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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

RESERVE AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KATHIE EMBODY, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Invitation to the President from the Reserve Officers
Association

Kathie
After reflection, I recommend that the President accept the invitation from ROA. I see no policy or political risk for the President in appearing before this particular organization and I can think of several reasons why an acceptance would be desirable. I have listed these reasons below:

1. The symbolic effect of a personal appearance before a large Reserve Organization at this time would be very important, since we are engaged in the first involuntary call-up of Reservists in 20 years. Moreover, the scale of the call-up is very large. As of November 18, some 6,408 volunteer Reservists were serving in connection with Operation DESERT SHIELD. Several thousand others had already served. Secretary Cheney has authorized an involuntary call-up of 126,250 Reservists and 44,847 of those had been activated. Since that time, several thousand more have been activated.

2. The employers and families of Reservists who have been called up can be expected to become increasingly restive the longer their employee/spouse-Reservists are absent from the workplace and home. An explanation by the President of the importance of Reserve forces to the attainment of our objectives in DESERT SHIELD would do more than dampen potential complaints. It would be an effective way to build and to solidify support for our efforts in the Persian Gulf.

3. This invitation offers an enthusiastic and very supportive forum in which the President could address any issues which he deems important. More than 2,000 people were in the audience in January 1988 when President Reagan made a very successful address to the ROA Mid-Winter Conference. Important speeches to the ROA are printed and given wide publicity.

4. As Major General Hultman notes in his letter to the President, the ROA is a somewhat unique Reserve organization. There are many National Guard and Reserve Organizations (e.g., the National Guard Association of the United States, the Naval Reserve Association, the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association, Enlisted Association of the National Guard of

United States, Adjutants General Association of the United States), but the ROA did receive an official charter from Congress when it was incorporated by an Act of Congress in 1950.

5. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I addressed the ROA last January in the middle of Operation JUST CAUSE. Volunteer Reservists were performing important missions during that operation and we learned that all of the Reserve components (Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve) were terribly interested to learn how Reservists were being used, and how the Total Force Policy was being applied in that operation. I have no doubt that there is even greater interest in the use of Reservists in DESERT SHIELD.

If you would like to discuss this invitation further, please let me know.



Stephen M. Duncan

ROA INSERT from Bob Simon

INSERT BEFORE FIRST FULL PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 5

Some 70 years ago, at the very first meeting of the ROA, Gen. John J. Pershing's words still speak to us today. He said, "Where would America be today, but for the patriotism of our fathers and sons, and their willingness to stand up for principle? ... What becomes of nations that are not ready to yield up life and treasure against the aggressor? No nation wants war. We do not seek it. But as long as human greed and hatred exist in the hearts of nations, individual wars are possible."

Gen. John Pershing is considered a founder of ROA.

Excerpts of his speech to the
1ST ROA convention

10/3/22

General Pershing's address at that opening convention session was reported in the *New York Times* of October 3, 1922. The *Times* was published by Adolph Ochs who strongly believed in Pershing's message, and whose family for several generations strongly supported the plan created by Pershing. Pershing's words come from the files of that paper:

"This convention, assembled to perfect an association of Reserve Officers, is of especial importance as a stimulus in the organization of Reserve units throughout the nation.

"Before the war there was no conception of even the possibility of such a society.

"The number of Reserve officers was practically negligible.

"There was no incentive to form a society of this character.

"There was, throughout the country, an almost total lack of appreciation of the value of a reserve force of any sort.

"But the war brought home to us in a very striking manner the advisability of reasonable precaution—completely vindicated the advocates of military training and preliminary organization, and demonstrated beyond question the fallacy of pacifist theories.

"These results were forced upon us to be sure at the unnecessary cost of valuable life and the lesson has sunk deep in the breasts of all save those who having eyes see not, and having ears hear not. The experience so far has awakened the country to a realization of our pre-war situation that a resolve has gone forth, embodied in the law of 1920, that never again shall our untrained boys be compelled to serve their country on the battlefield under the leadership of new officers with practically no conception of their duties and responsibilities

"I am not one of those who would have our people forget the bitter experience of war—nor eliminate from our histories all reference to war, but instead would have every child become familiar with the sacrifices of their ancestors in the cause of right. Where would America be today but for the patriotism of our fathers and our sons and their willingness to stand up for principle? Are we to minimize the importance to humanity of their part in the war of the Revolution, or the World War? What becomes of nations or people that are not ready to yield up life and treasure against the aggressor?

"NO NATION WANTS WAR. WE DO NOT SEEK IT, BUT AS LONG AS HUMAN GREED AND HATRED EXIST IN THE HEARTS OF NATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WARS ARE POSSIBLE."

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Source: "The ROA Story" by

John T. Carlton

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John F. Slinkman

BOB -

"TAKE BACK THE GULF!"

- E.

McNally/Simon
Jan. 16, 1991
Draft One (B:RESERVE)

**PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: U.S. RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
WASHINGTON HILTON
WEDNESDAY, JAN. 23, 1991, 7:30 P.M.**

((At ease!)) \\ \\ Thank you, "Curly" [[Gen. Evan Hultman]].
And thank you, each of you -- not for standing up to greet me --
but for standing up for the fighting men and women defending
freedom tonight in the Persian Gulf! \\ \\

I'm proud to be back here with the Reserve Officers
Association once again, and honored to be named the R.O.A.
"Minute Man of the Year." I was born in Massachusetts -- home of
the original Minute Man. But when we moved to Texas, I remember
one guy bragging to me about the heroes of the Alamo. He said:
"I bet you never had anybody so brave around Massachusetts."

So I asked him: "Ever hear of Paul Revere?"

And he said: "Paul Revere? Isn't that the guy who ran for
help?!" \\ \\ \\

Of course, Paul Revere didn't really run for help -- he rode
for freedom. And this month, far from home, America's best and
bravest once again took to the freedom trail.

This month marks a critical moment in history -- a moment of
truth -- for this generation, for this nation, for this world.

We were patient. We were cautious. We were slow to anger.
But when the moment of truth came, America did the right thing.
The Coalition did the right thing. And our troops did it well.

We've come a long way -- as a Nation, and as a people --
since the days when despots could afford to take Americans

hostage, smug in the knowledge that nothing would be done.

But this time it was different.

We said that if allied troops were forced to liberate Kuwait, we would do the job quickly, massively and decisively.

We said that if one American soldier had to go into battle, he would have enough force behind him to win.

We said that the occupation of Kuwait would not stand.

And today in the Gulf, America is keeping her word. \\\

Today in the Gulf, the liberation of Kuwait has begun. \\\

Today in the Gulf: It's hammer time. \\\

Exactly one week ago, the battle was joined. Having refused to face the cold hard facts, Saddam now faces cold hard steel. It is a conflict we did not seek and did not begin. But ladies and gentlemen -- it's one we do intend to finish. \\\

Yes, the liberation of Kuwait has begun. It has marked a proud day for every American -- and my proudest moment as Commander-in-Chief -- of the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-educated fighting force ever assembled! \\\

I know our fighting men and women are heartened by the tremendous outpouring of support from the American people and the Congress. Because when I said last week that this will not be another Vietnam, I meant two things:

First -- that never again will our fighting men and women be sent in to do a job with one hand tied behind their back. \\\

And second, just as important, never again will they be sent in to do a job without the full backing of the folks back home.

Over the past week, the outpouring of compassion, the outpouring of love and faith and support for our troops from Americans of all walks of life has been overwhelming. Maybe you saw the comments from some of the folks in Abilene, Kansas -- hometown of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kevin Mickey told a reporter he has no doubt that the U.S. action was necessary and will end in victory. He said: "We're the kind of people who win wars.... We're not sophisticated. But we know right from wrong." And Esther Foltz, who has a grandson in the Gulf, said that: "We're going to win this thing. And the world's going to be better."

Esther's right. Building a better world is an important part of what the Coalition is all about. Last fall at the United Nations, I described my vision of what this new partnership of nations might look like. I called it a "partnership based on consultation, co-operation, and collective action -- especially through interna-tional organizations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law, and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A partnership whose goals are to increase demo-cracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace and reduce arms."

Looking back, that sounds like a pretty fair description of the unprecedented partnership that's today standing up to the aggression in the Gulf. Gone are the days when America was the lone cop on the beat. Today the Coalition in the Gulf is not so much a global policeman as it is a neighborhood fire department -- a volunteer fire department that's no longer willing to

stand idly by and watch the world's flash points catch fire.

Today, the fire brigade in the Gulf is a cooperative and committed force freely supported by the world community for the mutual protection of the neighborhood. The volunteers come from 28 nations spanning five continents. Of an estimated \$__ billion in operating costs, an estimated \$__ billion, or 80 percent, is being paid by countries other than the United States.

But even a volunteer fire department needs a leader. And whether today or in the years to come, that leader must be -- that leader can only be -- the United States of America. \\\

The United States has always borne a disproportionate share -- not only of costs -- but also of leadership. And that's how it should be. History is moving decisively in America's favor -- thanks, in large part, to our own perserverance. The hallmarks of the modern world -- which the emerging democracies are now striving for -- are free markets, free movement, free speech, and free elections. America's had all these things for over 200 years. **They have given us both our power and our purpose.** And I can assure you -- America, and the world -- that we have not come through 214 years of history, fighting for freedom, only to back down now.

The United States is unique. Only the United States can bear this responsibility. Not Europe, not the new Germany, not the Soviet Union, not Japan. We come from every nation on Earth -- citizens of the world -- tracing our roots to Italy and Mexico, Germany and China, Western Africa and Southeast Asia. We

are the one nation on this Earth that can stand against the forces of aggression, and for the forces of peace. Among the nations of the world, only the United States has both this moral standing and the means to back it up.

Tonight, the world is united by shared commitments, shared interests, shared hopes. Tonight, our efforts will determine the kind of legacy we bequeath our children, the kind of world they will live in. And so tonight, let us re-dedicate ourselves to the ideals in which our troops so fiercely believe. Because our goals will not be fully achieved until we live in a world where every country is shaking hands -- and none are shaking fists. \\

And when this crisis is over, the opportunities ahead will be truly historic. Iraq can be welcomed back into the community of nations. And at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates -- where civilization began -- civilization can begin anew. \\

Tonight's dinner has special drama, not the least of which is the fact that some of the members of the R.O.A. who usually attend are on active duty with Desert Storm. From the moment they were called up on August 22nd, our Reservists have demonstrated the unique skills of the "citizen-soldier" -- and reminded us of the key role our Reserve Forces play in our Nation's defense strategy. Reserve volunteers were vital to the success of the early stages of Desert Shield, especially in communications, airlift and medical support. Today, more than 50,000 Reservists stand with the forces of the Coalition in the Gulf. And as we've seen this week in Desert Storm -- our

**Reservists and National Guardsmen rank among the finest fighter,
attack and transport pilots on Earth! **

The Reserves are doing their part. But I know that, at times like this, every American wants to lend a hand, and asks: "What can I do?"

Well, one possibility was suggested in a letter I received from Ann Macker, a Navy nurse serving in the Persian Gulf tonight aboard the USNS Comfort. She wrote:

"There is something [every American] can do... Please stand outside in the cold night air and search for that star. When you find it -- and it will be there -- please pray for [us] and ask the Good Lord to bring us home safely."

And so, as you go to home tonight, look up at the night sky and send a prayer eastward towards the morning sun -- across the ocean and halfway across the world -- to the brave men and women who carry with them our hopes, our dreams, and our love.

And let me say again to our troops what I said in my holiday address: The sacrifices you make will never be forgotten. **America is behind you. The world is behind you. And history is behind you.** And when you come home -- and we hope and pray it's soon -- you will be welcomed as what you are -- **all-American heroes**. \\\

The world is watching. And the world is with you.

Thank you. Goodnight. And God bless the United States of America.

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*Statement by Stephen M. Duncan,
assistant secretary of defense
(Reserve affairs), to the Defense
Subcommittee, Senate
Appropriations Committee, April 24,
1990.*

The Reserve forces of the United States enter the 1990s after a decade of growth and improvement which have assured their status as the best Reserve forces in the world. I have no doubt that the improvement in their capabilities has contributed directly to what the secretary of defense described in his own recent testimony to Congress as a "historic transformation of the global security environment." As we engage in the continuing task of developing specific policies to implement our national security strategy, I'm honored to once again have the opportunity to appear before the committee to report on the condition of the Reserve forces and to discuss the important responsibilities which our Reserve forces have been asked, and reasonably can be asked, to assume in the future.

For almost two decades, the Total Force Policy has been a basic pillar of our military strategy. The express purpose and the recent effect of that policy has, of course, been to place a substantial portion of our total military power in a high quality, volunteer, well-trained, well-equipped and early mobilizable Reserve force. In recent years, I have discussed the quality of our Reserve forces with various committees of the Congress. Since the quality of the Reserve components is directly relevant to any consideration of the efficacy of the Total Force Policy, permit me to introduce my testimony

today with a brief description of the actual performance of four of the seven Reserve components in the operation in Panama which commenced on Dec. 20, 1989.

Operation Just Cause

Statistical data and words often have limited utility in conveying the true quality and readiness condition of military units and personnel. Intangibles, such as morale, the quality of leadership, unit cohesiveness, etc., can make a unit much better than objective data would suggest. The converse is also true. The best measurement of quality and readiness is actual performance.

In the recent and highly visible test of performance in Panama, National Guardsmen and reservists with a wide range of skills, including many unique skills, performed brilliantly.

The Army chief of staff has described Operation Just Cause as one of the most complex contingency deployments and employments that U.S. forces have undertaken since World War II. When the operation began on Dec. 20, 1989, personnel from the 180th Tactical Fighter Group of the Air National Guard from Toledo, Ohio, were engaged in regularly scheduled training at Howard (Air Base) . . . Panama, with five of their A-7 aircraft. The 180th flew 76 close air-support sorties and expended in excess of 2,700 rounds of ammunition.

More significant than the num-

ber of rounds fired was the psychological effect on members of the Panamanian Defense Forces of the combat aircraft buzzing isolated PDF installations. The visible presence of the aircraft was credited as a major factor in the widespread surrender of PDF forces without a fight. Three days after the operation began, the Air Guard personnel from the 180th were replaced by crews from the 114th TFG in Sioux Falls, S.D., who were flown to Panama on C-141 aircraft piloted by the Air National Guard in Mississippi.

During the very early stages of the operation, other Air National Guard crews flew missions, with C-130 aircraft airlifting 553 tons of cargo and 3,107 people, including the very first aero-medical evacuation flight to the U.S. The 172nd Military Air Group of the Air National Guard flew C-141 missions from its home station in Jackson, Miss., transporting 1,733 people and 437 tons of cargo to Panama. The 105th MAG of the Air National Guard (New York) flew 49 C-5 Galaxy missions, airlifting 637 personnel and more than 1,000 tons of cargo. Hundreds of additional missions were flown in the later stages of the conflict. Other Air National Guard personnel provided various kinds of support to active Air Force personnel who were engaged in the operation.

Similar missions were flown by Air Force Reserve personnel. Two AC-130 gunships from the 919th Special Operations Group

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of the Air Force Reserve were a major contributor to the success of the operation, flying 38 combat sorties, hitting key facilities and providing cover for Army troops held hostage in the Marriott Hotel in Panama City. Associate KC-10 tanker units flew 13 missions to refuel aircraft and offload 1,169,000 pounds of fuel. Six separate C-5 and C-141 associate airlift units from five states flew 71 missions (852 flying hours), airlifting 3,927 personnel and 1,921 tons of cargo as part of their participation in the initial assault air drop and during follow-on air-land missions.

In addition to the airlift and gunship crew support, Air Force Reservists provided significant support in aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, aerial port, intelligence and base operating support. Reserve crews flew 10 aeromedical evacuation missions. Air Force Reserve aeromed units volunteered 1,000 mandays of effort, and some 208 nurses and technicians supported 225 litter patients and 42 ambulatory patients. They staffed medical facilities at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, and the nearby Wilford Hall U.S. Air Force Medical Center (Lackland AFB, Texas).

When I visited our Reserve forces in Panama in January, I was informed that at certain times during the intense early hours of the assault, aircraft were landing at Howard ... every 15 seconds, on a very crowded airfield, in blackout conditions (because of the danger of mortar rounds from nearby hills). The fact that not a single accident took place

despite these conditions and the confusion that inevitably surrounds combat operations is vivid testimony to the professionalism of the active Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve crews which were involved.

Other National Guardsmen and reservists were also actively involved in the early stages of the conflict. When the attack began, the 1138th Military Police Company of the Army National Guard (Missouri) was also conducting annual training in Panama. That unit was the only military police unit in Panama specially trained to process POWs and civilian detainees. At 1600 hours (4 p.m.) of the first day, the unit had constructed a holding facility and was receiving prisoners. Although the unit was scheduled to complete its training and return home on Dec. 21, over one-half of its members volunteered to remain in Panama over the holiday period for an additional two weeks.

The augmentation of the active force staffs during the crisis was another task that National Guardsmen and reservists performed well. At the request of the U.S. Southern Command, some 61 USAR (U.S. Army Reserve) individual mobilization augmentees volunteered to provide staff and related support to both SOUTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands during the around-the-clock intense operations. The 366th Army Reserve Public Affairs Detachment provided in-depth media coverage for approximately 13 days.

One of the more remarkable stories about Operation Just

Cause was the work of the Army Reserve civil affairs personnel who very ably demonstrated the often unique skills of the “citizen-soldier.” Soon after the operation began, warning orders were issued to specific Army Reserve civil affairs units. Army Reservists by the hundreds immediately began calling to volunteer to go to Panama.

Shortly after the operation commenced, SOUTHCOM requested that reservists with specific skills be deployed to Panama to conduct joint civil-military operations and specifically to assist the new government of Panama in the restoration of essential governmental services, in the assessment of the longer-term needs of the country and in the care of thousands of displaced Panamanian citizens.

The first contingent of Army Reserve civil affairs specialists arrived in Panama the day after Christmas, six days after the conflict began. By Jan. 1, a total of 222 Army Reserve civil affairs personnel had arrived. Specialists immediately began advising the ministers of the new government on the rebuilding of the governmental infrastructure. Immediate steps were taken to assist the new government in its efforts to build the new Public Forces of Panama from the ashes of the Panamanian Defense Forces and to change the entire culture and attitude of the former members of the PDF so that the FPP will become a police force dedicated to the protection of the citizens of Panama, rather than a military force which intimidates and abuses.

Army Reservists who serve as judges, prosecutors and precinct policemen in their private lives quickly designed a course of instruction for all members of the new FPP. The course included such subjects as “Police Ethics” and “Human Rights,” as well as such standard subjects as chain-of-custody procedures for evidence, arrest techniques, etc. The prison next to the Comandancia, the former headquarters building of Gen. Manuel Noriega and the PDF, which had been

emptied and ransacked after the attack began, was soon functioning again as a result of the advice and active assistance of a Spanish-speaking Army Reserve captain who serves in private life as a U.S. marshal.

A wide variety of other nation-building tasks were also performed by Army Reservists. A clean, organized refugee camp for almost 3,000 homeless and displaced persons was immediately established. Agriculture and medical specialists promptly commenced highly visible efforts to rebuild the distribution systems for food and medical supplies—by Jan. 20, 1990, a civil affairs unit in Colon had already delivered 60 tons of emergency food supplies to outlying districts cut off by the fighting.

Housing, real estate and construction specialists began detailed assessments of the short- and long-term housing needs of the citizens of Panama City, Colon and other areas. Airport management specialists assisted civil airport authorities in the return to normal civil aviation operations. Educational specialists worked to reopen the schools of Panama and to evaluate the long-term educational needs of the country.

Public works specialists repaired vehicles and equipment so that the public transportation system could operate. Engineers cleared the streets and attacked sanitation problems. In Colon, a sergeant in an Army Reserve civil affairs unit (who works as a civil engineer in his civilian job) designed a screening device for the intake valves of that city's drainage system, which had been inoperative for several months due to clogged intake valves and fouled turbines. His device worked superbly and will probably save the city from serious flooding during the next rainy season. It has already stopped the flow of raw sewage into the surrounding river system.

During my visit to Panama, I asked Gen. Max Thurman, the commander in chief of SOUTHCOM, how our Reserve forces

“During the intense early hours of the assault, aircraft were landing at Howard Air Base every 15 seconds, on a very crowded airfield, in blackout conditions. The fact that not a single accident took place ... is vivid testimony to the professionalism of the active Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve crews.”

were performing. He replied: “The skills that the Reserves bring (to SOUTHCOM) are a godsend.”

The role which National Guardsmen and reservists played in Operation Just Cause should not be overstated, but their many contributions were clearly important to the success of the operation. The prompt integration of active, National Guard and Reserve forces into such a formidable fighting force is eloquent testimony to the capabilities of our Reserve forces generally, to the often unique skills and experience they bring to the Total Force and to the progress which has been made in recent years in implementing the DoD Total Force Policy.

Understanding the Policy

In recent months, the Total Force Policy has become the subject of great public attention and of a major study by the Department of Defense. On Feb. 2, 1990, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed the first meeting of the Total Force Policy Study Group, a group on which I am privileged to serve as vice chairman.

I can assure you that the study group recognizes fully the great importance of the Total Force Policy Study, especially at a time of dramatic geopolitical change and when we are reducing force structure. A thorough examination of the policy is welcome. Indeed, it is essential if we are to ensure that fundamental decisions concerning how we man

the armed forces are sound. Unfortunately, much of the recent public discussion about the Total Force Policy has been uninformed or at least insufficiently focused.

Part of the confusion is generated by the use of the term “Reserves.” While a basic tenet of the Total Force Policy has always been that National Guard and Reserve units constitute the primary augmentation of the active component in military conflicts, many Guard and Reserve units (with a mix of part-time and full-time personnel) are fully ready and capable of responding rapidly to a mobilization or other orders to active duty. In this sense, they are not forces to be held in “reserve,” but rather early deploying or “mobilizable” units more typically found in the traditional Continental European conscription-based reserve system. Other American Guard and Reserve units are more characteristic of traditional (later-deploying) Reserve units.

The Total Force Policy was never intended to make active, career soldiers and Reserve soldiers fungible items or mirror images of each other. Given the limited training time of part-time citizen-soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, as well as the constrained budgetary environment in which the Department of Defense will operate in the early 1990s, it is unrealistic to attempt to make every Reserve unit the absolute equal in terms of readiness and capability of the best active units. Rather, the objective is to integrate the

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capabilities and strengths of active and Reserve units in the most cost-effective manner, i.e., one that provides the most total military capability and flexibility possible within the limitations of the budget.

In order to discuss the Total Force Policy in a meaningful way, it is important that broad generalities be avoided. Too many military analysts argue for large changes in the force mix balance for budgetary reasons alone that are unrelated to any apparent manning philosophy or threat evaluation. Others assert that the Total Force idea has already been carried too far.

I am skeptical about suggestions of large broad shifts in force mix across all of the Reserve components as an end in itself. I am equally skeptical, however, about ... simplistic and incorrect approaches to force mix that imply that all Reserve units can never be “as good” as active units merely because the former train less and ... similar approaches to reductions in force structure which result in “equal” reductions to active and Reserve components with no apparent relationship to strategy or to the need for a specific military capability.

A balanced analysis of the Total Force Policy must start with a focus on *particular* missions. Some missions, which require a high surge of activity in wartime, but comparatively low activity in peacetime, are obviously ideal for reservists. Others, such as those which require long periods of forward deployment in

peacetime, are unsuitable. Yet others can be reasonably assigned to either active or Reserve units, depending upon how soon the missions must be performed after a crisis or conflict develops, the demographic profile of particular geographical areas, the particular characteristics of individual units and many other factors.

Some National Guard or Reserve units can assume even greater wartime missions and peacetime operational responsibilities than they have now. Others clearly cannot. Certain missions which have previously been assigned to active forces could be transferred to Reserve units, especially if it can be demonstrated that significant cost savings are available with no loss or for a comparatively small loss in capability. Other missions should remain with the active forces.

Making Reservists Ready

The readiness of the Reserve components to perform their wartime missions continues to improve. Readiness levels are, of course, directly related to training. During FY 1989, National Guard and Reserve officers trained for their wartime missions an average of 61 days. Reserve enlisted personnel trained an average of 42 days.

One must see our citizen-soldiers in training to fully appreciate their capabilities. I have admired their skills while flying with them in the F-15, the TAV-8B and other aircraft. I have felt their enthusiasm and their energy as I watched them con-

duct amphibious landings on cold Norwegian beaches, cut roads through the mountains of Honduras and set up field hospitals in exercises on the plains of Germany. I have been amazed at their dedication and their professionalism as I talked with them on the decks of aircraft carriers, in the desert hills of the National Training Center, near the DMZ in Korea and in armories and Reserve centers all over the nation.

By any reasonable standard, the Reserve forces are in the highest state of readiness that has been attained since the Total Force Policy was adopted. Readiness challenges remain, however, in specific areas.

Deficiencies in the military occupational specialty of certain reservists—i.e., in their individual skill qualification and training—have replaced equipment shortages as the most serious readiness deficiency. Last year, I informed you of the persistent readiness challenges in the Army’s combat-support and combat-service-support forces. Those problems are Army problems, not Reserve problems, but because approximately 70 percent of the Army’s non-divisional CS/CSS forces are in the Army Reserve, I have given them a great deal of personal attention. I have been particularly concerned about the readiness of certain early deploying CS/CSS units.

It is important to remember that in seeking to maintain required standards of readiness, National Guard and Reserve units face problems that are the result of factors which are unique to guardsmen and reservists—i.e., limited training time, the geographic dispersion of individual reservists and the fact that Americans generally, including reservists, are mobile and tend to move from place to place.

These and many other kinds of readiness challenges, however, are not related to budgetary constraints. They can be corrected by innovative thinking, good leadership and management, and by a frank recognition of the

fact that the high quality of our modern Reserve forces permits ... the introduction of training techniques and ... the achievement of readiness levels that were generally not possible only a few years ago. Several encouraging developments are taking place.

Some of the most encouraging work is the result of the Army's Reserve Component Training Action Plan. The RC TDAP was prepared subsequent to the completion of an intensive study by the Army of the unique training challenges faced by the Army Reserve. The RC TDAP consists of 38 separate initiatives that are being taken by the Army to remedy these challenges. Emphasis is being placed on educating Reserve leaders (officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers). Resident courses at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command are being reconfigured to meet the training-time limitations of reservists. A special Skill Qualification Test for the Reserve soldier is being developed, and expanded use is being made of interactive video techniques and regional training centers.

Other encouraging developments include the recent efforts of the Army to eliminate or at least to reduce the turbulence in the CAPSTONE alignment process, i.e., the process by which Reserve units are assigned wartime missions and deployment schedules. For a variety of reasons, these missions and schedules have been changed far too often in recent years. The resulting turbulence has required the Reserve units involved to engage in continuous retraining with an attendant waste of training time, inefficient use of resources and loss of esprit de corps.

The importance of stability in mission assignments is obvious. New unit missions require individual reservists to obtain new military skills during their limited training time. While some reservists are engaged in civilian occupations that require the same range of skills that are required to perform their mili-

“Many Guard and Reserve units are fully ready and capable of responding rapidly to a mobilization or other orders to active duty. In this sense, they are not forces to be held in ‘reserve,’ but rather early deploying ... units more typically found in the traditional Continental European conscription-based reserve system.”

tary mission (e.g., aviation and police work), it is possible and desirable to hold most part-time reservists to the same standard of performance as full-time active soldiers only if the reservists are trained on fewer total tasks requiring fewer skills. I have discussed this problem with the senior leadership of the Army on a regular basis, and I am happy to report that it is the focus of considerable management attention. The Forces Command, for instance, is working to minimize the number of changes to the deployment schedules.

In considering the readiness of Reserve forces, it is important to recognize that the readiness of certain Reserve units may need to be kept higher than that which can be justified solely on the basis of strategy or threat evaluation. This need is based on intangible elements such as morale and sense of accomplishment which are directly related to decisions by reservists to leave or remain in the Reserve forces. The training which is required to maintain certain minimum levels of readiness usually provides those necessary intangibles.

The readiness of Reserve units does, of course, depend to a great extent upon the availability of modern equipment. One thing is certain: When Reserve units are assigned significant missions and responsibilities, they must be given the tools to do the job. It is morally indefensible to assign missions to Reserve units in order to achieve cost savings and then fail to give

those units the resources that will permit successful performance.

Under the Total Force Policy, the secretary of each military department is responsible for providing the necessary programs and budgetary actions that support the equipping which is necessary to ensure that units meet readiness standards and deployment schedules. Since there are insufficient resources to fully fund all programs, clear priorities must be established.

Prudence and common sense suggest that resources can and should be given first to those units, whether they are active or Reserve units, that will be deployed first to a conflict. Since 1982, the DoD policy of “first to fight, first to equip” has guided the equipment distribution planning of the military departments. The policy requires that all units, regardless of component, be resourced for equipment, according to the sequence in which they are required to be in place to perform their wartime mission. It is important to ensure that when called to active duty, all critical Reserve units are instantly ready to fight. It will not matter at all that the amount of warning time for future conflicts goes up by a factor of five, if we take or permit developments which increase the preparation time in which those Reserve units are ready to fight by a factor of 10!

As we go about the business of reducing force structure, the implications for the readiness condition of all remaining units, active and Reserve, must be kept

“Given the limited training time of part-time citizen-soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, as well as the constrained budgetary environment ... the objective is to integrate the capabilities and strengths of active and Reserve units in the most cost-effective manner.”

in mind. In this regard, we should guard against the trap of assuming that any reduction in military capability or readiness is unacceptable. Certain types of forces must, of course, be kept at the highest state of readiness. Others need not be.

In many cases, a shift of force structure from the active to the Reserve components would involve no reduction in capability at all. Even when such a reduction would result, it may be acceptable in view of a changed evaluation of threat, the nature of the specific mission involved and the significant cost savings that would result.

Other Initiatives

A program that has proven to be of extreme value to the readiness and training of all of the Reserve components is the Overseas Deployment Training Program. In 1989, some 3,139 separate Reserve units, or cells, including 88,500 Reserve personnel, trained overseas in 96 different countries.

This program provides realistic mobilization and employment training, an opportunity to train under the operational chain of command and familiarity with possible areas of wartime employment. It offers an excellent opportunity to improve ties between Reserve component units and their affiliated active component counterparts, and it is a terrific morale builder. It also provides an opportunity for Reserve personnel to fulfill peacetime mission requirements for theater CinCs (commanders in chief) while conducting training.

For example, the Army's rota-

tion of Reserve heavy equipment maintenance companies to the Equipment Maintenance Center in Kaiserslautern, Germany, to solve theater maintenance backlogs during annual training periods has been highly successful. I was updated on this program during a recent trip to Germany. During the test phase in FY 89, six heavy equipment Reserve maintenance companies contributed 38,888 productive man-hours toward the repair of 3,100 items of equipment. This resulted in theater labor cost avoidance of \$787,000. During FY 90, 12 heavy equipment maintenance companies are scheduled for three-week deployment training periods at the EMC.

The National Guard's Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depot in Brussels, Belgium, is also a successful and imaginative use of our Reserve forces in Europe. The AVCRAD provides our active European forces with a forward-deployed, pre-mobilization, depot-level aircraft maintenance capability in peacetime manned by Guardsmen engaged in annual training on a two- to three-week rotation basis. I am very impressed with this modern facility, including the quality of people who have been assigned there and the sophisticated equipment which is in place. It has proven to be very cost-effective.

The Naval Reserve has developed the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity program, which provides maintenance support for Naval Reserve Force ships. The SIMAs perform intermediate- as well as organizational-level maintenance while providing meaningful assignments ashore to support sea-

shore rotations and to retain the skilled petty officers necessary to man the fleet. SIMAs would augment destroyer tenders and repair ships for forward battle damage repair. Selected reservists are trained to backfill the SIMAs upon mobilization.

Progress also continues on an initiative which started in FY 1986—the Army's Regional Training Sites-Maintenance. These sites provide needed training for Reserve component non-divisional maintenance units. Of the planned 21 sites, 12 have been activated and are proving valuable in overcoming transition and sustainment maintenance training shortfalls.

The regional training site concept is also being extended for medical personnel. Two of seven medical training sites have been completed, Camp Shelby, Miss., and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.

The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are developing similar regional training centers, which will provide state-of-the-art simulator training for aircrews. Crews will travel to the appropriate center to accomplish requirements in courses tailored to Air Reserve component crew member availability and experience.

We are also giving considerable attention to the modularization of formal school courses so that they will be better suited to the availability of reservists. Many of the services' school requirements for initial skill qualification, retraining or skill enhancement are longer than the training time available to reservists. Each service has initiated programs to reconfigure these courses into modules that can be taken in a combination of weekend and annual training periods to accommodate reservists.

One of my deputies chairs an OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) training and training technology subcommittee, with membership from each service, the JCS, each Reserve component and selected OSD staff agencies. This subcommittee searches for innovative ways to apply technology to unique Reserve component training

challenges. During the past year, the subcommittee initiated an effort to find ways to contract for the training of reservists at their home stations.

We are about to finalize a new DoD directive entitled "Contracted Civilian Acquired Training for Reserve Components." The purpose of CCAT is to increase the number of mission-qualified individuals in Reserve component units. CCAT is an alternative to formal military school training and must be directly related to specific individual military job requirements and billet assignments. A pilot program is under way with the Florida Army National Guard, with management data being gathered by the Training Performance and Data Center in Orlando, Fla. I believe this effort has considerable potential for providing quality training at the home station, rather than requiring individual reservists to leave their families and employers for long periods of schooling.

Research efforts are also being focused on information systems that provide a capability to analyze and correct training deficiencies. These systems are being developed by the Defense Training and Performance Center. One such effort is a microcomputer-based system that permits us to analyze training requirements from a geographic perspective, an important factor in view of the geographical dispersion of reservists. Another recent initiative of my office which has received the support of the chiefs of the Reserve components is the Reserve Component Nested Model. This is essentially an expansion of the microcomputer system concept to a mainframe system that permits the assessment of training needs and options at all levels of command, from the Reserve unit to the service chief.

Reserves As Reinforcements

As the armed forces adjust to current geopolitical and budgetary realities, a view has gained currency in some quarters that Reserve forces should be refocused and limited to a

"Too many military analysts argue for large changes in the force mix balance for budgetary reasons alone that are unrelated to any apparent manning philosophy or threat evaluation. Others assert that the Total Force idea has already been carried too far."

"reinforcing" and "sustaining" role. According to this view, National Guard and Reserve units would serve only to supplement active forces during protracted contingencies or a general mobilization and subsequent to some initial period of conflict. Presumably, this concept would require Reserve units to be assigned late-deployment responsibilities. It assumes the need to place all rapidly deployable "contingency" forces in the active component. Like other policy proposals, it is neither as simple nor as attractive as it may seem at first blush.

First of all, it is contrary to the current policy of the Department of Defense, which is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy and overseas commitments permit. This policy was not accidentally or randomly adopted. It was adopted as a cost-effective way to meet increasing worldwide contingencies. It has been the consistent policy of the DoD to place maximum reliance on National Guard and Reserve units and manpower. We use active units and manpower to support scheduled overseas deployments or sea duty, training requirements and to support the rotation base. Above that level, we plan to support military contingencies with Guard and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within planned deployment schedules on a cost-effective basis.

Second, the "reinforcing role" concept ignores the obvious opportunities for the use of the most highly qualified Reserve force in the peacetime history of

the nation. A combination in recent years of modern equipment, the assumption of major wartime missions and peacetime operational responsibilities, challenging/realistic training and other factors has produced a largely unanticipated synergistic effect—the attraction into the Reserve forces of highly motivated, highly skilled people who are anxious to perform early deploying missions that would have been unthinkable for Reserve forces only a few years ago.

The nation has invested a great deal in the creation of this Reserve force. It should not be unthinkingly dismembered or relegated to a secondary role that will be unattractive to volunteer reservists who have no obligation to serve at all. It should never be forgotten that with an all-volunteer force, it is much easier to rebuild active units with full-time personnel than Reserve units with part-time personnel.

Finally, the "reinforcing role" concept incorrectly assumes that force packages designed for "contingency" missions cannot include reservists because such inclusion would inevitably result in unacceptable delays for retraining or "mobilization." Unless a particular conflict is considerably larger than what can fairly be characterized as a "contingency," it will not require "mobilization" in the sense of a massive recall of reservists.

The law (Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 673b) currently permits the president to make a limited, fast, selected recall to active duty of Selected Reserve units or individual mobilization aug-

“I am skeptical about ... simplistic and incorrect approaches to force mix that imply that Reserve units can never be ‘as good’ as active units ... (and) ‘equal’ reductions to active and Reserve components with no apparent relationship to strategy or to the need for a specific military capability.”

mentees. Thus, the president may order to active duty anywhere between one and 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve—without mobilization—whenever he determines that it is necessary to “augment the active forces for any operational mission.” The reservists involved can be retained on active duty for as long as 180 days. Since Selected Reservists are highly trained volunteers to begin with, any assumption that they are not available for rapid deployment is probably suspect.

Force Mix Decisions

In making choices about whether to assign certain war-time missions or peacetime operating responsibilities to active or to Reserve units, it is easy to overlook certain limiting factors—e.g., the fact that the amount of training time required to perform some missions creates unacceptable pressures in their civilian work places for participating reservists. Enhancing factors can also be insufficiently taken into account. Because of experience gained during their previous full-time service on active duty, for example, many National Guardsmen and reservists have capabilities that equal or exceed those of active soldiers who are currently serving on active duty. It is widely recognized, for example, that many reservists and National Guardsmen are among the best fighter, attack and transport pilots in the world. Many planners also forget or have never fully understood just how much the quality of the Reserve components has improved in recent years.

On the assumptions that the purpose of maintaining military forces is to deter war and that combat units have greater deterrence than support units, some military leaders are of the opinion that when resources are limited, combat units should receive available resources at the expense of support units. Other leaders argue that a more credible deterrence is achieved when potential adversaries recognize that the United States is capable of engaging in conventional combat operations over a period of time—i.e., that we have a strong balance between purely combat forces and the support forces that are necessary to sustain them.

Logically, of course, there should be no difference between the types of forces needed to deter conflicts and the forces needed to win them. A potential adversary’s perception of his chances of succeeding in a conflict is usually related directly to his ardor to begin it. Moreover, a reasonable question can be asked as to whether we can afford two types of forces, one devoted to deterring war and one to winning it.

I have long been of the view that as a general proposition, active and Reserve forces should be balanced—i.e., that each should contain an appropriate mix of combat and support elements. A corollary of this approach is that neither active nor Reserve forces should be unique in the absence of a specific military need that can or must be met by uniqueness.

The costs of such uniqueness can be unacceptably high. If a Reserve component, for exam-

ple, is given a mission or equipment not found in the active component, there may be no pipeline from which the Reserve component may receive personnel trained to perform or spare parts for the equipment needed for the mission.

Certain missions, however, may call for uniqueness. The Army Reserve civil affairs personnel who have served in Panama since the commencement of Operation Just Cause, for example, have brought to their nation-building task an array of civilian skills that simply cannot be found or maintained in active units.

Cuts: Sound Reasons

As we reduce force structure, it is important that budget cuts proposed by the services not have disproportionate and adverse impacts on National Guard or Reserve units unless there are sound reasons for such impacts. Indeed, even equal cuts of active and Reserve forces are not per se and inevitably wise.

Too many analysts are of the view that since active and Reserve forces grew together during the decade of the 1980s, they must now suffer force structure reductions at the same rate. Approximately equal force structure reductions of active and Guard/Reserve forces may be justifiable in certain instances on the ground that when a particular combat unit is reduced, its support units should receive a similar cut, but equal cuts should not be automatic. Such a philosophy suggests an approach to cutting force structure that bears no apparent relationship to a sound strategy or plan and no recognition of the relative cost of active and Reserve units. It may also exacerbate any existing structure imbalance between combat and support units. In the Dec. 7, 1989, edition of *The Washington Post*, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Bill Crowe made the point that:

“The usual device for keeping political pressure manageable has been to cut all organizations and weapons procurements equally, while eliminating none

of them. ... Forces and services that are cut must be related to more than just budgets. As the size of our active forces goes down, increasing attention should be given to our Reserve units and the mobilization system."

Much of the ongoing debate about whether Reserve forces should constitute a relatively higher percentage of the Total Force in the future relates to the relative cost of assigning a particular mission to a National Guard or Reserve unit rather than to an active unit. Since Reserve units are not fungible items, costs vary. In some cases, the costs incurred by a Reserve unit in training for and performing a particular mission are as great or almost as great as those incurred by active units which perform the same type of mission. In other cases, National Guard or Reserve units are much less expensive.

Whether a particular Reserve unit is one-third or two-thirds as costly as an active unit, the fact remains that Reserve forces are usually less costly over a period of time than active forces. In addition to the fact that they train an average of only 39 to 50 days per year, citizen-soldiers sleep and eat at home, and the infrastructure which is required for them is less.

Consequently, I believe that for cost reasons alone, a rebuttable presumption should exist that missions should be considered for assignment to the Reserve forces unless there are sound and apparent military reasons for assigning the missions to the active forces. If the presumption can't be easily rebutted, then a particular mission would seem to be a prime candidate for assignment to the Reserve forces.

We should avoid wholesale shifts of force structure to the Reserve components merely because they are generally less expensive. Any force structure/force mix decision that is driven solely by budget imperatives should be closely examined. However, the converse is also true. Broad conclusions that Reserve forces provide unaccept-

"Certain missions which have previously been assigned to active forces could be transferred to Reserve units, especially if it can be demonstrated that significant cost savings are available with no loss or for a comparatively small loss in capability. Other missions should remain with the active forces."

able levels of military capability must also be rejected. Force mix decisions must be made on a mission-by-mission, unit-by-unit, case-by-case basis.

As we reduce force structure and develop the appropriate mix of active and Reserve forces, it is important that we preserve as much of our human capital as is possible. Innovative approaches will be necessary to ensure that as highly trained individuals, especially leaders, leave the active forces, they are encouraged to continue their service in Reserve units. New ideas such as the "double roundout" concept (in which an active division of ground troops would have two National Guard/Reserve brigades and one active brigade, instead of the other way around) will also need to be energetically explored.

Despite unreasonably high expectations to the contrary in some quarters, the Total Force Policy Study Group will not be able to answer all force structure/force mix questions which merit attention. The world geopolitical situation is simply too fluid and dynamic for that.

Summary Principles

I am very hopeful, however, that the study group will be able to develop certain "neutral" principles that may eventually take the form of policy guidance by the secretary of defense to the services. Those principles might include ideas similar to the following and/or other ideas:

Like the active forces, Reserve forces are not immune from structure cuts, but service force mix proposals should be

based on a military rationale other than "equal" cuts of active and Reserve forces for the sake of equality.

The rationale relied upon by the services in each case and for each mission should be credible and easily understood in order to receive as wide acceptance as possible.

Force mix proposals should be regularly made and analyzed on a mission-by-mission, unit-by-unit (capability) basis which is clearly related to the war plans.

If significant cost savings can be achieved by a transfer of force structure to a Reserve component (for the performance of a particular mission), a working presumption should be established that the transfer should be made. The presumption can then be rebutted by the demonstration of a sound military reason why the transfer should not be made—e.g., the mission requires a forward-deployed unit over a period of time.

A similar rebuttable presumption should be made that when an active or a Reserve unit is withdrawn from the force structure, a certain part of the cost savings will be dedicated to the strengthening of the remaining force structure before the savings are applied to other needs.

All units, active or Reserve, should be resourced (for equipment, training and other purposes) according to the sequence in which they would be required to perform their wartime or other operational missions.

“By any reasonable standard, the Reserve forces are in the highest state of readiness that has been attained since the Total Force Policy was adopted. Readiness challenges remain, however, in specific areas.”

□ A rebuttable presumption should be established against force mix decisions that result in placing a particular mission exclusively in a Reserve component. The presumption can be rebutted by the demonstration of a sound military reason why the principle should not apply in a particular case.

Selected Reserve Manpower

It is clear that we must continue to anchor our global military strategy to the fundamentally sound doctrines of deterrence, flexible response, forward defense, security alliances and prudent arms reductions. The challenging issue is the question of what kind of forces are needed to carry out the strategy.

In addressing that issue during the preparation of our FY 1991 budget request, we established certain budgetary priorities, including the retention of ... versatile, ready, deployable and sustainable conventional forces; and ... substantial Reserve forces—including essential logistics, infrastructure and planning bases.

The end-year strength for the Selected Reserve which has been requested in the president's budget for FY 1991 is 1,151,600, a modest reduction of 3,400 from FY 1990. The strength at the end of FY 1990 will be 15,600 below FY 1989. The lower strength is due to a FY 1990 reduction of 9,700 by the Army National Guard and a 10,000 reduction in the Army Reserve. An additional decrease of 3,700 in the FY 1991 program is almost entirely attributable to the reduction in the Naval Reserve.

By comparison, by the end of FY 1991, the active force

end strength will decline to 2,038,800, some 91,400 less than the FY 1989 level and roughly equal to 1980 end strength. The decrease in the end strength of the overall Selected Reserve represents the first decrease in over a decade and is in marked contrast to the nearly 35 percent growth of the Selected Reserve between FY 1980 and FY 1989. During that period, Selected Reserve manpower increased by more than 300,000—from 868,617 to 1,170,560.

The Selected Reserve strength reductions included in the FY 1991 budget for the Reserve components of the Army were based primarily on fiscal considerations—i.e., to achieve compliance with the 1990 budget resolution and the partial sequestration—and were not premised on force structure reductions or realignments. Within the overall reduction in Selected Reserve strengths, however, the Army National Guard, in an effort to improve readiness, has increased its full-time Active Guard and Reserve strengths. The Selected Reserve strength request for the Naval Reserve in FY 1991 provides for an increase associated with additional ships being transferred to the Reserve and an increase in the Reserve medical program, offset by manpower economies in areas that are now considered excess to need. There are only minor changes in strength levels in the Marine Corps Reserve and the Reserve components of the Air Force.

Despite the FY 1990 and FY 1991 reductions, the Selected Reserve will continue to constitute 1.2 million of the 3.2 million-member Total Force. The expanded scope, size and nature of the missions assigned to the

Reserve components under the Total Force Policy require that units of the Selected Reserve, especially early deploying units, be manned at combat-ready levels.

End-strength reductions in the Army Reserve (10,044) and the Army National Guard (9,660) since FY 1989 are offset by the combined increase of 4,700 authorizations for the other four Reserve components. The Army Reserve decrease is based on fiscal constraints, while the Army National Guard decrease was required to pay for the needed additional full-time personnel.

In FY 1991, general purpose forces will thus include 30 divisions. The Army will decline to 16 active divisions (about half with Reserve roundout brigades) and 10 Reserve divisions; the Marine Corps will have three active divisions/wings and one Reserve wing. Naval aviation will include 13 active and two Reserve carrier air wings.

Strength adjustments after FY 1991 will be dependent in important part on principles being developed by the Total Force Policy Study Group and the allocation of missions among all of the uniformed components of the Total Force. ...

Conclusion

The world is rapidly changing. The changes present major challenges to the planning of the force structure and (active/Reserve) force mix which are necessary for the implementation of our national military strategy, including the preparation for future conflicts which are increasingly difficult to predict. I continue to believe, however, that these challenges can be met successfully if we address them with candor and energy, as well as an informed and focused discussion of how we can yet improve a Total Force Policy that has already proven to be a major success.

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PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH RPT DLY MGM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC 20500

MR PRESIDENT

WE SUPPORT ANY DECISION YOU MAKE TO STOP THIS MANIAC.....

IT'S HAMMER TIME.

GOD BLESS YOU

THE KEEFE'S
79 HAYRICK LN
COMMACK NY 11725

1128 EST

1131 EST

JAN 17 AM 11:30

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4074791091 POM TDBN BOCA RATON FL 23 01-17 0849P EST

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

DON'T ALLOW ANOTHER MAD MAN TO LET LOOSE A HOLOCAUST ON THE INNOCENT CHILDREN OF THE REMNANTS OF A PEOPLE. GIVE IRAQ HELL.

MR AND MRS BERNARD SHAPIRO

8113 AVENUE L

BROOKLYN NY 11236

2050 EST

01 JAN 17 08:48

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2128615112 POM TDBN NEW YORK NY 23 01-17 0808P EST

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

WE WERE OPPOSED TO THE WAR BEFORE THE UNTHINKABLE , UNSPEAKABLE CHEMICAL WARFARE ATTACK UPON ISREAL. PLEASE BOMB THE HELL OUT OF IRAQ.

ARNOLD AND CLAR SOLLAR

150 E 69TH ST

NEW YORK NY 10021

2009 EST

01 JAN 17 08:09

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ICS IPMBNGZ CSP

9194733776 POM TDBN MANTED NC 21 01-17 0851P EST

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

MAKE SADDAM EAT YOUR BROCOLLI. KEEP HITTING THEM HARD. YOU'RE DOING GREAT JOB. WE SUPPORT YOU AND ISRAELIS 110 PER CENT.

JOSH & DIANE WOODIN

RR1 BOX 754

MANTED NC 27954

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7172838298 POM TDBN FORTY FORT PA 11 01-18 0747A EST

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH RPT DLY MGM

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

JAN 18 A8:22

FORMER VIETNAM PROTESTER. OUTRAGED AT ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. BLOW HUSSEIN AWAY.

DAVID BESWICK

72 YEAGER

FORTY FORT PA 18704

0747 EST

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PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC

WORKING CLASS AMERICA SUPPOARTS YOU. MY USMC UNIFORMS STILL FIT.

LETS KICK SOME BUTT. GOD BLESS AND SEMPER FI

JIM CUNNINGHAM

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ICS IPMRNCZ CSF

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PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, DLR
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC 20000
MR PRESIDENT,

GOOD JOB. WE SUPPORT YOU. TED WILLIAMS WAS OUR LAST 400 HITTER.
YOU'RE BATTING 999. GOD BLESS YOU AND THE USA.

PROCELLE BROTHERS
ORANGE TX 77630

1251 EST

1416 EST

1430 EST

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PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH RPT DLY MGM
WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

WE SUPPORT YOUR ACTIONS AGAINST IRAQ 100 PER CENT. YOU HAVE DONE THE
RIGHT THING. KEEP IT UP. MAKE SURE WE WIN AND WIN BIG. BRING OUR
TROOPS HOME QUICKLY.

PHILLIP AND DEBORAH MCKEOWN

6102 W TROLLA

GLENDALE AZ 85304

0206 EST

*Pro Operation D. Bush
Storm*

4-026169S016 01/17/91

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5127361712 POM TDBN SAN ANTONIO TX 7 01-16 0931P EST 06

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

RIGHT ON. DON'T STOP. GOD BLESS YOU.

SHARON DIX WHITE

527 KINGS COURT

SAN ANTONIO TX 78212

0206 EST

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3149688052 POM TDRN ST LOUIS MO 27 01-17 1035A EST JAN 17 11:03

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

YOUR RIGHT. SANCTIONS DIDN'T WORK. AGAINST WAR. BUT WE HAVE NO CHOICE
AGAINST THAT TYRANT WHO GASSED HIS OWN PEOPLE. I APPLAUD YOUR COURAGE
AND STRONG STAND.

MARY M. AYRES

505 LAKE

ST LOUIS MO 63119

1036 EST

4-004311S017 01/17/91

ICS IPMRNCZ CSP

6123749390 POM TDRN MINNEAPOLIS MN 19 01-17 1037A EST JAN 17 11:04

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

CONGRATULATIONS. YOU'RE RIGHT. I WAS WRONG 40 YEARS YOUNGER AND I'D
ENLIST. GREAT PLANNING. PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN.

DOCTOR DONNA DENBOER

2424 LYNDALE AVE SOUTH

MINNEAPOLIS MN 55405

1038 EST

4-003393S017 01/17/91

ICS IPMRNCZ CSP

7143375656 POM TDRN LAKE ARROWHEAD CA 26 01-17 1003A EST

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH RPT DLY MGM

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

WE HAVE A SON ON THE FRONT LINES AND WE FEEL YOU HAVE DONE THE RIGHT
THING AND ARE BEHIND YOU 100 PERCENT.

SHARON AND DON CIOTA

PO BOX 440

LAKE ARROWHEAD CA 92352

1004 EST

6 relatives support

4-025453S016 01/17/91

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7149833870 POM TDRN ONTARIO CA 24 01-16 0856P EST

PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH, OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU. OUR SON IS IN SAUDI
ARABIA AND MAY GOD DIRECT YOUR HAND. MAY GOD SPEED. SINCERELY

STEPHEN MCINTYRE AND FAMILY

1556 NORTH OAKS CT

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0036 EST

1-003293I017 01/17/91

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PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH DLR

THE WHITE HOUSE

1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVE

WASHINGTON DC 20500

1 JAN 17 AM : 04

DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH,

FOR EVERY PEACE PROTESTER IN THE STREET THERE ARE A MILLION
AMERICANS SITTING QUIETLY AT HOME ADMIRING YOUR COURAGE, WISDOM
AND DETERMINATION.

THANK YOU FOR HAVING THE GUTS TO MAKE A DIFFICULT DECISION.

RESPECTFULLY,

SSGT BRIAN L. GOINS AND FAMILY

447 W. 17TH

SPOKANE WA 99203

1041 EST

4-025905S016 01/17/91

ICS IPMBNGZ CSP

3189338627 POM TDBN SHREVEPORT LA 13 01-JAN-91 09:22 EST

FMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

I SUPPORT YOU TOTALLY. GET IT DONE GET IT OVER AND GET OUT. GIVE 'EM HELL AND DONT GIVE 'EM A REST.

ROBERT AND H R SMITH

9918 LORETTA ST

KEITHVILLE LA 71047

0125 EST

4-026075S016 01/17/91

ICS IPMRNCZ CSP

8175660166 POM TDRN DENTON TX 49 01-16 09:27 EST 01-JAN-91 11:53

FMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH,

GOD BLESS AMERICA AND GOD BLESS YOU, PRESIDENT BUSH. I SUPPORT THE OPERATION DESERT STORM AND PRAY THAT ALL GOES WELL. LETS KICK SOME BUTT, PERFERABLE SADDAMS.

I STILL DON'T WANT TO PAY FOR A LAWRENCE WELK MUSEUM, BUT OTHER THAN THAT YOUR DOING GREAT.

SINCERELY,

SHARON WESTBROOK, STRONG REPUBLICAN AGAIN

RTE 1 BOX 131W

RIO VISTA TX 76093

4-024450S016 01/16/91

ICS IPMRNCZ CSP

8187076462 POM TDRN AGOURA HILLS CA 138 01-16 0807P EST
PMS PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH RPT DLY MGM

WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH

I DO NOT IN PRINCIPLE BELIEVE IN WAR. MY BROTHER A VIETNAM VET WAS SO PSYCHOLOGICALLY DAMAGED BY HIS PARTICIPATION IN THAT WAR THAT HE HAS WITHDRAWN FROM EVERYONE AND JUST BARELY EXISTS. I PROTESTED AGAINST VIETNAM BUT I BELIEVE WHAT YOU ARE DOING IS RIGHT AND I WISH I COULD DO MORE TO PARTICIPATE. GOD BLESS YOU AND YOUR BEAUTIFUL WIFE AND FAMILY DURING THESE DIFFICULT TIMES FOR DOING WHAT MUST BE DONE TO PROTECT OUR WORLD. I HAVE NEVER SENT A TELEGRAM TO MY PRESIDENT BEFORE BUT I HAD TO TELL YOU HOW BRAVE AND COURAGEOUS I FEEL YOU ARE

FOR TAKING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STOPPING A DANGEROUS MADMAN BEFORE HIS MOMENTUM DESTROYS MORE LIVES. YOUR STRENGTH AND LEADERSHIP MAKE ME PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN. AGAIN GOD BLESS YOU AND KEEP YOU.

KIM HANFT

30601 JANLOR DR

AGOURA HILLS CA 91301

2332 EST

62. I have always been opposed even to the thought of fighting a "preventive war." There is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be stopped by war. You don't "prevent" anything by war except peace.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
1952; *Memoirs, II*, 383

63. Warfare, no matter what weapons it employs, is a means to an end, and if that end can be achieved by negotiated settlements of conditional surrender, there is no need for war.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
1955; *Ibid.*, I, 210

64. Morale is the greatest single factor in successful wars.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
June 23, 1945

65. There is one thing you have in war that you do not have in peace. You have unification, compelled by a very threatening danger. In other words, Franklin's old saying, "If we don't hang together, we'll hang separately," applies in war more definitely than it does in peace.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Press Conference, Paris, France, June 16, 1945; *Eisenhower Speaks*, p. 23

66. Prosperous nations are not war-hungry, but a hungry nation will always seek war if it has to in desperation.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Speech in New York, N.Y., June 19, 1945; *Ibid.*, p. 44

67. I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its *stupidity*. Yet there is one thing to say on its credit side—victory required a mighty manifestation of the most ennobling of the virtues of man—faith, courage, fortitude, sacrifice!

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Address in Ottawa, Canada, Jan. 10, 1946; *Ibid.*, p. 64

68. In discussing war and peace, we incline to paint one all black and the other all white. We like to repeat "there never was a good war, or a bad peace." But war often has provided the setting for comradeship and understanding and greatness of spirit—among nations, as well as men—beyond anything in quiet days; while peace may be marked by . . . chicanery, treachery, and the temporary triumph of expediency over all spiritual values.

The pact of Munich was a greater blow to humanity than the atomic bomb at Hiroshima. Suffocation of human freedom among a once free people, however quietly and peacefully accomplished, is more far-reaching in its implications and its effects on their future than the destruction of their homes, industrial centers, and transportation facilities. Out of rubble heaps, willing hands can rebuild a better city; but out of freedom lost can stem only generations of hate and bitter struggle and brutal oppression. . . .

Without the ideals, the hopes and aspirations of humanity; those things of the soul and spirit which great men of history have valued far above peace and material wealth and even life itself . . . peace is an inhuman existence.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Address at Columbia University, Mar. 23, 1950; *Peace*, p. 12

69. The war maker is first of all a propagandist. . . .

Until war is eliminated from international relations, unpreparedness for it is well nigh as criminal as war itself. . . .

It is shocking . . . that, though many millions have been voluntarily donated for research in cancer of the individual body, nothing similar has been done with respect to the most malignant cancer of the world body—war.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Address at Columbia University, Mar. 23, 1950; *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 19

70. Possibly my hatred of war blinds me so that I cannot comprehend the arguments that its advocates adduce. But, in my opinion, there is no such thing as a preventive war. Although this suggestion is repeatedly made, no one has yet explained how war prevents war. Nor has anyone been able to explain away the fact that war begets conditions that beget further war.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Address at Pittsburgh, Pa., October, 1950; *What Eisenhower Thinks*, p. 91

71. Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purpose of those who threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace. For, as it must be the supreme purpose of all free men, so it must be the dedication of their leaders, to save humanity from preying upon itself.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
First Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1953

72. The hope of the world is that wisdom can arrest conflict between brothers. I believe that war is the deadly harvest of arrogant and unreasoning minds. And I find grounds for this belief in the wisdom literature of Proverbs. It says . . . panic strikes like a storm and calamity comes like a whirlwind to those who hate knowledge and ignore their God.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Address to National Education Association, Apr. 4, 1957; *Public Papers . . . Eisenhower, 1957*, p. 264

73. We know we are peaceful . . . Government only with the consent of the governed does not start wars, because it is the people that have to fight them that make the decision.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Remarks to League of Women Voters, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1957; *Ibid.*, p. 317

Remembering John Gordon

BY JOE KAMALICK

Maj. John Gordon went down with his Air Force C-5A Galaxy on Wednesday, Aug. 29, near Ramstein Air Base in West Germany. On the day he died, John's Air Force Reserve unit was called to active duty, but he and other volunteers had already been flying missions for three weeks. He was one of 13 on board who were killed; only four survived. The news reports from West Germany spoke of the flight's mission and cargo—carrying food, spare parts and other supplies to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.

Every available cargo plane and crew were pressed into service to rush vital supplies to our troops on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, to help them hold the line should the Iraqi armor move south. The Air Force was throwing an air bridge from supply depots in Europe to the Arabian desert. The huge long-range C-5As were in the air for such long hours that many, like John's last flight, carried two crews to spell each other. It is what the military calls "maximum effort."

But I'll leave all the strategic talk and the sweeping language of world crisis to others. Here in John Gordon's neighborhood just north of Houston, the talk is of his love for his family, his country and his devotion to flying. Like many true patriots, John Gordon didn't wear his patriotism on his sleeve. But it was there in his heart all the same. And now many of us, his neighbors and friends, recognize and honor his love of our nation. As is all too often the case, our honor for this good man is late in coming. But who could have known? We knew he flew those big C-5As on weekends. We knew he was in the Air Force Reserve. When John and I were on a neighborhood men's tennis team (strictly F level, but we took joking pride in being "F Troop"), John sometimes had to miss a match or practice because he was off flying those big birds for Uncle Sam. And we knew that when the call went out Aug. 1 for volunteers from the Reserves, John answered that call.

John changed jobs now and then, but not always, I think, out of preference. His flight duties often took him away from home and work for longer than the advertised one weekend a month. Sometimes his world-circling flights kept him away for a couple of weekdays as well. Beyond lip service, many employers are unwilling to share the burden borne by reservists and their families. I ran into him some weeks ago in the local grocery store and we joked that it was getting hard to find time to eat, much less to play tennis. I didn't know then that John had been laid off. It wasn't the kind of information that he would volunteer, and I did not find out about it until after he had answered the call for pilots and gone off to the Mideast.

But John never complained about the costs or sacrifices of being in the Reserves. Come to think of it, he never complained about much of anything; he was one of the happiest men we knew. Surely he had concerns; the mortgage, how to finance a college education for his three smart children. But you never saw those worries in his face. He was always smiling, always had the best, often hilarious jokes. Any outing, party or tennis match was more fun with John there. He still smoked cigarettes, and many of us used to bug him about it. At a recent party he stepped outside to have a smoke, not wanting to annoy his hostess or other guests. No one asked him to; no one would have even thought of it. But he was a gentleman (and he probably wanted a quiet smoke without having to take any flak from us). His hair was thinning and, like many of us who are in our middle 40s, he was fighting a holding action in the battle of the bulge. A few years ago, in an attempt to improve our tennis game and maybe shed a few pounds, we used to play an hour of predawn tennis almost every day before work.

All these things might sound like the elements of a perfectly average life and, on the face of it, they are. But as a casual student of American history, I have often wondered what they were like, those men and women of our revolutionary past, the ones who left family, farm and shop to fight for freedom. Surely, until the call came and they answered, many of these patriots lived workaday lives. Little do we know that they are among us still and, like John, are anything but ordinary.

Our loyalty: Any veteran of the '60s knows that it has been popular or at least common to challenge government policy in times of conflict and war. That is as it


should be. And history will judge the wisdom of our current call to arms. But whatever our opinions, we owe loyalty to the men and women—soldiers, sailors and fliers, friends and neighbors—who on our behalf go in harm's way.

The technology of modern war is vastly different from those early days of our history. And the world, it seems, is more complex, our options less clear-cut, our choices more difficult than those facing our countrymen long ago. But to John Gordon the choice was clear. He will be missed, and we and our children are in his debt. At John's home, after the Air Force chaplain left, neighbors and friends from afar came and called throughout the day and night. His fine wife, Judy, struggled with grief but greeted us all. In time we will return to our lives, the mundane, routine business of living; Judy will be with her children and her sorrow. John made his sacrifice. His widow and children now continue theirs in bearing their grief, in doing without a husband and father. So they, too, are patriots.

The Marines' Hymn proudly claims (with, of course, a gibe at other services) that "If the Army and the Navy ever look on heaven's scenes, they will find the streets are guarded by United States Marines." No doubt. Then surely Air Force veterans will be running heaven's shuttle service. And there's John strolling along the flight line with other pilots, swapping jokes—and reaching for his smokes. Go ahead John, light one up. We won't bug you about it.

And John, thanks.

Kamalick is a writer and newsletter publisher in Houston.



JAN 07 '91 15:59 JPAO 4TH MARDIV

P.3/10

GySgt. John Dittus, 44, USMCR, belongs to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764 (HMM-764) in MCAS El Toro, CA. He is a Vietnam veteran who spent 14 years out of the Marine Corps before returning to the Marine Corps Reserve in 1982. Although no longer a young man he still wanted to serve. When his unit was activated in November 1990, Dittus was a police sergeant in Santa Ana, CA. He has left a wife and two children in an uncomfortable financial situation because the loss in pay from his civilian position to his Marine gunnery sergeant's pay is \$3,300. per month. He has put one car in the garage to save on insurance, has gotten assistance from his bank concerning home mortgage payments, but didn't get someone to replace him as little league manager.

COMMANDER CLAIRE WEIDMAN, USNR OF NORFOLK, VA IS THE FLIGHT SURGEON FOR MARINE AIR GROUP 46, HMM-764, 4TH MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IN NORFOLK. DURING VIETNAM, WEIDMAN WAS A PFC IN THE MARINE CORPS. FOLLOWING THE WAR, HE ENROLLED IN MEDICAL SCHOOL AND BECAME A DOCTOR AND SHORTLY AFTER THAT, AN OFFICER IN THE NAVAL RESERVE. STILL FEELING AN ATTACHMENT TO THE MARINE CORPS, CMDR WEIDMAN REQUESTED TO BE THE FLIGHT SURGEON FOR A MARINE SQUADRON. IN THE CIVILIAN WORLD, CMDR WEIDMAN IS AN ORTHOPEDIC SURGEON AND MAKES OVER \$300,000 A YEAR. WHEN HIS UNIT WAS ACTIVATED, WEIDMAN VOLUNTEERED TO LEAVE HIS FAMILY AND TAKE A PAY REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY \$240,000 PER YEAR IN ORDER TO SERVE HIS COUNTRY. WEIDMAN PAYED \$80,000 IN TAXES TO THE IRS LAST YEAR. WITH HIS ACTIVATION, HIS TOTAL SALARY THIS YEAR WILL BE ONLY \$60,000.

JAN 07 '91 16:05 JPAO 4TH MARDIV

P.6/8

CAPTAIN JOHN ROBERTS, USMCR, OF ATLANTA, GA WAS THE RESERVE COMMANDING OFFICER OF BATTERY 'A', FOURTH LOW ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE BATTALION (4TH LAAD BN) IN MARIETTA, GA. HIS CIVILIAN POSITION WAS FLIGHT CREW MEMBER ON A DELTA AIRLINES L-1011, A POSITION HE HAS HELD FOR FIVE YEARS. JUST PRIOR TO BEING ACTIVATED, CAPT. ROBERTS HAD BEEN SELECTED BY DELTA TO FLY THE BOEING 767 AIRCRAFT ON THE COVETED LONG HAUL, INTERNATIONAL ROUTES. THIS MEANT A HIGHER, MORE CAREER ENHANCING POSITION IN THE AIRLINE, A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PAY, AN OPPORTUNITY TO WORK BETTER HOURS AND ON NEWER EQUIPMENT. AFTER PAYING HIS DUES, SO TO SPEAK, HIS BIG CHANCE WAS TO BE HANDED TO HIM IN DECEMBER. HE WAS ACTIVATED INSTEAD! IN ADDITION TO TAKING A \$65,000 CUT IN PAY, CAPT. ROBERTS WILL ALSO MISS THE MAY, 1991 BIRTH OF HIS THIRD CHILD.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHEN CAPT. ROBERTS REPORTED TO MCAS CHERRY POINT, NC, HE WAS REPLACED AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF HIS UNIT BECAUSE A MORE EXPERIENCED OFFICER WAS AVAILABLE. DESPITE LOSING HIS COMMAND, HE CONTINUES TO SERVE THE CORPS WITH A VERY POSITIVE ATTITUDE AS THE 2D LAAD BN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

FOC--LTCOL RUTHENBERG (404)421-5421

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 1/8/90

TO: Bob Simon

Here's a wonderful
letter you might
find a use for —

Sg

SHIRLEY M. GREEN
Special Assistant to the President
for Presidential Messages
and Correspondence
Room 94-OEOB, 456-7610

Shirley:

copies of incoming from former
Kuwait hostage you wanted to share
with Leg. Affairs. I spoke with
Mr. Cox 1/7/91 and he was pleased
to have his letter used if we choose
to do so. also offered to help
any other way. if you want more
copies, we can do.

SN

202105

Wayne G. Cox
9037 Bay Hill Blvd.
Orlando, Florida 32819
Tel: (407)876-2922
December 19, 1990

Dear President Bush,

7-11-1990

You are to be admired and praised for the courage you've shown and decisions you have thus far made in dealing with the Gulf crisis. And if every American, whether they be the man on the street, Congressman or Senator cannot fully support the actions you've thus far taken in the Gulf, then they are blatantly unconcerned with what is right and wrong in the world.

My Kuwaiti wife, and I and my three children who are natural-born U.S. citizens, were trapped in Kuwait since the August 2nd invasion until being flown out December 13th on the same plane as that of Ambassador Howell. With our fortunate release though, we have carried with us a burden in our hearts to do whatever we can to keep the world conscious of the seriousness of the situation we were eyewitnesses to and left behind. Indeed, the murder of innocent civilians from premature babies to grandparents, rapes of Phillipino, Sri Lankan, Indian, Kuwaiti and German women are factual and not just hyped up news stories. As well every item and product of value in Kuwait has been or is being stolen and transported to Iraq. And if force is not used soon, it is predicted that the Iraqis (not looters, as they'd like to blame) will dismantle buildings and transport them to Iraq. On my flight over from Frankfurt to Andrews A.F.B., I learned from an Arab source that actual, entire elevators were now being dismantled from buildings. Complete, organized, expert thievery ordered by the Iraqi government is taking place as I write this letter and while Saddam Hussein continues

to postpone peace talks. Allowed to remain in Kuwait another day as you read this letter Mr. Bush is another day that brings him closer to entering the very homes of the remaining, unarmed, fear-stricken Kuwaitis (who sheltered and fed myself and other Americans while there) to dismantle their homes while they watch and, yes, murder and rape at their discretion.

Our Kuwaiti friends hoped that I might be able to stress to you, Mr. Bush, that the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein is through the use of force. "He cannot be allowed to leave Kuwait without severe punishment." The Kuwaiti people, as well as I myself, were ready for force from the first week. It is the only thing, unfortunately, that the Middle eastern mind of Saddam Hussein (and Gaddafi!) can understand.....Bang 'em around!


In my interviews with the press in Baghdad, Frankfurt, Washington and Orlando since December 9th, I summed up my feelings of the Gulf crisis as an American in Kuwait with a quote from you, Mr. President: "It is simply a matter between right and wrong." And if any human being on the face of this earth cannot come to that assessment and back the noble cause and fight for justice which you have so courageously accepted, they must not have all the facts or else they have no sacrificial desire whatsoever to see evil overcome by good. Throughout history God always spoke to and used only one man to fulfill His will and His people were never totally unanimous in backing him. Democracy is a wonderful form of government, but we are fortunate to have in our United States Constitution the clause that permits the President to spontaneously use what he knows without a shadow of a doubt is the last and only solution in correcting obvious horror and injustice---the use of military force.

Mr. President, on behalf of the Kuwaiti people who love you and know that only God and you, His instrument, are their

only hope are deeply appreciative of all you have already done in standing up to the evil aggression done to them by Iraq.

May God bless and keep you always. You have my vote, my backing, my love and my highest respect of any world leader I have known in my 40 years. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you and Mrs. Bush and Family!

Sincerely,


Wayne G. Cox

P.S. I cried when I heard on the Voice of America, back on August 8th, your speech on how you responded without hesitation to the calling to stand up against wrong. Thank you.

- Thursday, January 10, 1991

House of Representatives Debate: Rep. Robert Michel
Transcript ID: 670818 (175 lines)

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATE
ON THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS AND THE USE OF FORCE

REMARKS BY REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT H. MICHEL (R-IL)

REP. MICHEL: Mr. Speaker, I'm going to yield myself such time as I may consume. And at the conclusion of my remarks, we'll devote -- we're going to have a system of rotating -- managing on this side for the time being. The distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee then, Mr. Broomfield, will manage the time.

SPEAKER: The gentleman from Illinois is recognized.

REP. MICHEL: I ask the Speaker to revise and extend my remarks.

SPEAKER: Without objection, so ordered.

REP. MICHEL: May I first pay my compliments to the distinguished Majority Leader for the tenor of his remarks. He's the Majority Leader in this body. I happen to be the Minority Leader.

Later on, we're going to be supporting differing resolutions because we have a difference of views on this. But I would applaud and certainly subscribe to the thought -- to the expression of the distinguished Majority Leader that after all the debate is over and it has been concluded, we will abide by the will of the majority when all is said and done. That's our system.

And even if it carries by one vote, that's the way we operate in this country -- to give everybody an opportunity to have their say. And I am happy and proud that the resolution which I support -- the bipartisan resolution is one that's in the form of a joint resolution. That would obviously go to the other body -- require the signature of the President. Then we would all be speaking with one voice.

But Mr. Speaker, as this debate opens and the United States of America has over 370,000 troops in the Gulf area, they're face to face with troops of a ruthless dictator, and our troops will be aware of every word we say in this debate and so will the dictator.

And the question we have to ask ourselves is this: When this

debate is finished, will the House be seen as a tower of strength or as a tower of battle?

I speak from the prejudice of being a combat veteran of World War II, and those of our generation know from bloody experience that unchecked aggression against a small nation is a prelude to an international disaster.

Saddam Hussein today has more planes and tanks and, frankly, men under arms than Hitler had at the time when Prime Minister

Chamberlain (sp) came back from Munich with that miserable piece of paper, Peace in Our Time. I'll never forget that replay of that movie in my life, and I have an obligation, I guess, coming from that generation to transmit those thoughts I had at the time to the younger generation who didn't experience what we did.

Saddam Hussein not only invaded Kuwait, he occupied, terrorized, murdered civilians, systematically looted and turned a peaceful nation into a wasteland of horror. He seeks control over one of the world's vital resources, and he ultimately seeks to make himself the unchallenged anti-Western dictator of the Mideast. Either we stop him now and stop him permanently or we won't stop him at all.

Now, the President has clearly presented the reasons why we can't stand by idly in his words, and I'd quote them, "We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression, and we're there because our vital interests are at stake." Now we're told by some that we must show patience. We must wait for sanctions to work. We must wait six months or a year before force is used. We must stay the course. My question is this: Stay what course? A course that allows Saddam to know he is free from surprise attack, free from sudden offensive movement for six months or a year or more? And I guess to you who advocate that course, I would have to ask you to do -- what you would do about the attitude of the American people in that interval period of time. How long is the American people -- will the American people put up with that? How long with that delicate coalition that we have pulled together currently? How long will they stay that kind of course -- not to mention our troops abroad and an extended period of time, and in that kind of an environment, when frankly over an extended period of time we'd have to be thinking seriously of rotation and all that that implies. So I think during the course of this debate, those who advocate that course are going to have to answer some of those questions.

Patience and delay can be virtues when they help bring about military or diplomatic goals. But when patience and delay become foreign policy goals in themselves, as I fear they have with some of our colleagues, they're no longer virtues.

I understand principal pacifism, which holds that nothing justifies the taking of a human life. I grew up in that tradition, and I respect it because World War II caused me to come grips with the very same question in my mind and in my conscience. What I can't understand is a policy that asks us to believe that after six months or a year the alliance will still hold, our sophisticated equipment will be in better shape than it is now after frying in the desert, our troops will have higher morale and better readiness.

Such a policy is not just an uncertain trumpet to the men and women in our armed forces. It is a veritable brass choir of

indecision, doubt and confusion. Patience at any price is not a policy; it's a cop-out.

We will be told by those who want delay that they don't want to risk American lives in combat. Let no one in this chamber or anyone else lecture me on the horrors of war.

And I see my friend, the gentleman from Florida, and several others, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Wylie, similarly who know of all the horrors of war. We've seen it at its worst. The memory will remain within our heart and minds for the rest of our lives. It's Saddam Hussein who will be responsible for those who make the supreme sacrifice and Saddam Hussein himself.

If Saddam convinces his neighbors he can survive this crisis, he'll become something more than a former hit man with delusions of grandeur. He'll be someone who has triumphed over a worldwide coalition. And if you seriously think that you wouldn't be -- that that wouldn't be a sinister event in the history of the 20th century, I think you're fooling yourself.

In our democracy, we elect our President to speak and act for us, primarily in foreign affairs, that our message might be clear and unmistakable. And we in the Congress have our role to play, and we can't shirk our responsibility. This is the time, it seems to me, for us to rally around the Chief and give him the support he deserves for our well-crafted bipartisan resolution.

And may I, in conclusion, thank my colleagues, my co-sponsors of this joint bipartisan resolution for the excellent work that's been done on this side of the aisle and on our side of the aisle by those who are listed as sponsors of our bipartisan resolution.

I hope the debate will go forward on a very high plane. As the distinguished Majority Leader said, this is the time to really come to grips with probably one of the most important issues we'll have, certainly, in this Congress and, for some of us, during the

tenure of our Congress here. We hope it's conducted on a high plane and, ultimately, then come to a resolution of it sometime Saturday and will abide by the will of the majority. Hopefully, that will be in strong support of the action the President has taken thus far and feels he may have to take in the future.

I yield back. (Applause.)

END

tions 121 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when the latter is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units, of the Selected Reserve.

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

This order shall be published in the *Federal Register* and transmitted promptly to the Congress.

George Bush

The White House,
August 22, 1990.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 4:41 p.m., August 24, 1990]

**Letter to the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate on the
Mobilization of United States Reserves
August 22, 1990**

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I have today, pursuant to section 673b of title 10, United States Code, authorized the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units of the Selected Reserve to perform such missions the Secretary of Defense may determine necessary. The deployment of United States forces to conduct operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula necessitates this action.

**Executive Order 12727—Ordering the
Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces
to Active Duty
August 22, 1990**

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sec-

A copy of the Executive order implementing this action is attached.

Sincerely,

George Bush

Note: Identical letters were sent to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Dan Quayle, President of the Senate.

Executive Order 12728—Delegating the President's Authority To Suspend Any Provision of Law Relating to the Promotion, Retirement, or Separation of Members of the Armed Forces
August 22, 1990

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 673c of title 10 of the United States Code and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, I hereby order:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, are hereby designated and empowered to exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President, the authority vested in the President by section 673c of title 10 of the United States Code (1) to suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces determined to be essential to the national security of the United States, and (2) to determine, for the purposes of said section, that members of the armed forces are essential to the national security of the United States.

Sec. 2. The authority delegated to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation by this order may be redelegated and further subdelegated to subordinates who are appointed to their offices by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Sec. 3. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or proce-

dural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

George Bush

The White House,
August 22, 1990.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 4:42 p.m., August 24, 1990]

Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Mobilization of United States Reserves

August 22, 1990

The President today authorized the Secretary of Defense to call Reserve units of the Armed Forces to active duty. The order permits the Secretary of Defense to call to duty selected members and units of the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as needed to support United States and multinational operations now underway. The President signed the order after the Secretary of Defense advised him that the effective conduct of military operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula may require augmentation of Active components of the Armed Forces. The actual number of Reserve personnel to be called to active duty will depend upon the operational needs of the Armed Forces, but at this time, we do not anticipate approaching the full 200,000 authority provided by law.

The Total Force Policy, which was established in 1973, allocates various military capabilities among the Active, Reserve, and National Guard components that together make up the Armed Forces of the United States. Under this policy, the capability to perform certain critical military activities has been concentrated in the Reserve component. Activating reservists to support operations such as those now underway has been a central feature of this approach.

The skills concentrated in the Reserve component include airlift, food and water handling, surface transportation, cargo handling, medical services, construction, and intelligence. By making judicious use of the

RESERVE PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
(As of December 30, 1990)

ALL SERVICES

- ◆ First RC units activated on 24 August (six airlift squadrons)
- ◆ 189,250 ceiling authorized under 673b (including Coast Guard)
- ◆ 1,810 units, 129,790 personnel called
- ◆ 1,347 IMAs called
- ◆ 69% of 673b allocation used
- ◆ 5,176 volunteers on duty (peak volunteer participation was 10,658 on 22 August)
- ◆ All 50 states alerted; RC personnel activated from all states (except Alaska), District of Columbia, Federal Republic of Germany, and Puerto Rico

-- 15% of U.S. forces deployed to the Operation Desert Shield Area of Responsibility are Reservists (45,583)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND DIRECTOR OF SPEECHWRITING

FROM: BOB SIMON
RESEARCH ASSISTANT
OFFICE OF RESEARCH



SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REQUESTS TO CONGRESS
ON THE USE OF FORCE

For your information, the last president to ask Congress for a declaration of war was Franklin Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor. Prior to that, Woodrow Wilson gave a lengthy speech in person asking Congress to declare war against Germany.

Both Presidents Johnson and Truman did not go to Capitol Hill in person to ask for resolutions authorizing force in Vietnam and Korea. Nor did Eisenhower make a personal appeal in 1955, when he sought and received unanimous approval for a resolution authorizing force to defend the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from Chinese communist aggression. (Eisenhower held the authority for years, but never used it.)

Also, in 1898, President McKinley did not appear before Congress -- as was the custom then -- when asking for a declaration of war against Spain.

Churchill

Churchill

The destiny of mankind is not decided by material computation. When great causes are on the move in the world . . . we learn that we are spirits, not animals, and that something is going on in space and time, and beyond space and time, which, whether we like it or not, spells duty.

Radio broadcast to America on receiving the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of Rochester, New York [June 16, 1941]

Hitler is a monster of wickedness, insatiable in his lust for blood and plunder. Not content with having all Europe under his heel, or else terrorized into various forms of abject submission, he must now carry his work of butchery and desolation among the vast multitudes of Russia and of Asia. The terrible military machine, which we and the rest of the civilized world so foolishly, so supinely, so insensately allowed the Nazi gangsters to build up year by year from almost nothing, cannot stand idle lest it rust or fall to pieces.

So now this bloodthirsty guttersnipe must launch his mechanized armies upon new fields of slaughter, pillage and devastation.

Radio broadcast on the German invasion of Russia [June 22, 1941]

We will have no truce or parley with you [Hitler], or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst—and we will do our best.

Speech to the London County Council [July 14, 1941]

The V sign is the symbol of the unconquerable will of the occupied territories, and a portent of the fate awaiting the Nazi tyranny.

Message to the people of Europe on launching the V for Victory propaganda campaign [July 20, 1941]

Nothing is more dangerous in wartime than to live in the temperamental atmosphere of a Gallup Poll,¹ always feeling one's pulse and taking one's temperature.

Report on the war, House of Commons [September 30, 1941]

Never give in, never give in, never, never, never—in nothing, great or small, large or petty—never give in except to convictions of honor and good sense.²

Address at Harrow School [October 29, 1941]

¹ Dr. George H. Gallup founded the British Institute of Public Opinion in 1936.

² See Shakespeare, 235:18, and William Pitt, 35:5.

Do not let us speak of darker days; let us speak rather of sterner days. These are not dark days: these are great days—the greatest days our country has ever lived; and we must all thank God that we have been allowed, each of us according to our stations, to play a part in making these days memorable in the history of our race. *Ib.*

⁸ In the past we have had a light which flickered, in the present we have a light which flames, and in the future there will be a light which shines over all the land and sea.

Speech on war with Japan, House of Commons [December 8, 1941]

⁹ What kind of people do they [the Japanese] think we are?

Speech to the U.S. Congress [December 26, 1941]

¹⁰ We have not journeyed all this way across the centuries, across the oceans, across the mountains, across the prairies, because we are made of sugar candy.

Speech to the Canadian Senate and House of Commons, Ottawa [December 30, 1941]

¹¹ This is no time to speak of the hopes of the future, or the broader world which lies beyond our struggles and our victory. We have to win that world for our children. We have to win it by our sacrifices. We have not won it yet. The crisis is upon us. . . . In this strange, terrible world war there is a place for everyone, man and woman, old and young, hale and halt; service in a thousand forms is open. There is no room now for the dilettante, the weakling, for the shirker, or the sluggard. The mine, the factory, the dockyard, the salt sea waves, the fields to till, the home, the hospital, the chair of the scientist, the pulpit of the preacher—from the highest to the humblest tasks, all are of equal honor; all have their part to play. *Ib.*

¹² When I warned [the French] that Britain would fight on alone whatever they did, their generals told their prime minister and his divided cabinet, "In three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken." Some chicken; some neck. *Ib.*

¹³ The late M. Venizelos³ observed that in all her wars England—he should have said Britain, of course—always wins one battle—the last.

Speech at the Lord Mayor's Day Luncheon, London [November 10, 1942]

³ Eleutherios Venizelos [1864–1936], Greek statesman.

Americas, the United States can give further, practical form to the high purposes of our policy.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

NOTE: On September 3, 1949, the President approved a bill extending the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (63 Stat. 685).

36 Remarks at a Dinner in Honor of General Vaughan Given by the Reserve Officers Association. *February 22, 1949*

I DON'T know whether I am supposed to tell all I know on Vaughan or not—if I haven't, the time is about right; but I am very happy to be here tonight because I have known General Vaughan all his military life, and some time besides.

He was at Fort Sill in 1917 at the training camp known as Camp Donovan, 35th Division, First World War. That dates him—and me, too. He was a sergeant in the field artillery when I was down there, and I was a first lieutenant. He went to a school down there known as the university of "doubt." He came out, I think, number four in his class. At any rate, he got a commission as first lieutenant. From then on he was in the heavies, 35th Field Artillery—155 Howitzers—went through the First World War, with honor to himself and a credit to his organization.

And then in 1940 he was my secretary when I was United States Senator from Missouri. He could have remained as my secretary if he had chosen to do it. Instead of that he was called into active service as a lieutenant colonel in the field artillery, and was sent to Australia. He served down there until he met with an accident—an airplane accident—chest crushed, leg was broken, and he was sent back to the United States.

When I became Vice President of the United States, I made him one of my secretaries, and my military adviser. When I became President, I made him aide to the

President of the United States.

I have three aides now, all able and efficient officers in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. I see my Naval Aide is sitting here at this end of the table. He used to command the battleship *Missouri*. I had quite a trip on that battleship. General Landry, over there, my Aide for Air, is an efficient and able one; and I have an aide for health over here, Dr. Graham, who is responsible for the fact that I can travel 31,700 miles and make 357 speeches and wear out all the newspapermen on the trip.

What I am leading up to is this, that there have been some very vicious attacks on my military aide, unjustified, and I say it advisedly, vicious. They are not intended to smear him, but he happens to be my military aide and in a campaign I am the head of one of the great political parties, and therefore a fair target for everything, and those who are around me sometimes get the attacks, and they are not pleasant.

But I can say this to you, that I have four secretaries, these three military aides, and a number of executive assistants, and they are able to take it.

I was reading a book this evening on pollsters. It is a most interesting book—it's just out. And the gentleman who wrote that book made a remark which I think is a classic. He said that if he ever found himself in agreement with the *Chicago Tribune*, or some of these columnists and broadcasters who have been attacking my staff, he

would know very well that he was wrong and he would survey his situation once more before he decided.

It was my very great privilege to have General Marshall as Chief of Staff, when I became President of the United States. General Eisenhower was in command of all the Armies in the European theatre, General MacArthur was in command of all the Armies in the Asiatic theatre, and General Eisenhower had an Army Commander who commanded more troops in the field than any other general in the history of the world. One day I got General Marshall to come over to see me, and he came into the outer office to wait for his turn to come in.

Now I may be bragging a little bit if I say I am usually prompt in my appointments—nobody has to wait on me; but he had to wait because he was early. And my appointment secretary asked him if he remembered a certain conversation that I had had with him in his office in 1940, when we passed the Draft Act. I had gone down to see General Marshall then, and asked him if he could make arrangements for me to have an artillery group in the coming unpleasantness, which I thought at that time we had to face.

And he looked at me, pulled his specs down on his nose, like that, and said, "How old are you?" I said, "I am 56." "Well," he said, "you are too derved old, you had better go home and keep on working in the Senate."

My appointment secretary asked him what he would say under present circumstances, if he were asked the same question. And General Marshall stuck to his guns and said, "I would say the same thing, only I would be a little more diplomatic."

Well, what I wanted to see General Marshall about was to assign his famous field commander to me as head of the Veterans

Bureau. That was General Bradley. He was made head of the Veterans Bureau by me. Then I made him Chief of Staff. I think he is one of the ablest military men in the United States. I am glad he is here tonight. I am glad to pay him that tribute.

Now, I am just as fond and just as loyal to my military aide as I am to the high brass, and I want you to distinctly understand that anyone who thinks he can cause any of those people to be discharged by me, by some smart aleck statement over the air or in the paper, he has got another think coming.

No commentator or columnist name any members of my Cabinet, or my staff. I name them myself. And when it is time for them to be moved on, I do the moving—nobody else.

I think I have one trait, and that is I never go back on a friend. A great many so-called friends have been a little jittery about me, sometimes, but I have never been. They were not so jittery on the 3d of November as they were on the first.

It is a very great pleasure to me to be able to come over here tonight and be present at these fine tributes that have been paid to my able and efficient military aide.

I want to say to you, and to all the rest of my secretaries, that I want you to bear that in mind, because that is the reason we can operate smoothly and put over a program which the voters decided that we should put over on November the 2d. And we are going to put it over, don't forget that!

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 8:50 p.m. at the Army and Navy Country Club in Arlington, Va.

In his remarks the President referred to Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, Military Aide to the President; Rear Adm. Robert L. Dennison, Naval Aide to the President; Brig. Gen. Robert B. Landry, Air Aide to the President; Brig. Gen. Wallace H. Graham, the White House Physician; and Matthew J. Connelly, Appointments Secretary to the President.

[174] June 27

Public Papers of the Presidents

ancient Hebrew prophet, we should say, "Let judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream."

In no other way can the nations of the earth endure.

NOTE: The President spoke at 3:43 p.m. In his opening words he referred to Chief Justice of the United States Fred M. Vinson, Chief Judge Harold M. Stephens of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, who was the chairman for the occasion, and Chief Judge Bolitha J. Laws of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

175 Exchange of Messages With Governor Dewey Concerning U.S. Action in Korea. *June 27, 1950*

I AM grateful for your message and hasten to assure you that I shall find strength and courage in your brave words. The whole-hearted pledge of support which you give will be a source of inspiration and fortitude as we gird ourselves for the difficult tasks ahead. We have taken our stand on the side of Korea and our pledge of faith to that nation is a witness to all the world that we champion liberty wherever the tyranny of communism is the aggressor.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

[Honorable Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York, Albany, New York]

NOTE: The text of Governor Dewey's telegram to the President, dated June 27, follows:

The President
The White House

I whole-heartedly agree with and support the difficult decision you have made today to extend American assistance to the Republic of Korea in combatting armed communist aggression. Your action there, in Formosa, the Philippines, and in Indochina was necessary to the security of our country and the free world. It should be supported by a united America.

THOMAS E. DEWEY

176 Remarks to Members of Reserve Officers Association. *June 28, 1950*

I APPRECIATE most highly the remarks of the Secretary of Defense. I think he gave the Commander in Chief a little more credit than he deserves, but then I like that, too.

You gentlemen represent one of the principal components of the authority of the United States in the world. One of the great things about our Government is that it is founded on the fact that the people are the government.

George Washington, in a message to the Congress, and in correspondence with some of his friends, made the statement that every man who lives under a government that is controlled by the people owes that government certain service. Not only does he owe that service in a military way, if it becomes

necessary, but he owes service to his government as a civilian, he should take a part in his city, county, and State government; and he should be willing, whenever necessary, to serve the United States Government in whatever capacity he is fitted to serve it.

It is difficult, these days, to get the right sort of men for the right places, due to the fact that they not only have to give up civilian income, which is in most cases much greater than you can get from Government, but they also have to stand and receive a certain amount of criticism and mudslinging which they do not deserve.

Back in 1920—about 30 years ago—it was my privilege to organize the first Reserve Officers Association in the United States. It

Harry S. Truman, 1950

June 28 [1950]

consisted of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air. It was a unified Reserve Association.

When it became my duty as President of the United States to look into a defense program for the future, after the shooting in the Second World War had stopped, I made it my business to get in touch with every commander—every field commander that we had at that time—and we had some of the greatest ever produced. And I corresponded with those gentlemen, and nearly every one of them is on record as to what he thinks of a unified defense program. They were all for it.

We have succeeded in implementing a defense program. That is a unification of the services on the basis where rivalry doesn't cease, as esprit de corps is just as important as any other morale factor that makes up the Nation. It doesn't mean that there can't be rivalry between organizations under the same command, between the Army, Navy, and the Air Force as to who has the best men and who does the best job. But it means that when necessary there is complete cooperation between them, for the welfare of the country as a whole. That's all that unification means. And it has been implemented, I think, in such a manner that the morale of no single organization has been hurt.

Your organization is of vital importance to the welfare of the Nation. You are the men who, on your own time, try to keep yourselves informed on the latest of military subjects so that in case of emergency you can fill the places that would ordinarily be necessary in an emergency.

I am proud to be a Reserve officer. I

think General Bradley told me that I still have a commission as a colonel in the Reserve Corps. I am somewhat beyond the age of retirement, but I don't believe they are going to retire me, at least for 2½ years.

I hope you gentlemen will continue to attend your schools and keep yourselves up to date in matters military, and in matters civil.

Remember that the civil government is just as important for your welfare, and for the welfare of the Nation, as your education as military men. I hope that you will take time out maybe to read a short speech which I made yesterday on the laying of the cornerstone of the courts building here in the District of Columbia. I went into some detail on the rights of the individual under his Government. If you will study that, you will never become a man who thirsts for power, you will never become one who overrides the rights of the people to get into a position of power.

That is the most important thing in the Constitution of the United States, that the rights of the individual come first. I am imbued with that idea. I believe that this is a Government of and by and for the people, as Abraham Lincoln said. And as far as I can, as President of the United States, I am trying to implement that theory, not only in the United States but in the world at large.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:25 a.m. at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. In his opening words he referred to Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense. Later he referred to Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

TO: David Demarest

FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

EVENT: Attend Reserve Officers Association of the
U.S. Annual Dinner

DATE: January 23, 1991 - Wednesday

TIME: 7:15 p.m.

DURATION: 45 minutes

LOCATION: Washington Hilton Hotel

ATTIRE: Black Tie

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: Is Invited

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: 2 Tier - H.T. Reception
Evan "Curly"

CONTACT: General/Holtman

TELEPHONE: OFFICE 479-2200 HOME _____

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

| | | |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Ed Rogers | Marlin Fitzwater | Ede Holiday |
| James Cicconi | David Demarest | David Valdez |
| Fred McClure | Fran Norris | USSS - PPD |
| Susan Porter Rose | Sig Rogich | Gary Walters |
| Patty Presock | John Keller | WHCA Audio/Visual |
| Chriss Winston | Bruce Caughman | WHCA Operations |
| Laurie Firestone | J. Bonnie Newman | C. Boyden Gray |
| William Kristol | Paul Bateman | Laura Melillo |
| Jackie Kennedy | Debra Romash | John Herrick |
| Deb Anderson | Richard Trefry | |



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS

MAY 1990



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

RESERVE AFFAIRS

May 1, 1990

FOREWORD

Since its adoption in the early 1970's, the Total Force Policy has been a basic pillar of our Nation's military strategy. As a result of that policy, the Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces have become an increasingly important element of our national defense. After a decade of growth and improvement, Reserve forces are now responsible for the performance of a variety of important missions in the event of armed conflict, and for assisting the Active forces in meeting peacetime operating requirements.

The historic geopolitical developments which have occurred in the two years since this Handbook was last published promise to have a profound impact on policies relating to the Reserve components. The President has recently observed that as we adjust force structure in response to changes in the security environment, we must thoroughly explore the alternative of retaining National Guard and Reserve units as a way to reduce defense costs, while still hedging against uncertainties.

This Handbook contains a broad range of information about the Reserve component forces of the United States. While it is not practical to include more detailed information about the organization, strength, training and administration of the United States Reserve Forces, the Handbook should have great utility. Within the covers of this single publication, readers will find a condensed, yet comprehensive description of the significant improvements which have been made in all of the Reserve component forces in recent years and of the important contributions which are being made by those forces to the national security interests of the United States.

The Handbook has been prepared for the purpose of providing a general understanding of our Reserve forces and is issued under the authority of Department of Defense Directive 1215.15, "Reserve Officers Foreign Exchange Program," September 8, 1987. It will be distributed to our NATO allies and to their Reserve forces and it may, therefore, be translated into the French and German languages. Department of Defense Components may obtain copies of this publication through their own publication channels. Other Federal Agencies and the public may obtain copies from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA, 22161.

Stephen M. Duncan

Stephen M. Duncan

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Colonial America adopted the concept of the citizen soldier from England, which had an armed citizens' militia prepared for service in war or peace. This system was ideally suited for the American colonies, which faced the task of developing frontier defense with limited economic means.

Before the American Revolutionary War, the militia was the only defense of Colonial America. In 1636, the first permanent regiments of the militia were organized in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Just before the American Revolution, some militia members were designated "minutemen"—ready for duty at a minute's notice. Other militia units were available in several hours. The militia was organized into local citizen units controlled by the Colonial Assemblies. From Lexington to Yorktown, the militiamen fought in every battle and provided support to the Continental Army.

The citizen-soldier often paid a heavy price, having to set aside or neglect ordinary means of livelihood. The primary motivation was a strong sense of patriotism. Thus, a tradition of military service was established reflecting one of the most basic attitudes of all free people. George Washington, a colonel in the Virginia Militia from 1752 through 1758, holds the distinction of being the first of 18 former members of the militia or National Guard to later become President of the United States. While serving as President, Washington is quoted as having said, "Citizens must be prepared to devote a portion of their routines in order to be capable in defense of country." This tradition has served the United States well. In peacetime, the United States has neither desired nor been willing to finance a standing active military force sufficient to meet all requirements of war. The United States' major conflicts have been fought by an active force nucleus augmented substantially by individuals and units from mobilized Reserve forces.

The organized part of the militia became known as the "National Guard." The name was inspired by a French hero, the Marquis de Lafayette, who had served as a major general in the Continental Army. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, New York Militia, adopted the designation "National Guards" in 1824 in honor of Lafayette who had commanded the French militia the "Garde Nationale." By the 1890's, each State militia had adopted the National Guard designation.

During the passage of years, the organized militia—the National Guard, later joined by the Service Reserve components—became an integral part of community life. Not only military but civic and social activities were centered in the militia meeting halls of many towns.

As communities and industries grew, some leaders in the American business community began encouraging employees to participate in National Guard and Reserve activities as citizen-soldiers. This employer support has grown during this century and continues today. The U. S. Armed Forces have traditionally been an extension of our civilian society. The defense of our Nation has been based on the concept of the civilian who becomes a soldier-at-arms in time of national emergency. During peacetime, the civilians who are also National Guardsmen and reservists prepare for active service.

At the beginning of World War II, the Reserve component forces organized into units were poor in equipment and required extensive training prior to entering combat. These volunteers helped the Active Army expand from 264,118 on June 30, 1940 to 1,455,565 one year later. About 300,000 of this increase came from the National Guard and Reserves. Once fully trained and equipped, reservists made outstanding contributions to victory.

The nearly 1 million National Guard and Reserve members mobilized during the Korean War in the early 1950s were relatively better prepared to respond than their counterparts had been in previous conflicts. They required less postmobilization training as most of them were veterans of World War II. Despite receiving little or no training since the end of the war, the first reservists and Guard members called for Korea were sent into combat as individual fillers assigned to duty with Active units. As was the case in World War II, at the start of the Korean conflict there was a lack of National Guard and Reserve units which were sufficiently trained and equipped to be employed as units. This situation led to a major revitalization of the U.S. Reserve forces in the years that followed.

During the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and 1962, 148,000 National Guardsmen and reservists served on active duty. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 involved 14,000 Air Force reservists who reported from civilian life to their units within as few as 9 hours. The Pueblo Crisis and the war in Vietnam in the late 1960s saw the mobilization of 35,000 National Guard and Reserve members with their units, plus nearly 2,000 called as individuals in a non-unit status.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a dramatic increase in reliance on Reserve component forces in the fulfilling of peacetime and combat operational responsibilities of the U.S. military. Naval reservists have assumed shipping-control responsibilities and have served with the crews of mine-sweepers and other ships which deployed to the Persian Gulf, just as others served aboard USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) off the coast of Lebanon. U.S. Air Force Reserve crews airlifted students from Grenada and an Army Reserve Civil Affairs unit helped restore order in that small island country. U.S. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard crews flew refueling missions for the bomber aircraft which struck the retaliatory blow in Libya. Personnel from the Army's Reserve components are providing substantial maintenance support in Europe and served on the Joint Task Force in Honduras. Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force Reserve crews airlifted troops to Honduras and also flew humanitarian relief supplies to Armenia, Central America and Jamaica. Air National Guard pilots continuously fly routine air defense missions with modern aircraft such as the F-16. Marine Corps Reserve air refueling tanker aircraft regularly support Active force tactical aircraft worldwide. Coast Guard reservists volunteered in substantial numbers to assist in the cleanup following a major oil spill at Valdez, Alaska.

In late 1989, Reserve component forces provided substantial contributions toward the success of operation "Just Cause," the liberation of the Republic of Panama. U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard individuals and units provided essential support in such areas as security, public affairs and civil affairs. Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force Reserve crews provided hundreds of flying sorties ranging from strategic and tactical airlift to close air support and gunship missions. As in Grenada, Army reservists assumed a lead role in the process of restoring order and essential services to Panama in the aftermath of the military operations.

Historically, Congress has played an important role in shaping the U.S. Reserve components. Laws concerning the exact role of Federal and State governments with respect to the National Guard were first drawn up in 1903, and, since 1933, the National Guard has had a dual status as a State force and a Federal Reserve component. The first purely Federal Reserve force, the Army Medical Reserve Corps, was established in 1908. It was not until 1916, when the realities of World War I became clear, that additional Federal Reserve components were established.

The "Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952" was the first of several major initiatives of the 1950's and 1960's which, together, form the basis for today's Reserve components personnel, training and pay structure. This act established the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, the Retired Reserve, and also specified the seven Reserve components. In 1967, Congress passed the first law to establish annual personnel strengths for the Reserve components. This law also required that each Reserve component maintain part of its structure in organized and trained units. It set minimum annual training requirements for Reserve units, and also established chiefs of the Reserve components at the flag and general officer rank. With the expanding use of and reliance on Reserve forces, Congress, in 1983, authorized an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Thus, a principal staff assistant for Reserve component matters was positioned at the highest decision-making level of the Department of Defense.

TOTAL FORCE

The end to conscription in 1973 and the need to make the most effective use of available resources led the Department of Defense to formulate the "Total Force" policy. The objective of the policy is a balanced mix of forces that fully utilizes all available assets, while ensuring that the maximum military capability is achieved at the minimum realistic cost. Today, this policy is a reality and the National Guard and Reserve forces have been assigned significantly expanded peacetime operational responsibilities as well as greater wartime missions.

The total force includes the Active and Reserve components, military retirees, civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and civilian contractors. This personnel mix permits a large segment of the civilian population to remain productive in the peacetime economy while remaining available for rapid mobilization as members of, or in direct support of, the Armed Forces in time of crisis.


The key elements of the total force are the Active and Reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces. The Armed Forces of the U.S. are the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Their Reserve components consist of: Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR); Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (USAFR); Naval Reserve (USNR); Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR); and Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR).

Reserve Personnel

Reserve and National Guard forces total over 1.6 million uniformed personnel or around 44 percent of the U.S. total military force. A significant asset in and of itself, the retired reserve, with over 1.8 million members, could be recalled in an emergency. The following chart illustrates the force mix of the U.S. military by Active and Reserve component(s) of each of the Services, excluding retirees:

TOTAL FORCE MIX BY SERVICE

(expressed in thousands - excludes Retirees)



During the 1980's, efforts to improve the quality of personnel who serve in the Reserve components have met with great success. The improvements can be seen and measured in various ways. For example, over 90 percent of enlisted accessions without prior service are high school graduates and about 95 percent scored "average" or higher in the standardized Armed Forces Qualification Test. This represents an increase of over 20 percent in both categories since 1980.

The following table reflects the trend in recent years of the total strength of the Reserve components including the Ready and Standby Reserve categories. Reserve categories are defined later in this Handbook.

Table 1.

RESERVE STRENGTH (In Thousands)

| | 1980 | 1984 | 1988 | 1989 |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| ARNG | 373.8 | 443.7 | 464.2 | 467.1 |
| USAR | 431.3 | 552.0 | 606.1 | 594.5 |
| USNR | 217.4 | 201.2 | 244.2 | 248.0 |
| USMCR | 94.2 | 91.7 | 87.4 | 81.5 |
| ANG | 96.6 | 105.0 | 115.2 | 116.1 |
| USAFR | 146.6 | 140.5 | 159.8 | 153.6 |
| USCGR | 21.5 | 18.7 | 18.1 | 17.8 |
| Total | 1381.4 | 1552.8 | 1695.0 | 1678.6 |

Reserve Equipment

In consonance with the total force, the quality of National Guard and Reserve equipment has significantly improved. Clearly, if Reserve components are to play a credible role in the force structure, it is imperative that they be provided with modern equipment. This equipment must be compatible with the Active component, and supportable within the current logistics base. Since 1980, the Reserve components have been the beneficiaries of a significant modernization program. The guiding principle is contained in guidance which the Secretary of Defense gave to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services in June 1982:

- “The long range ... goal of the Department is to equip all Active, Guard and Reserve units to full wartime requirements . . . units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component.”
- “. . . early deploying Guard and Reserve units must have equipment to perform their missions. Active and Reserve units deploying at the same time should have equal claim on modern equipment inventories.”

In fiscal years 1988 and 1989, a total of \$6.05 billion was provided for new equipment for the National Guard and Reserves. During the same 2-year period, equipment valued at \$20.5 billion was distributed to the Reserve components including equipment from new production and serviceable equipment from the Active components, such as F-16s, C-5s, Perry class guided missile frigates, and M60A3 and M-1 tanks. When added to Fiscal Year 1990 equipment distribution projections of \$10.9 billion, this yields a total of \$30.4 billion for equipment programmed to enter Reserve component inventories over the 3-year period.

Cost Effectiveness

Although the Reserve components comprise approximately 45 percent of the total military force of the United States, the costs associated with Reserve capabilities are relatively modest. The three principal elements of the U.S. defense budget which affect the Reserve components are: operations and maintenance (O&M); procurement, consisting of new weapons systems and ammunition; and personnel. The following table depicts the expenditures in these three categories for the Reserve components as a percentage of total Defense Department expenditures for fiscal year 1989.

Table 2.
RESERVE COMPONENT EXPENDITURES
(In Billions of Dollars)

| CATEGORY | RESERVE | TOTAL DEFENSE* | PERCENTAGE |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| O&M | \$ 6.822 | \$ 86.922 | 07.8% |
| Procurement | \$ 2.858 | \$ 79.692 | 03.6% |
| Personnel | \$ 9.100 | \$ 78.803 | 11.5% |
| Total | \$18.780 | \$245.417* | 07.6% |

* Not included in the Defense total is money expended for other major budget items such as facilities construction and research, development, test and evaluation.

RESERVE CATEGORIES

The Reserve components make up a complex structure. Each Reserve component consists of three Reserve categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The exceptions are the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, which do not have a Standby Reserve. Reserve component personnel strengths by categories are shown in Appendix A.

READY RESERVE. The Ready Reserve consists of Reserve component units, individual reservists assigned to Active component units, and individuals subject to recall to active duty to augment the Active forces in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve consists of three subgroups: the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard.

- **Selected Reserve.** The Selected Reserve is composed of those units and individuals designated by their respective Services and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority for training, equipment, and personnel over all other Reserve elements. Individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) are members of the Selected Reserve not assigned to a Reserve component unit but rather assigned to and trained for an Active component organization, Selective Service System, or Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on or shortly after mobilization.
- **Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).** The IRR is a manpower pool consisting mainly of trained individuals who have previously served in Active component units or in the Selected Reserve. IRR members are liable for involuntary active duty for training and fulfillment of mobilization requirements.
- **Inactive National Guard (ING).** The ING consists of Army National Guard personnel who are in an inactive status (the term does not apply to the Air National Guard). Members of the ING are attached to National Guard units but do not participate in training activities. Upon mobilization, they would mobilize with their units. To remain members of the ING, individuals must report annually to their assigned unit.

STANDBY RESERVE. Personnel assigned to the Standby Reserve have completed all obligated or required service or have been removed from the Ready Reserve because of civilian employment, temporary hardship, or disability. Standby Reservists maintain military affiliation, but are not required to perform training or to be assigned to a unit.

RETIRED RESERVE. The Retired Reserve consists of personnel who have been placed in a retirement status based on completion of 20 or more qualifying years of Reserve component and/or Active component service. A member of the Retired Reserve does not receive retired pay until reaching age 60, unless he or she has 20 or more years active Federal service.

Selected Reserve Growth

While all segments of the Reserve components are subject to mobilization during war or national emergency declared by Congress, the Selected Reserve is the mainstay of the Reserve Force. Most Selected Reservists are assigned to units which conduct monthly and annual training. All Selected Reservists will be the first to mobilize. As the primary source of timely augmentation of the Active force, the Selected Reserve receives major attention within each Service component. The Selected Reserve has increased by 30 percent since 1980, as shown in the following table:

Table 3.
SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

| | 1980 | 1984 | 1988 | 1989 |
|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| ARNG | 366.6 | 434.3 | 455.2 | 457.0 |
| USAR | 213.2 | 275.1 | 312.8 | 319.2 |
| USNR | 97.1 | 120.6 | 149.5 | 151.5 |
| USMCR | 35.7 | 40.6 | 43.5 | 43.6 |
| ANG | 96.3 | 105.0 | 115.2 | 116.1 |
| USAFR | 59.8 | 70.3 | 82.1 | 83.2 |
| USCGR | 11.9 | 12.4 | 12.1 | 12.0 |
| Total | 880.5 | 1058.2 | 1170.4 | 1182.6 |

Individual Ready Reserve Growth


The IRR is the principal source of trained individuals to fill wartime manpower shortages in Active and Reserve units, to replace unskilled or partially skilled unit members and to replace combat casualties during the first 120 days after mobilization. The IRR reached a peak strength of over 1.5 million in the early 1970s during the Vietnam conflict. Beginning in 1973, the IRR experienced a period of declining strength which lasted until 1978. From that point, increases in both the Active and Reserve components have yielded parallel growth in this vital Reserve category. An increase in the Military Service Obligation from 6 years to 8 years, enacted in 1984, will generate further growth into the 1990s. Approximate IRR strength for various fiscal years (FYs) has been as follows:

- FY 1971 — 1,593,000 (high point)
- FY 1978—356,000 (low point)
- FY 1983—417,000
- FY 1988—489,000
- FY 1991—695,000 (projection)

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The President of the United States is Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces. The President appoints a Secretary of Defense, with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, to direct the entire military establishment. Within the Department of Defense, there is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, also appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is responsible for exercising overall supervision of Reserve component matters within the Department of Defense. The organization of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD(RA)) is depicted in figure 2:

Figure 2.
OASD(RA) Organization.



The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve components. The RFPB is established under section 175 of title 10, United States Code. The Board consists of: a civilian chairman; the Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Regular officers from each of the Services; and Reserve officers from each of the Reserve components.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Secretary of Transportation administer the different Reserve components. The Secretary of the Army administers the Army National Guard of the United States and the Army Reserve; the Secretary of the Navy administers the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve and, in time of war, the Coast Guard Reserve; and the Secretary of the Air Force administers the Air National Guard of the United States and the Air Force Reserve. During peacetime, the Secretary of Transportation administers the Coast Guard Reserve.

Personnel strength and budget levels for the Reserve components are recommended by the President and approved by the Congress. The Congress has historically taken a strong oversight interest in the Reserve components, consistently acting to ensure that the Reserve forces are a major part of the U.S. defense structure.

The National Guard

The Army and Air National Guard are unique among the world's Reserve military forces, in that they combine both Federal and State functions. The National Guard of each State is both a State military force under the command of the respective State and territorial governor and, at the same time, a Federal Reserve component. The dual State-Federal missions derive from the U.S. Constitution and the United States Code of Laws.

The National Guard's Federal mission is to provide properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization in the event of a war, national emergency or as otherwise needed. The Guard's State mission is to provide military support within the State. Army and Air National Guard units in a non-mobilized status are commanded by the governors of the 50 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, and the Commanding General of the District of Columbia. The National Guard of each State is directly supervised by the State adjutant general, an official who usually holds the rank of major general. There are hundreds of State callups of National Guard units each year for such missions as emergency relief from natural disasters, search and rescue operations, protection of life, preservation of order, and maintenance of vital public services.

The National Guard also plays an important role in the U.S. war on drugs. During Fiscal Year 1989, the National Guard executed over 1800 missions in support of local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies.

National Guard Bureau

The Army and Air National Guard of the United States are administered on the Federal side through the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB is a joint bureau of the Departments of the Army and Air Force, serving as both a staff and an operating Agency of the two Services. Its functions include directing resources to support the National Guard mission of providing combat ready units to accomplish the national military strategy of deterring war by (1) developing, coordinating and administering all National Guard Federal policies, plans and programs, (2) channeling communications between the Services, States and units, and (3) assisting the States in organization, maintenance, and operation of National Guard units.

The Chief of the NGB is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The Chief, who must be a National Guard officer, serves for a term of 4 years, and is eligible for a second term. The President has included the Chief on the list of positions of responsibility and importance in which the incumbent is nominated to serve in the grade of lieutenant general. This officer reports to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and serves as their principal staff advisor on National Guard affairs.

Reporting directly to the Chief of the NGB are: the Director, Joint Staff; the Director, Army National Guard; and the Director, Air National Guard. The Joint Staff provides liaison and coordination between the Army and Air Guard. Each of the three Directorates is supported by seven to ten specialized offices or divisions.

RESERVE COMPONENTS

The seven Reserve components augment the Active components in accomplishment of their assigned missions. The Army and Air Force both have components from the National Guard and the Reserve. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard each have a single Reserve component. A description of each of the seven Reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces follows.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve

● Mission

The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) provide trained units and individuals in support of the Army's Active component wartime force. The USAR is a Federal force while the ARNG has both a Federal and State mission.

Selected ARNG and USAR units participate with Active component units to improve readiness through the Directed Training Associations (DTA). These associations include CAPSTONE, Active Component/Reserve Component Partnership Program, and affiliation.

● Army National Guard History

Having celebrated its 350th anniversary in 1986, the ARNG is the oldest military force in the country, dating from 1636. The oldest military units in the National Guard and U.S. Army are four Massachusetts ARNG units; the 181st and 182nd Infantries, the 101st Field Artillery, and the 101st Engineer Battalion. The ARNG has participated in all U.S. wars and conflicts from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam and is entitled to nearly all of the 168 battle and campaign streamers on the Army flag. A graphic portrayal of the participation of the militia/National Guard is shown below.

- 1775 — Revolutionary War 164,000 militiamen.
- 1812 — War of 1812 489,173 militiamen.
- 1846 — Mexican War 73,000 militiamen.

- 1898 — Spanish-American War 165,000 Army Guardsmen.
- 1916 — Mexican-American border 158,000 Army Guardsmen.
- 1917 — World War I 379,000 Army Guardsmen 17 combat divisions (40% of American Expeditionary Force).
- 1940 — World War II 300,000 Army Guardsmen.
- 1950 — Korean War 183,000 Army Guardsmen.
- 1961 — Berlin Crisis 45,115 Army Guardsmen.
- 1968 — Vietnam War 12,234 Army Guardsmen.

● **Army National Guard Structure**

In terms of Selected Reserve strength, the ARNG is the largest of the nation's seven Reserve components and is composed predominantly of combat units. It consists of more than 5,900 battalion, company, detachment and team size units located in more than 2,600 communities in all States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The authorized peacetime strength of the ARNG is over 460,000. Wartime structure is more than 480,000.

The ARNG operates 260 State training sites of various sizes and two partially active Army installations. Increased emphasis placed on Reserve component readiness has resulted in additional requirements for maintenance, storage, and training facilities.

● **Army Reserve History**

The Modern Army Reserve began with the establishment of the Medical Corps Reserve on April 23, 1908, with 364 officers. The USAR from 1908 through World War II was primarily composed of officers. After World I, the USAR was composed of 26 divisions, all of which suffered from severe shortages of personnel, equipment and training. As a result, callups in the early stages of World War II were of individual reservists, not Reserve units. The U.S. Army ended World War II with 89 combat divisions on active duty. By 1946, that number had been reduced to 10 Active divisions with 27 divisions assigned to the National Guard and 26 divisions assigned to the USAR. Since 1917, the USAR has been highly involved in our nation's international commitments.

- 1917 — WWI over 160,000 reservists served.
- 1941 — WWII over 200,000 reservists served.
- 1950 — Korean War 244,000 reservists served.
- 1961 — Berlin Crisis 40,000 reservists served.
- 1968 — Vietnam War 5,181 mobilized with 3,500 deployed to Vietnam.

● **Army Reserve Structure**

In 1967, a reorganization eliminated the combat divisions and restructured the USAR to provide combat, combat support, and combat service support units. This reorganization provided the formation of 18 Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) organized on a geographic basis. Two additional ARCOMs were added, one in 1973 and a second in 1986, for a total of 20.

The USAR is second in size among the Reserve components in terms of Selected Reserve strength. It consists mainly of approximately 3,300 company/detachment sized units, primarily combat support and combat service support units. The authorized peacetime Selected Reserve strength for the USAR is over 300,000.

The Chief of the Army Reserve serves as the principal adviser to the Army Chief of Staff on USAR matters. The Chief of the Army Reserve is appointed from the USAR by the President, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and serves in the grade of major general.

All USAR units are assigned to an ARCOM or to a General Officer Command (GOCOM). General Officer Commands include all units authorized a general officer as commander (except ARCOMs). An ARCOM, authorized a major general or brigadier general as commander, has command of USAR units located in a specific geographic area.


ARCOMs are commanded by the Commander, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) through one of the five numbered Continental United States (CONUS) armies, by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or by an overseas major commander. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) supervises initial entry and service school training for individual reservists.

• **Total Army Contribution**

Since 1980, the combined ARNG and USAR personnel strength has increased over 30 percent compared to a small decline in the strength of the Active Army over the same period. Over half of the total Army's combat forces and two-thirds of its aggregate combat support and combat service support are in the ARNG and the USAR. Reserve Component contributions to the total Army are reflected in the following chart:

Figure 3.


USAR Contributions to the Total Army.



As of September 30, 1989

Figure 4.

ARNG Contributions to the Total Army.



ARNG PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ARMY

As of September 30, 1989

The Army Reserve comprises less than 10 percent of total Army combat units as compared to the Army Guard's 44 percent. This relationship reverses itself in the combat support and combat service support areas. The USAR and ARNG perform nearly all of the missions assigned to the U.S. Army. As of the end of FY 1989, the two components fielded an impressive number of units within the Total Army, including:

Combat

- 82 Infantry Battalions
- 53 Armored Battalions
- 123 Field Artillery Battalions
- 8 Special Forces Units
- 45 Mechanized Infantry Battalions
- 2 Armored Cavalry Regiments
- 24 Attack Helicopter Battalions

Combat Support/Service Support

- 7 Heavy Helicopter Companies
- 47 Training Brigades
- 140 Judge Advocate General Units
- 77 Supply and Service Units (Quartermaster)
- 192 Maintenance Units
- 116 Engineer Units
- 154 Military Police Units
- 12 Corps Signal Battalions
- 38 Major Logistical Units
- 62 Engineer Bridge Companies
- 79 Public Affairs Units
- 36 Civil Affairs Units
- 118 Hospitals—all types

● Force Modernization

As a part of the growing partnership, the ARNG and USAR are moving ahead aggressively with a program of modernization which will further improve their combat readiness and their ability to support the missions of the total Army.

The ARNG and USAR are placing special emphasis on aviation force modernization, including the activation of aviation brigades in all of the divisions and many new corps level units. Highlights of the ARNG modernization program are AH-64 helicopter attack battalions and UH-60 helicopter assault units. The Army Guard received 54 AH-64 aircraft in FY 89, bringing their total to 78 aircraft assigned. Also during 1989, the ARNG received 82 UH-60s bringing to 127 the number of these aircraft assigned.

Modernization of ground forces of the ARNG continues as well. The inventory includes over 300 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and over 425 Improved TOW Vehicles. In addition, Army Guard units have received more M1 tanks, M-198 Howitzers, Chaparrals, Heavy Expandable Mobility Tactical Trucks, and Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles.

During 1988 and 1989, nearly 8,000 personnel and more than 190 aircraft were added to the USAR aviation structure. Two new attack helicopter battalions equipped with AH-1 (Cobras), two attack helicopter regiment headquarters, and numerous other elements were added in 1988 to make USAR aviation forces more responsive to total Army mobilization needs. In 1989, three attack helicopter battalions were activated in the USAR and aligned with four Active U.S. Army corps.

During 1989, USAR ground combat units were completely fielded with M60A3 battle tanks with 105MM guns, thermal sights, laser range finders, and analog ballistics computers. USAR units continue to receive a wide array of wheeled and tracked vehicles which have been purchased expressly for the Reserves under the Dedicated Procurement Program.

Two major USAR programs are the Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) program and the construction of sites to support the Regional Training Site-Medical (RTS-MED) program. Currently, 94 USAR hospital units are scheduled for DEPMEDS distribution. Seven RTS-MEDS are being constructed to support training on DEPMEDS equipment. Five of these sites are USAR and two are ARNG. Fort Devens, Massachusetts is the first USAR site for construction, with occupancy scheduled for early 1991.

Naval Reserve

● Mission

The mission of the U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR) is to provide trained units to increase the Navy's force level during mobilization and trained individuals to sustain Active component force operations around-the-clock. In recent years, the Naval Reserve has shouldered an increasing share of the Navy's operational responsibilities. Today's Naval Reserve is serving an indispensable role in the nation's maritime defense.

● History

President Thomas Jefferson, in 1805, suggested the creation of a naval militia, but nothing came of it. In the early days of the Civil War a "sort of Naval Reserve"—the Volunteer Navy of the United States—was created to provide officers for the increased needs of the Navy. Over 7,500 volunteer officers served during the conflict.

In May 1888, Massachusetts established a naval battalion within the State militia. By 1897, 16 other States had a naval militia. A year later these trained bodies were to prove of value during the Spanish-American War, as the militia furnished 4,216 men to the Navy. In 1914 the Division of Militia Affairs was established in the Navy Department. The origin of today's Naval Reserve dates from March 1915, when Congress established a Naval Reserve Force. The contributions of Naval reservists in conflicts during this century have been very impressive:

- 1917— WWI- 330,000 reservists served.
- 1941— WWII- over 2,000,000 reservists served. Most of these were inductees assigned to the Reserve.
- 1950— Korea- over 130,000 reservists served.
- 1968— Vietnam- One out of seven on active duty were reservists and two Reserve Seabee battalions were mobilized.

After World War II many of the sailors who had served joined the USNR, resulting in a cadre of 130,000 drilling reservists. Many of these reservists were recalled to active duty during the Korean War, when 75 percent of the Navy's combat sorties were flown by USNR aviators.

Today, the USNR is taking on vital operational responsibilities. For example, in 1986 the USNR ship USS PRESERVER spearheaded the salvage operation of the space shuttle Challenger, with a reservist diver locating the Challenger's crew compartment. Since 1987, when hostilities intensified in the Persian Gulf, deployed USNR minesweepers have been continuously on station under operation "Earnest Will" to augment airborne mine countermeasures and explosives ordnance disposal units already on scene. Two Reserve guided missile frigates also deployed to the Persian Gulf to assist in maintaining the increased operational tempo. In addition, USNR special boat units and volunteer personnel were sent to the area to support Navy operations.

● Structure

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for the organization, administration, training, and equipping of the USNR and for mobilization planning to reinforce and augment the Active forces. The USNR command structure, which supports the CNO, is headed by a rear admiral, either Regular or Reserve, who serves as Director of Naval Reserve (DIRNAVRES) and Commander, Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR). This officer also holds the title of Chief of Naval Reserve (CNAVRES). The incumbent, based in Washington, D.C., is the principal advisor to the CNO on matters of policy, plans, programming, and budgeting for the USNR.

COMNAVRESFOR, a field command headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, is responsible for the operations, training, administration, and readiness of Naval reservists. Two subordinate flag commands are also located in New Orleans with a Regular or Reserve flag officer commanding each: Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force (COMNAVSURFRESFOR), and Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRESFOR). The senior of the two also serves as Deputy COMNAVRESFOR.

As of September 30, 1989, there were 248,040 members of the USNR, 151,505 of whom are members of the Selected Reserve. The vanguard of the USNR—the Navy's source of immediate mobilization manpower—is the drilling Selected Reservist. These men and women normally train 1 weekend a month and perform at least 2 weeks of active duty annually.

The Selected Reserve is structured to provide an increase in the Navy's combat capability upon mobilization by delivering three types of trained, combat-ready resources: (1) commissioned units; (2) reinforcing units; and (3) sustaining units.

● **Commissioned Units** are complete operational entities. These units, which have organic equipment, include ships, aircraft squadrons, construction battalions, cargo handling battalions, mobile inshore undersea warfare units, and special boat units. As of the end of Fiscal Year 1989, the USNR included the following surface and air commissioned units:

Ships

- 46 ships
 - 22 frigates (FF) (8 KNOX class/16 PERRY class)
 - 1 destroyer (DD)
 - 18 minesweepers (MSO)
 - 2 amphibious ships (LST)
 - 3 salvage ships (ARS)

Shore and Support Forces

- 12 cargo handling battalions (CHB)
- 17 mobile construction battalions (RNMCB)
- 23 mobile inshore undersea warfare (MIUW) units
- 14 craft of opportunity (COOP) units
- 4 special boat units (SBU)
- 1 cargo handling training battalion (CHTB)
- 2 explosive ordnance disposal mobile units (EODMU)
- 9 naval construction regiments (RNCR)
- 4 naval construction force support units (RNCFSU)

Aircraft (51 Squadrons)

- 2 carrier air wings
 - 4 fighter squadrons (VF)
 - 3 strike fighter squadrons (VFA)
 - 1 light attack squadrons (VAL)
 - 2 medium attack squadron (VAM)
 - 2 carrier airborne early warning squadrons (VAW)
 - 2 tactical electronic warfare squadrons (VAQ)
- 2 patrol air wings
 - 13 maritime patrol squadrons (VP)
- 1 helicopter air wing
 - 1 helicopter combat search and rescue squadron (HC)
 - 1 helicopter light attack squadron (HAL)
 - 2 helicopter carrier ASW squadrons (HS)
 - 3 helicopter ASW LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) squadrons (HSL)
 - 2 helicopter mine countermeasure squadrons (HM)
 - 1 helicopter combat support special squadron (HCS)
- fleet logistics support wing
 - 12 fleet logistic support squadrons (VR)
 - 2 fleet fighter/composite squadrons (VFC)

The Selected Reserve also includes over 3,000 reinforcing and sustaining units. These units are composed of professionals in more than 30 fields, such as intelligence, medicine and law. They provide augmentation personnel for virtually every type of Active Navy organization.

- **Reinforcing Units** augment Active Navy commissioned units and operating staffs (and some Marine Corps combat commands) with trained personnel to enable combat forces to operate at the highest level of personnel readiness for an indefinite period of time.

- **Sustaining Units** augment fleet support activities with the trained personnel necessary for a surge capability and for sustaining the high level of activity required to support the deployed forces.

- **Total Force Contribution**


The Navy's heavy investment in its Reserve forces over the past decade has provided adequate force structure for deterrence to be maintained at an affordable cost. While front line equipment is kept in a combat-ready status, the Navy accrues substantial savings in reduced personnel and operating costs. If these forces were held in reserve for mobilization purposes only, force structure cost savings would still accrue, but there would be no peacetime dividend on the outlays for Reserve personnel, equipment and training. Seeking such a dividend, the Navy has structured Reserve training to support a peacetime payoff in the form of "mutual support." In May 1988, the Secretary of the Navy approved a new category of training for Naval reservists, "Mutual Support Training," under which reservists work alongside their active duty counterparts for "hands on" training with the fleet. Below are some examples of mutual support:

- Reserve patrol squadrons provide support for fleet training and exercises, drug interdiction and static displays.
- Reserve fleet logistic support squadrons provide nearly all of the Navy's organic airlift in the continental United States as well as substantial support to the Mediterranean and western Pacific theaters.
- Reserve fighter composite squadrons, flying three versions of the Douglas A-4 aircraft, provide training support to Active Navy and Marine Corps units in dissimilar air combat maneuvering, intercept training, air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons targeting and fleet exercises.

Examples of the USNR as a percentage of the Navy's total capability are presented in figure 5:

Figure 5.

USNR Contributions to the Total Navy



USNR PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NAVY

As of September 30, 1989

● Force Modernization

The partnership between the Navy and the USNR has made the Navy "total force" a reality. The ships operated by the USNR are an integral part of the total Navy. In fact, by the early 1990s one of every 10 ships of the proposed 550-ship Navy will be operated by the Naval Reserve.

Modernization of the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) continued in 1989 with the acceptance of one FFG-7 PERRY Class frigate and one FF-1052 KNOX class frigate. In FY 1990, the NRF will receive an additional two FFG-7 class frigates. An additional 10 FF-1052 class frigates are scheduled to transfer to the NRF between FYs 1990 and 1991. This will bring the total number of frigates in the NRF to 18 FFG-7 class and 18 FF-1052 class frigates.

One amphibious tank landing ship is scheduled to transfer to the NRF in Fiscal Year 1990. In addition, the USNR is scheduled to receive new MHC-52 HERON class coastal mine hunters during the 1990s. Three new mobile inshore undersea warfare units were established in 1989 with two more scheduled in 1990, bringing the total to 30 units.

Modernization of Naval Reserve aviation is accomplished through the Navy's policy of "horizontal integration"—the process of modernizing ships and aircraft by class and type and introducing new generation equipment into the USNR as it is brought on line in the Active force. During the 1980s, Reserve air wings received such aircraft as the F-14, the A-7E and the F/A-18. A second airborne mine countermeasure squadron, flying the RH-53D, was commissioned in the USNR in 1989.

Marine Corps Reserve

● Mission

Charged with providing the means for rapid expansion of the Marine Corps during a national emergency, the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) is the underlying foundation for the sustainability of the Marine Corps upon mobilization. With trained units and qualified individuals on call to rapidly augment and reinforce Active forces in response to crises, the USMCR provides a valuable dimension of the "Total Force" policy.

USMCR roles upon mobilization will be to:

- Selectively augment the Active forces in order to field three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) at full wartime structure.
- If augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, provide a nucleus to reconstitute a Division, Wing and Force Service Support Group.

● History

The Marine Corps Reserve was established by law in 1916, but its unofficial history can be traced back to 1893 when seven states established Marine detachments within their Naval Militia organizations. When World War I was declared in 1917 and the Reserve was called to active duty, it consisted of three officers and 32 enlisted reservists. Over 6,400 Marine reservists served in France with the 4th Marine Brigade. Many other Marine Reserves served during WWI, including the First Marine Aeronautic Company, the first American flying unit of any service to deploy overseas completely trained and equipped.

During the period between World War I and World War II, the USMCR was maintained through the voluntary efforts of a few who desired to see the Corps have a Reserve program. By the late 1930s, their dedication paid off as the program was officially revitalized and expanded.

The contributions of the USMCR in the other major conflicts of this century are as follows:

- WWII—70 percent of the Marines total strength of 475,000 served as reservists. Almost all of the 10,000 Marine aviators served as reservists.
- Korea—Over 85,000 reservists called to active duty
- Vietnam—Although no national mobilization took place, several USMCR elements were deployed to Southeast Asia and served with distinction.

● Structure

The Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for the operation of the Marine Corps' Reserve component. As a member of the Commandant's staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is the principal staff officer for oversight of Reserve matters. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is normally an active duty lieutenant general. As of September 30, 1989, USMCR strength was 80,128, of which 43,576 were members of the Selected Reserve.

The key element of the USMCR is the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) with units organized under the 4th Marine Division (MARDIV), 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and 4th Force Service Support Group (FSSG). The Reserve division and wing headquarters are each commanded by an active duty major general and both are located in New Orleans, Louisiana. The 4th FSSG Headquarters is located in Atlanta, Georgia and commanded by a Reserve brigadier general who reports to the Commanding General, 4th Marine Division. USMCR units are located in 46 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

The 4th MARDIV is made up of nine infantry battalions, an artillery regiment, two tank battalions and various combat and combat support units. The 4th MAW has over 200 fixed and rotary wing aircraft in 19 flying squadrons. These units provide fighter, attack, reconnaissance, assault support, air control and aerial refueling capabilities. The 4th MAW also possesses one light anti-aircraft missile battalion and a variety of aviation support units. The 4th FSSG provides combat service support to the SMCR.


● **Total Force Contribution**

In support of the total force, the USMCR is a fully integrated partner of the Active Marine Corps. Marine reservists are dedicated, professional men and women with a patriotic commitment to our Nation's defense. They are an indispensable asset to the Corps in meeting its role as the Nation's "Force-in-Readiness."

The USMCR constitutes a full 25 percent of the Marine Corps force structure and 33 percent of the trained manpower. The blending of Active and Reserve Marines is the only way to achieve the military strength necessary to meet full Marine Corps wartime requirements.

Specific examples of the USMCR contributions to the total force are depicted in figure 6.

Figure 6.
USMCR Contributions to the Total Marine Corps.



USMCR PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MARINE CORPS

As of September 30, 1989

● Force Modernization

The Reserve is an integral partner of the Active force. All equipment acquisition objectives include Active and Reserve requirements concurrently. The single acquisition objective facilitates the modernization of Marine Corps components and places continuous attention on achieving and maintaining a single equipment inventory. This, in turn, will ensure organizational integrity, maintenance compatibility, single generation supply support and battlefield interoperability.

When possible, the Marine Corps follows a horizontal fielding plan for distribution of new assets. Disbursement of equipment to the Reserves generally follows mobilization priorities based upon various scenarios—that is, “first to fight,” whether Active or Reserve, will be “first to be equipped.”

The 4th Marine Air Wing is an integral part of the Marine Corps’ fighting capability and has been the subject of continual review, repair parts support capability and adaption. In the near future the 4th MAW will add six low altitude air defense platoons and absorb one light anti-aircraft missile battery.

Current aircraft upgrade plans for the 4th MAW are to replace the CH-46 helicopter with more modern troop transport aircraft, to replace the AH-1J attack helicopter with the AH-1W and replace the F-4 with the F/A-18 or the AV-8B “Harrier.” This replacement schedule commenced in 1989 and extends into the 1990s. Two major changes have significantly increased warfighting capability: the expansion to two AH-1 attack helicopter squadrons, one at Camp Pendleton, California; the other at Marietta, Georgia and the activation of a second KC-130T refueling squadron at Stewart International Airport near West Point, New York.

Structural changes for USMCR ground forces that have been directed as part of the Commandant’s warfighting initiatives include:

- Adding scout infantry to the Reserve armored battalion.
- Transferring three general support artillery battalions to the Reserves and adding two general support artillery batteries.
- Transferring three bulk fuel companies and two bridge companies to the Reserve.

Other significant improvements in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve have occurred in the recent past. A light armored vehicle battalion was activated in FY 88. Four TOW missile platoons will complete the structure of Anti-tank Company, 4th Tank Battalion, and an additional platoon will be placed in each of the three infantry regiments.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve

● Mission

The mission of the Air National Guard (ANG) and U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR) is to provide trained units and qualified individuals immediately available for Federal active duty in times of national emergency, as the emergency and as national security may require. Reserve component units must be responsive to situations covering the entire spectrum of warfare—from a mere threat to general war.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the ANG and USAFR have become an integral part of the total force, immediately deployable to support Air Force requirements. During peacetime, all units are assigned to gaining Air Force commands which include the Military Airlift Command, Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Air Force Communications Command, Pacific Air Forces, Alaskan Air Command, Electronic Security Command and Air Training Command.

Increased reliance on the ANG and the USAFR as full partners in defense has allowed these components to evolve into first-line Reserve forces. Today, ANG and USAFR units can be found performing missions throughout the world, from Europe to Asia to the Middle East and to Central and South America. Because they are an integral part of the total force, all ANG and USAFR units must meet Active component training and combat readiness standards.

● Air National Guard History

The National Guard's involvement in aviation began in 1911, when members of the First Company, Signal Corps, New York National Guard became the first in the National Guard to fly a plane. Members of units in Missouri and California also established flying units, but it was not until 1915 that the First Aero Company of New York was federally recognized as the first aviation unit. A year later, the First Aero Company, along with the rest of the National Guard was called to active duty to patrol the Mexican-American border.

Coincident with the establishment of the Department of the Air Force, the Air National Guard was officially established September 18, 1947. The 20th Fighter Squadron of Colorado was the first ANG unit to receive Federal recognition. Since its establishment, the ANG has been involved in every national emergency utilizing Reserve component forces.

- 1950 — Korean War—45,500 members served—four of the U.S. jet Aces were ANG pilots.
- 1961-62 — Berlin crisis—22,000 ANG personnel mobilized.
- 1968-73 — Vietnam War—10,511 ANG members activated.

● **Air National Guard Structure**

ANG units in peacetime are commanded by their State/territorial governors. However, when on Federal active duty, the units are assigned to gaining Air Force commands as an integral part of the total force. Upon mobilization, they are immediately deployable to support Air Force requirements.

The ANG constitutes 27 percent of the Air Force structure with over 115,000 members and 1,735 aircraft organized into:

- 24 wing headquarters
- 67 group headquarters
- 98 flying squadrons
- 282 mission support units

● **Air Force Reserve History**

The National Defense Act of 1916 authorized 296 officers and 2,000 enlisted men to serve in the Aviation Section, Signal Reserve Corps. During World War I, the First Reserve Squadron was formed in New York State. It was mobilized in 1917 and deployed overseas for service in France. Through two decades of austere budgets and manning limitations after World War I, the Army Air Corps used reservists, who were not charged against ceilings, to “keep ’em flying.” With the outbreak of World War II, approximately 1,500 Reserve pilots helped the Army Air Corps during the very critical days following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

As a consequence of the U.S. Air Force attaining separate status in September 1947, the Air Force Reserve was created on April 14, 1948. The following are some significant highlights involving the USAFR since that time.

- 1950—Korea—147,000 Air Force reservists participated.
- 1961-62—Berlin crisis 5,000 Air Force Reserve members were mobilized. Over 14,000 were called up during the Cuban missile crisis.
- 1968-73—Vietnam- over 5,600 Air Force reservists activated.
- 1983—An Air Force Reserve C-141 crew brought back the first American evacuees from Grenada.

● Air Force Reserve Structure

As of September 30, 1989, the USAFR had over 153,000 members. Of this number, over 83,000 were Selected Reservists. About 70,000 Selected Reservists serve as members of 58 USAFR flying units and over 400 combat support units. Most of the remainder are Individual Mobilization Augmentees. The USAFR also assigns full-time statutory tour personnel at many headquarters levels.

The Chief of the Air Force Reserve is a Reserve major general ordered to active duty to head the Office of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Based at the Pentagon, this officer is the principal advisor to the Air Force Chief of Staff and to the Secretary of the Air Force on all Air Force Reserve matters. He develops overall policy for the USAFR and directs two separate headquarters within the USAFR: Headquarters Air Force Reserve (AFRES), Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; and the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), Denver, Colorado. The Chief also coordinates with and assists the other Air Staff Agencies in the development of broad policies, plans, and programs pertaining to the USAFR.

The Vice Commander and chief operating official of the USAFR is also a Reserve major general ordered to extended active duty at the Command's Georgia Headquarters. Day-to-day operations of the Command are managed through the three Reserve Numbered Air Forces; the Fourth at McClellan Air Force Base, California; Tenth at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas; and Fourteenth at Dobbins Air Force Base, Georgia.

- **Total Air Force Contribution**

The Air Force continues to transfer new equipment and missions to the ANG and USAFR.

As a by-product of their primary mission of training for mobilization, the ANG and USAFR perform peacetime missions that are compatible with training and mobilization readiness requirements. These missions help to promote the total force under which all Active and Reserve component forces are one for contingency planning purposes.


The ANG's 102nd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, which began as the First Aero Company of New York (the National Guard's first flying unit), holds the high distinction of being the designated rescue unit for all manned Shuttle missions at NASA's Cape Canaveral launch facility.

In the USAFR, the Reserve Associate Program, developed in 1968, trains reservists with the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Associate crews use the aircraft and maintenance facilities of an Active MAC strategic airlift unit and train with Active component personnel. They fly regularly scheduled strategic airlift and aeromedical airlift missions, thus reducing MAC's personnel needs and overhead costs. Associate maintenance personnel provide MAC a surge capability to allow it to fly the increased hours necessary during contingencies or in wartime. These units provide approximately 50 percent of the authorized aircrews and 40 percent of the maintenance force for the operation of MAC's C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy transports, and over 90 percent of the aircrews for the C-9 Nightingale aeromedical evacuation aircraft.

In 1981, the Reserve Associate Program was expanded to include the Strategic Air Command. The Air Force Reserve provides 50 percent of the aircrews for operation of the KC-10A Extender aircraft.

The contribution of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve is significant as depicted in figures 7 and 8:


Figure 7.
ANG Contributions to the Total Air Force.



ANG PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AIR FORCE

As of September 30, 1989

Figure 8.
USAFR Contributions to the Total Air Force.



USAFR PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AIR FORCE

As of September 30, 1989

• **Force Modernization**

Since 1980, ANG and USAFR individual combat and combat support units have increased from 770 to over 820. In the 10 year period beginning in 1980, almost all ANG and USAFR units have experienced some form of equipment modification.

The ANG continues to modernize its tactical fighter force, replacing older F-4C/D and OA-37 aircraft with more capable F-16, F-15, and A-10 aircraft. During 1989, the ANG converted four squadrons to F-16s, one to F-15s and another to A-10s. During 1990, the program of conversion to more modern aircraft will proceed at an even greater rate, including the first conversion of an A-7 squadron to the F-16.

The ANG's C-5 conversion was completed in 1989. During 1988, the ANG received 10 additional KC-135 strategic refueling aircraft to robust five squadrons from eight to ten authorized aircraft. During 1989, the Air Guard continued to modernize its C-130 fleet, replacing older A/B models with E/H models.

The USAFR upgraded fighter forces by converting two F-4 units to F-16A/B aircraft in FY 1989. This program will continue with plans for completing conversions of one unit in 1990 and two units in 1991. Acquisition of C-130H aircraft in 1988 allowed the USAFR to retire its last C-130A. In 1989 six C-130Hs will replace six C-130Bs and in 1991 another unit will convert from C-130B to C-130E aircraft.

Aerial refueling capability in the USAFR will be enhanced in 1990 with each unit receiving two additional KC-135E aircraft. Strategic airlift conversions were completed with a C-141 unit in 1988 and a C-5 unit in 1989. Additional enhancements of strategic airlift capability scheduled for FY 1991 includes the conversion of a unit to C-141Bs.

The ANG and USAFR are also modernizing existing aircraft. Upgrades are underway on such aircraft as the F-15, F-16, A-7 and A-10. Most of these upgrades consist of installation of state-of-the-art avionics hardware and software which will yield improved operational capabilities.

Coast Guard Reserve

● Mission

The mission of the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR) is to provide trained units and personnel for active duty in time of war or national emergencies and to fill the needs of the parent Service whenever more units and personnel are needed than are in the Active component. The USCGR provides nearly one-fourth of the Coast Guard's total manpower resources.

Coast Guard mission assignments in the event of war or national emergency stem from two major sources. First are the statutory missions assigned to the Coast Guard by law, such as security of the nation's ports and waterways, maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, commercial vessel safety, polar and domestic icebreaking, as well as others. Most of these activities would continue in wartime. Some, such as port security, would expand dramatically in wartime because of the need to protect the nation's water transportation systems.

Other major wartime mission assignments result from war plan tasking developed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and assigned to the Coast Guard. The Navy also shares or reassigns certain wartime tasks to the Coast Guard. Maritime Defense Zones (MDZs) have brought the wartime mobilization mission of the Coast Guard Reserve into sharper focus. Concern over security of the nation's littoral approaches, ports and waterways in a wartime environment led to the formation of the MDZs in 1984.

The MDZs were established in principle by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of the Navy, creating Atlantic and Pacific MDZs. By agreement with the Chief of Naval Operations, Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific Area commanders are designated zone commanders, responsible to fleet commanders-in-chief for preparing, planning, coordinating and conducting coastal defense of the United States. This includes port security, harbor defense, anti-submarine warfare, mine-countermeasures, search and rescue, aids to navigation, and surveillance and interdiction. The commanders of the MDZs will meld together Active and Reserve Forces of the Coast Guard and the Navy in order to accomplish their missions. Atlantic and Pacific MDZ Commanders each have a joint Navy/Coast Guard staff in place that is responsible for all plans. The coastal defense mission takes advantage of the Coast Guard's resources, knowledge, experience and capabilities in operations in the coastal area and of the resources of Navy Active and Reserve units that are trained in the special naval warfare mission.

The U.S. Coast Guard serves within the Department of Transportation in peacetime. Because of this, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to call elements of the USCGR to active duty in support of domestic emergencies which require augmentation of the Active Coast Guard.

- **History**

The USCGR was established on February 19, 1941. Shortly thereafter, on November 23, 1942, a Women's Reserve was established as a branch of the USCGR.

The World War II Reserve consisted entirely of personnel on active duty designated as Reserves, reaching a peak strength of about 144,000 men and women during the war years. During the conflict, Reserves serving on active duty outnumbered Regulars by over 5 to 1. In addition, the Coast Guard Temporary Reserve, an organization that reached a peak strength of about 45,000 members, performed port security.

The enactment of the Magnuson Act in 1950 resulted in a significant expansion of Coast Guard responsibilities with respect to the safety and security of the nation's ports, waterways and waterfront facilities. At about this same time, funds were designated by Congress for the establishment of a paid drilling Reserve in support of the increase in port security responsibilities. The first organized USCGR unit was formed in Boston in October 1950.

There were no formal callups of USCGR elements for the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. However, in each case, reservists volunteered for active duty in sufficient numbers to effectively augment the Active Coast Guard.

● **Structure**

Unlike the other Armed Forces of the United States which are in the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard serves in peacetime as an agency within the Department of Transportation. In wartime or whenever the President so directs, the Coast Guard becomes a Service under the Department of the Navy. The USCGR is directed by an active duty rear admiral serving as Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve.

As of September 30, 1989, the USCGR had a strength of approximately 17,800. Of this number about 12,000 were members of the Selected Reserve. They are assigned to 260 Coast Guard Selected Reserve units located in 40 states, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia and Guam. The following chart depicts the seven types of Reserve units with the number in each category. These units are incorporated into 51 Reserve group commands within the ten Coast Guard Districts.

USCGR UNITS

| Type of Unit | Number |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|
| Port Security | 187 |
| General Support | 30 |
| Rescue Coordination | 3 |
| Inspection | 7 |
| Vessel Augmentation | 9 |
| Aviation | 3 |
| Mobilization Planning and Procedures | 8 |
| Administrative Groups | 51 |

● **Total Force Contribution**


The strength of the Coast Guard forces is a vital factor in defense readiness. Active forces of the Coast Guard represent the nucleus manpower requirements for mobilization. The most critical of the short-falls in these requirements—those that must be filled during the first 30 days following an order to mobilize—are scheduled to be filled by the Ready Reserve.

Since most of the Coast Guard's missions are equally applicable in peace and war, much of its Reserve component training is directed to supporting Coast Guard programs. Reservists perform nearly two-thirds of their training by augmenting Active component units. Coast Guard reservists are fully integrated into the functions and responsibilities of Captain of the Port operations, conducting port security inspections, safety and environmental protection patrols, and monitoring petroleum and hazardous material transfer and handling operations. At coastal search and rescue stations, reservists are integrated into station operations by standing communications watches and participating as crew members of search and rescue boats. Many reservists have qualified as boat coxswains and boat engineers, and it is not unusual for a mixed Active/Reserve component crew to have a Reserve coxswain. Reservists also augment and train on major Coast Guard cutters.

Reservists are frequently called to active duty to augment the Active Coast Guard in response to major disasters, both natural and man-made. During the 1980s, reservists have contributed significantly to Coast Guard efforts in response to such situations as the influx of hundreds of thousands of Cuban nationals along the southern U.S. coastal area, the Space Shuttle "Challenger" disaster, and others. Reservists have participated actively in port security operations for such major events as the 1984 Olympics and the Statue of Liberty centennial. Reservists are frequently called upon to assist in the protection of sensitive naval vessels as they enter and leave port—sometimes encountering large civilian demonstrations.

In response to the massive Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, nearly 400 Coast Guard reservists from all over the United States were sent to Alaska in support of Coast Guard oversight for clean-up operations, providing over 13,000 man-days of assistance. The destruction which resulted from Hurricane Hugo in 1989 provided yet another instance in which reservists quickly took positions alongside their active duty counterparts to expand the Coast Guard's capabilities. The security and recovery roles they played helped return life to normal in areas devastated by that storm.

Examples of the USCGR as a percentage of total Coast Guard capability are shown in figure 10:



As of September 30, 1989

- **Force Modernization**

At the request of the U.S. Congress, the Secretary of Transportation has prepared a plan for the USCGR to achieve 95 percent of its wartime mobilization requirements for Selected Reserve strength in terms of personnel and equipment over a 10-year period. As a first step, the President requested an increase in the authorized personnel strength of the Coast Guard Selected Reserve in his Fiscal Year 1990 budget request.

Modernization initiatives are underway to reduce mobilization equipment shortfalls, and to ensure that Coast Guard reservists will be adequately equipped to perform their wartime tasks. During 1989, communications upgrades were made in support of both the harbor defense role and the Coast Guard's other traditional missions. The three Coast Guard deployable port security units, presently 100 percent Reserve force manned, received their transportable port security boats in 1989. Other planned upgrades to the Coast Guard Reserve will involve procurement of such items as boats, surface vehicles, personal gear, protective clothing, defensive weapons systems and sensors.

SERVICE IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

Since 1973, the U.S. military has been an all volunteer force, but each individual appointed or enlisted automatically assumes a military service obligation (MSO). The military service obligation may be fulfilled by serving in the Active component, the Reserve component or a combination of both. On June 1, 1984 the military service obligation for new accessions was increased from 6 to 8 years.

Personnel Source

Personnel in National Guard and Reserve units come from two sources—non-prior service and prior service.

- **Non-prior Service.** Men and women without prior military service may enlist in a Reserve program provided they meet age, mental, and physical standards. A person may enlist at age 17 with parental consent. Individuals normally enlist for a specific unit compatible with their background, abilities, and interests. Reserve programs require enlistees to serve an initial period on active duty to undergo basic training and basic technical schooling or on-the-job training in a military specialty or occupation. Upon completion of the active duty training the reservist returns to the local unit in which he or she enlisted.
- **Prior Service.** Personnel with prior military service are recruited into the Reserve components. These individuals have completed their active duty obligation and voluntarily accept a Reserve obligation. Pay, camaraderie, and sense of duty are reasons why these people voluntarily join a Reserve unit. Approximately 44 percent of Reserve component members have completed 2 or more years of active duty. The more demanding technical skills tend to rely heavily on prior service individuals who have had technical training and hands-on experience while on active duty. For example, all Navy and Marine Corps pilots have completed 5 or more years of active duty before joining the Reserve component.

- **Women.** Women comprise about 11 percent of Reserve component personnel and serve in nearly all military skills except those involving direct combat.
- **Promotions.** Reserve component promotion systems are separate from those of the Active component. Reserve personnel compete only with other reservists of their service for promotion. It is possible to be promoted from Army recruit to sergeant within 40 months; from second lieutenant to colonel in 16 years.
- **Officer Procurement.** Sources of commissioned officers are the Federal Service Academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and direct appointment. The Federal Service Academies offer 4 years of college education leading to a bachelor degree. ROTC training is offered at selected public and private colleges and universities throughout the United States. ROTC scholarships are available to many qualified students; all students in the advanced ROTC course (third and fourth college years) receive a \$100 monthly stipend. Each Active component offers an Officer Candidate Program. Additionally, the National Guard offers state OCS programs to qualified high school graduates. The Air National Guard offers the Academy of Military Sciences for qualified college graduates. The majority of commissioned officers in the Reserve components have 2 or more years of active duty experience.

TRAINING

Training Obligations. Each member of the Selected Reserve assigned to a unit is required to attend at least 48 paid training assemblies, each being a minimum of four hours duration, and to perform two weeks annual training (AT) each year. The prevalent system in most units is to meet one weekend (16 hours) per month. Individuals are also eligible for active duty for training (ADT) to accomplish additional military training and schooling. The minimum training objective is to attain unit level proficiency for its mobilization mission.

Integrated Training. Each of the Services has incorporated training of its Reserve components with its Active component. For example, the Army through CAPSTONE, the Air Force through its Associate program, and most services in Augmentation Training.

- **CAPSTONE.** Links units of the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve that would likely operate together. Because many peacetime chains-of-command would change after mobilization, the Army decided that those units that would serve together after a call-up need to coordinate, plan, and train together during peacetime. CAPSTONE helps determine where, when, and with whom a unit will train. Linked units and commands trade staff visits and standard operating procedures, and fashion strong informal ties among commanders and staff members.

- **Roundout.** A special type of CAPSTONE relationship, provides units of the ARNG and USAR to bring Active component units to full strength. Upon mobilization, Reserve component Roundout units complete the force structure of Active component units that are organized—in peacetime—at less than their full wartime configurations. For instance, there are nine Active component divisions that cannot achieve full combat potential until augmented by ARNG or USAR units of battalion or brigade size.

- **Reserve Associate Program.** The Air Force Reserve Associate Program trains reservists with the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Associate crews, which have no aircraft of their own, use the aircraft and maintenance facilities of the MAC strategic airlift unit and train with Active component personnel. They fly regularly scheduled MAC strategic airlift and aeromedical airlift missions, thus reducing MAC's personnel needs and overhead costs. Associate maintenance personnel provide MAC a surge capability to allow it to fly the increased hours necessary during contingencies or in wartime. The USAFR also performs an associate role with the Strategic Air Command (SAC), flying the KC-10 Extender aircraft, which increases SAC's ability to provide support to fighter and transport aircraft deployments.

- **Augmentation Training.** Augmentation Training is defined as any Reserve component activity that supports effective training for mobilization while meeting a stated need of an element of the Active component. For example, since the Coast Guard's missions are equally applicable in peace and war, the majority of Reserve training is directed to supporting the Coast Guard programs (search and rescue, merchant marine and boating safety, aids to navigation, icebreaking, port safety, and law enforcement) and thus supplements the Active component during national emergencies or natural disasters.


Exchange Programs. Reserve exchange programs are designed to provide Reserve individuals and units an opportunity to orient themselves in their military duties while serving with counterparts in the armed forces of the host nation. Additionally, they provide a sharing of expertise and knowledge between NATO allies and the United States which can be utilized to enhance total force readiness of all allies. Currently there are two DoD exchange programs at the individual Reserve officer level, one with the United Kingdom and the other with the Federal Republic of Germany. Several other programs exist between the respective services and foreign countries that include Reserve officer and/or enlisted personnel exchanges.

Overseas Training. Each of the Reserve components participates in overseas training. This program sends entire Reserve units—or cells composed of key unit members—to train overseas in locations where the unit would be most likely to deploy after a mobilization. This training is realistic and provides the opportunity for units and individuals to conduct mission-oriented training in an overseas environment while completing tasks in support of real world requirements. Many of these programs are reciprocal, involving exchanges of units or individuals, both officer and enlisted, between the U.S. and other countries. In FY 89, more than 110,000 reservists trained in over 50 countries worldwide. The growth of the overseas training program is evident when the '89 figures are compared with FY 81, when only 19,824 reservists participated.

FULL-TIME SUPPORT

With the exception of the Coast Guard Reserve, Reserve component units are manned by a mix of part-time and full-time personnel. However, most unit members are drilling reservists, trained men and women who participate on a part-time basis, spending 300 to 350 hours a year in maintaining their proficiency. This limited time must be used for training and mission preparation. Because of these constraints, unit commanders and members are painfully aware of the unit training "time squeeze." This competition for a reservist's time is graphically portrayed in figure 10:

Figure 10.
Unit Training Time Squeeze.



Clearly, continuity of mission, maintenance, and administration can not be accomplished with only part-time participation. Nor would it be effective to use valuable training time of part-time reservists to perform everyday housekeeping tasks. For this reason, extensive use is made of full-time support personnel to provide for administration, maintenance, recruiting, and training the Reserve components.

Except for some civil service employees, each individual in a full-time support position also fills an organizational billet within the Reserve unit.

There are four categories of full-time support personnel:

- **Active Component personnel:** Provide current experience with Active component equipment, operational doctrine, and training techniques. Upon mobilization, these personnel will serve with the Reserve unit to which assigned.
- **Reserve component personnel on active duty:** Provide Reserve component expertise and assignment flexibility. The generic term applied to these personnel is **Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)**. They are sometimes referred to as Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) in the Naval Reserve and as Full Time Support (FTS) in the Marine Corps Reserve.
- **Military Technicians:** Dual status individuals who work full time as a civilian for a Reserve unit and also are a drilling reservist. Military Technicians serve in the four Reserve components of the Army and the Air Force.
- **Civilian:** Provide clerical, technical and administrative support at all levels. They have no requirement to belong to the Reserve components.

Together, these elements enable drilling reservists to concentrate their limited training time on preparing for their mobilization missions. Shown below is the Full Time Support Personnel actual end strength as of September 30, 1989:

Table 4.
Full Time Support Personnel

| SERVICE | ACTIVE COMPONENT | AGR | MILITARY TECHNICIAN | CIVILIAN | SERVICE TOTALS |
|----------------|-------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| ARNG | 576 | 25893 | 25923 | 3091 | 55483 |
| USAR | 1163 | 13344 | 7613 | 5613 | 27733 |
| USNR | 7239 | 21987 | 0 | 2895 | 32121 |
| USMCR | 5430 | 1948 | 0 | 333 | 7711 |
| ANG | 600 | 8019 | 23140 | 2511 | 34270 |
| USAFR | 592 | 635 | 9299 | 4856 | 15382 |
| USCGR | 599 | 0 | 0 | 112 | 711 |
| TOTAL | 16199 | 71826 | 65975 | 19411 | 173411 |

MOBILIZATION

Authority

The President and the Congress of the United States have broad powers to utilize the National Guard and Reserve in a national emergency. The President has the authority, under law, to order to active duty:

- (1) as many as 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for up to 90 days and to extend the callup for an additional 90 days, if necessary, without regard to a state of national emergency or war for the purpose of augmenting the Active component forces for an operational mission;
- (2) as many as one million members of the Ready Reserve, for not longer than 24 months in a national emergency.

With a declaration by the U.S. Congress of a national emergency or war, all the Reserve components, including those in Standby and Retired status could be ordered to active duty for the duration of the war, plus 6 months.

In recent years, the Congress has authorized the Secretary of Transportation to mobilize selected units and individuals in the Coast Guard Reserve to meet urgent needs of a domestic emergency, particularly those relating to natural disasters. A similar authority, held by the governors of the states and territories, has also been a long-standing feature of the National Guard in fulfilling its peacetime responsibilities as a state or territorial force.

The U.S. Active component military forces are currently manned at a peacetime level. In the event of mobilization, wartime strength would be achieved by calling to active duty the National Guard and Reserve forces. In later months, these pretrained personnel would be supplemented by newly trained draftees or volunteers.

Personnel Screening

- **Ready Reserve.** The screening process is used to identify members who would be unable to meet mobilization requirements and to eliminate those members from the Ready Reserve before mobilization. Upon mobilization, all members remaining in the Ready Reserve are considered immediately available for active service.

- **Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).** All members of the IRR are required to serve at least 1 day of duty each year for screening to ensure maximum availability and utilization of the IRR in time of mobilization. During this process, personnel records are updated, physical condition is checked and military skill proficiency is tested.

Personnel Reporting

Upon notification, members of the Selected Reserve are required to report for active duty within 24 hours to their unit or initial reporting assignment. Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard members are required to report within 5 to 15 days of notification as determined by the respective Military Service. Official notification may either be written or oral.

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

Members of the Reserve components face one major challenge not encountered by members of the Active components—most of them have civilian employment. Consequently, to accomplish training, members of the Reserve components must frequently request time off from their employers.

While there are laws that provide protections to many employees, the willing support of the employer is obviously beneficial to the individual reservist or National Guard member. Therefore, employers can play an important role in the national defense. Conflicts between the employer and the employee because of competing employment and military priorities must be minimized.

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve was established in 1972 to achieve cooperation and understanding between employers and members of the National Guard or Reserve and to assist in the resolution of conflicts. Its basic mission is one of education—few employers are knowledgeable about the role the National Guard and Reserve now play in the national defense and the higher readiness standards that the Reserve components must therefore meet.

A great many employers, when they know the facts, demonstrate their full support of their employees who are members of the Reserve components. In some cases, private and public employers pay reservists their full salaries during annual training time; others make up the difference between the employee's civilian pay and the military pay.

The National Committee, working through the efforts of some 3600 unpaid volunteers in 55 State and territorial committees, conducts a variety of public affairs activities to accomplish its mission. In 1989, the State committees conducted 89 "bosslifts," taking employers to see National Guard and Reserve training. The committees conducted 153 other events to plan and support their programs.

The National Committee, supported by the Advertising Council, manages a national public service advertising program. In 1989, two television products and new print and radio advertisements were produced and released. The theme of the campaign was "Be a hero! Support the Guard and Reserve. It's good for your country and your company." For the first time, advertising materials were produced in Spanish to reach employers in Hispanic communities. Distribution was made to 9300 newspapers and 4700 other publications. Billboard posters were shipped to 518 outdoor advertising companies.

To support distribution, State committees identified local public affairs volunteers, trained at the first National Public Affairs Seminar, to visit local media outlets and seek their support by educating the directors/editors on the number of members of the community who were National Guard or Reserve members.

Over 7100 awards were presented to recognize employers across the nation who supported their employees. This figure includes 20 Pro Patria awards, signed by the Secretary of Defense, that recognize particularly significant contributions on the part of the employer.

The National Committee's goal for 1990 is "Mission One", a program to ultimately place a trained, knowledgeable volunteer with every National Guard and Reserve training site in the nation—over 6000. The purpose is to provide every Reserve component commander and member with an immediate resource should an employment conflict occur.

RESERVE COMPONENT PAY, BENEFITS, AND ENTITLEMENTS

Pay

Reserve component pay is based on the active duty pay scale for grade and length of service. During Inactive Duty Training (IDT) periods, members of the Selected Reserve receive one day's basic pay (plus any special pay to which entitled) for each Unit Training Assembly (UTA) attended. An example of special pay is flight pay for aircrew members. A UTA is 4 to 6 hours in duration, typically performed on a weekend. Since 2 UTA's can be performed in 1 day, National Guardsmen and reservists normally receive 2 days' basic pay for each 8 hour period. During Annual Training (AT), Active Duty for Training (ADT), and Full Time Training Duty (FTTD) periods, members receive essentially the same compensation (basic pay, special pay, reimbursement for quarters and subsistence) as their Active component counterparts; in other words, one day's pay and allowances for each day of duty performed. For extended tours of active duty, depending on duration, reservists receive other entitlements such as paid leave, moving allowance and others.

Based on pay tables effective January 1 1990, annual earnings of a lieutenant colonel or equivalent with 18 years of service could be more than \$7,500 for attending 48 training assemblies and 2 weeks annual training. A junior enlisted member (E3 with 3 years service) would be paid approximately \$1,800 for attending 48 training assemblies and 2 weeks annual training. Reservists with dependents receive an additional allowance for quarters during annual training. Some Reserve component personnel are eligible for additional special pay for aviation duty, medical, or dental service or hazardous duty pay.

Bonuses

In addition to pay received for weekend drills and their two week annual active duty for training periods, many enlisted reservists are eligible for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. Cash bonuses are granted to enlisted members in the Selected Reserve who possess critically needed skills. Qualified non-prior service enlistees can earn bonuses of up to \$2,000 for a 6 year commitment to the Selected Reserve. Additionally, for those members leaving active duty who still have a remaining Military Service Obligation (MSO), a cash bonus may be paid (up to 50 dollars per month) for each month remaining on the MSO, provided the member agrees to affiliate with the Selected Reserve. To retain personnel in the Reserve components beyond their initial term of service, a reenlistment/enlistment bonus of up to \$1,500 for a 3-year reenlistment and up to \$3,000 for a 6-year reenlistment is offered in qualifying critical specialties and units. Beginning in 1986, a prior service bonus was offered for the first time to be paid on the same basis as the reenlistment bonus for either a 3 or 6 year commitment in the Selected Reserve.

Educational Assistance

The G.I. Bill for Selected Reservists was effective July 1 1985. It offers an educational assistance program towards a baccalaureate degree for both officers and enlisted personnel who agree to serve in the Selected Reserve for 6 years. Benefits may not be paid to members prior to completion of their initial period of active duty training. Payments for full-time students are \$140 a month for 36 months. Monies received from the G.I. Bill program are non-taxable.

Certain members of the Selected Reserve actively pursuing a college education may have portions of government-financed student loans forgiven at the rate of 15 percent or 500 dollars (whichever is greater) per year for each year of satisfactory participation in the Selected Reserve. This program is currently available to members of the Army Reserve and the Air National Guard.

Benefits

Members of the Ready Reserve are entitled to use the military exchange system based upon the formula of 1 day of shopping for each period of inactive duty training. Selected Reservists are authorized up to 12 days commissary use per year. In addition, Reserve component personnel may use military clothing stores, official library services, and have access to some service clubs. Ready Reservists who perform at least 12 drills yearly and participate in Annual Training also may receive full-time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance with \$50,000 coverage for \$4.00 per month.

Entitlements

Members of the Reserve components who accumulate 20 qualifying years of creditable service and who reach age 60 are entitled to retired pay computed on the basis of retirement points accumulated. The qualifying years can be earned on active duty, inactive duty or a combination of both, but the last 8 qualifying years must be served in a Reserve component. A qualifying year is not the same as a calendar year, but is one during which a member of a Reserve component accumulates 50 or more retirement points. Points are awarded on the basis of one point for each 4-hour assembly (UTA), each day of active duty, and each three credits of military correspondence studies completed. Additionally, 15 points are awarded annually for membership. Not more than 60 points per year for inactive duty training and membership may be credited for retirement purposes during any retirement year.

Retired pay is computed by totalling all retirement points accumulated and dividing by 360. The quotient is then multiplied by 2½ percent and the resulting percentage applied to the active duty base pay rate for the grade and number of years of service, using the pay schedule in effect at the time the member draws retired pay. Based on the 1990 pay schedule, a lieutenant colonel or equivalent, retired with three years of active Federal service and 20 years of Reserve component service (about 2200 retirement points), would receive approximately \$600 per month retired pay beginning at age 60. Upon receipt of retired pay, reservists and their dependents become eligible for the same medical care benefits as are accorded Active component retirees. Retirees are also eligible to use military facilities such as commissary stores, post exchanges, clothing sales stores, theaters, recreation facilities, clubs, guest house accommodations and more. Space-available air travel on military aircraft is also authorized for retired reservists.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Two important legislative proposals affecting the U.S. Reserve component personnel policy continued to be worked and refined during 1989. These are the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, already sent to the Congress for approval, and the Uniformed Services Employment Rights Act, which was in the final review process in the Executive branch as of February 1990. Both measures could become law in 1990.

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)

ROPMA is designed to provide a new set of laws to update personnel management of Reserve officers along the lines of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, previously enacted, which applies to Active component officers. Specific goals of ROPMA include:

- provide common rules for all Reserve components regarding appointment, promotion, and separation of Reserve officers.
- establish a uniform and improved officer personnel management system for Reserve officers not on extended active duty.
- provide the flexibility to respond to changing officer requirements.
- allow for an attractive career progression for Reserve officers while still achieving management objectives.

Uniformed Services Employment Rights Act

This proposed legislation is the result of a joint study by the Department of Defense and the Department of Labor. It would provide an update of statutes governing both employment and reemployment rights for reservists. The effort is intended to address a number of issues, including: rights of Federal Government employees who are reservists; more effective use of conciliation rather than formal enforcement action to resolve disputes; a clearer definition of "active duty" as it applies to reemployment rights; and a description of the obligations owed by reservists to their civilian employers.

Insignia of Rank

The officer and enlisted insignias of rank for each of the Armed Services are portrayed at Appendix C. There is no differentiation of rank or insignia between the Active and Reserve components.

Reserve Component Addresses

Addresses for each of the Reserve components are provided in Appendix D for anyone desiring additional information.

TOTAL RESERVE STRENGTH

TOTAL FY 1989 RESERVE MANPOWER

OFFICIAL
NUMBERS

AS OF: SEPTEMBER 1989
(4th Qtr, FY 1989)

| TOTAL RESERVE MANPOWER | |
|------------------------|-----------|
| ARNG | 467,086 |
| USAR | 594,464 |
| USNR | 248,040 |
| USMCR | 81,529 |
| ANG | 116,061 |
| USAFR | 153,630 |
| TOTAL DOD | 1,660,810 |
| USCGR | 17,773 |
| TOTAL | 1,678,583 |

| READY RESERVE | |
|---------------|-----------|
| ARNG | 467,086 |
| USAR | 593,832 |
| USNR | 238,061 |
| USMCR | 80,128 |
| ANG | 116,061 |
| USAFR | 136,331 |
| TOTAL DOD | 1,631,499 |
| USCGR | 17,211 |
| TOTAL | 1,648,710 |

| STANDBY RESERVE | |
|-----------------|--------|
| ARNG | 0 |
| USAR | 632 |
| USNR | 9,979 |
| USMCR | 1,401 |
| ANG | 0 |
| USAFR | 17,299 |
| TOTAL DOD | 29,311 |
| USCGR | 562 |
| TOTAL | 29,875 |

| SELECTED RESERVE | |
|------------------|-----------|
| ARNG | 456,960 |
| USAR | 319,244 |
| USNR | 151,505 |
| USMCR | 43,576 |
| ANG | 116,061 |
| USAFR | 83,214 |
| TOTAL DOD | 1,170,560 |
| USCGR | 12,012 |
| TOTAL | 1,182,572 |

| IRR/ING | |
|-----------|---------|
| ARNG | 10,126 |
| USAR | 274,588 |
| USNR | 86,556 |
| USMCR | 36,552 |
| ANG | 0 |
| USAFR | 53,117 |
| TOTAL DOD | 460,939 |
| USCGR | 5,199 |
| TOTAL | 466,138 |

| TRAINED PERSONNEL (UNIT & INDIVIDUALS) | |
|---|-----------|
| ARNG | 418,467 |
| USAR | 288,275 |
| USNR | 142,194 |
| USMCR | 39,357 |
| ANG | 113,154 |
| USAFR | 81,328 |
| TOTAL DOD | 1,082,775 |
| USCGR | 11,594 |
| TOTAL | 1,094,369 |

| TRAINING PIPELINE | |
|-------------------|--------|
| ARNG | 38,493 |
| USAR | 30,969 |
| USNR | 9,311 |
| USMCR | 4,219 |
| ANG | 2,907 |
| USAFR | 1,886 |
| TOTAL DOD | 85,925 |
| USCGR | 418 |
| TOTAL | 86,343 |

| IRR | |
|-----------|---------|
| ARNG | 0 |
| USAR | 274,588 |
| USNR | 86,556 |
| USMCR | 36,552 |
| ANG | 0 |
| USAFR | 53,117 |
| TOTAL DOD | 450,813 |
| USCGR | 5,199 |
| TOTAL | 456,012 |

| ING | |
|------|--------|
| ARNG | 10,126 |

RESERVE DRILL PAY RATES

4 DAYS OF DRILL PAY
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1990

| PAY GRADE | YEARS OF SERVICE | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| | <2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 18 | 20 | 22 | 26 |
| COMMISSIONED OFFICERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| O-10 | 788.84 | 816.60 | 816.60 | 816.60 | 816.60 | 847.92 | 847.92 | 894.92 | 894.92 | 949.68 | 949.68 | 949.68 | 949.68 | 1007.80 |
| O-9 | 699.12 | 717.44 | 732.72 | 732.72 | 732.72 | 751.36 | 751.36 | 782.64 | 782.64 | 847.92 | 847.92 | 894.92 | 894.92 | 949.68 |
| O-8 | 633.24 | 652.20 | 667.68 | 667.68 | 667.68 | 717.44 | 717.44 | 751.36 | 751.36 | 782.64 | 816.60 | 847.92 | 868.80 | 868.80 |
| O-7 | 526.16 | 561.92 | 561.92 | 561.92 | 587.12 | 587.12 | 621.16 | 621.16 | 652.20 | 717.44 | 766.80 | 766.80 | 766.80 | 766.80 |
| O-6 | 390.00 | 428.48 | 456.56 | 456.56 | 456.56 | 456.56 | 456.56 | 456.56 | 472.04 | 546.68 | 574.60 | 587.12 | 621.16 | 673.68 |
| O-5 | 311.88 | 366.24 | 391.56 | 391.56 | 391.56 | 391.56 | 403.40 | 425.08 | 453.60 | 487.56 | 515.52 | 531.12 | 549.68 | 549.68 |
| O-4 | 262.92 | 320.16 | 341.52 | 341.52 | 347.84 | 363.20 | 387.96 | 409.76 | 428.48 | 447.28 | 459.64 | 459.64 | 459.64 | 459.64 |
| O-3 | 244.32 | 273.16 | 292.04 | 323.12 | 338.56 | 350.72 | 369.68 | 387.96 | 397.52 | 397.52 | 397.52 | 397.52 | 397.52 | 397.52 |
| O-2 | 219.04 | 232.68 | 279.52 | 288.92 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 | 294.96 |
| O-1 | 184.96 | 192.56 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 | 232.68 |
| COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| O-3E | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 323.12 | 338.56 | 350.72 | 369.68 | 387.96 | 403.40 | 403.40 | 403.40 | 403.40 | 403.40 | 403.40 |
| O-2E | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 288.92 | 294.96 | 304.28 | 320.16 | 332.40 | 341.52 | 341.52 | 341.52 | 341.52 | 341.52 | 341.52 |
| O-1E | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 232.68 | 248.56 | 257.72 | 267.04 | 276.36 | 288.92 | 288.92 | 288.92 | 288.92 | 288.92 | 288.92 |
| WARRANT OFFICERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| W-4 | 248.92 | 267.04 | 267.04 | 273.16 | 285.56 | 298.16 | 310.68 | 332.40 | 347.84 | 360.04 | 369.68 | 381.64 | 394.40 | 425.08 |
| W-3 | 226.24 | 245.40 | 245.40 | 248.56 | 251.44 | 269.84 | 285.56 | 294.96 | 304.28 | 313.36 | 323.12 | 335.68 | 347.84 | 360.04 |
| W-2 | 198.12 | 214.36 | 214.36 | 220.64 | 232.68 | 245.40 | 254.72 | 264.04 | 273.16 | 282.76 | 292.04 | 301.24 | 313.36 | 313.36 |
| W-1 | 165.08 | 189.28 | 189.28 | 205.08 | 214.36 | 223.60 | 232.68 | 242.28 | 251.44 | 260.84 | 269.84 | 279.52 | 279.52 | 279.52 |
| ENLISTED MEMBERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| E-9 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 289.56 | 296.08 | 302.80 | 309.72 | 316.64 | 322.80 | 339.76 | 372.80 |
| E-8 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 242.84 | 249.76 | 256.36 | 263.00 | 269.96 | 276.16 | 282.96 | 299.56 | 332.92 |
| E-7 | 169.52 | 183.00 | 189.80 | 196.44 | 203.12 | 209.60 | 216.32 | 223.04 | 233.16 | 239.76 | 246.44 | 249.64 | 266.40 | 299.56 |
| E-6 | 145.88 | 158.96 | 165.60 | 172.64 | 179.08 | 185.56 | 192.40 | 202.32 | 208.64 | 215.40 | 218.68 | 218.68 | 218.68 | 218.68 |
| E-5 | 128.00 | 139.32 | 146.08 | 152.44 | 162.44 | 169.08 | 175.80 | 182.24 | 185.56 | 185.56 | 185.56 | 185.56 | 185.56 | 185.56 |
| E-4 | 119.40 | 126.08 | 133.48 | 143.84 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 | 149.52 |
| E-3 | 112.48 | 118.64 | 123.40 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 | 128.28 |
| E-2 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 | 108.24 |
| E-1 >4 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 | 96.56 |
| E-1 <4 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 | 89.28 |

INSIGNIA OF RANK OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

OFFICERS

O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 O-7 O-8 O-9 O-10 SPECIAL

NAVY

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------|-------------------------|------------|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------|---------------|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| ENSIGN | LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE | LIEUTENANT | LIEUTENANT COMMANDER | COMMANDER | CAPTAIN | REAR ADMIRAL (LOWER HALF) | REAR ADMIRAL | VICE ADMIRAL | ADMIRAL | FLEET ADMIRAL |

MARINES

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------------|---------|-------|--------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| SECOND LIEUTENANT | FIRST LIEUTENANT | CAPTAIN | MAJOR | LIEUTENANT COLONEL | COLONEL | BRIGADIER GENERAL | MAJOR GENERAL | LIEUTENANT GENERAL | GENERAL | |

ARMY

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------------|---------|-------|--------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------|---------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| SECOND LIEUTENANT | FIRST LIEUTENANT | CAPTAIN | MAJOR | LIEUTENANT COLONEL | COLONEL | BRIGADIER GENERAL | MAJOR GENERAL | LIEUTENANT GENERAL | GENERAL | GENERAL OF THE ARMY |


AIR FORCE

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------------|---------|-------|--------------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------|--------------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| SECOND LIEUTENANT | FIRST LIEUTENANT | CAPTAIN | MAJOR | LIEUTENANT COLONEL | COLONEL | BRIGADIER GENERAL | MAJOR GENERAL | LIEUTENANT GENERAL | GENERAL | GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE |

WARRANT

| NAVY | | | MARINES | | ARMY | |
|-----------------------|-----|--|-----------------------|--|-----------------------|--|
| | | | | | | |
| WARRANT OFFICER | W-1 | | WARRANT OFFICER | | WARRANT OFFICER | |
| | | | | | | |
| CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | W-2 | | CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | | CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | |
| | | | | | | |
| CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | W-3 | | CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | | CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | |
| | | | | | | |
| CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | W-4 | | CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | | CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER | |

COAST GUARD













Coast Guard enlisted rating badges are the same as the Navy's for grades E-1 through E-6. E-7s through E-9s have silver specialty marks, eagles and stars, and gold chevrons. The badge of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard has a gold chevron and specialty mark, a silver eagle and gold stars. Coast Guard officers use the same rank insignia as Navy officers. For all ranks, the gold Coast Guard shield on the uniform sleeve replaces the Navy star.












ENLISTED

E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9













NAVY

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|---|--|---|---|---|---|
|  SEAMAN RECRUIT |  SEAMAN APPRENTICE |  SEAMAN |  PETTY OFFICER THIRD CLASS |  PETTY OFFICER SECOND CLASS |  PETTY OFFICER FIRST CLASS |  CHIEF PETTY OFFICER |  SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER |  MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER |  MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE NAVY |
|--|---|---|--|---|--|---|---|---|---|

MARINES

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|---|--|---|---|--|--|
| (no insignia) PRIVATE |  PRIVATE FIRST CLASS |  LANCE CORPORAL |  CORPORAL |  SERGEANT |  STAFF SERGEANT |  GUNNERY SERGEANT |  FIRST SERGEANT |  SERGEANT MAJOR |  SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE MARINE CORPS |
| | | | | | | |  MASTER SERGEANT |  MASTER GUNNERY SERGEANT | |

ARMY

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|---|--|---|---|--|---|
| (no insignia) PRIVATE |  PRIVATE |  PRIVATE FIRST CLASS |  CORPORAL |  SERGEANT |  STAFF SERGEANT |  SERGEANT FIRST CLASS |  FIRST SERGEANT |  COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR |  SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE ARMY |
| | | |  SPECIALIST 4 | | | |  MASTER SERGEANT |  SERGEANT MAJOR | |

AIR FORCE










| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|---|--|--|--|---|--|---|
| (no insignia) AIRMAN BASIC |  AIRMAN |  AIRMAN FIRST CLASS |  SERGEANT |  STAFF SERGEANT |  TECHNICAL SERGEANT |  MASTER SERGEANT |  SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT |  CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT |  CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT OF THE AIR FORCE |
|----------------------------------|---|--|---|--|--|--|---|--|---|

Chart by Phyllis Cox and John Pack

RESERVE COMPONENT ADDRESSES



Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Reserve Affairs)
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1500



Chief, National Guard Bureau
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-2500



Director, Army National Guard
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-2500



Director, Air National Guard
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-2500



Chief, Army Reserve
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310



Director, Naval Reserve
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350



Chief, Air Force Reserve
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-5440



Commandant of the Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs (Code: RES)
Washington, D.C. 20380-0001



Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve
Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard
2100 2nd Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20593