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OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The New Encyclopædia Britannica

in 30 Volumes

MACROPÆDIA
Volume 13

Knowledge in Depth

FOUNDED 1768
15TH EDITION

Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
William Benton, Publisher, 1943–1973
Helen Hemingway Benton, Publisher, 1973–1974
Chicago/Geneva/London/Manila/Paris/Rome
Seoul/Sydney/Tokyo/Toronto

Ottoman Empire and Turkey, History of the

A term without ethnic significance, "Ottoman" is a dynastic application derived from the Arabic "'Uthmān," for Turkish Osman, who is regarded as the founder of the empire that spanned six centuries and came to an end only in 1922, when Turkey was proclaimed a republic. This empire, centred in Anatolia, varied greatly in extent during its history. At its height it included modern Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the islands of the eastern Mediterranean; parts of Hungary and Russia; Iraq, Syria, Palestine, the Caucasus, and Egypt; North Africa as far west as Algeria; and parts of Arabia. For the previous history of the Turkish tribes, see SELJUQS; and for the history of the area of modern Turkey before the Ottomans, see ANATOLIA, ANCIENT.

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In this article the most recent research into contemporary Ottoman sources is used to fix the major dates of the first century of Ottoman expansion. These replace dates traditionally accepted on the basis of inadequate non-Ottoman sources or limited research into conflicting Ottoman documents.

I. The period of growth and world power

THE OTTOMAN STATE TO 1481: THE AGE OF EXPANSION

The first period of Ottoman history was characterized by almost continuous territorial expansion, during which the Ottoman dominion spread out from a small northwestern Anatolian principality to cover an empire encompassing southeastern Europe, Anatolia, and the Arab world. At the same time, the political, economic, and social institutions of the Middle East were amalgamated with those inherited from Byzantium and the great Turkish empires of central Asia and re-established in new forms that were to be characteristic of the area into modern times.

Origins and expansion of the Ottoman state, c. 1300–1402. In their initial stages of expansion, the Ottomans were leaders of the Turkish *gazis*, or fighters for the faith of Islām, against the shrinking Christian Byzantine state. The ancestors of Osman, the founder of the dynasty, were members of the Kayı tribe who had entered Anatolia along with a mass of Oğuz Turkmen nomads who overwhelmed Byzantium after the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 and came to occupy eastern and central Anatolia during the 12th century. The *gazis* fought against the Byzantines and then the Mongols, who invaded Anatolia following the establishment of the Il-Khanid Empire in Iran and Mesopotamia starting in the last half of the 13th century. Following the Mongol defeat of the Seljuq army in 1293, Osman I emerged as prince *(amīr)* of the border principality of Bithynia, in northwestern Anatolia, and was in command of the *gazis* leading the fight against the Byzantines in that area. With the disintegration of Seljuq power and its replacement by Mongol suzerainty, independent Turkmen principalities emerged in parts of Anatolia not occupied by the Mongols, among which was that led by Osman. Hemmed in on the east by the more powerful Turkmen principality of Germiyan, Osman and his immediate successors concentrated their attacks on Byzantine territories bordering the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara. The Ottomans became the main focus for the mass of nomads and urban unemployed then searching for means to gain their livelihoods and to fulfill their religious desire to spread Islām. The Ottomans were able to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the decay of the Byzantine Empire (*q.v.*) and, starting under Osman I and continuing under his successors Orhan (ruled 1324–60) and Murad I (ruled 1360–89), took over Byzantine territories, first in western Anatolia and then in southeastern Europe. It was only under Bayezid I (ruled 1389–1402) that the wealth and power gained by this initial expansion were used to assimilate the Anatolian Turkish principalities to the east.

gazis


By 1300 Osman ruled an area stretching from Eskişehir (Dorylaeum) to the plains of İznik (Nicaea), having defeated several organized Byzantine efforts to curb his expansion, and the emperor's use of mercenary troops from western Europe caused more damage to his own territory than to that of the Turks. At the time, however, the Ottomans lacked effective siege equipment and were unable to take the major cities of Bithynia. Nor could they move against their increasingly powerful Turkmen neighbours at Aydın and Karası, in southwestern Anatolia. Orhan's capture of Bursa in 1324 provided the first means for developing the administrative, financial, and military power necessary to make the principality into a real state and to create an army. It was Orhan who began the military policy of employing Christian mercenary troops, thus lessening his dependence on the nomads as well as providing better fighting forces. Orhan soon was able to capture the remaining Byzantine towns in northwestern Anatolia: Nicaea (İznik; 1331), Nicomedia (İzmit; 1337), and Scutari (Üsküdar; 1338).

Capture of Bursa

He then moved against his major Turkmen neighbours to the south. Taking advantage of internal conflicts he annexed Karası in 1345 and gained control of the area between the Gulf of Edremit and Kapı Dağı (Cyzicus), reaching the Sea of Marmara. He thus put himself in a position to end Aydın's lucrative monopoly in providing mercenary troops to competing Byzantine factions in Thrace and Constantinople. In 1346 Orhan replaced Aydın as the principal ally of the Byzantine emperor John VI Cantacuzenus. The consequent entry of Ottoman troops into Europe gave them a direct opportunity to see the possibilities for conquest offered by the decline of Byzantium. The collapse of Aydın following the death (1348) of its ruler, Umur Bey, left the Ottomans alone as the leaders of the *gazis* against the Byzantines. Orhan helped Cantacuzenus take the throne of Byzantium from John V Palaeologus and as reward secured the right to ravage Thrace and to marry the emperor's daughter Theodora. Ottoman raiding parties began to move regularly through Gallipoli into Thrace. Huge quantities of captured booty strengthened Ottoman power.

Starting in 1354, Orhan's son Süleyman transformed Gallipoli, on the European side of the Dardanelles, into a base for expansion into Europe and refused to leave, despite the protests of Cantacuzenus and others. From this base, his bands moved into the Balkans, up the Maritsa River, raiding as far as Adrianople. Cantacuzenus soon fell from power, at least partly because of his

Gallipoli as base for expansion



Expansion of the Ottoman Empire.
From S. Fischer, *The Middle East: A History* (1960); Alfred A. Knopf


cooperation with the Turks, and Europe began to be aware of the extent of the Turkish danger.

It was only under Orhan's son Murad I that Gallipoli was used for permanent conquests. Constantinople itself was bypassed because its thick walls and well-organized defenses, despite the weakness and disorganization of its defenders, remained too strong for the rudimentary Ottoman army. Murad's initial conquests were northward into Thrace, culminating with the capture in 1361 of Adrianople—the second city of the Byzantine Empire; renamed Edirne, the city became the new Ottoman capital, providing the Ottomans with a centre for the administrative and military control of Thrace. As the main fortress between Constantinople and the Danube, it controlled the principal invasion road through the Balkan mountains, assured Ottoman retention of their European conquests, and gave them the means for further expansion to the north. Murad then moved through the Maritsa Valley and captured Philippopolis (Filibe) in 1363. Control of the main sources of Constantinople's grain and tax revenues enabled Murad to force the emperor to accept his suzerainty. The death of the Serbian emperor Stefan Dušan in 1355 left his successors too divided and weak to defeat the Ottomans, despite an alliance with King Louis the Great of Hungary and Tsar Shishman of Bulgaria in the first European crusade against the Ottomans. The Byzantine emperor John V tried to mobilize European assistance by uniting the churches of Constantinople and Rome, but only further divided Byzantium without assuring any concrete help from the West. Murad was thus able to rout the allies at Chirmen, on the Maritsa in 1371, increasing his own confidence and demoralizing his smaller enemies, who rapidly accepted his suzerainty without further resistance. Murad next inaugurated an Ottoman empire of vassals in Europe. He retained local native rulers, who in return accepted his suzerainty, paid annual tributes, and provided contingents for his army when required to do so. This policy enabled the Ottomans to avoid a great deal of local resistance to conquest by assuring rulers and subjects alike that their lives, properties, traditions, and positions would be preserved if they peacefully accepted Ottoman rule. It also enabled the Ottomans to govern the newly conquered areas without building up a vast administrative system of their own or maintaining occupation garrisons.

Creation of European vassals

Moving rapidly to consolidate his empire south of the Danube, Murad captured Macedonia (1371–87), central Bulgaria (including Monastir (1382), Sofia (1385), and Niš (Nish) (1386), and Serbia, all culminating in the climactic defeat of the Balkan allies at the Battle of Kosovo (Kosovo Polje) in 1389. South of the Danube, only Walachia, Bosnia, Albania, Greece, and the Serbian fort of Belgrade remained outside Ottoman rule, and to the north, Hungary alone was in a position to resist further Muslim advances.

Murad was killed during the Battle of Kosovo. His son and successor Bayezid I was unable to take advantage of his father's victory to achieve further European conquest, and was, in fact, compelled to restore the defeated vassals and return to Anatolia to face the rising threat of the Turkmen principality of Karaman, created on the ruins of the Seljuq Empire of Anatolia, with its capital at Konya. Bayezid's predecessors had avoided forceful annexation of Turkmen territory in order to concentrate on Europe. They had, however, expanded by such peaceful means as marriage alliances and the purchase of territories. The acquisition of territory in central Anatolia from the amirates of Hamid and Germiyan had brought the Otto-



mans into direct contact with Karaman for the first time. Murad had been compelled to take some military action to prevent Karaman from occupying his newly acquired territories, but once this was accomplished he had turned back to Europe leaving the unsolved problem to his successor son. Karaman willingly cooperated with Serbia in stirring opposition to Ottoman rule among Murad's vassals in both Europe and Anatolia. It had strengthened the Balkan Union that was routed by the Ottomans at Kosovo, and had stimulated a general revolt in Anatolia that Bayezid was forced to meet by an open attack as soon as he was able to do so. By the end of 1390, Bayezid had overwhelmed and annexed all the remaining Turkmen principalities in western Anatolia. He attacked and defeated Karaman in 1391, annexed several Turkmen states in eastern Anatolia, and was preparing to complete his conquest in the area when he was forced to turn back to Europe to deal with a revolt of some of his Balkan vassals, encouraged and helped by Hungary and Byzantium. Bayezid quickly smashed the rebels (1390–93), occupied Bulgaria and put it under direct Ottoman administration for the first time, and put Constantinople under siege. In response, Hungary organized a major European crusade against the Ottomans. The effort was beaten back by Bayezid at Nicopolis (Niğbolu) on the Danube in 1396. Europe was terrorized and Ottoman rule south of the Danube was so assured, and Bayezid's prestige in the Islāmic world was so extended that he was given the title of *sulṭān* by the shadow ʿAbbāsid caliph of Cairo—this despite the opposition of the caliph's Mamlūk masters, the rulers of Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Cities, who wanted to retain the title only for themselves.

Turning back to Anatolia to complete the conquests aborted by his move against the crusaders, Bayezid thoroughly overran Karaman, the last Turkmen principality, in 1397. His advances, however, now attracted the attention of Timur (Tamerlane), who had been building a powerful Tatar empire in Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Mesopotamia, and whose invasion of India in 1398 had been halted by his fear of the rising Ottoman power on his western flank. Encouraged by several Turkmen princes who had fled to his court when their territories were taken by Bayezid, Timur decided to destroy Bayezid's empire before resuming his campaigns in India and thus invaded Anatolia. As Bayezid and Timur moved toward battle, the former's Turkmen vassals and Muslim followers deserted him because he had abandoned the old Ottoman *gazi* tradition of advancing against the infidel. Left only with forces provided by his Christian vassals, Bayezid was decisively overwhelmed by Timur at the Battle of Ankara in 1402. Taken captive by the victor, he died within a year.

Restoration of the Ottoman Empire, 1402–81. Timur's objective in Anatolia had not been conquest, and he followed his victory by retiring from Anatolia after restoring to power the Turkmen princes who had joined him. Even Bayezid's sons were able to assume control over the family's former possessions in western Anatolia, and the Ottoman Empire in Europe was left largely untouched. At this time a strong European crusade might have pushed the Ottomans out of Europe altogether, but weakness and division south of the Danube and diversion in other matters to the north left an opportunity for the Ottomans to restore what had been torn asunder without significant loss.

But internal divisions were to hinder Ottoman efforts to restore their power. Bayezid's four sons fought for the right of succession. His eldest son Süleyman assumed control in Europe, with his capital at Edirne, and gained the support of the Christian vassals and those who had stimulated Bayezid to turn toward conquest in the East. The descendants of the Turkmen notables who had assisted the early Ottoman conquests in Europe supported the claims of Mehmed, who with the additional support of the Anatolian Muslim religious orders and artisan guilds was able to defeat and kill his brothers Mûsa Bey, who had established his capital at Bursa, and İsa Bey of Balıkesir, in southwestern Anatolia, as well as Süleyman, and so assume undisputed possession of the entire empire as Sultan Mehmed (Muḥammad) I. He was to reign from 1413 to 1420.

Under Mehmed and Murad II (ruled 1421–51), there was a new period of expansion in which Bayezid's empire was restored and new additions made. Mehmed restored the vassal system in Bulgaria and Serbia and promised the vassal princes that he would not undertake new European adventures and would restore his position within the state. Murad II was also compelled to devote most of the early years of his reign to internal problems, and particularly to the efforts of the *gazi* commanders and Balkan vassal princes in Europe, as well as the Turkmen vassals and princes in Anatolia, to retain the autonomy and even independence gained during the decade following the Battle of Ankara. In 1422–23, Murad suppressed the Balkan resistance and put Constantinople under a new siege that ended only after the Byzantines had provided him with huge amounts of tribute. He then restored Ottoman rule in Anatolia and eliminated all of the Turkmen principalities left by Timur with the exception of Karaman and Candar (Jandar), which he left autonomous though tributory so as not to excite the renewed fears of Timur's successors in the east. Murad then inaugurated the first Ottoman war with Venice (1423–30), which had maintained friendly relations with the sultans in order to develop a strong trade position in the Ottoman dominions and the Black Sea area. Venice, however, had accepted Salonica from Byzantium in order to prevent Ottoman expansion across Macedonia to the Adriatic, which it considered to be a Venetian lake. The war was indecisive for some time; Venice was diverted by conflicts in Italy, and the Ottomans needed time to build a naval force sufficient to compete with that of the Venetians. In addition, Murad was diverted by an effort of Hungary to establish its rule in Walachia, between the Danube and the Transylvanian Alps, a move which inaugurated a series of Ottoman-Hungarian conflicts that were to occupy much of the remainder of his reign. Murad finally built a fleet strong enough to blockade Salonica and enable his army to take it (1430), after which Ottoman naval raids against Venetian ports in the Adriatic and the Aegean compelled Venice in 1432 to make a peace in which it abandoned its efforts to prevent the Ottoman advance to the Adriatic, and was allowed to assume a role as the leading commercial power in the sultan's dominions.

Outbreak of Venetian War

Murad, who had been put on the throne by Turkish notables who had joined the Ottoman state during the first century of its existence, soon began to resent the power they had gained in return as well as in consequence of the great new estates they had built up in the conquered areas of Europe and Anatolia. To counteract their power, he began to build up the power of various non-Turkish groups in his service, particularly those composed of Christian slaves and converts to Islām, whose military arm was organized into a new infantry organization called the Janissary corps. To strengthen this group, Murad began to distribute most of his new conquests to its members, and to add new supporters of this sort he developed the famous *devşirme* system by which Christian youths were drafted from the Balkan provinces for conversion to Islām and life service to the sultan. With their revenues and numbers increasing, the *devşirme* men and their supporters achieved considerable political power. Because the new European conquests were being used by the sultan to build up the *devşirme* relative to the Turkish notables, the former wanted them to continue and expand, while the latter opposed them. Murad, wanting to return to aggressive policies of European expansion in order to help the *devşirme* reduce the power of the Turkish notables, renewed the struggle with Hungary in Serbia and Wallachia starting in 1434. He took advantage of the death in 1437 of the Hungarian king Sigismund to reoccupy Serbia, excepting Belgrade, and to ravage much of Hungary, and he then annexed Serbia in 1439, beginning a policy of replacing the vassals with direct Ottoman rule throughout the empire. Hungarian control of Belgrade was now the major bar to large-scale advances north of the Danube. Ottoman attacks on it and raids on Transylvania failed to move the Hungarians, largely because

Organization of the Janissary corps

of the leadership of János Hunyadi (*q.v.*), originally a leader of the Walachian border resistance to the *gazis* in 1440–42. Although Murad finally defeated Hunyadi at the Battle of Zlatica (Izladi) in 1443, the increased influence of the Turkish notables at Murad's court led the sultan to agree to the Peace of Adrianople in 1444. By its terms Serbia regained its autonomy, Hungary kept Wallachia and Belgrade, and the Ottomans promised to end their raids north of the Danube. In 1444 Murad also made peace with his main Anatolian enemy, Karaman, and retired to a life of religious contemplation, voluntarily passing the throne to his son Mehmed II who, still very young, already showed the qualities of leadership that were later to distinguish his long reign. The Byzantines and the pope sought to use the opportunity created by the existence of a youthful sultan to push the Ottomans out of Europe, organizing a new crusade joined by Hungary and Venice when the pope assured them that they were not bound to honour the peace treaty they had signed with Muslim infidels. A crusader army moved through Serbia across the Balkan Mountains to the Black Sea at Varna, where it was to be supplied and transported to Constantinople by a Venetian fleet, which was to sail through the Straits, at the same time using its power to prevent Murad from returning from Anatolia with the bulk of the Ottoman army. Though the crusaders reached Varna, a Serbian decision to remain loyal to the sultan, combined with Venetian reluctance to fulfill its part of the agreement for fear of losing its trade position should the Ottomans win, left the crusaders stranded. Further quarrels among the crusade leaders gave Murad time to return from Anatolia and organize a new army. The Turkish victory at Varna on November 10, 1444, ended the last important European crusading effort against the Ottomans. Murad now reassumed the throne and brought back to power with him the *devşirme* party, whose insistent demands for conquest led him to spend the remainder of his reign eliminating the vassals and establishing direct rule in much of Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Greece. In the process, he divided the newly acquired lands into estates the revenues of which further increased the power of the *devşirme* at the expense of the Turkish notables. Only Albania was able to resist because of the leadership of its national hero, Skanderbeg (George Kastrioti). He was routed by the sultan at the second Battle of Kosovo (1448). By the time of Murad's death in February 1451, the Danube frontier was secure, and it seemed that the Ottoman Empire was in Europe to stay.

New European crusade

Whereas the victory at Varna brought new power to the *devşirme* party, the grand vizier Candarlı Halil Paşa was able to retain a dominant position for the Turkish notables whom he led by keeping the confidence of the sultan and by successfully dividing his opponents. Prince Mehmed therefore became the candidate of the *devşirme*, and it was only with his accession that they were able to achieve the political and military power made possible by the financial base built up during the previous two decades. Under Sultan Mehmed II (1451–81), the *devşirme* increasingly came to dominate, and to press their desire for new conquests in order to take fuller advantage of the situation created at Varna. Constantinople became their first objective. To Mehmed and his supporters, the Ottoman dominions in Europe could never reach their full extent or be molded into a real empire so long as their natural administrative and cultural centre remained outside their hands. The grand vizier (the sultan's chief adviser) and other Turkish notables bitterly opposed the attack, ostensibly because it might draw a new crusade, but in fact because of their fear that the capture of the Byzantine capital might bring about a final triumph of the *devşirme*. The siege (April 6–May 29, 1453) and conquest of Constantinople and its transformation into the Ottoman capital of Istanbul marked an important new state in Ottoman history. Internally, it saw the end of power and influence for the old Turkish nobility, whose leaders soon were executed or exiled and whose properties were confiscated, and the triumph of the *devşirme* and their supporters. Externally, the conquest made Mehmed II the most famous ruler in the Muslim world, even though the lands of the old caliphate still remained in the hands of the Mamlūks of Egypt and Timur's successors in Iran. Moreover, it was not long before possession of Constantinople stimulated Mehmed to nourish an ambition to place under his dominion not merely the Islāmic and Turkic worlds but also a re-created Byzantine Empire and, perhaps, the entire world of Christendom.

Final attack on Constantinople

To pursue these objectives, Mehmed II developed various bases of power. Domestically, his primary objective was to restore Istanbul as the political, economic, and social centre of the area that it formerly had dominated. To this end, he worked to repopulate the city, not only with its former inhabitants but also with elements of all the conquered peoples of the empire, whose residence and intermingling there would provide a microcosm for a similar process that Mehmed hoped would weld the entire empire into a powerful and integrated whole. Special tax concessions were established to encourage the most active and skilled of his subjects to settle in the capital. The major religious groups were allowed to establish their own self-governing communities, called *millets*, under the leadership of their religious chiefs, each retaining its own civil laws, traditions, and language under the general protection of the sultan. Mehmed also worked to restore the physical aspects of the city. Old buildings were repaired; streets, aqueducts, and bridges were constructed; sanitary facilities were modernized; and a vast supply system was set up to provide for the city's inhabitants. Great attention was paid to restoring Istanbul's industry and trade, with special concessions to attract merchants and artisans from all parts of the empire.

Restoration of Istanbul

Mehmed also devoted much time in expanding his dominions in Europe and Asia in order to establish his claim to world leadership. To this end, he eliminated the last princes who might dispute his claims to be legitimate successor to the Byzantine and Seljuq dynasties, and replaced the remaining vassal princes with direct, Ottoman administration. In addition, he extended Ottoman rule far beyond the territories inherited from Murad II; from 1454 to 1463, he concentrated mainly on southeastern Europe, annexing Serbia (1454–55), conquering the Morea (1458–60), and eliminating in the process the last major claimants to the Byzantine throne. When Venice refused to surrender its important forts on the Aegean coast of the Morea, Mehmed inaugurated the second Venetian-Ottoman war (1463–79). At the same time he annexed Trebizond (1461) and the Genoese commercial colonies that had survived along the Black Sea coast of Anatolia, including Sinop and Kafa, and began the process by which the Crimean Tatar *khāns* were compelled to accept Ottoman suzerainty. In 1463 he occupied and annexed Bosnia, helped by the native Bogomils, an evangelical Christian sect that had been badly treated by the Catholic Hungarians. When Albania continued to hold out, helped by supplies sent by sea from Venice, Mehmed sent in large numbers of Turkmen irregulars, who in the process of conquering Albania settled there and formed a Muslim community. Whereas the papacy and Venice were unable to raise a new crusade, they were able to divert Mehmed by encouraging attacks by his Eastern enemies, the Turkmen principality of Karaman and the Tatar Ak Koyunlu ("White Sheep") dynasty, which under the leadership of Uzun Ḥasan, had replaced Timur's descendants in Iran. Mehmed, however, skillfully used dynastic divisions to conquer Karaman in 1468, extending direct Ottoman rule in Anatolia to the Euphrates. When Uzun Ḥasan responded by invading Anatolia in the company of many Turkmen princes, Venice intensified its attacks in the Morea, Hungary moved into Serbia, and Skanderbeg attacked Bosnia. Mehmed, however, was able to defeat these enemies, one after the other. In 1473 he routed Uzun Ḥasan, who acknowledged Ottoman rule in all of Anatolia and returned to Iran. This brought the Ottomans into conflict with the Mamlūk empire in Syria, which Mehmed neutralized, though he could not defeat it. He then turned to Venice, and several naval raids along the Adriatic coast finally led to a peace in 1479 whereby Venice surrendered its bases in Albania and the

Second Venetian war

Morea and agreed to pay a regular annual tribute in return for restoration of its commercial privileges. Mehmed then used his new naval power to send a large force that landed at Otranto in southern Italy in August 1480, and to attack Rhodes. Success seemed within sight when his premature death in 1481 brought his effort to an end. But he had, indeed, laid the foundations for Ottoman rule in Anatolia and southeastern Europe that was to survive for the next four centuries.

Restoration of Istanbul

In addition to conquering a large empire, Mehmed worked to consolidate it and to codify the political, administrative, religious, and legal institutions developed during the previous century in a series of law codes called *kanun-names*. The immensity of the task, however, and his diversion in numerous campaigns delayed the process to such an extent that it was completed only during the mid-16th century. Nor was Mehmed overly successful in building the economic and social bases of his empire. His most important problem was securing sufficient money to finance his military expeditions and the new apparatus of government and society. The tax systems inherited from his predecessors did not provide the required money, particularly because most of the conquered lands were turned into estates whose taxes went entirely to their holders in return for military and administrative services. Mehmed therefore turned to a number of expedients that achieved their immediate objectives, but at the cost of grave economic and social difficulties. He regularly withdrew all coins from circulation and issued new ones with a larger proportion of base metal alloys. To enforce acceptance of the new issues, he sent armed bands around the empire with the right to confiscate without compensation all of the older and more valuable coins that had not been voluntarily exchanged for the new. The debasement of the coinage soon caused a rapid inflation, and this in turn greatly disturbed the industry and trade that the sultan had hoped to assist. In addition, in his search for revenues, Mehmed created monopolies over the production and use of essential goods, distributing them among the highest bidders, who in turn charged excessive prices and created artificial scarcities to secure their profits. Finally, Mehmed established the principle that all revenue-producing property belonged to the sultan. In pursuance of this, he confiscated much private property and religious foundation lands, creating tremendous resentment and opposition among those who lost their revenues, including members of the religious *'ulamā'* class, the Turkish notables, and even some *devşirme* men, whose discontent threatened to undermine both state and sultan. It was only by playing these groups off against each other that Mehmed was able to maintain his own position and power and to continue his conquests.

Financial difficulties

Second Venetian war

Ottoman institutions in the 14th and 15th centuries. Ottoman dynasts were transformed from simple tribal leaders to border princes (*uc bey*) and *gazi* leaders under Seljuq and then Il-Khānid suzerainty in the 13th and early 14th centuries. With the capture of Bursa, Orhan had been able to declare himself independent of his suzerains and assume the title of *bey*, which was retained by his successors until Bayezid I was named sultan by the shadow 'Abbāsid caliph of Cairo following his victory over the Christian crusaders at the Battle of Nicopolis (1396). These title changes were not immaterial in the position of the Ottoman ruler within the state and in the organization of the state itself. As *uc bey* and even *bey*, the Ottoman leader remained little more than a tribal chief, sharing administrative and military leadership with the Turkmen chiefs surrounding him. Like the tribal chiefs, he had the right to the loyalty and obedience of his followers only so long as he led them to victory, and only in relation to his military functions. Beyond this, he was only one among equals in the councils that decided general internal policies; the tribes and clans remained autonomous in their internal affairs. The *bey* was accessible to the tribe and clan leaders as well as to their followers. He could intervene in disputes among the clans, but jurisdiction was limited indeed. Muslim law and jurists had little influence, whereas Turkish tribal law and custom prevailed. In such a situation, the idea of rule was very limited; administration was conceived mainly in financial terms, with each clan or family or tribe accepting Ottoman military leadership largely for the financial rewards it could bring. Ottoman chiefs collected the booty in conquered lands, and following the conquest had the right to collect taxes from lands left in their possession. The only advantage that the *bey* had over the chiefs surrounding him was, as tribal war leader, the right called *pençik*, to collect an extra fifth of the booty taken by his followers. Because the *bey* was dependent for his power and revenues on the assent of his followers, his authority was limited in scope and in time.

Powers of Ottoman rulers

But as the territory of the Ottoman principality expanded, and the Ottomans fell heirs to the administrative apparatus left by the Byzantines, this simple tribal organization was replaced by a more complex form of government, so that by the time the Ottoman rulers became sultans, they already had far more extensive power and authority than had been the case a half-century earlier. The simple tribal organization of the Ottoman *bey* could suffice only for so long as the state was small enough for the individual tribal leaders to remain on their lands and fight the nearby enemy at the same time. But as the principality expanded and the frontiers and enemies became further removed from previously conquered territory, the financial and administrative functions at home had to be separated from the military. Taxes had to be collected to exploit the conquered territories and support the officers and soldiers while they were away. The treasury of the sultan had to be separated from that of the state so that each would have an independent income and organization. Throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ottoman state gradually evolved its institutions of government and the army to meet the needs of administering and defending an expanding empire. As this was done, it was natural that it should be influenced by those states that had preceded it, not only in the areas it came to rule, but also in the lands of its ancestors. So it was that the developing Ottoman state was influenced by the traditions of the nomadic Turkic empires of Central Asia, particularly in military organization and tactics. It was also influenced heavily by the classical High Islāmic civilization of the 'Abbāsids, as passed through the hands of the Seljuqs, particularly in the development of orthodox Islām as the basis of its institutions of administration, religion, law, and education, and in the development of the *mukataa* as the basic unit of its administrative and financial systems. In the court hierarchy, the central financial structure, and the tax and administrative organizations developed in the European provinces, the Ottomans were influenced by the Byzantines and, to a lesser extent, by the Serbian and Bulgarian empires. Whereas conversion to Islām was not demanded of those conquered at this time, many Christians and Jews voluntarily converted to secure full status in the new empire. Most, however, continued to practice their old religions without restriction. A particularly important source of Christian influence during the 14th century came from the close marriage ties between the Ottoman and Christian courts. Sultan Orhan married Theodora, daughter of Byzantine emperor John VI Cantacuzenus. Theodora was the mother of Murad I, who in turn married Byzantine and Bulgarian princesses, whereas Bayezid I married Despina, daughter of the Serbian prince Lazar. Each of these marriages brought Christian followers and advisers into the Ottoman court, and it was under their influence that Bayezid I in particular abandoned the simple nomadic courts and practices of his predecessors and isolated himself behind elaborate court hierarchies and ceremonials borrowed primarily from the Byzantines. At the same time, the Greek and Serbian languages tended to dominate Ottoman court life, and to a lesser extent its administration.

Influences of early states

The triumph of Sultan Mehmed I in 1413 was due at least in part to the support of the Turkish notables and Muslim religious orders of Anatolia who strongly resented the Christian predominance in Bayezid's court and

attributed his abandonment of the *gazi* tradition and attacks in Turkish Muslim Anatolia to their influence. As a result, Turkish and Muslim influences dominated the Ottoman court during the 15th century, although the hierarchies, institutions, and ceremonies introduced in the previous century remained largely without change.

Growth of administration

The same process that isolated the sultans from their subjects also removed them from the daily administration of government. Formal institutions of administration therefore had to be evolved to take their place, with the rulers delegating more and more of their duties to executive ministers, to whom the Seljuq title *vezīr* (vizier) was given. The continued close connections of the Ottoman family with the urban guilds and orders of Anatolia, many of the members of which were descendants of officials of the Great Seljuq and Il-Khānid empires, as well as the empire of the Seljuqs of Konya, provided continuity with the Islāmic Turkish traditions of government. With them came the basic unit of Islāmic administrative and financial organization, the *mukataa*, which intimately associated each office with a source of revenues and made each official the collector of his own salary, at the same time that it circumscribed his administrative powers within those tasks directly involved with the financial function. It was relatively simple for the Ottomans to preserve previous methods of taxing on the local levels in different parts of the empire while weaving them into a united whole through the veneer provided by the *mukataa* units in which the resulting tax revenues were assigned to Ottoman officials.

As the central administration was divided into functional departments, a vizier was appointed to direct each. Most of the early viziers were former Turkmen princes who had entered Ottoman service, though some, particularly under Bayezid I, were Christians and Christian converts. State policy was discussed and decided in a council (*divan*) of these viziers, who were joined by religious, judicial, and military leaders under the direction and chairmanship of the sultan. As the duties of the state became more extensive and complex, the individual viziers gained increased financial and political power, and as the Byzantine influence caused the sultan to isolate himself, it was inevitable that the viziers would come to dominate. As if to emphasize his removal from the daily affairs of state, the sultan began to appoint one of his viziers as his chief minister, or grand vizier. From 1360 to the conquest of Constantinople, this powerful position was reserved for members of the Çandarlı family, which came to lead and represent the powerful and assertative Turkmen notable families, who thus benefitted most from the 14th-century expansion of the empire.

Office of grand vizier

The first Ottoman army had been composed entirely of Turkmen nomads, who had remained largely under the command of their own tribe and clan leaders, and under the influence of the *şeyh*s of the heterodox and mystic religious orders that had converted most of them to Islām. Armed with bows and arrows and spears, these nomadic cavalrymen had lived mostly on booty, but those assigned as *gazi*s to border areas or sent to conquer and raid Christian lands had also been given more permanent revenues in the form of taxes levied on the lands they garrisoned. These revenue holdings were formalized as *mukata'a*s, with the tribal leaders and *gazi* commanders holding them and collecting their revenues to feed, supply, and arm their followers. It was this type of *mukataa* that developed into the Ottoman form of fief called *timar*, that was the basis of Ottoman military and administrative organization as the European portions of the empire were conquered from the vassals in the 15th century and placed under direct Ottoman administration.

These troops had predominated through Orhan's reign until he had seen that such mounted and undisciplined men were of limited use in besieging and taking large cities. In addition, once he had established his state, he had found it difficult to maintain order with such an army because the nomads still preferred to maintain themselves by the traditional forms of looting, in the lands of their commander as well as in those of the enemy. To replace the nomads, Orhan had organized a separate standing army of hired mercenaries paid by salary rather than booty or by *timar* estates. Those mercenaries organized as infantry were called *yaya*s, those organized as cavalry, *müsellem*s. Although the new force included some Turkmen who were content to accept salaries in place of booty, most of its men were Christian soldiers from the Balkans who were not required to convert to Islām as long as they obeyed their Ottoman commanders. As Murad I had conquered more and more of southeastern Europe these forces had become mainly Christian, and as they came to dominate the Ottoman army, the older Turkmen cavalrymen were maintained mainly as irregular shock troops, called *akıncı*s, who were compensated only by booty. As the *yaya*s and *müsellem*s expanded in numbers, their salaries became too burdensome for the Ottoman treasury, so in most cases the newly conquered lands were assigned to their commanders in the form of *timar*s. It was this new regular army that developed the techniques of battle and siege used to achieve most of the 14th-century Ottoman conquests, but because it was commanded by members of the Turkish notable class, it became the major vehicle for their rise to predominance over the sultans, whose direct military supporters were limited to the vassal contingents.

Growth of a regular army

Only late in the 14th century did Murad I and Bayezid I attempt to build up their personal power by building a military slave force for the sultan under the name *kapı-kulu* (pl. *kapikullari*), or slaves of the Porte. Murad based the new force on his right to a fifth of the war booty, which he interpreted to include captives taken in battle. As these men entered his service, they were converted to Islām and trained as Ottomans, gaining the knowledge and experience required for service in the government, as well as the army, while remaining in the sultan's personal service. During the late 14th century, this force became the most important element of the Ottoman army, particularly its infantry branch, called *yeniçeri* ("new soldiers"), or the Janissary corps. The provincial forces provided by the timar holders comprised the Ottoman cavalry and were called *sipahi*s, while the irregular *akıncı*s and salaried *yaya*s and *müsellem*s were relegated to rear-line duties and lost their military and political importance. But when Bayezid I abandoned the *gazi* tradition and moved into Anatolia, he lost the support of the Turkish notables and their *sipahi*s before his new *kapıkulu* army was fully established. He thus had to rely only on the Christian vassal forces in the Battle of Ankara, and whereas they demonstrated considerable valour and fighting ability, they were not alone sufficient to resist Timur's powerful army.

When the Ottoman Empire was restored under sultan Mehmed I, the Turkish notables, in order to deprive the sultan of the only military force he could use to resist their control, required him to abandon the *kapıkulu* as contrary to the Islāmic tradition that Muslims could not be kept in slavery. The European and Anatolian revolts that arose early in the reign of Murad II were at least partly stimulated and supported by members of the *kapıkulu* as well as the Christian slaves and vassals who had been losing their power to the Turkish notables. But as soon as Murad II was established, he resumed earlier efforts to make the sultanate more independent, building up the strength of the Janissaries and their associates and playing them off against the notables. He distributed most of his conquests to members of the *kapıkulu* force, occasionally as *timar*s, but more often as tax farms (*iltizam*s), so that the treasury could obtain the money it needed to maintain the Janissary army entirely on a salaried basis. In addition, in order to man the new force, Murad developed the *devşirme* system of recruiting the best Christian youths from southeastern Europe.

The *devşirme* system

Whereas Mehmed II used the conquest of Constantinople to destroy the major Turkish notable families, and build up the power of the *devşirme*, he sought only to establish a balance of power and function between the two groups so that he could use and control both for the benefit of the empire. So it was that he enlarged the concept of *kapıkulu* to include members of the Turkish nobility and their Turkmen followers as well as the products of the

devşirme. Now only persons accepting the status of slaves of the sultan could hold positions in the Ottoman government and army. Persons of Muslim and non-Muslim origin could achieve this status, so long as they accepted the limitations involved, namely absolute obedience to their master and the devotion of their lives, properties, and families to his service. After this time, all important ministers, military officers, judges, governors, *timar* holders, tax farmers, Janissaries, *sipahis*, and the like were made members of this class and attached to the will and service of the sultan. The salaried Janissary corps remained the primary source of strength of the *devşirme* class whereas the *sipahis* and the *timar* system remained the bases of power of the Turkish notables.

Mehmed II thus avoided the fate of the great Middle Eastern empires that had preceded that of the Ottomans, in which rule had been shared among members of the ruling dynasty and with others, and rapid disintegration had resulted. The Ottomans established the principle of indivisibility of rule, with all members of the ruling class subjected to the absolute will of the sultan. To assure this, Mehmed II began the process of developing a firm law of succession, beginning the practice of executing all the brothers of the reigning sultan so that succession would be limited to one of his sons, preferably the ablest one.

THE PEAK OF OTTOMAN POWER, 1481–1566

Domination of southeastern Europe and the Near East. During much of the century that followed the reign of Mehmed II, the Ottoman Empire achieved the peak of its power and wealth. New conquests extended its domain well into central Europe and throughout the Arab portion of the old Islāmic caliphate; and a new amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic organizations and traditions was institutionalized and developed into a living, working whole.

Bayezid II (ruled 1481–1512). The reign of Mehmed II's immediate successor, Sultan Bayezid II, was largely a period of rest. The previous conquests were consolidated, and many of the political, economic, and social problems caused by Mehmed's internal policies were dealt with, leaving a firm foundation for the conquests of the 16th-century sultans.

The economic stringencies imposed to finance Mehmed II's campaigns had led during the last year of his reign to a virtual civil war encouraged and participated in by the major factions in Istanbul—the *devşirme* party and the Turkish aristocracy. Bayezid was put on the throne by the Janissaries because of their military domination of the capital, whereas his more militant brother Cem fled to Anatolia, where he led a revolt initially supported by the Turkish notables. Bayezid managed to conciliate the latter, however, by exposing to them his essentially pacific plans, which he concealed from the Janissaries. Left without major support, Cem fled into exile to Mamlūk Syria in the summer of 1481. He returned the next year with the help of the Mamlūks and the last Turkmen ruler of Karaman, but his effort to secure the support of the Turkmen nomads failed because of Bayezid's heterodox religious policies. Cem remained in exile, first at Rhodes, then with the pope in Rome, until his death in 1495. European efforts to use him as the spearhead of a new crusade effort against Istanbul were unsuccessful.

In the meantime, however, the threat that Cem might lead a foreign attack compelled Bayezid to concentrate on internal consolidation. Most of the property expropriated by his father was restored to its original owners. Equal taxes were established around the empire so that all subjects could fulfill their obligations to the government without the kind of disruption and dissatisfaction that had characterized the previous regime. Particularly important was the establishment of the *avârız-i divaniye* (war chest) tax, which provided for the special expenditures of war without special confiscations or heavy levies. The value of the coinage was restored, and Mehmed II's plans for economic expansion were at long last brought to fruition. The vassal system was replaced by direct Ottoman administration throughout the empire. For the first time the central government was given a budget system in which expenditures were balanced against revenues on a regular basis.

Culturally, Bayezid stimulated a strong reaction against the Europeanizing trends of the previous half century. The Turkish language and Muslim traditions were emphasized. He worked to develop and establish the institutions of orthodox Islām in order to save the empire from the increasing menace of heterodox Shī'ism among the tribes of eastern Anatolia, until, late in his life, his own tendency toward mystic Şūfism led him largely to abandon the effort.

Though Bayezid preferred to maintain peace so as to have the time and resources to concentrate on internal development, he was forced into a number of campaigns by the exigencies of the time and the demands of his more militant *devşirme* followers. In Europe, he rounded off the empire south of the Danube and Sava by taking Hercegovina (1483), leaving only Belgrade outside Ottoman control. The Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus (ruled 1458–90) was interested mainly in establishing his rule over Bohemia and agreed to peace with the Ottomans (1484), and after his death, struggles for succession left this front relatively quiet for the remainder of Bayezid's reign. To the northeast, the sultan pushed Ottoman territory north of the Danube, along the shores of the Black Sea, capturing (1484) the ports of Kilia and Akkerman, which controlled the mouths of the Danube and Dniester, thus giving the Ottomans control over the major entrepôts of northern Europe's trade with the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Bayezid was there able to compel Moldavia to accept his suzerainty—an important step toward the incorporation of the Romanian principalities in his empire. Because these advances conflicted with the ambitions of Poland, war followed (1483–89) until the diversion of Poland by the threat of Muscovy under Ivan the Great (ruled 1462–1505) left this front quiet also after 1484.

Extension of the empire

Bayezid then turned to the East, where previous conquests as far as the Euphrates had for the first time brought the Ottomans up to the Mamlūk Empire. Conflict over control of the small Turkmen principality of Dulkadir (Dhū al-Qadr), which controlled much of Cilicia and the mountains south of Lake Van, and an Ottoman desire to share in the control of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, led to an intermittent war (1485–91); but there were no concrete results, and Bayezid's disinclination to commit major forces to the endeavour led to dissention and criticism on the part of his militant followers. To counter this, Bayezid tried to use Hungarian internal dissention to take Belgrade; but he failed, and raiding forces sent into Transylvania, Croatia, and Carinthia were turned back.

In the same year that Cem died (1495) a new peace with Hungary left Bayezid's objectives unfulfilled, so he turned toward his other major European enemy, Venice, to rebuild his reputation. Venice had been encouraging revolts against the sultan in the Morea, Dalmatia, and Albania, which it had ceded to the Ottomans in 1479. It also gained control of Cyprus (1489), where it built a major naval base, which it refused to allow Bayezid to use against the Mamlūks, thus pointing up the strategic importance of Cyprus to the sultan. Bayezid also hoped to conquer the last Venetian ports in the Morea to establish the bases for complete Ottoman naval control of the eastern Mediterranean. All these objectives except control of Cyprus were achieved in the war that followed (1499–1503). The Ottoman fleet emerged for the first time as a major Mediterranean naval power, and the Ottomans became an integral part of European diplomatic relations.

Bayezid never was able to use this situation to make new conquests in Europe because the rise of revolts in eastern Anatolia occupied much of his attention during the last years of his reign. There the old conflict resumed between the autonomous, uncivilized nomads and the stable, settled Middle Eastern civilization—the Turkmen nomads resisted the efforts of the Ottomans to expand their administrative control to all parts of the empire. In reaction to the orthodox Muslim establishment, the nomads

The Şafavids

showed a fanatical attachment to the leaders of the Şūfī and Shī'ah mystic orders, of whom the most successful were the Şafavids of Ardabīl, who at this time used a religious-military appeal to conquer most of Iran. Under Shāh Esmā'īl (ruled 1502–24), the Şafavids sent missionaries throughout Anatolia, spreading a message of religious heresy and political revolt, not only among the tribesmen but also to cultivators and some urban elements, who began to see in this movement the answers to their own problems. A series of revolts resulted, with Bayezid, because of his involvements in Europe, able to do little to suppress them. Finally, at the start of the 16th century, a general Anatolian uprising forced Bayezid into a major expedition (1502–03), which pushed the Şafavids and many of their Turkmen followers back into Iran; there the Ottomans turned from Şūfism to Shī'ism as a means of gaining the loyalty of the Persians to a Turkish dynasty. Shāh Esmā'īl continued, however, to spread his message as Şūfī leader in Anatolia, leading to a second major revolt of his followers against the Ottomans (1511). All the grievances of the time coalesced into what was basically a religious uprising against the central government, and only a major expedition led by the grand vizier Ali Paşa could suppress it. But the conditions that had caused the uprising remained a major problem for Bayezid's successor. In the end, Bayezid's increasingly mystical and pacific nature led the Janissaries to dethrone him in favour of his militant and active son, Sultan Selim I.

Selim I (ruled 1512–20). Whereas Bayezid, despite his pacific nature, had been put on the throne by the Janissaries, Selim I was their candidate because he shared their desire to return to an aggressive policy of conquest. But Selim did not wish to be dependent on, or under the control of, those who had brought him to power; he killed not only his brothers but also all seven of their sons and four of his own five sons, leaving only the ablest, Süleyman, as the sole possible heir to the throne. This deprived potential opponents of alternative leaders around whom they could coalesce. Selim was then able to leave the *devşirme* in control of the government; but with a single heir, and with the sultan establishing his personal control over the Janissaries, it was he who dominated, rather than the *devşirme*.

Selim's ambitions encompassed Europe as well as Asia; but Bayezid had left the European fronts relatively quiet, so the new sultan turned first to the East, and chose the Şafavids of Iran as his initial victims. Selim first launched a vigorous campaign against the Şafavid supporters in eastern Anatolia, massacring thousands of tribesmen and missionaries and espousing a strict defense of Islāmic orthodoxy as a means of regaining political control. In the summer of 1514 he launched a major expedition against the Şafavids, hoping to add Iran to his empire and finally to eliminate the threat of heterodoxy. Esmā'īl employed a scorched-earth policy, retiring into central Iran and hoping that winter would force the Ottomans to retire without a battle. But the militant Kızılbâş (Kizilbash) followers of the Şafavids forced the *shāh* to accept battle by intercepting the Ottomans before they entered Azerbaijan. The Ottoman and Şafavid armies clashed at Chāldirān, on the eastern side of the Euphrates (August 23, 1514), and the Şafavids were routed by Ottoman superiority in weapons and tactics (particularly because of Selim's use of cannons and gunpowder, in contrast to Şafavid reliance on spears and arrows). Though Azerbaijan was occupied, the Ottoman victory led to neither the conquest of Iran nor to the collapse of the Şafavid empire. The Ottoman army became increasingly discontented under the impact of Şafavid propaganda among the already-heterodox Janissaries and because of a relative lack of booty and supplies compared to campaigns in Europe. Selim was compelled to retire, and the Şafavids regained their lost province without resistance. The major result of the Chāldirān battle was to convince Shāh Esmā'īl and his successors to avoid open conflict with the Ottomans at all costs—a policy followed for the next century. This preserved the Şafavid army, but it enabled Selim to overcome the last independent Turkmen dynasties in eastern Anatolia (1515–17) and to establish a strong strategic position relative to the Mamlūk Empire, which was falling into internal decay and was ripe for conquest by either the Ottomans or the Şafavids.

Defeat of the Şafavids

With Shāh Esmā'īl still busy restoring his army, Selim I was able to overwhelm the Mamlūks in a single year's campaign during the summer and winter of 1516–17. The Mamlūk army fell easily to the well-organized and disciplined Ottoman infantry and cavalry, supported by artillery. The conquest was aided by the support of many Mamlūk officials, who betrayed their masters in return for important positions and revenues promised by the conquerors. In addition, most of the major populated centres of Syria and Egypt turned out their Mamlūk garrisons, preferring the security and order offered by the Ottomans to the anarchy and terror of the prior century of Mamlūk dominion.

Thus in a single sweep, Selim doubled the size of his empire, adding to it all of the lands of the old Islāmic caliphate with the exception of Iran, which remained under the Şafavids, and Mesopotamia, which was later taken by his successor. These acquisitions were of immense importance to the Ottomans. Under an efficient administration, the Arab world provided Istanbul with new revenues that solved the financial problems left from the 15th century and made the empire into one of the most powerful and wealthy states in the 16th century. Acquisition of the holy places of Islām cemented the position of the sultan as the most important ruler of Islām. The Ottomans had gained direct access to the intellectual, artistic, and administrative heritage of high Islāmic civilization, previously transmitted to them only indirectly. Now from the Arab world there came to Istanbul the leading Muslim intellectuals, artisans, administrators, and artists of the time. They penetrated every facet of Ottoman life and made the empire much more of a traditional Islāmic state than it ever had been before. Finally, the Ottomans replaced the Mamlūks in control of the Middle Eastern trade routes—part of the old international routes between Europe and the Far East.

Contro the Ara world

One of the major reasons for the Mamlūk decline had been Portuguese discoveries in India and the establishment of an all-water route around southern Africa in place of that through the Middle East. It now remained for the Ottomans to restore the full prosperity of their Arab dominions by countering Portuguese naval activities in the Eastern seas. The Ottoman conquests in the East, combined with the Şafavid survival in Iran, ended the long period of political vacuum and anarchy that had followed the collapse of the universal 'Abbāsid Empire, starting in the 11th century. Order and security finally were re-established, and the stability of Middle Eastern society was restored under the guidance and protection of powerful imperial orders. But the Islāmic world was left permanently divided, with Iran and Transoxania, once centres of the Islāmic caliphates, separated from the Arab world, to which Anatolia and southeastern Europe were for the first time added as integral parts of the Middle East.

Süleyman I (ruled 1520–66). Selim I's last years were spent in Istanbul solidifying the supremacy of the sultan, exploiting the prestige and revenues resulting from his Eastern victories. It was therefore only during the long reign of his son and successor Süleyman I (ruled 1520–66)—called the Magnificent in Europe and the Lawgiver among the Ottomans—that the foundations left by Selim were fully used to establish the classical Ottoman state and society and to make important new conquests in East and West. Süleyman assumed the throne with a position unequalled by any sultan before or after him. He was without opposition and with a great deal of control over the *devşirme* class as well as over the remnants of the Turkish notables. The conquest of the Arab world had doubled the revenues of the treasury without imposing important additional financial obligations, leaving Süleyman with wealth and power unparalleled in Ottoman history. Although Süleyman never took full advantage of the opportunities left him and, in fact, began a process of Ottoman decline, his reign still marked

the peak of Ottoman grandeur, and it has always been regarded as the Golden Age of Ottoman history.

The chief battlefields of Ottoman expansion in Europe now were Hungary and the Mediterranean. The weak southeastern European enemies of Süleyman's predecessors had been replaced by the powerful Habsburg Empire, bolstered by the appeals of the pope against the menace of Islām. Süleyman's main European ally was France, which sought to use Ottoman pressure in the East to lessen the pressure of the Habsburgs.

The land war with the Habsburgs centred in Hungary and was fought in three main stages. From 1520 to 1526 the independent Hungarian kingdom bore the direct brunt of the Ottoman attack and acted as a buffer between the two great empires; but a weak king, Louis II (ruled 1516–26) and feudal anarchy and misrule made a united defense impossible. A split among Hungarian nobles over the question of accepting Habsburg rule, combined with the social and national divisions stimulated by the Reformation, further weakened the opposition to Ottoman attack, and, as a result, Süleyman was able to take Belgrade in August 1521, opening the way for a large-scale advance north of the Danube. The only real army the Hungarian notables could muster was routed at the Battle of Mohács (August 29, 1526), and the death of Louis II ended the last hope for Hungarian unity and independence.

The second period of Ottoman-Habsburg relations (1526–41) was characterized by Hungarian autonomy under the anti-Habsburg prince of Transylvania, John Zápolya (ruled 1528–40), who accepted the suzerainty of the sultan in return for the right to continue native administration and military defense. The Habsburg prince Ferdinand, brother of the Emperor Charles V (ruled 1519–58), occupied the northern areas of Hungary with the support of the Hungarian nobles who desired Habsburg aid against the Turks, and for all practical purposes he annexed them to Austria before, in 1527–28, undertaking an effort to conquer the remainder of Hungary. In response Süleyman returned from Anatolia; drove the Habsburgs from all of Hungary; and besieged Vienna (1529), an effort that failed due to the difficulty of supplying a large force so far from the major centres of Ottoman power. Vienna thus was the chief remaining European bulwark against further Muslim advance. Under the existing conditions of supply, transport, and military organization, the Ottomans had reached the limit of their possible expansion in the West from a winter base that had to be maintained in Istanbul because of the constant threat of possible military needs in the East.

The siege of Vienna had important benefits for the Ottomans—it secured Süleyman's rule of Hungary, and it prevented Ferdinand from launching a new attack against Zápolya for some time to come. Although the siege frightened the other states of Europe sufficiently for them to agree to a temporary Catholic-Protestant truce (1532), the result was only temporary, and Ferdinand never was certain of the support of the independent German princes and of other European rulers who promised him help. Even Charles V was too preoccupied with the problems of the Reformation and with France to devote much attention to the Ottomans. Thus, when Süleyman went on a second Austrian campaign (1532), he was unable to draw the imperial army into conflict and had to content himself with devastating large parts of the Habsburg realm.

By the peace of 1533 Ferdinand abandoned his claims to central Hungary and recognized Zápolya's rule there as Ottoman vassal, whereas Süleyman agreed to accept Ferdinand as ruler of northern Hungary in return for the payment of an annual tribute. This arrangement lasted until 1540, when Zápolya died and left his dominions to Ferdinand in defiance of his agreement with the sultan. When Ferdinand tried to assume his heritage by force, Süleyman occupied and annexed Hungary (August 1541) under the guise of championing the cause of Zápolya's infant son, John Sigismund Zápolya. Thus began the third and final period of Ottoman-Habsburg relations, with the two great powers in direct contact and almost continuous border conflict; diversions on both sides, however, prevented long periods of open warfare.

Many historians have accused Francis I of France (ruled 1515–47) of encouraging Ottoman expansion into central Europe to relieve Habsburg pressure on him. But the Ottoman advances were due less to any French overtures than to Süleyman's own ambitions, together with his fears of a possible alliance among the Habsburgs, the Hungarians, and the Ṣafavids and of Habsburg rule in Hungary. The sultan regarded the French king largely as a supplicant for commercial favours, which were granted in the Capitulations of 1536—an agreement by which French subjects were given the freedom to travel and trade in the sultan's dominions, and subjects of other states wishing to do the same were required to secure French protection as a condition of the necessary permission. French and other merchants and travellers in the Ottoman Empire were allowed to remain under French laws and courts in cases concerning themselves and to have special privileges when involved with Ottoman law. Thus was established the foundation of the French predominance in the Levant, which remained to modern times. The Capitulations served as a model for later trade agreements between the Ottomans and the other European powers, who subsequently used them, during the centuries of Ottoman weakness, as means to dominate commerce within the Ottoman dominions and thus prevent the rise of a native commercial class.

The Mediterranean front

The stalemate between the Ottomans and Habsburgs in Hungary led their conflict to shift periodically from the land to the sea, with the Ottomans emerging as a major naval power for the first time. The decline of the Venetian navy led Charles V to try for complete control of the Mediterranean, enlisting as his naval commander a great Genoese seaman, Andrea Doria, and thus securing the support of the powerful Genoese fleet. Süleyman responded by driving the Knights Hospitallers—a Christian religious and military order—from Rhodes (1522), but Charles then established them on Malta (1530) and captured Tunis (1535). While Süleyman was busy in Anatolia, Doria captured a number of ports in the Morea (Peloponnese) and began to raid the Ottoman coasts, largely severing the sea lines of communication between Istanbul and Alexandria. To counter this, Süleyman in 1533 enrolled in his service as grand admiral Barbarossa (Khayr ad-Dīn), a Turkish captain who had built a major pirate fleet in the western Mediterranean and had used it to capture Algiers (1529) and other North African ports. The Ottomans annexed Algiers to the empire, but as a special province permanently assigned to the grand admiral to support the fleet. Ottoman land troops were sent to defend Algiers against Habsburg attacks—probably the main reason Barbarossa agreed to join the sultan.

Barbarossa built a powerful Ottoman fleet, able to meet the Habsburgs on equal terms. In 1537 he launched a major attack on southern Italy, expecting a promised French attack in the north, with the objective of a joint conquest of Italy. But France, fearing a hostile European reaction to its alliance with the infidel, withheld the diversion. Doria then organized and led an allied European naval force against the Ottomans; but it was routed at the Battle of Preveza (September 25–28, 1538), off the Albanian coast. Venice then surrendered its last possessions in the Aegean, the Morea, and Dalmatia, thus assuring Ottoman naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, which remained unbroken for the next three decades.

The eastern front

Süleyman failed to pursue his ambitions in Europe after 1541, largely because of his increasing preoccupation with problems in the East. He ruthlessly suppressed Ṣafavid propagandists and supporters in eastern Anatolia and stimulated the Turkmen Özbek Empire of Transoxania to attack Iran from the East. Iran fell into disorder following the death of Shāh Esmāʿīl and the accession of his infant son Ṭahmāsp I (ruled 1524–76), but Süleyman was able to use this situation only during periods of peace in Europe. He personally led three campaigns into northwestern Iran—in 1534–35, 1548–50, and 1554—but although he captured Ṣafavid territories in the southern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Iraq on each occasion, he

never was able to catch the Iranian army to defeat it; and supply problems invariably compelled him to retire to Anatolia during the winter months, allowing the Persians to regain their territories with little difficulty. Süleyman finally despaired of defeating his elusive enemies, so he agreed to the Peace of Amasya (May 29, 1555), by which he retained Iran and eastern Anatolia but renounced Ottoman claims to Azerbaijan and the Caucasus and agreed to allow Shī'ah Persian pilgrims to visit Mecca and Medina as well as their own holy places in Iraq. Thus the same geographical problems that had limited Ottoman conquests in central Europe made western Azerbaijan the viable limit of Ottoman expansion in the East; preventing the final elimination of the Ṣafavid danger.

Süleyman was somewhat more successful in restoring the old international trade routes through his Middle East possessions. To counteract the Portuguese fleet, supplied by the Ṣafavids from their Persian Gulf ports, he built major naval bases—at Suez (1517) and, as soon as he took Iraq, at Basra (1538)—establishing garrisons and fleets that not only resisted the Portuguese naval attacks but also went out against them in the Eastern seas. As a result the old trade route regained some of its former volume in the 16th century; the Ottomans never were able to fully restore it, however, because Portugal still was able to pay higher prices in the East and sell at lower prices in Europe because of their use of a sea route, which avoided the duties and local charges levied on goods sent through Ottoman territory. (It should be noted that it was the Ottomans who fought to keep the old Middle Eastern trade route open; the route was closed only when the Cape route was taken over from the Portuguese by the much more powerful fleets of Great Britain and Holland.)

Classical Ottoman society and administration. During the 16th century the institutions of society and government that had been evolving in the Ottoman dominions for two centuries reached the classical forms and patterns that were to characterize them until modern times.

Social divisions

The basic division in Ottoman society was the traditional Middle Eastern distinction between the small group of rulers who formed the ruling class, and the large mass of subjects. Possession of three attributes was essential for membership in the Ottoman ruling class: (1) profession of loyalty to the sultan and his state; (2) acceptance and practice of the Muslim religion and the system of thought and action that was an integral part of it; and (3) knowledge and practice of the complicated system of customs, behaviour, and language known as the Ottoman Way. Those who lacked any of these attributes were considered to be members of the subject class, *reayas* (*rayahs*), the "protected flock" of the sultan. There was a system of social mobility based on the possession of these definable and attainable attributes; *reayas* able to acquire them could rise into the ruling class, and Ottomans who came to lack any of them would become members of the subject class.

Members of the Ottoman ruling class were considered to be the sultan's slaves, and thus acquired their master's social status. As slaves, however, their properties, lives, and persons were entirely at his disposition; and he could do with them as he wished. Their basic function was to preserve the Islāmic nature of the state and to rule and defend the empire. By Ottoman theory, the main attribute of the sultan's sovereignty was the right to possess all sources of wealth in the empire together with the authority necessary to exploit them. The function of enlarging, protecting, and exploiting that wealth for the benefit of the sultan and his state, therefore, was the main duty of the ruling class. The primary duty of the *reayas* was to produce the wealth—by farming the land or engaging in trade and industry—and then paying a part of the resulting profits to the ruling class in the form of taxes.

The Ottoman state encompassed organizations and hierarchies developed by the ruling and subject classes to carry out their functions in Ottoman society. The ruling class divided itself into four functional institutions: the Imperial (Mülkiye) Institution, led by the Sultan himself, provided the leadership and direction for the other institutions as well as for the entire Ottoman system; the Military (Seyfiye) Institution was in charge of expanding and defending the empire and keeping order and security within the sultan's dominions; the Administrative (Kalemiye) Institution, organized as the Imperial Treasury (Hazine-i Amire), was in charge of collecting and spending the imperial revenues; and the Religious/Cultural (Ilmiye) Institution, which included the *'ulamā'* (all Ottomans expert in the religious sciences), was in charge of organizing and propagating the faith and maintaining and enforcing the religious law (Sharī'ah), its interpretation in the courts, its expounding in the mosques and schools, and its study and interpretation.

To cover the areas of life not included within the scope of the ruling class, members of the subject class were allowed to organize themselves as they wished. As a natural manifestation of Islāmic society their organization was determined largely by religious and occupational distinctions. The basic class divisions within the subject class were determined by religion, with each important group organizing into a relatively self-centred autonomous community called a *millet*, under its own laws and forms of internal organization, directed by a religious leader who was responsible to the sultan for the fulfillment of the duties and responsibilities of the *millet* members, particularly those of paying taxes and security. In addition, each *millet* cared for the many social and administrative functions not assumed by the Ottoman state, concerning such matters as marriage, divorce, birth and death, health, education, internal security, and justice.

The *mil*

Within the *millet*s, just as in Ottoman society as a whole, there was a social mobility, with persons moving up and down the ladder according to ability and luck. Individuals could pass from one *millet* to another if they wished to convert, but because all the *millet*s were extremely antagonistic toward those who left them to convert to another religion, the state discouraged such action as much as possible to preserve social harmony and tranquility, the main object of the system. The *millet* system succeeded for 500 years by keeping the different peoples of the empire as much apart as possible, thus reducing to a minimum the possible sources of conflict and keeping social order in a highly heterogeneous state.

All of the classes, institutions, and communities described above were, in essence, means by which the slaves and subjects of the sultan were divided and organized so as best to fulfill their functions. But there also were means by which they were related to one another and united into the whole of Ottoman society. The principal cement was the sultan, the keystone of the system who alone was the common focus of loyalty of the ruling and ruled subjects alike. But such loyalty was an abstract; it could not have held Ottoman society together without the help of the artisan and religious guilds, which cut across the boundaries and made members of different groups brothers in common organizations based not on class, rank, or religion but on mutually shared values and beliefs, economic activities, and social needs. Through contact and cooperation in such guilds, members of the different groups of Ottoman society were cemented into a common whole, performing many of the social and economic functions outside the scope of the ruling class and of the *millet*s, particularly those functions associated with economic regulation and social security, and receiving a more personal religious experience than that provided by the established religious organizations, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

Within the Ottoman ruling class, the most important unit of organization and action was the *mukata'a*, in which a member of the ruling class "cut off" a portion of the sultan's revenues and had sufficient authority to exploit it for purposes determined by the sultan. The exact nature of the *mukata'a* depended on the extent to which the holder remitted his revenues to the treasury and what portion he retained for himself. The *timar* type of *mukata'a*, traditionally described as a fief, only marginally approached the concept of feudalism as it was known in Europe because it was part of a centralized system and did not involve the kind of mutual rights and obligations

The *mukata*

characteristic of Western feudalism. In return for services to the state, the *timar* holder was given the full profits of the source of revenue for his personal exploitation and profit, which were independent of, and in addition to, those connected with the exploitation of the *timar* itself. For many military and administrative positions, *timars* normally were given in lieu of salaries, thus relieving the treasury of the trouble and expense of collecting revenues and disbursing them to its employees as salaries. Almost all the 14th- and 15th-century Ottoman conquests in southeastern Europe were distributed as *timars* to military officers, who in return performed the tasks of administration in peacetime and provided soldiers and military leadership for the Ottoman army in war. Many of the officers of the central government also were rewarded with *timars* in place of, or in addition to, salaries paid by the treasury.

The second principal form of the *mukataʿa* was the *emânet* (trusteeship), held by the *emin* (trustee, agent). In contrast to the situation of the *timar* holder, the *emin* turned all his proceeds over to the treasury and was compensated entirely by salary, thus being the closest Ottoman equivalent to the modern government official. The legal basis for this arrangement was that the *emin* did no more than administer the *mukataʿa;* he undertook no additional service, and so had no right to share in the profits of the *mukataʿa* that he held. This was the least common type of administrative position in Ottoman times, for the most part used for urban custom houses and market police, which were very close to, and under the supervision and control of, the central government and its agents, and which did not need the profit motive in order to assure efficiency on the part of the holders.

The most common kind of *mukataʿa,* and therefore the most prevalent type of administrative unit in the Ottoman system, was the tax farm (*iltizam*), which combined elements of both the *timar* and *emânet.* As in the former, the tax farmer (*mültezim*) could keep a part—but only a part—of the tax he collected, and, like the *emin,* had to deliver the balance to the treasury. This was because his service consisted only of his work in administering the *mukataʿa,* for which he was given a share of his collection instead of the *emin*'s salary. The tax farmer thus was given the inducement of profit to be as efficient as possible. Most of Anatolia and the Arab provinces were administered in this way because they were conquered at a time when the government's need for cash to pay the salaried Janissary infantry and to supply an increasingly lavish court required the treasury to seek out all the revenues it could find. As the *timar*-based *sipahi* cavalry became less important, and as the Turkish notables who held most of the *timars* lost most of their political power during the time of Süleyman, the estates gradually fell into the hands of the *devşirme* class.

The legal and customary bases of organization and action in Ottoman society depended on a dual system of law—the Sharīʿah or religious law, and the *kanun,* or civil law. The former, the basic law of Ottoman society, as it was of all Muslim communities, was considered to be a divinely inspired corpus of political, social, and moral regulations and principles, which were supposed to cover all aspects of life for Muslims. But it was highly developed only in the fields of personal behaviour covered in detail in the early Muslim community and reflected in the Qurʾān and early Muslim tradition. It never was developed in detail in matters of public law, state organization, and administration. Its general principles left room for interpretation and legislation on specific matters by secular authorities; and the Muslim judges of the Ottoman Empire recognized the right of the sultan to legislate in civil laws, so long as he did not conflict with the Sharīʿah in detail or principle. The Sharīʿah, therefore, provided the principles of public law, and covered matters of personal behaviour and status in the Muslim *millet* in the same way that the members of the Christian and Jewish *millets* were subject to their own religious codes. The Sharīʿah was interpreted and enforced by members of the Cultural Institution—the *ʿulamāʾ*—just as the laws of each non-Muslim *millet* were enforced by its leaders. Strictly speaking, the *ʿulamāʾ* members had the right to invalidate any law they felt contradicted the Sharīʿah, but they rarely did this because, as part of the ruling class, they were under the authority of the sultan and could be removed from their positions. The sultan therefore was relatively free to legislate changes in Ottoman institutions and practices to meet the needs of the time; this was a major factor in the long survival of the empire, even during centuries of decline. It must be noted, however, that with the restricted scope of the Ottoman ruling class and state and the large areas of power and function left to the religious communities and guilds as well as to the Ottoman officials who held the different kinds of *mukataʿas,* the sultans were never as autocratic as has been commonly assumed. It was only in the 19th century that Ottoman reformers centralized government and society on Western lines and restricted or ended the traditional autonomies, which had done so much to decentralize power in the previous centuries.

DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1566–1807

Internal problems. The reign of Süleyman the Magnificent marked the peak of Ottoman grandeur, but elements of weakness crept in and began the slow but steady decline that followed. An important factor of decline was the increasing lack of ability and power of the sultans themselves. Süleyman tired of the long military campaigns and arduous duties of administration concentrated in his person, and withdrew more and more from public affairs to devote himself to the pleasure of his harem. To take his place, the office of grand vizier was built up to become second only to the sultan in authority and revenue, including the right to demand and obtain absolute obedience. But while the grand vizier was, indeed, able to replace the sultan in official functions, he could not take his place as the focus of loyalty for all the different classes and groups in the empire. The resulting separation of political loyalty and central authority led to a decline in the government's ability to impose its will.

Decline of the sultans

Triumph of the devşirme. The mid-16th century also saw the triumph of the *devşirme* over the Turkish nobility, which lost almost all of its power and positions in the capital and returned to its old centres of power in southeastern Europe and Anatolia. In consequence, many of the *timars* formerly assigned to the notables to support the *sipahi* cavalry were seized by the *devşirme* and transformed into great estates, for all practical purposes as private property, thus depriving the state of their services as well as of the revenue they could have produced if they had been transformed into tax farms. Whereas the *sipahis* did not entirely disappear as a military force, the Janissaries and the associated artillery corps became the most important segments of the Ottoman army.

Corruption and nepotism. Because the sultans no longer could control the *devşirme* by playing the Turkish notables off against them, the *devşirme* gained control of the sultans and used the government for its own benefit rather than for that of the sultan or his empire. In consequence, the evils of corruption and nepotism took hold at all levels of administration. In addition, with the challenge of the notables gone, the *devşirme* class itself broke into countless factions and parties, each working for its own advantage by supporting the candidacy of one or another of the imperial princes and each in close alliance with corresponding palace factions led by the mothers, sisters, and wives of each prince. Following Süleyman, therefore, accession and appointments to positions came less as the result of ability than as a consequence of the political manoeuvrings of the *devşirme*-harem political parties. Those in power found it more convenient to control the princes by keeping them uneducated and inexperienced, and the old tradition by which young princes were educated in the field, was replaced by a system in which all the princes were isolated in the private apartments of the harem and limited to the education its permanent inhabitants could provide. In consequence, few of the sultans after Süleyman had the ability to exercise real power even when circumstances might have enabled them to do so.

But the lack of ability did not end the sultans' desire for power; because they lacked the devices developed by their predecessors to achieve this end, they developed new ones. Selim II (ruled 1566–74), known as the Sot, and Murad III (ruled 1574–95) both gained power by playing off the different factions and by weakening the office of grand vizier, the main administrative vehicle for factional and party influence in the declining Ottoman state. As the grand viziers lost their dominant position following the downfall of Mehmed Sokollu (served 1560–79), power fell first into the hands of the women of the harem, during the "Sultanate of the Women" (1570–78), and then into the grasp of the chief Janissary officers, the *ağa*s who dominated from 1578 to 1625. But no matter who controlled the apparatus of government during this time, the results were the same—a growing paralysis of administration throughout the empire and a pulling apart of the different groups into separate and hostile communities.

Economic difficulties. Under such conditions, it was inevitable that the Ottoman government could not meet the increasingly difficult problems that rose to plague the empire in the 16th and 17th centuries. Economic difficulties began in the late 16th century when the Dutch and British were able to completely close the old international trade routes through the Middle East. As a result, the prosperity of the Arab provinces declined and, in addition, the Ottoman economy was upset by inflation, started by the influx of precious metals into Europe from the Americas and by an increasing imbalance of trade between East and West. As the treasury lost more of its revenues to the depredations of the *devşirme*, it began to meet its obligations by debasing the coinage, heavily increasing taxes, and resorting to confiscations—all of which further worsened the situation. All those persons depending on salaries found themselves underpaid, and the result was further theft and corruption. Holders of the *timar*s and tax farms started using them as sources of revenue to be milked as rapidly as possible, rather than as long-term holdings whose prosperity had to be maintained to provide for the future; political influence and corruption also enabled them to transform these holdings into private property, either as life holdings (*malikâne*) or as religious endowments (*vakf*), without any further obligations to the state. Inflation also hit the traditional industries and trades. Functioning under strict price regulations, the guilds were unable to provide quality goods at prices low enough to compete with the cheap European manufactured goods that entered the empire without restriction due to the capitulations agreements. In consequence, traditional Ottoman industry fell into rapid decline.

The decline of Ottoman industry

Social erosion. These conditions were exacerbated by a large increase of population during the 16th and 17th centuries—part of the general population rise that occurred in much of Europe at this time. The amount of subsistance available was not only unable to expand to meet the needs of the rising population, but in fact fell as the result of the political and economic conditions then prevalent in the Ottoman Empire; social distress increased, and upset resulted. Landless and jobless peasants fled from the lands as did cultivators subjected to confiscatory taxation at the hands of timariots and tax collectors, thus reducing food supplies even more. Many of them fled to the cities, where they added to the problem of food supply and reacted against their troubles by rising against the established order; many more remained in the countryside and joined rebel bands, known as *levend*s and Jelālīs (Celâlis), which took what they could from those who remained to cultivate and trade.

The central government became weaker; and as more peasants joined rebel bands, they were able to take over large parts of the empire, keeping all the remaining tax revenues for themselves and often cutting off the regular food supplies of the cities as well as of the Ottoman armies still guarding the frontiers. Under such conditions, the armies themselves broke up, with most of the salaried positions in the Janissary corps and other corps falling into the hands of urban investors, who used them simply as new sources of revenue, without performing any military services in return. Thus it was that the Ottoman armies came to be composed primarily of fighting contingents supplied by the vassals of the sultan (particularly the Crimean Tartar khans), together with whatever rabble could be dragged from the streets of the cities whenever required by campaigns. The Ottoman army still remained strong enough to curb the most pressing provincial revolts; but the latter proliferated through the centuries of decline, making effective administration outside the major cities still under the government's control almost impossible. In many ways the substratum of Ottoman society—formed by the *millet*s and various economic, social and religious guilds and buttressed by the organization of the Ottoman *'ulamā'*—cushioned the mass of the people and the ruling class itself from the worst effects of this multisided disintegration.

External relations. Despite these difficulties, the internal Ottoman weakness was evident to only the most discerning Ottoman and foreign observers during much of the 17th century. Most Europeans continued to fear the Ottoman army much as it had been feared two centuries before; and whereas its ability was reduced, it remained strong enough not only to prevent the provincial rebels from assuming complete control but also to make a few more significant conquests in both East and West. Whereas the empire now suffered defeats for the first time, it still retained reserve strength sufficient for it to recoup when needed and to prevent the loss of any integral parts of the empire. Although the Ottoman navy was destroyed by the fleet of the Holy League at the Battle of Lepanto (1571), it was yet able to rebuild and regain naval mastery in the eastern Mediterranean through most of the 17th century, taking Tunis from the Spanish Habsburgs (1574), Fez from the Portuguese (1578), and Crete from Venice (1669). In consequence, so long as Europe continued to fear the Ottomans, no one tried to upset the precarious peace treaties concluded in Süleyman's later years; and the Ottomans were shielded from the results of their own weakness.

Supremacy of Ottoman navy

Military campaigns. Despite the upsets then disturbing the Ottoman body politic, the Porte undertook new campaigns. When the rising Principality of Moscow conquered the last Mongol states in Central Asia and reached the Caspian, thus posing a threat to the Ottoman position north of the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, Murad II conquered the Caucasus and, taking advantage of anarchy in Iran following the death of Shāh Ṭahmāsp I in 1576, seized the long-coveted Azerbaijan. He thus brought the empire to the peak of its territorial extent and added wealthy new provinces whose revenues, for a half century at least, rescued the Ottoman treasury from the worst of its financial troubles and gave the empire a respite in which it could at least try to remedy its worst problems.

Reform efforts in the 17th century were undertaken by sultans Osman II (ruled 1618–22) and Murad IV (ruled 1623–40) and by a famous dynasty of Köprülü grand viziers who served under Sultan Mehmed IV (ruled 1648–1687)—Mehmed Köprülü (served 1656–61) and Ahmed Köprülü (served 1661–76). Each of these early reformers rose as the result of crises and military defeats that threatened the very existence of the empire. Each was given the power needed to introduce reforms because of the fears of the ruling class that the empire, on which its privileges depended, was in mortal danger.

Exposure of Ottoman weakness. In a war between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs (began 1593) the Austrians were able to take much of central Hungary and Romania, and only an accidental Ottoman triumph in 1596 enabled the Sultan to sufficiently recoup so that the Habsburgs agreed to the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (1606), by which agreement Ottoman rule of Hungary and Romania was restored. The treaty itself, however, like the events that led up to it, for the first time showed Europe the extent of Ottoman weakness and so exposed the Ottomans to considerable new dangers in subsequent years. In the East, anarchy in Iran was brought to an end by Shāh 'Abbās I (ruled 1587–1629), who not only restored Iranian power but drove the Ottomans out of Azerbaijan and the Cauca-

sus (1603), conquered Iraq (1624), and threatened to take the entire Ottoman Empire. Though Murad IV was able to retake Iraq (1638), Iran remained a major threat. Finally, a long war with Venice (1645–69), occasioned by Ottoman efforts to capture Crete, exposed Istanbul to a major Venetian naval attack. Although finally pushed back in a naval campaign culminating in the Ottoman conquest of Crete (1669), the Venetians still posed a major threat, which, like those that had occurred earlier in the century, stimulated the ruling class to accept needed reforms.

Reforms. The Ottoman reforms introduced during the 17th century were too limited in nature and scope to permanently arrest the Ottoman decline. Basically, they were no more than efforts to restore to the state the inherited system of government and society that had operated successfully in the past. Corrupt officials were executed. Efforts were made to restore the *timar* and tax-farm systems as the basis of the administration and army. Provincial revolts were suppressed, peasants were forced back to the lands, and cultivation was increased. Debased coins were replaced by coins of full face value. Industry and trade were encouraged, and corruption and insubordination were driven out.

Such reforms were sufficient to end the immediate difficulties. But they were successful only for the moment because the reformers were allowed only to act against the results of the decay and not its cause—the selfish rule of the ruling class—which continued. As soon as the worst consequences of decay had been alleviated, the old groups returned to power and resumed their old ways. Moreover, the reformers really did not understand that the Europe now faced by the Ottomans was far more powerful than that which the great sultans of the past had defeated; thus even if the reforms had been more permanently successful, they could not have corrected the increasing Ottoman weakness relative to the powerful nation-states then rising in Europe. Such an understanding was to come to the Ottoman reformers only in the 19th century.

Military defeats, 1683–1792. The traditional 17th-century reforms did, however, produce at least a semblance of revival. By 1681 the Ottoman army seemed so strong that Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa (served 1676–83), brother-in-law of Ahmed Köprülü, was emboldened to move again into central Europe and besiege Vienna (July–September 1683). His effort quickly overextended the fragile bases of the Ottoman revival.

Anti-Ottoman coalition. The aroused defenders, stimulated by the Polish king Jan Sobieski (ruled 1674–96), not only held out but also built a major European coalition that moved to bring destruction to the Ottoman Empire during the subsequent century: the Habsburgs set out to reconquer Hungary, Serbia, and the Balkans; Venice hoped to regain its naval bases on the Adriatic and in the Morea and to resume its naval and commercial power in the Levant; Russia worked to extend its lands to the open seas. Only the enemies of the coalition in Europe, led by France and Sweden, tried to support the Ottomans; neutral Britain and Holland, to guard the commercial privileges they had secured from the sultan through the Capitulations, worked to prevent any nation from gaining control of the entire Ottoman Empire and from becoming, thereby, preponderant in Europe.

Russia and Austria fought the Ottomans not only by direct military attack but also by fomenting dissatisfaction and revolt on the part of the non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan. Against such an attack, the Ottomans could only conciliate their subjects where possible and repress them when conciliation was rejected, taking advantage, at every opportunity, of every rivalry that arose between the Habsburgs and Russians for predominance in the Balkan provinces of the empire.

European wars. In consequence of this situation, the Ottoman Empire was at war with European enemies for 41 years between the second siege of Vienna (1683) and the Treaty of Jassy (1792). From 1683 to 1699 it fought the armies of the Holy League in a disastrous war culminating in the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699). In 1710 and 1711 it fought Russia again and at the Treaty of the Pruth (1711) regained some territories previously lost. The war of 1714–18 with Venice and Austria was concluded by the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718); and three wars with Russia and Austria—in 1736–39, 1768–74, and 1787–92—culminated in the treaties of Belgrade (1739), Küçük Kaynarca (1774), and Jassy (1792). As a result of these wars, the Ottomans lost Hungary, the Banat of Temisvar, Transylvania, and Bukovina in Europe, establishing their boundary on the Danube, where it had last been early in the 16th century. To Russia they lost all their possessions on the northern coasts of the Black Sea from the principalities to the Caucasus, including Bessarabia, Podolya, and the Crimea, the soldiers of which had provided the strongest element in the Ottoman army during the previous century. In addition, the Ottomans were compelled to allow the Russians and Austrians to intervene legally on behalf of the sultan's Christian subjects in a manner that opened the way to an increased European influence in internal Ottoman affairs.

Loss of territory

Imperial decline in the 18th and early 19th centuries. The manifestations of decline were only continuations and elaborations of earlier conditions. But a new factor of decline was added—the weakness of the central government resulted in the loss of control of most of the provinces to local rulers, called notables (*a'yan*), who took more or less permanent control of large areas, creating a situation that in many ways resembled European feudalism much more than the traditional Ottoman *timar* system ever did.

Rise of local rulers. These notables were able to build up their power and maintain control not only because the Sultan's government lacked the military resources to suppress them but also because the local populations themselves preferred the notables' rule to that of the corrupt and incompetent Ottoman officials of the time. In the Balkans and Anatolia, local rulers solidified their positions by taking advantage of currents of local nationalism that were arising among the Balkan Christians and the Muslim Turks. The notables formed private armies of mercenaries and slaves, with which they sometimes provided important contributions to the Ottoman armies in return for recognition of their autonomy by the sultans. These rulers were able to exercise almost complete authority, collecting taxes for themselves and sending only nominal payments to the treasury, thus further increasing its problems. The central government maintained its position by playing off the local rebels against each other, using the leverage of Ottoman support to its own advantage, and securing considerable payments of cash and military contributions when needed. The treasury, therefore, did not suffer as much from these provincial revolts as might be imagined; but the revolts did disrupt the established food supplies of the empire sufficiently for large-scale famines to arise in the major cities on a regular basis. In response, the urban populace became a restless, misruled, and anarchic mass that broke loose at the slightest provocation, responding to unemployment, famine, the plague, and the like with riots and summary executions of the officials considered responsible. Such violence, while manifesting Ottoman difficulties, did not remedy them and, in fact, made things worse. Remedy lay only in the hands of the ruling class; but its reaction was quite different.

Urban anarchy

Resistance to change. Most Ottomans saw little need for the empire to change because they actually benefitted financially from the existing anarchy and lack of control by the sultan. In addition, the ruling class was completely isolated from developments outside its own sphere; it assumed that the remedies to Ottoman decline lay entirely within Ottoman practice and experience. This resulted from the basic belief of Ottoman society in its own superiority over anything the infidel could possibly produce —a belief that had far more basis in the 16th century, when it was developed, than in the 18th century. All of the developments in industrial and commercial life, in science and technology, and particularly in political and military organization and techniques that had occurred in Europe since the Reformation were simply unknown to

the Ottomans. The only direct Ottoman contacts with Europe were on the battlefield, where most Ottomans still assumed that their military reverses were caused not by the superiority of Western armies as such but rather by Ottoman failure to apply fully the techniques that had worked so well in the past. So the 18th-century reforms largely paralleled those of the traditional Ottoman reformers of the 17th century, with only occasional efforts to add new military organizations and to make use of specific European weapons and techniques of undeniable superiority.

Contacts with the West. For a few Ottomans this isolation was at least partially broken down when some channels of contact opened with the West during the 18th century—a few Ottoman ambassadors went to Europe to participate in negotiations and sign treaties; more and more European merchants, travellers, and consuls came into the Ottoman Empire; a very few Ottoman men of science and philosophy began to correspond with their Western counterparts; members of the Ottoman minorities entered into correspondence with their relatives in the West. But such contacts had very limited effects; only a small number of Ottomans experienced them, and even when they did learn something, the effect was quite superficial because the resulting information did not fit into the patterns of thought of even the most educated Ottomans. Those few who did understand something of what they heard usually were only voices in the wilderness, and their efforts to apply and spread what they knew had little overall effect.

Such contacts did lead to changes in the modes of living of a few upper class Ottomans and to some military innovations, but to nothing more. Starting in the so-called Tulip Period (1717–30; see below) some Ottomans under the influence of Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa began to dress like Europeans, and the palace began to imitate European court life and pleasures. Sultan Ahmed III (ruled 1703–30) built several lavish summer residences on the Bosporus and the Golden Horn (an inlet that forms the harbour of Istanbul), and these were imitated by members of his immediate entourage, who held frequent garden parties in imitation of the pleasures of Versailles. The sultan and his ministers were no longer confined behind the walls of the palace; and the new era was celebrated by Nedim, the court poet, who reflected a considerable awareness of his environment and an appreciation of nature. Growing tulips, as a mark of westernization, became an obsession with rich and poor alike, and the flower gave its name to the period. In 1727 Turkish language books were printed for the first time in the empire by a Hungarian convert named İbrahim Müteferrika; and while the press was closed by the government at times, during the remainder of the century it provided a number of books on history and geography that further opened the minds of those who saw and read them.

The Tulip Period

Military reforms. As a result of contact with European armies and the influence of European renegades in Ottoman service, a few attempts were made during the century to adopt Western-type uniforms, weapons, and tactics. Because the members of the established military corps could not and would not surrender their old ways, entirely new corps were formed to handle the new weapons under the direction of European instructors. But the new corps had no effect at all on the Janissaries and the other older corps that continued to form the bulk of the army; the latter accurately saw that the new ways were threats to their privileges and security. The new corps were, therefore, no more than special mercenary bodies built up under the stimulus of individual Ottomans, lasting only so long as the latter remained in power. The most successful and lasting Ottoman military reform during this time came in the navy, which was modernized by Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa (served 1770–89), with the support and encouragement of Sultan Abdülhamid I (ruled 1774–89); this success came largely because the Ottoman naval establishment was wiped out at the Battle of Çeşme (1770) by a Russian fleet, and there was no such inbred resistance as that which stifled significant reforms elsewhere. Important reforms introduced into the army under Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Paşa (served 1782–85), with the help of Western technicians, were limited to new corps especially created for the purpose, while the bulk of the Ottoman army continued to remain without change.

Selim III (ruled 1789–1807). These 18th-century reform efforts culminated during the reign of Sultan Selim III, who is thought by some to have been the originator of modern reform in the Ottoman Empire. While still a prince, Selim developed plans for modernizing the Ottoman army. He came to the throne during the 1787–92 war with Austria and Russia and had to postpone serious reform efforts until its completion. Early efforts to modernize the Janissary corps created such opposition that Selim thereafter concentrated on creating a new European-style army, called the *nizam-ı cedid* ("new order"), using the modern weapons and tactics developed in Europe. This new force, never numbering more than 10,000 active soldiers, was trained in Istanbul and in certain Anatolian provincial centres by officers and military experts sent by the different European powers that were competing for the sultan's support at the time. So as not to disturb the established Ottoman institutions, it was financed by an entirely new treasury, called the *irad-i cedid* ("new revenue"), whose revenues came from taxes imposed on previously untaxed revenue sources and from the confiscation of some *timar*s whose holders were not fulfilling their military and administrative duties to the state. Under the guidance of European technicians, factories were constructed to manufacture modern weapons and ammunitions, and technical schools were opened to train Ottoman officers. Limited efforts also were made to rationalize the Ottoman administrative machinery, but largely along traditional lines.


Modern reform

The older military corps, however, remained intact and hostile to the new force, and Selim was therefore compelled to limit its size and use. At the same time, much of his energy was diverted by the rise of powerful autonomous notables in southeastern Europe, Anatolia, and the Arab provinces, as well as by a French Expedition to Egypt (1798–1801), which eventually drew him into alliances with Great Britain and Russia. The rise of nationalism among Ottoman subject peoples stimulated by agents of Russia, Austria, and Revolutionary France, and culminating in the beginning of a Serbian revolution (1804) and a new war with Russia (1806–12) also made it impossible for Selim to resist the wishes of the Janissaries, who still formed the bulk of his army. Finally, the sultan's personal weakness, which led him to desert the reformers and the new army whenever opposition became strong, left him with little significant support in 1807, when he was attacked and overthrown by a conservative coalition. While Selim was imprisoned in the palace, a conservative reaction under Sultan Mustafa IV (1807–08) ended the reforms and massacred most of the reformers. An effort to restore Selim led by the Bulgarian notable Bayrakdar Mustafa Paşa led to Selim's death and, after the short rule of Mustafa IV, the accession of his reforming cousin, Mahmud II (ruled 1808–39). Selim's reforms were largely abandoned for some time. But the greatly increased knowledge of the West in the Ottoman Empire, made possible by the schools established for the *nizam-ı cedid* as well as by the increased numbers of Westerners present in Istanbul during the era of the French Revolution, began the process by which the old Ottoman isolation was finally and definitively broken. This set the stage for more significant reforms, which transformed the empire during the remainder of the 19th century. (S.J.S.)

II. European domination and the establishment of a Turkish national state

THE EMPIRE, FROM 1807 TO 1920

The triumph of the antireform coalition, which had overthrown Selim III, was interrupted in 1808 when the surviving reformers within the higher bureaucracy found support among the *a'yan* (local notables) of Rumelia (Ottoman possessions in the Balkans), who were worried



The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1807–1924.

Adapted from R. Treharne and H. Fullard (eds.), *Muir's Historical Atlas: Ancient, Medieval and Modern*, 9th edition (1965); George Philip & Son Ltd., London

by possible threats to their own position. These were led by Bayrakdar (Standard Bearer) Mustafa Paşa. The forces of Mustafa and the grand vizier Çelebi Mustafa Paşa together recovered Istanbul; deposed Mustafa IV; set up Mahmud II, the son of Abdülhamid I; and recommenced some of the reforming policies that had been initiated by Selim.

The *aʿyan* took care to protect their own interests by securing in the Covenant of Union (Sened-i Ittifak) a definition and guarantee of their own rights against the central government. Their victory, however, was short-lived. A further Janissary uprising in November 1808 led to the death of the Bayrakdar and to the re-establishment of conservative rule.

Mahmud II (ruled 1808–39). The Ottoman situation at the end of 1808 appeared desperate. Within the empire the authority of the central government was minimal. Control of North Africa had long since faded. In Egypt, the Ottoman Viceroy Muḥammad ʿAlī (*q.v.*) was laying the foundations for independent power. In Iraq the Georgian Mamlūk pashas paid only lip service to the authority of the Porte, as did various independent local governors in Syria. In Arabia the Wahhābīs mocked Ottoman pretensions. In all Anatolia only two provinces were really under central control, while in the European provinces power had fallen into the hands of such formidable local notables as Ali Paşa, who controlled southern Albania, and Osman Pasvanoğlu, who had dominated northern Bulgaria until his death in 1807. Serbia under the leadership of George Petrović (Karageorge) had been in revolt since 1804; at first the Serbs had risen in desperation against the terrorist policies of the Janissaries, who had usurped the power of the local governor, but they had subsequently demanded autonomy and, in 1807, allied with Russia.

The external threat to the empire was no less ominous. Selim III had hoped to enlist French aid in order to recover territory lost to Russia; as a result, the Ottomans found themselves at war with both Russia, which invaded the Principalities in November 1806, and Britain, which attempted to seize the Dardanelles with a naval force (February 1807) and invaded Egypt (March 1807). Meanwhile Napoleon, through the agreements of Tilsit (July 7, 1807) and Erfurt (October 12, 1808), had not only abandoned active opposition to Russia but had accepted its occupation of the Principalities.

The preoccupation of the European powers with other interests helped the Ottomans mend the international problems. Britain made peace on January 5, 1809 (Peace of the Dardanelles); and Russia, on May 28, 1812 (Treaty of Bucharest), by which the Principalities were returned to Ottoman rule although Russia retained most of Bessarabia.

Internal reform. Mahmud II was then able to concentrate on internal reform. The basic element in Mahmud's reforms was the reconstruction of the army to make it a fit instrument for preserving the Ottoman Empire against both the encroachments of European powers and the centrifugal ambitions of local potentates. This policy brought him into head-on collision with the Janissaries. In 1826 Mahmud set out his proposals for a new European style army; on June 15 the Istanbul Janissaries mutinied in protest and were promptly and efficiently massacred by the sultan—an episode known to later Ottoman historians as "The Auspicious Incident."

Reconstruction of the army

As a tactician, Mahmud proved to be superior to Selim. He had the support of most of the higher *ʿulamāʾ*. Whereas in 1807 the Janissaries had enjoyed the approval of the population of Istanbul, in 1826 only two guilds gave them active help. Mahmud had built up a cooperative group among the Janissary officers and had carefully arranged to have loyal troops at hand. Perhaps most important of all, Mahmud presented his proposals not as dangerous and infidel innovations but as a restoration of the military system of the Ottoman golden age.

The destruction of the old army was completed in 1831 by the final abolition of the feudal (*timar*) system. The remaining fiefs were resumed by the government. Although the new army was dressed, equipped, and trained in the style of European armies and helped by a succession of European advisers (including the future chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke), it differed from the former army in its greater loyalty to the

sultan. It thus became an instrument of political centralization, and it provided the major motive for modernization. The continuing need to pay and equip the army and to train its officers and other specialized personnel in a sustained, but ultimately vain, attempt to keep pace with the European powers, stimulated reform of the political and economic institutions of the Ottoman Empire. The modernization of higher education began with the need to train officers, army doctors, and veterinary surgeons; that of the taxation system began with the need to pay the army; that of the administration, with the need to collect the taxes, and so on. Ultimately the entire system of minimal government—by which political, economic, and social decisions were left to local organizations—was replaced by one in which the state came to centralize decisions in its own hands.

Move toward centralization. Mahmud began by curbing the power of rival claimants. He undermined the influence of the *'ulamā'* and of popular religious organizations. He created a new directorate of *evkâf* (charitable endowments) in 1826, hoping to gain control of the hitherto independent financial base of *'ulamā'* power. To make his power more effective, he built new roads and, in 1834, inaugurated a postal service.

Administrative reorganization

The central administration was reorganized. New European-style ministries were created to replace the ancient bottleneck of power caused by the universal administrative responsibility of the grand vizier. New councils were established to assist in long term planning; one—the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (1838)—subsequently became the principal legislative body. Bureaucrats were given greater security by abolishing the practice of confiscating their property at death, while the opening of a translation bureau (1833) and the reopening of embassies abroad gave some the opportunity to learn European languages and encounter European ideas.

The reformed army and administration became the agents by which the sultan extended his authority over the semi-independent governors, local notables, valley lords (*derebeys*), and other groups, that had wielded political power in various parts of the empire. This process had begun immediately after 1812. The Serbian revolt had been temporarily suppressed in 1813, although it broke out again in 1815. Firm Ottoman governmental control was established over Anatolia, Iraq, and much of Rumelia.

The only local ruler who succeeded in asserting his own authority, unaided against the Porte, was Muḥammad 'Alī of Egypt, who was carrying through a still more radical program of modernization. In 1831 Egyptian forces invaded Syria, routed the Ottomans at Konya (December 27, 1832) and threatened Istanbul. Mahmud was forced to seek Russian aid, and on July 8, 1833, he signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (Unkiar Skelessi); Muḥammad 'Alī was, for a time, left in possession of Syria, but Mahmud had not abandoned his claims. In 1839 he attacked the Egyptians; once more the Ottomans were defeated (June 24, 1839). With the help of the European powers (except France) through the Treaty of London (July 15, 1840), the Ottomans recovered Syria and eventually consolidated their authority there; but Muḥammad 'Alī obtained recognition as hereditary ruler of Egypt (1841).

Attempts to extend Ottoman control in the European provinces, notably in Greece, Serbia, and the Principalities, were frustrated. The Greek revolt was the product of the economic prosperity of the Napoleonic Wars, exposure to western European ideas, and a reaction against Ottoman centralization. It had two sources. The first lay in the opposition of peasants and bandits; the second, in the plots of certain intellectuals organized through the Philikí Etairía (a political society) and led by Alexander Ypsilantis, who invaded Moldavia in March 1821. Ypsilantis was defeated, but a rising began in the Peloponnesus. A stalemate developed; but the Ottomans were reinforced, in 1825, by Egyptian troops and threatened to put down the revolt. The destruction of the combined Ottoman and Egyptian fleets by Russian, French, and British naval forces at Navarino, in the southwestern Peloponnese (October 20, 1827) prevented the Muslims from supplying their armies and made Greek independence inevitable. The Ottomans were forced to recognize first Greek autonomy (1829), and then independence (1832).

Similarly, Ottoman efforts to regain control of Serbia and the Principalities were obstructed by Russian opposition, leading to the Russo-Ottoman War (1828–29). By the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) on September 14, 1829, the Ottomans ceded to Russia the mouth of the Danube and important territories in eastern Asia Minor and conceded new privileges to the Principalities and Serbia. Serbian autonomy was recognized in 1830 and was extended over the full area of the state in 1833.

Changes in the empire

By the death of Mahmud II (July 1, 1839) the Ottoman Empire was diminished in extent; it was more consolidated and powerful but increasingly subject to European pressures, with Russia supporting and Britain opposing separatist movements and the other powers oscillating between. The cure, however, had begun. Mahmud had established the "respectability of change," and its symbol was the replacement of the turban with the fez (1828).

The Tanzimat (1839–76). The "Tanzimat" is the name given to the series of Ottoman reforms promulgated during the reigns of Mahmud's sons Abdülmecid I (ruled 1839–61) and Abdülaziz (ruled 1861–76). The best known of these reforms are the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber; November 3, 1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (Imperial Edict, February 18, 1856).

Purpose of the Tanzimat. The Tanzimat has been the subject of much controversy. Many Western writers have dismissed the promises of reform as an Ottoman desire to win European diplomatic support at critical moments, and some features of the Tanzimat appear to support such a view. The promises of equality for Christian subjects were not always implemented—for example, it was proposed in 1855 to end the poll tax paid by non-Muslims and to allow them to enter the army; but the old poll tax was merely replaced by a new exemption tax levied at a higher rate, and Christians were still excluded from the army. It is also true that the timing of reform announcements coincided with crises—the 1839 edict came when the Ottomans needed European help against Muḥammad 'Alī; the 1856 edict when the Ottomans needed European acceptance in the wake of the Crimean War; and the 1876 constitution when European pressure for reforms was mounting.

This view of the Tanzimat is based, however, upon a misconception of its purpose. Europeans, who were principally concerned with winning better conditions for Ottoman Christians, looked first at those elements of the Tanzimat that appeared to be directed toward this goal (*e.g.*, a proclamation in the 1839 edict of the principles of individual liberty, freedom from oppression, and equality before the law and a substantial section of the 1856 edict that was concerned with the rights of Christians). But to the Ottomans the purpose of reform was to preserve the Ottoman state. While it was necessary to make some concessions to European powers and to their own non-Muslim subjects, and, although some Tanzimat statesmen saw equality as an ultimate goal, it was preservation that required the mobilization of resources for modernization. The central reforms, therefore, were in the army (notably major reorganizations of 1842 and 1869, the latter following the pattern of the successful Prussian conscript system); in the administration, both at the centre and in the provinces; and in society, through changes in education and law.

Reform in education. Before the reforms, education in the Ottoman Empire had not been a state responsibility but had been provided by the various *millets*; education for Muslims was controlled by the *'ulamā'* and was directed toward religion. The first inroads into the system had been made with the creation of naval (1773), military (1793), engineering, medical (1827), and military science (1834) colleges. In this way specialized Western-type training was grafted onto the traditional system to produce specialists for the army. Similar institutions for diplomats and administrators were founded, including

the translation bureau (1833) and the civil service school (1859); the latter was reorganized in 1877 and eventually became the faculty of political science in the University of Ankara (1950) and the major training centre for higher civil servants.

Comprehensive education plan

In 1846 the first comprehensive plan for state education was made. It provided for a complete system of primary and secondary schools leading to university, all under the Ministry of Education. A still more ambitious educational plan, inaugurated in 1869, provided for free and compulsory primary education. Both schemes progressed slowly because of a lack of money, but they provided a framework within which development toward a systematic, secular pattern could take place.

Changes in the empire

By 1914 there were more than 36,000 Ottoman schools, although the great majority were small, traditional primary schools. The development of the state system was aided by the example of progress among the non-Muslim *millet* schools, in which the education provided was more modern than in the Ottoman schools; by 1914 these included more than 1,800 Greek schools with about 185,000 pupils and some 800 Armenian schools with more than 81,000 pupils. Non-Muslims also used schools provided by foreign missionary groups in the empire; by 1914 there were 675 U.S., 500 French Catholic, and 178 British missionary schools, with more than 100,000 pupils among them. These foreign schools included such famous institutions as Robert College (founded 1863), the Syrian Protestant College (1866; later the American University of Beirut), and the Université Saint-Joseph (1874).

Reforms in law. Law too, to a large extent, had been the responsibility of the various *millets*. The Capitulations exempted foreigners and those Ottoman citizens on whom foreign consuls conferred protection from the application of criminal law. The Tanzimat reformers had two objects in the reform of law and legal procedure—to make Ottoman law acceptable to Europeans so that the capitulations could be abolished and sovereignty recovered, and to modernize the traditional Islāmic law. Their efforts resulted in the promulgation of a number of codes —a commercial code (effective in 1850), a commercial procedure (1861), a maritime code (1863), and a penal code (1858). French influence predominated in these, as it did in the civil code of 1870–76. Increasingly, the laws were administered in new state courts, outside the control of the *'ulamā'*. Although they failed to achieve the purposes intended, they provided the basis for future success.

Obstructions to reforms. The Tanzimat reforms moved steadily in the direction of modernization and centralization. The reformers were handicapped by lack of money and skilled men; and they were opposed by traditionalists, who argued that the reformers were destroying the empire's fundamental Islāmic character and who often halted the progress of reform. Centralization, meanwhile, was slowed by European interference, which obstructed the Ottoman attempt to recover power in Bosnia and Montenegro in 1853; forced the granting of autonomy to Mount Lebanon in 1861; and considered, but eventually rejected, intervention to prevent the Ottomans from suppressing a Cretan revolt of 1868. Although Britain and France helped the Ottomans resist Russian pressure during the Crimean War (1853–56), the Ottomans derived no real benefits from the peace settlement; and new arrangements helped to bring about the unification of the Principalities (1859) and paved the way for the emergence of independent Romania.

European interference

The very success of the Tanzimat reformers revealed a novel weakness. The effect of centralization removed the checks on the power of the sultan. After the death of Ali Paşa, Abdülaziz so abused his unrestrained authority as to produce a major crisis in 1875–78.

The 1875–78 crisis. Drought in 1873 and floods in 1874 produced widespread discontent and even famine among an Ottoman peasantry already disturbed by its increased burdens under a landholding system that had spread in the Balkans in the 19th century and by increased taxation and greater liability to conscription as a result of the 1869 military reorganization. The burden of taxation had been aggravated by the Ottoman problems of debt repayment. The first Ottoman foreign loan was in 1854; by 1875 the nominal public debt was £200,000,000 with annual repayments and amortization taking £12,000,000, or more than half the national revenue, but the Ottomans could pay only half the interest due because a world financial crisis in 1873 had made new credit difficult to obtain.

Balkan discontent was fanned by nationalist agitation supported by Serbia and by émigré Slav organizations. It culminated in risings largely of Christian peasants against Muslim lords in Bosnia and Hercegovina (July 1875) and in Bulgaria (August 1876). Ottoman efforts to suppress the risings led to war with Serbia and Montenegro (July 1876) and to attempts by European powers to force Ottoman reforms.

Agreement among the European powers proved impossible; and when the Ottomans rejected its demands, Russia decided to act alone and declared war (April 24, 1877). The war ended in defeat for the Ottomans, but their unexpected resistance at Plevna (modern Pleven, Bulgaria; July–December 1877) allowed other European powers, led by Britain, to intervene. According to the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), the Ottomans were to recognize the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and cede territory to them; to concede autonomy to an extensive new state of Bulgaria; to cede territory to Russia in the Dobruja (west of the Black Sea) and eastern Asia Minor; and to introduce various administrative reforms and pay an indemnity.

Russo-Turkish War, 1877–78

Diplomatic pressure from other European powers led to the modification of these terms at the Congress of Berlin (June–July 1878). The major changes concerned autonomous Bulgaria, which was substantially reduced in size and divided into two parts—the northern part to have political and the southern (eastern Rumelia) to have administrative autonomy. The independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania was recognized, but their territorial gains were much reduced. Russia retained its acquisitions of Kars and Batum in Asia Minor. Austria-Hungary was given control of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the strategic district of Novi Pazar, in Yugoslavia. By a separate convention Cyprus was put under British rule.

The settlement was a major defeat for the Ottomans. Eastern Rumelia was soon lost, when it united with Bulgaria in 1885. The Ottoman territories in Europe were reduced to Macedonia, Albania, and Thrace, and European influence had attained new dimensions. Britain now proposed to supervise governmental reforms in the Asian provinces, although this was skillfully frustrated by Abdülhamid II (ruled 1876–1909). In addition, the Ottomans were soon forced to accept new financial controls. By the Decree of Muharrem (December 1881) the Ottoman public debt was reduced from £191,000,000 to £106,000,000, certain revenues were assigned to its service, and a European-controlled organization (the Ottoman Public Debt Administration—OPDA) was set up to collect them.

The OPDA subsequently played an important part in Ottoman affairs, acting as agent for the collection of other revenues and as an intermediary with European companies seeking investment opportunities. Its influence should not, however, be exaggerated. It remained under Ottoman political control, and its existence even enabled the Ottomans to add to the debt at the annual rate of £3,000,000 throughout the reign of Abdülhamid; nor was the burden of repayments a major drain on the country's resources. But taken in conjunction with the activities of European-controlled banks and with the tariff limitations imposed on the Ottomans by the capitulations, the result was a distinct restriction on Ottoman ability to guide the allocation of resources.

The constitution, 1876. Perhaps more significant than external changes were the internal political developments that brought about the first Ottoman constitution, December 23, 1876. The Tanzimat had produced three types of criticism within the Muslim community. The first was a simple traditionalist opposition. The second was a more

sophisticated critique elaborated by certain intellectuals, many of whom had bureaucratic training and some knowledge of Western ideas. The third was a determination to depose the sultan (see below).

The Young Ottomans

The intellectuals were known as the Young Ottomans. Although some had taken part in a secret society (the "Patriotic Alliance") in 1865 and had some similarity of background, the Young Ottomans were not an organized political party; they are considered as a group largely through the accident of their assembly in Paris and London in 1867–71. Their political views ranged from secular, cosmopolitan revolutionism to profoundly Islāmic traditionalism. Because his views occupied a middle ground among these intellectuals and because of his lucidity of expression, Namık Kemal (1840–88) has often been regarded as the representative figure, although he is no more representative than the others. His views, however, had the greatest effect on later reformers.

Kemal criticized the Tanzimat reformers for their indiscriminate adoption of Western innovations. While admiring much of Western civilization, he believed that the principles underlying its best institutions were to be found in Islām. In particular he derived from early Islāmic precept and practice the idea of a representative assembly that could check the unbridled power of the sultan and his ministers. He helped to form and popularize the idea of a constitution and of loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland. Like others, he was assisted by the development of an Ottoman press, which had its origins in the 1830s but began to express opinions, occasionally critical of the government, in the 1860s, which saw the establishment of the *Tercüman-ı Ahval* (1860) and the *Tasvir-i Efkâr* (1862), both of which, along with later newspapers, became the vehicles for Young Ottoman ideas.

But it was the third line of criticism that was most important. Arising within the higher Ottoman bureaucracy itself, it was led by Midhat Paşa. Midhat and others became convinced by their own exclusion from power and by the disastrous results of Abdülaziz's policies that some check was needed upon the sultan's power. The traditional check was deposition, and this was accomplished (May 30, 1876) following a riot by theological students and the removal of the hated grand vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa. A new Cabinet was formed, which included Midhat and other partisans of reform. A new sultan, Murad V (ruled 1876), with a reputation for liberalism was installed; but Murad became insane and was deposed in August and replaced by Abdülhamid II. The experience convinced Midhat of the necessity of a permanent check upon the power of the sultan, such as could be provided by a representative assembly that would give ministers a basis of support independent of the sultan. Accordingly, Abdülhamid was persuaded to agree to a constitution.

First Ottoman constitution

Although earlier documents had had constitutional implications and although the development of councils—particularly provincial councils with their elected elements—had had parliamentary aspects, the December 23 document was the first comprehensive Ottoman constitution and, except for a Tunisian organic law of 1861, the first in any Islāmic country. The constitution was derived entirely from the will of the ruler, who retained full executive power and to whom ministers were individually responsible. In legislation the sultan was assisted by a two-chamber Parliament—the lower indirectly elected and the upper nominated by the ruler. Rights of ruler and ruled were set out, but the system it established might best be described as attenuated autocracy. Midhat has been criticized for accepting certain amendments demanded by Abdülhamid, including the then notorious article 113, which gave the sultan the right to deport persons harmful to the state; but it is clear that the majority of Midhat's colleagues were content with these amendments, and that the amendments made little difference, so great were the sultan's powers within and outside the constitution. The Parliament summoned under the constitution in March 1877 was dissolved in less than a year and was not recalled until 1908. The liberals were exiled; some, incuding Midhat, were put to death.

Abdülhamid II (ruled 1876–1909). The reign of Abdülhamid II is often regarded as having been a reaction against the Tanzimat; but, insofar as the essence of the Tanzimat reforms was centralization rather than liberalization, Abdülhamid may be seen as its fulfiller rather than its destroyer. The continued development of the army and administration, the formation of a gendarmerie, the growth of communications—especially the telegraph and railways—and the formation of an elaborate spy system enabled the sultan to monopolize power and crush opposition. His brutal repression of the Armenians in 1894–96 earned him the European title red sultan. But Abdülhamid's reign also made positive advances in education (including the foundation of the University of Istanbul in 1900); in legal reform, led by his grand vizier Mehmed Said Paşa; and in economic development, through the construction of railways in Asia Minor and Syria with foreign capital and of the Hejaz Railway from Damascus to Medina with the help of international Muslim subscriptions.

Pan-Islāmism. The Hejaz Railway constituted one element in Abdülhamid's Pan-Islāmic policies. Political Pan-Islāmism had made its first appearance in Ottoman policy at the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) with Russia, when the Ottoman sultan had put forward claims to religious jurisdiction over Muslims outside his territories (particularly those in the Crimea). Some years later the theory was elaborated by the addition of the baseless legend that in 1517 the ʿAbbāsid caliphate had been transferred to the Ottoman sultan. With the extinction of many independent Muslim states and their absorption into the empires of European powers, this myth of the caliphate became a useful weapon in the Ottoman diplomatic armoury and was exploited by Abdülhamid as a means of deterring European powers from pressing him too hard, lest he create dissension within their own territories. In addition, stress on popular Islām through the press and other publications and through the Sultan's patronage of dervish orders served to rally Muslim opinion within the empire behind him.

Power of the myth of the caliphate

Preservation of the empire. Abdülhamid had reasonable success in preserving the empire after 1878. Apart from eastern Rumelia, no further territories were lost until 1908 (Ottoman authority in Tunisia, occupied by France in 1881, and that in Egypt, occupied by Britain in 1882, was already insignificant). In Crete the Ottomans suppressed revolts and defeated Greece when it intervened in 1897 in support of the Cretans. The European powers, however, forced Abdülhamid to concede autonomy to Crete. He was more successful in obstructing the efforts of the powers to force the introduction of substantial reforms in Macedonia. In Arabia the Ottomans continued the expansion of their power that had begun in the early 1870s.

The Young Turk Revolution, 1908. Several conspiracies took place against Abdülhamid. In 1889 a conspiracy in the military medical college spread to other Istanbul colleges. These conspirators came to call themselves Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki). When the plot was discovered, some of its leaders went to reinforce Ottoman exiles in Paris, Geneva, and Cairo, where they helped to prepare the ground for a revolution by developing a comprehensive critique of the Hamidian system. The most noteworthy among these were Murad Bey, Ahmed Rıza, and Prince Sabaheddin. As editor of *Mizan* ("Balance"), published first in Istanbul (1886) and later in Cairo and Geneva, Murad Bey preached liberal ideas combined with a strong Islāmic feeling; this last may have contributed to his defection and return to Istanbul in 1897. Ahmed Riza in Paris edited *Meşveret* ("Consultation"), in which he set out ideas of reform, strongly flavoured by positivism. His advocacy of a strong central government within the Ottoman Empire and the exclusion of foreign influence led to a major split within the Young Turk exiles at the 1902 Paris Congress; Ahmed Rıza clashed with Sabaheddin, who, with Armenian support, favoured administrative decentralization and European assistance to promote reform. Sabaheddin set up the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization.

The émigrés could supply literary sustenance to dissidents, but Abdülhamid could not be overthrown so long as the army remained loyal. The real origin of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 lay in the discontent within the 3rd Army Corps in Macedonia, where officers acted quite independently of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in Paris. It is still unclear if a coordinated conspiracy existed in Macedonia or if a number of separate centres of disaffection, linked haphazardly through individuals, dervish orders, Freemason lodges, etc., coalesced in July 1908 under the banner of the CUP through the pressure of events. On July 3, 1908, Maj. Ahmed Niyazi (1873–1912), apparently fearing discovery by an investigatory committee, decamped from Resne with 200 followers, including civilians, leaving behind a demand for the restoration of the constitution. The Sultan's attempt to suppress this rising failed, and rebellion spread rapidly. Unable to rely on other troops, on July 24 Abdülhamid announced the restoration of the constitution.

The young officers who had made the revolution, like their civilian supporters, were primarily concerned with preserving the Ottoman Empire; they feared that Hamidian policies and European interventions were endangering its existence. Personal grievances concerned with pay, promotion, etc., also played a part. Though some writers have argued that a new type of officer of lower than usual social origins influenced this discontent, there is little evidence to support such a theory. It is clear, however, that the officers had not thought much beyond their demand for the restoration of a constitution that had proved ineffectual in 1877–78. They had no program of action and were content to leave government to the established bureaucrats.

Power of the myth of the caliphate

In April 1909, however, an army mutiny in Istanbul (known because of the Julian calendar as the "31st March Incident") exposed the weakness of the CUP and at the same time gave it a new opportunity. The mutiny resulted from the discontent of ordinary soldiers arising from their conditions and their neglect by college-trained and politically ambitious officers, and from what they regarded as infidel innovations. They were encouraged by a religious organization—the Mohammedan Union. Government weakness allowed the mutiny to spread; and although order was eventually restored in Istanbul and more quickly elsewhere, a force from Macedonia (the Action Army) led by Mahmud Şevket Paşa marched on Istanbul and occupied the city (April 24).

Dissolution of the empire. Abdülhamid was deposed and replaced by Sultan Mehmed V (ruled 1909–18), son of Abdülmecid. The constitution was amended to transfer real power to the Parliament. The army, and particularly Şevket Paşa became the real arbiters of Ottoman politics.

Rise of the CUP. Although the removal of many of its political opponents had allowed the CUP to move into a more prominent position in government, it was still weak. It had a core of able, determined men but a much larger collection of individuals and factions that wore the Unionist label so lightly that they easily merged into other parties. Although the CUP won an overwhelming majority in the election of April 1912, its support rapidly melted away following military losses to Italy. Evidence of army hostility finally forced the CUP out of office in July 1912, to be succeeded by a political coalition called the Liberal Union.

The Liberal Union, too, lost support following defeats in the Balkans. This provided the opportunity for a small group of CUP officers and soldiers to stage a coup (January 23, 1913), known as the Sublime Porte Incident, to force the resignation of the grand vizier Mehmed Kâmil Paşa and establish a new cabinet under Şevket. Şevket, however, was not a Unionist and it was only after his assassination (June 11, 1913) that the CUP at last succeeded in establishing a Unionist-dominated government under Said Halim Paşa.

Internal developments. The disastrous results of the Young Turks' external policies have overshadowed the important internal developments of the years 1908–18. Further administrative reforms, particularly of provincial administration in 1913, led to more centralization, although by European standards the central Ottoman government remained relatively weak, particularly in the provinces distant from Istanbul. The burden of taxation was well below that of European powers.

The Young Turks were the first Ottoman reformers to promote industrialization, with a Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1909, revised 1915). Although they had little success, they did build a framework for later state-directed economic planning. Considerable attention was given to education, especially to the neglected area of primary education. The process of secularization of the law was carried much further. A major development in national journalism took place, and the position of women improved. The whole period was one of intense social and political discussion and change.

Turkish nationalism. The basic ideologies of the state remained Ottomanism and Islām, but a new sense of Turkish identity began to develop. This new concept was fostered by educational work of the Turkish Society (1908) and the Turkish Hearth (1912). A political twist was given by the adherents of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism. Pan-Turkism, which aimed at the political union of all Turkish-speaking peoples, began among Turks in the Crimea and on the Volga. Its leading exponent was Ismail Bey Gasprinski (Gaspirali; 1851–1914), who attempted to create a common Turkish language. Many Pan-Turkists migrated to Ottoman lands, especially after 1905. One of them, Yusuf Akçuraoğlu, argued in *Üç tarz-ı siyaset* (1903; "Three Kinds of Policy") that Turkism provided a better basis for the Ottoman Empire than either Islām or Ottomanism. Pan-Turanianism developed from a now much-disputed 19th-century theory of the common origin of Turkish, Mongol, Tungus, Finnish, Hungarian, and other languages; in certain very limited circles it looked forward to a great political federation of speakers of these languages, extending from Hungary to the Pacific.

Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism

These ideas, however, found little support within the Ottoman government. The accusation that the Young Turks pursued a deliberate policy of Turkification within the empire so as to alienate non-Turks and promote the rise of Arab and Albanian nationalism is an oversimplification. The extension of government activity inevitably brought with it the language of government—Turkish. This produced some reaction from speakers of other languages, but the evidence suggests that it did not override basic feelings of Muslim solidarity, except among some small minorities. It was among the Christian groups that distinct separatist ideas were developed.

Foreign relations. The foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks led to disaster. The 1908 revolution provided an opportunity for several powers to press home their designs upon the empire. On October 5, 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Hercegovina and Bulgaria proclaimed its independence. Italy seized Tripoli and occupied the Dodecanese, a group of Aegean islands; by the Treaty of Lausanne (October 18, 1912) Italy retained the former but agreed to evacuate the Dodecanese. In fact, however, it continued to occupy them.

The two Balkan Wars (1912–13) almost completed the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. In the first (October 1912–May 1913), the Ottomans lost almost all of their European possessions, including Crete, to Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and the newly created state of Albania (Treaty of London, May 30, 1913). In the second (June–July 1913), fought between Bulgaria and the remaining Balkan states, including Romania, over the division of Macedonia, the Ottomans intervened against Bulgaria and recovered part of eastern Thrace including Edirne (Adrianople). The Ottomans had lost 83% of the territory and 69% of the population of their European provinces.

The people. In 1914 the total population of the Ottoman Empire was approximately 25,000,000, of which about 10,000,000 were Turks; 6,000,000, Arabs; 1,500,000 each, Kurds and Greeks; and between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 Armenians. The population of the empire (excluding such virtually independent areas as Egypt, Romania, and Serbia) in the period immediately prior to the

Population of the empire

losses of 1878 is estimated to have been about 26,000,000. Natural increases and Muslim immigration from Russia and the Balkans virtually made up the losses, and in 1914 the population was more homogeneous in religion and, though less so, in language.

World War I, 1914–18. The Ottoman entry into World War I resulted from an overly hasty calculation of likely advantage. German influence was strong, but not decisive; Germany's trade with the Ottomans still lagged behind that of Britain, France, and Austria and its investments, which included the Baghdad railway, were smaller than those of France. A mission to Turkey led by the German military officer Otto Liman von Sanders in 1913 was only one of a series, and Liman's authority was much more limited than contemporaries supposed. Except for the interest of Russia in Istanbul and the Straits, no European power had really vital interests in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans might have remained neutral, as a majority of the cabinet wished to do, at least until the situation became clearer. But the opportunism of the minister of War Enver Paşa, early German victories, friction with the Triple Entente (France, Russia, and Great Britain) arising out of the shelter given by the Ottomans to German warships, and basic hostility to Russia combined to produce an Ottoman bombardment of the Russian Black Sea ports (October 28, 1914) and a declaration of war by the Entente against the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottomans made a substantial contribution to the Central Powers' war effort. Their forces fought in eastern Asia Minor, Azerbaijan, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, and at the Dardanelles, as well as on European fronts, and they held down large numbers of Entente troops. In September 1918 they dominated Transcaucasia. During the war the Young Turks also took the opportunity to attack certain internal problems—the Capitulations were abolished unilaterally (September 1914), the autonomous status of Lebanon was ended, a number of Arab nationalists were executed in Damascus (August 1915 and May 1916), and the Armenian community in eastern Asia Minor and Cilicia was massacred or deported as part of a deliberate policy of eliminating one cause of European interference. Possibly a million Armenians either fled or were killed (principally by Kurdish irregulars) or deported.

From the end of 1916 army desertions took place on a massive scale, and economic pressures became acute. The surrender of Bulgaria (September 28, 1918), which severed direct links with Germany, was the final blow. The CUP Cabinet resigned on October 7, and a new government was formed under Ahmed Izzet Paşa (1864–1937) on October 9. On October 30 the Ottomans signed the Armistice of Mudros.

Allied war aims and the proposed peace settlement. Entente proposals for the partition of Ottoman territories were formulated in a number of wartime agreements. By the Istanbul Agreements (March–April 1915) Russia was promised Istanbul and the Straits; and France, a sphere of influence in Syria and Cilicia. Britain had already annexed Cyprus and declared a protectorate over Egypt. By the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement (January 3, 1916) the French sphere was confirmed and extended eastward to Mosul in Iraq. A British sphere in Mesopotamia as far north as Baghdad, control of Haifa and Acre, and a linking sphere of influence were recognized. Palestine was to be placed under an international régime. In compensation, the Russian gains were extended (April–May 1916) to include the Ottoman provinces of Trabzon, Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis in eastern Asia Minor. By the London Agreement (April 26, 1915) Italy was promised the Dodecanese and a possible share of Asia Minor. By the Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne (April 1917) Italy was promised a large area of southwestern Anatolia, including Izmir (Smyrna) and a further sphere to the north. Britain made various promises of independence to Arab leaders, notably in the Ḥusayn-MacMahon correspondence, 1915–16, and, in the Balfour Declaration (November 2, 1917), promised to support the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

Partition of Ottoman territories

The Russian withdrawal in 1917 and postwar bargaining led to some modifications of these agreements, and the Allied terms were not finally presented until 1920. By the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) the Ottomans retained Istanbul and part of Thrace, but lost the Arab provinces and a large area of Asia Minor to a newly created Armenian state with access to the sea, surrendered the islands of İmroz and Bozcaada to Greece, and accepted arrangements that implied the eventual loss of Izmir to Greece. The Straits were internationalized, and strict European control of Ottoman finances was established. An accompanying tripartite agreement between Britain, France, and Italy defined the extensive spheres of influence of the latter two powers. The treaty was ratified only by Greece and was abrogated by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) as the result of a determined struggle for independence waged under the leadership of the outstanding Ottoman wartime general Mustafa Kemal, later known as "Atatürk."

The War of Independence, 1919–23. Although the legal Ottoman government in Istanbul, under the 36th, and last, Ottoman sultan Mehmed VI Vahideddin (ruled 1918–22) had decided that resistance to Allied demands was impossible, pockets of resistance remained in Asia Minor after the armistice. These included bands of irregulars and deserters, certain intact Ottoman forces, and various societies for the defense of rights. Resistance was stimulated by the Greek occupation of Izmir (May 15, 1919). At this time Mustafa Kemal was sent on an official mission to eastern Asia Minor, landing at Samsun on May 19. He immediately began to organize resistance, despite official Ottoman opposition. Through the Association for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia (founded March 3, 1919), he summoned a congress at Erzurum (July–August), followed by a second congress at Sivas (September) with delegates representing the whole country. A new Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia was established, and an executive committee with Mustafa Kemal as chairman was created to conduct resistance.

Congress at Erzurum

The official government yielded to Kemalist pressure. The unpopular grand vizier, Damad Ferid Paşa, resigned and was replaced by the more sympathetic Ali Rıza Paşa. Negotiations with the Kemalists were followed by the election of a new parliament, which met in Istanbul in January 1920. A large majority in parliament was opposed to the official government policy and passed the "National Pact," which embodied the political aims of independence roughly within the October 1918 armistice lines and which had been formulated at Erzurum and Sivas. The Allies countered by extending the occupied area of Istanbul (March 16, 1920) and by arresting and deporting many deputies. Damad Ferid became grand vizier again on April 5 and, with religious support, set out to crush the Kemalists.

The Kemalists were now faced with local risings, official Ottoman forces, and the Greeks. The first necessity was to establish a legitimate basis of action. A parliament (the Grand National Assembly) met at Ankara on April 23 and asserted that the sultan's government was under infidel control and that it was the duty of Muslims to resist foreign encroachment. In the Fundamental Law of January 20, 1921, the assembly declared that sovereignty belonged to the nation and that the assembly was the "true and only representative of the nation." The name of the state was declared to be "Turkey" ("Türkiye"); and executive power was entrusted to an executive council, headed by Mustafa Kemal, who could now concentrate on the war.

TURKEY SINCE 1920

The uprisings and Ottoman forces were both defeated, principally by irregular forces, who at the end of 1920 were brought under Kemal's control. In 1920–21 the Greeks made major advances, almost to Ankara, but were defeated at the Battle of the Sakarya River (August 24, 1921) and began a long retreat that ended in the Turkish occupation of Izmir (September 9, 1922).

The Kemalists had already begun to gain European rec-

ognition. On March 16, 1921, the Soviet-Turkish Treaty gave Turkey a favourable settlement of its eastern frontier by restoring Kars and Ardahan. Domestic problems induced Italy to begin withdrawal from the territory it occupied; and, by the Treaty of Ankara (Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, October 20, 1921), France agreed to evacuate Cilicia. Finally, by the Armistice of Mudanya the Allies agreed to Turkish reoccupation of Istanbul and eastern Thrace.

A comprehensive settlement was eventually achieved at the Lausanne Conference (November 1922–July 1923). The Turkish frontier in Thrace was established on the Maritsa River, and Greece returned the islands of Imroz and Bozcaada. A compulsory exchange of populations was arranged, as a result of which an estimated 1,300,000 Greeks left Turkey in return for 400,000 Turks. The question of Mosul was left to the League of Nations, which in 1925 recommended its retention by Iraq. The Lausanne Treaty also provided for the apportionment of the Ottoman Public Debt, for the gradual abolition of the Capitulations (Turkey regained tariff autonomy in 1929), and for an international régime for the Straits. Turkey did not recover complete control of the Straits until the 1936 Montreux Convention.

The result of the war and the peace settlement created a state in which the great majority spoke Turkish. Though there has been a tendency to see this as the almost inevitable consequence of the rise of Turkish and Arab nationalisms, it seems in fact to have been the accident of war that broke off the Arab provinces. Whatever the views of Mustafa Kemal himself, it is clear that the majority of his followers thought of themselves primarily as Muslims; in the elaborate religious ceremony that preceded the opening of the Grand National Assembly there was no word of Turks or Turkey but only of the need to save "religion's last country." The creation of a sense of Turkish nationhood was the product of a long effort in which Mustafa Kemal played the dominant role.

Congress at Erzurum

Kemalism, 1922–38. Construction of a new political system began with the abolition of the sultanate and the declaration of a republic. Loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty was strong even among Kemalists; but Vahideddin's identification with the Allies weakened his support.

Abolition of the sultanate and caliphate. An Allied invitation to the sultan to nominate representatives to Lausanne aided Kemal—a split Turkish delegation would be self-defeating. With a brilliant mixture of threats and persuasion, Kemal was able, therefore, to induce the Assembly to abolish the sultanate (November 1, 1922). Vahideddin left Turkey, and his cousin Abdülmecid (died 1944) was installed as the first and last Ottoman caliph who was not also sultan. The caliphate was finally abolished on March 3, 1924, and all members of the Ottoman dynasty were expelled from Turkey. Before that the assembly had declared Turkey to be a republic and had elected Mustafa Kemal as first president (October 29, 1923). A full republican constitution was adopted on April 20, 1924; it retained Islām as the state religion, but in April 1928 this clause was removed and Turkey became a purely secular republic.

Kemal's government. The assembly was the instrument of Kemal's will. The first assembly had contained large factions hostile to his policies, including religious conservatives, merchants, and former members of the CUP. In opposition to his 197 acknowledged supporters, who were known as the "First Group," there were 118 opponents, members of a "Second Group." The first Assembly was dissolved on April 16, 1923, and Mustafa Kemal took care to keep his opponents out of the second assembly; only three of the Second Group were returned. Kemal's own party, which became the Republican People's Party (RPP), dominated all assemblies until 1950; this period saw a heavy preponderance in the Assembly of urban professional men and of officials with university education. With an outlook different from that of the illiterate Turkish peasant they carried out a revolution from the top.

Opposition. There was little opposition to Mustafa Kemal—the small Progressive Party (founded, November 17, 1924; dissolved, June 5, 1925) had only 29 members and was suppressed because Kemal feared that its leading members, who included some of his most notable associates in the war of independence, might have too much influence in the army; the short-lived Liberal Republican Party (August 12–December 18, 1930) was an abortive attempt by Kemal to organize a moderate opposition to his own party. Otherwise Kemal ruled quite autocratically. A plot against his life in 1926 gave him the chance to deal with his rivals, who were tried by a special court and many of them sentenced to death, imprisonment, or exile. Opposition outside the assembly, of which the most dangerous were the Kurdish revolts of 1925, 1930, and 1937, was suppressed vigorously.

Kemalist policies. The bases of Mustafa Kemal's policies were enshrined in the Republican People's Party program of 1931 and subsequently (February 1937) written into the Turkish constitution. These were the six principles of republicanism (the creation of the republic), nationalism, populism, statism (*devletçilik*), secularism, and revolution. Revolution was implicit in the whole radical reorganization of the political, social, and economic systems. Populism was the effort to mobilize popular support from the top through such characteristic devices as the People's Houses (1931–51), which spread the new concept of a national culture in provincial towns, and the village institutes, which performed the same educational and proseletyzing role in the countryside. The creation of a sense of nationalism was encouraged by changes in school curricula, by the rewriting of history to glorify the Turkish past, by the "purification" of the language by a reduction of the number of words of foreign origin (sometime later, this effort appeared to be redundant in the light of a promulgation that all languages were descended from Turkish), and by the renunciation of Pan-Islāmic, Pan-Turkish, and Pan-Ottoman goals in foreign policy.

Mustafa Kemal's six principles

Statism was the movement toward state-controlled economic development; the shortage of skilled labour and entrepreneurs (particularly owing to the reduction of the Greek and Armenian communities, which in 1914 had controlled 80% of Ottoman finance, industry, and commerce), the lack of capital, and the intense nationalist desire for industrial self-sufficiency that would banish foreign influence, all stimulated a movement in the 1930s towards state ownership or control. This was achieved through investment banks, monopolies, state industrial enterprises, and planning. A five-year plan was instituted in 1934. Although the immediate results were disappointing, the policy of state-inspired economic growth was important for future economic advance.

Under secularism is included the reform of law, involving the abolition of religious courts and schools (1924) and the adoption of a purely secular system of family law. The substitution of Latin for the Arabic alphabet in writing Turkish was a significant step toward secularism and made learning easier; other measures included the adoption (1925) of the Gregorian calendar that had been jointly used with the Hijrī calendar since 1917; the replacement of Friday by Sunday as the weekly holiday (1935); the adoption of surnames (1935); and, most striking of all, the abolition of the fez (1925). The wearing of clerical garb outside places of worship was forbidden in 1934.

These changes, coupled with the abolition of the caliphate, and the elimination of the dervish orders after a Kurdish revolt in 1925, dealt a tremendous blow to Islām's position in social life, completing the process begun in the Tanzimat. With secularism there came a steady improvement in the status of women, who were given the right to vote and to sit in the parliament.

Vital as the changes made were, in many cases they were primarily matters of appearance and style. Structural changes in society took longer. At the first census, in 1927, the population was put at 13,600,000, of which 24% was urban. In 1940 the population was 17,800,000, but the urban percentage was almost unchanged. In 1938 the per capita income and literacy were both below comparable figures for developed countries.

Foreign policy was subordinated to internal change. The loss of Mosul was accepted (June 5, 1926). Hatay, however, was recovered. It was given internal autonomy by France in 1937, occupied by Turkish troops in 1938, and incorporated into Turkey in 1939. Turkey followed a neutralist policy, supported the League of Nations, which it joined in 1932, and sought alliances with other minor powers, leading to the Balkan Entente (1934) and the Sa'dābād Pact with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan (1937).

Neutralist policy

World War II and the postwar era, 1938–50. Atatürk's autocratic, dominating, and inspiring personality had directed and shaped the Turkish republic. At this death in 1938, his closest associate İsmet İnönü (born 1884) was elected president. With the approach of war, foreign affairs assumed greater importance. An alliance with Britain and France (October 19, 1939) was not implemented because of Germany's early victories. After Germany's invasion of Russia (June 22, 1941), there was popular support for an alliance with Germany, which seemed to offer prospects of realizing old Pan-Turkish aims. Although a nonaggression pact was signed with Germany (June 18, 1941), Turkey clung to neutrality until an Axis defeat was seen to be inevitable, when it entered the war on the Allied side (February 23, 1945). The great expansion of Soviet power exposed Turkey, in June 1945, to demands that control of the Straits be given to Black Sea powers and for the cession of territory in eastern Asia Minor. It was also suggested that a large area of northeastern Anatolia be ceded to Soviet Georgia and a more democratic government established in Turkey. This caused Turkey to seek U.S. assistance; it received U.S. military aid beginning in 1947 (providing the basis for a large and continuing flow of military aid) and economic assistance beginning in 1948.

Economic problems. The war also brought changes in domestic policy. The army had been kept small throughout the Atatürk period, and defense expenditure had been reduced to 28% of the budget. The army was rapidly expanded in 1939, and defense expenditures rose to between 50% and 60% of the budget for the duration of the war. Substantial deficits were incurred, imposing a severe economic strain, which was aggravated by shortages of raw materials. By 1945 agricultural output had fallen to 70% of the 1939 figure; per capita income, to 75%. Inflation was strong; official statistics show a rise of 354% between 1938 and 1945, but this probably understates the fall in the value of money, which in 1943 was less than one-fifth its 1938 purchasing power. One means chosen by the government to raise money was a capital levy introduced in 1942, arranged to fall with punitive force upon the non-Muslim communities and upon the Dönmes (Jewish converts to Islām). The war did provide some stimulus to industry, however, and enabled Turkey to build up substantial foreign credits, which could be used to finance postwar economic development.

Political changes. The most notable change in the postwar years was the liberalization of political life. The investment in education was beginning to show some return, and literacy had risen to 29% by 1945. A growing class of professional and commercial men demanded more freedom. The Allied victory had made democracy more fashionable; accordingly, the government made concessions allowing new political parties, universal suffrage, and direct election.

Political liberalization

From a split within the Republican People's Party (RPP), the Democrat Party (DP) was founded in 1946 and immediately gathered support. Despite government interference, the DP won 61 seats in the 1946 general election. Some elements in the RPP, led by the prime minister Recep Peker (served 1946–47), wished to suppress the DP, but they were prevented by İnönü. In his declaration of July 12, 1947, İnönü stated that the logic of a multiparty system implied the possibility of a change of government. Prophetically, he renounced the title of "National Unchangeable Leader," which had been conferred upon him in 1938. Peker resigned and was succeeded by more liberal prime ministers in Hasan Saka (served 1947–49), and Şemseddin Günaltay (served 1949–50).

Other restrictions on political freedom, including press censorship, were relaxed. The period saw the establishment of the first mass circulation, independent newspapers. Trade Unions were permitted in 1947, although they were not given the right to strike until 1963. A far-reaching measure of land redistribution was passed in 1945, although little was done to implement it before 1950. Other political parties were established including the conservative National Party (1948); Socialist and Communist activities, however, were severely repressed.

In the more open atmosphere the DP was able to organize in the villages. The RPP, despite its Village Institutes, had always been the government party and had had little real grass-roots organization. The Democrats were much more responsive to local interests. The DP won a massive victory in the 1950 elections, claiming 54% of the vote and 396 out of 487 seats. The RPP won 68 seats; the National Party, one. The DP victory has been attributed variously to U.S. influence, to social change, to a desire for economic liberalization, to better organization, to religious hostility to the RPP, and to a bad harvest in 1949. Perhaps the basic reason was that in 27 years the RPP had made many enemies.

Turkey under the Democrats, 1950–60. In the DP government Celâl Bayar became president; Adnan Menderes, prime minister (a post which for the first time came to surpass that of the president in importance).

The economy. The Democrats were pledged to a program of economic growth, to be achieved through a reduction of state interference. At first they had much success; in 1950–53 Turkey's average annual rate of economic growth was 6%, and annual per capita income rose at a rate of 3%. Good harvests in 1950 and 1953 and the Korean War boom assisted. But problems appeared after 1953. In 1954 a poor harvest obliged Turkey to import wheat again. A shortage of foreign exchange limited the purchase of essential materials and parts, which handicapped industry. After a sudden favourable surge in the early 1950s, the terms of trade moved steadily against Turkey. Inflation, which averaged 15% or more annually, became a serious problem. The government attempted unsuccessfully to check the price rise by legislation, but its policies contributed to inflation as the result of a continued rise in public expenditure. Despite the problems, the DP achieved considerable success over the decade 1950–60. The proportion of the gross national product going to investment was raised (with overseas aid) from about 10% to between 12% and 15%, and annual growth averaged 5%.

Political repressions. The political fortunes of the Democrat government closely reflected the economic changes. In the 1954 elections—the Democratic peak—the DP took 57% of the vote and gained 503 out of 541 seats; the RPP took 35% and 31 seats. Subsequent economic difficulties led to mounting criticism within and outside the DP, to which the government replied with increasing repression. In 1953 much of the property of the RPP was confiscated, forcing the closure of the People's Houses. The RPP newspaper presses in Ankara were seized. In 1954 the National Party was dissolved because of its opposition to Kemalist principles (it was immediately reformed as the Republican Nation's Party and united in 1958 with the Peasants' Party to form the Republican Peasants' Nation Party). Laws passed in 1954 provided for heavy fines on journalists who damaged the prestige of the state or the law; several prominent journalists were prosecuted under this law, which was made more severe in 1956, in which year other laws substantially abridged the independence of civil servants (including university teachers) and judges. In October 1955 critics within the DP were expelled; these critics subsequently formed the Freedom Party (December 1955), which later (1958) merged with the RPP. In 1956 limitations were placed upon public meetings.

The DP's loss of popularity was reflected in the elections of October 1957, when they won only 48% of the vote and 424 out of 610 seats. The RPP took 41% and 178 seats. The three opposition parties had attempted to form an electoral coalition, but a law passed that September

had declared such coalitions illegal. The combined opposition vote was 52% of the total, and many persons believed that this government action had deprived them of victory. Opposition attacks upon the DP became stronger, and it was accused of unconstitutional action. At the same time, the Democrats, fearing a revolution, redoubled control. In December 1959 an alleged plot (the so-called Nine Officers' Plot) was unearthed; some of the accused were so clearly innocent that punishment fell upon the accuser, but it appears that there had been a conspiracy of some sort.

A charge on which the RPP laid great stress was that the DP was reversing the principles of secularism and favouring conservative religious organizations. The DP had relaxed some of the secularist policies of pure Kemalism, following in the steps of the RPP in the years 1945–49. Religious instruction in schools had been extended and the organization of religious schools permitted. Arabic had been reinstated for the call to prayer, and radio readings of the Qur'ān had been allowed. These, however, were modest concessions in themselves, and the Democrats had clearly demonstrated their unwillingness to tolerate religious influence in politics by suppressing the activities of dervish orders in 1950–52.

The years 1958–60 saw a further worsening of the economic situation as the government reluctantly introduced restrictive measures. Returns on new investment fell and inflation continued. Serious problems of housing, unemployment, etc., were emerging in the large towns, whose population had been growing annually at the rate of about 10%, so that by 1960 the proportion of urban population to the whole had risen, to 32%. RPP attacks became more bitter, and the government's response stronger. In April 1960 the government ordered the army to prevent İnönü from campaigning in Kayseri and followed this by forming a committee to investigate the affairs of the RPP. It was widely believed that the next action would be to close the RPP. Student demonstrations followed, and martial law was declared on April 28. The army had been brought directly into the political arena.

Military takeover. Relatively neglected from 1923 to 1939, the army during the war had undergone a rapid expansion and a considerable modernization subsequently with the aid of U.S. advisers. Many officers feared that the DP threatened the principles of the secular, progressive Kemalist state. Some younger officers saw the army as the direct instrument of unity and reform. On May 3, 1960, the commander of the land forces, Gen. Cemal Gürsel, demanded political reforms, and resigned when they were refused. On May 27 the army acted; an almost bloodless coup was carried out by officers and cadets from the Istanbul and Ankara War colleges. The leaders established a 38-man "National Unity Committee" with Gürsel as chairman. The Democrat leaders were imprisoned.

The National Unity Committee, 1960–61. From the outset, a clear division existed among the officers who had carried out the coup. One group, predominantly of younger officers, believed that to restore national unity and carry out major social and economic reforms it was necessary to retain power for some years; this group included both those who supported a nationalistic and Islāmist policy and those who favoured accelerated secularization. Another group, which included most of the senior officers, wanted to withdraw the army from politics as soon as possible. In November 1960 the dispute was decided against the first group, and 14 were expelled from the committee and and sent into diplomatic exile.

The main work of the National Unity Committee was to destroy the DP and to prepare a new constitution. Substantial purges took place—5,000 officers including 235 out of 260 generals were dismissed or retired; 147 university teachers left their jobs; 55 wealthy landowners were banished from eastern Anatolia, their lands confiscated. The DP was abolished (September 29, 1960), and many Democrats were brought to trial at Yassi Ada (October) on charges of corruption, unconstitutional rule, and high treason. Of 601 tried, 464 were found guilty. Three former ministers, including Menderes, were executed; 12 others, including Bayer, had their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment.

Work on the new constitution began immediately after the coup, when a committee of five law professors was appointed to prepare a draft. This was submitted to the National Unity Committee on October 18. The Committee appointed a second committee to redraft the constitution; the new draft was presented to a Constituent Assembly, which met in January 1961. The constitution was completed in May and approved by 61% of the voters at a referendum in July.

The new constitution established a two chamber parliament—consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly. A separate electoral law provided for proportional representation. The president was elected by the Senate and National Assembly together. The constitution also provided for a Constitutional Court and a State Planning Organization. The first elections were held in October 1961. The army then withdrew from direct political involvement, although the members of the National Unity Committee retained some influence as life members of the Senate.

Period of transition, 1961–65. No party won a majority in October 1961. The RPP won 38% of the votes and 173 of the 450 Assembly seats. The newly formed Justice Party (JP), led by retired general Rağip Gümüspala, received 35% and 158 seats. The remaining seats were divided between two smaller parties—the Republican Peasants' Nation Party, which took 54 seats, and the liberal New Turkey Party, which gained 65. The results demonstrated the enduring popularity of the old Democrat Party. Its votes had been divided among the three smaller parties, the majority of them going to the Justice Party, which had also emerged as the largest party in the Senate. The RPP had failed to hold all its 1957 vote and had suffered by identification with the army coup.

The new Grand National Assembly elected General Gürsel as president. The RPP leader İnönü formed a coalition government with the JP, but the coalition survived only until June 1962, when it broke up over the question of an amnesty for the imprisoned Democrats. After some delay and splits within the parties (which led to the formation of the Nation Party by dissidents who withdrew from the Republican Peasants' Nation Party), the RPP formed a coalition with the two smaller parties. This accelerated the tendency for former Democrat voters to turn to the JP.

In the local elections of 1963 the JP made extensive gains at the expense of the two smaller parties. This led to the breakup of the coalition, and because the JP was unable to form a government, İnönü formed a minority government from his own party alone, but with voting support from the New Turkey Party. The RPP government resigned after a defeat on the budget in February 1965 and was replaced by a coalition of all the other parties under the leadership of an independent, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü; this coalition acted as caretaker until the elections of October 10, 1965.

The national remainder principle

In December 1964 a new electoral law had introduced the principle of "the national remainder," by which a certain number of seats were distributed to parties according to their proportion of the vote. The law had been intended to operate in favour of the smaller parties and against the JP, but in the election the JP won a surprising majority with 53% of the votes and 240 seats. The RPP received 29% and 134 seats; and the smaller parties, 76 seats. The new JP leader Süleyman Demirel, a former engineer, was able to form a government.

Political moderation had triumphed in the years 1961–65. The army had stood aloof while power came gradually to a party that drew its main support from the same groups and areas as the Democrats and that espoused a similar philosophy. Attempts to restore army rule had failed. Intervention proposed by senior officers in October 1961 had been rejected by others. Two projected coups had been foiled in February 1962 and May 1963. In December 1962, 11 air force officers were removed for their radical views. Members of another secret society within the army—the Young Kemalists—were arrested in April 1963. Criticism of the 1960 revolution was

made illegal in 1962; army leaders contented themselves with occasional warnings.

The political trends were liberal: the Democrat prisoners were released in 1962–64; the labour law of 1963 made strikes legal and promoted a great expansion of trade unionism; workers became more active in politics through the left-wing Confederation of Reformist Workers' Unions, or DISK, and through the Marxist Turkish Workers (or Labour) Party (TWP; founded in 1961).

Political development, 1965–71. The victory of the Justice Party in 1965 did not lead to strong government mainly because the JP was itself a coalition of disparate elements—modernizers and traditionalists, secularists and religious conservatives. Prime Minister Demirel showed considerable skill in balancing factions and holding his party to a moderate line. He established good relations with the new president (1966–73), the former chief of staff Cevdet Sunay. Demirel concentrated on fostering rapid economic growth through foreign investment (thus avoiding the need for tax reform) and on suppressing the increasingly violent hostility of the radical left, notably of the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu; short form, Dev Genç), a Marxist student organization founded in 1969, which adopted terrorist methods. The leftists clashed with the newly emerging radical right.

Election of 1969

In the election of 1969 the JP won with a reduced majority. The national remainder system, which had favoured the smaller parties, was dropped in favour of simple proportional representation. The result was that the two major parties, JP and RPP, increased their share of the seats in the National Assembly, although they secured a smaller share of the vote. The JP won 47 percent of the vote and 256 seats; the RPP 27 percent and 143. The extremist parties of left and right performed poorly.

The loss of votes weakened Demirel's hold on the JP. His power was challenged by the rightists, led by his chief rival Sadettin Bilgiç. Excluded from the new Cabinet, they retaliated by defeating Demirel's government in February 1970. Demirel was reappointed prime minister, but his authority was considerably weakened; some rightists seceded from the JP in December 1970 to form the Democratic Party (DP), led by Ferruh Bozbeyli. The Demirel government was evidently unable to deal with the increasing disorders in Turkey. The army leaders became disturbed by the situation and by their own identification with Demirel's policies. On March 12, 1971, possibly to anticipate a takeover of government by more radical junior officers, the senior military commanders, led by the chief of staff, Gen. Memduh Tağmaç, presented a memorandum calling for the resignation of the government on the grounds that it had proved itself incapable of dealing with the crisis that threatened civilization in Turkey. Demirel immediately resigned.

Political development from 1971. From 1971 Turkey was governed by coalition governments—led successively by Nihat Erim (March 1971–April 1972), Ferit Melen (to April 1973), and Naim Talu (to January 1974)—claiming to be above party and including several technocrats and bureaucrats as well as politicians, enjoying the support of the army leaders and obtaining the consent of the National Assembly. Their main aim was to restore law and order. On April 26, 1971, martial law was established in 11 provinces; there were many arrests and trials before military courts and armed clashes between the security forces and the radical guerrillas (the so-called Turkish People's Liberation Army). The Islāmic-based National Order Party (founded January 1970) was suppressed in May 1971 and the TWP in July. In September 1971 the constitution was amended to reduce personal freedoms. Martial law was not lifted finally until September 1973, when the military courts were replaced by special security courts. Retired Adm. Fahri Korutürk was chosen as president in 1973.

The crisis of 1971 accelerated an important change in the RPP. Its failure to attract popular support after 1961 had led to a re-examination of its policies and the adoption in 1965 of a "left of centre" policy. The party's failure in the election of 1965 sharpened divisions between the radicals (led by Bülent Ecevit) and the conservatives (led by Turhan Feyzioğlu). The party leader, İnönü, favoured the Ecevit group, and in 1967 Feyzioğlu and others seceded to found the Reliance Party (renamed National Reliance Party in 1969). Many conservatives remained in the RPP, however, and the conflict broke out again after the party's defeat in 1969; it was brought to a head by the army's intervention in March 1971. Ecevit opposed İnönü's acceptance of the army's action and in May 1972 defeated the veteran leader in a battle for control of the party. (İnönü died December 25, 1973.) Other conservatives now left to form a Republican Party, which merged with the National Reliance Party in March 1973 to form the Republican Reliance Party (RRP). The RPP had largely shed its eastern and central Anatolian landowner element and could now present itself as a social democratic party.

No party secured a majority at the general election in October 1973, but the RPP emerged as the largest single party, with a third of the vote and 185 seats. The right-wing vote was much larger (more than 60 percent) but was divided among several parties, mainly the JP (29.8 percent and 149); the DP (11.9 percent and 45); the religiously based National Salvation Party (NSP), founded in October 1972 in succession to the banned National Order Party and led by Necmettin Erbakan (11.8 percent and 48); the RRP (5.3 percent and 13); and the National Action Party (NAP), until 1969 the Republican Peasants' Nation Party, a right-wing nationalist party led by Alparslan Türkeş (3.4 percent and 3).

An uneasy coalition government was eventually formed by the RPP and NSP in January 1974 with Ecevit as prime minister. In September 1974 it was dissolved by Ecevit. Instead there followed a long ministerial crisis and an above-party caretaker government under Sadi Irmak (November 1974–March 1975). This was succeeded by a right-wing coalition of JP, NSP, RRP, and NAP (the Nationalist Front) led by Demirel. In this period the internal security situation again deteriorated; there were conflicts in universities between leftists and rightists (notably the NAP youth commandos known as Gray Wolves) and clashes between security forces and guerrillas in eastern Turkey.

National Front coalition

At the National Assembly election in June 1977, the swing to the smaller parties that had characterized the elections of 1973 was reversed. The RPP gained 41.4 percent of the vote and 213 seats, the JP 36.9 percent and 189 seats. Only two of the smaller parties secured more than 2 percent of the vote: the NSP (8.6 percent and 24) and the NAP (6.4 percent and 16). The DP was virtually obliterated, and the reformed Turkish Workers Party gained only 0.1 percent of the vote. Yet no party had a clear majority, and Demirel's ineffective coalition returned to office until the end of the year. The economic situation deteriorated with rapidly rising inflation and unemployment, and internal security worsened. In January 1978 Ecevit formed a new coalition with the RRP, DP, and independents, mainly defectors from the JP.

By contrast with the years 1922–60, the years after 1960 have been characterized by weak governments, political instability, fluid political loyalties, increasing political violence, the rise of radical groups of the left and right, and army intervention in politics. At the same time they revealed much greater popular interest in political issues, the moderation and skill of the senior army commanders and of the main political leaders (especially İnönü and Demirel), and a significant reordering of political demarcations to replace traditional loyalties with clearer ideological differences between the main political groups.

Economic and social development from 1960. Despite grave difficulties—caused by deteriorating terms of trade, continual deficits in the balance of trade made much worse by the oil price increases of 1973–74, permanent inflation (more than 20 percent in 1975 and 1976 and rising to nearly 50 percent in 1977) necessitating frequent devaluations of the currency, unemployment rising from 1,000,000 in 1962 to more than 3,000,000 at the end of 1977 (made worse by population growth at 2 percent annually, although this had fallen from 3 percent in the

1950s), and frequent predictions of imminent collapse—Turkey maintained a remarkable rate of economic growth during this period. Its average annual rate of growth during the 1960s was more than 6 percent and in the 1970s more than 7 percent. This was chiefly attributable to the expansion of industrial output, financed especially by overseas aid and investment; a consortium to provide aid to Turkey was formed by western European countries in 1962, aid was received from the United States, credits were given by the Soviet Union, and much private foreign investment took place in the 1960s. The remittances of about a million Turkish workers in Europe were also valuable sources of foreign exchange. Domestic savings also increased from 15 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in the early 1960s to nearly 20 percent in 1970, though it had declined to less than 15 percent again by the late 1970s. An important role in directing development was played by the State Planning Organization (established 1960), which devised three five-year plans (1962–67, 1967–72, and 1972–77), although the main emphasis has been on private initiative.

Turkey's sustained economic expansion produced important structural changes in the economy: a major shift of population to the towns and a decline in the contribution of agriculture to GNP and a rise in that of industry. The problem of land reform, evaded by many governments, was finally attacked in a bill passed in 1973. This established maximum family landholdings of 80 acres (32 hectares) irrigated and 250 acres (101 hectares) unirrigated and provided for 8,000,000 acres (3,238,000 hectares) (6,000,000 state and 2,000,000 private) to be redistributed to 500,000 peasants over 15 years.

Significant social changes also took place. By 1968 the percentage of literates had risen to 49, and the great pressure on institutions of higher education contributed to student discontent in the late 1960s. Industrialization and the labour law of 1963 led to a rise in trade-union membership from 300,000 in 1963 to more than a million in 1968. Urbanization produced large shantytowns (*gecekondu*) around the major cities.

Foreign policy after 1950. Until about 1964 Turkish foreign policy was wholly based upon the Western alliance. Turkey sent troops to Korea, joined NATO (1952), joined the Baghdad Pact, later Central Treaty Organization, or Cento (1955), joined the Organization for European Economic Co-operation and the Council of Europe, and applied for membership in the European Economic Community (1959). This policy was based on fear of the Soviet Union, on dependence upon U.S. military and economic aid, and on the conviction that Turkey's destiny was as a secular European state. From 1960 the suitability of this policy was increasingly questioned, and from 1964 Turkish policy, while retaining its Western inclination, was more attuned to Turkey's own regional interests. The principal causes of this change were the general East-West détente, which encouraged NATO countries to seek to improve their relations with those of eastern Europe; the growing importance of Middle Eastern countries; and discontent with the fruits of Turkey's cultivation of the U.S. Turkish doubts were brought to a head by the problem of Cyprus.

During the 1950s Greek Cypriot demands for independence from Britain and union with Greece led to strife involving the Turkish Cypriot community, which looked to Turkey for help. Tension between Turkey and Greece ensued, although this was reduced by the Zürich and London agreements of 1959, providing for the independence of Cyprus under certain conditions. Disputes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in independent Cyprus led to civil war in December 1963, and Turkish public opinion demanded intervention in support of the Turkish Cypriots. A letter from U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson in June 1964 warning Turkey against intervention, and apparently threatening to refuse to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union, caused great resentment in Turkey. The crisis passed, but in November 1967 Turkey again threatened military intervention. War was then averted by U.S. and UN pressure, which procured the withdrawal of Greek regular forces that had been introduced into Cyprus. In July 1974, however, occurred a major crisis when, following a coup against President Makarios of Cyprus that had been supported by the Greek government, Turkish forces occupied the north of the island. Turkey's action led to an embargo on military aid to Turkey, imposed by the U.S. Congress from February 1975 (relaxed in October 1975 and May 1977). In retaliation Turkey denounced the U.S.-Turkish defense agreement of 1969 and closed U.S. defense installations on July 25, 1975. A new defense agreement was negotiated (March 26, 1976) by which the bases passed under Turkish control and the U.S. guaranteed $1,000,000,000 military aid to Turkey over four years. In September 1978 the arms embargo was lifted, and the next month Turkey responded by giving the U.S. permission to reopen four installations.

The Cyprus dispute and indifferent relations with the U.S. were important factors in Turkey's decision to respond to Soviet overtures for friendship, which had been frequently repeated since 1953. In 1964 the Turkish foreign minister visited Moscow in the first of a series of high-level visits that led to economic and cultural agreements and, on June 23, 1978, a political agreement couched in broad terms of friendship. Turkey also set out to improve relations with the Balkan states (other than Greece), which had languished since the Balkan Entente (Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey) of 1954. Relations with Greece suffered not only from the Cyprus problem but also from disputes over rights in the Aegean Sea bed and overflying rights in that area.

Soviet-Turkish accords

Turkey also endeavoured to improve its relations with other states. China was recognized (1971), and gestures were made to the Arab countries. A movement toward the Arab position in the dispute with Israel and the cultivation of Islāmic bonds led to better relations with the Arab world. Relations with Iran and Pakistan (through Cento and the Regional Cooperation for Development) were always close. Turkey's overall commitment to the West, however, was evidenced by its close ties with western European countries and by its ambition to join the EEC. By the Ankara agreement of 1963, a timetable for Turkey's membership was drawn up. After a preparatory period Turkey was given associate status, and it was planned (optimistically, in the view of most observers) that over the period 1973–95 Turkey would abolish all economic barriers between itself and the EEC. It was this ambitious drive for economic equality with Europe that helped to sustain Turkey's determination to maintain its startling rate of economic growth. (M.E.Y.)

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(S.J.S./M.E.Y.)

Ou-yang Hsiu

The Chinese poet, historian, and statesman Ou-yang Hsiu (in Pin-yin romanization, Ou-yang Xiu) reintroduced the unadorned "ancient style" in literature and as a statesman sought to reform political life through adherence to Classical Confucian principles. He was born in 1007 in what is today Mien-yang, Szechwan Province, where his father was a judge. His father died when he was three, and he and his mother went to live with his uncle in Hupeh. Although the story that the family was so poor that he had to learn writing in the sand with a reed is apocryphal, they probably lived in straitened circumstances. In 1030 he placed first in the doctoral examinations and was appointed a judge at the western capital, Lo-yang. He was already known as a brilliant young writer, and at Lo-yang he befriended the renowned essayist Yen Shu and the poet Mei Yao-ch'en. These friendships not only enhanced Ou-yang's status but, more important, reinforced his strong preference for the simplicity and clarity of the "ancient style." Some years before, he had read the works of Han Yü, the great master of T'ang dynasty literature, whose pure and easy "ancient style," free of outworn metaphors and allusions, had greatly impressed him. Eventually, his leadership and advocacy of that style paved the way for a new literary movement.

In 1034 he was appointed a collator of texts in the Imperial library at the capital, K'ai-feng. Two years later, when Fan Chung-yen, a government official, was banished, at the insistence of an Imperial counsellor, for speaking out against certain official practices and institutions, Ou-yang did not hesitate to attack the counsellor in writing. As a result, he, too, was banished and demoted to low judicial office in Hupeh and Hunan provinces, where he wrote the *Hsin Wu-tai shih* ("New History of the Five Dynasties"), a period of political chaos lasting through almost the entire 10th century. Ou-yang's strong sense of fairness led him to devote separate sections to political outcasts such as martyrs, rebels, and traitors, a radical departure from previous dynastic histories.


Writing of the "New History of the Five Dynasties"

Highly recommended by Fan Chung-yen, who was back at the capital, and other high officials, Ou-yang was recalled to the capital in 1043 to become Imperial counsellor. When Fan and others were dismissed for forming a private group of political reformers, Ou-yang, in a notable essay on partisanship, defended associations of gentlemen as politically constructive. His courage and forthright opinions earned the respect of the emperor, Sung Jen Tsung, and he was commissioned to record Jen Tsung's daily life and to draft edicts. His frank opinions and severe criticisms of others created many enemies, and in 1045 he was accused of and tried for having had illicit relations with his niece many years before—a charge to which his romantic life with women and wine,

DINNER

5-600

courtyard



1843 - 1856

Imp Ceremonial Hall

chandeliers 4½ tons

750 light bulbs

4000 light bulbs in hall

Ataturk's Tomb

A nation w/out conditions +
w/unfettered sovereignty —

~~Hak~~
HAKİMİYET KAYITSIZ ŞARTSIZ
MİLLETİNDİR

(leading to tomb - signs)

Ismet İNÖNÜ - 2nd Pres.
Ataturk's deputy
H. is son now leader of opp.
in Parliament.

Music opens

Peace at home, peace in the world.
(in the country) Ataturk

Sher-ay-fay - Cheers
(to your honor)

Eisenhower - NATO tour
Ankara March 1952

State Dinners - dinner remarks?

Pink Palace 3-5 min.

1968

Ataturk died here 1939

Münir Nuretten Selçuk

Metal Selcuk

OSIS 15125 8 9

(Mayt-tal Sel-chook) pronun.

last reception held there for de Gaulle in 1968

Bob –
this is the woman who can get you info on D. Palace – here Rather random Greece & Turkey stuff
Peggy

ISTANBUL

A poet writing fourteen centuries ago described Istanbul as being surrounded by a garland of water, and the city still owes much of its spirit and beauty to the waters that bind and divide it. The former capital of three world empires, Istanbul is the only city in the world which stands upon two continents. The main part of the city lies in Europe and is separated from its Asian suburbs by the Bosphorus. The Golden Horn divides the European city into two parts, the old imperial town of Stamboul on the south bank and the more modern town of Galata on the north.

Tradition says that the original settlement of Byzantium was established where the Topkapi Palace now stands, in the seventh century B.C., although the actual date was probably much earlier. Known from the beginning as an important center of trade and commerce, during its first millennium Byzantium had much the same history as other cities in the region. This changed when Constantine the Great, fresh from reuniting the Roman Empire under his control, decided to reconstitute the Empire with Byzantium as its capital. In 330 A.D. the city was rededicated as New Rome, which soon changed to Constantinople. For the next eleven centuries Constantinople served as the imperial and religious capital of the Byzantine Empire. This first golden age of the city is symbolized by the magnificent Haghia Sophia church, which was considered the center of the orthodox Christian world.

The combination of the Bosphorus, the Golden Horn and the great land walls built by the early rulers protected Constantinople from numerous sieges. Indeed, the city was taken by force only twice by the armies of the Fourth Crusade in 1204 and by the Ottoman Turks in 1453.

The city taken by Mehmet the Conqueror was a pale shadow of the former imperial Byzantine capital. The Ottomans repeopled and rebuilt it, making it by the beginning of the sixteenth century a thriving and populous metropolis, once again the capital of a vast empire. The Ottoman empire reached its peak during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, who ruled from 1520 to 1560. This second golden age of the city is symbolized by the great Suleymaniye Mosque built in 1557.

When the Ottoman empire foundered at the end of the First World War, Istanbul was occupied by the victorious allied armies. Kemal Ataturk, leader of the Turkish nationalist forces, decided to make a clean break with the imperial past of the city, and placed the capital of the new Turkish Republic in Ankara. Its imperial past reflected in the unforgettable skyline of the city, Istanbul today remains a vast metropolis that continues to serve as the economic, industrial and cultural heart of Turkey.

HAGHIA SOPHIA
AYA SOFYA

The history and architecture of Haghia Sophia make it one

of the Holy [illegible] the church of the Divine Wisdom, was dedicated by the Emperor Justinian on December 26 in the year A.D. 537. For nearly a thousand years it served as the cathedral of Constantinople and was the center of the religious life of the Byzantine Empire. For almost five centuries after the Turkish Conquest in 1453 it ranked first among the imperial mosques of Istanbul under the name of Aya Sofya Camii. In 1935, during the early years of the Turkish Republic, Haghia Sophia was converted into a museum. The architectural genius of the building is most evident in its magnificent dome, which was pictured by the ancients as being suspended from heaven by a golden chain.

SULTAN AHMET CAMII
THE BLUE MOSQUE

Not far from Haghia Sophia, the Sultan Ahmet Camii, commonly known as the Blue Mosque, is a splendid example of Ottoman imperial architecture. It forms one of the principal landmarks of the Istanbul skyline, with its graceful cascade of domes and semidomes, its six slender minarets and the lovely gray color of the stone set off by the gilded ornaments on domes and minarets. The Blue Mosque was founded by Sultan Ahmet I and constructed between 1609 and 1616. The mosque is celebrated for the light that streams in from its 260 windows as well as for the splendor of the tiles used in the interior--hence the name "Blue Mosque."

TOPKAPI SARAYI
TOPKAPI PALACE

Topkapi Sarayi, the Great Palace of the Ottoman Sultans, is the most extensive and fascinating monument of Ottoman civil architecture in existance. It served as the seat of Ottoman power for over 400 years. Perched on a hill [illegible] both the Golden Horn and the Bosphorus

Constantinople, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, [illegible]
1465. It served not only as the private residence of the Sultan, his Harem and his court, but was also the seat of the supreme executive and judicial council of the Ottoman empire, known as the Divan, as well as the home of the largest and most select training school for the imperial civil service. The Palace is divided into four courts and surrounded on its slopes by gardens and parks. It also houses a museum with superb collections of porcelains, armor, fabrics, jewels, illuminated manuscripts, and calligraphy.

DOLMABAHCE SARAYI
DOLMABAHCE PALACE

Dolmabachce Palace stretches for 600 meters along the shore of the Bosphorus ~~near where the first Bosphorus bridge (1974) links Asia and Europe~~. It was built in 1853 by Sultan Abdul Mecit who found Topkapi too old fashioned. After completion, it served as the chief residence of the Sultans until the end of the Empire. Ataturk stayed there when in Istanbul and died there on November 10, 1938. Predominantly Western in style, Dolmabahce Palace is most noted for the baroque extravagance of its decor. It houses, among other things, an incredible crystal staircase and an alabaster bathroom.

ROBERT COLLEGE

Located on a hill overlooking the Bosphorus in Arnavutkoy, Robert College is a private American coeducational high school founded in 1871 as the American College for Girls. It was the first modern high school of its kind in Turkey and produced many women who played a leading part in the life of their country. In 1971, on the occasion of its centennial, it was combined with the boy's high school of the old Robert College, taking the latter's name. (The original boys' school, located a short distance to the north on the Bosphorus, today houses Bosphorus University (Bogazici Universitesi), one of Turkey's most prestigious institutions of higher learning.) Robert College is still considered by many the best high school in Turkey, and its graduates continue to occupy prominent positions in all walks of Turkish life.

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MACROPÆDIA
Volume 2

Knowledge in Depth

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Helen Hemingway Benton, Publisher, 1973–1974
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Area of conflicts over mineral resources

For many years in the 19th century, the desert was the source of conflicts between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru because of its valuable resources, particularly sodium nitrate deposits located northeast of Antofagasta and inland from Iquique. Much of the area belonged to Bolivia and Peru, but the mining industry there was controlled by Chilean interests, which were strongly supported by the Chilean government. From the War of the Pacific (1879 to 1883) between the three countries, Chile emerged victorious. The resulting Treaty of Ancon (1884) gave Chile permanent ownership of sectors previously controlled by Peru and Bolivia, the latter losing its whole Pacific coastline.

The area proved to be one of the chief sources of Chile's wealth until World War I. Nitrate deposits in the central depression and in several basins of the coastal range were systematically mined after the middle of the 19th century. Ports were built at Iquique, Caldera, Antofagasta, Taltal, Tocopilla, Mejillones, and, farther north, Pisagua, and railroads penetrated the mountain barriers to the interior. Prior to World War I, Chile had a world monopoly on nitrate; in some years 3,000,000 tons were extracted, and the taxes on its export amounted to half the government's revenues. The development of synthetic methods of fixing nitrogen have since reduced the market to a regional one, and only 780,000 tons per year were produced in the late 1960s. Once, 120,000 nitrate workers were employed; now there are fewer than 10,000. Whole towns were abandoned, and the port of Pisagua had fewer than 25 inhabitants in 1970.

Some sulfur is still mined in the high Cordillera. The region's chief source of revenue, however, is copper mining at Chuquicamata in the Andes and at Paposo on the coast. The industry developed with the entry of U.S. capital and technical skill in the early part of the 20th century. The deposits are abundant, and the government (1964–70) of Pres. Eduardo Frei (Montalva) had an ambitious development program. The succeeding government of Pres. Salvador Allende (Gossens) nationalized all U.S.-owned copper companies.

Topography of the Atacama

Some farming is done in the desert, but this supports only a few thousand people. Lemons are grown at Pica, and a variety of products are cultivated on the shores of the salt marshes at San Pedro de Atacama. At Calama, near Chuquicamata, water from the Río Loa irrigates potato and alfalfa fields.

Atacama had become a region of declining population, despite the presence of the copper industry. The development of fishing and the establishment of canning factories, especially at Iquique, provided employment for relatively few. So far had the decline of population gone that government programs for afforestation and sheep breeding were faced with a lack of manpower.

(J.-L.-F.T.)

Atatürk, Kemal

Kemal Atatürk, a distinguished Turkish soldier, reformer, and statesman, was the founder of the Republic of Turkey and its first president. His successful struggle for the liberation of Turkey against the powers of the Entente (an alliance of Britain, France, and Russia) after Turkey's defeat in World War I has inspired many embryonic states in Asia and Africa to fight for their independence.

Early life and career. Kemal Atatürk, born in 1881 in Salonika, Greece, of a Turkish family of humble origin, was named Mustafa. His mother was Zübeyde Hanım, his father Ali Riza, a minor government employee. When Mustafa was still in the primary school he lost his father, and his mother took the boy to live in the country with her brother. Returning to Salonika later, Mustafa finished primary school and entered the military secondary school in that town in order to become an officer in the Ottoman army. It was at this school that one of his teachers, who admired the boy for his skill in mathematics and who was also called Mustafa, suggested he should call himself Mustafa Kemal (maturity and perfection). After finishing secondary school, Mustafa Kemal went on to the military high school in Manastir, where, observing with hatred the continuous attacks of the Christian Macedonian anarchists on the Turkish population, he became, like most of his fellow cadets, an ardent nationalist.

Education

In 1899 Mustafa Kemal entered the Military Academy in Istanbul. There he came to take a close interest in politics; he and his fellow students read secret pamphlets attacking the despotic rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II. He was especially influenced by the patriotic and liberal thinking of the poet Namık Kemal Bey. He also read books on the French Revolution and developed an admiration for Napoleon.

In 1902 Mustafa Kemal graduated from the Military Academy and entered the General Staff College, where his interest in politics continued. After finishing the college with the rank of captain, he was appointed to the cavalry regiment in Damascus. There, together with some of his friends, he founded a secret society called "Fatherland and Freedom," which, however, failed to make much progress. On his return to Salonika, Mustafa Kemal, like many of his fellow officers, joined the secret "Committee of Union and Progress," which spread its revolutionary activities throughout the armed forces and caused the proclamation of the Constitution of 1908.

Mustafa Kemal devoted all his time and energy to his profession in the following years. In 1911, when the Italians attacked Tripoli, an Ottoman province at that time, he hurried there together with some of his officer friends and, forming troops of the natives, launched successful guerrilla raids on the enemy. In the same year Mustafa Kemal was promoted to major. In the Balkan War of 1912 he was charged with the defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula—a task that gave him an excellent opportunity to study the strategic position of this important area. In 1913 he was sent to Sofia as military attaché, and during his stay there he acquired a good knowledge of the Western standards in taste, the arts, and the relations between men and women in polite society. He made good use of this knowledge later when he set about reforming social life in his country. While still in Sofia, Mustafa Kemal was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

Activities during World War I

When World War I broke out, Mustafa Kemal was appointed to the command of the 19th Division at Çanakkale. He defeated the British at Gallipoli twice and gained for himself in the Turkish press the title of "the Saviour of Istanbul." And he was promoted to colonel. In 1916, serving on the eastern front, he stopped the advance of the Russian forces to the south and was promoted to brigadier general.

In 1917 Mustafa Kemal accompanied the crown prince, Vahideddin, on a state visit to Germany. During a tour of the German Western Front he did not hesitate to express openly his view about the vulnerability of the front and Germany's position in the war. On his return to Istanbul Mustafa Kemal fell ill, and for treatment he went to Vienna and Carlsbad (now Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia) where he had a further opportunity to observe European civilization.

In 1918 Mustafa Kemal was appointed to command the 7th Army in Palestine; when he took up his duties, however, the fight with the British had all but ended, and the enemy was advancing northward without meeting any resistance. The Arab guerrillas too were launching attacks on the Turkish army. To avoid the capture of the whole 7th Army, Mustafa Kemal withdrew his forces to the north of Aleppo. When, after the Armistice of Mudros (Moúdhros), the German officers and commanders serving in Turkey returned to their country, Mustafa Kemal assumed the command of all the forces of the southeastern front. Disagreeing with the British over the enforcement of the terms of the Armistice, however, he was appointed to a post in the Ministry of War. On his arrival in Istanbul he found the fleet of the Entente anchored in the harbour. The terms of the Armistice were hard enough, but information was now received about a secret agreement reached by the states of the Entente for the partition of the Ottoman territories. Moreover, the minorities in Is-

tanbul and elsewhere had seized the opportunity to organize themselves against the Turks. The Turkish people looked for a means of redress; in some parts of the country they formed organizations called "the Society for the Defence of Rights" to fight against them.

Activities after World War I. In Istanbul there were two main ideas about Turkey's future: the Sultan and his supporters were thinking of placing the country under English protection, while some well-known Turkish journalists and intellectuals were spreading propaganda for placing Turkey under an American mandate. In both cases the aim was to maintain the Ottoman Empire in its cosmopolitan structure. Mustafa Kemal, however, persisted in the idea of an independent Turkish nation living within its national boundaries and believed that this could be achieved if the nation was prepared for a new struggle. Before deciding on a course of action, he had talks with many Turkish and foreign notables, including the Sultan and his ministers. Then he discussed it with his friends, all commanders who were bitterly disillusioned over the abolition of the Ottoman army by the terms of the Armistice, and saw the solution in starting a war of independence in Anatolia.

An excellent opportunity for this presented itself soon: the powers of the Entente were putting pressure on the Turkish government to take measures against riots likely to break out in the eastern provinces. The Sultan appointed Mustafa Kemal as Inspector of the Third Army in Erzurum, endowing him with power over military and civilian authorities. On May 15, 1919, immediately before Mustafa Kemal's departure for Erzurum, the Greeks occupied Izmir.

Mustafa Kemal's secret circular

After a secret interview with the Sultan, Mustafa Kemal left Istanbul with a large suite of staff officers and set foot in Samsun on May 19. In Amasya, with the approval of local corps commanders, he issued a secret circular dated June 22 in which he described the dangers that the country faced: how the government in Istanbul had yielded weakly to the forces of occupation and how the only hope of salvation lay in the nation's own struggle for its liberation. Such a struggle, he added, had already begun, and to make it the decision of the nation itself a national congress would be convoked in Sivas with the participation of three delegates from each province. He ordered all unit commanders to strengthen their forces, disregarding the terms of the Armistice about the demobilization of the Turkish army. Finally, he warned both the military and civilian authorities that henceforth they would take their orders from him alone.

Mustafa Kemal's demands were fervently complied with by the military because his demands meant saving the army from extinction. The army took under its control all postal and telegraphic communications in Anatolia and forced into obedience those civil administrators who tried to resist Mustafa Kemal's orders.

Participation in nationalist congresses

In all the towns and cities he called at on his way to Sivas, Mustafa Kemal met the leading citizens and explained to them his views on a national struggle for independence. He arrived in Sivas amid warm demonstrations of support by the people, and after important talks with the notables of the city, he proceeded to Erzurum, ignoring all orders given by the Sultan's government, under pressure from the states of the Entente for his immediate return to Istanbul. In Erzurum a congress was to be convened on July 23 by the Society for the Defense of Rights in Eastern Anatolia. In the meantime the military and civilian authorities of Erzurum received an order for Mustafa Kemal's arrest and transport to Istanbul. Although this order went unheeded, Mustafa Kemal resigned his commission in the army, deeming it necessary to have more freedom as the leader of the national struggle he had started. Thus he entered the congress as a mere delegate and was elected its president. At his suggestion the congress accepted the National Covenant, which was in the nature of an oath requiring the indivisibility of the fatherland and the successful completion of the national movement. In addition, a Standing Committee of nine members was elected of which Mustafa Kemal was chosen president. On September 4 he opened the National Congress in Sivas, and he was again elected president of the congress. The National Congress adopted all the decisions taken by the Congress of Erzurum and rejected decisively the idea of placing Turkey under American mandate. Resisting a motion for establishing a new state in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal proposed the joining of all local Societies for the Defense of Rights into one society to be called "the Society for the Defence of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia." The proposal was accepted, and so the prototype of a political party was formed. The Ottoman cabinet of Ferid Paşa and succeeding Ottoman governments continued to view the national movement as an act of rebellion and Mustafa Kemal's activities as illegitimate.

Role in the founding and reform of modern Turkey. On December 27 Mustafa Kemal transferred the seat of the national struggle to Ankara, thinking it a more convenient location for his purposes. In the meantime, at the general elections of members for the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal's supporters won an overwhelming majority and succeeded in getting the chamber to proclaim as its own decision the principles of the National Covenant. They also secured the cancellation of the government's former decree about Mustafa Kemal's dismissal from the army. Alarmed at these indications of change in the Ottoman policy, the British occupied Istanbul officially on March 16, 1920, and dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. Mustafa Kemal vehemently protested the British government's action; but, in fact, the occupation of the Ottoman capital and especially the dissolution of the chamber were extremely useful to his aims because they removed the legal obstacle that Istanbul presented to his plan of forming a national government in Anatolia. So, after a new election of deputies, he opened on April 23 in Ankara the first Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and he was elected its president. At Mustafa Kemal's proposal, a constitutional law was passed changing the name of the state to Turkey and stipulating that sovereignty and executive powers would be used on its behalf by the Grand National Assembly. Accordingly, as president of the assembly Mustafa Kemal took upon himself the offices of the prime minister and of the president of the state. Thus ended the Islāmic form of government that had existed in Turkey since the Middle Ages; and, as in the French Revolution, the Turkish people passed suddenly from rule of absolutism and the caliphate to a regime based on national sovereignty. This important change caused serious uprisings in some regions, but they were quickly suppressed by the national forces.

Struggle to consolidate the country

Mustafa Kemal now busied himself with the work of gaining control of such parts of the country as were then under occupation. First, in the east, the Armenians and the Georgians were defeated, and through the mediation of Soviet Russia, a treaty was signed with them that regained for Turkey even the territories she had lost in 1878. After extensive guerrilla warfare, the French in the south evacuated Turkish territories and withdrew to Syria and recognized the legitimacy of the National Government in Ankara. Ignoring Ankara altogether, the British got the Ottoman government to sign the Treaty of Sèvres. The National Government proclaimed that it did not recognize as legitimate a treaty of such terms, whereupon the Greek army extended its area of occupation, advancing within 50 kilometres of Ankara. At this time of great anxiety the National Assembly appointed Mustafa Kemal the commander in chief with extraordinary powers. Indeed, on August 26, 1922, after an all-out offensive planned and directed personally by the Commander in Chief, the Greek army was defeated and forced within two weeks to leave Anatolia completely. Upon this decisive victory and with the mediation of the states of the Entente, an armistice was signed with the Greeks according to which they evacuated all Turkish territories. The British ceded Çanakkale and Istanbul to the National Government. Vahideddin, the last Ottoman sultan, fled abroad, and upon a motion by Mustafa Kemal the National Assembly terminated the 600 years of Ottoman rule in Turkey. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed

on July 24, 1923, established the integrity of Turkey's national frontiers and its complete independence. All privileges granted to the European countries by the Ottomans were cancelled. Thus, Mustafa Kemal realized his dream of founding a completely independent and national Turkish state in place of the Ottoman Empire, that "sick man of Europe" that had been for a long time a subject of strife among the great powers of Europe.

Marriage

In 1922 Mustafa Kemal married Latife Hanım, the well-educated daughter of a wealthy family in Izmir. The marriage was contracted in the modern manner, not in the tradition of Islām. In order to show the Turkish people that the place of women in society was by the side of their men, he took his wife with him on his trips around the country. His marriage did not last long, however. During his long years of single life he had developed an independent habit of living that he found difficult to give up and that his wife could not tolerate.

On one occasion as early as 1917, Mustafa Kemal had remarked that, had he the power and the authority, he would change social life in Turkey at one blow. This opportunity had now presented itself, and he launched on a program of reforms. In place of the Society for the Defense of Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia, he founded the People's Republican Party and became its leader. With the general elections held immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, this party, as Turkey's only political party, took complete control of government. On October 29, 1923, Mustafa Kemal proclaimed the Republic and was elected its first president. In 1924 he abolished the caliphate. In the meantime, a group of his friends who were against his drastic methods of reform and who believed in gradual progress over a period of time founded the Progressive Republican Party. Mustafa Kemal went on carrying out his program of reform: he closed down all institutions based on the Muslim canon law, all monasteries, and religious orders. "Science is the most reliable guide in life," he remarked, and abolishing the traditional system of education, which was mainly religious, he established secular schools of the modern type. The whole Ottoman legal system was modernized, and a new civil and penal code was adopted. The Oriental forms of dress that carried a religious significance were discarded in favour of European dress. Dances, balls, and other forms of entertainment involving both men and women were encouraged, and the enlightened classes adopted the European way of life.

Reforms

Mustafa Kemal's reforms did not go unchallenged. In Eastern Anatolia a man called Şeyh Said stirred up a rebellion to restore the Muslim canon law; in Izmir preparations for a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal were reportedly discovered; and there were said also to be some local attempts at rebellion against the use of hats. Mustafa Kemal punished severely all the leaders of these movements, closed down the Progressive Party, and, reverting to the former authoritarian regime, he pursued his program of reform. Setting aside all the old laws and traditions that held women inferior to men, he established complete equality between the sexes, including the right of electing and being elected. In 1928 he substituted Roman characters for the Arabic that had been used in Turkey for centuries. He endeavoured to popularize Western classical music and the theatre in Turkey. In 1930 he made a second attempt at introducing a multiparty regime by allowing the creation of the Free Republican Party; but, as this party soon became a centre for antireformist ideas and activities, it met the same fate as the Progressive Republican Party. Mustafa Kemal also launched a large-scale program of research in the fields of Turkish language and history. By this means he wanted to strengthen in society the ties of national feeling in place of the old ties of religion. In 1933 a law was passed to make the use of family names compulsory, and the National Assembly gave Mustafa Kemal the name Atatürk ("Father of Turks"), which soon became so popular as to supersede his previous name and titles.

Struggle to consolidate the country

Atatürk's foreign policy can be summed up by his motto: "Peace at home, and peace in the world." In economy, he followed a policy of national economy, nationalizing all foreign firms and companies. On the question of Turkey's industrialization, he placed his hope on private domestic capital for a while, but discovering its insufficiency, he decided to encourage etatism (state socialism). In neither case, however, did he achieve any important success. If one or two items of foreign policy are excepted, there was a gradual slowing down in the last five years of Atatürk's life, and his final year passed in serious illness. He died on November 10, 1938, in Istanbul, where he had gone to rest.

Atatürk made major reforms in Turkey in the field of politics, law, and culture that only affected, however, bureaucrats and a minority of well-to-do people in the cities. The poorer part of the population, and especially the peasants who still subsisted in an agricultural order of the medieval type, continued to live much the same as before. Nevertheless, the Western view of life had gained enough power among the educated classes to make a return to the old way of life impossible.

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(M.Ak.)

Athanasius, Saint


St. Athanasius, theologian, ecclesiastical statesman, and Egyptian national leader, was the chief defender of Christian orthodoxy in the 4th-century battle against Arianism, the heresy that asserted that the Son of God was a creature of like but not the same substance as God the Father. His two-part work of apologetics, *Against the Heathen* and *The Incarnation of the Word of God*, completed about AD 335, was the first great classic of developed Greek Orthodox theology. In Athanasius' system, the Son of God, the eternal Word through whom God made the world, entered the world in human form to lead men back to the harmony from which they had fallen away. Athanasius reacted vigorously against Arianism, for which the Son was a lesser being, and welcomed the definition of the Son formulated at the Council of Nicaea in AD 325: "consubstantial with the Father."

Life and major works

Athanasius was born at Alexandria, Egypt, about 293 and received his philosophical and theological training there; in 325 he attended Bishop Alexander of Alexandria as deacon at the Council of Nicaea. A recognized theologian and ascetic, Athanasius was the obvious candidate to succeed Alexander when the latter died in 328. The first years of his episcopate were devoted to visitation of his extensive patriarchate, which included all of Egypt and Libya. During this time he established important contacts with the Coptic monks of Upper Egypt and their leader Pachomius. Soon began the struggle with imperialist and Arian churchmen that occupied much of his life. He used political influence against the Meletians, followers of the schismatic bishop Meletius of Lycopolis, who had gone back on the plans made at Nicaea for their reunion with the church; but he refuted specific charges of mistreatment of Arians and Meletians before a hostile gathering of bishops at Tyre (in modern Lebanon) in 335, which he refused to recognize as a general council of the church. When both parties met the emperor Constantine at Constantinople in 336, Athanasius was accused of threatening to interfere with the grain supply from Egypt, and without any formal trial Constantine exiled him to the Rhineland.

The Emperor's death in 337 allowed Athanasius to return to Alexandria, but Constantine's son Constantius, emperor in the East, renewed the order of banishment in 338. Athanasius took refuge at Rome under the protection of Constantius' brother Constans, emperor in the West. An Arian bishop, Gregory, was installed at Alexandria; Athanasius, however, kept in touch with his flock through the annual *Festal Letters* announcing the date of Easter. Pope Julius I wrote in vain on his behalf, and the general council called for AD 343 was no more successful

28 Turkey



Introduction

Turkey is one place to which the term "East meets West" really applies, both literally and figuratively. It is in Turkey's largest city, Istanbul, where the continents of Europe and Asia meet, separated only by the Bosphorus, which flows 29 kilometers (18 miles) from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara.

Although most of Turkey's land mass is in Asia, Turkey has faced West politically since 1923, when Mustapha Kemal, better known as Atatürk, founded the modern republic. He transformed the remnants of the shattered Ottoman Empire into a secular state with a Western outlook. So thorough was this changeover, culturally, politically, and economically, that in 1987, 49 years after Atatürk's death, Turkey applied for full membership to the European Community (EC). It has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952.

For 16 centuries Istanbul, originally known as Byzantium, played a major part in world politics, first as capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, when it was known as Constantinople; then, as capital of the Ottoman Empire, the most powerful Islamic empire in the world, it was renamed Istanbul. Atatürk moved the capital to Ankara at the inception of the Turkish Republic.

The legacy of the Greeks, Romans, Ottomans, and numerous other civilizations has made the country a vast outdoor museum. The most spectacular of the reconstructed classical sites are along the western Aegean coast and the southwest Mediterranean coast, which are lined with magnificent sandy beaches and sleepy little fishing villages, as well as busy holiday spots with sophisticated tourism facilities.


For those with more time, an extra five to seven days, an excursion inland to central Anatolia and the eroded lunar valleys of the Cappadocia area will show some of the enormous diversity of the landscapes and people of Turkey.

Turkey remains solidly Islamic. Of its 52 million people, 99% are Muslim; primarily these are rural people whose lives are deeply rooted in tradition. You can drive through areas where peasants still pick cotton by hand or collect hay with a pitchfork, while smoke rises from a nearby campsite—scenes that have barely changed over the centuries.

Before You Go

When to Go The height of the tourist season runs from April through October. July and August are the busiest and warmest months. They are also the best time to visit central and eastern Anatolia in Asia Minor, which can be extremely cold in winter, with roads and mountain passes closed by snow. April through June and September and October are the best months to visit archaeological sites or Istanbul and the Marmara area because the days are cooler and the crowds are smaller. Istanbul is hot in the summer and cold in the winter.

Climate The Mediterranean and Aegean coasts have mild winters and hot summers. You can swim in the sea from late April through October. The Black Sea coast is mild and damp, with a rainfall



of 228 centimeters (90 inches) a year. Summer brings hot and dry weather to eastern Anatolia, but evenings are cool.

The following are the average daily maximum and minimum temperatures for Istanbul.

Jan.	46F	8C	**May**	69F	21C	**Sept.**	76F	24C
	37	3		53	12		61	16
Feb.	47F	9C	**June**	77F	25C	**Oct.**	68F	20C
	36	2		60	16		55	13
Mar.	51F	11C	**July**	82F	28C	**Nov.**	59F	15C
	38	3		65	18		48	9
Apr.	60F	16C	**Aug.**	82F	28C	**Dec.**	51F	11C
	45	7		66	19		41	5

Currency The monetary unit is the Turkish lira (TL), which comes in bank notes of 1,000, 10,000, 20,000, and 50,000. Although there are coins of smaller denominations, they are seldom used. At press time (spring 1990), the exchange rate was 2,600 TL to the dollar and 4,680 TL to the pound sterling. Major credit cards and traveler's checks are widely accepted in hotels, shops, and expensive restaurants in cities and resorts, but rarely in villages and small shops and restaurants.

Be certain to retain your original exchange slips when you convert money into Turkish lira—you will need them to reconvert the money. Because the Turkish lira is worth a lot less than the dollar or most foreign currencies, it's best to convert only what you plan to spend.

What It Will Cost Turkey is the least expensive of the Mediterranean countries. Although inflation hovers between 50% and 70%, frequent small devaluations of the lira keep prices fairly stable when measured against foreign currencies. Prices in this chapter are quoted in dollars, which indicate the real cost to the tourist more accurately than do the constantly increasing lira prices.

Sample Prices Coffee can range from about 30¢ to $2.50 a cup, depending on whether it's the less expensive Turkish coffee or American-style coffee and whether it's served in a luxury hotel or a café; tea, 20¢ to $2.50 a glass; local beer, $1–$3; soft drinks, $1–$4; lamb shish kebab, $1.50–$7; taxi, $1 for 1 mile; prices are 50% higher between midnight and 6AM.

Customs On Arrival Turkish customs officials rarely look through tourists' luggage on arrival. You are allowed to take in 400 cigarettes, 50 cigars, 200 grams of tobacco, 1.5 kilograms of coffee, 500 grams of tea, and 2.5 liters of alcohol. An additional 600 cigarettes, 100 cigars, or 500 grams of tobacco may be imported if purchased at the Turkish duty-free shops on arrival. Register all valuable personal items in your passport on entry. Turkey has duty-free shops in airports for international arrivals. Items are usually less expensive than in duty-free shops in European airports or than what's offered in-flight.

On Departure You must keep receipts of your purchases, especially items such as carpets, as proof that they were bought with legally exchanged currency. Also, it cannot be emphasized strongly enough that Turkey is extremely tough on anyone attempting to export antiques without authorization or on anyone caught with illegal drugs, regardless of the amount.

Language In 1928, Atatürk launched his sweeping language reforms that, over a period of six weeks, replaced Arabic script with the Latin-based alphabet and eliminated many difficult and obtuse Arabic and Persian words from the Turkish language. The result has been dramatic: The literacy rate today is 75%, compared with 9% before the reforms.

English and German are widely spoken in hotels, restaurants, and shops in cities and resorts. In the villages or in remote areas, you'll have a hard time finding anyone who speaks anything but Turkish. Try learning a few basic Turkish words; the Turks will love you for it.

Getting Around

By Car

Road Conditions Turkey has excellent roads—25,000 miles of well-maintained, paved highways—but signposts are few and marked poorly, lighting is scarce, and city traffic is chaotic. City streets and highways are jammed with vehicles operated by high-speed lunatics and drivers who constantly blast their horns. In Istanbul, it's safer and faster to drive on the modern highways. Avoid the many small one-way streets, since you never know when someone is going to barrel down one of them in the wrong direction. Better yet, leave your car in a garage and use public transportation or take taxis. Parking is a big problem in the cities and larger towns.

Rules of the Road The best way to see Turkey is by car, but be warned that it has one of the highest accident rates in Europe. In general, Turkish driving conforms to Mediterranean customs, with driving on the right and passing on the left. But watch out for drivers passing on a curve or on the top of a hill. Other hazards are peasant carts, which are unlit at night, and motorcycles weaving in and out of traffic, even though they may be carrying an entire family.

Gasoline Throughout the country Mobil, Shell, and British Petroleum, as well as two Turkish oil companies, have gas stations which are open 24 hours on the main highways. Others are open from 6 AM to 10 PM.

Breakdowns Before you start out, check with your hotel or a tourist information office about how, in case of an emergency, to contact one of the road rescue services available on some highways. Turkish mechanics in the villages will usually manage to get you going again, at least until you reach a city for full repairs. In the cities, entire streets are given over to car repair shops—one repairs radiators; another, electrical fittings; another, steering wheels. Each shop is run by a team of experts. Prices are not high, but it's good to give a small tip to the person who does the actual repair work. If you're not in the shop during the repairs, take all the car documents with you.

By Train Although there are express trains in Turkey, the term is usually a misnomer. These trains ply several long-distance routes, but they tend to be slow. The best trains are Mototren, Ekspres, and Mavi. Dining cars on some trains have waiter service and serve surprisingly good and inexpensive food. Overnight expresses have sleeping cars and bunk beds.

Fares Train fares tend to be less expensive than bus fares. Seats on the best trains, as well as those with sleeping berths, should be booked in advance. Round-trip fares are cheaper than two one-way fares. There are 10% student discounts and 30% discounts for groups of 24 or more. In railroad stations, buy tickets at windows marked "Bilgisayar Giseleri."

By Bus Buses, which are run by private companies, are much faster than trains and provide excellent, inexpensive service. Buses are available, virtually around the clock, between all cities and towns. They are fairly comfortable and some are air-conditioned. Companies have their own fixed fares for different routes. Istanbul to Ankara, for instance, varies from $7 to $12, Istanbul to Izmir varies from $10 to $15. *Su* (bottled water) is included in the fare. You can purchase tickets at stands in a town's *octogar* (central bus terminal). All seats are reserved. Fares don't vary much among the competing companies, but there's often a great deal of difference between the age of the buses and their comfort level. Whether you end up on a new bus or a rattling old one is simply a matter of luck. For very short trips, or getting around within a city, take minibuses or a *dolmuş* (shared taxi). Both are inexpensive and comfortable.

By Plane **Turkish Airlines (THY)** operates an extensive domestic network. There are nine flights daily on weekdays between Istanbul and Ankara. During the summer, many flights between the cities and coastal resorts are added. Try to arrive at the airport at least 45 minutes before your flight because security checks, which are rigidly enforced without exception, can be time-consuming. Checked luggage is placed on trolleys on the tarmac and must be identified by boarding passengers before it is put on the plane. Unidentified luggage is left behind and checked for bombs or firearms.

THY offers several discounts on domestic flights: 10% for family members, including spouses; 50% for children aged 12 and under; 90% for children under two; and 50% for sports groups of seven or more. The THY sales office is at Sishane terminal, tel. 144–0296 or 145–4238; reservations by phone, 573–3515–40 (26 lines).

By Boat **Turkish Maritime Lines** operates car ferry and cruise services from Istanbul. Cruises are in demand, so make your reservations in advance, either through the head office in Istanbul (Rihtim Cad. 1, Karaköy, tel. 1/144–0207) or through **Sunquest Holidays Ltd.** in London (Aldine House, Aldine St., London W128AW, tel. 081/749–9933). One of its cruises is the 10-day Mediterranean Cruise from Istanbul to Alanya, with ports of call at resorts along the way. The cruises, from May through September, depart every 15 days. Round-trip fares vary between $155 and $1,100 including all meals and land tours.

The **Black Sea Ferry** sails from May through September from Istanbul to Samsun and Trabzon and back, from Kabataş or Sarayburnu Dock in Istanbul. One-way fares to Trabzon are about $15 for a reclining seat, $20 to $75 for cabins, and $26 for cars. The Istanbul to Izmir car ferry departs three days a week. The price of a one-way ticket with no meals included varies between $15 and $37, and $22 for a car.

Staying in Turkey

Telephones Most pay phones are yellow, push-button models, although a few older, operator-controlled telephones are still in use. Multilingual directions are posted in phone booths.

Local Calls Public phones use *jetons* (tokens), which can be purchased for 150 TL at post offices and street booths. For a local call, deposit the token, wait until the light at the top of the phone goes off, then dial the number. If you need operator assistance for long-distance calls within Turkey, dial 031. For intercity automatic calls, dial 9, wait for a buzzing sound, then dial the city code and the number. Jetons are available for 750 TL and 2250 TL for long-distance calls.

International Calls For all international calls dial 9, wait for the buzz, dial 9, again, then dial the country code, area or city code, and the number. You can use the higher-price jetons for this, or reach an international operator by dialing 032.

If you must make a call abroad, you're better off calling from a phone booth and using jetons or a telephone credit card; hotels in Turkey, as elsewhere, have hefty service charges for international calls.

Mail Post offices are painted bright yellow and have PTT (Post, Telegraph, and Telephone) signs on the front. The major ones are open Monday–Saturday, from 8 AM to 9 PM, Sundays from 9 to 7. Smaller branches open Monday–Saturday 8:30–5.

Receiving Mail If you're uncertain where you'll be staying, have mail sent to Post Restante, Merkez Postanesi (central post office) in the town of your choice.

Shopping *Bargaining* The best part of shopping in Turkey is visiting the *bedestans* (bazaars), all brimming with copper and brassware items, hand-painted ceramics, alabaster and onyx goods, fabrics, and richly colored carpets. The key word for shopping in the bazaars is "bargain." You must be willing to bargain, and bargain hard. It's great fun once you get the hang of it. As a rule of thumb, offer 50% less after you're given the initial price and be prepared to go up by about 25% to 30% of the first asking price. It's both bad manners and bad business to grossly underbid or to start bargaining if you're not serious about buying. Outside the bazaars, prices are usually fixed, although in resort areas some shopkeepers may be willing to bargain if you ask for a "better price." Part of the fun of roaming through the bazaars is having a free glass of *cay* (tea), which vendors will offer you whether you're a serious shopper or just browsing. Beware of antiques: Chances are you will end up with an expensive fake, but even if you do find the genuine article, it's illegal to export antiques of any type.

VAT Refunds Value-added tax (VAT) is nearly always included in the price. You can claim back the VAT if you buy articles from shops authorized to refund VAT. The net total value of articles subject to VAT on your invoice must be over $22 (50,000 TL) and these articles must be exported within three months of purchase. The invoice must be stamped by customs. If the VAT to be refunded is less than 50,000 TL you can obtain it from a bank outside customs boundaries where the dealer has an account. Otherwise, mail back the stamped invoice to the dealer within one month of departure and the dealer will send back a check.

Opening and Closing Times **Banks.** Banks are open weekdays, 8:30–noon and 1:30–5.

Mosques. Most mosques are open to the public, except during prayer hours *(namaz)*, which are observed five times a day. These times are based on the position of the sun, so they vary through the seasons between the following hours: sunrise

(5–7); lunchtime (noon–1, when the sun is directly overhead); afternoon (3–4); sunset (5–7); bedtime (9–10). Prayers last 30–40 minutes.

Museums. Museums are generally open Tuesday–Sunday, 9:30–4:30, and closed Monday. Palaces, open the same hours, are closed Thursday.

Shops. Most shops are closed daily from 1 PM to 2 PM and all day Sunday. Generally they're open Monday–Saturday, 9:30–1 and 2–7. There are some exceptions in the resort areas, where shops stay open until 9 PM and are often open Sunday.

National Holidays January 1; April 23 (National Independence and Children's Day); April 15 (sunset) to April 18 (sunset): *Seker Bayrami* (sugar feast), three-day feast marking the end of Ramadan, a month-long Islamic observance that includes daytime fasting; Ramadan is based on the Muhammadan lunar calendar and varies yearly; May 19 (Atatürk's Commemoration, Youth and Sports Day); June 22 (sunset) to June 26 (sunset): *Kurban Bayrami* (sacrificial feast), Turkey's most important religious holiday, celebrates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son to God; the holiday varies yearly according to the lunar calendar; August 30 (Victory Day); October 29 (Republic Day).

Dining Turkish cuisine is one of the best in the world. The old cliché about it being hard to find a bad meal in Paris more aptly describes Istanbul, where the tiniest little hole-in-the-wall place serves delicious food. It's also an extremely healthful cuisine, full of fresh vegetables, yogurt, legumes, and grains, not to mention fresh seafood, roast lamb, and shish kebab made of lamb, beef, or chicken. Because Turkey is predominantly Muslim, pork is not readily available. But there's plenty of alcohol, including local beer and wine, which are excellent and inexpensive. Particularly good wines are Villa Doluca and Kavaklidere, available in *beyaz* (white) and *kirmizi* (red). The most popular local beer is Efes Pilsen. The national alcoholic drink, *raki*, is made from grapes and aniseed. Turks mix it with water or ice and sip it throughout their meal or serve it as an aperitif.

Hotel restaurants have English-language menus and usually serve a bland version of Continental cuisine. Far more adventurous and tasty are meals in *restorans* and in *lokantas* (Turkish restaurants). Most lokantas do not have menus because they serve only what's fresh and in season, which varies daily. At lokantas, you simply sit back and let the waiter bring food to your table, beginning with a tray of *mezes* (appetizers). You point to the dishes that look inviting and take as many as you want. Then you select your main course from fresh meat or fish—displayed in glass-covered refrigerated units—which is then cooked to order, or from a steam table laden with casseroles and stews. For lighter meals, there are *kebabcis*, tiny restaurants specializing in kebabs served with salad and yogurt, and *pidecis*, selling *pides*, a pizzalike snack on flat bread, topped with butter, cheese, egg, or ground lamb, and baked in a wood-fired oven.

Mealtimes Lunch is generally served from 12 to 3, and dinner from 7 to 10. In the cities, you can find restaurants or cafés open virtually any time of day or night, but in the villages, finding a restaurant open at odd hours can be a problem.

Dress Except for Very Expensive restaurants, where formal dress is appropriate, informal dress is acceptable at restaurants in all price categories.

Precautions Tap water is heavily chlorinated and supposedly safe to drink in cities and resorts. It's best to play it safe, however, and drink bottled mineral water *(maden suyu)* or bottled water *(şişe suyu)*, which is better tasting and inexpensive.

Ratings Prices are per person and include an appetizer, main course, and dessert. Wine and gratuities are not included. A service charge of 10%–15% is added to the bill; waiters expect another 10%. Best bets are indicated by a star ☆.

Category	Major Cities	Other Areas
Very Expensive	over $30	$17
Expensive	$19–$30	$11–$17
Moderate	$8–$19	$6.50–$11
Inexpensive	under $8	under $6.50

Credit Cards The following credit card abbreviations are used: AE, American Express; DC, Diners Club; MC, MasterCard; V, Visa.

Lodging Hotels are officially classified in Turkey as HL (luxury), H1 to H5 (first- to fifth-class); motels, M1 to M2 (first- to second-class); and P, *pansiyons* (guest houses). The classification is misleading because the lack of a restaurant or a lounge automatically relegates the establishment to the bottom of the ratings. A lower-grade hotel may actually be far more charming and comfortable than one with a higher rating. There are also many local establishments that are licensed but not included in the official ratings list. You can obtain their names from local tourist offices.

Accommodations range from international luxury chains in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir to comfortable, family-run pansiyons. Plan ahead for the peak summer season, when resort hotels are often booked solid by tour companies. Turkey does not have central hotel reservations offices.

Rates vary from $10 to more than $200 a night for a double room. In the less expensive hotels, the plumbing and furnishings will probably leave much to be desired. You can find very acceptable, clean double rooms with bath for between $20 and $70, with breakfast included. Room rates are displayed in the reception area.

It is accepted practice in Turkey to ask to see the room in advance. Your room probably will be much more basic than the well-decorated reception area. Check for noise, especially if the room faces a street.

Ratings Prices are for two people in a double room, including VAT and service charge. Best bets are indicated by a star ☆.

Category	Major Cities	Other Areas
Very Expensive	over $180	over $130
Expensive	$100–$180	$105–$130

Moderate	$50–$100	$66–$105
Inexpensive	under $50	under $66

Credit Cards The following credit card abbreviations are used: AE, American Express; DC, Diners Club; MC, MasterCard; V, Visa.

Tipping Except at inexpensive restaurants, a 10% to 15% charge is added to the bill. Since the money does not necessarily find its way to the waiter, leave an additional 10% on the table or hand it to the waiter. In the top restaurants, waiters expect tips of between 10% and 15%. Hotel porters expect between $2 and $5, and the chambermaid, about $2 a day. Taxi drivers don't expect tips, although they are becoming accustomed to foreigners giving them something. Round off the fare to the nearest 100 TL. At Turkish baths, the staff that attends you expects to share a tip of 30% to 35% of the bill. You won't miss them, they'll be lined up expectantly on your departure.

Istanbul

Arriving and Departing

By Plane All international and domestic flights arrive at Istanbul's Atatürk Airport. For information on times, call the individual airline or the airport's information desk (tel. 1/574–7300; 20 lines).

Between the Airport and Downtown Shuttle buses run between the airport's international and domestic terminals to the Turkish Airlines (THY) terminal in downtown Istanbul, at Meşrutiyet Caddesi, near the Galata Tower. Buses depart for the airport at the same address, every hour from 6AM to 11PM. After that, departure time depends on the number of passengers. Allow at least 45 minutes for the bus ride. Plan to be at the airport two hours before your international flight because of the lengthy security and check in procedures. The ride from the airport into town takes from 30 to 40 minutes, depending on traffic. Taxis charge about $9.

By Train Trains from the west arrive at Sirkeci station (tel. 1/527–5984) in Old Istanbul. Eastbound trains to Anatolia depart from Haydarpasa station (tel. 1/337–8724 or 336–4470) on the Asian side.

By Bus Buses arrive at Topkapi terminal (not to be confused with the area around the Topkapi Palace) just outside the city at the Cannon Gate. The smaller Trakya Otogari terminal is used for buses serving cities and villages on the European side of Turkey. The Anadolu Otogari serves Anatolian Turkey and European destinations. A few buses from Anatolia arrive at Harem terminal, on the eastern shore of the Bosphorus. Some bus companies have minibus services *(servis arabasi)* to the hotel areas of Taksim Square and Aksaray. There are local buses (no. 83, 71, 72, 73, and 76 to Taksim and no. 84, 89, 92, 93, and 94 to Eminönü from Topkapi terminal) as well as shared taxis (dolmuşlar). If you arrive with baggage, it is much easier to take a taxi, which will cost about $6 to Taksim from the bus terminals and about $3 to Old Istanbul.

By Car If you drive in from the west, the busy and often hair-raising E5 highway, also called Londra Asfalti, leads from Edirne to Ata-

türk Airport and on through the city walls at Cannon Gate (Topkapi). E5 heading out of Istanbul leads into central Anatolia and on to Iran and Syria. An alternative to E5, when leaving the city, is to take one of the numerous car ferries that ply the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles from Kabatas Dock, or try the overnight ferry to İzmir, which leaves from Sarayburnu.

Getting Around

The best way to get around all the magnificent monuments in Sultanahmet in Old Istanbul is to walk. They're all within easy distance of each other, along streets filled with peddlers, shoeshine boys, children playing, and craftsmen working. To get to other areas, you can take a bus or one of the many ferries that steam between the Asian and European continents. Dolmuş and taxis are plentiful, inexpensive, and more comfortable than city buses. There's no subway system, but there is the Tünel, a tiny underground train that's handy for getting up the steep hill from Karaköy to the bottom of Istiklal Caddesi. It runs every 10 minutes and costs about 13¢.

By Bus Buy a ticket before boarding a bus. You can buy them individually or in books of 10, at ticket stands around the city. Shoeshine boys or men on the street will also sell them to you, for a few cents more. Fares are about 22¢ per ride.

By Dolmuş These are shared taxis that stop at one of the red, black, and white dolmuş signs. The destination is shown either on a roof sign or a card in the front window. Many of them are classic American cars from the '50s.

By Taxi Taxis are inexpensive. Since most drivers do not speak English and may not know the street names, write down the street you want, the nearby main streets, and the name of the area. Taxis are metered. Although tipping is not expected, you should round off the fare to the nearest 100 TL.

By Boat For a fun and inexpensive ride, take the *Anadolu Kavağı* boat along the Bosphorus to its mouth at the Black Sea. The boat leaves year-round from the Eminönü Docks, next to the Galata Bridge on the Old Istanbul side, at 10:30 AM and 1:30 PM, with two extra trips on weekdays and four extra trips on Sundays from April to September. The fare is $5.50 (round-trip). The trip takes one hour and 45 minutes one way. You can disembark at any of the stops and return by land if you wish. Regular ferries depart from Kabataş Dock, near Dolmabahçe Palace on the European side, to Üsküdar on the Asian side; and also from Eminönü Docks 1 and 2, near Sirkeci station.

Important Addresses and Numbers

Tourist Information Official tourist information offices are at **Atatürk Airport** (tel. 1/573–7399 or 1/573–4136); the **Hilton Hotel** (tel. 1/133–0592); **Karaköy Yolcu Salonu,** International Maritime Passenger Terminal (tel. 1/149–5776); and in a pavilion in the Sultanamet district of **Old Istanbul** (Divan Yolu Cad. 3, tel. 1/522–4903).

Consulates U.S.: Meşrutiyet Caddesi 104/8, Tepebaşi, Beyoğlu, tel. 1/151–3602. **Canada:** Büyükdere Caddesi 10773, Bengün Han, tel. 1/172–5174. **U.K.:** Meşrutiyet Caddesi 34, Tepebaşi, Beyoğlu, tel. 1/144–7540.

Emergencies **Tourism Police:** tel. 1/528–5369 or 1/527–4503. **Ambulance:** tel. 077. **Doctors:** For an English-speaking doctor, call the American Hospital (Güzelbahçe Sok. 20, Nişantaşi, tel. 1/131–4050/69) or Beyoğlu Hospital (Kuledibi, Karaköy, tel. 1/151–5900). You may also find English-speaking doctors at the French Hospital on Taksim Square, behind the Divan hotel (tel. 1/148–4756). **Pharmacies:** There is one on duty 24 hours in every neighborhood; tel. 011 for details. Consult the notice in the window of any pharmacy for the name and address of the nearest all-night shop. One that's centrally located is Pamuk in the Taksim district (Tak-i Zafer Cad. 1, tel. 1/149–2252).

English-Language Bookstores The most complete is **Redhouse,** near the Grand Bazaar (Riza Paşa Yokuşu 50, Sultanhamam, tel. 1/527–8100). Others include **Haset Bookshop** (Istiklal Cad. 469, tel. 1/143–1343); **Tünel,** with several branches, including one in the Hilton and the Sheraton hotels; and **Net,** publishers of tourism guides (Yerebatan Cad. 15/3, Sultanahmet, tel. 1/520–8406).

Travel Agencies Most are concentrated along Cumhuriyet Caddesi, off Taksim Square, in the hotel area. They include **American Express** (Hilton Hotel, Cumhuriyet Cad., Harbiye, tel. 1/140–3939); **Intra** (Halaskargazi Cad. 111, Harbiye, tel. 1/148–1406); **Orion Tur** (Halaskargazi Cad. 287/1 Osmanbey, tel. 1/148–8014 or 148–8437); **Setur** (Cumhuriyet Cad. 107, Harbiye, tel. 1/130–0336); and **Vitur** (Cumhuriyet Cad. 261, Harbiye, tel. 1/130–0895).

Guided Tours

Tours are arranged through travel agencies (*see* Travel Agencies, above). Choices include the "Classical Tour," either half- or full-day. The half-day tour costs $25 and includes St. Sophia, the Museum of Turkish and Islamic Arts, the Hippodrome, Yerebatan Sarayi, and the Blue Mosque; the full-day tour costs $50, and, in addition to the above sights, includes the Topkapi Palace, the Süleymaniye Mosque, the Covered or Egyptian Bazaar, and lunch. The "Bosphorus Tour" costs $25 for a half day or $50 for a full day, and includes lunch at Sariyer and visits to the Dolmabahçe and Beylerbeyi palaces. The "Night Tour" costs $50 and includes dinner and drinks at Kervansaray or Galata, where there is a show. The full-day guided "Classical Tour" by private car costs between $60 and $90 per person.

Exploring Istanbul

Istanbul is a noisy, chaotic, and exciting city, where Asia meets Europe and spires and domes of mosques and medieval palaces dominate the skyline. At dawn, when the call to muezzin's prayer rebounds from ancient minarets, many people are making their way home from the nightclubs and bars, while others are kneeling on their prayer rugs, facing Mecca.

Day and night, Istanbul has a schizophrenic air to it. Women in jeans, business suits, or elegant designer outfits pass women wearing the long skirts and head coverings that village women have worn for generations. Donkey-drawn carts vie with old Chevrolets and Pontiacs for dominance of the noisy, narrow streets, and the world's most fascinating Oriental bazaar competes with Western boutiques for the time and attention of both tourists and locals.

Ironically, Istanbul's Asian side is filled with Western-style sprawling suburbs, while its European side contains Old Istanbul—an Oriental wonderland of mosques, opulent palaces, and crowded bazaars. The Golden Horn, an inlet 6½ kilometers (four miles) long, flows off the Bosphorus on the European side, separating Old Istanbul from New Town. The center of New Town is Beyoglu, a modern district filled with hotels, banks, and shops grouped around Taksim Square. There are three bridges spanning the Golden Horn: the Atatürk, the Galata, and the Halic. The Galata Bridge is a central landmark and a good place to get your bearings, although it will be replaced by a new bridge due to be completed this year. From here, you can see the city's layout and its seven hills. The bridge will also give you a taste of Istanbul's frenetic street life. It's filled with peddlers selling everything from pistachio nuts and spices to curly-toed slippers fancy enough for a sultan; fishermen meanwhile grill their catch on coal braziers and sell them to passersby. None of this sits well with motorists, who blast their horns constantly, usually to no avail. If you want to orient yourself in a quieter way, take a boat trip from the docks on the Eminönü side of the Galata Bridge up the Bosphorus.

Numbers in the margin correspond with points of interest on the Istanbul map.

Old Istanbul (Sultanahmet)

The number one attraction in Istanbul is the **Topkapi Palace** (Topkapi Saray), located on Seraglio Point in Old Istanbul, known as Sultanahmet. The palace, which dates from the 15th century, was the residence of a number of sultans and their harems until the mid-19th century. In order to avoid the crowds, try to get there by 9:30, when the gates open. If you're arriving by taxi, tell the driver you want the Topkapi *Saray* (palace) in Sultanahmet, or you could end up at the Topkapi bus terminal on the outskirts of town.

Sultan Mehmet II built the first palace in the 1450s, shortly after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. Over the centuries, sultan after sultan added ever more elaborate architectural fantasies, until the palace eventually ended up with more than four courtyards and some 5,000 residents, many of them concubines and eunuchs. Topkapi was the residence and center of bloodshed and drama for the Ottoman rulers until the 1850s, when Sultan Abdül Mecit moved with his harem to the European-style Dolmabahçe Palace farther up the Bosphorus coast.

In Topkapi's outer courtyard is the **Church of St. Irene** (Ava Irini), open only during festival days for concerts, and the **Court of the Janissaries** (Merasim Avlusu), members of the sultan's elite guard. Today, the area where the Janissaries once prepared their meals in giant soup kettles is occupied by the central ticket booth for entrance to the grounds, as well as a parking lot for taxis and buses.

Adjacent to the ticket office is the **Bab-i-Selam** (Gate of Salutation), built in 1524 by Süleyman the Magnificent, who was the only person allowed to pass through it. From the towers on either side, prisoners were kept until they were executed beside the fountain outside the gate in the first courtyard. In the second courtyard, amid the rose gardens, is the **Divan-i-Humayun,** the assembly room of the council of state, once presided over by the grand vizir (prime minister). The sultan would sit behind a latticed window, hidden by a curtain so no one would know

when he was listening, although occasionally he would pull the curtain aside to comment.

One of the most popular tours in Topkapi is the Harem, a maze of nearly 400 halls, terraces, rooms, wings, and apartments grouped around the sultan's private quarters on the west side of the second courtyard. Forty rooms have been meticulously restored and are open to the public. Next to the entrance are the quarters of the eunuchs and about 200 of the lesser concubines, who were lodged in tiny cubicles, as cramped and uncomfortable as the main rooms of the Harem are large and opulent. Because only a limited number of visitors are allowed through the Harem each day, buy a ticket (88¢)—at the entrance to the Harem—as soon as you enter the palace grounds. Tours begin about every half hour.

In the third courtyard is the **Treasury** (Hazine Dairesi), four rooms filled with jewels, including two uncut emeralds, each weighing 3½ kilograms (7.7 pounds), that once hung from the ceiling. Here, too, you will be dazzled by the emerald dagger used in the movie *Topkapi* and the 84-carat "Spoonmaker" diamond that, according to legend, was found by a pauper and traded for three wooden spoons.


Time Out Just past the Treasury, on the right side of the courtyard, are steps leading to a 19th-century Rococo Mecidiye pavilion, now the **Konyali Restaurant** (tel. 1/513–9596), which serves excellent Turkish food and has a magnificent view of the *seraglio* (sultan's household, including harem) and the Golden Horn. On a terrace below is an outdoor café, with an even better view. Go early or reserve a table to beat the tour-group crush. The restaurant and café are open for lunch only.

In the fourth and last courtyard of the Topkapi Palace are small, elegant summer houses, mosques, fountains, and reflecting pools scattered amid the gardens on different levels. Here you will find the **Erivan Kiosk,** also known as the Revan Kiosk, built by Murat IV in 1636 to commemorate his capture of Rivan in Caucasus. In another kiosk in the gardens, called the **Golden Cage** (Iftariye), the closest relatives of the reigning sultan lived in strict confinement under what amounted to house arrest. The custom began in the 1800s after the old custom of murdering all possible rivals to the throne had been abandoned. The confinement of the heirs apparently helped keep the peace, but it deprived them of any chance to prepare themselves for the formidable task of ruling a great empire. *Topkapi Palace. Admission: $4.40, harem 88¢. Open Wed.–Mon. 9:30–5.*

To the left as you enter the outer courtyard, a lane slopes downhill to three museums grouped together: the **Archaeological Museum** (Arkeoloji Müzesi), which houses a fine collection of Greek and Roman antiquities, including finds from Ephesus and Troy; the **Museum of the Ancient Orient** (Eski Şark Eserleri Müzesi), with Sumerian, Babylonian, and Hittite treasures; and the **Tiled Pavilion** (Çinili Köşkü), which houses ceramics from the early Seljuk and Osmanli empires. *Museums. Admission: $2.20. Open Tues.–Sun. 9:30–5.*

Just outside the walls of Topkapi Palace is St. Sophia (Ayasofya), one of the world's greatest examples of Byzantine architecture. Built in AD 532 under the supervision of Emperor

Archaeological Museum, 4
Blue Mosque, 6
Church of St. Irene, 2
Cistern Basilica, 9
Court of the Janissaries, 3
Dolmabahçe Mosque, 16
Dolmabahçe Palace, 17
Egyptian Bazaar, 13
Flower Market, 15
Galata Tower, 14
Grand Bazaar, 10
Hippodrome, 7
Museum of Turkish and Islamic Arts, 8
St. Sophia, 5
Süleymaniye Mosque, 12
Topkapi Palace, 1
University, 11



Justinian, it took 10,000 men and six years to complete. St. Sophia is made of ivory from Asia, marble from Egypt, and columns from the ruins of Ephesus. The dome, one of the most magnificent in the world, was also the world's largest until the dome at St. Peter's Basilica was built in Rome 1,000 years later. St. Sophia was the cathedral of Constantinople for 900 years, surviving earthquakes and looting Crusaders until 1453, when it was converted into a mosque by Mehmet the Conqueror. Minarets were added by succeeding sultans. St. Sophia originally had many mosaics depicting Christian scenes, which were plastered over by Süleyman I, who felt they were inappropriate for a mosque. In 1935, Atatürk converted St. Sophia into a museum. Shortly after that, American archaeologists discovered the mosaics, which were restored and are now on display.

According to legend, the **Sacred Column,** in the north aisle of the mosque, "weeps water" that can work miracles. It's so popular that, over the centuries, believers have worn a hole through the marble and brass column. You can stick your finger in it and make a wish. *Ayasofya Meydani. Admission: $4.40. Open Tues.–Sun. 9:30–4:30.*

⑧ Across from St. Sophia is the **Blue Mosque** (Sultan Ahmet Camii), with its shimmering blue tiles, 260 stained-glass windows, and six minarets, as grand and beautiful a monument to Islam as St. Sophia was to Christiandom. Mehmet Aga, also known as Sedefkar (Worker of Mother of Pearl) built the mosque during the reign of Sultan Ahmet I in eight years, beginning in 1609, nearly 1,100 years after the completion of St. Sophia. His goal was to surpass Justinian's masterpiece, and many in the world believe he succeeded.

Turkey is one of the few Islamic countries that opens its mosques to tourists. If you hear the muezzin calling the faithful to prayer, wait about a half hour before entering as a courtesy to the worshippers.

Enter the mosque at the side entrance that faces St. Sophia. You must remove your shoes and leave them at the entrance. Immodest clothing is not allowed, but an attendant at the door will lend you a robe if he feels you are not appropriately dressed. *Blue Mosque. Admission free. Open daily 9–5.*

The **Carpet and Kilim museums** (Hünkar Kasri) are in the mosque's stone-vaulted cellars and upstairs at the end of a stone ramp, where the sultans rested before and after their prayers. *Admission: Joint ticket $1.32 and adults, 20¢ students. Open Tues.–Sun. 9AM–4:30 PM.*

⑨ The **Hippodrome** is a long park directly in front of the Blue Mosque. As a Roman stadium with 100,000 seats, it was once the focal point for public entertainment, including chariot races and circuses. It was also the site of many riots and public executions. What remains today are an **Egyptian Obelisk** (Dikilitas), the **Column of Constantinos** (Örme Sütun), and the **Serpentine Column** (Yilanli Sütun) taken from the Temple of Apollo at Delphi in Greece. You'll also encounter thousands of peddlers selling postcards, nuts, and trinkets.

On the western side of the Hippodrome is **Ibrahim Paşa Palace,** the grandiose residence of the son-in-law and grand vizir of Süleyman the Magnificent. Ibrahim Paşa was executed when he became too powerful for Süleyman's liking. The palace now

⑧ houses the **Museum of Turkish and Islamic Arts,** which gives a superb insight into the lifestyles of Turks of every level of society, from the 8th century to the present. *Şifahane Sok, across from the Blue Mosque, in line with the Serpentine Column. Admission: $2.20. Open Tues.–Sun. 10–5.*

Walk back along the length of the Hippodrome and cross the busy main road, Divanyolu. Turn left onto Hilaliahmer
⑰ Caddesi. On your left is the **Cistern Basilica** (Yerebatan Sarayi). This is an underground network of waterways first excavated by Emperor Constantine in the 3rd century and then by Emperor Justinian in the 6th century. It has 336 marble columns rising 8 meters (26 feet) to support Byzantine arches and domes. The cistern was always kept full as a precaution against long sieges. *Hilaliahmer Cad. Admission: $1.75 Open daily 9–5.*

Time Out If you need some time out and want a real treat, spend an hour in a Turkish bath. One of the best is **Cägaloğlu Hamami,** near St. Sophia in a magnificent 18th-century building. *Hilaliahmer Cad. 34, tel. 1/522–2424. Admission: $4.40 for self-service bath, $11 for full service. Open daily 8AM–7PM for women; 7 AM–9 PM for men.*

⑩ The next grand attraction is the **Grand Bazaar** (Kapali Carsişi) about a quarter-mile northwest of the Hippodrome. You can walk to it in about 15 minutes or take a five-minute taxi ride. The Grand Bazaar, also called the Covered Bazaar, is a maze of 65 winding, covered streets, with 4,000 shops, tiny cafés, and restaurants. Originally built by Mehmet the Conqueror in the 1450s, it was ravaged by two modern-day fires, one in 1954 that virtually destroyed it, and a smaller one in 1974. In both cases, the bazaar was quickly rebuilt. It's a shopper's paradise, filled with thousands of different items, including fabrics, clothing, brass candalabra, furniture, and jewelry. *Yeniçeriler Cad. and Fautpasa Cad. Admission free. Open Apr.–Oct., Mon.–Sat. 8:30–7; Nov.–Mar., Mon.–Sat. 8:30–6:30.*

When you leave the bazaar, cross Fuatpasa Caddesi and walk
⑪ around the grounds of the **university,** which has a magnificent gateway facing Beyazit Square. Follow Besim Ömer Paşa Caddesi, the western border of the university, to the right to the
⑫ 16th-century **Süleymaniye Mosque.** The mosque was designed by Sinan, the architectural genius who masterminded more than 350 buildings and monuments under the direction of Süleyman the Magnificent. This is Sinan's grandest and most famous monument, and the burial site of both himself and his patron, Süleyman. *Admission free. Open daily outside prayer hours.*

The Grand Bazaar isn't the only bazaar in Istanbul. Another
⑬ one worth visiting is the **Egyptian Bazaar** (Misir Carsişi). You reach it by walking down Çarşi Caddesi to Çakmakçilar Yokuşu and Firincilar Sokak, and then into Sabunchani Sokak, where you will see the back of the bazaar. It was built in the 17th century as a means of rental income for the upkeep of the Yeni Mosque. The bazaar was once a vast pharmacy, filled with burlap bags overflowing with herbs and spices for folk remedies. Today, you're more likely to see bags full of fruit, nuts, Royal Jelly from the beehives of the Aegean coast, and white sacks spilling over with culinary spices. It's a lively, colorful scene.

Nearby are the fruit and fish markets, which are equally colorful. *Yeni Cami. Open Mon.–Sat. 8–7.*

Time Out **Pandelli.** Excellent food is served in this Ottoman-tiled, turn-of-the-century restaurant, with its domed alcoves. It can be reached up two flights of stairs over the arched gateway to the Egyptian bazaar. *Misir Carsişi, Eminönü, tel. 1/522–5534. AE, DC, MC, V. Lunch only. Closed Sun. Moderate.*

New Town New Town is the area on the northern shore of the Golden Horn, the waterway that cuts through Istanbul and divides Europe from Asia. The area's most prominent landmark is the ⑭ **Galata Tower,** built by the Genoese in 1349 as part of their fortifications. In this century, it served as a fire lookout until 1960. Today it houses a restaurant and nightclub (*see* Nightlife, below), and a daytime viewing tower. *Büyük Hendek Cad. Admission: 75¢. Open daily 9–8.*

⑮ North of the tower is the **Flower Market** (Çiçek Pasaji), off Istiklâl Caddesi, a lively blend of flower stalls, tiny restaurants, bars, and street musicians.

⑯ Next head for **Dolmabahçe Mosque** and Dolmabahçe Palace, which are reached by following Istiklâl Caddesi to Taksim Square and then taking Gümüssuyu Caddesi around the square to a junction. You will see the Dolmabahçe Mosque on your right and the clock tower and gateway to Dolmabahçe Palace on your left. The mosque is a separate building from the palace. It was founded by Valide Sultan Bezmialem, mother of Abdül Mecit I, and was completed in 1853. *Admission free. Open daily outside prayer hours.*

⑰ The **Dolmabahçe Palace** was also built in 1853 and, until the declaration of the modern republic in 1923, was the residence of the last sultans of the Ottoman Empire. It was also the residence of Atatürk, who died here in 1938. The palace, floodlit at night, is an extraordinary mixture of Hindu, Turkish, and European styles of architecture and interior design. Queen Victoria's contribution to the lavishness was a chandelier weighing 4½ tons. Guided tours of the palace take about 80 minutes. *Gümüssuyu Cad. Admission: $4.40. Open Apr.–Oct. 9–4; Nov.–Mar. 9–3. Closed Mon. and Thurs.*

Off the Beaten Track

The views of the Istanbul skyline at sunset are enough to warrant a trip to this city. The best views are from **Çamlica,** the highest hill on the Asian side of the city. The area has several pavilions where you can order tea and sit on cushions at low brass tables, and outdoor booths where you can buy such snacks as pancakes with honey or corn on the cob. At the Çamlica café, you can dine by candlelight after the sun has set and be served by waiters in traditional Turkish garb. *Sefatepsesi, tel. 1/335–3301. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Open Apr.–Oct., daily 9:30 AM–midnight; Nov.–Mar., daily 9:30 AM–10:30 PM. Moderate.*

Another great area for watching sunsets is **Salacak,** also on the Asian side, opposite Leander's Tower. You can reach it by ferry from Eminönü to Üsküdar; then it's a 10-minute walk along the waterfront. The area has open-air cafés and *yalis* (old wooden houses) at water's edge. In the cafés and restaurants along the

waterfront, you can enjoy fish from the daily catch. A popular restaurant on the wharf, with an excellent view of the minaret-studded skyline, is **Huzur** (Iskele Cad. 20, tel. 1/333–3157).

Shopping

Gift Ideas The **Grand Bazaar** *(see* Exploring Istanbul) is a treasure trove of all things Turkish—carpets, brass, copper, jewelry, textiles, and leather goods.

Stores Stores and boutiques are located in New Town on streets such as **Istiklâl Caddesi,** which runs off Taksim Square, and **Rumeli, Halaskargazi,** and **Valikonagi Caddeleri,** north of the Hilton Hotel. Two streets in the Kadikoy area where there's good shopping are **Bagdat and Bahariye Caddeleri. Ataköy Shopping and Tourism Center** is a large shopping and leisure mall near the airport. It's a good place for children, too.

Markets **Balikpazari** (fish market) is in Beyoglu Caddesi, off Istiklal Caddesi. Despite its name, you will find anything connected with food at this market. A **flea market** is held in Beyazit Square, near the Grand Bazaar, every Sunday.

Dining

Istanbul has a wide range of eating establishments, with prices to match. Most of the major hotels have dining rooms serving rather bland international cuisine. It's far more rewarding to eat in Turkish restaurants. For details and price category definitions, *see* Dining in Staying in Turkey.

Very Expensive **Bebek Ambassadeurs.** Here you can dine on French and international cuisine while enjoying the views over the Bosphorus from the terrace. *Cevdet Paşa Cad. 113, Bebek, tel. 1/163–3002. Reservations advised. AE, DC, MC, V.*

Orient Express. This restaurant offers French cuisine amid decor styled after the famous train. *Etap Marmara Hotel, Taksim Square, tel. 1/151–4696. Reservations advised. AE, DC, MC, V. No lunch.*

Restaurant 29. This popular restaurant serves French and Turkish cuisine. After midnight there is a discotheque upstairs until 2 AM. *Nispetiye Cad. 29, Etiler, tel. 1/163–5411. Reservations required. AE, DC, MC, V. No lunch*

Ziya. This restaurant features international cuisine amid elegant modern decor. *Mim Kemal Öke Cad. 21/1, Nişantaşi, tel. 1/147–1708. Reservations advised. AE, DC, MC, V.*

Expensive **Cemal Balik.** This is one of many excellent restaurants in the Kumkapi area that serves a wide variety of fish dishes. Try the fish kebabs or pickled fish. *Capariz Sok. 27, tel. 1/527–2288. Reservations not necessary. DC, MC, V.*

Divan. You'll enjoy gourmet Turkish-French cuisine, elegant surroundings, and excellent service at this restaurant, located in the Divan hotel. *Cumhuriyet Cad. 2, Elmadağ, tel. 1/131–4100. Reservations advised. AE, DC, MC.*

Gelik. This restaurant, located in a two-story 19th-century villa, is usually packed, often with people who want to savor its specialty: all types of meat cooked in deep wells. *Sahil Yolu 63–70, tel. 1/572–0806. Reservations advised. AE, DC, MC, V.*

Moderate ★ **Borsa Lokantasi.** This unpretentious restaurant serves some of the best food in Turkey. The baked lamb in eggplant puree and

the stuffed artichokes are not to be missed. *Yaliköskü Cad. Yaliköskü Han 60–62, Eminönü, tel. 1/522–4173. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Lunch only. Closed Sun. Another branch at Halaskargazi Cad. 90/1, Osmanbey, tel. 1/132–4200. AE, DC, MC, V.*

Dört Mevsim. Located in a large Victorian building, Dört Mevsim is noted for its blend of Turkish and French cuisine and for its owners, Gay and Musa, an Anglo-Turkish couple who opened it in 1965. On any given day, you'll find them in the kitchen overseeing such delights as shrimp in cognac sauce and baked marinated lamb. *Istiklal Cad. 509, Beyoğlu, tel. 1/145–8941. Reservations advised. DC, MC, V. Closed Sun.*

Inexpensive

Hacibaba. This is a large, cheerful-looking place, with a terrace overlooking the Greek Orthodox churchyard. Fish, meat, and a wide variety of vegetable dishes are on display for your selection. Before you choose your main course, you'll be offered a tray of appetizers that can be a meal in themselves. *Istiklal Cad. 49, Taksim, tel. 1/144–1886. Reservations advised. AE, DC, V.*

★ **Haci Salih.** A tiny, family-run restaurant, Haci Salih has only 10 tables, so you may have to line up and wait—but it's worth it. Traditional Turkish food is the fare here, with special emphasis on vegetable dishes and lamb. Alcohol is not served, but you can bring your own. *Anadolu Han 201, Alyon Sok, off Istiklal Cad., tel. 1/143–4528. Reservations sometimes accepted. No credit cards. BYOB. Lunch only. Closed Sun.*

Kaptan. An animated, crowded fish restaurant near the Bosphorus. It's worth taking a taxi here. *Birinçi Cad. 53, Arnavutköy, tel. 1/165–8487. Reservations advised. V.*

Rejans. Founded by three Russian dancing girls fleeing the revolution, this restaurant offers traditional East European decor and excellent Russian food and vodka, served by eccentric old waiters. *Istiklal Cad., Olivo Geçidi 15, Galatasaray, tel. 1/144–1610. Reservations required. AE, CB, DC, MC, V. Closed Sun.*

Lodging

The top hotels are located mainly around Taksim Square in New Town. Hotels generally include the 26.5% tax and service charge in the rate. Modern, middle-range hotels usually have a friendly staff, which compensates for the generally bland architecture and interiors. In Old Istanbul, the Aksaray, Laleli, Sultanahmet, and Beyazit areas have many conveniently located, inexpensive small hotels and family-run pansiyons. Istanbul has a chronic shortage of beds, so plan ahead. For details and price category definitions, *see* Lodging in Staying in Turkey.

Very Expensive

The Hilton. Lavishly decorated with Turkish rugs and large brass urns, this is one of the best Hiltons in the chain, and worth a visit even if you don't plan to stay. Ask for a room with a view of the Bosphorus. *Cumhuriyet Cad., Harbiye, tel. 1/131–4646. 498 rooms with bath. Facilities: Turkish baths, beauty and health spa, pool, rooftop bar and restaurant, tennis, squash, shopping arcade. AE, DC, MC, V.*

★ **Pera Palace.** A grand hotel with a genuinely Turkish feel, the Pera Palace was built in 1892 to accommodate guests arriving on the "Orient Express." Although it has been modernized, it has lost none of its original Victorian opulence. Ask to see the room where Atatürk used to stay—it's been maintained with

some of his personal belongings and is a popular attraction. *Meşrutiyet Cad. 98, Tepebaşi, tel. 1/151–4560. 122 rooms with bath. Facilities: bar. AE, DC, MC, V.*

Ramada. The first international chain to open in Old Town, the Ramada is in a converted, four-story apartment block with courtyards leading into it. *Ordu Cad. 226, Laleli, tel. 1/573–9300. 275 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, bar, pool, casino. AE, DC, MC, V.*

The Sheraton. Taksim Park provides a splendid setting for this hotel. All rooms have views of the Bosphorus or the square. For a night's spree, try the rooftop restaurant and nightclub. *Asker Ocağı Cad., Taksim, tel. 1/131–2121. 437 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, bar, nightclub, pool, health and beauty spa. AE, DC, MC, V.*

Expensive

Ayasofia Pansiyons. These guest houses are part of an imaginative project undertaken by the Touring and Automobile Club to restore a little street of historic wooden houses along the outer wall of Topkapi Palace. One of the houses has been converted into a library and two into pansiyons, furnished in late Osmanli style, with excellent dining rooms. During the summer, tea and refreshments are served in the gardens to guests and nonguests alike. *Soğukçesme Sokak, Sultanahmet, tel. 1/513–3660. AE, DC, V.*

Divan. This is a quiet, small hotel with an excellent restaurant. *Cumhuriyet Cad. 2, Şisli, tel. 1/131–4100. 98 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, bar, tea shop, beauty salon. AE, DC, MC.*

Yeşil Ev (Green House). This hotel is decorated in old-fashioned Ottoman style with lace curtains and latticed shutters. In the summer, you can dine on marble tables in a high-walled garden. *Kabasakal Sok. 5, Sultanahmet, tel. 1/511–1151. 20 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant and garden. AE, V.*

Moderate

Barin. Modern, clean, and comfortable, with good friendly service, the Barin caters to business travelers as well as tourists. *Fevziye Cad. 25, Sehzadebaşi, tel. 1/526–4440. 65 rooms with bath. MC, V.*

★ **Barut's Guesthouse.** Quiet and secluded and in the heart of Old Istanbul, Barut's has a roof terrace overlooking the Sea of Marmara. The owners, Hikmet and Füsun Barut, run this friendly, pleasant establishment. The foyer has a modern art gallery. *Ishakpaşa Cad. 8, Sultanahmet, tel. 1/516–0357. 23 rooms with bath. MC, V.*

Büyük Londra. This is another old Victorian hotel, similar to the Pera Palace, but not as grand, that has grown old gracefully. *Meşrutiyet Cad. 117, Tepebaşi, tel. 1/145–0670. 42 rooms with bath. AE, MC, V.*

Inexpensive

Berk Guest House. Clean and exceptionally comfortable, this is run by an English-speaking couple, Gungor and Nevin Evrensel. Two rooms have balconies overlooking a garden. *Kutlugün Sok. 27, Cankurtaran, Sultanahmet, tel. 1/511–0737. 7 rooms with bath. No restaurant. No credit cards.*

Plaza. This is an older-style, well-run hotel overlooking the Bosphorus. *Siraselviler Cad. Arslanyatağı Sok. 19, Taksim, tel. 1/145–3273. 18 rooms with bath. No credit cards.*

The Arts

Entertainment in Istanbul ranges from the **Istanbul International Festival**—held late June through mid-July and attracting internationally renowned artists and performers—to local folklore and theatrical groups, some amateur, some professional. Because there is no central ticket agency, ask your hotel to help you. You can also pick up tickets at the box office or through a local tourist office.

For tickets to the Istanbul International Festival, apply to the **Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts** (Kültür ve Sanat Vakfi, Yildiz, Besiktas; tel. 1/160–4533 and 1/160–9072). Performances, which include modern and classical music, ballet, opera, and theater, are given throughout the city in historic buildings, such as St. Irene Church and Rumeli Castle. The highlight of the festival is the performance of Mozart's opera *Abduction from the Seraglio*, at Topkapi Palace, the site that inspired the opera.

Concerts Tickets for performances at the main concert hall, **Atatürk Kültür Merkezi**, are available from the box office at Taksim Square (tel. 1/151–5600). From October through May, the **Istanbul State Symphony** gives performances here. It's also the location for ballet and dance companies. The Touring and Automobile Association organizes chamber music performances at **Beyaz Kösk** and **Hidiv Kasri**, two 19th-century mini-palaces. For information, contact the **Touring and Automobile Association** (Halaskargazi Cad. 364, Şişli, tel. 1/131–4631).

Nightlife

Bars and Nightclubs **Kulis** (Cumhuriyet Cad. 117, tel. 1/146–9345), an all-night hangout for actors and writers, offers good piano music. Open daily 10 PM–5 AM. Local young professionals patronize **Zihni** (Bronz Sok. 21, Tesvikiye, Macka, tel. 1/146–9043) for lunch or evening cocktails. Open daily noon–3 and 6–10.

Bebek Bar (Bebek Ambassadeurs hotel, Cevdet Paşa Cad. 113, Bebek, tel. 1/163–3000) has views over the Bosphorus. Open daily until midnight.

A well-established nightclub, where you can dine, dance, and watch belly-dancing shows, is **Kervansaray** (Cumhuriyet Cad. 30, Elmadağ, tel. 1/147–1630). Open daily 8 PM–midnight. Two other good places for floor shows are **Balim** (Kemerhatun Mah. Hamalbaşi Cad. 8, Beyoğlu, tel. 1/149–5608) and **Olimpia** (Acar Sok. Tomtom Mah., off Istiklal Cad., tel. 1/144–9456). **Galata Tower** (Kuledibi, tel. 1/145–1160) offers dinner between 8:30 and 10, with a Turkish show and dancing from 10 to 1 AM. *Reservations advised. AE, DC, MC, V.*

Jazz **Bilsak** (Soğanci Sok. 7, Siraselviler Cad., tel. 1/143–2899) is an easygoing restaurant and jazz bar, open Monday through Saturday, where local groups and singers sometimes perform.

Discos A popular disco with a lively atmosphere is **Studyo 54 Istanbul** (Nispetige Cad. 24, Levent, tel. 1/168–6660), open every night from 11 PM to 4 AM. **Çubuklu 29** (Bahçeburun, Çubuklu, tel. 1/331–2829), situated by the Bosphorus on the Asian side, has a beautiful view. This place is open from mid-June through September, and reservations are necessary for the restuarant.

Regine (Cumhuriyet Cad. 16, Elmadağ, tel. 1/146–7449) is an upscale disco-nightclub that is open from 10 PM to 4 AM.

The Aegean Coast

Some of the finest reconstructed Greek and Roman cities, including the fabled Pergamum, Ephesus, Aphrodisias, and Troy, are to be found in this region of Turkey. Bright yellow road signs pointing to historical sites or to those currently undergoing excavation are everywhere here. There are so many Greek and Roman ruins, in fact, that some haven't yet been excavated and others are going to seed.

Grand or small, all the sites are steeped in atmosphere and are best explored early in the morning or late in the afternoon, when there are fewer crowds. You can spend the heat of the day on one of the sandy beaches that line the coast.

Getting Around

The E24 from Çanakkale follows the coast until it turns inland at Kuşadasi to meet the Mediterranean again at Antalya. All the towns on the itinerary are served by direct bus routes, and there are connecting services to the ancient sites.

Guided Tours

The travel agencies in all the major towns offer organized tours of the historical sites. **Troy-Anzac Tours** (tel. 196/15849 or 196/15847), in central Çanakkale, has guided tours of the battlefields at Gallipoli. The tour takes about four hours and costs about $10.96 per person, including breakfast. Travel agencies along Teyyare Caddesi in Kuşadasi offer escorted tours to Ephesus; Priene, Miletus, and Didyma; and Aphrodisias and Pamukkale.


Tourist Information

Contact the tourist office in each town for names of travel agencies and licensed tour guides.

Ayvalik. Yat Limani Karşisi, tel. 6631/2122.
Bergama. Zafer Mah. Izmir Cad. 54, tel. 5411/1862.
Bursa. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar Cad. Saydan iş Merkezi Kat 21/5, tel. 24/228005; Ulu Cami Parki, Atatürk Cad. 64, tel. 24/212359.
Çanakkale. Iskele Meyd. 67, tel. 196/11187.
Çeşme. Iskele Meyd. 6, tel. 5492/6653.
İzmir. Atatürk Cad. 418, Alsancak, tel. 51/220207; Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Bulvari, Büyuk Efes Oteli Alti, tel. 51/199278.
Kuşadasi. Iskele Meyd. tel. 6361/1103.

Exploring the Aegean Coast

Bursa **Bursa**, the first capital of the Ottoman Empire, is known as Yeşil (Green) Bursa, not only because of its many trees and parks but also because of its **Yeşil Cami** (Green Mosque) and **Yeşil Turbe** (Green Mausoleum). Both the mosque and mausoleum derive their names from the green tiles that line the interior of the buildings. They are located opposite each other



on Yeşil Caddesi (Green Avenue). *Admission free outside namaz (prayer) hours. Open daily.*

Bursa is also the site of **Ülüdag** (the Great Mountain), Turkey's most popular ski resort. To fully appreciate why the town is called Green Bursa, take a ride on the *teleferik* (cable car) from Namazgah Caddesi up the mountain for a panoramic view.

The town square is called **Heykel,** which means "statue," and is named for its statue of Atatürk. Off Heykel, along Atatürk Caddesi, is the **Ulu Cami** (Great Mosque) with its distinctive silhouette of 20 domes. *Admission free outside namaz hours. Open daily.*

A spa since Roman times, Bursa has thermal baths built on the slopes of Cekirge, a suburb with many hotels and guest houses that offer *celiks* (mineral baths) as part of the package.

Çanakkale, at the northernmost tip of the Aegean coast, is 5½ hours west of Bursa by bus. This is a good stopping-off point if you're heading for the battlefields of Gallipoli.

Troy The ruins of ancient **Troy** are 40 minutes southwest of Çanakkale. Long thought to be simply an imaginary city from Homer's *Iliad,* Troy was excavated in the 1870s by Heinrich Schliemann, a German amateur archaeologist. While others laughed at him, he poured his considerable wealth into the excavations and had the last laugh: He found the remains not only of the fabled Troy but also of nine successive civilizations, one on top of the other, dating back 5,000 years. Considering Troy's fame, the site is surprisingly small. It's best to take a guided

tour to appreciate fully the significance of this discovery and the unwavering passion of the man who proved that Troy was not just another ancient myth. *Admission: $2.20. Open daily 8–7.*

The E24 highway leads around the **Gulf of Edremit,** a glorious area of olive groves, pine forests, and small seaside resorts patronized more by Turks than by foreign visitors. Colorful tea gardens sprawl along the shores, and good seafood restaurants abound, most of them serving plates heaped with oysters.

Some worthwhile nearby villages include **Behram Kale** (a short detour off E24 at Ayvacik), where you'll find the ruins of Assos, an ancient Greek town; **Akçay,** with its hot springs and thermal baths; and Ören, which has camping grounds nearby.

Ayvalik, 5 kilometers (3 miles) off the main bus route, between Çanakkale and Izmir, is an ideal place to stay while visiting the ruins of ancient Pergamum, 40 kilometers (24 miles) away. From Ayvalik you can take boats to **Ali Bey Adasi,** a tiny island with pleasant waterfront restaurants, and to the Greek island of Lesbos.

Pergamum **Pergamum** is reached by driving southeast along E24 following the signs toward Bergama, the modern-day name of the ancient Greek-Roman site. If you're traveling by bus, be certain it is going all the way to Bergama, or you'll find yourself dropped off at the turn-in, 8 kilometers (5 miles) from the site.

Because the ruins of Pergamum are spread out over several miles, it's best to take a taxi from one site to the next. The most noteworthy places are the Asklepieion, the Ethnological Museum, the Red Hall, and the **Acropolis.** *Admission: $2.20. Open Apr.–Oct., daily 8:30–6:30; Nov.–Mar., daily 8:30–5:30*

Pergamum's glory peaked during the Greek Attalid dynasty (241–133 BC), when it was one of the world's most magnificent architectural and artistic centers—especially so under the rule of Eumenes II, who lavished his great wealth on the city. Greek rule continued until 133 BC, when the mad Attalus III died, bequeathing the entire kingdom to Rome.

The most famous building at the acropolis is the **library,** which once contained a collection of 200,000 books, all on papyrus. The library's collection was second only to the one in Alexandria, Egypt. When the troops of Julius Caesar burned down the library in Alexandria, Mark Antony consoled Cleopatra by shipping the entire collection of books from Pergamum to Alexandria. These, too, went up in flames 400 years later, in wars between Muslims and Christians.

All that remains of the original **Altar of Zeus** (Zeus Sunagi) are its foundations. It was excavated by German archaeologists who sent every stone to the Pergamum Museum in East Berlin.

The **Asklepieion** was the temple of Asklepios, god of medicine, and was a cultural and healing center of ancient times. The snake and staff of Asklepios are accepted as the symbol of modern medicine. *Admission: $2.20. Open daily 8:30–5.*

İzmir The coastal area between Bergama and İzmir, 104 kilometers (64 miles), was once thick with ancient Greek settlements. Today only İzmir remains. Called Smyrna by the Greeks, it was a vital trading port that was often ravaged by wars and earthquakes. İzmir was completely destroyed by a fire in 1922

following Turkey's War of Independence against Greece. The war was a bloody battle to win back the Aegean coast, which had been given to the Greeks in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. Atatürk was in İzmir helping to celebrate the victory when celebrations soon turned to horror as the fire engulfed the city.

The city was quickly rebuilt, and it then became known by its Turkish name, İzmir. It's a beautiful, modern city filled with wide boulevards and apartment houses and office buildings. The center of the city is **Kültürpark,** a large green park that is the site of İzmir's industrial fair from late August to late September, a time when most hotels are full.

On top of İzmir's highest hill is the **Kadifekale** (Velvet Fortress), built in the 3rd century BC, the Hellenistic Age, by Lysimachos. It is easily reached by dolmuş and is one of the few ancient ruins that was not destroyed in the fire. At the foot of the hill is the restored **Agora,** the market of ancient Smyrna. The modern-day marketplace is in **Konak Square,** a maze of tiny streets filled with shops and covered stalls. *Open 8–8. Closed Sun.*

The road southwest of Konak Square leads to a coastal road and Route 300, lined with beaches and spas. Although the entire peninsula is filled with resorts, the area is too remote as a base for sightseeing.

Kuşadasi **Kuşadasi,** about 80 kilometers (50 miles) south of İzmir, has grown since the late 1970s from a fishing village into a sprawling, hyperactive town geared to serving thousands of tourists who visit the nearby ruins and beaches. Although it's packed with curio shops, Kuşadasi has managed to retain a pleasant atmosphere.

Ephesus The major attraction near Kuşadasi is **Ephesus,** a city created by the Ionians in the 11th century BC and now one of the grandest reconstructed ancient sites in the world. It is the showpiece of Aegean archaeology. Ephesus was a powerful trading port and the sacred center for the cult of Artemis, Greek goddess of chastity, the moon, and hunting. The Ionians built a temple in her honor, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World. During the Roman period, it became a shrine for the Roman goddess Diana. Today, waterlogged foundations are all that remain of the temple.

Allow yourself at least one full day to tour Ephesus. It's especially appealing out of season, when it can seem like a ghost town with its shimmering, long, white marble road grooved by chariot wheels. In the summer it's packed with tourists, many of them coming off the Greek ships that cruise the Aegean and call at Kuşadasi. Two of the ancient city's most famous visitors were Mark Antony and Cleopatra.

Some of the splendors you can see here include the two-story **Library of Celsus,** filled with rolls of papyrus; houses of noblemen, with their terraces and courtyards; a 25,000-seat **amphitheater,** still used today during the Selçuk Ephesus Festival of Culture and Art; remains of the municipal baths; and a brothel. *Admission: $5. Admission to the houses on the slopes: $1. Open daily 8:30–6 (summer), 8:30–5 (winter).*

Selçuk On Ayasoluk Hill in **Selçuk,** 4 kilometers (2½ miles) from Ephesus, is the restored **Basilica of St. John** (St. Jean Aniti),

containing the tomb of the apostle. Near the entrance to the basilica is the **Ephesus Museum,** with two statues of Artemis. The museum also has marvelous frescoes and mosaics among its treasures. *Admission: $2.20. Basilica and museum open Tues.–Sun. 8:30–6.*

St. Paul and St. John preached in both Ephesus and Selçuk and changed the cult of Artemis into the cult of the Virgin Mary. **Meryemana,** 5 kilometers (3 miles) from Ephesus, has the **House of Mary,** thought to have been the place where St. John took the mother of Jesus after the crucifixion and where some believe she ascended to heaven. *Admission $1. Open daily 7:30–sunset.*

Priene and Miletus Priene and Miletus, 40 kilometers (25 miles) from Kuşadasi, are sister cities, also founded by the Ionians in 11 BC. Nearby is **Didyma,** a holy sanctuary dedicated to Apollo.

Priene, on top of a steep hill, was an artistic and cultural center; Miletus, 8 kilometers (5 miles) from the sea, was a prosperous port city where commerce reigned supreme. You reach Priene by climbing up the hill and you go on from there to Miletus. Priene's main attraction is the **Temple of Athena,** a spectacular sight, with its five fluted columns and its backdrop of mountains and the fertile plains of the Meander River. You can also see the city's small amphitheater, gymnasium, council chambers, marketplace, and stadium. *Admission: $1. Open daily 8:30–6.*

Prosperous **Miletus,** a short walk away, was the first Greek city to use coins for money. It also became an Ionian intellectual center and home to such philosophers as Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, all of whom made contributions to mathematics and the natural sciences.

The city's most magnificent building is the **Great Theater,** a remarkably intact 25,000-seat amphitheater built by the Ionians and kept up by the Romans. Climb to the highest seats in the amphitheater for a view across the city to the bay. *Admission: ruins $1, museum $1. Open Tues.–Sun. 8:30–6.*

The temple of **Didyma** is reached by a 32-kilometer (20-mile) road called the **Sacred Way,** starting from Miletus at the bay. The temple's oracles were as revered as those of Delphi.

Under the courtyard is a network of corridors whose walls would throw the oracle's voice into deep and ghostly echoes. The messages would then be interpreted by the priests. Fragments of bas-relief include a gigantic head of Medusa and a small statue of Poseidon and his wife, Amphitrite. *Admission: $1. Open daily 8:30–6.*

Pamukkale East of Kuşadasi, 120 kilometers (75 miles), is **Pamukkale,** which first appears as an enormous chalky white cliff rising some 102 meters (330 feet) from the plains. Mineral-rich volcanic spring water cascades over basins and natural terraces, crystallizing into white stalactites, curtains of solidified water seemingly suspended in air. The hot springs in the area were popular with the ancient Romans, who believed they had curative powers. You can see the remains of Roman baths among the ruins of nearby **Hierapolis.**

The village of Pamukkale has many small hotels surrounding the hot springs, which are used today by people who still be-

lieve that they can cure a variety of problems, including rheumatism. Farther down in the village are inexpensive pansiyons, some also with hot springs.

It's best to stay overnight in Pamukkale before heading on to the ruins of **Aphrodisias,** a city of 60,000 dedicated to Aphrodite, the Greek goddess of love and fertility. It thrived from 1 BC to AD 5. Aphrodisias is reached via **Karacasu,** a good place to stop for lunch; fresh trout is the local specialty.

Aphrodisias is filled with marble baths, temples, and theaters, all overrun with wild blackberries and pomegranates. Across a field sprinkled with poppies and sunflowers is a well-preserved **stadium,** which was built for 30,000 spectators.

Dining and Lodging

For details and price category definitions, *see* Dining and Lodging in Staying in Turkey.

Ayvalik *Lodging*

Buyuk Berk. This is a modern hotel on Ayvalik's best beach, about 3½ kilometers (2 miles) from the center of town. *Sarimsakli Mev., tel. 661/2311. 97 rooms with bath. Facilities: outdoor pool, restaurant, disco. AE, DC, MC, V. Moderate.*

Ankara Oteli. Located on Sarimsakli beach, just a few feet from the surf, the Ankara Oteli gives excellent value for the money. *Sarimsakli Mev., tel. 661/1195. 57 rooms with bath. Facilities: café, bar, game room. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Bergama *Lodging*

Tuscan Bergama Moteli. On the main road leading into Bergama, the Tuscan has a pool fed by hot springs. The rooms are simple and clean. *İzmir Yolu, Cati Mev., tel. 5411/1173. 42 rooms with bath. Facilities: outdoor pool. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Bursa *Dining*

Özkent. Located in Kültür Park, the Özkent serves excellent Turkish food in a quiet setting. *Kültür Park, tel. 241/67666. Reservations advised. AE, DC, MC, V. Moderate.*

Lodging ☆

Celik Palace. The main attraction of this luxurious five-star hotel is a domed, Roman-style pool fed by hot springs. *Çekirage Cad. 79, tel. 24/353500. 173 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, bar, pool, nightclub, disco. AE, DC, MC, V. Expensive.*

Ada Palas. Located near Kültür Park, this hotel has an inviting thermal pool. *Murat Cad. 21, tel. 24/361600. 39 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Artic. In the center of town, the Artic is a good base for sightseeing. Ask for an inside room because the traffic noise can be fierce. *Fevzi Çakmak Cad. 123, tel. 24/219500. 70 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Huzur Oteli. Clean and tidy, this hotel is near the Hüdavendigâr Mosque and a good base for sightseeing. Another plus is its friendly staff. *Birinçi Murat Camii Bitisgi, tel. 241/68021. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Çanakkale, Troy, and Gallipoli *Lodging*

Anafartalar. Located along the waterfront in Çanakkale, this is a quiet, pleasant hotel. *Kayserili A. Paşa Cad., tel. 1961/4454. 69 rooms with bath. Facilities: bar, restaurant. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Truva. Near the center of Çanakkale, the Truva is an excellent base for sightseeing. *Yaliboyu, tel. 1961/1024. 66 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Tusan-Truva. Surrounded by a pine forest on a beach at Intepe, north of Troy, the Tusan-Truva is one of the most popular hotels in the area. Be certain to reserve well in advance. *Intepe, E24, tel. 1961/1461. 64 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Closed Oct.–Feb. Moderate.*

Çeşme *Lodging*

Çeşme Kervansaray. Built in 1528 during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, the Kervansaray is decorated in traditional Turkish style. It has an excellent restaurant, with outdoor dining in an ancient courtyard. Adjacent to the hotel is a medieval castle. *Cumhuriyet Mey, tel. 549/26490. 32 rooms with bath. AE, DC, MC, V. Expensive.*

İzmir *Lodging*

Büyük Efes. Elegant but showing its age, this hotel is distinguished by a beautiful and relaxing enclosed garden. *Cumhuriyet Mey., tel. 51/144300. 446 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, outdoor pool, disco. AE, DC, MC, V. Very expensive.*

Kismet. Tastefully decorated, the Kismet is a quiet, comfortable hotel with friendly service. *1377 Sok. 9, tel. 51/217050. 68 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant. AE, DC, MC, V. Moderate.*

Kuşadasi *Dining* ☆

Sultan Han. Full of atmosphere, with excellent food to boot, Sultan Han is an old house built around a courtyard, where the focal point is a gigantic tree. You can dine in the courtyard or upstairs in small rooms. One of the specialties is fresh seafood, which you select from platters piled high with fish and shellfish of every possible variety. Ask to have your after-dinner coffee served upstairs, where you can sit on cushions at low brass tables. *Bahar Sok. 8, tel. 6361/3849. Reservations required. No credit cards. Expensive.*

Lodging

Club Kervansaray. A refurbished, 300-year-old caravansery, this hotel is decorated in the Ottoman style and loaded with charm and atmosphere. It's in the center of town and features a restaurant with a floor show. There's dancing after dinner in the courtyard, where the camels were once kept. *Barbaros Cad., tel. 636/14115. 40 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, nightclub, bar. No credit cards. Expensive.*

☆

Kismet. Although it's a small hotel, Kismet is run on a grand scale, surrounded by beautifully maintained gardens on a promontory overlooking the marina on one side and the Aegean on the other. Ask for rooms in the garden annex. Its popularity makes reservations a must. *Akyar Mev., tel. 636/12005. 98 rooms with bath. Facilities: private beach, restaurant. MC, V. Closed Nov.–Mar. Expensive.*

Akman. One of the many reasonably priced, family-run pansiyons in and around Kuşadasi, Akman is well located on a beach a few minutes from town. *Istiklal Cad. 13, tel. 636/11501. 47 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Aran. Although it's quite a climb up the steep hill to this hotel, it's worth it for the view from the roof terrace. *Kaya Aldogan Cad. 4, tel. 636/11076. 22 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Pammukale *Lodging*

Tusan. The best feature of the Tusan is its pool, one of the most inviting in the area. The rooms are basic and comfortable. The one-story building is at the top of a steep hill. *Tel. 6213/1010. 47 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, outdoor pool. AE, DC, MC, V. Moderate.*

Selçuk *Lodging*

Hulya. This is a pleasant, family-run pansiyon, where one of the family members is a fisherman who brings in some of his daily catch. You can enjoy a delicious fish meal cooked to order. *Atatürk Cad., Ozgur Sok. 15, tel. 5451/2120. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Kale Han. Located in a refurbished stone inn, Kale Han is another pansiyon run by a warm, welcoming family. *Atatürk Cad. 49, tel. 5451/1154. 18 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

The Mediterranean Coast

Until the mid-1970s, Turkey's southwest coast was inaccessible to all but the most determined travelers—those intrepid souls in four-wheel-drive vehicles or on the backs of donkeys. Today, well-maintained highways wind through the area and jets full of tourists arrive at the new Dalaman Airport.

Thanks to strict developmental control, the area has not been glutted with high-rise hotels and condos, but has maintained its Turkish flavor, with low, whitewashed buildings and tiled roofs. The beaches are clean, and you can swim and snorkel in turquoise waters so clear that you can see fish 6 meters (20 feet) below. There are excellent outdoor cafés and seafood restaurants in which to dine, and you won't find a shortage of bars, discos, and nightclubs.

Getting Around

By Car Although the highways between towns are well maintained, the smaller roads are usually unpaved and very rough.

By Boat There are lots of coves and picnic areas accessible only by boat. For a small fee, local fishermen will take you to and from the coves; also, you can take one of the many water taxis. Or charter a small yacht, with or without skipper, at the marinas of Bodrum and Marmaris. Many people charter boats and join small flotillas that leave the marinas daily for sightseeing in the summer. One of the most enjoyable ways to see the coast is to take a one- or two-week **Blue Voyage** cruise on a *gulet*, a wooden craft with a full crew. There are also three-night mini Blue Voyage trips for scuba divers and snorkelers. For information, contact the following Blue Voyage agencies in the United Kingdom: **Explore,** 1 Frederick Street, Aldershot, Hants GU11 1LQ, tel, 02/523–19448; **Simply Turkey,** 8 Chiswick Terrace, Acton Lane, London W4, 081/747–1011; **Falcon Sailing,** 13 Hillgate Street, London W8, 071/727–0232.

Guided Tours and Tourist Information

Local tourist offices list all the guided tours for the area and will also arrange for local guides.

Bodrum. Eylül Meyd. 12, tel. 6141/1091.
Dalaman. Dalaman Airport, tel. 6119/1229 or 1292.
Datça. Iskele Mah. Belediye Binasi, tel. 6145/1163.
Fethiye. Iskele Meyd. 1, tel. 6151/1527.
Kaş. Cumhuriyet Meyd. 6, tel. 3226/1238.
Marmaris. Iskele Meyd. 39, tel. 6121/1035.

Exploring the Mediterranean Coast

Bodrum **Bodrum,** which sits between two crescent-shaped bays, has for years been the favorite haunt of the Turkish upper classes. Today, the elite are joined by thousands of foreign visitors, and the area is filling rapidly with hotels and guest houses, cafés, restaurants, and discos. Many compare it to St. Tropez on the French Riviera. Fortunately, it is still beautiful and unspoiled, with gleaming whitewashed buildings covered with bougainvillea and magnificent unfettered vistas of the bays.

People flock to Bodrum not for its beach, which is a disappointment, but for its fine dining and nightlife. You'll find beautiful beaches in the outlying villages on the peninsula—**Torba, Türkbükü, Yalikavak, Turgutreis, Akyarlar, Ortakent Bitez,** and **Gümbet.** Easy to reach by mini-bus or dolmuş, these villages are about an hour's drive away and have clean hotels and plenty of outdoor restaurants.

One of the outstanding sights in Bodrum is Bodrum Castle, known as the **Castle of St. Peter.** Located between the two bays, the castle was built by crusaders in the 11th century. It has beautiful gardens and a **Museum of Underwater Archaeology.** *Castle and museum. Admission: $2.20. Open Tues.–Sun. 8–noon and 1–5.*


The peninsula is downright littered with ancient Greek and Roman ruins, although getting to some of them involves driving over rough dirt roads. Five kilometers (3 miles) from Bodrum is **Halikarnas,** a well-preserved 10,000-seat Greek amphitheater, built in the 1st century BC and still used for town festivals. *Admission free. Open daily 8:30–sunset.*

Marmaris Another beach resort situated in the middle of two bays is **Marmaris,** which has some of the best sailing on the Mediterranean. It is 178 kilometers (111 miles) along Route 400 from Bodrum via Muğla. You'll climb steep, winding mountain passes, with cliffs that drop straight into the sea. The final 30 kilometers (19 miles) into Marmaris is a broad boulevard lined with eucalyptus trees.

Marmaris, like Bodrum, is a sophisticated resort with boutiques, elegant restaurants, and plenty of nightlife. Nearby are quiet villages, easy to reach by boat or taxi. One of these is **Knidos,** where you can see the ruins of Aphrodite's circular temple and an ancient theater. By road, Knidos is a very rough 108 kilometers (67 miles) from Marmaris. It's easier and quicker to take a boat. Another town is **Turunc,** worth a day's visit, especially for its beaches.

Time Out At the **Turunc Bay Yacht Club** you can dine on a small terrace built into a hill above a sandy cove, surrounded by mountains and pine forests. It's a five-minute walk on the road toward Kumlubuk Road. *No credit cards. Closed Nov.–mid-May. Expensive.*

Freshwater **Lake Köyceğiz** can be reached by boat through the reed beds of the **Dalyan delta.** This entire area is a wildlife preserve, filled with such birds as kingfishers, kestrals, egrets, and cranes. **Köyceğiz** and **Dalyan** villages, both 20 minutes' drive from Dalaman Airport, are good stopping-off places for



exploring the area. It costs $16 to rent a boat with a boatsman to sail from Dalyan to the ruins and beach.

Fethiye **Fethiye,** 130 kilometers (80 miles) from Bodrum and 167 kilometers (104 miles) from Marmaris, was rebuilt after the original town was destroyed in an earthquake in 1957. The town is especially appealing at night, when residents promenade along the lighted harbor or relax in their gardens sipping tea. Although modern in appearance, it's still an old-fashioned agricultural community, where goats and sheep are herded along the main roads on their way to market.

Ölü Deniz One of Turkey's greatest natural wonders is **Ölü Deniz,** an azure lagoon flanked by long, white beaches. The area is about 15 kilometers (9 miles) from Fethiye and can be reached by ferry. There are a few wooden chalets in camping grounds and one beachfront hotel. Opposite the beach, you'll find small restaurants with rooftop bars, many with live music that goes on all night. One of the beachside restaurants, **Ada Kamp,** serves excellent lobsters and barbecued jumbo shrimp. The area around the lagoon is a national park.

Southeast of Fethiye, near Route 400, are several ancient sites, including the ruins of **Pinara,** one of the most important cities of the former Roman province of Lycia. It is 40 kilometers (24 miles) from Fethiye. Near Pinara, up a steep and strenuous dirt road, you'll find nearly 200 Roman tombs cut honeycomb-fashion into the face of the cliffs. *Admission: $1. Open daily 8:30–sunset.*

Xanthos Return to Route 400 and head 18 kilometers (11 miles) south toward the village of Kinik. At Kinik leave the main highway and take a mile-long bumpy road to **Xanthos,** another major city of ancient Lycia. It was excavated in 1838 and much of what was found here is now in the British Museum in London. What's left is still well worth the bumpy ride: the acropolis, the Tomb of Harpies, some plastercast reliefs, and ruins of some Byzantine buildings. *Admission: $1. Open daily 8:30–sunset.*

Patara and Kalkan Ten minutes from Xanthos is **Patara,** once the city's port. Here you'll find ruins scattered around the marshes and sand dunes. The area's long, wide beaches remain beautiful and unspoiled, despite the fact that they attract hundreds of Turkish families and tourists. You can find two small restaurants at the beach and some makeshift stalls with cold drinks for sale. The nearest place to stay is **Kalkan,** a fishing village 20 minutes away by minibus. Kalkan has plenty of small hotels, guest houses, and restaurants with roof terraces—ideal spots from which to watch sunsets across the bay. Its waterfront is lined with excellent seafood restaurants.

Kaş **Kaş,** 30 kilometers (18 miles) from Kalkan, is another fishing village that has become a popular resort, and is also developing into a major yachting center. Although luxury hotels have replaced many of the tiny houses on the hills, there are still plenty of old-fashioned pansiyons for those on a budget. One of the attractions here is the underwater city of **Kekova,** where you can look overboard and see ancient Roman and Greek columns that were once part of a thriving city before the area was flooded. Kekova is especially popular with scuba divers and snorkelers, but to scuba-dive or fish in this area, a permit must be obtained from the directorate of the harbor and from the directorate of the ministry of tourism. Motorboats leave daily at 9:30 and cost about $10.

Two interesting side trips from Kaş by boat include a visit to **Kale,** where you can roam through a Byzantine fortress at the top of a steep hill, and **Demre,** site of **St. Nicholas's Basilica,** built soon after the saint's death in the 4th century. His remains were stolen and taken to Bari, Italy, in 1087. St. Nicholas, the original Santa Claus, was a bishop of Myra in Asia Minor.

The 190-kilometer (119-mile) road from Kaş to Antalya is under reconstruction and the trip takes a good four hours by car and five hours by bus. You can visit Kale and Demre along the way.

For romantic ruins, it would be hard to beat **Phaselis.** The Roman agora, theater, aqueduct, and a necropolis with fine sarcophagi are scattered through the pine woods which surround the Temple of Athena. Overgrown streets descend to the translucent water, ideal for a swim.

Kemer is the center of intensive touristic development, with hotels and restaurants, well-equipped marina, and club-style holiday villages where you wouldn't know you're in Turkey. The remaining 35 kilometers (26 miles) are increasingly occupied by villas and motels along the smooth pebbles of Konyalti Beach, which stretches to the outskirts of Antalya.

Antalya The resort of **Antalya,** on the Mediterranean, is a good base for several worthwhile excursions. The city is on a beautifully re-

stored harbor and filled with narrow streets lined with small houses, restaurants, and pansiyons. On the hilltop are tea gardens where you can enjoy tea made in an old-fashioned samovar and look across the bay to the Taurus Mountains, which parallel the coast. To the right of the port is the 13th-century **Fluted Minaret** (Yivli Minare). The Hisar Café, Tophane tea garden, and Mermerli tea garden all overlook Antalya's harbor.

Dining and Lodging

For details and price category definitions, *see* Dining and Lodging in Staying in Turkey.

Antalya *Lodging* ☆

Talya. This is a luxurious resort hotel with its own beach that you reach by taking an elevator down the side of the cliff. From every angle there's a view of the sea. It has a five-star rating and gets booked up quickly in high season. *Fevzi Çakmak Cad., tel. 31/115600. 204 rooms with bath. Facilities: disco, restaurant, pool, game room. AE, DC, MC, V. Very Expensive.*

Turban Adalya. Built in 1869 as a bank, the Turban Adalya has been imaginatively transformed into a luxurious hotel overlooking the colorful fishing port. *Kaleiçi Yat Limani, tel. 31/118066. 23 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant. AE, DC. Expensive.*

Altun Pansiyon. Near the Fluted Minaret and minutes from the seaport, this is a recent addition to Antalya's hotels. The staff is extremely helpful. It has a well-stocked bar and a pleasant courtyard. *Kaleiçi Mev. 10, tel. 31/116624. 15 rooms, some with shower. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Bodrum *Dining*

Club Pirinç. This restaurant has a pleasant bar, nine guest rooms, a swimming pool, and offers Turkish-French cuisine. *Akçabuk Mev., tel. 6141/2902. Expensive.*

Restaurant No. 7. Octopus casseroles are a specialty. *Eski Banka Sok. 7. Expensive.*

Balik Restaurant. Specialties include fish, meat, and chicken kebabs. *Yeniçarşi 28, tel. 6141/3018. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Korfez Restaurant. This is a seaside fish restaurant. *Cumhuriyet Cad. 18, tel. 6141/1169. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Lodging

Manzara Aparhotel. On a hill looking across the bay toward Bodrum Castle, the Manzara is a group of 20 small apartments, each with living room, kitchen, and terrace. At peak times, you may have to pay half-board. *Kumbahce Mah. Meteoroloji Yani, tel. 6141/1719. Facilities: restaurant, outdoor pool. AE, DC, MC, V. Expensive.*

Merhaba Pansiyon. Here, on the waterfront, you'll find a beautiful roof terrace and simply furnished but clean rooms. *Akasya Sok. 5, tel. 6141/2115. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Dalyan *Dining*

Yali Restaurant. This is a waterside eatery reached by a short boatride from Dalyan. It's also a good stopping-off point if you're planning a walk to the Kaunus ruins. *Tel. 6116/1150. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Lodging

Hotel Turtle. This is a quiet 10-room hotel tucked away in a bay of orchards on the lakeside. The hotel boat picks up guests from Dalyan. Vefa Ülkü, the owner, cooks excellent dishes served under a big plane tree. *Kücük Karaağac, Sultaniye Köyü, Köyceğiz, tel. 6114/1487. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Kaunos Hotel. Overlooking the river, some of the rooms have views. Good outdoor restaurant. *Posta Kodu 48810, Dalyan, tel. 6116/1057. Inexpensive.*

Fethiye *Lodging*

Ulgen. Travelers on a budget will find the Ülgen a pleasant, simply furnished pansiyon. *Cumhuriyet Mah. Pasptir Mev. 3, Merdivenli Yokusu, tel. 6151/3491. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Kalkan *Lodging*

Kalkan Han. A rambling old house in the back part of the village, the Kalkan Han has a special treat for visitors: a roof terrace with sweeping views of the bay, a perfect place to enjoy breakfast. *Koyici Mev., tel. 3215/1151. 16 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Moderate. Closed Nov.–Apr.*

Balikci Han. This delightful pansiyon is in a converted 19th-century inn, directly on the waterfront. *Tel. 3215/1075. 7 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Kaş *Dining*

Mercan. On the eastern side of the harbor, the Mercan serves good, basic Turkish food in an attractive open-air setting. The water is so close you can actually hear fish jumping. *Hukumet Cad. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Lodging

Kaş Oteli. This hotel has wonderful views of the Greek island of Kastellorizo. There's good swimming off the rocks in front of the hotel, or you can laze in the sun with drinks and snacks from the bar or restaurant. *Hastana Cad. 15, tel. 3226/1271. No credit cards. Closed Nov.–Apr. Moderate.*

Mimosa. This is a new hotel conveniently located on a hill near the bus station, with plain but perfectly adequate rooms, all with balconies and views. *Elmali Cad., tel. 3226/1272. 22 rooms with bath. Facilities: swimming pool. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Çan Otel. Turkish carpets and antiques grace this village house that's been lovingly restored and turned into a pansiyon. It's on a tiny side street near the harbor. *Off Hukumet Cad., tel. 3226/1441. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Köyceğiz *Lodging*

Hotel Özay. This lakeside hotel is quiet, modern, and efficiently run. *Kordon Boyu 11, Köyceğiz, tel. 6114/1300. 22 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant, bar, swimming pool. AE, DC, MC, V. Expensive.*

Hotel Deniz Feneri. The owner is an artist whose wood carvings hang in Golbasi Restaurant. The hotel is located in a picturesque square; the rooms are basic. *Atatürk Square, Köyceğiz, tel. 6114/1777. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Ölü Deniz *Dining* ☆

Beyaz Yunus. Wicker chairs and wooden floors fill this domed restaurant, whose name means "white dolphin." The most elegant restaurant in the area, it's situated on a promontory near Padirali and serves Continental and Turkish cuisine, imaginatively prepared and presented. *No telephone. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Expensive.*

Kebapici Salonu. You can grill meat at your table in this outdoor restaurant, where tables and chairs are clustered around trees in a field. Meals are served with meze, salad, and wine. *Behind Han Camp, no telephone. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Lodging

Meri Oteli. Located on a steep incline above the lagoon, this is a series of bungalows, with rooms a bit down-at-the-heel but clean. These are the only accommodations at the lagoon. *Tel. 6151/1482. 75 rooms with bath. Facilities: restaurant. AE, DC, MC, V. Moderate.*

Central Anatolia: Cappadocia

Cappadocia, an area filled with ruins of ancient civilizations, is in the eastern part of Anatolia. Cappadocia has changed little over the centuries. People travel between their farms and villages in horse-drawn carts, women drape their houses with strings of apricots and paprika for drying in the sun, and nomads pitch their black tents beside wheat and sunflower fields and cook on tiny fires that send smoke billowing through the tops of the tents. And in the distance, a minaret pierces the sky.

Getting Around

By Car There are good roads between Istanbul and the main cities of Anatolia—Ankara (the capital of Turkey), Konya, and Kayseri. The highways are generally well maintained and lead to all the major sites. Minor roads are full of potholes and are very rough. On narrow, winding roads, look out for oncoming trucks, whose drivers apparently don't believe in staying on their side of the road.

By Bus There is a good interlinking bus network between most towns and cities, and fares are reasonable.

By Train Though there are frequent trains between the main cities, they are almost nonexistent between small towns. It's much quicker to take a bus.

By Taxi Drivers are usually willing to take you to historical sites out of town, for reasonable fares.

Guided Tours

Since the Cappadocia area is so vast, you'll need at least two days to see the main sights. If you are driving, consider hiring a guide for about $13–$26 a day. Local tourist offices and hotels will be able to recommend guides and excursions.

Tourist Information


Check with local tourist offices for names of travel agencies and English-speaking guides.

Aksaray. Hükümet Konağı, tel. 4811/12474.
Nevsehir. Devlet Hastanesi Yani, tel. 4851/3659.
Ürgüp. Kayseri Cad. 37, tel. 4868/1059.

Exploring Central Anatolia and Cappadocia

An hour's drive, 30 kilometers (19 miles) to the northwest of Antalya, is **Termessos,** which has an almost complete Roman amphitheater built on a mountainside, and the unexcavated remains of a Roman city on the other side of the mountain. There are organized tours to Termessos from Antalya. *Admission free. Open daily 9–5:30.*

Perge, 19 kilometers (11 miles) east of Antalya, has many Roman ruins to explore. You can climb up a 22,000-seat amphi-



theater, walk down a restored colonnaded street, visit well-preserved thermal baths and a Roman basilica, and see the spot where St. Paul preached his first sermon in AD 45. *Admission: $2.20. Open daily 9–5:30.*

Nearby is **Aspendos,** 44 kilometers (23 miles) to the east of Antalya, which contains Turkey's best-preserved amphitheater. The acoustics are so fine that modern-day performers don't need microphones or amplifiers. *Admission: $2.20. Open daily 9–5:30.*

Konya, home of the Whirling Dervishes, is reached by driving 427 kilometers (267 miles) northeast of Antalya past Lake **Beyşehir.** There is also a longer and more difficult road via Lake **Eğridir.** The Whirling Dervishes belong to a religious order founded in the 13th century by Melvana, a Muslim mystic, who said, "There are many ways of knowing God. I choose the dance and music." You can see the dervishes whirl to the sounds of a flute at the annual commemorative rites held in Konya in early December. Tickets are available from travel agencies or **Konya Turizm Vakfi** (tel. 33/116255).

Sultan Han, 95 kilometers (59 miles) northeast of Konya, is Anatolia's largest and best-preserved caravansery, once a place of rest and shelter for travelers and their camels plying the ancient trade routes. Traditionally, caravanseries opened into vast courtyards from private and public rooms and had kitchens, a bathhouse, and a small mosque. Lodging was free

because these were run by religious foundations funded by sultans. Caravanseries were built between 20 and 25 miles apart, a comfortable day's journey for a camel laden with goods.

Cappadocia roughly forms the triangular area between **Kayseri, Nevşehir,** and **Niğde.** Most of the main sights are within an even smaller triangular area linked by Ürgürp, Göreme, and Avanos. **Ürgürp** is the center from which to explore the villages and the best place to shop, as well as to arrange tours.

The landscape is stark and lunarlike. It was formed by prehistoric volcanic eruptions that dumped layers of mud, ashes, and lava on the area. Eventually the ground turned to *tufa* (soft, porous rock). Rain, snow, and wind created a fantasyland of rock formations resembling chimneys, cones, needles, pillars, and pyramids, often topped by perfectly balanced gigantic slabs of rock. Then came earthquakes to add vast valleys, and oxidation to give the area the final artistic touch: rocks "painted" yellow, pink, red, russet, and gray-violet.

The softness of the rock in this area was ideal for hollowing out cave dwellings and forming defenses from invading armies. The Cappadocians carved out about 40 underground cities, with some structures as deep as 20 stories underground. The largest of these cities housed 20,000 people. Each had dormitories, dining halls, sewage disposal systems, ventilation chimneys, a cemetery, and a prison. Large millstones sealed off the entrances from enemies. Two of these cities are open to the public, one at **Derinkuyu,** 21 kilometers (13 miles) south of Nevşehir, and the other at **Kaymakli** 30 kilometers (10 miles) south of Nevşehir. *Admission: $2.20. Open daily 8–sunset.*

The Christians also hid in these underground cities when the Islamic forces swept through Cappadocia in the 7th century. Some of the earliest relics of Christianity are to be found in the **Göreme Valley,** a few miles east of Nevşehir. There are dozens of old churches and monasteries covered by frescoes. For a history of the area, visit the **Göreme Open-Air Museum,** 1 kilometer (.62 miles) outside of Göreme village on the Ürgüp road. *Admission free. Open daily 8:30–5:30.*

Dining and Lodging

For details and price category definitions, *see* Dining and Lodging in Staying in Turkey.

Konya

Dining

Ali Baba Kebapçisi. This restaurant serves good kebabs, and is famous for its Firin kebap, cooked over an open charcoal fire. *Eski Avukatlar Sokak 11/A, tel. 33/110307. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Bolu Restaurant. You can eat dishes here for which Konya is reknowned: *etli ekmek* (flat bread with ground lamb) and *tereyağli borek* (buttered pastries). *Pürküklü Mah. 31/c, tel. 33/124533. Reservations not necessary. Inexpensive.*

Damla Restaurant. Damla is owned and run by a woman who is famous for her cooking, especially *piliç* (roast chicken) and *saç kavurma* (sauteed lamb). *Hükümet Alani, Şahin Oteli Alti, tel. 33/113705. Reservations not necessary. Inexpensive.*

Meram Tavusbaba Cafeteria. This restaurant has a good view overlooking the city. Its most famous dish is *kuzu cevirme* (lamb). *In Meram Tavusbaba, tel. 33/179525. Reservations not necessary. Inexpensive.*

Lodging

Basak Palas. An older but charming small hotel, Basak Palas is also comfortable. *Hukumet Alani 3, tel. 33/111338. 40 rooms, most with bath. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Ürgüp

Dining

Hanedan. Located in the cellar of an old Greek house, the Hanedan is on a hill a short distance from town. You can sit on the terrace and watch the sunset across the plains toward the mountains. The food is very good and presented with flair. *Nevşehir Yolu Uzen, tel. 4868/1266. Reservations not necessary. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Lodging

Buyuk. Located in the center of town, this is a friendly hotel that features folk dancing in the evenings—you're encouraged to join in, but can just sit back and watch if you prefer. *Kayseri Cad., tel. 4868/1060. 49 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Moderate.*

Hitit. The family-run Hitit is a comfortable, small hotel with a restaurant serving basic but enjoyable food. *Dumlupinar Cad. 54, tel. 4868/1481. 15 rooms without bath. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*

Hotel Ozata. This is an ideal hotel if you're on a tight budget. It's a clean, family-run place, just outside the center of town. *Atatürk Bulvari 56, tel. 4868/1355. 32 rooms with bath. No credit cards. Inexpensive.*



THE "KÖŞK" MUSEUM AT ÇANKAYA


THE "KÖŞK" MUSEUM AT ÇANKAYA
1921-1932



GENERAL DIRECTORATE
OF PRESS AND INFORMATION

PHOTOS: MUSTAFA TÜRKYILMAZ -

PRINTED IN BY/AJANS - TÜRK MATBAACILIK SANAYİİ / ANKARA - TURKEY


Atatürk

THE "KÖŞK" MUSEUM AT ÇANKAYA

1921-1932


The Köşk Museum located at Çankaya owes its name to Atatürk. He lived in this residence between the years 1921 and 1932. It is in this residence that he conducted the War of Independence, supervised the founding of the new Turkish State, and determined the principles and watched the implementation of the reforms which echoed at the four corners of the earth. It is for these important reasons that the Çankaya residence has acquired the quality of a museum which has no counterpart in the world. This museum constitutes a testimony to the most vivid part of the story of Atatürk's life.

Atatürk was born in Salonika, in 1881, at a time of crisis both for the world and for the Ottoman Empire. In Russia Tsar Alexander II, in America, President Garfield have been assassinated. England has just entered a violent conflict with Ireland. In Canada an insurrection has started, and in the French Parliament fighting is going on between the conservatives and liberals, on the issue of the freedom of education and of the press.

As regards the Ottoman Empire : Abdülhamid II's despotism is intensifying. A political, social and ethical disintegration has arisen in all the ramifications of the State and of the society. The British are settling down in Egypt. The French occupying Tunis. The buds of rebellion are sprouting in the Balkans. For the western public opinion the Turkish nation is a «sick man». The time has come to drive him out of Europe. His lands in Asia are to be shared out.

Thus, the Turkish people in the Ottoman Empire lived in a state of spiritual depression, of fear and hopelessness. Now and then appeared in the nations' subconscious a sense of liberation, like a flash of lightning in the darkness : a saviour would come who would solve the crisis and open the way towards justice.

Atatürk was born in such a milieu. His native house was situated on an eminence in Salonika. From its windows one could see the fortress and the sea. Just opposite his house was the big school built by Mithat Pasha, the martyr of independence. For Atatürk he was a symbol of three values : first history, then freedom and thought, thirdly life, the future and novelty.



At the time of Atatürk's birth, an army headquarters was located in Salonika, and the setting was mostly military. Soldiers, officers, hing ranking commanders, various means of war added colour and movement to the city. People had more freedom there than in Istanbul. The young officers who filled most of the army ranks were more open - minded and vigilant. That is why it is in Salonika that news of the projects developed against the Turks by the Balkan countries spread first than any other place, it is in Salonika that the savagery of rebel groups operating in the Balkans aroused emotions in the hearts of the Turkish population.

It is in Salonika that means were devised against the despotic rule of Abdülhamid, as well as the policy of the Foreign Powers, aimed at dividing the Empire. Atatürk was brought up and flourished within these very circles consisting of members of the army and of personalities struggling for independence.

By birth, Atatürk could neither enjoy the advantages of fortune, nor fame. Having died prematurely, his father had not even left a testament. On the subject of choosing a career he had been at odds with his mother. Atatürk wanted to join the army. Whereas his mother wanted him to study the Quran. In spite of the resistance by his mother he joined the military school without her knowledge.

Between the years 1891 and 1905, he studied in turn at the military junior high school in Salonika, at the

military senior high school in Monastir, and after graduating from the Istanbul Millitary College and War Academy, he joined the army with the rank of captain. It is there that he got acquainted with those persons with whom he would later collaborate, and maintain relations of friendship. Among those friends Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Fethi Okyar, Ismet Inönü, Kâzım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Fevzi Çakmak should be mentioned first.

After finishing the War Academy he started his successful ascent through various echelons of the army. Between the years 1905 and 1918, we can see him in the capacity of commander, military attaché, army representative in Syria, Tripoli, Macedonia, the Balkans, France as well as in Germany. His first combat is against the Italians in Tripoli (Libya). During the war in the Balkans, he is on the Bolayır front. During World War I he briliantly wins victories against the French and the English, in the Anafartalar and Gallipoli fronts, and against the Russians in the Muş front. Which will make his name heard in his homeland as well as in the whole world. Commanding the «Yıldırım» army group, he succeeds in stopping the English troops in the north of Aleppo.

The military career has offered Atatürk large possibilities for developing his personality in every way: it has given him the opportunity of weighing the extent of the political crisis which enveloped the country. His career has also prepared the ground to perceive the plans of the countries who were aiming at the destruction of the Turkish nation, and to devise measures to prevent such plans. Seeing the heroism of his soldiers originating from the four corners of the Empire, coming forward under conditions of extreme poverty, in order to fight to preserve the honour and dignity of the nation, he learnt to recognize the lofty character of the Turks. Furthermore, the military career strengthened his will, his self confidence, his sense of responsibility and his ability to command.

His idea concerning the liberation of his homeland surpassed the boundaries of the military art. Consequently, in addition to the knowledge and experience he had acquired, he was fully aware of the necessity of equipping himself with broader knowledge. In his book entitled «Chat with the Officer», he had argued that the force directing the people is thought. He had in mind to be a philosopher. To achieve this aim he had to educate himself.

It is for this reason that he thought it essential to follow all the trends of contemporary thought, literature, and art. Taking advantage of the temporary silence



ATATÜRK AS A CAPTAIN, IN DAMASCUS. (1)

of guns and rifles, he gave himself to reading books about history, philosophy and literature. He had made a habit of summing up every book he had just read and of adding his own opinion about it. This method of reading had turned Atatürk into a man of action as well as a man of thought. For this reason, it was not a mere coincidence that Atatürk showed up in the horizon as a liberator, in the end of World War I, and eventually on the threshold of the Turkish War of Independence.

His theory of liberation lies on three basic points : a lofty ideal, reforms, belief in the nation. Even among his close friends, there were people who did not understand him. They qualified as a meaningless passion his quick actions and scientific works. The answer that Atatürk would give them shows that his designs go beyond personal intentions :

«Indeed, I have passions, and big ones. But these passions have nothing to do with such ordinary ambitions as attaining high positions or earning a lot of money. I seek the fulfilment of my passions in the success of an idea which will be of great use to my homeland and will give me the peace of mind of someone who carried out his duty with efficiency. This idea struck me from my earliest years, and I will not fail to preserve it until I breathe my last». One can read through these lines that this «great idea» he mentioned was doubtless nothing but his national ideal. But he thought the time was not ripe to give full details about it. Towards the end of World War I, the intelligentsia had started to explore the ways leading to liberation. Thus, an idea which was put forward during the reform initiative of the promulgation of the first Constitution, even since the proclamation of «Tanzimat» was spreading about, namely : the remedy for the problem of liberation is : to mix with the people and pretending to believe in the very things the people are attached to, slowly modernize them. In a way, Atatürk is opposed to this way of modernizing his society, as one can see from his own words : «If I ever have authority and power, I believe that I can carry out with a single leap forward the reforms required in our social life. For, as some people do, I cannot believe it is possible to fulfil this task by mixing with the people, raising slowly their opinion and those of the ulemas to the level of mine, and prompting them to think. As far as I am concerned, this kind of action is revolting. Why, after so many years of training and study of social life and civilization, should I go down to the level of the people ? I will rather bring them up to my level. Why should I act the way they do ? Let them act the way I do».

«To raise the level of the people, mould them according to my pattern, not to be moulded according to theirs». That is the gift of his philosophy : constructive, liberating, revolutionary ! But here a question arises : by what means can he perform this lofty aim ? Here is the picture of the country as drawn by himself :

«Our country is completely ruined. There is not a single city where the people can live. The villages look like places made of rubbish. There are places which reminds one of the ruins of Pompei. They are places unsuitable for living. Moreover, the nation is ignorant, poor, miserable». This shows that Atatürk nourishes a feeling of pity for the people, not of apprehension. He considers that to have pity for the people and work for them is the real patriotism. The key to success in this matter can be found in the very essence of the Turkish nation. He has observed this quality in the poorest class of people. He had observed this quality within the heroism of the Turkish soldiers who rivalled him in face of danger, as they rushed from one battle to another. Archimedes had said that in order to lift the world a base was necessary. Atatürk had seized that for the liberation and development of the Turkish nation, it would be sufficient to place confidence in its basic national and human qualities.

It is after the defeat of Turkey in World War I that Atatürk started to put his thought into practice. On the aftermath of the war, as a result of the cease fire signed at Mondros on October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Empire was divided into pieces, Anatolia and Thrace were occupied by the forces of the victorious Powers. On November 13, 1918, the fleets of the Allied Powers hold Istanbul within the reach of their guns. Subsequently, they occupied such places as Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, Urfa, Maraş and Antalya. In the meantime, the Greek army landed in Izmir with the help of the Allied Powers. Still, this was not the end of the crisis. A Greek danger appeared in the horizon for the eastern part of the Black Sea, as for Eastern Anatolia, the danger came from the Armenians.

At a time when the homeland was faced with dark hours and was starting to sink into doubt and anxiety, Atatürk set foot in Samsun, on May 19, 1919, as the commander of the 9 th Army Corps. His first step was to examine the general state of affairs and the effect of the world war I on the army. The nation was impoverished. Vahidettin, who combined the powers of Sultan and Caliph, and his grand vizier, Damat Ferit were incapable and selfish and were only anxious

about their position and interests. The national associations setup against the occupation by the Allied Forces were operating in limited areas with no coordination. In view of this situation, Atatürk could envisage only a single solution to be adopted in order to liberate the country : namely, the founding of a new Turkish state, based on unconditional sovereignty. To achieve this, it was necessary to maintain the national feelings aroused as a result of the foreign occupation to ensure the national unity. It was also necessary to reorganize and reinforce the army. The days following May 19 witness his activities to fulfil this purpose. The main developments which had an impact on the War of Independence are as follows :

On June 22, in Amasya; after having examined the situation with Rauf bey, Ali Fuat and Refet Pasha, in a communiqué, he declared that the integrity of the whole country and the independence of the nation were in danger and that only through resolution and resistance could the nation free itself. For this purpose, he suggested the convening of a congress at Sivas. On June 23, the government in Istanbul dismissed Atatürk from his duty. In a communiqué issued in Erzurum on July 8, addressed to the people as well as civilian and military authorities, he explained the nature of his new obligation, in the following manner :

«... In order to free the grand nation and homeland from the danger of disintegration, my official titles prevent me from participating in the national struggle freely. I swear that I shall not fail to strive until the end of my life for the sake of this sacred aim. Consequently, I resign today from my military duties and give up a career that I have always cherished. From now on I would like to inform you that I am no one but a simple soldier fighting in the bosom of the nation, ready to make sacrifices in order to fulfil the grand national design».

One can feel in this communiqué a new source of faith, a new authority, as well as a new approach to his duty. The source of his new faith sprung from the true interest for the Turkish nation and homeland. The new authority was dependent on the aspiration and will of the people, instead of the sultan, caliphate and Ottoman government. As to the new approach to his duties, it consisted of reinforcing the links with the people, by a solemn oath.

It was this new conviction and approach to national faith and ethics mentioned above which bestowed honour to Atatürk, elected to the presidency of the congress, which convened on July 23, in Erzurum. The congress ascertained the political boundaries of the country. It also accepted provisions in order to eliminate all kinds of obstacles of a nature to cast shadow on the independence of the country. Moreover, in case the government in Istanbul did not fulfil the above mentioned duties, the Congress let it be known that a provisional government would be set up in Anatolia. Another phase was the convening of a congress in Sivas, on September 4 - 12, under the chairmanship of Atatürk. This congress would reach decisions on behalf of the entire nation. It approved the decisions taken by the congress of Erzurum, in spite of the fact that it did not have a regional nature. It was also decided that different ressistance organizations based in different parts of the country should come under the authority of a single organization. Atatürk, in order to put this decision into practice, presented the governor a document concerning the founding of the association for the Protection of the Rights of the People in Anatolia and Thrace. Thus, two important tasks were fulfilled : Firstly, the basic principles of the struggle for independence in evolution were determined; secondly, a new organization symbolizing the national unity was created. Atatürk was elected as the head of its executive council.

On September 12, Atatürk counter - attacked the government of Damat Ferit Pasha, who was doing everything in order to strangle the national movement which developed in Anatolia. Until the formation of a government respectful of the national will, he stopped all contacts between Anatolia and Istanbul. He made Sivas the administrative center of the country. The execution of these decisions and Damat Ferit's forced resignation from office manifested the appearance in Anatolia of an organized movement corresponding to the will of the Turkish people.

Atatürk's name had been heard for the first time on the occasion of the battle of Çanakkale. After the Armistice, all the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress having fled the country, this name began to spread among our patriotic intellectuals. But after he moved into Anatolia, he was considered as a saviour, not only amongst the intelligentsia, but also amongst the people. After the congress of Sivas, he was met by the people on his way to Ankara with the warmest enthusiasm.

The Delegation of Representatives first stopped at Kayseri. An unexpectedly huge crowd had been waiting for them for hours. All the eyes were filled with tears and the lips trembling with emotion. It was as if the passionate heart of Anatolia was beating in Kayseri. In a letter of thanks addressed to the inhabitants

of Kayseri, Atatürk could not help saying that as long as he lived, he would preserve the memory of this warm welcome.

On December 21, the Delegation of Representatives passed through Mucur. The townspeople, as well as the inhabitants of surrounding villages had lined up on both sides of the road through which Atatürk was to pass. Despite the falling rain. all waited in silence. When Atatürk's car appeared, they started running towards him in disorder, as if they were welcoming their son returning after many years of military service. On their part, the group led by Atatürk having stepped out of their cars, marched to meet those faithful people. Those who had fought with him at Çanakkale ran towards him with tears in their eyes to ask whether he recognized them. This sight made people weep. Seeing that, Atatürk said : «I have never seen such a welcome. Thus, you have exalted our national cause».

On December 23, people of Hacı Bektaş reserved Atatürk the same warm welcome. He said during the banquet given in his honour that he would work until the end of his life and give the last drop of his blood in order to save the country and the people from the enemies' fetters.

On December 24, passing through Kırşehir, he was so moved by the interest shown him by the youth that he addressed them in this way : «In order to save our beloved and respected country, it is essential that all enlightened people, as well as all the sons of this land, should prepare themselves for the struggle. We shall not go to Istanbul. It is Anatolia which is our treasure. It is in the bosom of the nation that we shall look for the way to salvation until the end of our lives».

WINTER VIEW OF OLD ANKARA. (2)



After a brilliant and enthusiastic welcome in Kaman, the Delegation of Representatives arrived at last at Ankara. Ali Fuat Pasha had made the necessary arrangements to greet them. All the inhabitants of the city were out in the streets to see the Pasha. After having saluted and thanked those who had come to greet him, Atatürk told them that no force could save the country but courageous and self - sacrificing people like them.

This visit to Ankara was a turning point not only in his life and in that of the nation, but also in the evolution of the historical events of the century. The fact that, in the communiqué issued on the occasion of his visit, he said that the Delegation of Representatives would meet in Ankara, was significant. From now on it was in this city that the heart of the new Turkey would beat. The eyes of the innocent nations would turn to this city, filled with hope, and this would cause awe and doubt in the Imperialist Countries.

Yet Ankara looked more like a big and dull village with big section of its population of 20 000 occupied with agriculture. The town stretched between the Citadel and Ulus Square. Apart from a few stone Government buildings, the houses were made of clay, most of them with flat tops. There were no trees and no fountains with bubbling water. Ankara Brook, uncovered, formed sheets of water from place to place, bringing forth mosquitoes. As in many other places in Anatolia, Malaria was there, as the people's fierce enemy. (picture 2).

The fact that Atatürk had come to Ankara, that many people had joined him there after the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Powers who were determined to carry on fighting in Anatolia, and finally the convening there of the Grand National Assembly, made a capital out of Ankara. All that people, particularly those coming from Istanbul, had seen on the way, their first impression about Ankara, and their idea about Atatürk's conception of the liberation contributed to create an atmosphere of pessimism.

They had seen emptiness, stagnation, ruins everywhere. What most of them thought about Ankara could be summed up thus : «... Ankara was like a town im-

mersed in a profound sleep that was like death. To spend a day in idleness in that desert - like place would provoke a feeling of boredom and melancholy, which would shorten one's life by half».

In like manner, Atatürk's state was a matter of bewilderment for the newcomers. He had established his headquarters in the School of Agriculture, and from that place, he addressed the whole nation and answered the questions put to him. All that he achieved was done in the name of the Delegation of Representatives, although all the members of this Delegation lived in far away places. Such a Delegation did not even truly exist, but Atatürk acted as if it was a reality. The state in which the army corps stationed in Ankara alarmed those who were pessimistic. There were only 150 men under arms, poorly equipped, and 90 mules captured from the English forces when they had been forced to retreat from Eskişehir by Ali Fuat Pasha.

Those who were desperate in face of this vacuum and disorder rushed to see Atatürk with the hope that an explanation that would soothe them. Atatürk would answer the questions put to him as follows :

«Yes our country looks empty, like a desert. Bu the thrill of the big thing we are doing at present is here. Create life out of a desert, organization out of disorder. Moreover, one should not take into account the present vacuum ! This field which seems empty is in reality full. In this world which is considered a desert there is a hidden and powerful life, and it is the nation, the Turkish nation. What is lacking is organization. That is what we are working on».

What Atatürk meant by organization was the convening of the Grand National Assembly. Once it would be convened, everything would be settled, and the necessary measures could be adopted for the liberation. For some of those who came from Istanbul, first and foremost thing should be putting up an army; the assembly and its future work were hypothetical. As to Atatürk, he defended his opinion categorically, in the following manner : «In my opinion the Assembly is not an hypothesis, it is a reality, and it is the most important of realities. It is the nation that will constitute the armed forces and the Assembly is the representative of the nation. For, the army means hundreds of thousands of human beings, and financial means which are expressed in terms of millions. Organizing an army cannot be decided upon by a few persons, only the decision and approval of the nation can create the armed forces».



THE FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. (3)

Another category of people believed that even though the Grand National Assembly was constituted, one could not expect miracles as a result of its work. As to Atatürk, he understood the necessity of convincing them on this point. He said : «On the contrary, I am one of those people who expect miracles from the Assembly. We are in such an epoch where everything has to conform with the law. The rule of law and legality in the national life depends on decisions taken by the nation and can bé ensured by conforming with the general tendency of the nation. Our nation is great indeed. Don't fear, the way of the nation is the safest way» (picture 3).

Those who were listening to Atatürk and shared his opinion about the liberation of the country thought that if it had not been for Atatürk's strong personality, one could get mad at the sight of this vacuum, this disorder and these ruins. Besides, Atatürk had to face an opposition concerning the Assembly. The first moment of opposition originated among his closest friends and was due to the name that was to be attributed to the new assembly. Considering the fact that all relations were cut between Anatolia and Istanbul, Atatürk deemed it necessary for the Assembly to be a «Constituent Assembly». Some of his friends having disagreed upon this name, he had accepted the name «Grand National Assembly» as a satisfactory one, considering the fact that it meant such an assembly would be granted extraordinary powers of decision and

authority. The second movement of opposition of any importance appeared at the first session on April 23, 1920, on the occasion of the election of the president. Considering the propaganda made against him from various sides and thinking it would be harmful to the national cause, Atatürk declared at the first session that he did not solicit any office. In the subsequent poll, he was elected president of the Grand National Assembly by 110 favourable votes out of 120.

After his election as President of the Assembly and after performing his duties for a certain time, Atatürk continued to work in the stone building of Ankara railway station. As from 1921 on, he began to use the Çankaya pavilion as residence of the Chief of State.

Neither the School of Agriculture, nor the railway station building appeared suitable for a permanent place to work in : As it has been mentioned above it was situated in a hot and dusty area, muddy in wintertime and full of mosquitoes in summertime. As for him, he was fond of nature and of trees. Upon the suggestion by one of his close friends, Ruşen Eşref, he went up to Çankaya and found a convenient place. (picture 4).

Çankaya was a village situated on the southern slopes of Ankara. There were houses scattered about, surrounded by vineyards. On the very top of one of those hills, but in a concealed place, was a residence, hidden among the trees. This residence could not be seen from the plain below, but, if one stepped a little further, Ankara down below, the Citadel which overlooks it and the surrounding mountains struck the eye. The weather there was rigorous but healthy. There was neither dust, mosquitoes or noise of the city, nor its smells. Moreover in the hall of the residence, a murmuring fountain gave life and freshness all around.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE RAILWAY STATION WITH THE STONE BUILDING (4)





VIEW OF THE RESIDENCE, IN 1931. (5)

Atatürk lived in this residence offered to him by the people of Ankara, between the years 1921 and 1932. His mother Zübeyde Hanım and his wife Latife Hanım stayed there for a while. It is there that he would welcome and entertain his visitors, his native and foreign hosts, and the journalists. It is during the time he lived in this residence that occurred all the significant historical events such as the War of Independence and the implementation of all the reforms bearing his name

He won the battle of Sakarya as the first commander in chief in the history of the new Turkish State and was granted the title of «Gazi» and that of marshal.


The historical events, such as the winning of great battles, the recapture of Izmir, Thrace and Istanbul, the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, the abrogation of the sultanate and of the caliphate, the proclamation



ATATÜRK DURING THE REFORM OF THE ALPHABET. (6)

of the republic, were all carefully elaborated in his mind during his stay at the Çankaya Pavilion. All reforms, such as the promulgation of the constitution based on secular principles, the abolition of decayed institutions contrary to the above mentioned principles, the modernizing of costumes, the banning of the «tekke» s, the adoption of the Civil Code and of the new Turkish alphabet, were all planned in this Çankaya residence.

Most of historical monuments in the world owe their fame to their architects, whereas the Çankaya residence has no material importance, neither is its architect known. But its historical value and fame is greater than most of that of the magnificent palaces occupied by renowned sovereigns and built by famous architects. For, in this residence, the hero of the Turkish War of Independence, the architect of the Turkish State, and the founder of the modern Turkish nation, Atatürk, had worked, thought, and created. The name Çankaya became as renowned as that of the biggest capitals in the world. It added new and glorious history to the ancient history of Ankara.





A VIEW OF THE «KÖŞK»



THE TOWER.



FAÇADE OF THE RESIDENCE
WITH THE ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS. (8)

As can be seen on picture 4, the first shape of the residence was a two storey building with wooden stutters and with a balcony on both façades, that overlooking the town, and that at the rear. On the ground floor of this house, which opened to the rear, there used to be a marble fountain. From an open place of the hall on the 1 st floor divided in two by a balustrade, one could see this fountain below. Thus, this house consisting of two rooms and a hall on the lst floor and of the same ordering on the ground floor, was enlarged in 1924 by architect Mehmet Vedat and took its present state.

These additions consisted a glassed entry on the front which extended forward to the room on the left. At the rear, on the ground floor, there were a pantry and a kitchen, and on the side, there was a projection forming angles in the shape of a tower. On the first floor was the same disposition. (picture 5, 6).

Although the house had been equipped with central heating in 1926, since it proved to be defective, the house could not be heated properly and, for this reason, during winters when repairs were necessary, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had to leave Ankara for trips, until everything was put in order. On the other hand, since the library did not have enough suitable space for additional books, M. Kemal Atatürk chose a new site for a presidential residence which is located on top of a rocky hill.

When this plan of the building was drawn up, the architect was given the instruction to build a spacious library and a comfortable and luminous study.

Both houses are predominantly decorated with pink and various tones of green to suit the taste of Atatürk. The decoration of the ceilings of the residence which is now a museum consists of Turkish motifs and is in accordance with the Turkish style.

When he moved to the new building, in 1932, Atatürk maintained the old residence exactly as it was and lodged there some of his closest friends such as Fethi Okyar. ,,

Now let us visit this Çankaya residence, respecting the way it was used by M. Kemal Atatürk. The glass entry is furnished with a mirror and armchairs made out of carved dark brown wood. Here sat a doorkeeper of Ethiopian origin called Nesip Efendi. Nesip Efendi had two peculiarities : firstly the model of his uniform and buttons which he had copied from the picture reproduced in a newspaper of a uniform worn by a king. He always wore the same uniform without provoking any question from Atatürk; secondly : he knew by heart all the telephone numbers of all familiar people (picture 7). After this entry came a hall of which the main furniture was a billiard - table. Presently it is on the Ist floor. During the day - time its accessories were kept in a side cupboard and nearly every evening Atatürk would play billiards as his daily exercise. Although he used to ride a horse or walk sometimes, billiards was still his permanent




A VIEW OF THE BILLIARD ROOM (10)

THE GLASSED ENTRY. (9)



DETAIL OF A CUPBOARD DOOR
IN THE ENTRY OF THE AMBASSADORS (11)





THE AMBASSADORS' RECEPTION ROOM, ON THE GROUND GLOOR. (12)



ENTRY OF THE AMBASSADORS' RECEPTION ROOM. (13)



ANOTHER VIEW OF THE AMBASSADORS' RECEPTION ROOM. (14)

DETAIL OF THE SOFA INLAID WITH MOTHER - OF - PEARL IN THE AMBASSADORS' RECEPTION ROOM. (15)



favourite sport. In this hall there was a sofa and a few armchairs. At the bottom of the stairs there was a piano (picture 8).

On the left hand side of this hall, in the tower, there was a reception - room for ambassadors and foreign dignitaries, which was divided into two and lighted by a bow window (pictures 9, 10, 11, 12, 13), Opposite the writing - desk inlaid with mother - of - pearl there was a corner furnished with armchairs and tables inlaid with mother - of - pearl in the like manner. Atatürk would sit at this desk and receive his official



THE GREEN DRAWING - ROOM. (16)

guests. It is there that one day a foreign ambassador fell down, either slipping on the polished floor, or perhaps out of emotion, but was able to pull himself together quickly, thanks to a screen.

On June 5, 1930, in this reception - room, came an official guest. It was the French General Gouraud who had lost one arm in the battle of Çanakkale. When he first met M. Kemal Atatürk, he told him : «I have lost this arm when fighting at Çanakkale against the Turks, today, I came here to hold the other one out as a token of friendship». Atatürk had been deeply moved by these words and had spoken to him for a long time.

Atfer this visit, General Gouraud told the journalists : «Today I have had the good fortune of conversing for two hours with your President». Mentioning the battle of Çanakkale, he added : «My having fought the Turks has given me the occasion of getting to know closer a very courageous nation, and of loving and respecting this nation».

Opposite this room, there is another room called the «green drawing - room». Its windows open on the front and on the side of the pavilion. It is used as a reception - room. In a corner, there used to be a portable stove. On its walls hang swords ornamented

with jewels; there is a glass cabinet with souvenirs and couriosities in it (Picture 14).


A door opens on the dining - room, although its main entrance is through the hall. The dining - room is divided in two : the dining place proper, decorated with high stained glass windows and with a fire place ornamented with a carved wood mantelpiece in the old Turkish fashion (picture 15). Next to it there is a small room used for the service purposes and opening into the kitchen. This dining - room is furnished with a side board, a glass cabinet and a large dining table. It is the place where M. Kemal Atatürk welcomes his guests in the evening. There gathered statesmen, high ranking officers, lawyers, writers and poets as well as members of Parliament of all professions. Every evening, those guests commented on political events and have had discussions about them. Here all kinds of subjects are pretext to conversation. Atatürk, who presides over the table, opens the subjects, puts questions about them, giving a chance of speaking to every one in turn, manages the opponents on delicate questions. For instance, in 1930, the law recognizing the right for women to vote and be elected in the municipal elections, was the topic of conversation and the object of discussion there, before it was put forward to the Grand Nationai Assembly (picture 16).

WALL PANEL IN THE DINING - ROOM (1932). (18)



Another topic concerns new published books. Writers and poets read their own works. Problems related to the country are discussed, as well as historical subjects. M. Kemal Atatürk, who wishes the history of the Turks and of Turkey to be examined from the point of view of its contribution to civilization, often relates what he has read, or sometimes gives a copy of a newly published book, taken out of his own

ENTRY FROM THE HALL TO THE DINING - ROOM. (17)






ANOTHER VIEW OF THE DINING - ROOM. (19)



THE DINING - ROOM. (20)



A STAINED GLASS WINDOW IN THE DINING - ROOM. (21)

CEILING OF THE TOWER ROOM, ON THE GROUND FLOOR. (22)



library, to his friends speaking foreign languages, asking them to summarize it for him, at short notice. Thereafter, they would give their opinion about the said book would set down in writing their criticism about it (pictures 17, 18, 19).

Sometimes, musicians were invited too. This is a picture of the atmosphere of this dining room every evening. Thus, the notable people of the country would gather round this table and there would be discussions and conversations about all sorts of topics.

There was a two - leaf door opening onto the garden in the other part of the dining - room, and a gaming - table which was seldom in use was placed there.

In addition, two steps lead to the tower room, which is a resting place and is furnished with a leather sofa and armchairs (pictures 20, 21). There, coffee was served and, now and then, Atatürk would sit there before or after the meal, with people whom he wanted to speak to privately.



THE TOWER ROOM, ON THE GROUND FLOOR. (23)



LIVING - ROOM. (24)

Now, we can go up to the Ist floor. On the first curve of the staircase is a landing. After the second curve, on the right, there is a small 3 windowed bedroom or living room which overlooks the town (picture 22). A door leads out into the drawing - room which used to have a second door between the staircase landing and the glassed entry and which does not exist any more. This room has an oriental character. It has a brazier in the middle and is furnished with sofas. On the front is a balcony, which corresponds to the entry on the ground floor (picture 24).

The door on the left hand side of this drawing - room is that of Atatürk's bedroom (pictures 23, 25) and another one opens into a bathroom.

While one of the rooms was being used as library, a room next to Atatürk's bedroom called «the tower - room» came to be used as library and study, after 1930, as there was not sufficient room for the books and files in the library. Between the bedroom and this tower - room, in place of the glass panel, shelves for the books were fitted up. There is a door opening into the bedroom too. The library opens out on the front and side façades. It is provided with walnut wood shelves and glassed cabinets, in the old fashion. This room is furnished with a large writing desk, besides a sofa and a few armchairs. It is on this desk that Atatürk wrote or dictated his «Speech» where as it is in the palace of Dolmabahçe that were written «Improvements» and the «Address to the Youth».

In this library were books about military art, law, literature, his private note books, For instance his daily memos written during the battles of Anafartalar or Arıburun, or the Karlsbad note books used to be there. There was no catalogue of the books; they were only recorded in a big register by an employee, who came from the Grand National Assembly (picture 27).

ATATÜRK's BEDROOM. (25)






DRAWING - ROOM WITH BRAZIER IN THE MIDDLE. (26)



ATATÜRK's BEDROOM. (27)

The part of this library that was situated in the tower was fitted with oak wood furniture, and white and grey upholstery. His particularity consisted in a writing desk situated in the window recess (picture 28). Atatürk would smoke cigarettes and drink coffee for hours and days, or sometimes buttermilk. Now and then, the man he was dictating to would be tired and another one would take his place. There were instances of M. Kemal Atatürk's working for two days and two nights without stopping. An event occured in that room is worth mentioning : On one morning following one of those nights of continuous work, Prime Minister Ismet Inönü comes very embarrassed to see Atatürk, in order to submit to him a question concerning the budget. He is most anxious. Atatürk comes into the room and though knowing very well the problem the Prime Minister was going to put to him, and his concern, calmly brings up historical subjects he had been working on during the previous night. The Prime Minister is very impatient, but has to listen though. President Atatürk, feeling that Ismet Inönü has recovered his calm, suddenly resumes the subject of the day. He gives solutions and lays down general lines of conduct about the question that has to be settled to the Prime Minister who has now recovered his calm. Looking pleased and cheerful as he is leaving Atatürk. They have solved together that day's problem. One can explain thus the reason why Atatürk had rather talked about historical questions first : After having diverted the interest of the Prime Minister, worried by that day's problem, M. Kemal had made his weariness disap-



THE LIBRARY. (28)



THE LIBRARY RECORD BOOK. (29)




TOWER ROOM TRANSFORMED LATER INTO A LIBRARY. (30)

pear and then they had together quietly found a solution.

This library is the place that Atatürk liked best. It is there he spent most of his time and received in the daytime officials and friends. The Secretary General of the Presidency used to come there every day with official documents, he would inform Atatürk about the documents the Chief of State would have to sign, about the problems that were to be solved and he would take his orders. It is in this library that the Prime Minister, the ministers, the chief of general staff, hing ranking officers would discuss the affairs of the army and of the State and the solutions to be found. Atatürk gave the greatest importance to books. He would not simply read them rapidly, but would underline places he thought important with red or blue pencils. It is in this library that his works on history took shape. Believing in the necessity of research on the history of the Turks and of Turkey, he studied it himself and gave tasks to tho-

A BOOK OUT OF THE LIBRARY,
WITH NOTES WRITTEN BY ATATÜRK's (31)






THE TOWER ROOM. (32)




se who wanted to take pains at studying history. One can sum up the subjects he worked upon : the establishing of a chronological history of the Turks and of Turkey and, last but not least, the finding of examples of the contribution of the Turks to the world civilization (picture 29, 30).

Besides, he was interested in legal subjects and political principles concerning the control of the State, on economic matters, on books and studies about it. For instance, after having taken notes out of the books he had read or had had analized for him, in view of establishing the principles of our Constitution, it is in this library that he put them forward and explained how they should be enforced by taking into comparison our social and economic state he had observed in his journeys through the country.
As for the gardens and trees around the Çankaya residence, they witness how he loved and valued nature. He cared personally for them and was interested in their pruning. He could satisfy thus his love and admiration for greens. In his time, as well as later on new trees were added to the old ones in Çankaya. It is as though he took pride in seeing them grow and become green. One spring, he had been most worried by the fact that some trees had been too much pruned, and he had scolded the gardener.

M. Kemal Atatürk has lived in this world as all mortal creatures do. He has spent ten years of his life in Çankaya residence. Here, his memory lives. Only the people are mortal, ideas and successful deeds remain. According to this principle, Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, has entrusted the Turkish nation with the task of preserving the territorial integrity, of advancing every day further in the way of civilization. The leader of the Nation has been able to say : «I am happy, because I have been successful».



GROUND FLOOR


BALCONY
THE LIBRARY
LIVING ROOM
REST ROOM
BEDROOM
W.C.
BATHROOM
TOWER ROOM

1 st FLOOR

PRINTED IN TURKEY BY AJANS-TÜRK MATBAACILIK SANAYİİ / ANKARA

QUOTATIONS

from

Mustafa Kemal

ATATÜRK

Translated by **Yılmaz Öz**

from an original compilation by **Akil Aksan**

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Published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, on the occasion of Atatürk's Centenary.

Ankara
1982

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Douglas MAC ARTHUR - (1948)

With his death the World lost a genius and a great leader; the Turkish nation lost its eminent and most gallant son, and Humanity lost a fearless defender endowed with keen perception... If he were to be alive, the turmoiled international scene would have been substantially different today. His death at a crucial moment of the conflict shattering the World continues to be an irreplaceable loss.

Jawaharlal NEHRU - (1963)

Kemal ATATÜRK or Kemal Pasha as we knew him then, was a hero of mine in my younger days. We were then wholly occupied with our own freedom movement and I had, in common with many others, begun my pilgrimage to jails. Even in prison, we followed avidly the news of Kemal Pasha's activities and his struggles to free Turkey from foreign rule and influences. I remember when news came to us in the prison, of his great victory over the Greeks in Asia Minor, how we rejoiced and we celebrated it even in prison. Later on, when we read of his great reforms we were much impressed. His dynamism, his fearlessness were most impressive. He is one of leaders of the modern age in the East and I for one continue to admire him greatly.

John F. KENNEDY - (1963)

The name of ATATÜRK brings to mind the historical accomplishments of one of the great men of this century; his inspired leadership of the Turkish people; his perceptive understanding of the modern World; and, his boldness as a military leader.

It is to the credit of ATATÜRK and the Turkish people that a free Turkey grew out of a collapsing empire and that the new Turkey has proudly proclaimed and maintained its independence ever since.

Certainly, there is no more successful example of national self-reliance than the Turkish Republic and the profound changes initiated since then by Turkey and ATATÜRK.

AYUB HAN - (1963)

Kemal ATATÜRK was not only one of the greatest men of the century but we in Pakistan regard him as one of the greatest men of all times. A military genius, a born leader of men and a great patriot, Kemal ATATÜRK has put Turkey back on the road to greatness. He is not only the beloved leader of Turkish people but muslims all over the World look upon him with feelings of love and admiration.



Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK
(1881 - 1938)

END OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

My Friends,

Here is the purpose in my assembling you here tonight:(*) I think it redundant to remind you of the grave moments which our country is now living through. All of you are aware of this. We have important obligations towards this ill-fated country. Our sole object is to save it. They now want to detach Macedonia and the whole of Roumelia from the country. Parts of it are already under foreign influence and predominance. The Sultan who thinks of nothing but the pursuit of his pleasures and his reign has but a detestable personality capable of all baseness. The nation is perishing under tyranny and oppression. And in a country where freedom ceases to exist, only death and destruction reign. The mainspring of all progress and deliverance is freedom. History today charges us with a

(*) This talk was delivered at a secret meeting in Salonika.

great mission. I have already formed an association in Syria and we have started our fight against tyranny. My purpose in coming here also is to lay the groundwork for this association. For the time being, it is necessary to remain in secret and to organize further.

I expect sacrifices from you. In order to be able to respond to a crushing tyranny through revolution, to destroy a rotten and obsolete administration, to render the nation sovereign, and in short, to save the country, I am inviting you to take on this mission.

.....

It is true that before ours, there have been many attemps to this end. They failed because they lacked organization. Whereas with the organization we will create we shall eventually and indubitably succeed. We will save the country and the nation.

(1906)

* * *

The problem is not one of dying. It is to bring our ideals to realization before we die. (*)

(1906)

* * *

The day will come when I shall have realized all these reforms which you today consider as dreams. The nation to which I belong will believe in me.

The Sultanate must be abolished. The structure of the state should rest on a homogenous element. Religious and state affairs should be separated. We

(*) To his friends who pledge their lives "for the sake of the reforms".

must cast off and divert our identity from that of the Eastern civilization to the Western. We must establish a new social order by eliminating the difference between man and woman. Renouncing the script which prevents us from joining the Western civilization, we must adopt an alphabet of Latin origin. We must adapt to westerners in everything, down to the way we dress. Rest assured that all of these will one day be realized. (*)

(1907)

* * *

The country will most assuredly be saved and the nation will rejoice. Because many are the youth of this country who are willing to sacrifice their own safety and happiness for that of their nation.

(1912)

* * *

Gentlemen! I am hoping that after the conclusion of an appropriate peace, our situation will be better than which prevailed within our previous borders, assuming that it is properly handled. At this juncture, let me expound on a further idea: We have lived for centuries and within the same frontiers, together with our fellow-moslems, our dear brethren, who are now to remain outside the frontiers we have drawn for ourselves. These brethren of ours in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen and all over the Orient are struggling to preserve their existence and to gain their independence in

(*) From his talk in Salonika with I. Manolof, the eminent Bulgarian Turcologist.

their own boundaries. How great a happiness will it be for the World of Islam, for all such moslem segments to reach independence? I feel the greatest of joys in imagining, even from now, how powerful the situation in the World of Islam will become when this is attained. My conviction as to the success of the Moslem World which, without doubt, has been awakening, is so strong that expressing my sentiments along lines of this conviction gives me a profound pleasure.

(1919)

* * *

Having thoroughly studied the Mudros Armistice(*) terms, I had reached the conclusion that with this Armistice, the Ottoman Empire was not only consenting to capitulate unconditionally before its enemies, but promised, as well, to assist them to occupy the country.

.....

I passed unto the Government my opinion that if the terms of this Armistice were to be put into effect as written, the country would be exposed to total invasion and occupation, and I explained to them that the consequences of kowtowing to all demands of the enemies would, undoubtedly, lead to the invaders taking over the entire country and to their appointing the Ottoman Cabinet. One did not need to be endowed with a gift for prophecy to see this.

(1926)

* * *

(*) The Armistice signed between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire on October 30, 1918.

THE RIGHTS OF A NATION

"People's voice is the voice of righteousness"

(1923)

* * *

Henceforth the nation will have to seek and defend its own rights. And it behooves us, in cooperation with the Army, to show the way and to assist it to the extent possible.

(1918)

* * *

History never negates the blood, the rights and the reality of a nation. Therefore, verdicts pronounced and opinions expressed against our country and our nation behind so deceptive a curtain, are definitely condemned to remain without effect.

(1919)

* * *

If a nation is unconcerned over its might, and over its intellectual and physical resources for its own existence and for its rights, and if it is incapable of securing its existence and independence through use of its own might, it will remain merely a toy for others.

(1919)



The right surely does exist in this World of ours and it is superior to might. However, one must prove to the World that the nation is aware of its rights and is ready to make all sacrifices for the defense and preservation thereof.

(1919)



Moved by injustices committed by the Allied Powers and the weakness and inability of the Government(*) in Istanbul, our nation has been compelled to adopt the resolution to prove its existence and to take action to defend its honor and independence against actual aggression.

(1919)



Disasters always lead men and wise nations to persevere and to make vigorous moves.

(1919)



(*) The Sultan's Government in Istanbul.

The national force now emerging in the country has been given its birth in the minds and the heart of the nation deriving its lesson from calamities.

(1919)



The nation must be vigilant towards its Government. Because if the Governments' actions are negative and if the nation does to object thereto or divest itself thereof, it would be deemed to have shared in all the faults and the blame.

(1919)



Our conviction is firm as to the sacred nature of the struggle we initiated for the defense of our rights and independence, and as to the fact that there is no force which is able to deprive a nation of its right to exist.

(1920)



In the East and the West, almost in all corners of the country, associations had been formed for the defense and protection of the rights of the nation and the country. These associations were the sole organizations issuing from a resolution well-rooted in the nation's conscience.

(1920)



So far as we are concerned, the Treaty of Sèvres(*) which envisions the elimination of our political, judicial, economic and financial independence, and which, consequently, denies and terminates our right to live, does not exist.(**)

(1921)

* * *

We wish none other than living free and independent within our national boundaries. We wish our rights to be kept inviolable, just a those enjoyed by other nations of Europe.

(1921)

* * *

We do not wish to violate the rights of others, and by the same token, we have no claim other than their respecting our right to an independent existence. All humanity and the civilized World will finally recognize the legitimate rights of the Turkish Nation which has no purpose other than to live independently, as any other civilized nation, within its national boundaries and free of foreign intervention.

Our Assembly and its government are far from being belligerent or adventuresome. Quite to the reverse, they prefer peace and deliverance. In particular they fervently wish the realization of humane and

(*) This Treaty which was signed by and between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers on August 1, 1920, was refused by Atatürk and The Grand National Assembly in Ankara. In brief, this Treaty was leaving only a few provinces in Central Anatolia for Turkey.

(**) To the United Press Correspondent.

civilized ideals. Within this framework, they will always seek to enter into good relations and to develop amicable ties with both the Eastern and the Western world.

(1921)

* * *

Those who lack force and talent are not respected.

(1921)

* * *

For many centuries our nation had gravely suffered under the weight of two tyrannical and destructive forces: The first of these were the despots who had a direct claim to the rule of the country and the nation, and the second consisted of the world of imperialist capitalism.

Subjected to the pressures of these two forces for centuries, the nation certainly is in an extremely feeble condition. However, Gentlemen, as a result of these pressures, great awakenings are taking place. In our nation too such a true awakening has occurred and we happen to find ourselves in just such a period. Indeed, it has now been about a year and a half that the nation revolted against both these two forces and started its struggle.

(1921)

* * *

This victory in Anatolia will be imbedded in history as the best example which demonstrates how

powerful and reviving could become an idea as embraced by a nation so totally.

(1922)

* * *

Within the community of men, there is a great Turkish nation with a population which exceeds one hundred million, and this nation has a historical depth proportionate to its extent on the face of this Earth.

(1922)

* * *

Gentlemen, Mr. Claude Farrère has proven in the most unmistakable manner that he is veritably and seriously a friend of Turkey. When our country was living through tragic moments, when our nation was subjected to oppression and when all the injustices of the World were being hurled upon us, one heard a noble voice, a humane voice against all such oppression. This was the voice of Claude Farrère in whose presence here today we feel much happiness. (*)

(1922)

* * *

We recognize for all nations of the World the right to "self-determination" which is advanced by civilized Mankind in international relations as corresponding to a total embodiment of the most noble and lofty of ideas and desires. And we demand that this right of ours be recognized without any condition or reservation.

(*) From a talk during the visit to Atatürk by Claude Farrère at İzmit.

The responsibility for blood already shed or to be further shed in denying us this legitimite and righteous claim will, undoubtedly, fall on those who so deny. No force is conceivable which could make us to renounce pursuing this national cause. National cause to us means our lives.

(1922)

⁂

Know we must that the nations which fail to find their national identity do fall prey to other nations.

(1923)

⁂

We do not want far too much from anyone. We should not be denied those things which all civilized nations of the World enjoy by nature; and our rights too should be admitted. Because those rights are natural, legitimate and reasonable, and we need them. We shall never relinquish them. The capability and the might of our country and of our nation to defend and safeguard them is but a reflection of the legitimacy of our claim.

(1923)

⁂

It appears the Allied Powers have not yet developed the sense to accept and confirm the conditions which are absolutely necessary for the existence and development of Turkey and its people. The obstinacy and the insistence of the Allied Powers which entertain certain conditions for and demands from Turkey, infringing upon its independence and which are incon-

ceivable for any civilized nation is an event which should be deplored by the whole World in surprise and astonishment.

We want a peace which guarantees our independence. As long as we see this remains unsecured, we shall continue what we have started until we attain full independence with a view to reach the élan with which we need to live. This represents the firm resolution of our nation. All measures to implement this decision, at whatever cost, have already been taken.

(1923)

* * *

Our Nation has severely suffered for having ignored its proper origin. Different peoples making up the Ottoman Empire have emancipated themselves by adopting national beliefs and by the force inherent in ideals of nationalism. We did not realize our own identity and the fact that we are distinct from and foreign to them until after they forced us out. They insulted and humiliated us when we had become weak. Only then did we become aware of our error in having forgotten what we really were.

(1923)

* * *

In the accomplishment of our great mission, the great capacity and the infallible good sense of our nation have served as our principal guide and the source of our success.

(1923)

* * *

True victory does not consist solely of triumph in the battlefield, but it is in the reinforcement of the sources of triumph and in the elevation of the nation, as well.

(1923)



The system which is most compatible with the nature and spirit of the Turkish Nation is Republicanism.

(1924)



Offer the Turk something good and positive. He will not possibly refuse it.

(1924)



The origins of national struggles do not lie in personal ambitions, but rather, in national ideals and national honor.

(1925)



Those who are uncivilized are condemned to be trampled under the feet of civilized ones.

(1925)



Great missions are accomplished but by great nations.

(1928)



Outside our own political existence and in lands afar, there are Turkish communities which, although having a unity with us, of language, of race and origin and even close or distant historical and moral affinity, have willingly or unwillingly shared destinies with other political entities. This fact, which resulted merely from a historical dislocation, constitutes a painful memory, although it would never affect neither the roots nor the solidarity in the original formation of the Turkish nation, from both the historical and ethnological viewpoints.

(1930)



The people of Turkey which formed the Republic of Turkey are called The Turkish Nation.

(1930)



Force is unique and it belongs to the nation.

(1937)



Independence

However wealthy and prosperous, a nation deprived of independence cannot be worthy of any claim higher than that of being subservient in the eyes of civilized men.

(1919)



When its independence is in danger, the nation recruits its own armies and adopts but one attitude: to sacrifice its blood to the last for its own salvation.

(1919)



A nation which puts forth every imaginable effort and sacrifice to secure its existence and independence does succeed. To speak of the probability the it may not so succeed, means that such a nation is moribund anyway. Therefore, so long as the nation is alive and continues its sacrifices, failure is inconceivable. (*)

(1919)



We must be independent, from the standpoint of religion, as well.

(1919)



(*) His replies to Major General James G. Harbord of the United States upon being posed the question as to what he was going to do if the movement failed.

The independence of the nation will be saved by its own will and resolution.

(1919)

* * *

In any case, our State and our nation shall remain independent, internally and externally, in the fullest sense.

(1919)

* * *

The spirit of our mission today is total independence. And to this mission, we have committed ourselves as the entire nation and history will bear witness. (*)

(1921)

* * *

When one speaks of full independence, this means, of course, total political, financial, economic, judicial, military, cultural etc., freedom in all respects. Being deprived of anyone of those I enumerated, would mean, in the strictest sense, that the nation and the country lack full independence.

(1921)

* * *

(*) From his statement to Franklin Bouillon, the informal emissary of France.

Regardless of how much our misfortunes may increase, the idea to which we are committed is independence.

(1921)



Total independence is possible only along with financial independence.

(1922)



The nations which are enamored with independence and liberty should always keep fresh the memory of their moments of suffering, and the reasons and causes for such suffering, so that proper lessons are drawn and vigilance maintained.(*)

(1928)



Liberty

Institutions founded on slavery of nations are bound to be eradicated everywhere.

(1924)



We, the Turks, are a nation which throughout its entire history has become a symbol of independence and freedom.

(1927)



(*) His statement to the King of Afghanistan who was visiting Ankara.

Unlimited liberties are inconceivable. Even the right to live, the greatest of rights, is not absolute.

(1930)



For the Turk, freedom is his life.

(1930)



Freedom consists of man's ability to do what he thinks and desires, without any influence or intervention by others. This is the widest definition of the concept. Mankind has never attained liberty to this extent and never will. Because as is known, men are creations of Nature and the Nature itself is not absolutely free either; it is subject to universal laws.

(1930)



National Sovereignty

National will prevails and rules over the destiny of the state and the nation. The army is subservient to said will and is at its service.

(1919)



The nation has claimed its sovereignty and has done so through rebellion. Sovereignty so attained cannot be waived, returned or abandoned under any circumstance or for any reason whatever. To wrestle

away such sovereignty, one has to resort to the same sort of means when the nation was attempted to be subjugated.

(1921)

* * *

Sovereignty is vested with the nation unconditionally and without any reservation.

(1923)

* * *

In order for our state to be perpetual, for our country to become stronger, for the prosperity and felicity of our nation, for our lives, for our honor and dignity, for our future, and for all that we hold sacred, we shall defend and jealously guard our national sovereignty with all our might and with reawakened vigilance.

(1923)

* * *

Adversity to national sovereignty is nothing but the crime of deliberately attempting in one stroke to do away with everything possessed by a nation which has exceptional dignity and honor.

(1923)

* * *

Those who fail to conform to the will and desire of the nation are destined to definite ruin and destruction.

(1923)

* * *

The principal tenet underlying the new Turkish State is national sovereignty. And, it is unconditional sovereignty.

(1923)



All the World should know that there is no other power or authority any more above this state and this nation. There is but one power and that is national sovereignty. There is but one authority and that is the heart, the conscience and the very existence of the nation itself.

(1923)



I take this oath before my mother's grave and in God's presence: I shall not hesitate, if need be, to join by my mother's side, in order to ensure the defense and preservation of the sovereignty which this nation has secured by shedding so much blood. I consider it an obligation of conscience and an honorable duty to give my life for the sovereignty of our nation.

(1923)



Sovereignty is not given, it is only taken.

(1927)



Sovereignty cannot be founded upon fear. And, sovereignty which is supported by guns shall not last. That sort of sovereignty or dictatorship would not be necessary, except in times of revolution and for only a limited time.

(1930)



THE BIRTH OF A NEW TURKISH STATE

("Defense of Rights", "National Forces", Organization, Struggle)

I landed at Samsun(*) on the 19th day of May 1919.(**) Here was the general situation:

The group of powers which included the Ottoman Empire had been defeated in the World War. The Ottoman army bruised everywhere. An Armistice signed under severe conditions. After long years of the Great War, the people left exhausted and impoverished. Those who had driven the nation and the country into the World War having fled, caring for nothing but their own safety. Vahdettin, the dege-

(*) This is the Black Sea port where he first set foot at following his departure from Istanbul as the Inspector General of the 9th Army. The forces belonging to this Army had been deployed in central and eastern Anatolia.

(**) The "Speech" he delivered before the convention of the Republican People's Party during the 6-day period of October 15 through 20, 1927, starts with these words.

nerate occupant of the Throne and of the Caliphate seeking some despicable way to save his person and his Throne, the only objects of his anxiety. The Cabinet under Damat Ferit Pasha neither competent, nor having any dignity or courage, being subservient only to the will of the Sultan and resigned to any proposal which could protect its members and their Sovereign.

The army deprived and being deprived of its arms and ammuniton.

The Allied Powers not considering it necessary to respect the terms of the Armistice. Their men-of-war and their troops remaining in Istanbul under one pretext or another.....

.....

Gentlemen, under these circumstances one resolution alone was possible, namely, to create a new Turkish State, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognized.

This was the resolution we had adopted even before leaving Istanbul, and which we began executing immediately upon setting foot on Anatolian soil at Samsun.

The reasoning and logic best supporting this resolution were as follows:

The basic point is that the Turkish Nation should live in honor and dignity. Such a basis could only be attained by complete independence. However wealthy and prosperous, a nation deprived of its independence, cannot be worthy of any claim higher than that of being subservient in the eyes of civilized men.

To accept the protectorate and dominion of a foreign power would be nothing more than an admission of the lack of human qualities, and of weakness and incapacity. Indeed, it is impossible to envision people who have not denigrated to so low a level as to accept willingly a foreign master.

But the Turk is both very dignified and proud. He is also capable and talented. Such a nation would prefer to perish rather than subject itself to servitude.

Therefore, independence or death! This was to be the rallying cry of all those who honestly desired to save their country.

(1919)

* * *

Within its national boundaries, our homeland constitues one indivisible unit.

(1919)

* * *

There is no nation which could prosper without the support of moral principles.

(1919)

* * *

After the Armistice —and this is regrettably said— the nation remained indifferent to its destiny, while the enemies, resolved to eliminate its existence, were about to dismember the country. Fortunately, however, certain events caused our beloved nation to awaken and to regain its vigilance. Hither and thither, citizens started searching for and finding each other

and as a result of this, an organization sprang. The foreigners who were set on the destruction of the independence of our state, were not expecting our nation to exhibit such a spirit. They had mistaken the people living on this land to be devoid of any sense. When reaching their conclusion that "no such nation has a right to live", they failed to take into account the real existence of this nation. Due to events, they also failed to discern its efforts towards organization in many corners of the country. Yet what these ignored segments wish to defend resolutely and in line with the basic point of departure adopted by the entire nation can be summarized in these words: "National forces must be made effective and the national will must be made to prevail."

And this is the spirit of that organization.

(1919)

* * *

My offical capacity and military title(*) have now begun to hinder me from working freely with the nation in the national resistance movement initiated for the salvation of our sacred land and of our nation from dismemberment. As I have promised on everything I hold sacred, to strive alongside my nation until the very end towards these sacred aims. I have quit and resigned today of my military commission — this career which I love so deeply—. I hereby announce through this circular that henceforth I shall continue

(*) Inspector-General of the IX. Army.

simply as an individual foot-fighter among the ranks of the nation, striving with the utmost of sacrifices towards our sacred national object.(*)

(1919)

* * *

In general, our Association(**) is not in need of great amounts of money, as frequently misconceived. Our objectives are not unlawful. Therefore, we are in no need to have them recognized by a foreign state through offers of money, we are not in a position of being forced to purchase other nations' consciences either, nor are we obliged to set our own nation upon an unknown objective. Stemming from national consciousness, our Association is the fruit of purely patriotic a movement, and, it enjoys nationwide organization. Our treasury is made up of our nation which has learned to appreciate the value of independence and patriotism. Our revenues spring from the spontaneous donations by the nation.

(1919)

* * *

For the moment, we have arms both for defense and for the offensive. We are going to take away, the arms we shall be needing in the future too, from the hands of the enemies.

(1920)

* * *

(*) This telegram was circularized to all provinces.

(**) Association for the Defense of Rights for Anatolia and Roumelia.

It is true that we are called the nationalists. However, our nationalism is such that we treat with respect all nations which cooperate with us. We recognize all exigencies of their nationality. At any rate, our nationalism certainly is not one which is egotistic or arrogant.

(1920)

* * *

One needs to derive some life out of this desert, and to create an organization out of these ruins. The space which seems empty is in fact full, and under this territory which is mistaken for a desert, there lies a life of extreme vigor. And that entity is the nation itself. What is lacking is organization and that is what we are now trying to create.

(1920)

* * *

Just to meet every contingency, in assuring our life and existence, if we ever needed to resort to an exterior force or source of force, we decided it would not be inopportune to utilize any source, on condition that our viewpoint would remain reserved at all times.

(1920)

* * *

When we had taken the decision to salvage the existence and independence of our country and of our nation, we had no viewpoints other than our very own and we relied only on our own strength. We did not seek any lessons from anyone, and we did not embark on our mission being duped by fake promises by

others. Everyone knows that our viewpoint and our principles are not bolshevik principles and we have never entertained the thought of or attempted to coerce our nation to accept bolshevik principles.

(1920)

* * *

Facing this inimical World full of malfeasance, the nation itself must speak and respond. The voice best authorized to so speak could only be that of the National Assembly. Supposing even after the Assembly is constituted, and due to events, we are forced to leave Ankara, we could speak with still greater an authority and force, from wherever we may have to relocate. We shall defend the existence and independence of our nation even from the tops of the last rock in the land and we shall succeed without fail.

(1920)

* * *

There was a central Government in Istanbul and all the armed forces came under its jurisdiction. This Government was firmly besieged by the enemy. It was a tight political encirclement. It was in this sort of a situation that the Government was issuing orders to the armed forces, for the defense of the land and of the independence of the nation and the state. With orders issued in this manner, it was impossible to expect these forces to accomplish their basic mission, as in fact, they could not. The army as the principal element of these forces, although still retaining and asserting its name, was nevertheless denied the ability to perform.

Thus the basic mission which consisted of defending and salvaging the country fell directly on the nation itself. Our nation has now been obliged to entrust to the Army, constituted by conscripts from its own bosom, the mission to defend the areas under attack by the enemy, as well as, the lives of their brethren suffering from aggression. These we call "The National Forces" and the entire World calls them by the same name.

The organization which incarnates the unity of the nation and which is created for the purpose of exhibiting this unity both within the country and abroad —despite the condition which Istanbul happened to find itself— does not merely consist of these cadres of National Forces. In point of fact, another civil organization has been created on a perfectly legal basis all over the country, down to its most distant corners, and we call it "Association for the Defense of Rights".

In this organization, the question does not concern arms. Perhaps one could say, from a civil, social and general viewpoint, that it is akin to a political association. This Association, as you know, has Central Committees in every province and independent county. The Army, however, not finding any competent central authority in these Committees, needed sustenance, administration and direction from a unified quarter and hence, the absorption of the armed forces into the organization for the Defense of Rights.

(1920)



Mr. Minister,(*)

I have the honor to submit to you that following the unjustified and reprehensible occupation of the city of Istanbul by the Allied Powers, The Ottoman Nation, considering the Caliph and the Government as captive, has proceeded with the convening of the Grand National Assembly, and to effect, has called general elections. In the course of its opening session on April 23, 1920, The Grand National Assembly, has decided by acclamation, to take into its hands, the destiny of the country, now and for the future, for as long as the Caliph, The Sultan and its eternal capital remain under foreign occupation and domination.....

.....

Therefore, the orders and religious edicts emanating from Istanbul are considered null and void.

(1920)

* * *

Our paramount duty is not politics. Today our sole mission and that of our country and our nation is to chase the enemy out of our land with our bayonets. For as long as we fail to accomplish this, the word "politics" shall remain devoid of any meaning.

(1921)

* * *

When faced with the tragic blows aimed at the elimination of its independence and existence, Turkey

(*) From a Note sent to the foreign ministers of the Allied Powers and the Neutral Governments.

and its people had no support in the World. Trusting only in their own will and resolution springing from their own hearts and conscience, these people have decided either to live in full possession of their independence or die. As a natural consequence of this decision, they initiated a national resistance movement which currently continues.

(1921)

* * *

A new Turkish State has been born out of the old Ottoman Empire. This must be recognized. New Turkey shall have its rights recognized, just as any other independent nation. The Treaty of Sèvres is so nefarious a death sentence for the Turkish Nation that we expect no friend will pronounce it. Even during conversation, I abhor the mention of this Treaty. We could not entertain any relations based on confidence, with any nation which has not banished the Treaty of Sèvres from its minds. So far as we are concerned, no such treaty exists. (*)

(1921)

* * *

As this map before us shows very clearly, Anatolia is like an outpost of all Asia and of all the oppressed peoples towards the world of oppression. Owing to this situation, Anatolia takes the brunt of all oppression, attacks and aggression. They want to ruin, trample and tear Anatolia apart. But Gentlemen, these

(*) To Mr. Franklin Bouillon.

aggressions are not limited to Anatolia. The overall object behind all these is the entire Orient.

Against all sorts of attacks Anatolia defends itself with all its might and is confident of success. With such defense, Anatolia does not only fulfill its own duty but perhaps, it blocks the attacks aimed at the entire Orient, as well. Gentlemen, these attacks will surely be repelled, and all these acts of aggression will surely be brought to an end. Then and only then will real peace and real prosperity and humanity prevail in the West and in the entire World.

(1921)

* * *

Gentlemen, I have not for a moment wavered in my confidence and my belief that we shall, without fail, defeat the enemies who want to take our hapless nation as prisoner. I declare this total confidence at this moment, before your austere Assembly, before the entire nation and to the whole World.

(1921)

* * *

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has assumed both the legislative and executive powers, and as such, is an assembly which effectively has taken into its hand the destiny of the nation and of the country. In other words, it is the Government itself.

(1921)

* * *

Gentlemen, our Government is not a democratic Government, neither is it socialistic. In fact, from a scientific viewpoint, it is one which has no resemblance to Governments described in books. Yet it is the only Government causing the manifestation of the sovereignty of the nation and of the national will. If we were to describe it from a scientific and social viewpoint, we would call it a "popular Government". In its Articles 1 through 4, our Constitutional Law defines clearly what the Government is, who directs it, and what the powers and authority thereof are. The structure and format are fixed. But when considered from the standpoint of social doctrine too, we are an unfortunate people who are striving to save their lives and their independence. Let us admit what we are. We are a people who must work to save themselves and to live. Therefore, all of us have rights and authority. However, only by working are we entitled to a right. Those who loaf and wish to live in idlesse have no place and no rights in our society. Then let it be said clearly, Gentlemen! 'Populism' is a social doctrine which wants to base the social order on work and rights. Gentlemen, to reserve this right and to assure ourselves of our independence, we are a people who have embraced the view that we are justified in our national struggle against imperialism which desires none other than our total elimination, and, against capitalism which desires simply to swallow us. Therefore, in the light of those demands for clarification and these explanations we offer, one should see clearly that the base on which our Government rests is one which

social science supports. They say that our Government does not resemble to a democracy, nor to socialism nor to any other form. So what Gentlemen? We should be proud of not resembling to anyone and not attempting at any comparisons. Because we resemble only to our own very selves!

(1921)

* * *

Although all my friends have already expressed it, I feel it worthwhile to confirm once again that the current Turkish struggle does not concern Turkey only. If the struggle initiated by Turkey was only in its name and for its own account, it would perhaps have been of shorter duration and less bloody. Turkey has mounted an enormous and substantial effort. Because what it defends is the cause of all oppressed nations, the cause of the entire Orient. Turkey is certain that until final victory all nations of the Orient which support it will march along.

(1922)

* * *

Our task is not finished, we are just beginning. (*)

(1922)

* * *

For salvation and independence, there is no resolution or solution other than first combatting the enemy with all our might and defeating him.

(1922)

* * *

(*) Statement in Izmir immediately on the morrow of having driven the enemy forces to the sea.

Candor obliges us to admit that until about three and one half years ago, we were living like a mere community. They used to govern us however they wished. The World had come to know us only through our representatives. But for the last three and one half years we have been living like a true nation. The best tangible proof of this is the form and character of our Government which the law has named as "The Grand National Assembly".

(1922)



New Turkey has no relation to the old one. The Ottoman Government has disappeared into history. A new Turkey has now been born. It is true that the nation has not changed. It is the self-same Turkish element which constitutes it. However, the system has changed. Before the formation of a national Government in Ankara, there was a Sultan in Istanbul and his Government. The nation did not have a voice in the affairs of the country except through an assembly whose duty consisted merely of passing laws. This form of government was not sufficient to give the nation the independence and liberty to which it was entitled. The adverse consequences of such a government have been obvious.

The nation did not want to expire; it wanted to live and to do whatever necessary therefor. This is the reason why it changed its system, and instead of the government of a monarchy which I explained a while

ago, it adopted a government issuing directly from itself.

(1922)

* * *

The Government of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, being always fully cognizant of all the attempts which are adverse to the Turkish State, obviously has thought of counter-measures(*). That The Grand National Assembly is the sole authority which has taken into its hands and is responsible over the destiny, since its inception, of the new Turkish State, the form and character of which are defined in the Constitutional Law, is known to the entire World and is reconfirmed by actual events and political action. In the peace conference which is imminent as a natural consequence of the decisive victories won by the armies of the Grand National Assembly, the Turkish State shall be represented solely by the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In view of these facts, it goes without saying that if delegations or delegates whose illegitimacy have been repeatedly expressed and declared by the Grand National Assembly do not desist from interfering with the politics of the State, as had occurred many times in the past, they will invite heavy responsibilities.

(1922)

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(*) From a letter to the Grand Vizier in Istanbul.

The Ottoman Empire has become completely extinct. However, our enemies misconstrued this to mean the extinction of the Turkish Nation which founded the Ottoman Empire, the destruction of essential elements and of the real people of this country, as well. They could not have erred more. The Turkish Nation which founded the Ottoman State and numerous other states similar to it, had not in fact, been destroyed. Quite to the reverse, under these blows menacing its existence, these bitter and despicable blows from enemies both within and abroad, it regained its faculties of a sudden, and with renewed awareness and vigilance, it rose tenaciously to salvage its life and its honor, all united and solid.

(1923)

* * *

Gentlemen, the secret for all the accomplishments with which we are justly proud of lies in the structure of the new Turkish State.

In point of fact, the pillars on which the new State is founded are different in nature than those historical institutions which preceded it.

If one has to summarize this in one word, it could be said that the new Turkish State is a popular state or a state of the people, whereas the old institutions were emanating from or belonging to person or to groups of persons.

(1923)

* * *

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey does not belong to the Caliph, and nor can it so belongs. This Assembly belongs to none other than the nation itself. It comprises of deputies elected by the nation. It has to follow the orders of none other than the nation itself. The nation cannot entrust or deliver this right to anyone, whatever his name and title. (*)

(1923)

* * *

We expect only favorable results from the Lausanne Conference (**). We will not consider any result which fails to satisfy our national demands. The Turkish Nation along with the rest of the World, awaits with impatience the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference. If this Conference fails to bring the peace everyone wants, the responsibility therefor will surely not fall on us.

(1923)

* * *

The movement of Turks for centuries has kept a steady course. We have always been marching from the East to the West.

(1924)

* * *

The countries may differ but civilization is one and the same. And, in order to progress, a nation must

(*) The Sultanate was abolished by a decision of the Grand National Assembly in 1922. The Caliphate was repealed by Law adopted in 1924.

(**) To journalist Mr. Paul Herriot.

partake this sole civilization. The decline of the Ottoman Empire started on the day when, very proud of its triumphs over the West, it cut its ties with the European nations. This was a mistake which we will not repeat.

(1924)



The sole means for the salvation of the country from an internal or external danger, with minimum sacrifice and most expediently is to have every citizen respond to a call for mobilization, in haste and at once.

(1925)



The old state did pass away. But as you can see, the Turkish Nation continues to live, much stronger and with increased dignity. Our current Government and organization of our state are those which the nation has itself created directly and it is called the Republic. The past distinction between the Government and the nation is not valid anymore; the Government is the nation and the nation is the Government.

(1925)



The affairs of the nation and of the state cannot be administered nor can their honor and independence be secured by entreaties for justice and forgiveness.

There is no such thing as begging for justice and forgiveness. The Turkish nation and our future generations should not, even for a moment, forget this.

(1927)



When I landed at Samsun in May of 1919, there was no physical force available to me. Only the moral force filling my conscience and born out of the nobility of the Turkish nation. Relying on this national force and the nation itself, did I embark on my mission.

(1927)



A nation which, when needed, knows to strive for the country resolutely as one individual, is one which is surely entitled to and be a candidate for a great future.



There will be no bolshevism in Turkey. Because the foremost objective of the Turkish Government is to assure the liberty and the happiness of its people.

(1935)



REVOLUTIONS AND REFORMS

To Demolish and Rebuild

If one day I am given great power and authority, I believe, I would apply swiftly and in a single "coup" the reforms desired in our social lives.

(1918)

* * *

We cannot close our eyes and suppose that we are living an isolated life. We cannot live restricting our country to within a circle and cutting relations with the World at large.... Quite to the contrary, we will be living as a progressive and civilized nation. And this is possible only through science and technology. We shall reach for science and technology wherever they may be, and we shall see to it that they are instilled into the minds of every member of our nation. For science and technology, there are no conditions or restrictions.

The progress of nations which persist on keeping certain beliefs and traditions devoid of logical base

shall be very difficult, or perhaps, nil. The nations which do not surmount their preconceptions on the road to progress, are incapable to conceive life in reasonable and practical terms. They are condemned to becoming slaves under the domination of other nations with a larger philosophical vision of life.

(1922)

* * *

Our country will surely become a modern, civilized and prosperous one. This is a vital matter for us. The fruition of all our sacrifices depends on this.

Turkey must have an honest administration animated by new ideas, otherwise it will cease to exist.

I have plenty of contact with the people. You don't know how these pure masses long for renovation.

(1923)

* * *

..... There must be a natural consensus between the minds and the objectives of the intellectual class and of the people at large. In other words, the ideas to be suggested by the intellectuals to the people should emanate from the spirit and conscience of the latter.... Let us admit that, as yet, there is no perfect accord between the young intelligenstia and the people and masses. To save the country, it is necessary to put a stop to the discordance between these mentalities and to bring them together before marching ahead. To achieve this, the masses should be inspired to accelerate a bit while the intellectuals are proceeding even

faster. However, to approach the people and to merge with them is a duty which falls mostly on the intellectuals.

(1923)

* * *

Just as the greatest of ignoramuses may come out of the ranks of literate people, veritable scientists who see the truth, especially such as those observed among you, may arise out of illiterates. (*)

(1923)

* * *

..... Every useful and novel action inevitably creates a counter-force. This is what is called "reactionary" in our language. To eliminate such reaction, the necessary measures must be taken in advance. Our entire nation should remain confident and be reassured that those who have accomplished the reforms have the power, the capability and the measures to crush these negative forces wherever they may appear.

(1923)

* * *

Every nation has its own traditions, mores and national traits. No nation should imitate exactly another. Because if it does, it will really neither attain that identity nor preserve its own. Such imitation would, doubtless, lead to disappointment.

(1923)

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(*) From a chat at a village.

In Turkey, the Republic and the Republicans are facts. The elements who wish to destroy these sacred existences can no longer breath the air of Turkey without being suffocated.

(1924)

* * *

What is the "Turkish Reform"? This reform, other than meaning revolution as the word at first implies, also signifies a transformation much vaster than that. The form of our current state represents the most progressive one, eliminating the ancient forms which have persisted for centuries. The common bond envisioned by the nation for its survival as between its members, has modified its form and nature. In other words, the nation has united its members by the bond of Turkish nationality instead of religious and sectarian ties.

The nation has adopted as a principle and as an immutable reality that the knowledge and the means assuring life and power in the competition within the international community can only be found in contemporary civilization.

In sum, Gentlemen, as a natural and inevitable consequence of the changes and reforms I have enumerated, the nation has judged it to be vital for its very existence to adopt a down-to-earth mentality of Government on the basis that the whole of its administration and legislation be inspired by worldly needs and be continuously changed and improved with every change and improvement therein....

These transmutations which our great nation has carried out during the last six years of its existence constitute the greatest of reforms and are much more important and profound than any revolution.

(1925)



Those who have duly understood the objectives of the Reform shall always be capable of protecting it.

(1925)



I have always sided with one thing: I am for the Republic and for intellectual and social reforms.

(1925)



Whatever strides and reforms I have so far accomplished for the benefit of the nation and the country, I have always been able to achieve them on the strength and inspiration given me by the interest. Affection and sincerity exhibited by my people during such contacts as this. (*)

(1925)



Genuine reformists are those who know to seize upon the veritable tendencies in the spirit and conscience of the people they wish to lead unto the path of progress and renovation. Let me also add in this connection that the real author of the miracles and of the

(*) From his talk to sailors and boatmen who had come to visit him.

political and social reforms realized by the Turkish Nation in recent years is that nation itself. It's you! If the nation did not possess this capacity, no power would have sufficed in achieving these reforms.

(1925)

* * *

The internal and the external politics of the Republic will be characterized, even in the future, by dignity, by power and honesty, as well as, by the channelling and concentration of national power into the prosperity and development of the Turkish Nation.

(1927)

* * *

It was an absolute necessity to reject the fez on our heads which was looked upon as a symbol of ignorance, of fanaticism and of adversity towards progress and civilization; and to don in its place the hat which was the head-gear used by the entire civilized world, and this to show that there was no difference of mentality between the Turkish nation and the civilized World.

(1927)

* * *

The French Revolution which spread the idea of liberty to the entire World still constitutes the principal source thereof. However, since then humanity has progressed much. the Turkish democracy has, while following in the footsteps of the French Revolution, nevertheless developed in line with its own qualities

and characteristics. Because each nation realizes its own reforms in due consideration of conditions resulting from the pressures and the needs of its own social environment, and of the time when such revolution and reforms do take place.

(1928)

* * *

To enlighten and guide those who harbor ideas and sentiments adverse to our blessed reforms is the first and foremost of national duties which fall on our intellectuals.

(1929)

* * *

The link between national sentiments and language is very strong. A rich language of national character is the primary factor in the development of national sentiments.

Turkish is one of the richest languages, provided it is cultivated conscientously.

The Turkish nation which has shown that it can preserve its land and its independence, must set its language free from yoke of foreign languages, as well.

(1930)

* * *

Reform signifies tearing down of institutions which hampered the development of the Turkish nation for centuries, and the establishment in their place, of new institutions which will assure the

progress of the nation in accordance with the highest of standards of civilization.

(1933)

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* *

You know the extreme importance we as a nation attach to our cultural affairs. Foremost among these, I must cite the earnest efforts which are now underway, in order to reestablish Turkish history on its correct foundations and to give the original Turkish language the amplitude it merits.

(1934)

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* *

Those who will represent the nation through its will should be the intellectuals. With the laws already passed and those to be further promulgated, they shall reaffirm our reforms and shall elevate the nation to the level of contemporary civilization... Two times eight makes sixteen. Supposing ten of us say so, while a hundred others insist that it makes ten! Are we to accept the view of these hundred? We now belong to the West. We cannot attempt to attain and surpass the level of contemporary civilization merely by boasting about our old civilization which reigned over the old World. Instead, we shall achieve that goal by breaking all the chains and by walking the same paths as the civilization of the past century... We shall rid ourselves of myths and superstitions. In science, and knowledge, in arts and in everything positive, cultivated individuals will lead our great, noble and compliant nation

along this path, aided by their culture, their knowledge and their persevering wills and application. We shall undoubtedly and most certainly achieve these goals.

(1934)



A ruined country on the edge of precipice..... bloody struggles against all sorts of adversaries... war lasting many years... then a new country, a new society, a new state, respected both within and abroad, and uninterrupted reforms to accomplish all of these... That's the brief description of the general Turkish Reform.

(1935)



The Turkish Linguistic Society(*), as a commendable and very useful task, has determined the Turkish equivalents of terms relating to various sciences and thus has taken an important step towards eliminating from our language the influence of foreign languages.

(1937)



Reforms cannot be accomplished without first preparing the nation and the social base.

(1929)



(*) Founded by Atatürk in 1932.

Religion and Secularism

Our religion is the most reasonable and natural of all and that is the reason why it is the latest of religions. For a religion to be natural, it must conform to reason, science, technology and logic. Our religion fully conforms to all of these.

(1923)

* * *

Like for so many centuries, the existence even to this day, both in our country and abroad, of those who, by taking advantage of the ignorance and fanaticism of peoples, try to use religion as an instrument and means to serve all manner of political and personal purpose and gain, unfortunately, does not yet cause us to remain indifferent in speaking on the subject. Until such time as the sentiments and the knowledge of Mankind in regard to religion are purified and cleansed of all myths and superstition, under the light of genuine

science and technology, one will encounter players of religious histrionics everywhere.

(1923)

* * *

Sermons to be pronounced must be and shall be entirely in Turkish; and in conformity with the current needs.

(1923)

* * *

Now Turkey is far from being the scene of religious or shariat schemes. If there are any who desire such schemes they would be well advised to seek other stages for themselves.

(1924)

* * *

The truest of guides is science and technology. And this is valid for civilization, for life, for success and for everything in this World of ours. To search for guides outside of science and technology is nothing but gross aberration, ignorance and blunder.

(1924)

* * *

The Caliphate is nothing but a myth of the past having no place in modern times.

(1924)

* * *

The Republic of Turkey has no official religion. In the administration of the state, all laws and regula-

tions are enacted and applied in accordance with the basis, the form and the mundane needs as science provides to contemporary civilization. Since the concept of religion relates to personal conviction, the Republic considers the separation of religious ideas from state and world affairs and from politics, as the principal factor in the success of the contemporary progress of our nation.

(1930)

* * *

The Turkish State is secular. Every individual reaching majority is free in choosing his or her religion.

(1930)

* * *

The closure of convents of dervishes and of cloisters, individual tombs, as well as, the suppression and abrogation of all sects and all titles such as sheik, dervish, disciple, occultist, sorcerer, tomb-warden etc., were accomplished during the era of the "Law concerning the Reinforcement of Peace and Order". It should be granted that the implementation of this Law was of utmost necessity from the standpoint of showing that our society actually was not a superstitious and primitive nation.

Can one consider as a civilized nation, a mass consisting of people subjecting themselves to some sheiks, dedes, masters, disciples, fathers, emirs, or, entrusting their lives to all sorts of fortune-tellers, occultists, sorcerers, healers, soothsayers? Should one

have kept in the new Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic such elements and institutions which could misrepresent and which, indeed, have misrepresented our nation for many centuries? Would it not have been the gravest and most irreparable of mistakes in the cause of progress and renovation, not to attach any importance to this? If we did take advantage of the Law concerning the Reinforcement of Peace and Order, we did so in order to avoid such a historical mistake and to show the visage of our nation as it really is and that it is not bigoted nor of a Middle-Ages mentality.

(1927)



The principles that we follow in the administration of our state should never be confused with the dogmas in certain books which are believed to have been heaven-sent. We have received our inspiration neither from the heavens nor from the invisible, but directly from life itself.

What has set our course for us has been the land in which we live, the Turkish Nation from whose bosom we have sprung and the conclusions we have extracted from the pages of the history of nations, recording a thousand and one types of calamities and sufferings.

(1937)



Conclusion: Let us be brave in this subject, let us drop all scruples and let us allow women to be enlightened and let us grace their minds with serious science and technology.

(1918)

⁂

Great accomplishments are realized thanks to eminent sons and daughters who are brought up by worthy mothers.

(1923)

⁂

Our current level is insufficient to meet current requirements and basic wants. We are in need of men of a diffecerent mentality and maturity. And such men shall be raised by future mothers.

(1923)

⁂

There is another path which we can follow more securely and straightforward: to let the great Turkish women participate in our work; to conduct our life jointly with them, to make the Turkish woman a partner, an associate, an assistant and supporter of the man in the scientific, moral, social and economic domains.

(1923)



It is scientifically improbable and even impossible for a society to progress, if it does not march toward the same goals together with all its men and women.

(1923)



It is true that it was our men with bayonets on hand who faced the invader and his bayonets. However the vital sources of the Army which comprised of our men were maintained by our women. Those who have prepared the way for the very existence of the country have been and will continue to be none other than our womenfolk.

(1923)



Turkish women will also become imbued in science and technology and will go through all levels of education which men undergo. Thereafter, in social

life, the women will march along with men and will support and help one another.

(1923)



If a society is content with the acquisition of modern ways for only one of the sexes, such society is enfeebled by more than one half. A nation which is resolute on progress and cilivization must particularly accept this basic truth.

(1923)



All we see on the face of this Earth is the creation of women.

(1923)



The foundation of civilization and the base of progress and power rest on family life. All derailment in this life inevitably leads to social, economic and political incapacity. It is necessary for the man and woman who form the family, to enjoy their natural rights and to be capable of fulfilling the family duties.

(1924)



The starting point in social life is the family.

(1925)



In sum, the women must acquire the right to elect and be elected. Because:

— The logic of democracy dictates this,

— There are specific interests to be defended by women,

— There are specific duties which the women must perform towards the society, and finally,

— It will be beneficial for the women to exercise their political rights.

(1930)

* * *

In expressing their desire to join in the political group which directs the destiny of the nation in its name, The Turkish women will not consider themselves exempt from any of the duties imposed by the nation on its citizens. Because there is no right which does not correspond to a duty.

(1931)

* * *

I am convinced that the exercise of political and social rights by women is necessary from the standpoint of the happiness and prestige of mankind.

(1935)

* * *

The modern Turkish society, with its women and men being equal in every right, is a creation of recent years. (*)

(1937)

* * *

(*) The Turkish women acquired suffrage in municipal elections, in 1930, and in general elections, in 1934.

Law and Justice

The right to jurisdiction is the primary condition for independence of nations. A nation whose judiciary is not independent cannot be considered a state.

(1920)

⁂

All is not simply to legislate. Quite to the reverse, all consists of implementing and have implemented those laws. Those who must apply and execute are always in a much stronger position than those who legislate.

(1921)

⁂

The fundamental principle of our judiciary policy is the irrefutable rule that with the change in times the provisions too must be changed.

(1922)

⁂

The goals to follow in our judiciary policy are, firstly, to deliver justice without tiring the people, swiftly, accurately and securely. Secondly, taking into account that contacts between our society and the rest of the World are necessary and natural, we must have our justice on a level with that of all civilized socities. To achieve this, we are in the process of improving, renewing and reforming our laws and procedures conformant to these views, and we shall continue to do so.

(1922)

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Our laws shall be renewed, improved and completed in accordance with national needs and precepts of the science of Law. In the preparation of all our laws and in all our reorganization, we shall take action within the framework of national sovereignty.

(1923)

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The important point is to rid, as soon as possible, our judiciary concepts and our judiciary organization, of the anachronistic ties which have until now influenced us, consciously or unconsciously, and which to not conform to the requirements of our century. The nation wants civilized procedures which assure speedy and decisive justice.

(1924)

* * *

The time has now come to take action for the creation of new juridical bases and a new body of

jurists who will respond to the concepts and satisfy the needs of this great work.

(1925)



We are attempting to efface completely the ancient juridical bases by legislating new laws. We are inaugurating this institution(*) for the purpose of bringing up a new generation for jurists who will begin their studies with the basics of new principles of law.

(1925)



(*) From the speech he gave during the opening of the Ankara School of Law.

Education and the New Alphabet

Education

Gentlemen, whatever the level of their studies, our children and our youth must be taught, before and above everything else, of the need to combat against all elements which are hostile to Turkey's independence, to its identity and to its national traditions.

(1922)

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The master of this country and the basic component of our society is the peasant. It is the peasant who has heretofore been deprived of the light of education. Therefore, the pillar of the educational policy we are going to follow shall be, firstly, to eradicate the ignorance which exists.

(1922)

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It is with science and technology which the school will offer, will the Turkish Nation, Turkish art, Turkish economy and Turkish poetry and literature blossom in full.

(1922)

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Everywhere in the World, the teachers constitute the most devoted and the most respectable elements of the human community.

(1923)

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You the devoted teachers and educators of the Republic! It is you who will bring up the new generation and that will be your work. The value of this work will be proportionate to your ability and sacrifices. The Republic requires guardians of high qualification and who are strong intellectually, physically, and science-wise.

(1924)

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Only the teachers and educators are the saviours of nations. A nation wanting of these cannot yet be called a nation. It may be called an ordinary mass but not a nation.

(1925)

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Regardless of their age, the students should be considered and treated as the adults of future.

(1930)

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The more the Turkish youth reconizes his ancestors, the more power he will find in himself to accomplish great works.

(1930)



If I were not the President, I would have wanted to become the Minister of Education.

(1930)



As the cultural level of a nation is raised, the fields of application of individual liberty too shall increase and be broadened.

(1930)



Civilization is none other than culture itself.

(1930)



Science is not acquired merely by translating but only through study and research.

(1932)



All sorts of sports activity must be deemed among essential elements of the national education of the Turkish youth.

(1937)



As long as a nation lacks a well-educated core, the glorious victories which it may secure in battlefields will not be crowned with durable results.

(1937)



The New Alphabet

Our rich and harmonious language will shine forth through the new Turkish alphabet(*).

(1928)

* * *

The new Turkish alphabet must be mastered quickly. This must be taught to every citizen, to the man, the woman, the porter, the boatman. Regard this as a partriotic and national duty. Within one or two years at the most, the entire Turkish society will learn the new script. With its script and with its mind our nation will show that its place is with the civilized World.

(1928)

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Dear friends, I would firstly like to discuss a matter which constitutes the cornerstone towards any

(*) In 1928, a Latin Alphabet was adopted as the new Turkish alphabet with some minor changes, in substitution of the Arabic script being used for centuries.

sort of development: Before any other means, the great Turkish nation must be given a facile alphabet totally different than the one which has rendered all its efforts sterile. This grand nation may cast off ignorance with minimum effort and straightaway, only through an expedient device easily conforming to its beautiful and noble language. and, this device could only be a Turkish alphabet based on Latin letters. A simple experiment has shown clearly how the new Turkish letters conform to the Turkish language and how easily the Turks of advanced age, both in cities and in the villages, can read and write.

The adoption of the new Turkish alphabet by a resolution of the Grand National Assembly and the promulgation of the law relevant thereto shall constitute a principal milestone in the struggle for the elevation of this country.

(1928)



This will either be done in three months or never! (*)

(1928)



(*) His reply to a journalist who happened to indicate that the transition period into the new script would take a minimum of five years.

Economy

There is no civilized state which has not given consideration to its economy prior to its army or navy.

(1923)



The new Turkish state shall be an economic state.

(1923)



My friends, we shall be heading for very important victories. But these victories will not be those of the bayonet. They will be victories of economy and of science. The victories achieved to this day by our armies cannot be considered as having brought our country to safe havens. These victories have only prepared an invaluable base for our future victories. Let us not be too proud of our military victories,

Instead, let us be prepared for new scientific and economic victories.

(1923)

* * *

Our people does not comprise of castes or classes whose interests differ. Quite to the contrary, it is made of classes whose existence and efforts are mutually needed. Those who are listening to me now are farmers, artisans, merchants and workers. Which of these could be against the other? Who can deny that the farmer needs the artisan, the artisan needs the farmer and the farmer needs the merchants, and that all of these need not only each other, but the worker as well....

All these classes I have enumerated have to be enriched one and at the same time.

(1923)

* * *

However big the political and military victories may be, they will not last and are liable to snuff out in a short time, unless they are crowned with economic victories. Therefore, to continue reaping the beneficial effects of our great and brilliant victory, our economy and our economic independence must be secured, reinforced and expanded.

(1923)

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It is necessary to find the means —and this is possible— and to adopt the measures enabling the

structure of the state to live by its own resources and revenue, without resorting to outside help. Saving at a maximum should be our national principle.

(1923)

* * *

When searching for causes for the rise and fall of nations, the history finds and enumerates a multitude of political, military, social reasons. No doubt all such causes affect social events. However, what directly concerns and is related to the very existence of a nation and to its rise and fall is its economy. This truth, which is based on history and experience, has manifested itself in the history of our nation as well. In order to elevate the new Turkey to the level it merits, we must attach absolutely the greatest importance to our economy. Because our era is one of economy.

(1923)

* * *

Fortune and the prosperity and happiness which are its natural consequences belong only to those who work hard.

(1923)

* * *

Before and everything else, we are searching the ways to make our country rich, in agriculture and farm industries.

(1924)

* * *

The people and the peasants everywhere have underlined to me the most-wanted features of our work program in these two words: roads and schools.

(1924)

* * *

An economically feeble country cannot escape poverty and misery, and cannot attain an advanced degree of civilization, of prosperity and felicity; neither can it avert social and political disasters.

(1924)

* * *

To live as consumers is not good. We must be productive.

(1925)

* * *

There are two different means by which to conquer the World; the sword and the plough! A nation whose victory was based on the sword is liable one day to be chased out of the occupied territory, to be ridiculed and to be ruined. Therefore, real conquests are those which are made not with the sword alone, but with the plough, as well. The sword and the plough! Of these two conquerors, the first always succumbed to the latter...

(1928)

* * *

It behooves everyone to do something useful for the society. This implies the requirement to consider

work as a social duty. Work is the general rule. Even the rentiers and the rich are not immune from this rule; they must utilize their fortunes in such manner as to help in increasing the nation's fortunes. A rich man may manage to remain free from manual labor, but in that case, his activity must be diverted to an intellectual occupation.

(1930)

* * *

A management observing utmost frugality must prevail in all our activities, official and private alike.

(1930)

* * *

The legitimate way making a fortune consists of working with competence and sacrifice and strictly observing saving.

(1930)

* * *

The system of Statism being applied by Turkey is not a system adopting, by way of mere translation, the ideas advanced by theories of socialism since the 19th century. This is a system born out of Turkey's own needs and one which is its own. To us Statism means the following:

While acknowledging as basis the private enterprise and personal activities of individuals; to let the state take in hand the economy of the country, in due consideration of all the needs of a great nation and a vast country and the fact that there is so much left undone.

The State of the Republic of Turkey tried to accomplish in the country in short order such things which, for centuries, were traditionally left to private and individual enterprise. And as witnessed, it succeeded. The road we follow, as seen, is something other than liberalism.

(1936)



I would like to briefly relate to you the concept of "merchant" as same is endorsed by the Republic: The merchant is the man in whose hand and mind a trust is placed, for the enhancement of the value of the nation's labor and products, and for which trust he must prove eligible.

(1937)



Not one farmer should be left in the country who is deprived of land. And more importantly, the indivisibility for any reason and under any manner whatever, of the piece of land which props a peasant family, must be assured. The expanse of land exploitable by big farmers and farms should be limited according to the density of population and the fertility level in the region where such land is located.

(1937)



PUBLIC OPINION, PRESS, HISTORY

Public Opinion, the Press

The press is the collective voice of the nation. In enlightening and inspiring the nation, in providing it with the intellectual nourishment it needs, and in sum, in assuring the nation to march along towards the common goal of happiness, the press constitutes a force, a school, a guide in itself.

(1922)

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The press can in no wise be subjected to domination and influence.

(1923)

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It is of utmost importance to let the people be informed of the general situation.

(1924)

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We are of the opinion that the only remedy to remove the handicaps resulting from the freedom of the press, lies in that freedom itself.

(1924)

⁂

The Turkish press will form an iron fortress around the Republic whereat the real voice and the will of the nation are manifested. A fortress of ideas, a fortress of concepts, if you will. The Republic has the right to demand this from the members of the press. Today, it is essential that the nation remains sincerely and solidy united. This is how the common good and happiness will be assured. The struggle is not over yet. The duty of the press to have this truth properly relayed to the ears and the conscience of the nation is of utmost importance.

(1924)

⁂

My preference always is to let the public opinion to face the real situation.

(1927)

⁂

I do hope that in the utilization of the liberty of pen in this country, more discretion will be exhibited as befitting a democratic system. I am convinced that such discretion is particularly required in a country such as ours which has suffered so many misfortunes resulting from the abuse of liberties.

(1930)

⁂

The propagation and elevation of the ideas of "national sovereignty" and of "representative government" is not possible except through the interaction of public opinion.

(1930)

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The opinion of the government must represent the opinion of the nation.

(1930)

* * *

Criticism and debate are entirely free. What keeps the government and the Assembly vigilant is the freedom of criticism.

(1930)

* * *

The press helps prevent abuses and forces the government agencies to perform their duties correctly. Press and publications constitute a most effective check. However, at this juncture, it should, alse be remembered that it is easier to criticise than to create.

(1930)

* * *

The freedom to criticise public affairs creates the ground for understanding between the government and the nation. The government takes cognizance of the public opinion through the press, and when needed, enlightens such opinion by publishing the necessary documents. The mutual understanding between the

government and the nation leads to their becoming and staying united.

(1930)



However grievesome it may be, it is absolutely necessary to keep the public opinion always in contact with the truth.

(1931)



History

What a fine mirror history is! In great events recorded by history, how clearly can one see, in their attitudes, acts and deeds, the moral levels of those who have taken part in such events.

(1915)



Great events cause great evolution in ideas.

(1922)



One of the speakers asked me from where do I derive my inspiration and strength. I would like to answer this briefly: For the awakening of today, we are indebted to the past, to yesterday.

(1924)



To write the history is as important as making it. If the writer does not remain faithful to those who

make it, the immutable truth turns into an enigma for the Mankind.

(1931)

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Instead of creating a hastily prepared work and then regretting over it in the morrow, it is better not to create any and to admit one's inability.

In the writing of history, we must pay particular attention to search for the men who accomplished deeds or took part in events. If we cannot locate them, let us not demur from admitting the unknown and our ignorance in that respect. Let us not try to create apostles. This is not our calling. We must remain as men always searching for the truth, and who face it courageously when finding it or being convinced of having found it.

(1931)

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History is the truest of guides to show what a nation is capable for and what it can succeed in.

(1937)

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ART AND ARTISTS

Art becomes more honored, the simpler it is.

(1922)



Certain bases are needed to make a nation live. And, as you know, Art constitutes one such base which is of foremost importance. If a nation is deprived of art and artists it cannot have a full life... It means one of its vital arteries is cut.

(1923)



Let us admit it: A nation which cares not for painting, a nation which builds no statues, a nation which does not meet the exigencies of science and technology deserves no place on the path towards development.

(1923)



Does one need music in life? No, music is not needed in life. Because life itself is music. Any being not having interest in music is not human. If one is talking of human life, the music is absolutely there. No life is possible without music anyway.

(1925)

* * *

We do not accept a religion which ignores fine arts.

(1926)

* * *

Genius is he who is looked upon as insane when he first advances those ideas which everyone will later appreciate and accept.

(1926)

* * *

Gentlemen! In your lifetime you may become deputies, ministers, even the president, but you will never make artists. Therefore, let us appreciate these young people.(*)

(1927)

* * *

Human beings carry certain refined, superior and pure sentiments in their hearts from which their lives receive sustenance. It is the poet who can best hear these sentiments and relay them to other human beings.

(1928)

* * *

(*) Remarks to a gathering of deputies where some performers of art were also present.

The motive which rules over people's lives and activities is the capacity to create and invent.

(1930)

* * *

I am well aware of how you wish to see our nation's youth to progress in all the branches of Fine Arts. This is now being done. However, priority in this regard must first be given to Turkish music. The criteria in the renewal of a nation rests in its ability to seize and grasp the changes in music..... It is necessary to compile the high expressions which reflect the refined national sentiments and ideas, and to process them soonest, according to generally prevailing rules of music. That is how the distinguished Turkish national music could elevate itself and claim its rightful place within the universal music.

(1934)

* * *

Would you believe it? This portrait(**), at one stage, reflected very well my likeness. However, the good Master did not then care to stop! Artists, like commanders, ought to know when to stop. Otherwise, the downfall from the zenith they have arrived at, would start.

(1932)

* * *

The artist is the first one in a society who feels the light shine on his forehead after long labor and effort.

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(*) Looking at a painting of his which had just been completed.

STEWARDS OF NATIONS

The onus of responsibility is heavier than anything, including death.

(1915)

* * *

Sacred is the weapon directed against the rule of an individual and the ill-omened administration represented by him.

* * *

Manifestations such as meetings and rallies alone can never assure great goals. They can be helpful only if they are based on the common energy which actually emanates from the bosom of the nation.

(1919)

* * *

It is not proper to link the defense of the country to one single person, however invaluable he may be.

(1920)

* * *

Gentlemen! Any person can lead a nation to rebellion. But the leading of the rebellion unto real objects of the nation is not possible except through getting it entirely involved. In our World, the application of this rule has become possible only with the assumption of the task by national assemblies.

(1922)

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No nation should resort to adopting and imitating the methods applied by another.

(1922)

* * *

If a nation's salvation, deliverance and success are wished, one should never demand these from one person alone. The success of any person belonging to a nation means the success of the latter, as well. And, the success of a nation is possible only through formation of forces of national character and the direction thereof towards a unified goal.

(1923)

* * *

The reason for the existence of government is to assure the order in the country, as well as the peace and comfort of the nation.

(1923)

* * *

Legitimacy in national affairs may be obtained only through being supported by national decisions and by reflecting the general tendencies of the nation.

(1924)



The men in whom the destiny of a nation is entrusted should never forget that they are obligated to employ the energy and force of the nation only towards its real and attainable interests. They should always keep in mind that it does not suffice to invade and occupy a country in order to establish mastery over the owners thereof. It is not possible to overpower a nation unless its spirit is subjugated and its resolution and will are broken too. And, no one can overpower the spirit of any nation which is the product of many centuries and which is endowed with a strong and permanent will.

Dictators strong enough to keep a nation under servitude against its will, no longer exist on the face of our Earth.

(1924)



It is painful for a country and its people to be ravaged by the enemy. But it is even more painful for the people to be exposed to perfidy and misfortune by those who are of their very own race and whom they regard as great and keep at their head.

(1924)



Great tasks and important missions are accomplished only through cooperative efforts.

(1925)



In success it is necessary to overcome pride and in disasters it is necessary to resist despair.

(1930)



Some leaders who lack sincerity and who do not take into consideration the gravity of war have let themselves to become the tools and agents for aggression. They have misled the nations under their control by misrepresenting and abusing nationalism and tradition. In order to avoid chaos, the time has come in this hour of crisis, for the masses to deliberate on their fate themselves and deliver their stewardship to men of high character, of morals and conscience.

This needs to be done without any delay.

(1930)



We must always be in position to render an account of our actions, before history and before the entire World.

(1930)



Ambition cannot be given up. Yet ambition must not be personal. It should be directed towards the objectives aiming at national interest.

(1937)



On an individual or national basis alike, egotism should always be considered bad.

(1937)



Unfortunate are those who identify the existence of the entire mankind with their own persons.

(1937)



Nations should not be exposed to grief and chagrin. The duty of the leaders is to show the way to their nations in perceiving life with zest and zeal.

(1937)



The men who direct and lead nations, certainly and above everything else, should strive to ensure the existence and happinees of ther own nations. However, they must at the same time wish the same for all other nations.

(1937)



THE YOUTH

Despite everything, we are marching sure-footedly towards a bright future. The force which sustains this fervent belief in me is not only my endless love for my beloved country and nation, but also because I see a youth which is trying to seek and disseminate the light, prompted only by their love for the country and for the truth, despite the darkness, immorality and quackery prevailing in our day.

(1918)

* * *

All my hopes rest with the youth.

(1919)

* * *

Political squabbles are largely fatuitous, whereas social work is always meritorious. Our intellectuals must work towards this. Why do not they come and work in Anatolia? Why do not they enter into direct

contact with the nation itself? One must travel in the country, get to know the nation, discover and identify the deficiencies. This is how one shows his love for the nation.

(1919)



Dear youngsters! Life consists but of a struggle. For this reason there are only two things in life: To overcome or to be vanquished. The conscious mission we charge with and entrust in you, the youth of Turkey, is always to be victorious, and I am sure, you will always be that!

(1923)



Young people, it is you who reinforce and help maintain our courage. With the education and training you are receiving, you will be the best symbols of human virtue, of the love for the country, and of intellectual liberty.

Oh, you the new generation on the rise! You are the future. We founded the Republic, it is it you who shall raise and perpetuate it.

(1924)



To have young ideas means to be endowed with the truth.

(1925)



Among the sportsmen, I like those who are intelligent, agile, and at the same time, of high morals.

(1926)

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Gentlemen, (*)

This long and detailed exposition which claimed your attention for several days is, in sum, the recital of an epoch which is now the past. I shall consider myself fortunate, if through this recital, I have been able to underscore some points which may require caution and attentiveness on the part of our nation and our future children.

Gentlemen, through this éxposé, I have tried to express how a great nation which was deemed extinct, regained its independence and established a national and modern state based on the most recent fundamentals of science and technology.

The result we have now achieved corresponds to the price of our awakening from the national misfortunes with which we had been stricken for several centuries and of the blood shed over every corner of our beloved land.

I entrust this result to the youth of Turkey.

You, the Turkish Youth! You primary duty is to forever protect and defend the Turkish Independence and the Turkish Republic. This is the mainstay of your existence and of your future. This foundation is your

(*) His famous 6-day speech ends with these words.

most precious treasure. In the future, as well, there will be malevolents, within and abroad, who will seek to deny you of this treasury. If one day you are compelled to defend your independence and the Republic, you shall not reflect on the conditions and possibilities of the situation in which you find yourself, in order to accomplish your mission. These conditions and possibilities may appear as very unfavorable. The adversaries who scheme against your independence and your Republic may be the representatives of a victory without precedent in the World. By force or by ruse, all citadels and all arsenals of our dear fatherland may have been taken, all of its armies may have been dispersed and all corners of the country may have been physically occupied. More distressing and more grievous than all these, those who hold and exercise the power within the country may have fallen in gross aberration, blunder, and even treason. These holders of power may have even united their personal interests with the political ambitions of the invaders. The nation itself may have fallen into privation, and may have become exhausted and desolate.

You the future sons and daughters of Turkey! Even under such circumstances and conditions, your duty is to redeem the Turkish independence and the Republic! The strength you shall need exists in the noble blood flowing through your veins!

(1927)



Here is what should be the last legacy to their children, of those who bid goodbye to the Turkish nation and depart from this World: "My duties towards the Turkish nation, the Turkish Republic and the future of Turks have not yet been fully fulfilled. You shall finish them. You too must repeat these words of mine to those who will succeed you". (*) These words are not the expression of an individual. Rather, they are the expression of the sentiment of Turkish nationhood. Every Turk shall expire only after repeating this as a password to those who will succeed him. The last breath of every Turk must be the proof that the Turkish nation will never quit breathing and that it will remain eternal.

(1935)



You, the young blood of new Turkey shall follow me even if you are exhausted, I have come here (**) this evening only to tell you this. Those who resolve to march on without any pause, will never be tired. The Turkish Youth shall march towards the goals, towards our high ideals indefatigably and incessantly.

(1937)



(*) From a message to the students of the School of Political Sciences.

(**) In an informal chat with young people at the Ankara Town center.

MILITARY ART, ARMY, WAR

As the country faces an armed agression, we are now only engaged in war. However, if the safety of the country one day dictates that we enter in politics, we shall not hesitate for a moment, to engage in it with the same sincerity and veracity as we wage this war.

(1910)

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In battles what is more important than force itself is to deploy and direct your forces in accordance with established aims.

(1915)

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Every soldier who combats here, (*) by me, should absolutely realize that in the accomplishment of the

(*) From an order-of-the-day during the Çanakkale (Dardanelles) Campaigns.

honorable mission entrusted on us, we shall retreat not even one step. Let me remind that the seeking of an opportunity to rest and sleep, may cause not only us but our whole nation to be deprived of such rest forever. There is no doubt that all our mates share this view and shall show no signs of fatigue until the enemy is entirely hurled into the sea.

(1915)



If you wish to be assured of the execution of orders you give, you must remain in place and in person, until the very execution.

(1918)



The rule and procedure is such that those who assume the responsibility for the direction and command of the situation must place themselves, to the extent possible, near the most important of objectives and most imminent of dangers, provided however, that such proximity is not to such extent as to deprive the ability to see the overall situation.

(1919)



In the struggle for its existence and honor, our Army is the sole prop of the nation and its goals. The first requirement for the success of the army, in this noble task with which it is entrusted is an iron discipline. In the army, this is secured through an

enlightened, courageous and self-sacrificing corps of officers.(*)

(1920)

* * *

History records no front which has not been or which cannot be pierced.

(1920)

* * *

You defeated not only the enemy there, but the adverse fortunes of the nation, as well.(**)

(1921)

* * *

To engage in an offensive which is ill-prepared or supported by incomplete measures is worse than not attacking at all.

(1921)

* * *

There is no such thing as a line of defense. Only a surface to defend.(***) And, that surface consists of the entire fatherland. Not one inch of our country can be abandoned unless drenched with the blood of its people. Any unit, large or small, may be dislodged from its position. But each such unit shall regroup and

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(*) From his address to the first officer cadets in Ankara.

(**) From his congratulatory telegram to Ismet Pasha, the Commander of the Western Front and the Chief of Staff, following the victory at the 2nd İnönü Battle.

(***) An order-of-the-day issued during the Sakarya field battles which lasted 22 days and 22 nights and which affected the final outcome of the war.

reform the front, at the first spot where it can hold its ground and continue to fight the enemy. The units observing that the neighboring ones are forced to retreat cannot simply follow suit. They must hold their positions and continue to resist until the end.

(1921)

* * *

To overcome those who cast their eyes on our country and our independence only militarily is not sufficient. We need to be so strong politically, administratively and economically as to dissuade completely those who may entertain any thought of invading our country.

(1922)

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The Great War which lasted for years and which caused the Earth's face to become soaked in human blood has brought about noble awakenings in the minds of Mankind.

(1922)

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Armies! Your first destination is the Mediterranean. Forward! (*)

(1922)

* * *

(*) Upon this order-of-the-day the Turkish Army gave hot-pursuit to the enemy forces following the decisive battles at Dumlupınar, and reached Izmir and the Aegean Coast on September 9, 1922, covering a distance in excess of 400 kilometers, in nine days.

Gentlemen, the honor front can never be pierced nor defeated.

(1923)

* * *

I am not one of those who would wish to have his nation enter in war for any frivilous reason. War must be resorted to only when indispensible and vital. My firm opinion is this: I should feel no qualms in my conscience, when leading the nation to war. We could wage war against those who say "kill them" by responding "we shall not die". But waging of war when the life of the nation is not threatened is a murderous crime.

(1923)

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The decisive result it always obtained by attacking.

(1924)

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The sole means for the salvation of the country from an internal and external danger, with minimum sacrifices and most expediently, is to have every citizen respond to a call for mobilization in haste and at once.

(1925)

* * *

Commanders do not issue orders just for the sake of ordering. They must order what is indispensible and

amenable to execution; and when ordering, they must imagine themselves in place of those who will carry it out and must know how the order could be executed.

(1927)

* * *

In history there have been armies which have defended an entire country, inch by inch, until last ditch with heroism and honor, against enemy forces far too superior, and yet still preserving their existence. The Turkish Army is one such army, provided that those who are in command have the quality required for such command.

Gentlemen, when reflecting over and applying military duties and requirements, the commanders should refrain from having their minds influenced by political considerations. They should not forget that there are other persons attending to political requirements.

When they send the nation's youth to face the enemy and possible death and when they expose the country's means put at their disposition, the sole preoccupation of commanders should be to perform and bring to conclusion the duty entrusted in them, by fire, by bayonet and if need be, by giving up their lives. Military missions can be accomplished only with such an attitude and conviction. These missions cannot be carried out by mere words or politics or by falling in for fake promises by the enemy. Those who cannot shoulder the duty and responsibility of command and



"... the waging of war when the life of the nation is not threatened is a murderous crime."

(1923)

who especially lack the required mental strength shall inevitably meet tragic ends.

Gentlemen, it may be excusable for a military commander too to fall prisoner, provided however, that he is captured by the enemy in the course of performing his soldierly duties and only after he uses his forces, as well as, his last bayonet and breath, to the last, without having had the chance to shed his own blood. There have been Turkish commanders, Gentlemen, who have sought death, by charging their horses, sword in hand straight into the tent of the enemy's chief, even when their army was defeated by and retreating before superior armies of the adversary.

Even if we may excuse a Turkish commander who happens to fall prisoner to the enemy, without using his army, albeit when due to bad coincidences and mischance, the history will not and should not forgive it. This is the message to be derived from the history of the Turkish Reform for future generations.

(1927)

* * *

You know well that war and battle mean not only the confrontation of two armies but also the confrontation and fighting between two nations with all their existence and all their means, and utilizing all their material and moral might. This is the reason why I had to get the entire Turkish Nation interested and involved, intellectually, emotionally, and physically just as the army in the front. Not only those who were in

front lines facing the enemy, but everyone, be as it may in the villages, in their houses, in their fields, were to feel themselves as on duty and were to dedicate themselves entirely to the fight, the same as those frontline soldiers. Those nations which are lax or slow in mobilizing all their material and moral forces for the defense of the country cannot be deemed to have resolved seriously to make war and to have convinced themselves as to their chances of success.

The sole condition for success in future wars shall be found mostly in this concept that I have explained. The great military nations of Europe have already begun to adopt this concept as the basic rule.

(1927)

* * *

He who flees on the day of defeat is not a true chief.

(1930)

* * *

A command post is extremely important. Under a real commander an army could defeat forces superior to itself and a defeated army could become victorious under a competent commander.

(1930)

* * *

The infantry is the main component of the army. Battle is not possible without the infantry. Because it is the infantry which attacks, wins and keeps what it has gained; whereas arms, mechanized vehicles, tanks etc.,

cannot by themselves accomplish these two missions. They would need the infantry.

(1930)

* * *

Whoever is in command must understand human nature.

(1930)

* * *

No victory in itself is an objective. Victory can only be the principal means to achieve an objective much greater than itself. The objective is an idea. Victory has value only to the extent it serves the achievement of an idea. A victory not supported by an idea cannot endure. It becomes a hollow effort.

(1933)

* * *

Here is the key to military art: To calculate minutely the various possibilities, and to put into effect audaciously and decisively that which appears best.

* * *

The other day they were telling me about fortified lines of defense... For example, about the Maginot Line... Perhaps my opinion will sound somewhat adverse... But I must insist in not believing the utility of such lines. Because war is waged by men who should be physically on the ground. A force placed in the subterrain like moles or in reinforced concrete tubes or in armored towers should be considered as out-of-action right from the outset. By eliminating its own


maneuvrability, I cannot imagine what an army may expect in war, except defeat.

(1938)



What I like most about the military is its art.

(1938)



FOREIGN POLICY

In order for our nation to be strong, happy and stable the state must pursue an entirely national policy and such policy must entirely be based on and conform to our internal organization. When I refer to national policy, here is what I mean: To work for the real happiness and prosperity of the nation and the country, within our national boundaries, by relying, above everything else, on our own power... Not to engage the nation in and not to damage it by pursuing absolutely illusory aims... To expect a civilized and humane treatment from and a reciprocal friendship with the civilized World.

(1920)

* * *

Our foreign policy does not contemplate transgressing the rights of other states. But we are and will

keep defending our right, our lives, our country and our honor.

(1921)

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* *

Insofar as our relations with the Bolsheviks are concerned, it should be noted that we have concluded an accord of friendship with them. One of the principal terms thereof is that the Russians will refrain from waging propaganda and provocation in our country, because there is a fundamental disconformity between the Soviet organization and ours.

(1921)

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* *

Communism is a social problem. The current situation in our country, the social conditions thereof and the strength of our religious and national traditions are of such nature as confirming the opinion that the communism of Russia has no practical application here. The political parties recently formed in our country on the basis of communism have experienced this truth and have become convinced as to the need to cease their activities. Even the Russian thinkers themselves are convinced as to this truth as concerning us. Therefore, our relations and friendship with the Russians are based only on premises of entente and alliance between two independent countries.

(1921)

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The basic lines of our foreign policy are simple, straight-forward and clear.

(1922)



Lofty and powerful Ottoman Sultans had been guided in their external policies, by their desires, ambitions and aspirations. Being so guided, they were obliged to adapt their internal policies and organization to the requirements of such external policies resulting from their royal ambitions. But external policies must of necessity be based on internal organization and policies. In other words, they should not be of such magnitude as not to be sustained by internal organization, otherwise, those who pursue such imaginary policies lose their support automatically. The Ottoman rulers had lost sight of this essential principle.

(1923)



External policies are closely related to the internal structure of the society. Because external policies not supported by appropriate internal structure are always doomed. The external policies of a society would be firm and strong, in direct proportion to its own firmness and strength.

(1923)



Let us not be friends with those who are hostile to our national existence.

(1923)

* * *

Whatever their origins, Turkey received eagerly all appeals to peace and spared no help.

(1924)

* * *

We wish the League of Nations to manifest itself and develop as an institution which is not an instrument of domination by the strong, but as one which assures harmony and balance between nations and which helps conflicts to be reviewed and settled within fair and equitable premises.

(1924)

* * *

The efforts being spent for some time in the political world in the matter of mutual security do merit attention. Mutual security is a basis for happiness which all nations of the World should strive for. However, unless such security is extended to cover all nations, it will not serve to assure World peace, but rather, will have to be considered as a license for some nations to act freely in regard to certain other nations intended to serve as spheres of influence.... In particular, the measures which will result in letting international arms trade to remain under the control of certain nations, reconfirms this belief.

(1925)

* * *

We are the most ardent supporter of an open and sincere policy in international relations aimed at mutual security and respect. Our sensitivity is centered on whether or not the proposed arrangements and formalities will assure us a real and effective security.

(1926)

* * *

In our foreign policy, the principles of honesty and attention to inviolability of the security and development of our country guide our actions. Nothing should be more easily explained than a country which is in the process of radical reforms and development, seriously wanting peace and serenity both within its borders and in its region. To assure the country of the power to defend itself against any aggression which may be aimed at the safety and security thereof and at the rights of its citizens, constitutes the point on which we are very particular.

(1928)

* * *

Our clear and honest policy in foreign affairs is based particularly on the ideas of peace. To seek the solving of all of our international problems through peaceful means would be the method best-suited to our mentality and our interests. In order to avoid any proposition outside this method, we attach great importance to the principle of security and to the means to be employed in its achievement. For the safeguarding of

international peace, the Republic of Turkey will not spare any service within its ability.

(1929)

* * *

I do hope that, our clear and sound doctrine and concepts in international relations, which call for loyalty to friendships and which are not adverse to any nation are getting better understood as time goes by.

(1930)

* * *

The accords which the nations can truly rely on are only those which bind mutual interests through a thorough cognizance and understanding.

(1930)

* * *

In the international sphere we are maintaining good relations with every nation and we are achieving positive results.

A path towards peace which aims at assuring the security of Turkey and bearing malice to no nation shall always remain as our guiding principle.

(1931)

* * *

I am especially pleased to mention my appreciation of the activities of private national organizations which pursue the object peace and understanding between the nations in the Balkans.

Owing to its geographical situation, Turkey is particularly interested in the protection and strengthening of peace in the Balkans. The fact that it has almost no conflict or dispute with its neighbors, naturally, renders Turkey's wishes to be especially sincere.

(1931)

* * *

Ladies and Gentlemen![*]

The Balkan nations today exist as independent political entities such as Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The peoples of these nations lived together for many centuries. It could be said that the Balkan states of our day, coming into existence in recent centuries, including the Republic of Turkey, are the historical result of the slow dismemberment, finally ending with disappearance into history, of the Ottoman Empire.

Therefore, the Balkan nations have a common history extending over several centuries. If such history contains painful memories, they belong jointly to all the Balkans. The share of Turks in these memories have been no less painful.

You, the distinguished representatives of the Balkan nations, by elevating yourselves above the intricate accounts and emotions of the past, you will establish the basis for a profound fraternity and open vast horizons for union; you will redeem the great truths which were heretofore forgotten and neglected.

(*) From an address to the 2nd Balkan Conference convened in Ankara in 1932.

Whatever social and political appearance they may now have, it should not be forgotten that the Balkan nations share a common ancestry of the same blood and of a race close to each other, originating in Central Asia....

.....

As you can see, it is perfectly possible to bind the Balkan nations with each other with iron links more from the distant and profound past than recent.

(1931)

* * *

In our opinion, the first and foremost condition for the development of international political security is that the nations should at least sincerely agree on the idea of preserving the peace.

(1932)

* * *

The Versailles Treaty(*) has not removed a single one of the reasons which caused the first World War. On the contrary, it has deepened the chasm between the main rivals of yesterday. The victors, steeped in hostile feelings, dictated to the vanquished conditions of peace, without taking into account either the ethnical, geopolitical, or economic peculiarities of the defeated countries. Hence the peace we have today, is better described as an armistice. If you, Americans,

(*) During his exchange with General Douglas Mac Arthur of the United States who visited Turkey in 1932.

had not withdrawn from European affairs and had insisted on the execution of Wilson's program, we could today have had a lasting peace.

It seems to me that the future of Europe depends today, as it did yesterday, on the attitude of Germany. This seventy million strong, disciplined, hardworking, and extremely dynamic people will, sooner or later, try to remedy the Versailles treaty, if it is led by a political movement capable of exciting its national feelings and passions.

Germany has the ability to create within a short space of time an army to occupy the whole of Europe, excepting England and Russia; war would break out sometime during the period of 1940-45; France has lost the quality which goes to the making of a strong army and England could no longer count on it for the defence of its islands.

America, as in the last war, will not remain neutral and Germany will finally lose the war as a result of American intervention. If Europe's statesmen, casting aside national egoisms and differences, do not tackle with all sincerity and determination, the solution of fundamental political problems in the interests of all, I am afraid that it will be impossible to avert a new catastrophy. Strictly speaking, the European problem has long passed the stage when it was caused by differences between England, France and Germany. Today, to the East of Europe there has appeared a new power,. This power, besides mobilizing all its moral and material resources for world revolution, employs

new political methods as yet unknown to Europeans and Americans, and is skilled in making very good use of the slightest mistakes and oversights of its enemies.

In a war, which will break out in Europe the main victor will not be either England, France or Germany, but Bolshevism. As close neighbours to Russia and as a nation having fought Russia the most, we Turks, are better placed to watch the events occurring in that country, and we see the danger in all its nakedness. The Bolsheviks who are exploiting the feelings of the awakening peoples of the East and who are cajoling their national passions and feelings, and who know how to provoke their hatred, have become the primary power, which threaten not only Europe, but also Asia.

(1932)

* * *

Here I stand, watching the sun which is about to rise from the East.... Just as I witness the daybreak, I can also see from a distance, the awakening of the entire nations of the East. There are many of our brethren who will yet achieve their liberty and freedom. Their reawakening will undoubtedly be directed at progress and prosperity. Despite all difficulties and barriers, these nations will triumph and attain the freedom which awaits them. Colonialism and imperialism will disappear from this Earth and will be replaced by a new era of harmony and cooperation between nations without any discrimination as to color, creed and race.

(1933)

* * *

The firm loyalty of the Republic of Turkey to its friendships has been put to test on many occasions in past years. The universally acknowledged quality of our nation is the keeping of mutual promises. It should be amply evident that we are and will continue to be keen on this principle.

(1934)

* * *

Our Republic which has just completed its tenth year, has pursued, step by step, the line of action which it had determined even as it was being formed, and has succeeded, in a short time, to dissipate the darkness which constituted the accumulations of the immediate past.

The goal of "Peace at home, Peace in the World" as constituting one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic should be the most essential factor in the prosperity and progress of Mankind and civilization. To have served this cause as best we could, is a source of pride for us.

As the sun of reform rising from Turkey emits its warmth, the heart of the Turkish nation too is being imbued with warm affection towards the great and precious works of the World and it is embracing firmly all the principles of progress. (*)

(1933)

* * *

(*) His reply to the congratulatory message received from President Roosevelt on occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic.

The international situation is undergoing a grave crisis. The deep rift of days yore has reached a disturbing point. We should like to hope that the exalted Mankind of our day will succeed in eliminating the sense of insecurity which prevails generally, by discovering the means to bring nations together.

(1935)



In order to avoid a bomb-shell like eruption of war, the nations should not hesitate to unite their armed defenses and their financial power against the aggressor. The most rapid and effective measure against aggression consists in the founding of an international organization which is able to clearly show to a would-be aggressor that he would not get away with it.

(1935)



No, that is not possible! If war breaks out, the high position which America enjoys in the community of nations, shall most certainly be affected. Whatever their geographic situation, nations are linked to each other by a variety of ties. The nations on this Earth are like tenants in an apartment building. The United States is occupying the most luxurious flat. If the building is put on fire by some of its occupants, it is not possible for the others not to be affected. The same

holds true for war. It is unthinkable for the United Stated to stay away from it. (*)

(1935)

* * *

The strengthening of fraternity between the Balkan peoples has always been our principal desire.

(1936)

* * *

One of the major problems which currently preoccupy our nation, day and night, is the destiny of Iskenderun-Antakya and its region, the real owners of which are genuinely Turkish. We are obliged to dwell on this matter seriously and decisively. (**)

This is the only major problem between France and us, for whose friendship we always attach extreme importance. Those who know the truth of the matter and who side with the righteous will be able to better understand and consider our ardor and sincerity only as natural.

(1936)

* * *

Hatay is my personal problem. I have explained the situation to the French Ambassador right from the outset. In the current state of World affairs, the evolv-

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(*) From his reply to a question by Miss Gladys Baker, a U.S. journalist asking him whether the United States could remain neutral in a possible war.

(**) The old Sanjak of Alexandretta had been disputed ever since the first World War, between Turkey and France, the mandate power in the region. Hatay first became an independent state and then elected to cede itself to Turkey in 1939 of which it has been a province ever since.

ing of such a problem into an armed confict between Turkey and France is definitely out of question. Howe Wr, I have not altogether dismissed this possibility, as well, and I have reached a decision. If such a possibility —however extremely remote it may be— appears on the horizon, I shall resign as President of the Turkish Republic and even as member of the Grand National Assembly, and, together with a few friends who will join me, I shall enter Hatay and continue the struggle by joining hands with our compatriots there.

(1937)



Nations are bound more by sentiments than treaties.

(1937)



PEACE AND HUMANISM

No nation has more respect than we do for the beliefs and customs of foreign elements, Mehmet the Conqueror left the religious and national instituons which he found in Istanbul untouched. Such leaders of Christian religion as the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs, and the Bulgarian Exarch were granted concessions and all sorts of liberty. The wide concessions enjoyed by non-moslem elements since the fall of Istanbul, are the clearest proof of the fact that our nation is one of the most tolerant and munificient of the world.

(1919)

***

Towards the middle of this year, our Army had already attained the power and the might necessary to defeat and rout the enemy's army. However, I appreciated very well that the preference of our Assembly

which comprised of the real representatives of the entire nation was to achieve our national goals, if possible, without any bloodletting. Therefore, gentlemen, it was another of our duties to attempt to resolve the problem peacefully and in bloodless manner, before we put our military forces in use. All measures were taken to attend to this duty and all political démarches were made.

.....

But, Gentlemen, all these attemps were negatively interpreted. These peaceful attemps which we had initiated, merely, as resulting from our humane sentiments were mistaken for our weakness. They thought that our Army was feeble. They thought that our Army was hardly able to move, let alone to mount an offensive and pursuit. They thought that our Assembly and our Government were weak and in despair. Undoubtedly, on all these points they were in grave error and aberration. Perhaps some situations and certain appearances had given rise to this sort of a hope in our enemies. However, I was not too sorry over their being misled as such. If I had wished, I could have corrected this wrong impression at that moment. But, Gentlemen, I preferred to effect this correction not by words but by action.

.....

And only then, did I issue orders for preparations on the final offensive. (*)

(1922)

* * *

(*) The final offensive which resulted in the total defeat of the enemy.

There is no reason anymore to continue the battle. I definitely desire peace. I had no desire to mount the final offensive. However there was no other means to chase the enemy off Anatolia. (*)

(1922)

* * *

Mutual security and safety should be the principle for happiness desired by all nations of the World.

(1925)

* * *

Relying on the assurances given by Mr. Franklin Bouillon on behalf of the Allied Powers and on expectation of an immediate opening of negotiations for the speedy establishment of a just peace, we have ordered the cessation forthwith of our military action in hot-pursuit of the enemy towards and into Istanbul and the Dardanelles. (**)

(1922)

* * *

Recent world events and the Great War... brought about great awakenings in the minds of the entire Mankind. True that the despotic types who rule nations which are astir with such awakenings are striving to perpetuate their tyranny by resorting to force. However, within a short time the whole World will recognize on whose side justice is and.... societies will be transformed into noble human masses. Then

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(*) To the Daily Mail correspondent following the evacuation of Izmir by the defeated enemy.

(**) In a message to Mr. R. Poincaré, The French Prime Minister.

and only then, the total goal of nations will evolve into humanism and mutual affection.

Strong indicators of this intellectual movement are observable not only in the East, in Asia, but in Africa, as well. During a campaign lasting one year, I lived among the people of Africa waging this sort of a struggle.(*) I had close contacts with them and I know profoundly what their ideas are. The men of Africa, perhaps, had come to know personal liberty much earlier. However, they never were given a chance to express it. The invaders and their conquering armies never ceased their pressure on them. But whatever its severity, this pressure shall not succeed in containing this great intellectual movement. Sooner or later the forward movement towards the idea of humanity will succeed. All oppressed nations will one day do away with and destroy the brutes. Then the words oppressed and brute will disappear from the face of this Earth and Mankind will enjoy a social order as befitting it.

(1922)

⁂

All men are members of a social organism and hence are bound to each other. (1930)

⁂

Mutual bonds render us tolerant towards others. Because they help to show that in others' faults often we too are culpable, though perhaps unintentionally. In brief, solidarity imposes the substitution of the idea

(*) The Tripoli Campaign (1911).

of "everybody for his own" with "everybody for everybody".

(1930)

* * *

Peace at home, Peace in the World.

(1931)

* * *

Is it not worth to examine to what degree are reassuring the results of the paths followed and the means employed for centuries in trying to make the hapless Mankind happy?

The concept of humanity has, at present, reached so exalted a level as to assist us in purging our conscience and in dignifying our sentiments.

If we observe and consider the existing situation and its requirements as civilized men and with perfectly clear conscience, we should arrive at the following conclusions:

To have men slaughter each other, ostensibly to lead them to happiness is an inhuman and extremely deplorable system.

The only way to render Mankind happy lies in action and energy aimed at securing their mutual physical and moral wants by having them draw closer to and love each other.

The real happiness of Mankind in world-wide peace shall be realized only through the increase in numbers and success of individuals subscribing to these high ideals.

(1931)

* * *

In linking the continents, you are also helping nations draw closer. Heroes like yourselves do cause the nations to become members of the same family who are concerned over the happiness and destinies of one another. (*)

(1931)

* * *

You, the valiant heroes who have shed their blood on this soil! You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. May you rest in peace. You are side by side with our dear Mehmets. You, the mothers who sent their sons from countries afar, wipe away your tears; your sons are now in our midst and they are sleeping in peace. Having lost their lives on this land, they have become our sons, as well. (**)

(1934)


* * *

It is impossible not to feel distress over the deterioration of peace. At any rate, the elimination of the grave conflicts of our day should be the fervent wish of civilized Mankind.

It goes without saying how attached we are to the ideal of peace and how fundamental is our wish to see this ideal guaranteed.

(*) His remarks to Polando and Boardman, the American aviators who flew non-stop from New York to Istanbul in 49 1/2 hours.

(**) From an address dictated by Atatürk and delivered by his Interior Minister, Mr. Şükrü Kaya, at the military memorial in Çanakkale, before members of the Turkish and foreign press. This text now also appears on a monument erected in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia in memory of the Anzac units which had participated in the Dardanelles Campaigns under the flag of the British Empire.



"Nations are bound more by sentiments than treaties."

(1937)

It is our sincere wish that the League of Nations which dwells on this issue will develop its principles, duly profiting from experiences, and, increase its strength in the protection of Peace.

(1935)



If lasting peace is wanted, international measures to improve the lot of masses should be taken. The prosperity of Mankind as a whole should replace famine and oppression. The citizens of the World should be brought up in such way as to discourage sentiments of jealousy, avarice and hate.

(1935)



Today the nations on earth have become or are fast becoming members of the same family. Therefore, men should think of the peace and prosperity of all nations, as well as, the existence and the happiness of the nation to which they belong. They should strive towards the happiness of all nations, as best as they can, and with just as much value they attach to the happiness of their own. Because to strive for the happiness of all nations means striving to ensure, although in a circuitous way, one's own peace and prosperity. If tranquility, clarity and good relations are lacking as between World nations, a nation will not enjoy peace, even when it does whatever it can for its own account.

(1937)



ATATÜRK, THE MAN

If in the environment he lives and works, man happens to be in agreement with the leaders of the era and shares their views, he can but be regarded as a man of that same era and environment.

(1918)

* * *

The affairs of the nation and of the State cannot be administered nor can their honor and independence be secured by entreaties for justice and forgiveness. There is no such thing as begging for justice and forgiveness. The Turkish nation and our future generations should not, even for a moment, forget this.

One must think of ways to avoid and protect himself against a disaster, before it actually arrives. To lament after its occurrence serves no purpose.

(1920)

* * *

Liberty and independence are my character.

(1921)

* * *

For the title and rank which you conferred today upon my humble self, I submit my deep gratitude and thanks. The success we achieved manifested itself through the breakdown in the will of enemy's army thanks to our Army whose will was fortified by that of your austere Assembly. Therefore, the truly appropriate party to which these felicitations must be addressed is the Army itself. (*)

(1921)

* * *

I am not a man who would feel spiteful towards a nation for the errors committed by its government. (**)

(1922)

* * *

I, thus became aware of one fact: Danger flees from man.

(1922)

* * *

There is no law which states that I am an exception.

(1922)

* * *

(*) From his remarks upon being conferred by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey the title of "Ghazi" and the rank of "Field Marshall" following the field battles at Sakarya.

(**) From his remarks to the Morning-Post Correspondent on the Turco-British relations.

The flag is the symbol of the independence of a nation. It must be respected even when it happens to be that of the enemy.

(1922)

* * *

I am proud of not having deceived my nation by my words and acts heretofore. When I had said "I will do, we shall do, we can do", I was firmly convinced that, in fact, they could be done.

(1923)

* * *

The honor never rests with one man only, it belongs to the whole nation.

(1923)

* * *

I have nothing to say to those who are against me. Let them be. But I cannot stand the hypocrisy of those who are my antagonists and yet try and present themselves to the people who love me, as if they are with me.

(1923)

* * *

I believe that I am not necessarily any higher than any other member of our nation. If I have shown more initiatives, these have not really emanated from me, but rather from the common conscience of the nation. If it were not for you, and for your deep con-

scious tendencies supporting me, I would not have been able to come up with any of those initiatives.

(1923)

* * *

We never act arbitrarily. Neither are we despots. Our lives and all our actions have been dedicated to fighting against those who act arbitrarily and in despotic a manner in the affairs of the country.

(1925)

* * *

I have no goals other than working towards the salvation and felicity of the nation and the country. This should provide sufficient joy and pleasure for a man. The comfort and happiness of the individual and of the family are possible only through that of the nation.

(1925)

* * *

We must do forthwith anything which we are convinced is necessary.

(1925)

* * *

Victory belongs to whomever can say "Victory is mine". Success belongs to whomever starts by saying "I shall succeed" and ends by declaring his success.

(1925)

* * *

The real motivation in our national struggle was national honor and not personal ambitions.

(1925)

⁂

We do not claim pride for the services we rendered. Bu we find comfort in the hope that the services we are yet to render will indeed merit pride.

(1925)

⁂

My friends, you cannot imagine how happy I am to be a humble member of a nation such as yours. I congratulate myself, because I happen to belong to you.(*)

(1925)

⁂

To expect help from the dead is a disgrace for a civilized society.

(1925)

⁂

Sincerety has no language. It is ineffable; it can be read in the eyes and the looks.

(1925)

⁂

This great nation has always appreciated and protected her sons who strive to see and succeed in

(*) Remarks made on occasion of a torch-light procession conducted in his honor in Izmir.

eeing the direction towards which its desires and abilities point.

(1926)



Do not fear of speaking the truth.

(1926)



One day my humble body will surely return to earth. But, the Republic of Turkey will remain perpetual and the Turkish nation will continue marching resolutely down the path towards civilization, in accordance with such principles as will guarantee its security and happiness.

(1926)



Life means strife and struggle. And success in life is possible only through absolute success in strife. and, this is a matter which requires power and strength, both moral and physical.

(1927)



Dear fellow citizens!

The greatest support and source of strength in my life has been the trust of and assistance from my fellow citizens. In all my undertakings, the greatest worry my conscience has had, has been always to care for and respect the sacred nature of your trust.

(1927)



That's where the comparison ends(*)... Alexander conquered the World. I did not. When conquering the World he forsake his homeland, whereas I shall never forget mine.

(1928)

* * *

Why do you take this trouble for me? I feel embarrassed(**). To see me should not necessarily mean seeing my face. If you understand and feel my ideas and my sentiments, that should be sufficient. Before departing Ankara, I have heard the rumors being circulated about me which were saying: "He is ill. He is paralysed and his days are numbered".

Here we are, face-to-face! And you see that I am in health and not paralysed. I am in perfect shape and strength. Facing me this very evening, as a representative segment of the nation, I know that I am going to be heard by the entire nation when I address you. Then, hear it yourselves and let it be heard. The man who has devoted his whole life and his health for your interests is in good shape and he will continue to strive for you. Because he lives for you. My strength comes from our mutual affection. This country and this nation with its new system shall constitute one of the

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(*) His replies to Mr. de Chambrun, the French Ambassador who commented on the coincidence of his being born in the same region as Alexander, the Great.

(**) His remarks from the balcony of a mansion located by the Bosphorus to a group of citizens who had come to see him in person, following rumors as to his failing health.

most reasonable entities of the World. I small not die before I see this with my very own eyes.

(1929)



I feel happy because I succeeded.

(1930)



Oh! Homeland! Let everything be sacrificed for you! You are sacred. All of us have pledged our lives to your cause. But you shall remain fertile in order to sustain the Turkish Nation forever. Turkish Soil! You cannot be the burial place for the Turkish Nation which is so enamoured with you. Show your fertility for this nation.

(1930)



Life is the source for progress and dynamism. Man is obliged to adapt himself to it.

(1930)



There is no love as great as that for the nation.

(1930)



The Great Turkish Nation! Many times during the last fifteen years you have heard me promising success in undertakings we have initiated. I feel happy

that in none of these have I committed any error which might have shaken my nation's trust in me. (*)

(1923)

* * *

To me, the dictator is he who makes others succumb to his will. I would like to rule not by breaking hearts but rather by winning them.

(1935)

* * *

If I had wanted I would have forthwith set up a military dictatorship and set out to administer the country through it. But what I had in mind was to help create a modern state for my nation.

* * *

I tell openly to those I love, what I think. Also, I happen to be a man who is unable to keep to himself a useless secret. Because I am a man of the people. I must always speak before the people as to what I think. If I am wrong, my people can refute me. However, I have so far never seen the people refute me when I have spoken candidly.

(1937)

* * *

I do not stop and think on how I shall succeed in a given job. I merely concentrate on what could

(*) From his speech on occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic.

possibly present obstacles thereto. And when I remove the obstacles, the job processes itself automatically.

* * *

I am not keen on territorial enlargements. I am not in the habit of breaking the peace either. However, I claim our right as based on treaty. I cannot do without it. I promised from the rostrum of the Grand National Assembly to my nation: I shall take Hatay! (*) My nation believes in me. If I fail to deliver my promise, I cannot face the nation and I cannot keep my position. I have never been defeated; I shall not be defeated but if that comes, I cannot live a moment longer.

(1937)

* * *

I forgive them, because I have a heart. They do not forgive me because they have none. (**)

* * *

What is necessary for any individual to be content and happy for as long as he lives, is for him to work not for himself but for those who will succeed him....

Full pleasure and happiness in life can be found only in working for the honor and happiness of future generations.

(1937)

* * *

(*) Please see footnote on page 117.

(**) Speaking of his antagonists.

My People may bury me wherever they wish, as long as, they do not forget me!

(1937)



What time is it? (*)







(*) His last words, a few moments before his death on November 10, 1938.

METEKSAN, Ltd., Ankara
Printed in Turkey


K. Atatürk