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VISIT TO THE U.S.-GREEK BASE AT
SOUDA BAY

- You will visit Souda Bay, one of our two military bases in Greece, with Prime Minister Mitsotakis, to symbolize our commitment to a strong U.S.-Greek security relationship. Souda Bay played an important facilitating role in Operation Desert Storm and Provide Comfort by hosting aircraft and supporting maritime surveillance operations. Souda Bay was also a coveted liberty port for American crews on their way to or from the Gulf.
- You will be visiting a Greek and a U.S. Sixth Fleet ship -- docked side-by-side -- which participated in the war. The Greek frigate, "Limnos," was the first of two Greek frigates to participate on a rotating basis in Desert Storm. They were used for interdiction operations in the Red Sea. The "Limnos" is Greece's most modern surface combatant and, as such, the pride of the Greek Navy. It is the only Greek naval vessel which has been successfully tested for operation in a Chemical/Biological warfare environment. The Gulf operation was its first outside the Mediterranean. By all reports, operational cooperation between the "Limnos" and elements of the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea has been outstanding.
- Souda Bay is one of the largest and safest harbors in the Mediterranean. The facility is large enough to accommodate almost the entire Sixth Fleet. Our facility, NAVSUPACT, is very small, wholly inside the perimeter of the Greek air base.
- Over the ages Souda Bay has been used by Minoans, Greeks, Romans, Saracens, Venetians, Turks, and pirates.

WREATH LAYING AT TOMB OF ELEFThERIOS VENIZELOS

- You have agreed to lay a wreath at the tomb of Eleftherios Venizelos (1864-1936) who was Greece's greatest modern leader. This event is important to Mitsotakis who was Venizelos' nephew. It will also promote one of the dominant themes of your trip -- Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Venizelos and Ataturk (at whose tomb you will lay a wreath in Ankara) worked together to forge good Greek-Turkish relations after the First World War.
- Venizelos was Greek Prime Minister off and on between 1910 and 1932. He stood for stability, national unity, and democracy in the midst of Greece's often rocky political history. Venizelos' mass popular appeal reached across political and class lines, and he was even well respected in Turkey.
- Venizelos was a visionary. His chief legacy was the transformation of Greece into a modern state and, as such, he earned the title "apostle of Greek political modernism." His first name, Eleftherios, by coincidence means "liberator." As Prime Minister he brought Greek legislative and administrative processes into line with Western democratic standards, promoted economic reforms and foreign investment, and introduced social reforms.
- Rapprochement with Turkey was a key accomplishment of his political career. Greece and Turkey signed a friendship treaty in 1930 which ushered in an era of warm bilateral ties which lasted until the 1950s. Venizelos accomplished this through his work with Ataturk and his personal friendship with Ataturk's Prime Minister and successor Ismet Inonu. In Turkey, you will be meeting with Inonu's son, Erdal Inonu, an important Turkish opposition leader.
- Venizelos was a staunch democrat. He worked closely with Britain and France before and after the First World War. Greece reaped massive territorial rewards, doubling its size, as a result of its alliances with the West in World War I and his decision to fight in the two Balkan wars (1912-1913).
- Venizelos' political career ended in 1933 when he retired and returned to his birthplace on Crete. He was sentenced to death in 1935 following a rightist military coup. Venizelos died the following year while in exile in Paris and was returned to Crete for burial.

Presidential Preadvance
to
London, Athens, and Ankara



Morton I. Abramowitz U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Morton I. Abramowitz was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey on June 29, 1989.

Mr. Abramowitz began his Foreign Service career in 1960 as a consular/economic officer in Taipei. Following service in various posts in the Far East, he returned to the Department to serve as a staff member of the Inter-Departmental Group, dealing with such issues as policy on Korea. As Special Assistant to Under Secretary Elliot Richardson, Mr. Abramowitz dealt with a wide range of issues, including initial steps to ease economic restrictions on trade with the People's Republic of China. In 1971 and 1972, he served in the Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. From 1972 to 1978, he served in the Department of Defense, dealing with such issues in East Asia as regional base arrangements, U.S. troop levels, and defense relations with the Republic of Korea.

In 1978, Mr. Abramowitz was appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Thailand. From 1983 to 1984, he was U.S. Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, Austria. In February 1985, he returned to INR, where he served as Director. In 1986, the President nominated him as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research.

Mr. Abramowitz has been awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award, the Secretary of Defense Distinguished Service Award, the Joseph C. Wilson Award for Distinction in International Affairs in 1980 from the University of Rochester, the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Service in 1981 and 1988, and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal.

In 1989, Mr. Abramowitz was granted the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the Department's highest rank, in recognition of especially distinguished service over a sustained period, joining only ten other diplomats who have attained this high honor.

Throughout his career, Mr. Abramowitz has been recognized for his scholarship. His principal publications are: *Remaking China Policy*, *Aspects of Taiwan's Economic Growth*, and *Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers*.

Mr. Abramowitz was born January 20, 1933 in Lakewood, New Jersey. He received his BA degree from Stanford University in 1953 and his MA from Harvard University in 1955.

Turgut OZAL
(Phonetic: uhZ AHL)

TURKEY

President (since November 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. President

Turgut Ozal served as Prime Minister from 1983 until he was elected to his current post. He had also been chairman of the ruling Motherland Party since 1983. As Prime Minister, Ozal traveled extensively, including trips to the United States, the United Kingdom, Syria, India, the Soviet Union, and several Asian countries. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State under the military government from 1980 until 1982.



Ozal was born on 13 October 1927. He has a degree in electrical engineering from Istanbul Technical University and has studied power projects in the United States. Early in his career he served for several years as director general in charge of electrification projects in the Public Works Ministry. From 1971 until 1974 Ozal worked at the World Bank in Washington. During 1979-80 he was principal economic adviser to Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, as well as head of the State Planning Organization.

Ozal speaks English and French. In February 1987 he underwent coronary bypass surgery in Texas. He and his wife, Semra, have three children. One of his brothers, Yusuf, once worked with the International Finance Corporation in Washington and was a Minister of State from December 1987 until March 1989. Ozal's son Ahmet, formerly with the World Bank, now works for American Express in Turkey.

29 October 1990

Yildirim AKBULUT
(Phonetic: ACKbooloot)

TURKEY

Prime Minister (since 15 November 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

A member of the ruling Motherland Party (ANAP), Yildirim Akbulut had been Speaker of the Grand National Assembly (parliament) from 1987 until being named to his current post. Akbulut was Minister of Interior during 1984-87; in that position he was responsible for Ankara's counterinsurgency efforts against Kurdish rebels.

Akbulut was born in 1935 in Erzincan, in the eastern Anatolia region. He holds a law degree from the University of Istanbul and had a private law practice before 1983, when he was elected to parliament; he served as deputy speaker from 1983 to 1984. Married, he has three children.



19 June 1990

Ahmet Kurtcebe ALPTMOCIN
(Phonetic: AHLPtimochn)

TURKEY

Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since October 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

While serving as Minister of Finance and Customs (1984-89), Ahmet Alptemocin met with US officials in October 1987 and February 1988 and made several trips to Moscow to negotiate trade agreements. Alptemocin's political career began in 1983 when he was elected to parliament as a Motherland Party deputy from Bursa. That same year, he became a state minister responsible primarily for the paper, steel, and iron industries.



Alptemocin was born in 1941. He received a degree in mechanical engineering from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara in 1962. After a stint in the public sector, he worked in private industry, eventually becoming director general of a textiles firm. Alptemocin speaks English, German, and Italian. Married, he has a child.

7 November 1990

Michael G. Sotirhos

U.S. Ambassador to Greece

Michael G. Sotirhos has served as U.S. Ambassador to Greece since 1989.

Prior to this appointment, he was Ambassador to Kingston, Jamaica, from 1985 to 1989. He was a member of the National Advisory Council of the Small Business Administration in 1976. He served on the New York State Commission on Architecture in 1974. From 1973 to 1975, he served on the National Voluntary Service Advisory Council.

Mr. Sotirhos was Vice President, President, and Chief Executive Officer of the predecessor to the current Ariston Group, Inc., of New York, an organization that he and others founded upon his graduation from college. He resigned as Chairman of the Board in September 1985 to become U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica.

Mr. Sotirhos has served as President of the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation, Chairman of the National Republican Heritage Groups Council, Chairman of the Ethnic Voters for Reagan/Bush '84, and was a member of the Republican National Committee.

He received his B.B.A. degree in Business Administration from Bernard M. Baruch School of Business and Civic Administration.

Constantine MITSOTAKIS
(Phonetic: meetsoTAHkees)

GREECE


Prime Minister (since April 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

Leader of the conservative New Democracy (ND) party and longtime aspirant to the prime-ministership, Constantine Mitsotakis leads a government that has a two-seat parliamentary margin. He is an experienced legislator and has held a variety of Cabinet-level portfolios, including Finance (1963-64) and Foreign Affairs (1980-81).

Mitsotakis was born on 18 October 1918 on the island of Crete. He holds degrees in law and political science from the University of Athens. During World War II he was active in the Cretan resistance and was twice jailed briefly by the Nazis, narrowly escaping execution. He has been a member of parliament since the mid-1940s. When the military took over the government in 1967, Mitsotakis and his family went into exile in Paris. He returned to Greece in the early 1970s and founded the moderate and short-lived New Liberal Party in 1977. He joined ND shortly thereafter.

Mitsotakis has visited the United States several times, most recently in June 1990. He speaks fluent French and German; he understands and speaks English but often prefers to use an interpreter. He and his wife, Marika, have three daughters and a son. Their eldest daughter, Dora Bakoyiannis, serves as Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister.



7 January 1991

Antonios SAMARAS
(Phonetic: sahmahRAHS)

GREECE

*Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since April 1990)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

A member of the conservative New Democracy Party (ND), Antonios Samaras was Minister of Finance in the ND-Communist coalition that ruled during July-October 1989 and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the all-party government during November 1989 – February 1990.

Samaras was born on 23 May 1951. He earned a degree in economics from Amherst and received an M.B.A. degree from Harvard in 1976. The following year he was elected to Parliament; he later served on the parliamentary committee that prepared for Greece's entry into the EC.

Samaras speaks English, French, and Italian. He enjoys playing tennis. He married the former Georgia Kritikou in May 1990.



20 June 1990

ATHENS

ARRIVAL CEREMONY

- o at Athinai Airport, Athens, Greece

STATE DINNER

- o at the Presidential Palace, the "Megaro Proedriou"
- o the Presidential Palace used to be the Royal Palace. Very taboo to mention this. I asked for historical information on the Palace, and everyone was extremely reluctant, saying there was nothing they could think of that would be appropriate for the President to mention
- o President Karamanlis and POTUS will be seated in front of a tapestry. Everyone claimed ignorance as to what the tapestry portrayed -- probably something royal?

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BREAKFAST

- o will most likely take place at the Hilton. Very similar to the Chamber of Commerce breakfasts we did in South America.

PRESS AVAILABILITY FOLLOWING MEETING AT PM'S RESIDENCE

WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER (TENTATIVE)

- o whether or not this takes place depends very much on what security arrangements can be worked out
- o Tomb is guarded by the Greek guards known as "evzones." They do a very elaborate changing of the guard ceremony every hour
- o the names of famous battles are written in different places all over the memorial
- o Dimitri Alexandrakis from the President's Office, or the Embassy contacts (see bottom) can probably get information on the Tomb

ADDRESS TO GREEK PARLIAMENT

- o called the Vouli, which comes from the Greek verb "to decide"
- o Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is right in front of the Parliament building
- o the Chamber is non-descript. Nothing of interest to

point out.

- o when POTUS walks into the Chamber, he will shake hands with Prime Minister Mitsotakis and the opposition leaders before mounting the podium.
- o **No Teleprompter!** The way the podium is shaped, there's no way to set up the prompter.

EMBASSY GREETING

- o at Ambassador's Residence
- o basic Embassy Greeting

RECIPROCAL COCKTAIL RECEPTION AT AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

- o instead of having a reciprocal dinner, we're giving this cocktail reception instead. POTUS will make brief remarks.

TOUR OF THE ACROPOLIS

- o with President Karamanlis. No remarks.

CRETE

ADDRESS TO GREEK AND AMERICAN SHIPS AT SOUDA BAY NAVAL BASE

- o the plan is to anchor one Greek and one American ship at the dock -- both of which would have participated in Operation Desert Storm -- and rig some sort of sound system so POTUS can speak to both ships at once
- o no word yet on which ships they'll be
- o good historical information on the base in packet from Souda Bay

GOOD CONTACTS:

U.S. Embassy: 91 Vasilissis Sophias Blvd.
101060 Athens
011-30-1-721-2951 or 721-8401

Brady Kiesling

John Klekas, Political Section, x390, (h) 671-6344

Dimitri Alexandrakis, Diplomatic Cabinet of the President (of Greece), 724-4834

"LA PASIONARIA" OF THE ACROPOLIS

Why did Melina Mercouri, the impassioned movie-star Cabinet minister, so dramatically lose her last bid for office?

BY MAUREEN ORTH

On the Richter scale of high divadom, this is a major quake. Melina Mercouri's whole body is racked with sobs. "My life is sheet!" she shrieks in Hellenic English. "I don't want to fight anymore. I just want to be alone!" For a nanosecond she seems to forget that her devoted husband, film director Jules Dassin, is sitting next to her. "I just want to be alone with my husband!" she wails without missing a beat.

"Oh sure," laughs Dassin. "Wouldn't that be something?"

It is the morning after. Late the night before, Melina Mercouri, the most powerful woman in Greece, formerly both a major motion-picture star and the country's flamboyant minister of cul-

ture, lost her bid to become mayor of Athens. Her defeat is humiliating. Her fellow Athenians have rejected her, rejected her attempt to follow in the footsteps of her famous grandfather, who had been mayor for thirty years. Not only the Athenians, the very gods of politics have betrayed her.

Mercouri looks haggard but mildly glamorous in her long turquoise silk dressing gown embroidered with pink beads and her gold lamé slippers that match her honey-colored hair. She also looks fierce, and reinforces this effect by crushing a pack of unfiltered Greek cigarettes in her palm while glaring at her companions: her husband, her brother, Spiro, who functioned as her campaign manager, and her close friend actress Despo Diamantidou. This American reporter is especially unwelcome.

La Mercurial throws her glasses

across a table and buries her face in her arms. "Today I think my life has been mostly nightmares." Her smoky voice is hoarse and cracked. "I am so ashamed."

Mercouri, now seventy-one (more or less), is used to getting her way. No one close to her, including her husband, thought it was a remotely good idea to run for mayor, but since she was practically the only remaining scandal-free figure of note in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)—the party she helped found in the mid-seventies, when the dictatorial Colonels were overthrown—she accepted the baton, assuming there was no way she could possibly drop it. Now the anterooms of Mercouri's four-story house in Athens's Kolonaki section, the same posh neighborhood where she grew up, are filled

with morosely quiet PASOK officials, their faces buried in newspapers. In early September the polls said Mercouri was the most popular politician in Greece—six weeks later she has managed only 46 percent of the local vote. Worse, all of Athens is whispering that she conducted a frivolous campaign, full of platitudes instead of programs. A few days before the election, her colorful opponent, Antonis Tritsis, a former socialist Cabinet minister who broke with the left, had complained that all Melina Mercouri would take a stand on was her love for the city. "She talks about these...these feelings. About love...It's like running against a U.F.O."

According to Spiro, however, this was deliberate. "Her campaign is based on emotion because Athens has so many problems that you can't do anything un-



Mercouri campaigning for mayor of Athens. Left: in the sixties, with her husband, director Jules Dassin, and Peter Ustinov, who starred with her in Dassin's *Topkapi*.

less you make people feel a part of the solution. It's not a matter of doing this or that, but saying, Come on, let's do it together." And, more practically, since the conservative central government controls the municipal budget, promises might be hard to keep for a vociferous member of the party out of power. Plus, as Mercouri's French political consultant pointed out on election night, "she's an actress, not a political girl." Outside her campaign headquarters in Athens, a huge grid of sixteen TV screens mounted above the sidewalk had featured scenes from her signature film, *Never on Sunday*, as well as clips of Mercouri's meetings with world leaders and excerpts from a *60 Minutes* interview. The message was that Melina Mercouri is a great star and patriot, able to attract international attention for Greece—which needs all the help it can get these days because of its high inflation rate and huge foreign debt. The images were a reminder that the mayor can ask the European Community for funding for specific projects and can also go abroad for loans. Mercouri's ability on the foreign front has always been one of her most potent political assets.

"I want to make Athens again a city that has glamour, pride, and a conscience, to do whatever I can for this city that I loved as a child," she said. But it probably didn't occur to Mercouri as she repeatedly thrust her arms in the air and gave the V sign with both hands or stared transfixed at her image up on the grid of TV screens that glamour, bravado, and bravery might not be enough anymore in a city fraught with more than its share of end-of-the-millennium problems.

A prominent architect has described modern-day Athens as "a visual wound." Although the boundaries of the old city, and the parameters of the mayor's power, are still drawn as they were in her grandfather's day, much of the far more charming city Mercouri grew up in is gone—sacrificed to greed and the need for space. Worse, pollution is eating away at the city's largest dollar, yen, and mark draw: its incomparable repository of classical architecture, which has withered away more in the last twenty-five years than in all the time since its creation in 500 B.C. Until recently so little has been done to control pollution that for many days of the year Athenians are virtually held hostage to the dread *nephos*—the Athenians' word

for their black cloud—air so unhealthy it is hard to breathe without choking.

In the last fifty years, Athens has survived a World War, undeclared civil war, wave upon wave of villagers who

It probably didn't occur to Mercouri that glamour, bravado, and bravery might not be enough in end-of-the-millennium Athens.

want to be urbanites, and the return of thousands of expatriate Greeks who came rushing home when politics allowed it—swelling the population of the city and its environs to three million, or one-third of the entire country. The result is that some Athens neighborhoods are more densely populated than Singapore. There are virtually no sidewalks in many places, let alone shrubbery, and traffic is in a permanent snarl, particularly in the center of the city, where the government bureaus are concentrated.

Yet for all the horrors that plague Athens, it is still one of the more humane cities in the Western world. There are no homeless wandering the streets. Buildings are rarely higher than several stories. Neighborhoods are vibrant and alive—the Greek family is still largely intact, and the police walk around with unloaded guns. The city is so safe that a woman can wander alone at night and never have to be afraid. Compared with, say, the citizens of New York, Los Angeles, or even Milan, Athenians don't have that much to complain about—but they do anyway, constantly, among themselves and in the city's seventeen contentious daily newspapers. "We like complaining," says Fotini Papathanou, a political scientist. "People have very strong negative feelings about Athens, but everybody keeps on coming here—it's a love-hate relationship." When I asked the outgoing mayor, Nikolas Yatrakos, how many murders had been committed in Athens in the last year, he said, "You mean apart from traffic fatalities? I guess about three or four." Yatrakos, a member of the ruling conservative party, New Democracy, had not been permitted to run against Mercouri. "I'm not a movie star," the rather lackluster economist explained.

Last April the New Democracy party had gained control of the national gov-

ernment from PASOK and the left, but not by much of a margin (a single seat), considering that PASOK's leader, former prime minister Andreas Papandreou, along with many of his colleagues, had been involved in a bribery scandal. Papandreou had also divorced his longtime American wife to marry his mistress (a flight attendant nearly half his age), had suffered a heart attack, allegedly consulted an astrologer daily,

and left the country in economic chaos. However, since the new government's harsh austerity measures shocked a populace used to being under socialist protection, most of Athens went on strike only a few weeks before the mayoral election. Many viewed the mayor's race as a referendum on the national government. "We are really running two elections here," noted Tritsis, who was campaigning against Mercouri on the New Democracy ticket. "One is national, the other is local."

It was a bold stroke for PASOK—if not a desperate one—to offer the popular Melina for mayor. In response, and to distance themselves from defeat if she was elected, the conservative New Democracy party had backed Tritsis, a mustachioed former minister of education and the environment in the leftist government who had fallen out with the socialists two years ago and lost his Cabinet seat. To many conservatives, he is still suspiciously liberal, however, and not a team player. In some circles, Tritsis, fifty-three, a former decathlon champion and city planner with an American Ph.D., is considered a gadfly and an eccentric. But he proved to be an energetic campaigner who thrilled audiences with rhetorical flourishes and myriad schemes to fix Athens.

"I will break the asphalt," he promised, explaining that he would create a new archaeological park around the Acropolis by eliminating the roadway which currently carries tourists up to the decaying wonder of the world. So then how would the tourists get to the Acropolis? "On their knees!"

Melina wanted to break the asphalt too—somewhere in her campaign literature she said so. But the idea of her vigorously attacking the city's problems and protecting its precious heritage didn't come across on TV, where much

of the election was decided. She looked frail and off her game. Privately, she was like a raging faucet. "You never know which one you're going to get when you go over there," said Despo Diamantidou, "hot or cold." Her friends, already concerned about her health, despaired. She was simply not the old Melina. But, looking wild-eyed and fearful at times, she stubbornly plowed on. "She feels disarmed of her charm—the main weapon she's had in life is gone," said a woman who has known her for years. "The glorious Melina is like a frigate in full sail. With this campaign she is demystifying herself."

But, ah, what a myth.

Either you eat men or be eaten by them—make your choice," Melina Mercouri's beautiful mother taught her, and indeed it has been she who has seduced and devoured for the better part of her life, most visibly at first as the happy hooker in *Never on Sunday* (1960), and then as the passionate soul of the opposition starting in the late sixties, when the repressive Colonels ruled Greece, and finally as the charismatic minister of culture in the government of Andreas Papandreou, the socialist prime minister who replaced the fascistic Colonels. Mercouri became the symbol of Greek national identity. "I know just enough English to wince along with you when I mispronounce," she said during a lecture in London. "Permit me then to launch our theme with a few Greek words: Music, Drama, Tragedy, Comedy, Theater, Choreography, Philosophy, History, Democracy. All Greek words. . . ." "Melina is an exhibitionist of the mind," says her brother.

Her magic on the screen, however, was anything but cerebral. "She has a very aggressive sexuality, which is rare in a female film star," says Peter Aspiden, a British journalist who has written about Mercouri in a forthcoming book on what makes certain actors explode into mega-stardom. "It's almost masculine. She's always been rather emancipated—she knows what she wants and she knows how to get it. The irony is that all this emerged on the screen in the fifties and in Greece."

Stella, her first movie, directed by

Michael Cacoyannis on a budget of about \$30,000, burst into view at the 1955 Cannes Film Festival and astounded its audiences. Mercouri was in turn alluring, selfish, warm, self-centered,

She was "more or less the same wild creature I saw up on the screen," remembers her husband, Jules Dassin.



***Never on Sunday* was launched at an unforgettable party during the 1960 Cannes Film Festival.**

and charming, and when she sang she smoldered. Filmed in gritty black-and-white, it is the story (written especially for her) of a singer in a bouzouki café who refuses to marry, for fear she will lose her freedom. In the end she must die for having loved too many men (even though one at a time) and for leaving an archetypal Greek male, a soccer star, at the altar. "To see this macho Greek man led by this woman—it had an incredibly powerful effect," says Aspiden. Especially in Greece. Yet *Stella* is Melina Mercouri's only film in Greek, and she had to wait until she was an established stage actress and in her thirties to make it. "She had been ignored by filmmakers until then," says Cacoyannis, "because they thought her mouth was too big."

Jules Dassin, a blacklisted American director from the Bronx who had begun working successfully in France, saw Melina for the first time at Cannes in *Stella*. He was looking for a Greek actress to play a secondary role in a film

he was adapting from a story by Nikos Kazantzakis—and Mercouri knocked him dead. Dassin remembers that when he met Melina she was "more or less the same wild creature I saw up on the screen." At the time, he was married with three children and not planning a divorce.

Dassin's wife decided to stay at home while he shot the Kazantzakis film in Greece—a big break for Melina, who was not shy about her feelings for him. "A man could not escape when she wanted him," says Deni Vachliotou, an old friend who did the costumes for *Never on Sunday*. "She had such success with men. She provoked them to the point they went after her." And from that moment on, Melina Mercouri and Jules Dassin—whom many characterize as "a saint"—have had an extremely close personal and professional collaboration. "Thirty-two years I am with Julie, and he has never lied to me or told me anything that is second-rate," Mercouri says. And, of course, it was Dassin who made her a star.

Never on Sunday, written and directed by Dassin, began life as *The Happy Whore* and has probably done more for tourism in Greece than anything since the building of the Parthenon. It had sun, it had the sea, it had Melina. In 1960, at a moment when U.S. audiences could choose between Sandra Dee, Elizabeth Taylor, Annette Funicello, and Marilyn Monroe, Melina Mercouri hit the screen as incredibly sexy, forthright, unneurotic, and uncontrived—"able to devour ouzo, men, city corruption, and American imperialism in equal measure," Peter Aspiden notes. Dassin created a character of sunny, unbridled optimism who even makes up happy endings to the Greek tragedies—a trait inspired by Melina's mother. "It came from our differing interpretations of the Bible," says Dassin, who is Jewish. "Melina's mother did not believe Christ was crucified, he didn't die on the cross, and he wasn't a Jew."

Mercouri's captivating performance was enhanced considerably by a bouzouki-music score and an Oscar-winning title song. Inside the industry, it didn't hurt either that the film was launched with an unforgettable party on the French Riviera complete with imported

bouzouki players, hundreds of European jet-setters linking arms and dancing Greek folk dances, and the traditional breaking of several hundred pounds of crockery. "I knew we had a hit," says Alain Bernheim, Dassin's agent at the time. "when the Begum Aga Khan started smashing glasses with her barefoot sandals." Melina Mercouri walked off with the best-actress award at Cannes, an Academy Award nomination, and an international reputation.

Even today most people think of Mercouri as the golden, happy-go-lucky creature who was so overpowering in *Never on Sunday*. The movie is still so much her trademark that wherever in the world she appeared during her eight years as minister of culture the band inevitably struck up the tune. The opposition even used it against her in the campaign for mayor. Greeks traditionally go to the polls on Sundays, so thousands of leaflets were printed saying, "Melina—Never on Sunday." At a huge rally a few days before the vote, Mercouri, dressed in a white shirt with the sleeves rolled up, white slacks, and brand-new white U.S. Keds, threw red and white carnations to the crowd from a platform and intoned deeply, "Melina, always on Sunday." The crowd roared.

As minister of culture during the eighties, Mercouri oversaw everything from archaeological sites to soccer stadiums. At important events in Europe she hobnobbed with her best buddy, the French minister of culture, Jack Lang, and she waged a noisy fight to have Britain ship back the Elgin Marbles, which had adorned the Parthenon before Lord Elgin finished removing them in 1812. When the roof fell in on Andreas Papandreou's government in 1989, Mercouri had to relinquish her office, which may have been inevitable, since for the last two years she has battled a serious lung disease that has noticeably drained her. (It is currently in remission.) If there was ever a time to slow down, this was it. So friends were shocked last June when she declared her intention to become mayor, although they probably shouldn't have been. "I hate the word 'retire,'" Mercouri says. "I hate it." Center stage has always been her natural milieu.

As a toddler, Melina rode beside her grandfather—who was far more important than the mayor of Athens today—in an open carriage waving to the faithful. At the age of five, knowing she would not receive the phonograph she wanted

for Christmas, she looked in the mirror and conjured her first crocodile tears, one at a time. Childhood playmates recall that she could often outdo the boys in sports and climbing trees, that she

"The glorious Melina is like a frigate in full sail. With this campaign she is demystifying herself," said a friend.

was bright and quick-witted but wild and undisciplined, often cutting school and sneaking off to the movies. "She was a terrible child," says her brother, Spiro. "Her grandfather had a colossal weakness for her, and because he was a very grand person, nobody dared to object to what Melina was doing. He spoiled her a lot."

She was ten when she decided she wanted to act. At fourteen, rarely at school, she began a mad pursuit of a thirty-five-year-old matinee idol. Her family was appropriately scandalized, but by this time Melina's elegant parents had divorced—her father, a ladies' man and a member of Parliament, had run off with an actress. They were undoubtedly relieved when she eloped at seventeen with a very rich Greek in his thirties who had to quickly divorce his Romanian dancer wife to marry Melina.

"She got married so she could leave her family's house and become an actress," says Despo Diamantidou. "In those days in *haut bourgeois* families, acting was not considered a proper occupation." Pan Characopos, Melina's first husband, was a Cambridge-educated Anglophile who doted on Melina. Apparently never sexually compatible, they stayed married for a long time in a most unconventional style. Melina took lovers with Pan's approval and brought them into the house. "We had a great relationship," she says. "He was not a typical Greek man—he was very eccentric." She spent the first years of her marriage playing at being a rich bohemian, studying acting, and presiding over a glorious salon.

"Melina was full of charm and the joy of life," says Deni Vachliotou. "All the artists and all the politicians gathered in her house. We had wonderful conversations and wonderful parties. We were young and handsome; we had dreams

and Melina taught me I could realize them." "I was lucky," Melina says. "I had great freedom in those years—it was very, very exciting."

The bliss was interrupted by World War II. Greece was invaded by Germany, and the Greeks were left to starve. Today, Melina Mercouri's contemporaries speak of the war and the decade of civil unrest that followed as if it were yesterday. "I think our whole

generation was wounded by the war," says Despo Diamantidou. Many joined the Resistance. Melina was more practical. She took a quisling for a lover, a handsome black-marketeer who kept her in furs and food and who later committed suicide because, some say, Melina threw him over after the war. She claims now that she also gave a lot of money to the Resistance. Certainly the food she got she shared with her friends—her generosity and her loyalty to her friends have never been in doubt. "During the war I was able to eat because I went to Melina's house," says Diamantidou. In her autobiography, *I Was Born Greek*, Mercouri mentions that many of her first theater audiences "hated" her for her ability to survive in style during that time. Today she defends her behavior: "I don't like to apologize for that—I don't want to. If I see my life today, I would say I was a young girl who just wanted to live and that's why war is a terrible thing."

Although Mercouri's theater debut in 1944 was inauspicious—one critic wrote, "Too tall, too young, too blonde. Too awkward. No talent. Why doesn't Miss Mercouri stay home where she belongs?"—she was determined to be a star. "She liked the applause, she liked to be worshiped," says Deni Vachliotou. And she worked very hard. Eventually, her stage career began to take off, first in the classical theater, then in modern pieces. And she set out to conquer Paris.

Wearing a pink hat at lunch one day, Melina attracted the attention of French playwright Marcel Achard, who immediately wrote a part for her in his new play. The rest of the cast snubbed her, of course, as only the French can. But Colette met her and wrote her a petit poem that ended, "Elle n'a qu'à lever ses yeux et l'Acropole est là." *Tant pis* for the

cast. Unfortunately, those difficult French also gave her trouble with *Stella*. Mercouri was the supposed favorite to win the best-actress prize at Cannes, but she and the jurors celebrated so hard one night at a party given by the Soviet delegation that they arrived in no state to judge that evening's French entry. A local *scandale* ensued and no best-actress prize was given in Cannes in 1955.

Mercouri and Dassin set up house-keeping together in Paris, to be near his children. What was for her an astoundingly quiet life was something quite different for him. "Julie was a little Jewish boy from the Bronx," says his ex-agent, Alain Bernheim. "Suddenly he was turned into this jet-setty Parisian. Melina knew a lot of people—she'd been around Paris. And they were surrounded by her faithful servants—they were like slaves who catered to their every whim. You could have dinner at their apartment at any hour—two A.M., they'd cook for them." Not surprisingly, Dassin catered to Melina's whims as well. Though he had many chances after *Never on Sunday* to work on major movies with big-name stars, she would never allow it—unless she could somehow star in them too. "He made a choice and his choice was to be with Melina," says Bernheim. "If she was in the movie, she was happy and he could be happy—if not, well, she was bigger than life." Bernheim, who remains friends with Dassin, gave up their professional partnership when Dassin turned down a big directing job with Elizabeth Taylor. "I'll never forget his line: 'It's more important for me to be with Melina than to make a movie'"—an attitude Dassin says he doesn't disagree with today.

"I was very jealous when he worked with others," says Melina. "It was very bad for his career, very bad. It's the only remorse I have in my life, that I didn't let him have his career. And that I brought him here."

Although Dassin and Mercouri made nine films together, with the exception of the hit caper *Topkapi* in 1964, nothing came close to the success of *Never on Sunday*. Nor was her luck any better with directors ranging from Joseph Losey to Norman Jewison. Melina, in fact, was reprising her role from *Never on Sunday* on the Broadway stage in 1967 when she received the shocking news one night that the Greek government had fallen to the Colonels.

"I had a choice to shut up, but I

couldn't," Melina says. She began to make a speech every night after her performance, telling the audience that the happy-go-lucky musical they had just seen did not accurately reflect the reality

Since she was practically the only remaining scandal-free figure of note in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, she agreed to become a candidate.

in Greece at that time. The response of the Colonels was swift. "Julie had gone to the Middle East and I was sleeping in the same room with Melina," recalls Despo Diamantidou. "In the middle of the night an American reporter was on the phone to tell Melina she had lost her Greek citizenship." Her response became famous: "I was born a Greek, I shall die a Greek. Colonel Pattakos was born a Fascist. He will die a Fascist."

By her own admission, "the hedonist became Joan of Arc." She also made the cover of *Life*.

If anything, Melina's views in her youth were rightist and royalist. She began to have a more heightened political consciousness in her early theater days, and under the tutelage of Dassin drifted steadily leftward. But even today Melina Mercouri is the quintessential champagne socialist. Her baths are drawn by servants, her clothes laid out. During the mayor's race she voted in Armani. "But it was always in the back of her mind since she was a child that at some time she would get into politics," says Deni Vachliotou. "She got it from her grandfather." When the moment presented itself, she was outspoken and brave.

For seven years Mercouri raged against the Colonels in country after country, rally after rally. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Yves Montand and Simone Signoret—the *crème de la crème gauche* were her allies in the Resistance. In the process the temptress became a feminist. "I became great friends with women," she says. "I had great conversations with them—they helped me a lot. I believe that the woman is a great fighter to the end," which is obviously the way that Melina Mercouri looks at herself. Deni Vachliotou

recalls that one night in Paris in 1963 she and Melina went to see the last performance of Edith Piaf, who died a few days later. The legendary chanteuse could no longer stand alone, but was held up by two men supporting her bandaged arms and hands, and on her feet were old bedroom slippers. She no longer had a voice. Nonetheless, the crowd went wild as she sang all her greatest hits, especially "Non, Je Ne Regrette Rien." Melina was spellbound. "This is how I'm going to die,"

Vachliotou remembers her declaring, "standing, standing onstage."

In 1974, when the Colonels were overthrown, Melina Mercouri returned to Greece in delirious triumph. Her overjoyed countrymen hoisted her onto their shoulders straight from the airplane. "As soon as she heard the news, she told me she wanted to go back to Greece," says Dassin. "That meant I would have to change my life. But I thought about it overnight and I decided I would go."

At home once again, she decided to stay in politics—"because they needed women in Parliament in Greece." In fact, when Mercouri got elected for the first time, in 1977, representing her old *Never on Sunday* stomping ground, Piraeus, there were no toilet facilities for women in the Greek Parliament and there were rules against women wearing pants. Her fights to bring the patriarchs of Greece into the modern world got lots of headlines. For Jules Dassin, however, his wife's ascending political star was something else—in his words, "a partnership dissolved." For a few years, until he began directing plays in Greece, he was stranded professionally.

Mercouri became minister of culture in 1981 and seized on the return of the Elgin Marbles as her pet cause. No matter that just before her first press conference in the British Museum she reportedly shed tears in front of the wrong sculpture, not the Parthenon marbles at all. Never mind, because she was out to raise the world's and Hellenic consciousness about preserving the Greeks' heritage. She abolished museum fees for all Greeks and announced that a new Acropolis Museum would be built to house the treasures when they were returned. (Finally, in November 1992,

\$100 million plan for the building was unveiled, but so far only \$1.8 million has been raised to build it. "I am sure it will be easy to find money," Mercouri insists.) But some complain that museums are often dirty and that even at the Acropolis, with its extremely serious problems of disintegration due to pollution, much more could have been done. One woman involved in its restoration reports that money the European Community offered for projects at the Acropolis went unspent because Mercouri's ministry was never organized enough to institute the programs. "She was not really worse than usual, perhaps," the woman said, "but people expected more from Melina. She made promises she couldn't deliver." Another archaeologist, an American, was shocked that after she personally appealed to Mercouri to preserve "an important historical site...an office building was erected over it instead."

Mercouri herself would rather emphasize other things, like the many exhibitions of Greek art her brother organized for international consumption, and her success in getting the European Community to go along with her plan to have Athens made "the Cultural Capital of Europe" in 1985. As a result, some of the world's best performing companies came, and continue to come, to Athens.

In true socialist style, Mercouri created myriad new little theaters for the provinces (while many of the more elite traditional theater companies languished or declined). When the classics were performed at the summer festivals, Melina Mercouri was always there to lend support, taking her seat amid the crowd's applause. Young, untried filmmakers were given the chance to make feature-length movies on government subsidies. The fact that Greek audiences stayed away in droves from these works did not disturb Melina. "I believe we have made three or four directors," she says. "They were psychological films only for the directors, but it doesn't matter—young cinema is good." In contrast, Eriks Andreou, who now runs the Greek Film Center, talks about "trying to win back the Greek public by steering closer to the center," and encouraging foreign film production in Greece, particularly by U.S. companies, which were never made to feel welcome during the years the openly anti-American Papandreou government was in power. (Mercouri's Film Center director once told a *Hollywood Reporter* writer that he was more interested in the North Korean than the U.S. market.)

Greeks are notoriously hard on one another and so highly politicized that it is almost impossible to get an objective assessment of the weather let alone of anyone as controversial as Melina Mercouri

"This is how I'm going to die," a friend remembers her saying during Edith Piaf's last performance, in the sixties, "standing, standing onstage."

and her tenure at the Ministry of Culture. The charitable view is of good intentions gone awry, and even the political opposition gives her high marks for her efforts to promote the glories of Greece outside the country. But she has serious critics.

"Because of her worldwide fame she had a chance that nobody before or after her will ever have and she blew it," says Greek-American TV-and-film producer Renee Pappas, who is married to a Greek actor and ran a talent agency in Athens while Melina was minister. "If you wanted to go to Greece to make a film, you'd have to rely on luck. There was no office to scout locations, no office to get actors. There are dozens of English-speaking actors in Greece and nobody knows about them." Pappas arranged for a possible "Greek Film Week" at the Museum of Modern Art in New York but needed prints of twenty Greek films. At a meeting, Mercouri assured her she would have them. "It's eight years later and I'm still waiting for those twenty prints," she says.

"The ministry was chaos whenever you walked into her office," says former *New York Times* man Nicholas Gage. "There were always twenty people in there: she'd be on the phone trying to talk, there would be groups muttering in various corners of the room—it was just havoc." Gage has a bone to pick with Mercouri because the movie version of *Eleni*, his book about his mother's murder in Greece at the hands of Communists right after W.W. II, was not shot there. The harsh portrait of the Communists drawn in the story did not sit well with the Papandreou government, although the Ministry of Culture did O.K. the project. But "we didn't get the kind of encouragement that made it possible to leave behind the \$8 to \$10 million we

would have in Greece," says Gage. As a result the film was shot in Spain.

"Listen, we were not responsible for *Eleni*. They asked and we gave the permission—Mr. Gage can say nothing!"

Melina Mercouri responds defiantly. "I believe I was an excellent bureaucrat. I did good work on many things—I had no money, but the ministry was well organized and we had excellent relations abroad." And what about the charges of anti-Americanism? "Ridiculous. I visited America a thousand times." Her position is that things fell

apart after she left. "Now, now it's the shits," she thunders. "Now there is nothing going on. You will see—now the Ministry of Culture will not even exist!"

This last year has been a tough one for Melina Mercouri. She lost the election, Greece lost the campaign she spearheaded to bring the 1996 Olympics to Athens, Jules Dassin was hospitalized. She refuses to stop smoking, and her own health is fragile. All her extraordinary life, say her closest friends, Melina Mercouri has lived in a state of anxiety—never celebrating her happiest times, but constantly worrying that such moments will not come again. "She doesn't enjoy such things. It's a metaphysical problem," says Deni Vachliotou, who remembers Mercouri running down the steps of the palazzo in Cannes like Cinderella moments after the smash opening of *Never on Sunday*, sobbing that the triumph would not last. "For the first time in my life I was an optimist for this election and you see what happened," Mercouri said. "It's the only time I thought I would win."

She sank into gloom and despair for weeks afterward. Then suddenly the black cloud, her own personal *nephos*, lifted. "She might run for president," a friend predicts. At any rate, Melina Mercouri seemed to turn into that frigate in full sail again. Certainly there was no time anymore to hash over old history. She is still a member of the Greek Parliament, and the leader of the opposition in the Athens city council. "You see, I am very, very busy," she said to me on the phone after I had returned to the U.S. "I am having a big meeting here—many people are coming to my house to talk about...what is the word? That dark air. Pollution!" □

Caught in the Labyrinth

Papandreou, ailing and under attack, is not yet out for the count

Reasonable people expected that Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou would suffer heavier losses. He had campaigned for the June 18 parliamentary elections amid a series of scandals linking some members of his government to huge embezzlement, fraud, payoffs and illegal arms deals. On top of that, there was his public romance with Dimitra Liani, a former airline flight attendant half his age. But Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) slid only far enough to lose its majority. And since no other party won more than half the seats, Papandreou, who was hospitalized in serious condition last week with lung, heart and kidney complications, is staying on as caretaker Prime Minister while the struggle continues to form a government.

The major beneficiary in the balloting was Constantine Mitsotakis' conservative New Democracy Party, which won 145 seats, just six short of control in the 300-seat Parliament. The New Democrats campaigned on the promise of "catharsis," which included investigating and prosecuting political bigwigs implicated in several cases of alleged fraud that involved millions of dollars, including the embezzlement of more than \$210 million from the Bank of Crete by its former owner George Koskotas.

For the first time, the Communists in Greece hold the balance of parliamentary power. The Alliance of the Left, which the Communists dominate, won



The Prime Minister enters the hospital



New Democracy's Mitsotakis confers with Communist leader Florakis

28 seats and could form a government with either PASOK, which holds 125 seats, or New Democracy. Communist Party leader Harilaos Florakis also demands catharsis but so far has refused to consider entering a coalition under either Papandreou or Mitsotakis.

Before he fell ill, Papandreou, 70, hoped to talk the Alliance of the Left into joining PASOK in "a coalition of the progressive forces." He dismissed the financial scandals, claiming they are simply plots instigated against him by "foreign and domestic forces." But last week another scandal was revealed as U.S. authorities arrested 14 employees of the National Mortgage Bank of Greece on charges of illegally transferring about \$700 million to the bank's central office in Athens, apparently to avoid paying taxes.

While the political parties continue to look for a possible deal, the business of Greece has come to a halt. Since there is no elected head of government, President Christos Sartzetakis will represent Greece

at this week's European summit in Madrid. Negotiations with the U.S. for a new agreement on American military bases in Greece must await a functioning government. A long-overdue austerity program is also on hold. "The country is running itself now," said Parliament member George Voulgarakis.

The Alliance has proposed a short-term "ecumenical government" made up of public figures who are acceptable to all sides. Such a transition team would be assigned to set the cleanup in motion and then take the country into new elections. As Papandreou's health deteriorated last week, many in Athens believed it might be the one way out of the labyrinth. ■

THE COMMUNITY

New Times

Thatcher down, Greens up

Although elections for the European Parliament may still be more symbolic than substantive, the balloting shattered British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's image of invincibility last week. Her Conservative Party suffered its first national defeat in nearly 15 years, capturing only 34.7% of the vote and losing 13 of its 45 European Parliament seats. By contrast, the left-leaning Labor Party totted up 40.2%, stirring dreams among Laborites of ousting Thatcher from power at home.

In West Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats received a blow as the new right-wing Republican Party, led by a former sergeant in Hitler's

Waffen-SS, won 7% of the vote by capitalizing on fears of competition from foreign workers.

Elections for the Strasbourg-based assembly, once consigned to the status of a European debating society, are fast becoming a bellwether for European politics. Thatcher aides sought to downplay the Tory defeat by arguing that the culprit was domestic discontent with Britain's 15% interest rates and 8.3% inflation. Even critics within her own party scoffed, blaming her Britain-first, anti-European rhetoric at a time when Europe is moving toward economic integration in 1992. Said a Tory backbencher: "She got it drastically wrong."

Across Western Europe, the biggest gains were won by Green parties, which nearly doubled their representation, to 39 delegates. The environmentalists thus hold the balance of power in the 518-seat

chamber, ensuring that their issues will be high on the European Community's agenda. West Germany's well-established Green contingent will be joined by delegations from other E.C. countries, including France and Italy. In Britain the Greens captured an impressive 15% of the vote but no seats because Britain does not have a proportional-representation system.

As E.C. leaders hold their first post-election summit in Madrid this week, the big question is whether Thatcher's weakened position will cause her to be more conciliatory on two key proposals: a social charter intended to safeguard workers' rights and, more important, the eventual establishment of a single currency managed by a European central bank. Emboldened by the erosion of Thatcher's political strength, her fellow summiteers may decide to press on toward European unity, whatever her objections. ■

• SCANDALS

The Looting of Greece

For the first time, a fallen tycoon tells how he embezzled millions



BY ROBERT AJEMIAN

Greeks were exhilarated in 1981 when Andreas Papandreou and his Socialist Party swept to power. Their enthusiasm has long since turned to bitterness and disbelief as the worst financial and political scandal in four decades engulfs Greece. The press, the Bank of Greece, a magistrate and Parliament are delving into charges of corruption, seeking to uncover how more than \$210 million disappeared from the Bank of Crete. Charges of embezzlement, kickbacks and bribery, of banknotes stuffed into briefcases, have been leveled against high officials.

The scandal has scorched the Socialist Party (PASOK), and public cynicism has increasingly focused on the party's leader Papandreou himself. The Prime Minister last September was already the target of snickering and outrage as he conducted a highly public extramarital liaison with airline flight steward Dimitra Liani, 34.

Now inside a Salem prison, Koskotas fears that once extradited, he will disappear behind bars—or be murdered and declared a suicide.

KOSKOTAS' TALE OF CORRUPTION HE ALLEGES

THE SCAM

1984
Koskotas buys Bank of Crete



FALL 1985
PASOK leaders order state-managed corporations to deposit funds in the Bank of Crete

SUMMER 1985
After winning re-election, PASOK cuts deal with Koskotas



By skimming interest payments on the state funds, Koskotas started building a huge pool of money for payoffs.

As the parliamentary investigations dug through testimony, the question loomed: Was the Prime Minister aware of the crime all along?

Papandreou has not testified before investigators, though he vehemently denies any involvement in what he calls a "conspiracy aiming to hurt Greece." But investigators have yet to hear from the central figure in the case, George Koskotas, 34, a one-time New York house painter who vaulted to power as the multimillionaire owner of the Bank of Crete. Now jailed in Massachusetts on a variety of charges leveled just before he fled Greece last November, Koskotas is facing extradition to answer accusations of looting his own bank.

Amid more than a dozen lawsuits, much has come out about the vast scandal, but most Greeks believe there is far more to be revealed—by one man in particular. Given his central role in the affair, Koskotas' version of the dirty dealings could prove to be an imperfect account. Apparently nothing will be resolved until the public has weighed his tale. "At this point," says a frustrated former PASOK member, "we are all waiting to hear what Koskotas has to say."

A plump man with steady dark eyes and a soft voice, Koskotas is no common embezzler. In addition to the Bank of Crete, he owned Grammi, a flourishing publishing empire that operated five magazines, three newspapers and a radio station. He bankrolled big hotels. A year ago, he bought Greece's wildly popular soccer team, Olympiakos. He created one of the world's most advanced printing plants. And until he fled Greece, Koskotas con-



Papandreou: increasingly the focus of public cynicism

Did he authorize the looting of the Bank of Crete?

sorted freely with the country's ruling Socialist leaders. At 34, George Koskotas, the Greek wunderkind, had achieved a dazzling reputation in his own land.

Now inside a Salem, Mass., prison, Koskotas has finally decided to talk. His chief motivation, he explains, is a fear that once extradited to Greece he will disappear behind bars—or be murdered and declared a suicide and thus be unable to present his own version of what happened. He figures his fate in Greece will be worse if Papandreou remains in power; so his motive for speaking may also be to wound the government.

The Koskotas accusations are ex-

traordinary, though difficult to verify. In six lengthy prison interviews with TIME, the banker describes a Socialist government riddled by extortion and criminality. Koskotas charges that millions of dollars missing from his bank were actually payoffs that went directly to the head of the government, Andreas Papandreou, and PASOK officials. The Prime Minister, says the banker, personally authorized the plan to loot the Bank of Crete. Koskotas describes as well his own illegal complicity in the huge swindle, one that involves enormous sums hard to account for adequately.

The plot was an audacious one. To create the pool of crooked money, PASOK leaders had for three years ordered state-managed corporations such as the Post Office, the Organization of Urban Transportation and the State Pharmaceutical Co. to transfer large bank deposits—the country's money, in effect—out of the big national banks into the Bank of Crete, then the smallest private bank in the country. There,

Koskotas says, he arranged for the government deposits to draw an exceptionally low rate of interest, only 2% or 3%. Bank savings accounts in Greece routinely draw 15% interest. The excess interest earned on the government deposits was siphoned off and went straight to the politicians, he says. In addition, protected and encouraged by Papandreou, Koskotas secretly plowed Bank of Crete funds into his magazines and newspapers.

In the past year, says Koskotas, some 40 shipments of money, in blue briefcases stuffed with 5,000-drachma notes, were carted out of the Bank of Crete and taken first to his own residence. There the bank-

THE PAYOFF

1986-87

Koskotas begins making illicit payments eventually totaling more than \$30 million, to PASOK officials




OCTOBER 1987

Visiting Washington, Koskotas is arrested on old charges of defrauding the U.S. Government but returns to Greece

LATE OCTOBER 1987

Threatening Koskotas with prison, Papandreou pressures him to make regular payments directly to the Prime Minister; in the next year, Koskotas hands over \$20 million in about 40 blue briefcases



THE INFLUENCE

1986-88

At Papandreou's urging, and using bank funds, Koskotas buys top Greek newspapers *Kathimerini*, *Vradyni*; installs editors favorable to Papandreou; and starts new paper *24 Hours* to promote the Papandreou family



After the weekly *Evdomi* publishes nude pictures of Papandreou's mistress Dimitra Liani, Koskotas buys it and shuts it down




Papandreou presses Koskotas to buy the popular Greek football team Olympiakos to associate it with PASOK's 1989 campaign



THE SCANDAL


SEPTEMBER 1988

Papandreou's political power slips amid heart surgery, revelations about his mistress and the emerging banking scandal



OCTOBER 1988

Papandreou is too weak to stop an investigation into the Bank of Crete that reveals \$210 million is missing



NOVEMBER 1988

Tipped by a friend in Greek intelligence, Koskotas flees and is arrested by the FBI after landing near Boston

TIME CHART BY JOE LENTOLA

er handed the money over to a Papandreou confidant, Georgios Louvaris, who Koskotas says made the deliveries to the Prime Minister. Pickups occurred weekly and amounted over the year to more than 3 billion drachmas (\$20 million at today's rates). In addition, Koskotas claims he personally carried a total of half a billion drachmas (\$3.3 million) to the home of a Deputy Prime Minister, Menios Koutsogiorgas. At the Bank of Crete half a dozen other PASOK leaders twice a month received briefcases filled with money totaling 1.5 billion drachmas (\$10 million).

There was little danger of interference. Fifty different national audits of the Bank of Crete that might have uncovered the scheme were squelched over the years by PASOK officials, says Koskotas, twice by direct calls from Papandreou.

In the summer of 1988, the government muscled through a special Secrecy Act that had the effect of guaranteeing its overdrawn banker financial confidentiality. Koskotas says he was directed to pay an additional \$2 million to then Deputy Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas as a reward for managing the legislation.

The dank atmosphere that nurtured this tangle of alleged corruption began after the Socialists' re-election in 1985. Papandreou was eager to tighten his grip on the country. He found a perfect match in the ambitious young publisher and banker Koskotas, who saw in PASOK a means to build an empire.

Now, sitting in the library of the Salem prison, Koskotas recalled the beginnings of a relationship that led to his ruin. He wore a blue pullover sport shirt and blue jeans, white leather sneakers on his feet. Koskotas had squeezed his big waist into a one-armed desk chair.

In his lap he balanced a pile of tape transcripts and letters he had carried out of Greece as evidence. From time to time he ran his finger across the pages of his old appointment book, picking out entries of meetings with the Prime Minister and other key government officials.

He remembers the meetings with Papandreou vividly, five times alone in the Prime Minister's home at Kastri, once at the home of a Papandreou intimate, Michalis Ziogas. At the first meeting in early 1986, Koskotas recalls, the Prime Minister had a proposal: Koskotas should start a daily newspaper to provide positive coverage of the Papandreou family. Kos-

kotas later put up the money, and the first issue of the paper, called *24 Hours*, appeared in February 1988.

The Prime Minister always seemed to possess inside information. Papandreou, says the banker, taps the home and business telephones of such rivals as the head of the political opposition, New Democracy's Constantine Mitsotakis, and unfriendly publishers. "I know all their plans," he proudly told Koskotas.

Papandreou came to assume that Grammi's national magazines and newspapers really served him. Certain Papandreou favorites were hired as editors. Says Koskotas: "All our editors were instructed never to criticize the Prime Minister per-

But the Bank of Crete opened about 50 branches in four years, and licenses were granted for an additional 20. Sure of his political shield, Koskotas was unafraid to violate banking laws and withdraw huge sums of cash at will. If Koskotas worried aloud about audits, Papandreou was always reassuring. "So long as I am here," Koskotas says Papandreou told him, "you never have to worry."

Koskotas said little of his early years, but he was a young man drawn to risk. Born in 1954 in Greece, he came to America with his parents in 1970. "George was very ambitious," says his wife Kathy, whom he married in 1973. "His mind was always working."

At New York University, that overactive mind seemed to be hunting for angles. Koskotas ordered a batch of N.Y.U. and Fordham University stationery from a printer. He said he wanted to send reprimanding letters to some student friends as a prank. The university believed he intended to create fake transcripts. He was arrested, fined \$200 and asked to leave school.


Not satisfied with all his claimed wealth, he continued to indulge his compulsion for risk taking, and it backfired badly. Koskotas obtained fake Social Security numbers for several of his painters who were illegal aliens—federal prosecutors charge that he created fictitious names—and then used them in efforts to collect unemployment insurance claims and income tax refunds. In 1979, before Koskotas was indicted by the U.S. Attorney, he

returned to Greece with his wife and four children. A year later, in 1980, the U.S. formally charged him with stealing \$40,000. In the years that followed, Koskotas traveled back and forth numerous times to America, always unaware he was under indictment, he claims. Long after, the incident would rise up to haunt him.


Back in Greece, still only 25, he landed a job as an administrative officer at the Bank of Crete. Five years later, in late 1984 when the Bank of Crete came up for purchase at \$9 million, Koskotas somehow produced a bankroll big enough to buy it. He knew exactly where he wanted to go. The Socialists were immersed in an election and Koskotas was determined to curry favor. Within a few months he hired as bank general manager a PASOK veteran, Panayotis Vakalis, whom he knew to be a longtime friend of Andreas Papandreou's.



Koutsogiorgas: Payoffs?



Louvaris: Deliveryman?



Charges of embezzlement and kickbacks and banknotes stuffed into briefcases for officials

sonally, not even a single cartoon." Papandreou urged Koskotas to neutralize hostile newspapers by buying them up gradually. At their second meeting in early 1987, Papandreou pressed Koskotas to buy *Kathimerini*, the country's most respected paper; he did, using Bank of Crete funds.

Another time Papandreou had an unexpected idea: Koskotas should purchase the Olympiakos football team. Papandreou, according to Koskotas, wanted the banker to build up the team, so that just before the 1989 election the government would agree to build Olympiakos a new stadium, an announcement certain to be highly popular. Koskotas laid out 4 billion drachmas for the plan.

Koskotas' first ambition, he says, was to enlarge the Bank of Crete. Private banks routinely had to wait at least a year for authorization to open a single branch.

The connection eventually brought the young banker and the Prime Minister together. The great swindle was under way.

For two years, says Koskotas, payoffs went to the party, none to Papandreou himself. Then a pivotal event occurred. In October 1987, Koskotas traveled to Washington to attend a White House luncheon at which Vice President George Bush was the host. Secret Service agents, checking invitations, were surprised to discover that the guest from Greece was under a six-year-old federal indictment. They arrested Koskotas at his Washington hotel. The banker posted bail of \$1 million. A few days later, to get home, Koskotas lied to Greek embassy officials and obtained a travel document.

Only three weeks later, Koskotas says, he was summoned by Papandreou. It was apparent to Koskotas that something was wrong. Sternly the Prime Minister warned that because of the passport violation, Koskotas might have to go to jail. Eventually Papandreou declared Koskotas need not worry. But there were certain requirements. An election was coming, the Prime Minister stressed, and PASOK needed 5 billion drachmas (\$33 million). Thereupon, says Koskotas, Papandreou bluntly described a much expanded plan for kicking back interest payments. Koskotas, he directed, should work out the details with Deputy Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas. Says Koskotas, sounding surprisingly disingenuous: "I realized it was outright blackmail." Until then he had rationalized that the stolen interest payments to PASOK were simply the political cost of doing business in Greece.

Two weeks later, Koskotas says, the first direct request for money came by telephone from Papandreou. The Prime Minister wanted 200 million drachmas (\$1.3 million), purportedly to pay the expenses for a PASOK youth festival. Georgios Louvaris would drop by. In the following months, says Koskotas, Papandreou made two other personal calls for cash, each for 150 million drachmas (\$1 million), for what he described as PASOK events. Otherwise the Prime Minister received a weekly delivery of around 75 million drachmas.

Soon Koskotas found the requests from Papandreou and Koutsogiorgas bolder—and more personal. Papandreou wanted to squelch a critical memoir by his first wife, Christine, a psychiatrist. Through foreign book agents, Koskotas paid out \$90,000 and tied up world rights to the book. Papandreou raised another problem. The Prime Minister, then 69,

was keeping company with Dimitra Liani, a buxom airline hostess half his age. The weekly newspaper *Evdomi*, Papandreou complained, kept turning up nude photographs of Dimitra. Within a month Koskotas had bought *Evdomi*, and three months later he shut it down. Then there was Margaret, the second wife Papandreou wanted to divorce. He said that Margaret, absurdly, wanted a settlement of \$100 million. Koskotas heard himself say he could over a period of time put together \$10 million to \$20 million as a start.

In August 1988 the Prime Minister suddenly flew to London for triple-bypass heart surgery. The day before Papandreou left, Koskotas says, Louvaris came to pick up the customary cash, a suitcase of 90 million drachmas (\$600,000). After the surgery, Papandreou for the first time made public what many already knew: his rela-

6:30 that evening; Koskotas fled. He slipped out of his printing plant unseen, hidden in the back of one of his newspaper delivery trucks, to start a desperate journey across three continents. Three weeks later he fetched up in the U.S., where he was apprehended.

Locked in the Salem prison and fighting extradition, George Koskotas started to get advice to keep quiet from old accomplices. One of them, Yannis Mantzouranis, former secretary to the Greek Cabinet, sounded especially anxious to learn if the prisoner was going to talk. Mantzouranis, Koskotas says, was still holding a \$2 million payoff to Koutsogiorgas in a Swiss bank account. The existence of the account would implicate him.

Hoping to entrap Mantzouranis, Koskotas instructed his wife to make tape recordings of the phone calls from Athens.

The objective was to goad the unwitting Cabinet secretary into telling more about PASOK corruption. Mantzouranis warns of the consequences of saying too much. "I know them better than George," he says of his PASOK colleagues. "They wouldn't hesitate to do anything."

Mantzouranis relates how his own life has changed drastically. "You must understand that I am in danger," he says. "I do not circulate at night. I no longer live at my house."

In jail, listening to the cassette, Koskotas heard the fright in the caller's voice. It was an echo of his own fears. Mantzouranis had an important message to pass on: Koutsogiorgas wants to be certain the prisoner knows what he is doing. "Menios says," the voice from Greece emphasized, "that George should not betray the only people who can help him now." Koskotas pondered si-

lently and for a second felt a twinge of his old power. Then he dismissed the warning. He wanted to talk.

Throughout last week *TIME* sought comments and answers from government officials—including Prime Minister Papandreou—on the accusations in this story. When all refused to be interviewed, a list of questions was submitted to them. *TIME* did not disclose that it had interviewed Koskotas, but made clear that it was publishing a major story that contained serious and damaging allegations. Papandreou did address the affair in a Feb. 14 memorandum to investigators. He said he met Koskotas only three times, at the banker's initiative, between March 4, 1987, and June 30, 1988, during which the two discussed only Koskotas' business and, later, the accusations against him. ■



Dangerous liaisons: the Prime Minister attended by Dimitra Liani

tionship with Liani. That further undermined his slipping political standing. Rumors of the Koskotas money connection were also circulating: now opponents called for a reckoning.

The governor of the Bank of Greece started to press for a special audit of the Bank of Crete. Koutsogiorgas told Koskotas that the investigation could not be stopped. Fearing abandonment, Koskotas made a last threat. "If I am destroyed," he says he told Koutsogiorgas, "we'll all be destroyed. You know what they will find at the bank."

Soon 40 secret service agents were keeping a discreet surveillance over Koskotas. He began to think he might be killed. One day a friend in Greek intelligence told him he would be arrested by

Tilings for picture-perfect quasicrystals

Since the 1984 discovery of the first alloy with atoms arranged in a pattern having a symmetry forbidden by the usual rules of crystallography, scientists have debated whether such alloys belong to a special category of materials known as quasicrystals or instead consist simply of tiny, conventional crystals joined in unusual ways. New images showing atoms on the surface of an aluminum-cobalt-copper alloy provide the best evidence yet that at least some materials actually do solidify into quasicrystals.


"For the first time, we've been able to resolve individual atoms on the surface of a quasicrystal," says A. Refik Kortan of AT&T Bell Laboratories in Murray Hill, N.J. The resulting pictures clearly show that atoms can arrange themselves into patterns having a fivefold or a tenfold symmetry. The findings, reported in the Jan. 8 *PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS*, establish the feasibility of growing near-perfect quasicrystals (SN: 3/11/89, p.149) and demonstrate that simple tiling models can explain the structure of such materials down to the atomic level.

In the theoretical model of a quasicrystal, units consisting of groups of atoms fit together like tiles or blocks to create an orderly, space-filling arrangement. But the fitted units are not equally spaced, or periodic, as in a conventional crystal. Instead, the sequence of spacings follows a more complicated mathematical formula. A Penrose tiling (SN: 7/16/88, p.42), in which two types of diamond-shaped tiles combine to create just such a quasiperiodic pattern, provides one possible mathematical model for a quasicrystalline solid.

The alloy studied by Kortan and his co-workers crystallizes into small, 10-sided columns. Earlier studies had shown that these crystals seem to consist of neatly stacked, two-dimensional quasicrystalline layers. By preparing the crystals carefully, the researchers obtained samples with only a small number of defects, suitable for studying with a scanning tunneling microscope.

The tunneling microscope images of a cut, polished and cleaned surface show a network of points and ring-like structures, which correspond to the positions of atoms. When viewed at an angle, these structures appear to line up in five directions spaced 72° apart, attesting to the material's fivefold symmetry. Moreover, the fact that these lines continue across the steps that mark the edges of different layers in the material indicates that the positions of atoms are strongly correlated from one layer to the next.

The pictures effectively rule out the possibility that this alloy consists of a jumble of tiny, "multi-twinned" conventional crystals. "Since the full decagonal symmetry is realized on scales as small



At right, a network of points and ring-like structures, corresponding to atomic positions, covers a 150-angstrom-square region of a quasicrystalline alloy. The surface shows four prominent steps, revealing parts of the material's four top layers. This picture suggests a tiling model (left) in which aluminum atoms (open circles) tend to settle into pentagonal rings with copper or cobalt atoms (filled circles) at their centers. Shaded box corresponds to a surface region about 20 angstroms wide.



as 60 angstroms, and no periodic structures are seen, we can conclude that multi-twinning does not adequately describe the features in the [microscope] images," the researchers report.

"It's the first time anyone has confirmed at the atomic level the existence of a quasicrystalline material that appears to be perfect," says Paul J. Steinhardt of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. "The atoms map out a beautiful Penrose tiling."

Kortan and his colleagues propose a tiling model for this alloy in which each

layer consists of a framework of pentagonal rings made up largely of aluminum atoms, with either cobalt or copper atoms at the center of each ring. Each successive layer has roughly the same pentagonal pattern but rotated by 36°.

"That's more or less what the data suggest, but it's obviously not our final model," Kortan says. "The basic interatomic distance we measure in this pentagonal network is in good agreement with the aluminum-aluminum distance one would find in similar transition-metal compounds."

— I. Peterson

Minoan culture survived volcanic eruption

The Minoan civilization of ancient Crete literally rose from the ashes, according to new evidence. Advanced Minoan culture and its grand palaces disappeared around 1450 B.C. — a collapse attributed by many researchers to a devastating volcanic eruption on the nearby island of Thera (now known as Santorini). But recent excavations on Crete indicate the Minoans rebuilt their dwellings on top of large quantities of volcanic ash soon after the Santorini blast.

"We have conclusive evidence for the survival of Minoan civilization after the [Santorini] eruption," says Jeffrey S. Soles of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, who conducted the excavations with Greek colleagues. He described the findings Dec. 29 at the annual meeting of the Archaeological Institute of America in Boston.

Researchers had already begun to question the argument that the Santorini explosion triggered the Minoan collapse. Other investigators recently reported that seeds in Santorini's volcanic ash date to about 1600 B.C., 150 years prior to previous estimates of the eruption and the decline of the Minoans.

Soles and his colleagues are working at the site of Mochlos on the north coast of

Crete, an island near mainland Greece. Their project represents the first systematic excavation at Mochlos since 1908.

Last summer, the researchers took a closer look at a domestic structure largely uncovered in 1908. Numerous examples of Minoan pottery dot the floor of the three-room house. Beneath the floor lies a layer of soft, grainy volcanic ash covering a 23-square-foot area, ranging in thickness from 2 to 8 inches.

"It appears the house was built on top of the ash immediately after the ash fell, thus sealing and preserving [the underlying ash]," Soles maintains.


The 1908 investigators dug around the ash but did not comment on it at the time and probably considered it unimportant, he adds.

The Minoan civilization rose to prominence between about 2000 B.C. and 1450 B.C. It developed a sophisticated economy and traded extensively with nearby peoples. With the elimination of the Santorini eruption as the major culprit in the collapse of the Minoan culture, an alternative theory now gains support: The Minoans may have been conquered by members of the Mycenaean civilization that emerged on mainland Greece around 1600 B.C.

— B. Bowe

Greece Adrift

RICHARD C. CARPENTER



Jennifer Lawson

ATHENS—The general elections in Greece last week mark the second time in five months that voters gave no political party a clear mandate to govern the country. This means fresh elections in the not too distant future, with protracted economic instability and foreign-policy uncertainty.

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For those who take their news about Greece in occasional spurts, all this may sound strange. Indeed, most of the international media had been portraying former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou as easy prey. His popularity had plummeted thanks to

charges of large-scale government corruption (none yet substantiated, but probably all true). In the June elections, his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) was ousted from power.

But it was never reasonable to assume, as most pundits did, that the quasi-conservative Constantine Mitsotakis and his New Democracy party (ND) would automatically pick up the votes Pasok lost. The way the November campaign was waged, and the election results themselves, demonstrate why ND is unlikely to win the next round, or to govern long or well if it does win.

True, the Communist-led Coalition of the Left and Progress dropped two points; it garnered only 10.9 per cent of the vote. Unfortunately, scandal-ridden as it is, Pasok still managed a 1.5-point increase, to 40.7 per cent. The ND's vote increased by only two points, to 46.2 per cent. ND now holds 148 of the three hundred seats in parliament (up three, but still three shy of a majority), Pasok has 128 (also up three), and the Communists have 21 (down seven). The three remaining seats went to various independents. In short, the center-left to hard-left still accounts for some 52 per cent of parliament.

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Third, on economic policy, Mitsotakis waffled between promises of Thatcherite programs one day, and notions of following a Mitterrand or González model the next.

Fourth, Mitsotakis sent out confusing signals regarding foreign policy. For example, he promised Greece would finally give Israel diplomatic recognition, but then added a prominent exponent of Greek anti-Semitism to ND's ticket. On issues such as participation in NATO, the future of U.S. military facilities in Greece, bilateral relations with Turkey, and Common Market cooperation, he became much like Andreas Papandreou: a man of his most recent word.

The impression made? According to one Western observer, ND has become a "hodge-podge of political misfits and has-beens strung together with ill-defined ideology"; it "ought to be called not New Democracy but New Menagerie."

"It's high time to send Mr. No-Win packing," says a party insider. "If he won't leave peaceably, the party—at least a large segment of it—may soon leave him behind."

These sentiments of disgust have not yet reached groundswell proportions. But after a string of defeats (even if close ones) and erratic swings in policy, the message that ND must reform itself is abundantly clear.


Sadly, it may already be too late. Papandreou is sniggering on the sideline, calculating his prospects and reportedly preparing a "spectacular development" to solidify his position and

Mr. Carpenter, NR's Athens correspondent, has lived in Greece since 1981.

boost Pasok's support. If he delivers even half of what he is promising, democracy will suffer a further blow in the land of its birth. □

The Regents' Round Table

LAWRENCE AUSTER



NEW YORK—The radicalization of American schools proceeds apace. A report recently issued by New York State Commissioner of Education Thomas Sobol, entitled "A Curriculum of Inclusion," opens with the declaration that "African Americans, Asian Americans, Puerto Ricans/Latinos, and Native Americans have all been the victims of an intellectual and educational oppression that has characterized the culture and institutions of the United States and the European American world for centuries." No, this oppression does not consist in giving an *inferior* education to minorities, but in giving them the *same* education as whites. A "systematic bias toward European culture and its derivatives" has "a terribly damaging effect on the psyche of young people of African, Asian, Latino, and Native American descent." The report calls for a totally restructured curriculum for the state's public schools, in which "the history, achievements, aspirations, and concerns of people of all cultures [shall be] made an integral part of all curricula." This even includes science and math, since "by ostensibly omitting cultural references from science and mathematics materials, a subtle message is given to all children that all science and mathematics originated within the European culture."

Mr. Auster is a freelance writer living in New York City.

The proposal was released at the July meeting of the New York Board of Regents, the body that determines state education policy. Professor Harry Hamilton, a member of the Commissioner's Task Force on Minorities, which prepared the report, told the Regents: "We're on the brink of something very important for New York and the nation. We have to change the entire framework in the way we look at ourselves as a nation." Hamilton invoked mythic imagery: "Instead of one group, European Americans, at the head of a long table, with other cultures present only as invited guests, we will have a Round Table with all cultures equal." Sitting at their own long table, the Regents received the report with enthusiasm. Even conservatives liked it; former Chancellor Willard Genrich, one of a tiny minority on the Board that had just tried to block a major expansion of bilingual education, declared: "This is an excellent document and we should proceed with it."

Unfortunately, if their recent handling of bilingual education is any guide, the Regents seem likely to decide on the curriculum plan on the basis of uplifting slogans about a new America rather than critical thought about the plan's contents. The report does contain some good ideas about widening the curriculum to reflect minority experiences; but on the whole it is a poorly thought-out document, steeped in racial victimology and hos-

tility to the West. The idea that Western-oriented education robs minority youth of self-esteem, "turns off" the child who is not European American," is not backed up by any evidence at all. When we recall such figures as W. E. B. Du Bois and Martin Luther King, as well as a host of other American blacks who were shining products of "Eurocentered" education, it is hard to take that idea seriously. And why, if a group's curricular "invisibility" harms its self-esteem, have Japanese Americans done so well? Asians have obviously been added to the litany of aggrieved and ego-damaged groups to make plausible the notion of a blanket educational oppression of *all* non-whites and the resulting need for a radical overhaul.

Surprisingly, the report concedes the presence of substantial "multicultural" content (as well as the absence of negative stereotypes) in the present curriculum. A series of textbook reviews written from each minority viewpoint shows that "there has been a serious attempt to broaden the content to reflect the pluralism of American society." But such inclusion, says the report, does not solve the problem, because it is only "additive and not at the center of the endeavors." This is what the Task Force calls "Eurocentered multiculturalism." The mere inclusion of material on minority experience, no matter how extensive, "cannot counteract deeply rooted racist traditions in American culture. Merely adding marginal examples of 'other' cultures to an assumed dominant culture cannot reverse long established and entrenched policies and practices of that dominant culture. . . . The European American monocultural perspective prevails. Its value system and norms dominate."

Hence the report's inoffensive-sounding title, "A Curriculum of Inclusion," conceals a radical intent; it is not just greater inclusion of minority cultures the Task Force seeks, but the dismantling of the dominant culture. By the Orwellian magic of a name—"European American"—the national culture is transformed into an *ethnic* culture on the same level as all of America's minority cultures. Children will be taught that all cultures are to be "equally valued"; that the contributions of Puerto Ricans and Chinese and Iroquois are as important in the development of our society

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PRESIDENT BUSH'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT
ATHENS, GREECE

MR. PRESIDENT -- I AM GREATLY HONORED TO HAVE YOU WELCOME ME HERE TODAY, AND TO SEE PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS AND OTHER DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. AS SOME OF YOU MAY KNOW, I VISITED ATHENS ONCE BEFORE IN THE EARLY 1960'S AS A PRIVATE BUSINESSMAN. I COME NOW AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO TAKE GREAT PRIDE IN THEIR LONGSTANDING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE OF GREECE.

✓ DWIGHT EISENHOWER WAS THE LAST U.S. PRESIDENT TO VISIT GREECE, IN DECEMBER OF 1959. THE WORLD WAS A VERY DIFFERENT PLACE THEN. TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WERE ESCALATING. THE RESOLVE OF THE ALLIANCE IN UPHOLDING THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY WAS BEING TESTED. AND THE LIGHT OF LIBERTY IN MANY COUNTRIES WAS ALREADY EXTINGUISHED BY TOTALITARIAN RULE.

DURING PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S VISIT, OUR TWO COUNTRIES REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OBJECTIVES OF NATO. TO UNITE FOR THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND FOR PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. TO DEFEND THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW. THE ALLIANCE ROSE TO MEET EVERY CHALLENGE TO ITS MEMBERS AND ITS BELIEFS. IT HAS PROSPERED AND FLOURISHED. TOTALITARIANISM HAS BEEN ERODED BY ITS DEFEATS AND COLLAPSED UNDER ITS OWN UNSUSTAINABLE WEIGHT.

I HAVE JUST COME FROM THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING IN LONDON. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY HOLDS MORE PROMISE THAN EVER BEFORE. I SEE EVERY REASON FOR HOPE. EVERY REASON TO JOIN IN BUILDING A WORLD ORDER FOUNDED ON THOSE SAME TRIED AND TRUE ALLIANCE PRINCIPLES. AND ONE REASON I AM HERE TODAY IS TO DISCUSS THAT FUTURE WITH GREECE'S LEADERS.


I AM ALSO HERE TO AFFIRM AMERICA'S INTEREST IN A STRONG AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AND TO HONOR THE COUNTRY WHICH GAVE BIRTH TO DEMOCRACY IN THIS VERY CITY 2,500 YEARS AGO.

DWIGHT EISENHOWER WAS HERE IN A COLD WINTER OF THE COLD WAR. I AM FORTUNATE TO BE WITH YOU IN THE SUN-WASHED SUMMER OF GREECE AND A NEW AGE. PERHAPS YOUR OWN NOBEL PRIZE-WINNING POET GEORGE SEFERIS SAID IT BEST: "A LITTLE FARTHER -- WE WILL SEE ALMOND TREES BLOSSOMING -- THE MARBLE GLEAMING IN THE SUN -- THE SEA BREAKING INTO WAVES. A LITTLE FARTHER -- LET US RISE A LITTLE HIGHER."

LET US RISE TOGETHER. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Greece Adrift

RICHARD C. CARPENTER



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Third, on economic policy, Mitsotakis waffled between promises of Thatcherite programs one day, and notions of following a Mitterrand or González model the next.

Fourth, Mitsotakis sent out confusing signals regarding foreign policy. For example, he promised Greece would finally give Israel diplomatic recognition, but then added a prominent exponent of Greek anti-Semitism to ND's ticket. On issues such as participation in NATO, the future of U.S. military facilities in Greece, bilateral relations with Turkey, and Common Market cooperation, he became much like Andreas Papandreou: a man of his most recent word.

The impression made? According to one Western observer, ND has become a "hodge-podge of political misfits and has-beens strung together with ill-defined ideology"; it "ought to be called not New Democracy but New Menagerie."

"It's high time to send Mr. No-Win packing," says a party insider. "If he won't leave peaceably, the party—at least a large segment of it—may soon leave him behind."

These sentiments of disgust have not yet reached groundswell proportions. But after a string of defeats (even if close ones) and erratic swings in policy, the message that ND must reform itself is abundantly clear.


Sadly, it may already be too late. Papandreou is sniggering on the sideline, calculating his prospects and reportedly preparing a "spectacular development" to solidify his position and

Mr. Carpenter, NR's Athens correspondent, has lived in Greece since 1981.

boost Pasok's support. If he delivers even half of what he is promising, democracy will suffer a further blow in the land of its birth. □

The Regents' Round Table

LAWRENCE AUSTER



NEW YORK—The radicalization of American schools proceeds apace. A report recently issued by New York State Commissioner of Education Thomas Sobol, entitled "A Curriculum of Inclusion," opens with the declaration that "African Americans, Asian Americans, Puerto Ricans/Latinos, and Native Americans have all been the victims of an intellectual and educational oppression that has characterized the culture and institutions of the United States and the European American world for centuries." No, this oppression does not consist in giving an *inferior* education to minorities, but in giving them the *same* education as whites. A "systematic bias toward European culture and its derivatives" has "a terribly damaging effect on the psyche of young people of African, Asian, Latino, and Native American descent." The report calls for a totally restructured curriculum for the state's public schools, in which "the history, achievements, aspirations, and concerns of people of all cultures [shall be] made an integral part of all curricula." This even includes science and math, since "by ostensibly omitting cultural references from science and mathematics materials, a subtle message is given to all children that all science and mathematics originated within the European culture."

Mr. Auster is a freelance writer living in New York City.

The proposal was released at the July meeting of the New York Board of Regents, the body that determines state education policy. Professor Harry Hamilton, a member of the Commissioner's Task Force on Minorities, which prepared the report, told the Regents: "We're on the brink of something very important for New York and the nation. We have to change the entire framework in the way we look at ourselves as a nation." Hamilton invoked mythic imagery: "Instead of one group, European Americans, at the head of a long table, with other cultures present only as invited guests, we will have a Round Table with all cultures equal." Sitting at their own long table, the Regents received the report with enthusiasm. Even conservatives liked it; former Chancellor Willard Genrich, one of a tiny minority on the Board that had just tried to block a major expansion of bilingual education, declared: "This is an excellent document and we should proceed with it."

Unfortunately, if their recent handling of bilingual education is any guide, the Regents seem likely to decide on the curriculum plan on the basis of uplifting slogans about a new America rather than critical thought about the plan's contents. The report does contain some good ideas about widening the curriculum to reflect minority experiences; but on the whole it is a poorly thought-out document, steeped in racial victimology and hos-

tility to the West. The idea that Western-oriented education robs minority youth of self-esteem, "turns off" the child who is not European American," is not backed up by any evidence at all. When we recall such figures as W. E. B. Du Bois and Martin Luther King, as well as a host of other American blacks who were shining products of "Eurocentered" education, it is hard to take that idea seriously. And why, if a group's curricular "invisibility" harms its self-esteem, have Japanese Americans done so well? Asians have obviously been added to the litany of aggrieved and ego-damaged groups to make plausible the notion of a blanket educational oppression of all non-whites and the resulting need for a radical overhaul.

Surprisingly, the report concedes the presence of substantial "multicultural" content (as well as the absence of negative stereotypes) in the present curriculum. A series of textbook reviews written from each minority viewpoint shows that "there has been a serious attempt to broaden the content to reflect the pluralism of American society." But such inclusion, says the report, does not solve the problem, because it is only "additive and not at the center of the endeavors." This is what the Task Force calls "Eurocentered multiculturalism." The mere inclusion of material on minority experience, no matter how extensive, "cannot counteract deeply rooted racist traditions in American culture. Merely adding marginal examples of 'other' cultures to an assumed dominant culture cannot reverse long established and entrenched policies and practices of that dominant culture. . . . The European American monocultural perspective prevails. Its value system and norms dominate."

Hence the report's inoffensive-sounding title, "A Curriculum of Inclusion," conceals a radical intent; it is not just greater inclusion of minority cultures the Task Force seeks, but the dismantling of the dominant culture. By the Orwellian magic of a name—"European American"—the national culture is transformed into an *ethnic* culture on the same level as all of America's minority cultures. Children will be taught that all cultures are to be "equally valued"; that the contributions of Puerto Ricans and Chinese and Iroquois are as important in the development of our society

Caught in the Labyrinth

Papandreou, ailing and under attack, is not yet out for the count

Reasonable people expected that Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou would suffer heavier losses. He had campaigned for the June 18 parliamentary elections amid a series of scandals linking some members of his government to huge embezzlement, fraud, payoffs and illegal arms deals. On top of that, there was his public romance with Dimitra Liani, a former airline flight attendant half his age. But Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) slid only far enough to lose its majority. And since no other party won more than half the seats, Papandreou, who was hospitalized in serious condition last week with lung, heart and kidney complications, is staying on as caretaker Prime Minister while the struggle continues to form a government.

The major beneficiary in the balloting was Constantine Mitsotakis' conservative New Democracy Party, which won 145 seats, just six short of control in the 300-seat Parliament. The New Democrats campaigned on the promise of "catharsis," which included investigating and prosecuting political big-wigs implicated in several cases of alleged fraud that involved millions of dollars, including the embezzlement of more than \$210 million from the Bank of Crete by its former owner George Koskotas.

For the first time, the Communists in Greece hold the balance of parliamentary power. The Alliance of the Left, which the Communists dominate, won



The Prime Minister enters the hospital



New Democracy's Mitsotakis confers with Communist leader Florakis

28 seats and could form a government with either PASOK, which holds 125 seats, or New Democracy. Communist Party leader Harilaos Florakis also demands catharsis but so far has refused to consider entering a coalition under either Papandreou or Mitsotakis.

Before he fell ill, Papandreou, 70, hoped to talk the Alliance of the Left into joining PASOK in "a coalition of the progressive forces." He dismissed the financial scandals, claiming they are simply plots instigated against him by "foreign and domestic forces." But last week another scandal was revealed as U.S. authorities arrested 14 employees of the National Mortgage Bank of Greece on charges of illegally transferring about \$700 million to the bank's central office in Athens, apparently to avoid paying taxes.

While the political parties continue to look for a possible deal, the business of Greece has come to a halt. Since there is no elected head of government, President Christos Sartzetakis will represent Greece

at this week's European summit in Madrid. Negotiations with the U.S. for a new agreement on American military bases in Greece must await a functioning government. A long-overdue austerity program is also on hold. "The country is running itself now," said Parliament member George Voulgarakis.

The Alliance has proposed a short-term "ecumenical government" made up of public figures who are acceptable to all sides. Such a transition team would be assigned to set the cleanup in motion and then take the country into new elections. As Papandreou's health deteriorated last week, many in Athens believed it might be the one way out of the labyrinth. ■

THE COMMUNITY

New Times

Thatcher down, Greens up

Although elections for the European Parliament may still be more symbolic than substantive, the balloting shattered British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's image of invincibility last week. Her Conservative Party suffered its first national defeat in nearly 15 years, capturing only 34.7% of the vote and losing 13 of its 45 European Parliament seats. By contrast, the left-leaning Labor Party totted up 40.2%, stirring dreams among Laborites of ousting Thatcher from power at home.

In West Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats received a blow as the new right-wing Republican Party, led by a former sergeant in Hitler's

Waffen-SS, won 7% of the vote by capitalizing on fears of competition from foreign workers.

Elections for the Strasbourg-based assembly, once consigned to the status of a European debating society, are fast becoming a bellwether for European politics. Thatcher aides sought to downplay the Tory defeat by arguing that the culprit was domestic discontent with Britain's 15% interest rates and 8.3% inflation. Even critics within her own party scoffed, blaming her Britain-first, anti-European rhetoric at a time when Europe is moving toward economic integration in 1992. Said a Tory backbencher: "She got it drastically wrong."

Across Western Europe, the biggest gains were won by Green parties, which nearly doubled their representation, to 39 delegates. The environmentalists thus hold the balance of power in the 518-seat

chamber, ensuring that their issues will be high on the European Community's agenda. West Germany's well-established Green contingent will be joined by delegations from other E.C. countries, including France and Italy. In Britain the Greens captured an impressive 15% of the vote but no seats because Britain does not have a proportional-representation system.

As E.C. leaders hold their first post-election summit in Madrid this week, the big question is whether Thatcher's weakened position will cause her to be more conciliatory on two key proposals: a social charter intended to safeguard workers' rights and, more important, the eventual establishment of a single currency managed by a European central bank. Emboldened by the erosion of Thatcher's political strength, her fellow summiteers may decide to press on toward European unity, whatever her objections. ■

● SCANDALS

The Looting of Greece

For the first time, a fallen tycoon tells how he embezzled millions



BY ROBERT AJEMIAN

Greeks were exhilarated in 1981 when Andreas Papandreou and his Socialist Party swept to power. Their enthusiasm has since turned to bitterness and disbelief: the worst financial and political scandal in four decades engulfs Greece. The president, the Bank of Greece, a magistrate and Parliament are delving into charges of corruption, seeking to uncover how more than \$210 million disappeared from the Bank of Crete. Charges of embezzlement, kickbacks and bribery, of banknotes stuffed into briefcases, have been leveled against high officials.

The scandal has scorched the Socialist Party (PASOK), and public cynicism has increasingly focused on the party's leader, Papandreou himself. The Prime Minister last September was already the target of snickering and outrage as he conducted a highly public extramarital liaison with airline flight stewardess Dimitra Liani. 3

Now inside a Salem prison, Koskotas fears that once extradited, he will disappear behind bars—or be murdered and declared a suicide.

KOSKOTAS' TALE OF CORRUPTION: HE ALLEGES

THE SCAM

1984

Koskotas buys Bank of Crete



FALL 1985

PASOK leaders order state-managed corporations to deposit funds in the Bank of Crete

SUMMER 1985

After winning re-election, PASOK cuts deal with Koskotas



By skimming interest payments on the state funds, Koskotas started building a huge pool of money for payoffs.

As the parliamentary investigations dug through testimony, the question loomed: Was the Prime Minister aware of the crime all along?

Papandreou has not testified before investigators, though he vehemently denies any involvement in what he calls a "conspiracy aiming to hurt Greece." But investigators have yet to hear from the central figure in the case, George Koskotas, 34, a one-time New York house painter who vaulted to power as the multimillionaire owner of the Bank of Crete. Now jailed in Massachusetts on a variety of charges leveled just before he fled Greece last November, Koskotas is facing extradition to answer accusations of looting his own bank.

Amid more than a dozen lawsuits, much has come out about the vast scandal, but most Greeks believe there is far more to be revealed—by one man in particular. Given his central role in the affair, Koskotas' version of the dirty dealings could prove to be an imperfect account. Apparently nothing will be resolved until the public has weighed his tale. "At this point," says a frustrated former PASOK member, "we are all waiting to hear what Koskotas has to say."

A plump man with steady dark eyes and a soft voice, Koskotas is no common embezzler. In addition to the Bank of Crete, he owned Grammi, a flourishing publishing empire that operated five magazines, three newspapers and a radio station. He bankrolled big hotels. A year ago, he bought Greece's wildly popular soccer team, Olympiakos. He created one of the world's most advanced printing plants. And until he fled Greece, Koskotas con-



Papandreou: increasingly the focus of public cynicism

Did he authorize the looting of the Bank of Crete?

sorted freely with the country's ruling Socialist leaders. At 34, George Koskotas, the Greek wunderkind, had achieved a dazzling reputation in his own land.

Now inside a Salem, Mass., prison, Koskotas has finally decided to talk. His chief motivation, he explains, is a fear that once extradited to Greece he will disappear behind bars—or be murdered and declared a suicide and thus be unable to present his own version of what happened. He figures his fate in Greece will be worse if Papandreou remains in power; so his motive for speaking may also be to wound the government.

The Koskotas accusations are ex-

traordinary, though difficult to verify. In six lengthy prison interviews with TIME, the banker describes a Socialist government riddled by extortion and criminality. Koskotas charges that millions of dollars missing from his bank were actually payoffs that went directly to the head of the government, Andreas Papandreou, and PASOK officials. The Prime Minister, says the banker, personally authorized the plan to loot the Bank of Crete. Koskotas describes as well his own illegal complicity in the huge swindle, one that involves enormous sums hard to account for adequately.

The plot was an audacious one. To create the pool of crooked money, PASOK leaders had for three years ordered state-managed corporations such as the Post Office, the Organization of Urban Transportation and the State Pharmaceutical Co. to transfer large bank deposits—the country's money, in effect—out of the big national banks into the Bank of Crete, then the smallest private bank in the country. There,

Koskotas says, he arranged for the government deposits to draw an exceptionally low rate of interest, only 2% or 3%. Bank savings accounts in Greece routinely draw 15% interest. The excess interest earned on the government deposits was siphoned off and went straight to the politicians, he says. In addition, protected and encouraged by Papandreou, Koskotas secretly plowed Bank of Crete funds into his magazines and newspapers.

In the past year, says Koskotas, some 40 shipments of money, in blue briefcases stuffed with 5,000-drachma notes, were carted out of the Bank of Crete and taken first to his own residence. There the bank-

THE PAYOFF

1986-87

Koskotas begins making illicit payments eventually totaling more than \$30 million, to PASOK officials


OCTOBER 1987

Visiting Washington, Koskotas is arrested on old charges of defrauding the U.S. Government but returns to Greece



LATE OCTOBER 1987

Threatening Koskotas with prison, Papandreou pressures him to make regular payments directly to the Prime Minister; in the next year, Koskotas hands over \$20 million in about 40 blue briefcases



THE INFLUENCE

1986-88


At Papandreou's urging, and using bank funds, Koskotas buys top Greek newspapers *Kathimerini*, *Vradyni*; installs editors favorable to Papandreou; and starts new paper *24 Hours* to promote the Papandreou family



After the weekly *Evdomi* publishes nude pictures of Papandreou's mistress Dimitra Liani, Koskotas buys it and shuts it down




Papandreou presses Koskotas to buy the popular Greek football team Olympiakos to associate it with PASOK's 1989 campaign



THE SCANDAL


SEPTEMBER 1988

Papandreou's political power slips amid heart surgery, revelations about his mistress and the emerging banking scandal



OCTOBER 1988

Papandreou is too weak to stop an investigation into the Bank of Crete that reveals \$210 million is missing



NOVEMBER 1988

Tipped by a friend in Greek intelligence, Koskotas flees and is arrested by the FBI after landing near Boston

TIME: Cover by Jon Lundberg

er handed the money over to a Papandreou confidant. Georgios Louvaris, who Koskotas says made the deliveries to the Prime Minister. Pickups occurred weekly and amounted over the year to more than 3 billion drachmas (\$20 million at today's rates). In addition, Koskotas claims he personally carried a total of half a billion drachmas (\$3.3 million) to the home of a Deputy Prime Minister, Menios Koutsogiorgas. At the Bank of Crete half a dozen other PASOK leaders twice a month received briefcases filled with money totaling 1.5 billion drachmas (\$10 million).

There was little danger of interference. Fifty different national audits of the Bank of Crete that might have uncovered the scheme were squelched over the years by PASOK officials, says Koskotas, twice by direct calls from Papandreou.

In the summer of 1988, the government muscled through a special Secrecy Act that had the effect of guaranteeing its overdrawn banker financial confidentiality. Koskotas says he was directed to pay an additional \$2 million to then Deputy Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas as a reward for managing the legislation.

The dank atmosphere that nurtured this tangle of alleged corruption began after the Socialists' re-election in 1985. Papandreou was eager to tighten his grip on the country. He found a perfect match in the ambitious young publisher and banker Koskotas, who saw in PASOK a means to build an empire.

Now, sitting in the library of the Salem prison, Koskotas recalled the beginnings of a relationship that led to his ruin. He wore a blue pullover sport shirt and blue jeans, white leather sneakers on his feet. Koskotas had squeezed his big waist into a one-armed desk chair.

In his lap he balanced a pile of tape transcripts and letters he had carried out of Greece as evidence. From time to time he ran his finger across the pages of his old appointment book, picking out entries of meetings with the Prime Minister and other key government officials.

He remembers the meetings with Papandreou vividly, five times alone in the Prime Minister's home at Kastri, once at the home of a Papandreou intimate, Michalis Ziangas. At the first meeting in early 1986, Koskotas recalls, the Prime Minister had a proposal: Koskotas should start a daily newspaper to provide positive coverage of the Papandreou family. Kos-

kotas later put up the money, and the first issue of the paper, called *24 Hours*, appeared in February 1988.

The Prime Minister always seemed to possess inside information. Papandreou, says the banker, taps the home and business telephones of such rivals as the head of the political opposition, New Democracy's Constantine Mitsotakis, and unfriendly publishers. "I know all their plans," he proudly told Koskotas.

Papandreou came to assume that Grammi's national magazines and newspapers really served him. Certain Papandreou favorites were hired as editors. Says Koskotas: "All our editors were instructed never to criticize the Prime Minister per-

But the Bank of Crete opened about 50 branches in four years, and licenses were granted for an additional 20. Sure of his political shield, Koskotas was unafraid to violate banking laws and withdraw huge sums of cash at will. If Koskotas worried aloud about audits, Papandreou was always reassuring. "So long as I am here," Koskotas says Papandreou told him, "you never have to worry."

Koskotas said little of his early years, but he was a young man drawn to risk. Born in 1954 in Greece, he came to America with his parents in 1970. "George was very ambitious," says his wife Kathy, whom he married in 1973. "His mind was always working."

At New York University, that overactive mind seemed to be hunting for angles. Koskotas ordered a batch of N.Y.U. and Fordham University stationery from a printer. He said he wanted to send reprimanding letters to some student friends as a prank. The university believed he intended to create fake transcripts. He was arrested, fined \$200 and asked to leave school.


Not satisfied with all his claimed wealth, he continued to indulge his compulsion for risk taking, and it backfired badly. Koskotas obtained fake Social Security numbers for several of his painters who were illegal aliens—federal prosecutors charge that he created fictitious names—and then used them in efforts to collect unemployment insurance claims and income tax refunds. In 1979, before Koskotas was indicted by the U.S. Attorney, he

returned to Greece with his wife and four children. A year later, in 1980, the U.S. formally charged him with stealing \$40,000. In the years that followed, Koskotas traveled back and forth numerous times to America, always unaware he was under indictment, he claims. Long after, the incident would rise up to haunt him.


Back in Greece, still only 25, he landed a job as an administrative officer at the Bank of Crete. Five years later, in late 1984 when the Bank of Crete came up for purchase at \$9 million, Koskotas somehow produced a bankroll big enough to buy it. He knew exactly where he wanted to go. The Socialists were immersed in an election and Koskotas was determined to curry favor. Within a few months he hired as bank general manager a PASOK veteran, Panayotis Vakalis, whom he knew to be a longtime friend of Andreas Papandreou's.



Koutsogiorgas: Payoffs?



Louvaris: Deliveryman?



Charges of embezzlement and kickbacks and banknotes stuffed into briefcases for officials

sonally, not even a single cartoon." Papandreou urged Koskotas to neutralize hostile newspapers by buying them up gradually. At their second meeting in early 1987, Papandreou pressed Koskotas to buy *Kathimerini*, the country's most respected paper; he did, using Bank of Crete funds.

Another time Papandreou had an unexpected idea: Koskotas should purchase the Olympiakos football team. Papandreou, according to Koskotas, wanted the banker to build up the team, so that just before the 1989 election the government would agree to build Olympiakos a new stadium, an announcement certain to be highly popular. Koskotas laid out 4 billion drachmas for the plan.

Koskotas' first ambition, he says, was to enlarge the Bank of Crete. Private banks routinely had to wait at least a year for authorization to open a single branch.

The connection eventually brought the young banker and the Prime Minister together. The great swindle was under way.

For two years, says Koskotas, payoffs went to the party, none to Papandreou himself. Then a pivotal event occurred. In October 1987, Koskotas traveled to Washington to attend a White House luncheon at which Vice President George Bush was the host. Secret Service agents, checking invitations, were surprised to discover that the guest from Greece was under a six-year-old federal indictment. They arrested Koskotas at his Washington hotel. The banker posted bail of \$1 million. A few days later, to get home, Koskotas lied to Greek embassy officials and obtained a travel document.

Only three weeks later, Koskotas says, he was summoned by Papandreou. It was apparent to Koskotas that something was wrong. Sternly the Prime Minister warned that because of the passport violation, Koskotas might have to go to jail. Eventually Papandreou declared Koskotas need not worry. But there were certain requirements. An election was coming, the Prime Minister stressed, and PASOK needed 5 billion drachmas (\$33 million). Thereupon, says Koskotas, Papandreou bluntly described a much expanded plan for kicking back interest payments. Koskotas, he directed, should work out the details with Deputy Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas. Says Koskotas, sounding surprisingly disingenuous: "I realized it was outright blackmail." Until then he had rationalized that the stolen interest payments to PASOK were simply the political cost of doing business in Greece.

Two weeks later, Koskotas says, the first direct request for money came by telephone from Papandreou. The Prime Minister wanted 200 million drachmas (\$1.3 million), purportedly to pay the expenses for a PASOK youth festival. Georgios Louvaris would drop by. In the following months, says Koskotas, Papandreou made two other personal calls for cash, each for 150 million drachmas (\$1 million), for what he described as PASOK events. Otherwise the Prime Minister received a weekly delivery of around 75 million drachmas.

Soon Koskotas found the requests from Papandreou and Koutsogiorgas bolder—and more personal. Papandreou wanted to squelch a critical memoir by his first wife, Christine, a psychiatrist. Through foreign book agents, Koskotas paid out \$90,000 and tied up world rights to the book. Papandreou raised another problem. The Prime Minister, then 69,

was keeping company with Dimitra Liani, a buxom airline hostess half his age. The weekly newspaper *Evdomi*, Papandreou complained, kept turning up nude photographs of Dimitra. Within a month Koskotas had bought *Evdomi*, and three months later he shut it down. Then there was Margaret, the second wife Papandreou wanted to divorce. He said that Margaret, absurdly, wanted a settlement of \$100 million. Koskotas heard himself say he could over a period of time put together \$10 million to \$20 million as a start.

In August 1988 the Prime Minister suddenly flew to London for triple-bypass heart surgery. The day before Papandreou left, Koskotas says, Louvaris came to pick up the customary cash, a suitcase of 90 million drachmas (\$600,000). After the surgery, Papandreou for the first time made public what many already knew: his rela-

6:30 that evening; Koskotas fled. He slipped out of his printing plant unseen, hidden in the back of one of his newspaper delivery trucks, to start a desperate journey across three continents. Three weeks later he fetched up in the U.S., where he was apprehended.

Locked in the Salem prison and fighting extradition, George Koskotas started to get advice to keep quiet from old accomplices. One of them, Yannis Mantzouranis, former secretary to the Greek Cabinet, sounded especially anxious to learn if the prisoner was going to talk. Mantzouranis, Koskotas says, was still holding a \$2 million payoff to Koutsogiorgas in a Swiss bank account. The existence of the account would implicate him.

Hoping to entrap Mantzouranis, Koskotas instructed his wife to make tape recordings of the phone calls from Athens.

The objective was to goad the unwitting Cabinet secretary into telling more about PASOK corruption. Mantzouranis warns of the consequences of saying too much. "I know them better than George," he says of his PASOK colleagues. "They wouldn't hesitate to do anything."

Mantzouranis relates how his own life has changed drastically. "You must understand that I am in danger," he says. "I do not circulate at night. I no longer live at my house."

In jail, listening to the cassette, Koskotas heard the fright in the caller's voice. It was an echo of his own fears. Mantzouranis had an important message to pass on: Koutsogiorgas wants to be certain the prisoner knows what he is doing. "Menios says," the voice from Greece emphasized, "that George should not betray the only people who can help him now." Koskotas pondered si-

lently and for a second felt a twinge of his old power. Then he dismissed the warning. He wanted to talk.

Throughout last week TIME sought comments and answers from government officials—including Prime Minister Papandreou—on the accusations in this story. When all refused to be interviewed, a list of questions was submitted to them. TIME did not disclose that it had interviewed Koskotas, but made clear that it was publishing a major story that contained serious and damaging allegations. Papandreou did address the affair in a Feb. 14 memorandum to investigators. He said he met Koskotas only three times, at the banker's initiative, between March 4, 1987, and June 30, 1988, during which the two discussed only Koskotas' business and, later, the accusations against him.



Dangerous liaisons: the Prime Minister attended by Dimitra Liani

tionship with Liani. That further undermined his slipping political standing. Rumors of the Koskotas money connection were also circulating; now opponents called for a reckoning.

The governor of the Bank of Greece started to press for a special audit of the Bank of Crete. Koutsogiorgas told Koskotas that the investigation could not be stopped. Fearing abandonment, Koskotas made a last threat. "If I am destroyed," he says he told Koutsogiorgas, "we'll all be destroyed. You know what they will find at the bank."

Soon 40 secret service agents were keeping a discreet surveillance over Koskotas. He began to think he might be killed. One day a friend in Greek intelligence told him he would be arrested by

Tilings for picture-perfect quasicrystals

Since the 1984 discovery of the first alloy with atoms arranged in a pattern having a symmetry forbidden by the usual rules of crystallography, scientists have debated whether such alloys belong to a special category of materials known as quasicrystals or instead consist simply of tiny, conventional crystals joined in unusual ways. New images showing atoms on the surface of an aluminum-cobalt-copper alloy provide the best evidence yet that at least some materials actually do solidify into quasicrystals.


"For the first time, we've been able to resolve individual atoms on the surface of a quasicrystal," says A. Refik Kortan of AT&T Bell Laboratories in Murray Hill, N.J. The resulting pictures clearly show that atoms can arrange themselves into patterns having a fivefold or a tenfold symmetry. The findings, reported in the Jan. 8 *PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS*, establish the feasibility of growing near-perfect quasicrystals (SN: 3/11/89, p.149) and demonstrate that simple tiling models can explain the structure of such materials down to the atomic level.

In the theoretical model of a quasicrystal, units consisting of groups of atoms fit together like tiles or blocks to create an orderly, space-filling arrangement. But the fitted units are not equally spaced, or periodic, as in a conventional crystal. Instead, the sequence of spacings follows a more complicated mathematical formula. A Penrose tiling (SN: 7/16/88, p.42), in which two types of diamond-shaped tiles combine to create just such a quasiperiodic pattern, provides one possible mathematical model for a quasicrystalline solid.


The alloy studied by Kortan and his co-workers crystallizes into small, 10-sided columns. Earlier studies had shown that these crystals seem to consist of neatly stacked, two-dimensional quasicrystalline layers. By preparing the crystals carefully, the researchers obtained samples with only a small number of defects, suitable for studying with a scanning tunneling microscope.

The tunneling microscope images of a cut, polished and cleaned surface show a network of points and ring-like structures, which correspond to the positions of atoms. When viewed at an angle, these structures appear to line up in five directions spaced 72° apart, attesting to the material's fivefold symmetry. Moreover, the fact that these lines continue across the steps that mark the edges of different layers in the material indicates that the positions of atoms are strongly correlated from one layer to the next.

The pictures effectively rule out the possibility that this alloy consists of a jumble of tiny, "multi-twinned" conventional crystals. "Since the full decagonal symmetry is realized on scales as small



As right, a network of points and ring-like structures, corresponding to atomic positions, covers a 150-angstrom-square region of a quasicrystalline alloy. The surface shows four prominent steps, revealing parts of the material's four top layers. This picture suggests a tiling model (left) in which aluminum atoms (open circles) tend to settle into pentagonal rings with copper or cobalt atoms (filled circles) at their centers. Shaded box corresponds to a surface region about 20 angstroms wide.



as 60 angstroms, and no periodic structures are seen, we can conclude that multi-twinning does not adequately describe the features in the [microscope] images," the researchers report.

"It's the first time anyone has confirmed at the atomic level the existence of a quasicrystalline material that appears to be perfect," says Paul J. Steinhardt of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. "The atoms map out a beautiful Penrose tiling."

Kortan and his colleagues propose a tiling model for this alloy in which each

layer consists of a framework of pentagonal rings made up largely of aluminum atoms, with either cobalt or copper atoms at the center of each ring. Each successive layer has roughly the same pentagonal pattern but rotated by 36°.

"That's more or less what the data suggest, but it's obviously not our final model," Kortan says. "The basic interatomic distance we measure in this pentagonal network is in good agreement with the aluminum-aluminum distance one would find in similar transition-metal compounds."

— I. Petersen

Minoan culture survived volcanic eruption

The Minoan civilization of ancient Crete literally rose from the ashes, according to new evidence. Advanced Minoan culture and its grand palaces disappeared around 1450 B.C. — a collapse attributed by many researchers to a devastating volcanic eruption on the nearby island of Thera (now known as Santorini). But recent excavations on Crete indicate the Minoans rebuilt their dwellings on top of large quantities of volcanic ash soon after the Santorini blast.

"We have conclusive evidence for the survival of Minoan civilization after the [Santorini] eruption," says Jeffrey S. Soles of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, who conducted the excavations with Greek colleagues. He described the findings Dec. 29 at the annual meeting of the Archaeological Institute of America in Boston.

Researchers had already begun to question the argument that the Santorini explosion triggered the Minoan collapse. Other investigators recently reported that seeds in Santorini's volcanic ash date to about 1600 B.C., 150 years prior to previous estimates of the eruption and the decline of the Minoans.

Soles and his colleagues are working at the site of Mochlos on the north coast of

Crete, an island near mainland Greece. Their project represents the first systematic excavation at Mochlos since 1908.

Last summer, the researchers took a closer look at a domestic structure largely uncovered in 1908. Numerous examples of Minoan pottery dot the floor of the three-room house. Beneath the floor lies a layer of soft, grainy volcanic ash covering a 23-square-foot area, ranging in thickness from 2 to 8 inches.

"It appears the house was built on top of the ash immediately after the ash fell, thus sealing and preserving [the underlying ash]," Soles maintains.

The 1908 investigators dug around the ash but did not comment on it at the time and probably considered it unimportant, he adds.

The Minoan civilization rose to prominence between about 2000 B.C. and 1450 B.C. It developed a sophisticated economy and traded extensively with nearby peoples. With the elimination of the Santorini eruption as the major culprit in the collapse of the Minoan culture, an alternative theory now gains support: The Minoans may have been conquered by members of the Mycenaean civilization that emerged on mainland Greece around 1600 B.C.

— B. Bow

A new kind of Greek tragedy


The land that invented democracy can't make it work

Democracy may be thriving almost everywhere else, but it has fallen on hard times in the land of its birth. Some 2,500 years after Pericles, Greece is an ordinary Eastern Mediterranean state of 10 million people more reasonably compared with neighboring Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey than with Athens's Golden Age. The Greeks' inability to govern themselves mocks the legend and is a warning to Romanians, Nicaraguans, Argentines and others that building a better future sometimes requires forgetting the past.

Greece cannot, or will not, and it is caught in a new age of paralysis. Its parliament cannot choose a new figurehead President, let alone face tough budget issues. Washington's recent decision to close two of the four U.S. military bases in Greece was a godsend; no local politician had the authority to negotiate their removal. Greece remains the second-poorest nation in the European Community, edging out only backward Portugal, and saved from catastrophe only by continuing aid from the EC and the United States. In the past two years, one government slithered into a pit of corruption, two national elections produced nothing more than futile coalitions, and now a third parliamentary vote on April 8 is likely to produce only another nonresult.

Placing all the blame on the last leader to hold real power, Socialist Andreas Papandreou, is easy. Charges of corruption and illegal wiretapping against him blackened Greece's image. But something deeper is behind Greece's failure to make democracy work.

Dig deep into why Greeks vote the way they do—for deadlock—and an immovable wall of passion and prejudice appears. Trikala, a relatively prosperous cotton-growing town of 45,000 in the province of Thessaly, mirrors the national mood: It is split between Papandreou's center-left Socialists and Constantine Mitsotakis's conservative New Democracy Party, with the Communists drawing perhaps 10 percent. No one is willing to change his vote, even if doing so would



On the right. Constantine Mitsotakis

mean producing a viable government.

The origins of this polarization lie in Greece's vicious 1947-49 civil war and, to a lesser extent, in a conflict over the monarchy that only flickered out in 1974. The civil war broke out when the Communists, who had led Greek resistance to the Germans during World War II, tried to take over. With strong U.S. support, they were beaten. But the war and the conservatives' subsequent repression of all opponents, not just Communists, created lasting divisions. "The civil war still helps dictate the way people vote," says Eleftherios Simos, chairman of Trikala's Chamber of Commerce. "It is a continuing self-destruction."

Vangelis Papadimitriou, an innkeeper and New Democracy supporter, says Papandreou exploits these passions. "He wants to convince Greeks that today's right will again persecute the left." Trikala folk who support Papandreou regard Mitsotakis's conservatives as fascists, says Labros Katsiambas, editor of the local newspaper. "People won't change their votes. They're fearful of betraying values established in the civil war and before." Adds tax consultant Theodoros Spathis, a Communist, "They'd forgive Papandreou anything just to block the right. There are people who vote for him who hate him."

Digging up the past. There is an even older dimension to Papandreou's durability. His anti-Americanism, particularly on the issue of the bases, harkens back to the 400-year Turkish occupation of Greece, argues Mitsotakis supporter Papadimitriou. "We were disgraced by subordination to the Turks; Papandreou says we cannot be subordinated to the U.S."


The chances that Papandreou will stand trial for his alleged misdeeds have dimmed since his Socialists teamed up with New Democracy and the Communists in the latest do-nothing coalition. Absurdly, the ex-Premier and the old foe who beat him, Mitsotakis, recently were saying nice things about each other in closed-door strategy sessions. Less absurdly, there are signs of political compromise between Socialists and conservatives as free-market thinking takes hold across Europe.

There is even talk of putting the country on course with a left-right "government of national salvation," but hardly anyone believes that would be any more decisive than the present benumbed caretaker squads. Must Papandreou and Mitsotakis both step aside? Probably, say Trikala voters. But only a new willingness among Greeks to cast their votes for the future instead of the past can save Greece from itself. ■



On the left. Socialist Papandreou is trying for a comeback

by David Lawday
in Trikala, Greece



Leningrad shopper in nearly empty store: billions of dollars' worth of foreign emergency aid

DUCLOS/SIPA-PHOTOSSE

had recently threatened to cut its 1991 contribution to the national budget by \$244 billion, or 83 per cent. And Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene told a news conference last week that her Baltic republic would continue its independent path. Declared Prunskiene: "Lithuania will not take part either in the union budget or in the currency or some other common funds and structures of the Soviet Union."

Gorbachev, meanwhile, has issued a flurry of recent orders designed to aid hungry consumers and contain social unrest. He assigned the KGB a new task: cracking down on theft and black-market profiteering. He installed Boris Pugo, the former head of the KGB in Latvia, as interior minister in charge of the country's regular police forces. He also reaffirmed his own

Curtain along its eastern borders, a possibility in which self-preservation would triumph over its commitment to democracy."

To help alleviate Soviet food shortages and show support for the embattled Gorbachev, foreign governments have sent billions of dollars' worth of emergency aid, technical assistance and credits. At a December meeting of the 12-nation European Community at which leaders agreed on a \$2.8-billion package of such aid, British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd declared: "It is not in the interests of Europe that the Soviet Union lapse into anarchy or that it should fall back into the hands of some backward-looking tyrant." Canada has

pledged easier terms for nearly \$1 billion in food credits.

The situation in the Soviet Union, however, remains precarious. Last Thursday, Gorbachev announced a temporary economic accord with rebellious republican leaders. The Soviet president said that agreement had been reached on food supplies for the coming year, and he hinted at progress in resolving disputes with the republics over who controls natural resources and hard-currency export earnings. But it was not clear whether the Kremlin had completely patched up differences with the Russian Federation, the largest republic, led by Gorbachev's archrival, Boris Yeltsin, which

intention to preserve the boundaries of the union. Those hard-line measures have sparked widespread speculation that Gorbachev was about to resort to dictatorial rule, and led to the sudden resignation of foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze last month. Gorbachev's aides say that the Soviet president's tough stance is a tactic intended to marshal conservative support for long-overdue reforms. With growing disorder and frustration within a fraying Soviet Union, however, failure could make dark predictions of a mass exodus increasingly realistic.

ANDREW BILSKI with MALCOLM GRAY in Moscow and BOGDAN TUREK in Warsaw

A PERILOUS WINTER EXODUS

They came by the thousands, stumbling along mountain paths, tunnelling under fences and swimming across freezing rivers to escape Albania, Eastern Europe's last bastion of orthodox communism. Most of the refugees were ethnic Greeks and their destination was Greece itself, on the far side of snow-covered Mount Tsamandás straddling the border. They fled despite promises by Albanian President Ramiz Alia to democratize his country, Europe's poorest nation. And they created an acute problem for Greece, where the government broadcast an appeal to their fellow ethnics, who make up about 10 per cent of Albania's 3.5 million people, to stay at home.

Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis scheduled a Jan. 13 visit to Tirana, the Albanian capital, in an effort to hasten

the liberalization process. But a speed-up seemed unlikely—many Albanians are deeply skeptical about Alia's commitment to installing a measure of democracy. And even after Albanian border guards shot and killed five would-be refugees last month, the exodus continued, swelling to over 2,000 during December. There was a sudden surge over the holidays: Greek border police reported that 3,000 Albanians crossed the border on New Year's Eve alone. Some frontier guards made no attempt to stop them. In fact, some observers said that authorities in Tirana may have deliberately opened the frontier to allow the Greeks to escape. Clearhos Bolomos, 45, who made a 13-hour trek to freedom, said that one guard had let his group through even though he "told us we were traitors, pointed his machine-gun and spat at us."

Meanwhile, the exodus created a major problem in the Greek border zone. In Filiátes (population 5,000), 4,000 refugees crowded the muddy streets in search of food and shelter. Many of them were practically

without clothes, said Mayor Pantelis Koufalias, and many were sleeping in courtyards and on sidewalks, huddling around campfires for warmth.

Albania's 45-year-old Communist regime, once so rigid that it severed relations with the Stalinist Soviet Union in 1961, began minor reforms last year following the collapse of authoritarian governments in other Eastern European nations. Then, Alia undertook to accelerate the reforms after anti-government riots last month. He authorized opposition political parties and scheduled free elections in February. As well, a draft constitution, published in the state-controlled press just after Christmas, would give Albanians the right to enter or leave the country freely. But, for many of them, the changes were plainly too little, too late. Like most dictatorships, Tirana's faces its gravest dangers as it begins to reform.

JOHN BIERMAN with correspondents' reports

ALBANIA

Climbing Out of the Cage

As the communist regime confronts demands for change, ethnic Greeks flee to their motherland—and a less than rousing welcome

Snowcapped in winter and precipitous in many places, the Pindus Mountains, which straddle Greece and Albania, are all but impassable. That has not stopped thousands of desperate Albanians from crossing into Greece since the last week of 1990. In early December, four fleeing Albanians were shot dead near the frontier by soldiers of the Stalinist regime in Tirana. Last week, by contrast, refugees walked into Greece with little to deter them except the cold and the mountains. Instead of opening fire, border guards merely shot curses at the fugitives. By week's end about 5,000 refugees streamed into the northwestern Greek province of Epirus, doubling the population of the border area. Most of the fugitives belonged to Albania's large Greek minority, leaving territory once disputed by the two countries.

But even as Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis extended temporary-resident status to refugees claiming Greek ancestry, he pleaded with ethnic Greeks still in Albania to stay home to prevent a "na-



Exhausted refugees: better than Albania's wasteland of want

tional disaster." As for refugees in Greece, government spokesman Vyron Polydoras said, "We wish that the idea will ripen that they will return to their homeland."

With few volunteers for the trip back to Albania and more refugees expected in the months to come, Mitsotakis scheduled a trip to Tirana. He will be the first Western leader to visit since Albania withdrew into isolation at the end of World War II. Athens is aghast at the prospect of accommodating

a good part of Albania's estimated 400,000 ethnic Greeks, especially when it believes that Tirana is encouraging the flight to wriggle through political difficulties.

In mid-December student demonstrations, belatedly inspired by the upheavals in the rest of the East bloc, forced concessions from the government of President Ramiz Alia, including promises of fair elections and economic reform. According to spokesman Polydoras in Athens, Alia is trying to rid himself of the Greeks before the vote scheduled for February because the ethnic group, which exceeds 10% of the population, is opposed to his rule.

Fearing persecution, ethnic Greeks chose to flee at the first word that border guards would not stand in their way. The countryside the refugees left behind is a wasteland of want. Virtually the only meat rural families saw last year was half a chicken distributed to each household on Nov. 29, the National Day. By contrast, even the icy refugee camps, such as Kalpaki in northern Greece, seem like paradise, providing shelter and plentiful food. Said a high-ranking Greek official: "The question is, Where does one draw the line? We don't want to make them feel too comfortable because we want them to go back." But back to what? —By Howard G. Chua-Eoan.

Reported by Mirka Gondicas/Kalpaki

SOVIET UNION

Good News, Bad Times

Gorbachev seeks an economic truce with his restive republics, hoping to ease the country's tensions

With good news scarcer than sausage in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev made the most of what was available last week. Emerging jubilant from a Kremlin meeting with the Federation Council, a policymaking body that includes leaders of the 15 republics, the President announced that a temporary economic truce had been reached with the republics, finally making it possible to draft a national budget for the coming year. The central government and the republics, Gorbachev said, would also cooperate to overcome a deepening food crisis and set up a transitional administration until a new treaty reorganizing the federal structure of the Soviet Union was approved. "Months were lost in the tug-of-war between the center and the republics," Gorbachev complained. "We are specialists at going to extremes, but I am for common sense."

The embattled President could also claim some success in easing tensions in



Stopping the presses at a Latvian plant

the southwestern republic of Moldavia. Russian and Turkic minorities have tried to set up independent states there in opposition to a republican government that is dominated by the Romanian-speaking majority. In Kishinev, Moldavia's capital, the parliament bowed to an ultimatum from Gorbachev and agreed to reconsider laws promoting rights for ethnic Moldavians; in return, the parliament was assured that lo-

cal secessionists would halt their efforts to splinter the republic.

Gorbachev was clearly pleased to show that his newly enhanced presidential powers can produce results, but tougher tests lie ahead. Crucial economic disagreements must still be resolved with the powerful and populous Russian republic, whose parliament voted at year's end to withhold the lion's share of its contributions to the central government.

Elsewhere, the outlook was far from hopeful. General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, pledged last week that "not a single additional soldier" would be sent to the breakaway Baltic states, but that did not stop tensions from mounting in the region. Interior Ministry special forces seized Latvia's largest printing plant and brought publication of major newspapers in the republic to a virtual halt. Moscow officials said the raid in Riga was to recover Communist Party property, which was allegedly seized illegally by the republican government. In neighboring Lithuania, Interior Ministry troops took control of party headquarters, expelling local police units. Such bully tactics have raised questions about how repressive Gorbachev is prepared to be to hold his crumbling empire together. —By John Kohan/Moscow

Athens vs. Sparta

THE OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (391 pp., \$42.50, 1969); THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR (367 pp., \$39.50, 1974); THE PEACE OF Nicias AND THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION (372 pp., \$39.50, 1981); THE FALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE (426 pp., \$39.50, 1987). By DONALD KAGAN. Cornell University Press.

Reviewed by EDWARD N. LUTTWAK

IMAGINE that the only contemporary record of most events of World War II had been written by a well-known general on the losing side, seriously at odds with his own people—a Rommel, say, though of philosophical disposition, moral clarity, evident compassion, and altogether superior intellect. Such a Rommel would be an incomparably greater man than his real-life prototype, but as a historical source his shortcomings would still be most severe. Because of the inevitable limits of his knowledge of a complicated and protracted war, many events would escape his scrutiny in the whole or in detail; because of the unconscious partisanship induced by his origins and fate, further events would be subtly or less subtly distorted; and given the great variety of politics, customs, and procedures he would have to cover, still other events would be obscured by confusions technical, topographic, or even political. Finally, there would be a partiality entirely deliberate, caused by the author's selection of what he deemed most important, thereby slighting other facts perhaps only circumstantial and

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ephemeral yet still integral to the web of events.

Now imagine that despite his shortcomings, this vastly enhanced Rommel had written a history of World War II of such surpassing merit in every way that it caused all other contemporary accounts to be abandoned without trace, keeping subsequent historians in its thrall thematically, factually, and stylistically, and indeed defining the very task of writing history.

What would we then *know* of World War II? As it is, the gap between the texts—official histories included—that now fill our libraries and the findings of the latest documentary research is becoming embarrassingly wide, so that reputations once secure are now greatly diminished by recent scholarship while others have been greatly elevated; various events once supposed to have been inevitable are now revealed as adventitious, and vice versa; and the Holocaust is slowly emerging as the central event of Hitler's war, but less and less a purely German crime. What colossal mystifications would be uncovered, what sort of sweeping reappraisal of causes and modalities would be necessary, if till now the only record of what happened between 1939 and 1945 had been a single book by our transfigured Rommel?

That, in short, is more or less our condition vis-à-vis the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, which lasted from 431 to 404 B.C.E. and resulted in the transfer of hegemony over Greece from Athens to Sparta. But in the case of the Peloponnesian War there are no archives to redeem our dependence on Thucydides, son of Olorus, born around 460 B.C.E., one of ten generals elected in 424, thereafter exiled from Athens for twenty years, and the author of the great *History* of the war that breaks off abruptly in the year 411.

One very simple solution to our difficulties would be to adopt the view already sanctioned by many of

our most expensive universities and to treat the *History* of Thucydides as just one more text among many, of inevitably modest importance alongside the writings of every age and culture. We could, moreover, cheerfully overlook its limitations as a source by agreeing that the warfare it records among Athens, Sparta, and even pettier town-states two-and-a-half millennia ago was of no greater importance than, say, African tribal struggles, Aztec slave-raiding expeditions, the Mogul invasion of the Deccan, or the contemporaneous strife of the Chinese warring states. Since none of these episodes is anywhere nearly so well documented as the Peloponnesian War, historiographical egalitarianism would surely compel us to research them first, rather than striving for further clarifications of the minor details of a war so remote in time, and materially so insignificant.

But even though no human culture should be alien to us, and curiosity about the past, regardless of what ensued from it, needs no justification, it is simply foolish to deny that the history of the Greeks before, during, and after the Peloponnesian War is of incomparably greater significance than the deeds of Aztecs, African tribes, Moguls, or ancient Chinese—and precisely because of what ensued from that history. Instead of surviving only as a passive residue, of great scholarly and antiquarian interest perhaps but no more, the record of what a few Greeks said and did so long ago still resonates vibrantly in our own day—and not least for Latin Americans, Africans, Indians, and Chinese. The comedies of the Greeks make us laugh and their tragedies make us weep, we know their names and even their feelings as we share in their great events, glorious victories, crushing defeats, or agonized debates. But it is above all the ideas of those 5th-century Greeks that are so completely alive for us.

Our own schools and universi-

ties may now be subjected to a regime of cultural relativism,* but polite pretense or academic perversity cannot alter the primacy of the culture that invented the three ideas which are still instructing, inspiring, and conquering minds all over the planet: the idea of science—that is, the quest for rational explanations by refutable hypothesis, invented by the ancient Greeks alone and by no one else; the idea of democracy and its concomitant, the priority of freedom as the greatest happiness, most famously expressed by Pericles in the funeral oration which Thucydides reports (or improves), but concretely manifest in the detailed political practices he records; and the idea of the individual personality as a universe of consciousness, rather than as a mere fragment of some imposed collectivity, whether tribe, nation, civic community, or family, whether caste, faith, class, or party.

These three intertwined ideas, more subversive today than ever before of every form of political, ideological, religious, and social oppression, are autonomously living forces. Simply because they arose in that place and time, the Peloponnesian War is far more than another historical episode among many. Because all three ideas pervade and find within the *History* of Thucydides their finest expression, that text is far more than just another text among many.

AND this is the text that has been the subject of the twenty-year labors of Donald Kagan, long-time professor of history and classics at Yale. In four volumes and 1,556 pages (not counting appendices, bibliographies, and indices), of which the last has recently been published, Kagan contends with Thucydides as a historical source while incidentally displaying for

* My thirteen-year-old son, unprompted, complains that he is not allowed to study the Greeks and Romans. Chinese history, he tells me, is "boring"—as it would be when taught by one also forced to teach about Aztecs and Indians, Africans and Arabs, while lacking the insight into those cultures that in the case of Greeks and Romans percolates from all directions even into the crassest mind.

us Thucydides the philosopher of life and continuing master of our thoughts.

To build the edifice of a coherent and more comprehensive history of the Peloponnesian War around the incomplete and often cryptic text of Thucydides, Kagan has employed several methods.

First, he has made the fullest use of all other contemporary sources, poor as they are. In the comedies of Aristophanes, for example, there

are only hints and jocular references to the events and personalities of the war. But because these plays were performed for a public that included many who actually took part in those events and knew those personalities quite intimately, authenticity is uniquely guaranteed: had Aristophanes been inaccurate, his audience would have missed the joke and his parodic intention would have misfired. Kagan extracts what he can from this source,

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
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which many previous scholars have simply overlooked. Similarly, he strives to use fragments from the speeches of Andocines the companion of Alcibiades, and of Lysias the orator (whose views do not appear to have been mechanically conditioned by the fact that his family owned a shield factory), and from Plato, who as it happens is of remarkably little use though he was over twenty when the war ended.

Xenophon (born c. 430 B.C.E.), an experienced soldier, a late-phase participant in the war, and a prolific writer, could have been the ideal author of a competing version of the war from a pro-Spartan perspective; though he was an Athenian, it was Sparta that gained his loyalty, and kept it even after later defeat at the hands of Thebes. As it was, though, Xenophon must have been one of the first to be dissuaded from emulating his predecessor by the immensity of the latter's achievement. (Others did write, but in competition with Thucydides their works could not attract enough interest to ensure survival—only the names of such lost authors have been preserved.) In his *Hellenika*, Xenophon merely tries to continue where Thucydides left off in 411 B.C.E., and the book's shortcomings (glaring distortions, worse omissions) are so severe that Kagan follows all modern historians in preferring the account of a later anonymous historian recovered in 1906 from papyrus, as well as much later authors.

There are also some contemporary inscriptions, though many fewer than would be the case for, say, the Roman empire, where the abundance of surviving epigraphic material allows the reconstruction of entire decades of history without a single narrative source. For 5th-century Greece the most notable epigraphs are the Athenian Tribute Lists, which record the voluntary and involuntary affiliates of that peculiar empire. Cut in stone or scratched on pieces of broken pottery (*ostraka*), the inscriptions that survive, mostly in fragments, cannot tell stories, but they do provide factual reference points for Kagan's account, sometimes invaluable.

SECOND, Kagan has been bold in

his use of the later writings of antiquity. Diodorus the Sicilian (*Siculus*), author of the *Bibliothèque Historique*, a world history in forty books, lived at the time of Julius Caesar some four centuries after Pericles. He was, moreover, a rather uncritical compiler of previous texts. But because among his sources were earlier writers who in turn had access to solid evidence, Kagan uses what he can of the fifteen surviving volumes (which fortunately include the period 480-323 B.C.E.), just as he carefully extracts bits and pieces from the unreliable biographies of Cornelius Nepos, the military anecdotes of Frontinus (1st century C.E.), the abridged history of the still later Justinus, and so forth, and also consults Aristotle, who was of course much closer in time to the war but otherwise preoccupied.

Even bolder because altogether larger is Kagan's use of Plutarch, who lived half a millennium after the events of the war, and under a Roman imperial autocracy in many ways more different from the age of Pericles than are our own days of turbulence and freedom. Worse, Plutarch's *Bioi paralleloi*, the "parallel lives" of eminent Romans and Greeks, are moral and psychological character studies rather than "life-and-times" biographies. Hence, historical events are described in them only incidentally, when they figure in illustrative anecdotes. For these reasons, Plutarch on Pericles, Alcibiades, Nicias, etc., has been little used by previous historians of the war.

Obviously Kagan relies on a particular statement in Plutarch only when he has no stronger corroboration, for otherwise he would not need so very late an author. But the reliability of Plutarch as a whole can be tested in detail, because some of his Roman lives at least are well documented in other texts of known reliability, and, even better, by epigraphic, numismatic, even archeological evidence. Unlike that other collection of biographies, the pseudonymous *Historia Augusta* so heavily followed by Gibbon and now condemned as hopelessly unreliable, Plutarch's Roman biographies have triumphantly survived systematic comparisons with the mass of new evidence: Kagan's wid-

er reliance on him is thus solidly justified.

THIRD, Kagan is not afraid to evoke analogies, ancient and modern. Although they can provide no new facts they can offer explanations for facts unexplained, poorly explained, or even misrepresented in the primary sources—and in Thucydides most often. For even Thucydides, whose insistence on explanation defined the very nature of historiography (as against mere chronography), and whose honesty and insight are so inspiring—even Thucydides can nod, and his expertise too is not limitless.

That analogy is a dangerous device is clear enough, for it can easily serve to mislead. But Kagan does not employ analogies to persuade us; his purpose, rather, is to find new explanations, which he then offers in full for our own scrutiny. Thus, for example, in discussing the Athenian invasion of Aetolia in 426 B.C.E. Kagan invokes the analogy of Churchill's landings at Gallipoli to suggest that the Athenian strategy may have been sound even though this particular application of it failed. After pointing out that in 426 as in 1915, powerful alliances were stalemated in a war of attrition, Kagan quotes Churchill on the merits of surprise outflanking maneuvers as a path to victory that can "save slaughter." He then reproduces Churchill's list of the conditions under which even a secondary front can be a decisive theater ("... if the strongest power cannot be directly defeated itself, but cannot stand without the weakest, it is the weakest that should be attacked"). Kagan then tests the circumstances of 426 B.C.E. by Churchill's criteria, and finds that the Aetolian operation, like the Gallipoli landings, *could* have been so successful as to justify the risk. The overall effect is illuminating and, to this reader at least, persuasive.

FOURTH, Kagan, a scholar of the classics, that most disciplined of disciplines, has also made complete use of the abundant modern research on the war, in French and Italian as well as German. On important points, the views of earlier historians are not merely cited but quoted, sometimes by the para-

graph; without pedantic excess the terms of debate are defined, rival hypotheses deployed, criteria of selection established, and only then does Kagan present his own view. That view, moreover, is always sound, often subtle, and not infrequently original.

Finally, Kagan employs the information he derives from all four methods to extract more from Thucydides himself than any previous scholar. This is a text which ever since the 3rd century B.C.E. has been subjected to systematic editing, exegesis, and internal analysis. Work begun so well by the Hellenistic scholiasts of Alexandria—their “book” divisions, still followed in every modern edition, are the convenient length of a papyrus roll—was being continued by Byzantine commentators a thousand years later, and was resumed in the West as soon as a knowledge of Attic Greek was broadly revived in the 16th century. Kagan ably stands on the shoulders of all his predecessors, to construe more than ever before from the much-studied text.


ALTHOUGH I am not qualified to assess the validity of Kagan's choices when alternative theories are in contention, there are some things that even a nonspecialist can assert with confidence about his reconstruction of the Peloponnesian War.

This is above all a wonderfully attractive work. Once the reading begins, the four volumes seem not too long but too short; it was in the middle of the second volume that I began to dread the parting to come. Given the interest of the subject, only a poor style could dissuade, but Kagan's style is light and perfectly lucid, always elegant, never intrusive. For all its care and completeness, Kagan's careful scholarship does not at any point deprive us of the dramatic excitement which makes the reading of Thucydides himself as stirring as it is instructive.

It seems most unlikely that the fate of Kagan's four volumes will be settled once and for all by their current publication, for he too has written a work that will attract the continuing attention of future generations. In the meantime, to read these volumes is a delight not

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Tradition and Change

RESPONSE TO MODERNITY: A HISTORY OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM. By MICHAEL A. MEYER. Oxford University Press. 494 pp. \$39.95.

Reviewed by DAVID SINGER

IN *The Origins of the Modern Jew* (1967), Michael Meyer deftly described the initial encounter of European Jews with modern secular society. In his new book, a study of the quintessential modern movement within Jewish life, he shows us what that encounter has meant over the long haul.

Meyer is associated with Reform Judaism as a faculty member at Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, but his book bears none of the marks of a potted institutional history. He presents the Reform movement in all its diversity and complexity, paying particular attention to the intellectual element without, however, slighting the institutional side. Meyer also consistently underscores the larger historical context in which Reform developed, pointing up the interplay with concurrent trends in both Jewish and general society. Finally, and most importantly, Meyer shows eminent good sense in his judgments, readily acknowledging the achievements of Reform but also facing up to its more problematic aspects. All in all, he has produced an important work of historical synthesis, one that will be cited for years to come.

Response to Modernity is organized along chronological lines, but with special emphasis on European origins. Reform Judaism had its first flowering in early 19th-century Germany, and Meyer points to several factors in accounting for this. One was that German Jews, caught up in an accelerating process of acculturation, felt "an incongruity between the world of

their origins and the modern German and European world with which they identified and in which they longed to participate." Then again, the fact that German Jews were "neither wholly denied civil rights nor granted them completely" served as a spur to religious reform.

Still another important stimulus to the growth of Reform Judaism in Germany was the impact of the Protestant environment. Protestantism, Meyer notes,

provided a model for theological . . . reformation, for the rejection of an old hierarchy, and for liturgy in the vernacular. Protestantism placed the sermon at the center of the service; it focused on words spoken and sung, not physical ritual acts; and as a religion which had itself revolted and developed further, it raised the hope that, in its liberal formulations, it would go far toward meeting Judaism on common religious ground.

Finally, Meyer points to the rise among German Jews of a "new religious leadership," a "sizable cadre of . . . secularly trained" rabbis conversant with modern critical scholarship. These men, unable to obtain academic positions in the larger society, turned to the Jewish community as a sphere for acting out their "conflicting intellectual and communal commitments."

But if Germany was the scene of Reform's first growth, the United States from the mid-19th century and onward was to be the place of its fullest development. Today, close to 30 percent of all American Jews identify as Reform, and over the past two decades Reform has been the fastest growing Jewish denomination.

As Meyer puts it in accounting for this success, the United States "lacked the obstacles that had lain in the path of European Reform while providing an environment which could scarcely have been more conducive." Most important in this context, of course, was the religious freedom that America accorded its citizens. In addition, Reform Judaism in America did not carry a stigma of "rebellion against long-established traditions and against an entrenched rabbinical leadership," since traditional Juda-

ism was barely in evidence in the United States when Reform arrived on the scene. Indeed, among the early Jewish settlers in America, "disregard for Jewish observance was rampant and mixed marriage not infrequent." On the positive side, Meyer points out, the Reform movement's emphasis on "individual authority in religious matters" fitted in well with the individualistic strain of the American ethos. Moreover, Reform's sense of mission—the obligation to spread ethical monotheism—was quite compatible with the open-ended view of American destiny that was characteristic of the United States in the 19th century.

Response to Modernity is extremely useful in exploding a number of negative myths that still cling to Reform. Thus, Meyer makes it clear that the early Reform rabbis did not cause the initial rupture between Jews and traditional Judaism. On the contrary, it was because that rupture had already occurred—with sizable groups of Central and West European Jews moving away from traditional patterns of religious observance and belief—that early Reform was able to find an audience. Moreover, Meyer indicates, calls for religious change had less to do with a conscious pandering to Gentile opinion—although this sometimes entered the picture—than with the fact that European Jews had begun to internalize the religious and cultural values of the larger society.

Still another myth is the notion that Reform Judaism in Germany was particularly "un-Jewish." In truth, Meyer shows, German Reform was far more respectful of Jewish tradition than was its American counterpart; it was in the United States that "radical" Reform came into its own. Finally, with regard to the American Reform movement itself, Meyer disposes of the idea that it was consistently anti-Zionist prior to the creation of the state of Israel. By 1935, Reform in America had moved to a position of official neutrality on Zionism, with a pro-Zionist majority increasingly holding sway.

WHAT makes Reform the paradigmatic modern Jewish movement is

"LA PASIONARIA" OF THE ACROPOLIS

Why did Melina Mercouri, the
impassioned movie-star Cabinet minister,
so dramatically lose her last bid for office?

BY MAUREEN ORTH

On the Richter scale of high divadom, this is a major quake. Melina Mercouri's whole body is racked with sobs. "My life is sheet!" she shrieks in Hellenic English. "I don't want to fight anymore. I just want to be alone!" For a nanosecond she seems to forget that her devoted husband, film director Jules Dassin, is sitting next to her. "I just want to be alone with my husband!" she wails without missing a beat.

"Oh sure," laughs Dassin. "Wouldn't that be something?"

It is the morning after. Late the night before, Melina Mercouri, the most powerful woman in Greece, formerly both a major motion-picture star and the country's flamboyant minister of culture, lost her bid to become mayor of Athens. Her defeat is humiliating. Her fellow Athenians have rejected her, rejected her attempt to follow in the footsteps of her famous grandfather, who had been mayor for thirty years. Not only the Athenians, the very gods of politics have betrayed her.

Mercouri looks haggard but mildly glamorous in her long turquoise silk dressing gown embroidered with pink beads and her gold lamé slippers that match her honey-colored hair. She also looks fierce, and reinforces this effect by crushing a pack of unfiltered Greek cigarettes in her palm while glaring at her companions: her husband, her brother, Spiro, who functioned as her campaign manager, and her close friend actress Despo Diamantidou. This American reporter is especially unwelcome.

La Mercurial throws her glasses

across a table and buries her face in her arms. "Today I think my life has been mostly nightmares." Her smoky voice is hoarse and cracked. "I am so ashamed."

Mercouri, now seventy-one (more or less), is used to getting her way. No one close to her, including her husband, thought it was a remotely good idea to run for mayor, but since she was practically the only remaining scandal-free figure of note in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)—the party she helped found in the mid-seventies, when the dictatorial Colonels were overthrown—she accepted the baton, assuming there was no way she could possibly drop it. Now the anterooms of Mercouri's four-story house in Athens's Kolonaki section, the same posh neighborhood where she grew up, are filled

with morosely quiet PASOK officials, their faces buried in newspapers. In early September the polls said Mercouri was the most popular politician in Greece—six weeks later she has managed only 46 percent of the local vote. Worse, all of Athens is whispering that she conducted a frivolous campaign, full of platitudes instead of programs. A few days before the election, her colorful opponent, Antonis Tritsis, a former socialist Cabinet minister who broke with the left, had complained that all Melina Mercouri would take a stand on was her love for the city. "She talks about these...these feelings. About love...It's like running against a U.F.O."

According to Spiro, however, this was deliberate. "Her campaign is based on emotion because Athens has so many problems that you can't do anything un-



Mercouri campaigning for mayor of Athens. Left: in the sixties, with her husband, director Jules Dassin, and Peter Ustinov, who starred with her in Dassin's *Topkapi*.

PHOTOGRAPH, TOP, BY DIMIS ARGYROPOULOS

less you make people feel a part of the solution. It's not a matter of doing this or that, but saying, 'Come on, let's do it together.' And, more practically, since the conservative central government controls the municipal budget, promises might be hard to keep for a vociferous member of the party out of power. Plus, as Mercouri's French political consultant pointed out on election night, "she's an actress, not a political girl." Outside her campaign headquarters in Athens, a huge grid of sixteen TV screens mounted above the sidewalk had featured scenes from her signature film, *Never on Sunday*, as well as clips of Mercouri's meetings with world leaders and excerpts from a *60 Minutes* interview. The message was that Melina Mercouri is a great star and patriot, able to attract international attention for Greece—which needs all the help it can get these days because of its high inflation rate and huge foreign debt. The images were a reminder that the mayor can ask the European Community for funding for specific projects and can also go abroad for loans. Mercouri's ability on the foreign front has always been one of her most potent political assets.

"I want to make Athens again a city that has glamour, pride, and a conscience, to do whatever I can for this city that I loved as a child," she said. But it probably didn't occur to Mercouri as she repeatedly thrust her arms in the air and gave the V sign with both hands or stared transfixed at her image up on the grid of TV screens that glamour, bravado, and bravery might not be enough anymore in a city fraught with more than its share of end-of-the-millennium problems.

A prominent architect has described modern-day Athens as "a visual wound." Although the boundaries of the old city, and the parameters of the mayor's power, are still drawn as they were in her grandfather's day, much of the far more charming city Mercouri grew up in is gone—sacrificed to greed and the need for space. Worse, pollution is eating away at the city's largest dollar, yen, and mark draw: its incomparable repository of classical architecture, which has withered away more in the last twenty-five years than in all the time since its creation in 500 B.C. Until recently so little has been done to control pollution that for many days of the year Athenians are virtually held hostage to the dread *nephos*—the Athenians' word

for their black cloud—air so unhealthy it is hard to breathe without choking.

In the last fifty years, Athens has survived a World War, undeclared civil war, wave upon wave of villagers who

It probably didn't occur to Mercouri that glamour, bravado, and bravery might not be enough in end-of-the-millennium Athens.

want to be urbanites, and the return of thousands of expatriate Greeks who came rushing home when politics allowed it—swelling the population of the city and its environs to three million, or one-third of the entire country. The result is that some Athens neighborhoods are more densely populated than Singapore. There are virtually no sidewalks in many places, let alone shrubbery, and traffic is in a permanent snarl, particularly in the center of the city, where the government bureaus are concentrated.

Yet for all the horrors that plague Athens, it is still one of the more humane cities in the Western world. There are no homeless wandering the streets. Buildings are rarely higher than several stories. Neighborhoods are vibrant and alive—the Greek family is still largely intact, and the police walk around with unloaded guns. The city is so safe that a woman can wander alone at night and never have to be afraid. Compared with, say, the citizens of New York, Los Angeles, or even Milan, Athenians don't have *that* much to complain about—but they do anyway, constantly, among themselves and in the city's seventeen contentious daily newspapers. "We like complaining," says Fotini Papathanou, a political scientist. "People have very strong negative feelings about Athens, but everybody keeps on coming here—it's a love-hate relationship." When I asked the outgoing mayor, Nikolas Yatrakos, how many murders had been committed in Athens in the last year, he said, "You mean apart from traffic fatalities? I guess about three or four." Yatrakos, a member of the ruling conservative party, New Democracy, had not been permitted to run against Mercouri. "I'm not a movie star," the rather lackluster economist explained.

Last April the New Democracy party had gained control of the national gov-

ernment from PASOK and the left, but not by much of a margin (a single seat), considering that PASOK's leader, former prime minister Andreas Papandreou, along with many of his colleagues, had

been involved in a bribery scandal. Papandreou had also divorced his longtime American wife to marry his mistress (a flight attendant nearly half his age), had suffered a heart attack, allegedly consulted an astrologer daily,

and left the country in economic chaos. However, since the new government's harsh austerity measures shocked a populace used to being under socialist protection, most of Athens went on strike only a few weeks before the mayoral election. Many viewed the mayor's race as a referendum on the national government. "We are really running two elections here," noted Tritsis, who was campaigning against Mercouri on the New Democracy ticket. "One is national, the other is local."

It was a bold stroke for PASOK—if not a desperate one—to offer the popular Melina for mayor. In response, and to distance themselves from defeat if she was elected, the conservative New Democracy party had backed Tritsis, a mustachioed former minister of education and the environment in the leftist government who had fallen out with the socialists two years ago and lost his Cabinet seat. To many conservatives, he is still suspiciously liberal, however, and not a team player. In some circles, Tritsis, fifty-three, a former decathlon champion and city planner with an American Ph.D., is considered a gadfly and an eccentric. But he proved to be an energetic campaigner who thrilled audiences with rhetorical flourishes and myriad schemes to fix Athens.

"I will break the asphalt," he promised, explaining that he would create a new archaeological park around the Acropolis by eliminating the roadway which currently carries tourists up to the decaying wonder of the world. So then how would the tourists get to the Acropolis? "On their knees!"

Melina wanted to break the asphalt too—somewhere in her campaign literature she said so. But the idea of her vigorously attacking the city's problems and protecting its precious heritage didn't come across on TV, where much

of the election was decided. She looked frail and off her game. Privately, she was like a raging faucet. "You never know which one you're going to get when you go over there," said Despo Diamantidou, "hot or cold." Her friends, already concerned about her health, despaired. She was simply not the old Melina. But, looking wild-eyed and fearful at times, she stubbornly plowed on. "She feels disarmed of her charm—the main weapon she's had in life is gone," said a woman who has known her for years. "The glorious Melina is like a frigate in full sail. With this campaign she is demystifying herself."

But, ah, what a myth.

Either you eat men or be eaten by them—make your choice," Melina Mercouri's beautiful mother taught her, and indeed it has been she who has seduced and devoured for the better part of her life, most visibly at first as the happy hooker in *Never on Sunday* (1960), and then as the passionate soul of the opposition starting in the late sixties, when the repressive Colonels ruled Greece, and finally as the charismatic minister of culture in the government of Andreas Papandreou, the socialist prime minister who replaced the fascistic Colonels. Mercouri became the symbol of Greek national identity. "I know just enough English to wince along with you when I mispronounce," she said during a lecture in London. "Permit me then to launch our theme with a few Greek words: Music, Drama, Tragedy, Comedy, Theater, Choreography, Philosophy, History, Democracy. All Greek words..." "Melina is an exhibitionist of the mind," says her brother.

Her magic on the screen, however, was anything but cerebral. "She has a very aggressive sexuality, which is rare in a female film star," says Peter Aspden, a British journalist who has written about Mercouri in a forthcoming book on what makes certain actors explode into mega-stardom. "It's almost masculine. She's always been rather emancipated—she knows what she wants and she knows how to get it. The irony is that all this emerged on the screen in the fifties and in Greece."

Stella, her first movie, directed by

Michael Cacoyannis on a budget of about \$30,000, burst into view at the 1955 Cannes Film Festival and astounded its audiences. Mercouri was in turn alluring, selfish, warm, self-centered,

She was "more or less the same wild creature I saw up on the screen," remembers her husband, Jules Dassin.



Never on Sunday was launched at an unforgettable party during the 1960 Cannes Film Festival.

and charming, and when she sang she smoldered. Filmed in gritty black-and-white, it is the story (written especially for her) of a singer in a bouzouki café who refuses to marry, for fear she will lose her freedom. In the end she must die for having loved too many men (even though one at a time) and for leaving an archetypal Greek male, a soccer star, at the altar. "To see this macho Greek man led by this woman—it had an incredibly powerful effect," says Aspden. Especially in Greece. Yet *Stella* is Melina Mercouri's only film in Greek, and she had to wait until she was an established stage actress and in her thirties to make it. "She had been ignored by filmmakers until then," says Cacoyannis, "because they thought her mouth was too big."

Jules Dassin, a blacklisted American director from the Bronx who had begun working successfully in France, saw Melina for the first time at Cannes in *Stella*. He was looking for a Greek actress to play a secondary role in a film

he was adapting from a story by Nikos Kazantzakis—and Mercouri knocked him dead. Dassin remembers that when he met Melina she was "more or less the same wild creature I saw up on the

screen." At the time, he was married with three children and not planning a divorce.

Dassin's wife decided to stay at home while he shot the Kazantzakis film in Greece—a big break for Melina, who was not shy about her feelings for him. "A man could not escape when she wanted him," says Deni Vachliotou, an old friend who did the costumes for *Never on Sunday*. "She had such success with men. She provoked them to the point they went after her." And from that moment on, Melina Mercouri and Jules Dassin—whom many characterize as "a saint"—have had an extremely close personal and professional collaboration. "Thirty-two years I am with Julie, and he has never lied to me or told me anything that is second-rate," Mercouri says. And, of course, it was Dassin who made her a star.

Never on Sunday, written and directed by Dassin, began life as *The Happy Whore* and has probably done more for tourism in Greece than anything since the building of the Parthenon. It had sun, it had the sea, it had Melina. In 1960, at a moment when U.S. audiences could choose between Sandra Dee, Elizabeth Taylor, Annette Funicello, and Marilyn Monroe, Melina Mercouri hit the screen as incredibly sexy, forthright, unneurotic, and uncontrived—"able to devour ouzo, men, city corruption, and American imperialism in equal measure," Peter Aspden notes. Dassin created a character of sunny, unbridled optimism who even makes up happy endings to the Greek tragedies—a trait inspired by Melina's mother. "It came from our differing interpretations of the Bible," says Dassin, who is Jewish. "Melina's mother did not believe Christ was crucified, he didn't die on the cross, and he wasn't a Jew."

Mercouri's captivating performance was enhanced considerably by a bouzouki-music score and an Oscar-winning title song. Inside the industry, it didn't hurt either that the film was launched with an unforgettable party on the French Riviera complete with imported

bouzouki players, hundreds of European jet-setters linking arms and dancing Greek folk dances, and the traditional breaking of several hundred pounds of crockery. "I knew we had a hit," says Alain Bernheim, Dassin's agent at the time. "when the Begum Aga Khan started smashing glasses with her barefoot sandals." Melina Mercouri walked off with the best-actress award at Cannes, an Academy Award nomination, and an international reputation.

Even today most people think of Mercouri as the golden, happy-go-lucky creature who was so overpowering in *Never on Sunday*. The movie is still so much her trademark that wherever in the world she appeared during her eight years as minister of culture the band inevitably struck up the tune. The opposition even used it against her in the campaign for mayor. Greeks traditionally go to the polls on Sundays, so thousands of leaflets were printed saying, "Melina—Never on Sunday." At a huge rally a few days before the vote, Mercouri, dressed in a white shirt with the sleeves rolled up, white slacks, and brand-new white U.S. Keds, threw red and white carnations to the crowd from a platform and intoned deeply, "Melina, always on Sunday." The crowd roared.

As minister of culture during the eighties, Mercouri oversaw everything from archaeological sites to soccer stadiums. At important events in Europe she hobnobbed with her best buddy, the French minister of culture, Jack Lang, and she waged a noisy fight to have Britain ship back the Elgin Marbles, which had adorned the Parthenon before Lord Elgin finished removing them in 1812. When the roof fell in on Andreas Papan-dreou's government in 1989, Mercouri had to relinquish her office, which may have been inevitable, since for the last two years she has battled a serious lung disease that has noticeably drained her. (It is currently in remission.) If there was ever a time to slow down, this was it. So friends were shocked last June when she declared her intention to become mayor, although they probably shouldn't have been. "I hate the word 'retire,'" Mercouri says. "I hate it." Center stage has always been her natural milieu.

As a toddler, Melina rode beside her grandfather—who was far more important than the mayor of Athens today—in an open carriage waving to the faithful. At the age of five, knowing she would not receive the phonograph she wanted

for Christmas, she looked in the mirror and conjured her first crocodile tears, one at a time. Childhood playmates recall that she could often outdo the boys in sports and climbing trees, that she

"The glorious Melina is like a frigate in full sail. With this campaign she is demystifying herself," said a friend.

was bright and quick-witted but wild and undisciplined, often cutting school and sneaking off to the movies. "She was a terrible child," says her brother, Spiro. "Her grandfather had a colossal weakness for her, and because he was a very grand person, nobody dared to object to what Melina was doing. He spoiled her a lot."

She was ten when she decided she wanted to act. At fourteen, rarely at school, she began a mad pursuit of a thirty-five-year-old matinee idol. Her family was appropriately scandalized, but by this time Melina's elegant parents had divorced—her father, a ladies' man and a member of Parliament, had run off with an actress. They were undoubtedly relieved when she eloped at seventeen with a very rich Greek in his thirties who had to quickly divorce his Romanian dancer wife to marry Melina.

"She got married so she could leave her family's house and become an actress," says Despo Diamantidou. "In those days in *haut bourgeois* families, acting was not considered a proper occupation." Pan Characopos, Melina's first husband, was a Cambridge-educated Anglophile who doted on Melina. Apparently never sexually compatible, they stayed married for a long time in a most unconventional style. Melina took lovers with Pan's approval and brought them into the house. "We had a great relationship," she says. "He was not a typical Greek man—he was very eccentric." She spent the first years of her marriage playing at being a rich bohemian, studying acting, and presiding over a glorious salon.

"Melina was full of charm and the joy of life," says Deni Vachliotou. "All the artists and all the politicians gathered in her house. We had wonderful conversations and wonderful parties. We were young and handsome; we had dreams

and Melina taught me I could realize them." "I was lucky," Melina says. "I had great freedom in those years—it was very, very exciting."

The bliss was interrupted by World War II. Greece was invaded by Germany, and the Greeks were left to starve. Today, Melina Mercouri's contemporaries speak of the war and the decade of civil unrest that followed as if it were yesterday. "I think our whole

generation was wounded by the war," says Despo Diamantidou. Many joined the Resistance. Melina was more practical. She took a quisling for a lover, a handsome black-marketeer who kept her in furs and food and who later committed suicide because, some say, Melina threw him over after the war. She claims now that she also gave a lot of money to the Resistance. Certainly the food she got she shared with her friends—her generosity and her loyalty to her friends have never been in doubt. "During the war I was able to eat because I went to Melina's house," says Diamantidou. In her autobiography, *I Was Born Greek*, Mercouri mentions that many of her first theater audiences "hated" her for her ability to survive in style during that time. Today she defends her behavior: "I don't like to apologize for that—I don't want to. If I see my life today, I would say I was a young girl who just wanted to live and that's why war is a terrible thing."

Although Mercouri's theater debut in 1944 was inauspicious—one critic wrote, "Too tall, too young, too blonde. Too awkward. No talent. Why doesn't Miss Mercouri stay home where she belongs?"—she was determined to be a star. "She liked the applause, she liked to be worshiped," says Deni Vachliotou. And she worked very hard. Eventually, her stage career began to take off, first in the classical theater, then in modern pieces. And she set out to conquer Paris.

Wearing a pink hat at lunch one day, Melina attracted the attention of French playwright Marcel Achard, who immediately wrote a part for her in his new play. The rest of the cast snubbed her, of course, as only the French can. But Colette met her and wrote her a petit poem that ended, "*Elle n'a qu'à lever ses yeux et l'Acropole est là.*" *Tant pis* for the

cast. Unfortunately, those difficult French also gave her trouble with *Stella*. Mercuri was the supposed favorite to win the best-actress prize at Cannes, but she and the jurors celebrated so hard one night at a party given by the Soviet delegation that they arrived in no state to judge that evening's French entry. A local *scandale* ensued and no best-actress prize was given in Cannes in 1955.

Mercuri and Dassin set up house-keeping together in Paris, to be near his children. What was for her an astoundingly quiet life was something quite different for him. "Julie was a little Jewish boy from the Bronx," says his ex-agent, Alain Bernheim. "Suddenly he was turned into this jet-setty Parisian. Melina knew a lot of people—she'd been around Paris. And they were surrounded by her faithful servants—they were like slaves who catered to their every whim. You could have dinner at their apartment at any hour—two A.M., they'd cook for them." Not surprisingly, Dassin catered to Melina's whims as well. Though he had many chances after *Never on Sunday* to work on major movies with big-name stars, she would never allow it—unless she could somehow star in them too. "He made a choice and his choice was to be with Melina," says Bernheim. "If she was in the movie, she was happy and he could be happy—if not, well, she was bigger than life." Bernheim, who remains friends with Dassin, gave up their professional partnership when Dassin turned down a big directing job with Elizabeth Taylor. "I'll never forget his line: 'It's more important for me to be with Melina than to make a movie'"—an attitude Dassin says he doesn't disagree with today.

"I was very jealous when he worked with others," says Melina. "It was very bad for his career, very bad. It's the only remorse I have in my life, that I didn't let him have his career. And that I brought him here."

Although Dassin and Mercuri made nine films together, with the exception of the hit caper *Topkapi* in 1964, nothing came close to the success of *Never on Sunday*. Nor was her luck any better with directors ranging from Joseph Losey to Norman Jewison. Melina, in fact, was reprising her role from *Never on Sunday* on the Broadway stage in 1967 when she received the shocking news one night that the Greek government had fallen to the Colonels.

"I had a choice to shut up, but I

couldn't," Melina says. She began to make a speech every night after her performance, telling the audience that the happy-go-lucky musical they had just seen did not accurately reflect the reality

Since she was practically the only remaining scandal-free figure of note in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, she agreed to become a candidate.

in Greece at that time. The response of the Colonels was swift. "Julie had gone to the Middle East and I was sleeping in the same room with Melina," recalls Despo Diamantidou. "In the middle of the night an American reporter was on the phone to tell Melina she had lost her Greek citizenship." Her response became famous: "I was born a Greek, I shall die a Greek. Colonel Pattakos was born a Fascist. He will die a Fascist." By her own admission, "the hedonist became Joan of Arc." She also made the cover of *Life*.

If anything, Melina's views in her youth were rightist and royalist. She began to have a more heightened political consciousness in her early theater days, and under the tutelage of Dassin drifted steadily leftward. But even today Melina Mercuri is the quintessential champagne socialist. Her baths are drawn by servants, her clothes laid out. During the mayor's race she voted in Armani. "But it was always in the back of her mind since she was a child that at some time she would get into politics," says Deni Vachliotou. "She got it from her grandfather." When the moment presented itself, she was outspoken and brave.

For seven years Mercuri raged against the Colonels in country after country, rally after rally. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Yves Montand and Simone Signoret—the *crème de la crème gauche* were her allies in the Resistance. In the process the temptress became a feminist. "I became great friends with women," she says. "I had great conversations with them—they helped me a lot. I believe that the woman is a great fighter to the end," which is obviously the way that Melina Mercuri looks at herself. Deni Vachliotou

recalls that one night in Paris in 1963 she and Melina went to see the last performance of Edith Piaf, who died a few days later. The legendary chanteuse could no longer stand alone, but was held up by two men supporting her bandaged arms and hands, and on her feet were old bedroom slippers. She no longer had a voice. Nonetheless, the crowd went wild as she sang all her greatest hits, especially "Non, Je Ne Regrette Rien." Melina was spellbound. "This is how I'm going to die,"

Vachliotou remembers her declaring, "standing, standing onstage."

In 1974, when the Colonels were overthrown, Melina Mercuri returned to Greece in delirious triumph. Her overjoyed countrymen hoisted her onto their shoulders straight from the airplane. "As soon as she heard the news, she told me she wanted to go back to Greece," says Dassin. "That meant I would have to change my life. But I thought about it overnight and I decided I would go."

At home once again, she decided to stay in politics—"because they needed women in Parliament in Greece." In fact, when Mercuri got elected for the first time, in 1977, representing her old *Never on Sunday* stomping ground, Piraeus, there were no toilet facilities for women in the Greek Parliament and there were rules against women wearing pants. Her fights to bring the patriarchs of Greece into the modern world got lots of headlines. For Jules Dassin, however, his wife's ascending political star was something else—in his words, "a partnership dissolved." For a few years, until he began directing plays in Greece, he was stranded professionally.

Mercuri became minister of culture in 1981 and seized on the return of the Elgin Marbles as her pet cause. No matter that just before her first press conference in the British Museum she reportedly shed tears in front of the wrong sculpture, not the Parthenon marbles at all. Never mind, because she was out to raise the world's and Hellenic consciousness about preserving the Greeks' heritage. She abolished museum fees for all Greeks and announced that a new Acropolis Museum would be built to house the treasures when they were returned. (Finally, in November 1992,

\$100 million plan for the building was unveiled, but so far only \$1.8 million has been raised to build it. "I am sure it will be easy to find money," Mercouri insists.) But some complain that museums are often dirty and that even at the Acropolis, with its extremely serious problems of disintegration due to pollution, much more could have been done. One woman involved in its restoration reports that moneys the European Community offered for projects at the Acropolis went unspent because Mercouri's ministry was never organized enough to institute the programs. "She was not really worse than usual, perhaps," the woman said, "but people expected more from Melina. She made promises she couldn't deliver." Another archaeologist, an American, was shocked that after she personally appealed to Mercouri to preserve "an important historical site...an office building was erected over it instead."

Mercouri herself would rather emphasize other things, like the many exhibitions of Greek art her brother organized for international consumption, and her success in getting the European Community to go along with her plan to have Athens made "the Cultural Capital of Europe" in 1985. As a result, some of the world's best performing companies came, and continue to come, to Athens.

In true socialist style, Mercouri created myriad new little theaters for the provinces (while many of the more elite traditional theater companies languished or declined). When the classics were performed at the summer festivals, Melina Mercouri was always there to lend support, taking her seat amid the crowd's applause. Young, untried filmmakers were given the chance to make feature-length movies on government subsidies. The fact that Greek audiences stayed away in droves from these works did not disturb Melina. "I believe we have made three or four directors," she says. "They were psychological films only for the directors, but it doesn't matter—young cinema is good." In contrast, Erikos Andreou, who now runs the Greek Film Center, talks about "trying to win back the Greek public by steering closer to the center," and encouraging foreign film production in Greece, particularly by U.S. companies, which were never made to feel welcome during the years the openly anti-American Papandreou government was in power. (Mercouri's Film Center director once told a *Hollywood Reporter* writer that he was more interested in the North Korean than the U.S. market.)

Greeks are notoriously hard on one another and so highly politicized that it is almost impossible to get an objective assessment of the weather let alone of anyone as controversial as Melina Mercouri

"This is how I'm going to die," a friend remembers her saying during Edith Piaf's last performance, in the sixties, "standing, standing onstage."

and her tenure at the Ministry of Culture. The charitable view is of good intentions gone awry, and even the political opposition gives her high marks for her efforts to promote the glories of Greece outside the country. But she has serious critics.

"Because of her worldwide fame she had a chance that nobody before or after her will ever have and she blew it," says Greek-American TV-and-film producer Renee Pappas, who is married to a Greek actor and ran a talent agency in Athens while Melina was minister. "If you wanted to go to Greece to make a film, you'd have to rely on luck. There was no office to scout locations, no office to get actors. There are dozens of English-speaking actors in Greece and nobody knows about them." Pappas arranged for a possible "Greek Film Week" at the Museum of Modern Art in New York but needed prints of twenty Greek films. At a meeting, Mercouri assured her she would have them. "It's eight years later and I'm still waiting for those twenty prints," she says.

"The ministry was chaos whenever you walked into her office," says former *New York Times* man Nicholas Gage. "There were always twenty people in there: she'd be on the phone trying to talk, there would be groups muttering in various corners of the room—it was just havoc." Gage has a bone to pick with Mercouri because the movie version of *Eleni*, his book about his mother's murder in Greece at the hands of Communists right after W.W. II, was not shot there. The harsh portrait of the Communists drawn in the story did not sit well with the Papandreou government, although the Ministry of Culture did O.K. the project. But "we didn't get the kind of encouragement that made it possible to leave behind the \$8 to \$10 million we

would have in Greece," says Gage. As a result the film was shot in Spain.

"Listen, we were not responsible for *Eleni*. They asked and we gave the permission—Mr. Gage can say nothing!"

Melina Mercouri responds defiantly. "I believe I was an excellent bureaucrat. I did good work on many things—I had no money, but the ministry was well organized and we had excellent relations abroad." And what about the charges of anti-Americanism? "Ridiculous. I visited America a thousand times." Her position is that things fell

apart after she left. "Now, now it's the shits," she thunders. "Now there is nothing going on. You will see—now the Ministry of Culture will not even exist!"

This last year has been a tough one for Melina Mercouri. She lost the election. Greece lost the campaign she spearheaded to bring the 1996 Olympics to Athens. Jules Dassin was hospitalized. She refuses to stop smoking, and her own health is fragile. All her extraordinary life, say her closest friends, Melina Mercouri has lived in a state of anxiety—never celebrating her happiest times, but constantly worrying that such moments will not come again. "She doesn't enjoy such things. It's a meta-physical problem," says Deni Vachliotou, who remembers Mercouri running down the steps of the palazzo in Cannes like Cinderella moments after the smash opening of *Never on Sunday*, sobbing that the triumph would not last. "For the first time in my life I was an optimist for this election and you see what happened," Mercouri said. "It's the only time I thought I would win."

She sank into gloom and despair for weeks afterward. Then suddenly the black cloud, her own personal *nephos*, lifted. "She might run for president," a friend predicts. At any rate, Melina Mercouri seemed to turn into that frigate in full sail again. Certainly there was no time anymore to hash over old history. She is still a member of the Greek Parliament, and the leader of the opposition in the Athens city council. "You see, I am very, very busy," she said to me on the phone after I had returned to the U.S. "I am having a big meeting here—many people are coming to my house to talk about...what is the word? That dark air. Pollution!" □

VENIZELOS, STATESMAN

- o Eleftherios ("Liberator") Venizelos (1864-1936), was a towering figure in early 20th century Greek and international politics.
- o He was born in Mouriou, Crete, the son of a wealthy businessman banished from the island after its Ottoman rulers charged him with revolutionary behavior. Elected a Cretan deputy in 1889, Venizelos dominated Greek republican politics for thirty years.
- o He first gained fame by defying Prince George and advocating Cretan enosis or union with the mainland, which he effected in 1908.
- o Throughout the pre- and post-World War I period, Venizelos worked with, and was supported by, Western powers, particularly the British under Lloyd George.
- o Respected by both Greeks and Turks as a strong, dedicated leader who dedicated himself to an ideal, Venizelos appealed across class boundaries.
- o He fought for thirty years for a constitutional monarchy against royalists and communists. He has been called the "apostle of Greek political modernism."
- o His government signed the 1919 Treaty of Sevres and occupied Smyrna (Izmir), but the royalists forced him out of office in November 1920, before launching the Greek offensive into Anatolia.
- o Venizelos realized that Greece could not conquer non-Greek areas, and called repeatedly for negotiations with Turkey after the collapse of the Greek troops in Anatolia.
- o His administration signed friendship treaties with Italy and Yugoslavia, and, more significantly, with Turkey in 1930, heralding warm ties in Greek-Turkish relations that lasted until the the 1950's. That singular achievement reflected in part his personal friendship with Turkish leader Ismet Inonu.
- o He retired to Crete in 1933, but was condemned to death after the 1935 rightist coup and died the following year in exile in Paris.

Byzantine trade relations 3:564h
 Byzantine trading concessions 1:483c
 Crusades and capture of Constantinople 5:305h
 Cyprus subjection to merchants 5:407f
 Dandolo's rule and expansion 5:480g
 diplomacy and wars from 1494 6:1082b
 Genoa's history of rivalry 7:1017a
 Latin attempt to recover Byzantine rule 12:97b
 Leopold III and the Venice-Genoa war 2:452g
 medieval trade and politics 9:1122b
 Oriental trade domination 4:880b
 Ottoman imperial expansion 2:620h
 Ottoman war of 1499-1503 2:776h
 Ottoman wars and trade disputes 13:773f
 papal conflict in 17th century 16:251c
 Renaissance history and culture 15:663e
 Renaissance political evolution 9:1143h
 republic economic and political decline 9:1151e
 spice trade power in Europe 17:502f
 supremacy over Ravenna 15:534e
 Swiss invasion and occupation 17:882c
 Istanbul foreign trade monopoly 9:1070d
 map, Italy 9:1088
 Marco Polo voyage map 14:758
 newspaper publishing history 15:236d
 quarantine period origin 15:326f
 Rialto Bridge construction 3:177b
 trade development and routes 18:664h

Venice, resort city, Sarasota County, southwestern Florida, U.S., on the Gulf of Mexico. Originally planned (1924-25) as a retirement city for members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the project was abandoned after the stock-market crash of 1929, but Venice survived as a small resort noted for tarpon fishing. It prospered after 1960, when it became winter headquarters for the Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Circus. Light manufacturing augments tourism as the economic mainstay. Nearby are Oscar Scherer State Park, Warm Mineral Springs and Cyclorama, the National Police Hall of Fame and Museum, and Floridaland—a recreated town of the Old West. Inc. 1925. Pop. (1970) 6,648; (1980) 12,153. 27°06' N, 82°27' W

Venice, Gulf of, Italian GOLFO DI VENEZIA, north section of the Adriatic Sea (an arm of the Mediterranean Sea), extending eastward for 60 mi (97 km) from the Po River Delta, Italy, to the coast of Istria, Yugoslavia. It receives the Po, Adige, Piave, and Tagliamento rivers. Marshes, lagoons, and sandspits border the gulf's shores as far as Trieste, Italy, where the low plateau of the Istrian Peninsula begins. A northeast or east-northeast wind, called the bora, causes rough seas and creates shipping hazards in the gulf. The rise of the city of Venice as a maritime power at the northwest end of the gulf gave special importance to Adriatic shipping routes in the Middle Ages. Modern gulf ports, apart from Venice, include Pula and Rovinj, Yugoslavia, and Trieste, which is located on a northeast inlet, the Gulf of Trieste. 45°15' N, 13°00' E
 map, Italy 9:1088
 map, Yugoslavia 19:1100

Venice, League of, 15th-century alliance of Venice, Milan, Spain, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the Pope that was intended to drive the French from Italy.
 Italian defense against France 9:1146c

Venice, Peace of (1177), resolved hostilities between Frederick I Barbarossa and Pope Alexander III.
 papal anti-imperial success 9:1132a

Venice Film Festival: see festival, film.

Venice maiolica, tin-glazed earthenware made at Venice and reaching its zenith in the 16th century. The workshops of Maestro Ludovico (flourished 1540-45), Domenico da Venezia (flourished 1550-60), and Jacomo da Pesaro (flourished 1543) were outstanding.

scenes from the antique in the Urbino manner (see Urbino maiolica), they excelled in depicting arrangements of decorative trophies, globes, musical instruments, and other apparatus, executed in a brilliant linear style in a blue-tinted enamel on a bluish-white or white ground, highlighted with opaque white.



Venice maiolica dish decorated with arabesques, from the workshop of Maestro Ludovico, c. 1540; in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London

By courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London; photograph, EB Inc.

Another typical design was a dense network of intertwining stems and arabesques. In their preference for blue-and-white enamel decoration, the Venetians showed the influence of Chinese porcelain and Turkish ware.

Vening Meinesz, Felix Andries (b. July 30, 1887, The Hague—d. Aug. 10, 1966, Amersfoort, Neth.), geophysicist and geodesist known for developing, in 1923, a method of measuring gravity in ocean basins by means of a device carried in a submarine, which contributed to an understanding of the Earth's crust beneath the ocean.

Vening Meinesz was a professor of geodesy at the Delft Technical University, Netherlands, from 1938 to 1957. He is also noted for his investigations concerning convection currents within the Earth and for his study of the effect of solar movements on the deformation of the Earth's crust.

gravity anomaly formula derivation 6:3g
 regional gravity anomaly correction 6:20g

Vénissieux, town, southeastern suburb of Lyon, Rhône département, southeast central France. It was the site of a Gallo-Roman villa, Vinitiacum, and the medieval village of Venicy. Latest census 47,460.

venite: see migmatite rock.

Vénitienne, La (1705), opera ballet by Houdart de la Motte.

Watteau's adaptation of Cythera theme 19:664a

Venius, also called OCTAVIUS VAENIUS, real name OTTO VAN VEEN (1556-1629), Flemish artist whom Rubens served as apprentice.
 Rubens' style and background influence 16:1g

Venizélos, Eleuthérios 19:76 (b. Aug. 23, 1864, Mourniés, Crete—d. March 18, 1936, Paris), the most prominent Greek politician and statesman of the early 20th century, considerably expanded Greece's territory through his diplomacy.

Abstract of text biography. He gained public notice by his part in Crete's uprising against Ottoman rule (1897). After serving as Crete's minister of justice (1899-1901) and Athens' deputy in the Greek Parliament (August 1910), he became prime minister (October 1910) under King George I. Through his policy Greece doubled in area and population during the Balkan Wars (1912-13). Engineering the exile of the pro-German King Constantine during World War I, Venizélos led Greece into the war on the side of the Western Allies. He gained international repute at the Treaty of Versailles (1919), negotiating sepa-

ately with Italy, Bulgaria, and Turkey to Greece's considerable advantage. Defeated by the Monarchists in the 1920 elections, he returned to lead the Liberal Party during the second Hellenic Republic (1924-35). His final exile in France followed an abortive anti-monarchist revolt in Crete (March 1935).

REFERENCES in other text articles:

Allied intervention against Constantine 19:958f
 Ottoman imperial collapse 2:630e
 role in Crete's union 5:253c

Venkata I, king of Vijayanager, reigned 1585 to 1614.

defeat of rebellions 9:377e

Venkaṭanātha (religious leader): see Vedāntadeśika.

Venkataraman Aiyer: see Ramana Maharishi.

Venlo, municipality (*gemeente*), Limburg province, southeastern Netherlands, on the Maas (Meuse) River, near the West German border. Chartered in 1343, it joined the Hanseatic League in 1364 and was a medieval fortress and trade centre. Venlo (Marsh and Wood) is now the centre of a market gardening "greenhouse" area exporting vegetables to the Rhineland. It also manufactures electric bulbs, optical instruments, and wood products. Heavily damaged in World War II, it has since been restored. Notable medieval buildings include St. Martin's Church and the town hall. Pop. (1972 est.) 63,106. 51°24' N, 6°10' E

map, The Netherlands 12:1060

Venn, John (1834-1923), British logician and man of letters, taught logic and wrote *The Logic of Chance* (1866), *Symbolic Logic* (1881), and *The Principles of Empirical Logic* (1889).

algebraic structure theory 1:521e
 Pragmatism influenced by Empiricism 14:941c
 probabilistic theory and method 11:667e

Vennberg, Karl Gunnar (b. Nov. 4, 1910, Blådinge, Swed.), poet and critic who was the leader of the critical-analytical line in the modern Swedish poetry of the 1940s. Vennberg's impelling and influential reviews and critical essays broke the ground for the radical cause of the 40-talslyrik (1947; "Poetry of the 1940s"), an anthology that he edited together with Erik Lindegren. Moreover, his two volumes of verse, in which he exposes contemporary deception and self-deception, *Halmfackla* (1944; "Straw Torch") and *Tideräkning* (1945; "Reckoning of Time"), together with Lindegren's collections from these years, are considered the central works, the essence of the new poetry of the 1940s. In his later poetry, *Gatukorsning* (1952; "Crossing the Street") and *Synfält* (1954; "Points of View"), he remains an adamant nonbeliever and, as such, sees himself as forced to stand alone.

Venn diagrams, means of depicting mathematical sets and subsets, a graphical aid in the study of Boolean algebra (*q.v.*).

algebraic structure theory 1:521d
 class inclusion representation 17:897d; illus.

venom, a toxic secretion of animal origin produced by specialized glands often associated with spines, teeth, or other piercing devices; some are skin or cuticular secretions. The venom apparatus may be primarily for killing or paralyzing prey or may be a purely defensive adaptation. The venoms of snakes, centipedes, and some marine invertebrates are also digestive fluids.

Most venoms injure man only when introduced into the skin or deeper tissues, usually through a sting or bite. Local effects include wheals, blisters, and violent inflammation, often followed by death of tissue, muscle spasm,