

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):

S

FOIA Number:

S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Speech File Backup Files
Subseries: Chron File, 1989-1993

OA/ID Number: 13760
Folder ID Number: 13760-001

Folder Title:
Baltic Freedom Day Signing Ceremony 6/13/91 [OA 8324]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	26	21	4	6

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: TONY SNOW *TS*
FROM: DAN MCGROARTY *DMcG*
SUBJECT: BALTIC FREEDOM DAY SIGNING CEREMONY

I. SUMMARY

On Thursday, June 13, at 2:15 p.m., you will give brief remarks in the Roosevelt Room before signing a proclamation declaring Baltic Freedom Day.

II. DISCUSSION

The remarks (5 minutes, on cards) discuss our desire for peaceful change as the Baltic nations strive for freedom and independence.

McGroarty/(Simon/Trujillo)
June 11, 1991
5:00 pm
[BAL TIC]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BAL TIC FREEDOM DAY SIGNING CEREMONY
THE ROOSEVELT ROOM
JUNE 13, 1991
2:15 pm

Welcome, all of you, to the White House. *Sen. Riezel, Cong. Ritter + Hertel.* [Introductory acknowledgements. Congressional co-sponsors.] Let me begin by thanking all of you for coming today. I had the pleasure of meeting a few of you several months ago here at the White House. I valued the chance to exchange views on the situation in the Baltics and I pledge my Administration's desire to continue close consultations with the Baltic-American community -- and of course the Congress. /

It is an honor to mark this important occasion with so many of the men and women who champion the cause of **freedom in the Baltics.** //

More than 50 years have passed since the dark days of June 1940, when three sovereign nations were subjugated by superior force. In those 50 years, the courage of the Baltic peoples has shown that force can subjugate a nation -- but it cannot rob a people of their desire for freedom.

Never has anyone in this room believed that the fate of the Baltic states was sealed by the secret pact between Hitler and Stalin. Never has the United States recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

Never in five long decades have the Baltic peoples lost hope -- the indomitable spirit that sustains their **heritage and**

history. Generations of sons and daughters who have never known freedom have faith that the Baltics will one day, once more be free. //

Today, that dream of self-determination -- the Baltics' democratic destiny -- burns bright and fierce. //

In Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, **freely elected legislatures** now govern in the name of the people. The popular will has expressed its clear and unmistakable desire for **freedom.** And in the face of violence and intimidation, the Baltic peoples and their freely-elected leaders have steadfastly **refused to answer violence with violence** -- preferring the path of peace and principle. //

The resumption of negotiations between the Soviet government and the Baltic states is a positive step. Yet there is much reason to be concerned about recent Soviet actions against customs posts in Lithuania and Latvia -- and the ongoing Soviet occupation of broadcast facilities in Vilnius -- acts that are incompatible with a process of peaceful change. **Good-faith negotiations** cannot go forward in an atmosphere of threat and intimidation. //

This nation has taken steps to demonstrate our support for the Baltic peoples. In February -- through the generous support of many of the groups represented here today -- the U.S. shipped **emergency medical supplies** to Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. /
I am proud to say that since the response from the Baltic-

American community has been so great, we will soon send a second shipment to the Baltics. //

These shipments are but one sign of the affinity we feel as Americans with the aspirations of all the Baltic peoples. In May, I met here in the White House with the elected leaders of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia -- my sixth meeting with Baltic leaders in the past 12 months. I will tell you today what I told them: At every opportunity, I have made clear to President Gorbachev and to other Soviet leaders this nation's firm belief in the legitimate aspirations of the Baltic states.

Let me add one thing more: You have my word that when I next meet with President Gorbachev, the fate of freedom in the Baltics will be high on my agenda. //

Once more, welcome -- and may God bless all the people of the Baltics. // I will now sign the proclamation, designating June 14, 1991 Baltic Freedom Day.

#

McGroarty/(Simon/Trujillo)
June 7, 1991
8:00 am
[BALTIC]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BALTIC FREEDOM DAY SIGNING CEREMONY
THE ROOSEVELT ROOM
JUNE 13, 1991
2:15 pm

Sen. Riegel

Welcome, all of you, to the White House. [Introductory

acknowledgements. Congressional co-sponsors.] Let me recognize **Angela Nelsas** of the Baltic-American Freedom League. **Dr. Olgerts Pavlovskis**, Chairman of the Joint Baltic-American National Committee. **Maido Kari** of the Baltic World Council. **Juhan Simonson** of the American National Baltic Association -- and all the other leaders in this great cause. / It is an honor to mark this important occasion with so many of the men and women who champion the cause of **freedom and independence in the Baltics.**

*June 14, 40
Lithuanian
Legation
(475)*

→ More than 50 years have passed since the dark days of June 1940, when three sovereign nations were subjugated by superior force. In those 50 years, the courage of the Baltic peoples has shown that **force can subjugate a nation** -- but it cannot rob a **people of their independence.**

*Molotov-
Ribbentrop
Pact 39*

Never has anyone in this room believed that the Baltics fate was sealed by the secret pact between Hitler and Stalin. Never has the United States recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

*Press
Statement
Fitzwater
8 May 91*

*(June 14, 40)
Lithuanian
Legation*

Never in five long decades have the Baltic peoples **lost hope** -- the indomitable spirit that sustains their **heritage and history.** Generations of sons and daughters who have **never known**

freedom have faith that the Baltics will one day, once more be free. //

Today, that dream of self-determination -- the Baltics' democratic destiny -- burns bright and fierce. //

In Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, **freely elected legislatures** now govern in the name of the people. The popular will has expressed its clear and unmistakable desire for **independence**. And in the face of violence and intimidation, the Baltic peoples and their freely-elected leaders have steadfastly **refused to answer violence with violence** -- preferring the path of peace and principle. //

In spite of our great hopes, there is much reason to be concerned. Recent Soviet actions against customs posts in Lithuania and Latvia -- the ongoing Soviet occupation of broadcast facilities in Vilnius -- these and other acts are incompatible with a process of peaceful change. Good-faith negotiations cannot go forward in an atmosphere of threat and intimidation. //

The United States recognizes the deep desire of all the Baltic peoples for freedom and independence. In May, I met here in the White House with the elected leaders of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia -- my sixth meeting with Baltic leaders in the past 12 months. I will tell you today what I told them: At every opportunity, I have made clear to President Gorbachev and to other Soviet leaders **this nation's firm belief in the legitimate aspirations of the Baltic states**.

Andrew
Silsky
647-
3188
Baltic
Aff.
State
Dept.

DRAFT
Proclamation
for Baltic
Freedom
2/28

Press
Statement
by
Fitzwater
8 May 91

Let me add one thing more: You have my word that when I travel to Moscow later this month, the fate of freedom in the Baltics will be high on my agenda. //

Once more, welcome -- and may God bless all the people of the Baltics. // I will now sign the proclamation, designating ~~this day~~ -- June 14, 1991 -- Baltic Freedom Day.

this day
to

June 14, 1991 # # #

374

Sanner NSC

BALTIC FREEDOM DAY, 1991 AND 1992

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

DRAFT

During the past year, the long struggle of the Baltic peoples to recover their freedom has been marked by both triumph and tragedy: triumph in their bold calls for liberty and independence; tragedy in the bloody events of January 1991.

The United States and, indeed, all freedom-loving nations have long denounced the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that led to the forcible incorporation of the independent Baltic States into the Soviet Union. Both the West and the Baltic peoples have continued to believe that the freedom of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia must and can be restored. Recent events suggest that our hopes have not been misplaced.

In peaceful, democratic referendums, the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have asserted overwhelmingly their intention to restore their independence. Toward that aim, they have sought to enter into meaningful negotiations with Moscow about their status. Despite the tragic events of January 1991, when Soviet forces killed at least 13 pro-Independence Lithuanians and injured hundreds of others, a dialogue between the Baltic governments and the Soviet Union has begun. We hope that it will bear fruit.

However, the United States remains deeply concerned over the continued Soviet occupation of broadcast facilities in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius; the recent ransacking of customs posts along the Lithuanian and Latvian borders; and other applications of intimidation and force by Soviet authorities. Such actions are incompatible with the process of peaceful change through fair and constructive negotiations.

The United States never has and never will recognize the forcible annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union.

I reiterated this policy during my recent meeting with Lithuanian President Landsbergis, Estonian Prime Minister Savisaar, and Latvian Prime Minister Godmanis. The United States actively supports self-determination for the Baltic peoples, and we urge the Soviet Union to move forward with the talks.

As we commemorate "Baltic Freedom Day," we reaffirm our support for the right of the Baltic peoples to liberty and self-determination, to free and fair elections, and to a better life for themselves and for their children.

The Congress, by House Joint Resolution ¹⁰²⁻¹⁷ 167, has designated June 14, 1991, and June 14, 1992, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the days of June 14, 1991, and June 14, 1992, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe these days with appropriate ceremonies and activities to reaffirm their commitment to human rights and to freedom and democracy for all oppressed peoples.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
 day of _____, in the year of our
 Lord nineteen hundred and ninety-one, and of the Independence of
 the United States of America the two hundred and fifteenth.

States, had requested the meeting, the President's sixth with Baltic officials during the past 12 months.

The President reiterated the longstanding U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union in 1940. The President noted the United States had transported emergency medical assistance to the Baltic States in February. The United States intends to send additional shipments of medical supplies to the Baltic States and to continue its program of medical assistance in the Soviet Union itself.

The President said the United States was encouraged by the resumption of negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Baltic States. The United States believes that fair and constructive negotiations are the only way to resolve the complex problems between Moscow and the Baltic governments. He said the United States hoped that all parties to these negotiations could be flexible and pragmatic in order to reach a just and lasting resolution of the problem.

Remarks to the Hispanic Alliance for Free Trade
May 9, 1991

Thank you very much. And some of that has to do, I think, with my fibrillating heart—[laughter]—but it's all right. I just came back from Bethesda and really got a wonderful report. I won't go into the clinical assessment, but it's great. I just take something to do with the thyroid, and the heart is perfect. So, I'm very lucky, very, very lucky.

I came over to talk to you today about an issue that is really of vital concern to me and, I think, of our country. And I have some talking points here, but let me just put them away and speak from the heart. I see my friend the Ambassador here, and I have great respect for him. And I might say I have enormous respect for President Salinas of Mexico.

And he is taking that country that we all love and moving it in a direction that we can all admire. And it would be a terrible tragedy if we took this Fast Track authority

continuing to establish settlements—that people may be telling the Secretary one thing but either unable to deliver or actually not telling the truth about their intentions.

The President. As we know, these differences have gone on for a long, long time. And I don't think that's the case, that somebody's saying one thing and then going off and just doing something behind his back. But, no, it's complex. But I don't accept that criticism. There's plenty of room to critique this and to wish for more progress from one country or another. But there's a lot going on. And I want to stay involved myself. I want to be a part of this because I think we have an opportunity now. And I think countries that the United States have helped recognize that. And I think Israel understands that. I think the Saudis understand that. I think the Egyptians understand that. And so, I want to use that good will to further peace in the Middle East. And so I'm—put it this way—moderately optimistic.

Thank you all very much.

Note: President Bush spoke at 8:35 a.m. in the Briefing Room at the White House. In his remarks, he referred to Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President; Gary Sick, former National Security Council official during the Carter administration; Marlin Fitzwater, Press Secretary to the President; and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on President Bush's Meeting With President Vytautas Landsbergis of Lithuania and Prime Ministers Ivars Godmanis of Latvia and Edgar Savisaar of Estonia
May 8, 1991

The President met today with President Landsbergis of Lithuania, Prime Minister Godmanis of Latvia, and Prime Minister Savisaar of Estonia for about 40 minutes in the Cabinet Room. The three Baltic leaders, who are on a private visit to the United

Statement on the Extension of United States Sanctions on the Export of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union June 18, 1982

I have reviewed the sanctions on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union imposed on December 30, 1981, and have decided to extend these sanctions through adoption of new regulations to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad, as well as equipment produced abroad under licenses issued by U.S. companies.

The objective of the United States in im-

posing the sanctions has been and continues to be to advance reconciliation in Poland. Since December 30, 1981, little has changed concerning the situation in Poland; there has been no movement that would enable us to undertake positive, reciprocal measures.

The decision taken today will, we believe, advance our objective of reconciliation in Poland.

Proclamation 4948—Baltic Freedom Day June 14, 1982

*By the President of the United States
of America*

A Proclamation

The independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was extinguished in 1939 as a result of a nefarious deal struck between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Hitler handed Stalin the three Baltic republics as a bonus to secure his cooperation in the destruction of Poland and to obtain a secure eastern frontier which enabled him to launch war against the western democracies. Subsequently, hundreds of thousands of Baltic nationals were deported to the Soviet Union where many of them perished in prisons and forced labor camps. The darkest day of that great human tragedy occurred on June 14, 1941, when their homes and jobs were taken by Russian settlers.

Today, some of the survivors of these mass deportations are citizens of the United States. Their aspirations for a better future for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have helped to bring new meaning to our nation's commitment to freedom for all

people. The United States has never, over the intervening forty-one years, recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

As a nation, we remain dedicated to the furtherance and preservation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of all people and take note on this special day of our hope that the blessings of liberty will one day be part of the national life of the courageous people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The Congress of the United States by Senate Joint Resolution 201 has authorized and requested the President to proclaim June 14 as Baltic Freedom Day.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate June 14, 1982, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States to reaffirm their belief and hope that the citizens of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and of all nations will one day achieve through peaceful means the goals of democratic freedom and self-determination.

In Witness Where
my hand this 14th c
of our Lord ninetee
two, and of the Inde
States of America
sixth.

Remarks of the Israel Following June 21, 1982

The President. It
have Prime Ministe
House again.

All of us share a c
of the need to bring
the Middle East. To
portunity to exchan
cause can be advan
clear that we and Isr
the violence there
pendent Lebanon w
strong, central gover

We agree that Isra
ed to violence from
United States will
achieve these goals a
drawal of all foreign

And, now, our g
Begin.

The Prime Ministe
dent.

Mr. President, la
good afternoon. I'm
friend, the President
for his invitation to c
again, after my fir
1981, in the White H
sion, a very fruitfu
President and his adv

Everybody of you
now a situation in t
calls for activity, grea

Public Law 102-17
102d Congress

Joint Resolution

Designating June 14, 1991, and June 14, 1992, each as "Baltic Freedom Day".

Mar. 22, 1991

[H.J. Res. 167]

Whereas on June 14, 1941, the Soviet Union began mass deportation to Siberia of peoples from the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania;

Whereas the United States has for the past 50 years refused to recognize the forced incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union;

Whereas the Soviet Union has consistently refused to follow the request of the United States that it begin negotiating a peaceful end to the occupation of the Baltic republics;

Whereas the Baltic republics, which in 1990 reaffirmed independence from the Soviet Union, have not been allowed to pursue policies which would realize the intent of these declarations;

Whereas the armed forces and secret police of the Soviet Union continue to maintain an extensive presence in the Baltic republics;

Whereas, although the Soviet Union has stated its intention to pursue policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, recent events in the Baltic republics indicate that the Soviet Union is not fully committed to those policies;

Whereas the Soviet Union has consistently pursued measures which are contrary to its stated goal of sovereignty for Soviet republics; and

Whereas the Soviet Union has not acted in accord with the Helsinki agreements, which it signed 15 years ago, because it has not allowed the Baltic republics to exercise their respective rights to self-determination: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That June 14, 1991, and June 14, 1992, are each designated as "Baltic Freedom Day", and the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe such days with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

Approved March 22, 1991.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.J. Res. 167:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 137 (1991):

Mar. 5, considered and passed House.

Mar. 7, considered and passed Senate.



4:45 P.M. NEWS UPDATE

SOVIET AID/PRESIDENT (Aboard Air Force One/Reuter) -- President Bush said the U.S. and Soviet Union were pushing hard for a strategic arms accord and a summit, and he was convening a "rather important" NSC meeting to expedite decisions. Bush said Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh would try to iron out differences on a START treaty and clear the way for an imminent U.S.-Soviet summit when they meet on Friday. "I assume they'll be talking about a possible summit meeting," Bush told reporters aboard the presidential jet en route to Washington. "But as I've said before, we want to move START further along, so we'll be talking substance. I'll be having a meeting when I get back this afternoon, a rather important meeting, and that will help Secretary Baker go ahead."

BALTICS/GORBACHEV (Stockholm/AP) -- Mikhail Gorbachev, stung by criticism of his policy on the Baltics, warned Western powers against getting involved in internal Soviet affairs by encouraging separatist movements. Gorbachev visited Sweden and Norway, but his Nobel triumph was clouded by questions about Soviet troop attacks in secessionist Lithuania. "Compassion by a neighboring country must not take the form of meddling in the affairs of the Soviet Union, especially when it is in the process of reform," Gorbachev said. The Soviet president, renewing his call for Western aid, said "one should instead support this process, which is being carried out within the framework of the constitution. To support separatism and oppress minorities is not acceptable."

CIVIL RIGHTS/PRESIDENT (Robert Shepard, UPI) -- President Bush said Congress should take a serious look at the civil rights bill he is proposing and denied that his opposition to a Democratic measure amounts to "divisive politics." Commenting on House passage of the Democrats' bill, Bush said what he wants to happen next is for "somebody to take a look at our legislation. I don't think any of you have heard a serious analysis of our bill and the reason is we're always playing from somebody's else's sheet of music," Bush told reporters on Air Force One.

FROHNMAYER/PRESIDENT (Atlanta/Chris Connell, AP) -- ...After the Southern Baptists adopted resolutions Wednesday demanding that President Bush fire NEA Chairman Frohnmayer, the President said, Frohnmayer was "in a very difficult positions, and in my view he's done a good job. It's tough because we don't want censorship, but we don't want just plain sacrilegious junk being pedalled as art." Bush said some works "put forward and called art that are totally sacrilegious are deeply offensive to me. And I also think it's offensive to John Frohnmayer."

GUN CONTROL/MITCHELL (UPI) -- Sen. Mitchell introduced gun control legislation that he said would meet the goal of keeping weapons out of the hands of criminals. Mitchell [who opposed the Brady Bill] said it will be incorporated in anti-crime legislation that the Senate expects to consider as early as next week. Mitchell's bill would include a 7-day waiting period -- that would end when a national phone-check system is fully in place -- but also requires a background check prior to the sale of a handgun.

-more-

THORNBURGH CRITICISM (UPI) -- [Responding to criticism from Sen. Mitchell about the attorney general's timetable,] spokesman Dan Eramian said, "The attorney general does not work for Mr. Mitchell. He works for the President of the United States and the President of the United States asked him to stay on."

MIDEAST ARMS (AP) -- The Bush administration will soon proceed with billions of dollars worth of new weapons sales to the Mideast, a senior State Department official said. Undersecretary of State Bartholomew said the sales aren't at odds with President Bush's goal of halting proliferation of all kinds of weapons in the region. Bush's plan "is not aimed at preventing peaceful nations from having the ability to defend themselves," Bartholomew said at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. "It is not aimed at stopping the international transfer of arms." New sales "directly undercut the notion of restraint," said Sen. Pell. "Having gone through the wrenching Gulf war, how can we now countenance, much less lead, a new arms race?"

SDI FUNDING (UPI) -- Seven of the Senate's most conservative Republicans launched a bid to rescue the administration's SDI program from deep cuts inflicted by the House. Some suggested that the 1972 ABM Treaty needs to be reopened to permit deployment of SDI weaponry. "A ballistic missile defense is clearly within the technical ability of America," argued Sen. Wallop, who organized the morning remarks. "It is not within the political ability."

IRAQ/FOOD DIVERSION (U.N./AP) -- Bush administration complaints that Iraq is diverting emergency food supplies are exaggerated, the U.N. said. "The problem has been dramatized out of proportion," said U.N. spokesman Giuliani. He said he had been informed that some food had been diverted but "once the World Food Program pointed this out, the (Iraqi) government replenished what had been taken, and there was no major problem."

STRAUSS NOMINATION (UPI) -- The leader of a conservative business group downplayed earlier criticism of Robert Strauss' nomination as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and said his group, the U.S. Business and Industrial Council, would not try to block confirmation.

AIDS (Atlanta/UPI) -- Assessing the U.S. AIDS epidemic 10 years after it began, federal health officials projected the disease will become the second leading cause of death of young men and one of five leading causes of death among young women in 1991. "Clearly, AIDS is taking its place as a common cause of death of young adults in the United States," said Dr. James Curran, director of the AIDS division of the federal CDC.

###

91 JUN 6 12:25

LEGATION OF LATVIA
4325 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20011

ATTN: MR. BOB SIMON

1 page follows

*Bob - please keep
for file.
Dan Mink*

0002

tions were the triumph of the working classes. In solving the question of the political regime "we turn our eyes toward the great example set by the friendly peoples of the Soviet Union. Every worker in the U.S.S.R. is guaranteed the right to work, to rest, to education and to material support in his old age." The declaration continues with such eulogies of the Soviet system.

A declaration concerning the incorporation of Latvia into Soviet Union after accusing the former Government of oppressing the peasants, squandering the country's wealth, increasing its indebtedness and making the country dependent on foreign capitalists and bankers, accuses it of failure to fulfill the mutual aid pact of October 5, 1939 with the U.S.S.R. and states that a firm and stable union between Latvia and the U.S.S.R. must be legally established.

A telegram to Stalin starts with eulogistic greetings and continues that the Saeima, expressing the will of the people, has unanimously established the Latvian Socialist Republic. Another telegram to Molotov is in the same vein.

WASHINGTON

861.01/2198: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 4, 1940.

[Received August 4—10:48 a. m.]

057. The Supreme Soviet yesterday passed a law stating that it had resolved "to satisfy the request of the Seim of Lithuania and to admit the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a constituent Soviet Socialist Republic possessing equal rights".

Action with respect to Estonia and Latvia presumably will be taken at meetings next week.²²

THURSTON

809P.00/327

*The Latvian Minister (Bilmanis) to the Secretary of State*¹

No. 701/502

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1940.

SIR: With reference to my Notes dated July 18th, 18th and 23rd,² and in view of the fact that the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet

¹The Chargé in the Soviet Union informed the Department in telegram No. 972, August 6 (861.01/2199), and in telegram No. 980, August 7 (8601.01/73), that the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union had similarly resolved to admit Latvia into the Soviet Union on August 6, and Estonia on August 7.

²Similar notes were presented to the Department by the Lithuanian Minister, Povilas Zadeikis, on August 3, and by the Acting Consul General of Estonia in New York, in charge of the Estonian Legation, Johannes Kalv, on August 6. The receipt of all three notes was acknowledged on August 10 by the Counselor of the Department, R. Walton Moore.

³None printed.

Socialist Republics has proclaimed the incorporation of the Republic of Latvia into the Soviet Union, I have the honor to inform you that I consider this act to be an outrageous infringement of international law, practice and morals and that I protest against this violation of Latvia's integrity.

Although the U. S. S. R. has attempted to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings, a glance at the Constitution of Latvia shows that this "legality" is nothing but a flimsy veil to cover the annihilation of the independence of a weaker country by brutal force. Article One of the Constitution of Latvia states that

"1. Latvia is an independent democratic republic."

Articles Seventy-six and Seventy-seven of the Constitution further state that

"76. Saeima [Parliament] may amend the Constitution in sessions in which at least two-thirds of the members of Saeima participate. Amendments shall be adopted in three readings by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the deputies present."

"77. Should the Saeima amend Articles One, Two, Three or Six of the Constitution, such amendments to attain legal force shall be referred to a national referendum."

It is well known that no referendum was carried out in Latvia and that even the Saeima elections were illegal, only one party being permitted to run. Moreover, no referendum could have been carried out in the presence of the huge military forces of the Soviet Union occupying Latvia. Thus the action of the U. S. S. R. and of the Latvian puppet Saeima in incorporating the Republic of Latvia into the Soviet Union does not have the slightest constitutional legality.

In view of the above and as the duly accredited envoy and representative of the constitutional Government of Latvia to the United States of America, I have the honor respectfully to beg the United States Government to refuse to recognize this predatory act of the U. S. S. R. whereby the Republic of Latvia has been robbed of its independence.

Accept [etc.]

DR. ALFRED BILMANIS

860P.01/89: Telegram

The Chargé in Latvia (Washington) to the Secretary of State

Riga, August 6, 1940—1 p. m.

[Received 1:13 p. m.]

254. Latvia has greeted the first day of its incorporation into Soviet Russia with no evidences of spontaneous enthusiasm. Manifestation is scheduled for 6 p. m., today however and members of trade unions

¹Brackets appear in the original note.

ISSR
nce
m

ESTONIA AND THE ESTONIANS

Toivo U. Raun



HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Aleksei Müürisepp (1961–1970)

Artur Vader (1970–1978)

Johannes Käbin (1978–1983)

Arnold Rüütel (1983–)

It is noteworthy that, after a string of four Russian-Estonians, Rüütel is the first native Estonian to hold this post since Jakobson in 1958.

In conjunction with the promulgation of the new all-Union constitution in 1977, a similar one was proclaimed for the ESSR in 1978. In comparison to the 1940 constitution, the new document is much longer and more detailed. For the first time the leading role of the Communist Party is specifically recognized, and the goal of building communism, rather than socialism, sets the standard for behavior. Although it updates the 1940 document and eliminates certain obsolete clauses, the practical significance of the new ESSR constitution appears to be limited. Nevertheless, both the all-Union and ESSR constitutions of the late 1970s can be seen as a codification of the centralizing tendencies of the post-Khrushchev era.²²

DISSENT

Under the Stalinist regime, nonviolent dissent in Estonia had virtually no basis for existence. As noted above, the only visible form of resistance was the violent opposition of the pro-independence guerrilla movement. However, after 1953 the dismantling of most of Stalin's terror apparatus, the rehabilitation of many of his victims, and the return of surviving deportees contributed to a new era of rising political expectations. De-Stalinization implied that the Soviet régime was ready for reforms. Nevertheless, the Khrushchev era passed without fundamental change, and under Brezhnev the Soviet authorities toed an increasingly harder political line. It was disappointment with the unfulfilled promises of reform that first led to the emergence of open dissent in Moscow by the second half of the 1960s.

In Estonia dissent had appeared by 1968, no doubt on the Moscow model, and was fueled by the effects of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of that year. It is noteworthy that the first letters of protest from Estonia in the late 1960s were the work of both Estonians and non-Estonians and concerned primarily civil rights issues rather than nationalist ones. By the 1970s, however, nationalism had become the major theme of Estonian dissent. In 1972 the Estonian Democratic Movement and the Estonian National Front, two small dissident groups, demanded the restoration of Estonian independence and called on the United Nations to administer the election of a constituent assem-

bly. In 1975 four members of the two groups were sentenced to five or six years in prison for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."²³

Despite the crackdown by the authorities, the scope of Estonian dissent broadened in the late 1970s. In 1977 eighteen natural scientists condemned the pollution caused by careless and overly ambitious oil-shale and phosphorite mining in Estonia. Estonian dissidents made contact with other Balts, resulting most strikingly in the "Baltic appeal" for self-determination on the fortieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1979 and a call for a Nordic nuclear-free zone including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1981. One of the Estonian signers of the "Baltic appeal," the long-term dissident and scientist Mart Niklus, was sentenced in 1981 to a ten-year imprisonment. At the same trial, fellow scientist Jüri Kukk, who had declared solidarity with the "Baltic appeal," received a two-year sentence, but he died in mysterious circumstances while on a hunger strike only two months later. The arrest and trial of Estonian dissidents continued in the early 1980s as did various forms of protest against the Soviet regime, including a call for a monthly "silent half-hour" at workplaces and an increase in the number of defections to the West—in some cases by highly placed individuals.²⁴ Among various Estonian samizdat publications the most important and long-lived has been *Lisandusi mõtete ja uudiste vabale levikule Eestis* (Some additions to the free flow of thoughts and news in Estonia). In nineteen issues in 1978–1984 it reported mainly on dissident activity and trials, but it also addressed other matters such as the situation in Poland.²⁵

Although a tradition of spontaneous student demonstrations expressing nationalist sentiments dates back to the 1960s, youth unrest has increased in the recent past in the major cities. Tartu University has been the main center of protests, but the largest demonstration took place in Tallinn in October 1980. About 2,000 secondary-school students marched in the streets and shouted slogans calling for an Estonia free from Russian rule.²⁶ The use of police force to quell the demonstration as well as clashes with Russian students prompted one of the most remarkable documents of the Soviet era in Estonia. In a signed, open letter, 40 established Estonian intellectuals—some with excellent party credentials—decried the increase in ethnic tensions in the ESSR and spoke out in defense of the Estonian language and culture, which they regarded as increasingly threatened in recent years. A second, unsigned letter from fifteen Estonian intellectuals, dated March 1982, provides a blunter and more graphic description of the growing role of Russians and the Russian language in Estonia. A third, signed letter from thirteen Estonian dissidents in October 1982 appealed to Finnish firms and workers not to participate in the construction of the new Muuga harbor near Tallinn because it would only lead to the further influx of Russians and other non-Estonians into Estonia.²⁷ In short, during the Vaino years since 1978 the social base of dissent has broadened, and

its major concern has shifted from political demands to the more fundamental issues of national and cultural survival.

STRUCTURE OF THE POST-STALIN ECONOMY

In the decades after Stalin's death the Estonian economy became further integrated into the all-Union one, and Soviet authorities continued to emphasize industrial development. By the late 1950s, for the first time in Estonian history, the number of workers in industry had outnumbered those in agriculture. However, in the 1960s and 1970s the proportion of industrial workers remained nearly constant at 34–35 percent, and the share of agricultural workers was cut in half from about 25 percent in 1960 to less than 13 percent in 1980. As might be expected in an increasingly developed economy, employment in trade and in the service sector—material, educational, and cultural—has shown the greatest increases in the last two decades.²⁸ If the structure of the economy is measured by total annual output in rubles, the role of industry has been dominant throughout the post-Stalin era (60 percent in 1956, 63 percent in 1983). In agriculture growing mechanization has partially compensated for the loss of labor, keeping its share at 17 percent of total annual output in 1983 as compared to 24 percent in 1956. The only other economic sector worthy of mention in this regard is construction, whose contribution to total output remained stable at 7–9 percent annually between 1956 and 1983.²⁹

Economic ties with the other parts of the Soviet Union have played an important role in the Estonian economy in the post-Stalin era. This development reflects the Soviet emphasis on regional specialization as well as Estonia's relative lack of raw materials for its growing industrial sector. In 1977, 82 percent of all imports to the ESSR and 93 percent of exports from it involved other Soviet republics. Of the imports, 40 percent consisted of raw materials and fuel. Among exports from Estonia in the early 1970s, three areas dominated: light industry (30 percent), food products (24 percent), and machinery (19 percent). In 1977, 55–60 percent of Estonia's external trade in both directions was with the RSFSR. The share of the other union republics, from 12 percent for the Ukraine to 0.3 percent for Tadzhikistan in 1972, was generally proportional to their size and inversely proportional to their distance from Estonia. Outside the USSR, Estonia's main trading partners were, in order of importance, Eastern Europe, Finland and Western Europe, and Third World countries in Africa and Asia.³⁰

91 JUN 6 P1: 44

LITHUANIAN LEGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

2622 16th St., N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20009

Tel: 202-234-5860

Fax: 202-328-0466


FAX MESSAGE TO : MR. BOB SIMONDS - THE WHITE HOUSE FAX:456-6218

FROM : STASYS LOZORAITIS - LEGATION OF LITHUANIA

Number of Pages 5
(incl. Transmittal Page)

COMMENTS : I AM ENCLOSING THREE DIPLOMATIC

DOCUMENTS SENT AFTER THE SOVIET
OCCUPATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND TO THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS VISCOUNT
HALIFAX.



TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
CERTIFIEDLITHUANIAN LEGATION,
Washington, D. C., July 22, 1940.

The Honorable CORDELL HULL,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: Referring to my communication of July 13, 1940, concerning the national crisis precipitated by the Soviet Union's unlawful intervention in Lithuania's internal affairs, I have the honor to invite your attention to the nature of that intervention and to the results that followed.

On October 10, 1939, Lithuania formally entered into a Mutual Assistance Pact with the Soviet Union, which was based on nonintervention in internal affairs of either High Contracting Party. Limited garrisons of Soviet troops in Lithuania were agreed upon. Lithuania, for obvious reasons, scrupulously observed all the requirements of the Pact and expected, naturally, reciprocal attitude from her colossal neighbor.

During the short period of comparative tranquility, satisfaction was expressed by Soviet authorities concerning the treatment accorded the Red Army garrisons in Lithuania. But on May 25, 1940, like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky came the news that Soviet officials advanced certain charges regarding mistreatment of Red Army soldiers in Lithuania, such as kidnappings and even death of a soldier, presumably a deserter; there were also accusations directed against the Entente of the Baltic States; charges and accusations not substantiated as yet.

All efforts on the part of the Lithuanian Government to wipe out all possible misunderstandings and suspicions and to placate the Soviet authorities, were in vain; even Prime Minister Merkys' trip to Moscow did not bring any betterment of the situation nor did it obtain the necessary cooperation of the Soviet authorities in clarifying their charges.

At midnight of June 14th, the Soviet Union Commissar for Foreign Affairs presented an ultimatum to Mr. Urbsys, the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was in Moscow at that time by order of Prime Minister Merkys. Only nine hours were given in which to comply with the terms of the ultimatum which were as follows: (1) the prosecution of officials responsible for the alleged provocative acts against the Red Army garrisons; (2) the formation of a pro-Soviet government; (3) the admission into Lithuania of an unlimited number of Soviet troops.

If the government of Mr. Merkys could be accused of any guilt, it certainly was guilty not of provocative acts against the Red Army garrisons, but perhaps of too lenient an attitude towards them. In this instance it is well to recall an opinion of one great American statesman that, "The presence of troops of one country on the soil of another constitutes prima facie evidence of aggression."

Although the terms of the Soviet ultimatum were incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Mutual Assistance Pact and undoubtedly constituted an illegal intervention in Lithuania's internal affairs, the Lithuanian Government, under the circumstances and in view of the imminent invasion of the Red Army, complied with the terms and resigned. General Rastikis was designated by the President of the Lithuanian Republic to form a new government, but this move, which was the last act of the free government, failed because of the Soviet stand taken. Mr. Justas Paleckis, the Soviet's choice, was named Prime Minister instead.

TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
CERTIFIED



Concerning the Soviet Union's demand for unlimited numbers of Red Army troops to be stationed in Lithuania, it must be observed that such a demand could have been prompted by some emergency or by an anticipated attack by some European Power, as stipulated by Article Five of the Mutual Assistance Pact. But the plain fact is that there was no emergency and no anticipated attack from anywhere. And if the Soviet Union's demand to increase her army garrisons in Lithuania were to constitute an extension of the Mutual Assistance Pact, there is no doubt that there was no formal agreement entered into and ratified as required by law.

On June 15, 1940, numerous Red Army divisions crossed Lithuania's frontiers at several points. H. E. Antanas Smetona, President of the Republic of Lithuania, as stated in my previous note, departed from the country and went abroad without tendering his resignation as President. A few hours later a special Commissar from Moscow arrived by plane to Kaunas to supervise the formation of a new government. Thus on June 17, 1940, the Paleckis government came into being, as related in my note of June 25, 1940.

The parliamentary elections of July 14 and 15 were guarded by devastating numbers of foreign troops, supervised by a special emissary from a foreign capital and managed exclusively by one Party (the Communist Party) with a single list of candidates, while other political parties that stand for the country's independence were barred from the polls. Therefore, such elections, regardless of the high voting rate, as reported by the press despatches are illegal in all respects as, under the above described circumstances, they not only cannot and do not represent the true will of the free people, but at the same time they aim at the very heart of national existence by usurping the sovereignty rights of the free Lithuanian Nation as defined in Article One of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. This illegally elected body, the Seimas (Parliament), on July 21, 1940, according to telegraphic despatches from Kaunas, declared that from now on Lithuania is a Soviet Republic and requested membership in the Union which, of course, was granted in advance by the Soviet government.

Thus with the creation of the Paleckis government, with the Red Army present in all parts of Lithuania and new elections carried out to suit its purposes, the government of the Soviet Union, using the most modern methods of veiled aggression accomplished its task—the destruction of the independence of the Lithuanian Republic at such a time when peaceful conditions prevailed and the development of friendly relations had a fair chance of success. This evil act was committed by Soviet stratagem while the Lithuanian-Soviet Union Non-Aggression Treaty was still in effect and the clause of non-intervention in internal affairs only eight months old.

The Treaty of Non-aggression between Lithuania and the Soviet Union sounds rather ironical in present circumstances:

ARTICLE 2. The Republic of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics mutually undertake to respect in all circumstances the sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of each other.

"ARTICLE 3. Each of the two contracting parties undertakes to refrain from any aggressive action whatsoever against the other party."

And another document worth while recalling at this time is the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, signed in London, July 4, 1933, of which the Soviet Union was the initiator and signatory. Article 2 of the Convention reads as follows:

"Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, without prejudice to the agreements in force between the Parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

"(a) * * *

"(b) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of

"(b) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;

"(c) * * *

"ARTICLE 3. No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2."

The Soviet Union, concerned solely with her own interests, found it expedient to deny even the elementary rights to her smaller neighbor. This, evidently, is the common way of an aggressor.

As a duly appointed representative of the sovereign State of Lithuania, I voice my solemn protest against the unprovoked aggression and occupation of Lithuania by the Red Army of the Soviet Union and subsequent incorporation of Lithuania by the Government of the Union of

TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
CERTIFIED

No. 1009

LITHUANIAN LEGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 3, 1940.The Honorable CORDELL HULL,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

SIR: According to information available, the supreme Soviet authority of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on August 3, 1940 made a move to incorporate the Republic of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, thus not only completing a process whereby the Lithuanian nation has been deprived, temporarily at least, of her independence and the possibility of exercising her sovereignty rights, but also inflicting untold suffering and misery upon the innocent people.

The government of the Soviet Union, in order to camouflage its devious methods of aggression and to confuse world opinion, was eager to base this ignominious move against Lithuania's integrity on a resolution made in Moscow but adopted in Kaunas on July 21, 1940 by the Seimas (Parliament) which, in fact, was elected illegally and was one of the byproducts of the Soviet invasion. But the Soviet leaders for obvious reasons failed to mention the Lithuanian-Soviet treaties broken by them: the Treaty of Nonaggression, for example, extended to 1945; the Lithuanian-Soviet Russian Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, the first Article of which reads as follows:

"Relying on the strength of a declaration made by the Federal Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia to the effect that all peoples of every nationality have the right of self-determination and complete separation from the State to which they belonged previously, Russia, without any reservation whatsoever, recognizes Lithuania as a self-governing and independent State with all juridical consequences that follow from such a recognition and in a spirit of free and good will renounces all sovereignty rights of Russia concerning the Lithuanian nation and Lithuanian territory which previously belonged to her. The fact that Lithuania for some time was under Russian sovereignty does not impose on the Lithuanian people and their territory any obligations towards Russia."

As the so-called Parliamentary elections of July 14 and 15, 1940, and the forced adoption of a resolution to join the Soviet Union were utterly void of legality, as referred to in my previous note of July 22, 1940, so is the incorporation of Lithuania, together with her historic capital Vilnius and the Vilnius District, into the Soviet system a lawless act, contrary to elementary rules of international conduct—an act that is in fact the final phase of veiled aggression and imposition by threat of force of the Soviet's will upon its weaker neighbor.

As the duly accredited representative of the Sovereign Republic of Lithuania near the Government of the United States of America I repeat my protest against the unprovoked aggression and illegal incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union and at the same time express the hope of the Lithuanian nation that no State in the world will recognize this international outrage as having any legality or bona fide excuse.

I take this opportunity to express my most profound gratitude to the American Government for the stand taken in this matter as evidenced in the statement by the Soviet Socialist Republics. Lithuania, with her rich historic traditions dating back from the XII century, her ancient language, her devotion to religion and western culture, has the undisputable right to independence and free economic development. During twenty-two years of independent existence, Lithuania, comprising 24,000 square miles of territory and with her population of three million souls, who differ racially and linguistically from the Soviet Russians, thanks only to the spirit of independence was able to convincingly demonstrate to her neighbors and to the world her ability of self-government and to achieve rapid progress in every respect.

In view of the foregoing, I deem it my duty to register my plea and my hope that the Government of the United States of America, champion of legal inter-

that the Government of the United States of America, champion of legal intercourse among nations, will consider this present Soviet occupation of Lithuania as an illegal act contrary to the spirit of International Law, and will accord, if possible, every assistance to Lithuanian citizens wherever there are no legal representatives of the Lithuanian State.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

P. ZADEIKIS,
*Minister of Lithuania.**

TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
CERTIFIED

23d JULY, 1940.

153
The Rt. Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAX, K. G., P. C., G. S. C. I., G. C. I. E.,
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office, London, S. W. 1.²⁰

My LORD: I consider it my painful duty to inform you that my country has become a victim of unprovoked aggression committed by the Soviet Government in violation of a series of treaties by which the Soviet Government had solemnly undertaken to abstain from direct or indirect aggression against Lithuania.

2. As late as 10th October, 1939, a treaty was concluded between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, providing for the stationing of a limited number of Russian garrison troops in Lithuania, ostensibly for the mutual protection of both States. This treaty contains the following provision:

"The fulfilment of the present treaty shall not in any way affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, particularly their State organization, economic and social system, military methods, and generally, the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs. (Article VII)."

3. On June 14, 1940, on the pretext of entirely false charges, the Soviet Government abruptly confronted my Government with an ultimatum, presented at midnight of that day and expiring nine hours later; demanding unlimited occupation of Lithuania by Soviet military forces and the formation of a new Government acceptable to the U. S. S. R. while the entire country came under the rigid occupation of the Soviet military forces.

5. On July 14th and 15th, elections were staged for the return of a new Parliament which, on July 21st, decided unanimously, it is claimed, to surrender the independence of Lithuania and asked for incorporation into the U. S. S. R.

6. It must be obvious to any impartial and unprejudiced observer that neither the "elections" held under the pressure of foreign occupational troops nor the so-called Parliament constituted under such conditions can in any manner whatsoever reflect the will of the Lithuania people: they did not possess a shred of electoral liberty or the remotest possibility of expressing their true wishes.

7. In these circumstances, my duty as a representative of the Lithuanian people in this country, is to voice a most solemn protest against this wanton act of aggression against my country. At the same time, I wish to declare that I am unable to recognize as valid and binding any decision of the Parliament elected under foreign domination or any act of the Government formed and acting under duress.

8. Bringing the above to the notice of His Majesty's Government, I venture to hope that His Majesty's Government, themselves engaged in a struggle "till freedom for ourselves and others is secured" (to use your Lordship's own inspiring words of yesterday) will decline to recognize the acts depriving Lithuania of her freedom.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
My Lord,
Your obedient Servant,

D. K. RAUTIS

LATVIA COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

CHIEF EDITOR

J. RUTKIS



LATVIAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION
STOCKHOLM

are run by managers (directors) chosen by the Party. The consumer's cooperatives, too, are not independent organizations. Actually, they are part of the State goods distribution system.

There are no *cultural organizations* worthy of their name. During the "thaw", in 1956, the Latvian Ministry of Culture planned to establish a "Latvian Cultural Society" with sections throughout the country. Its purpose would have been to revive the traditions of free Latvia. However, the realization of this plan was not permitted. Factories, kolkhozes, et cetera, have "clubs" which occasionally arrange lectures, concerts or theatrical performances but mostly they have to engage in communistic and anti-religious propaganda.

The actual position of the "social organizations" may be characterized by a statement of Dr. M. Valters: "The Bolshevik monstre recognizes no other law than that imposed by the Communist Party".³³

THE LIFE-STRUGGLE OF THE LATVIAN NATION

The Soviet occupation has shaken the very foundations of the Latvian people, whose existence as a national unit is now threatened more than ever before in their history. The major actions directed against their national, political and cultural interests are:

1. *Genocide*, as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, signed in 1948 and endorsed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime, in addition to mass executions, has deported Latvian citizens, mostly to the Arctic regions of Siberia and other areas with a harsh climate. Some 70 percent of the deportees have perished there in forced labour camps, and only a minor number survived to fall under the provisions of the so-called amnesty issued after Stalin's death. According to an estimate by Professor A. Švābe, Latvia lost 35,000 or 1.89 % of her population during the first Soviet occupation (1940/41). This percentage would represent 2,400,000 persons in the United States, 865,000 in Great Britain and 205,000 in Canada. Under the 2nd Russian occupation (since 1944) Soviet terror and deportations have exacted an even heavier toll of Latvians.³⁴

2. *Deportation of Latvian youths* continued under Khrushchev, disguised as a "voluntary" large-scale transfer of labour to Kazakhstan and other newly developed agricultural and industrial areas.

3. *Colonization* by aliens, mostly Russians, sent to take the place of deported Latvians. As a result of this process, which tends to expand, the proportion of ethnic Latvians in the Latvian population is decreasing (see Population).

4. *Russification* is deliberately pursued by the present regime in several ways. The first is by means of school policy. Russian is a compulsory subject in all schools in Latvia; there have been established the so-called "amalgamated schools" where Latvians study together with Russians and other non-Latvians; in addition, Latvians are urged to send their children to Russian schools (i.e. schools where all subjects are taught in Russian) because, it is said, the graduates of such schools would have greater opportunities later on. Secondly, the appointment of Russians to leading positions in the "Party and government", law courts, industry, commerce and agriculture causes Russian to become the language in which business is transacted in all governmental agencies. Thirdly, and this is the most important point, there is the new (1961) programme of the Soviet Communist Party. Its section, "Tasks of the Party in the Field of National Relations", calls for the total elimination of national characteristics. It admits that the "disappearance of linguistic differences" may prove a long-

range proposition but declares that "all the Soviet nations are developing a common international culture" and that "for all the people of the U.S.S.R., Russian has already become the language of mutual communication and cooperation". As regards the future, the programme utters definite threats: "No expression of national peculiarities will be tolerated in the Soviet Republics as regards the training and employment of officials belonging to different nationalities. The suppression of any expression of nationalism is in the interests of all the nations and peoples of the U.S.S.R."³⁵

Hence, the programme calls for the elimination of a Latvian nation and the dissolution of their national culture into an "international" one, actually into a uniform Russified culture of the "Soviet man".

LATVIAN RESISTANCE

It goes without saying that these Soviet measures have not failed to cause reaction on the part of the Latvians. There have been open fights and the Latvian opposition has never entirely ceased. It should be recalled here that the right of every people to independent existence is not only an integral part of international law, but is also recognized by the United Nations' Declaration on Human Rights, especially by the amendments proposed by its drafting committee, viz.: "Whenever a government, a group of persons or an individual seriously or systematically violates the basic rights and basic freedoms of man, both individuals and peoples have the right to resist oppression and tyranny". Such resistance has, indeed, been shown by the Latvians to the Soviet regime.

First in this connection should be mentioned the armed clashes between more or less spontaneously formed Latvian guerilla groups and minor units of the Red Army, during the early stage of the Russo-German war in 1941. There followed the Latvian military units which fought on the East Front. Whatever the conditions under which these units were formed, their basic purpose was to fight against a regime that had deprived their nation of freedom and had imposed on them a way of life alien to their tradition and mentality. They fought in the hope of preventing the return of the Soviet regime to their country. Their siding with the Germans against the Russians (not the West) was no more morally reprehensible than was the alliance between the Western Powers and Soviet Russia. Moreover, there was certainly no love lost between the Latvians and National Socialist Germany, while in the West — during the war and in the postwar period — even influential groups favoured the transformation of their military alliance with Stalin's regime into a lasting peace-time co-operation, although it was the same regime that had killed or deported millions of Ukrainians during the enforced farm collectivization in the 1930s, that had given Hitler a free hand to invade Poland and, by the same token, to start World War II, had participated in the 4th partition of Poland, had been expelled from the League of Nations for aggression against Finland and had killed thousands of Polish officers at the Katyn camp.

After Germany's capitulation in May 1945, some of the units of the Latvian Legion did not lay down arms but took to the woods and continued their fight against the Red Army, until 1949 when the last guerillas were killed or captured. Ādolfs Šilde, who has described the heroic fight of these Latvian Legionaries quotes their oath: "Before God and my people, I swear to devote all my thoughts and efforts to the fight for the Latvian people".³⁶ These former legionaries were joined by Latvian farmers who had lost their land and equipment as a result of the forced agricultural collectivization drive started in 1948. Tens of thousands — farmers and their family

members — were then deported to Siberia while the younger men went into hiding in the woods, from where they fought a desperate fight against the Russian oppressors.

Opposition against the occupation regime, i.e. the Russian central power in Moscow, developed even within the Latvian Communist Party. The post-Stalin thaw gave rise to manifestations of "national communism" even in Latvia. Groups of Latvian communists wished to bring about radical changes: to arrest the flow of non-Latvians to Latvia, to preserve Latvian culture and schools and to put an end to the economic exploitation of Latvia by Russia. This movement was headed by E. Berklavs, a member of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party and was supported by trade-union and Communist-Youth members, as well as by students. It was considered serious enough to demand Khrushchev's personal intervention. He came to Riga in 1959 and initiated a purge which resulted in 800 Latvian functionaries being "purged" and replaced by Russians sent by Moscow. In fact, viewed against the background of intensified Russification, the purge — elimination of Latvian elements from the Latvian Communist Party — still continues.

Yet the spirit of opposition is still alive among the Latvians. Since 1959 it seems to have had no organized leadership, but is occasionally manifested by acts of sabotage and by spontaneous actions, against restrictions and prohibitions imposed on Latvians by the Russians.

LATVIAN EXILES

While the Soviet regime imposes silence on the Latvians in their own country, their cause is defended by the Latvian exiles in the free world. During the war some 125,000 Latvians left their homes and have now found refuge in the United States, Canada, Australia, England, West Germany, Sweden and many other countries. In each of these countries they have formed their national committees or councils, as the case may be, which in turn have established central organizations whose purpose is to work for the restoration of independent Latvia. Thus, there is in Europe the European Centre of the Committee for Restoration of Latvia, founded in 1952, with headquarters in London. A global organization — the Latvian Association in the Free World — was formed subsequently. In addition to these organizations, open to all Latvians in a country of refuge or a wider area, there are a number of specialized bodies. The larger political parties, such as the Social Democrats, Agrarians, Liberals, New Settlers and Latgallian Christian Democrats have set up their exile centres. The "Daugavas Vanagi", a veterans organization, primarily cares for war invalids, aged people, and orphans on a world-wide basis. Specialized organizations, such as the Latvian National Foundation, with headquarters in Stockholm, Sweden, are engaged in the collection and spreading of information about conditions in Soviet-occupied Latvia. There are very active Latvian youth organizations in the different continents of the free world. All of them promote the cause of Latvian freedom in one way or other.

Significant is the cooperation of Latvians with representatives of other oppressed nations. Here we may mention the Committee for A Free Latvia, established in 1951 within the framework of the American organization, "Free Europe", and especially the joint organization of the Eastern and Central European countries known as the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), founded in 1954. Its Latvian group or delegation was long headed by the experienced diplomat Dr. Vilis Māsēns until his death in 1964. He has been succeeded by Major Vilis Hāzners. The late Ādolfs Bļodnieks (former Prime Minister, and member of both the Committee for a

Free Latvia and ACEN) states in his book devoted to the struggle for Latvia's freedom: "... ACEN was established in New York on September 20, 1954, by the representatives ... of the Albanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Romanian nations.

"In many meetings the ACEN did endeavour to speak on behalf of the said nine European nations, asking for freedom and independence for one hundred million peoples now in Soviet captivity and not represented in the international bodies or misrepresented in the United Nations by their occupants.

"... the captive peoples place their hopes on the free world, the guardians of the rights of man. They trust that their just and legitimate aspirations to be free and to enjoy the rights guaranteed by the United Nations charter cannot be disregarded unless the free world is prepared to forsake the very basis on which it stands.

"To voice the rightful aspirations of the silenced captive European peoples is the right and the duty of the exiled representatives of the Soviet-enslaved peoples in the free world."³⁷

It goes without saying that the efforts of the Latvian exile organizations receive support from those Latvian diplomatic representatives who enjoy a more or less official status in their respective countries of residence. Since the death of Envoy Kārlis Zariņš (1881—1963), the senior diplomats are Professor Dr. Arnolds Spekke (1887) in the United States and Mr. Roberts Liepiņš (1890) in Federal Germany. The Latvian objective of regaining political independence is likewise backed by the Latvian exile press, as well as by foreign newspapers, broadcasting stations and other information agencies that promote the cause of freedom throughout the world.

THE LATVIAN PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WESTERN STANDPOINTS

The Soviet military occupation of 1940, renewed in 1944, and Latvia's annexation by the Soviet Union constitute an international delict to which the countries of the free world have reacted in different ways.

To date the staunchest stand has been taken and the most consistent policy followed by the United States. As early as June 23, 1940 the Washington government declared that it did not recognize the devious processes by which the Soviet Union had seized control over the Baltic countries. In line with the principle known as Stimson's doctrine ("no country shall subject another country by means of force"), the United States has rejected repeated Soviet demands for recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. Washington continues to recognize Latvia's existence as a subject of international law and, accordingly, to recognize Latvian diplomatic and consular representatives in the United States.

In recent years, this American attitude has also been expressed by the following resolution on the Baltic States, adopted by the United States House of Representatives and Senate:

Calendar N. 1573

H. CON. RES. 416

[Report No. 1606]

BALTIC STATES IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

June 23, 1966

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
September 19 (legislative day, September 7), 1966
Reported by Mr. Fulbright, without amendment

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; and

Whereas all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, cultural, and religious development; and

Whereas the Baltic peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been forcibly deprived of these rights by the Government of the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the Government of the Soviet Union, through a program of deportations and resettlement of peoples, continues in its effort to change the ethnic character of the populations of the Baltic States; and

Whereas it has been the firm and consistent policy of the Government of the United States to support the aspirations of Baltic peoples for self-determination and national independence; and

Whereas there exist many historical, cultural, and family ties between the peoples of the Baltic States and the American people: Be it

- 1 *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*
- 2 *concurring)*, That the House of Representatives of the
- 3 United States urge the President of the United States—
- 4 (a) to direct the attention of world opinion at the
- 5 United Nations and at other appropriate international
- 6 forums and by such means as he deems appropriate, to
- 7 the denial of the rights of self-determination for the
- 8 peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and
- 9 (b) to bring the force of world opinion to bear
- 10 on behalf of the restoration of these rights to the Baltic
- 11 peoples.

Passed the House of Representatives June 21, 1965.

House Concurrent Resolution 416 was adopted by the House of Representatives by a vote of 293 yeas to no nays on June 21, 1965, and unanimously passed by the United States Senate on October 22, 1966.

During World War II Great Britain recognized Latvia's incorporation *de facto*, but she has refused a *de jure* recognition of the Soviet action. Some countries in the British Commonwealth, such as Canada and Australia, have rejected Moscow's demands for recognition of the incorporation in a more definite manner.

Some Western countries (France, Italy, Switzerland) have, it is true, withdrawn recognition from the Latvian legations in their capitals and thus *de facto* recognized the annexation, yet a *de jure* recognition has not been declared.

A number of countries of the free world (Spain, Portugal, Eire, Colombia, Uruguay and others) have followed the example set by the United States and have recognized Latvia's incorporation neither *de facto* nor *de jure*.

Since the Soviet rule in Latvia has not been recognized *de jure*, the restoration of Latvian sovereignty would imply under the international law not the creation of a new State but only the reinstatement of the Latvian Republic in its former status.

LATVIA AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

During World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed on the "Atlantic Charter", i.e. on basic principles governing the sovereign rights of the peoples and the liberation of forcibly occupied countries. It was a declaration under international law and there was all reason to expect that its demands would be realized after the war. Later (May 14, 1944) Churchill, speaking in the British parliament, claimed that the Charter was designed only as a "war-time programme" of the Allied Powers and therefore should not be considered as a source of law. This post-factum denial of the Charter's basic aims is untenable, at least from the technical viewpoint, because (1) this bilateral document had become a multilateral one through the accession to it on Sept. 24, 1941 of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Greek, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Soviet, Polish and Free French (de Gaulle) governments; the representatives of these governments declared adherence to "the general political principles of the statement" and pledged "to do their best" to implement them; (2) the Yalta conference (Feb. 3—11, 1945) expressly confirmed "the principles of the Atlantic Charter": viz. that "all peoples have the right to choose the form of government they desire, to have restored to them their sovereignty and self-government of which they have been deprived by aggressors, to create a provisional government with a broad representation of all democratic groups, which shall as soon as possible hold elections that would reflect the nation's will and, if necessary, to promote the organization of such elections."³⁸ Winston Churchill was not authorized to renounce unilaterally these principles which had validity under international law.

LATVIA AND THE UN CHARTER

Whatever the reason, the principles of the Atlantic Charter have not become a source of law of practical significance. Are there any other internationally binding provisions that nations which have been, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, forcibly deprived of their sovereign rights might invoke? The United Nations bylaws, without expressly naming any country, embody the same inalienable principles of the rights of man, national self-determination and political independence as were introduced into the sphere of international law by the American President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 through his "Fourteen Points", which promoted the rise of a number of new sovereign states, including Latvia. A few of the provisions of the United Nations bylaws may be quoted here: Art. 4—2 says that "all UN members shall refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country"; Art. 32: "any country, even if not a member of UN, but that is party to a dispute with another country, may be invited to the Security Council, without having a vote in her case", Art. 34: "The Security Council may examine and decide any question (issue) that may cause international complications, in order to preserve international peace and security"; and Art. 55: "The UN has the right to demand that there exist among the peoples peaceful and friendly relations, in accordance with the principles of equality and self-determination of peoples". In addition, the UN bylaws provide for sanctions, including expulsion from the UN, to be applied against recalcitrant members (Art. 6).³⁹

These provisions of the United Nations bylaws are explicit enough. And yet the world organization has not been able to settle major outstanding political issues, such as the restoration of freedom to countries subjugated by the Kremlin.⁴⁰

CONCLUSIONS

Whatever her political regime, Russia has always—under Peter I, Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev—regarded the Baltic area as an obstacle to its imperialistic westward expansion. An Eastern Bloc dominated by Greater Russia is and will be a permanent threat to the European nations. The liberation of Latvia, the two other Baltic States and the so-called Soviet satellites from Moscow's control is not only a regional problem. A free East Europe is a prerequisite for the preservation of all European peoples from the imperialistic designs of the Kremlin. A Latvian geographer has calculated that, before World War II, the Soviet westward expansion was obstructed by five independent countries whose protective wall extended over 3400 kilometres from Finland to the Black sea. During World War II this wall was seized by the Soviet Union, which thus has pushed the western defence lines 1000—1200 kilometres further west.⁴¹

These are plain facts. What conclusions do they permit? What are the prospects for the restoration of Latvian political independence?

History (along with the history of international law) may provide us with an answer, since it gives examples and offers comparisons. The Latvian occupation has now lasted more than 25 years, yet there are peoples who have reacquired their independence after hundreds and even thousands of years have passed. The Irish lost their freedom in 1014 and fully recovered it as late as 1949. Bohemia (Czechoslovakia) came under the Habsburg rule early in the 17th century and became free after 300 years. The 3rd partition and elimination of free Poland took place in 1795, its restoration became possible in 1917. And even more significant is the reestablishment of the State of Israel after some 2000 years.

What is the decisive factor in the national independence of a country? The "balance of power" is subject to change and with it the destinies of individual nations. International treaties likewise do not provide an absolutely safe foundation, since treaties may expire or become obsolete and the stronger country may violate the rights of the weaker one. But the sovereign will of a people, being a natural right, knows no limitations in time, provided the people itself does not lose the will to be free and independent. The Irish had preserved their determination for some one thousand years. The same is true of the Jewish Zionists who, scattered all over the world, reestablished their country, returning to the land of their forefathers after 2000 years. And if the Latvians do not lose the determination to restore Latvia's freedom, the time will come when it will bear fruit. For the sovereign will of a people is a source of international law. In this sense one should understand the words of the Latvian historian and jurist, Professor A. Švābe: "The 18th of November of 1918 is neither the beginning nor the end of the struggle for the Latvian people and the Latvian State".

Proclamation 6146—Baltic Freedom Day, 1990

June 14, 1990

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

The struggle for Baltic freedom has entered a new era of great promise and hope. The 50-year-long effort by the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to regain freedom and democracy has begun to bear fruit.

The international community has long decried the dark summer of 1940 when, as a result of a self-serving agreement made earlier by Hitler and Stalin in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Baltic States were denied their independent status. During that fateful summer, Soviet troops invaded and occupied the Baltic States. The rigged elections that followed put an end to Baltic self-determination.

These events, however, did not end the desire of the Baltic peoples for freedom and independence. During the past year, they have taken major steps toward achieving self-determination. Generally free and fair elections based on a vigorous multiparty political system produced popular legislatures. In decisions reflecting the will of the Baltic peoples, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have asserted their intention to restore their independence. The representatives of the Baltic peoples have taken a nonviolent path and have consistently appealed for dialogue and negotiations with Moscow.

For 50 years the United States has refused to recognize the forced incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. As I assured the Prime Minister of Lithuania during her recent visit, the United States will remain faithful to this policy. We support self-determination for the Baltic peoples, and we call upon the Soviet Union to enter a good-faith dialogue with representatives of the Baltic governments who received popular mandates in free and fair elections. We are encouraged by recent steps in that direction and hope that a full and productive dialogue will materialize.

The right to liberty and self-determination; free and fair elections; a better life for

themselves and for their children—these are the just aspirations of the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. On this Baltic Freedom Day, we reaffirm our support for them.

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 251, has designated June 14, 1990, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

Now, Therefore, I, George Bush, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim June 14, 1990, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States of America to observe this day with appropriate remembrances and ceremonies to reaffirm their commitment to principles of freedom and liberty for all oppressed people.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and ninety, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fourteenth.

George Bush

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 11:12 a.m., June 15, 1990]

Proclamation 6147—Father's Day, 1990
June 14, 1990

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Each year, on the third Sunday in June, we pause to honor our fathers and to express our gratitude for their generosity and devotion. Father's Day is more than a day rich in family love and tradition—it is also a day when we are deeply mindful of the many ways fathers strengthen our communities and Nation.

As children, we cannot fully fathom the depth of our father's love for us. Neither can we fully realize the weight of his responsibilities. Children cherish their father's affection and attention, as well as the time they spend together—be it playing a favorite game, assembling a kite or train set, or

BALTIC NEWS

genuine

history
celebrate

1) Angela Nelson —
Public-American Fisher Eye.

2) Dr. Olga Pavlovskis
Chmn of Joint Baltic-Am
Nat'l Committee.

⑤ → Other dignitaries.

3) MAURO KARI, of the
Baltic Wrd Council.

④ Johan Simonson —
Pres(?) American Nat'l Baltic
Assn.

~~④~~
Roe Garden. ←

LITHUANIA 700 Years

Edited by DR. ALBERTAS GERUTIS

Translated by ALGIRDAS BUDRECKIS

Introduction by RAPHAEL SEALEY

MANYLAND BOOKS
New York

Liberation Attempts from Abroad

by ALGIRDAS BUDRECKIS

I. AN IDEALISTIC CRUSADE, 1940-45

1.

Almost one million Lithuanian immigrants and their descendants lived in the United States before World War II. Numerous communities of Lithuanians, numbering an additional 100,000, were living in Great Britain, Canada, and the countries of South America. Most of them had their own cultural and religious organizations, as well as thirty-five newspapers. The Lithuanians abroad reacted most strongly against the Soviet invasion of their homeland. Special committees for Lithuanian liberation were organized in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Canada and the United States. It is the activities of the major liberation movements with which we will be concerned in this study.

While the Lithuanians did not despair and were determined to continue their opposition to the Kremlin's domination by all available means, they also realized that, by themselves, they were too weak to throw off the rule of the Soviet Union. Their eyes, therefore, turned toward the international sector. They refused to believe that the free world would remain passive spectators to the unprecedented Lithuanian tragedy, especially since the occupation of their country was not of their own choosing.

The Lithuanian people were encouraged by the indignation

and protest expressed in behalf of the United States government by the then Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in June, 1940, and by the assurances given to the American Lithuanian Council several months later by United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. They had an almost naive belief that Nazi Germany would first crush the Soviet Union and then, in turn, be defeated by the Anglo-American alliance, which would restore Europe on an *ante bellum* status. The Lithuanians in the Nazi-occupied homeland and abroad believed in the sanctity of the wartime legal commitments and political pledges of the great Western powers, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter. The Atlantic Charter, proclaimed by President Roosevelt and the prime minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, brought new hope to the Lithuanians. It stipulated that no territorial changes should take place unless freely accepted by the clearly expressed will of the interested populations (Article 2 of the Charter). Referring to the old democratic principle of the right of all people to self-determination, the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon democracies pledged themselves, in Article 3 of the Charter, to respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live; and declared it to be their wish to see sovereignty and self-government restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them. These principles apply in every respect to Lithuania.

The free Lithuanians believed in the sanctity of the United Nations Declaration and the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe, which promised the restoration of independence to nations which had fallen victims to aggressive powers. They believed with a crusading ardor that the universal application and implementation of the right of all people to self-determination does not stop at the Iron Curtain.

Their optimistic enthusiasm suffered a setback on February 11, 1945, when a communiqué was issued making known the results of the conference held at Yalta in which the participants were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. The Yalta Agreement, confirming the division of Europe into military zones previously adopted at the Conference at Teheran, ultimately decided the fate of Central and Eastern Europe, as Soviet military occupation was bound to

turn into Communist political domination. By the same token, the fate of all nations of Central and Eastern Europe was sealed.

2.

At the beginning of Soviet-Lithuanian friction in 1940, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry felt that arrangements should be made to continue government functions in case the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania. The post of diplomatic chief was conceived in conjunction with Telegram 288 sent by the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys on June 2, 1940, to Stasys Lozoraitis, envoy to Rome: "If we are met with a catastrophe, Stasys Lozoraitis is to be held chief of the remaining diplomatic corps abroad." Two alternates were also designated—Jurgis Šaulys in Switzerland and Petras Klimas in France.

Although the Lithuanian state continues to exist, there is no organ which could exercise further the rights deriving from its continued legal existence. Nevertheless, certain ministers plenipotentiary and other diplomatic representatives of Lithuania were still recognized and continued to fulfill certain functions deriving from state sovereignty. But they were executive bodies, and not sovereign political representatives. As such, they were subordinated to central government. No organ existed any longer, however, capable of concentrating in itself the execution of sovereign rights in their completeness.

The Lithuanian diplomats abroad considered the Merkys cabinet left behind by President Smetona to operate in the face of the Soviet invasion, as provisional in nature, in no way hindering President Smetona's freedom to appoint a new ministry. Smetona, while still isolated in East Prussia following his flight, informed Minister to Berlin Kazys Škirpa that he planned to form a new ministry, with Lozoraitis, the minister to Rome, at its head (the so-called Kybartai Protocol which dismissed Merkys from the Premiership).

Since the last legal government of Lithuania had not made any formal protest against the Soviet aggression, its inaction automatically hindered such protests by the Lithuanian diplomats abroad. The occasion came one month after the Soviet occupation.

When the Soviets convened the puppet "Peoples' Diet" in Kaunas on July 21, which announced that it had petitioned for admission of Lithuania into the USSR, the Lithuanian diplomats protested.

On the basis of a communication between the Lithuanian diplomats, it was felt that corresponding notes should be presented on July 22 in all of the capitals in which Lithuania was represented. Lithuanian diplomats in Washington, London, the Vatican, and Rome protested the republic's incorporation into the USSR. Similar notes were sent to the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, the diplomats presented their protests against the falsification of the will of the Lithuanian nation directly to the puppet government of Soviet-occupied Lithuania. These protests, on the one hand, formally exposed to the world that the Soviets were attempting to mask their aggression against Lithuania; on the other hand, the diplomatic protests authoritatively encouraged the Lithuanian nation to have hope and to wage resistance against the USSR. The diplomats were deprived of Lithuanian citizenship by the puppet regime on August 14, 1940. This was the only way the Soviets could mete out punishment for the diplomats' bold stand.

3.

A plan to organize the Lithuanians under a united front for the struggle was formulated as early as July, 1940, while Minister Kazys Škirpa was still at the Lithuanian Legation in Berlin. President Smetona, whom Škirpa informed about his projects, approved of the plans in principle, informing Škirpa that he would give him a mandate to form a new ministry if the Lithuanians succeeded in restoring sovereignty in "at least one township."

From September 19-25, 1940, Lithuanian diplomats Stasys Girdvainis, Stasys Lozoraitis, Petras Klimas, Eduardas Turauskas and Kazys Škirpa held a conference in Rome. Petras Klimas suggested the formation of a national committee, modeled after Masaryk's Czech National Committee, which at the appropriate moment could become the provisional government. Such a com-

mittee was set up in Berlin, based on the legal authorization by the republic to its legations to protect Lithuanian interests abroad. Ernestas Galvanauskas, who had recently fled to Germany, was appointed chairman. His *ipso jure* alternate was Stasys Lozoraitis. Eduardas Turauskas and Kazys Škirpa were to be permanent members. Later, Minister to Washington Povilas Žadeikis was designated as a second alternate. The Lithuanian envoys, by concerted action, approved of the formation of the Lithuanian National Committee as the unifying agency for the restoration of independent Lithuania.

On August 11, the Soviets pressured the Germans to force Škirpa and his staff to vacate the Lithuanian Legation and turn over the property to the Russians. President Smetona also had problems. He wanted to remain in Europe, close to Lithuania; however, since his presence in Germany threatened to complicate Nazi-Soviet relations, the unsympathetic German government coaxed him into leaving the country. Smetona received his diplomatic visa on September 19 and immediately left for Bern, Switzerland.

The Lithuanian diplomatic corps made contact with Spanish Foreign Minister Colonel Juan Beigbeder y Atienza, a personal acquaintance of Škirpa's, to allow some ten Lithuanian political leaders, including Galvanauskas, to reside in Spain until the opportune moment when this group, without any hindrance, could set up a provisional government. Foreign Minister Beigbeder was willing to give his consent to this plan, but the Nazis would not permit Galvanauskas to leave Germany.

While in Switzerland, Smetona decided that he could serve the cause of Lithuanian freedom better in the United States. On February 14, 1941, the Smetona family sailed to Rio de Janeiro. While in Brazil, the president appointed Frikas Meieris to the post of Lithuanian Minister to that country.

On March 10, 1941, President Smetona landed in New York, and immediately began organizing the nationalistically-minded Lithuanian-Americans. On April 1, he visited Sumner Welles in the State Department. Through the efforts of Minister Žadeikis, he had a private audience with President Roosevelt, whom he

thanked for the United States government's firm stand against Lithuania's occupation.

On May 4, the Mayor of Chicago, Edward Kelly, at a special reception in honor of the Lithuanian President, declared: "To President Smetona we offer the solemn pledge of our continuing resistance to the oppression that snatched liberty from Lithuania."

During 1941, the exiled president's supporters flocked to the Lithuanian Liberation Alliance (Lietuvai Vaduoti Sąjunga). He visited the larger cities—New York, Newark, Elizabeth, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland—urging his nationals to organize for liberation.

Smetona found a temporary haven on Mr. Joseph Bachunas' Tabor Farm in Michigan. Finally in May, 1942, he settled down in his son's home in Cleveland, and devoted his energies to writing a study about Lithuania's boundaries, making speeches concerning Lithuania's restoration. As Lithuania's President-in-exile, he continued to exercise a moral force as a symbol of Lithuanian state sovereignty. The case for the continuity of government met with complications when he died in a fire in his son's home on January 9, 1944. His last testament to the nation was the advice given to friends on January 2, 1944, to wit: "One must go down various routes to the one goal—restoration of Lithuanian Independence. One must not be discouraged, if everyone does not fit into one organization." (Reikia eiti visokiais keliais prie vieno tikslo—kad Lietuvai būtų iškovota nepriklausomybė. Nereikia nuleisti rankų, jeigu nesutelpama į vieną organizaciją.)

In addition to the National Committee, the Lithuanian political exiles in Berlin organized a liberation movement, which was headed by Kazys Škirpa. On November 17, twenty-eight exile political leaders met and formally established the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF or Lietuvių Aktyvistų Frontas). The LAF had two purposes: to fight for the restoration of independence and to prepare a program for the organization of the restored state. Among the refugees who fled to Germany were many Lithuanian statesmen, famous civic and cultural leaders, former officers and civil servants. They all supported the plans and activities of the LAF, in spite of prior political differences. In order to prepare for the revolt, the LAF established contact with the

underground in Lithuania, providing it with necessary information for the preparation of the armed revolt.

The Lithuanian resistance movement with its centers in Kaunas and Vilnius, acknowledged the Berlin LAF as its center. The entire resistance movement merged into the LAF. The Berlin staff maintained precarious relations with the German foreign ministry and the army high command. Škirpa formulated instructions and plans for the eventual revolt; he even drew up a list of ministers for the provisional government, which was accepted with slight alterations by the Lithuanian underground. He soon realized that the Germans intended to use the Lithuanian resistance to help establish German rule in the Soviet-occupied Baltic States. He therefore proceeded to instruct the underground to quickly set up a functioning Lithuanian administration at the outbreak of the Russo-German conflict, in order to confront the Nazis with an independent state.

When, on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the USSR, a spontaneous revolt against the Soviets erupted, and a Lithuanian provisional government was proclaimed in Kaunas, naming Škirpa its head. The Berlin LAF publicized these events to the world through American, Swiss and Swedish correspondents in Berlin and through operatives in Sweden and Switzerland. The Nazis retaliated by placing Škirpa under house arrest. Other provisional ministers in Berlin were detained from returning to Kaunas. Only General Raštikis, provisional defense minister, was permitted to fly to Kaunas. He informed the provisional cabinet, presided over by Education Minister J. Ambrazevičius, of German designs to set up a protectorate. On August 5, after six weeks of administration, the provisional government was suppressed by the Nazis. Members of the Berlin LAF were deported to German provincial towns or to concentration camps by the Gestapo. Several LAF operatives abroad, such as Albertas Gerutis in Bern, Switzerland, continued to inform the Lithuanian diplomats of developments in Lithuania.

Immediately after the Soviet invasion of Lithuania, the diplomatic and consular representatives protected the properties of the Lithuanian Government as well as the properties of their nationals "by all legal means." First, there were the deposits of the

state and private banks as well as those of corporations and Lithuanian nationals in the United States banks. There were also several ships under the Lithuanian flag in foreign ports and on the high seas. The Lithuanian representative, Mr. Povilas Žadeikis, requested the United States Government to safeguard and secure these deposits and property.

In a memorandum on July 15, 1940, Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs of the U.S. State Department, after describing and evaluating the Soviet activities in the Baltic States, stressed that "the recent events in the Baltic States have raised a number of rather important questions," the first of which was the basic policy and the political philosophy of the United States toward these countries. The problem concerning this basic question was worded in a memorandum as follows:

Is the Government of the United States to apply certain standards of judgment and conduct to aggression by Germany and Japan which it will not apply to aggression by the Soviet Union? In other words, is the Government of the United States to follow one policy with respect to, say, Czechoslovakia, Denmark and German-occupied Poland, and another policy with respect to Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland? Is the United States to continue to refuse to recognize the fruits of aggression regardless of who the aggressor may be, or for reasons of expediency to close its eyes to the fact that certain nations are committing aggression upon their neighbors?

The United States will probably not receive one cent of the several million dollars which the governments of these three countries owe us. Furthermore, American interests in those three countries will probably be a total loss.

The Treasury Department acted on the same day and decided to block all the accounts of the three Baltic countries in the United States. Title to the assets remained in the names of the non-Soviet governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The protests which followed from Soviet Russia and its three new "republics" did not change the U.S. position in this matter.

Although the assets were "frozen," disbursements from them were subsequently accorded to the Baltic diplomatic and consular missions in order to support their continued operations, not only in the United States but also in the other countries which had not recognized the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States.

Following the declaration of the puppet Diet in Lithuania for union with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, issued (July 23, 1940) a statement condemning the deliberate suppression by "devious process" of the independence of the Baltic States. He went on to say to the press:

During these past few days the devious processes whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic Republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion. From the day when the people of these republics first gained their independence and democratic form of government, the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest.

The policy of this government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activity no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of another state, however weak.

These principles constitute the very foundations upon which the existing relationship between the 21 sovereign republics of the New World rests.

The United States will continue to stand by these principles, because of the conviction of the American people that unless the doctrines in which these principles are inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice, and of law—in other words, the basis of modern civilization itself—cannot be preserved.

This declaration constituted the basis of the policy of non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States. The example

set by the United States in this nonrecognition has been followed by the majority of those nations which have expressed an attitude in regard to this problem. The United States government reemphasized on subsequent occasions its nonrecognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. In view of this American position, Lithuanian diplomatic and consular representatives have continued to function in the United States, enjoying all rights usually accorded to such representatives.

The attitude of Great Britain toward Lithuania's status was less clear than that of the United States. During World War II, Great Britain extended *de facto* recognition of Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR. However, the British government refused to accord *de jure* recognition to the annexation. The problem of the Baltic States was raised during the Soviet-British negotiations for a friendship and alliance treaty (December, 1941, to May, 1942). The Soviet government exerted pressure upon Great Britain to include in the treaty a clause which would have recognized the Soviet frontiers of 1941, i.e., including the Baltic States. Mainly due to the unswerving attitude of the United States government against any territorial changes during the war period, the British government refused to accede to the Soviet wishes, and the treaty was finally signed without any territorial clauses. Lithuania was listed in the British official *Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1942* alongside its colleagues. The Lithuanian diplomats' names appeared under the name of their respective country. This has also been true in all subsequent editions.

In 1942, the names of the ministers of the Baltic States and their staff members were placed by the *Diplomats' Annual* in a separate category at the end of the official diplomatic list, without any indication of the country they were representing, under the caption: List of Persons No Longer Included in the Diplomatic List But Still Accepted by His Majesty's Government as Personally Enjoying Certain Diplomatic Courtesies. In a letter on this occasion from the Foreign Office to the Latvian Minister, it was stated that it was "felt desirable and in fact necessary to take into account the anomalous situation in which you and your Estonian and Lithuanian colleagues find yourselves as a result of

having no government to represent." In the House of Commons on December 21, 1944, Sir Henry Williams asked the Foreign Secretary "Whether His Majesty's Government still recognises the Governments or republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania?" Answering for Secretary Eden, Mr. George Hall said: "His Majesty's Government has not recognised any Government in the Republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania since the changes occurred in June, 1940."

The position of the French government was subject to more fluctuation. At least *de facto* recognition to the annexation was accorded by the French in 1940, but the Lithuanian Legation was closed on August 15, 1940, and Minister Petras Klimas was subsequently arrested by the Germans. The request by the diplomatic representatives of the Baltic States for permission to continue their activities was denied after the departure of the Germans in September, 1944. Yet, there has still been no official announcement concerning the recognition of the annexation.

The attitude of Mussolini's Italy was not clear. In 1940, the Mussolini regime closed the Lithuanian Legation, but no formal declaration to this effect was issued. This act alone would infer a *de facto* recognition of the annexation.

Spain and Portugal, as members of the Savendra-Lamas Pact, assumed a mutual obligation not to recognize any territorial arrangement "which is not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of an occupation or acquisition of territory that may be brought by force." Consequently, they have not recognized the annexation of the Baltic States. Although there were no official pronouncements by Latin American states on the subject of their treatment of the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Baltic States and the nationals of these states, it is safe to assume that they have not recognized the annexation either *de jure* or *de facto*. In Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Colombia, Lithuanian diplomatic and consular officers continued to function and carry on their duties.

Sweden came closest to a *de jure* recognition of the Soviet annexation, although it has never officially affirmed it. According to the official Swedish point of view, Lithuania disappeared as an independent state and, accordingly, its incorporation into the

Soviet Union merited *de facto* recognition. Foreign Minister Gunther emphasized, in a statement in the upper house of the Riksdag, that practical considerations have led Sweden to such recognition. No Lithuanian nationality is recognized by the Swedish government, and former nationals are officially considered either Soviet citizens or stateless persons. They are considered stateless if they left their homeland before the enactment of the Soviet Nationality Edict of September 7, 1940, which declares the citizens of the Baltic States to be Soviet citizens.

All in all, the Lithuanian Foreign Service, in spite of the occupation, remained active. Under the leadership of Minister Plenipotentiary Stasys Lozoraitis, officially designated Chief of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service Abroad, the following ministers continued their functions during the war years: Povilas Žadeikis—Washington; Bronius Balutis—London; Stasys Girdvainis—the Holy See; Kazys Graužinis—Buenos Aires and Montevideo; Frikas Meieris—Rio de Janeiro. For a while in 1940, the following ministers continued in quasi-official capacities: Kazys Škirpa—Berlin; Petras Klimas—Paris; Jurgis Šaulys—Berne; Vytautas Gylys—Stockholm. Lithuanian consuls also continued at the following posts: Consul General Jonas Budrys—New York; Vytautas Stašinskas, consul—New York; Anicetas Simutis, vice-consul—New York; Julius Bielskis, honorary consul—Los Angeles; Anthony O. Shallna, honorary consul—Boston; Aleksandras Polišaitis, consul—Sao Paulo; Friedrich Simon, consul general—Zurich; Dr. N. Rachmilevičius, consul—Tel Aviv; Colonel Grant-Suttie, consul general—Toronto.

4. *The Lithuanian American Council—ALT*

When the Soviets occupied Lithuania on June 15, 1940, the Lithuanian-American community in the United States began organizing to protect Lithuania's interests. The prevailing mood was to form one organizational center to coordinate the work. The Lithuanian American Roman Catholic Federation, convening in Pittsburgh on August 10, 1940, voted in favor of an intergroup center. In September, the Socialists reorganized into a Democratic Lithuanian Independence Alliance (*Demokratijos ir*

Lietuvos Nepriklausomybės Sąjunga) whose purpose was to fight for a democratic Lithuania.

After Sumner Welles' pronouncement, the idea was conceived to visit Washington and thank President Roosevelt for his condolences to enslaved Lithuania. Spokesmen of the three main ideological groups Socialists, Catholics, and Liberal nationalists formed the delegation. The delegation had an audience with President Roosevelt on October 15, 1940, at which time Dr. Pijus Grigaitis bemoaned the fact that Lithuania had lost her independence and urged that the President help the nation. President Roosevelt outdid the Lithuanians in his reply:

I understand perfectly your feelings concerning the fate of Lithuania. Let me tell you that you have made here two mistakes: the first mistake is in your address that you gave me. It is stated here that Lithuania has lost her independence. It is a mistake to say so. Lithuania did not lose her independence—Lithuania's independence was only temporarily put aside. Time will come and Lithuania will be free again. This will happen sooner than you may expect. The other mistake as I observed was made by one of your speakers when he referred to Lithuania as a very small state. Look at the Latin American Republics and you will see that there are even smaller states than Lithuania, but they live a free and happy life. It is not fitting to even talk about the smallness of Lithuania for even the smallest nation has the same right to enjoy independence as the largest nation.

He went on to say that the United States would do everything in its power to hasten that day, and that after the war Lithuania and the other enslaved nations would be free. (When he subsequently received President Smetona, on April 18, 1941, President Roosevelt assured him of American support for Lithuanian independence.)

After the audience with President Roosevelt, inspired by his assurances, the delegation met at the Lithuanian legation and decided that the remarks had opened the way for further Lithuanian-American action. That same day, they formed the intergroup Committee to Aid Lithuania (Lietuvai Gelbėti Taryba).

This was just the beginning. There were no by-laws, guidelines, treasury or chapters as yet. The Lithuanian-American political leadership did not have a popular attractive name for their nucleus. The problem faced them as to how and on what basis to coordinate the thirty-four patriotic Lithuanian newspapers and 2,000 societies.

On May 15, 1941, when the delegation met in Chicago for deliberations, the name Lithuanian American Council (Amerikos Lietuvių Taryba) was accepted.

On June 7-8, 1941, the Lithuanian Nationalist leaders held a convention in Sodus, Michigan, and decided to form the Lithuanian Liberation Alliance (Lietuvai Vaduoti Sąjunga). The first chairman was the brilliant young Lithuanian-American lawyer Anthony Olis of Chicago. In 1942, the center was reorganized and moved to Cleveland, to the *Dirva* newspaper office. For three years the LVS chairman was Dr. Stasys T. Tamošaitis; he was followed for three years by Pijus J. Žiurys; the last chairman was Dr. Motiejus J. Colney. The long standing secretary was the editor of *Dirva*, Kazys S. Karpis. The LVS or Alliance formed chapters in the Lithuanian communities, organized President Smetona's lectures among Lithuanians and Americans, and published literature on Lithuania. In 1943, money was raised for the publication of the book *Timeless Lithuania* by the former American Minister to Kaunas, Owen Norem, which was distributed to American government officials, diplomats and civic leaders.

In order to inform the American public about Communist methods of terror, the LVS translated and published Colonel Petruitis' book *Kaip jie mus šaudė*. The LVS later published an anthology by Lithuanian journalists entitled *Lithuania in the Chains of Tyrants*. During the February 5-6, 1944, Congress in New York, a special commission was formed to present the Lithuanian problem to the American public. This commission was designated the Lithuanian American Mission (Amerikos Lietuvių Misija); the executive board consisted of Anthony Olis (chairman), Antanas G. Kumskis and Pijus J. Žiurys.

The Lithuanian American Mission was the political action organization of the Nationalists. Its purpose was to work for

Lithuanian freedom and independence. In order to realize this aim, it established close ties with members of the United States Congress and periodically visited the State Department. On March 21, 1945, then Vice President Harry S. Truman received the Mission's executive board. On March 23, the Mission organized a reception in Washington for members of the United States Congress and American statesmen, and the speeches made at that reception and later in Congress were recorded in the *Congressional Record*. (This tactic, developed by Anthony Olis, was later adopted by the Lithuanian American Council). The Mission had numerous articles about Lithuania published in the American press. When, in May, 1945, the United Nations Organization met in San Francisco, the Mission organized a press conference, and informed the American and other Western delegations about developments in Lithuania. It also organized a solemn mass for Lithuania in the local cathedral.

When the Nationalists rejoined ALT in November, 1948, A. Olis became a member of the Executive Committee of ALT (he was succeeded by Eugenijus A. Bartkus after his death). The Nationalists maintained their LVS ties until 1949.

On January 8, 1943, the Lithuanian American Council held a conference in New York and decided to place the entire organization on a firm footing by preparing by-laws, setting up a treasury, authorizing an executive committee to act in the organization's name, and to incorporate in the state of Illinois as a non-profit organization.

The agreed purpose of the Lithuanian American Council was to unite all of the democratic forces of Lithuanians in the fight for basic human rights, and to support world efforts to establish permanent peace based on justice, democracy and freedom; to work for the realization of the Atlantic Charter and to see to it that its provisions were applied to Lithuania which would restore her independence with historical-ethnographic boundaries; to give moral and material aid to Lithuania's people in their struggle for freedom and to aid refugees from oppression and Lithuania's exiled citizens, to disseminate to the public at large truthful information about Lithuania and to protect the latter from the lies and calumny of her enemies.

The executive committee of ALT was comprised of three members, who lived in Chicago, all three of whom were editors and represented three ideological newspapers: Pijus Grigaitis—socialist *Naujienos*, Leonardas Šimutis—Catholic *Draugas*, and Mykolas Vaidyla—liberal nationalist *Sandara*.

The January 8, 1943, ALT conference issued an appeal to the Lithuanian Americans to organize commemorations of Lithuanian Independence Day on February 16 in the various communities, and to collect money for the liberation of Lithuania. Since 1943, all of the Lithuanian communities have observed February 16, during which commemorations money is still raised to support the activities of ALT. These commemorations have featured prominent Americans as key-note speakers.

On September 2-3, 1943, ALT called a national convention in Pittsburgh attended by 400 delegates from various organizations, all of whom put aside their ideological differences and agreed to better intergroup relations for the common cause. They established a solid front against Lithuanian Communists, who supported the Soviet occupation. The Pittsburgh convention also authorized ALT to set up an information bureau and to establish a fund to help refugees. As a result, the following year the Lithuanian American Relief Fund (*Bendrasis Amerikos Lietuvių Šalpos Fondas*—BALF) was created, which helped bring to the United States over 30,000 Lithuanian displaced persons.

As its activities increased, the structure of ALT expanded. Two huge fraternal alliances—the Lithuanian Alliance of America and the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Alliance of America—joined the Council. With the return of the Nationalists in 1949, the Lithuanian American Council consisted of thirty-four representatives. The Executive Board was chosen for one year. Local ALT chapters were created in the Lithuanian communities, comprising representatives of the four major ideological groups as well as representatives of local societies.

In April, 1944, ALT founded the Lithuanian American Information Center (LAIC) in New York City, which maintained ties with American Senators, Congressmen and government officials, providing information for newspaper men and various agencies which sought news about Lithuania. It also published the

Lithuanian Bulletin which contained news about current developments in Lithuania, about Lithuanians and their activities. The original publisher was the Lithuanian National Council (Lietuvių Tautinė Taryba) which in 1943 printed ten issues, and many more followed in succeeding years. The LAIC also published twelve books in English on various questions dealing with Lithuania. When the United Nations met in San Francisco, the LAIC sent a delegation which informed the various government members and world press about Lithuania. For a while, the LAIC had a correspondent-observer at the United Nations; it cooperated with R. Lemkin in preparing a detailed report on genocide which he presented to the Senate Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, and also urged the United States Congress to investigate officially the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.

The overall concern of the Lithuanian American Council during the war was to counter Soviet pressure in Washington to recognize the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States. On March 4, 1945, any doubts on this subject were dissipated by the declaration of the United States Secretary of State in Washington that "as far as the United States is concerned, the status of the Baltic States has not altered in any way, not even after the Yalta Conference."

ALT also saw to it that Lithuanian interests would be protected at the San Francisco meeting and that the United Nations not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR.

5. *The Lithuanian Council of Canada*

The idea to form a uniting body was conceived by a group of Toronto Lithuanians in 1940. The conference took place in September, 1940, and voted to form the Lithuanian Council of Canada to fight for the liberation of the homeland. The Council gained the support of all patriotic groups scattered throughout the Dominion. In order to coordinate activities, an official weekly paper, *Nepriklausoma Lietuva*, (Independent Lithuania) was started.

The Lithuanian Council of Canada was comprised of thirty

representatives of various organizations. It organized Lithuanian Independence Day commemorations every year in the cities and issued protest resolutions denouncing the Soviet occupation of Lithuania to the Ottawa Government. It also took concrete measures to keep Canada from recognizing the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.

6. *The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania*

With the death of President Antanas Smetona in 1944, the last executor of the sovereign rights of the nation disappeared. Since there were no constitutional organs to continue the executive functions, the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania (Vyriausias Lietuvos Išlaisvinimo Komitetas or VLIK), as a revolutionary organ, took over the political leadership of the nation. VLIK, as supreme underground center of the resistance to the Nazi occupation, through its operative in Sweden, Algirdas Vokietaitis, kept the Lithuanian diplomats abroad informed of developments in the homeland. VLIK sent its military representative, Kazys Ambraziejus, to Sweden, but he was arrested by the German Gestapo in Tallinn, Estonia, and returned to Lithuania for interrogation. As a result, the Nazis began to arrest members of VLIK and its operatives on April 29-30, 1944. The Lithuanian political groups appointed new representatives in their stead. This reconstructed VLIK saw the inevitability of a second Soviet invasion and occupation; the threat was spelled out in the May 25, 1944, appeal to the nation. As a positive measure, VLIK appointed a delegation in Germany, while three authorized members of VLIK were to remain in Lithuania; the rest withdrew to carry on the struggle in the West.

The VLIK delegation abroad held its first meeting in Berlin on October 3, 1944, and decided to enlist more members. On October 25, the expanded delegation decided to use the full title Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, since only one of the VLIK plenipotentiaries remained in Lithuania. On December 14, VLIK spoke out against the conference called by the Nazis to mobilize Lithuanians for the war effort. As the Eastern Front fell back toward Berlin, the group moved to Würzburg, which was soon taken by the American army. Under these new

conditions, the group called its first meeting on March 9, 1945, and held its last meeting five days later, when the president of VLIK, Steponas Kairys-Kaminskas, arrived.

After the American occupation of Würzburg, this supreme Lithuanian political organization began its operations in the free world, convinced that the free world would help Lithuania regain its freedom and independence. The Teheran and Yalta conferences, however, had dimmed the hopes of immediate Western aid.

President Kairys called a meeting of the reconstituted VLIK, into which the Lithuanian Peasant Party and Lithuanian Peasant Union were admitted. The basic problems under discussion were: 1) communication with Lithuanian representatives in Washington, London, Paris, Rome, the Vatican, Montevideo and elsewhere, and 2) the quick preparation and presentation of a memorandum to the Allied Supreme Commander General Eisenhower. This memorandum introduced VLIK to General Eisenhower as the only Lithuanian political and resistance center in exile, and presented Lithuania's case. Subsequent memoranda spelled out the deportees and displaced persons problems of security and subsistence, and the question of prisoners of war captured by the Allies.

II. THE STRUGGLE BASED ON WESTERN HELP, 1945-56

1.

The Lithuanians were especially hopeful in the monocentric era that immediately followed the end of the second World War. Because of its atomic monopoly, the United States was at that time the dominating, if not the only, center of military strength and political and economic power. A peace conference, the Lithuanian exiles and immigration thought, would have to include on its agenda the righting of the wrongs done to the Baltic States by the Stalin-Hitler conspiracy. This hope vanished when it became obvious that, because of Soviet machinations, no peace conference was in sight.

When the Soviet deceit and hypocritical policies became

known, the United States reacted. On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman announced that the purpose of American policy was to help the free nations resisting conspiracies to enslave them by internal revolts, by armed minorities or by external aggression. This was the beginning of the so-called Truman Doctrine. A new period was ushered in when the United States gave aid to Greece, then fighting against Communist insurgents. Help was also given to Turkey. The Truman Doctrine slowly evolved into the so-called policy of "containment" or "stop Russia."

The bipolarization of the world that followed, when the Soviet Union became a nuclear rival of the United States, brought promise of the early liberation of the captive nations of East-Central Europe by peaceful and legitimate means. Such a liberation, the Lithuanian exile and immigration leaders had been assured, "has been, is and, until achieved, will be the major goal of United States policy."

A number of pronouncements by the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower affirmed this stand. For example, on November 20, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR that "the United States for its part maintains the diplomatic recognition which it extended in 1922 to the three Baltic nations. We continue to deal with their diplomatic and consular representatives who served the last independent governments of these states."

In spite of hopeful promises by the Eisenhower Administration, Lithuanian hopes for vigorous Western aid ended when Soviet tanks brutally and with impunity crushed the Hungarian Revolution of November 1956.

2.

During the period under consideration, the attitude of Great Britain toward Lithuania's status was not as clear as that of the United States. At the Nuremberg War Trials, the representatives of Great Britain made the same reservations as the United States concerning the Soviet listing of the Baltic States in the indictment as part of the Soviet Union; England emphasized that such

a listing had no relation to the British position on the question of Soviet sovereignty in the Baltic States. An official statement about the *de facto* recognition was given on May 23, 1947, in the House of Commons by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Mayhew, who stated that "it is necessary for us to deal with these facts as we find them. We have not however recognized these countries *de jure*." As recently as 1954, the joint Parliamentary Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, Dodds-Parker, declared in response to an inquiry in the House of Commons that "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to take any steps which would imply or constitute *de jure* recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States."

The Lithuanian Legation in London continued to function as in the past, and the Foreign Office maintained relations with it. Members of the British Commonwealth—Australia, Canada and New Zealand—for the most part adopted the same attitude as Great Britain. Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian consulates also functioned in Toronto, Canada. (When Grant-Suttie died on May 24, 1949, Minister Stasys Lozoraitis appointed Vytautas Gylys to succeed him as consul general. When Mr. Gylys died on June 14, 1953 the consulate general was vacant until Prime Minister Diefenbaker recognized the appointment of Jonas Žmuidzinas on February 10, 1962.)

In 1948, when the Soviet government attempted to induce Lithuanian citizens in Canada to register at Soviet consulates as Soviet citizens, the Canadian government issued statements to the effect that the Soviet government in Lithuania was not a *de jure* government. This position was further confirmed in a governmental statement in the House of Commons on May 17, 1954:

There has been no occasion when the Government of Canada considered it necessary to reaffirm or withdraw formally *de jure* recognition of these Baltic States.

Because the Lithuanian Legation in Paris remained closed, it would appear that the French government recognized the annexation. The Supreme Court of France, however, in its decision in

the case of *Gebraud v. de Medem* (1951), rejected such an interpretation regarding the Baltic States:

Considering that no act of international significance has intervened to obliterate the recognition of the Latvian State as a holder of rights and liabilities to legal obligations; that the Court of Appeal rightly decided that so long as the peace treaty has not determined the fate of Latvia, it is impossible to say that Latvians at present have no nationality.

The position of the Belgian government is based on a statement of the High Court in Brussels in its decision in the case of *Compagnie Belgo-lithuanienne d'Electricité v. Société des Centrales électriques regionales* (October 26, 1946), in which it was stated that Belgium has not recognized the annexation of Lithuania *de jure* and that "no document issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade establishes that the Belgian Government considers such annexation recognized *de facto*." Mention in this connection should be made also of the fact that the government in 1945 refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union nationals of the Baltic States then in Belgium.

A *de facto* recognition of the Soviet annexation may be inferred from the acts of the Swiss government. The Federal Government of Switzerland decided on November 15, 1946, to take under its trusteeship the assets of the Baltic States and the archives of their former missions in Switzerland. The diplomatic missions of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had not been recognized as such by the Swiss government since January, 1941, but the final change in policy came when Switzerland exchanged diplomatic notes with the Soviet Union on March 18, 1946.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has not publicly stated its position in regard to the annexation of the Baltic States. Its actions, however, did not leave any doubt that it did not recognize the annexation either *de facto* or *de jure*. A circular letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of September 12, 1952, stated that the republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are still legally existing. Furthermore, the Bonn government honored passports issued by the consular representatives of the Baltic States, and showed its willingness to accept semi-diplomatic

representatives of these countries. On April 29, 1953, the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany notified the judicial organs of the city of Berlin that it considered Latvia to be still in existence, since neither the German Reich nor the present Federal government had ever recognized that state's annexation. In the circular letter of March 2, 1953, the same ministry stated that, since the annexation of the Baltic States was not recognized in international law and the citizens of those states had not become the citizens of the Soviet Union, the citizenship of those persons remained unchanged; hence, passports issued by the diplomatic and consular services of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were valid as long as they conformed to the usual regulations.

The Latin American states, signatories of the Savendra-Lamas Pact, like Spain and Portugal, did not recognize the annexation of the Baltic States. Peron's regime in Argentina alone suspended the functioning of the Lithuanian Legation in 1948, until the question of the Baltic States is solved by the United Nations. The Lithuanian Legation under Dr. Kazys Grauzinis was then transferred from Argentina to Uruguay where it continued to operate. Through the efforts of Mr. Stasys Lozoraitis, a Lithuanian consulate under Dr. Stasys Sirutis was opened in Bogota, Colombia, in 1954.

After the war, the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service Abroad re-established a close-knit organization in the West. Stasys Lozoraitis, with his office in Rome, was acknowledged by all as the diplomatic chief. He wrote notes, protests, and memoranda to states which did not have official Lithuanian representatives. He also designated Lithuanian consuls (e.g., Vytautas Stašinskas' elevation to consul general in New York in 1964) and transfer of diplomatic officials (e.g., Stasys Bačkis from Paris to Washington). The Lithuanian diplomats had power to issue or confirm Lithuanian passports. They also retained the right to attend conferences and receptions. The consuls handled court cases dealing with Lithuanian property and wills. (The honorary consul in Boston, Anthony O. Shallna was instrumental in forging legal decisions regarding Lithuanian property that are still cited as precedents in American courts.) The consuls also handled

searches for missing persons and confirmed documents. For example, the consulate general in New York catalogued a file of over 100,000 Lithuanian names and addresses for such purposes. As one could see, in addition to preserving the symbol of Lithuanian sovereignty the Lithuanian diplomats also served a useful purpose.

The Lithuanian diplomats and their staffs were financed by the interest accrued on the Lithuanian gold assets frozen in the United States. The United States Department of the Treasury, together with the State Department, administered the reserves of the Lithuanian Republic. The Lithuanian Legation in Washington submitted budgets for all of the Lithuanian overseas missions.

The Lithuanian Legation in Washington published a bulletin in English *The Lithuanian Situation*. The first issue appeared on August 3, 1940; the second issue was much larger (44 pages) and appeared on June 15, 1941. The third issue was called *The Current News of the Lithuanian Situation*. This name was used until 1955, when the former name was readopted. Altogether, twelve volumes or 145 issues of this information bulletin were published until the fall of 1957. At first, it appeared twice a month. Since 1946, it has been a bi-monthly publication. In addition to articles about the plight of Lithuania, *The Lithuanian Situation* expounds the views of prominent statesmen on pertinent questions as well as on bibliographical reviews.

3. *American-Lithuanian Council*

Both ALT and BALF were instrumental in the passage of the Displaced Persons bill by the U.S. Congress, which eased the way for the immigration of 30,000 Lithuanian refugees to America from Western Europe. This immigration was a vital factor for the continuation of the Lithuanian cause. Some 75 percent of the nation's intellectuals had escaped to the West, along with 85 percent of the republic's municipal and government employees; close to 80 percent of the physicians, lawyers, teachers, engineers, artists, writers and businessmen. The intellectual calibre and scope of activities in the decade following the 1949-50 period of immigration was quite marked among the Lithuanian-Americans

as a result. Eventually, many of the displaced persons became the dynamic civic and cultural leaders of the ethnic community in the free world. This transition, of course, took place with some friction and misunderstandings, because of the difference in climate between the old and new immigrants.

ALT also held annual conventions at which time the political goals were formulated and the work of the past year was ratified. Between conventions, a four-man Executive Committee handled all of the financial matters and executed the plans. Leonardas Šimutis was president during the 1945-56 period. Dr. Pijus Gri-gaitis, serving at times as vice president or as secretary, was the leading political light of ALT. When the Nationalists rejoined ALT in 1949, Anthony Olis also played a prominent role. A loose network of chapters, following local by-laws, functioned under various names, such as New York Lithuanian Council, ALT Cleveland Chapter, Committee to Aid Lithuania (in Elizabeth, N. J.), etc.

In addition to organizing conventions and congresses, the ALT Executive Board continually felt the official pulse in Washington—ascertaining whether the American government was planning policy changes in regards to the Baltic States. This question plagued ALT when Hitler declared war against his former ally Russia, which made the USSR a wartime ally of the United States and the West. Relations between the United States and the USSR became so cordial that it took courage to speak out in public against Russia or even to raise the question of Lithuania. Returning from the Potsdam Conference, President Truman said the following about Stalin: "I like Joe, he's a good fellow. . . ." Since Berlin had been turned over to the Russians, ALT feared that the Baltic States would also be recognized as part of the USSR. ALT tried to ascertain policy in this matter. On October 29, 1946, an ALT Delegation visited President Truman and asked him if his administration had not changed its policy toward the Baltic States. President Truman reassured them that it had not. ALT visited President Truman on two other occasions; each time it received the same assurance.

ALT used the 1952 American presidential elections to gain party pledges from both the Democrats and the Republicans that

the Baltic States would not be recognized as part of the Soviet Union. Its representative also paid visits to the State Department and to Capitol Hill. In the fall of 1951, a project for the codification of "international crimes" was raised in the General Assembly of the United Nations. There was a threat that this code would be used against resistance movements in opposition to Soviet occupation; ALT took vigorous measures to have this project stricken from the Assembly's agenda. On January 13-16, 1952, ALT representatives paid a visit to the State Department with a memorandum concerning Soviet genocide in Lithuania. ALT also organized a letter-writing campaign directed at the United States Senate over the ratification of the United Nations Genocide Convention; 36,000 letters were sent. Unfortunately, the Senate did not ratify this convention.

ALT also organized press conferences in New York and Washington, when the VLIK representatives, Mykolas Krupavičius and Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, first visited the United States, when former President Kazys Grinius came to America, and when three fishermen fled from occupied Lithuania to the free West. In order to solicit public opinion against genocide in Lithuania, the ALT chapters organized June Commemorations to observe the first mass deportations of 1941.

ALT was instrumental in the establishment of a Lithuanian Section of the Voice of America. On February 16, 1951, the first Lithuanian broadcast over the Voice took place; these broadcasts took place twelve times a day. The former head of the Lithuanian-American Information Center, Dr. Kostas Jurgėla, became its director. The broadcasts were heard in Lithuania, America and Australia; Munich broadcasts were heard three times a day. These were the more popular of the two Lithuanian-language programs of the Voice of America. (It was discontinued in 1958.) Following the ill-fated Hungarian revolution, the Washington broadcasts became innocuous, carefully omitting aspects of Lithuanian political activities.

The ALT Executive Committee also visited President Eisenhower on several occasions, presenting its views on the Lithuanian situation, and memoranda were submitted to the State Department, a complete collection of which would fill a huge volume.

Of course, these various activities required a substantial war chest. Money was raised by the ALT chapters during rallies and mass meetings. Between 1943 and 1952, the Lithuanian-American community contributed \$353,501.33.

All in all, the most important victory of ALT was the creation of the so-called Kersten Committee by the United States Congress. The idea was conceived by a Brooklyn lawyer and member of ALT, Stephen Bredes. It was imperative to put the facts of the Soviet occupation on record in order to bolster the claims for restoration of independence. Although the Lithuanian-Americans knew how their mother country had been enslaved, the Soviet government always dangled the rebuttal that the so-called Peoples' Diet of Lithuania had voted for incorporation into the USSR. The Soviets asserted that they had merely complied with the wishes of the Lithuanian people!

The American diplomats did not believe this lie, however, they did not know how to refute it. It is for this reason that ALT suggested the creation of a Congressional Committee to investigate the facts. On July 27, 1953, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution by virtue of which the House Baltic Committee was created to investigate the seizure and forced incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union and the treatment of the Baltic peoples during and following the occupation by the Soviets. Congressman Charles J. Kersten was designated chairman. Later, this bipartisan committee was expanded into the Select and Bi-Partisan House Committee on Communist Aggression. President Eisenhower supported this project and Congress appropriated \$30,000 for its hearings.

The investigations began in Washington, where Lithuanian Minister Povilas Žadeikis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and others testified. Lithuanian witnesses were later questioned in New York, Detroit and Chicago. The Lithuanian-American Council also collaborated by gathering documents, classifying and registering witnesses, and translating these testimonies into English and sending them to the Kersten Committee. ALT gathered data from over 1,000 witnesses who had experienced Soviet terror in Lithuania.

After questioning Eastern European witnesses in America,

Yale University News Bureau

New Haven, Connecticut

State 7-3131, Ext. 344

#415

Steve Kezerian, Director

For Release on Delivery (at 11:30 A.M.), Monday, June 11, 1962.

New Haven, Conn., June 11:-- Following is the text, as delivered, of the Commencement Address of John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, at Yale's 261st Commencement on Monday morning, June 11.

President Kennedy received the honorary Doctor of Laws degree during the exercises.

This text was transcribed by the White House staff and released for the press.

* * * * *

President Griswold, members of the faculty, graduates and their families, ladies and gentlemen: Let me begin by expressing my appreciation for the very deep honor that you have conferred upon me. As General DeGaulle occasionally acknowledges America to be the daughter of Europe, so I am pleased to come to Yale, the daughter of Harvard. It might be said now that I have the best of both worlds, a Harvard education and a Yale degree.

I am particularly glad to become a Yale man because as I think about my troubles, I find that a lot of them have come from other Yale men. Among businessmen I have had a minor disagreement with Roger Blough, of the Law School Class of 1931, and I have had some complaints too from my friend Henry Ford, of the class of 1940. In journalism, I seem to have a difference with John Hay Whitney, of the class of 1926 -- and sometimes I also displease Henry Luce of the class of 1920, not to mention - always - William F. Buckley, Jr., of the class of 1950. I even have some trouble with my Yale advisors. I get along with them, but I am not always sure how they get along with each other.

I have the warmest feelings for Chester Bowles of the class of 1924 and for Dean Acheson, of the class of 1915, and my assistant, McGeorge Bundy, of the class of 1940, but I am not 100 per cent sure that these three wise and experienced Yale men wholly agree with each other on every issue.

m o r e

415 -2-

So this Administration which aims at peaceful cooperation among all Americans has been the victim of a certain natural pugnacity developed in this city among Yale men. Now that I, too, am a Yale man, it is time for peace. Last week at West Point, in the historic tradition of that Academy, I availed myself of the powers of Commander in Chief to remit all sentences of offending cadets. In that same spirit, and in the historic tradition of Yale, let me now offer to smoke the clay pipe of friendship with all of my brother Elis, and I hope that they may be friends not only with me but even with each other.

In any event, I am very glad to be here and as a new member of the club, I have been checking to see what earlier links existed between the institution of the Presidency and Yale, I found that a member of the class of 1878, William Howard Taft, served one term in the White House as preparation for becoming a member of this faculty. And a graduate of 1804, John C. Calhoun, regarded the Vice Presidency as too lowly a station for a Yale alumnus -- and became the only man in history to ever resign that office.

Calhoun in 1804 and Taft in 1878 graduated into a world very different from ours today. They and their contemporaries spent entire careers stretching over 40 years in grappling with a few dramatic issues on which the nation was sharply and emotionally divided, issues that occupied the attention of a generation at a time: The National Bank, the disposal of the public lands, nullification or union, freedom or slavery, gold or silver. Today these old sweeping issues very largely have disappeared. The central domestic issues of our time are more subtle and less simple. They relate not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology but to ways and means of reaching common goals -- to research for sophisticated solutions to complex and obstinate issues. The world of Calhoun, the world of Taft had its own hard problems and notable challenges. But its problems are not our problems. Their age is not our age. As every past generation has had to disentrail itself from an inheritance of truism and stereotype, so in our own time we must move on from the reassuring repetition of stale phrases to a new, difficult but essential confrontation with reality.

For the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive and unrealistic. Too often we hold fast to the cliches of our forebears. We subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.

Mythology distracts us everywhere -- in government as in business, in politics as in economics, in foreign affairs as in domestic policy. But today I want to particularly consider the myth and reality in our national economy. In recent months many have come to feel, as I do that the dialogue between the parties -- between business and government -- is clogged by illusion and platitude and fails to reflect the true realities of contemporary American society.

I speak of these matters here at Yale because of the self-evident truth that a great university is always enlisted against the spread of illusion and on the side of reality. No one has said it more clearly than your President Griswold: "Liberal learning is both a safeguard against false ideas of freedom and a source of true ones." Your role as university men, whatever your calling, will be to increase each new generation's grasp of its new duties.

m o r e

#415 -3-

There are three great areas of our domestic affairs in which, today, there is a danger that illusion may prevent effective action. They are, first, the question of the size and the shape of government's responsibilities; second, the question of public fiscal policy; and third, the matter of confidence, business confidence or public confidence, or simply confidence in America. I want to talk about all three, and I want to talk about them carefully and dispassionately -- and I emphasize that I am concerned here not with political debate but with finding ways to separate false problems from real ones.

If a contest in angry argument were forced upon it, no Administration could shrink from response, and history does not suggest that American Presidents are totally without resources in an engagement forced upon them because of hostility in one sector of society. But in the wider national interest, we need not partisan wrangling, but common concentration on common problems. I come this morning to ask you to join in this great task.

Let us take first the question of the size and shape of government. The myth here is that government is big, and bad -- and steadily getting bigger and worse. Obviously this myth has some excuse for existence. It is true that in recent history each new Administration has spent much more money than its predecessor. Thus President Roosevelt outspent President Hoover, and with allowances for the special case of the Second World War, President Truman outspent President Roosevelt. Just to prove that this was not a partisan matter, President Eisenhower outspent President Truman by the handsome figure of \$182 billion. It is even possible something of this trend may continue.

But does it follow that big government is growing relatively bigger? It does not -- for the fact is for the last 15 years, the Federal Government -- and also the Federal debt -- and also the federal bureaucracy -- have grown less rapidly than the economy as a whole. If we leave defense and space expenditures aside, the Federal Government since the Second World War has expended less than any other major sector of our national life -- less than industry, less than commerce, less than agriculture, less than higher education, and very much less than the noise about big government.

The truth about big government is the truth about any other great activity -- it is complex. Certainly it is true that size brings dangers -- but it is also true that size also can bring benefits. Here at Yale which has contributed so much to our national progress in science and medicine, it may be proper for me to mention one great and little noticed expansion of government which has brought strength to our whole society. The new role of our federal government as the major patron of research in science and in medicine. Few people realize that in 1961, in support of all university research in science and medicine, three dollars out of every four came from the federal government. I need hardly point out that this has taken place without undue enlargement of government control -- that American scientists remain second to none in their independence and in their individualism.

I am not suggesting that federal expenditures cannot bring some measure of control. The whole thrust of federal expenditures in agriculture has been related by purpose and design to control, . . . as a means of dealing with the problems created by our farmers and our growing productivity. Each sector, my point is, of activity must be approached on its own merits and in terms of specific national needs. Generalities in regard to federal expenditures,

m o r e

#415 -4-

therefore, can be misleading -- each case, science, urban renewal, education, agriculture, natural resources, each case must be determined on its merits if we are to profit from our unrivaled ability to combine the strength of public and private purpose.

Next, let us turn to the problem of our fiscal policy. Here the myths are legion and the truth hard to find. But let me take as a prime example the problem of the federal budget. We persist in measuring our federal fiscal integrity today by the conventional or administrative budget -- with results which would be regarded as absurd in any business firm -- in any country of Europe -- or in any careful assessment of the reality of our national finances. The administrative budget has sound administrative uses. But for wider purposes it is less helpful. It omits our special trust funds; it neglects changes in assets or inventories. It cannot tell a loan from a straight expenditure -- and worst of all it cannot distinguish between operating expenditures and long term investments.

This budget, in relation to the great problems of federal fiscal policy, is not simply irrelevant; it can be actively misleading. And yet there is a mythology that measures all of our national soundness or unsoundness on the single simple basis of this same annual administrative budget. If our federal budget is to serve, not the debate, but the country, we must and will find ways of clarifying this area of discourse.

Still in the area of fiscal policy, let me say a word about deficits. The myth persists that federal deficits create inflation and budget surpluses prevent it. Yet sizeable budget surpluses after the war did not prevent inflation, and persistent deficits for the last several years have not upset our basic price stability. Obviously deficits are sometimes dangerous -- and so are surpluses. But honest assessment plainly requires a more sophisticated view than the old and automatic cliché that deficits automatically bring inflation.

There are myths also about our public debt. It is widely supposed that this debt is growing at a dangerously rapid rate. In fact, both the debt per person and the debt as a proportion of our gross national product have declined sharply since the Second World War. In absolute terms the national debt increased only 8 per cent, while private debt was increasing 305 per cent, and the debts of state and local governments increased 378 per cent. Moreover, debts, public and private, are neither good nor bad, in and of themselves. Borrowing can lead to over-extension and collapse -- but it can also lead to expansion and strength. There is no single, simple slogan in this field that we can trust.

Finally, I come to the problem of confidence. Confidence is a matter of myth and also a matter of truth -- and this time let me take the truth of the matter first.

It is true -- and of high importance -- that the prosperity of this country depends on assurance that all major elements within it will live up to their responsibilities. If business were to neglect its obligations to the public; if labor were blind to all public responsibility; above all, if government were to abandon its obvious -- and statutory -- duty of watchful concern for our economic health -- if any of these things should happen, then confidence might well be weakened and danger of stagnation would increase. This is the true issue of confidence.

m o r e

A15 -5-

But there is also the false issue -- and its simplest form is the assertion that any and all unfavorable turns of the speculative wheel -- however temporary and however plainly speculative in character -- are the result of, and I quote, "lack of confidence in the national administration." This I must tell you, while comforting, is not wholly true. Worse, it obscures the reality -- which is also simple. The solid ground of mutual confidence is the necessary partnership of government with all of the sectors of our society in the steady quest for economic progress.

Corporate plans are not based on a political confidence in party leaders but on an economic confidence in the nation's ability to invest and produce and consume. Business had full confidence in the Administrations in power in 1929, 1954, 1958, and 1960 -- but this was not enough to prevent recession when business lacked full confidence in the economy. What matters is the capacity of the nation as a whole to deal with its economic problems and its opportunities.

The stereotypes I have been discussing distract our attention and divide our effort. These stereotypes do our nation a disservice, not just because they are exhausted and irrelevant, but above all because they are misleading -- because they stand in the way of the solution of hard and complicated facts. It is not new that past debates should obscure present realities. But the damage of such a false dialogue is greater today than ever before simply because today the safety of all the world -- the very future of freedom -- depends as never before upon the sensible and clear-headed management of the domestic affairs of the United States.

The real issues of our time are rarely so dramatic as the issues of Calhoun. The differences today are usually matters of degree. And we cannot understand and attack our contemporary problems in 1962 if we are bound by traditional labels and worn-out slogans of an earlier era. But the unfortunate fact of the matter is that our rhetoric has not kept pace with the speed of social and economic change. Our political debates, our public discourse -- on current domestic and economic issues -- too often bear little or no relation to the actual problems the United States faces.

What is at stake in our economic decisions today is not some grand warfare of rival ideologies which will sweep the country with passion but the practical management of a modern economy. What we need is not labels and cliches but more basic discussion of the sophisticated and technical questions involved in keeping a great economic machinery moving ahead.

The national interest lies in high employment and steady expansion of output, in stable prices, and a strong dollar. The declaration of such an objective is easy; their attainment in an intricate and interdependent economy and world is a little more difficult. To attain them, we require not some automatic response but hard thought. Let me end by suggesting a few of the real questions on our national agenda.

First, how can our budget and tax policies supply adequate revenues and preserve our balance of payments position without slowing up our economic growth?

m o r e

#415 -6-

Two, how are we to set our interest rates and regulate the flow of money in ways which will stimulate the economy at home, without weakening the dollar abroad? Given the spectrum of our domestic and international responsibilities, what should be the mix between fiscal and monetary policy?

Let me give several examples from my experience of the complexity of these matters and how political labels and ideological approaches are irrelevant to the solution.

Last week, a distinguished graduate of this school, Senator Proxmire, of the Class of 1938, who is ordinarily regarded as a liberal Democrat, suggested that we should follow in meeting our economic problems a stiff fiscal policy, with emphasis on budget balance and an easy monetary policy with low interest rates in order to keep our economy going. In the same week, the Bank International in Basel, Switzerland, a conservative organization representing the central bankers of Europe suggested that the appropriate economic policy in the United States should be the very opposite; that we should follow a flexible budget policy as in Europe, with deficits when the economy is down and a high monetary policy on interest rates in Europe in order to control inflation and protect goals. Both may be right or wrong. It will depend on many different factors.

The point is that this is basically an administrative or executive problem in which political labels or cliches do not give us a solution.

A well-known business journal this morning, as I journeyed to New Haven, raised the prospects that a further budget deficit would bring inflation and encourage the flow of gold. We have had several budget deficits beginning with a \$12½ billion deficit in 1958, and it is true that in the Fall of 1960 we had a gold dollar loss running at \$5 billion annually. This would seem to prove the case that a deficit produces inflation and that we lose gold, yet there was no inflation following the deficit of 1958 nor has there been inflation since then.

Our wholesale price index since 1958 has remained completely level in spite of several deficits, because the loss of gold has been due to other reasons; price instability, relative interest rates, relative export-import balance, national security expenditures -- all the rest.

Let me give you a third and final example. At the World Bank meeting in September, a number of American bankers attending predicted to their European colleagues that because of the Fiscal 1962 budget deficit, there would be a strong inflationary pressure on the dollar and a loss of gold. Their predictions of inflation were shared by many in business and helped push the market up. The recent reality of non-inflation helped bring it down. We have had no inflation because we have had other factors in our economy that have contributed to price stability.

I do not suggest that the government is right and they are wrong. The fact of the matter is in the Federal Reserve Board and in the Administration this Fall, a similar view was held by many well-informed and disinterested men that inflation was the major problem we would face in the Winter of 1962, but it was not. What I do suggest is that these problems are endlessly complicated and yet they go to the future of this country and its ability to prove to the world what we believe it must prove.

m o r e

#415 -7-

I am suggesting that the problems of fiscal and monetary policies in the Sixties as opposed to the kinds of problems we faced in the Thirties demand subtle challenges for which technical answers, not political answers, must be provided. These are matters upon which government and business may and in many cases will disagree. They are certainly matters that the government and business should be discussing in the most sober, dispassionate way if we are to maintain the kind of vigorous economy upon which our country depends.

How can we develop and sustain strong and stable world markets for basic commodities without unfairness to the consumer and without undue stimulus to the producer? How can we generate the buying power which can consume what we produce on our farms and in our factories. How can we take advantage of the miracles of automation with the great demand that it will put upon highly skilled labor and yet offer employment to the half million of unskilled school dropouts each year which enter the labor market, eight million of them in the 1960's.

How do we eradicate the barriers which separate substantial minorities of our citizens from access to education and employment on equal terms with the rest?

How, in sum, can we make our free economy work at full capacity -- that is, provide adequate profits for enterprise, adequate wages for labor, adequate utilization of plant and opportunity for all?

These are the problems that we should be talking about -- that the political parties and the various groups in our country should be discussing. They cannot be solved by incantations of the forgotten past, but the example of Western Europe shows that they are capable of solution -- that governments, and many of them are conservative governments, prepared to face technical problems without ideological preconceptions, can coordinate the elements of a national economy to bring about growth and prosperity -- a decade of it.

Some conversations I have heard in our own country sound like old records, long-playing, left over from the middle Thirties. The debate of the Thirties had its great significance and produced great results but it took place in a different world with different needs and different tasks. It is our responsibility today to live in our own world -- and to identify the needs and discharge the tasks of the 1960's.

If there is any current trend toward meeting present problems with old cliches, this is the moment to stop it -- before it lands us all in a bog of sterile acrimony.

Discussion is essential; and I am hopeful that the debate of recent weeks, though up to now somewhat barren, may represent the start of a serious dialogue of the kind which has led in Europe to such fruitful collaboration among all the elements of economic society and to a decade of unrivaled economic progress. But let us not engage in the wrong argument at the wrong time between the wrong people in the wrong country -- while the real problems of our own time grow and multiply, fertilized by our neglect.

m o r e

#415 -8-

Nearly 150 years ago Thomas Jefferson wrote, "The new circumstances under which we are placed call for new words, new phrases, and for the transfer of old words to new objects." That is truer today than it was in the time of Jefferson, because the role of this country is so vastly more significant. There is a show in England called "Stop the World, I Want to Get Off". You have not chosen to exercise that option. You are part of the world and you must participate in these days of our years in the solution of the problems that pour upon us requiring the most sophisticated and technical judgment, and as we work in consonance to meet the authentic problems of our times, we will generate a vision and an energy which will demonstrate anew to the world the superior vitality and the strength of the free society.

/////