The great majority are commercial centres benefiting from a favourable location. Others are administrative, manufacturing, mining, or port centres, or a combination of these.

Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir all had more than 500,000 inhabitants in the early 1970s, and the biggest city, Istanbul, had a population exceeding 2,200,000. The last was a conurbation extending 30 miles from the former village of Küçükçekmece on the west to Pendik on the east and 12 miles north along the Bosphorus. Surrounding it is an industrial area that produces nearly one-third of the country's manufacturing output. Ankara, the capital of Turkey, was a flourishing trading centre and military base under Roman rule. Since World War I the city had grown very rapidly, and in 1970 it had more than 1,200,000 inhabitants. İzmir, a busy commercial city, had more than 520,000 inhabitants.

PEOPLE AND POPULATION

Languages, races, and religions. *Linguistic groups.* Turkish is the mother tongue of over 90 percent of the country's population. Modern Turkish, one of the southwestern groups of the Turkic family of languages, has been derived from Ottoman Turkish through a long nationalistic effort to purify it of the Arabic and Persian words and idioms that invaded the literary language during the Ottoman Empire. Turkish is written in Latin script.

The principal linguistic minority groups are Kurds and Arabs. Kurdish (including the Zaza dialect), the mother tongue of about 7 percent of the country's population, is widely spoken by a predominantly rural popula-

The
growth
towns

Types of
rural
settle-
ments


Table 2: Turkey, Area and Population

	area*		population			area*		population	
	sq mi	sq km	1965 census	1970 census†		sq mi	sq km	1965 census	1970 census†
Regions (bölgeler)					Regions (bölgeler)				
Black Sea Coast					Marmara and Aegean Coasts				
Provinces (iller)					Provinces				
Artvin	2,871	7,436	210,000	226,000	Aydın	3,092	8,007	525,000	567,000
Bolu	4,267	11,051	384,000	403,000	Balıkesir	5,518	14,292	708,000	753,000
Giresun	2,677	6,934	428,000	447,000	Bursa	4,268	11,053	756,000	848,000
Kastamonu	5,061	13,108	442,000	447,000	Çanakkale‡	3,147	8,152	300,000	360,000§
Ordu	2,317	6,001	544,000	607,000	İstanbul	896	2,320	537,000	†
Rize	1,514	3,920	281,000	318,000	İzmir	4,623	11,973	1,235,000	1,430,000
Sakarya	1,721	4,457	404,000	456,000	Kocaeli	1,539	3,986	336,000	384,000
Samsun	3,698	9,579	756,000	822,000	Manisa	5,332	13,810	749,000	793,000
Sinop	2,263	5,862	266,000	265,000	Muğla	5,150	13,338	335,000	372,000
Trabzon	1,809	4,685	596,000	662,000					
Zonguldak	3,332	8,629	650,000	742,000					
Central Anatolia					Mediterranean Coast				
Provinces					Provinces				
Adıyaman	2,940	7,614	267,000	305,000	Adana	6,661	17,253	903,000	1,035,000
Amasya	2,131	5,520	286,000	310,000	Antalya	7,950	20,591	487,000	577,000
Ankara	11,859	30,715	1,644,000	2,023,000	Hatay	2,086	5,403	506,000	596,000
Çankırı	3,263	8,451	251,000	263,000	İçel	6,121	15,853	511,000	596,000
Çorum	4,950	12,820	486,000	521,000					
Kayseri	6,532	16,917	536,000	610,000	South East Anatolia				
Kırşehir	2,537	6,570	197,000	212,000	Provinces				
Konya	18,309	47,420	1,123,000	1,290,000	Gaziantep	2,951	7,642	511,000	605,000
Malatya	4,754	12,313	453,000	515,000	Mardin	4,927	12,760	398,000	458,000
Maraş	5,532	14,327	438,000	523,000	Urfa	7,175	18,584	451,000	542,000
Nevşehir	2,111	5,467	203,000	232,000					
Niğde	5,519	14,294	362,000	409,000	Thrace				
Sivas	10,999	28,488	705,000	729,000	Provinces				
Tokat	3,845	9,958	495,000	544,000	Çanakkale¶	612	1,585	50,000	§
Yozgat	5,453	14,123	438,000	470,000	Edirne	2,419	6,266	303,000	318,000
East Anatolia					İstanbul*	1,310	3,392	1,756,000	2,995,000†
Provinces					Kırklareli	2,529	6,550	258,000	257,000
Ağrı	4,392	11,376	247,000	293,000	Tekirdağ	2,401	6,218	287,000	297,000
Bingöl	3,137	8,125	151,000	178,000					
Bitlis	2,590	6,707	154,000	185,000	West Anatolia				
Diyarbakır	5,928	15,354	476,000	575,000	Provinces				
Elâzığ	3,533	9,151	323,000	378,000	Afyonkarahisar	5,494	14,230	502,000	543,000
Erzincan	4,596	11,903	259,000	278,000	Bilecik	1,559	4,308	139,000	139,000
Erzurum	9,678	25,066	628,000	686,000	Burdur	2,659	6,887	195,000	211,000
Gümüşhane	3,949	10,227	263,000	282,000	Denizli	4,582	11,868	463,000	512,000
Hakkâri	3,676	9,521	84,000	103,000	Eskişehir	5,271	13,652	415,000	463,000
Kars	7,165	18,557	606,000	663,000	İsparta	3,449	8,933	266,000	300,000
Muş	3,164	8,196	199,000	234,000	Kütahya	4,585	11,875	398,000	483,000
Sıirt	4,248	11,003	265,000	330,000	Uşak	2,062	5,341	191,000	208,000
Tunceli	3,002	7,774	154,000	160,000	Total Turkey	297,812	771,333	31,391,000 □	35,667,000 □
Van	7,363	19,069	267,000	326,000		301,380	780,576		

*Areas for provinces are 1965 census areas and purportedly exclude lakes. Of the two country total area figures, which are as of 1969, the first is the land area, the second the total area. †Preliminary. ‡Part of this province lies in the Thrace region; area and population figures for the part that lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region are for the districts of Ayvacık, Bayramiç, Biga, Bozcaada, Çan, Ezine, Lâpseki, and Yenice. §Population for the entire province is given under the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region because no breakdown for the province was available. ||Part of this province lies in the Thrace region; area and population figures for the part that lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region are for the districts of Adalar, Beykoz, Kadıköy, Üsküdar, Kartal, Şile, and Yalova. ¶Population for the entire province of Istanbul is given under the Thrace region because no breakdown for the province was available. ¶Part of this province lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region; area and population figures for the part that lies in the Thrace region are for the districts of Eceabat, Gelibolu, and İmroz. §Part of this province lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region; area and population figures for the part that lies in the Thrace region are for the districts of Bakirköy, Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Eminönü, Eyüp, Fatih, Gaziosmanpaşa, Sarıyer, Şişli, Zeytinburnu, Çatalca, and Silivri. □Figures do not add to total given because of rounding. Source: Official government figures.

tion in the eastern and southeastern regions. Arabic is spoken by 1.2 percent of the population, principally in parts of southeastern Anatolia. Greek, Armenian, and Yiddish are spoken by small groups in the larger cities, mainly in Istanbul. Most Turkish Jews are descendants of Jews expelled from Spain and speak a kind of Spanish mingled with some Turkish words; others speak Yiddish.

Ethnic groups. Turkey has been a melting pot of racially and culturally distinct groups since early prehistoric times. It was penetrated, settled, or ruled by Hittites, Phrygians, and Gauls from the north and northwest; by Greeks and Macedonians from the west; and by Parthians and Mongols from the east. The most decisive influence was the incursion of Turks from the east, who introduced a new element of mixed Mediterranean-Mongoloid origin into the country's ethnic composition. The rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire contributed to the racial mixture, particularly during the empire's decline, when many Muslim groups living in former Turkish territories in southeastern Europe and in countries around the Black Sea migrated to the home country. It is at present almost impossible to define an average Turk ethnically. He may be blond and blue-eyed or even red haired; he may be of roundheaded alpine stock with dark hair and eyes; he



Population density of Turkey.

may be of longheaded Mediterranean stock; or he may be Mongoloid with high cheekbones. The dominant stock seems to be Mediterranean-Turkic, giving way to Mediterranean in western and southern coastal areas and mixed with Alpine stock in the interior and the east.

Religious groups. Over 99 percent of the country's

population are Muslims. The Sunnī rite is predominant, followed closely by the Shi'ite. Christians are few: in 1965 there were about 74,000 Orthodox Christians (mostly Greeks), 70,000 Gregorians (mostly Armenians), and 26,000 Roman Catholics. There were 18,000 Jews. The Christian and Jewish minorities live mainly in Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir. In the *il* of Mardin in southeastern Anatolia a community of 22,000 Nestorians has survived. Religion and the state were strictly separated in Turkey after the foundation of the republic in 1923.

Demographic trends. Turkey has had one of the highest rates of population increase in the world. Total population, only 13,648,000 in 1927, almost tripled in the following 43 years to exceed 35,000,000 in 1970. Between 1950 and 1970 the annual average rate of population growth was approximately 27 per 1,000.

Population
growth

The rapid increase in Turkey's population is largely the consequence of a high birth rate, estimated at about 40 per 1,000 in recent decades. The average death rate, on the other hand, was believed to be around 15 per 1,000 in the same period and as low as 11 per 1,000 for the urban population. No detailed statistical data have been published for rural birth and death rates and their geographical distribution. It is known, however, that in rural regions of Turkey both the birth and death rates are considerably higher than in urban areas. The highest birth rates occur in underdeveloped eastern and southeastern Anatolia, where the average time interval between two successive births in the same family is only 22.7 months. The metropolitan areas of Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir have the lowest birth rates in the country and the largest average time interval (33.2 months) between successive births in the same family.

As in other countries with high rates of natural increase, Turkey's population is young. About 66 percent of the population were under 30 years of age in 1970, and only 7.2 percent were 60 and over. Males outnumbered females by 455,000, but females predominated in rural areas because of migration of males to the cities.

In the 1960s and 1970s large numbers of Turks emigrated to western Europe as workers. In 1970, 300,000 were living in West Germany, and 100,000 in Switzerland, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Emigration is regulated by mutual agreement among the countries concerned.

Although the population density rose from 45 per square mile in 1927 to 118 in 1970, Turkey was not heavily populated in comparison with other countries. There were striking differences between the sparsely populated areas of Anatolia and the dense agglomerations in the northern and western parts of the country, in which over 40 percent of the population lived. The most densely inhabited area was the eastern Black Sea coastal strip, averaging over 260 people per square mile. Relatively high population densities also occurred around the Sea of Marmara, in the agriculturally developed plains of the Aegean region and around the Gulf of Iskenderun.

Migration from rural areas to the cities was another important demographic trend of the second half of the 20th century, associated with the increasing industrialization of the country. The general pattern of migration was from the rural eastern *iller* (provinces) of the country toward the cities, including Istanbul, Zonguldak in the coal and metallurgical district in the northwest, Ankara in the interior, Adana and Mersin in the south, and İzmir in the west. Urban population grew from 24 percent of the total in 1927 to 38.7 percent in 1970. (S.Er.)

THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Although mostly in Asia, the country's economy is oriented to Europe and the Western world. This orientation has provided the impetus for rapid industrialization since 1950. At the same time, Turkey has close economic links with Iran and Pakistan within the framework of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), with other countries in the Middle East, and with eastern Europe.

Gross national product (GNP) rose by an average of about 6.5 percent per annum in real terms in the 1960s. Because the population continued to increase by 2.5 percent per annum, the net improvement in GNP per capita

was just under 4 percent per annum. Turkey's exports, which increased in value by 139 percent (to 6,909,000,000 lire) between 1960 and 1970, are represented chiefly by agricultural produce, mainly cotton, fruit, nuts, and tobacco. Imports increased in the same period by 117 percent (to 9,161,000,000 lire), and the cost of importing development capital brought about a chronic payments deficit. The lire was devalued by two-thirds in August 1970.

National resources. *Mineral resources.* Turkey is believed to be rich in a wide variety of mineral deposits, but relatively few of these have been exploited on a large scale because of a lack of domestic capital for exploration and exploitation, political pressures that have discouraged wide-scale investment from abroad, a preponderance of large but inefficient state mining concerns, and inadequate processing facilities.

State enterprises dominate the production of hard coal, lignite, copper, sulfur, mercury, iron ore, lead, salt, and chrome; while private producers are the principal exploiters of asbestos, antimony, barites, boron minerals, zinc, meerschaum, manganese, emery, magnesite, marble, sodium sulfate, dolomite, and other minerals. Bauxite deposits were being tapped on a big scale in the early 1970s by an aluminum-manufacturing centre near Konya. Crude oil production began on a regular basis in 1961.

Turkey's hard coal is of poor quality, and only negligible quantities are exported. The marketable annual output late in the 1960s was 4,700,000 tons. Lignite was becoming an increasingly important fuel, its annual output increasing from 4,000,000 tons early in the 1960s to 9,000,000 tons in the early 1970s. Iron-ore production, formerly exported, was barely keeping pace with the rising home demand in the early 1970s; annual production in the early 1970s was 3,000,000 tons. Chrome ore reserves are widespread; annual output approached 750,000 tons in the early 1970s. The output of blister copper averaged around 24,000 tons per annum but was expected to rise to over 60,000 tons per annum with the completion of a new plant on the Black Sea coast. Crude oil output quintupled after 1962, reaching 3,600,000 tons annually early in the 1970s. Exploration for oil was continuing over a wide area in the 1970s.

Biological resources. Turkey has a wide diversity of climate and ecology. The total area used for field crops increased by nearly 60 percent in the 1950s, reaching what appears to be its maximum feasible extent. Further increases will require greater use of fertilizers and irrigation and more efforts to combat soil erosion.

Vineyards, gardens, and orchards cover 9,000 square miles. A gradual extension of this area in the 1970s, especially in the Çukurova and Aegean regions, was probable in the light of the government's plans to develop fruit and vegetable production. About one-fourth of Turkey is covered with forests, which are predominantly coniferous but also include deciduous beech, poplar, oak, and walnut. Virtually all forest land is state owned, but only a fraction has been made productive, and much is completely virgin; untold damage has been done by the large peasant population in the forest areas. In the 1970s serious steps were being taken to implement a long-term forestry development plan; lumber and timber production were expected to reach 240,000,000 cubic feet in 1972, compared with 95,000,000 in 1962.

Hydroelectric power. Turkey has many rivers and mountain watercourses, but much remains to be done in harnessing these resources. Hydroelectric power rose from only 3.8 percent of the electricity output of 790,000,000 kilowatt-hours in 1950 to 27 percent of the 9,624,000,000 kilowatt-hours produced in 1971. The percentage was to rise sharply in 1973 with the coming into production of the 620-megawatt Keban (Euphrates) and the 300-megawatt Gökçekaya power stations (a megawatt equalling 1,000,000 watts). At least two more Euphrates hydroelectric schemes were planned for the 1970s. Although, like Keban, these were to be linked into the national grid, they would help to open up the sparsely populated eastern regions of the country.

Sources of national income. *Agriculture, forestry, and fishing.* The livelihood of 70 percent of the population and

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31 percent of the national income came from agriculture, forestry, and fishing in the late 1960s. The 1963 census of agriculture showed that of 3,500,000 agricultural holdings only 491 were of more than 1,200 acres, while 1,600,000 were of seven acres or less and a further 1,100,000 of between 7.7 and 25 acres. The situation in the early 1970s was basically the same, although the government intended to introduce legislation to prevent or at least to inhibit the further fractionalization of land used for farming.

Cereals—predominantly wheat and barley—are the largest crop, covering 32,000,000 acres in 1970; industrial crops—principally cotton, tobacco, sugar beets, and oil seeds—were sown over 4,200,000 acres. Other major agricultural products included pulses, potatoes, grapes, citrus and soft fruits, olives, hazelnuts, and tea. In the 1970s the government was attempting to guarantee minimum prices for the main crops without inducing the large surpluses of low-grade tobacco and tea and sugar beet that accumulated during the 1960s. It was also encouraging farmers to adopt improved methods by subsidizing credit, fertilizers, and improved seeds.

Livestock holdings totalled 84,000,000 head early in the 1970s, including 14,000,000 cattle, 36,000,000 sheep, and 6,000,000 Angora goats. The fishing industry contributes only 0.3 percent of the national income. Better organization, modern equipment, and an appreciation of the potential of deep-sea fishing are all urgently needed.

Forestry development was given a high priority in the early 1970s, at which time it provided less than 0.5 percent of the national income.

Very substantial sums of foreign aid capital have been invested in coal, lignite, copper, and bauxite mining and processing, along with government funds. State and foreign investment in the oil industry has been high. Mining and quarrying nevertheless accounted for only about 1.7 percent of the national income in the late 1960s.

Manufacturing. The manufacturing industries provided approximately 18.5 percent of the national income annually late in the 1960s, compared with 13 percent early in the decade. Manufacturing attracted about 20 percent of all investment in the late 1960s. The textile industry was the most important and had been considerably modernized in preceding years. Motor-vehicle production (assembly and parts manufacturing) had grown in importance, along with chemicals, petroleum products, rubber and plastics, and iron and steel products. Other dynamic manufacturing industries included processed foodstuffs, paper, nonferrous metals, domestic appliances, beverages, and cement and building materials. State-run firms accounted for about one-third of the overall output of manufacturing. The state had a monopoly only in cigarettes, tea, spirits, and newsprint; in other fields it competed with private industry.

Turkey's balance-of-payments problems in the early 1950s caused the government to favour industries that would reduce the need for imports. After 1968, however, when the State Planning Organization was made responsible for approving many investment projects, greater attention was paid to the earning rather than the saving of currency. Industrial growth in the 1970s was expected to be dictated largely by the needs of export markets.

Output in manufacturing was still generally well below capacity; and the labour force, especially in the state sector, was above the optimum level for economic production. By international standards, therefore, productivity was rather low.

Between 1962 and 1967 Turkey's energy consumption increased by almost 50 percent, to the equivalent of 30,600,000 tons of coal. Consumption in 1972 was expected to be 42,600,000 tons, double the 1962 total. But consumption per capita remained extremely low. In the mid-1960s about 29 percent of the energy consumed was provided by petroleum products (approximately half of which were imported), 22 percent by wood, 18 percent by dried dung, 28 percent by hard coal and lignite, and only 3 percent by hydroelectric power.

Financial services. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, set up in 1931, effectively controls the banking

system. It is the only note-issuing bank, is the sole channel for the issue of import licenses (on behalf of the Ministry of Commerce), provides access to foreign currency, and plays a key role in the administration of the government's credit policies. There are 33 commercial banks, a state-run Agriculture Bank, and a number of special-purpose, state-owned institutions, such as the Sömmerbank (concerned with industrial enterprises), the Etibank (mining and electric power), and the Turkish Maritime Bank (Denizcilik Bankası).

The main source of new finance for the numerous state enterprises is the State Investments Bank. The private sector was depending increasingly in the 1970s for its development funds upon the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (established with World Bank assistance in 1950) and to a lesser extent upon the Industrial Investment and Credit Bank. Turkey in the 1970s did not yet have an organized capital market. The true public company that raises capital by selling its securities to the public was still practically unknown, and the vast majority of the many joint-stock companies were family-owned or family-controlled enterprises. The stock exchange at Istanbul dealt mainly in government securities.

Foreign trade. Between 1960 and 1970 export earnings increased by 139 percent to 6,909,000,000 lire, or at a slightly lower average annual rate of growth than that of the economy as a whole. During this period cotton displaced tobacco as the largest single currency earner. By 1971 agricultural products still accounted for 73 percent, minerals for 6 percent, and industrial and processed goods for only 21 percent of total earnings. The limitations of world demand for such traditional exports as cotton, tobacco, dried fruit, and nuts made imperative the development of exports of manufactures and other items, such as fresh fruit and vegetables.

The countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market, accounted for more than 40 percent of all exports. The countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) took 18 percent of all exports in 1970. The U.S., Japan, and Canada took 18 percent. Exports to eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, and Egypt averaged 18 percent of the total.

Imports rose by an average of 12 percent annually in the 1960s, an increase not enough to meet industrial requirements; in the late 1960s there were serious shortages of raw materials, capital equipment, and spare parts. In the early 1970s, however, the balance of payments account showed much improvement; all shortages of essential imported goods were eradicated. The chief suppliers of Turkey's imports in 1970 were West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, and France.

Management of the economy. *The role of government.* Turkey's first ventures into industry were made in the 1930s, in the early years of the republic, when the state was of necessity the principal investor. Although the state still owned nearly half of the country's economic resources in 1970, increasing importance was being given to private industry, which provided almost 50 percent of the new fixed capital investment. The state sector was concerned mainly with investment in fields in which the capital requirement was too large or the expected returns too low to attract private enterprise.

The State Planning Organization, set up in 1960, became the arbiter of all foreign investment, as well as of all major Turkish private and state investment. Its five-year plans and annual programs set the guidelines for economic development. Through the Central Bank, the Agriculture Bank, and other state banking institutions, the government maintained a firm hold on all financial and investment operations. The railways, post office, airways, and internal sea passenger services were operated as government enterprises.

Taxation. Annual treasury revenue in the late 1960s totalled 24,028,000,000 lire. Direct taxation accounted for 6,798,000,000 lire, indirect taxation for 12,343,000,000 lire, foreign aid counterpart funds for 1,019,000,000 lire, and nontaxation revenues for 1,560,000,000 lire. The net revenues from state monopolies, the universities,

The State Planning Organization

Major crops

Energy consumption

Unexploited mineral wealth

and the State Farms Administration amounted to 836,000,000 lire; treasury bonds raised 600,000,000 lire, and savings bonds, which are compulsorily purchasable at the rate of 3 percent of taxable income, raised 727,000,000 lire. Direct taxation consisted mainly of an income tax on private individuals and companies and a corporation tax. There was widespread tax evasion, largely resulting from a shortage of qualified inspectors and also from the absence of a recognized body of professional accountants. The government continued to rely heavily on indirect taxation, such as sales and excise taxes. Banking, insurance, and other transactions were also subject to indirect taxation.

Trade unions. The trade union movement was relatively unimportant until the 1960s. Before July 1963, when the Strikes, Lockouts and Collective Agreements Law came into force, strikes and lockouts had been illegal. In the early 1970s there were about 1,000 unions, the majority affiliated to the moderate Turkish Trade Union Confederation and a few to the left-wing Confederation of Reformist Workers' Unions. Union membership totalled about 4,000,000.

The government fixes minimum wages by geographical areas, but these bear little relationship to actual rates, which in most establishments are determined by collective agreements. The agreements also cover a wide variety of such fringe benefits as holiday pay, performance bonuses, and food allowances. Social insurance and fringe benefits are equal to more than 60 percent of basic wages. The Confederation of Employers' Associations of Turkey grew rapidly in the 1960s.

Balance of payments. Since the inception of the First Five-Year Plan in 1962-63, the government has tried to achieve a 7 percent annual increase in national output. The deterioration of the balance of payments in the later 1960s led to a two-thirds devaluation of the lira and to the adoption of austerity measures in August 1970. Short- and medium-term policies called for greater emphasis on investment in currency-earning enterprises, for the curbing of internal demand and of price increases, and for an overall improvement in productivity. (E.I.U.)

Transportation. The Turkish Republic began very early to improve the transportation system as a means of integrating isolated regions and of developing the national economy. The length of railway tracks increased from about 2,500 miles in 1924 to around 6,000 in 1970. After World War II more emphasis was placed on road and harbour construction. The result was to give Turkey the best developed road and rail network in the Middle East. In 1970 the highways carried 43 percent of the freight traffic and 70 percent of the passenger traffic; the railroads carried 55 percent of the freight traffic and only 28 percent of the passenger traffic.

The heaviest traffic is between Istanbul and Ankara, followed by that of the Aegean region, with İzmir as its centre, the area around the Gulf of Iskenderun, with Adana as its centre, and the Ankara-Zonguldak route. Istanbul is the chief harbour; there are heavy flows of passengers and freight by sea between İzmir and Istanbul through the Aegean, between the southern coasts of the Sea of Marmara and Istanbul, and between Istanbul and the Black Sea ports of Zonguldak, Samsun, and Trabzon.

Roads. All-weather highways totalled 37,000 miles in 1971, of which over 13,000 miles were paved, the rest consisting of stabilized gravel or macadam. The main highways radiate from Ankara, in central Anatolia, from Istanbul and İzmir, in the west, from Adana, in the south, and from Erzurum and Diyarbakır, in the east.

Railways. The railroad pattern consists of a ring around the central Anatolian Plateau, from which branches radiate to the peripheral regions: two to Zonguldak and Samsun, on the Black Sea; three to the western ports of Istanbul, İzmir, and Bandırma; three to the east; and one to the south (via Adana to Syria and Iraq).

Port facilities. Turkey's merchant shipping fleet is relatively small, consisting in 1971 of 714,000 gross tons, of which 80 percent were oil tankers or cargo carriers. The port of Istanbul handles more than 50 percent of the country's imports and 11 percent of its exports. İzmir

ranks second, handling 35 percent of the exports. Other principal ports, in decreasing order, are Mersin and Iskenderun in the south and Zonguldak, Samsun, and Trabzon, in the north; all of these ports are located at the end of rail or land routes serving large hinterlands. Inland water transportation does not exist in Turkey except on Lake Van.

Air transport. The state-owned Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları) flies from Ankara to Istanbul, İzmir, Adana, Erzurum, Van, Samsun, and Trabzon. While Ankara is the major junction of the domestic air routes, Istanbul is the busiest airport and the principal terminus of international lines. İzmir ranks third in traffic volume. (S.Er.)

ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Government. Turkey is a republic, with its capital at Ankara. Under the constitution of 1961, political authority is centred in the Grand National Assembly, which has a lower chamber, the National Assembly, composed of 450 elected members, and a Senate made up of 165 members, 150 elected and 15 nominated by the president of the republic. There are also a few senators for life: army officers who carried out the 1960 revolution.

The head of state is the president of the republic, elected by the Grand National Assembly for a term of seven years. He is not eligible for a second consecutive term. The president selects a prime minister, who forms a government subject to approval by the National Assembly.

The country is divided into 67 provinces. Each province (*il* or *vilâyet*) is subdivided into districts and each district (*ilçe* or *kaza*) into communes. The highest administrative official in each is, respectively, the *vali* (governor), the *kaymakam* (prefect), and the *nahiye müdürü* (district official). The *vali*, who is appointed by the president on the recommendation of the minister of the interior, is the chief administrative officer of the province, representing all the national departments (except those of war and justice) and coordinating their work in his province. He corresponds directly with each ministry and has a staff of advisers, who also form an administrative council under his chairmanship. The organization of the district under the *kaymakam* and of the commune under the *nahiye müdürü* follows the same pattern. The commune comprises a number of villages, each of which has a headman (*muhtar*) and a council of elders (*ihtiyarlar meclisi*) numbering from 5 to 12 according to the size of the village. A provincial council, elected for four years, debates questions of local administration, and its resolutions have legal effect; the *vali*, who is president of the council, may, however, refer proposals to the Council of State. In every headquarters town of a province or district and in all other towns of 2,000 inhabitants or more, there is a municipality (*belediye*). At its head is the mayor (*belediye reisi*), assisted by an elected council and a committee composed of officials and of persons chosen by the council for a year's term.

All citizens over 21 are entitled to vote unless they have been legally deprived of their rights. Deputies to the National Assembly are elected every four years, and a third of the senators are elected every two years. The constitution prescribes a secret ballot. Actual voting procedures are determined by legislation. Before 1961 a party securing a majority in a province was given all the deputies from that province. The electoral law of 1961 introduced a form of proportional representation by which the deputies of a province were apportioned among the parties according to the size of each party's vote.

Turkey was a one-party state until 1946. Since then a number of parties have contested elections, and in October 1971 eight had deputies in the National Assembly.

The judicial system is entirely independent of the assembly and the government. The old Muslim legal and judicial system was swept away in the early years of the republic, and a new Western system was adopted that was based on the Swiss civil code, the Italian penal code, and German commercial law. The highest court, the Constitutional Court, was created in 1961 to review the legislation of the Grand National Assembly; it has 15 regular

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and 5 alternate members. The highest administrative court is the Council of State, with 31 judges, which serves as the final court of appeals for the decisions of lower administrative courts. There is a Court of Cassation that serves as a court of last resort for reviewing the decisions of other courts. A system of courts run by the Ministry of Justice handles ordinary civil and criminal cases.

The military forces had a total strength of about 508,500 men in 1971, of which 420,000 were in the army, 50,000 in the air force, and 38,500 in the navy. Young men are subject to two years of compulsory service at the age of 20. Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Central Treaty Organization (Cento). United States influence has been strong, exercised by a military mission in Ankara that directs the delivery of arms from the U.S. and supervises training programs in the three services. In 1971 land forces included 12 infantry divisions, one armoured division, four armoured brigades, and two parachute battalions. The navy had 12 submarines and ten destroyers. There were three tactical air forces. Headquarters of the Southeastern Command of NATO is at Izmir.

Education, health, and welfare. At the time the Turkish Republic was formed, the population was estimated to be only 10 percent literate. By the start of the 1970s, primary education was compulsory for all children from seven to 12, but a considerable number of children, particularly in the provinces, did not attend school. Although the educational system underwent great expansion after World War II, many peasants were reluctant to send their children to school or could not afford to keep them there during planting and harvesting seasons. The literacy rate in 1970 was estimated at 55 percent of the population of six years and over. Over 5,000,000 children attended primary school early in the 1970s, while the number in secondary schools and lycées was a little over 1,100,000. There were 245,000 in technical and vocational schools and colleges and 155,000 in various institutes of higher education. Religious instruction, forbidden in the early years of the republic, was permitted in primary schools and in the schools training religious personnel.

The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare carried out public health programs and operated a large number of hospitals and dispensaries. Others were run by the Ministry of Labour. State medical services are provided free to the poor. There are also private medical institutions run by philanthropic organizations and large business enterprises. In 1969 there was one hospital bed for every 495 persons and one doctor for every 2,267 persons.

Successful public health campaigns have been conducted against tuberculosis, trachoma, malaria, and syphilis, but in the late 1960s trachoma and tuberculosis were still endemic. Infant mortality, which stood at 160 per 1,000 live births in 1960, was 153 per 1,000 in 1970.

A basic law concerning labour and social insurance and regulating conditions of employment, passed in 1936, established the 48-hour week with paid holidays of 12 to 24 working days, depending upon length of service. Later legislation provided health and accident insurance and old-age pensions. In the late 1960s approximately 1,000,000 workers were covered by social insurance.

Housing standards in general have been low, and overcrowded conditions in the cities have given rise to shantytowns (*gecekondular*) on the outskirts, put up by peasants migrating from the countryside. The Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement was established in 1958 to organize and direct this migration. In the mid-1960s it was estimated that persons living in shantytowns comprised 45 percent of the population of Ankara, 21 percent of that of Istanbul, and 18 percent of that of Izmir. On the other hand, all of the larger cities contain modern, middle-class residential areas that have expanded at a rapid rate and in which people live by Western standards.

The maintenance of internal security is the responsibility of the police, the gendarmerie, and the army. The police are organized on a national basis under the Ministry of the Interior but carry out their duties at the command of local civil authorities. In each province there is a directorate of security, divided into administrative, judi-

cial, and political sections. The gendarmerie is a paramilitary force drawn from military conscripts and assigned to sectors not under police jurisdiction, notably rural frontier areas. It is attached to the Ministry of the Interior and subject to the same local authorities as the police.

CULTURAL LIFE AND INSTITUTIONS

Turkey has a long and various cultural heritage. When the Turks arrived in Anatolia in the 11th century they had already adopted Islām, and they soon fell under the influence of the highly developed Iranian and Arab civilizations. Another part of the Turkish inheritance came from the Byzantine civilization that had developed in the Eastern Roman Empire. As the Ottoman Empire expanded into Europe, it received cultural influences from the West, and, when the empire entered on its downward course in the 19th century, the cultural pressure of Europe became stronger. At the same time, European interest in Turkish language, history, and art inspired many educated persons in Turkey with a desire to strengthen and preserve the national culture. Among the most important of the reforms carried out after the national revolution were those aimed at reviving the Turkish language and breaking the hold of Islām upon the nation.

Modern Turkish culture has been dominated by nationalism. Writers, artists, and musicians have abandoned the long tradition of Islām and returned to the vernacular in literature, village scenes in painting, and folk ballads in music. The theatre has become popular, and innumerable Turkish or foreign plays are performed. The Ankara State Opera was founded in 1940 and the Istanbul Opera in 1950; both perform classical Western works.


The popular arts flourish and are encouraged. Popular literature takes the form of narrative (*hikâye*) and poetry (*siir*), recited by minstrels known as *âşiks*. There are many popular dances and games, varying according to region. Folk instruments include drums, trumpets, flutes, pipes, tambourines, viols, and cymbals, along with some modern instruments. Popular drama includes shadow plays, performed by dolls reflected on a linen screen, and the *orta oyunu*, a type of improvised comedy.

Formal cultural institutions begin with the Ministry of Culture, set up in 1971. Various organizations are devoted to the sciences and arts, including three music conservatories, in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul; the Academy of Fine Arts, in Istanbul; the National Folklore Institute, in Ankara; the Turkish Folklore Society, in Istanbul; and a number of scientific and professional societies. Every province has its museums. There are archaeological museums in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir and a Museum of Turkish and Islāmic Art in Istanbul. The National Library (Milli Kütüphane) in Ankara had over 500,000 volumes at the beginning of the 1970s.

Ankara early in the 1970s had 18 daily newspapers and ten weeklies; Istanbul had 24 dailies and 24 weeklies. There were six dailies in Izmir, three each in Adana and Bursa, and two in Eskişehir. Radio and television broadcasting are carried on by the government. In the early 1970s Radio Ankara had three domestic services and three to foreign listeners. Radio Istanbul had two domestic services. Television broadcasting began in Ankara in 1965 and by 1971 was carried on four days a week. A station in Istanbul began operating in 1971. (A.Te.)

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(S.Er./A.Te.)



JOHN ELK III/BRUCE COLEMAN INC

Istanbul's peerless Süleymaniye Mosque was created as the Ottoman Empire reached the apex of its power and glory.

TURKEY

CONTENTS

Section	Page	Section	Page
Land and Natural Resources	248	6. The Economy	253
The People	250b	7. History	256
Education	250d	Pre-Ottoman Anatolia	256
Culture	251	The Ottoman Empire	258
Places of Interest	251	The Republic	270

TURKEY, tür'kē, a country in the Middle East. The greater part of the country, Anatolia (Anatolia is in Asia, specifically in Asia Minor. Only the northwestern corner, Turkish Thrace (Thrace is located in Europe; it accounts for 8% of Turkey's territory.

Turkey is a rugged land, all high plateaus and narrow coastal strips. Its area is minute in comparison with the neighboring countries. It is half that of Iran, three times that of Iraq, four times that of Syria, five times that of Greece, and seven times that of Bulgaria. Its population is larger than any of its neighbors' except the Soviet Union's.


Although there is no state religion, almost all are Muslims. Their language, now written in the Latin alphabet, is unrelated to the Indo-European languages spoken by most Middle Easterners. The only minority of more than 8% of the population is the Kurdish minority, and the Kurds are the establishment of the republic in the industrial sector, transforming Turkey's economy from primarily subsistence agricultural to one in

which industry and mining play a major role. Nevertheless farmers today make up more than half of the labor force, and agriculture contributes about 20% to the Gross Domestic Product. Even Turkey's industry is dependent on agriculture in that food processing plays an important role in the economy.

The government has been deeply involved in the industrial sector ever since the republic's founder, Atatürk, made the industrialization of the country a major goal of his revolution. Today the government owns about 47% of all industry, chiefly heavy industry, with industrial production split between the public and private sectors in Turkey's mixed economy.

INFORMATION HIGHLIGHTS

Official Name: The Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti).
Name of Nationals: Turks.
Head of State: President.
Head of Government: Premier.
Legislature: Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly).
Area: 301,404 square miles (780,576 sq km).
Boundaries: North, Black Sea; northeast, USSR; east, Iran; south, Iraq, Syria, Mediterranean Sea; west, Aegean Sea; northwest, Greece, Bulgaria.
Elevations: Highest point, Mt. Ararat (Büyük Ağrı Dağı; 16,946 feet, or 5,165 meters); lowest, sea level.
Population: (1980 census) 44,736,957; (1984 est.) 45,747,000.
Capital: Ankara.
Largest City: Istanbul.
Major Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic.
Major Religious Groups: Muslims (over 99% of the population), Christians, Jews.
Monetary Unit: Turkish Lira (TL) (1 lira = 100 kuruş).
Flag: White crescent and five-pointed star on a red field. See also FLAG.



© DAMMILEO DEWYS

The Bosphorus was finally spanned by a bridge in 1973. It links European and Asian Turkey at Istanbul.

Because of its position athwart the route between Asia and Europe, Anatolia has been a highway for migrants and conquerors from before the dawn of history. The Ottomans, who established themselves in the area in the 14th century A.D., had been preceded in earlier millennia by many other conqueror-rulers, for some of whom Anatolia itself formed only part of larger empires. In addition to being ruled by the Hittites, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, and Arabs, Anatolia formed the seat of empire of Cimmerians, Celts, Goths, and others long since forgotten. The genes of all of them doubtless survive in the present population.

The first positive historical records of the Turks are in inscriptions of the 8th century A.D. in Siberia. They were a tough, martial people, against whose inroads the rulers of China vainly built the Great Wall. Their ancestral religion was Shamanism, their deities earth, sky, and water.

About a thousand years ago they made their way into the Arab dominions in western Asia, where they adopted Islam and went on to found, under the Ottoman dynasty, the last and greatest of all Islamic empires. The empire survived, though diminished in size and power, into the 20th century.

Foreigners called it the Turkish Empire. The Turks never did. For them it was the Guarded Domain of the Faith, and they devoted their energies to maintaining and extending its frontiers. They forgot their ethnic identity and were not reminded of it until, after the Christian subject peoples of the empire had one by one claimed their independence, the Turks' Arab co-religionists did the same.

Alone of the powers that had backed the losing side in World War I, Turkey defied the victors. Led by Mustafa Kemal, the one consistent-

ly successful Ottoman general of that war, he expelled the several armies of occupation. He sought to dismember the Turkish heartland. Kemal then set to work to convert his battered remnant of empire into a republic. His desire to see Turkey become a modern Western state was fueled by the resentment he had felt when the Ottoman army was being trained by Germans, a few of whom bothered to conceal their contempt for everything Turkish. Twice he tried, pretentively, to turn his one-party state into a parliamentary democracy. After World War II the experiment was repeated, and broadly speaking it was successful, despite some setbacks.

The armed forces were charged by Kemal with the duty of safeguarding the republic from enemies within and without, and they take their duty seriously. In recent decades they have intervened when they saw the politicians putting their personal and factional interests before the public good, but they have then returned power to the civilians. Meanwhile, politicians who have learned from the mistakes of their predecessors have been emerging, as well as a new generation and breed of civil servants, developments that augur well for the republic's future.


1. Land and Natural Resources

Turkey's shape is roughly rectangular, stretching east-west for about 1,000 miles (1,600 km) and north-south, at its widest point, about 400 miles (650 km). Mountains cover half the total area. Two great ranges meet at Mount Ararat (Büyük Ağrı Dağı) in the extreme east near Turkey's border with Iran and the USSR: the Black Sea (Pontic) range and the Taurus and its extension, the Anti-Taurus, mountains. The whole country is subject to earthquakes, the Black Sea region and the Eastern Anatolian region north of Lake Van particularly so. Riven, abundant, but little use is made of them for navigation. Of the more than 500 lakes, 127 are artificial and only 50 are more than 4 square miles (10 sq km) in area. The biggest are Lake Van (Van Gölü) in the east and Salt Lake (Tuz Gölü or Lake Tuz).

Black Sea Region. The mountains run parallel and close to the Black Sea coast, which is therefore not greatly indented and affords few natural harbors. Breakwaters have been constructed so that large ships can be accommodated at Ereğli, Zonguldak, Samsun, and Trabzon. More than 150 streams flow down the mountains' northern slopes. Three large rivers, the Sakarya, the Kızılırmak (Red River), and the Yeşilırmak (Green River), rise south of the mountains and flow through gorges on their way to the Black Sea.

The northern slopes of the mountains have ample rainfall throughout the year. The western part of the region receives most of its rain in winter. The highest precipitation of the whole country, above 90 inches (2,286 mm) a year, occurs at Rize, where it rains one day in two.

The northern slopes of the mountains are densely forested, with beech, oak, and elm, up to 4,000 feet (1,200 meters). Conifers grow at higher elevations, and above the conifer zone are the high mountain pastures. The southern slopes are less well forested, with oak, juniper, and pine. To the east, the northern slopes are given over to tea plantations, centering on Rize, where citrus fruits are also cultivated. The Black Sea region is the source of 62% of the world's hazel-



D. E. STREICHAN/SHOSTAL

Edirne and its fortress were the last of the Christian strongholds on the Aegean coast to fall to the Ottomans.

fruits that grow on the coast and on the terraced slopes include apples, peaches, and cherries (the word derives from the ancient city of Cerasus, now Giresun). Other crops include tobacco, corn, wheat, vegetables, and flax.

The Zonguldak coal field, with reserves estimated at more than one billion tons, is the largest in the Middle East. Manganese is mined just north of it, as well as south of Rize, and in the extreme east near Murgul, where copper and lead are also mined.

Despite the frequency of earthquakes, the Black Sea region is one of the most densely populated parts of the country because of the soil's fertility. The coastal cities all date from classical antiquity except for Zonguldak, which came into existence with the opening of the coal mines in 1944.

The Straits Region. The Straits are the Bosphorus in the northeast and the Dardanelles on the southwest, which, with the Sea of Marmara between them, constitute the waterway joining the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The Bosphorus is an unglaciated valley, 18 miles (29 km) long. At the northern end of the Bosphorus stands Turkey's greatest city, Istanbul (ancient Constantinople). In the Dardanelles (33 miles, or 53 km, long), as in the Bosphorus, an upper current runs toward the Mediterranean and a deeper current moves in the opposite direction.

The Marmara region is affected both by the Black Sea and Mediterranean climates. The weather is changeable. The summer droughts are not severe, and in the winter frost and snow are common. Skies are cloudier and more foggy than in the Mediterranean region.

The area is a center of industry. Its major factories produce automobiles, glass, plastics, food, and electronic equipment.

In the western part of Turkish Thrace (that is, European Turkey) is the wide and marshy valley

of the Meriç (Maritsa) River, which forms the frontier with Greece. With its tributary the Ergene, it drains all the many streams of the area into the Aegean. It is navigable as far as Edirne. The Ottoman capital from 1362 to 1453, Edirne owed its early importance to its position as the advanced base for Ottoman incursions into Christian Europe. Now, because of increased road traffic between Europe and the east, it is emerging from the long decline it suffered after Istanbul replaced it as the capital.

Winters in Turkish Thrace are generally mild and humid, with frequent mists. The summer winds from the north are much drier than in the Black Sea region, and summer temperatures average 74°F (23°C).

The southern limit of the Straits region is the line of uplands culminating in Uludağ, a mountain just south of Bursa that reaches 8,343 feet (2,543 meters). Between the uplands and Marmara is a broad fertile plain yielding cereals, tobacco, grapes, olives, and, near Bursa, mulberries. The area is drained by the Simav, the only river to have cut a way through the coastal ridge to the Sea of Marmara. The annual rainfall of nearly 28 inches (711 mm) is higher than in Thrace, as is the average winter temperature of 43°F (6°C).

The two great cities of the region south and east of the Sea of Marmara are Bursa and İzmit. Bursa, the Ottoman capital from 1326 to 1362 and traditionally the center of the silk trade, has had a wool industry since 1938 and today also produces man-made fibers. İzmit has been a port since Roman times and is now second to Istanbul as the port for the Marmara development region.

The Mediterranean Region. This region embraces both Turkey's southern coast and its Aegean coast on the west. The Aegean coast, a diverted section of the Mediterranean, is heavily

indented, with many offshore islands. There are several large rivers, notably the Büyük Menderes, the Küçük Menderes, and the Gediz, in whose valleys lie most of the large towns of the region. Erosion in the inland hills and the gentle incline of the valley floors cause heavy silting. Cotton, tobacco, olives, grapes, and figs are the major crops. The considerable export trade, especially in dried fruits, passes through İzmir, Turkey's third-largest city and its biggest export harbor.

The southern coast is made up of steep, high cliffs, with many waterfalls. Parts of the plain immediately north of Antalya are good only for pasture, but the rest of the plain produces the full range of Mediterranean crops, including cotton, citrus fruits, and olives, as does the narrow coastal plain between Antalya and Alanya. At the eastern end of the coast is the vast alluvial plain drained by the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers, mainly given over to cotton and cereals. Its market and administrative center is the rapidly expanding city of Adana, which is reached by barge traffic on the Seyhan River but depends even more on its rail link with the coastal city of Mersin. Mersin and Iskenderun handle between them the agricultural produce, copper, and petroleum of eastern Anatolia.

Precipitation throughout the Mediterranean region is high (42 inches, or 1,067 mm, a year at Antalya; 27 inches, or 686 mm, at İzmit), but droughts occur in summer, less severely on the Aegean coast than in the south. Temperatures average 50°F (10°C) in winter, 80°F (27°C) in summer.

The Central Anatolian Region. In the northern part of this region are sparsely wooded mountains, in the south bare hills and depressions.

The central area is predominantly plateau, 1,220 meters) above sea level. It is drained northward to the Black Sea by the Sakarya River. The river has been dammed at Sarıyar, 75 miles (60 km) west of Ankara, making a narrow lake and power generation for the northwest. Hirfanlı and Kesikköprü dams on the Kızılırmak, southeast of Ankara, have made a larger lake, 124 square miles (321 sq km), which is used to generate power for the north of Anatolia. To the south of this man-made lake is the Salt Lake, whose area varies with the season, from 77 square miles (200–1,642 sq km). It receives drainage from the surrounding hills but has no outlet.

There is less rainfall in the Central Anatolian region than in the Aegean area: 15 inches (381 mm) at Ankara, 12 inches (305 mm) at Konya, the south. April and May are the wettest months, August the driest. Average temperatures can range from -18°F (-28°C) in January to 104°F (40°C) in August. Wheat and sugar beets are the chief crops in the region.

Ankara, the country's capital, was a Phrygian city in the 8th century B.C. Because of its strategic defensive position on two steep hills, it dominated the plain. The second-largest city of the region is Konya, an administrative center and a market center since at least Roman times.

Southeast of Konya begins a 200-mile (320 km) line of extinct volcanoes, running north-east. On the northern foot of the largest of these, Mount Erciyes, stands the city of Kayseri, once an Assyrian trading colony at the intersection of north-south and east-west highways.

The Eastern Anatolian Region. This harsh landscape is studded with ancient volcanoes and still sub-

Team and plow are more commonly used than tractor to till the grain-producing fields of central Anatolia.



PROVINCES

Adana	176,446
Afyon	568,513
Amasya	131,400
Antalya	10,040
Artvin	55,030
Aydın	20,540
Bahçeşehir	73,832
Balıkesir	41,103
Bartın	10,424
Batman	13,312
Bayındır	8,015
Bilecik	10,831
Bingöl	9,669
Bismil	10,320
Bizim	60,061
Bizim	65,386
Bizim	40,418
Bizim	6,810
Bizim	14,600
Bizim	15,566
Bizim	11,438
Bizim	22,228
Bizim	25,605
Bizim	120,965
Bizim	8,980
Bizim	8,795
Bizim	4,368
Bizim	48,010
Bizim	22,555
Bizim	6,045

CITIES AND TOWNS

Adana	176,446
Afyon	568,513
Amasya	131,400
Antalya	10,040
Artvin	55,030
Aydın	20,540
Bahçeşehir	73,832
Balıkesir	41,103
Bartın	10,424
Batman	13,312
Bayındır	8,015
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Bingöl	9,669
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Bizim	8,980
Bizim	8,795
Bizim	4,368
Bizim	48,010
Bizim	22,555
Bizim	6,045

TURKEY (Continued)

Patnos 18,040	K 3	Suhut 8,154	D 3
Pazar 10,079	J 2	Sungurlu 24,170	F 2
Pazarlık 19,821	G 4	Sürmene 10,152	J 2
Pazarıyeri 6,005	C 3	Sürüş 19,000	H 4
Pera (Beyoğlu) 226,125	D 6	Suşehri 11,442	H 2
Perşembe 7,190	G 2	Susurluk 16,113	C 3
Pınarbaşı 10,578	G 3	Tarsus 120,270	F 4
Polatlı 43,514	E 3	Taşkent 7,098	E 4
Posof 2,277	K 2	Taşköprü 8,659	F 2
Pozantı 6,697	F 4	Taşova 6,208	F 4
Refahiye 7,505	H 3	Tatvan 40,324	K 3
Reyhani 30,843	G 4	Tavas 10,335	C 4
Rize 41,740	J 2	Tavşanlı 23,325	C 3
Safranbolu 19,155	E 2	Tekirdağ 51,327	B 2
Sakarya (Adapazarı)		Tırne 15,530	G 2
131,400	D 2	Tire 32,242	B 3
Salihi 51,638	C 3	Tirebolu 9,274	H 2
Samandağ 25,349	F 4	Tokat 60,369	G 2
Samsun 198,266	F 2	Tomarza 7,733	F 3
Sandıklı 15,966	D 3	Tömük 7,660	F 4
Sapanca 10,228	D 2	Tonya 11,010	H 2
Sarayköy 11,009	C 4	Torbalı 15,504	B 3
Sarayönü 8,643	E 3	Tosya 18,544	F 2
Sarıgöl 7,880	C 3	Trabzon 107,412	H 2
Sarıkamış 23,331	K 2	Trebizond (Trabzon) 107,412	H 2
Sarıkaya 7,297	F 3	Tunceli (Kalan) 13,144	H 3
Sarıyer 110,555	D 3	Turgutlu 55,575	B 3
Sarıgözü 12,611	G 3	Turhal 47,364	F 2
Sarıköy 6,755	B 3	Türközü 8,528	G 4
Savaştepe 7,110	B 3	Tuzluca 6,716	K 3
Sebinkarahisar 12,550	H 2	Tuzlukçu 6,716	D 3
Seddülbahir 332	F 6	Uluborlu 6,002	D 3
Sefaath 7,513	F 3	Ulukışla 7,841	F 4
Seferihisar 6,506	B 3	Ünye 27,946	G 2
Selimiye 2,989	B 4	Urfa 148,434	H 4
Semdinli 19,677	L 4	Urgüp 6,955	F 3
Senirkent 8,382	D 3	Urfa 14,347	B 3
Senkaya 2,685	K 2	Uşak 70,822	C 3
Şereflikoçhisar 22,208	E 3	Üsküdar 255,899	D 6
Serik 15,662	D 4	Uzunözü 27,706	B 2
Seydisehir 30,394	L 4	Vakıfköprü 13,814	H 2
Siirt 42,692	L 4	Van 93,823	K 3
Silifke 22,045	E 4	Varto 7,360	J 3
Silivri 13,922	C 2	Vezirköprü 13,547	F 2
Silopi 6,832	K 4	Viranşehir 41,934	H 4
Silvan 44,412	L 3	Vize 9,528	B 2
Simav 10,775	C 3	Yahyalı 15,585	F 3
Sındırgı 8,992	F 2	Yalova 41,869	C 2
Sinop 18,381	H 2	Yalvaç 19,986	D 3
Siran 6,088	K 4	Yatağan 7,350	C 4
Sirnak 10,947	G 3	Yenice 4,106	F 4
Sivas 173,831	H 4	Yeniköy, Çanakkale 540	B 6
Siverek 30,000	D 3	Yeniköy, Çanakkale 901	C 5
Sivrihisar 9,608	B 3	Yeniköy, İstanbul	D 6
Smyrna (İzmir) 753,749	D 3	Yenimahalle 265,752	E 3
Söğüt 6,353	B 4	Yenişehir 17,013	C 2
Söke 37,362	B 4	Yerköy 20,623	F 3
Solhan 7,170	B 3	Yeşilhisar 11,132	F 3
Soma 30,219	B 3	Yeşilköy	D 6
Sorgun 19,623	F 3	Yeşilyurt 7,040	H 3

OTHER FEATURES

Acı (lake)	C 4	Erciyes Dağı (mt.)	G 3
Adalar (isl.)	D 6	Ergene (river)	F 3
Aegean (sea)	A 3	Euphrates (Firat) (river)	L 4
Akçay (river)	C 4	Filyos (river)	D 3
Akdağ (mt.)	C 4	Firat (river)	G 3
Akşehir (lake)	D 3	Göksu (river)	D 6
Aksu (river)	F 4	Hasan Dağı, Büyük (mt.)	G 2
Alexandretta (gulf)	F 4	İğneada (cape)	G 2
Amanos (mts.)	G 4	İlgaz (mts.)	D 2
Anamur (cape)	E 5	İllium (ruins)	
Ankara (river)	D 3	İmralı (isl.)	
Anti-Taurus (mts.)	G 3	İmroz (Gökçeada) (isl.)	
Araks (river)	K 2	6,001	
Ararat (mt.)	L 3	Ince (cape)	
Balıç-Uzun (lake)	G 2	Incekum (cape)	
Banaz (river)	C 3	Istranca (mts.)	
Batı Firat (river)	H 3	Izmir (gulf)	
Bergos (river)	C 6	Iznik (lake)	
Bey (mts.)	D 4	Karaca Dağı (mt.)	
Beyşehir (lake)	D 4	Karadağ (mt.)	
Binboğa (mts.)	G 3	Karadeniz Boğazı	
Bingöl Dağları (mts.)	J 3	(Bosporus) (strait)	
Bosporus (strait)	C 2	Karasu (river)	
Bozcaada (isl.) 1,879	A 3	Kızılırmak (river)	
Burdur (lake)	D 4	Köroğlu (mts.)	
Burgaz (isl.)	D 6	Köroğlu Dağı (mt.)	
Büyük Ağı (Ararat) (mt.)	L 3	Köyceğiz (lake)	
Çanakkale Boğazı		Küre (mts.)	
(Dardanelles) (strait)	B 6	Kuruçay (river)	
Çandarlı (gulf)	B 3	Kuşada (gulf)	
Çanik (mts.)	G 2	Mandalya (gulf)	
Çekerek (river)	F 3	Marmara (sea)	
Ceyhan (river)	F 4	Menderes, Büyük (river)	
Çıldır (lake)	K 2	Meriç (river)	
Civa (cape)	G 2	Murat (river)	
Çoruh (river)	J 2	Murat Dağı (mt.)	
Çorum (river)	F 2	Nemrut Dağı (mt.)	
Çalaman (river)	C 4	Nuruah Dağı (mt.)	
Dardanelles (strait)	B 6	Pontic (mts.)	
Delice (river)	F 3	Porsuk (river)	
Devrez (river)	E 2	Sakarya (river)	
Dicle (river)	J 4	Saros (gulf)	
Eastern Taurus (mts.)	J 3	Seyfe (lake)	
Edremit (gulf)	B 3	Seyhan (river)	
Eğirdir (lake)	D 4	Sivrihisar (river)	
Emir Dağı (mt.)	D 3	Soğanlı (mts.)	
Ephesus (ruins)	B 3	Soğanlı (river)	
		Söğüt (lake)	
		Söğüt (mts.)	
		Sultan (mts.)	
		Süphan Dağı (mt.)	
		Taurus (mts.)	
		Taurus (mts.)	
		Tigris (Dicle) (river)	
		Troy (İllium) (ruins)	
		Türkmen Dağı (mt.)	
		Tuz (lake)	
		Uludağ (mt.)	
		Van (lake)	
		Yasun (cape)	
		Yeşilirmak (river)	

to devastating earthquakes, is the least densely populated part of the country. The north is drained by the Aras (Araks), which flows eastward from Bingöl and, with its tributary the Arpaçayı (the Arpa River), forms the frontier with the USSR, eventually emptying into the Caspian. The Dicle (Tigris) and Firat (Euphrates) rise north of Diyarbakır and north of Erzurum, respectively. The Keban dam, 30 miles (48 km) west of Elâzığ, at the junction of the Firat and the Murat, has created Turkey's biggest freshwater lake, 260 square miles (675 sq km) in area and 78 miles (125 km) long. Part of the purpose of the man-made lake is to provide energy for the region's planned electrochemical industry. Lake Van (1,434 square miles, or 3,714 sq km) is fed by a dozen streams, but it has no visible outlet and its waters are bitter and saline. It has often flooded the settlements on its shores.

Average temperatures range from 11°F to 63°F (-12°C to 17°C), but in the north winter temperatures of -40°F (-40°C) are known and the snow can last from four to seven months. Wheat and barley are grown over much of the region except in the very center.

About 60 miles (96 km) east of Diyarbakır is the Ramandag oilfield, with a refinery at Batman and a 300-mile (480-km) pipeline to the Gulf of Iskenderun. Iron is mined at Devriği and copper and chrome around Güleman and Maden.

The region's main settlements are all in river

valleys. Erzurum, Diyarbakır, and Kars are of immense age, originally fortresses to guard the country's eastern approaches. Gaziantep, the center for the cotton and wine industries of the region, lies on the ancient trade route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.

2. The People

The Turks have a favorite saying: "Biz biz benzeriz," which means "We resemble ourselves." However, with the rapid changes Turkey has experienced in the 20th century—political, economic, cultural—and with 40% of the population under 15, the old stereotypes of what a Turk is must inevitably lose their validity. But some generalizations may still be usefully made.

The sense of national identity is strong and national homogeneity an article of faith. The Turks take pride in their descent from Ertuğrul, father of the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, who with his 400 horsemen gained a foothold in western Anatolia from which the empire was to grow. *A priori*, the tangled ethnic mix in the history of Anatolia makes this tradition of purity of race hard to accept. The visitor will notice blond and blue-eyed individuals in the predominantly brown-haired, Mediterranean-looking mass, with a sprinkling of copper-hued Anatolian conscript soldiers.

The Turks are not a smiling people. Outwardly serious, even dour, they have a keen

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The "whirling dervish" order, formerly banned, may now perform its hypnotic spinning ritual once a year at Konya.

sense of humor, though it is not readily detectable by the foreigner. They are honest and hospitable. The tourist who travels by bus in Turkey need have no fear of losing his baggage, of being carried past his destination, or of being allowed to go hungry.

Few of the Turks feel any special kinship with their Arab or Persian neighbors. It is true that commercial common sense directs their attention toward their Muslim co-religionists. It is also true that the shared faith is for some a bond of immense importance. But the younger generation's eyes are on the West, while their elders have not forgotten how the Arabs, during World War I, took the side of the infidel British against the sultan-caliph.

Nor do they consider themselves members of a closely knit family of Turkic peoples. Although any Central Asian Turk who makes his way to the Republic of Turkey is sure of a kind welcome, Pan-Turanism—a notion held by a few intellectuals of some day uniting all the far-flung Turks of the east—has never had any appeal for the Turks of Turkey. If they think of such Central Asian Turks at all, it is as the "Tatars" whom Timur (Tamerlane) brought to devastate Anatolia in 1402.

The Turkish Language. Turkish is an agglutinating language. It makes words by adding strings of suffixes to unchanging roots, as for example *bulgırizligimdenmiş*, which means "I realize it was because of my ignorance." (See also **TURKIC LANGUAGES**.) In this respect it resembles Hungarian and Finnish. But it is not generally thought to be related to them. Some scholars believe it is related to Mongolian, and a possible Korean connection is being explored. It is linguistically totally unrelated to Arabic or Persian, except that it borrowed many thousands of words and a few grammatical features from them after the Turks came within the orbit of Islam. At no time did Arabic replace Turkish as the language of the Turks.

In 1928 the Arabo-Persian alphabet in which Turkish had been written was abandoned in favor of the Latin alphabet. Thereafter a sustained and successful effort was made to rid Turkish of its Arabic and Persian loan words.

The Kurdish Minority. The Kurds constitute the only sizable minority in Turkey. Making up about 5% of the population, they are concentrated in the east and southeast of the country. A pastoral people of Iranian stock and speech, they have never had a state of their own, and their

tribal territories are divided among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Turkish governments have always been sensitive to the risk of separatist activities among them, although there was no mass movement in that direction after the 1930's.

Their one legal disability is that Kurdish may not be taught in their schools. But Kurds may take their place in any sphere of Turkish life. There is in fact a growing assimilationist tendency among them. In the 1980's, books began to appear with such titles as *The Kurds, the First Turkish Dwellers in Anatolia*. The purpose was to show the ethnic identity of Kurds and Turks and—an even more hopeless task—to prove that Kurdish is a form of Turkish.

Religious Groups. More than 99% of the population is Muslim, mostly Sunni Muslim. In the absence of official figures, estimates of the number of Shiite Muslims vary between 5% and 35%. The former seems nearer the mark, but there is no way of knowing for sure since the census, for the sake of the state's doctrine of homogeneity, takes no account of the distinction.

The state is secular, there is freedom of worship, and it is a criminal offense to exploit religious feeling for political ends. The overwhelming majority of the people seem to accept this situation. The National Salvation party, which was avowedly antiseccular, even theocratic, fought just two elections. It won 11.9% of the votes in 1973 and 8.6% in 1977.

The Directorate of Religious Affairs is concerned solely with Muslim religious affairs. Muslim religious education is provided in state schools, but parents do not have to enroll their children for it. The state prefers to provide education so that the teaching will be by professional educators, who may or may not be practicing Muslims, rather than risk leaving it to the ignorant and fanatical.

Women students are not permitted to cover their heads on university premises, this being a mark of religious conservatism. Nor are clerics of any denomination normally allowed to wear their canonical garb outside their places of worship, though the Greek and Armenian patriarchs and the chief rabbi have sometimes been given special leave to do so at public functions.

Although the dervish orders were banned in 1925, many still exist clandestinely. The authorities keep a sharp lookout for any suspected of being a cover for antiseccularist conspiracy. But they take a more relaxed attitude about the Bektaşis (Bektashis), formerly the most popular of



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This 10th century Armenian church on Lake Van's island of Aghthamar was once joined to a palace and monastery.

Ararat, associated with Noah's ark and historical Armenia, rises in Turkey close to the Soviet-Turkish border.

SHOSTAL



apolis and the petrified cascades of Pamukkale which have been formed by the mineral-rich waters that flow down the slopes from the plateau above. At the southwestern end of the Aegean Coast is Bodrum, the site of ancient Halicarnassus and its Mausoleum, another of the Seven Wonders of the World. Dominated by the remains of its crusader castle, Bodrum is a center for underwater archaeology and yachting.

Mediterranean Coast. The beaches of this Turkish Coast are numerous, and swimming can be enjoyed through November. In the coastal city of Antalya they say the year consists of three springs and a summer. Antalya's little harbor is right out of the Arabian Nights. Of unusual interest are the city's pre-Ottoman religious buildings and Hadrian's Gate in the Roman wall. Just to the east is Perge, with its theater and stadium where Saint Paul preached. Farther to the east along the Gulf of Antalya are Aspendos, which has the best preserved of ancient Roman theaters; the Greek, Roman, and Byzantine ruins and broad sands of Side; and Alanya, with the 13th century fortress built by the Seljuk Aladdin Keykubad and the Red Tower standing guard over his arcaded shipyard.

Black Sea Coast. The spectacular mountains of this coast can best be viewed from the water. Toward the eastern end of the coast is Trabzon, which has its own little St. Sophia, dating from the 13th century, and the evocative ruins of ancient Trebizond. Inland is the monastery of Sumela, breathtakingly suspended on the side of a precipice.

Central Anatolia. The tomb of Atatürk is Ankara's most monumental modern building, its Museum of Anatolian Civilizations one of its most impressive institutions. To the west is the ancient Phrygian city of Gordion (Gordium), where Alexander is said to have cut the knot.

Southeast of Ankara lies the area of Cappadocia, a lunar landscape of volcanic tufa, weathered into fantastic turrets and pinnacles. Byzantine monks hollowed out the soft rock to make dwelling places and churches and decorated them with brilliant frescoes. Nearby are many-storied subterranean cities. Some of the tufa masses are inhabited today, as their numbered front doors indicate. Konya, famous for the mausoleum of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, founder of the Mevlevi order of dervishes, abounds in Seljuk mosques and former religious schools (*medreses*) richly adorned with carvings and tiles.

East and Southeast Anatolia. Lake Van is unequalled in this region for its wild scenery and its vast scale. The 10th century Armenian church of the Holy Cross, built on the island of Aghthamar in Lake Van, is memorable for its reliefs of Jonah and the whale and its other biblical themes. Varnats cats swim and have one blue and one yellow eye. Erzurum, which lies to the northwest of Lake Van, has been an important garrison city throughout its long history. Of historical and architectural interest, besides its mosques and tomb towers, is its Medrese of the Two Minarets. The ruins of Ani on the border with the Soviet Union recall an era when it served as the 10th century capital of the Bagratid kings of Georgia. Closer to the Turkish-Soviet-Iranian border is snowcapped Ararat and the fairy-tale palace of Ishak Paşa, a 17th century robber baron. Diyarbakir, in the southern part of the region, is a city walled in black basalt. Its towers bear some remarkable specimens of medieval Islamic her-

A high-contrast, black and white photograph of a mountainous landscape. The foreground shows steep, rocky slopes with scattered small buildings and structures. The middle ground features a valley with more buildings and a winding road. The background consists of rugged, snow-capped mountain peaks under a dark sky.

Cappadocia's honeycombed volcanic formations provide homes today, as they once did for Christian monks.

Adiy. To the west of Diyarbakır is Nemrud Dağı, a mountain with a man-made peak reared to the glory of Antiochus I, a 1st century B.C. king of Commagene. It is topped with 30-foot (9-meter) statues of Antiochus and the Olympian gods, whose stupendous fallen heads stand scattered before them.

of Atatürk is Ankara building, its most one of its most he west is the (Gordium), where the knot. The area of Cappadocian tufa, weathered facies. Byzantine rock to make dwellings are many-storied the tufa masses are bered front doors the mausoleum of under of the Meyounds in Selçuk schools (*medreses*) and tiles.

Business acumen was not thought to be a main virtue by those who built and ruled the Ottoman Empire. In its final years, when much of its revenue was mortgaged to foreign bondholders, its own non-Muslim citizens were the source of three quarters of the capital invested in the empire's industries. The mass exodus of the Christian minorities between 1912 and the mid-1920's gave rise to a feeling among the Turks that they were doomed to remain a nation of peasants.

government involvement, although government ownership was never less than 50% of any individual SEE.

Turkey's wartime neutrality left the country with a large trading surplus and a growing merchant class. The 1946 program of the newly formed Democrat party affirmed that private enterprise was basic to the economy, and that any economic activity the state undertook should be in accordance with a long-term plan whose details must be publicly known. On their coming to power in 1950, however, it emerged that the party abhorred planning, which it equated with communism. The party attempted to denationalize the State Maritime Lines, but only 5% of the shares were taken up by the public.

The dominance of the SEEs actually increased as a result of the 1954 crop failure and the ensuing inflation. Corruption as well as inefficiency and deficit financing played their part in the increasing role of the state's involvement in the economy. The government used state sugar factories as a vote-catching device, increasing their numbers far in excess of need. Inflation was accelerated by the large credits extended to farmers by the state and by the guaranteed prices for SEE products. However, under International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure, the government in 1958 undertook to restrict credits and raise the SEE prices.

The military, which took over the government in May 1960, set up the State Planning Organization in September 1960. But the planners seldom had the cooperation of the politicians, nor were their assumptions and predictions very accurate. Throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's the country suffered from inflation, foreign exchange shortages, and public sector deficits. Yet the period was one of growth. Between 1960 and 1978, per capita GNP rose annually by an average of 3.6%. Agricultural

from \$381 million to \$684 million. In the next decade, imports rose to \$8.8 billion and exports, still lagging behind, to \$5.7 billion. At the end of 1980, in pursuance of the policy of closer ties with the Muslim powers, diplomatic relations with Israel were reduced to the level of *chargé d'affaires*. This policy led to increased trade with and credits from Muslim countries.

Tourism. Despite its natural and historical attractions and the courtesy and friendliness of its people, the country does not attract many tourists. The 1.6 million visitors in 1983 (10 times the number who came in 1960) spent an average of \$175 per person. One reason is Turkey's apparent inability to publicize itself, but the chief reason is the weakness of the infrastructure for tourism. Government credits and tax concessions to private hotel chains are beginning, however, to improve this picture.

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Oxford University

7. History

Although the Turkish Republic dates only from 1923 and the Ottoman Empire, its predecessor, from the 14th century A.D., the present history of Turkey will begin by reviewing the history of the area of Anatolia prior to the arrival of the Turks there in the 11th century A.D.


PRE-OTTOMAN ANATOLIA

Anatolia has known nearly 40 centuries of recorded history as an area of settled civilization, and such sites as Troy and Boğazköy (Hattushash) contain evidence of even earlier habitation. The two phases of the great empire of the Hittites lasted for a millennium (2200–1200 B.C.), to be succeeded by such politically important

pre-Hellenic states as Urartu, Phrygia, and Lydia, with their distinctive cultural lives. The invasion of Cyrus, the Achaemenid king, in 546 B.C. brought virtually the whole region under Persian domination, and so it was to remain until its conquest by the Macedonian troops of Alexander the Great in 334 B.C. After the latter's death in 323 B.C., Anatolia became a bone of contention among the generals who were his heirs, the contest eventually resolving itself into a struggle between the Seleucids and the kingdom of Pergamum. As a result of the Seleucid defeat by the Romans at the Battle of Magnesia in 190 B.C., Pergamum was for a while to enjoy a period of unprecedented prosperity. But in 129 B.C. it was incorporated into the Roman province of Asia Minor.

The division of the Roman Empire into eastern and a western branch under Diocletian (reigned 284–305 A.D.), to be followed in 330 by Constantine's final transfer of the capital to Constantinople and his acceptance of Christianity as the state religion, brought a new concentration of power to bear on Asia Minor. Henceforth, it was to be the very heartland of the Byzantine Empire. For over four centuries Byzantium was able to hold the line of the Danube against the pressure of barbarian invasions from the north while at the same time maintaining an unyielding resistance toward an aggressive Persia. The measure of its moral and material strength is to be seen in the fact that whereas the Persian Sassanids collapsed almost immediately under the assault of the Islamic Arabs in the second quarter of the 7th century, Asia Minor did not experience any permanent inroads by the Muslims until after the disaster of Manzikert (Malazgirt) in 1071.

The Seljuk Turks in Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire, which ultimately replaced the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia, was the culminating political achievement of the Oghuz (Oğuz, Ghuzz) Turkish tribes. Originating in western Central Asia, they accepted Islam about the middle of the 10th century, wrested Persia from the control of the Ghaznavids, and founded the Seljuk Empire in 1037. A warlike nation organized for conquest and expansion, by 1055 the Seljuks had taken Baghdad. They converted the languishing Islamic caliphate into an instrument serving their own policies and ambitions. Within a few months virtually the whole of Iraq, Syria, and Palestine had fallen under their sway. The Byzantine emperor, Romanus IV Diogenes, alarmed at the growth of this powerful, aggressive neighbor on his eastern frontiers, in 1071 led a massive army against the Seljuk ruler Alp Arslan, who was then launching raids into Armenia and the adjoining provinces. The Byzantine forces suffered a staggering defeat in that year on the plain of Manzikert, to the north of Lake Van. As a result the defensive system that had for centuries protected Asia Minor from Muslim invasion collapsed, and the region lay open to wholesale Turkish migration. It was as migrants rather than military invaders that the Turks originally came into this area, each group maintaining its own tribal identity and pursuing the traditional life of nomadic shepherders; it is only incidentally



The sumptuous Hagia Sophia, triumph of Byzantine architecture, was converted into a mosque after the Ottomans captured Constantinople.

ch of Byzan-
o a mosque
Constantinople.

SCALA:ART RESOURCE

the Mongol's local governor.

Establishment of the Ottomans in Anatolia. Native historical tradition has it that the founders of the Ottoman Empire, the Osmanoglu, were the leaders of the Kayi tribe, the noblest of the Oghuz Turks. But the fact that the Osmanoglu were forced into the region of Bithynia at a period when Byzantine military strength was concentrated here for its effort to regain Constantinople and when, consequently, the opportunities for raiding or exacting tribute from the cities must have been poorer than ever before indicates that they were weaker than the other Turkish tribes. The same native tradition meets this point by exalting them to the role of *ghazi*, warriors of the holy war (*jihaad*) against the infidel, whose only purpose was the spread of Islam and whose only reward was in a life after death. But this theory assumes a view of Islam that it is quite improbable these tribal Turks had yet achieved; their indoctrination and instruction had been mainly from missionaries of the incoherent and extravagant dervish doctrines. Nor is it likely that the founder of the dynasty actually bore the Islamic name Osman (Arabic Uthman), which intrudes incongruously in a genealogy almost exclusively Turkish. The year 1300 (corresponding to the

Muslim year 699) as the date of the foundation of the new state is arbitrary and was probably selected to endow the event with a millennial portentousness; while the account that Osman was confirmed in his sovereignty in this year by the Seljuk sultan Keykubad III is no more than an attempt to endow the dynasty with a patent of legitimacy.

A variety of factors accounted for the success of Ottoman expansion. In 1261 the Byzantines regained Constantinople from the Latins and the government-in-exile moved from Nicaea with its armies, leaving Bithynia inadequately garrisoned. Once the Byzantines had arrived back in Europe, they faced the task of reconquering the small principalities in the Morea (Peloponnese), the Epirus, and Macedonia, which had grown up as a result of the Latin occupation of the Eastern Empire. There were also the problems of containing the persistent menace of the Bulgarians and opposing the dangerously growing power of the Serbians, and of achieving a political rapprochement with the West. Thus the attention and the seriously depleted resources of the emperor, Michael VIII Palaeologus (reigned 1259-1282), were diverted from Byzantine possessions in Asia. Consequently all but the strongest cities in Anatolia fell by default into the power of the nearest Turkish predators, the Ottomans. This success, in turn, attracted to their ranks warrior groups eager to share in the spoils. Bled of their manpower, the neighboring beyliks were left too weak to resist when the Ottomans expanded in their direction.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

In the span of 100 years the first four Ottoman rulers founded a state firmly rooted in northwestern Anatolia and reaching well into the Balkans.

Osman I (reigned 1300?-1326). The chronology of Osman's career lacks certainty at every point, but the generally accepted tradition fixes his birth in 1258 at Söğüt (northwest of Eskişehir) where his father, Ertuğrul, was the leader of a band of frontier warriors. On the latter's death, he became chieftain of the band and by the turn of the century he held the region including the cities of Bilecik, İnegöl, Yarhisar, and Yenisehir, the last of which became his center of operations against İznik (Nicaea) and Bursa. The intent was to isolate both these important Byzantine cities from assistance from Constantinople. In 1314, Bursa was placed under siege; it finally capitulated in 1326, the year of Osman's death, and the city became the first capital of the infant empire. By this time Ottoman possessions extended as far east as Bolu, to Kandıra near the Black Sea in the north, and to İnegöl in the south; but the direction of political opportunity clearly lay to the west.

Orhan (Orkhan) I (reigned 1326-?1360). Osman was succeeded by his eldest son, Orhan, the first significant event of whose reign was the capture of İznik in 1331. İzmit (Nicomedia) fell in 1337 after a siege of six years, and once this last enclave of Greek power in western Anatolia was in their hands, Europe beckoned irresistibly to the seemingly invincible Ottomans. Their first introduction to Europe came by invitation rather than assault. In 1346 the pretender to the Byzantine throne, John Cantacuzene (John VI), gave his daughter Theodora in marriage to Orhan and in return received the help of Turkish troops in

his struggle for the throne with John V Palaeologus. In 1353 the Ottomans were rewarded by the grant of a permanent base in the Gallipoli peninsula. It was from here that their expansion into the Balkans was to originate, and even before John VI Cantacuzene was forced to renounce the throne to his rival John V in 1374 they were already extended along the Marmara coast as far as Tekirdağ.

When Orhan died, not only did the Ottomans hold this firm bridgehead in Europe, but in Asia their territories had been pushed toward Ankara. It is in the reign of Orhan that we can notice the first efforts toward an organized state, patterned no doubt on Seljuk precedents. Silver coins were struck in his name in Bursa as early as 1326-1327; the council of state, or *divan*, was instituted; civil, as distinct from military, affairs were entrusted to an individual from the learned classes, who was given the title of *vezir* (vizier); and in each important city a religious judge, or *kadi*, was appointed. But the Ottomans were still no more than first among equals in the sight of the other tribal leaders. It was probably to assure an advantage over the other tribes as well as to give some organization to the warriors that a standing army of foot (*yaya*) and mounted (*müsellem*) soldiers was formed; this was to be the precursor of the renowned Janissary (Janyary) Corps.

Murad I (reigned 1360?-1389). Murad succeeded his father but not without opposition from his three brothers, whose liquidation in 1363 is the first instance of the precautionary execution of relatives that was to become the normal practice at each accession. In both Anatolia and Europe advantage was taken of the dynastic disturbances by rival beyliks and by the Byzantines for the purpose of regaining some of the territories they had lost to the Ottomans. But their efforts were fruitless, and Murad soon dominated the entire eastern bank of the Marmara. He took the great city of Edirne (Adrianople) in 1361 and Filibe (Philippopolis; now Plovdiv) in 1363. Byzantium, now virtually isolated, was obliged to give recognition to all these conquests and even to agree to a military alliance with the Ottomans for operations in Anatolia. The chronology of the campaigns in southeastern Europe (henceforth to be known as Rumili or Rumelia, the name given by the Turks to the area including Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace), as indeed the chronology of most events in early Ottoman history, is vague and confused, and little is known about the alliance among the Serbian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Walachian, and Bosnian negotiated by Pope Urban V to meet the growing menace. The alliance was defeated in the field at a battle on the banks of the Maritsa near Edirne (1365?), and the Ottomans were henceforth rarely to meet more than local opposition as they spread westward through Serbia, Macedonia to the Vardar River and northward to the foothills of the Balkan Mountains. The capital was moved from Bursa to Edirne, indicating that any sense of insecurity in this foreign, Christian land that may have been previously felt had now been overcome. It is also possible that Murad was forced into this move, as he was into the creation of a standing army of non-Turkish Janissaries (Turkish, *Yeniçeri*, "new army"), in order to counter the growing power of his own generals, who had been operating with head success in almost total independence of him

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But the Ottomans were not equals in the Caucasus. It was probably the other tribes (the Chechens and Dagestanis) who were the main threat to the warmongering Russians. The Russians had to be careful not to offend the Janissary (the

189). Murad without opposition, these liquidation of the precautions as to become a lion. In both Asia was taken of the beyliks and by the regaining some of the Ottomans. But Murad soon drove the of the Maritsa (Adrianople) to the sea; now Plovdiv was almost isolated, and all these conquests an alliance with the Wallachia. The close of the eastern Europe, Rumeli or Rumania to the area included Thrace), as indicated in early Ottoman times, and little among the Serbians, Bulgarians, and Bosnians V to meet the he was defeated the banks of the Maritsa. The Ottomans were more than local opposition through Serbia and northward into the mountains. The capture of Edirne, indicated this foreign. It was previously felt that also possible that he, as he was the majority of non-Turkish, a new army to the power of his own, negotiating with the independence of him.


But Anatolia also offered prizes too tempting to be neglected. A dispute over the succession in a neighboring tribe that controlled the region south of Ankara up to the Black Sea permitted Murad to intervene in 1383-1384 on behalf of one of the pretenders. He ultimately reduced them to vassalage, having secured his loyalty by a marriage alliance. Another such alliance between Murad's son Bayezid and the daughter of a neighboring Turkish ruler had already in 1381 brought the territories of Kütahya into the realm of the bride's dowry; and in the following year the lands to the south of this acquisition were purchased from the Hamidoğlu. The frontiers of the Ottomans now faced those of the Karamanids, a powerful beylik that had arisen in the northeast of Anatolia. When the inevitable trial of strength came in 1387, at a battle near Konya, it was the Karamanoğlu who were reduced to suing for peace. Ottoman power was now recognized as unchallengeable throughout the former domains of the Seljuks.

In 1388 the Ottomans launched a sudden attack on Bulgaria, at the conclusion of which the entire country was reduced to a province with its former king as a mere governor. The Turkish ~~armies~~ ^{troops} were now stretched along the Danube in strategic positions. In the summer of 1389 the ~~army~~ ^{army}, under the command of Murad himself, ~~advanced~~ ^{marched} across Bulgaria and confronted the Balkan allies on the plain (*polje*) of Kosovo (Kosovo west of Priština in modern Yugoslavia). The bloody encounter, legends of which still live in Balkan folklore, ended in victory for the Ottomans, and with it the South Slavs all but disap-

pear from history as a political entity for nearly five centuries. Murad himself was assassinated by a Serbian prisoner immediately after the battle had ended.

Bayezid (Bayazid, Bajazet) I (reigned 1389–1402). Murad's eldest son, Bayezid, was proclaimed leader on the field of battle, where his first command was that his brother Yakub be executed. All resistance to Ottoman might seems to have vanished: while his generals were raiding into Bosnia and across the Danube into Hungary and Walachia, he himself fixed a tributary status on Serbia and acted as kingmaker in settling the contention among the Palaeologi for the occupancy of the throne of Byzantium.

In 1390, when Bayezid crossed to Anatolia in response to rumors of rebellion in his Asiatic possessions, both Serbian and Greek contingents were among his troops. The reported alliance among the dispossessed emirs of the former beyliks, if it had ever existed, dissipated before his advance, and aside from incorporating still more independent Turkish territories and seizing the Mediterranean port of Antalya from the Tekkeoğlu, he forced the Karamanoğlu into recognizing all lands west of Konya as Ottoman domain. In the northeast of Anatolia, however, a more redoubtable opponent had arisen in the region of Sivas in the person of Kadı Bürhaneddin, whose activities were to keep Bayezid embattled here until the invasion of northeastern Syria and eastern Anatolia by Timur (Tamerlane) in 1394 brought them together in a defensive alliance with Mamluk (Mameluke) Egypt. Fortunately for Bayezid, the threatened invasion of Ottoman



Areas outlined in color indicate tributary states

territory by the hordes of Çagatay (Chaghatay; the Turkicized Mongols of Central Asia) did not materialize at this moment, for events in Europe were now assuming a very perilous posture.

Constantinople had been under almost constant siege by the Turks since Manuel II assumed the Byzantine throne in 1391. Sigismund, king of Hungary (and later Holy Roman emperor), alarmed by the increasing Ottoman incursions into his territory, canvassed the support of the princes of Christendom, and to this Pope Boniface IX responded by proclaiming a new crusade in 1394. Although the way in which the young chivalry of Western Europe rallied to the cause promised hopeful results, their lack of seriousness and their inability to unite under a single leadership resulted in a disastrous defeat at Nicopolis (now Nikopol, Bulgaria) on Sept. 25, 1396. The ransoms paid for the noblemen who had been taken prisoner brought an unimaginable wealth into the Ottoman treasury, and further conquests in Albania and the Greek mainland created an atmosphere of buoyancy and complacency symbolized by lavish building and extravagant luxuries. In 1397 a successful campaign was led against the Karamanoğlu, by which the great city of Konya, the former Seljuk capital, was acquired, and in the following year Bayezid extended his holdings along the Black Sea by taking Samsun.

The fact that Bayezid devoted so much attention to strengthening his position in war-impoorished Anatolia at a time when Europe was so vulnerable to conquest and exploitation implies an awareness that the most serious challenge to his century-old empire could only come from the East, where the megalomaniac Timur was looking upon the growing prestige of the Ottomans as impudent and defiant. The trial of strength came in 1402 on the plain of Ankara; Timur routed the Ottomans, took Bayezid prisoner, and made a triumphal progress across Anatolia, restoring the dispossessed emirs to their former beyliks and leaving it on his return as divided as it had been after the fall of the Seljuks. Bayezid died in captivity shortly afterward, but two of his sons, Isa and Mehmed, on offering their submission to Timur, were appointed governors of Karasi and Amasya respectively. A third son, Süleyman, fled to Rumili, where from his capital in Edirne he struggled to maintain what remained of Ottoman influence among the Turks who had emigrated there.

There can be little doubt that the reason for Bayezid's defeat is chiefly to be found in the disaffection of the Turkish tribal elements, who were resentful of Ottoman pretensions to royal prerogatives and saw their frequent intermarriages with the daughters of Greek and Slav princes as a Balkanization of the dynasty. Apart from the rewards that cooperation could bring in despoiling Europe, there was no basic cohesive principle in the state. It is difficult to say what conceptions of Islam were held, but it was certainly not a developed creed among them and probably did not amount to more than a loosely held loyalty that permitted a certain degree of unity when they were face to face with the Christians. Neither was there a general system of organization into which the conquered lands could be fitted, nor a body of law and precedent by which they could be administered. Under Ottoman rule life went on unchanged, except that the regional communities were allowed to

develop their individuality to an extent that had been impossible under the Byzantines. The very fact that there existed no finely balanced system that would fall apart if interfered with explains to some extent why Bayezid's defeat was not, as it otherwise might, mark the passing of an era; the confusion just became a little more extreme.

Interregnum. The years 1402-1413 are regarded as an interregnum in Ottoman history, with the sons of Bayezid warring among themselves to restore the integrity of the realm that had been created by their forefathers. Mehmed appears to have escaped from the debacle at Ankara with most of his troops intact, and when Timur acknowledged him as governor of Amasya, he was merely avoiding the fatigue of marching against him. Timur's army was his state, and he dared not parcel it out into garrisons for countless regions he had conquered in his restless career. In Anatolia he hoped to maintain authority by the familiar stratagem of dividing the land into mutually hostile beyliks, all small and weak to be politically effective or militarily dangerous. But Mehmed was not weak, and by 1404 he had driven Isa out of Bursa, and the following year found him in possession of most of western Anatolia and his brother slain in battle. Süleyman, who had been supporting his brother, crossed from Rumili with an army, and throughout the four years he remained in Anatolia a state of stalemate existed between him and Mehmed. Another brother, Musa, crossed to Europe in 1409, where he collected an army and began to bring the region under submission to himself. Süleyman died in battle against him in 1410. In 1413, Musa was to meet the same end at the hands of Mehmed, and it is from this year that the reign of the latter as the fifth sultan of the Ottoman dynasty is said to begin.

Mehmed (Mehmet, Mohammed) I (reigned 1413-1421). Ottoman power expanded only slightly during the eight years of Mehmed's rule. A truce with the Karamanoğlu was arranged in 1414, stabilizing conditions in Anatolia. But the campaigns in Walachia (1416) and Transylvania (1419) had no lasting importance. A dervish revolt in Izmir led by a certain Şeyh (Sheikh) Bedreddin in 1419 was soon suppressed; it deserves mention as the first of many similar popular revolts that were to disturb Anatolia for the next two centuries. When Mehmed died in 1421, the empire had more or less been restored to what it was before Timur's invasion, but it is wrong to describe him as its second founder, as the older historians frequently did. The fact is that at no time had either Asia or Europe lost continuity of Ottoman rule, nor did there emerge any power of equal strength to challenge the rule or to take advantage of the civil wars for its own benefit. Mehmed merely overcame the centrifugal pull to which all such adventitious constructed states are subject; that he did it was in the context of a civil war in no way heightening his achievement.

Murad II (reigned 1421-1451). At the accession of Murad II, the eldest son of Mehmed, insurrection broke out as two pretenders laid claim to the Ottoman throne. These insurrections, both of which failed, are indicative of the profound malaise of the state, which for a quarter of a century had won no spectacular victories nor substantially enlarged its territories. But they also show the general acceptance of the Ottoman house as the


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The fortress of Rumeli Hisari was built on the Bosphorus by Mehmed II one year before he captured Constantinople.

manifest head of the state, so that even revolt had to be given a legitimist basis. The Christian powers, too, availed themselves of the internal difficulties of the Ottomans for their own purposes: Venice, with its superior maritime power, strengthened its hold on the Dalmatian and Aegean coastline, while Hungary attempted to bring the Balkan provinces under its own hegemony. Nor did Asia Minor fail to add to the anarchy: it was not until 1425 that southwest Anatolia was regained from a local rebel, and the Karamanoglu, frequently as allies of the Christian powers in Europe, were unrelentingly menacing until their defeat in 1437.

A treaty of peace with Hungary in 1428 allowed for a concerted drive against Salonika, where since 1423 the Venetians had been holding out against the Ottomans. The fall of this city in 1430 was as important for the prestige it brought to the Ottomans as for the strategic advantage it assured them in the Aegean. But the victory was to be overshadowed almost at once by revolts in Albania, which proved to be but the prelude to a general rising of the Balkan and Danubian principalities, beginning in 1434. A campaign in Anatolia against the Karamanoglu, which lasted from 1435 to 1437, allowed the situation in Europe to deteriorate further. In 1441 the great Hungarian national hero János Hunyadi began the reconquest of the Balkans, while the other great figure of the period, Skanderbeg, in 1443 brought the whole of Albania into open revolt. Murad was obliged to sue for peace with the Hungarians, renouncing many of his Balkan possessions, while in Anatolia even the Karamanoglu were able to exact humiliating terms from him in the price of remaining nonaggressive. But in December 1444 the tide of fortune again turned in favor of the Ottomans: the Balkan alliance suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Varna, and in 1448, Hunyadi was again routed on the faraway field of Kosovo. The Turks were to remain supreme in southeastern Europe for the next two centuries.

Mehmed (Mehmet, Mohammed) II (reigned 1451-1481). Murad died in 1451 and was succeeded by his son Mehmed II, known as Fatih ("the Conqueror"). This ruler was to prove one of the truly great figures of the Renaissance and the architect of a political edifice that until its final disappearance in the 20th century bore the indelible mark of his genius.

It was the taking of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 that earned him his sobriquet. Even though that hitherto impregnable city had by this time been worn to exhaustion by the attrition of a century of Turkish hostility, its capture was nonetheless an achievement that astounded the contemporary world, just as the blow to Christendom, which its capture symbolized, brought Europe to despair.

Despite a reign of almost constant military activity, it was not Mehmed's ambition to enlarge the territories of the empire, but rather to consolidate and secure what was already held and to invest it with a central idea, a purpose, and an organization. What Christianity had been to Byzantium he made of Islam for the Ottoman Empire: not the wild, emotional doctrines of the dervishes, which until then had prevailed among these Turks, but the developed creed that had evolved over the centuries and had bred its own characteristic civilization and culture. To achieve a centralized state, he had to break the power of the Turkish military nobility. This he did by building up the strength of the Janissary corps and by appointing men loyal to the dynasty as the semifederal provincial administrators (*sipahi*). In the Palace School, which he founded shortly after transferring the capital to Istanbul, he provided for the training of Christian slave children, collected periodically from among the subject peoples and forcibly converted to Islam. These provided the state with a fund of devoted servants who could be trusted to administer the empire on behalf of their masters and benefactors. Likewise, the products of the theological colleges (*medrese*) that he founded and encour-

most of the Morea and having taken many of the Aegean and Ionian islands. Mehmed was now in the most important commercial Venetian Republic. Wars broke out between them, but they were mainly confined to the littoral, it did not lead to the problems of the territories. Walachia had been annexed and Hercegovina to a condition of vassalage to its formal incorporation. Ottoman control of the Black Sea was assured by the last surviving Byzantine (Trebizond) from the last ruler, drove to only in Amasra. An independent dynasty of the around Sinop, to within the Karamanids, finding an opportunity of a stubborn rival, and was to become a vilayet of the

1473 against the powerful Uzun Hasan, showed that was the mightiest serious threat from the Safavid dynasty following century. Confronted in 1473 by colonies on its west, the Mongol rulers of the Dalmatian coast, when Albania and Venice was forced to a changed political situation, a peace was concluded, in return for certain lands of the empire. The sea power had not the fact that in 1480, in the head of the Strait, in the head of the Strait, in the head of the Strait. But whatever and in Europe these were not to be died and with the period of

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But the fact is that throughout the whole of his reign the true center of events lay in Anatolia. The foundation of the Safavid state in Persia under Shah Ismail at the beginning of the 16th century exerted a powerful attraction on the disaffected elements in Anatolia, who were only too ready to accept any alternative Islamic hegemony. The five inconclusive wars that were fought with the Egyptian Mamluks in Syria and southern Anatolia between 1485 and 1491 must also be seen in this light. It is to Bayezid's credit that he was able to prevent his enemies to the east and the south from profiting by the internal problems with which he was beset in Anatolia, while at the same time securing his hold on the Black Sea by the capture of Kilis and Akkerman (modern Belgorod-Dnestrovski) from the Genoese in 1484, and on the eastern Mediterranean by seizing the important ports of the Morea—Lepanto, Modon, and Coron—from the Venetians in 1499-1500).

The Janissary establishment was greatly enlarged during his reign, and the Ottoman navy, for the first time, was developed into an organic arm of Ottoman strategy. The spectacular successes of his son Selim, who actually drove him from the throne in 1512 and is rumored to have had him poisoned in the same year, would have been impossible without the security and stability that Bayezid created.

Selim I (reigned 1512-1520). Selim secured his succession by a wholesale destruction of all possible claimants of Ottoman descent. His reign was marked by two momentous victories by which the whole face of the empire was changed. In 1514 he met the challenge presented by the vigorous state that the Safavids were creating on its eastern frontiers, and on the Plain of Çaldıran (Chaldiran) in eastern Anatolia he utterly destroyed the army of Shah Ismail and the hopes of all the discontented elements in Anatolia, who were looking in this direction for delivery from the Ottomans.

After having brought all the eastern provinces into total submission, he turned his attention to the Mamluks, and in August 1516 he defeated their armies on a plain near Aleppo. As a consequence the Mamluks were displaced from power, and he became master of all their territories in Syria, Egypt, and Arabia. The Mamluks were hated by the peoples whom they misruled for their own selfish advantage that once defeated there was little opposition to Selim's progress, and by January 1517 he had taken Cairo. By this victory he incorporated into the empire the economic complex of the Nile Valley. This was, however, no more important in the eyes of the Islamic world than that he thereby also became the "Protector of the Holy Cities of Arabia," Mecca and Medina in the Arabian peninsula. It was at this time that the popular misconception arose that he assumed the dignity of caliph, supplanting the Abbasid in whom the Mamluks had maintained as a facade of legitimacy for their own rule.

In 1519 the pirate Barbarossa (Khair ed-Din; Hayreddin), who had seized the port of Algiers in North Africa, offered his submission to the Sublime Porte (the European translation of Bâbiâli; the term is used to denote the Ottoman government) in order to gain the protection of Ottoman power. Thus the notorious Barbary corsairs became citizens of the empire. Ultimately they

proved to be more an embarrassment and a burden than an asset.

Süleyman (Suleiman, Solyman) I (reigned 1520-1566). In 1520, Selim was succeeded by his son Süleyman, known in the West as "the Magnificent" and in the East as Kanunî, "the Lawgiver." His reign of 46 years was to witness the apogee of Ottoman power and glory, towering above all rivals and competitors.

His title of "Lawgiver" refers to his redistribution of the provinces of the empire and his provision of each with an individual statute (*kanun*; *qanun*) of obligations and privileges, the financial aspects of which were based on actual land surveys. This was the first attempt ever made to estimate systematically the revenues of the empire, though it must be acknowledged that the information seldom seems to have contributed to the elaboration of a definite economic policy.

His political objectives, however, were well defined: the conquest of Hungary, the domination of the Mediterranean, control of the Tigris-Euphrates regions, and the neutralization of Safavid Persia. The first of these brought him into conflict with Habsburg Austria and so redoubtable an adversary as the Emperor Charles V. Süleyman captured Belgrade in 1521, and in 1526 he defeated King Louis (Lajos) II of Hungary at the famous Battle of Mohács. By 1528 the Ottoman army was besieging Vienna. Budapest was taken the following year, and by 1541 Transylvania was an Ottoman protectorate; from 1547 onward, Austria found it more expedient to pay an annual tribute to the Porte than to resist its arms.

In these wars Süleyman was acting more or less as an ally of France. His particular contribution to the alliance was made in the Mediterranean where, following the capture of Rhodes from the Knights of St. John (the Hospitalers) in

Süleyman I "the Magnificent," with two attendants, as portrayed by the court painter Haydar, known as Nigari. E. ARA GULER



1522, Ottoman strength had been growing relentlessly. In 1533, Barbarossa was made grand admiral of the fleet, and until his death in 1546 he was seldom effectively challenged in these waters. Tunisia fell to him in 1534, becoming another corsair state within the empire. In 1538 his defeat of Andrea Doria off Preveza put the seal of Ottoman supremacy on the Mediterranean. So confident had Süleyman become that he even thought to contest Portuguese power in the Persian Gulf by sending a fleet to Gujarat, India, in 1538 and again in 1554, but neither of these were to experience anything but disaster. Most of the islands of the Aegean were annexed (Chios fell in 1566), though Malta, to which the Knights of St. John had come after losing Rhodes, successfully resisted a determined siege in 1565.

Iraq was invaded and the capital city of Baghdad taken in 1534, assuring control of this key center of the economic life of the Middle East. Though at least two other campaigns were directed against the Safavids, their chief result was the intimidation of the unquiet territories through which the armies passed. Süleyman died in 1566 during the siege of Szigetvár, and with him the heroic age of Ottoman history comes to an end.

Stagnation and Decline of the Empire The slow but steady tempo of political decline in the succeeding two centuries had the positive result of allowing the integration of the various (and frequently incompatible) elements of the empire, so that a unique society was produced, no less homogeneous for being multiracial and diversified religiously. It tended to be dominated by those institutions by which the glories of the past had been achieved, and it remained so rigidly conservative that its very anachronism baffled other nations in all their dealings with it.

With only a few exceptions, the sultans all but lose their identity in the ceremonies of sovereignty. After Murad IV (reigned 1623-1640) they never take the field with their armies, and although they remain the supreme power in the land and are revered by their people as the "Shadow of God on Earth," their power is increasingly exploited by their viziers in competition with the women of the royal harem and their eunuchs.

The Janissaries, after the middle of the 17th century, ceased to be recruited from among the Christian peoples and became a hereditary body possessing the only effective power. The more dangerous to their masters as they became more innocuous to the enemy, in their insolence they did not hesitate to depose and murder sultans of whom they disapproved (for example, Osman II in 1622), and they jealously maintained their prerogatives at the expense of the security of the state.

As their power of intimidation and coercion outside the confines of the capital decreased, the military classes in the more distant provinces, particularly in Anatolia, began to govern in semi-independence, making their authority hereditary in their own families. From the early 18th century down to their final curtailment by the reforming Sultan Mahmud II (reigned 1808-1839), these *derebeyi* families ("lords of the valleys") were able to ignore and even defy the wishes of the Porte and its local representatives. The latter tended increasingly to be men who had purchased their office in expectation of making a

substantial profit by using their power to extract all they could from agriculture and trade, to the consequent detriment of both.

Various regions were almost totally given over to banditry, making communication difficult and dangerous. The defenseless peasants drifted into the cities, where they swelled the volume of the discontented proletariat. There were no industries to absorb them, and much of the lavish expenditure on the mosques, schools, and other public buildings that still adorn these cities must have had the employment of these masses among its other pious motives.

Statesmen of ability and foresight do emerge in every generation, but none saw the inherent impracticality of the system they were bent on preserving in the changing conditions of the world. Their talents were dissipated either in hopeless military adventures or in naive efforts to redress an anarchical economy. The learned classes, too, with no intellectual stimulation from a society almost universally illiterate and in part of even the most meager scholarly attainments, complacently and uninquiringly shut themselves up in an educational system in which the appeal to ancient authority could always silence the arguments of reason. They were the official exponents of Islamic doctrine and law as well, but they made even religion academic and lifeless, and the people were driven more and more to seek satisfaction of their spiritual needs in the dervish orders. Nevertheless, in response to this unstable situation, which might otherwise have been brutalizing and debasing, the Ottomans fashioned his own highly civilized philosophy of life, quietistic and fatalistic, but expressing the basic, ennobling human ideals of Islam.

The period has few military successes to record. In 1571, Cyprus was taken, but in the same year the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto exposed its vulnerability at sea and destroyed the image created by Barbarossa. Georgia was overrun in 1578. But with the advent of the great Safavid ruler Shah Abbas I (reigned 1587-1629), Persia was no longer an easy victim, and from 1623 to 1638 it even held Baghdad. The peace concluded between the two states in 1639 marks the renunciation of Ottoman ambitions in these parts. Crete was finally taken in 1669 after a 20-year struggle, in the course of which the Venetians had blockaded the Dardanelles and at one point were able to threaten Istanbul from the sea. Tunisia and Algeria, though nominally part of the empire, were ruled in total independence by their respective bey and deys and pursued their piracy with no regard for Ottoman policies or alliances.

But Austria, which had achieved the status of a first-rate military power during the Thirty Years' War, was the chief enemy. Even by 1606 in the Treaty of Sitvatorok (Zsitva-Torok) Austria was able to exact concessions from the sultan. At the Battle of St. Gotthard in 1664, the Austrian general Montecuccoli dispelled forever all the fear and respect that the Turks had once inspired. Though by sheer weight of numbers they were able to subject Vienna to its second siege in 1683, by the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 they were forced to surrender most of Hungary, renounce their pretensions in Transylvania, and recognize Venetian conquests in the Morea. The Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 completed the Ottoman evacuation of these parts and cost them Belgrade for about 20 years. (The Morea, how-

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There was yet another and more insatiable power waiting to complete the humiliation of the Turk. When at the end of the 17th century Peter the Great first began to introduce his newly united Russia into the sophisticated complexities of European politics, the demonstrated weakness of the Ottoman Empire made it seem his natural prey, just as its domination of his access to the Mediterranean made it a necessary enemy. In 1696 he took the Crimean stronghold of Azov, and in 1711 virtually proclaimed a Holy War against the infidel to the south. Surprisingly, this war resulted in a Russian disaster, which the Ottomans in their diplomatic simplicity failed to take full advantage of in the Treaty of the Pruth in the same year. But the theme of Russia as the legitimate heir of Byzantium in the protection of Orthodox Christianity was again taken up in 1738, and the Serbian and Greek subjects of the sultan were led to regard Russia as their ordained savior. The culminating stroke of this policy was delivered in 1768 by Catherine the Great, who had provoked the exhausted Ottomans into a war that they could only lose. The Danubian Principalities (the name for Moldavia and Wallachia) were overrun, the Crimea was occupied, and a Russian fleet sailed by way of the Atlantic to press the attack on the Turk from the Mediterranean. The war was brought to an end in 1774 by the famous Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (Turkish Küçük Kaynarca). After this treaty the Ottoman Empire was never again to be an independent agent in international affairs, nor even the arbiter of its own destinies.

As a consequence of the terms exacted by the Russians in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, the question was posed for the first time, in the form that was to become classic as the Eastern Question, of how to apportion the territory of the dying Ottoman Empire among its presumptive heirs. Russia was confident that warfare in European Turkey could henceforth only be victorious and profitable. The czar had gained recognition as the protector of the Greek Orthodox subjects of the sultan, and he inferred from his independent annexation of the Crimea in 1783 that intervention could be pursued without fear of concerted action by the rest of Europe. Russia, with the wholehearted encouragement of an equally ambitious Austria, sought by subversive propaganda in the Danubian Principalities and the Balkan provinces and by provocative behavior toward the Porte itself to maintain a state of ferment throughout all European Turkey. The French Revolution had effectively removed the French check to Russian ambition, while England could be relied on not to pass from disapproval to outright hostility so long as there was an immediate danger of the Russian fleet gaining access to the eastern Mediterranean. The peace treaty of Jassy in 1792 between Russia and Turkey, concluding a war in progress since 1787, left the mighty northern power extended and poised to leap across a frontier extending from the Caspian Sea to the Dniester River.

But before the seemingly inevitable could happen, Napoleon invaded the sultan's province of Egypt in 1798, bringing Russia, England, and Turkey into an uneasy alliance against the common threat. After peace had been concluded with France in 1801 and the latter had regained

some of its former influence at the Porte, the Ottoman Empire was again stretched on the carving board of European ambitions, Napoleon variously distributing in advance the joints to be dismembered in accordance with his own mercenary schemes. France, who provoked the action on the part of the Ottomans with regard to the native princes (hospodars) of Wallachia and Moldavia, gave Russia the opportunity of launching another war in 1806, at the conclusion of which, by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, the Russian frontiers moved to the Prut River and Turkey lost the whole of Bessarabia. It was Ottoman friendship with France that caused Britain to declare war on the sultan in 1807 when the Porte would not accept Britain's humiliating demands for joining in a new anti-French alliance. Finally, the French advised the Ottomans to treat a limited Serbian insurrection in 1806 as a major revolt, thereby putting in process the chain of events that was to lead to the total independence of this province.

The Reforms of Selim III (reigned 1789-1807) and Mahmud II (reigned 1808-1839). The tentative efforts at westernization that were made during the reign of Sultan Selim III, in an attempt to redress the fortunes of the empire by increasing the effectiveness of its military establishment, betray the fundamental archaism of Ottoman political thinking. For the army was still regarded as the chief prop, if not actually the chief purpose, of the state. Though Sultan Mahmud II delivered the state from the burden of the Janissaries by destroying them in 1826, his reign demonstrates that merely military solutions could not solve the problems of the empire. In 1816, Serbia gained an unprecedented degree of local autonomy, and the revolution that broke out in Greece in 1821 not only resulted in the total independence of that land in 1830, but entailed, as well, the virtual loss of the Romanian provinces and Egypt.

The defect in Mahmud II's reforms was that they did not recognize how altered the role of the Ottoman Empire in world politics had become. They were conceived in reference to a military state that no longer had any reality. In effect, what he sought to do was to transform a loose military feudalism into a centralized military despotism, and to a certain extent he achieved this. He replaced the Janissaries with a force conscripted from his Muslim subjects, organized and trained after the European fashion; he suppressed the derebeyis and once again brought the Anatolian provinces under the control of Istanbul, abolishing the feudal army of sipahis and appropriating their fiefs (*timar* and *ziamet*) to the public domain.

Presumably such reforms might have brought a measure of internal peace and prosperity to the empire had there been no intervention from without. Here another defect in Mahmud's conceptions must be noted: his total unawareness of the political complex in which his state had become involved. Muhammad Ali (Turkish, Mehmed Ali), the governor of Egypt, as a reward for the assistance he had given the sultan during the Greek revolt in 1825, was left undisputed master of that province. But his contempt for Ottoman weakness allowed him visions of even greater rewards, and he sent his son Ibrahim Pasha (Turkish, Ibrahim Paşa) to invade Syria in 1831. By December of the following year the governor's forces had taken Konya and the road to Istanbul lay open before them. The sultan

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powers, remained little more than a statement of good intentions. There were endless decrees reorganizing the administration, taxes, justice, education, and the other services of the state, but in each case they broke down for want of trained, active, and trustworthy officials to carry them through. Moreover, they all ran counter to the medieval Muslim mentality, to which such departures from tradition savored of impiety and a violation of the Holy Law. Indeed, it was unrealistic to expect, as Europe did, that a whole people could change its century-old mentality overnight.

Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The Bulgars, unlike the Slavs and Greeks, had never had their own church within the Orthodox community, and lacking this national core they had become completely lost to history during the period of Roman domination. In religion they were under the control of the Greek patriarch, and since nationality in the Ottoman Empire was based on religion, they were considered and, in fact, considered themselves as Greeks. However, about the middle of the 19th century, the nationalistic fever affected them also. The language began to be assiduously cultivated, and agitation was started for a national church that would separate them from the Greeks. In order to prevent them from accepting the Roman Catholic dispensation, as they threatened to do, Russia induced the Porte in 1870 to establish a Bulgarian church with an exarch at its head. In addition to this concession, the sultan recognized that Macedonia was a sort of frontier land between the Greek and Bulgarian churches, and allowed its parishes to go over to either side they wished on showing a two-thirds majority in favor. Thus began the battle of the patriarchs and the exarchs that was the preliminary to the ill-omened Macedonian Question.

In 1876 when Montenegro and Serbia associated themselves with the insurrections that had broken out in Bosnia and Hercegovina the previous year, Bulgaria attempted to gain its independence. But its efforts were so cruelly repressed by the *başıbozuk* (bashi-bazouk) militia of the Porte that all Europe was moved to indignation. It was at this juncture that Russia made its bid. Knowing that the popular opinion of Europe was against the Turk and would handicap the powers from taking effective action, it prepared a new war against the Ottoman Empire.

At this time the notorious Abdülhamid (Abdul-Hamid) II (reigned 1876-1909) had just come to the throne, and in order to placate the wrath of Europe he had, under the influence of a group of Turkish liberal statesmen led by Midhat Pasa (Midhat Pasha), formally proclaimed a constitution and parliamentary government. The proclamation was very dramatically timed, at the very moment when the representatives of the powers were assembled in Istanbul (December 1876) to decide how Russian-Turkish difficulties might be settled peacefully. Arguing that the constitutional absolutism of the state had ended, the Porte refused to make any concessions or to give the powers any further authority in their dominions. The conference could achieve nothing, and in April 1877, Russia was left free to declare the war it wanted.

Treaty of Berlin and Its Aftermath. Despite the heroic defense of Plevna, the Russians found little to impede their progress, and by January 1878 they had reached Edirne, whence they pressed

on to the shores of the Marmara in sight of Istanbul. The Turks had to sue for peace, and negotiations were opened at San Stefano. The terms of this treaty are of little importance, for neither Britain nor Austria had any intention of letting Russia realize its ambitions in the Balkans. Finding itself once again isolated among the European powers, Russia had to allow the matter to be negotiated at the Congress of Berlin (June 1878). Here everyone received satisfaction except Russia: a self-governing principality of Bulgaria was set up; Austria took under its protection Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Britain got Cyprus; Serbia and Rumania were declared fully independent; and Greece was given Thessaly and a bit of the Epirus.

It is clear that this treaty, unlike that drawn up at Paris 22 years before, was based on no illusions about the Ottoman Empire. In place of hollow professions about the integrity of the sultan's dominions, there was not only a frank recognition of their necessary subjection to the collective will of Europe, but also an unqualified acknowledgment that the sultan, left to himself, was not likely to carry out any administrative improvement worthy of the name. Of his former Christian territories, only Eastern Rumili, Macedonia, Crete, and Armenia were left to the sultan, and he was cautioned to carry out reforms in these regions immediately.

Abdülhamid took advantage of the war with Russia to suspend the constitution and to disencumber himself of the restraint imposed on him by the liberals under Midhat Pasa. He realized that his best chance of being allowed to reign lay in utilizing the inevitable disharmonies of the European concert and in tenaciously holding fast to every hereditary right identifiable with the sultanate. In domestic affairs he found the orthodox, conservative Muslim faction strongest numerically, so he unhesitatingly fashioned his policies to suit it. The Treaty of Berlin had extorted such undertakings with regard to Armenia, Macedonia, Crete, and Rumili that Abdülhamid felt it was only a matter of time before these territories, too, were taken from him. Indeed, there was already sufficient nationalistic agitation in all of them to warrant this feeling. Eastern Rumili was annexed by Bulgaria in 1885, in clear violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and none of the powers raised a finger. In order to prevent a similar loss of those eastern Anatolian territories that constituted historical Armenia, between the years 1894 and 1896 a systematic policy of annihilating all Armenians was followed. Muslim fanaticism was employed as the instrument and estimates place the slaughter at more than 100,000.

In 1896-1897 the Christians of Crete revolted, and popular agitation in Greece rose to such a pitch that the people themselves declared war against the Ottomans and marched into that part of Thessaly still held by the Turks. It was a mob rather than an army and was soon defeated by the German-trained troops of the sultan. However, the powers again took a hand; Crete was separated from Turkish administration and became self-governing.

In Macedonia—that region of the Vardar Valley through which most Balkan peoples had migrated at one time or another, leaving behind some national relic in the population—the rivalry of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria somewhat helped the position of the sultan. By their inten-

sive propaganda, both religious and educational, the Bulgarians had created a situation, especially in the Slavonic north, favorable to themselves. But there was also equally intensive propaganda by Serbia and Greece. About the turn of the century this activity began to take the form of small armed bands of terrorists, pro-Greek or pro-Bulgarian, who went about attacking the Turkish towns. In the face of the severe measures of repression taken by the Turks, the European powers felt compelled in 1903 to place the province under international control, owing only the most formal and nominal recognition to the Porte. The terrorist bands now began to fight each other, and ultimately the whole population indulged in an orgy of self-destruction, abetted by the neighboring states and incapable of being prevented or controlled by the police forces of Europe that were installed here.

Europe's drive for colonization based on economic exploitation was at work in other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1830, France had been engaged on the North African coast in the conquest of Algeria and in 1881 had extended its holdings by appropriating Tunisia. In the following year, Britain occupied Egypt, where the Suez Canal (opened in 1869) had completely revolutionized the India trade. Tripoli, it was generally understood, was to be taken by Italy as soon as Italy could find the time to conquer it.

However, since Italy's achievement of unity in 1871, a new power with colonial thirsts had entered the scene: Germany. The only place that seemed left for German imperial ventures was Asia Minor itself. It followed the now traditional method of economic penetration and early in the 1880's supplied a German military mission to reorganize the Ottoman army. But it was in 1896 that the real work began with the construction of railways in Anatolia, and in 1899 the concession was granted to the *Deutsche Bank* (German Bank) for the laying of the Berlin-Baghdad line. If this were completed, not only would the Persian Gulf and India be opened to German trade, but they would also become strategically vulnerable. Britain was seriously worried, and Russia was confronted with the prospect of having its age-long dream of possessing Istanbul forever destroyed. It was in response to this menace that Britain, Russia, and France composed their differences (all imperial) over Persia, Morocco, and Egypt, and formed the system of alliances known as the Triple Entente. About 1907 the Entente began to view the disorders in Macedonia with some anxiety, and their possible interference alarmed not only the sultan but also the Young Turks.

Young Turk Movement. The Young Turks were a group of Europeanized, young intellectuals who, from exile in Britain and France, had been conducting a propaganda campaign against the despotism of Abdülhamid, convinced that the only salvation for the Ottoman Empire lay in its becoming a wholly European nation. Their propaganda found its greatest reception in the army, and in 1906 they transferred their headquarters from Paris to Salonika, where they adopted the name of Committee of Union and Progress. The revolt they led began in Macedonia, and the sultan, seeing that he did not command the loyalty of the army, yielded to their demands, granting a new constitution in 1908 and summoning a national parliament.

The Young Turk revolution was greeted with political sunrise, not only among the peoples of the Balkans but even in the more cynical capitals of Europe. But it soon became apparent that the Young Turks, for all their talk about freedom and constitutionalism, had no intention of breaking up the old Ottoman Empire. Instead they proposed a new concept of Ottoman nationality, at all to the liking of the subject Christians. At first the tenure of the Committee of Union and Progress was uncertain. But after the Young Turks had overcome an attempt at counterrevolution by Abdülhamid and replaced him with Mehmed V (reigned 1909-1915), they began to apply their policies energetically.

The Young Turks had spoken boldly of gaining Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Crete, which had the immediate effect of prompting Bulgaria to declare its full independence, Crete to propose union with Greece, and Austria to annex in 1908 Bosnia and Hercegovina, which it had been "protecting" since the Treaty of Berlin. This move of Austria infuriated Serbia, which considered these Slav territories to be rightly its own, awaiting incorporation at some late date into a great Slav state. The Berlin-Baghdad railway would have to pass through Serbia, and encouraged by Russia, Serbia stood up to its powerful neighbor, attempting to obstruct this passage to the Near East, which the Triple Alliance of Austria, Germany, and Italy held to be vital in its destiny. Austria, supported by Germany, demonstrated quite clearly that it had no intention of giving up the provinces that it had annexed; the Triple Entente, unprepared to accept the consequences of their policies, withdrew its support they had been giving Serbia. A world war had been averted, and Europe stopped holding its breath for a while.

The Pan-Ottomanism of the Young Turks had failed as a solution to the nationalistic movements in the sultan's dominions. They were beginning to reveal themselves quite as despotic as the regime they had displaced. Trouble broke out in Albania, into whose remote hills the winds of nationalism had reached at last. Like most of the Balkans, the Albanians had interpreted the Young Turk manifesto as a concession of independence, and when they realized that it meant nothing more than a change of name, they were prepared to fight. The Turkish army could do little against this mountainous country. After a war, which dragged on for about three years (1909-1912), the Committee of Union and Progress, beset by more serious troubles elsewhere, granted them their independence. But they also had to give the new state a frontier, and the line was drawn to include the four former provinces of Scutari, Janina, Monastir, and Kosovo. However, for a long time the Greeks had been agitating for Janina, the Montenegrins claimed Scutari, while Monastir and Kosovo were Macedonian areas, which had for years been the scene of bitter rivalry between Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb. They all decided to act before the sketch map became a reality.

Turco-Italian War. In September 1911, Italy at last made its claim to Tripoli, the North African territory of the Porte that had hitherto escaped the imperialistic drives of France and Britain. Italy's troops had no trouble in defeating the Turkish and Arab defenders, but it soon became apparent that the sun and desert were more formidable enemies. The Turks refused to sign

over the province, and thereupon, in May 1912, the Italians occupied Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands. At this time events in the Balkans showed the Turks that they could not hold out in Africa any longer, and peace was signed at Lausanne on Oct. 18, 1912. Thus Tripoli became Libya, and the Balkan war was too pressing on the Turks for them to demand that the islands be evacuated as promised.

Balkan Wars. What no statesmanship in or out of the Balkans had ever been able to accomplish the Young Turks brought about almost overnight. Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro—these hitherto natural enemies—had formed an alliance and attacked the Ottomans on the day the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The allies scored a brilliant victory. Within a few months the only Ottoman territories left in Europe were Constantinople, and the three besieged fortresses of Thessalonica, Janina, and Scutari. The Greek navy, moreover, took possession of all the Aegean Islands not held by Britain or Italy. The Porte yielded in desperation to the European powers, and on Dec. 3, 1912, a cessation of hostilities was announced, to be followed by a conference in London. A coup d'état within the Committee of Union and Progress that resulted in the militarist Enver Bey becoming head of government caused the Balkan war to break out once again. But the struggle was futile, and eventually on May 30, 1913, a peace treaty was negotiated, again in London, whereby great territorial losses had to be accepted by the Turks.

But now the Balkan allies had the task of distributing the spoils, and immediately Bulgaria was at war with Greece and Serbia, a situation of which the Turks took advantage by reoccupying Thessalonica and Edirne. The intense negotiations and the stubborn haggling over every foot of land that followed the Treaty of Bucharest on Aug. 10, 1913, bringing this short war to a most unhappy end for Bulgaria, lose all significance and importance in view of the impending world war, which was to throw the Balkans into the melting pot once again.

World War I. Turkey's entry into World War I on the side of the Central Powers is still debated as an act of impetuous folly. But it is difficult to see how it could have avoided commitment on one side or the other, in spite of its tenuous and decept condition. Whether it participated or not, it was inevitable that its lands would figure among the prizes of victory. Germany had in the course of a quarter of a century become the most influential power at the Ottoman court, and nowhere was this influence more prominent than in the army, whose officers had largely undergone German military instruction. The militarist wing of the Committee of Union and Progress, which had seized power in 1912 effectively silenced the more moderate elements in the party. Since the Treaty of Berlin between Germany and Britain, directly or indirectly, had been involved in every misfortune suffered by the empire, and their alliance with Russia, the traditional enemy, was held to bode nothing but evil. On Aug. 2, 1914, an article of alliance was signed with Germany, and as a result of the assistance given by the Turkish navy to an assault on the Russian fleet in the Black Sea by the German fleet under Goeben and Breslau at the end of October 1914, the Allies declared war on Turkey. It has become part of the historical fiction of the Turkish Republic that the empire's involve-

ment in the war was wholly due to the conniving and duplicity of the war minister, Enver Paşa, and the minister of the interior, Talat Paşa. The statesmen of that period, in their memoirs, are careful to stress their own opposition to military participation and the degree to which they were kept in the dark about negotiations with Germany. But there is little doubt that the majority of the officer class in the army was wholeheartedly in favor of the venture and saw the alliance with a mighty Germany as an opportunity to redeem the humiliations their arms had suffered everywhere since the turn of the century. As usual, no one gave a thought to the economics of warfare. Territorial losses during the previous century had greatly reduced the size of the population from which soldiers could be levied, and only Anatolia remained as a source of manpower. This, of course, was inadequate to meet the needs of such a far-flung empire, and in practically every engagement these badly equipped and poorly trained Anatolian peasants were compelled to fight against armies superior in everything except courage. Moreover, the drain on the peasant population and their animals, along with the deportation and slaughter of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1915 for siding with the invading Russians, was a crippling blow to agriculture, and for four years the entire nation lived on the brink of famine.

The frenetic deathbed convulsions of the empire took place in the three years of Turkish participation in the war. The very first campaign against the Russians in the Caucasus resulted in total defeat (January 1915), while an attempt on the Suez Canal and Egypt in February of the same year was pathetically inadequate. The ill-advised Allied attempt to seize control of the Dardanelles and secure a passage to Istanbul between February and December 1915 provided the one notable Turkish success of the entire war. But in January 1916 the Russians resumed the offensive in the Caucasus, which by August brought them deep into eastern Anatolia along a line stretching from Trabzon on the Black Sea to Bitlis. Two Turkish armies were destroyed in their advance. Another attempt on the Suez Canal in June of this year was no more successful than the first, and the way was prepared for the cautious and deliberate advance of the British into Palestine and Syria. A victory over the British at Kut al-Amara in April 1916 was about the only Turkish success in the Mesopotamian theater. But early in the following year Baghdad was captured and the Turks had to fall back on Mosul.

The revolution in Russia in March 1917 relieved the situation in eastern Anatolia and allowed the lost territories to be retaken. Yet this only encouraged Enver Paşa into an ambitious fantasy involving the seizure of the whole of Transcaucasia. For this purpose he diverted troops from the Palestine front, where the Arab revolt of June 1916 had further complicated the precarious position of the defending Turks. It was only in Palestine that Turkish arms, though in slow but constant retreat, commanded respect. But General Allenby's campaign in 1918 showed how futile further resistance was here, too. When Bulgaria, in September 1918, signed a separate armistice with the Allies at Salonika, the land connection between Turkey and Austria was broken and there was no longer any hope left. So on Oct. 30, 1918, Turkey signed an armistice.

stice at Mudros (Moudros), on the island of Lemnos.

The moral deterioration of the Ottoman dynasty and the system that it symbolized was now complete. The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress had fled into exile in disgrace, and the new sultan, Mehmed VI, with no one of courage and strength to advise and direct him, became the helpless instrument of the victorious Allies. He was even induced to proscribe as a rebel Mustafa Kemal (later known as Kemal Atatürk), the one man who refused to be cowed by the arrogant might of the Allies and who since May 1919 had been organizing the still mobilized Turkish forces in the east to resist the Greek invasion of Anatolia, which the Allies had sponsored. In April 1920 an alternative government under Kemal's presidency was formed in Ankara. It claimed to express the true will of the Turkish people, whose destinies the sultan showed himself no longer concerned with when he accepted the terms imposed on the nation by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres (Aug. 10, 1920).

Toward the end of 1922, Turkish resistance had driven the Greek invaders into the sea, Izmir was recaptured, and the Allies were forced to accept an armistice virtually dictated by Kemal at Mudanya on October 11. The office of sultan was abolished on November 1, and Mehmed VI fled abroad on a British warship. The next Ottoman incumbent, Abdülmecid (Abdul-Medjid) II, was merely allowed to hold the semireligious position of caliph, but on March 3, 1924, five months after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, this office was also done away with. Thus the last survivor of the dynasty that had for over six centuries ruled one of the world's greatest empires passed into obscurity in exile.

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THE REPUBLIC

The Turkish Republic was proclaimed on Oct. 29, 1923, with Mustafa Kemal as its first president.

The Secularization of the Republic. Although Kemal's People's party was the only party in the new Grand National Assembly, not all its members were in sympathy with his plans to make Turkey into a secular Western state. On March 3, 1924, besides abolishing the caliphate and banishing all members of the Ottoman dynasty, the assembly replaced the ministry of sacred law (*seriat*) and pious foundations (*evkaf*) with a directorate of religious affairs within the premier's office. All schools were placed under the ministry of education, which closed the Muslim religious colleges (*medrese*) the next day. The Muslim law courts followed them into oblivion on April 8, 1924.

A new constitution was approved on April 20, 1924. Under it the assembly exercised its legislative power directly and its executive power through the president of the republic, whom it elected, and the council of ministers chosen by him. The judiciary was independent.

The Istanbul press, incensed by the transfer of the capital to Ankara, became the mouthpiece of those who were discontented with the new regime for various reasons; the disestablishment of Islam, the stagnation of trade (due largely to bureaucratic inefficiency), and Kemal's autocracy.

In November 1924 the People's party began to experience a wave of resignations, and on Nov. 17, 1924, the dissidents formed the Progressive Republican party. İsmet (İnönü) resigned, and Fethi (Okyar) took his place as premier. The Istanbul press misinterpreted Kemal's quiescence in these events as a sign of weakness. In fact, while naturally wishing to distance himself from the unpopularity of the Republican People's party (hereafter RPP; the "Republican" had been added on Nov. 10, 1924), he had no objection to opposition so long as it accepted the principle of a secular republic.

But the Istanbul press was not alone in its misinterpretation of weakness. On Nov. 2, 1924, the Progressive Republican party opened its first branch office, at Urfa, in the east, and on Feb. 13, 1925, the Kurds in the eastern provinces rose in rebellion under Şeyh Said, hereditary chief of the Nakşibendi dervishes. They were impelled by a combination of religious and national feelings. Their hopes of an independent Kurdistan had been frustrated by the establishment of the new Turkey, whose frontiers contained a substantial portion of their tribal territory. They had accepted the rule of the Turkish sultan, who was also "Commander of the Faithful," but they had no desire to form part of a secular Turkish republic. The government gave no support to the peasants by abolishing the agricultural tithe, but no other concessions were made. Martial law was proclaimed in 13 provinces, and the legal definition of treason was extended to cover "the use of religion as a political instrument." Fethi resigned and İsmet's strong hand resumed control. The next day, March 4, 1925, two "independence tribunals" under hanging judges were set up, and by the end of May 1925 the revolt had been stamped out. A month later Şeyh Said and other leaders were executed at the dervish lodges in the east were closed. Fethi's party was dissolved on June 3, 1925.

For the next 10 years a stream of legislation continued the process of secular Westernization known as the Atatürk Reforms. On Sept. 2, 1925, all dervish lodges and tombs of saints were closed. On Nov. 25, 1925, came the Hat Law which forbade all forms of male headdress but the hat with a brim. The international calendar and system of reckoning time were imposed by law of Dec. 26, 1925, and between February and May 1926, Islamic law was dethroned with the introduction of adaptations of the Swiss civil, Italian penal, and Italian and German commercial codes.

In June 1926, a plot to kill Kemal was uncovered, and several of his opponents whose complicity in the plot was doubtful, to say the least, joined the guilty on the gallows or in exile. This injustice was the one stain in Kemal's public career. From then on, his authority was unchallenged.

On April 10, 1928, the clause "The religion of the Turkish state is Islam" was struck out of the constitution. On May 24, 1928, the international numerals replaced the Arabic numerals. On Nov. 1, 1928, the assembly outlawed the Arabic Persian alphabet and adopted the Latin-based alphabet that Kemal himself had helped to devise and had already taught to crowded audiences in a series of open-air lecture tours. Another link with the Islamic past was broken on Sept. 1, 1929, with the removal of Arabic and Persian from the school curriculum.

These abrupt changes that the masses and on the popular economic hardships, the beginning of the depression, and the policy of Fethi's parliamentary and remedying measures, he formed on Aug. 12, 1930. As in 1924-1925, that the government was fanatically and his well-intentioned and bloody disorder of the sight of the party, except at multi-1945.

To counter the "plur's houses" were centers of political activity, a number of workers handpicked as RPP members, and for the future. It was a populist, statist, stationary, the teases. The private would finance enterprises. A few were drawn up in 1935. It was fun.

The Republic of Turkey was the Ottomanists moral war against the sultan, although Kemal himself had supported the sultan in 1925, he was with the USSR.

Home and peace: Treaty of Lausanne.

1923 between World War I opposition.

On Dec. 16, 1923, the disputed day, the Turkish party pact with the Allies accepted the

with Britain and the cementing of the treaty, thanks to the

Kemal and the Greek convention signed on

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Further Westernization of the republic, legal disabilities, the had endured the Ottoman rule. Political

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
These abrupt and radical changes encouraged rumors that the next step would be to close the mosques and outlaw Muslim worship. The resulting popular discontent was exacerbated by economic hardship, caused by a run of bad harvests, the beginning of the worldwide economic depression, and the government's illiberal financial policy. Fethi suggested that the creation of a parliamentary opposition would be a step toward remedying the country's ills. With Kemal's blessing, he formed the Liberal Republican party on Aug. 12, 1930.

As in 1924-1925, however, this was taken as a sign that the government was losing its grip. The fanatically religious flocked to join Fethi and his well-intentioned liberals. Widespread and bloody disorders followed. Fethi, appalled at the sight of the forces he had unleashed, dissolved the party on Nov. 17, 1930. No further attempt at multiparty government was made until 1945.

To counter the prevailing disaffection, "people's houses" were opened in the principal cities as centers of political and cultural indoctrination. A number of workers and small tradesmen were handpicked as RPP candidates in the 1931 election, and for the first time the party formulated an ideology. It declared itself to be republican, populist, statist, secularist, and reformist (or revolutionary, the term *inkılâpçı* admitting of both senses). The principle of statism meant that the state would finance and manage major industrial enterprises. A five-year plan for industrialization was drawn up in 1933, to run from 1934 to 1939. It was funded in part by a Soviet loan.

The Republic and Its Neighbors. The Soviet Union was the only power that had given the Kemalists moral and material support in their war against the sultan and the foreign invaders. Although Kemal had no sympathy with communism and had suppressed the Turkish Communists in 1925, he maintained friendly relations with the USSR. His watchword was "peace at home and peace abroad," and he meant it. The Treaty of Lausanne, the peace agreement signed in 1923 between the republic and Turkey's World War I opponents, had left unsettled the demarcation of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq. On Dec. 16, 1925, the League of Nations gave the disputed region of Mosul to Iraq. The next day, the Turks signed a nonaggression and security pact with the USSR. But six months later they accepted the League's decision, in a treaty with Britain and Iraq. Even more remarkable was the cementing of friendly relations with Greece, thanks to the farsighted statesmanship of Kemal and the Greek premier Venizelos. A convention signed on Dec. 30, 1930, gave Greek nationals the right to live and work in Turkey. Turkey was admitted to the League of Nations in July 1932.

Further Westernizing Reforms. In a few short years the republic freed Turkish women from the legal disabilities and inequality of status that they had endured throughout the six centuries of Ottoman rule. Polygamy was automatically outlawed with the introduction of the new civil code in 1926. In 1928 the first Turkish woman lawyer pleaded her first case. The first woman judge was appointed four years later. Women were given the vote at local elections in 1930, and in 1934 they gained the right to participate in national elections as voters and as candidates. The reform of which the outside world is




Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) addresses a crowd in 1923 shortly before becoming president of the new republic.

least aware, probably because it was not embodied in legislation, is the language reform. From 1930 onward, Kemal devoted much time and effort to—as he put it—"liberating the language from the yoke of foreign languages," that is, from the vast stock of Arabic and Persian words that had become part of the official and literary language of the Ottoman Empire. The work of finding or inventing Turkish replacements has gone on ever since. One result has been that Kemal's own book-length account of the birth of the republic, which he wrote in 1927, is now unintelligible to most Turks and has had to be translated into modern Turkish.

By a law passed on June 21, 1934, every Turk was obliged to have a Turkish surname; the Arab-style "Mehmed son of Ahmed" was no longer considered acceptable for citizens of a Western republic. The assembly voted Mustafa Kemal the surname Atatürk, meaning "Father-Turk." On May 27, 1935, the weekly holiday was changed from Friday, the day when Islam requires the noon prayer to be performed in congregation, to the Western Saturday afternoon and Sunday.

Foreign Affairs and World War II. Meanwhile Turkish diplomacy was making great strides. On Feb. 9, 1934, the Balkan Entente was signed with Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Turkey was elected to the Council of the League of Nations on Sept. 17, 1934. The Dardanelles and Bosphorus had been demilitarized by the Straits Convention of July 24, 1923; the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, restored full Turkish sovereignty over them.

France was anxious to secure Turkish support against the obvious threat from Germany and Italy, and Turkey judged the moment ripe to ask for the cession of the province of Hatay, formerly Alexandretta, which had been annexed to French-mandated Syria in 1921. France demurred and Atatürk, though mortally ill and in great pain, went on an official visit to Mersin and Adana, thus creating the impression that he was planning to invade the disputed territory. French opposition crumbled, and on July 23, 1939, Hatay became part of Turkey. But Atatürk never enjoyed his last triumph; he died on Nov.



Ankara, an inland city associated with Mustafa Kemal and his followers, replaced Istanbul as capital in 1923.

10, 1938. His successor as president was İsmet İnönü (the surname taken from the scene of his two great victories in the war of independence).

Turkey had watched the rise of Hitler and Mussolini with apprehension and had opened its doors wide to victims of Nazi persecution. Its leaders wished to ally themselves with Britain and France, while maintaining good relations with the USSR. Confronted, however, with the Russo-German pact of Aug. 23, 1939, and a Soviet demand that the Straits be closed to warships other than those of the Black Sea powers, they did not hesitate. In an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty signed on Oct. 19, 1939, Turkey undertook to aid the other signatories if they were involved in a Mediterranean war stemming from an act of aggression by a European power. But by the time that the Mediterranean had become a theater of war, it seemed to many highly placed Turks that Germany was invincible. On June 18, 1941, therefore, with all its neighbors under Axis occupation, Turkey signed a treaty of friendship with Germany. While quietly assisting the Allies as much as possible, Turkey officially maintained its neutrality until Feb. 22, 1945. On that date it declared war on Germany and Japan, thus qualifying for a place at the inaugural conference of the United Nations at San Francisco. In the following June, the USSR offered Turkey a new treaty of friendship on condition it would cede the districts of Kars and Ardahan and accept Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits. The offer was at once rejected.

Return to Multiparty Government. Much had changed in Turkey during the war, and few Turks had a good word to say of the ruling party. The commercial class, enlarged and enriched by neutrality, was resentful of bureaucracy and stat-

ism. Landowners were alarmed by a law of November 1945 granting land to landless peasants, while the latter were disappointed at the meagerness of the holdings they received. Industrial workers suffered from rising prices but were forbidden by law to strike. Liberal intellectuals, fired by the triumph of democracy, were impatient to see some of the fruits of it in their own country. The fanatically religious had not forgiven the secularist reforms. President İnönü, an immensely shrewd politician, decided not to swim against the tide and declared that there was now room in Turkey for democracy. A Democrat party was formed under Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes. By promising to rectify everybody's grievances, it won a landslide victory in the 1950 election with 408 seats to the Republicans. Celâl Bayar became president and Menderes premier.

For the first few years they seemed to be living up to their promises, except that the right to strike was not granted. It speedily became known that breaches of the secularist laws would be winked at: polygamy increased, busts and statues of Atatürk were smashed, and in the eastern provinces fezzes and turbans began to reappear. Large quantities of capital equipment and luxury goods were imported; agriculture and the private sector boomed. Turkey's international standing was high, at least in the Western world. The country had promptly answered the UN call for aid to South Korea, and the 25,000 Turks who fought there won great acclaim. Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Feb. 18, 1952. Menderes considered, with some justification, that Turkey's allies would never let it sink into bankruptcy. The flow of expensive imports continued even after the disastrous failure of the 1954 harvest. The worst sufferers from the ensuing inflation were those on fixed incomes, including the armed forces.

Bayar was authoritarian by nature, and Menderes could not bear to be criticized. Journalists were jailed and judges were dismissed. It could be argued that the Democrat government was democratic in that it gave most of the electorate what they wanted. But the armed forces, traditionally the most westward-looking section of the population, refused to stand by and see the secularist reforms sabotaged. The last straw came on April 18, 1960, when, in defiance of the constitution, the assembly vested its sovereign power in a commission "to investigate the affairs of the RPP and a section of the press." Given dictatorial authority, it banned any published reference to assembly debates.

Army Intervention in Government. After a month of student demonstrations, brutally repressed by the police, on May 27, 1960, a group of officers calling themselves the National Unity Committee seized power in a bloodless coup. The president and other government leaders were arrested and brought to trial and most received jail sentences, but Menderes and two of his ministers were hanged. The resulting bitterness left its mark on political life for many years.

True to the promise it gave on the day of the coup, the National Unity Committee held free elections on Oct. 15, 1961. The RPP won 171 seats and 158 went to the new Justice party, the self-proclaimed heir of the Democrat party. Thanks to the newly introduced system of proportional representation, two small parties won 119 seats between them. It took a show of force

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by the army to persuade the Justice party to join a coalition with the RPP. The RPP was divided: elderly authoritarian conservatives and young radical reformers, with only the octogenarian İsmet İnönü to hold them together. Coalition followed coalition until 1965, when the Justice party, under Süleyman Demirel, came to power with an absolute majority, which he increased in 1969. He had convinced many Turkish industrialists that his party, opposed as it was to economic planning, offered the one alternative to the embryonic socialist movement that was rapidly gaining converts among students and industrial workers. His promise of economic liberalism even won subsidies for his party from some U.S. firms in Turkey.

The pattern for the 1970's was set in February 1970, when students of the left and right fought a pitched battle in Ankara. Early in 1971, the military took to bank robbery and kidnapping. The country was fragmented into Stalinists, Maoists, and other factions. The rightists, though including both secular nationalists and religious fanatics, were more efficient because they were more united—in the National Action party. The party was led by Alparslan Türkeş, a former colonel dismissed from the National Unity Committee in 1960 for opposing the return of power to the civilians. The army intervened for a second time on March 12, 1971. Demirel was given an ultimatum: if he would not put an end to the prevailing anarchy and undertake the needed economic and social reforms, the army would assume direct rule. His response was to resign in a huff. The army did not in fact assume direct rule, but over the next two years nominated three civilian premiers in succession, who selected their own civilian governments.

The Workers' party, which in a curious echo of 1925 had set up "revolutionary cultural centers" in the Kurdish areas, was dissolved on July 23, 1971. This left the RPP as the only avowedly left-wing party. On May 14, 1972, Bülent Ecevit replaced İnönü as its chairman, and in the next election, in October 1973, the RPP emerged as the victor, though without an absolute majority. Demirel refused to cooperate in a new government. Ecevit then formed a coalition with the National Salvation party, whose leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was opposed to secularism and to Turkey's links with the West. It was as well that neither Atatürk nor İnönü (who had died a month before) lived to see their party's new ally.

Cyprus. Since the early 1950's, the problem of Cyprus had bedeviled Turkey's previously cordial relations with Greece. Both powers and Britain were bound by treaty to guarantee the independence and security of the Republic of Cyprus, inaugurated on Aug. 16, 1960. More than once Turkey was on the brink of armed intervention when it felt that the Cypriot Turks were being unfairly treated. In June 1964, after a massacre of Turks in Nicosia, a Turkish invasion was averted only when U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson warned that if such an action provoked the Soviets into invading Turkey, Turkey could still count on NATO support.

Significant deposits of crude oil and natural gas had been discovered in the northern Aegean, and the simmering ill will between Greece and Turkey was aggravated after February 1974 by a dispute about sovereignty over the continental shelf. The Athens government held that the whole Aegean was Greek territorial waters, a

view rejected at that time and thereafter by the Turks.

On July 15, 1974, the Cyprus government under Archbishop Makarios was overthrown in a coup organized by the military dictatorship in Greece. Ecevit, having failed to persuade Britain to take joint action to restore the status quo, invaded the island five days later. By the time hostilities ended, on Aug. 16, 1974, Cyprus was effectively partitioned, with Turkish forces in control of the northern third.

Democracy in Crisis. Like most of the world, Turkey suffered from the 1974 rise in oil prices and the resulting economic crisis. Mounting unemployment in Western Europe brought a marked reduction in one of Turkey's main sources of foreign exchange, remittances from Turkish workers who had been employed abroad. Terrorism was rampant. Most Turks believed it was financed from the USSR with the aim of destabilizing Turkey and hence NATO. They ascribed to the same origin the campaign of murder directed by Armenian terrorists against Turkish diplomats and their families.

Ecevit's uneasy coalition broke down and he resigned on Sept. 18, 1974, and attempts to create a government of national unity came to nothing. On July 21, 1977, Demirel again became premier, with Erbakan and Türkeş as his deputies. Türkeş set about dismissing senior police officers and replacing them with his own men. In 1975 there were 34 political murders; in the first nine months of 1979 there were 3,500, and thereafter the killings averaged 20 a day. The rate of inflation was 130% and rising. Discord was such that the assembly could not function: in the spring of 1980 it failed to elect a new president of the republic after more than one hundred ballots. A vote of censure of the government could not be taken, for want of a quorum.


The armed forces finally intervened on Sept. 12, 1980. They suspended all political parties, arrested the major party leaders, and rounded up leftist and rightist militants. Not until Nov. 6, 1983, were elections held. None of the politicians removed from office were permitted to run, and despite their pleas to their supporters for a boycott of the elections, 92% of the electorate voted. The Motherland party led by Turgut Özal, an economist, came to power with 212 of the 400 seats in the new assembly.

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
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160 TÜRKİYE TURKEY




STATE ARMS

Officially confirmed
5 June 1936.



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
PRESIDENTIAL FLAG



1:1

Red has been prominent in Turkish flags for 700 years. The star and crescent are Muslim symbols, but also have a long pre-Islamic past in Asia Minor.

220



The basic form of the national flag was apparently established in 1793 under Sultan Selim III, when the green flags used by the navy were changed to red and a white crescent and multi-pointed star were added. The five-pointed star dates from approximately 1844. Except for the issuance of design specifications, no change

was made when the Ottoman Empire became the Republic of Turkey and the caliphate (religious authority) was terminated.

Many traditions explain the star and crescent symbol. It is known that Diana was the patron goddess of Byzantium and that her symbol was a moon. In A.D. 330 the Emperor Constantine rededicated the city—which he called Constantinople—to the Virgin Mary, whose star symbol was superimposed over the crescent. In 1453 Constantinople was captured by the Ottoman Turks and renamed Istanbul, but its new rulers may have adopted the existing emblem for their own use.

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