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TURKEY


State Dinner Toast
Ankara

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Istanbul's peerless Süleymaniye Mosque was created as the Ottoman Empire reached the apex of its power and glory.

TURKEY

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TURKEY, tūr'kē, a country in the Middle East. The greater part of the country, Anatolia (Anatolia lies in Asia, specifically in Asia Minor. Only the northwestern corner, Turkish Thrace (Thrace is located in Europe; it accounts for 8% of Turkey's territory.

Turkey is a rugged land, all high plateaus and mountains bordered by narrow coastal strips. Its area is half that of Iran, three times that of Iraq, five times that of Syria, five times that of Greece, and seven times that of Bulgaria. Its population is larger than any of its neighbors' except the Soviet Union's.

Although there is no state religion, almost all Turks are Muslims. Their language, now written in the Latin alphabet, is unrelated to the Semitic or Indo-European languages spoken by most Middle Easterners. The only minority of any size is the Kurdish minority, and the Kurds make up only about 8% of the population.


Since the establishment of the republic in 1924, industry has made steady gains on the agricultural sector, transforming Turkey's economy from primarily subsistence agricultural to one in

which industry and mining play a major role. Nevertheless farmers today make up more than half of the labor force, and agriculture contributes about 20% to the Gross Domestic Product. Even Turkey's industry is dependent on agriculture in that food processing plays an important role in the economy.

The government has been deeply involved in the industrial sector ever since the republic's founder, Atatürk, made the industrialization of the country a major goal of his revolution. Today the government owns about 47% of all industry, chiefly heavy industry, with industrial production split between the public and private sectors in Turkey's mixed economy.

INFORMATION HIGHLIGHTS

Official Name: The Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti).
Name of Nationals: Turks.
Head of State: President.
Head of Government: Premier.
Legislature: Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly).
Area: 301,404 square miles (780,576 sq km).
Boundaries: North, Black Sea; northeast, USSR; east, Iran; south, Iraq, Syria, Mediterranean Sea; west, Aegean Sea; northwest, Greece, Bulgaria.
Elevations: Highest point, Mt. Ararat (Büyük Ağrı Dağı); 16,946 feet, or 5,165 meters; lowest, sea level.
Population: (1980 census) 44,736,957; (1984 est.) 45,747,000.
Capital: Ankara.
Largest City: Istanbul.
Major Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic.
Major Religious Groups: Muslims (over 99% of the population), Christians, Jews.
Monetary Unit: Turkish Lira (TL) (1 lira = 100 kuruş).
Flag: White crescent and five-pointed star on a red field. See also FLAG.



The Bosphorus was finally spanned by a bridge in 1973. It links European and Asian Turkey at Istanbul.

Because of its position athwart the route between Asia and Europe, Anatolia has been a highway for migrants and conquerors from before the dawn of history. The Ottomans, who established themselves in the area in the 14th century A.D., had been preceded in earlier millennia by many other conqueror-rulers, for some of whom Anatolia itself formed only part of larger empires. In addition to being ruled by the Hittites, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, and Arabs, Anatolia formed the seat of empire of Cimmerians, Celts, Goths, and others long since forgotten. The genes of all of them doubtless survive in the present population.

The first positive historical records of the Turks are in inscriptions of the 8th century A.D. in Siberia. They were a tough, martial people, against whose inroads the rulers of China vainly built the Great Wall. Their ancestral religion was Shamanism, their deities earth, sky, and water.

About a thousand years ago they made their way into the Arab dominions in western Asia, where they adopted Islam and went on to found, under the Ottoman dynasty, the last and greatest of all Islamic empires. The empire survived, though diminished in size and power, into the 20th century.

Foreigners called it the Turkish Empire. The Turks never did. For them it was the Guarded Domain of the Faith, and they devoted their energies to maintaining and extending its frontiers. They forgot their ethnic identity and were not reminded of it until, after the Christian subject peoples of the empire had one by one claimed their independence, the Turks' Arab co-religionists did the same.

Alone of the powers that had backed the losing side in World War I, Turkey defied the victors. Led by Mustafa Kemal, the one consistent-

ly successful Ottoman general of that war, he expelled the several armies of occupation and sought to dismember the Turkish heartland. Kemal then set to work to convert his battered remnant of empire into a republic. His desire to see Turkey become a modern Western state was fueled by the resentment he had felt when the Ottoman army was being trained by Germans, a few of whom bothered to conceal their contempt for everything Turkish. Twice he tried, presumably, to turn his one-party state into a parliamentary democracy. After World War II the experiment was repeated, and broadly speaking it was successful, despite some setbacks.

The armed forces were charged by Kemal with the duty of safeguarding the republic from enemies within and without, and they take the duty seriously. In recent decades they have intervened when they saw the politicians putting their personal and factional interests before the public good, but they have then returned power to the civilians. Meanwhile, politicians who have learned from the mistakes of their predecessors have been emerging, as well as a new generation and breed of civil servants, developments that augur well for the republic's future.

1. Land and Natural Resources

Turkey's shape is roughly rectangular, stretching east-west for about 1,000 miles (1,584 km) and north-south, at its widest point, about 400 miles (650 km). Mountains cover half the total area. Two great ranges meet at Mount Ararat (Büyük Ağrı Dağı) in the extreme east near Turkey's border with Iran and the USSR: the Black Sea (Pontic) range and the Taurus and its extension, the Anti-Taurus, mountains. The whole country is subject to earthquakes, the Black Sea region and the Eastern Anatolian region north of Lake Van particularly so. Rivers abound, but little use is made of them for navigation. Of the more than 500 lakes, 127 are artificial and only 50 are more than 4 square miles (10 sq km) in area. The biggest are Lake Van (Van Gölü) in the east and Salt Lake (Tuz Gölü, or Lake Tuz).

Black Sea Region. The mountains run parallel and close to the Black Sea coast, which is therefore not greatly indented and affords few natural harbors. Breakwaters have been constructed so that large ships can be accommodated at Ereğli, Zonguldak, Samsun, and Trabzon. More than 150 streams flow down the mountains' northern slopes. Three large rivers, the Sakarya, the Kızılırmak (Red River), and the Yeşilirmak (Green River), rise south of the mountains and flow through gorges on their way to the Black Sea.

The northern slopes of the mountains have ample rainfall throughout the year. The western part of the region receives most of its rain in winter. The highest precipitation of the whole country, above 90 inches (2,286 mm) a year, occurs at Rize, where it rains one day in two.

The northern slopes of the mountains are densely forested, with beech, oak, and elm, up to 4,000 feet (1,200 meters). Conifers grow at higher elevations, and above the conifer zone are the high mountain pastures. The southern slopes are less well forested, with oak, juniper, and pine. To the east, the northern slopes are given over to tea plantations, centering on Rize, where citrus fruits are also cultivated. The Black Sea region is the source of 62% of the world's hazel-



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Bodrum and its fortress were the last of the Christian strongholds on the Aegean coast to fall to the Ottomans.

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Fruits that grow on the coast and on the
slopes include apples, peaches, and
cherries (the word derives from the ancient city
Cerasus, now Giresun). Other crops include
tobacco, corn, wheat, vegetables, and flax.

The Zonguldak coal field, with reserves esti-
mated at more than one billion tons, is the largest
in the Middle East. Manganese is mined just
south of it, as well as south of Rize, and in the
east near Murgul, where copper and
lead are also mined.

Despite the frequency of earthquakes, the
Black Sea region is one of the most densely popu-
lated parts of the country because of the soil's
fertility. The coastal cities all date from classical
times, except for Zonguldak, which came into
existence with the opening of the coal mines in
1932.

The Straits Region. The Straits are the Bosphorus
to the northeast and the Dardanelles on the
northwest, which, with the Sea of Marmara be-
tween, constitute the waterway joining the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean. The Bosphorus is an
indented valley, 18 miles (29 km) long. At the
northern end of the Bosphorus stands Turkey's
largest city, Istanbul (ancient Constantinople).
In the Dardanelles (33 miles, or 53 km, long), as
in the Bosphorus, an upper current runs toward
the Mediterranean and a deeper current moves
in the opposite direction.

The Marmara region is affected both by the
Black Sea and Mediterranean climates. The
weather is changeable. The summer droughts
are not severe, and in the winter frost and snow
are common. Skies are cloudier and more fog
prevails than in the Mediterranean region.

The area is a center of industry. Its major
products produce automobiles, glass, plastics,
textiles, and electronic equipment.

In the western part of Turkish Thrace (that is,
European Turkey) is the wide and marshy valley

of the Meriç (Maritsa) River, which forms the
frontier with Greece. With its tributary the Er-
gene, it drains all the many streams of the area
into the Aegean. It is navigable as far as Edirne.
The Ottoman capital from 1362 to 1453, Edirne
owed its early importance to its position as the
advanced base for Ottoman incursions into
Christian Europe. Now, because of increased
road traffic between Europe and the east, it is
emerging from the long decline it suffered after
Istanbul replaced it as the capital.

Winters in Turkish Thrace are generally mild
and humid, with frequent mists. The summer
winds from the north are much drier than in the
Black Sea region, and summer temperatures aver-
age 74°F (23°C).

The southern limit of the Straits region is the
line of uplands culminating in Uludag, a moun-
tain just south of Bursa that reaches 8,343 feet
(2,543 meters). Between the uplands and Mar-
mara is a broad fertile plain yielding cereals,
tobacco, grapes, olives, and, near Bursa, mulber-
ries. The area is drained by the Simav, the only
river to have cut a way through the coastal ridge
to the Sea of Marmara. The annual rainfall of
nearly 28 inches (711 mm) is higher than in
Thrace, as is the average winter temperature of
43°F (6°C).

The two great cities of the region south and
east of the Sea of Marmara are Bursa and Izmit.
Bursa, the Ottoman capital from 1326 to 1362 and
traditionally the center of the silk trade, has had
a wool industry since 1938 and today also
produces man-made fibers. Izmit has been a
port since Roman times and is now second to
Istanbul as the port for the Marmara develop-
ment region.

The Mediterranean Region. This region em-
braces both Turkey's southern coast and its Ae-
gean coast on the west. The Aegean coast, a
diverted section of the Mediterranean, is heavily

TURKEY (Continued)

Patnos 18,040	K 3
Pazar 10,079	J 2
Pazarcık 19,821	G 4
Pazarıyeri 6,005	C 3
Pera (Beyoğlu) 226,125	D 6
Perşembe 7,190	G 2
Pınarbaşı 10,578	G 3
Polatlı 43,514	E 3
Posof 2,277	K 2
Pozanti 6,697	F 4
Refahiye 7,505	H 3
Reyhanlı 30,843	G 4
Rize 41,740	J 2
Safranbolu 19,155	E 2
Sakarya (Adapazarı) 131,400	D 2
Salihli 51,638	C 3
Samandağ 25,349	F 4
Samsun 198,266	F 2
Sandıklı 15,966	D 3
Sapanca 10,228	D 2
Sarayköy 11,009	C 4
Sarayönü 8,643	E 3
Sarıgöl 7,880	C 3
Sarıkay 7,297	E 3
Sarıkaya 2,935	F 3
Sarıyer 110,555	D 5
Sarıyaz 11,555	G 3
Sarıyaz 6,755	B 2
Savaştepe 7,110	B 3
Sebinkarahisar 12,550	H 2
Seddülbahir 332	B 6
Sefaattli 7,513	F 3
Seferihisar 6,506	B 3
Selimiye 2,989	B 4
Şemdinli 19,677	L 4
Senirkent 8,382	D 3
Şenkaya 2,685	K 2
Şereflioğuzlar 22,208	E 3
Şerik 15,662	D 4
Seydişehir 30,394	D 4
Siirt 42,692	J 4
Silifke 22,045	E 4
Silivri 13,922	C 2
Silopi 6,832	K 4
Silvan 44,412	J 3
Simav 10,775	C 3
Sındırgı 8,992	C 3
Sinop 18,381	F 2
Siran 6,088	H 2
Sirnak 10,947	K 4
Sivas 173,831	G 3
Siverek 30,000	H 4
Sivrihisar 9,608	D 3
Smyrna (İzmir) 753,749	B 3
Söğüt 6,353	D 3
Söke 37,362	B 4
Solhan 7,170	J 3
Soma 30,219	B 3
Sorgun 19,623	F 3

Şuhut 8,154	D 3
Sungurlu 24,170	F 2
Sürmene 10,152	J 2
Sürücü 19,000	H 4
Suşehri 11,442	H 2
Susurluk 16,113	C 3
Tarsus 120,270	F 4
Taşkent 7,098	E 4
Taşköprü 8,659	F 2
Taşova 6,208	F 4
Tatvan 40,324	K 3
Tavas 10,335	C 4
Tavşanlı 23,325	C 3
Tekirdağ 51,327	B 2
Terme 15,530	G 2
Tire 32,242	B 3
Tirebolu 9,274	H 2
Tokat 60,369	G 2
Tomarza 7,733	F 2
Tömük 7,660	F 4
Tonya 11,010	H 2
Torbali 15,504	B 3
Tosya 18,544	F 2
Trabzon 107,412	H 2
Trebizond (Trabzon) 107,412	H 2
Tunceli (Kalan) 13,144	H 2
Turgutlu 55,575	F 2
Turhal 47,364	F 4
Türkoğlu 8,528	G 3
Tuzluca 6,716	K 2
Tuzlukçu 6,002	D 3
Uluborlu 6,002	D 3
Ulukışla 7,841	F 4
Ünye 27,946	G 2
Urfa 148,434	H 4
Ürgüp 6,955	F 3
Urfa 14,347	C 3
Uşak 70,822	C 3
Üsküdar 255,899	D 6
Uzunköprü 27,706	B 2
Vakıfkebir 13,814	H 2
Van 93,823	K 3
Varto 7,360	J 3
Veziroğlu 13,547	F 4
Viranşehir 41,934	H 2
Vize 9,528	B 3
Yahyalı 15,585	C 3
Yalova 41,869	C 3
Yalvaç 19,986	C 3
Yatağan 7,350	F 4
Yenice 4,106	F 4
Yeniköy, Çarakkale 540	B 6
Yeniköy, Çarakkale 901	C 5
Yeniköy, İstanbul	D 6
Yenimahalle 265,752	E 3
Yenişehir 17,013	C 2
Yerköy 20,623	F 3
Yeşilhisar 11,132	F 3
Yeşilköy	D 6
Yeşilyurt 7,040	H 3

Yıldızeli 11,124	G 3
Yozgat 36,220	F 3
Yüksekova 11,867	L 4
Yunak 7,144	D 3
Zara 10,198	G 3
Zeytinburnu 126,899	D 6
Zile 30,066	G 2
Zonguldak 108,661	D 2

OTHER FEATURES

Acı (lake)	C 4
Adalar (isls.)	D 6
Aegean (sea)	A 3
Akçay (river)	C 4
Akdag (mt.)	D 3
Akşehir (lake)	D 4
Aksu (river)	F 4
Alexandretta (gulf)	F 4
Amanos (mts.)	E 4
Anamur (cape)	D 3
Ankara (river)	D 3
Anti-Taurus (mts.)	K 3
Araks (river)	G 2
Ararat (mt.)	G 2
Balık-Uzun (lake)	C 3
Banaz (river)	H 3
Batı Fırat (river)	C 6
Bergos (river)	H 3
Bey (mts.)	D 4
Beyshehir (lake)	D 4
Binboğa (mts.)	G 3
Bingöl Dağları (mts.)	J 3
Bosporus (strait)	C 2
Bozcaada (isls.) 1,879	A 3
Burdur (lake)	D 6
Burgaz (isls.)	D 6
Büyük Ağrı (Ararat) (mt.)	L 3
Çanakkale Boğazi (Dardanelles) (strait)	B 6
Candarlı (gulf)	B 3
Canik (mts.)	G 2
Çankırı (river)	F 3
Çekerek (river)	F 4
Ceyhan (river)	K 2
Cildir (lake)	J 2
Civa (cape)	G 2
Çorum (river)	F 2
Çorum (river)	F 2
Dalaman (river)	C 4
Dardanelles (strait)	B 6
Delice (river)	F 3
Devrez (river)	E 2
Dicle (river)	J 4
Eastern Taurus (mts.)	J 3
Edirne (gulf)	B 3
Eğirdir (lake)	D 4
Emir Dağı (mt.)	D 3
Ephesus (ruins)	B 3

Erciyes Dağı (mt.)	
Ergene (river)	
Euphrates (Fırat) (river)	
Filyos (river)	
Fırat (river)	
Göksu (river)	
Hasan Dağı, Büyük (mt.)	
İğneada (cape)	
İlgaz (mts.)	
İlium (ruins)	
İmralı (isls.)	
İmroz (Gökçeada) (isls.) 6,001	
Ince (cape)	
İncekum (cape)	
Istanbul (mts.)	
Izmir (gulf)	
Iznik (lake)	
Karaca Dağı (mt.)	
Karadağ (mt.)	
Karadeniz Boğazi (Bosporus) (strait)	
Karasu (river)	
Kızılırmak (river)	
Köröğlü (mts.)	
Köröğlü Dağı (mt.)	
Köyceğiz (lake)	
Küre (mts.)	
Kuruçay (river)	
Kuşada (gulf)	
Mandalıya (gulf)	
Marmara (sea) 7,370	
Marmara (isls.)	
Menderes, Büyük (river)	
Meriç (river)	
Murat (river)	
Murat Dağı (mt.)	
Nemrut Dağı (mt.)	
Nuruhak Dağı (mt.)	
Pontic (mts.)	
Porsuk (river)	
Sakarya (river)	
Saros (gulf)	
Seyfe (lake)	
Seyhan (river)	
Simav (river)	
Soğanlı (mts.)	
Soğanlı (river)	
Söğüt (lake)	
Sultan (mts.)	
Şifhan Dağı (mt.)	
Taurus (mts.)	
Tigris (Dicle) (river)	
Troy (İlium) (ruins)	
Türkmen Dağı (mt.)	
Tuz (lake)	
Uludağ (mt.)	
Van (lake)	
Yasun (cape)	
Yeşilirmak (river)	

to devastating earthquakes, is the least densely populated part of the country. The north is drained by the Aras (Araks), which flows eastward from Bingöl and, with its tributary the Arpaçayı (the Arpa River), forms the frontier with the USSR, eventually emptying into the Caspian. The Dicle (Tigris) and Fırat (Euphrates) rise north of Diyarbakır and north of Erzurum, respectively. The Keban dam, 30 miles (48 km) west of Elâzığ, at the junction of the Fırat and the Murat, has created Turkey's biggest freshwater lake, 260 square miles (675 sq km) in area and 78 miles (125 km) long. Part of the purpose of the man-made lake is to provide energy for the region's planned electrochemical industry. Lake Van (1,434 square miles, or 3,714 sq km) is fed by a dozen streams, but it has no visible outlet and its waters are bitter and saline. It has often flooded the settlements on its shores.

Average temperatures range from 11°F to 63°F (-12°C to 17°C), but in the north winter temperatures of -40°F (-40°C) are known and the snow can last from four to seven months. Wheat and barley are grown over much of the region except in the very center.

About 60 miles (96 km) east of Diyarbakır is the Ramandağ oilfield, with a refinery at Batman and a 300-mile (480-km) pipeline to the Gulf of Iskenderun. Iron is mined at Devriği and copper and chrome around Güleman and Maden.

The region's main settlements are all in river

valleys. Erzurum, Diyarbakır, and Kars are of immense age, originally fortresses to guard the country's eastern approaches. Gaziantep, the center for the cotton and wine industries of the region, lies on the ancient trade route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.

2. The People

The Turks have a favorite saying: "Biz biz benzeriz," which means "We resemble ourselves." However, with the rapid changes Turkey has experienced in the 20th century—political, economic, cultural—and with 40% of the population under 15, the old stereotypes of what a Turk is must inevitably lose their validity. But some generalizations may still be usefully made.

The sense of national identity is strong and national homogeneity an article of faith. The Turks take pride in their descent from Ertuğrul, father of the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, who with his 400 horsemen gained a foothold in western Anatolia from which the empire was to grow. *A priori*, the tangled ethnic mix in the history of Anatolia makes this tradition of purity of race hard to accept. The visitor will notice blond and blue-eyed individuals in the predominantly brown-haired, Mediterranean-looking mass, with a sprinkling of copper-hued Anatolian conscript soldiers.

The Turks are not a smiling people. Outwardly serious, even dour, they have a keen

The "whirling dervish"

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The "whirling dervish" order, formerly banned, may now perform its hypnotic spinning ritual once a year at Konya.

as Dağı (mt.) F 3
 ne (river) B 2
 rates (Firat) (river) G 4
 s (river) D 2
 (river) G 4
 su (river) F 4
 in Dağı, Büyük (mt.) C 2
 ada (cape) C 2
 (mts.) E 2
 (ruins) C 2
 lı (isl.) C 2
 z (Gökçeada) (isl.) A 2
 01 F 1
 (cape) F 4
 um (cape) F 4
 nca (mts.) B 2
 (gulf) B 3
 (lake) C 2
 ca Dağı (mt.) H 4
 dağ (mt.) E 4
 deniz Boğazi C 2
 sporus) (strait) C 2
 su (river) F 2
 rmak (river) F 2
 ğlu (mts.) E 2
 ğlu Dağı (mt.) E 2
 eğiz (lake) C 4
 (mts.) E 2
 çay (river) K 2
 da (gulf) B 4
 dalya (gulf) B 4
 nara (isl.) 7,370 B 2
 nara (sea) C 2
 deres, Büyük (river) C 4
 ç (river) B 2
 t (river) H 1
 it Dağı (mt.) C 3
 rut Dağı (mt.) J 3
 hak Dağı (mt.) G 3
 ic (mts.) H 2
 ik (river) D 3
 rya (river) D 2
 s (gulf) B 2
 s (lake) F 3
 an (river) F 4
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sense of humor, though it is not readily detectable by the foreigner. They are honest and hospitable. The tourist who travels by bus in Turkey need have no fear of losing his baggage, of being carried past his destination, or of being allowed to go hungry.

Few of the Turks feel any special kinship with their Arab or Persian neighbors. It is true that commercial common sense directs their attention toward their Muslim co-religionists. It is also true that the shared faith is for some a bond of immense importance. But the younger generation's eyes are on the West, while their elders have not forgotten how the Arabs, during World War I, took the side of the infidel British against the sultan-caliph.

Nor do they consider themselves members of a closely knit family of Turkic peoples. Although any Central Asian Turk who makes his way to the Republic of Turkey is sure of a kind welcome, Pan-Turanism—a notion held by a few intellectuals of some day uniting all the far-flung Turks of the east—has never had any appeal for the Turks of Turkey. If they think of such Central Asian Turks at all, it is as the "Tatars" whom Timur (Tamerlane) brought to devastate Anatolia in 1402.

The Turkish language. Turkish is an agglutinative language. It makes words by adding strings of suffixes to unchanging roots, as for example *bilgisizligimdenmiş*, which means "I realize it was because of my ignorance." (See also **TURKIC LANGUAGES**.) In this respect it resembles Hungarian and Finnish. But it is not generally thought to be related to them. Some scholars believe it is related to Mongolian, and a possible Korean connection is being explored. It is linguistically totally unrelated to Arabic or Persian, except that it borrowed many thousands of words and a few grammatical features from them after the Turks came within the orbit of Islam. At no time did Arabic replace Turkish as the language of the Turks.

In 1928 the Arabo-Persian alphabet in which Turkish had been written was abandoned in favor of the Latin alphabet. Thereafter a sustained and successful effort was made to rid Turkish of its Arabic and Persian loan words.

The Kurdish Minority. The Kurds constitute the only sizable minority in Turkey. Making up about 8% of the population, they are concentrated in the east and southeast of the country. A pastoral people of Iranian stock and speech, they have never had a state of their own, and their

tribal territories are divided among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Turkish governments have always been sensitive to the risk of separatist activities among them, although there was no mass movement in that direction after the 1930's.

Their one legal disability is that Kurdish may not be taught in their schools. But Kurds may take their place in any sphere of Turkish life. There is in fact a growing assimilationist tendency among them. In the 1980's, books began to appear with such titles as *The Kurds, the First Turkish Dwellers in Anatolia*. The purpose was to show the ethnic identity of Kurds and Turks and—an even more hopeless task—to prove that Kurdish is a form of Turkish.

Religious Groups. More than 99% of the population is Muslim, mostly Sunnite Muslim. In the absence of official figures, estimates of the number of Shiite Muslims vary between 5% and 35%. The former seems nearer the mark, but there is no way of knowing for sure since the census, for the sake of the state's doctrine of homogeneity, takes no account of the distinction.

The state is secular, there is freedom of worship, and it is a criminal offense to exploit religious feeling for political ends. The overwhelming majority of the people seem to accept this situation. The National Salvation party, which was avowedly antiseccular, even theocratic, fought just two elections. It won 11.9% of the votes in 1973 and 8.6% in 1977.

The Directorate of Religious Affairs is concerned solely with Muslim religious affairs. Muslim religious education is provided in state schools, but parents do not have to enroll their children for it. The state prefers to provide education so that the teaching will be by professional educators, who may or may not be practicing Muslims, rather than risk leaving it to the ignorant and fanatical.

Women students are not permitted to cover their heads on university premises, this being a mark of religious conservatism. Nor are clerics of any denomination normally allowed to wear their canonical garb outside their places of worship, though the Greek and Armenian patriarchs and the chief rabbi have sometimes been given special leave to do so at public functions.

Although the dervish orders were banned in 1925, many still exist clandestinely. The authorities keep a sharp lookout for any suspected of being a cover for antiseccularist conspiracy. But they take a more relaxed attitude about the Bektaşis (Bektashis), formerly the most popular of




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This 10th century Armenian church on Lake Van's island of Aghthamar was once joined to a palace and monastery.

Ararat, associated with Noah's ark and historical Armenia, rises in Turkey close to the Soviet-Turkish border.

SHOSTAL



apolis and the petrified cascades of Pamukkale which have been formed by the mineral-rich waters that flow down the slopes from the plateau above. At the southwestern end of the Aegean Coast is Bodrum, the site of ancient Halicarnassus and its Mausoleum, another of the Seven Wonders of the World. Dominated by the remains of its crusader castle, Bodrum is a center for underwater archaeology and yachting.

Mediterranean Coast. The beaches of this Turquoise Coast are numerous, and swimming can be enjoyed through November. In the coastal city of Antalya they say the year consists of three springs and a summer. Antalya's little harbor is right out of the Arabian Nights. Of unusual interest are the city's pre-Ottoman religious buildings and Hadrian's Gate in the Roman wall. Just to the east is Perge, with its theater and stadium where Saint Paul preached. Farther to the east along the Gulf of Antalya are Aspendos, which has the best preserved of ancient Roman theaters; the Greek, Roman, and Byzantine ruins and broad sands of Side; and Alanya, with the 13th century fortress built by the Seljuk Aladdin Keykubad and the Red Tower standing guard over his arcaded shipyard.

Black Sea Coast. The spectacular mountains of this coast can best be viewed from the water. Toward the eastern end of the coast is Trabzon, which has its own little St. Sophia, dating from the 13th century, and the evocative ruins of ancient Trebizond. Inland is the monastery of Sumela, breathtakingly suspended on the side of a precipice.

Central Anatolia. The tomb of Atatürk is Ankara's most monumental modern building, its Museum of Anatolian Civilizations one of its most impressive institutions. To the west is the ancient Phrygian city of Gordium (Gordium), where Alexander is said to have cut the knot.

Southeast of Ankara lies the area of Cappadocia, a lunar landscape of volcanic tufa, weathered into fantastic turrets and pinnacles. Byzantine monks hollowed out the soft rock to make dwelling places and churches and decorated them with brilliant frescoes. Nearby are many-storied subterranean cities. Some of the tufa masses are inhabited today, as their numbered front doors indicate. Konya, famous for the mausoleum of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, founder of the Mevlevi order of dervishes, abounds in Seljuk mosques and former religious schools (*medreses*), richly adorned with carvings and tiles.

East and Southeast Anatolia. Lake Van is unequalled in this region for its wild scenery and its vast scale. The 10th century Armenian church of the Holy Cross, built on the island of Aghthamar in Lake Van, is memorable for its reliefs of Jonah and the whale and its other biblical themes. Van cats swim and have one blue and one yellow eye. Erzurum, which lies to the northwest of Lake Van, has been an important garrison city throughout its long history. Of historical and architectural interest, besides its mosques and tomb towers, is its Medrese of the Two Minarets. The ruins of Ani on the border with the Soviet Union recall an era when it served as the 10th century capital of the Bagratid kings of Georgia. Closer to the Turkish-Soviet-Iranian border is snowcapped Ararat and the fairy-tale palace of Ishak Paşa, a 17th century robber baron. Diyarbakır, in the southern part of the region, is a city walled in black basalt. Its towers bear some remarkable specimens of medieval Islamic her-

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© E. STREICHAN/SHOSTAL

Cappadocia's honeycombed volcanic formations provide homes today, as they once did for Christian monks.

dry. To the west of Diyarbakir is Nemrud Dağı, a mountain with a man-made peak reared to the glory of Antiochus I, a 1st century B.C. king of Commagene. It is topped with 30-foot (9-meter) statues of Antiochus and the Olympian gods, whose stupendous fallen heads stand scattered before them.

6. The Economy

Business acumen was not thought to be a main virtue by those who built and ruled the Ottoman Empire. In its final years, when much of its revenue was mortgaged to foreign bondholders, its own non-Muslim citizens were the source of three quarters of the capital invested in the empire's industries. The mass exodus of the Christian minorities between 1912 and the mid-1930's gave rise to a feeling among the Turks that they were doomed to remain a nation of peasants.

Mustafa Kemal gave high priority to the goal of industrial self-sufficiency for Turkey, as much to dispel this feeling as for the sake of the economy. He sought a mixed economy, with the state running major credit and industrial enterprises. Of the credit institutions, the first to be created by the state was the Industrial and Mining Bank (1925). It was to invest in private industry as well as to run state-owned textile mills, an Ottoman legacy. Its functions were later divided between two new state banks, Sümerbank (1933) for industry and Etibank (1935) for mining. As for the state-established enterprises, which were called State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), the first to be formed was the state railroad company, organized in 1924. This was followed by a food-processing SEE. The SEEs increased in number throughout the 1930's and during World War II, particularly in those industries for which private capital was not forthcoming. The SEEs varied in the degree of

government involvement, although government ownership was never less than 50% of any individual SEE.

Turkey's wartime neutrality left the country with a large trading surplus and a growing merchant class. The 1946 program of the newly formed Democrat party affirmed that private enterprise was basic to the economy, and that any economic activity the state undertook should be in accordance with a long-term plan whose details must be publicly known. On their coming to power in 1950, however, it emerged that the party abhorred planning, which it equated with communism. The party attempted to denationalize the State Maritime Lines, but only 5% of the shares were taken up by the public.

The dominance of the SEEs actually increased as a result of the 1954 crop failure and the ensuing inflation. Corruption as well as inefficiency and deficit financing played their part in the increasing role of the state's involvement in the economy. The government used state sugar factories as a vote-catching device, increasing their numbers far in excess of need. Inflation was accelerated by the large credits extended to farmers by the state and by the guaranteed prices for SEE products. However, under International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure, the government in 1958 undertook to restrict credits and raise the SEE prices.

The military, which took over the government in May 1960, set up the State Planning Organization in September 1960. But the planners seldom had the cooperation of the politicians, nor were their assumptions and predictions very accurate. Throughout the 1960's and into the 1970's the country suffered from inflation, foreign exchange shortages, and public sector deficits. Yet the period was one of growth. Between 1960 and 1978, per capita GNP rose annually by an average of 3.6%. Agricultural

from \$381 million to \$684 million. In the next decade, imports rose to \$8.8 billion and exports, still lagging behind, to \$5.7 billion. At the end of 1980, in pursuance of the policy of closer ties with the Muslim powers, diplomatic relations with Israel were reduced to the level of *chargé d'affaires*. This policy led to increased trade with and credits from Muslim countries.

Tourism. Despite its natural and historical attractions and the courtesy and friendliness of its people, the country does not attract many tourists. The 1.6 million visitors in 1983 (10 times the number who came in 1960) spent an average of \$175 per person. One reason is Turkey's apparent inability to publicize itself, but the chief reason is the weakness of the infrastructure for tourism. Government credits and tax concessions to private hotel chains are beginning, however, to improve this picture.

GEOFFREY L. LEWIS
Oxford University

7. History

Although the Turkish Republic dates only from 1923 and the Ottoman Empire, its predecessor, from the 14th century A.D., the present history of Turkey will begin by reviewing the history of the area of Anatolia prior to the arrival of the Turks there in the 11th century A.D.


PRE-OTTOMAN ANATOLIA

Anatolia has known nearly 40 centuries of recorded history as an area of settled civilization, and such sites as Troy and Boğazköy (Hattushash) contain evidence of even earlier habitation. The two phases of the great empire of the Hittites lasted for a millennium (2200–1200 B.C.), to be succeeded by such politically important

pre-Hellenic states as Urartu, Phrygia, and Lycia, with their distinctive cultural lives. The invasion of Cyrus, the Achaemenid king, in 546 B.C. brought virtually the whole region under Persian domination, and so it was to remain until its conquest by the Macedonian troops of Alexander the Great in 334 B.C. After the latter's death in 323 B.C., Anatolia became a bone of contention among the generals who were his heirs, the contest eventually resolving itself into a struggle between the Seleucids and the kingdom of Pergamum. As a result of the Seleucid defeat by the Romans at the Battle of Magnesia in 190 B.C., Pergamum was for a while to enjoy a period of unprecedented prosperity. But in 129 B.C. it was incorporated into the Roman province of Asia Minor.

The division of the Roman Empire into an eastern and a western branch under Diocletian (reigned 284–305 A.D.), to be followed in 330 by Constantine's final transfer of the capital to Constantinople and his acceptance of Christianity as the state religion, brought a new concentration of power to bear on Asia Minor. Henceforth, it was to be the very heartland of the Byzantine Empire. For over four centuries Byzantium was able to hold the line of the Danube against the pressure of barbarian invasions from the north while at the same time maintaining an unyielding resistance toward an aggressive Persia. The measure of its moral and material strength is to be seen in the fact that whereas the Persian Sassanids collapsed almost immediately under the assault of the Islamic Arabs in the second quarter of the 7th century, Asia Minor did not experience any permanent inroads by the Muslims until after the disaster of Manzikert (Malazgirt) in 1071.

The Seljuk Turks in Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire, which ultimately replaced the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia, was the culminating political achievement of the Oghuz (Oğuz, Ghuzz) Turkish tribes. Originating in western Central Asia, they accepted Islam about the middle of the 10th century, wrested Persia from the control of the Chaznavids, and founded the Seljuk Empire in 1037. A warlike nation organized for conquest and expansion, by 1055 the Seljuks had taken Baghdad. They converted the languishing Islamic caliphate into an instrument serving their own policies and ambitions. Within a few more years virtually the whole of Iraq, Syria, and Palestine had fallen under their sway. The Byzantine emperor, Romanus IV Diogenes, alarmed by the growth of this powerful, aggressive neighbor on his eastern frontiers, in 1071 led a massive army against the Seljuk ruler Alp Arslan, who was then launching raids into Armenia and the adjoining provinces. The Byzantine forces suffered a staggering defeat in that year on the plain of Manzikert, to the north of Lake Van. As a result the defensive system that had for centuries protected Asia Minor from Muslim invasion collapsed, and the region lay open to wholesale Turkish migration. It was as migrants rather than military invaders that the Turks originally came into this area, each group maintaining its own tribal identity and pursuing the traditional life of nomadic shepherders; it is only incidentally



The sumptuous Hagia Sophia, triumph of Byzantine architecture, was converted into a mosque after the Ottomans captured Constantinople.


u, Phrygia, and Lycaonia. The kingdom of the Seleucids, in 333 B.C., was the whole region under the rule of Alexander the Great. It was to remain united until the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. After his death, the kingdom was divided among his heirs, the Seleucids. The kingdom of Pergamon, founded by Philetaerus in 190 B.C., was to enjoy a period of independence until 129 B.C. when it was made a Roman province.

The Roman Empire was divided into the Eastern and Western Empires under Diocletian in 313. Constantinople followed in 330 as the capital of the Eastern Empire. The rise of Christianity led to a new concentration of power in the East.

The Ottoman Empire was founded by Osman I in 1299. The Seljuks had taken control of the region in the 11th century. The Seljuks had taken control of the region in the 11th century. The Seljuks had taken control of the region in the 11th century.

ph of Byzantine Constantinople.

Astich, shown in the distance in a scene from a medieval illuminated manuscript, is the prize for which these Christian knights and Turks are fighting. It fell to the Crusaders in 1098, to the Egyptian Mamluks in 1268, and to the Ottomans in 1516, when its name was Turkicized to Antakya.



SCALA/ART RESOURCE

tally that the Byzantine cities suffered attack or were forced to pay tribute.

The Seljuks used Anatolia as an area into which could be drained migrating tribes from Central Asia incapable of being absorbed into the Persian economy, and also as a place of exile for the fractious members of the Seljuk dynasty. Seljuk Sultan Iqbal al-Din Mas'ud I, who belonged to the latter group, took advantage of the confusion that still gripped Byzantium to establish a small principality for himself with its capital in Nicaea (now Iznik). In 1097, his son, Kılıç (Kilij) Arslan, was driven back into the interior of Anatolia by the troops of the First Crusade. Here he began conquering and consolidating the other tribes and small Turkish emirates into a strong state, known as the sultanate of Rum (meaning Rome, or the West), the capital of which was located in Konya (Iconium). At the power of the Great Seljuks in Persia began to fall into rapid decline at the beginning of the 12th century, its Anatolian branch managed to survive and remained intact despite internecine conflicts, wars with the Byzantines, and the successive invasions of the Crusaders. The growing volume of the trans-Anatolian caravan trade between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean greatly increased the wealth of the region, and Konya became one of the most important cultural centers of the whole Islamic world.

In 1204 the Fourth Crusade drove the Byzantines out of Constantinople and formed the Latin Empire of Constantinople. Some of the expelled Byzantines rallied around the son-in-law of a former Byzantine emperor and established the Empire of Nicaea in Anatolia to the southeast of the Latin Empire. In so doing they forced the Turks who had occupied this region to seek new areas of settlement. As these could only be gained by dispossessing other tribes, local wars proliferated, seriously affecting the security of the caravan routes and the revenues derived from them. But the most lethal blow to Seljuk power came from the Mongols, who in 1243 inflicted a crippling defeat on their armies at Köse Dagh and reduced the Seljuk sultan of Rum to an intellectual puppet ruling through the sufferance of the Mongol's local governor.

Since the sultan no longer had the ability to

coerce and control the Turkish tribes, and since the Mongols more or less encouraged the tribes to rebel against the central authority so that they would not have to deal with a strong, united province, the tribal leaders one by one asserted their independence of the sultan in the territories that they held. By the second half of the 13th century Anatolia had become divided into over 20 petty principalities (emirates, beyliks) whose very survival depended on their military strength. The resources of the land had been so wasted by over a century and a half of unremitting warfare that the economies of each had to be largely based on war and conquest. In the west the Turkish dynasties, which were all more or less under the hegemony of the Germiyanoglu dynasty centered in Kutahya (Phrygia), included the Karasoglu (Mysia), the Saruhanoglu (Lydia), the Aydinoglu (Ionia), the Menteşeoğlu (Caria), the Tekkeoglu (Lycia), the Hamidoğlu (Pisidia), the Candaroglu (Paphlagonia), and in Bithynia the Osmanoglu, who were to be the founders of the Ottoman Empire.

Establishment of the Ottomans in Anatolia. Native historical tradition has it that the founders of the Ottoman Empire, the Osmanoglu, were the leaders of the Kayi tribe, the noblest of the Oghuz Turks. But the fact that the Osmanoglu were forced into the region of Bithynia at a period when Byzantine military strength was concentrated here for its effort to regain Constantinople and when, consequently, the opportunities for raiding or exacting tribute from the cities must have been poorer than ever before indicates that they were weaker than the other Turkish tribes. The same native tradition meets this point by exalting them to the role of *ghazi*, warriors of the holy war (*jihad*) against the infidel, whose only purpose was the spread of Islam and whose only reward was in a life after death. But this theory assumes a view of Islam that it is quite improbable these tribal Turks had yet achieved; their indoctrination and instruction had been mainly from missionaries of the incoherent and extravagant dervish doctrines. Nor is it likely that the founder of the dynasty actually bore the Islamic name Osman (Arabic Uthman), which intrudes incongruously in a genealogy almost exclusively Turkish. The year 1300 (corresponding to the

Muslim year 699) as the date of the foundation of the new state is arbitrary and was probably selected to endow the event with a millennial portentousness; while the account that Osman was confirmed in his sovereignty in this year by the Seljuk sultan Keykubad III is no more than an attempt to endow the dynasty with a patent of legitimacy.

A variety of factors accounted for the success of Ottoman expansion. In 1261 the Byzantines regained Constantinople from the Latins and the government-in-exile moved from Nicaea with its armies, leaving Bithynia inadequately garrisoned. Once the Byzantines had arrived back in Europe, they faced the task of reconquering the small principalities in the Morea (Peloponnese), the Epirus, and Macedonia, which had grown up as a result of the Latin occupation of the Eastern Empire. There were also the problems of containing the persistent menace of the Bulgarians and opposing the dangerously growing power of the Serbians, and of achieving a political rapprochement with the West. Thus the attention and the seriously depleted resources of the emperor, Michael VIII Palaeologus (reigned 1259-1282), were diverted from Byzantine possessions in Asia. Consequently all but the strongest cities in Anatolia fell by default into the power of the nearest Turkish predators, the Ottomans. This success, in turn, attracted to their ranks warrior groups eager to share in the spoils. Bled of their manpower, the neighboring beyliks were left too weak to resist when the Ottomans expanded in their direction.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

In the span of 100 years the first four Ottoman rulers founded a state firmly rooted in northwestern Anatolia and reaching well into the Balkans.

Osman I (reigned 1300?-1326). The chronology of Osman's career lacks certainty at every point, but the generally accepted tradition fixes his birth in 1258 at Söğüt (northwest of Eskişehir) where his father, Ertuğrul, was the leader of a band of frontier warriors. On the latter's death, he became chieftain of the band and by the turn of the century he held the region including the cities of Bilecik, İnegöl, Yarıhisar, and Yenişehir, the last of which became his center of operations against İznik (Nicaea) and Bursa. The intent was to isolate both these important Byzantine cities from assistance from Constantinople. In 1314, Bursa was placed under siege; it finally capitulated in 1326, the year of Osman's death, and the city became the first capital of the infant empire. By this time Ottoman possessions extended as far east as Bolu, to Kandıra near the Black Sea in the north, and to İnegöl in the south; but the direction of political opportunity clearly lay to the west.


Orhan (Orkhan) I (reigned 1326-?1360). Osman was succeeded by his eldest son, Orhan, the first significant event of whose reign was the capture of İznik in 1331. İzmit (Nicomedia) fell in 1337 after a siege of six years, and once this last enclave of Greek power in western Anatolia was in their hands, Europe beckoned irresistibly to the seemingly invincible Ottomans. Their first introduction to Europe came by invitation rather than assault. In 1346 the pretender to the Byzantine throne, John Cantacuzene (John VI), gave his daughter Theodora in marriage to Orhan and in return received the help of Turkish troops in

his struggle for the throne with John V Palaeologus. In 1353 the Ottomans were rewarded by the grant of a permanent base in the Gallipoli peninsula. It was from here that their expansion into the Balkans was to originate, and even before John VI Cantacuzene was forced to renounce the throne to his rival John V in 1376 they were already extended along the Maritima coast as far as Tekirdağ.

When Orhan died, not only did the Ottomans hold this firm bridgehead in Europe, but in Anatolia their territories had been pushed toward Ankara. It is in the reign of Orhan that we can notice the first efforts toward an organized state patterned no doubt on Seljuk precedents. Silver coins were struck in his name in Bursa as early as 1326-1327; the council of state, or *divan*, was instituted; civil, as distinct from military, affairs were entrusted to an individual from the learned classes, who was given the title of *vezir* (vizier); and in each important city a religious judge, or *kadi*, was appointed. But the Ottomans were still no more than first among equals in the sight of the other tribal leaders. It was probably to assure an advantage over the other tribes as well as to give some organization to the warriors that a standing army of foot (*yaya*) and mounted (*müsellem*) soldiers was formed; this was to be the precursor of the renowned Janissary (Janyary) Corps.

Murad I (reigned 1360?-1389). Murad succeeded his father but not without opposition from his three brothers, whose liquidation in 1363 is the first instance of the precautionary execution of relatives that was to become the normal practice at each accession. In both Anatolia and Europe advantage was taken of these dynastic disturbances by rival beyliks and by the Byzantines for the purpose of regaining some of the territories they had lost to the Ottomans. But their efforts were fruitless, and Murad soon dominated the entire eastern bank of the Maritima. He took the great city of Edirne (Adrianople) in 1361 and Filibe (Philippopolis; now Plovdiv) in 1363. Byzantium, now virtually isolated, was obliged to give recognition to all these conquests and even to agree to a military alliance with the Ottomans for operations in Anatolia. The chronology of the campaigns in southeastern Europe (henceforth to be known as Rumili or Rumelia, the name given by the Turks to the area including Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace), as indeed the chronology of most events in early Ottoman history, is vague and confused, and little is known about the alliance among the Serbians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Walachians, and Bosnians negotiated by Pope Urban V to meet the growing menace. The alliance was defeated in the field at a battle on the banks of the Maritima near Edirne (1365?), and the Ottomans were henceforth rarely to meet more than local opposition as they spread westward through Serbia, Macedonia to the Vardar River and northward to the foothills of the Balkan Mountains. The capital was moved from Bursa to Edirne, indicating that any sense of insecurity in this foreign, Christian land that may have been previously felt had now been overcome. It is also possible that Murad was forced into this move, as he was into the creation of a standing army of non-Turkish Janissaries (Turkish, *Yeniçeri*, "new army"), in order to counter the growing power of his own generals, who had been operating with headlong success in almost total independence of him.

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
But Anatolia also offered prizes too tempting to be neglected. A dispute over the succession in a neighboring tribe that controlled the region south of Ankara up to the Black Sea permitted Murad to intervene in 1383-1384 on behalf of one of the pretenders. He ultimately reduced the area to vassalage, having secured his loyalty by a marriage alliance. Another such alliance between Murad's son Bayezid and the daughter of a neighboring Turkish ruler had already in 1381 brought the territories of Kütahya into the realm as the bride's dowry; and in the following year the lands to the south of this acquisition were purchased from the Hamidoğlu. The frontiers of the Ottomans now faced those of the Karamanlular, a powerful beylik that had arisen in the northeast of Anatolia. When the inevitable trial of strength came in 1387, at a battle near Konya, it was the Karamanoğlu who were reduced to a treaty for peace. Ottoman power was now recognized as unchallengeable throughout the former domains of the Seljuks.

In 1388 the Ottomans launched a sudden attack on Bulgaria, at the conclusion of which the entire country was reduced to a province with its ruler king as a mere governor. The Turkish frontiers were now stretched along the Danube in strategic positions. In the summer of 1389 the army, under the command of Murad himself, marched across Bulgaria and confronted the Balkan allies on the plain (*polje*) of Kosovo (Kosovo, west of Priština in modern Yugoslavia). The bloody encounter, legends of which still live in Balkan folklore, ended in victory for the Ottomans, and with it the South Slavs all but disap-

pear from history as a political entity for nearly five centuries. Murad himself was assassinated by a Serbian prisoner immediately after the battle had ended.

Bayezid (Bayazid, Bajazet) I (reigned 1389-1402). Murad's eldest son, Bayezid, was proclaimed leader on the field of battle, where his first command was that his brother Yakub be executed. All resistance to Ottoman might seems to have vanished: while his generals were raiding into Bosnia and across the Danube into Hungary and Walachia, he himself fixed a tributary status on Serbia and acted as kingmaker in settling the contention among the Palaeologi for the occupancy of the throne of Byzantium.

In 1390, when Bayezid crossed to Anatolia in response to rumors of rebellion in his Asiatic possessions, both Serbian and Greek contingents were among his troops. The reported alliance among the dispossessed emirs of the former beyliks, if it had ever existed, dissipated before his advance, and aside from incorporating still more independent Turkish territories and seizing the Mediterranean port of Antalya from the Tekkeoğlu, he forced the Karamanoğlu into recognizing all lands west of Konya as Ottoman domain. In the northeast of Anatolia, however, a more redoubtable opponent had arisen in the region of Sivas in the person of Kadı Bühraneddin, whose activities were to keep Bayezid embattled here until the invasion of northeastern Syria and eastern Anatolia by Timur (Tamerlane) in 1394 brought them together in a defensive alliance with Mamluk (Mameluke) Egypt. Fortunately for Bayezid, the threatened invasion of Ottoman



territory by the hordes of Çağatay (Chaghatay; the Turkicized Mongols of Central Asia) did not materialize at this moment, for events in Europe were now assuming a very perilous posture.

Constantinople had been under almost constant siege by the Turks since Manuel II assumed the Byzantine throne in 1391. Sigismund, king of Hungary (and later Holy Roman emperor), alarmed by the increasing Ottoman incursions into his territory, canvassed the support of the princes of Christendom, and to this Pope Boniface IX responded by proclaiming a new crusade in 1394. Although the way in which the young chivalry of Western Europe rallied to the cause promised hopeful results, their lack of seriousness and their inability to unite under a single leadership resulted in a disastrous defeat at Nicopolis (now Nikopol, Bulgaria) on Sept. 25, 1396. The ransoms paid for the noblemen who had been taken prisoner brought an unimaginable wealth into the Ottoman treasury, and further conquests in Albania and the Greek mainland created an atmosphere of buoyancy and complacency symbolized by lavish building and extravagant luxuries. In 1397 a successful campaign was led against the Karamanoğlu, by which the great city of Konya, the former Seljuk capital, was acquired, and in the following year Bayezid extended his holdings along the Black Sea by taking Samsun.

The fact that Bayezid devoted so much attention to strengthening his position in war-impooverished Anatolia at a time when Europe was so vulnerable to conquest and exploitation implies an awareness that the most serious challenge to his century-old empire could only come from the East, where the megalomaniac Timur was looking upon the growing prestige of the Ottomans as impudent and defiant. The trial of strength came in 1402 on the plain of Ankara; Timur routed the Ottomans, took Bayezid prisoner, and made a triumphal progress across Anatolia, restoring the dispossessed emirs to their former beyliks and leaving it on his return as divided as it had been after the fall of the Seljuks. Bayezid died in captivity shortly afterward, but two of his sons, İsa and Mehmed, on offering their submission to Timur, were appointed governors of Karası and Amasya respectively. A third son, Süleyman, fled to Rumili, where from his capital in Edirne he struggled to maintain what remained of Ottoman influence among the Turks who had emigrated there.

There can be little doubt that the reason for Bayezid's defeat is chiefly to be found in the disaffection of the Turkish tribal elements, who were resentful of Ottoman pretensions to royal prerogatives and saw their frequent intermarriages with the daughters of Greek and Slav princes as a Balkanization of the dynasty. Apart from the rewards that cooperation could bring in despoiling Europe, there was no basic cohesive principle in the state. It is difficult to say what conceptions of Islam were held, but it was certainly not a developed creed among them and probably did not amount to more than a loosely held loyalty that permitted a certain degree of unity when they were face to face with the Christians. Neither was there a general system of organization into which the conquered lands could be fitted, nor a body of law and precedent by which they could be administered. Under Ottoman rule life went on unchanged, except that the regional communities were allowed to

develop their individuality to an extent that had been impossible under the Byzantines. The very fact that there existed no finely balanced system that would fall apart if interfered with explains to some extent why Bayezid's defeat did not, as it otherwise might, mark the passing of an era; the confusion just became a little more extreme.

Interregnum. The years 1402-1413 are regarded as an interregnum in Ottoman history with the sons of Bayezid warring among themselves to restore the integrity of the realm that had been created by their forefathers. Mehmed appears to have escaped from the debacle at Ankara with most of his troops intact, and when Timur acknowledged him as governor of Amasya, he was merely avoiding the fatigue of marching against him. Timur's army was his state; he dared not parcel it out into garrisons for countless regions he had conquered in his restless career. In Anatolia he hoped to maintain authority by the familiar stratagem of dividing the land into mutually hostile beyliks, all small and weak to be politically effective or mutually dangerous. But Mehmed was not weak, and by 1404 he had driven İsa out of Bursa, the following year found him in possession of most of western Anatolia and his brother slain in battle. Süleyman, who had been supporting Timur, crossed from Rumili with an army, and throughout the four years he remained in Anatolia a state of stalemate existed between him and Mehmed. Another brother, Musa, crossed to Europe in 1409, where he collected an army and began to bring the region under submission to himself. Süleyman died in battle against him in 1410. In 1413, Musa was to meet the same end at the hands of Mehmed, and it is from this year that the reign of the latter as the fifth sultan of the Ottoman dynasty is said to begin.

Mehmed (Mehmet, Mohammed) I (reigned 1413-1421). Ottoman power expanded only slightly during the eight years of Mehmed's rule. A truce with the Karamanoğlu was arranged in 1414, stabilizing conditions in Anatolia. But the campaigns in Walachia (1416) and Transylvania (1419) had no lasting importance. A dervish revolt in İzmir led by a certain Şeyh (Sheikh) Bedreddin in 1419 was soon suppressed; it deserves mention as the first of many similar popular revolts that were to disturb Anatolia for the next two centuries. When Mehmed died in 1421, the empire had more or less been restored to what it was before Timur's invasion, but it is wrong to describe him as its second founder, as the older historians frequently did. The fact is that at no time had either Asia or Europe lost continuity of Ottoman rule, nor did there emerge any power of equal strength to challenge the rule or to take advantage of the civil wars for its own benefit. Mehmed merely overcame the centrifugal pull to which all such adventitious constructed states are subject; that he did it was in the context of a civil war in no way heightened his achievement.


Murad II (reigned 1421-1451). At the accession of Murad II, the eldest son of Mehmed, insurrection broke out as two pretenders laid claim to the Ottoman throne. These insurrections, both of which failed, are indicative of the profound malaise of the state, which for a quarter of a century had won no spectacular victories nor substantially enlarged its territories. But they also show the general acceptance of the Ottoman house as the

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The fortress of Rumeli Hisari was built on the Bosphorus by Mehmed II one year before he captured Constantinople.

manifest head of the state, so that even revolt had to be given a legitimist basis. The Christian powers, too, availed themselves of the internal difficulties of the Ottomans for their own purposes: Venice, with its superior maritime power, strengthened its hold on the Dalmatian and Aegean coastlines, while Hungary attempted to bring the Balkan provinces under its own hegemony. Nor did Asia Minor fail to add to the anarchy: it was not until 1425 that southwest Anatolia was regained from a local rebel, and the Karamanoglu, frequently as allies of the Christian powers in Europe, were unrelentingly menacing until their defeat in 1437.

A treaty of peace with Hungary in 1428 allowed for a concerted drive against Salonika, where since 1423 the Venetians had been holding out against the Ottomans. The fall of this city in 1430 was as important for the prestige it brought to the Ottomans as for the strategic advantages it assured them in the Aegean. But the victory was to be overshadowed almost at once by revolts in Albania, which proved to be but the prelude to a general rising of the Balkan and Thracian principalities, beginning in 1434. A campaign in Anatolia against the Karamanoglu, which lasted from 1435 to 1437, allowed the situation in Europe to deteriorate further. In 1441 the great Hungarian national hero János Hunyadi led the reconquest of the Balkans, while the great figure of the period, Skanderbeg, in 1443 brought the whole of Albania into open revolt. Murad was obliged to sue for peace with the Hungarians, renouncing many of his Balkan conquests, while in Anatolia even the Karamanoglu were able to exact humiliating terms from the Ottomans as the price of remaining nonaggressive. In December 1444 the tide of fortune again turned in favor of the Ottomans: the Balkan alliance suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Kosova, and in 1448, Hunyadi was again routed on the famous field of Kosova. The Turks were to remain supreme in southeastern Europe for the next four centuries.

Mehmed (Mehmet, Mohammed) II (reigned 1451-1481). Murad died in 1451 and was succeeded by his son Mehmed II, known as Fatih ("the Conqueror"). This ruler was to prove one of the truly great figures of the Renaissance and the architect of a political edifice that until its final disappearance in the 20th century bore the indelible mark of his genius.

It was the taking of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 that earned him his sobriquet. Even though that hitherto impregnable city had by this time been worn to exhaustion by the attrition of a century of Turkish hostility, its capture was nonetheless an achievement that astounded the contemporary world, just as the blow to Christendom, which its capture symbolized, brought Europe to despair.

Despite a reign of almost constant military activity, it was not Mehmed's ambition to enlarge the territories of the empire, but rather to consolidate and secure what was already held and to invest it with a central idea, a purpose, and an organization. What Christianity had been to Byzantium he made of Islam for the Ottoman Empire: not the wild, emotional doctrines of the dervishes, which until then had prevailed among these Turks, but the developed creed that had evolved over the centuries and had bred its own characteristic civilization and culture. To achieve a centralized state, he had to break the power of the Turkish military nobility. This he did by building up the strength of the Janissary corps and by appointing men loyal to the dynasty as the semifederal provincial administrators (*sipahi*). In the Palace School, which he founded shortly after transferring the capital to Istanbul, he provided for the training of Christian slave children, collected periodically from among the subject peoples and forcibly converted to Islam. These provided the state with a fund of devoted servants who could be trusted to administer the empire on behalf of their masters and benefactors. Likewise, the products of the theological colleges (*medrese*) that he founded and encour-



A miniature of Mehmed II "the Conqueror," possibly the work of Sinan Bey, the first known Turkish painter.

aged were made virtually civil servants, whose distribution as judges (*kadı*) throughout the provinces introduced a unified system of Islamic law as the basis of the social order.

Realizing that the empire could not aspire to commercial power, he nevertheless sought to control the trade passing through it by dominating the surrounding waters and obliging it to make its contribution to the economic life of the state. The subject minorities were permitted to retain a great measure of religious and social autonomy within their communities (*millet*). Although agriculture was heavily taxed to finance these innovations, the levies made on it were at least systematic and no longer subject to the caprice or the greed of local despots. It was the tragedy of the Ottoman Empire that the very period when it was at its most constructive should have coincided with the general decline of the Mediterranean economy, brought about by the navigational discoveries in the late 15th century of new routes to the East. It was doomed to share the area's poverty before it had ever enjoyed its prosperity.

The military preoccupations of Mehmed serve to show how tenuous and makeshift all previous Ottoman conquests had been and how little they differed from mere raids. Serbia was among the earliest places requiring attention, and it was only reduced to the status of a province (*vilâyet*) in 1459 after four campaigns, during one of which (1456) Belgrade was unsuccessfully besieged. Albania was in a constant state of insurrection, and even after the death in 1468 of its inspiring leader, Skanderbeg, Venetian intrigues contrived to keep its resistance active.

Between 1458 and 1459 most of the Morea fell under Ottoman control, and having taken most of the strategic islands of the Aegean and fortified the Dardanelles, Mehmed was now in a position to cut one of the most important commercial lifelines of the Venetian Republic. A war that was to last 16 years broke out between them in 1463, but as it was mainly confined to the sea and the cities of the littoral, it did not greatly distract Mehmed from the problems presented by his other territories. Walachia had accepted tributary status in 1462, and in the following year Bosnia was annexed and Herzegovina (Herzegovina) brought to a condition of subjection, which led ultimately to its formal incorporation in 1480. In 1461, Ottoman control of the southern shores of the Black Sea was assured when Mehmed wrested the last surviving Byzantine stronghold of Trabzon (Trebizond) from the feeble grasp of its Comnenid ruler, drove the Genoese from their colony in Amasra, and brought the semi-independent dynasty of the Isfendiyağlı, centered around Sinop, to an end. Dynastic troubles within the Karamanid realm began in 1464, affording an opportunity of dealing finally with this stubborn rival, and within two years it too was to become a vilayet of the empire.

The campaign in 1472-1473 against the powerful ruler of Azerbaijan, Uzun Hasan, showed conclusively which side was the mightier. There was to be no further serious threat from this quarter until the rise of the Safavid dynasty at the beginning of the following century. Control over the Black Sea was tightened in 1475 by the capture of the Genoese colonies on its western shores and by reducing the Mongol rulers of the Crimea to vassalage. The Dalmatian coast passed into Turkish control when Albania was finally pacified in 1478. Venice was forced to come to terms with the changed political realities of the area by concluding a peace whereby, in addition to territorial concessions, it committed itself to an annual tribute in return for certain trading privileges in the lands of the empire. The extent to which Ottoman sea power had now grown may be seen in the fact that in 1480 Rhodes was besieged and Otranto, in the heel of Italy, occupied for a while. But whatever ambitions for further conquests in Europe these ventures may have foreshadowed were not to be realized, for in 1481 Mehmed died and with his death the youthful state entered a period of quiescence.

Bayezid (Bayazid, Bajazet) II (reigned 1481-1512) Yet the military inactivity that characterizes the reign of his son and successor, Bayezid II, cannot be attributed to inertia. Time and tranquillity were needed to permit the new order established by Mehmed to operate properly. Furthermore, the grievances caused by his innovations among the Turkish sipahi class had to be contained before they became actually dangerous. The struggle for the throne between Bayezid and his younger brother Cem (Jem, Djem) must be understood as a revolt of the sipahis of Anatolia, and the unrest here did not end with the defeat of Cem. For the remainder of his life Cem was in exile in Europe.

The fear that Cem might be used by the Christians as a puppet sultan in any eventual crusade against the Ottomans has in recent years often been advanced as one of the reasons for Bayezid's conciliatory attitude toward Europe.

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most of the Morea and having taken many of the Aegean and Ionian islands. Mehmed was now in the most important commercial Venetian Republic. Wars broke out between them, but they were mainly confined to the littoral, it did not suffer from the problems of the interior. Wallachia had been annexed and Hercegovina had become a condition of vassalage to its formal incorporation. Ottoman control of the Black Sea was assured by the last surviving Byzantine (Trebizond) from the Venetian ruler, drove the Venetian colony in Amasra, and the independent dynasty of the Karamanids around Sinop, to within the Karamanids, finding an opportunity to become a vilayet of the

1473 against the powerful Uzun Hasan, showed that he was the mightiest serious threat from the Safavid dynasty following century. Control tightened in 1475 by the colonies on its west, the Mongol rulers of the Dalmatian coast when Albania was Venice was forced to a peace which conceded, it came in return for certain sea power had the fact that in 1492, the heel of the sword in Europe these were not to be died and with the period of

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But the fact is that throughout the whole of his long reign the true center of events lay in Anatolia. The foundation of the Safavid state in Persia under Shah Ismail at the beginning of the 16th century exerted a powerful attraction on the disaffected elements in Anatolia, who were only too ready to accept any alternative Islamic hegemony. The five inconclusive wars that were fought with the Egyptian Mamluks in Syria and southern Anatolia between 1485 and 1491 must also be seen in this light. It is to Bayezid's credit that he was able to prevent his enemies to the east and the south from profiting by the internal problems with which he was beset in Anatolia, while at the same time securing his hold on the Black Sea by the capture of Kilia and Akkerman (modern Belgorod-Dnestrovski) from the Genoese (1484), and on the eastern Mediterranean by securing the important ports of the Morea—Lepanto, Modon, and Coron—from the Venetians (1499-1500).

The Janissary establishment was greatly enlarged during his reign, and the Ottoman navy, for the first time, was developed into an organic part of Ottoman strategy. The spectacular successes of his son Selim, who actually drove him from the throne in 1512 and is rumored to have had him poisoned in the same year, would have been impossible without the security and stability that Bayezid created.

Selim I (reigned 1512-1520). Selim secured his accession by a wholesale destruction of all possible claimants of Ottoman descent. His reign was marked by two momentous victories by which the whole face of the empire was changed. In 1514 he met the challenge presented by the vigorous state that the Safavids were creating on his eastern frontiers, and on the Plain of Çaldıran (Chaldiran) in eastern Anatolia he utterly destroyed the army of Shah Ismail and the hopes of all the discontented elements in Anatolia, who were looking in this direction for delivery from the Ottomans.

After having brought all the eastern provinces into total submission, he turned his attention to the Mamluks, and in August 1516 he defeated their armies on a plain near Aleppo. As a consequence the Mamluks were displaced from power, and he became master of all their territories in Syria, Egypt, and Arabia. The Mamluks were hated by the peoples whom they misruled for their own selfish advantage that once defeated there was little opposition to Selim's progress, and by January 1517 he had taken Cairo. By this victory he incorporated into the empire the economic complex of the Nile Valley. This was, however, no more important in the eyes of the Islamic world than that he thereby also became the "Protector of the Holy Cities of Arabia," Mecca and Medina in the Arabian peninsula. It was at this time that the popular misconception arose that he assumed the dignity of caliph, supposedly surrendered to him by the Abbasid in whom the Mamluks had maintained as a facade of legitimacy for their own rule.

In 1519 the pirate Barbarossa (Khair ed-Din; Hayreddin), who had seized the port of Algiers and sought to exercise control over all of central North Africa, offered his submission to the Sublime Porte (the European translation of Bâbü'lî; the term is used to denote the Ottoman government) in order to gain the protection of Ottoman power. Thus the notorious Barbary corsairs became citizens of the empire. Ultimately they

proved to be more an embarrassment and a burden than an asset.


Süleyman (Suleiman, Solyman) I (reigned 1520-1566). In 1520, Selim was succeeded by his son Süleyman, known in the West as "the Magnificent" and in the East as Kanuni, "the Lawgiver." His reign of 46 years was to witness the apogee of Ottoman power and glory, towering above all rivals and competitors.

His title of "Lawgiver" refers to his redistribution of the provinces of the empire and his provision of each with an individual statute (*kanun*; *qanun*) of obligations and privileges, the financial aspects of which were based on actual land surveys. This was the first attempt ever made to estimate systematically the revenues of the empire, though it must be acknowledge that the information seldom seems to have contributed to the elaboration of a definite economic policy.

His political objectives, however, were well defined: the conquest of Hungary, the domination of the Mediterranean, control of the Tigris-Euphrates regions, and the neutralization of Safavid Persia. The first of these brought him into conflict with Habsburg Austria and so redoubtable an adversary as the Emperor Charles V. Süleyman captured Belgrade in 1521, and in 1526 he defeated King Louis (Lajos) II of Hungary at the famous Battle of Mohács. By 1528 the Ottoman army was besieging Vienna. Budapest was taken the following year, and by 1541 Transylvania was an Ottoman protectorate; from 1547 onward, Austria found it more expedient to pay an annual tribute to the Porte than to resist its arms.

In these wars Süleyman was acting more or less as an ally of France. His particular contribution to the alliance was made in the Mediterranean where, following the capture of Rhodes from the Knights of St. John (the Hospitalers) in

Süleyman I "the Magnificent," with two attendants, as portrayed by the court painter Haydar, known as Nigari.



1522, Ottoman strength had been growing relentlessly. In 1533, Barbarossa was made grand admiral of the fleet, and until his death in 1546 he was seldom effectively challenged in these waters. Tunisia fell to him in 1534, becoming another corsair state within the empire. In 1538 his defeat of Andrea Doria off Preveza put the seal of Ottoman supremacy on the Mediterranean. So confident had Süleyman become that he even thought to contest Portuguese power in the Persian Gulf by sending a fleet to Gujarat, India, in 1538 and again in 1554, but neither of these were to experience anything but disaster. Most of the islands of the Aegean were annexed (Chios fell in 1566), though Malta, to which the Knights of St. John had come after losing Rhodes, successfully resisted a determined siege in 1565.

Iraq was invaded and the capital city of Baghdad taken in 1534, assuring control of this key center of the economic life of the Middle East. Though at least two other campaigns were directed against the Safavids, their chief result was the intimidation of the unquiet territories through which the armies passed. Süleyman died in 1566 during the siege of Szigetvár, and with him the heroic age of Ottoman history comes to an end.

Stagnation and Decline of the Empire The slow but steady tempo of political decline in the succeeding two centuries had the positive result of allowing the integration of the various (and frequently incompatible) elements of the empire, so that a unique society was produced, no less homogeneous for being multiracial and diversified religiously. It tended to be dominated by those institutions by which the glories of the past had been achieved, and it remained so rigidly conservative that its very anachronism baffled other nations in all their dealings with it.

With only a few exceptions, the sultans all but lose their identity in the ceremonies of sovereignty. After Murad IV (reigned 1623-1640) they never take the field with their armies, and although they remain the supreme power in the land and are revered by their people as the "Shadow of God on Earth," their power is increasingly exploited by their viziers in competition with the women of the royal harem and their eunuchs.

The Janissaries, after the middle of the 17th century, ceased to be recruited from among the Christian peoples and became a hereditary body possessing the only effective power. The more dangerous to their masters as they became more innocuous to the enemy, in their insolence they did not hesitate to depose and murder sultans of whom they disapproved (for example, Osman II in 1622), and they jealously maintained their prerogatives at the expense of the security of the state.

As their power of intimidation and coercion outside the confines of the capital decreased, the military classes in the more distant provinces, particularly in Anatolia, began to govern in semi-independence, making their authority hereditary in their own families. From the early 18th century down to their final curtailment by the reforming Sultan Mahmud II (reigned 1808-1839), these *derebeyi* families ("lords of the valleys") were able to ignore and even defy the wishes of the Porte and its local representatives. The latter tended increasingly to be men who had purchased their office in expectation of making a

substantial profit by using their power to extract all they could from agriculture and trade, to the consequent detriment of both.

Various regions were almost totally given over to banditry, making communication difficult and dangerous. The defenseless peasants drifted into the cities, where they swelled the volume of the discontented proletariat. There were no industries to absorb them, and much of the lavish expenditure on the mosques, schools and other public buildings that still adorn these cities must have had the employment of the masses among its other pious motives.

Statesmen of ability and foresight do emerge in every generation, but none saw the inherent impracticality of the system they were bent on preserving in the changing conditions of the world. Their talents were dissipated either in hopeless military adventures or in naive efforts to redress an anarchical economy. The learned classes, too, with no intellectual stimulation from a society almost universally illiterate and in a state of even the most meager scholarly attainments, complacently and uninquiringly shut themselves up in an educational system in which the appeal to ancient authority could always silence the arguments of reason. They were the official exponents of Islamic doctrine and law as well. But they made even religion academic and lifeless, and the people were driven more and more to seek satisfaction of their spiritual needs in the dervish orders. Nevertheless, in response to the unstable situation, which might otherwise have been brutalizing and debasing, the Ottoman fashioned his own highly civilized philosophy of life, quietistic and fatalistic, but expressing the basic, ennobling human ideals of Islam.

The period has few military successes to record. In 1571, Cyprus was taken, but in the same year the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto exposed its vulnerability at sea and destroyed the image created by Barbarossa. Georgia was overrun in 1578. But with the advent of the great Safavid ruler Shah Abbas I (reigned 1587-1629), Persia was no longer an easy victim, and from 1623 to 1638 it even held Baghdad. The peace concluded between the two states in 1639 marks the renunciation of Ottoman ambitions in these parts. Crete was finally taken in 1669 after a 20-year struggle, in the course of which the Venetians had blockaded the Dardanelles and at one point were able to threaten Istanbul from the sea. Tunisia and Algeria, though nominally part of the empire, were ruled in total independence by their respective bey and deys and pursued their piracy with no regard for Ottoman policies or alliances.

But Austria, which had achieved the status of a first-rate military power during the Thirty Years' War, was the chief enemy. Even by 1672 in the Treaty of Sivitvorok (Zsitva-Torok) Austria was able to exact concessions from the sultan. At the Battle of St. Gotthard in 1664, the Austrian general Montecuccoli dispelled forever all the fear and respect that the Turks had once inspired. Though by sheer weight of numbers they were able to subject Vienna to its second siege in 1683, by the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 they were forced to surrender most of Hungary, renounce their pretensions in Transylvania, and recognize Venetian conquests in the Morea. The Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 completed the Ottoman evacuation of these parts and cost the Belgrade for about 20 years. (The Morea, how-

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ever, had been reconquered from the Venetians in 1715 and remained Ottoman territory until the Greek revolution in the 19th century.)

There was yet another and more insatiable power waiting to complete the humiliation of the Turk. When at the end of the 17th century Peter the Great first began to introduce his newly united Russia into the sophisticated complexities of European politics, the demonstrated weakness of the Ottoman Empire made it seem his natural prey, just as its domination of his access to the Mediterranean made it a necessary enemy. In 1696 he took the Crimean stronghold of Azov, and in 1711 virtually proclaimed a Holy War against the infidel to the south. Surprisingly, this war resulted in a Russian disaster, which the Ottomans in their diplomatic simplicity failed to take full advantage of in the Treaty of the Pruth in the same year. But the theme of Russia as the legitimate heir of Byzantium in the protection of Orthodox Christianity was again taken up in 1738, and the Serbian and Greek subjects of the sultan were led to regard Russia as their ordained savior. The culminating stroke of this policy was delivered in 1768 by Catherine the Great, who had provoked the exhausted Ottomans into a war that they could only lose. The Danubian Principalities (the name for Moldavia and Wallachia) were overrun, the Crimea was occupied, and a Russian fleet sailed by way of the Atlantic to press the attack on the Turk from the Mediterranean. The war was brought to an end in 1774 by the famous Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (Turkish Küçük Kaynarca). After this treaty the Ottoman Empire was never again to be an independent agent in international affairs, nor even the arbiter of its own destinies.

As a consequence of the terms exacted by the Russians in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, the question was posed for the first time, in the form that was to become classic as the Eastern Question, of how to apportion the territory of the dying Ottoman Empire among its presumptive heirs. Russia was confident that warfare in European Turkey could henceforth only be victorious and profitable. The czar had gained recognition as the protector of the Greek Orthodox subjects of the sultan, and he inferred from his independent annexation of the Crimea in 1783 that aggression could be pursued without fear of concerted action by the rest of Europe. Russia, with the wholehearted encouragement of an equally ambitious Austria, sought by subversive propaganda in the Danubian Principalities and the Balkan provinces and by provocative behavior toward the Porte itself to maintain a state of ferment throughout all European Turkey. The French Revolution had effectively removed the French check to Russian ambition, while England could be relied on not to pass from disapproval to outright hostility so long as there was no immediate danger of the Russian fleet gaining access to the eastern Mediterranean. The peace treaty of Jassy in 1792 between Russia and Turkey, concluding a war in progress since 1787, left the mighty northern power extended and poised to leap across a frontier extending from the Caspian Sea to the Dniester River.

But before the seemingly inevitable could happen, Napoleon invaded the sultan's province of Egypt in 1798, bringing Russia, England, and Turkey into an uneasy alliance against the common threat. After peace had been concluded with France in 1801 and the latter had regained

some of its former influence at the Porte, the Ottoman Empire was again stretched on the carving board of European ambitions, Napoleon variously distributing in advance the joints to be dismembered in accordance with his own mercenary schemes. France, who provoked the action on the part of the Ottomans with regard to the native princes (hospodars) of Wallachia and Moldavia, gave Russia the opportunity of launching another war in 1806, at the conclusion of which, by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, the Russian frontiers moved to the Prut River and Turkey lost the whole of Bessarabia. It was Ottoman friendship with France that caused Britain to declare war on the sultan in 1807 when the Porte would not accept Britain's humiliating demands for joining in a new anti-French alliance. Finally, the French advised the Ottomans to treat a limited Serbian insurrection in 1806 as a major revolt, thereby putting in process the chain of events that was to lead to the total independence of this province.

The Reforms of Selim III (reigned 1789-1807) and Mahmud II (reigned 1808-1839). The tentative efforts at westernization that were made during the reign of Sultan Selim III, in an attempt to redress the fortunes of the empire by increasing the effectiveness of its military establishment, betray the fundamental archaism of Ottoman political thinking. For the army was still regarded as the chief prop, if not actually the chief purpose, of the state. Though Sultan Mahmud II delivered the state from the burden of the Janissaries by destroying them in 1826, his reign demonstrates that merely military solutions could not solve the problems of the empire. In 1816, Serbia gained an unprecedented degree of local autonomy, and the revolution that broke out in Greece in 1821 not only resulted in the total independence of that land in 1830, but entailed, as well, the virtual loss of the Romanian provinces and Egypt.

The defect in Mahmud II's reforms was that they did not recognize how altered the role of the Ottoman Empire in world politics had become. They were conceived in reference to a military state that no longer had any reality. In effect, what he sought to do was to transform a loose military feudalism into a centralized military despotism, and to a certain extent he achieved this. He replaced the Janissaries with a force conscripted from his Muslim subjects, organized and trained after the European fashion; he suppressed the derebeyis and once again brought the Anatolian provinces under the control of Istanbul, abolishing the feudal army of sipahis and appropriating their fiefs (*timar* and *ziamet*) to the public domain.

Presumably such reforms might have brought a measure of internal peace and prosperity to the empire had there been no intervention from without. Here another defect in Mahmud's conceptions must be noted: his total unawareness of the political complex in which his state had become involved. Muhammad Ali (Turkish, Mehmed Ali), the governor of Egypt, as a reward for the assistance he had given the sultan during the Greek revolt in 1825, was left undisputed master of that province. But his contempt for Ottoman weakness allowed him visions of even greater rewards, and he sent his son Ibrahim Pasha (Turkish, Ibrahim Paşa) to invade Syria in 1831. By December of the following year the governor's forces had taken Konya and the road to Istanbul lay open before them. The sultan

estine—was simply as were Russian and European possessions for access to the Mediterranean fixed determinative signs. The war need

All through the first Russians in the Danube, 1853, Britain made in the Russian administration as it lay anchored in Turkey's sea power, the accessible and British in peril. In March declared war, the latter to bring to an end in by an alliance with was between Britain; issue was the preservation of the Ottoman Empire; campaign—the siege of Sevastopol—and when 1855, Russia decided

1856 sought to make special advantages it had since Kuchuk Kainarji the Turks against and to show the world confidence reposed in it affirmed and amplified: the abolition of the people were diffusing to their religious by an unequivocal decision equal with Muslim powers agreed that of Christians should

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The Treaty of Paris Ottoman Empire succeeded in attempting to invert

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powers, remained little more than a statement of good intentions. There were endless decrees reorganizing the administration, taxes, justice, education, and the other services of the state, but in each case they broke down for want of trained, active, and trustworthy officials to carry them through. Moreover, they all ran counter to the medieval Muslim mentality, to which such departures from tradition savored of impiety and a violation of the Holy Law. Indeed, it was unrealistic to expect, as Europe did, that a whole people could change its century-old mentality overnight.

Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The Bulgars, unlike the Slavs and Greeks, had never had their own church within the Orthodox community, and lacking this national core they had become completely lost to history during the period of Ottoman domination. In religion they were under the control of the Greek patriarch, and since nationality in the Ottoman Empire was based on religion, they were considered and, in fact, considered themselves as Greeks. However, about the middle of the 19th century, the nationalistic fever affected them also. The language began to be assiduously cultivated, and agitation was started for a national church that would separate them from the Greeks. In order to prevent them from accepting the Roman Catholic dispensation, as they threatened to do, Russia induced the Porte in 1870 to establish a Bulgarian church with an exarch at its head. In addition to this concession, the sultan recognized that Macedonia was a sort of frontier land between the Greek and Bulgarian churches, and allowed its parishes to go over to either side they wished on showing a two-thirds majority in favor. Thus began the battle of the patriarchs and the exarchs that was the preliminary to the ill-omened Macedonian Question.

In 1876 when Montenegro and Serbia associated themselves with the insurrections that had broken out in Bosnia and Hercegovina the previous year, Bulgaria attempted to gain its independence. But its efforts were so cruelly repressed by the *basibozuk* (bashi-bazouk) militia of the Porte that all Europe was moved to indignation. It was at this juncture that Russia made its bid. Knowing that the popular opinion of Europe was against the Turk and would handicap the powers from taking effective action, it prepared a new war against the Ottoman Empire.

At this time the notorious Abdülhamid (Abdul-Hamid) II (reigned 1876-1909) had just ascended to the throne, and in order to placate the opinion of Europe he had, under the influence of a group of Turkish liberal statesmen led by Midhat Pasha (Midhat Pasha), formally proclaimed a constitution and parliamentary government. The constitution was very dramatically timed, at the very moment when the representatives of the powers were assembled in Istanbul (December 1876) to decide how Russian-Turkish difficulties might be settled peacefully. Arguing that the traditional absolutism of the state had ended, the Porte refused to make any concessions or to give Europe any further authority in their dominions. The conference could achieve nothing, and in April 1877, Russia was left free to declare the war it wanted.

Treaty of Berlin and Its Aftermath. Despite the heroic defense of Plevna, the Russians found little to impede their progress, and by January 1878 they had reached Edirne, whence they pressed

on to the shores of the Marmara in sight of Istanbul. The Turks had to sue for peace, and negotiations were opened at San Stefano. The terms of this treaty are of little importance, for neither Britain nor Austria had any intention of letting Russia realize its ambitions in the Balkans. Finding itself once again isolated among the European powers, Russia had to allow the matter to be negotiated at the Congress of Berlin (June 1878). Here everyone received satisfaction except Russia: a self-governing principality of Bulgaria was set up; Austria took under its protection Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Britain got Cyprus; Serbia and Romania were declared fully independent; and Greece was given Thessaly and a bit of the Epirus.

It is clear that this treaty, unlike that drawn up at Paris 22 years before, was based on no illusions about the Ottoman Empire. In place of hollow professions about the integrity of the sultan's dominions, there was not only a frank recognition of their necessary subjection to the collective will of Europe, but also an unqualified acknowledgment that the sultan, left to himself, was not likely to carry out any administrative improvement worthy of the name. Of his former Christian territories, only Eastern Rumili, Macedonia, Crete, and Armenia were left to the sultan, and he was cautioned to carry out reforms in these regions immediately.

Abdülhamid took advantage of the war with Russia to suspend the constitution and to disencumber himself of the restraint imposed on him by the liberals under Midhat Pasa. He realized that his best chance of being allowed to reign lay in utilizing the inevitable disharmonies of the European concert and in tenaciously holding fast to every hereditary right identifiable with the sultanate. In domestic affairs he found the orthodox, conservative Muslim faction strongest numerically, so he unhesitatingly fashioned his policies to suit it. The Treaty of Berlin had extorted such undertakings with regard to Armenia, Macedonia, Crete, and Rumili that Abdülhamid felt it was only a matter of time before these territories, too, were taken from him. Indeed, there was already sufficient nationalistic agitation in all of them to warrant this feeling. Eastern Rumili was annexed by Bulgaria in 1885, in clear violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and none of the powers raised a finger. In order to prevent a similar loss of those eastern Anatolian territories that constituted historical Armenia, between the years 1894 and 1896 a systematic policy of annihilating all Armenians was followed. Muslim fanaticism was employed as the instrument and estimates place the slaughter at more than 100,000.

In 1896-1897 the Christians of Crete revolted, and popular agitation in Greece rose to such a pitch that the people themselves declared war against the Ottomans and marched into that part of Thessaly still held by the Turks. It was a mob rather than an army and was soon defeated by the German-trained troops of the sultan. However, the powers again took a hand; Crete was separated from Turkish administration and became self-governing.

In Macedonia—that region of the Vardar Valley through which most Balkan peoples had migrated at one time or another, leaving behind some national relic in the population—the rivalry of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria somewhat helped the position of the sultan. By their inten-

sive propaganda, both religious and educational, the Bulgarians had created a situation, especially in the Slavonic north, favorable to themselves. But there was also equally intensive propaganda by Serbia and Greece. About the turn of the century this activity began to take the form of small armed bands of terrorists, pro-Greek or pro-Bulgarian, who went about attacking the Turkish towns. In the face of the severe measures of repression taken by the Turks, the European powers felt compelled in 1903 to place the province under international control, owing only the most formal and nominal recognition to the Porte. The terrorist bands now began to fight each other, and ultimately the whole population indulged in an orgy of self-destruction, abetted by the neighboring states and incapable of being prevented or controlled by the police forces of Europe that were installed here.

Europe's drive for colonization based on economic exploitation was at work in other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1830, France had been engaged on the North African coast in the conquest of Algeria and in 1881 had extended its holdings by appropriating Tunisia. In the following year, Britain occupied Egypt, where the Suez Canal (opened in 1869) had completely revolutionized the India trade. Tripoli, it was generally understood, was to be taken by Italy as soon as Italy could find the time to conquer it.

However, since Italy's achievement of unity in 1871, a new power with colonial thirsts had entered the scene: Germany. The only place that seemed left for German imperial ventures was Asia Minor itself. It followed the now traditional method of economic penetration and early in the 1880's supplied a German military mission to reorganize the Ottoman army. But it was in 1896 that the real work began with the construction of railways in Anatolia, and in 1899 the concession was granted to the *Deutsche Bank* (German Bank) for the laying of the Berlin-Baghdad line. If this were completed, not only would the Persian Gulf and India be opened to German trade, but they would also become strategically vulnerable. Britain was seriously worried, and Russia was confronted with the prospect of having its age-long dream of possessing Istanbul forever destroyed. It was in response to this menace that Britain, Russia, and France composed their differences (all imperial) over Persia, Morocco, and Egypt, and formed the system of alliances known as the Triple Entente. About 1907 the Entente began to view the disorders in Macedonia with some anxiety, and their possible interference alarmed not only the sultan but also the Young Turks.

Young Turk Movement. The Young Turks were a group of Europeanized, young intellectuals who, from exile in Britain and France, had been conducting a propaganda campaign against the despotism of Abdülhamid, convinced that the only salvation for the Ottoman Empire lay in its becoming a wholly European nation. Their propaganda found its greatest reception in the army, and in 1906 they transferred their headquarters from Paris to Salonika, where they adopted the name of Committee of Union and Progress. The revolt they led began in Macedonia, and the sultan, seeing that he did not command the loyalty of the army, yielded to their demands, granting a new constitution in 1908 and summoning a national parliament.

The Young Turk revolution was greeted as a political sunrise, not only among the peoples of the Balkans but even in the more cynical capitals of Europe. But it soon became apparent that the Young Turks, for all their talk about freedom and constitutionalism, had no intention of breaking up the old Ottoman Empire. Instead they proposed a new concept of Ottoman nationality, at all to the liking of the subject Christians. At first the tenure of the Committee of Union and Progress was uncertain. But after the Young Turks had overcome an attempt at counterrevolution by Abdülhamid and replaced him with Mehmed V (reigned 1909-1915), they began to apply their policies energetically.

The Young Turks had spoken boldly of gaining Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Crete, which had the immediate effect of prompting Bulgaria to declare its full independence, Crete to propose a union with Greece, and Austria to annex in 1908 Bosnia and Hercegovina, which it had been "protecting" since the Treaty of Berlin. The move of Austria infuriated Serbia, which considered these Slav territories to be rightly its own, awaiting incorporation at some late date into a great Slav state. The Berlin-Baghdad railway would have to pass through Serbia, and encouraged by Russia, Serbia stood up to its powerful neighbor, attempting to obstruct this passage to the Near East, which the Triple Alliance of Austria, Germany, and Italy held to be vital in its destiny. Austria, supported by Germany, demonstrated quite clearly that it had no intention of giving up the provinces that it had annexed; and the Triple Entente, unprepared to accept the consequences of their policies, withdrew the support they had been giving Serbia. A world war had been averted, and Europe stopped holding its breath for a while.

The Pan-Ottomanism of the Young Turks had failed as a solution to the nationalistic movements in the sultan's dominions. They were beginning to reveal themselves quite as despotic as the regime they had displaced. Trouble broke out in Albania, into whose remote hills the winds of nationalism had reached at last. Like most of the Balkans, the Albanians had interpreted the Young Turk manifesto as a concession of independence, and when they realized that it meant nothing more than a change of name, they were prepared to fight. The Turkish armies could do little against this mountainous country. After a war, which dragged on for about three years (1909-1912), the Committee of Union and Progress, beset by more serious troubles elsewhere, granted them their independence. But they also had to give the new state a frontier, and the line was drawn to include the four former provinces of Scutari, Janina, Monastir, and Kosovo. However, for a long time the Greeks had been agitating for Janina, the Montenegrins claimed Scutari, while Monastir and Kosovo were Macedonian areas, which had for years been the scene of bitter rivalry between Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb. They all decided to act before the sketch map became a reality.

Turco-Italian War. In September 1911, Italy at last made its claim to Tripoli, the North African territory of the Porte that had hitherto escaped the imperialistic drives of France and Britain. Italy's troops had no trouble in defeating the Turkish and Arab defenders, but it soon became apparent that the sun and desert were more formidable enemies. The Turks refused to sign

over the province, and thereupon, in May 1912, the Italians occupied Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands. At this time events in the Balkans showed the Turks that they could not hold out in Africa any longer, and peace was signed at Lausanne on Oct. 18, 1912. Thus Tripoli became Libya, and the Balkan war was too pressing on the Turks for them to demand that the islands be evacuated as promised.

Balkan Wars. What no statesmanship in or out of the Balkans had ever been able to accomplish the Young Turks brought about almost overnight. Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro—these hitherto natural enemies—had formed an alliance and attacked the Ottomans on the day the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The allies scored a brilliant victory. Within a few months the only Ottoman territories left in Europe were Istanbul, and the three besieged fortresses of Edirne, Janina, and Scutari. The Greek navy, moreover, took possession of all the Aegean Islands not held by Britain or Italy. The Porte yielded in desperation to the European powers, and on Dec. 3, 1912, a cessation of hostilities was obtained, to be followed by a conference in London. A coup d'état within the Committee of Union and Progress that resulted in the militarist Enver Bey becoming head of government caused the Balkan war to break out once again. But the struggle was futile, and eventually on May 30, 1913, a peace treaty was negotiated, again in London, whereby great territorial losses had to be accepted by the Turks.

But now the Balkan allies had the task of distributing the spoils, and immediately Bulgaria was at war with Greece and Serbia, a situation of which the Turks took advantage by reoccupying Thrace and Edirne. The intense negotiations and the stubborn haggling over every foot of land that followed the Treaty of Bucharest on Aug. 10, 1913, bringing this short war to a most unhappy end for Bulgaria, lose all significance and importance in view of the impending world war, which was to throw the Balkans into the melting pot once again.

World War I. Turkey's entry into World War I on the side of the Central Powers is still decried as an act of impetuous folly. But it is difficult to see how it could have avoided coming out on one side or the other, in spite of its unenviable and decrepit condition. Whether it participated or not, it was inevitable that its lands would figure among the prizes of victory. Germany had in the course of a quarter of a century become the most influential power at the Kaiser's court, and nowhere was this influence more prominent than in the army, whose officers had largely undergone German military instruction. The militarist wing of the Committee of Union and Progress, which had seized power in 1912, effectively silenced the more moderate elements in the party. Since the Treaty of Berlin between Austria and Britain, directly or indirectly, had been involved in every misfortune suffered by the empire, and their alliance with Russia, the mortal enemy, was held to bode nothing but evil. On Aug. 2, 1914, an article of alliance was signed with Germany, and as a result of the assistance given by the Turkish navy to an assault on the Russian fleet in the Black Sea by the German Admiral Goeben and Breslau at the end of October 1914, the Allies declared war on Turkey.

It has become part of the historical fiction of the Turkish Republic that the empire's involve-

ment in the war was wholly due to the conniving and duplicity of the war minister, Enver Paşa, and the minister of the interior, Talat Paşa. The statesmen of that period, in their memoirs, are careful to stress their own opposition to military participation and the degree to which they were kept in the dark about negotiations with Germany. But there is little doubt that the majority of the officer class in the army was wholeheartedly in favor of the venture and saw the alliance with a mighty Germany as an opportunity to redeem the humiliations their arms had suffered everywhere since the turn of the century. As usual, no one gave a thought to the economics of warfare. Territorial losses during the previous century had greatly reduced the size of the population from which soldiers could be levied, and only Anatolia remained as a source of manpower. This, of course, was inadequate to meet the needs of such a far-flung empire, and in practically every engagement these badly equipped and poorly trained Anatolian peasants were compelled to fight against armies superior in everything except courage. Moreover, the drain on the peasant population and their animals, along with the deportation and slaughter of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1915 for siding with the invading Russians, was a crippling blow to agriculture, and for four years the entire nation lived on the brink of famine.

The frenetic deathbed convulsions of the empire took place in the three years of Turkish participation in the war. The very first campaign against the Russians in the Caucasus resulted in total defeat (January 1915), while an attempt on the Suez Canal and Egypt in February of the same year was pathetically inadequate. The ill-advised Allied attempt to seize control of the Dardanelles and secure a passage to Istanbul between February and December 1915 provided the one notable Turkish success of the entire war. But in January 1916 the Russians resumed the offensive in the Caucasus, which by August brought them deep into eastern Anatolia along a line stretching from Trabzon on the Black Sea to Bitlis. Two Turkish armies were destroyed in their advance. Another attempt on the Suez Canal in June of this year was no more successful than the first, and the way was prepared for the cautious and deliberate advance of the British into Palestine and Syria. A victory over the British at Kut al-Amara in April 1916 was about the only Turkish success in the Mesopotamian theater. But early in the following year Baghdad was captured and the Turks had to fall back on Mosul.

The revolution in Russia in March 1917 relieved the situation in eastern Anatolia and allowed the lost territories to be retaken. Yet this only encouraged Enver Paşa into an ambitious fantasy involving the seizure of the whole of Transcaucasia. For this purpose he diverted troops from the Palestine front, where the Arab revolt of June 1916 had further complicated the precarious position of the defending Turks. It was only in Palestine that Turkish arms, though in slow but constant retreat, commanded respect. But General Allenby's campaign in 1918 showed how futile further resistance was here, too. When Bulgaria, in September 1918, signed a separate armistice with the Allies at Salonika, the land connection between Turkey and Austria was broken and there was no longer any hope left. So on Oct. 30, 1918, Turkey signed an armistice.

stice at Mudros (Moudros), on the island of Lemnos.

The moral deterioration of the Ottoman dynasty and the system that it symbolized was now complete. The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress had fled into exile in disgrace, and the new sultan, Mehmed VI, with no one of courage and strength to advise and direct him, became the helpless instrument of the victorious Allies. He was even induced to proscribe as a rebel Mustafa Kemal (later known as Kemal Atatürk), the one man who refused to be cowed by the arrogant might of the Allies and who since May 1919 had been organizing the still mobilized Turkish forces in the east to resist the Greek invasion of Anatolia, which the Allies had sponsored. In April 1920 an alternative government under Kemal's presidency was formed in Ankara. It claimed to express the true will of the Turkish people, whose destinies the sultan showed himself no longer concerned with when he accepted the terms imposed on the nation by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres (Aug. 10, 1920).

Toward the end of 1922, Turkish resistance had driven the Greek invaders into the sea, İzmir was recaptured, and the Allies were forced to accept an armistice virtually dictated by Kemal at Mudanya on October 11. The office of sultan was abolished on November 1, and Mehmed VI fled abroad on a British warship. The next Ottoman incumbent, Abdülmecid (Abdul-Medjid) II, was merely allowed to hold the semireligious position of caliph, but on March 3, 1924, five months after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, this office was also done away with. Thus the last survivor of the dynasty that had for over six centuries ruled one of the world's greatest empires passed into obscurity in exile.

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THE REPUBLIC

The Turkish Republic was proclaimed on Oct. 29, 1923, with Mustafa Kemal as its first president.

The Secularization of the Republic. Although Kemal's People's party was the only party in the new Grand National Assembly, not all its members were in sympathy with his plans to make Turkey into a secular Western state. On March 3, 1924, besides abolishing the caliphate and banishing all members of the Ottoman dynasty, the assembly replaced the ministry of sacred law (*şeriat*) and pious foundations (*evkaf*) with a directorate of religious affairs within the premier's office. All schools were placed under the ministry of education, which closed the Muslim religious colleges (*medrese*) the next day. The Muslim law courts followed them into oblivion on April 8, 1924.

A new constitution was approved on April 20, 1924. Under it the assembly exercised its legislative power directly and its executive power through the president of the republic, whom it elected, and the council of ministers chosen by him. The judiciary was independent.

The Istanbul press, incensed by the transfer of the capital to Ankara, became the mouthpiece of those who were discontented with the new regime for various reasons; the disestablishment of Islam, the stagnation of trade (due largely to bureaucratic inefficiency), and Kemal's autocracy.

In November 1924 the People's party began to experience a wave of resignations, and on Nov. 17, 1924, the dissidents formed the Progressive Republican party. İsmet (İnönü) resigned, and Fethi (Okyar) took his place as premier. The Istanbul press misinterpreted Kemal's quiescence in these events as a sign of weakness. In fact, while naturally wishing to distance himself from the unpopularity of the Republican People's party (hereafter RPP; the "Republican" had been added on Nov. 10, 1924), he had no objection to opposition so long as it accepted the principle of a secular republic.

But the Istanbul press was not alone in its misinterpretation of weakness. On Nov. 10, 1924, the Progressive Republican party opened its first branch office, at Urfa, in the east, and on Feb. 13, 1925, the Kurds in the eastern provinces rose in rebellion under Şeyh Said, hereditary chief of the Nakşbendi dervishes. They were impelled by a combination of religious and national feelings. Their hopes of an independent Kurdistan had been frustrated by the establishment of the new Turkey, whose frontiers contained a substantial portion of their tribal territory. They had accepted the rule of the Turkish sultan, who was also "Commander of the Faithful," but they had no desire to form part of a secular Turkish republic. The government gave a sop to the peasants by abolishing the agricultural tithe, but no other concessions were made. Martial law was proclaimed in 13 provinces, and the legal definition of treason was extended to cover "the use of religion as a political instrument." Fethi resigned and İsmet's strong hand resumed control. The next day, March 4, 1925, two "independence tribunals" under hanging judges were set up, and by the end of May 1925 the revolt had been stamped out. A month later Şeyh Said and other leaders were executed and the dervish lodges in the east were closed. Fethi's party was dissolved on June 3, 1925.

For the next 10 years a stream of legislation continued the process of secular Westernization known as the Atatürk Reforms. On Sept. 2, 1925, all dervish lodges and tombs of saints were closed. On Nov. 25, 1925, came the Hat Law which forbade all forms of male headdress but the hat with a brim. The international calendar and system of reckoning time were imposed by law of Dec. 26, 1925, and between February and May 1926, Islamic law was dethroned with the introduction of adaptations of the Swiss and Italian penal, and Italian and German commercial codes.

In June 1926, a plot to kill Kemal was uncovered, and several of his opponents whose complicity in the plot was doubtful, to say the least, joined the guilty on the gallows or in exile. The injustice was the one stain in Kemal's public career. From then on, his authority was unchallenged.

On April 10, 1928, the clause "The religion of the Turkish state is Islam" was struck out of the constitution. On May 24, 1928, the international numerals replaced the Arabic numerals. On Nov. 1, 1928, the assembly outlawed the Arabic-Persian alphabet and adopted the Latin-based alphabet that Kemal himself had helped to devise and had already taught to crowded audiences in a series of open-air lecture tours. Another link with the Islamic past was broken on Sept. 1, 1929, with the removal of Arabic and Persian from the school curriculum.

These abrupt changes that the masses and ordinary popular economic hardships, the beginning of depression, and the policy. Fethi's parliamentary and remedying measures. he formed Aug. 12, 1931. As in 1924-1925 that the government fanatically and his well-intentioned and bloody disorientation of the sight of the party's attempt at multiparty 1945.

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The Republic of Turkey was the Ottoman moral war against the secular. Although Kemal's team and had success in 1925, he with the USSR. Home and peace a Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 between World War I opposition. On Dec. 16, the disputed treaty, the Turkish party pact with they accepted the with Britain and was the cementing Greece, thanks to Kemal and the Greek convention signed or national's right Turkey was admitted July 1932.

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These abrupt and radical changes encouraged rumors that the next step would be to close the mosques and outlaw Muslim worship. The resulting popular discontent was exacerbated by economic hardship, caused by a run of bad harvests, the beginning of the worldwide economic depression, and the government's illiberal financial policy. Fethi suggested that the creation of a parliamentary opposition would be a step toward remedying the country's ills. With Kemal's blessing, he formed the Liberal Republican party on Aug. 12, 1930.

As in 1924-1925, however, this was taken as a sign that the government was losing its grip. The fanatically religious flocked to join Fethi and his well-intentioned liberals. Widespread and bloody disorders followed. Fethi, appalled at the sight of the forces he had unleashed, dissolved the party on Nov. 17, 1930. No further attempt at multiparty government was made until 1945.

To counter the prevailing disaffection, "people's houses" were opened in the principal cities as centers of political and cultural indoctrination. A number of workers and small tradesmen were handpicked as RPP candidates in the 1931 election, and for the first time the party formulated an ideology. It declared itself to be republican, populist, statist, secularist, and reformist (or revolutionary, the term *inkılâpçı* admitting of both senses). The principle of statism meant that the state would finance and manage major industrial enterprises. A five-year plan for industrialization was drawn up in 1933, to run from 1934 to 1939. It was funded in part by a Soviet loan.

The Republic and Its Neighbors. The Soviet Union was the only power that had given the Kemalists moral and material support in their war against the sultan and the foreign invaders. Although Kemal had no sympathy with communism and had suppressed the Turkish Communists in 1925, he maintained friendly relations with the USSR. His watchword was "peace at home and peace abroad," and he meant it. The Treaty of Lausanne, the peace agreement signed in 1923 between the republic and Turkey's World War I opponents, had left unsettled the demarcation of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq. On Dec. 16, 1925, the League of Nations gave the disputed region of Mosul to Iraq. The next day, the Turks signed a nonaggression and neutrality pact with the USSR. But six months later they accepted the League's decision, in a treaty with Britain and Iraq. Even more remarkable was the cementing of friendly relations with Greece, thanks to the farsighted statesmanship of Kemal and the Greek premier Venizelos. A convention signed on Dec. 30, 1930, gave Greek nationals the right to live and work in Turkey. Turkey was admitted to the League of Nations in July 1932.

Further Westernizing Reforms. In a few short years the republic freed Turkish women from the legal disabilities and inequality of status that they had endured throughout the six centuries of Ottoman rule. Polygamy was automatically outlawed with the introduction of the new civil code in 1926. In 1928 the first Turkish woman lawyer was appointed her first case. The first woman judge was appointed four years later. Women were given the vote at local elections in 1930, and in national elections as voters and as candidates.

The reform of which the outside world is




Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) addresses a crowd in 1923 shortly before becoming president of the new republic.

least aware, probably because it was not embodied in legislation, is the language reform. From 1930 onward, Kemal devoted much time and effort to—as he put it—"liberating the language from the yoke of foreign languages," that is, from the vast stock of Arabic and Persian words that had become part of the official and literary language of the Ottoman Empire. The work of finding or inventing Turkish replacements has gone on ever since. One result has been that Kemal's own book-length account of the birth of the republic, which he wrote in 1927, is now unintelligible to most Turks and has had to be translated into modern Turkish.

By a law passed on June 21, 1934, every Turk was obliged to have a Turkish surname; the Arab-style "Mehmed son of Ahmed" was no longer considered acceptable for citizens of a Western republic. The assembly voted Mustafa Kemal the surname Atatürk, meaning "Father-Turk." On May 27, 1935, the weekly holiday was changed from Friday, the day when Islam requires the noon prayer to be performed in congregation, to the Western Saturday afternoon and Sunday.

Foreign Affairs and World War II. Meanwhile Turkish diplomacy was making great strides. On Feb. 9, 1934, the Balkan Entente was signed with Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Turkey was elected to the Council of the League of Nations on Sept. 17, 1934. The Dardanelles and Bosphorus had been demilitarized by the Straits Convention of July 24, 1923; the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, restored full Turkish sovereignty over them.

France was anxious to secure Turkish support against the obvious threat from Germany and Italy, and Turkey judged the moment ripe to ask for the cession of the province of Hatay, formerly Alexandretta, which had been annexed to French-mandated Syria in 1921. France demurred and Atatürk, though mortally ill and in great pain, went on an official visit to Mersin and Adana, thus creating the impression that he was planning to invade the disputed territory. French opposition crumbled, and on July 23, 1939, Hatay became part of Turkey. But Atatürk never enjoyed his last triumph; he died on Nov.



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Ankara, an inland city associated with Mustafa Kemal and his followers, replaced Istanbul as capital in 1923.

10, 1938. His successor as president was İsmet İnönü (the surname taken from the scene of his two great victories in the war of independence).

Turkey had watched the rise of Hitler and Mussolini with apprehension and had opened its doors wide to victims of Nazi persecution. Its leaders wished to ally themselves with Britain and France, while maintaining good relations with the USSR. Confronted, however, with the Russo-German pact of Aug. 23, 1939, and a Soviet demand that the Straits be closed to warships other than those of the Black Sea powers, they did not hesitate. In an Anglo-French-Turkish treaty signed on Oct. 19, 1939, Turkey undertook to aid the other signatories if they were involved in a Mediterranean war stemming from an act of aggression by a European power. But by the time that the Mediterranean had become a theater of war, it seemed to many highly placed Turks that Germany was invincible. On June 18, 1941, therefore, with all its neighbors under Axis occupation, Turkey signed a treaty of friendship with Germany. While quietly assisting the Allies as much as possible, Turkey officially maintained its neutrality until Feb. 22, 1945. On that date it declared war on Germany and Japan, thus qualifying for a place at the inaugural conference of the United Nations at San Francisco. In the following June, the USSR offered Turkey a new treaty of friendship on condition it would cede the districts of Kars and Ardahan and accept Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits. The offer was at once rejected.

Return to Multiparty Government. Much had changed in Turkey during the war, and few Turks had a good word to say of the ruling party. The commercial class, enlarged and enriched by neutrality, was resentful of bureaucracy and stat-

ism. Landowners were alarmed by a law of November 1945 granting land to landless peasants while the latter were disappointed at the minuteness of the holdings they received. Industrial workers suffered from rising prices but were forbidden by law to strike. Liberal intellectuals, fired by the triumph of democracy, were impatient to see some of the fruits of it in their own country. The fanatically religious had not forgiven the secularist reforms. President İnönü, an immensely shrewd politician, decided not to swim against the tide and declared that there was now room in Turkey for democracy. A Democratic party was formed under Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes. By promising to rectify everybody's grievances, it won a landslide victory in the 1950 election with 408 seats to the Republicans. Celâl Bayar became president and Menderes premier.

For the first few years they seemed to be living up to their promises, except that the right to strike was not granted. It speedily became known that breaches of the secularist laws would be winked at: polygamy increased, busts and statues of Atatürk were smashed, and in the eastern provinces fezzes and turbans began to appear. Large quantities of capital equipment and luxury goods were imported; agriculture and the private sector boomed. Turkey's international standing was high, at least in the Western world. The country had promptly answered the UN call for aid to South Korea, and the 25,000 Turks who fought there won great acclaim. Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Feb. 18, 1952. Menderes considered, with some justification, that Turkey's allies would never let it sink into bankruptcy. The flow of expensive imports continued even after the disastrous failure of the 1954 harvest. The worst sufferers from the ensuing inflation were those on fixed incomes, including the armed forces.

Bayar was authoritarian by nature, and Menderes could not bear to be criticized. Journalists were jailed and judges were dismissed. It could be argued that the Democrat government was democratic in that it gave most of the electorate what they wanted. But the armed forces, traditionally the most westward-looking section of the population, refused to stand by and see the Kemal reforms sabotaged. The last straw came on April 18, 1960, when, in defiance of the constitution, the assembly vested its sovereign power in a commission "to investigate the affairs of the RPP and a section of the press." Given dictatorial authority, it banned any published reference to assembly debates.

Army Intervention in Government. After a month of student demonstrations, brutally repressed by the police, on May 27, 1960, a group of officers calling themselves the National Unity Committee seized power in a bloodless coup. The president and other government leaders were arrested and brought to trial and most received jail sentences, but Menderes and two of his ministers were hanged. The resulting bitterness left its mark on political life for many years.

True to the promise it gave on the day of the coup, the National Unity Committee held free elections on Oct. 15, 1961. The RPP won 173 seats and 158 went to the new Justice party, the self-proclaimed heir of the Democrat party. Thanks to the newly introduced system of proportional representation, two small parties won 119 seats between them. It took a show of force

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by the army to persuade the Justice party to join a coalition with the RPP. The RPP was divided: elderly authoritarian conservatives and young radical reformers, with only the octogenarian İnönü to hold them together. Coalition followed coalition until 1965, when the Justice party, under Süleyman Demirel, came to power with an absolute majority, which he increased in 1969. He had convinced many Turkish industrialists that his party, opposed as it was to economic planning, offered the one alternative to the embryonic socialist movement that was rapidly gaining converts among students and industrial workers. His promise of economic liberalism even won subsidies for his party from some U.S. firms in Turkey.

The pattern for the 1970's was set in February 1970, when students of the left and right fought a pitched battle in Ankara. Early in 1971, the militants took to bank robbery and kidnapping. The left was fragmented into Stalinists, Maoists, and other factions. The rightists, though including both secular nationalists and religious fanatics, were more efficient because they were more united—in the National Action party. The party was led by Alparslan Türkeş, a former colonel dismissed from the National Unity Committee in 1960 for opposing the return of power to the civilians. The army intervened for a second time, on March 12, 1971. Demirel was given an ultimatum: if he would not put an end to the prevailing anarchy and undertake the needed economic and social reforms, the army would assume direct rule. His response was to resign in a huff. The army did not in fact assume direct rule, but over the next two years nominated three civilian premiers in succession, who selected their own civilian governments.

The Workers' party, which in a curious echo of 1925 had set up "revolutionary cultural centers" in the Kurdish areas, was dissolved on July 29, 1971. This left the RPP as the only avowedly ruling party. On May 14, 1972, Bülent Ecevit replaced İnönü as its chairman, and in the next election, in October 1973, the RPP emerged as the victor, though without an absolute majority. Demirel refused to cooperate in a new government. Ecevit then formed a coalition with the National Salvation party, whose leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was opposed to secularism and to Turkey's links with the West. It was as well that neither Atatürk nor İnönü (who had died a month before) lived to see their party's new ally.

Since the early 1950's, the problem of Cyprus had bedeviled Turkey's previously cordial relations with Greece. Both powers and their citizens were bound by treaty to guarantee the independence and security of the Republic of Cyprus, inaugurated on Aug. 16, 1960. More than once Turkey was on the brink of armed intervention when it felt that the Cypriot Turks were being unfairly treated. In June 1964, after a massacre of Turks in Nicosia, a Turkish invasion was started only when U.S. President Lyndon Johnson warned that if such an action provoked the Soviets into invading Turkey, Turkey could no longer count on NATO support.

Significant deposits of crude oil and natural gas had been discovered in the northern Aegean, and the simmering ill will between Greece and Turkey was aggravated after February 1974 by a dispute about sovereignty over the continental shelf. The Athens government held that the whole Aegean was Greek territorial waters, a

view rejected at that time and thereafter by the Turks.

On July 15, 1974, the Cyprus government under Archbishop Makarios was overthrown in a coup organized by the military dictatorship in Greece. Ecevit, having failed to persuade Britain to take joint action to restore the status quo, invaded the island five days later. By the time hostilities ended, on Aug. 16, 1974, Cyprus was effectively partitioned, with Turkish forces in control of the northern third.

Democracy in Crisis. Like most of the world, Turkey suffered from the 1974 rise in oil prices and the resulting economic crisis. Mounting unemployment in Western Europe brought a marked reduction in one of Turkey's main sources of foreign exchange, remittances from Turkish workers who had been employed abroad. Terrorism was rampant. Most Turks believed it was financed from the USSR with the aim of destabilizing Turkey and hence NATO. They ascribed to the same origin the campaign of murder directed by Armenian terrorists against Turkish diplomats and their families.

Ecevit's uneasy coalition broke down and he resigned on Sept. 18, 1974, and attempts to create a government of national unity came to nothing. On July 21, 1977, Demirel again became premier, with Erbakan and Türkeş as his deputies. Türkeş set about dismissing senior police officers and replacing them with his own men. In 1975 there were 34 political murders; in the first nine months of 1979 there were 3,500, and thereafter the killings averaged 20 a day. The rate of inflation was 130% and rising. Discord was such that the assembly could not function: in the spring of 1980 it failed to elect a new president of the republic after more than one hundred ballots. A vote of censure of the government could not be taken, for want of a quorum.

The armed forces finally intervened on Sept. 12, 1980. They suspended all political parties, arrested the major party leaders, and rounded up leftist and rightist militants. Not until Nov. 6, 1983, were elections held. None of the politicians removed from office were permitted to run, and despite their pleas to their supporters for a boycott of the elections, 92% of the electorate voted. The Motherland party led by Turgut Özal, an economist, came to power with 212 of the 400 seats in the new assembly.

GEOFFREY L. LEWIS
Oxford University

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Presidential Preadvance
to
London, Athens, and Ankara



Morton I. Abramowitz U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Morton I. Abramowitz was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey on June 29, 1989.

Mr. Abramowitz began his Foreign Service career in 1960 as a consular/economic officer in Taipei. Following service in various posts in the Far East, he returned to the Department to serve as a staff member of the Inter-Departmental Group, dealing with such issues as policy on Korea. As Special Assistant to Under Secretary Elliot Richardson, Mr. Abramowitz dealt with a wide range of issues, including initial steps to ease economic restrictions on trade with the People's Republic of China. In 1971 and 1972, he served in the Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. From 1972 to 1978, he served in the Department of Defense, dealing with such issues in East Asia as regional base arrangements, U.S. troop levels, and defense relations with the Republic of Korea.

In 1978, Mr. Abramowitz was appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Thailand. From 1983 to 1984, he was U.S. Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, Austria. In February 1985, he returned to INR, where he served as Director. In 1986, the President nominated him as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research.

Mr. Abramowitz has been awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award, the Secretary of Defense Distinguished Service Award, the Joseph C. Wilson Award for Distinction in International Affairs in 1980 from the University of Rochester, the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Service in 1981 and 1988, and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal.

In 1989, Mr. Abramowitz was granted the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the Department's highest rank, in recognition of especially distinguished service over a sustained period, joining only ten other diplomats who have attained this high honor.

Throughout his career, Mr. Abramowitz has been recognized for his scholarship. His principal publications are: *Remaking China Policy*, *Aspects of Taiwan's Economic Growth*, and *Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers*.

Mr. Abramowitz was born January 20, 1933 in Lakewood, New Jersey. He received his BA degree from Stanford University in 1953 and his MA from Harvard University in 1955.

Turgut OZAL
(Phonetic: uhZ AHL)

TURKEY

President (since November 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. President

Turgut Ozal served as Prime Minister from 1983 until he was elected to his current post. He had also been chairman of the ruling Motherland Party since 1983. As Prime Minister, Ozal traveled extensively, including trips to the United States, the United Kingdom, Syria, India, the Soviet Union, and several Asian countries. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State under the military government from 1980 until 1982.



Ozal was born on 13 October 1927. He has a degree in electrical engineering from Istanbul Technical University and has studied power projects in the United States. Early in his career he served for several years as director general in charge of electrification projects in the Public Works Ministry. From 1971 until 1974 Ozal worked at the World Bank in Washington. During 1979-80 he was principal economic adviser to Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, as well as head of the State Planning Organization.

Ozal speaks English and French. In February 1987 he underwent coronary bypass surgery in Texas. He and his wife, Semra, have three children. One of his brothers, Yusuf, once worked with the International Finance Corporation in Washington and was a Minister of State from December 1987 until March 1989. Ozal's son Ahmet, formerly with the World Bank, now works for American Express in Turkey.

29 October 1990

Yildirim AKBULUT
(Phonetic: ACKbooloot)

TURKEY

Prime Minister (since 15 November 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

A member of the ruling Motherland Party (ANAP), Yildirim Akbulut had been Speaker of the Grand National Assembly (parliament) from 1987 until being named to his current post. Akbulut was Minister of Interior during 1984-87; in that position he was responsible for Ankara's counterinsurgency efforts against Kurdish rebels.

Akbulut was born in 1935 in Erzincan, in the eastern Anatolia region. He holds a law degree from the University of Istanbul and had a private law practice before 1983, when he was elected to parliament; he served as deputy speaker from 1983 to 1984. Married, he has three children.



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19 June 1990

Ahmet Kurtcebe ALPTEMOCIN
(Phonetic: AHLPtimohchin)

TURKEY

*Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since October 1990)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

While serving as Minister of Finance and Customs (1984-89), Ahmet Alptemocin met with US officials in October 1987 and February 1988 and made several trips to Moscow to negotiate trade agreements. Alptemocin's political career began in 1983 when he was elected to parliament as a Motherland Party deputy from Bursa. That same year, he became a state minister responsible primarily for the paper, steel, and iron industries.



Alptemocin was born in 1941. He received a degree in mechanical engineering from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara in 1962. After a stint in the public sector, he worked in private industry, eventually becoming director general of a textiles firm. Alptemocin speaks English, German, and Italian. Married, he has a child.

7 November 1990

Michael G. Sotirhos **U.S. Ambassador to Greece**

Michael G. Sotirhos has served as U.S. Ambassador to Greece since 1989.

Prior to this appointment, he was Ambassador to Kingston, Jamaica, from 1985 to 1989. He was a member of the National Advisory Council of the Small Business Administration in 1976. He served on the New York State Commission on Architecture in 1974. From 1973 to 1975, he served on the National Voluntary Service Advisory Council.

Mr. Sotirhos was Vice President, President, and Chief Executive Officer of the predecessor to the current Ariston Group, Inc., of New York, an organization that he and others founded upon his graduation from college. He resigned as Chairman of the Board in September 1985 to become U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica.

Mr. Sotirhos has served as President of the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation, Chairman of the National Republican Heritage Groups Council, Chairman of the Ethnic Voters for Reagan/Bush '84, and was a member of the Republican National Committee.

He received his B.B.A. degree in Business Administration from Bernard M. Baruch School of Business and Civic Administration.

Constantine MITSOTAKIS
(Phonetic: meetsoTAHkees)

Prime Minister (since April 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

Leader of the conservative New Democracy (ND) party and longtime aspirant to the prime-ministership, Constantine Mitsotakis leads a government that has a two-seat parliamentary margin. He is an experienced legislator and has held a variety of Cabinet-level portfolios, including Finance (1963-64) and Foreign Affairs (1980-81).

Mitsotakis was born on 18 October 1918 on the island of Crete. He holds degrees in law and political science from the University of Athens. During World War II he was active in the Cretan resistance and was twice jailed briefly by the Nazis, narrowly escaping execution. He has been a member of parliament since the mid-1940s. When the military took over the government in 1967, Mitsotakis and his family went into exile in Paris. He returned to Greece in the early 1970s and founded the moderate and short-lived New Liberal Party in 1977. He joined ND shortly thereafter.

Mitsotakis has visited the United States several times, most recently in June 1990. He speaks fluent French and German; he understands and speaks English but often prefers to use an interpreter. He and his wife, Marika, have three daughters and a son. Their eldest daughter, Dora Bakoyiannis, serves as Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister.



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7 January 1991

Antonios SAMARAS
(Phonetic: sahmahRAHS)

GREECE

Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since April 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

A member of the conservative New Democracy Party (ND), Antonios Samaras was Minister of Finance in the ND-Communist coalition that ruled during July-October 1989 and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the all-party government during November 1989 – February 1990.

Samaras was born on 23 May 1951. He earned a degree in economics from Amherst and received an M.B.A. degree from Harvard in 1976. The following year he was elected to Parliament; he later served on the parliamentary committee that prepared for Greece's entry into the EC.



Samaras speaks English, French, and Italian. He enjoys playing tennis. He married the former Georgia Kriticou in May 1990.

20 June 1990



UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Remarks for President's Public Statements

Attached are proposed remarks for the President's meeting in Turkey with the American community, his arrival statement, and the major policy speech he will deliver in Istanbul.

Attachment: as stated

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: EUR/SE:DMRansom/BITurney *tu*.
SESE 6666, 15 Jun 91, x7-6114
Pres. Remarks to American Community
Cleared: EUR:RRJohnson
S/P:JHughes
C:MFoulon
P:CvanVoorst *CV*.
EUR/PA:MPearson

UNCLASSIFIED

PROPOSED REMARKS
FOR THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

WHENEVER I VISIT AN EMBASSY THESE DAYS I AM REMINDED OF MY OWN DAYS AS AN AMBASSADOR--I KNOW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WHAT IT TAKES TO MAKE A VISITOR FROM WASHINGTON FEEL WELCOME. I ALSO KNOW HOW MUCH MORE EFFORT IT TAKES WHEN THE VISITOR IS A PRESIDENT, AND FOR THAT YOU HAVE, WELL, MY SYMPATHY--BUT ALSO MY THANKS AND MY ADMIRATION.

LET ME BE CLEAR: EVERY MAN AND WOMAN EMPLOYED IN THIS EMBASSY, BOTH AMERICAN AND TURKISH, CAN TAKE SATISFACTION THAT THE VISITOR WHO IS TALKING TO YOU RIGHT NOW FEELS VERY WELCOME, AND FEELS THAT EVERY MINUTE OF HIS VISIT WILL BE USEFUL AND ENJOYABLE.

I AM ALSO KEENLY AWARE THAT FOR THE LAST YEAR THIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN WORKING AT FULL TILT--ALL THE COMPLICATED AND EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS TO BRING IN A US MILITARY FORCE THAT CONTRIBUTED SO MAGNIFICENTLY TO THE DEFEAT OF SADDAM'S MILITARY AFTER IT INVADED KUWAIT. I SEE MANY PROUD MEMBERS HERE TODAY FROM OUR MILITARY, STANDING TALL, AS WELL YOU SHOULD, AND I KNOW THAT MANY OF YOU ARE FROM THE CRACK FORCE THAT CAME BACK TO TURKEY, AFTER THE WAR ENDED, WHEN SADDAM USED THE REMNANTS OF HIS MILITARY TO DRIVE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS FROM THEIR HOMES. IT IS A REMARKABLE FACT THAT YOUR EFFORTS--

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ALONG WITH THOSE OF THOUSANDS OF TURKISH AIRMEN AND SOLDIERS--
HAVE HELPED GET THESE UNFORTUNATE REFUGEES OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS
AND BACK TO THEIR HOMES. I SALUTE YOU.

IN THESE TWO OPERATIONS, DESERT STORM AND PROVIDE COMFORT,
WE SHOWED THE WORLD WHAT TURKISH-US COOPERATION CAN DO--AND IN
THE PROCESS CREATED SOME IMPORTANT STRATEGIC FACTS FOR THE
FUTURE. THE EMBASSY HERE HAS BEEN IMAGINATIVE AND TIRELESS IN
ORCHESTRATING ALL THIS, AND I HAVE THE HONOR TO CITE YOUR
EXCEPTIONAL SERVICE AND ANNOUNCE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS
AWARDED THE SUPERIOR HONOR AWARD TO THE EMBASSY AS A WHOLE--
AND HAS AWARDED TO AMBASSADOR ABRAMOWITZ THE DISTINGUISHED
HONOR AWARD.

MORT, YOU ARE RETIRING IN A FEW DAYS, AFTER REACHING THE
HIGHEST RANK IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE: CAREER AMBASSADOR. YOU
ARE GOING ON TO A POSITION OF GREAT INFLUENCE AND HONOR--THE
HEAD OF THE CARNEGIE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE. YOU
WILL LEAVE HERE IN TURKEY MANY FRIENDS--FROM THE PRESIDENT ON
DOWN--BUT YOU CAN CONSOLE YOURSELF WITH THE THOUGHT THAT WHEN
YOU GET TO WASHINGTON YOU WILL FIND MANY FRIENDS THERE--FROM
THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN, I MIGHT ADD.

MORT, CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU, AND TO YOUR ABLE AND
HARD-WORKING STAFF.

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FINALLY, I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE SACRIFICES EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU--FOREIGN SERVICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL, SPOUSES AND CHILDREN--HAVE MADE TO REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS. I REALIZE YOU WOULD NOT BE HERE TODAY IF YOU DID NOT DERIVE GREAT SATISFACTION FROM SERVING YOUR COUNTRY AND HELPING GIVE SHAPE TO THE HISTORY OF OUR TIME. ON THE OTHER HAND, I KNOW IT CAN BE TOUGH AT TIMES--WHAT WITH THE LONG HOURS, DEPLOYMENTS TO THE MOST REMOTE CORNERS OF TURKEY, LIVING CONDITIONS SOMETIMES BORDERING ON HARDSHIP, THE THREAT OF TERRORISM--NOT TO MENTION THE STRAIN OF BEING FAR-REMOVED FROM FAMILY AND FRIENDS BACK HOME. ALL OF YOU CAN LOOK WITH PRIDE AT YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OVER THE LAST YEAR, AND I HOPE YOU WILL CONCLUDE--AND I AM CONFIDENT YOU WILL--THAT THE SACRIFICES WERE WORTH IT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO MY VISIT HERE IN TURKEY, AND HOPE THAT IT WILL HAVE A FAVORABLE IMPACT ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS. IT IS THE RESULT OF YOUR HARD WORK AND TIRELESS DEDICATION, AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU.

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Drafted: DMRansom/GMStaples *DM*
SESE 6664, 15 Jun 91, x7-6114
President's Arrival Statement - Ankara
Cleared: EUR:RRJohnson
P:CvanVoorst
C:MFoulon
S/P:JHughes
EUR/PA:MPearson *MP*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo	Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, the White House, re: Draft Remarks for President's Public Statements; account number redacted. (1 pp.)	n.d.	P-6, (b)(6)	

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<p>Date Closed: 10/29/2004 FOIA/SYS Case #: Re-review Case #: 2004-2265-S P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</p>	<p>OA/ID Number: 08325</p>
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Turkey -
last remarks
outstanding

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(with CONFIDENTIAL attachment)

UPS 2490

P.6 (b)(6)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

made NO for
stpp.

Subject: Draft Remarks for President's Public Statements

Attached are proposed remarks for the dinner the President
will attend in Ankara during his July 20-22 visit to Turkey.

Attachment: As stated.

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(with CONFIDENTIAL attachment)

Drafted: EUR/SE:BITurner
SESE 6642, 15 Jun 91, x7-6114
Prez Ankara Speech State Dinner
Cleared: EUR:RRJohnson
EUR/SE:DMRansom,PCCollins
S/P:JHughes
P:CvanVoorst
C:MFoulon
NEA/RA:AKEiswetter
EUR/PA:MPearson

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DECL:6/21/91

PROPOSED REMARKS
FOR THE PRESIDENT AT THE
STATE DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT OZAL
JULY 20, 1991

MR. PRESIDENT, MINISTERS, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS AND FRIENDS,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I WANT AGAIN TO THANK PRESIDENT OZAL FOR INVITING ME TO SEE
FIRST-HAND THIS WONDERFUL COUNTRY AND EXPERIENCE THE WARMTH AND
LEGENDARY HOSPITALITY OF THE TURKISH PEOPLE. IT IS TRULY AN
HONOR AND A DELIGHT TO BE HERE. I UNDERSTAND BETTER NOW WHY IT
IS WRITTEN OUTSIDE ATATURK'S TOMB: "NE MUTLU TURKUM DIYENE."
(NAY MUT-LOO TURK-UM DEE-YEN-EH) ("How happy am I to be a
Turk.")

STANDING THERE THIS MORNING, I COULD NOT HELP BUT THINK OF
THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE FOUNDER OF THE MODERN TURKISH
REPUBLIC--WHOSE NAME I UNDERSTAND MEANS LITERALLY, "FATHER OF
THE TURKS"--AND THE MAN WE AMERICANS CALL THE FATHER OF OUR
COUNTRY, GEORGE WASHINGTON. BOTH MEN WERE GREAT GENERALS,
CAPABLE OF PROSECUTING A WAR TO VICTORY. WHAT MADE THEM
ENDURING HISTORICAL FIGURES WAS THEIR UNDERSTANDING THAT
WINNING THE WAR MEANT SECURING THE PEACE BY MAKING FRIENDS OUT
OF ONE'S FORMER ENEMIES. IN ADDITION, BOTH HAD A VISION FOR
THEIR COUNTRIES' FUTURES WHICH, WHILE REQUIRING PROFOUND AND

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Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By RM NARA, Date 11/09/04

~~DETERMINED TO BE AN
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PER E.O. 12958, SEC 3.3 (C)~~

RM 10/29/01

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DIFFICULT CHANGE AT THE TIME, WOULD PROVE ITSELF OVER TIME A VITAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONS' SELF-UNDERSTANDING.

THEN AS NOW, TURKEY AND AMERICA HAVE ESPOUSED THE SAME IDEALS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL LIBERTY, DEMOCRACY, OPPORTUNITY AND PROSPERITY--WHAT WE CALL THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS--AND THE RULE OF LAW. BOTH OF US BELIEVE IN WHAT ATATURK CALLED "PEACE AT HOME AND PEACE ABROAD," BUT WE BOTH ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT PROTECTING PEACE SOMETIMES MEANS BEING WILLING TO DEFEND IT. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN NATO FOR NEARLY FORTY YEARS. THAT IS WHY WE FOUGHT TOGETHER IN THE KOREAN WAR. THAT IS WHY WE STOOD TOGETHER TO REVERSE THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT.

IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS FROM NOW, ON AUGUST 2, A YEAR WILL HAVE PASSED SINCE SADDAM HUSSEIN UNLEASHED HIS INVASION OF KUWAIT. BY THAT TIME I HOPE THAT THE LAST AMERICAN WILL HAVE DEPARTED FROM NORTHERN IRAQ. IT HAS BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARY YEAR FOR BOTH YOUR COUNTRY AND MINE. WE HAVE HAD TO RISE TO EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGES. THAT WE SUCCEEDED IN MEETING THESE CHALLENGES IS A TRIBUTE TO THE EXTRAORDINARY FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IT IS ALSO A TRIBUTE TO OUR WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE. NOT LAST, THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD HAS REQUIRED

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EXCEPTIONAL LEADERSHIP FROM PEOPLE LIKE YOUR PRESIDENT, TURGUT OZAL.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW--AND I SPEAK HERE ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE AMERICAN PEOPLE--THAT TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE GULF CRISIS WAS NOT, AND WILL NOT BE, FORGOTTEN. YOU HAVE DESERVEDLY WON THE THANKS OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, TURKEY STOOD ON PRINCIPLE IN CONDEMNING IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT. TURKEY'S EARLY AND DECISIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN SANCTIONS REGIME WAS CRITICAL TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ISOLATE IRAQ ECONOMICALLY. FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES ON JANUARY 16, THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT TOOK THE COURAGEOUS DECISION OF VOTING TO ALLOW COALITION FORCES TO USE TURKISH BASES FOR MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. IT DID SO DESPITE THE IMMEDIATE RISK OF IRAQI RETALIATION AS WELL AS THE LONGER-TERM RISK THAT TURKEY'S TIES WITH ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR MIGHT SUFFER FOR MANY YEARS TO COME. FINALLY, ON APRIL 2, JUST WHEN IT APPEARED THAT COALITION FORCES HAD SUCCEEDED IN CONTAINING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AGGRESSION OUTWARD, TURKEY WAS CONFRONTED WITH YET ANOTHER CRISIS WHEN OVER 450,000 IRAQI REFUGEES FLED TO THE TURKISH-IRAQI BORDER.

THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY CAN BE PROUD OF WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED TOGETHER OVER THE LAST YEAR, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN

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WITHOUT COST. TURKEY INCURRED ENORMOUS COSTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTHEAST, AS A RESULT OF ITS COMPLIANCE WITH UN SANCTIONS, ITS DECISION TO DEPLOY TROOPS CLOSE TO THE TURKISH-IRAQI BORDER, AND ITS GENEROUS RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED IRAQIS CAMPED ALONG ITS BORDERS. THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN THE LEAD, THROUGH ITS CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL COORDINATION GROUP, TO OBTAIN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY. WE HAVE ALSO MADE SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO TURKEY ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

I HAVE TALKED OF EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR NOT OUT OF NOSTALGIA BUT BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN SO EXTRAORDINARY. BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES CAN BE PROUD OF HAVING RISEN SO MAGNIFICENTLY TO THE CHALLENGE. AS I THINK PRESIDENT OZAL WOULD AGREE, WE SHOULD VIEW OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION OVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS AS A GUIDE TO THE FUTURE. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT WE ARE NOW EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION. THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY HAVE A SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP AND A SHARED DESTINY.

TURKEY'S GROWING ABILITY TO EXPORT TO THE WORLD, ATTRACT TOURISTS AND INVESTORS, DEVELOP THE AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL OF THE REGION THROUGH MAMMOTH WATER PROJECTS, AND EDUCATE ITS TALENTED PEOPLE, HAVE BEEN WATCHED WITH ADMIRATION BY ALL OF TURKEY'S FRIENDS. ALONG WITH OTHER WESTERN STATES, TURKEY AND

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THE UNITED STATES CAN WORK TOGETHER TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD BY ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO FREE TRADE, STABILITY, AND JUSTICE WHEREVER WE MIGHT FIND THEM. I SAY TO YOU, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND ATATURK WERE ONLY THE BEGINNING.

PLEASE JOIN ME IN RAISING YOUR GLASSES TO PRESIDENT AND MRS. OZAL.

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DECL: 6/22/91

ATTEN: SMITH/GROSSMAN

PROPOSED ARRIVAL STATEMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT

MR. PRESIDENT, YOUR EXCELLENCIES, MY FRIENDS:

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE WARM WELCOME YOU HAVE EXTENDED TO ME AND MY PARTY, AND AM EXTREMELY PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO VISIT TURKEY WITH ITS DYNAMIC, RICH HISTORY AND TRADITIONS.

THE LAST US PRESIDENT TO VISIT TURKEY WAS DWIGHT EISENHOWER. WHEN HE ARRIVED IN ANKARA IN 1959, HE SAID HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT A "WORLD OF PLENTY IN WHICH ALL NATIONS CAN LIVE -- INDEPENDENT AND PROSPEROUS, AT PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS." THESE SENTIMENTS ECHOED THE WORDS OF YOUR GREAT STATESMAN, KEMAL ATATURK--"PEACE AT HOME, PEACE ABROAD," A GOAL TOWARD WHICH ALL NATIONS SHOULD STRIVE.

I ARRIVE TODAY TO SAY THAT, THROUGH A STRONG ALLIANCE, HARD WORK AND FIRM VALUES, ALL OF THE WEST -- AND ESPECIALLY THE PROUD AND ABLE TURKS -- HAVE NOT JUST PROSPERED GREATLY BUT ALSO SUCCEEDED IN MOVING FROM A COLD WAR TO A WARM PEACE.

THESE ARE GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS, AND THE LONDON SUMMIT I HAVE JUST ATTENDED CONFIRMS MY BELIEF THAT FREE MEN IN BOTH THE EAST AND THE WEST CAN COOPERATE FOR A STABLE PEACE AND GREATER PROSPERITY.

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Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Paul NARA, Date 11/09/04

DETERMINED TO BE AN
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Paul 10/29/04

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THAT'S WHAT I WANT TO TALK ABOUT WITH YOU, PRESIDENT OZAL:
THE COMING ERA. WHEN I REFLECT ON ALL THE YEARS SINCE MY
ILLUSTRIOUS PREDECESSOR VISITED TURKEY, AND ESPECIALLY ON THE
TUMULTUOUS YEAR JUST PASSED, I SEE THE COMING ERA AS ONE OF
ESPECIALLY CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE UNITED
STATES.

THANK YOU FOR THIS WARM RECEPTION. I KNOW, ALREADY, THAT I
AM AMONG FRIENDS AND ALLIES. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING MORE OF
THIS IMPORTANT, BEAUTIFUL AND HISTORIC LAND AND PEOPLE.

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Drafted: EUR/SE:GMStaples *AD*
SESE 6643, June 13, 1991, x7-6114
President's Speech - U.S.-Turkish Relations
Cleared: EUR:JFDobbins
EUR/SE:DMRansom
EUR/SE:PCollins
P:CvanVoorst
C:MFoulon
S/P:JHughes/DWagner *AD*
EUR/PA:MPearson

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DECL: 6/22/91

GENERAL

PROPOSED REMARKS FOR THE PRESIDENT
U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS

MR. PRESIDENT, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS:

LET ME EXPRESS AGAIN HERE TONIGHT ON BEHALF OF EVERYONE IN OUR PARTY OUR SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE OUTPOURING OF WARMTH AND AFFECTION WE HAVE RECEIVED DURING OUR VISIT. I COULD NOT HELP THINKING DURING MY TOUR TODAY OF THE BLUE MOSQUE, AYA SOFIA, AND THE TOPKAPI PALACE OF THE HISTORY THAT SURROUNDS THESE SITES AND INDEED ALL OF TURKEY. HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY HAVE MADE TURKEY AN INTERNATIONAL CROSSROADS, WITH A GLORIOUS PAST AND A DAZZLING FUTURE.

WE MEET TONIGHT IN A WORLD CHANGED BY THE EVENT OF THE PAST TWO YEARS. FOR OVER FORTY YEARS, THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY SUCCEEDED IN SAFEGUARDING THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, WE REAPED THE REWARD OF OUR VIGILANCE BY WITNESSING THE FALL OF THE IRON CURTAIN AND THE FREEDOM OF THE NATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE. THE WARSAW PACT HAS BEEN DISSOLVED AND NATIONS THAT WERE ONCE OUR ENEMIES HAVE BECOME OUR FRIENDS. WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE DRAMATIC CHANGES SWEEPING EASTERN EUROPE

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AND THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT TENSIONS ARE INEVITABLE WHEN COUNTRIES MUST SUDDENLY RESHAPE THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, NOT TO MENTION THE IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THEIR ENTIRE WAY OF LIFE. THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT TO FORGE NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES IN THIS ENVIRONMENT THAT WILL STRENGTHEN THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THESE EVOLVING SOCIETIES, MUCH AS TURKEY HAS DONE.

AS PART OF ITS EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, TURKEY HAS TAKEN BOLD STEPS SUCH AS ITS BLACK SEA COOPERATION INITIATIVE. THIS WILL ENCOURAGE THE MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES AS WELL AS GREATER ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WHICH SURROUND THIS IMPORTANT BODY OF WATER. TURKEY'S EFFORTS TO INCREASE TRADE WITH THE SOVIET REPUBLICS, PARTICIPATE IN CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES, AND, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH ARMENIA, OPEN ITS BORDERS TO FACILITATE TRADE AND POLITICAL EXCHANGES ARE EXAMPLES OF A NEW DETERMINATION BY SO MANY NATIONS TODAY TO ENRICH THEIR TIES WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS TO AVOID THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PAST THAT HAVE LED TO CONFLICT.

THESE POSITIVE, INNOVATIVE STEPS BY TURKEY IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS BALKAN NEIGHBORS

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STAND, HOWEVER, IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE ACTIONS OF TURKEY'S NEIGHBOR TO THE SOUTH - IRAQ. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BRUTAL INVASION OF KUWAIT LAST AUGUST 2 PROMPTED AN UNPRECEDENTED RESPONSE BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY. TURKEY PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE, BY FIRST SHUTTING DOWN THE IRAQI OIL PIPELINE AND BANNING CROSS BORDER TRADE. THESE STEPS, AT GREAT ECONOMIC COST, WERE KEY TO THE SUCCESSFUL ENFORCEMENT OF UN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE IRAQI REGIME. THE U.S. IN TURN, SOUGHT ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY FROM ALLIES WHO PLEDGED AID TO REIMBURSE TURKEY FOR THE LOSSES IT SUFFERED FROM ENFORCING SANCTIONS.

IN JANUARY WHEN MILITARY ACTION BECAME UNAVOIDABLE, TURKEY'S COURAGEOUS DECISION TO PERMIT ALLIED MILITARY STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ TO BE LAUNCHED FROM TURKISH BASES WAS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF DESERT STORM. TURKEY'S DECISION TO REDEPLOY OVER 100,000 TROOPS TO THE IRAQI BORDER TIED DOWN OVER TEN IRAQI DIVISIONS AND HELPED DETER FURTHER IRAQI ADVENTURISM. I COULD NOT HELP BUT BE REMINDED AS THE COALITION FORCES SWEEP INTO KUWAIT TO LIBERATE IT FROM THE INVADER, OF THE BRAVERY AND HEROISM OF TURKEY'S SOLDIERS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT WHERE OUR FORCES AGAIN JOINED TOGETHER TO THWART AGGRESSION. FOR THAT EFFORT AND SACRIFICE FORTY YEARS AGO, AND FOR HER STEADFASTNESS AGAIN IN THIS CRISIS, THE WORLD OWES TURKEY A GREAT DEBT OF GRATITUDE.

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IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR, TURKEY'S IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AND HER STRATEGIC ROLE IN THE REGION BECAME CLEARER TO US ALL. TURKEY REMAINS THE LINCHPIN OF NATO'S SECURITY PERIMETER. HOWEVER, BEYOND ITS TRADITIONAL --AND VITALLY IMPORTANT-- ROLE IN NATO AND EUROPE, TURKEY'S POSITION AS NATO'S ONLY MUSLIM MEMBER MAKES IT A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE WESTERN AND MUSLIM WORLDS AND WE BELIEVE ENABLES IT TO PLAY A STABILIZING ROLE IN THE VOLATILE MIDDLE EAST.

ASIDE FROM ISRAEL, TURKEY IS THE ONLY STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION WITH A LONGSTANDING COMMITMENT TO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. TURKEY'S COMMITMENT TO SECULARISM, INSTITUTED BY THE FAR-SEEING FOUNDER OF MODERN TURKEY, KEMAL ATATURK, IS EPITOMIZED BY THE CITY OF ISTANBUL WITH ITS MOSQUES AND WESTERN SHOPS AND INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTING TOGETHER, EACH IN ITS OWN WAY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN TURKEY. TURKEY THUS OFFERS A UNIQUE MODEL FOR ISLAM, NOT IN CONFLICT WITH SECULARISM AND DEMOCRACY, BUT RATHER SUPPORTIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN VALUES CHERISHED BY BOTH OUR COUNTRIES OF FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.

BEYOND THIS, HOWEVER, TURKEY ALSO SERVES AS A PROVEN MODEL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ITS FREE MARKET REFORMS, UNDER THE STEWARDSHIP OF THEN PRIME MINISTER OZAL, OPENED THE ECONOMY AND EXPANDED ACCESS BY TURKISH ENTREPRENEURS TO FOREIGN IMPORTS,

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CREDIT, AND INVESTMENT. AS A RESULT, TURKEY IN THE 1980'S BOASTED THE STRONGEST GROWTH RATE OF ANY OF THE COUNTRIES THAT BELONG TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. EXPORTS SURGED, AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCREASED FIVEFOLD. WE HOPE THESE RESULTS WILL ENCOURAGE NEEDED ECONOMIC REFORMS BY TURKEY'S NEIGHBORS IN THE REGION, WHO STAND TO BENEFIT GREATLY FROM CLOSER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES WITH THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, THE NATIONS OF EUROPE, AND WITH THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THAT DAY COMES, I COULD EASILY FORESEE TURKEY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ITS UNIQUE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION TO BECOME A REGIONAL ECONOMIC HUB BETWEEN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE BALKANS.

FINALLY, TURKEY HAS A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. ONE OF MY SINCEREST HOPES IS THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF CONFLICT, RELATIONS BETWEEN BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY CAN BE IMPROVED. FOLLOWING WORLD WAR TWO, SOVIET MEDDLING IN THE GREEK CIVIL WAR AND TERRITORIAL DEMANDS ON TURKEY GAVE BOTH A COMMON ENEMY, AND EARNED BOTH A COMMON FRIEND IN THE U.S. HOWEVER, DISPUTES OVER AEGEAN AIRSPACE, COASTAL WATERS, THE SEABED AND CYPRUS HAVE SINCE PLAGUED THE RELATIONSHIP. BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY COOPERATED MAGNIFICENTLY DURING THE GULF CONFLICT, AS THEY HAVE AS NATO ALLIES FOR SO MANY YEARS. YESTERDAY, I WAS PRIVILEGED TO LAY A WREATH AT THE ATATURK MAUSOLEUM, AND WHEN I WAS IN CRETE I VISITED THE TOMB

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STAND, HOWEVER, IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE ACTIONS OF TURKEY'S NEIGHBOR TO THE SOUTH - IRAQ. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S BRUTAL INVASION OF KUWAIT LAST AUGUST 2 PROMPTED AN UNPRECEDENTED RESPONSE BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY. TURKEY PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE, BY FIRST SHUTTING DOWN THE IRAQI OIL PIPELINE AND BANNING CROSS BORDER TRADE. THESE STEPS, AT GREAT ECONOMIC COST, WERE KEY TO THE SUCCESSFUL ENFORCEMENT OF UN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE IRAQI REGIME. THE U.S. IN TURN, SOUGHT ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY FROM ALLIES WHO PLEDGED AID TO REIMBURSE TURKEY FOR THE LOSSES IT SUFFERED FROM ENFORCING SANCTIONS.

IN JANUARY WHEN MILITARY ACTION BECAME UNAVOIDABLE, TURKEY'S COURAGEOUS DECISION TO PERMIT ALLIED MILITARY STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ TO BE LAUNCHED FROM TURKISH BASES WAS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF DESERT STORM. TURKEY'S DECISION TO REDEPLOY OVER 100,000 TROOPS TO THE IRAQI BORDER TIED DOWN OVER TEN IRAQI DIVISIONS AND HELPED DETER FURTHER IRAQI ADVENTURISM. I COULD NOT HELP BUT BE REMINDED AS THE COALITION FORCES SWEEP INTO KUWAIT TO LIBERATE IT FROM THE INVADER, OF THE BRAVERY AND HEROISM OF TURKEY'S SOLDIERS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT WHERE OUR FORCES AGAIN JOINED TOGETHER TO THWART AGGRESSION. FOR THAT EFFORT AND SACRIFICE FORTY YEARS AGO, AND FOR HER STEADFASTNESS AGAIN IN THIS CRISIS, THE WORLD OWES TURKEY A GREAT DEBT OF GRATITUDE.

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IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR, TURKEY'S IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AND HER STRATEGIC ROLE IN THE REGION BECAME CLEARER TO US ALL. TURKEY REMAINS THE LINCHPIN OF NATO'S SECURITY PERIMETER. HOWEVER, BEYOND ITS TRADITIONAL --AND VITALLY IMPORTANT-- ROLE IN NATO AND EUROPE, TURKEY'S POSITION AS NATO'S ONLY MUSLIM MEMBER MAKES IT A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE WESTERN AND MUSLIM WORLDS AND WE BELIEVE ENABLES IT TO PLAY A STABILIZING ROLE IN THE VOLATILE MIDDLE EAST.

ASIDE FROM ISRAEL, TURKEY IS THE ONLY STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION WITH A LONGSTANDING COMMITMENT TO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. TURKEY'S COMMITMENT TO SECULARISM, INSTITUTED BY THE FAR-SEEING FOUNDER OF MODERN TURKEY, KEMAL ATATURK, IS EPITOMIZED BY THE CITY OF ISTANBUL WITH ITS MOSQUES AND WESTERN SHOPS AND INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTING TOGETHER, EACH IN ITS OWN WAY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN TURKEY. TURKEY THUS OFFERS A UNIQUE MODEL FOR ISLAM, NOT IN CONFLICT WITH SECULARISM AND DEMOCRACY, BUT RATHER SUPPORTIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN VALUES CHERISHED BY BOTH OUR COUNTRIES OF FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.

BEYOND THIS, HOWEVER, TURKEY ALSO SERVES AS A PROVEN MODEL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ITS FREE MARKET REFORMS, UNDER THE STEWARDSHIP OF THEN PRIME MINISTER OZAL, OPENED THE ECONOMY AND EXPANDED ACCESS BY TURKISH ENTREPRENEURS TO FOREIGN IMPORTS,

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CREDIT, AND INVESTMENT. AS A RESULT, TURKEY IN THE 1980'S BOASTED THE STRONGEST GROWTH RATE OF ANY OF THE COUNTRIES THAT BELONG TO THE ORGANIZATION FOR COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. EXPORTS SURGED, AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCREASED FIVEFOLD. WE HOPE THESE RESULTS WILL ENCOURAGE NEEDED ECONOMIC REFORMS BY TURKEY'S NEIGHBORS IN THE REGION, WHO STAND TO BENEFIT GREATLY FROM CLOSER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES WITH THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, THE NATIONS OF EUROPE, AND WITH THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THAT DAY COMES, I COULD EASILY FORESEE TURKEY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ITS UNIQUE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION TO BECOME A REGIONAL ECONOMIC HUB BETWEEN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE BALKANS.

FINALLY, TURKEY HAS A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. ONE OF MY SINCEREST HOPES IS THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF CONFLICT, RELATIONS BETWEEN BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY CAN BE IMPROVED. FOLLOWING WORLD WAR TWO, SOVIET MEDDLING IN THE GREEK CIVIL WAR AND TERRITORIAL DEMANDS ON TURKEY GAVE BOTH A COMMON ENEMY, AND EARNED BOTH A COMMON FRIEND IN THE U.S. HOWEVER, DISPUTES OVER AEGEAN AIRSPACE, COASTAL WATERS, THE SEABED AND CYPRUS HAVE SINCE PLAGUED THE RELATIONSHIP. BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY COOPERATED MAGNIFICENTLY DURING THE GULF CONFLICT, AS THEY HAVE AS NATO ALLIES FOR SO MANY YEARS. YESTERDAY, I WAS PRIVILEGED TO LAY A WREATH AT THE ATATURK MAUSOLEUM, AND WHEN I WAS IN CRETE I VISITED THE TOMB

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President's Trip to Greece and Turkey
Concept Paper

Overview

The President's July 18-22 trip to Greece and Turkey provides a major opportunity for us to advance our relationships with the Mitsotakis and Ozal governments. The President will be the first American President since Eisenhower (1959) to visit both countries. His trip has dominated the Greek and Turkish press since it was announced and has assumed enormous symbolic importance in each country. Ozal and Mitsotakis have signalled that they expect new security and economic assistance initiatives from us and their publics have high expectations that the visit will result in stronger and closer relations with the U.S.

We are well positioned to use the trip to strengthen and broaden our relationships with both countries. We should announce new initiatives to convey in concrete terms our interest in closer ties with Greece and Turkey. We should also emphasize our willingness to work with them to promote better Greek-Turkish relations and progress on Cyprus. This will be more difficult to achieve. We will have to use the President's speeches and remarks to pound away at this theme and should prepare ideas for the President to put forward on the trip.

The stop in Greece is in many ways the more important of the two. Prime Minister Mitsotakis has adopted a clear U.S. bias since taking office in April 1990. He has consistently backed us on major international issues, such as the Gulf crisis, and has not pushed the President publicly on Cyprus.

Mitsotakis has been criticised by Papandreou and even some in his own party for having allowed the U.S. to tilt toward Turkey on his watch without having received anything tangible in return for Greece. In essence, Mitsotakis cannot now demonstrate that his close relationship with the U.S. has paid off for Greece. Retaining only a slim, two-vote majority in Parliament, Mitsotakis wants and needs a greater demonstration of support from the President during the visit.

The President's visit to Turkey, on the other hand, will likely take on a celebratory air of the extraordinary expansion of the relationship during the past year. Total U.S. aid has never been greater and Ozal's close relationship with the President has convinced many Turks and Greeks that the U.S. has chosen to shift

its traditionally careful balance of Greek and Turkish interests decidedly in favor of Ankara.

The Turks want the President to articulate an even more expansive vision of the relationship, however, during his visit. They are pressing us for a joint statement proclaiming new strategic cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. They want more U.S. defense and economic aid. The challenge for the President's trip to Turkey is to convey the sense of a closer relationship while avoiding promising more than we can deliver. Ozal will also insist on joining himself to the President for the entire two days in Turkey. While the President will want to show support for him, he should also go out of his way to demonstrate an interest in and respect for Turkey itself and the interests and values that have made us partners for forty years.

OBJECTIVES FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

- 1) Emphasize U.S. desire to improve and expand relations with both countries, especially on defense and security issues.
 - Public remarks should emphasize what U.S. has in common with both Turkey and Greece--NATO partnership; democratic and free market values; interest in stability for the Eastern Mediterranean.
 - We should avoid, however, arguing publicly the merits of 7:10.

- 2) Affirm U.S. willingness to help resolve Greek-Turkish differences, including Cyprus, stressing need for compromise and flexibility on major, divisive issues.
 - President should suggest ways to move forward on Cyprus: we should support UNSYG's attempt to convene an international conference by September.
 - President should also convince Ozal and Mitsotakis to agree to a bilateral meeting this summer on major differences, including a non-aggression pact, agreement on avoiding altercations in Aegean; and agreement on Aegean seabed issues.
 - We should hold open the possibility of the President suggesting Ozal and Mitsotakis meet with him together during the trip on Crete or in Istanbul to seek progress on some of these issues.

OBJECTIVES FOR GREECE

- 1) Encourage Mitsotakis' inclinations to seek closer ties with the U.S. but demonstrate to him, the Greek political establishment and public that pro-U.S. policies pay off in concrete terms.

- Visit itself will help to draw attention to long-standing ties between U.S. and Greece. We should emphasize in remarks fact that this is first Presidential visit in 30 years.

- President should announce in speech to Parliament invitation for Karamanlis to make State visit in 1992. He should also reaffirm invitation for Mitsotakis to make an official working visit.

- Announce initiatives in security assistance: F-16 purchases; lease of Knox frigates; COBS MOU; continued healthy \$350 million in security assistance.

- 2) Work with the Greeks to forge compromises on key issues with Turkey--Cyprus, Aegean issues, non-aggression pact.

- As noted previously, will require Presidential involvement with both leaders and possible tripartite meeting.

- 3) Consult closely with Greece to maintain stability in the Balkans.

- Follow up June 27 bilateral discussions on Balkans by stressing U.S.-Greek consultation on this issue during visit.

- We should refer to our support of Greek interests in Balkans in public statements. This will also reinforce message of benefits of close relationship with U.S.

- In addition, we should propose joint U.S.-Greek technical assistance for Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria to emphasize Greek expertise and our common objectives.

- 4) Communicate privately and publicly our rationale for a strong U.S. relationship with Turkey and need for increased aid.

-President should make this point in meetings with Mitsotakis, as he has done before so that Greeks understand from him necessity of continued expanded ties to Turkey.

-We should be careful about framing this publicly. May be able to do best by reference to Turkey's Gulf war commitment in speech and remarks.

OBJECTIVES FOR TURKEY

- 1) Seek agreement on continued, enhanced U.S.-Turkish security relationship produced by the Gulf conflict.

-We will want to maintain greater access to Turkish facilities enjoyed during the Gulf conflict for at least as long as our redeployed forces from northern Iraq are in Turkey.

-Frame enhanced U.S. access as manifestation of our desire for a strategic dialogue/understanding with Turkey on the Gulf and Middle East.

-Emphasize strategic dialogue in public remarks but avoid a joint statement which could antagonize Greece. Compromise could be both Presidents mentioning strategic dialogue and common interests in their respective press statements at joint press conference.

- 2) Strengthen Turkish military capabilities to respond to future regional contingencies:

-Make commitment to 80-plane F-16 buy. President could dramatize by visiting F-16 plant at Murted.

-Reconfirm Administration commitment to greater FY-92 FMS level--assert privately and publicly that we will seek full funding (\$625 FMS, \$75 ESF).

-Resell package of security assistance Administration produced for Turkey since start of Gulf conflict.

- 3) Support Turkey's desire for further economic integration with West.

--Reaffirm support for EC membership and enhanced trade and investment relationship with EC in meantime.

-Suggest ways to expand U.S.-Turkish trade but hold off on FTA. Point to greater Turkish use of GSP privileges and personal involvement of Mosbacher and Hills as avenues for more active discussion of these issues.

-Keep pushing for international community to make good on Gulf crisis economic support payments to Turkey, including Saudi oil aid.

- 4) Convey support for Ozal to help him domestically while being careful to not personalize the relationship excessively. President should also pay respect to importance of Turkey and its institutions to western security.

-Since Ozal will be with President for entire schedule, their personal friendship and Gulf alliance will be emphasized. President will want to continue to praise Ozal's leadership and courage during Gulf conflict.

-At the same time, President should stress our respect for the Turkish people, the military and other leaders to convey an interest in Turkey beyond Ozal. We can do this by meeting with opposition leaders, praising the role of the Turkish military in the Gulf conflict and paying attention to this theme in the public statements.

-Visit to the Ataturk Mausoleum and historic sites in Istanbul will also help on this theme.

- 5) As with Greece, emphasize the importance of movement on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish issues and need for compromise and flexibility on both sides.

least desirable available, for 13 years and there displayed his extraordinary capacities as an administrator, reformer, and economist. In 1766 he published his best known work, *Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses*, to which he was to add—among other famous works—*Lettres sur la liberté du commerce des grains* (1770; "Letters on the Freedom of the Grain Trade"). He introduced new methods to the peasant region he administered, substituting a small tax in money for the *corvée* (unpaid work required of peasants for the upkeep of roads); compiling a land register (*cadastre*) for tax purposes; and combatting the famine of 1770–71, during which—despite opposition—he maintained the free commerce in grain. He was appointed comptroller general by Louis XVI on August 24, 1774.

Ministry. Turgot was all that a successful courtier should not be. Large and fat, with regular and quite distinguished features, he was nevertheless a shy and awkward bachelor who blushed easily, spoke with hesitation, and was rarely convivially gay. Though his customary serious manner was tinged with humour, he was not persuasive and could irritate a questioner with the brusqueness of his statements, his theoretical cast of thought, and the suppressed irony of his half smile.

Realizing that the young king was inexperienced and wishing to avoid political storms, Turgot temporized during the first days of his ministry, but later, feeling himself threatened by his adversaries, a frenzy for public service drove him to accumulate reforms. He introduced his Six Edicts in 1776. Four of them (suppressing certain dues and offices) were of no great importance, and the fifth (suppressing the guilds of Paris) encountered no serious opposition. It was against the sixth edict, that abolishing the *corvée*, that his enemies, who defended privilege, concentrated their attack. Appealing in vain to the good sense and courage of the young king from whom he had been alienated by a coalition of financiers, place-holders, privileged classes, and the religious party at court, he saw his reforms abandoned and, after his dismissal on May 12, 1776, forgotten. Five years later, on March 18, 1781, having published nothing after his public disgrace, he died in Paris attended by a few friends.

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(Je.B.)

Turkey

Turkey (Türkiye) is a country of the Middle East lying partly in Asia and partly in Europe. Its location in two continents has been a central factor in its history, culture, and politics; Turkey has often been called a bridge between East and West. The country's area of 300,948 square miles (779,452 square kilometres) includes 9,150 square miles in European Turkey, known as Thrace (Turkish: Trakya), and a larger area of 291,798 square miles in Asia, called Anatolia (Turkish: Anadolu, derived from the Greek word *anatolē*, "sunrise"—i.e., eastern land). Imroz Adası (ancient Imbros) and Bozca (ancient Tenedos) islands in the Aegean Sea belong to Turkey.

Turkey is bounded on the east by Iran and the Soviet Union, on the south by Iraq and Syria, and on the west by Greece and Bulgaria. Turkey in Europe is separated from Anatolia by the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles Strait (in ancient times, called the Hellespont), which form the only sea passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. During the 17th century, when Turkish expansion was at its peak, the Ottoman Empire reached into central Europe to include what is

now Romania, Hungary, and most of present-day Yugoslavia. It also included what is now Syria, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, and North Africa as far west as Algeria. For information on the history of Turkey, see the article OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY, HISTORY OF THE.

THE LANDSCAPE

The natural environment. *Relief.* Turkey includes part of the belt of young mountain ranges that run from the Balkan Peninsula to Iran. The mean altitude of the country is more than 3,600 feet (1,097 metres), and it increases eastward to more than 6,560 feet. Lofty mountains are interspersed with depressions surrounded by steep slopes and high plateaus. Less than nine percent of Turkey's area consists of level or gently sloping lands. Lowlands are mainly in the coastal areas. Turkey's rugged relief was formed in relatively recent geological times, and it is still a very active region of the Earth's crust, as is shown by frequent tremors and occasional destructive earthquakes.

The mountainous relief is dominated in the north and south by ranges of more than 10,000 feet that encircle the Central Anatolian Plateau and separate it from the narrow coastal lowlands. North of the central plateau the Pontic Mountains follow the contour of the southern shore of the Black Sea, their altitude increasing eastward to the highest peak in Kaçkar Dağı (12,900 feet [3,932 metres]), where traces of Quaternary glaciation (occurring during the last 2,500,000 years) are extensive and where even today small glaciers are found. South of the central plateau are the Taurus Mountains, composed of several ranges that extend in broad arches along the Mediterranean coast and north of Syria. Their highest points are Mor Dağı (12,490 feet [3,807 metres]) and the heavily glaciated Cilo Dağı (13,504 feet [4,116 metres]) in the eastern Taurus. The Taurus system is composed mainly of limestone and therefore is full of caves, potholes, and underground streams.

Central Anatolia is a semi-arid plateau with a core of older rocks overlain by horizontal or slightly tilted Tertiary deposits (formed from 65,000,000 to 2,500,000 years ago). It is divided into several basins, some of which were prehistoric lakes. Today the greater part of the region is an interior basin with a number of shallow salt lakes (e.g., Tuz Gölü, covering 579 square miles with a depth of only one or two feet) and extensive eroded areas—as around Ürgüp, near the middle course of the Kızıl İrmak (Kızıl River), where there are cave dwellings, underground churches, and subterranean villages. The region is rich in young volcanic features, like the glacier-crowned Erciyes Dağı (12,851 feet [3,917 metres]), the highest point of central Anatolia; many volcanic cones, crater lakes, and explosion pits lie between Konya and Kumköy.

Eastern Anatolia is composed of lofty ranges and recent volcanic cones, such as Mt. Ararat (Ağrı Dağı, the highest peak in Turkey with an altitude of 16,853 feet [5,137 metres])—the legendary site where Noah's Ark came to rest) and Süphan Dağı (13,313 feet [4,058 metres]). These rise above high plateaus often covered by extensive lava flows. The plateaus are interrupted by basins, one of which is occupied by Lake Van (Van Gölü), a salt lake formed by the extinct volcano of Nemrut Dağı, which last erupted in 1441.

Western Anatolia, known as the Aegean region, has elongated mountain ridges separated by depressed floors: a system of young, roughly parallel fault lines running east and west. It includes, from north to south, the valleys of Bakır Çayı (ancient Caicus); Gediz (Hermus); Küçük Menderes (Cayster), with the ruins of Ephesus; and Büyük Menderes (Maeander), where there are the remains of several ancient towns, including Miletus. These valleys lead from the Aegean up to the plateau.

The landforms of northwestern Turkey around the Sea of Marmara are simple. Thrace is a large basin bounded by mountains of moderate height on the north (Istranca Dağları) and south (Ganos Dağı) and by low plateaus 300 to 500 feet in altitude around the Bosphorus on the east. The semi-arid central part of Thrace, filled by recent deposits, forms a rolling plain. The plateaus around Istanbul are deeply dissected by valleys. One of these, the

Bosporus, a former river valley drowned by the rising sea level after the last glaciers melted, is now the channel between the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. The Dardanelles, linking the Sea of Marmara at its other end to the Aegean, originated in the same way.

Drainage and soils. The water divide between the drainage basins of the Atlantic and Indian oceans runs obliquely through eastern Anatolia. The land east of the divide drains to the Caspian through the Kuruçay and Aras rivers and to the Persian Gulf through the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The country west and north of the main divide drains to the Black Sea through the Kızıl Irmak (Halys) and Sakarya rivers. The Yeşil Irmak (Iris) also empties into the Black Sea. The western regions of the country drain to the Sea of Marmara through the Susurluk (Macestus) river and to the Aegean through the Gediz (Hermus) and the Büyükmenderes (Maeander) rivers. The principal rivers of the Mediterranean basin are the Göksu (Calycadnus), Seyhan (Sarus), Ceyhan (Pyramus), and the lower course of the Orontes (Asi). Approximately one-seventh of Turkey has no exterior drainage. Turkish rivers have generally irregular and shallow beds, and their seasonal changes in depth make them unsuitable for navigation.

The principal lakes of the country are Lake Van, 1,443 square miles, over 330 feet deep, and highly saline, in eastern Anatolia; Tuz Gölü (Salt Lake), 635 square miles and only one or two feet deep, in central Anatolia; and the freshwater lakes Beyşehir, Eğirdir, and Burdur, northeast of the Gulf of Antalya.

Turkey has a variety of soil types, reflecting great differences in climate, geology, and vegetation. An outer belt of red and reddish-brown podzolic soils extends over the humid northern and southern marginal regions. The extremely humid eastern Black Sea coasts have strongly acid red soils, whereas the drier northwestern part of the country is covered by slightly acid brown and yellowish-brown podzolic soils. In the Mediterranean area, red and podzolic soil alternates frequently with patches of red clayey soil and in the northwest with rich limy soil. Most of the interior is covered by alkaline, brown and reddish-brown steppe soils. In the driest core of central Anatolia even patches of desertic gray soils occur, and saline soils cover considerable areas. The transitional regions between the dry interior and the humid margins are generally occupied by a belt of brown forest soils. Turkey faces a serious problem in soil erosion, resulting from extensive deforestation that began in the Hellenistic and Roman periods and continued in later times.

Climate. The climate is varied, depending largely on geographic factors. The coastal areas are generally humid, while the interior is semi-arid because it is cut off from the rain-bearing winds by mountain ranges. The northern slopes of the Black Sea mountains receive heavy rain even during summer. Annual rainfall in the coastal areas is more than 27 inches and as much as 96 inches in the eastern Black Sea region. In most of central Anatolia average annual precipitation varies between 10 and 14 inches. Areas of moderate rainfall (15 to 24 inches) include the Marmara and Aegean regions and southeastern and eastern Anatolia.

The low coastal areas have relatively high annual temperatures and warm winters. Along the Mediterranean coast frosts are rare, and snowfall is almost unknown. In the interior, on the other hand, winter temperatures are often below freezing, and in the northeastern plateaus the winters are very cold. Snow cover lasts 20 to 40 days in central Anatolia and more than 120 days in the northeast. The regional differences are much less marked in summer. Four climatic regions can be distinguished. The south and west coasts have a Mediterranean climate with hot, dry summers and mild, rainy winters; the mean annual temperature is about 68° F (20° C) and ranges from 53° F (11° C) in the coldest month to 84° F (29° C) in the warmest month. The Black Sea coast enjoys warm summers, mild winters, and a fair amount of rainfall throughout the year; the mean annual temperature is about 58° F (14° C), ranging from 44° F (7° C) in the coldest month to 73° F (23° C) in the warmest month.

The high northeastern plateaus have fairly warm summers but very severe winters, with maximum precipitation in the summer; the mean annual temperature is about 39° F (4° C), ranging from 10° F (-12° C) in the coldest month to 64° F (18° C) in the hottest. The semi-arid interior and southeast have cold, moist winters and hot, dry summers; the mean annual temperature is about 53° F (12° C), ranging from 32° F (0° C) in the coldest month to 74° F (23° C) in the warmest.

Plant and animal life. Large areas in the south, west, and northwest are covered by a Mediterranean vegetation, consisting mainly of thick, scrubby underbrush in the lowlands and deciduous or coniferous forests at higher altitudes up to the timberline (6,000 or 7,000 feet). The humid northern margins of the country are the most densely wooded region of Turkey. On the eastern Black Sea there are subtropical forests. The Anatolian interior is a region of steppes. Forests, mostly oak and coniferous trees, occur only on the elevated parts.

Turkey is fairly rich in wild animals and game birds. The wolf, fox, boar, wildcat, beaver, marten, jackal, hyena, bear, deer, gazelle, and mountain goat are among the animals still found in secluded and wooded regions. Domestic animals include the buffalo, Angora goat (on the Central Plateau), and camel. Major game birds are partridge, wild goose, quail, and bustard.

Geographic regions. *The Black Sea Coast.* Extending along the northern margins of the country from the Soviet frontier in the east to the lower course of the Sakarya River in the west is a mountainous area with abundant precipitation at all seasons. It is densely wooded, comprising more than one-fourth of Turkey's forested areas. It also has the highest rural population density, in some local areas exceeding 500 inhabitants per square mile. The region is mainly agricultural, corn (maize) being the dominant field crop and staple food. Tea is grown in the most eastern coastal strip, hazelnuts around Giresun and Ordu, and tobacco in Samsun and Trabzon. West of Sinop and south of the mountains, the transition toward the Marmara region and the Anatolian interior is marked by increasing acreage in wheat and fallow land. The principal mineral resources of the region are copper in the east (at Murgul) and coal in the west (the Ereğli-Zonguldak Basin). Samsun, Zonguldak, and Trabzon (site of a university) are the leading towns and ports.

The Marmara region. The areas adjacent to the Sea of Marmara, including Thrace, are the most heavily urbanized of the country. The principal cities are, in decreasing order of size, Istanbul (formerly Constantinople), Bursa, Izmit, Adapazarı, and Edirne. Istanbul, situated at the Bosphorus, is Turkey's leading industrial, commercial, and cultural centre. The Marmara region is economically the most developed area of Turkey. Its agriculture is variegated, including tobacco, wheat, rice, sunflower, corn, olives, grapes, and natural silk. On the straits and coasts of the Sea of Marmara fishing is well developed. The leading manufacturing districts are around Istanbul and in a narrow coastal strip between Istanbul and Izmit.

The Aegean region. The coastal area from the Dardanelles on the north to the vicinity of Rhodes on the south is densely populated and economically one of the most advanced regions of the country. Its wealth rests on the production of several export crops, including tobacco (more than 50 percent of Turkey's total production), cotton (30 percent of the total), high-quality grapes suitable for drying, olives (more than 50 percent of the Turkish output), and figs. The main cities are Izmir (the leading export outlet of Turkey and site of a university), Manisa, and Aydin. The area draws many tourists with its beaches and historical sites (Pergamum, Ephesus, Miletus). Between the Aegean region and central Anatolia there is a high, thinly populated area specializing in grain and livestock production; in the 1960s it also produced much of the Western world's supply of opium.

Mediterranean region. Turkey's Mediterranean region extends from Rhodes to the Syrian frontier, and is occupied largely by the Taurus Mountains. Principal passes in the Taurus Mountains connecting the interior plateaus with the narrow coastal strip are the Külek Boğazi, lead-

The Taurus Mountains

The rivers of Turkey

Central Anatolia

the Taurus Mountains

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ing to Tarsus and Adana; the Sertavul Pass, between Karaman and Silifke; and the Çubukboğazi pass, between the lake district and Antalya in the west. The Amanus Dağları (mountains) bordering the Gulf of Iskenderun are crossed by the Belen Pass. The region has several subregions: the sparsely populated limestone plateaus of Taşeli in the middle; the lake district in the west with its continental climate, where grain is grown; and the intensively cultivated, densely populated coastal plains. Principal cities of the region include Adana, an important commercial and industrial centre; Mersin; Iskenderun (Alexandretta); Antalya; and Gaziantep. The coastal areas produce crops such as cotton (60 percent of Turkey's output), sesame, citrus fruits (more than 90 percent of the country's production), early vegetables, and bananas. The higher parts of the region have relatively little arable land and much soil erosion; grain and livestock are produced, and there is pastoral nomadism among the Yürüks.

Central Anatolia. The middle of the Anatolian plain has a continental steppe climate and scanty rainfall. Grain occupies over 90 percent of the arable land (40 percent of the country's wheat production). More than one-third of Turkey's sheep and nearly all of its Angora goats are raised there. The chief commercial and industrial centres are Ankara (capital of Turkey), Eskişehir, Konya, Kayseri, and Sivas.

Eastern Anatolia. The eastern part of the interior is a high and extremely rugged region with coniferous forests and mountain pastures in the northeast and wooded steppes in the south. Eastern Anatolia is the most thinly populated region of the country, with population densities as low as 13 people per square mile in some areas. Farming is difficult because of the long, severe winters, steep slopes, and eroded soil. Grain, chiefly summer wheat and barley, is the dominant crop. In the humid northeast, beef and dairy cattle are raised; in the south there are pastoral nomads who raise sheep and goats. Eastern Anatolia is rich in mineral resources (iron ore at Divriği, copper at Ergani, chrome at Guleman). The principal cities are Erzurum, Malatya, Elâziğ, and Van.

Southeastern Anatolia. At the foot of the Taurus mountains is a barren plateau drained by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Agriculture is confined mainly to irrigated valleys and basins (wheat, rice, vegetables, grapes). Much of the population is nomadic or seminomadic. Turkey's only oil fields are at Raman and Garzan, linked by pipeline to the port of Iskenderun. The principal urban centres are Gaziantep, Urfa, and Diyarbakır.

Cultural landscape. *Rural settlements.* Turkey is essentially an agricultural country, and more than 60 percent of its population live in rural areas. There are around 35,000 rural settlements. In physical form these differ from region to region: wooden houses are typical in the Black Sea area; sun-dried bricks and flat roofs prevail in the semi-arid interior, and stone is the dominant building material in the Taurus Mountains, the Aegean region, and parts of eastern Anatolia.

Rural settlement types range from single-residence units and several types of temporarily occupied settlements to agglomerated villages. The types correspond to different natural and economic conditions and to different stages in the evolution of land occupancy. Single rural settlement units and dispersed settlements occur in the eastern and western Black Sea regions, in eastern Anatolia, and in the Taurus Mountains. In eastern Anatolia they are associated with stock raising, while in the eastern Black Sea region they are small farmsteads, based on a subsistence agriculture. In the karst (limestone sink) regions of the Taurus area, the scattered distribution of soil in small depressions accounts for the occurrence of dispersed settlements and single-residence units. In the Mediterranean coastal strip, single rural settlement units usually consist of a two-story dwelling surrounded by a large field in which cash crops such as bananas, citrus fruits, and early vegetables are cultivated; the lower story of the house is used for storage.

Between the single rural settlement units and the more prevalent agglomerated villages, there are many transitional types. A *mahalle* consists of a group of single

rural settlement units. *Divans*, occurring mainly in northern Anatolia, comprise a number of *mahalles* organized into a single administrative unit. *Mezraas* are settlements founded on agricultural lands that were originally inhabited only temporarily during plowing and harvesting but later became permanently settled villages or towns. Among temporary settlements, *koms* are usually smaller than *mezraas*. *Yaylas* are temporary summer rural settlements, associated with nomadism. Every nomadic group in southeastern Anatolia or in the Taurus Mountains has its own *yayla*, used solely for pasture. The practice of migrating between summer-dry lowlands and humid mountain pastures has resulted in most permanently inhabited villages in many regions of Turkey possessing one or more *yaylas*. *Kışlas* (literally, "winter quarters") are the sheltered winter quarters of nomads or former nomads. A considerable number of *yaylas* and *kışlas* have in time been transformed into permanent settlements.

Urban settlements. Approximately 40 percent of Turkey's population is located in municipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants. The percentage of urban population is relatively high in the northwestern and western parts of the country, in northwestern central Anatolia, and around the Gulf of Iskenderun. Most towns have fewer than 25,000 inhabitants. Only 20 had more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1970.

The
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towns

Table 1: Cities with More Than 100,000 Inhabitants (1970)

	population		population
Ankara*	1,209,000	Erzurum	135,000
Istanbul	2,248,000	Samsun	134,000
Izmir	521,000	Sivas	133,000
Adana	356,000	Malatya	130,000
Bursa	276,000	Izmit	123,000
Gaziantep	226,000	Mersin	114,000
Eskişehir	216,000	Elâziğ	108,000
Konya	201,000	Maraş	105,000
Kayseri	168,000	Adapazarı	102,000
Diyarbakır	139,000	Urfa	100,000

*Capital city.

More than half of the towns with more than 25,000 inhabitants are concentrated around the Sea of Marmara, in the western coastal region, and in the Adana subregion. Most are so old that they may be traced back to pre-Roman or Roman times. The great majority are commercial centres benefiting from a favourable location. Others are administrative, manufacturing, mining, or port centres, or a combination of these.

Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir all had more than 500,000 inhabitants in the early 1970s, and the biggest city, Istanbul, had a population exceeding 2,200,000. The last was a conurbation extending 30 miles from the former village of Küçükçekmece on the west to Pendik on the east and 12 miles north along the Bosphorus. Surrounding it is an industrial area that produces nearly one-third of the country's manufacturing output. Ankara, the capital of Turkey, was a flourishing trading centre and military base under Roman rule. Since World War I the city had grown very rapidly, and in 1970 it had more than 1,200,000 inhabitants. Izmir, a busy commercial city, had more than 520,000 inhabitants.

PEOPLE AND POPULATION

Languages, races, and religions. *Linguistic groups.* Turkish is the mother tongue of over 90 percent of the country's population. Modern Turkish, one of the southwestern groups of the Turkic family of languages, has been derived from Ottoman Turkish through a long nationalistic effort to purify it of the Arabic and Persian words and idioms that invaded the literary language during the Ottoman Empire. Turkish is written in Latin script.

The principal linguistic minority groups are Kurds and Arabs. Kurdish (including the Zaza dialect), the mother tongue of about 7 percent of the country's population, is widely spoken by a predominantly rural popula-


Types of
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Table 2: Turkey, Area and Population

	area*		population			area*		population	
	sq mi	sq km	1965 census	1970 census†		sq mi	sq km	1965 census	1970 census†
Regions (bölgeler)					Regions (bölgeler)				
Black Sea Coast					Marmara and Aegean Coasts				
Provinces (iller)					Provinces				
Artvin	2,871	7,436	210,000	226,000	Aydın	3,092	8,007	525,000	567,000
Bolu	4,267	11,051	384,000	403,000	Balıkesir	5,518	14,292	708,000	753,000
Giresun	2,677	6,934	428,000	447,000	Bursa	4,268	11,053	756,000	848,000
Kastamonu	5,061	13,108	442,000	447,000	Çanakkale‡	3,147	8,152	300,000	360,000§
Ordu	2,317	6,001	544,000	607,000	Istanbul	896	2,320	537,000	†
Rize	1,514	3,920	281,000	318,000	İzmir	4,623	11,973	1,235,000	1,430,000
Sakarya	1,721	4,457	404,000	456,000	Kocaeli	1,539	3,986	336,000	384,000
Samsun	3,698	9,579	756,000	822,000	Manisa	5,332	13,810	749,000	793,000
Sinop	2,263	5,862	266,000	265,000	Muğla	5,150	13,338	335,000	372,000
Trabzon	1,809	4,685	596,000	662,000					
Zonguldak	3,332	8,629	650,000	742,000					
Central Anatolia					Mediterranean Coast				
Provinces					Provinces				
Adıyaman	2,940	7,614	267,000	305,000	Adana	6,661	17,253	903,000	1,035,000
Amasya	2,131	5,520	286,000	310,000	Antalya	7,950	20,591	487,000	577,000
Ankara	11,859	30,715	1,644,000	2,023,000	Hatay	2,086	5,403	506,000	596,000
Çankırı	3,263	8,451	251,000	263,000	İçel	6,121	15,853	511,000	596,000
Çorum	4,950	12,820	486,000	521,000					
Kayseri	6,532	16,917	536,000	610,000					
Kırşehir	2,537	6,570	197,000	212,000					
Konya	18,309	47,420	1,123,000	1,290,000					
Malatya	4,754	12,313	453,000	515,000					
Marş	5,532	14,327	438,000	523,000					
Nevşehir	2,111	5,467	203,000	232,000					
Niğde	5,519	14,294	362,000	409,000					
Sivas	10,999	28,488	705,000	729,000					
Tokat	3,845	9,958	495,000	544,000					
Yozgat	5,453	14,123	438,000	470,000					
East Anatolia					South East Anatolia				
Provinces					Provinces				
Ağrı	4,392	11,376	247,000	293,000	Gaziantep	2,951	7,642	511,000	605,000
Bingöl	3,137	8,125	151,000	178,000	Mardin	4,927	12,760	398,000	458,000
Bitlis	2,590	6,707	154,000	185,000	Urfa	7,175	18,584	451,000	542,000
Diyarbakır	5,928	15,354	476,000	575,000					
Elâzığ	3,533	9,151	323,000	378,000					
Erzincan	4,596	11,903	259,000	278,000					
Erzurum	9,678	25,066	628,000	686,000					
Gümüşhane	3,949	10,227	263,000	282,000					
Hakkâri	3,676	9,521	84,000	103,000					
Kars	7,165	18,557	606,000	663,000					
Muş	3,164	8,196	199,000	234,000					
Siirt	4,248	11,003	265,000	330,000					
Tunceli	3,002	7,774	154,000	160,000					
Van	7,363	19,069	267,000	326,000					
					Thrace				
					Provinces				
					Çanakkale¶	612	1,585	50,000	§
					Edirne	2,419	6,266	303,000	318,000
					Istanbul*	1,310	3,392	1,756,000	2,995,000†
					Kırklareli	2,529	6,550	258,000	257,000
					Tekirdağ	2,401	6,218	287,000	297,000
					West Anatolia				
					Provinces				
					Afyonkarahisar	5,494	14,230	502,000	543,000
					Bilecik	1,559	4,308	139,000	139,000
					Burdur	2,659	6,887	195,000	211,000
					Denizli	4,582	11,868	463,000	512,000
					Eskişehir	5,271	13,652	415,000	463,000
					İsparta	3,449	8,933	266,000	300,000
					Kütahya	4,585	11,875	398,000	483,000
					Uşak	2,062	5,341	191,000	208,000
					Total Turkey	297,812	771,333	31,391,000[□]	35,667,000[□]
						301,380	780,576		

*Areas for provinces are 1965 census areas and purportedly exclude lakes. Of the two country total area figures, which are as of 1969, the first is the land area, the second the total area. †Preliminary. ‡Part of this province lies in the Thrace region; area and population figures for the part that lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region are for the districts of Ayvacık, Bayramiç, Biga, Bozcaada, Çan, Ezine, Lâpsêki, and Yenice. §Population for the entire province is given under the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region because no breakdown for the province was available. ¶Part of this province lies in the Thrace region; area and population figures for the part that lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region are for the districts of Adalar, Beykoz, Kadıköy, Üsküdar, Kartal, Şile, and Yalova. †Population for the entire province of Istanbul is given under the Thrace region because no breakdown for the province was available. §Part of this province lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region; area and population figures for the part that lies in the Thrace region are for the districts of Eceabat, Gelibolu, and İmroz. ¶Part of this province lies in the Marmara and Aegean Coasts region; area and population figures for the part that lies in Thrace region are for the districts of Bakirköy, Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Eminönü, Eyüp, Fatih, Gaziosmanpaşa, Sarıyer, Şişli, Zeytinburnu, Çatalca, and Silivri. □Figures do not add to total given because of rounding. Source: Official government figures.

tion in the eastern and southeastern regions. Arabic is spoken by 1.2 percent of the population, principally in parts of southeastern Anatolia. Greek, Armenian, and Yiddish are spoken by small groups in the larger cities, mainly in Istanbul. Most Turkish Jews are descendants of Jews expelled from Spain and speak a kind of Spanish mingled with some Turkish words; others speak Yiddish. **Ethnic groups.** Turkey has been a melting pot of racially and culturally distinct groups since early prehistoric times. It was penetrated, settled, or ruled by Hittites, Phrygians, and Gauls from the north and northwest; by Greeks and Macedonians from the west; and by Parthians and Mongols from the east. The most decisive influence was the incursion of Turks from the east, who introduced a new element of mixed Mediterranean-Mongoloid origin into the country's ethnic composition. The rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire contributed to the racial mixture, particularly during the empire's decline, when many Muslim groups living in former Turkish territories in southeastern Europe and in countries around the Black Sea migrated to the home country. It is at present almost impossible to define an average Turk ethnically. He may be blond and blue-eyed or even red haired; he may be of roundheaded alpine stock with dark hair and eyes; he



Population density of Turkey.

may be of longheaded Mediterranean stock; or he may be Mongoloid with high cheekbones. The dominant stock seems to be Mediterranean-Turkic, giving way to Mediterranean in western and southern coastal areas and mixed with Alpine stock in the interior and the east.

Religious groups. Over 99 percent of the country's

population are Muslims. The Sunni rite is predominant, followed closely by the Shi'ite. Christians are few: in 1965 there were about 74,000 Orthodox Christians (mostly Greeks), 70,000 Gregorians (mostly Armenians), and 26,000 Roman Catholics. There were 18,000 Jews. The Christian and Jewish minorities live mainly in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. In the *il* of Mardin in south-eastern Anatolia a community of 22,000 Nestorians has survived. Religion and the state were strictly separated in Turkey after the foundation of the republic in 1923.

Demographic trends. Turkey has had one of the highest rates of population increase in the world. Total population, only 13,648,000 in 1927, almost tripled in the following 43 years to exceed 35,000,000 in 1970. Between 1950 and 1970 the annual average rate of population growth was approximately 27 per 1,000.

Population growth

The rapid increase in Turkey's population is largely the consequence of a high birth rate, estimated at about 40 per 1,000 in recent decades. The average death rate, on the other hand, was believed to be around 15 per 1,000 in the same period and as low as 11 per 1,000 for the urban population. No detailed statistical data have been published for rural birth and death rates and their geographical distribution. It is known, however, that in rural regions of Turkey both the birth and death rates are considerably higher than in urban areas. The highest birth rates occur in underdeveloped eastern and southeastern Anatolia, where the average time interval between two successive births in the same family is only 22.7 months. The metropolitan areas of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir have the lowest birth rates in the country and the largest average time interval (33.2 months) between successive births in the same family.

As in other countries with high rates of natural increase, Turkey's population is young. About 66 percent of the population were under 30 years of age in 1970, and only 7.2 percent were 60 and over. Males outnumbered females by 455,000, but females predominated in rural areas because of migration of males to the cities.

In the 1960s and 1970s large numbers of Turks emigrated to western Europe as workers. In 1970, 300,000 were living in West Germany, and 100,000 in Switzerland, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Emigration is regulated by mutual agreement among the countries concerned.

Although the population density rose from 45 per square mile in 1927 to 118 in 1970, Turkey was not heavily populated in comparison with other countries. There were striking differences between the sparsely populated areas of Anatolia and the dense agglomerations in the northern and western parts of the country, in which over 40 percent of the population lived. The most densely inhabited area was the eastern Black Sea coastal strip, averaging over 260 people per square mile. Relatively high population densities also occurred around the Sea of Marmara, in the agriculturally developed plains of the Aegean region and around the Gulf of Iskenderun.

Migration from rural areas to the cities was another important demographic trend of the second half of the 20th century, associated with the increasing industrialization of the country. The general pattern of migration was from the rural eastern *iller* (provinces) of the country toward the cities, including Istanbul, Zonguldak in the coal and metallurgical district in the northwest, Ankara in the interior, Adana and Mersin in the south, and Izmir in the west. Urban population grew from 24 percent of the total in 1927 to 38.7 percent in 1970. (S.Er.)

THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Although mostly in Asia, the country's economy is oriented to Europe and the Western world. This orientation has provided the impetus for rapid industrialization since 1950. At the same time, Turkey has close economic links with Iran and Pakistan within the framework of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), with other countries in the Middle East, and with eastern Europe.

Gross national product (GNP) rose by an average of about 6.5 percent per annum in real terms in the 1960s. Because the population continued to increase by 2.5 percent per annum, the net improvement in GNP per capita

was just under 4 percent per annum. Turkey's exports, which increased in value by 139 percent (to 6,909,000,000 lire) between 1960 and 1970, are represented chiefly by agricultural produce, mainly cotton, fruit, nuts, and tobacco. Imports increased in the same period by 117 percent (to 9,161,000,000 lire), and the cost of importing development capital brought about a chronic payments deficit. The lire was devalued by two-thirds in August 1970.

National resources. *Mineral resources.* Turkey is believed to be rich in a wide variety of mineral deposits, but relatively few of these have been exploited on a large scale because of a lack of domestic capital for exploration and exploitation, political pressures that have discouraged wide-scale investment from abroad, a preponderance of large but inefficient state mining concerns, and inadequate processing facilities.

State enterprises dominate the production of hard coal, lignite, copper, sulfur, mercury, iron ore, lead, salt, and chrome; while private producers are the principal exploiters of asbestos, antimony, barites, boron minerals, zinc, meerschaum, manganese, emery, magnesite, marble, sodium sulfate, dolomite, and other minerals. Bauxite deposits were being tapped on a big scale in the early 1970s by an aluminum-manufacturing centre near Konya. Crude oil production began on a regular basis in 1961.

Turkey's hard coal is of poor quality, and only negligible quantities are exported. The marketable annual output late in the 1960s was 4,700,000 tons. Lignite was becoming an increasingly important fuel, its annual output increasing from 4,000,000 tons early in the 1960s to 9,000,000 tons in the early 1970s. Iron-ore production, formerly exported, was barely keeping pace with the rising home demand in the early 1970s; annual production in the early 1970s was 3,000,000 tons. Chrome ore reserves are widespread; annual output approached 750,000 tons in the early 1970s. The output of blister copper averaged around 24,000 tons per annum but was expected to rise to over 60,000 tons per annum with the completion of a new plant on the Black Sea coast. Crude oil output quintupled after 1962, reaching 3,600,000 tons annually early in the 1970s. Exploration for oil was continuing over a wide area in the 1970s.

Biological resources. Turkey has a wide diversity of climate and ecology. The total area used for field crops increased by nearly 60 percent in the 1950s, reaching what appears to be its maximum feasible extent. Further increases will require greater use of fertilizers and irrigation and more efforts to combat soil erosion.

Vineyards, gardens, and orchards cover 9,000 square miles. A gradual extension of this area in the 1970s, especially in the Çukurova and Aegean regions, was probable in the light of the government's plans to develop fruit and vegetable production. About one-fourth of Turkey is covered with forests, which are predominantly coniferous but also include deciduous beech, poplar, oak, and walnut. Virtually all forest land is state owned, but only a fraction has been made productive, and much is completely virgin; untold damage has been done by the large peasant population in the forest areas. In the 1970s serious steps were being taken to implement a long-term forestry development plan; lumber and timber production were expected to reach 240,000,000 cubic feet in 1972, compared with 95,000,000 in 1962.

Hydroelectric power. Turkey has many rivers and mountain watercourses, but much remains to be done in harnessing these resources. Hydroelectric power rose from only 3.8 percent of the electricity output of 790,000,000 kilowatt-hours in 1950 to 27 percent of the 9,624,000,000 kilowatt-hours produced in 1971. The percentage was to rise sharply in 1973 with the coming into production of the 620-megawatt Keban (Euphrates) and the 300-megawatt Gökçekaya power stations (a megawatt equalling 1,000,000 watts). At least two more Euphrates hydroelectric schemes were planned for the 1970s. Although, like Keban, these were to be linked into the national grid, they would help to open up the sparsely populated eastern regions of the country.

Sources of national income. *Agriculture, forestry, and fishing.* The livelihood of 70 percent of the population and

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31 percent of the national income came from agriculture, forestry, and fishing in the late 1960s. The 1963 census of agriculture showed that of 3,500,000 agricultural holdings only 491 were of more than 1,200 acres, while 1,600,000 were of seven acres or less and a further 1,100,000 of between 7.7 and 25 acres. The situation in the early 1970s was basically the same, although the government intended to introduce legislation to prevent or at least to inhibit the further fractionalization of land used for farming.

Cereals—predominantly wheat and barley—are the largest crop, covering 32,000,000 acres in 1970; industrial crops—principally cotton, tobacco, sugar beets, and oil-seeds—were sown over 4,200,000 acres. Other major agricultural products included pulses, potatoes, grapes, citrus and soft fruits, olives, hazelnuts, and tea. In the 1970s the government was attempting to guarantee minimum prices for the main crops without inducing the large surpluses of low-grade tobacco and tea and sugar beet that accumulated during the 1960s. It was also encouraging farmers to adopt improved methods by subsidizing credit, fertilizers, and improved seeds.

Livestock holdings totalled 84,000,000 head early in the 1970s, including 14,000,000 cattle, 36,000,000 sheep, and 6,000,000 Angora goats. The fishing industry contributes only 0.3 percent of the national income. Better organization, modern equipment, and an appreciation of the potential of deep-sea fishing are all urgently needed.

Forestry development was given a high priority in the early 1970s, at which time it provided less than 0.5 percent of the national income.

Very substantial sums of foreign aid capital have been invested in coal, lignite, copper, and bauxite mining and processing, along with government funds. State and foreign investment in the oil industry has been high. Mining and quarrying nevertheless accounted for only about 1.7 percent of the national income in the late 1960s.

Manufacturing. The manufacturing industries provided approximately 18.5 percent of the national income annually late in the 1960s, compared with 13 percent early in the decade. Manufacturing attracted about 20 percent of all investment in the late 1960s. The textile industry was the most important and had been considerably modernized in preceding years. Motor-vehicle production (assembly and parts manufacturing) had grown in importance, along with chemicals, petroleum products, rubber and plastics, and iron and steel products. Other dynamic manufacturing industries included processed foodstuffs, paper, nonferrous metals, domestic appliances, beverages, and cement and building materials. State-run firms accounted for about one-third of the overall output of manufacturing. The state had a monopoly only in cigarettes, tea, spirits, and newsprint; in other fields it competed with private industry.

Turkey's balance-of-payments problems in the early 1950s caused the government to favour industries that would reduce the need for imports. After 1968, however, when the State Planning Organization was made responsible for approving many investment projects, greater attention was paid to the earning rather than the saving of currency. Industrial growth in the 1970s was expected to be dictated largely by the needs of export markets.

Output in manufacturing was still generally well below capacity; and the labour force, especially in the state sector, was above the optimum level for economic production. By international standards, therefore, productivity was rather low.

Between 1962 and 1967 Turkey's energy consumption increased by almost 50 percent, to the equivalent of 30,600,000 tons of coal. Consumption in 1972 was expected to be 42,600,000 tons, double the 1962 total. But consumption per capita remained extremely low. In the mid-1960s about 29 percent of the energy consumed was provided by petroleum products (approximately half of which were imported), 22 percent by wood, 18 percent by dried dung, 28 percent by hard coal and lignite, and only 3 percent by hydroelectric power.

Financial services. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, set up in 1931, effectively controls the banking

system. It is the only note-issuing bank, is the sole channel for the issue of import licenses (on behalf of the Ministry of Commerce), provides access to foreign currency, and plays a key role in the administration of the government's credit policies. There are 33 commercial banks, a state-run Agriculture Bank, and a number of special-purpose, state-owned institutions, such as the Sümerbank (concerned with industrial enterprises), the Etibank (mining and electric power), and the Turkish Maritime Bank (Denizçilik Bankası).

The main source of new finance for the numerous state enterprises is the State Investments Bank. The private sector was depending increasingly in the 1970s for its development funds upon the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (established with World Bank assistance in 1950) and to a lesser extent upon the Industrial Investment and Credit Bank. Turkey in the 1970s did not yet have an organized capital market. The true public company that raises capital by selling its securities to the public was still practically unknown, and the vast majority of the many joint-stock companies were family-owned or family-controlled enterprises. The stock exchange at Istanbul dealt mainly in government securities.

Foreign trade. Between 1960 and 1970 export earnings increased by 139 percent to 6,909,000,000 lire, or at a slightly lower average annual rate of growth than that of the economy as a whole. During this period cotton displaced tobacco as the largest single currency earner. By 1971 agricultural products still accounted for 73 percent, minerals for 6 percent, and industrial and processed goods for only 21 percent of total earnings. The limitations of world demand for such traditional exports as cotton, tobacco, dried fruit, and nuts made imperative the development of exports of manufactures and other items, such as fresh fruit and vegetables.

The countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market, accounted for more than 40 percent of all exports. The countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) took 18 percent of all exports in 1970. The U.S., Japan, and Canada took 18 percent. Exports to eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, and Egypt averaged 18 percent of the total.

Imports rose by an average of 12 percent annually in the 1960s, an increase not enough to meet industrial requirements; in the late 1960s there were serious shortages of raw materials, capital equipment, and spare parts. In the early 1970s, however, the balance of payments account showed much improvement; all shortages of essential imported goods were eradicated. The chief suppliers of Turkey's imports in 1970 were West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, and the Soviet Union, and France.

Management of the economy. *The role of government.* Turkey's first ventures into industry were made in the 1930s, in the early years of the republic, when the state was of necessity the principal investor. Although the state still owned nearly half of the country's economic resources in 1970, increasing importance was being given to private industry, which provided almost 50 percent of the new fixed capital investment. The state sector was concerned mainly with investment in fields in which the capital requirement was too large or the expected returns too low to attract private enterprise.

The State Planning Organization, set up in 1960, became the arbiter of all foreign investment, as well as of all major Turkish private and state investment. Its five-year plans and annual programs set the guidelines for economic development. Through the Central Bank, the Agriculture Bank, and other state banking institutions, the government maintained a firm hold on all financial and investment operations. The railways, post office, airways, and internal sea passenger services were operated as government enterprises.

Taxation. Annual treasury revenue in the late 1960s totalled 24,028,000,000 lire. Direct taxation accounted for 6,798,000,000 lire, indirect taxation for 12,343,000,000 lire, foreign aid counterpart funds for 1,019,000,000 lire, and nontaxation revenues for 1,560,000,000 lire. The net revenues from state monopolies, the universities,

The State Planning Organization

Unexploited mineral wealth

Major crops

Energy consumption

and the State Farms Administration amounted to 836,000,000 lire; treasury bonds raised 600,000,000 lire, and savings bonds, which are compulsorily purchasable at the rate of 3 percent of taxable income, raised 727,000,000 lire. Direct taxation consisted mainly of an income tax on private individuals and companies and a corporation tax. There was widespread tax evasion, largely resulting from a shortage of qualified inspectors and also from the absence of a recognized body of professional accountants. The government continued to rely heavily on indirect taxation, such as sales and excise taxes. Banking, insurance, and other transactions were also subject to indirect taxation.

Trade unions. The trade union movement was relatively unimportant until the 1960s. Before July 1963, when the Strikes, Lockouts and Collective Agreements Law came into force, strikes and lockouts had been illegal. In the early 1970s there were about 1,000 unions, the majority affiliated to the moderate Turkish Trade Union Confederation and a few to the left-wing Confederation of Reformist Workers' Unions. Union membership totalled about 4,000,000.

The government fixes minimum wages by geographical areas, but these bear little relationship to actual rates, which in most establishments are determined by collective agreements. The agreements also cover a wide variety of such fringe benefits as holiday pay, performance bonuses, and food allowances. Social insurance and fringe benefits are equal to more than 60 percent of basic wages. The Confederation of Employers' Associations of Turkey grew rapidly in the 1960s.

Balance of payments. Since the inception of the First Five-Year Plan in 1962-63, the government has tried to achieve a 7 percent annual increase in national output. The deterioration of the balance of payments in the later 1960s led to a two-thirds devaluation of the lira and to the adoption of austerity measures in August 1970. Short- and medium-term policies called for greater emphasis on investment in currency-earning enterprises, for the curbing of internal demand and of price increases, and for an overall improvement in productivity. (E.I.U.)

Transportation. The Turkish Republic began very early to improve the transportation system as a means of integrating isolated regions and of developing the national economy. The length of railway tracks increased from about 2,500 miles in 1924 to around 6,000 in 1970. After World War II more emphasis was placed on road and harbour construction. The result was to give Turkey the best developed road and rail network in the Middle East. In 1970 the highways carried 43 percent of the freight traffic and 70 percent of the passenger traffic; the railroads carried 55 percent of the freight traffic and only 28 percent of the passenger traffic.

The heaviest traffic is between Istanbul and Ankara, followed by that of the Aegean region, with Izmir as its centre, the area around the Gulf of Iskenderun, with Adana as its centre, and the Ankara-Zonguldak route. Istanbul is the chief harbour; there are heavy flows of passengers and freight by sea between Izmir and Istanbul through the Aegean, between the southern coasts of the Sea of Marmara and Istanbul, and between Istanbul and the Black Sea ports of Zonguldak, Samsun, and Trabzon.

Roads. All-weather highways totalled 37,000 miles in 1971, of which over 13,000 miles were paved, the rest consisting of stabilized gravel or macadam. The main highways radiate from Ankara, in central Anatolia, from Istanbul and Izmir, in the west, from Adana, in the south, and from Erzurum and Diyarbakir, in the east.

Railways. The railroad pattern consists of a ring around the central Anatolian Plateau, from which branches radiate to the peripheral regions: two to Zonguldak and Samsun, on the Black Sea; three to the western ports of Istanbul, Izmir, and Bandirma; three to the east; and one to the south (via Adana to Syria and Iraq).

Port facilities. Turkey's merchant shipping fleet is relatively small, consisting in 1971 of 714,000 gross tons, of which 80 percent were oil tankers or cargo carriers. The port of Istanbul handles more than 50 percent of the country's imports and 11 percent of its exports. Izmir

ranks second, handling 35 percent of the exports. Other principal ports, in decreasing order, are Mersin and Iskenderun in the south and Zonguldak, Samsun, and Trabzon, in the north; all of these ports are located at the end of rail or land routes serving large hinterlands. Inland water transportation does not exist in Turkey except on Lake Van.

Air transport. The state-owned Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları) flies from Ankara to Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Erzurum, Van, Samsun, and Trabzon. While Ankara is the major junction of the domestic air routes, Istanbul is the busiest airport and the principal terminus of international lines. Izmir ranks third in traffic volume. (S.Er.)

ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Government. Turkey is a republic, with its capital at Ankara. Under the constitution of 1961, political authority is centred in the Grand National Assembly, which has a lower chamber, the National Assembly, composed of 450 elected members, and a Senate made up of 165 members, 150 elected and 15 nominated by the president of the republic. There are also a few senators for life: army officers who carried out the 1960 revolution.

The head of state is the president of the republic, elected by the Grand National Assembly for a term of seven years. He is not eligible for a second consecutive term. The president selects a prime minister, who forms a government subject to approval by the National Assembly.

The country is divided into 67 provinces. Each province (*il* or *vilâyet*) is subdivided into districts and each district (*ilçe* or *kaza*) into communes. The highest administrative official in each is, respectively, the *vali* (governor), the *kaymakam* (prefect), and the *nahiye müdürü* (district official). The *vali*, who is appointed by the president on the recommendation of the minister of the interior, is the chief administrative officer of the province, representing all the national departments (except those of war and justice) and coordinating their work in his province. He corresponds directly with each ministry and has a staff of advisers, who also form an administrative council under his chairmanship. The organization of the district under the *kaymakam* and of the commune under the *nahiye müdürü* follows the same pattern. The commune comprises a number of villages, each of which has a headman (*muhtar*) and a council of elders (*ihtiyarlar meclisi*) numbering from 5 to 12 according to the size of the village. A provincial council, elected for four years, debates questions of local administration, and its resolutions have legal effect; the *vali*, who is president of the council, may, however, refer proposals to the Council of State. In every headquarters town of a province or district and in all other towns of 2,000 inhabitants or more, there is a municipality (*belediye*). At its head is the mayor (*belediye reisi*), assisted by an elected council and a committee composed of officials and of persons chosen by the council for a year's term.

All citizens over 21 are entitled to vote unless they have been legally deprived of their rights. Deputies to the National Assembly are elected every four years, and a third of the senators are elected every two years. The constitution prescribes a secret ballot. Actual voting procedures are determined by legislation. Before 1961 a party securing a majority in a province was given all the deputies from that province. The electoral law of 1961 introduced a form of proportional representation by which the deputies of a province were apportioned among the parties according to the size of each party's vote.

Turkey was a one-party state until 1946. Since then a number of parties have contested elections, and in October 1971 eight had deputies in the National Assembly.

The judicial system is entirely independent of the assembly and the government. The old Muslim legal and judicial system was swept away in the early years of the republic, and a new Western system was adopted that was based on the Swiss civil code, the Italian penal code, and German commercial law. The highest court, the Constitutional Court, was created in 1961 to review the legislation of the Grand National Assembly; it has 15 regular

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and 5 alternate members. The highest administrative court is the Council of State, with 31 judges, which serves as the final court of appeals for the decisions of lower administrative courts. There is a Court of Cassation that serves as a court of last resort for reviewing the decisions of other courts. A system of courts run by the Ministry of Justice handles ordinary civil and criminal cases.

The military forces had a total strength of about 508,500 men in 1971, of which 420,000 were in the army, 50,000 in the air force, and 38,500 in the navy. Young men are subject to two years of compulsory service at the age of 20. Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Central Treaty Organization (Cento). United States influence has been strong, exercised by a military mission in Ankara that directs the delivery of arms from the U.S. and supervises training programs in the three services. In 1971 land forces included 12 infantry divisions, one armoured division, four armoured brigades, and two parachute battalions. The navy had 12 submarines and ten destroyers. There were three tactical air forces. Headquarters of the Southeastern Command of NATO is at Izmir.

Education, health, and welfare. At the time the Turkish Republic was formed, the population was estimated to be only 10 percent literate. By the start of the 1970s, primary education was compulsory for all children from seven to 12, but a considerable number of children, particularly in the provinces, did not attend school. Although the educational system underwent great expansion after World War II, many peasants were reluctant to send their children to school or could not afford to keep them there during planting and harvesting seasons. The literacy rate in 1970 was estimated at 55 percent of the population of six years and over. Over 5,000,000 children attended primary school early in the 1970s, while the number in secondary schools and lycées was a little over 1,100,000. There were 245,000 in technical and vocational schools and colleges and 155,000 in various institutes of higher education. Religious instruction, forbidden in the early years of the republic, was permitted in primary schools and in the schools training religious personnel.

The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare carried out public health programs and operated a large number of hospitals and dispensaries. Others were run by the Ministry of Labour. State medical services are provided free to the poor. There are also private medical institutions run by philanthropic organizations and large business enterprises. In 1969 there was one hospital bed for every 495 persons and one doctor for every 2,267 persons.

Successful public health campaigns have been conducted against tuberculosis, trachoma, malaria, and syphilis, but in the late 1960s trachoma and tuberculosis were still endemic. Infant mortality, which stood at 160 per 1,000 live births in 1960, was 153 per 1,000 in 1970.

A basic law concerning labour and social insurance and regulating conditions of employment, passed in 1936, established the 48-hour week with paid holidays of 12 to 24 working days, depending upon length of service. Later legislation provided health and accident insurance and old-age pensions. In the late 1960s approximately 1,000,000 workers were covered by social insurance.

Housing standards in general have been low, and overcrowded conditions in the cities have given rise to shantytowns (*gecekondular*) on the outskirts, put up by peasants migrating from the countryside. The Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement was established in 1958 to organize and direct this migration. In the mid-1960s it was estimated that persons living in shantytowns comprised 45 percent of the population of Ankara, 21 percent of that of Istanbul, and 18 percent of that of Izmir. On the other hand, all of the larger cities contain modern, middle-class residential areas that have expanded at a rapid rate and in which people live by Western standards.

The maintenance of internal security is the responsibility of the police, the gendarmerie, and the army. The police are organized on a national basis under the Ministry of the Interior but carry out their duties at the command of local civil authorities. In each province there is a directorate of security, divided into administrative, judi-

cial, and political sections. The gendarmerie is a paramilitary force drawn from military conscripts and assigned to sectors not under police jurisdiction, notably rural frontier areas. It is attached to the Ministry of the Interior and subject to the same local authorities as the police.

CULTURAL LIFE AND INSTITUTIONS

Turkey has a long and various cultural heritage. When the Turks arrived in Anatolia in the 11th century they had already adopted Islām, and they soon fell under the influence of the highly developed Iranian and Arab civilizations. Another part of the Turkish inheritance came from the Byzantine civilization that had developed in the Eastern Roman Empire. As the Ottoman Empire expanded into Europe, it received cultural influences from the West, and, when the empire entered on its downward course in the 19th century, the cultural pressure of Europe became stronger. At the same time, European interest in Turkish language, history, and art inspired many educated persons in Turkey with a desire to strengthen and preserve the national culture. Among the most important of the reforms carried out after the national revolution were those aimed at reviving the Turkish language and breaking the hold of Islām upon the nation.

Modern Turkish culture has been dominated by nationalism. Writers, artists, and musicians have abandoned the long tradition of Islām and returned to the vernacular in literature, village scenes in painting, and folk ballads in music. The theatre has become popular, and innumerable Turkish or foreign plays are performed. The Ankara State Opera was founded in 1940 and the Istanbul Opera in 1950; both perform classical Western works.

The popular arts flourish and are encouraged. Popular literature takes the form of narrative (*hikâye*) and poetry (*siir*), recited by minstrels known as *âşiks*. There are many popular dances and games, varying according to region. Folk instruments include drums, trumpets, flutes, pipes, tambourines, viols, and cymbals, along with some modern instruments. Popular drama includes shadow plays, performed by dolls reflected on a linen screen, and the *orta oyunu*, a type of improvised comedy.

Formal cultural institutions begin with the Ministry of Culture, set up in 1971. Various organizations are devoted to the sciences and arts, including three music conservatories, in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul; the Academy of Fine Arts, in Istanbul; the National Folklore Institute, in Ankara; the Turkish Folklore Society, in Istanbul; and a number of scientific and professional societies. Every province has its museums. There are archaeological museums in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir and a Museum of Turkish and Islāmic Art in Istanbul. The National Library (Milli Kütüphane) in Ankara had over 500,000 volumes at the beginning of the 1970s.

Ankara early in the 1970s had 18 daily newspapers and ten weeklies; Istanbul had 24 dailies and 24 weeklies. There were six dailies in Izmir, three each in Adana and Bursa, and two in Eskişehir. Radio and television broadcasting are carried on by the government. In the early 1970s Radio Ankara had three domestic services and three to foreign listeners. Radio Istanbul had two domestic services. Television broadcasting began in Ankara in 1965 and by 1971 was carried on four days a week. A station in Istanbul began operating in 1971. (A.Te.)



BIBLIOGRAPHY. A general introduction that contains a useful bibliography is THOMAS D. ROBERTS *et al.*, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (1970). Another recent work is BERNARD LEWIS, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (1968). For geography, see W.C. BRICE, *South-West Asia* (1966); and GEORGE B. CRESSEY, *Crossroads: Land and Life in Southwest Asia* (1960). For the economy, see Z.Y. HERSHLAG, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth* (1968); UNION OF CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, AND COMMODITY EXCHANGES OF TURKEY, *Investment Guide to Turkey* (1964); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, *Annual Survey of the Turkish Economy*; and the annual publications of the Economic Research Department, Ankara, and of the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, Istanbul. The State Planning Organization, Ankara, has issued three five-year development plans (1964, 1969, and 1972).

(S.Er./A.Te.)

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
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
The basic form of the national flag was apparently established in 1793 under Sultan Selim III, when the green flags used by the navy were changed to red and a white crescent and multi-pointed star were added. The five-pointed star dates from approximately 1844. Except for the issuance of design specifications, no change

Officially confirmed 5 June 1936.



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PRESIDENTIAL FLAG



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Red has been prominent in Turkish flags for 700 years. The star and crescent are Muslim symbols, but also have a long pre-Islamic past in Asia Minor.

was made when the Ottoman Empire became the Republic of Turkey and the caliphate (religious authority) was terminated. Many traditions explain the star and crescent symbol. It is known that Diana was the patron goddess of Byzantium and that her symbol was a moon. In A.D. 330 the Emperor Constantine rededicated the city—which he called Constantinople—to the Virgin Mary, whose star symbol was superimposed over the crescent. In 1453 Constantinople was captured by the Ottoman Turks and renamed Istanbul, but its new rulers may have adopted the existing emblem for their own use.

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FROM HEATH LOWRY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TURKISH INSTITUTE

The Turkish people are very excited about this visit. They have an enormous amount of respect for the President, as they saw his face on the television everyday during Desert Storm. His remarks will be very well-received.

Turks are extremely proud of their reputation as gracious hosts, and pride themselves on the best hospitality that any country has to offer. Any references to the generous hospitality of the Turkish people will go over very well in a toast or embassy greeting.

The Turkish people are also very proud of their cuisine. There is a saying that "the three best cuisines in the world are French, Chinese, and Turkish." If the President were to make reference to that phrase, and then further comment on the cuisine anticipated at the state dinner, the crowd would love it.

There is a phrase whose English translation goes something like this: "Good friends become apparent on black days." If the President were to say this in English, the translator would know exactly what phrase he is talking about. The Turkish people would appreciate this, because they believe their country played a pivotal role in Desert Storm, and consider the USA a valuable ally.

Here's another warm and fuzzy phrase: "A shared cup of coffee results in forty years of memories."

**FROM BRUCE KUNIHOLM, DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES AT DUKE UNIVERSITY**

He suggests that for the state dinner toast, it would be wise to emphasize the US-Turkish connection that goes back to 1945-46, and to note that it has weathered the adversities that confront all alliances. It's important to mention the reciprocal notion of the alliance: that each side has both given something to it and received something from it, and that, while it hasn't been perfect, it has stood the test of time and been beneficial to both sides.

Professor Kuniholm met extensively with Ozal when he visited Duke University. Here are some facts about him that might lend to jokes, stories, etc....

He is an electrical engineer with a Master's from Istanbul Technical University; he has served as Deputy General of the State Electrical Authority overseeing projects on the electrification of Turkey, including Turkey's main hydroelectric power stations; he served as Deputy Prime Minister and helped see the country through terrible times; he encouraged the lifting of martial law, all the while encouraging the opening of the Turkish economy to trade and competition.

As President, he has had the vision to be creative about Turkey's post Cold War era, advocating trade and direct investment links with the nations of the Black Sea. During the Gulf crisis, Ozal, at considerable political risk, was unwavering in his support of U.N. principles and the coalition's policies. He stopped the flow of oil in the Iraqi pipeline, supported the U.N. sanctions, extended the DECA agreement with the U.S., deployed forces along his border with Iraq, and allowed allied troops to use Turkish bases.

Turkey is the only Muslim country in the Near East that is secular and democratic, and it serves as an important model to other countries in the region striving to transform their structures for political participation. Turkey is keenly aware of who its allies are; it is loyal to its responsibilities, and it expects the same from its partners.

Turkey was there when we needed her, as was President Ozal. This was most recently recognized when President Bush after returning from Camp David with President Ozal, thanked Ozal for "the best communications any two countries could possibly have had, for his advice, and for his steadfast adherence to principle from day one."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS



Spring 1991

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TURKEY AND THE WEST

Turkey, a long-standing U.S. ally and staunch member of NATO, has played a pivotal, if at times delicate, role in the defense of Europe and the Middle East. Its value as a Western ally has hinged on its geographic reach: it spans two continents and two theaters of Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union.

In the first years after World War II, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic government, Turkey was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Middle East. Along with Iran, it provided a massive land barrier to Moscow's ambitions in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Later, as the threat of Soviet expansionism seemed to fix on Europe, and U.S. policy shifted from containment in the Middle East (under the Truman Doctrine) to containment in Europe (under the Marshall Plan and NATO), Turkey's main strategic role was increasingly seen in a European context: as potentially bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea, tying up Warsaw Pact forces along NATO's southern flank, and serving as a staging ground for a counterthrust against the Soviet Union.

Underpinning Turkey's early role in the NATO alliance was the principle of reciprocity: Turkey would play an important part in the defense of the West, and make its facilities available, while the West would provide Turkey with a deterrent against Soviet attack, as well as military and economic assistance. Today Turkey's relations with its allies continue to be informed by the notion of reciprocity and are colored by shifting security concerns. The only difference from recent years is that, with the Soviet threat sharply diminished and Ankara having assumed an important role in the allied coalition against Iraq, Turkey's strategic significance is once again being assessed chiefly in its Middle Eastern context.

Bruce R. Kuniholm is Director of Duke University's Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs and Chairman of Duke's Department of Public Policy Studies.

II

Turkey's Western-oriented leader, President Turgut Özal, has taken up the challenge of Ankara's role in the post-Cold War world, perhaps sooner than most observers would have guessed. In the process, he has precipitated a vigorous debate within Turkey over his role as president and the extent of his authority. Özal moved with alacrity to commit the country as a staging ground for U.S. and coalition air forces against Iraq. It was a politically calculated move that went beyond immediate national security concerns. Indeed, Turkey has never been willing to commit itself wholeheartedly to a Western military endeavor without some form of quid pro quo. In the current context, Özal is hoping for a substantial return on his country's investment in the war effort, from both the United States and Europe.

The expected payoff from Washington is increased military aid and a revision of the seven-to-ten ratio in U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey. The informal ratio, while never adopted by the executive branch, has served in recent years as a reference point for congressional approval of military assistance to those countries. Also expected is greater access to U.S. markets for Turkish foodstuffs and textiles. From Europe—and here Ankara is expecting Washington's support—Özal clearly expects military and economic assistance and wants a softening of resistance from the European Community to its application for membership in the 12-nation economic bloc. Indeed, before the gulf crisis erupted, no foreign policy issue had been more important to Özal than securing EC membership.

The determined effort by Ankara to bolster the allied coalition's interests in the gulf involved substantial risk. In the first instance, it involved exposing the country to attack. In the past the real question in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation was not the willingness of Turks to defend themselves, but the extent to which Turkey would have subjected itself to counterattack by supporting offensive actions against communist forces in eastern Europe. A similar scenario obtained, albeit from the south, where vast numbers of Iraqi forces—equipped with long-range missiles—were deployed following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August.

Another major risk stems from within. The Özal government's commitment to the anti-Iraq coalition was not well

36 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

received inside Turkey. The decision, and the manner in which it was reached, triggered the resignation of the chief of the Turkish general staff on December 3. The Turkish media railed against the country's involvement in the war; as would be expected, opposition parties clamored both for an end to what they perceived as the nation's overenthusiastic role in support of the allied coalition and a halt to what they characterize as Özal's "one-man rule." Terrorism, which plagued the country in the 1970s, is once again on the rise. At least eight incidents were reported after the outbreak of the war, including the fatal shootings of the senior security adviser to Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut and of a U.S. civilian attached to a NATO base inside the country.

For a nation struggling to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the West, while maintaining a poor human rights record and suffering from a substandard economy, the assumption of a strategic role in the gulf is a tightrope walk to security and prosperity. Özal, perhaps recognizing that U.S.-Turkish ties have tended to falter during periods of U.S.-Soviet détente, seized the opportunity to commit Turkey to the coalition's cause against a new and real threat. Recognizing that his country is at a crossroads, Özal has made the first in a series of tough choices that will confront Turkey in the years ahead. For now, his limited popularity at home is being put to a serious test.

III

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, introduced a new regional dimension to the balance of power in the Middle East and constituted the most serious threat to vital U.S. and Western oil interests in the Persian Gulf since the Iranian Revolution. The crisis underscored once again the geopolitical value to the United States of the U.S.-Turkish alliance and corroborated estimates both within the Turkish government and the U.S. Department of Defense of Turkey's continuing importance.

Turkey's contribution to the anti-Iraq coalition included: effective closure of the Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean (through which Iraq exported 54 percent of its oil, or approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil a day); extension until December 1991 of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which gives the United States access to military bases in Turkey; deployment of over 100,000 troops along the

Iraqi border, which forced Iraq to deploy substantial troops to the north and raised the prospect of at least a two-front war; and use of NATO airbases within striking range of military targets in northern and central Iraq.

But such a commitment obviously did not come without substantial costs. Turkish financial losses from the war are difficult to calculate, but include lost trade with Iraq and Kuwait, lost tourism revenues, lost fees from transit trade, suspension on repayment of Iraqi debts, lost fees for transit of Iraqi oil through the Turkish pipeline, suspended construction contracts, lost remittances from Turkish workers in Iraq and Kuwait, and increased oil prices. To compensate for these losses and to reward Turkey's quick response to the crisis, President Bush, along with the EC, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has sought to put together a multibillion-dollar assistance package to the so-called frontline states.

In return for Ankara's military assistance, U.S. officials have explored the possibility of supplying the Turks with extensive military equipment as a quid pro quo. The Southern Region Amendment assistance program, which has allowed for transfer of slightly outmoded American weapons, has helped contribute to a substantial U.S. arms package. The American aid, in conjunction with a German arms package, includes: 600 M-60 tanks, 400 Leopard tanks, 700 armored personnel carriers, 40 Phantom fighters, as well as a complement of Cobra helicopters, missile destroyers and Roland surface-to-air missiles. Such a comprehensive package of advanced arms, however, will not arrive overnight. As a stopgap measure intended to serve as a symbolic deterrent, NATO deployed 42 somewhat outdated combat jets from Germany, Italy and Belgium at Turkey's request. Batteries of U.S. Patriot missiles were also sent to Turkey on an emergency basis. No Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Turkey were reported.

On the economic aid front, President Bush also has pledged to review Turkey's textile quotas with a view toward increasing its access to the U.S. textile and apparel market. According to a Turkish government spokesman, textile quotas (Turkey currently has approximately one percent of the U.S. textile market) will be raised by as much as 50 percent. Other assistance packages, however, have been slow to materialize. Turkey lost over \$2 billion in revenue over the first three months of the crisis, and, as estimates of its losses in succeeding months rose to \$9 billion, the ruling Motherland Party was

severely criticized by leaders of the rival Social Democratic Populist Party and the True Path Party for having given too much for too little.

In their judgment, the threat to Turkey was not adequately compensated by the benefits, even if they were substantial. In addition to an estimated \$8 billion in arms from the United States and Germany, Turkey is scheduled to receive a total of \$2.2 billion in oil, grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, France and the EC. Kuwait's newly restored government has said it is reviewing possible construction contracts with Turkish companies for the rebuilding of the emirate's devastated infrastructure. Moreover, the annual U.S. security assistance package was raised from \$553.4 million (\$500 million of which was an outright grant) to \$635.4 million, and the high proportion of grant assistance to Turkey (as distinguished from concessional loans to Greece) essentially cancelled any semblance of the seven-to-ten ratio.

While acknowledging the value of striking a balance in assistance to Greece and Turkey, the Bush administration has never believed that the mechanistic application of the seven-to-ten ratio was the way to achieve it. The Reagan administration took the same view. The military balance, Washington argued, is determined by factors far more complex than levels of assistance. The Gulf War and President Özal's determined support for the allied coalition's effort seemed to bolster their argument, even if Özal's support for U.S. policies has troubled his own domestic critics.

IV

Before the Cold War began to wind down, Turkey played a number of critical strategic roles for NATO. Turkey helped to deter a Soviet attack on NATO's central front because its forces could threaten Warsaw Pact forces in the Balkans and the Transcaucasus. If deterrence failed, this potential threat from Turkey would have impeded Soviet capacity to reinforce the central front. Installations in Turkey made it possible to detect, intercept and limit the projection of Soviet airpower into the eastern Mediterranean. At sea, Turkish control of the Bosphorus blocked the projection of Soviet naval power into the Aegean. The importance of the waterway is emphasized by the fact that in recent years the Soviets have made over 18,000 ship transits a year through the straits, through which pass 60 percent of their exports and 50 percent of their imports. As

for contingencies outside the European theater, Turkey's land mass and its bases deterred Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf. In their absence, Soviet support for and accessibility to such countries as Syria and Iraq would have been much more pervasive and potentially threatening to U.S. interests in the region and would have created serious problems for Israel.

Finally, as NATO's only Muslim country, Turkey also provided a cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East. If the United States eventually reestablishes ties with Iran, those ties will have been facilitated by the relationship it shares with intermediaries, such as Turkey. In recent months, for example, Turkey has revived the idea of building strong economic ties with both Iran and Pakistan.

Turkey's relationship with NATO, of course, is not one-sided, and many Turks recognize the necessity of having a strong NATO deterrent force on their soil. It was repeatedly brought home to them by Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Hungary and Poland in 1956, Czechoslovakia again in 1968 and, most recently, in Afghanistan in 1979. In spite of these reminders, however, and in part because of a legacy of distrust engendered by differences over contentious issues such as Cyprus, the status of the Aegean, the Armenian question and alleged human rights abuses, the Turks have occasionally recognized the desirability of exploring alternative means for assuring their security. They have been willing to examine a more neutral stance between East and West. But three major developments—the decline of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a resurgent EC and the advent of a long-term threat posed by Iraq—have led President Özal to check what, in different circumstances, might have been a drift toward neutrality or nonalignment.

Aggression by its southern neighbor and trading partner, on the other hand, raised a sensitive issue for Turkey: the use of its territory and (potentially) its armed forces in a Western military engagement outside NATO's boundaries. In the past, Turkey has appeared increasingly reluctant to allow the United States use of its territory as a staging ground in non-NATO contingencies. During the war in Lebanon in 1958, for example, the United States had used Turkish bases to support its intervention. Following the Cyprus crisis of 1964, however, when the United States called into question its obligations under NATO to protect Turkey from a Soviet attack, the Turks became more guarded about the use of Turkish

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facilities for non-NATO scenarios. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the United States was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey, but was not allowed to use Turkish bases for refueling or supply activities. In the course of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States was not allowed to use Turkish bases for direct combat or logistical support, although it was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey during the resupply effort. The United States was also permitted to use Turkish bases for the evacuation of American citizens during the Jordanian civil war in 1970 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Such reluctance to engage in non-NATO contingencies reverberated in many official Turkish quarters after Saddam's troops rolled into Kuwait. In addition to criticisms of Özal's "one-man rule," other detractors asserted that to commit to a U.S.-led war against Saddam would give the United States the capacity to permanently damage Turkey's economic and diplomatic relations with Iraq. Over the last ten years, Iraq has accounted for as much as 18 percent of total Turkish imports and 13 percent of total Turkish exports. As Özal's critics have noted, Iraq will remain a neighbor with a large—and needy—economy.

But within Özal's inner circle, there were indications of a readiness to take a tough stand against any potential aggression from the south. The groundwork had been laid at a meeting of Turkish emissaries in Vienna in December 1989, well before the gulf crisis. Mesut Yilmaz, then foreign minister, met with 17 Turkish ambassadors to examine the effects on Turkey of developments in eastern Europe and the implications of better relations between East and West.

At that meeting, the broad outline of a future foreign policy for Turkey was devised. Turkey, the ministers concurred, would definitely remain in NATO. It would, however, establish closer ties with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. Turkey recognized that, to be accepted as a member of the EC, it would have to take greater steps toward democracy and improve its human rights record. While vigilance would still have to be maintained against the Soviet threat, the major threat to Turkey now came from the southeast: Iraq and Syria. This shift would be reflected in Turkey's new defense strategy.

The ministers noted that while Turkey's strategic importance was lessened by East-West détente, it was not eliminated. Its geographical location would dictate its continuing strategic

importance to the alliance. And, no less important, even if Turkey were not granted full membership in the EC, it would not be totally excluded.

v

Beyond regional security concerns, threats to Turkey were perceived in economic terms and were associated with the consequences of being excluded from the EC, which will dominate a unified market of more than 300 million Europeans in the 1990s. The Turkish government's interest was declared in 1987 when it applied for admission to the EC. On December 18, 1989, the EC Commission told the Turks that their application could not be considered before 1993 at the earliest. The commission argued that enlarging the Community would weaken its capacity to pursue internal and external policies required for the success of the Single European Act of 1986, which calls for the establishment of a wholly integrated internal market by the end of 1992.

Specific concerns addressed were Turkey's size and population—it had “a greater area and would eventually have a bigger population than any Community member state”—and the fact that Turkey had a substantially lower level of development than the European average. Purchasing power in Turkey was one-third that of the EC average, while the country suffered from high inflation rates and high unemployment. More than 50 percent of the labor force in Turkey was employed in agriculture, and the Community was concerned about the access of Turkish labor to the EC labor market at a time when unemployment was a problem in the 12 associated economies.

The commission recommended a number of measures that would enable both Turkey and the EC to move toward increased interdependence and integration. While the Turks were disappointed, the postponement was not unexpected. The government, putting on its best face, emphasized the report's reaffirmation of Turkey's qualification to become a full member and its call for a customs union between Turkey and the EC by 1995. Subsequently, however, Turks were angered by Austria's apparent jump in standing to be the next member and disillusioned by the EC's favorable reception of Cyprus' application for membership.

Turkish commentators worried that developments might lead to the Europeans' rearranging themselves in a fortress

Europe that excluded Turkey, as in the early postwar era. If there is no commitment to Turkey's entry down the road, many would take it as the denial of a right that Turkey has earned and a rejection of Turkey's commitment to Europe. Membership in the EC, on the other hand, would guarantee the continued westernization of Turkey and cement its identity in Europe. Anything less would be hypocritical and discriminatory of the country's attempt to seek its rightful place in the European community of nations.

While the Turks are hopeful about the possibility of joining the EC, and Özal continues to put the best face on the difficulties they encounter, many Europeans privately express enormous doubts about Turkey's achieving membership in the near future. They suggest that Turkey focus on intermediate steps, such as a customs union, an industrial cooperation agreement or an aid program. These steps would give Ankara time to prepare the country for membership. Others suggest the desirability of examining alternative arrangements.

Speculation in the Turkish press about alternative relationships with the EC has included discussion of a European free-trade area with a European core, a northern federation (including Norway), and a southern federation (comprising Mediterranean countries such as Turkey, Israel and Malta). In the aftermath of the changes in eastern Europe in 1989, Turks speculated that their country could play a role in an expanded EC, which would include a Benelux east (Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) and Turkey (which enjoys substantial trade with eastern Europe). They have also contemplated, in the event that they are excluded from the EC, a free-trade agreement with the United States, a Black Sea cooperative system, and a Balkan cooperative zone.

Precedents for economic integration schemes in the Middle East include the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Council. The Turkish government, however, looks to Europe and fears the consequences of rejection—particularly if the real reason stems from cultural and religious prejudice against Turkey's Muslim heritage. They have sensed such prejudice in the West's relatively weak reaction to the treatment of Turks in Soviet Azerbaijan or in Bulgaria, as opposed to its support for Christians in the restive Soviet Socialist republics of Armenia and Lithuania. President Özal has warned that rejection would push Turkey away from Europe and encourage the spread of

religious fundamentalism throughout the region. Islamic fundamentalists have never captured more than ten percent of the vote in Turkey in recent years, but their cause in Turkey clearly would be fueled by such rejection.

VI

In the context of their perceived rejection by Europe, the Turks have looked to their bilateral relationships. The United States, because of its interests in the Middle East, has continued to cooperate with Turkey. But, as in the early postwar period, there have been differences within the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. If the end of the Cold War led the Department of State to see the U.S.-Turkish relationship as increasingly free of its defense focus, the Department of Defense, responding to the logic of Turkey's potential role in the Persian Gulf, continued to recognize Turkey's important strategic role in the region. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reinforced the Pentagon's view. As noted, however, the bilateral relationship will not be without its troubles.

The Soviet Union, which has expressed its appreciation for Turkey's realistic and balanced attitude toward problems in Soviet Azerbaijan, is interested in upgrading relations with Turkey as much as possible, as it did in the late 1970s. Trade volume between Turkey and the Soviet Union has tripled in the last three years. In 1989 it reached \$1.3 billion. In October 1990 Turkey and the Soviet Union agreed to increase the volume of trade to \$4 billion. Estimates of the volume of trade by the end of the decade range as high as \$12 billion. The Soviets will supply the Turks with 4.1 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 1990, expand exports to six billion cubic meters by 1992 and expect to run pipelines through the Caucasus by 1994. The amount of consumer goods Turkey will exchange for gas is substantial—70 percent of the cost will be paid back by Turkish exports of goods and services. The Soviets have a large market and could become the greatest importers of Turkish goods.

These trends, however, do not mean a peace dividend for the Turks, whose defense budget for 1990 called for more than doubling the previous year's budget to \$3.4 billion—and this was before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In November 1989 then National Defense Minister Safa Giray expressed the opinion that, in an era of uncertainty, easing Turkey's defense efforts could lead to instability. Why should Turkey have such

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a large defense budget? His answer, echoed by those who have looked at Turkey's obsolete equipment, was the need for modernization. The need for a large peacetime army had become increasingly obvious: internal insecurity in the southeast (where the Kurdish separatist movement was gaining momentum) and a more general regional threat, subsequently epitomized by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. The defense budget for 1991 has been raised to \$4.8 billion, or 12.5 percent of the national budget.

Prior to the gulf crisis, the Turks' main security concern was an emerging Islamic terrorist threat within the country and increased confrontations with the separatist Kurdish movement. In the last six years, Kurdish rebels in southeastern Turkey have conducted a bloody guerrilla war that, according to Ankara, has claimed the lives of 1,432 soldiers and civilians, as well as 866 members of the Marxist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). More than 300 PKK members were killed in the last year alone. The PKK reestablished itself in Iraq following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and in conjunction with bases in Syria and Iran, has supported an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 rebels in Turkey, whose population of 57 million includes approximately ten million Kurds.

The official Turkish position has been to deny the legitimacy of a separate Kurdish identity because the political implications of doing so could threaten Turkey's claim to and control over southeastern Turkey. While Turkey has treated its Kurds better than Iran or Iraq have treated theirs, and gave temporary asylum to approximately 100,000 Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War, it has not treated them well. The biggest problem, according to domestic critics, is that the government has delegated the issue to the military. Measures taken by the military to control the separatist movement include the forced removal of 30,000 Kurds who apparently refused to set up local militias in 1989. That action drew harsh criticism from abroad. In May 1990 the European Parliament (with only 71 of 518 members present) voted for a resolution condemning terrorism in Turkey and called on the government to recognize the political, cultural and social rights of the Kurds. Following Turkey's November 1990 signing of the Paris Charter, a document which gives significant weight to minority rights, the Özal government has begun to explore such changes and has recommended lifting a ban on the use of the Kurdish language.

Turkish concern over the Kurdish problem led Ankara in 1986 to notify the United States and Iran that if Iraq were defeated by Tehran and the state were to disintegrate, it would demand the return of Mosul and the great northern oil basin of Kirkuk—a claim that dates back to Turkey's loss of the region in 1926. In the current context of a possible disintegration of Iraq, Turkish concern over the Kurdish nationality problem has again surfaced. The difficulty of incorporating even more Kurds into the Republic of Turkey would, of course, pose serious problems. It would in some ways be similar to the problem of Israel occupying even more Arab territory and coping with an additional Arab population. If Turkey has to improve its human rights record and become more democratic to win acceptance by the EC, the incorporation of more Kurds would hardly facilitate that goal. Amnesty International's annual reports repeatedly allege systematic torture and human rights violations in Turkey—violations that, many Turks feel, can be explained in part by memories of the chaos that led up to the September 1980 generals' coup and the difficulties of dealing with internal threats to security. Incorporation of Mosul would only add to such reports, reinforcing Western perceptions of a poor human rights record and precluding Turkey's admission to the EC. For these and other reasons, Turkey—along with Iran and Syria—would prefer to see Iraq keep its own borders. The territorial integrity of regional states has been one of Turkey's long-standing policies.

On the other hand, if the local Kurdish insurrection in northeastern Iraq were to become widespread, consolidate its gains and evolve into a separate Kurdish rump state, Ankara would see such a development as unacceptable. If confronted with the prospect of a nationalist, irredentist Kurdish state, many Turks would prefer to have those Kurds maintain their Kurdish identity but be under joint Iraqi and Turkish control, or under the guarantorship of Turkey, Syria and Iran. These preferences explain why, if changes are to be made in the map of the Middle East, Turkey will expect to have a seat at the table when such decisions are made.

If Turkish officials worry that the Kurdish insurgency will spread to cities throughout the southeast, they already are confronting a growing terrorist threat to secularism and democracy in some of their major cities. Some analysts have attributed the rise of terrorism by Islamic radicals to the

promotion of Islam in the 1980s, when it was regarded as a means of undercutting the ideologies of the left. Others have focused on Turkey's continuing high inflation and unemployment and, most recently, on radical support for Saddam. Whatever the cause of Islamic terrorism, 21 prominent secularists have been assassinated in Ankara, Bursa and Istanbul in 1990 alone, and Lieutenant General Teoman Koman, undersecretary of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization, has asserted that the terrorists receive considerable support from neighboring countries.

VII

The threat posed by Saddam Hussein and internal challenges from Kurdish nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists are not the only problems the Turks worry about. In recent years they have had troubles with a number of neighbors: with Bulgaria over the Turkish ethnic minority there; with Greece over Cyprus and a range of Aegean issues, not to mention treatment of the Turkish minority in Thrace; with Syria over its support for the Damascus-based Kurdish Workers' Party and Armenian terrorist groups; and with Iran over its support for Islamic causes and the export of the revolution. Prior to the war, the Turks had experienced serious differences with Iraq over control of the Kurdish minority there, as well as over control of the rate of water flow in the Euphrates, which Turkey has begun to control with its massive \$21 billion Southeastern Anatolian Project.

A country that has a serious internal insurgency, that is surrounded by potentially hostile countries and that has ambivalent allies must ultimately rely on itself. Turkey shares borders with countries that support religious and ethnic terrorist activities, that have missiles with ranges in excess of 1,000 kilometers and that do not participate in negotiations on disarmament and arms control.

For this reason, President Özal was mindful of the larger context within which Saddam Hussein's actions were to be seen. He emphasized that his stand was one of principle—it concerned the norms of international behavior and the fundamental tenets of the U.N. Charter. Özal was also mindful, however, of the very serious threat Saddam posed, and of the necessity of taking risks to effect Turkey's interests. In response to opposition critics, he stated: "I am not a gambler. I am an engineer. I know mathematics and logic, and therefore I don't think I will lose."

The risks posed by Özal's calculated policies were under-

scored by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, who accused Turkey of aggression against Iraq and warned of unspecified "consequences" that would flow from Ankara's act of "submission" to the United States. Although no Scud missiles were fired at Turkey, reports that the missiles may have been deployed within range of southeastern Turkey sparked the evacuation of some three million Turks in the area, according to U.N. officials in Geneva. Mitigating these risks was the fact that Turkey received a NATO guarantee that it will be protected if attacked by Saddam's forces.

While granting NATO allies use of Turkish installations for operations against Iraq, Özal said he would not attack Iraq unless Turkey was attacked. He correctly calculated that Saddam, preoccupied with the ground war in the south, would not risk a second front. A Scud attack would have been sufficient to elicit a retaliatory strike, but probably would not have brought Turkey into the ground war. Throughout the war, Özal downplayed the harm that could be caused by such an attack.

To be sure, a more cautious role in the allied coalition would not have earned Turkey the same measure of respect from its allies, and it would not have given the Turks so many real and potential benefits: economic assistance from a substantial number of coalition forces; military assistance and support for the modernization of Turkish forces from its NATO allies; recognition of Turkey as a leader and potential source of stability in the region, one deserving of a seat at whatever peace conferences take place in the postwar era; and the gratitude of its allies—the most clear expression of which would be admission to the EC.

VIII

While the Turks recognize the necessity of self-reliance, they clearly will not leave NATO, even as its military role is subordinated to a more political one. To do so without a countervailing force against regional enemies—whether the Soviets or the Iraqis—would be fatuous. The Bosphorus has been and continues to be one of the Soviet Union's lifelines. To leave NATO would eliminate a critical deterrent, threaten to eliminate the substantial assistance that the Turks receive and give the Greeks an unnecessary advantage in their differences with the Turks. It would also lessen the likelihood that Turkey will ever become a full member of the EC.

Within the framework of NATO, however, particularly if it is rejected by the EC, Turkey will pursue its own course. Turks

are sensitive to the fact that NATO is now considering a postcrisis regional defense arrangement in the Persian Gulf and that, as Manfred Wörner, the general secretary of NATO, has acknowledged, Turkey's participation would be essential to such a structure. Like Iran and Afghanistan, Turkey is cognizant of its vulnerability to both East and West, sensitive to the capricious character of its relations with them and aware of the necessity of walking a delicate line between power blocs and cultures. Surrounded by countries that are undergoing massive upheavals, and which are often antagonistic toward each other, the Turks increasingly realize that cautious diplomacy leaves them out in the cold, while an activist diplomacy—consistent with their self-image as an emerging regional power—requires tough choices about their friends and enemies. This holds true whether in the Black Sea, Caspian Sea or the Persian Gulf. Such choices always involve risks because one's allies tend to determine one's enemies. Nonetheless such risks must sometimes be taken, as was the case in the Gulf War.

Iran has rejected alignment with the great powers, and Afghanistan, once it reconstitutes itself, will also do so. Özal has asserted that Turkey has an important economic and political role to play in the Middle East, not the least of which involves the so-called Middle East Peace-Water Project that would include countries from the eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

The issue, here, is not Turkey's relationship with the Middle East, but whether that relationship will be established in concert with its European allies or without them. This is a reality that Europeans should ponder as they attempt to safeguard vital interests in the Persian Gulf with a security framework anchored in part in Turkey.

Turkey has earned the right to join the EC. The strategic reasons for its accession to NATO, moreover, still hold, although they have undergone a substantial reorientation. Just as Turkey's postwar geopolitical importance depended on its being seen in a European as well as a Middle Eastern context, so its importance in the aftermath of the Cold War—and the Persian Gulf War—will depend on its being seen in a Middle Eastern as well as a European context. But that vision will also depend on Turkey's being accepted as a full-fledged member of Europe. If it is, Kemal Atatürk's legacy as a westernizer will be safeguarded and Turkey will be an important model to those Muslim nations in the Middle East that contemplate what it means to be a secular, democratic republic.

ISTANBUL

A poet writing fourteen centuries ago described Istanbul as being surrounded by a garland of water, and the city still owes much of its spirit and beauty to the waters that bind and divide it. The former capital of three world empires, ~~Istanbul is the only city in the world which stands upon two continents.~~ The main part of the city lies in Europe and is separated from its Asian suburbs by the Bosphorus. The Golden Horn divides the European city into two parts, the old imperial town of Stamboul on the south bank and the more modern town of Galata on the north.

Tradition says that the original settlement of Byzantium was established where the Topkapi Palace now stands, in the seventh century B.C., although the actual date was probably much earlier. Known from the beginning as an important center of ~~trade and commerce~~, during its first millennium Byzantium had much the same history as other cities in the region. This changed when Constantine the Great, fresh from reuniting the Roman Empire under his control, decided to reconstitute the Empire with Byzantium as its capital. In 330 A.D. the city was rededicated as New Rome, which soon changed to Constantinople. For the next eleven centuries Constantinople served as the imperial and religious capital of the Byzantine Empire. This first golden age of the city is symbolized by the magnificent Haghia Sophia church, which was considered the center of the orthodox Christian world.

The combination of the Bosphorus, the Golden Horn and the great land walls built by the early rulers protected Constantinople from numerous sieges. Indeed, the city was taken by force only twice by the armies of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 and by the Ottoman Turks in 1453.

The city taken by Mehmet the Conqueror was a pale shadow of the former imperial Byzantine capital. The Ottomans repopled and rebuilt it, making it by the beginning of the sixteenth century a thriving and populous metropolis, once again the capital of a vast empire. The Ottoman empire reached its peak during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, who ruled from 1520 to 1560. This second golden age of the city is symbolized by the great Suleymaniye Mosque built in 1557.

When the Ottoman empire foundered at the end of the First World War, Istanbul was occupied by the victorious allied armies. Kemal ~~Ataturk~~, leader of the Turkish nationalist forces, decided to make a clean break with the imperial past of the city, and placed the capital of the new Turkish Republic in ~~Ankara~~. Its imperial past reflected in the unforgettable skyline of the city, Istanbul today remains a vast metropolis that continues to serve as the economic, industrial and cultural heart of Turkey.

HAGHIA SOPHIA AYA SOFYA

The history and architecture of Haghia Sophia make it one

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of the early years of the church of the Divine Wisdom, was dedicated by the Emperor Justinian on December 26 in the year A.D. 537. For nearly a thousand years it served as the cathedral of Constantinople and was the center of the religious life of the Byzantine Empire. For almost five centuries after the Turkish conquest in 1453 it ranked first among the Imperial mosques of Istanbul under the name of Aya Sofya (St. Sophia). In 1935, during the early years of the Turkish Republic, Hagia Sophia was converted into a museum. The architectural genius of the building is most evident in its magnificent dome, which was pictured by the ancients as being suspended from heaven by a golden chain.

SULTAN AHMET CAMII
THE BLUE MOSQUE

Not far from Hagia Sophia, the Sultan Ahmet Camii, commonly known as the Blue Mosque, is a splendid example of Ottoman Imperial architecture. It forms one of the principal landmarks of the Istanbul skyline, with its graceful cascade of domes and minarets, its six slender minarets and the lovely gray color of the stone set off by the gilded ornaments on domes and minarets. The blue mosque was founded by Sultan Ahmet I and constructed between 1609 and 1616. The mosque is celebrated for the light that streams in from its 260 windows as well as for the splendor of the tiles used in the interior--hence the name "Blue Mosque."

TOPKAPI SARAYI
TOPKAPI PALACE

Topkapi Sarayı, the Great Palace of the Ottoman Sultans, is the most extensive and fascinating monument of Ottoman civil architecture in existence. It served as the seat of Ottoman power for over 400 years. Perched on a hill with the Golden Horn and the Bosphorus

ROBERT COLLEGE

Located on a hill overlooking the Bosphorus in Arnavutkoy, Robert College is a private American educational high school founded in 1871 as the American College for Girls. It was the first modern high school of its kind in Turkey and produced many women who played a leading part in the life of that country. In 1971, on the occasion of its centennial, it was combined with the boy's high school of the old Robert College, taking the latter's name. (The original boys' school, located a short distance to the north on the Bosphorus, today houses Bosphorus University (Bogazici University), one of Turkey's most prestigious institutions of higher learning.) Robert College is still considered by many the best high school in Turkey, and its graduates continue to occupy prominent positions in all walks of Turkish life.

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(Smith/Blymire)
July 12, 1991
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PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: STATE DINNER
ANKARA, TURKEY
SATURDAY, JULY 20, 1991

Mr. President, ^{→ Ministers} distinguished guests and friends, ladies and gentlemen. It is indeed a privilege for Barbara and me to be in this magnificent room -- and to be received so warmly by the President of Turkey. //

I want first to thank President Ozal for inviting us to see this wonderful country. I understand better now why it is written outside Ataturk's tomb: "Ne mutlu turkum diyene." ((Nay Mut-loo Turk-um Dee-yen-eh.) "How happy am I to be a Turk." //

Standing here this morning, I could not help but think of the parallels between the founder of the modern Turkish Republic -- whose name means "Father of the Turks" -- and the man we Americans call the Father of our Country, George Washington. /

Both were great generals, capable of prosecuting a war to victory. Both realized the truth of the proverb: "Four things ~~never return~~. The spoken word. / The sped arrow. / Time past. / The neglected opportunity." And both used their words, their swords, their times and their opportunities to build great nations.

Each knew that to win a war one must secure the peace -- that one could not neglect the opportunity to make friends of former enemies. Each had a vision for his country's future that,

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Omar Ibn
Sayings
Jerusalem's
1433:1

through courage, labor and selfless determination -- became that nation's destiny. //

Then, as now, Turkey and America espoused the same ideals about human rights and personal liberty, opportunity, and prosperity. Each revered the rule of law. // Now, as then, we believe in what Ataturk called "peace at home~~x~~ and peace abroad." We know that protecting peace sometimes means being willing to defend it. // That is why we have worked together in NATO for nearly 40 years. / That is why we fought together in the Korean War. / That is why we stood together to reverse the occupation of Kuwait. //

Less than two weeks from now, on August 2, a year will have passed since Saddam Hussein unleashed his butchery of Kuwait. It has been a momentous year for the United States and Turkey. We had to rise to extraordinary challenges -- and did. // That we succeeded is a tribute to the friendship between our peoples. It is also a tribute to our willingness to sacrifice -- and to leadership from people like your President. //


I want you to know -- and I speak here on behalf of the American people -- that Turkey's role in the Gulf Crisis has not, and will not be, forgotten. // We remember how you shut down the Iraqi oil pipeline -- then, banned cross-border trade -- then, permitted allied military strikes from your bases. // We appreciate your more than 100,000 troops to the Iraqi border -- occupying over ten Iraqi divisions and helping deter further

adventurism. And we value your membership in the new rapid deployment force.//

Let me say: I know the cost of your courage. Turkey has incurred enormous damage -- especially in the Southeast -- from its compliance with U.N. sanctions, its decision to deploy troops, and its generous relief assistance to the hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis camped along its borders. //

For its part, America has tried to help. Through our chairmanship of the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, we have obtained economic assistance for Turkey. We have also made ~~large~~ assistance available on a bilateral basis. / As we look ahead, let us use the last year as a model of cooperation. / As allies, Mr. President, we must expand and deepen our relationship. We can afford no less. Our people deserve no less. //

gagme A Turkish scholar once said, "Great tasks and important missions are accomplished only through cooperative efforts." //



That is why we talked today of strengthening the bonds that link our countries. / We discussed how other countries can do what Turkey has: Eliminate illicit opium production. / We praised Turkey's ability to export to the world / attract tourists and investors / to develop the agricultural potential of this region through water projects / and to educate its people. /

Turkey's genius can advance not only prosperity at home but also peace abroad. So we detailed today the need to deal -- directly, and decisively -- with the Cyprus question. /

Alternates

→ "It is evident that many great and useful objects can be attained in this world only by cooperation. It is equally evident that there cannot be efficient cooperation if men proceed on the principle that they must not cooperate for one object unless they agree about other objects."

-T.B. Macaulay, 1839

→ "...What we want is to work with that some one else for the good of both of us - any man will speedily find that other people can benefit him just as much as he can benefit them."

-TRoosevelt, 1913

We spoke of how the international community can aid regional stability by making good on its Gulf Crisis economic support payments to Turkey. /

We focused, too, on the need to avoid strife in the Aegean Sea -- and to reach agreement on Aegean seabed issues. / We are united by this belief: Reason -- not inflated rhetoric -- can make ours a better, more peaceful world. //

Toward that end, I was pleased to talk to President Ozal of our desire for a strategic understanding with Turkey on the Gulf and Middle East. / We intend to sell Turkey 80 F-16 planes. We restated our commitment to greater FMS funding. ~~We reaffirmed our support of Turkey's membership in the European Community.~~ / I believe these acts can advance security / stability / and justice in this region and across the globe. /

There is an ancient proverb that goes, "God guides whom He wills toward a straight path." Mr. President, let our path be straight and true. Let us achieve the real peace Ataturk and General Washington dreamt of. Let us enrich this generation -- and all generations to come.

*King Fahd
toast*



In that spirit, I ask all of our guests tonight to rise and raise their glasses:

- To Turkish-American friendship;
- To a safer world for our children, and all children;
- And to the health and happiness of the people of Turkey.

#

Alternates

1) Cicero said - c. 78 B.C.

"There is nothing which God cannot accomplish."

2) Alcuin, Epistles - c. 800 -

"Man thinks, God directs."

(Smith/Blessey)
August 29, 1989
Draft One
TOAST

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: FAHD TOAST
STATE DINING ROOM
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1989

Your Majesty, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.

It is indeed a privilege for Barbara and I to have you as our guest. Three years ago, receiving us as friends, you extended that kindness for which you and Saudi Arabia are famous. This evening, we are honored to return the favor -- and to welcome you to the White House.

More than two millennia ago, a great prophet helped found the Islamic Empire. "Four things come not back," said Omar Ibn Al-Halif. "The spoken word; the sped arrow; time past; the neglected opportunity."

Well, tonight I intend to use this opportunity to salute the great leader of a great country. My close friend -- and a friend of America's. For our "time past" has indeed been time well-spent. As must our time be in the future.

Together, your Majesty, our two Nations have forged a special relationship built on the crucial role you play, regionally and internationally. And on our shared objectives of security and stability. Over years, with eight American Presidents, your country has helped subdue conflict from Lebanon

to Afghanistan. Becoming vital to the Gulf Region and the Middle East. And to the wings of peace which can uplift the world.

For that, I thank you. As does America. Now, let us go onward -- as we did in today's discussions. For our two Nations can assist the peace. By reaffirming the historic friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. And by finding new ways to strengthen old ties.

Those ties, Your Majesty, are abiding, and enduring. For they rest on respect and maturity, and close communication and consultation. Our ties are economic and military, educational and commercial. And based on the values which link our Nations -- values of faith, family, and respect for tradition.

There is an ancient proverb which goes, "God guides whom He wills toward a straight path." Your Majesty, let our path be straight and true. Bringing peace to the Middle East, and South West Asia. And so enrich this generation -- and all the generations to come.

In that spirit, I ask all of our guests tonight to rise and raise their glasses:

-- To Saudi-American friendship;
-- To a safer world for our children, and all children;
-- And to Your Majesty's health and happiness, and what you symbolize -- both for Saudi Arabia, and the world.

#



Date: 7/8/91

FACSIMILE COVER PAGE

TO

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Messages (if any): I've circled possible quotes. LC does not hold the Turkish original. Edit as you see fit and call me back

1 of 12 pages

tion is an event which
le World in surprise and
guarantees our indepen-
remains unsecured, we
arted until we attain full
each the élan with which
its the firm resolution of
plement this decision, at
en taken.

(1923)

True victory does not consist solely of triumph in
the battlefield, but it is in the reinforcement of the
sources of triumph and in the elevation of the nation,
as well.

(1923)

* *

The system which is most compatible with the
nature and spirit of the Turkish Nation is Republica-
nism.

(1924)

* *

ely suffered for having
ferent peoples making up
nicipated themselves by
by the force inherent in
not realize our own iden-
are distinct from and
hey forced us out. They
en we had become weak.
are of our error in having

(1923)

Offer the Turk something good and positive. He
will not possibly refuse it.

(1924)

* *

The origins of national struggles do not lie in
personal ambitions, but rather, in national ideals and
national honor.

(1925)

* *

Those who are uncivilized are condemned to be
trampled under the feet of civilized ones.

(1925)

of our great mission, the
illible good sense of our
principal guide and the

(1923)

* *

Great missions are accomplished but by great
nations.

(1928)

unconcerned over its might, and
and physical resources for its own
rights, and if it is incapable of
and independence through use of
remain merely a toy for others.

(1919)

**

ly does exist in this World of ours
might. However, one must prove
the nation is aware of its rights and
all sacrifices for the defense and
f.

(1919)

**

injustices committed by the Allied
weakness and inability of the Govern-
our nation has been compelled to
n to prove its existence and to take
s honor and independence against

(1919)

**

ays lead men and wise nations to
ake vigorous moves.

(1919)

**

t in Istanbul.

The national force now emerging in the country
has been given its birth in the minds and the heart of
the nation deriving its lesson from calamities.

(1919)

**

The nation must be vigilant towards its Govern-
ment. Because if the Governments' actions are nega-
tive and if the nation does not object thereto or divest
itself thereof, it would be deemed to have shared in all
the faults and the blame.

(1919)

**

Our conviction is firm as to the sacred nature of
the struggle we initiated for the defense of our rights
and independence, and as to the fact that there is no
force which is able to deprive a nation of its right to
exist.

(1920)

**

In the East and the West, almost in all corners of
the country, associations had been formed for the
defense and protection of the rights of the nation and
the country. These associations were the sole organiza-
tions issuing from a resolution well-rooted in the
nation's conscience.

(1920)

**

So far as we are concerned, the Treaty of Sèvres^(*) which envisions the elimination of our political, judicial, economic and financial independence, and which, consequently, denies and terminates our right to live, does not exist.^(**)

(1921)

* *
We wish none other than living free and independent within our national boundaries. We wish our rights to be kept inviolable, just as those enjoyed by other nations of Europe.

(1921)

We do not wish to violate the rights of others, and by the same token, we have no claim other than their respecting our right to an independent existence. All humanity and the civilized World will finally recognize the legitimate rights of the Turkish Nation which has no purpose other than to live independently, as any other civilized nation, within its national boundaries and free of foreign intervention.

Our Assembly and its government are far from being belligerent or adventuresome. Quite to the reverse, they prefer peace and deliverance. In particular they fervently wish the realization of humane and

(*) This Treaty which was signed by and between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers on August 1, 1920, was refused by Atatürk and The Grand National Assembly in Ankara. In brief, this Treaty was leaving only a few provinces in Central Anatolia for Turkey.

(**) To the United Press Correspondent.

ence of the nation will be saved by
lution.

(1919)

**

ir State and our nation shall remain
ally and externally, in the fullest

(1919)

**

our mission today is total indepen-
mission, we have committed our-
re nation and history will bear

(1921)

**

peaks of full independence, this
total political, financial, economic,
ultural etc., freedom in all respects.
nyone of those I enumerated, would
st sense, that the nation and the
dependence.

(1921)

**

inklin Bouillon, the informal emissary of France.

Regardless of how much our misfortunes may
increase, the idea to which we are committed is inde-
pendence.

(1921)

**

Total independence is possible only along with
financial independence.

(1922)

**

The nations which are enamored with indepen-
dence and liberty should always keep fresh the memory
of their moments of suffering, and the reasons and
causes for such suffering, so that proper lessons are
drawn and vigilance maintained. (*)

(1928)

** ** *

Liberty

Institutions founded on slavery of nations are
bound to be eradicated everywhere.

(1924)

*

We, the Turks, are a nation which throughout its
entire history has become a symbol of independence
and freedom.

(1927)

**

(*) His statement to the King of Afghanistan who was visiting Ankara.

to live by its own resources and
relying on outside help. Saving at a
our national principle.

(1923)

* * *

ing for causes for the rise and fall of
finds and enumerates a multitude
, social reasons. No doubt all such
events. However, what directly
ed to the very existence of a nation
ll is its economy. This truth, which
and experience, has manifested
of our nation as well. In order to
key to the level it merits, we must
the greatest importance to our
ur era is one of economy.

(1923)

* * *

ne prosperity and happiness which
quences belong only to those who

(1923)

* * *

anything else, we are searching the
untry rich, in agriculture and farm

(1924)

* * *

The people and the peasants everywhere have
underlined to me the most-wanted features of our
work program in these two words: roads and schools.

(1924)

* * *

An economically feeble country cannot escape
poverty and misery, and cannot attain an advanced
degree of civilization, of prosperity and felicity;
neither can it avert social and political disasters.

(1924)

* * *

To live as consumers is not good. We must be
productive.

(1925)

* * *

There are two different means by which to con-
quer the World; the sword and the plough! A nation
whose victory was based on the sword is liable one day
to be chased out of the occupied territory, to be ridi-
culed and to be ruined. Therefore, real conquests are
those which are made not with the sword alone, but
with the plough, as well. The sword and the plough!
Of these two conquerors, the first always succumbed
to the latter...

(1928)

* * *

It behooves everyone to do something useful for
the society. This implies the requirement to consider

We are of the opinion that the only remedy to remove the handicaps resulting from the freedom of the press, lies in that freedom itself.

(1924)

* *

The Turkish press will form an iron fortress around the Republic whereat the real voice and the will of the nation are manifested. A fortress of ideas, a fortress of concepts, if you will. The Republic has the right to demand this from the members of the press. Today, it is essential that the nation remains sincerely and solidly united. This is how the common good and happiness will be assured. The struggle is not over yet. The duty of the press to have this truth properly relayed to the ears and the conscience of the nation is of utmost importance.

(1924)

* *

My preference always is to let the public opinion face the real situation.

(1927)

* *

I do hope that in the utilization of the liberty of pen in this country, more discretion will be exhibited as befitting a democratic system. I am convinced that such discretion is particularly required in a country such as ours which has suffered so many misfortunes resulting from the abuse of liberties.

(1930)

* *

OPINION, PRESS, HISTORY

Opinion, the Press

is the collective voice of the nation. and inspiring the nation, in providing it with nourishment it needs, and in sum, nation to march along towards the path of happiness, the press constitutes a guide in itself.

(1922)

* *

and in no wise be subjected to domination.

(1923)

* *

of most importance to let the people be in the general situation.

(1924)

* *

The propagation and elevation of the ideas of "national sovereignty" and of "representative government" is not possible except through the interaction of public opinion.

(1930)

The opinion of the government must represent the opinion of the nation.

(1930)

Criticism and debate are entirely free. What keeps the government and the Assembly vigilant is the freedom of criticism.

(1930)

The press helps prevent abuses and forces the government agencies to perform their duties correctly. Press and publications constitute a most effective check. However, at this juncture, it should, also be remembered that it is easier to criticise than to create.

(1930)

The freedom to criticise public affairs creates the ground for understanding between the government and the nation. The government takes cognizance of the public opinion through the press, and when needed, enlightens such opinion by publishing the necessary documents. The mutual understanding between the

government and the nation leads to the staying united.

However grievous it may be, necessary to keep the public opinion a with the truth.

proper to link the defense of the country
person, however invaluable he may be.

(1920)

**

Any person can lead a nation to
the leading of the rebellion unto real
nation is not possible except through
ly involved. In our World, the applica-
le has become possible only with the
the task by national assemblies.

(1922)

**

tion should resort to adopting and
methods applied by another.

(1922)

**

on's salvation, deliverance and success
e should never demand these from one
The success of any person belonging to a
he success of the latter, as well. And, the
tion is possible only through formation
national character and the direction
s a unified goal.

(1923)

**

on for the existence of government is to
r in the country, as well as the peace and
nation.

(1923)

**

Legitimacy in national affairs may be obtained
only through being supported by national decisions
and by reflecting the general tendencies of the nation.

(1924)

**

The men in whom the destiny of a nation is
entrusted should never forget that they are obligated to
employ the energy and force of the nation only
towards its real and attainable interests. They should
always keep in mind that it does not suffice to invade
and occupy a country in order to establish mastery
over the owners thereof. It is not possible to overpower
a nation unless its spirit is subjugated and its resolution
and will are broken too. And, no one can overpower
the spirit of any nation which is the product of many
centuries and which is endowed with a strong and
permanent will.

Dictators strong enough to keep a nation under
servitude against its will, no longer exist on the face of
our Earth.

(1924)

**

It is painful for a country and its people to be
ravaged by the enemy. But it is even more painful for
the people to be exposed to perfidy and misfortune by
those who are of their very own race and whom they
regard as great and keep at their head.

(1924)

**

Great tasks and important missions are accomplished only through cooperative efforts.

(1925)

In success it is necessary to overcome pride and in disasters it is necessary to resist despair.

(1930)

Some leaders who lack sincerity and who do not take into consideration the gravity of war have let themselves to become the tools and agents for aggression. They have misled the nations under their control by misrepresenting and abusing nationalism and tradition. In order to avoid chaos, the time has come in this hour of crisis, for the masses to deliberate on their fate themselves and deliver their stewardship to men of high character, of morals and conscience.

This needs to be done without any delay.

(1930)

We must always be in position to render an account of our actions, before history and before the entire World.

(1930)

Ambition cannot be given up. Yet ambition must not be personal. It should be directed towards the objectives aiming at national interest.

(1937)

On an individual or national level should always be considered bad.

Unfortunate are those who identify themselves with the interests of the entire mankind with their own interests.

Nations should not be expected to feel chagrin. The duty of the leaders is to guide their nations in perceiving life with wisdom.

The men who direct and lead nations should be above and above everything else, should be above the existence and happiness of their own nations. They must at the same time wish the good of all nations.

the symbol of the independence of a
respected even when it happens to be

(1922)

**

of not having deceived my nation by
is heretofore. When I had said "I will
we can do", I was firmly convinced
could be done.

(1923)

**

never rests with one man only, it
role nation.

(1923)

**

hing to say to those who are against
. But I cannot stand the hypocrisy of
ly antagonists and yet try and present
te people who love me, as if they are

(1923)

**

that I am not necessarily any higher
member of our nation. If I have shown
, these have not really emanated from
from the common conscience of the
re not for you, and for your deep con-

scious tendencies supporting me, I would not have
been able to come up with any of those initiatives.

(1923)

We never act arbitrarily. Neither are we despots.
Our lives and all our actions have been dedicated to
fighting against those who act arbitrarily and in
despotic a manner in the affairs of the country.

(1925)

**

I have no goals other than working towards the
salvation and felicity of the nation and the country.
This should provide sufficient joy and pleasure for a
man. The comfort and happiness of the individual and
of the family are possible only through that of the
nation.

(1925)

**

We must do forthwith anything which we are
convinced is necessary.


(1925)

**

Victory belongs to whomever can say "Victory is
mine". Success belongs to whomever starts by saying
"I shall succeed" and ends by declaring his success.

(1925)

**



tivation in our national struggle was
d not personal ambitions.
(1925)

claim pride for the services we rende-
omfort in the hope that the services
er will indeed merit pride.
(1925)

you cannot imagine how happy I am
member of a nation such as yours. I
self, because I happen to belong to
(1925)

help from the dead is a disgrace for a
(1925)

has no language. It is ineffable; it can
es and the looks.
(1925)

t nation has always appreciated and
ons who strive to see and succeed in

occasion of a torch-light procession conducted in his honor

seeing the direction towards which its desires and abili-
ties point.
(1926)

Do not fear of speaking the truth.
(1926)

One day my humble body will surely return to
earth. But, the Republic of Turkey will remain per-
petual and the Turkish nation will continue marching
resolutely down the path towards civilization, in accor-
dance with such principles as will guarantee its security
and happiness.
(1926)

Life means strife and struggle. And success in life
is possible only through absolute success in strife. and,
this is a matter which requires power and strength,
both moral and physical.
(1927)

Dear fellow citizens!
The greatest support and source of strength in
my life has been the trust of and assistance from my
fellow citizens. In all my undertakings, the greatest
worry my conscience has had, has been always to care
for and respect the sacred nature of your trust.
(1927)