

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
S

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Speech File Backup Files
Subseries: Chron File, 1989-1993

OA/ID Number: 13717
Folder ID Number: 13717-003

Folder Title:
Korean War Veterans Memorial 5/1/90 [OA 6890]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	26	20	5	5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADDRESS TO THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS ADVISORY BOARD

DATE: MAY 1, 1990
TIME: 8:10 P.M.
LOCATION: THE OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL

THROUGH: DAVID F. DEMAREST, JR.,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
COMMUNICATIONS

DAVID Q. BATES, JR.,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY TO THE CABINET

FROM: DOUG WEAD, SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON

MIKE DUNCAN, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC
LIAISON

I. PURPOSE:

To honor 47 Members of Congress who are veterans of the Korean War.

II. BACKGROUND:

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea as an attempt to unite North and South Korea once again -- under Communist rule.

As the world looked towards America to assume the leadership and responsibility to restore peace in Korea, the first American troops, stationed in Japan, were ordered to Korea on July 1, 1950. 403 American soldiers dug foxholes on three hillsides along the main road between Suwon and Osan in the early morning of July 5th. Unassured hopes that the mere presence of American troops would put an end to the conflict were left unfounded. Our unprepared soldiers were defeated by the Communist forces as they proceeded their bloody march south.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

The aggression of the North Korean Communist forces upon the American troops was the spark leading America once again into war. The war would last for three years and involve over one million Americans sent to Korea. The American peoples living in the States did not clearly understand our objectives, and it was labeled "a dirty and unpopular war," with no end in sight. However, none of these factors detracted from the sacrifice and determination of those fighting the battles.

The annual gala dinner is a salute to those involved directly or indirectly with the Korean War. The dinner is typically hosted and attended by various celebrities as well as those directly involved.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President

See attached list of the participants in the Photo Opportunity prior to your address.

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Open Press.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

See Advance Office scenario.

VI. REMARKS:

To be provided by Speech writers.

General R. G. Stilwell (Ret.)

2000 15th STREET NORTH
SUITE 450
ARLINGTON, VA 22201

(703) 558-7527

25 April 1990

FAX 456-6218


To: Ms. Mary Kate Grant
White House Staff

From: General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board

Subj: Material re: KWM

Here is the material I promised:

- 1) American Legion Magazine article (June issue)
- 2) Brochure, 14 June 1989 ceremony
(Note words describing statues; or, alternatively,
"of those who fought the war on foot.")
- 3) Visual of the column of statues
- 4) James A. Van Fleet, aged 98, Commander, Eighth Army
Matt Ridgway, aged 95, UN Commander (1 May 1951)


General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.

Overall, they performed in the best tradition of our Armed Forces. Yet, when the guns fell silent by virtue of military armistice, the opposing sides were virtually at the start line of the conflict. A stalemate, with no winners? Was MacArthur right?

No! Wars are waged for objectives defined by our elected leaders. The overriding political objective set by President Truman - and maintained by President Eisenhower - were to restore the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea and to ensure the freedom of its people (now numbering 40 million). A collateral objective was to stop, once and for all, the advance of communism by force of arms. Thanks to the collective courage and sacrifices of those 1 1/2 million Americans, South Koreans and other allies arrayed alongside them, these national objectives were attained in full.

There were even greater consequences. In early 1950, a milestone national security document, had articulated a sound concept for frustrating Moscow's quest for world domination. However, the major investments required to implement the concept were given scant attention; indeed, in the existing domestic environment, they had no support in the Congress or the public. The Korean experience soon changed attitudes, driving home the lesson that a day of war costs more than a year of prevention.

Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the war, we set about building the powerful, balanced military capabilities and the global system of alliances that we know today. American resolve has been the glue of that collective security framework while our Armed Forces, notably including substantial forward deployments, have provided the muscle. Dividends from that steady course are now being reaped in Eastern Europe.

East Asia, given its potential and its dangers, became central to this strategic posture. Visible American military power and security guarantees provided the shield, behind which infusion of American aid coupled with Asian work ethic to spark the sustained, dynamic growth which will shortly usher in the Century of the Pacific. The Republic of Korea is the most spectacular example of the remarkable, region-wide successes achieved by this combination. That nation is already a major player in world affairs, confident of its destiny. Yet our work there is not done for the still divided Korean peninsula is the vortex of Northeast Asia; the Armistice Agreement remains our responsibility; and, pending North Korean renunciation of its aggressive designs, American forces on the ground - and in harm's way - perform an unique, non-transferable role.

Time and distance improve perspectives. It is now indisputable that the Korean intervention was a pivotal event in post-World War II history; and that the policies and initiatives

that followed were of immense benefit to the United States, its allies and its friends. The American men and women who crossed the Pacific to defend a people they had never met in a land they had never known cannot take credit for all that has transpired these past forty years. But their collective heroism and fortitude, from the stout defense of the Pusan perimeter onward, was the indispensable achievement, without which nothing. They can stand tall in pride. They won - big! And every American has reason to applaud and support the Congressionally-mandated national Korean War Veterans Memorial to be created in their honor.

PRESIDENT BUSH UNVEILS WINNING DESIGN OF KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL




WASHINGTON—President George Bush unveiled the winning design of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in the Nation's capital on June 14, 1989, during Flag Day ceremonies in the White House Rose Garden.

The design, a striking combination of architecture, statuary, and landscape, is the concept of four members of the Penn State University faculty. The main feature is a column of thirty-eight larger than life statues representing a combat formation; of Army, Marine, Navy and Air Force elements moving forward on an undefined mission.

Visitors will walk through the column to a plaza where the American flag flies. Muraled walls will tell the story of the Korean War, pay special tribute to the fallen, and recognize the contributions of other participating nations.

General Richard G. Stilwell (US Army, Retired), Chairman of the Korean War Veterans Memorial Advisory Board, is shown here briefing President Bush on the Memorial design. General Andrew J. Goodpastor (USA, Retired), Chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission is behind the President. At the right is General Raymond G. Davis (USMC, Retired), Vice Chairman of the Advisory Board and Chairman of the Design Committee.



Bob Hansen

343-2541

Gen. 558-7527

John Gibbons
Lead Advance

~500

Grant/Dooley
April 26, 1990
Draft two
A:Korea

BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
TIME? 8:00 PM

on-stage Derwinski - intro
Stilwell
Good poster

((Acknowledgements))

Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the
midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest
terms, what we are doing ⁱⁿ Korea is this: We are trying to
prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought
in Korea -- and who continue to guard the ^{boundary of Rep. of Korea} 38th parallel --
fulfilled that mission and helped ensure peace in the world.

Radio Report to
The American
People on Korea
+ on U.S. Policy
in the Far East
4/11/51
Gen. Stilwell
558-7527

It was in ^{April} ~~May~~ of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman
addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring
Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. (And it was that same
month) that our two leaders, General Jim Van Fleet, commanding the
Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgeway, commanding the U.N. ^{Forces} ~~Army~~
repelled the offensive and drove the Chinese back to the north.
Although they could not join us tonight, General Van Fleet and
General Ridgeway -- ages 98 and 95, respectively deserve our
respect and gratitude. \\\

Gen. Stilwell
558-7527

Sean Byrne
Mil Office
X 2150

Tensions heightened during this month of May, 39 years ago,
as the first major struggle of the nuclear age evolved into a war
of battlefield strategy and a war of international politics.
But it was a war in which we turned the tide against communism
for the first time, in a victory sometimes ignored by history.

Gen. Stilwell
558-7527

We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten Victory." Once this memorial is built, no American will ever forget the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought as they sought to stop aggression. America must remember that struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to the recapture and brave defense of Seoul. And it is never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those who didn't. \\\

Looking back at the Korean conflict, our policy of strength based on the principles of freedom laid the foundation for the march of democracy we're seeing today around the world. And that march is reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 ^{men who fought the war} foot soldiers ^{on foot} from all services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known throughout the world.

It's those men and women honored by this memorial who joined ^{Korean forces under the U.N. banner} the ~~South Korean and U.N. forces~~ to help save this small nation from communism. Men like the Members of Congress here tonight: Senators Warren Rudman, John Chaffee, and John Glenn, Congressmen Andy Jacobs, Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and John Conyers to name only a few who served in the Armed Forces during the Korean War. Because of these brave soldiers and so many others, South Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic powers, with a freely-elected democratic government and secure borders.

Gen. Stilwell

Gen. Stilwell

Gen. Stilwell

Gen. Stilwell

And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old soldiers who have not just "faded away," but who have continued to serve their country in elected office. Let me in closing share with you a line from Tennyson, in which Ulysses looks back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men and tells them that they remained "... strong in will to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."

*Ulysses /
A.L.T.
Immortal Poem
of the Eng.
Lang.*

We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when *the* cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and God bless America. Thank you.

#

Kor Amb Park

Grant/Dooley
April 27, 1990
Draft four-B
A:Korea

BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
7:45 P.M.

((Acknowledgements)) *Thank you, Secretary Derwinski.
General Stilwell. Thank all of you. ~~for asking me here.~~
It's great to be here. //*

In the Spring of 1951, almost 40 years ago, President Truman addressed the American people in the midst of the Korean War, saying, "In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought in Korea -- and who continue to guard the boundary of the Republic of Korea -- fulfilled that mission and helped ensure peace in the world.

Korea, the first major struggle of the nuclear age, evolved into a war of battlefield stratagem and a war of international politics. But it was a war in which we turned the tide against communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes ignored by history.

A year before President Truman spoke, tensions in the Korean peninsula had heightened, breaking out into a bitter conflict on June 24, 1950, when North Korea launched a surprise attack on the fledgling republic in the South. President Truman quickly made the decision to commit American troops, under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, to stop the Communist aggression.

The world watched as fighting continued throughout 1950, and then, from late April through this month of May in 1951, the

Communists began their Spring Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. But it was our two leaders, General Jim Van Fleet, commanding the Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgway commanding the U.N. Forces, who repelled the offensive and drove Communist troops back to the north. Although they could not join us tonight, General Van Fleet and General Ridgway -- ages 98 and 95, respectively -- deserve our respect and gratitude. \\

We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten Victory." Once this memorial is constructed, no American will ever forget the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters faced as they sought to stop aggression. **America must remember that struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to the recapture and brave defense of Seoul. And it is never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those who didn't. **

Looking back at the Korean conflict, our defense of freedom laid the foundation for the march of democracy we're seeing today around the world. And that march is reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 soldiers from all services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known throughout the world.

It's those men and women honored by this memorial who joined with South Korean troops under the U.N. banner to help save a proud nation from communism. Men like the Members of Congress

here tonight: Senators Warren Rudman, John Chafee, and John Glenn, Congressmen Andy Jacobs, Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and John Conyers to name only a few who served in the Armed Forces during the Korean War. Because of these brave soldiers and so many others, South Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic powers, with a freely-elected democratic government and secure borders.

And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old soldiers who have not just "faded away," but who have continued to serve their country in elected office. In closing, let me share with you a line from Tennyson, in which Ulysses looks back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men and tells them, "Though much has been taken, much abides."

We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our Korean War Veterans, who have given so much that others might have freedom. God bless you all and the cause you've served. Thank you.

#

Chris - what do you think of this?

Grant/Dooley
April 27, 1990
Draft four
A:Korea

MK

BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
7:45 P.M.

((Acknowledgements))

Almost 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought in Korea -- and who continue to guard the boundary of the Republic of Korea -- fulfilled that mission and helped ensure peace in the world.

~~It was about a year earlier that tensions heightened until~~
~~they soon broke~~ into a bitter conflict, ~~begun by a North~~
~~Korean surprise attack on the fledgling republic in the South.~~
President Truman quickly made the decision to commit American troops to stop the Communist aggression, under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

Then, in this month of May 1951, the Communists launched their Spring Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. It was our two leaders, General Jim Van Fleet, commanding the Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgway commanding the U.N. Forces, who repelled the offensive and drove Communist troops back to the north. Although they could not join us tonight, General Van

Fleet and General Ridgway -- ages 98 and 95, respectively -- deserve our respect and gratitude. \\\

Korea, the first major struggle of the nuclear age, soon evolved into a war of battlefield stratagem and a war of international politics. But it was a war in which we turned the tide against communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes ignored by history.

We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten Victory." Once this memorial is constructed, no American will ever forget the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters faced as they sought to stop aggression. **America must remember that struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to the recapture and brave defense of Seoul. And it is never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those who didn't. **

Looking back at the Korean conflict, our defense of freedom laid the foundation for the march of democracy we're seeing today around the world. And that march is reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 soldiers from all services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known throughout the world.

It's those men and women honored by this memorial who joined with South Korean troops under the U.N. banner to help save a proud nation from communism. Men like the Members of Congress

VOLUME 23

Pumps to Russell

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA
INTERNATIONAL EDITION

COMPLETE IN THIRTY VOLUMES
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1829



GROLIER INCORPORATED

International Headquarters: Danbury, Connecticut 06816

used controversy because of his driving energy, and habit of cutting governmental red tape. Navy twice passed him over for promotion, but after a congressional promotion he received a congressional admiral in 1958, and to his credit. He received a congressional medal in 1959 and won the Enrico Fermi award for his contributions to the atomic energy.

also an outspoken critic of the international system, calling for more peace. His works include *Education* (1959) and *American Education* (1963).

INRIKISHA.

ement or question having a meaning, put forth as a puzzle here are two types of riddles: re problems generally expressed in or allegorical language and genuinity and careful thinking in d conundrums, which are questions based on punning, in on or the answer. The Humpty rhyme is a simple example of a question "What is black and white?" is a popular children's conundrum—a newspaper—depends on a "red."

cially enigmas, are of very ancient found in most cultures. They are used by oracles and soothsayers, messages from the gods. Also, disguised important truths that wise for all to know, enigmas are used by ambassadors for secret

ar in the Bible, such as that at his nuptial feast (Judges 14). In classical mythology the riddle is the riddle of the Sphinx (see SPHINX). Aristotle dignified them as metaphorical and to natural phenomena. Riddles figured significantly in writings, such as the Anglo-Saxon Shakespeare, Macbeth's downcast, and the Third Appendix hall never vanquish'd be united to high Dunsinane Hill/Shall

found their way from literature to music. In music, the plot of *Pandot* turns on the solution of a riddle by the heroine. The English composer Elgar presented a series of riddles in his *Enigma Variations* (1898), intended to puzzle the listener by using various devices, to identify a particular variation with a fine arts, the appeal of riddles in such metaphysical paintings as J.M.W. Turner's *Enigma of an Autumn Afternoon*.

s, particularly conundrums, are of children's play. However, the use of riddles is illustrated by a riddle in the *Enigma of an Autumn Afternoon* by John Galsworthy, who characterized it as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery."

RIDEAU CANAL, ri-dō', a 126-mile (203-km) waterway extending southwestward from Ottawa to Kingston in Ontario, Canada. It consists of a series of natural watercourses connected by short locks and locks. The natural waterways include the Rideau River at Ottawa, the Upper Rideau Lake, and the Cataraqui River, which empties into Lake Ontario at Kingston. Along the route are 47 locks, each 134 feet (41 meters) long, 33 feet (10 meters) wide, and 5 feet (1.5 meters) deep.

The canal was built by the British government in 1826-1832, under the direction of Lt. John By, to provide a military route that would be secure from United States attack. It is now used chiefly by pleasure boats.

RIDERS TO THE SEA, a tragedy in one act by the Irish dramatist John Millington Synge, first produced in 1904. The work, widely regarded as the finest one-act play in English, is remarkable for its exquisite lyrical tone and its moving and compassionate depiction of the human spirit in the face of tragedy.

The play is set in a fisherman's cottage in the Aran Islands of Ireland. Maurya, an old woman, has lost her husband and four of her six sons to the sea. Her fifth son, Michael, is missing. She begs Bartley, her remaining son, not to go to the Galway horse fair on the mainland to sell horses: "It was a hundred horses, or a thousand horses you had itself, what is the price of a son only?" While she is pleading, her daughters receive from the priest a bundle of clothes, which they identify as those of Michael, now known to be dead. Bartley goes, and the sea swallows him. Then, utterly bereft, Maurya finds a strength, a release from her terrible pain. She has lost all her men, and she can lose no more. "They're all gone now, and there isn't anything more the sea can do to me..."

RIDGEFIELD, a town in Connecticut, in Fairfield County, 9 miles (14 km) south of Danbury. A residential community, it has some light industry.

Purchased from the Indians in 1708 and incorporated in 1709, Ridgefield was settled by 25 men from Norwalk and Milford, who chose their sites by lottery. The Battle of Ridgefield was fought here on April 27, 1777, when militia and neighborhood farmers led by Gen. Benedict Arnold attempted to halt retreating British troops who had raided Danbury. A round shot fired during the battle is embedded in a wall of Keeler Tavern. Government is by a board of selectmen. Population: 20,120.

RIDGEWOOD, a village in New Jersey, in Bergen County, 25 miles (40 km) northwest of New York City. Ridgewood is primarily a residential community, many of whose residents commute to New York City.

The site was first settled by the Dutch about 1680. During the American Revolution, American and British forces repeatedly camped here, and in March and April 1780 fighting took place in the locality. The settlement was sparsely populated until the railroad came in 1848. In 1853 a large estate development began, called Godwinville after Abraham Godwin, a Revolutionary patriot. The community was renamed Ridgewood in 1876 and incorporated in 1894. Government is by council and manager. Population: 25,208.

RIDGWAY, rij'wā, **Matthew Bunker** (1895-), U. S. army officer. He was born at Fort Monroe, Va., on March 3, 1895. He graduated from the U. S. Military Academy at West Point in 1917 and completed advanced courses at Fort Benning Infantry School in 1930 and at the Army War College in 1937. Between the two world wars he served in staff positions in the United States and had overseas assignments in China, Nicaragua, the Panama Canal Zone, and the Philippines.

Appointed commander of the reactivated 82d Infantry Division in 1942, Ridgway supervised its conversion into the 82d Airborne Division, and he planned and executed its July 1943 airborne invasion of Sicily. In June 1944 he led his division in its D-Day airborne assault on Normandy. Later that year he took command of the 18th Airborne Corps, which fought in France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany and played a key role in stemming the German offensive in the Battle of the Bulge in 1944-1945. After serving in command posts in the Philippines and the Mediterranean he was senior U. S. Army representative on the military staff committee of the United Nations from 1946 to 1948.

Assigned to Korea in late 1950, Ridgway took command of the U. S. 8th Army and UN ground forces and helped to turn back a Chinese offensive. In April 1951, following President Harry S. Truman's removal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur from command, Ridgway was appointed to succeed him as supreme commander of UN forces in Korea and as Allied commander in Japan, with the rank of full general. In 1952 he succeeded Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as supreme Allied commander in Europe, and in August 1953 he was appointed chief of staff of the U. S. Army. Following his retirement from active military service in June 1955, he served until 1960 as chairman of the board of trustees of the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research. His memoirs, *Soldier*, were published in 1956.

RIDING. See HORSEMANSHIP AND RIDING.

RIDLEY, rid'lē, **Nicholas** (c. 1500-1555), English prelate, religious reformer, and martyr, who was a leader of the Protestant party during the reign of Edward VI. Ridley was born at Unthank Hall, in Northumberland, about 1500, and educated at Pembroke Hall, Cambridge. He supported Henry VIII in his quarrel with the pope, and in 1537 was made chaplain to Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury, and in 1538 vicar of Herne, in Kent.

Although Ridley gradually came to favor a more radical reform of doctrine, he was made chaplain to Henry VIII and canon of Canterbury and Westminster. In 1547, following the accession of Edward VI, Ridley was appointed bishop of Rochester. In the following years he furthered the spread of Anglican doctrines, served on the commission to reform English canon law, and probably assisted Cranmer in drawing up the First Book of Common Prayer. In 1550 he was made bishop of London.

In 1553, after Edward's death, Ridley was sent to the Tower by Queen Mary, whose accession he had opposed. In the spring of 1554, along with Cranmer and Hugh Latimer, he was sent to Oxford, examined by an ecclesiastical commission, and pronounced a heretic. He and Latimer were burned at the stake in Oxford on Oct. 16, 1555.

agreed upon a prisoner of war exchange. Involved were 241 Israelis and 8,031 Egyptians. Following the exchange (completed November 22) the talks broke down because of inability of the two sides to agree on a disengagement formula (November 29).

1973, December 21-22. First Meeting of Geneva Peace Conference. Representatives of Egypt, Israel, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed that Egyptian-Israeli discussion of separation of forces should continue in Geneva (December 26).

1974, January 18. Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement Agreement. This followed a week of intensive "shuttle diplomacy" by Secretary of State Kissinger, flying back and forth between Egypt and Israel (January 11-17). Israeli troops were to withdraw within 40 days from their bridgehead to a line 15 to 20 kilometers east of the Canal. The Egyptians would remain on the East Bank, in a zone 8 to 10 kilometers deep. A buffer zone between the two forces, 5 to 8 kilometers wide, would be patrolled by UNEF. This left the Israelis in control of the Gidi and Mitla passes. The Israeli withdrawal began on January 24 and was completed March 4.

1974, February 28. The U.S. and Egypt Resume Diplomatic Relations. These had been broken since June 6, 1967 (see p. 1231).

1974, February-May. Syrian-Israeli "War of Attrition." Apparently as a tactic to place pressure on Israel to make territorial concessions on the Golan Heights, Syrian forces initiated a protracted artil-

lery and small-arms duel along the entire cease-fire line between Kuneitra and Damascus.

1974, March 18. Arabs End Oil Embargo of the U.S. Libya and Algeria refused to vote with the majority of 7 Arab oil-producing nations (see p. 1284).

1974, April-May. Intensified Palestine Guerrilla Attacks. Palestine guerrillas, attempting to place pressure on Israel, undertook a number of suicide raids across the border from Lebanon into Israel. Most notable were attacks on Qiryat Shemona (April 11) and Maalot (May 15). Israeli aircraft bombed Palestine guerrilla bases and camps in Lebanon in retaliation. Losses of life among the civilian population on both sides further inflamed Arab-Israeli hostilities.

1974, April 18. Egypt Abandons Reliance on Soviet Military Equipment. Announcing that the U.S.S.R. had failed for 6 months to honor Egyptian resupply requests, and that Soviet terms for renewed supply of arms to Egypt were "unacceptable" and an "instrument of policy leverage," President Sadat ended 18 years of Egyptian reliance upon Soviet arms deliveries.

1974, May 31. Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Agreement. After 32 days of shuttle diplomacy by Kissinger between Israel and Syria, Israel gave up all of the territory captured from Syria in the October 1973 war, plus two small strips taken in 1967, including the town of Kuneitra. Military forces were to be limited in zones on either side of the new cease-fire line, and a narrow buffer zone was to be patrolled by units of the UNEF.

THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

BACKGROUND

Korea, annexed by Japan following the Russo-Japanese War (see p. 920), was promised its freedom by the Allies at the Cairo Conference (December 1, 1943). The decision was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Proclamation (July 26, 1945). When Japan surrendered in World War II (see p. 1198), a hurried Allied agreement (August 15, 1945) established the 38th degree of latitude as an arbitrary dividing line, north of which the U.S.S.R. would accept surrender of Japanese forces in Korea; those Japanese south of the line would surrender to U.S. troops. Following the surrender, which took place with little friction, the U.S.S.R. held the 38th parallel to be a political boundary; along it the Iron Curtain dropped.

Two years of unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement were followed by U.S.

referral of the problem to the U.N., which undertook the establishment of an independent Korean government following free nationwide elections. The U.S.S.R. refused to co-operate. In the southern zone, the Republic of Korea was established (August 15, 1947), with Seoul its capital. Declaring the action illegal, the U.S.S.R. set up a puppet government—the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its capital at Pyongyang—and organized a North Korean Army (NKA). Allegedly, Soviet troops evacuated the north (December, 1948). U.S. troops completed evacuation of the south (June, 1949); a small American military advisory group remained to organize a Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. More than a year of continuous bickering—Communist propaganda, raids, sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla action—harassed the south without breaking down the ROK government.

THE OPPOSING FORCES

Communist North Korea now had a well-trained and Russian-equipped army: 130,000 men in 10 divisions with a brigade of Russian T-34 medium tanks and supporting troops. Its hard core was composed of some 25,000 veterans of the Chinese Communist campaign in Manchuria (see p. 1306). The air force consisted of some 180 Russian Yak planes of World War II type. There were more than 100,000 trained reserves.


The ROK Army—little more than a national police force—consisted of about 100,000 men in 8 divisions with little supporting artillery. It lacked medium and heavy artillery, tanks, combat aircraft, and reserves.

Naval strength on both sides was negligible.

OPERATIONS, 1950

1950, June 25. Invasion. North Korean forces—7 infantry divisions, the tank bri-

gade, and supporting troops, under Marshal Choe Yong Gun—crossed the border in 4 columns, driving on Seoul. Surprise was complete. The power punch, accom-



COMMENT. *The Inchon landing was one of the great strategic strokes of history, in conception, execution, and results. MacArthur's genius had transformed into a stunning victory a desperate defense seemingly doomed to disaster. The Communist grab at South Korea, which if successful might have meant the eventual absorption of all the Asian mainland, had been thwarted, the North Korean Army crushed. MacArthur's decision was taken while his Eighth Army was still clawing to maintain a toehold at Pusan. On August 12 his staff was ordered to prepare the operation, one month to accomplish what ordinarily would take several. His dynamic insistence overcame the doubts of the U.S. JCS (technically the Inchon area was most disadvantageous for an amphibious operation) and he was provided with the bulk of the 1 division of Marines he demanded. (One of its brigades, already there, came from his own Pusan perimeter.) The 7th Infantry Division was the last of his occupation troops in Japan, its ranks filled by more than 5,000 ROK soldiers hurried to Japan to train with it. Success depended on (a) the ability of the U.S. Navy to provide sufficient water transport, (b) the ability of Walker's hard-pressed Eighth Army to hold the Pusan perimeter until the stroke fell, and (c) perfect timing of the assault (a 30-foot tide variance permitted use of the beaches for only 6 of each 24 hours.)*

1950, October 1-November 24. Advance to the Yalu. As directed by both the U.N. and President Truman, MacArthur pushed north across the 38th parallel. ROK troops crossed the line (October 1); Eighth Army followed (October 9), leaving 2 divisions in the southern area to secure communication lines to Pusan and mop up roving remnants of the NKA. A serious military handicap was the injunction that under no circumstances were U.N. aircraft to fly north of the Yalu River. **Pyongyang**, North Korean capital, was overrun (October 20) by a combined airborne (187th Regimental Combat Team) landing and overland advance. The ROK 6th Division reached the Yalu at Chosan, and other ROK units fanned out behind it. By this time, other U.N. token forces had joined Eighth Army and were integrated in existing U.S. divisional elements: a Turkish brigade, and Canadian,

Australian, Philippine, Netherland and Thai battalions.

1950, October 15. Wake Island Conference. President Truman and General MacArthur conferred at Wake Island on the course of the war. This later became an issue in the Senate investigation that followed the relief of General MacArthur (see p. 1271).

1950, October 16-26. Shift of U.S. X Corps to the East Coast. Embarked at Inchon, the corps was moved around to the east coast to Wonsan (October 19), which had already been captured by the ROK I Corps. A 7-day delay in landing was necessary to sweep the harbor clear of latest-type Soviet mines, sown under the direction of Soviet experts with the NKA.

1950, October-November. Threats from Communist China. Peking had threatened intervention should the 38th parallel be crossed by U.N. troops, and heavy concentrations of Chinese Communist (ChiCom) troops were reported north of the Yalu, in Manchuria. Since aerial reconnaissance beyond the Yalu was prohibited, MacArthur knew neither the full strength nor the dispositions of these troops, nor—until his forward ROK divisions were ambushed by them and a U.S. regiment at Unsan was severely mauled (November 1)—was he aware that ChiComs in considerable numbers were already south of the Yalu. Walker, confronted by the presence of this new element in the situation, recalled his leading Eighth Army units and consolidated temporarily along the Chongchon River.

MacArthur's Plans and Problems. His intention was to advance up the entire front of the peninsula, X Corps on the east coast, Eighth Army on the west, and make a sweeping envelopment. X Corps would turn west on reaching the Yalu and drive all enemy forces south of the border into the arms of Eighth Army. Since the rugged, desolate central massif precluded mutual support, these forces acted independently, their control and co-ordination directed by MacArthur in Tokyo. Almond's X Corps now consisted of the U.S. 1st Marine and 3rd and 7th Divisions and the ROK I Corps (3rd and Capital Divisions). The Eighth Army, 9 divisions strong, was grouped in 3 army corps: the U.S. I and IX and the ROK II, from left

to right. The total combat strength of the entire command was about 200,000 men, with perhaps 150,000 more in support functions in the rear. In addition to the ROK corps, some 21,000 more Korean troops were attached to or integrated in U.S. units.

MacArthur had believed that Communist China was bluffing; that she would not enter the conflict unless Manchuria itself were invaded. He had expressed this opinion to Truman at Wake Island (see above). The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was of the same opinion. Yet now Red Chinese troops were in Korea. MacArthur considered that to suspend his advance would be a violation of his directive: "to destroy the North Korean armed forces." Aerial reconnaissance north of the Yalu being still prohibited, he decided the only remaining course was to clarify the situation by a bold advance. The decision was specifically approved by the JCS. Meanwhile X Corps had thrust north, widely distributed over an immense front; the ROK Capital Division had reached Chongjin on the coast; the U.S. 7th Division was on the Yalu at Hyesanjin.

1950, November 24. Eighth Army Advance. MacArthur's "reconnaissance in force" began.

1950, November 25-26. Communist Counteroffensive. After advancing for 24 hours against practically no opposition, the Eighth Army was suddenly struck a massive blow, the main effort being directed against the U.N. force's right flank. Some 180,000 Chinese troops, in 18 divisions, shattered and ripped through the ROK II Corps, hit the U.S. 2nd Division on the right flank of IX Corps, and threatened envelopment of the entire Eighth Army. The 2nd Division, attempting to refuse its right flank, fell into an ambush at **Kunu-ri** as the ChiCom envelopment trapped its columns while passing through a defile in march order. Some 4,000 men and most of the divisional artillery were lost while trying to fight their way out. Walker threw in his reserves, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the Turkish and 27th Commonwealth brigades. They stayed off the envelopment, the Turks in particular taking heavy losses, and the Eighth Army managed to disengage in comparatively good order. By December 5, the

Eighth Army, its right flank refused, had completely extricated itself, and the Communist drive was beginning to lose momentum; but the central and east-coast area being wide open (see below), a stronger defensive position was essential. Walker accordingly withdrew to the general line of the 38th parallel, slightly north of Seoul and some 130 miles below the November 24 situation. There, as the year ended, the Eighth Army awaited a new Communist offensive.

1950, November 27-December 9. X Corps Withdrawal. In the eastern zone, an additional 120,000 Chinese troops, advancing on both sides of the Chosin reservoir, isolated the 1st Marine Division and drove in elements of the 3rd and 7th divisions. The ROK troops on the coastal flank were hurriedly withdrawn on Almond's order without much molestation. MacArthur ordered evacuation of the entire force, since the Communist drive, directed on the ports of Hungnam and Wonsan, threatened its piecemeal destruction. Navy transports were rushed to both ports. Defensive perimeters were established, manned by elements of the 3rd and 7th divisions, while the 1st Marine Division, under Major General Oliver Smith, consolidated south of the Chosin reservoir in subzero weather. Surrounded by 8 Communist divisions, General Smith, announcing to his troops that they were not retreating, but "attacking in another direction," moved southeast on Hungnam, supplied by the Far East Air Force. When a Communist blow destroyed the 1 bridge across a gorge otherwise impassable for the division's trucks and tanks, bridging material was flown in by air and the Marine southward "advance" continued. Thirteen days of running fight ended (December 9) when a relief column of 3rd Division troops met the Marine vanguard outside the Hungnam perimeter.

1950, December 5-15. X Corps Evacuation. Despite continued Communist attacks on the perimeters of both ports, evacuation by air and by sea went smoothly. Air Force and Navy carrier-plane support, together with naval gunfire, facilitated the final embarkation. In all, 105,000 ROK and U.S. troops were lifted by the Navy, together with 98,000 civilian refugees. Some 350,000 tons of cargo and 17,500

vehicles were also carried. The Far East Air Force evacuated 3,600 troops, 200 vehicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo. On arrival at Pusan, the X Corps came under Eighth Army control as a strategical reserve.

1950, December 23-26. Death of Walker; Arrival of Ridgway. Walker, killed in an automobile accident, was replaced by Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway. MacArthur gave Ridgway command of all ground operations in Korea, retaining over-all ground, air, and sea command.

COMMENT. *The U.N. forces in Korea had suffered a serious defeat, though disaster was averted through skillful troop leading and stubborn—in some cases phenomenal—resistance. MacArthur's critics were quick to blame his simultaneous advance in 2 independent zones on 1 front, and the inadequate security measures which had permitted the stunning surprise. His supporters, in rebuttal, pointed to the nature of the terrain, which rendered close ground liaison and mutual support between Eighth Army and X Corps impossible. They also blamed the artificial ground rules set up by the U.N. and the JCS prior to the Communist assault prohibiting aerial reconnaissance north of the Yalu. To add to MacArthur's problems, he had been denied his immediate request that he be now permitted to bomb the Yalu bridges and also the important North Korean entry port of Rachin, only 35 miles from Vladivostok, through which Soviet war matériel had long flowed freely to the NKA. Bombing of the southern ends of the Yalu bridges was finally permitted; this was an extremely hazardous and practically futile operation, since to approach them U.N. aircraft had to fly parallel to the river, exposed to antiaircraft fire from Manchuria and to the assaults of Communist attack planes. Communist traffic over the bridges was little interrupted.*

It would appear that MacArthur's original decision to advance—a decision concurred in by the JCS—was proper. But the method may be criticized. The JCS must take much blame for permitting the advance while prohibiting the prior air reconnaissance that was essential. There is no doubt that MacArthur expected that, should the Chinese Communist threat materialize, he would immediately be given full authority to extend his air operations over the border and choke

the assault at its source, but the JCS had no intention of giving such authority. Finally, the actual local security measures taken just before and during the Eighth Army's move were inadequate under the circumstances. For this both MacArthur and Walker must share blame.

The most important lesson from this defeat was the necessity that U.N. troops relearn the rudiments of fire and movement on foot. Roadbound, they had found themselves too dependent upon supporting tanks, artillery, or aircraft. The Chinese troops, on the other hand, lightly equipped, utilized fluidity, surprise, and concealment in the rugged regions to compensate for their inferiority in fire power. They moved and attacked by night; lay camouflaged in daylight. Their attacks all followed the same pattern: infiltration, encirclement, and ambush. Frontal assaults were in effect holding attacks in small force, but the penetrations were deep. Each engagement was initially one of small units. It was a platoon commander's war. At no time was the U.N. able to employ its fire-power superiority in full force.

OPERATIONS, 1951

1951, January 1-15. Second Communist Invasion. Long prepared and expected, the Communist assault crossed the 38th parallel at daybreak, its main effort in the western zone. Some 400,000 Chinese troops, with an additional 100,000 of the reconstituted NKA, pushed the 200,000-man Eighth Army back almost to Seoul. Then (January 3) a heavy penetration farther east, in the Chungpyong reservoir area, overran the ROK divisions on both flanks of the U.S. 2nd Division, which extricated itself only after serious fighting and the commitment of Ridgway's reserve—the 3rd and 7th divisions.


1951, January 4. Evacuation of Seoul. This was the third time the capital had changed hands. Stubborn resistance of ground troops, plus the Far East Air Force's close support and interdiction of the now exposed Communist lines of communications, slowly checked the momentum of the drive. The U.N. position stabilized some 50 miles south of the 38th parallel, from Pyongtaek on the west coast to Samchok on the east (January 15).

1951, January 25-February 10. U.N. Counteroffensive. Ridgway launched a series of limited-objective attacks, slowly driving north. A Communist counterattack near Chipyong and Wonju (February 11-18) checked the advance in the center, but on the west U.N. troops reached the outskirts of Seoul.

1951, March 7-31. Operation "Ripper." This was designed primarily to inflict cas-

ualties on the enemy, and secondarily to relieve Seoul and eliminate a large Communist supply base now built up at Chunchon. The main effort, in the center, forced the Communists back. The Han River was crossed east of Seoul.

1951, March 14. Reoccupation of Seoul. Patrols of the I Corps found it abandoned. Chinese resistance then stiffened, but an airborne drop by a reinforced regi-



ment (187th Regimental Combat Team) at Munsan, 25 miles north of Seoul (March 23), forced a general Communist retirement. The Eighth Army was back roughly along the old 38th-parallel front (March 31). MacArthur and Ridgway decided on further advance, toward the "Iron Triangle"—Chorwan-Kumhwa-Pyonggang, the major assembly and supply area, as well as communications center, for the Chinese.

1951, April 11. MacArthur Relieved. President Truman summarily ousted Gen-

eral MacArthur from his dual command of U.N. forces and of U.S. forces in the Far East. Ridgway was appointed in his place, and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet was hurried from the U.S. to command the Eighth Army.

COMMENT. *The President was exercising his legal prerogative as Commander in Chief. MacArthur was not in sympathy with the policy of limiting the war to the Korean peninsula and had not attempted to conceal his dissatisfaction with the restrictions placed on his operations. MacArthur had stated that*

"in war there is no substitute for victory" in a letter (March 20) to Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (R., Mass.), which Martin promptly made public. MacArthur was advocating neither the use of the atom bomb nor a land invasion of China. He did want to destroy, by conventional air attack, bases in Manchuria which were being used as springboards for invasion of Korea. He did urge the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, and also the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek on the Chinese mainland. He believed that the Soviet Union could not afford to risk war by coming to the aid of Red China, but that if it did make such a mistake there could be no better time for the U.S. to face a showdown with the Kremlin. Without consulting Washington, he had called on the ChiCom commander in Korea to surrender (March 25) and hinted that air and naval attacks against Communist China would be the probable consequence if the conflict continued.

To Truman such opinion and actions were anathema. MacArthur was defying Presidential authority and debating national policy. The United States—listening to an anxious Free World opinion frightened by Soviet possession of the atomic bomb—had deliberately given up the idea of liberating all of Korea and was seeking merely to restore the status quo in South Korea. So MacArthur had to go. The brusqueness of the ousting—the general learned it first through a news broadcast—offended many people. MacArthur returned to the U.S. to receive a hero's welcome and an invitation to address the Congress in joint session, which he did. A Senate investigation later (May-June 1951) aired all the policy issues; the results of the investigation were inconclusive; in general, however, U.S. policy became tougher subsequently.

1951, April 12-21. Continued U.N. Advance. Aware of Communist preparations for a counteroffensive to blunt the threat to their "Iron Triangle," General Van Fleet continued forward movement, prepared to fall back, if necessary, to previously prepared defensive positions. There he would contain the enemy by his heavy fire power and then counterattack.

1951, April 22-May 1. Communist Spring Offensive—First Phase. The attack came on a moonlit night; the first assault broke through the ROK 6th Division, west of

the Chungpyong reservoir. The U.S. 24th Division on the left and the 1st Marine Division on the right promptly refused their respective flanks, but the penetration compromised Van Fleet's general position and he began withdrawal of his left—the I and IX Corps. The Chinese main effort developed against the I Corps, north of Seoul. Hasty withdrawal by the ROK 1st Division exposed the flank of the U.K. 29th Brigade on its right and a battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment was cut off. After a heroic defense of their hill position, the survivors attacked north, to the momentary confusion of their assailants. Some 40 men escaped; the remainder were killed or captured. As usual, the Communist assault finally lost momentum and came to a pause (April 30). They broke contact, retiring in general beyond U.N. artillery range. Communist losses in this phase were at least 70,000 men, while Eighth Army casualties were about 7,000.

1951, May 14-20. Second Phase of Communist Offensive. Shifting the weight of their attack to the east, more than 20 divisions, with NKA divisions on their right and left, struck the right elements of X Corps—the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions. The U.S. 2d Division, next on the left, stood firm, but the ROK III Corps, farther east, went to pieces under heavy assault. The ROK I Corps, on the extreme right, refused its flank against the Communist surge through this wide corridor. The U.S. 2nd Division (with French and Netherlands battalions attached) and the 1st Marine Division, on the west side, promptly counterattacked. Van Fleet had expected the blow in this area and had already shifted his reserves—the U.S. 3rd Division and 187th Regimental Combat Team. Their combined efforts snubbed the Communist offensive (May 20). Attacks on the west flank, north of Seoul, and in the center, down the Pukhon River, had been repulsed.

COMMENT. As usual, initial Communist contact was by small units, attempting to infiltrate and terrorize. There were few tanks. The attacks, vigorous at night, ceased with daylight when U.N. artillery and tactical aircraft fire power could intervene. Communist losses in this 7-day phase were estimated at 90,000. They were now overex-


tended, supplies expended and communications under continuous aerial attack.

1951, May 22-31. U.N. Offensive. Preceded by limited attacks on the far left, anchoring the U.N. position on the Imjim River, north of Munsan, the entire U.N. front moved north. The ROK Capital and 2nd Divisions, on the extreme right, flashed up the east coast with little opposition, reaching Kansong. Advance was slower in the center, but was accelerating by month's end. Van Fleet was now ordered to halt. Despite his plea for approval of "hot pursuit" against an enemy on the verge of collapse, the JCS refused either increased means or permission for another drive northward. The U.S. government was concerned by Soviet threats and by consequent alarm elsewhere in the Free World.

It was decided to do nothing to risk World War III.

1951, June 1-15. Consolidation of U.N. Position. With the rainy season on, Van Fleet decided to establish a defensive belt across Korea, from which springboard he could keep the enemy off balance by a succession of JCS-approved limited-objective moves. Some gains were made at the base of the "Iron Triangle"—thus denying its use to the enemy—and on the southern rim of the "Punchbowl," a fortified hill-circle northwest of Soхва. Meanwhile the Communists were themselves organizing in depth to the north.

1951, June 23. Soviet Cease-Fire Proposal. This was made in the U.N. by Soviet Ambassador Malik. It confirmed that the Chinese had been badly hurt in the pre-



vious 6 months' fighting. Estimated enemy losses totaled 200,000 men, together with much matériel. Also, U.N. air attacks had foiled every attempt to install Communist air bases south of the Yalu. Delegations from both sides met at Kaesong.

1951, July-August. Negotiations. The Communists, taking advantage of the location of Kaesong just inside their lines, seized every opportunity to insult U.N. negotia-

tors and to delay progress while playing for time to recuperate from their mauling. They used the negotiations as a sounding board for propaganda against the U.N. allies and the U.S. in particular. Meanwhile, clashes between patrols and outposts continued all along the firing line as both sides improved their positions. The Eighth Army improved its hold both on the Iron Triangle and the Punchbowl. The negotia-

tions broke down completely (late August).

1951, August-November. Resumption of U.N. Limited Attacks. Van Fleet's troops cleared the Iron Triangle and the Punchbowl, driving the Chinese back from the Hwachon reservoir and the Chorwan-Seoul railway line. These successes

brought prompt Communist requests for resumption of armistice discussions.

1951, November 12. Discussions Begin at Panmunjon. This was a village between the lines in No Man's Land. General Ridgway (November 12) ordered offensive operations stopped, and Eighth Army went on a highly active defense.

OPERATIONS, 1952

While negotiations dragged out interminably at Panmunjon, minor actions flared continually all along the front. General Ridgway, ordered to NATO command (see p. 1224), was replaced (May) by General Mark W. Clark. The Communists continued building up their strength. By the year's end an estimated 800,000 Communist ground troops—three-fourths of them Chinese—were in Korea, while heavy shipments of Soviet artillery were brought in, including excellent anti-aircraft guns, radar-controlled. However, U.N. command of the air was never seriously threatened, and the Communists were forced to continue their practice of taking shelter during daylight hours in concealed, deep-dug bunkers and other underground installations.

Prisoners of War. Communist wranglings at the Panmunjon conferences centered on the disposition of prisoners of war. About 92,000 U.N. troops had fallen into Communist hands: some 10,000 Americans, 80,000 Koreans, and 2,500 from other U.N. forces. Statistical computation is impossible; no one will ever know how many prisoners died of mistreatment or starvation. Communist boasts in 1951 put their POW bag at 65,000, but at Panmunjon they admitted holding only 11,500. Consensus of reports by returned POW's indicated that about two-thirds of U.S. prisoners died or were killed in the prison camps. No neutral or Red Cross inspections were ever permitted.

Some 171,000 Communist prisoners fell into U.N. hands, more than 20,000 of them Chinese. About 80,000 of them were assembled on the island of Koje, just off Pusan, where they were held under rather haphazard control, due to U.S. anxiety about our own captives in Communist hands, as well as humanitarian, if misguided, efforts to improve their conditions.

At Panmunjon, Communist negotiators insisted on total repatriation of all POW's, but at least 50,000 prisoners in U.N. hands were violently opposed to returning home. The U.N. command had no intention of forcing these unfortunates back into Communist hands. A deliberate build-up of hard-core Communists at Koje—organizers planted to become POW's—produced an organized revolt (May 7) when U.S. Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, naive camp commander, was captured through a ruse and held as hostage inside his own prison compound. His successor, U.S. Brigadier General Charles F. Colson, unwitting that he was abetting a Communist propaganda coup, bartered for Dodd's release by promising in effect that alleged abuses in treatment of Communist POW's (abuses which did not exist in fact) would be "corrected." General Clark ordered U.S. Brigadier General Haydon Boatner to clear up the situation. Boatner, combining military firmness with knowledge of the Chinese Communist mentality, swept the Communist hard-core recalcitrants into a separate compound and restored order.

All this while, a dreary succession of attacks and counterattacks—in reality tests of will power—cost both sides great losses in flesh and blood. In October, the negotiations at Panmunjon again broke off, while the war became a political foot-

ball in the U.S. presidential election. The American people, tired of the struggle, elected Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had promised to bring about an honorable conclusion.

OPERATIONS, 1953

1953, March 28. Communist Move for Peace.

Unexpectedly, but apparently in tune with internal unrest in the Communist world following Stalin's death (March 5), Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea and General P'eng Teh-huai, heading the ChiCom "volunteers," informed General Clark of their agreement to his previously ignored proposal for mutual exchange of sick and wounded POW's. They also urged resumption of the Panmunjon conferences. Unquestionably, indications of extensive U.S. plans to renew offensive operations, and possibly to extend the war, were major factors in the Communist gambit.

1953, April. Operation "Little Switch."

This was an exchange of 5,800 Communists for 471 ROK's, 149 Americans, and 64 other U.N. personnel.

1953, May-June. South Korean Intransigence.

South Korea's President Syngman Rhee flatly refused to become a party to any agreement which left Korea divided. After Communist attacks against his troops (see below), he demanded resumption of the military offensive (June 18).

At the same time he released from his own prison camps 27,000 North Korean POW's unwilling to be repatriated.

1953, June 10-31. Chinese Communist Offensive. Massive attacks, mostly against ROK troops, were begun, obviously to bring about U.S. pressure on Syngman Rhee. When he released the prisoners, the Communists, accusing the U.N. of bad faith, again broke off negotiations and launched still another offensive (June 25), against the ROK sector. Some slight gains were made, but quick shifts of U.S. reinforcements and the ChiComs' usual inability to exploit their penetrations brought the attack to a halt, with loss of some 70,000 troops.

1953, July 10. Resumption of Negotiations.

Following U.N. assurance to the Communists that no further ROK intransigence would occur, the negotiators hammered out a final armistice.

1953, July 27. Armistice Signed.

The *de facto* boundary was the existing battle line. Exchange of prisoners who desired repatriation followed: 77,000 Communists, against 12,700 U.N. men—of whom 3,597 were Americans and 945 Britons.

SUMMARY

The Korean War cost the U.N. 118,515 men killed and 264,591 wounded; 92,987 were captured. (A great majority of these died of mistreatment or starvation.) The Communist armies suffered at least 1,600,000 battle casualties, 60 per cent of them Chinese. An additional estimated 400,000 Communists were nonbattle casualties. U. S. casualties were 33,629 killed and 103,284 wounded (see Statistical Summary). Of 10,218 Americans who fell into Communist hands, only 3,746 returned; the remainder (except 21 men who refused repatriation) either were murdered or died. In all, 357 U.N. soldiers refused repatriation. South Korea's toll—which can only be estimated—came to 70,000 killed, 150,000 wounded, and 80,000 captured. Approximately 3 million South Korean civilians died from causes directly attributable to the war.

This war was significant on several counts. It was the first major struggle of the nuclear age. While no nuclear weapons were employed, the threat of the atom bomb hung heavy over all concerned and throttled exploitation of success.

It was a war between two differing ideologies, a war of stratagem and deceit in which roadbound superior fire power was canceled out by lighter-armed fluidity over desolate, trackless wastes. All ethical standards of western civilization were scorned by the Communists.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY: U.S. FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

	Total U.S. Forces Worldwide	Maximum Deployed Strength		Total Combat Casualties	Killed and Died of Wounds	Prisoner or Nonbattle Deaths	Wounded Missing	
Total	5,764,143	c. 440,000	(Apr-Jul '53)	147,131	33,629	103,284	10,218	20,617
Army	2,834,000	276,581	(July '53)	113,610	27,704	77,596	8,310	9,429
Navy	1,177,000	84,124	(Feb '53)	2,243	458	1,576	209	4,043
Marines	424,000	36,966	(Apr '53)	28,627	4,267	23,744	616	1,261
Air Force	1,285,000	46,388	(Dec '52)	2,651	1,200	368	1,083	5,884

U.N. Participation. Fourteen U.N. member nations besides the U.S. took part in this, the first war in which the U.N. had engaged. Britain and Turkey each contributed a brigade (each about two-thirds of a division). In addition, the U.K. furnished 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 8 destroyers, with Marine and supporting units. Canada sent 1 brigade of infantry, 1 artillery group, 1 armored battalion; Australia, 2 infantry battalions, 1 each air fighter and transport squadrons, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 destroyers, 1 frigate; Thailand, 1 regimental combat team; France, 1 infantry battalion, 1 gunboat; Greece, 1 infantry battalion, 1 air transport squadron; New Zealand, 1 artillery group, 2 frigates; Netherlands, 1 infantry battalion, 1 destroyer; Colombia, 1 infantry battalion, 1 frigate; Belgium and Ethiopia, 1 infantry battalion each; Luxembourg, 1 infantry company; Union of South Africa, 1 fighter squadron. All these elements, though merely token forces, bore themselves well and sustained heavy casualties. In addition, from Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden came hospital or field-ambulance noncombat units.

Air Warfare. The conflict reaffirmed the critical importance of air power as an essential ingredient of successful combat; it also was a reminder that air power alone can neither assure adequate ground reconnaissance nor bring about final decision in land warfare. The immediate superiority achieved by the U.N. in the air necessitated bringing in Soviet Mig-15's—then the latest U.S.S.R. jet fighters, quite superior to America's F-84 and surpassing in some respects the F-86. Migs, first seen in Korea in late 1950, increased in number during 1951, but the training and competence of U.N. pilots—mostly American—compensated for any inferiority in matériel. While U.N. pilots were never permitted to hound the Migs across the Yalu in "hot pursuit," they were able to neutralize all Communist efforts to establish bases south of the river. In air-to-air combat, 1,108 Communist planes were destroyed, including 838 Mig-15's; probably destroyed were another 177 and severely damaged were an additional 1,027 planes, against a total U.N. loss of 114 aircraft. As the war drew to a close, U.S. F-86 jets were downing Mig-15's at the rate of 13 confirmed Communist losses to each F-86 shot down. U.N. plane losses to Communist antiaircraft fire—while giving magnificent close support to ground troops—were 1,213.

The Helicopter. The potential of this new means of mobile transportation was clearly demonstrated. It was excellent for reconnaissance, evacuation, and rescue work.

The Navy's Role. American command of the sea was one of the principal handicaps to Communist success. Without this, the U.N. campaign in aid of South Korea would have been impossible. The U.S. Seventh Fleet gave valuable gunfire support along the coast and carried out amphibious operations, while naval and Marine air units participated in Air Force interdiction and close support to ground units. The Navy's blockade of the peninsula prevented any attempts to supply the Communist forces by water. Had it been possible to interdict ground-supply channels

from Manchuria and Siberia in similar fashion, the war would have been over in short order.

Brainwashing. Not until the U.N. POW's returned home was the full extent of the Communist ideological warfare realized. Through brutality—physical and psychological torture (some 60 per cent of American and British POW's died from torture or neglect)—many men unraveled. About 15 per cent of Americans in captivity actively collaborated with the enemy; only about 5 per cent of the total resisted categorically all Communist indoctrination and all efforts to use them for propaganda purposes. Consensus in the U.S. and Britain was that their soldiers had been mentally unprepared for such treatment.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

THE UNITED NATIONS

The U.N. Charter, formally ratified by 29 nations, came into force (October 24, 1945; the U.N. was later located in New York), composed of a General Assembly and an elected Security Council of 12, whose 5 permanent members were China, France, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. Disarmament activities of the U.N. are treated separately below. Important highlights of its other activities during the period were:

1946, April 18. End of League of Nations.

The League voted itself out of existence, transferring assets and responsibilities to the U.N.

1946, December 19. Greek Frontiers.

A commission was established to investigate violations of the Greek frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria (see p. 1271). A special commission was later established to observe the northern frontier of Greece (October 21, 1947).

1947, May 15. Palestine.

A special commission was established to investigate the problem of Palestine (see p. 1276). This led to a plan for establishment of separate independent Jewish and Arabic states, approved by the General Assembly (November 29, 1947).

1947, August 26. Indonesia.

A Good Offices Commission was appointed to seek peaceful settlement of the war in Indonesia (see p. 1303).

1948, January 20. Jammu and Kashmir.

Attempt was initiated to settle the India-Pakistan dispute by a U.N. mediation commission (see p. 1287).

1948, April 23. Palestine Truce Commission.

This was established, after outbreak of Arab-Israeli war (see p. 1224), under the leadership of Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden. An international Palestine U.N. Mediation and Observer Group was later created under Bernadotte's command (May 14). Soon after, Bernadotte was as-

sassinated by Jewish terrorists (see p. 1226).

1948, October 25. Soviet Veto on Berlin.

This blocked settlement by the Security Council of the Berlin Blockade (see p. 1263).

1948, December 11. Conciliation Commission for Palestine Established.

1948, December 12. Korea. The General Assembly appointed a commission to aid unification of Korea (see p. 1241).

1949, January 7. Israeli-Arab Armistice.

(See p. 1227.) Supervision arrangements were made by the Security Council.

1949, January 28. Indonesia.

The Security Council renewed efforts to halt hostilities and settle the Indonesian question; the Good Offices Commission (see above) was reconstituted as the U.N. Commission for Indonesia.

1950, January 3-August 15. Soviet Boycott.

The U.S.S.R. boycotted all U.N. bodies on which Nationalist China was represented.

1950, June 27. Korean War.

The Security Council voted 7-1 (Russia absent) to assist South Korea in repelling North Korean aggression (see p. 1241).

1950, September 14. U.N. Denounces North Korean Aggression.

This was in a report by the Commission on Korea to the General Assembly.

1951, February 1. Communist China Named Aggressor in Korea.

This was by General

Stilwell approves -

Grant/Dooley
April 24, 1990
Draft one
A:Korea

BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
TIME?

((Acknowledgements))

Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought in Korea -- and who continue to guard the 38th parallel -- ^{*fulfilled*} ~~did~~ ^{*that mission*} ~~prevent that next war, holding the line against communism and~~ ^{*helped*} ~~ensuring~~ peace in the world.

It was in May of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. And it was that same month that our two leaders, General ^{*James*} Van Fleet, commanding the Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgeway commanding the U.N. Army - ~~ages 98 and 95, respectively~~ ^{*and*} ~~both still with us and~~ ^{*on respect and our gratitude.*} ~~deserving of a salute~~ -- ^{*although...*} repelled the offensive and drove the Chinese back to the north. ^{*General Van Fleet and General Ridgeway,*} Tensions heightened during this month of May, 39 years ago, as the first major struggle of the nuclear age evolved into a war of battlefield strategem and a war of international politics. But it was a war in which we turned the tide against communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes ignored by history.

We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten Victory." Once this memorial is built, no American will *ever* ~~forget~~ the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought as they sought to stop aggression. America must remember *that* her struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to the recapture and *stout* defense of Seoul. And it is never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those *who* didn't, ~~make it back~~. ///

at the Korean conflict, our policy as strength based on
Looking back, ~~the policy we maintained in the Korean~~
the principles of free choice laid the foundation
~~conflict paved the way for the march of democracy we're seeing~~
~~today from Manila to Managua to Moscow~~. And that march is reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 foot soldiers from all services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known throughout the world.

honored
It's these men and women ~~symbolized~~ by this memorial ~~and~~
~~the Members of Congress here tonight who also served in that war~~
joined the S. Korean and UN forces to help
-- who ~~saved the South Koreans from communist forces~~. Men like
the members of Congress these brave soldiers
Senators Warren Rudman, John Glenn, Congressmen Andy Jacobs, Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and John Conyers to name only a few ~~being honored tonight~~ who served in the Armed Forces during the Korean War. ~~It's~~ because of these ~~fighters~~ *brave soldiers and so many others* that South Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic powers, with a freely-elected democratic government and secure borders.

And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old soldiers who have not just faded away, but who have continued to serve their country in elected office. Let me in closing share with you a ~~few~~ lines from Tennyson's ~~Ulysses~~ ^{Ulysses}, in which he looks back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men: ~~"... That which we are, we are -- one equal temper of heroic hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield."~~

We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and God bless America. Thank you.

#

dents

good neighbors, with not a single
offer a toast to all the American
and to the heads of all those
Republics, and those of you who
d here tonight.

resident proposed the toast at a dinner
Hotel in Washington on the evening
ay of the Fourth Meeting of Consulta-
ters of Foreign Affairs of American
Manuel Tello, Acting Foreign Minister
delivered the principal address of the

om Document 145, the Final Act of
ecting, are published in the Depart-
Bulletin (vol. 24, p. 606).

Believing General 1951

MacArthur's place in history as
atest commanders is fully estab-
Nation owes him a debt of grat-
distinguished and exceptional
he has rendered his country in
responsibility. For that reason
regret at the necessity for the
compelled to take in his case.
y the President to General

ret that it becomes my duty
d Commander in Chief of the
military forces to replace you
Commander, Allied Powers;
Chief, United Nations Com-
nder in Chief, Far East; and
General, U.S. Army, Far East.
n over your commands, ef-
, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B.
are authorized to have is-
as are necessary to complete
such place as you select.
or your replacement will be
currently with the delivery
regoing order, and are con-

Harry S. Truman, 1951

Apr. 11 [78]

tained in the next following message. (See
attached Statement by the President.)

NOTE: On April 11 the White House released the
text of an order from Secretary of Defense George C.
Marshall to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway inform-
ing him that the President was appointing him to
succeed Gen. Douglas MacArthur. He also notified
General Ridgway that Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet
would take his place as commander of the 8th
Army in Korea.

On the same day the White House also made
public the following:

1. A message, dated December 6, 1950, from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. The
message transmitted the text of a Presidential
memorandum, dated December 5, directing that no
speech, press release, or other public statement
concerning foreign or military policy should be re-
leased until cleared by the State Department or the
Department of Defense, and further directing that
advance copies of speeches or press releases be sub-
mitted to the White House.
2. A message, dated March 20, 1951, from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, inform-
ing him that the President was about to announce

that the United Nations was prepared to discuss
conditions of settlement in Korea.

3. A statement by General MacArthur, published
in the New York Times of March 24, 1951, point-
ing out the weaknesses of Red China "even under
inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United
Nations forces and the corresponding military ad-
vantages which accrue to Red China." The state-
ment also contained two paragraphs which are
noted in Item 108 [2] below.

4. A message, dated March 24, 1951, from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur inform-
ing him that the President had directed that his
attention be called to the memorandum of December
6, 1950 (1 above), and further informing him that
"in view of the information given you 20 March
1951 (2 above) any further statements by you
must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of
6 December."

5. A letter to Representative Joseph W. Martin,
Jr., House Minority Leader, dated March 20, 1951,
which Representative Martin published in the Con-
gressional Record of April 5 (vol. 97, p. 3380), and
which spoke of "meeting force" with maximum
counter force" in the Korean conflict.

78 Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East. April 11, 1951 [Broadcast from the White House at 10:30 p.m.]

My fellow Americans:

I want to talk to you plainly tonight about
what we are doing in Korea and about our
policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing
in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a
third world war.

I think most people in this country recog-
nized that fact last June. And they warmly
supported the decision of the Government
to help the Republic of Korea against the
Communist aggressors. Now, many per-
sons, even some who applauded our decision
to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic
reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea now. It
was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communists in the Kremlin are en-

gaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp
out freedom all over the world. If they
were to succeed, the United States would be
numbered among their principal victims.
It must be clear to everyone that the United
States cannot—and will not—sit idly by and
await foreign conquest. The only question
is: What is the best time to meet the threat
and how is the best way to meet it?

The best time to meet the threat is in the
beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in
the beginning when it is small than after it
has become a roaring blaze. And the best
way to meet the threat of aggression is for
the peace-loving nations to act together. If
they don't act together, they are likely to be
picked off, one by one.

If they had followed the right policies in
the 1930's—if the free countries had acted

together to crush the aggression of the dictators, and if they had acted in the beginning when the aggression was small—there probably would have been no World War II.

If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to the peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.

This is a lesson that most people in this country have learned thoroughly. This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And, since the end of World War II, we have been putting that lesson into practice—we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by the aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency.

The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made.

The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia.

I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which came to us after the attack on Korea. It is a report of a speech a Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs

last May, 1 month before South Korea was invaded. The report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully prepared plot. Here, in part, is what the Communist officer, who had been trained in Moscow, told his men: "Our forces," he said, "are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June. . . . The coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia."

Notice that he used the word "liberation." This is Communist doubletalk meaning "conquest."

I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: "In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world revolution, we must first unify Asia. . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets. . . . The United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all the countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States." Again, "liberation" in "commie" language means conquest.

That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and that is what they have been trying to do.

They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin.

This plan of conquest is in flat contradiction to what we believe. We believe that Korea belong to the Koreans, we believe that India belongs to the Indians, we believe that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East, and it is the basis of peace everywhere else.

The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression.

before South Korea was
 ort shows in great detail
 was part of a carefully
 ere, in part, is what the
 who had been trained in
 men: "Our forces," he
 d to attack South Korean
 middle of June. . . . The
 South Korea marks the
 e liberation of Asia."
 sed the word "liberation."
 nist doubletalk meaning

secret intelligence report
 tells what another Com-
 he Far East told his men
 fore the invasion of Korea.
 said: "In order to success-
 e long-awaited world revo-
 lution unify Asia. . . . Java,
 a, India, Tibet, Thailand,
 Japan are our ultimate tar-
 get. The United States is the only
 ad for the liberation of all
 southeast Asia. In other
 nify the people of Asia and
 l States." Again, "libera-
 " language means conquest.
 he Communist leaders are
 ple, and that is what they
 to do.

control all Asia from the
 conquest is in flat contradic-
 tion. We believe that
 the Koreans, we believe that
 the Indians, we believe that
 Asia should be free to work
 in their own way. This is
 e in the Far East, and it is
 everywhere else.

Communist imperialism is
 a threat to peace in the Far East.
 et Union that trained and
 North Koreans for aggression.

The Chinese Communists massed 44 well-
 trained and well-equipped divisions on the
 Korean frontier. These were the troops they
 threw into battle when the North Korean
 Communists were beaten.

The question we have had to face is
 whether the Communist plan of conquest
 can be stopped without a general war. Our
 Government and other countries associated
 with us in the United Nations believe that
 the best chance of stopping it without a gen-
 eral war is to meet the attack in Korea and
 defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is
 a difficult and bitter task.

But so far it has been successful.

So far, we have prevented world war III.

So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea,
 we have prevented aggression from suc-
 ceeding, and bringing on a general war.
 And the ability of the whole free world to
 resist Communist aggression has been greatly
 improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He
 has found that aggression is not cheap or
 easy. Moreover, men all over the world
 who want to remain free have been given
 new courage and new hope. They know
 now that the champions of freedom can
 stand up and fight, and that they will stand
 up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping
 the forces of freedom now fighting in Indo-
 china and other countries in that part of the
 world. It has already slowed down the
 timetable of conquest.

In Korea itself there are signs that the
 enemy is building up his ground forces for
 a new mass offensive. We also know that
 there have been large increases in the
 enemy's available air forces.

If a new attack comes, I feel confident it
 will be turned back. The United Nations
 fighting forces are tough and able and
 well equipped. They are fighting for a just

cause. They are proving to all the world
 that the principle of collective security will
 work. We are proud of all these forces for
 the magnificent job they have done against
 heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may
 succeed, for upon their success may hinge
 the peace of the world.

The Communist side must now choose
 its course of action. The Communist rulers
 may press the attack against us. They may
 take further action which will spread the
 conflict. They have that choice, and with it
 the awful responsibility for what may fol-
 low. The Communists also have the choice
 of a peaceful settlement which could lead to
 a general relaxation of the tensions in the
 Far East. The decision is theirs, because the
 forces of the United Nations will strive to
 limit the conflict if possible.

We do not want to see the conflict in
 Korea extended. We are trying to prevent
 a world war—not to start one. And the best
 way to do that is to make it plain that we
 and the other free countries will continue
 to resist the attack.

But you may ask why can't we take other
 steps to punish the aggressor. Why don't
 we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why
 don't we assist the Chinese Nationalist troops
 to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would
 be running a very grave risk of starting a
 general war. If that were to happen, we
 would have brought about the exact situation
 we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would
 become entangled in a vast conflict on the
 continent of Asia and our task would become
 immeasurably more difficult all over the
 world.

What would suit the ambitions of the
 Kremlin better than for our military forces
 to be committed to a full-scale war with
 Red China?

It may well be that, in spite of our best

efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong—tragically wrong—for us to take the initiative in extending the war.

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.

Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea—and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible.

The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is much more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: The fighting must stop.

Two: Concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: There must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective—to repel

attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

Free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing, we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

79 Statement by the President on the Invitation to General MacArthur To Address a Joint Session of Congress. April 13, 1951

I AM happy to learn from Speaker Rayburn that Congress is planning to invite General MacArthur to address the Members of both

Houses. I regard it as fitting that Congress bestow this honor on one of our great military men.

80 Address at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner. April 14, 1951

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, fellow Americans:

It gives a man a feeling of great humility, and a feeling of great inadequacy, when he hears the wonderful statements which have been made here tonight about his responsibilities and his ability. I hope I can fulfill the things that are necessary to meet those responsibilities.

This is a meeting of Democrats. More

important than that, it is a meeting of Americans. It is a meeting of Americans who put the welfare of their country first.

This is a time when all Americans should put their country first. This is no time for business as usual—or for politics as usual.

There are some people, I am sorry to say, who are playing petty politics, right now, with the future of the country and the peace of the world at stake. These people seem

W-909

75c

Immortal Poems of the English Language

AN ANTHOLOGY EDITED BY
OSCAR WILLIAMS

447 BRITISH AND AMERICAN
MASTERPIECES BY 150 POETS

WASHINGTON SQUARE PRESS



Wm. Shakespeare



John Milton



John Keats



T. S. Eliot



W. B. Yeats



G. M. Hopkins

Ask Me No More

Ask me no more: the moon may draw the sea;
 The cloud may stoop from heaven and take shape,
 With fold to fold, of mountain or of cape;
 But O too fond, when have I answer'd thee?
 Ask me no more.

Ask me no more: what answer should I give?
 I love not hollow cheek or faded eye:
 Yet O my friend, I will not have thee die!
 Ask me no more, lest I should bid thee live;
 Ask me no more.

Ask me no more: thy fate and mine are seal'd:
 I strove against the stream and all in vain:
 Let the great river take me to the main:
 No more, dear love, for at a touch I yield;
 Ask me no more.

All in All

In Love, if Love be Love, if Love be ours,
 Faith and unfaith can ne'er be equal powers:
 Unfaith in aught is want of faith in all.

It is the little rift within the lute,
 That by and by will make the music mute,
 And ever widening slowly silence all.

The little rift within the lover's lute,
 Or little pitted speck in garner'd fruit,
 That rotting inward slowly moulders all.

It is not worth the keeping: let it go:
 But shall it? answer, darling, answer, no.
 And trust me not at all or all in all.

From Merlin and Vivien

Flower in the Crannied Wall

Flower in the crannied wall,
 I pluck you out of the crannies,
 I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
 Little flower—but if I could understand
 What you are, root and all, and all in all,
 I should know what God and man is.

As Thro' the Land at Eve We Went

As thro' the land at eve we went,
 And pluck'd the ripen'd ears,
 We fell out, my wife and I,
 O we fell out I know not why,
 And kiss'd again with tears!
 And blessings on the falling out
 That all the more endears,
 When we fall out with those we love
 And kiss again with tears!
 For when we came where lies the child
 We lost in other years,
 There above the little grave,
 O there above the little grave,
 We kiss'd again with tears.

Ulysses

A little profits that an idle king,
 By this still hearth, among these barren crags,
 Matched with an aged wife, I mete and dole
 Unequal laws unto a savage race,
 That hoard, and sleep, and feed, and know not me.
 I cannot rest from travel; I will drink
 Life to the lees. All times I have enjoyed
 Greatly, have suffered greatly, both with those

That loved me, and alone; on shore, and when
Through scudding drifts the rainy Hyades
Vexed the dim sea. I am become a name;
For always roaming with a hungry heart
Much have I seen and known—cities of men
And manners, climates, councils, governments,
Myself not least, but honoured of them all—
And drunk delight of battle with my peers,
Far on the ringing plains of windy Troy.

I am a part of all that I have met;
Yet all experience is an arch wherethrough
Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades
Forever and forever when I move.

How dull it is to pause, to make an end,
To rust unburnished, not to shine in use!
As though to breathe were life! Life piled on life
Were all too little, and of one to me
Little remains; but every hour is saved
From that eternal silence, something more,
A bringer of new things; and vile it were
For some three suns to store and hoard myself,
And this grey spirit yearning in desire
To follow knowledge like a sinking star,
Beyond the utmost bound of human thought.

This is my son, mine own Telemachus,
To whom I leave the scepter and the isle—
Well-loved of me, discerning to fulfill
This labour, by slow prudence to make mild
A rugged people, and through soft degrees
Subdue them to the useful and the good.
Most blameless is he, centered in the sphere
Of common duties, decent not to fail
In offices of tenderness, and pay
Meet adoration to my household gods,
When I am gone. He works his work, I mine.

There lies the port; the vessel puffs her sail;
There gloom the dark, broad seas. My mariners,

Souls that have toiled, and wrought, and thought with me—
That ever with a frolic welcome took
The thunder and the sunshine, and opposed
Free hearts, free foreheads—you and I are old;
Old age hath yet his honour and his toil.
Death closes all; but something ere the end,
Some work of noble note, may yet be done,
Not unbecoming men that strove with gods.
The lights begin to twinkle from the rocks;
The long day wanes; the slow moon climbs; the deep
Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
Tis not too late to seek a newer world.
Push off, and sitting well in order smite
The sounding furrows; for my purpose holds
To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths
Of all the western stars, until I die.
It may be that the gulfs will wash us down;
It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles,
And see the great Achilles, whom we knew.
Though much is taken, much abides; and though
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are—
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Choric Song of the Lotos-Eaters

There is sweet music here that softer falls
Than petals from blown roses on the grass,
Or night-dews on still waters between walls
Of shadowy granite, in a gleaming pass;
Music that gentlier on the spirit lies,
Than tired eyelids upon tired eyes;
Music that brings sweet sleep down from the blissful skies.
Here are cool mosses deep,
And through the moss the ivies creep,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1990

Dear General Stilwell:

On behalf of the President, I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your letter inviting him to attend the fundraising dinner for the Korean War Veterans Memorial next May.

The President is pleased to accept. This has been entered on his schedule for May 1, and nearer the date, Mr. John G. Keller, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Advance, will contact you concerning the President's involvement.

The President's acceptance of this invitation should not be announced to anyone until official notification is given by the White House Press Office, and any public announcement of this event must be coordinated with Mr. Jay Allison who may be reached at 202/456-2100.

You should be aware that certain physical facility requirements exist for any Presidential appearance. The costs associated with these requirements are generally the responsibility of the host and are summarized on the attached list.

If you wish to alter the current plans for this event in any way, such as changing any part of the format, the location, or the participants, please direct your request for the proposed change to the Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


JOSEPH W. HAGIN II
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Appointments and Scheduling

General R. G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman
Korean War Veterans Memorial
Advisory Board
U.S. Department of Interior
16th & C Streets, N.W.
Room 7023
Washington, D.C. 20240

JWH/lhw

cc: incoming to Helen Donaldson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1990


Dear Dick:

I am pleased to accept your invitation to serve as Honorary Chairman of the Korean War Veterans Advisory Board.

I believe in your goals, and I am proud to give my enthusiastic support to your organization's initiatives. Thank you for extending this opportunity to me. I know that my staff has been in touch with you recently concerning my attendance at the dinner your membership is hosting on May 1st. I look forward to joining you for this special occasion.

With appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. H. W. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "George" and last name "Bush" clearly legible.

General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board
Department of the Interior
Room 7023
18th and C Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240

106283

WARREN B. RUDMAN
NEW HAMPSHIRE

COMMITTEES:

APPROPRIATIONS
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
BUDGET
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
VICE-CHAIRMAN

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510
January 12, 1990

OFFICES:

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
202-224-3324
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
125 NORTH MAIN STREET
603-225-7115
CONCORD, NH 03301
NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING
603-666-7591
MANCHESTER, NH 03103
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING
603-431-5900
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
157 MAIN STREET
603-752-2604
BERLIN, NH 03570

The Honorable John Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear John:

Could we expedite consideration of this "contingent" acceptance?

Sincerely,



Warren B. Rudman
United States Senator

Enclosure

WARREN B. RUDMAN
NEW HAMPSHIRE

COMMITTEES:

APPROPRIATIONS
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
BUDGET
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
VICE-CHAIRMAN

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510
January 12, 1990

OFFICES:

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
202-224-3324
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
125 NORTH MAIN STREET
603-225-7115
CONCORD, NH 03301
NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING
603-666-7591
MANCHESTER, NH 03103
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING
603-431-5900
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
157 MAIN STREET
603-752-2604
BERLIN, NH 03570

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


Those of us in the Congress who are Korean War veterans will be honored at a major affair to be held at the Shoreham on 1 May, 1990. The Speaker and Senator Mitchell agreed to co-chair the Honorary Dinner Committee which will include minority leaders of both Chambers and Chairmen of several key committees. As was true of the ceremony you hosted in the Rose Garden on Flag Day, the event will be another milestone toward realization of the national Korean War veterans memorial.

You have been invited by Dick Stilwell, Chairman of the Board appointed by your predecessor, to be honorary chair of this event and, the demands of your high office permitting, to attend in company with Mrs. Bush. Your presence would be most meaningful to my fellow veterans and me. I therefore hope you will circle that date on your calendar, even though it may be too early to make a firm commitment about attendance.

It is pivotal to the success of the dinner that the invitational letters make reference to prospective Presidential attendance. I propose, for your approval, the following wording:

"The President and First Lady have marked this date on their schedules and plan to attend, the exigent demands of State permitting..."

Respectfully,


Warren B. Rudman
United States Senator

KOREAN WAR VETERANS

ASSOCIATION, INC.

Blaine P. Friedlander
Counsel
2341 Dale Drive
Falls Church, VA 22043
(703) 560-4716

December 21, 1989

*mally,
call Kathy Super &
see where this stands. IT
still is early*

*Bobbie
Then call Friedlander &
let him know what's up.
Bobbie*

The Hon. Bobbie Kilberg
Director, Public Liaison
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Via FAX 456-6281

Dear Bobbie:

When last we spoke you were seeking a Senator's seat in the Virginia General Assembly. One could now state that you have reached a higher level, and I wish to offer my congratulations.

Enclosed you will note a copy of a press release the Korean War Veterans Association endorsing the actions of President Bush in Panama. Most of our members served in a similar capacity in Korea and we are pleased and impressed with the current events.

Somewhere in the White House there is an invitation from our President, Dick Adams, to your President, George Bush, to participate in our convention on July 27, 1990, in Northern Virginia. It would appear that President Bush would be most warmly received, and the KWVA would like to make a presentation that would express our appreciation for his handling of the matters in Panama.

It would be most appreciated if you would kindly meet with several of us to discuss this matter at your earliest convenience.

With every best wish for the holiday season and New Year,


Blaine P. Friedlander

December 21, 1989

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

Dick Adams, President
Korean War Veterans Association
P.O. Box 127, Caruthers, CA 936

[O] (209) 268-1869
[H] (209) 864-3196
[FAX] (209) 864-8208

Caruthers, CA. Dec. 21. Dick Adams, President of the Korean War Veterans Association, said today that the Korean War Veteran salutes George Bush, President of the United States for his prompt and proper actions in Panama yesterday and called upon all citizens to write their Senators and Representative to immediately ratify the Presidential action.

According to Adams, President Bush's action follows the in the tradition of President Harry S. Truman, who provided military support for Korea after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950.

"The military movement in Panama is a police action, just as it was in Korea, nearly forty years ago. It is a sign we are still a great nation, willing to fight for the freedom of another country. The combat veteran is in Panama for the same reasons we were sent to Korea," Adams said.

Adams, was 17 years old when he was sent to Korea as a member of a Tank company attached to the 25th Infantry Division, one of the first units sent to Korea. He celebrated his 18th Birthday on the Pusan Perimeter and participated in the drive north after the Inchon landing. Adams was wounded twice. He left Korea as a First Sergeant.

Adams says that those who eschew force should remember the restraint of our government during the recent past when the Panamanian leadership deliberately taunted the United States and acted in a provocative manner.

"The Korean War Veterans Association at its Midwinter Meeting on February 10, 1990, will look at an appropriate ceremony to acknowledge the continued strong leadership of the United States for good and continued world peace," Adams said.

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR

Benjamin M. Campbell	R - California	Air Force
John J. Conyers, Jr.	D - Michigan	Army
William E. Frenzel	R - Minnesota	Navy
Robert Garcia	D - New York	Army
Andrew Jacobs, Jr.	D - Indiana	Marine Corps
Alfred A. McCandless	R - California	Marine Corps
Guy V. Molinari	R - New York	Marine Corps
Stanford E. Parris	R - Virginia	Air Force
Charles B. Rangel	D - New York	Army
Richard T. Schulze	R - Pennsylvania	Army

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO SERVED
IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR

William R. Archer	R - Texas	Air Force
Herbert H. Bateman	R - Virginia	Air Force
Michael Bilirakis	R - Florida	Air Force
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.	R - Virginia	Navy
Herbert L. Callahan	R - Alabama	Navy
William L. Clay	D - Missouri	Army
William F. Clinger, Jr.	R - Pennsylvania	Navy
Robert L. Coughlin, Jr.	R - Pennsylvania	Marine Corps
William E. Dannemeyer	R - California	Army
Eligio de la Garza	D - Texas	Army
Robert K. Dornan	R - California	Air Force
Melton D. Hancock	R - Missouri	Air Force
James V. Hansen	R - Utah	Navy
Norman F. Lent, Jr.	R - New York	Navy
Thomas F. Lewis	R - Florida	Air Force
Thomas J. Manton	D - New York	Marine Corps
Norman Y. Mineta	D - California	Army
G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery	D - Mississippi	National Guard
John P. Murtha	D - Pennsylvania	Marine Corps
George E. Sangmeister	D - Illinois	Army
Gerald B.H. Solomon	R - New York	Marine Corps
Floyd D. Spence	R - South Carolina	Navy
Esteban E. Torres	D - California	Army
Bill C. Young	R - Florida	National Guard

LEADING PROPONENTS OF KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
LEGISLATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

Mary Rose Oakar	D - Ohio
Stan Parris	R - Virginia
James J. Florio	D - New Jersey

SENATORS WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR

John H. Chafee	R - Rhode Island	Marine Corps
John Glenn	D - Ohio	Marine Corps
Warren B. Rudman	R - New Hampshire	Army
John W. Warner	R - Virginia	Marine Corps

SENATORS WHO SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES,
BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR

Wendell Ford	D - Kentucky	Air National Guard
Edward M. Kennedy	D - Massachusetts	Army
Terry Sanford	D - North Carolina	Army National Guard
Paul M. Simon	D - Illinois	Army
Strom Thurmond	R - South Carolina	Army Reserve
Arlen Specter	R - Pennsylvania	Air Force

Senator William Armstrong (R - Colorado) is the major proponent of authorizing legislation for the Korean War Veterans Memorial.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES

FROM: BARRY R. MCBEE *ben*

SUBJECT: (1) Korean War Veterans Memorial Dinner
(2) Indian Museum Dedication

(1) Secretary Derwinski is very supportive of this organization and its efforts and of General Stilwell personally. He encourages the President at a minimum to agree to serve as honorary chairman and, if at all possible, to try and drop by the dinner. He notes that Korean War veterans are moving into leadership positions of many of the veterans organizations.

(2) Tom Weimer noted that by late January, the proposed date for the dedication ceremony, Interior will probably be close to finalizing its position on the recommendations of the Senate committee that studied the federal government's oversight of Indians and the Bureau of Indian Affairs; hearings on this issue are anticipated to begin in mid to late February. One sensitive issue that could be the focus of attention in connection with the dedication is the question of museums' disposition of Indian bones. Extensive discussions on this issue have gone on over the last few months, with a possible compromise of bones that can be identified being returned to tribes for proper burial; bones that cannot be identified can be retained by museums as archaeological materials. Interior and BIA personnel have been involved in these discussions. I will arrange for a briefing closer to the event (if it is approved).



KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

11 December 1989

Board Members

STILWELL, Richard G.
General, USA (Retired)
Chairman

DAVIS, Raymond G. (MOH)
General, USMC (Retired)
Vice Chairman and
Chairman, Design

McKEVITT, James D. "Mike"
Attorney - at - Law
Chairman, Promotion

WEBER, William E.
Colonel, USA (Retired)
Chairman, Veterans Liaison

BORCHERDT, Edward R., Jr.
President, Borchardt and Co.

CHERRY, Fred V.
Colonel, USAF (Retired)

CURCIO, John B.
CEO, (Retired)
Mack Trucks, Inc.

DEHNE, Thomas G.
Assistant National Adjutant
Disabled American Veterans

McCARTHY, Rosemary T.
Colonel, USA (Retired)

McSWEENEY, William F.
President, Occidental
International Corporation

RODRIGUEZ, Carlos
Administrator of Benefits
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans
Association

General Counsel

HOFFMAN, Martin R.
Former Secretary of the Army

Management Advisor

THOMPSON, Gerald J.
RADM, SC, USN (Retired)
Partner, Coopers & Lybrand

Executive Director

HANSEN, Robert L.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

My dear Mr. President,

With the unveiling of the design for the Congressionally-mandated Korean War Veterans Memorial last Flag Day, you paid high honor to all who served in that conflict. Your participation gave enormous boost to a noble project. Public awareness - and support - has been heightened, the design concept has been endorsed by all cognizant national commissions and the architectural engineering phase has begun. Actual construction could initiate in early 1991, if the requisite \$9 million has been raised. (We currently have \$4.5 million.)

In the enabling legislation, Congress determined the national interest would best be served if these funds came from the American people. To achieve our goal, Sir, we will be holding our first official "fund raising" event on **May 1, 1990**.

The function will honor all serving Members of Congress who are veterans of the Korean War (to include 10 Senators and 34 Members of the House). Our good friend, **Bob Hope**, has already agreed to play a major role in the evening's activities.

We would be most honored if:

- o As a combat veteran yourself, you would **serve as the Chairman of this special evening**, joining members of the leadership of both Chambers who will serve as the Dinner Committee.
- o And, of course, we hope you and Mrs. Bush will put it on your schedules to attend what promises to be a wonderful event for a most worthy cause.

The President
December 11, 1989
Page Two

Your distinguished presence would pay further tribute to the brave Americans who, at staggering cost, helped rescue a fledgling nation from communist bondage and achieve a major geopolitical victory.

Thank you most sincerely for your consideration of this request.

Most respectfully,


General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board

Enclosures: As noted

RGS/j

G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
3d DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

DISTRICT OFFICES:
FEDERAL BUILDING
MERIDIAN, MS 39301
(801) 693-6681

GOLDEN TRIANGLE AIRPORT
COLUMBUS, MS 39701
(801) 327-2788

FEDERAL BUILDING
LAUREL, MS 39440
(801) 649-1231

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

January 4, 1990

COMMITTEES:
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN
ARMED SERVICES
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT:
ANDRE CLEMANDOT

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

You and Barbara have received an letter of invitation from GEN Dick Stilwell to attend a Gala Dinner on May 1 to honor current Members of Congress who served during the Korean War. The dinner also will serve as the kick-off fund raising for the Korean War Veterans Memorial, which has been authorized by the Congress. You will remember you participated in the ceremonies in the Rose Garden unveiling the design of the Memorial last Flag Day.

I certainly hope your schedule will allow you and Barbara to be present for this important event. It will certainly mean a lot to those who served during the Korean War.

Sincerely,

Sonny Montgomery
GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

270

GVM:ac

*And Mrs. Bush to
attend the May 1 Gala
Dinner. to kick-off the
fundraising efforts ~~to honor~~
for the Korean War Veterans
Memorial.*

"In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: we are trying to prevent a third world war."

HST speech to Nation
April 14, 1951
p. 120 Bully Pulpit

"America was not built on fear, America was built on courage, on imagination and an unbeatable determination to do the job at hand."

HST special message, Congress
Jan. 8 1947 p. 47

"We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are -
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield."

Ulysses by Alfred Lord Tennyson
p. 376 Immortal Poems.

Korean War
Vets -

343

2561

~~558-7527~~
558-7596

Gen
Richard
Stilwell

558-7808
Jan

This month?

Who will be there
anecdotes.

any one else
to talk to?

Battles appropriate

"Forgotten War"
won

Stilwell approves

Grant/Dooley
April 24, 1990
Draft one
A:Korea

BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
TIME?

((Acknowledgements))

Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought in Korea -- and who continue to guard the 38th parallel -- did prevent that next war, holding the line against communism and ensuring peace in the world.

It was in May of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. And it was that same month that our two leaders, General Van Fleet, commanding the Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgeway commanding the U.N. Army -- ages 98 and 95, respectively -- both still with us and deserving of a salute -- repelled the offensive and drove the Chinese back to the north. Tensions heightened during this month of May, 39 years ago, as the first major struggle of the nuclear age evolved into a war of battlefield strategem and a war of international politics. But it was a war in which we turned the tide against communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes ignored by history.

We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten Victory." Once this memorial is built, no American will "forget" the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought as they sought to stop aggression. America must remember her struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to the recapture and stout defense of Seoul. And it is never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those didn't make it back. \\\

Looking back, the policy we maintained in the Korean conflict paved the way for the march of democracy we're seeing today from Manila to Managua to Moscow. And that march is reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 foot soldiers from all services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known throughout the world.

It's those men and women symbolized by this memorial -- and the Members of Congress here tonight who also served in that war -- who saved the South Koreans from communist forces. Men like Senators Warren Rudman, John Glenn, Congressmen Andy Jacobs, Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and John Conyers to name only a few being honored tonight who served in the Armed Forces during the Korean War. It's because of these fighters that South Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic powers, with a freely-elected democratic government and secure borders.

And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old soldiers who have not just faded away, but who have continued to serve their country in elected office. Let me in closing share with you a few lines from Tennyson's Ulysses, in which he looks back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men: "... That which we are, we are -- one equal temper of heroic hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield."

We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and God bless America. Thank you.

#

Grant/Dooley
April 24, 1990
Draft one
A:Korea

BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
TIME?

((Acknowledgements))

Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought in Korea -- and who continue to guard the 38th parallel -- did prevent that next war, holding the line against communism and ensuring peace in the world.

It was in May of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring Offensive into the south. And it was that same month that the U.N. forces repelled the enemy back to the north. As tensions heightened during this month of May 39 years ago, the first major struggle of the nuclear age evolved more clearly into a war of complex strategy as well as a war of differing ideology.

We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles and their combined victory in what is often called "The Forgotten War." Once this memorial is built, no American will "forget" the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought as they sought to stop aggression. **America must remember her struggle**

-- from the port of Pusan to the landing at Inchon to the retaking of Seoul. And it is never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served under our flag in Korea -- those who came home, and those whom we buried. \\\

Looking back, the policy we maintained in the Korean conflict paved the way for the march of democracy we're seeing today from Manila to Managua to Moscow. And that march is reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 members of an infantry platoon moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known throughout the world.

It's those men and women symbolized by this memorial -- and the Members of Congress here tonight who also served in that war -- who saved the South Koreans from communist forces. Men like Senators John Glenn, John Chaffee, Warren Rudman, John Warner, and Congressmen Guy Molinari, John Conyers and Bill Frenzel to name only a few being honored tonight who served in the Armed Forces during the Korean War. It's because of these fighters that South Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic powers, with a freely-elected democratic government and secure borders.

And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old soldiers who have not just faded away. Let me in closing share with you a few lines from Tennyson's Ulysses, in which he looks back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men: "... That which we are, we are -- one equal temper of heroic

hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive,
to seek, to find and not to yield."

We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our
Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when
cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and
God bless America. Thank you.

#

Pete Watson - NSC

N. Kor - size
line arms in N. Korea

starting to push back
to 38th parallel -

stood up to Comm +
pushed them back
for 1st time

forgetter was $\rightarrow$
magnificent victory =
turning of the tide
Sorensen victory (Stilwell)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ROUTING SLIP

Blaine Friedlander
Blessey
Dooley Current History
3/1951
Martin
Simon trip to NKor - 8/15
Wallace
Wood
5

After reviewing the attached document, Please
initial and file.

Comm never really moved forward
since that time

KOREAN WAR VETERANS

ASSOCIATION, INC.

Blaine P. Friedlander
Counsel
2341 Dale Drive
Falls Church, VA 22043
(703) 560-4716

FAX (703) 237-6780

To Peggy Dooley
White House
456-6218

copy of Article in Current History

March 1951

pages 136-144

Ten pages including Cover

Did Kim Il Sung,
or Stalin plan
the Korean War?

NORTH KOREA JUMPS THE GUN

By WILBUR W. HITCHCOCK

Former Member, United States Military Government in Korea

"THE attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. So the President of the United States stated at noon, June 27, 1950. He was announcing the commitment of American armed forces against those of North Korea 70 hours after the latter had stormed across the thirty-eighth parallel. Mr. Truman's remarks have been misinterpreted by no one. The President, while avoiding directness, fully intended to imply that the invasion was that of the Moscow-directed international conspiracy known as Communism, that the North Koreans were but dangerous stooges of the Kremlin and that the real aggressor was the Soviet Union. Moreover, his interpretation of the events unfolding in Korea was neither startling nor new. Mr. Truman merely made official the opinion that had gelled into its present form throughout the free world with the first electrifying reports of the attack: the Soviet Union, no longer feeling restrained from the use of armed force, had finally thrown the switch!

This interpretation of the conflict has had a profound influence upon the planners of the West. Should we give military assistance to the South Koreans? Having committed air and sea forces, should we introduce ground forces? Should the enemy be repulsed beyond his original border, the thirty-eighth parallel? Should he be pursued to the south bank of the Yalu River? Should the Communists from China be attacked in their own territory? Should Nationalist Chinese forces be utilized? Each of these questions, and many more, were answered in the light of what the Soviet Union's next move was most likely to be. At each step of decision-making, our

planners carefully weighed the influence of the factor that, having thrown the switch in Korea, the Russians were very likely to throw other switches.

Whether other switches will be thrown hinges not only upon the operational decisions of the West, however, but also upon whatever may be the Communist mission in Korea. For Communist strategists will measure each Western move by its effect on the accomplishment of their mission. In turn, we can neither anticipate possible enemy reaction to our plans nor achieve our own objectives without first determining and considering the purpose of the North Korean attack. Accordingly, most vital to the strategy of the West must be the detection of the Communist mission in the Korean war.

Marx, Lenin and Stalin teach and have always taught in Communist classics that the Communists fear encirclement by the capitalist world. No expedient means for hastening the fall of capitalism is therefore to be denied the Soviet strategist, war with the West is inevitable and whenever the Soviet Union feels the time ripe she will "defend" herself by taking whatever action, military or otherwise, is deemed necessary. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary by Soviet representatives abroad, these doctrines are taught fervently in schools, factories and public assemblies and have never been denied behind the Iron Curtain.

Is it any wonder, then, that during the first few days of the conflict serious consideration was given the thought that the Soviet Union intended the North Korean invasion to be a prelude to all-out war with the West, either as a main thrust or as a feint for a main thrust elsewhere? This conclusion, that the Communist mission in Korea involved the initia-

tion of a V
ported by t
for whatever
At least
Communism
by North 1
matter of h
reason to
Korean inv
advantages
drive into
army state
people the
military rec
by the Unit

WHAT COULD

1. By the
by the fore
Powers that
peace was
would attac
monist str
Large segm
be convince
were not w
of specific
arming and
proceeded
leaders are
extreme sac
less the pro
support suc
for example
a national
the outbrea
data from
the use of a
true that e
Russia's fav
that much
And the ma
aware of th
which Soviet
whether th
it was decid
tion with th
people woul
the rearmin
public opini
point at wh
great enough

tion of a World War III, was further supported by the huge price paid by Communism for whatever was to be gained by the attack.

At least four major advantages held by Communism before the conflict were sacrificed by North Korean aggression. This is not a matter of hindsight. Soviet planners had every reason to suspect in advance that a North Korean invasion would cost what it did in advantages lost. Forfeited by the Communist invasion into South Korea were a favorable force ratio, the neutrality of certain states, the element of surprise and the im- mediate recognition of Red Chinese delegates by the United Nations.

WHAT COMMUNISM LOST

apparent ¹ Greco-Turkish aid, the Marshall ² Plan, the North Atlantic Pact and the Schuman Plan were official expression of this shift in opinion; American ire over the loss of China to the Communists, an unofficial ³ expression. One more false move by international Communism might so incense the masses of the West that their governments would be encouraged to take steps that would make each day of peace a day favoring the West. The Kremlin knew this well; the North Koreans attacked anyhow.

Even had the United Nations not approved intervention in South Korea's behalf, even had the United States not intervened in the first place, the Korean invasion would have so

GUN

influence of
he switch in
ely to throw

expected after the shock of the initial blow had worn off, never again will the Soviet Union have at its disposal the element of complete surprise, so essential in an aggressive war. This could not have been unforeseen by Soviet strategists.

4. The Soviet Union has advocated and still desires the recognition of Communist Chinese delegates by the United Nations. In the spring of 1950, she had all but achieved that goal. The Communist government at Peiping was in almost complete control of the Chinese mainland and had indicated a desire to carry on business as usual with other nations. Most deliberately the Peiping government had avoided antagonizing other nations by internal or external extremes of arbitrariness, once control of the mainland was acquired. The Peiping government had earned for itself several non-Communist advocates, including the United Kingdom and India. Her chief opponent, the Nationalist Chinese government, had lost favor even with the strongest of capitalist states, the United States. And the United States had gone on record that, though she would not vote for Red China's admission to the United Nations, she would not veto such admission either. In general, Communist China seemed to be behaving herself, and it would appear that the seating of the Red delegates was but a matter of time.

The Korean war, however, changed all this. Immediately strong storms of protest arose from every quarter over even considering replacement of the Nationalist delegates. So unlikely did it become that the Communists would be seated that on December 14, while Communist China held two additional bargaining points, her advancing armies in Korea and the visit of her representatives to the United Nations by invitation, the matter of seating her delegates was excluded from her terms for a peace settlement.

Thus in the spring of 1950 it would have seemed to Russia's advantage to provoke the West no further, to make no more false moves, until her strength was such that victory in an all-out war would be certain. But the Korean attack is not indicative that Soviet strength had reached that point, for the all-out war never came. The Red Army, for example, did not launch an invasion of Europe.

The Red Air Force did not attempt to cripple the industrial potential of the free world's arsenal, the United States. Both objectives could have been more easily achieved in June, 1950, than at any later time. Neither can the invasion be explained as a diversionary feint enabling Russia better to initiate all-out war, for the latter could have been prosecuted more effectively were the slumbering opponent not prematurely alerted by a feint. Furthermore, regardless of this consideration, having diverted the world's attention to Korea, Russia took in fact no steps tantamount to all-out war.

WHAT WAS RUSSIA'S AIM?

We must look further, then, for Soviet purposes. Russia must have had in mind a goal more immediate and more local than the involvement of her resources in World War II. Our commentators have offered many suggestions. The invasion, for example, was merely a reconnaissance-in-force to determine the strength of South Korea and to learn the capabilities and intentions of the West. Or the invasion had the limited goal of merely bringing South Korea within the Soviet realm. Or the invasion was but a feint to conceal a more significant but limited (i.e., not involving all-out war) attack elsewhere. Or the invasion was but a crowbar with which to pry concessions from the West. Or the invasion was but a scheme to exhibit the United States and her allies as imperialists and aggressors. Or the invasion was a clever device to wear down by attrition the military and economic potential of the West without so affecting that of the Soviet Union.

Each suggestion, however, either has been nullified by succeeding events or has been reached by its proponents without full consideration of the factors involved. Most fail only because they do not compensate for the loss of the four major advantages mentioned above. For whatever objective the Soviet Union had in instigating the North Korean thrust, it must have been a goal which she considered reasonably attainable and for which she was willing to trade these advantages, i.e., the favorable rearmament ratio, the neutrality of certain peoples, the element of surprise and the imminent United Nations

recognition of consider each

The reconna because the co excessive. It Within a wee United Nation yet in Korea. naissance woul North Korean tion, the Sovie to her inf naissance. ha further United the Security status at a well have a tions for in no a reconnaissan gate, however, Council until conaissance v tically alters hardly be cons information it enemy's reacti conaissance i or a gain thru if one intends does not awa he will behave

The acquisit goal, has muc ing together w would give Ru of the Sea of cupping power contrary to th to remain disa state the con bases in Japa complete Japa damaging pro Japanese peac poned or cond soon complain homeland a V Karon, it wou Russian bear Western imp equipment mi invaders and t

the
Kop
papers

t to cripple
the world's
objectives
ed in June,
her can the
quary feint
all-out war,
prosecuted
g opponent
t. Further-
ion, having
Korea, Rus-
it to all-out

Soviet pur-
suing a goal
than the in-
ld War III.
any sugges-
was merely
erminate the
learn the
West. Or
l of merely
oviet realm
o conceal a
of involving
the invasion
pry conces-
ion was but
ates and her
ors. Or the
ar down by
ic potential
that of the

er has been
or has been
ut full con-
l. Most fail
isate for the
s mentioned
the Soviet
orth Korean
I which she
nd for which
antages, i.e.,
o, the new
ment of sur-
ted Nation

recognition of Red Chinese delegates. Let us consider each suggested objective in detail.

The reconnaissance-in-force theory collapses because the cost of such an action would be excessive. It has other defects, however. Within a week after the invasion, although United Nations forces in quantity were not yet in Korea, the mission of such a reconnaissance would have been accomplished. Yet North Koreans continued the fight. In addition, the Soviet Union, having had disclosed the information sought by the reconnaissance, had sufficient time to prevent further United Nations action by her veto in the Security Council. In fact, to better her name as a "peace-loving nation," she might well have approved the United Nations resolutions in no way would have this hindered a reconnaissance mission. The Russian delegate, however, did not appear in the Security Council until a month later. Further, a reconnaissance which by its own action drastically alters the enemy's dispositions can hardly be considered a reconnaissance, for the information it seeks would be out-dated by the enemy's reaction to the investigation. The reconnaissance in this case approaches a feint or a main thrust, to be treated below. In short, if one intends to capture a sleeping tiger, one does not awaken him first to determine how he will behave should he wake up!

The acquisition of South Korea, as a limited goal, has much to say for itself. Such a holding together with Sakhalin Island in the north would give Russia almost complete domination of the Sea of Japan, forcing the Western occupying powers in Japan to rearm that nation contrary to their plea that the Japanese were to remain disarmed. At least, it would necessitate the consolidation of Western military bases in Japan contrary to the trend toward complete Japanese sovereignty. This makes for damaging propaganda against the West: the Japanese peace treaty would have to be postponed or conditioned and the Japanese should soon complain against attempts to make their homeland a Western outpost. With this backdrop, it would perhaps be easier for the Russian bear to "liberate" the Japanese from Western imperialism: Western arms and equipment might soon find their way to the invaders and their supporters in Japan even as

happened in the case of the Chinese "liberation." South Korea per se, however, being completely agricultural and offering but three major seaports, was hardly worth the loss of the four great advantages mentioned above, and it might even be questioned that the increase in Japanese-Western friction just described would really be worth it.

Regardless of the calculated value to Russia of gaining South Korea, however, and each analyst will calculate the value slightly differently, the fact remains that if this were the Soviet objective the Soviet Union did not do certain things which would have helped the invaders accomplish this mission. First, the Soviet Union did not return to the United Nations until it was too late to veto United Nations intervention. Her contention that she remained away because Red China had not been seated was patently a fraud for she did return in August though that condition was still unsatisfied. Secondly, Chinese troops were not committed until North Korea was all but lost rather than at a time when much fewer Chinese forces would have sufficed to drive the United Nations from the Pusan beach-head. Had the acquisition of South Korea been the immediate target of the Soviet Union, even presuming that she had no grounds for anticipating United Nations intervention, it stretches Soviet naivete too far to assume that she would not have taken preparatory measures for this eventuality.

That the invasion could have been a feint for a more significant but limited attack elsewhere is disproved by the same reasoning that it could not have been a feint for a major war-provoking attack. Only one Communist invasion followed the Korean attack, the invasion of Tibet, and this is hardly more significant than the presumed feint. Even if the forces of the West were not tied down in Korea, under no circumstances could it have been supposed by Soviet planners that the West would, or could, defend Tibet.

More feasible is the possibility that the feint was intended to reduce the defenses of Formosa by sucking Nationalist Chinese troops into Korea and that the United States naval blockade of Formosa unexpectedly prevented the main attack. Once again we can question that the seizure of Formosa was worth the loss

Did
Russia
want
the
war?

of the four major advantages held by the Communists prior to the Korean invasion. This theory, however, presumes that Red forces were massed for the attack prior to the Korean feint. An amphibious assault is the most difficult operation in the book. Even under optimum conditions a successful amphibious attack demands the maximum of fire-power and man-power. Yet, the Chinese Reds, hypothetically poised for assault across the Taiwan Strait, preparing for another assault into Tibet, and located ominously near the French Indo-Chinese border, took five months to enter the Korean conflict in force once it was established that the United States Seventh Fleet would thwart all attempts Formosa-ward. (The very fact that so many Chinese troops were massed elsewhere, at the borders of Tibet and of French Indo-China, indicates that an invasion of Formosa was either not imminent or of low priority.)

We must conclude, then, that the Chinese Communists were not prepared to strike at Formosa and that this could not have been the operation for which the Korean attack was intended to be a feint. The feint-theory must be rejected, therefore, on the grounds that no significant attack was attempted elsewhere and that the feint must have more chronological proximity to the main thrust than is now possible if the main attack has not yet been initiated, as might be the case in French Indo-China.

If the Korean strike were to be a means of prying concessions from the West, such desired concessions should have been made public by now. Communists have made demands; but the methods of the Communists are hardly appropriate to these demands. The Soviet Union has insisted on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and the United Nations recognition of Red China. Communist China, in her December demands for a peaceful settlement, has sought, but a reversion to the pre-war status quo: withdrawal of United Nations troops from Korea, withdrawal of American troops from Formosa and cessation by Western powers of all armed expansion and war preparation. The only terms for settlement offered by Communists, then, have either been made more difficult to attain because of or would have been unnecessary to seek but for, the Korean assault.

The crowbar theory must fail for lack of suitable concessions demanded.

It is doubtful that the securing of an opportunity to label the West as imperialist and aggressive would compensate for the loss of the four major advantages. This suggested objective of the Korean war, however, can be rejected for a more obvious reason: one does not purchase a standard edition at a cost of x if one can obtain the deluxe edition at a cost of less than x. American air and sea forces had been committed to their "imperialist destiny" in Korea several hours before the Security Council passed its second resolution, which directly authorized and encouraged such action. Soviet Russia could have vetoed that resolution. Had the Soviets vetoed, America would have been branded aggressive, not only by Russia and her friends, but also, by innuendo, by the United Nations (i.e., the deluxe edition.) Had the Soviets vetoed, America and her allies would have had to operate under extreme restraint if, indeed, her allies offered support or the United States continued operations at all (i.e., the lower cost).

A WAR OF ATTRITION?

Most popular of the explanations offered, however, is perhaps that which describes the Korean conflict as a clever means of wearing down our economic and military resources without so affecting Soviet potentialities. This attrition theory, however, is a contradiction in terms. It would have us believe that Stalin is able to expend his resources in a manner which will not expend his resources. For let us not lose sight of the fact that whatever military or economic potentialities are available for disposition by the Kremlin, be they Russian or satellite, they are military or economic potentialities available to the Kremlin! The use of such forces to wear away at the potential of the West cannot be justified on the grounds that Soviet potential is not affected. If, for example, the manpower of North Korea and of Communist China can be commanded by Moscow, and the attrition theory presumes this to be so, then any attrition is a direct loss to Moscow, for whatever manpower is expended in Korea cannot be utilized at some later date in another place. The same is true of economic and industrial

potential, within the realm. It forces off the involved in have some gained by Nations of Russia adequately to special communist purchase.

This attrition satisfy our fundamental ing away o States Army ing, a staff But even di potential of divisions we In return for and the mil of our troop her allies ha of the inter conversion o mobilization planning and lentie and the arrangement are gains in relatively slip at net gains; out Korean the scene an in several ye situation po maintain our ing expendit away process

The attrition schemers and the war. If tion theory h tion is true, planners in tremendous t hant that su panning ex materiel and of the man ang. The a hat the Sc

potential, wherever located in the Communist realm. It is quite true that the military forces of the Soviet Union are not yet directly involved in the shooting, and there is perhaps some slight diplomatic advantage to be gained by Moscow from that fact. Yet millions of Russians in slave-labor camps testify adequately that the Georgian Stalin has no special compunction about expending Russians per se.

This attrition theory, however, fails to satisfy our requirements for even a more fundamental reason. Is there actually a wearing away of our resources? Seven United States Army divisions, at the moment of writing, are suffering a bad mauling in Korea. These divisions is hardly the total military power of the United States. Eighty-nine divisions were mobilized in World War II. In return for our serious setbacks in Korea and the magnificent though bitter sacrifices of our troops there, the United States and her allies have been awakened to the realities of the international political order. The re-conversion of industry to war production, the mobilization and training of fighting men, the planning and implementation of civilian defense and the accumulation of mutual defense arrangements have all been stepped up. These are gains in our favor. Compared with the relatively slight losses in Korea they stand out as net gains, no matter how tragically bitter our Korean losses are to the participants on the scene and their families at home. Perhaps in several years, when we have reached the saturation point in preparedness and need only maintain our defenses at that level by replacing expenditures, we can speak of a wearing away process. But not yet.

The attrition theory premises that Soviet schemers anticipated Western involvement in the war. If this assumption is false, the attrition theory has no foundation. If this assumption is true, we can not suppose that the planners in the Kremlin would overlook the tremendous stimulus to our rearmament programs that such involvement, with its accompanying expenditures of personnel and materiel and with the concomitant excitation of the man on the street, would inevitably bring. The attrition theory asks us to believe that the Soviet Union would deliberately

cause the West to make more adequate preparations for war. It must therefore be rejected.

Thus each of the "explanations" for Soviet conduct in Korea are refuted. We cannot infer that the Kremlin, without considering carefully every factor, ordered the invasion erroneously. We cannot assume that Soviet planners are inept or uninformed. We must give the enemy the benefit of the doubt in regard to the soundness of his plans. It is a fundamental maxim of military intelligence that, irrefutable evidence to the contrary lacking, the enemy is mentally capable and plans his manoeuvres in a logical fashion. Another maxim, that what appears logical to you is not necessarily logical to the enemy, might attenuate application of the first, but without a precise knowledge of the nature and extent of the intelligence upon which the enemy bases his strategies, our examination of his actions must of necessity be restricted by what appears to be reasonable and logical and by what information it would seem reasonable to suppose is in the enemy's possession. On these grounds each suggestion concerning Russia's immediate objective in the Korean war has failed to withstand analysis. On these grounds we can state that none of the suggestions would have been accepted by Soviet planners as goals to be reached feasibly or profitably by a North Korean attack.

Accordingly, we are led to either of two conclusions. The first is merely that we have not yet fathomed Russia's real purpose for the Korean war. This follows logically from the premise that the Soviets had such a purpose. The conclusion is negative, however, and not very useful since it clarifies little if anything. Furthermore, the conclusion is questionable inasmuch as it presumes a highly improbable, though not impossible, Soviet feat: that, her ultimate goal, world domination, well known, Russia was able to instigate and maintain a war for six months without revealing her immediate objectives.

Better suited to our purpose is a second conclusion which may be honestly accepted until a better explanation of the Korean conflict becomes apparent. This alternate conclusion has greater utility than has the first: it circumscribes the first conclusion by ex-

Security Council had passed its first resolution based on reports of diplomatic agents and of the Sunday edition of *The New York Times*. The first Communist comment came from Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, via the (Communist) New China News Agency and Berlin. It was only to the effect that the South Koreans had attacked first. Not until the next day did the Soviet Union comment, and then only that the first resolution of the Security Council was illegal since the Soviet and Red Chinese delegates were absent from the proceedings! On the day in which every other newspaper in the nation carried banner headlines, June 25, the *Sunday Worker*, Pyongyang's out-scoped, said nothing about the attack! Not until the following day, along with the tardy comment from Moscow, did the *Daily Worker* proclaim indecisively, "Report fighting in Korea; North said to rebuff Rightist aggression."

For the masters of the coup d'état and the propaganda lie, these attempts seem feeble indeed. To fabricate a more plausible account of the battle than the weak and patently ridiculous assertion that the other party shot first would have been child's play for the professionals. The clay from which to mold a more obvious fabrication was readily available: border incidents at the thirty-eighth parallel had been common for years.

For example, a South Korean reconnaissance force might have captured several key officers of the North Korean general staff as they were making an inspection of the border's defenses. Local Northern commanders impetuously took matters into their own hands and attempted to rescue the captives. Facing a variety of either the Oriental or Western variety would have demanded this action of the commanders, responsible for the safety of the staff officers while the latter were in their zones. The Southern forces repulsed the local Northern rescue teams and before Pyongyang regained control over her field commanders the conflict had spread. However, nothing would satisfy Pyongyang now but the return of the officers unharmed—which demand, being impossible for the South to meet since no officers had been captured in the first place, would justify the extension of the war.

The professional propagandist not only

could do at least this well but also could thoroughly document such an incident with photographs and with sworn statements of loyal South Korean soldiers (Southern Communists deliberately planted in the Southern army—and there were many so planted) and civilians who had been truly enlightened at last by their heart-breaking observations of Rightist perfidy. Further, such a "truth" could have been dispatched instantly to every corner of the world. The wires of Tass were open. But nothing of this sort was even attempted! In fact, the apparent bungling of Communist propaganda efforts would lead one to suspect not only that the attack was Korean-made but even that Kim Il Sung delayed considerably before bothering his brothers in the Kremlin with a report.

The conclusion explains also Chinese Communist tardiness in arriving at the scene of battle. They could have been used to great advantage in the earlier stages of the war. They were not prepared, however, for a Korean expedition.

It clarifies the stupidity of the atrocities committed by North Korean troops not only against their military foe but also against the civilian population of the South. Over and above the attack itself, the atrocities constituted the worst publicity for the milk and honey of Communism. Were Moscow in the driver's seat, she would never have permitted such activities if there were any danger, and there was, that reports would soon reach the outside world. Chinese Communists have behaved more properly.

WHAT OF KIM IL SUNG?

The conclusion indicates why full advantage was not taken of Soviet chairmanship of the Security Council in August. Had the invasion been held off by the instigators until the end of July, Chairman Malik, who very capably blocked all positive action by that body for a month, could have used his temporary role even more effectively.

Finally, the conclusion sheds light on the unusual silence of Kim Il Sung, about whose welfare we might well wonder. In October he was reported fleeing to Manchuria after conceding that the North Korean cause was lost. The picture, however, has been altered.

troops to the drive. It seems significant that when all other reports from the Com side of the battlefield were brought in via Peiping, this report should have come from Moscow. It seems significant that no account of Kim's location or of his activities was included in the report. It seems significant that there has been no glorious, well-photographed meeting, Hitler-Mussolini style, with Brother Kim greeting and thanking Brother Lin Biao, the Chinese commander.

Though braggadocio is to be expected of resuscitated has-beens, Kim, for all practical purposes, has disappeared. If presently it is revealed that Kim has succumbed to jungle rot, the meaning will be clear: his wild excursion to the South has brought more grief than joy to Moscow.

Thus, the conclusion that the North Korean regime began the war independently of the rulers in the Kremlin has great utility. Without introducing new uncertainties, it clarifies many issues inexplicable by its contradiction.

¹ Since the turn of the year, Kim is reported to have made two public pronouncements: a New Year's greeting on January 1, ostensibly broadcast from Pyongyang, and a special broadcast celebrating the recapture of Seoul on January 5. There is no indication that Kim made either announcement personally. Further, Radio Pyongyang being monitored regularly, it is certain that we learn of these messages indirectly by way of Moscow. By no means does Kim's appearance at this late date upset the conclusion reached above that North Korea attacked without a signal from Moscow. It could mean simply that the Soviets, recognizing that we have failed to prevent the Korean affair in its true light, have decided to put Kim's name to limited use for propaganda purposes.

² Radio Pyongyang announced on February 2 that Kim Chek, the North Korean vice-premier, died January 30 of a heart attack. Significantly, he held the additional position of commanding general of the North Korean Army and according to the Associated Press, had been "formerly considered the most influential North Korean Communist since Kim Il Sung." Pyongyang exhibited some confusion about his death. It had reported earlier that he had been killed in action. Will Kim Il Sung be next or has the buck been passed successfully to Kim Chek?

"The American imperialists have not invaded Korea with the sole aim of swallowing Korea alone; their ultimate ambition being to conquer entire Asia and the rest of the world. Therefore, this great war the Korean people are now waging for the liberation of their fatherland has already become a banner of the liberation movement of all the oppressed peoples throughout the world."

—North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung, New Year's Day, 1951

THIS estimate.

A new frame of reference, using this conclusion as a working hypothesis, must be erected for the planners of the West. The Korean invasion was not a part of Moscow's grand strategy does not mean, of course, that Soviet strategy has not been adjusted; meanwhile to accord with events. It does mean that since June 25, 1950, Soviet strategy in Asia has been at best a salvage operation for the purpose of extricating international Communism from what was at the time, and may still be, a bad situation not of its choosing.

By no means should this new hypothesis excuse any relaxation in our defense preparations. We merely need not be quite as fearful as we have been in the past over what Russia's "next" move will be. Confident that the international picture is not as hopeless as unsimulated war news would indicate, we can proceed with a little more determination. Perhaps MacArthur should have been permitted to strike on the opposite shores of the Yalu. Perhaps the threat to bomb Manchurian industry might have deterred the Chinese Reds without complicating the battle. Perhaps getting a bit tougher in our dealings with the Soviet Union will not provoke Russian intervention and World War III.

Precisely what new operational decisions should be drawn from this hypothesis is left to the professional planners, who have before them daily intelligence reports.

We may yet dedicate a monument to the rambunctious Kim Il Sung who, by his blundering, awakened the West to its peril.

LAN

THE...
A power...
to resist...
aggression...
of the...
West of an...
Russia which...
West-German...
Only France...
is an equal...
community...
allowed Germ...
the unity of...
A weak F...
and threat...
Germany ag...
and with C...
Moreover, a...
odd in the...
ness in her...
Russia and...
en neighbor...
to keep Ger...
gent France...
inherent in...
states of We...
forces unres...
region as a...
defense of...
with condit...
power and...
restoration...
France hold...
of western...
many, the...
of the...
consequently...
cannot stand...
France, se...
a population...
area endow...
largest shar

News of Xenos
on active duty

Demmer's MC
intro?
or stillwell

John Howard
US Army Band

Matt Anthony
Army Power -
drawing.

PRES

dinner
Demmer's -
Stillwell - remarks
and
Resuming ceremony
and

Bob Hope 10 min.

Bob + Rosemary
Maj. Don of Wash - present

KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Department of the Interior, Main Building
18th & C Streets, NW Room 7023
Washington, D.C. 20240

202-343-2561

FAX 202-343-3459

(PLEASE NOTE THIS IS A NEW FAX NUMBER)

DATE: 4/24/90

TIME: _____

SEND TO: Peggy LaubyFIRM/ORGANIZATION: White House

ADDRESS: _____

FAX #: 456 - 6218FROM: Ed Hensen

FIRM/ORGANIZATION: _____

Number of Pages to follow: 12COMMENTS: Please call if you need more
info:

KWVMAB FAX Number: (202) 343-3459

THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL

IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL



MEMBERS OF THE 101ST CONGRESS WHO SERVED IN THE ARMED FORCES DURING THE KOREAN WAR

SENATE

Y	John H. Chafee	R-Rhode Island	Marine Corps
Y	Wendell Ford	D-Kentucky	Air National Guard
Y	John Glenn	D-Ohio	Marine Corps
Y	Edward M. Kennedy	D-Massachusetts	Army
Y	Warren B. Rudman	R-New Hampshire	Army
Y	Terry Sanford	D-North Carolina	Army National Guard
Y	Paul M. Simon	D-Illinois	Army
Y	Arlen Specter	R-Pennsylvania	Air Force
Y	Strom Thurmond	R-South Carolina	Army Reserve
Y	John W. Warner	R-Virginia	Marine Corps

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Y	William R. Archer	R-Texas	Air Force
Y	Herbert H. Bateman	R-Virginia	Air Force
Y	Michael Bilirakis	R-Florida	Air Force
Y	Ben Blaz	R-Guam	Marine Corps
Y	Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.	R-Virginia	Navy
Y	Herbert L. Callahan	R-Alabama	Navy
Y	Benjamin N. Campbell	D-Colorado	Air Force
Y	William L. Clay	D-Missouri	Army
Y	William F. Clinger, Jr.	R-Pennsylvania	Navy
Y	Howard Coble	R-North Carolina	Coast Guard
Y	John J. Conyers, Jr.	D-Michigan	Army
Y	R. Lawrence Coughlin, Jr.	R-Pennsylvania	Marine Corps
Y	William E. Dannemeyer	R-California	Army
Y	Eligio de la Garza	D-Texas	Army
Y	Robert K. Dornan	R-California	Air Force
Y	William E. Frenzel	R-Minnesota	Navy
Y	Robert Garcia	D-New York	Army
Y	Melton D. Hancock	R-Missouri	Air Force
Y	James V. Hansen	R-Utah	Navy
Y	Andrew Jacobs, Jr.	D-Indiana	Marine Corps
Y	Ed Jenkins	D-Georgia	Coast Guard
Y	Norman F. Lent, Jr.	R-New York	Navy
Y	Thomas F. Lewis	R-Florida	Air Force
Y	Thomas J. Manton	D-New York	Marine Corps
Y	Alfred A. McCandless	R-California	Marine Corps
Y	Norman Y. Mineta	D-California	Army
Y	Guy V. Molinari	R-New York	Marine Corps
Y	G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery	D-Mississippi	National Guard
Y	John P. Murtha	D-Pennsylvania	Marine Corps
Y	Stanford E. Parris	R-Virginia	Air Force
Y	Charles B. Rangel	D-New York	Army
Y	George E. Sangmeister	D-Illinois	Army
Y	Richard T. Schulze	R-Pennsylvania	Army
Y	Gerald B. H. Solomon	R-New York	Marine Corps
Y	Floyd D. Spence	R-South Carolina	Navy
Y	Esteban E. Torres	D-California	Army
Y	C. W. "Bill" Young	R-Florida	National Guard

NH
Committee
as of 4/24/90

of people
coming

page 5

"Those Who Served"

on mac disk

and

THEIR COLLEAGUES

whose untiring advocacy insured that such
service would be remembered for all time:

Senator William L. Armstrong
Representative Mary Rose Oakar
Governor Jim Florio

KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, MAIN BUILDING
18TH AND C STREETS, NW ROOM 7023
WASHINGTON, DC 20240

202-343-2561
FAX 202-343-3459

RLH SUMMARY OF MAY 1st GALA DINNER TABLES SOLD
(list should ultimately be alphabetized)
(33 TABLES AS OF 4-24-90)

Korean War Veterans Association
Disabled American Veterans
Paralyzed Veterans of America
Military Order of the Purple Heart
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans of America
KOREAN EMBASSY
SAMSUNG (6 tables)
AMOCO
GOODYEAR
LITTON
GENERAL MOTORS
MARTIN MARIETTA (Subsidiary)
GLOBAL INC. (1 table)
BOEING
HUGHES AIRCRAFT
GE
MCGAHN, FRISS & MILLER
DR. NAM
POHANG STEEL
ALLIED SIGNAL
ERIN COMMUNICATIONS (2 tables)
TRUMP
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
ZACHARY FISHER
WILLIAM BUSH
READER'S DIGEST
ARNOLD PORTER

Individual seats from:
(36 SEATS)

The American Legion (5 seats)
Bethlehem Steel (2 seats)
Sun Company, Inc (2 seats)
Bank of America (2 seats)
GENERAL R G. STILWELL (2 seats)
WILLIAM F. MCSWEENEY (2 seats)
MIKE MCKEVITT (2 seats)
ORACLE (ROPKO) (2 seats)
SID HAWKES (2 seats)
AMERICAN GOLD STAR MOTHERS (2 seats)
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS (2 seats)
NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING (2 seats)
ASSOCIATIONS OF THE ARMY (1 seat)
Air Force Association (1 seat)
NYNEX (1 seat)
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (3 SEATS)
SOFT DRINK ASSOICATION (2 SEATS)

Stat

page 6 & 7

THE NATIONAL MEMORIAL TO VETERANS OF THE KOREAN WAR

On July 27, 1953, a military armistice ended three years of vicious combat on the war-torn Korean peninsula. The cost in human and material treasure had been enormous - but communist aggression had been halted, the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea restored, the rights of 40 million people preserved and Northeast Asia stabilized. All this had been made possible by a multi-national command, marshalled under the United Nations banner, to which the Republic of Korea and the United States contributed the major forces and suffered the major losses.

In 1986, Congress provided the long sought authorization to express our nation's enduring gratitude to the American service men and women whose fortitude and suffering had been all but forgotten. Signed into law by President Reagan, the legislation called for establishment of a Memorial to honor members of the United States Armed Forces who served in the Korean War, particularly those who were killed in action, are still listed as missing in action, or were held as prisoners of war.

The winning design, chosen from among 543 submissions, was developed by the team of Veronica Burns-Lucas, John Lucas, Don Leon and Eliza Pennypacker Oberholtzer from State College, Pennsylvania. It was unveiled by President Bush in a Rose Garden ceremony on Flag day 1989. His eloquent words reflect the nation's pride and gratitude for the heroes of the Korean War, "America could not be the land of the free, were it not the home of the brave."

Powerful in concept, the design radiates a message that is at once inspirational in content and timeless in meaning. The main feature is a column of 38 larger-than-life statues representing a combat formation of Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force elements going forward on an undefined mission. Muralled walls will tell the story of the Korean War, pay special tribute to the fallen and recognize the contributions of other participating nations.

With the preliminary approval of the cognizant Federal Commissions in hand, the architectural firm of Cooper-Lesky has been engaged to provide architectural-engineering design and the sculptor selection process is in train.

The estimated cost is \$10.5 million, all of which must be in hand by October, 1991 - the five year limitation imposed by the Commemorative Works Act. To date, \$5.5 million, representing over 100,000 contributions, has been deposited in an escrow account secured by the Government and reserved exclusively for construction costs. Promotion is thus heavily dependent on pro-bono/in-kind support.

Dedication of the Memorial on or before the 40th Anniversary of the Armistice will conclude the final campaign of the geo-political victory that was the Korean War.

page 8

MENU*Change
Add
copy***Appetizer**

Filet of Smoked Trout with
Lemon Capers, Red Onions, Lettuce Leaves
and Dijon Mayonnaise

Fetzer Chardonnay

Entree

~~X~~ Grilled Filet Mignon
~~X~~ Grilled Filet of Salmon
crisp Snow Peas with Water Chestnuts
California Carrots with Grand Marnier
Anna Potatoes

Fetzer Cabernet

Salad

Hearts of Palm, Bibb Lettuce, Pimentos
Lemon Vinaigrette

Whole Wheat and Pumpernickel Rolls
with Sweet Butter Curis

Dessert

White Chocolate Mousse Cake
Raspberry Coulis

Coffee

page 9, program- jmoc

A SALUTE TO THOSE WHO SERVED

GALA DINNER

1 May 1990

The Omni Shoreham Hotel

Master of Ceremonies
Edward J. Derwinski,
Secretary for Veterans Affairs

*New
copy*

RECEPTION, The Blue Room

PRESENTATION OF COLORS

Armed Forces Color Guard of the United States

THE NATIONAL ANTHEM

Sergeant Alvy Powell

INVOCATION

James D. Ford, Chaplain, U.S. House of Representative

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

DINNER

HISTORICAL REVIEW

THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL

REMARKS *Presentation*

General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret)

"THOSE WHO SERVED" Presentation

ENTERTAINMENT

Rosemary Clooney

Bob Hope

"THE HILLS OF VALOR"

The Military District of Washington

BENEDICTION

Archbishop Joseph T. Ryan

*Correct
Title*

page 10

BIOGRAPHIES**BOB HOPE**

Hailed as the only performer who has triumphed in all of the five major entertainment media: vaudeville, stage, radio, motion picture and television, Bob Hope occupies a unique niche in American life and an extraordinary status among comedians. He is as much a symbol of American patriotism as Yankee Doodle, and is recognized internationally as a tireless humanitarian devoted to the complex art of "lifting the American spirit."

Since 1941 Hope has travelled more than a million miles to entertain more than ten million military troops. He has appeared at almost every American military base in the world, including eight trips to Korea, and has received more than a thousand awards and citations for his humanitarian and professional efforts.

Hope has entertained and been honored by ten presidents. He has been made Honorary Commander of the British Empire by order of Queen Elizabeth, and is one of only three Americans to receive France's highest award. Hope has contributed zealous doses of his time and talent to charities throughout the world, and was timelessly recognized by President Kennedy as "America's most prized ambassador of goodwill throughout the world."

~~~~~

**Rosemary Clooney**

Whether Rosemary Clooney sings alone or in concert, the quality of her performances reveals an artist who is at the peak of her creative powers. The distinctive, smooth sound which garnered Clooney awards and gold records in earlier years is today strengthened by her triumphant victory over past personal trauma and a return to her real joy in singing and making music.

Over the years, Clooney has earned tremendous affection and respect internationally. The success of her recent album "Rosemary Clooney Sings the Music of Rodgers, Hart and Hammerstein" and an overwhelming response to recent appearances across the nation confirm her timeless appeal. As Frank Sinatra put it, "Rosemary Clooney has that great talent which exudes warmth and feeling in every song she sings. She is a symbol of good, modern American music."

A cause close to Rosemary's heart is the Betty Clooney Foundation for Persons with Brain Injury, named after her sister who died of a brain aneurism in 1976. This year marks the "Fifth Annual Singer's Salute to the Songwriter," a gala concert held to benefit the Foundation and the Betty Clooney Center of Long Beach, California. A unique post-rehabilitation facility, the Betty Clooney Center offers affordable community-based vocational and recreational services for survivors of brain injury.

page 11 top

## **"THE HILLS OF VALOR"**

presented by  
**THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

*Sgt?*

Tonight's presentation "The Hills of Valor" will be a tribute to the valor and sacrifices of over one million Americans and their United Nations comrades-in-arms.

The production is presented by the Military District of Washington and will be performed by elements of the United States Army Chorus, The 3rd United States Infantry (The Old Guard) and members of honor guard units from the United States Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard.

The United States Army Band was organized in 1922 by General of the Armies, General John J. Pershing. The band's duties are extensive. It is the official band for most diplomatic and state functions in the nation's capital and performs musical honors for the arrival in Washington of foreign heads of state, diplomats, and ~~high-ranking~~ military officials.

The 3rd Infantry (The Old Guard), on active duty since 1784, is The United States Army's elite ceremonial unit. The marching platoons, color guards, firing parties, honor guards and casket teams add distinction and pride to The Presidential Ceremonies, Guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and ~~conducting~~ funerals for our fallen comrades who are laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery.

Written by: ~~Mr. Mark Murray~~  
Arranged by: ~~Sargent Major James C. Kessler~~  
Produced and  
Directed by: ~~Captain Michael A. Greer~~

page 11 bottom

Tributes

All New Copy

WITH DEEP GRATITUDE...

**ABIGAIL VAN BUREN (Dear Abby)**

Trusted and beloved friend and counselor of so much of America over the years. For her abiding concern for those who served and sacrificed for the cause of freedom; for her extraordinary efforts to ensure that the long forgotten Korean veterans will be remembered for all time; for her unparalleled success in promoting the Memorial and marshalling her devoted readership to its support.

**THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS ASSOCIATION**

Few of numbers, strong of spirit. For the singled minded concentraton of rank and file on achieving recognition of a victory heretofore ignored by history and coalescing those who made it so; and for its many initiatives in furtherance of our noble project, notably including Kathleen Wyosnick's heartwarming letter.

**DONALD  CHUNG, MD.**

Native of North Korea, soldier for the South, American cardiologist with a very big heart. For his remarkable creativity and "Can do" spirit; and for his unfagging dedication of self and resources to further our common goal of memorializing those who secured freedom for a nation and its people.

page 12 top

tributes can't

### ELI BELIL

Korean vet, patriot, publicist. For his long standing and articulate advocacy of a national memorial; for his outstanding effectiveness in placing our public service announcements in national papers and magazines; and for a host of related activities to enhance public awareness via the mass media.

### LEE KUN HEE

*But* Distinguished steward of the Republic of Korea's premier corporation. For his involvement in the memorial project; and for the magnificent generosity that has made this evening possible.

... and to those many thousands, the length and breadth of grassroots America, whose support and encouragement will one day make the Memorial a reality.

*This evening*

We are indebted to Mr. Lee Kun Hee, distinguished Chairman, Samsung Group, whose <sup>great</sup> generosity has made this evening possible

*New Copy*

page 13 - dinner patrons Benefactors

**MEMORIAL BENEFACTORS**

Contributions to the memorial in excess of \$ 10,000 are listed below, starting with the largest contributor and continuing in descending order:

Hyundai Motor America and its USA Distributors  
Veterans of Foreign Wars  
Disabled American Veterans  
Korean War Veterans Association  
Paralyzed Veterans of America  
Veterans of Foreign War, Ladies Auxillary  
AFL-CIO & Affiliates  
The American Legion  
Ford Motor Company  
Pohang Steel America, Inc.  
RAKKASANS  
Military Order of the Purple Heart  
13th Bomb Squadron Association Korea (Grim Reapers)  
IBM  
Anheuser-Busch, Inc  
Chrysler Corporation Fund  
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.  
Phillip Morris  
United States Automobile Association

Martin Marietta ?

California Korea Bank  
Daewoo International (America) Corp.  
Daelim America, Inc.  
Doosan America Corp.  
Golden Bell USA Co., Inc.  
Goldstar America International  
Haital Trading USA  
Hanil Trading USA  
Hyosung (America), Inc.  
Kolon California Corp.  
Kumho USA, Inc.

Pohang Steel America, Inc. ?

Sammi America Corp.  
Ssanyong (USA) Inc.  
Sunkyoung America Inc.  
Waikiki Resort Hotel  
Marilyn Vandever  
Hahn Kook Center (USA) Inc.

Donald K. (B) Chung, MD ?

page 13 con't

American Legion Post 284/Virginia  
Association of Ranger Infantry Co.  
Adolph Coors, Inc.  
Americares Foundation Inc.  
Katherine T. Lemnitzer  
United Technologies



# KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

558-7808  
Jan

11 December 1989

## Board Members

STILWELL, Richard G.  
General, USA (Retired)  
Chairman

DAVIS, Raymond G. (MOH)  
General, USMC (Retired)  
Vice Chairman and  
Chairman, Design

McKEVITT, James D. 'Mike'  
Attorney - at - Law  
Chairman, Promotion

WEBER, William E.  
Colonel, USA (Retired)  
Chairman, Veterans Liaison

BORCHERDT, Edward R., Jr.  
President, Borchardt and Co.

CHERRY, Fred V.  
Colonel, USAF (Retired)

CURCIO, John B.  
CEO, (Retired)  
Mack Trucks, Inc.

DEHNE, Thomas G.  
Assistant National Adjutant  
Disabled American Veterans

McCARTHY, Rosemary T.  
Colonel, USA (Retired)

McSWEENEY, William F.  
President, Occidental  
International Corporation

RODRIGUEZ, Carlos  
Administrator of Benefits  
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans  
Association

## General Counsel

HOFFMAN, Martin R.  
Former Secretary of the Army

## Management Advisor

THOMPSON, Gerald J.  
RADM, SC, USN (Retired)  
Partner, Coopers & Lybrand

## Executive Director

HANSEN, Robert L.

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

My dear Mr. President,

With the unveiling of the design for the Congressionally-mandated Korean War Veterans Memorial last Flag Day, you paid high honor to all who served in that conflict. Your participation gave enormous boost to a noble project. Public awareness - and support - has been heightened, the design concept has been endorsed by all cognizant national commissions and the architectural engineering phase has begun. Actual construction could initiate in early 1991, if the requisite \$9 million has been raised. (We currently have \$4.5 million.)

In the enabling legislation, Congress determined the national interest would best be served if these funds came from the American people. To achieve our goal, Sir, we will be holding our first official "fund raising" event on **May 1, 1990**.

The function will honor all serving Members of Congress who are veterans of the Korean War (to include 10 Senators and 34 Members of the House). Our good friend, **Bob Hope**, has already agreed to play a major role in the evening's activities.

We would be most honored if:

- o As a combat veteran yourself, you would **serve as the Chairman** of this special evening, joining members of the leadership of both Chambers who will serve as the Dinner Committee.
- o And, of course, we **hope** you and Mrs. Bush will put it on your schedules to attend what promises to be a wonderful event for a most worthy cause.

Appx 700-800

50/50 M/F

Vets + Corp exec

Bob hope

Rosemary Clurey

Dear Abbey  $\rightarrow$  <sup>honored</sup> Columns  $\rightarrow$  ~~\$~~ 700,000

46 <sup>Gmen</sup>

10 Senators

36 Reps

10/ Congress

in uniform 50-53

25-30 Committed



The President  
December 11, 1989  
Page Two

Your distinguished presence would pay further tribute to the brave Americans who, at staggering cost, helped rescue a fledgling nation from communist bondage and achieve a major geopolitical victory.

Thank you most sincerely for your consideration of this request.

Most respectfully,

  
General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.  
Chairman, Korean War Veterans  
Memorial Advisory Board

Enclosures: As noted

RGS/j

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR

|                      |                  |              |
|----------------------|------------------|--------------|
| Benjamin M. Campbell | R - California   | Air Force    |
| John J. Conyers, Jr. | D - Michigan     | Army         |
| William E. Frenzel   | R - Minnesota    | Navy         |
| Robert Garcia        | D - New York     | Army         |
| Andrew Jacobs, Jr.   | D - Indiana      | Marine Corps |
| Alfred A. McCandless | R - California   | Marine Corps |
| Guy V. Molinari      | R - New York     | Marine Corps |
| Stanford E. Parris   | R - Virginia     | Air Force    |
| Charles B. Rangel    | D - New York     | Army         |
| Richard T. Schulze   | R - Pennsylvania | Army         |

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO SERVED  
IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR

|                         |                    |                |
|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| William R. Archer       | R - Texas          | Air Force      |
| Herbert H. Bateman      | R - Virginia       | Air Force      |
| Michael Bilirakis       | R - Florida        | Air Force      |
| Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.   | R - Virginia       | Navy           |
| Herbert L. Callahan     | R - Alabama        | Navy           |
| William L. Clay         | D - Missouri       | Army           |
| William F. Clinger, Jr. | R - Pennsylvania   | Navy           |
| Robert L. Coughlin, Jr. | R - Pennsylvania   | Marine Corps   |
| William E. Dannemeyer   | R - California     | Army           |
| Eligio de la Garza      | D - Texas          | Army           |
| Robert K. Dornan        | R - California     | Air Force      |
| Melton D. Hancock       | R - Missouri       | Air Force      |
| James V. Hansen         | R - Utah           | Navy           |
| Norman F. Lent, Jr.     | R - New York       | Navy           |
| Thomas F. Lewis         | R - Florida        | Air Force      |
| Thomas J. Manton        | D - New York       | Marine Corps   |
| Norman Y. Mineta        | D - California     | Army           |
| G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery | D - Mississippi    | National Guard |
| John P. Murtha          | D - Pennsylvania   | Marine Corps   |
| George E. Sangmeister   | D - Illinois       | Army           |
| Gerald B.H. Soloman     | R - New York       | Marine Corps   |
| Floyd D. Spence         | R - South Carolina | Navy           |
| Esteban E. Torres       | D - California     | Army           |
| Bill C. Young           | R - Florida        | National Guard |

LEADING PROPONENTS OF KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL  
LEGISLATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

|                 |                |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Mary Rose Oakar | D - Ohio       |
| Stan Parris     | R - Virginia   |
| James J. Florio | D - New Jersey |

SENATORS WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR

|                  |                   |              |
|------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| John H. Chafee   | R - Rhode Island  | Marine Corps |
| John Glenn       | D - Ohio          | Marine Corps |
| Warren B. Rudman | R - New Hampshire | Army         |
| John W. Warner   | R - Virginia      | Marine Corps |

SENATORS WHO SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES,  
BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR

|                   |                    |                     |
|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Wendell Ford      | D - Kentucky       | Air National Guard  |
| Edward M. Kennedy | D - Massachusetts  | Army                |
| Terry Sanford     | D - North Carolina | Army National Guard |
| Paul M. Simon     | D - Illinois       | Army                |
| Strom Thurmond    | R - South Carolina | Army Reserve        |
| Arlen Specter     | R - Pennsylvania   | Air Force           |

Senator William Armstrong (R - Colorado) is the major proponent of authorizing legislation for the Korean War Veterans Memorial.

# KOREAN WAR VETERANS

ASSOCIATION, INC.

Blaine P. Friedlander  
Counsel  
2341 Dale Drive  
Falls Church, VA 22043  
(703) 560-4716

December 21, 1989

*mally,  
call Kathy Super &  
see where this stands. IT  
still is early*

*Bobbie*

*Then call Friedlander &  
let him know what's up.  
Bobbie*

The Hon. Bobbie Kilberg  
Director, Public Liaison  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Via FAX 456-6281

Dear Bobbie:


When last we spoke you were seeking a Senator's seat in the Virginia General Assembly. One could now state that you have reached a higher level, and I wish to offer my congratulations.

Enclosed you will note a copy of a press release the Korean War Veterans Association endorsing the actions of President Bush in Panama. Most of our members served in a similar capacity in Korea and we are pleased and impressed with the current events.

Somewhere in the White House there is an invitation from our President, Dick Adams, to your President, George Bush, to participate in our convention on July 27, 1990, in Northern Virginia. It would appear that President Bush would be most warmly received, and the KWVA would like to make a presentation that would express our appreciation for his handling of the matters in Panama.

It would be most appreciated if you would kindly meet with several of us to discuss this matter at your earliest convenience.

With every best wish for the holiday season and New Year,

  
Blaine P. Friedlander

December 21, 1989

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

Dick Adams, President  
Korean War Veterans Association  
P.O. Box 127, Caruthers, CA 936

[O] (209) 268-1869  
[H] (209) 864-3196  
[FAX] (209) 864-8208

Caruthers, CA. Dec. 21. Dick Adams, President of the Korean War Veterans Association, said today that the Korean War Veteran salutes George Bush, President of the United States for his prompt and proper actions in Panama yesterday and called upon all citizens to write their Senators and Representative to immediately ratify the Presidential action.

According to Adams, President Bush's action follows the in the tradition of President Harry S. Truman, who provided military support for Korea after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950.

"The military movement in Panama is a police action, just as it was in Korea, nearly forty years ago. It is a sign we are still a great nation, willing to fight for the freedom of another country. The combat veteran is in Panama for the same reasons we were sent to Korea," Adams said.

Adams, was 17 years old when he was sent to Korea as a member of a Tank company attached to the 25th Infantry Division, one of the first units sent to Korea. He celebrated his 18th Birthday on the Pusan Perimeter and participated in the drive north after the Inchon landing. Adams was wounded twice. He left Korea as a First Sergeant.

Adams says that those who eschew force should remember the restraint of our government during the recent past when the Panamanian leadership deliberately taunted the United States and acted in a provocative manner.

"The Korean War Veterans Association at its Midwinter Meeting on February 10, 1990, will look at an appropriate ceremony to acknowledge the continued strong leadership of the United States for good and continued world peace," Adams said.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1990

Dear General Stilwell:

On behalf of the President, I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your letter inviting him to attend the fundraising dinner for the Korean War Veterans Memorial next May.

The President is pleased to accept. This has been entered on his schedule for May 1, and nearer the date, Mr. John G. Keller, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Advance, will contact you concerning the President's involvement.

The President's acceptance of this invitation should not be announced to anyone until official notification is given by the White House Press Office, and any public announcement of this event must be coordinated with Mr. Jay Allison who may be reached at 202/456-2100.

You should be aware that certain physical facility requirements exist for any Presidential appearance. The costs associated with these requirements are generally the responsibility of the host and are summarized on the attached list.

If you wish to alter the current plans for this event in any way, such as changing any part of the format, the location, or the participants, please direct your request for the proposed change to the Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



JOSEPH W. HAGIN II  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for Appointments and Scheduling

General R. G. Stilwell, USA Ret.  
Chairman  
Korean War Veterans Memorial  
Advisory Board  
U.S. Department of Interior  
16th & C Streets, N.W.  
Room 7023  
Washington, D.C. 20240

JWH/lhw  
cc: incoming to Helen Donaldson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1990


Dear Dick:

I am pleased to accept your invitation to serve as Honorary Chairman of the Korean War Veterans Advisory Board.

I believe in your goals, and I am proud to give my enthusiastic support to your organization's initiatives. Thank you for extending this opportunity to me. I know that my staff has been in touch with you recently concerning my attendance at the dinner your membership is hosting on May 1st. I look forward to joining you for this special occasion.

With appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. H. W. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "George" and last name "Bush" clearly legible.

General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret.  
Chairman, Korean War Veterans  
Memorial Advisory Board  
Department of the Interior  
Room 7023  
18th and C Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20240

WARREN B. RUDMAN  
NEW HAMPSHIRE

COMMITTEES:

APPROPRIATIONS

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

BUDGET

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,  
VICE-CHAIRMAN

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
January 12, 1990

OFFICES:

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
202-224-3324  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

125 NORTH MAIN STREET  
603-225-7115  
CONCORD, NH 03301

NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING  
603-888-7591  
MANCHESTER, NH 03103

THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING  
603-431-5900  
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801

157 MAIN STREET  
603-752-2804  
BERLIN, NH 03570

The Honorable John Sununu  
Chief of Staff  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear John:

Could we expedite consideration of this "contingent"  
acceptance?

Sincerely,



Warren B. Rudman  
United States Senator

Enclosure

WARREN B. RUDMAN  
NEW HAMPSHIRE

COMMITTEES:

APPROPRIATIONS  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
BUDGET  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,  
VICE-CHAIRMAN

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
January 12, 1990

OFFICES:

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
202-224-3324  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
125 NORTH MAIN STREET  
803-225-7115  
CONCORD, NH 03301  
NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING  
603-866-7591  
MANCHESTER, NH 03103  
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING  
603-431-5900  
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801  
157 MAIN STREET  
603-752-2604  
BERLIN, NH 03570

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


Those of us in the Congress who are Korean War veterans will be honored at a major affair to be held at the Shoreham on 1 May 1990. The Speaker and Senator Mitchell agreed to co-chair the Honorary Dinner Committee which will include minority leaders of both Chambers and Chairmen of several key committees. As was true of the ceremony you hosted in the Rose Garden on Flag Day, the event will be another milestone toward realization of the national Korean War veterans memorial.

You have been invited by Dick Stilwell, Chairman of the Board appointed by your predecessor, to be honorary chair of this event and, the demands of your high office permitting, to attend in company with Mrs. Bush. Your presence would be most meaningful to my fellow veterans and me. I therefore hope you will circle that date on your calendar, even though it may be too early to make a firm commitment about attendance.

It is pivotal to the success of the dinner that the invitational letters make reference to prospective Presidential attendance. I propose, for your approval, the following wording:

"The President and First Lady have marked this date on their schedules and plan to attend, the exigent demands of State permitting..."

Respectfully,

  
Warren B. Rudman  
United States Senator

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES

FROM: BARRY R. MCBEE *ben*

SUBJECT: (1) Korean War Veterans Memorial Dinner  
(2) Indian Museum Dedication

(1) Secretary Derwinski is very supportive of this organization and its efforts and of General Stilwell personally. He encourages the President at a minimum to agree to serve as honorary chairman and, if at all possible, to try and drop by the dinner. He notes that Korean War veterans are moving into leadership positions of many of the veterans organizations.

(2) Tom Weimer noted that by late January, the proposed date for the dedication ceremony, Interior will probably be close to finalizing its position on the recommendations of the Senate committee that studied the federal government's oversight of Indians and the Bureau of Indian Affairs; hearings on this issue are anticipated to begin in mid to late February. One sensitive issue that could be the focus of attention in connection with the dedication is the question of museums' disposition of Indian bones. Extensive discussions on this issue have gone on over the last few months, with a possible compromise of bones that can be identified being returned to tribes for proper burial; bones that cannot be identified can be retained by museums as archaeological materials. Interior and BIA personnel have been involved in these discussions. I will arrange for a briefing closer to the event (if it is approved).

G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY  
3d DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

100012  
DISTRICT OFFICE:  
FEDERAL BUILDING  
MERIDIAN, MS 39301  
(601) 683-6681

GOLDEN TRIANGLE AIRPORT  
COLUMBUS, MS 39701  
(601) 327-2766

FEDERAL BUILDING  
LAUREL, MS 39440  
(601) 648-1231

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

January 4, 1990

COMMITTEES:  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN  
ARMED SERVICES  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT:  
ANDRE CLEMANDOT

*F. McJure*  
The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

FDM  
S/H

Dear Mr. President:

You and Barbara have received an letter of invitation from GEN Dick Stilwell to attend a Gala Dinner on May 1 to honor current Members of Congress who served during the Korean War. The dinner also will serve as the kick-off fund raising for the Korean War Veterans Memorial, which has been authorized by the Congress. You will remember you participated in the ceremonies in the Rose Garden unveiling the design of the Memorial last Flag Day.

I certainly hope your schedule will allow you and Barbara to be present for this important event. It will certainly mean a lot to those who served during the Korean War.

Sincerely,

*Sonny Montgomery*  
GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY  
Member of Congress

*270*

GVM:ac

*And Mrs. Bush to  
attend the May 1 Gala  
Dinner. to kick-off the  
fundraising efforts ~~to honor~~  
for the Korean War Veterans  
Memorial.*