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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
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Series:	Speech File Backup Files
Subseries:	Chron File, 1989-1993

OA/ID Number:	13709
Folder ID Number:	13709-009

Folder Title:
Prime Minister Mazowiecki [Poland] 3/21/90 [OA 6854] [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	26	19	7	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Report	Government report. (2 pp.)	10/19/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Speech File, Backup
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Prime Minister Mazowiecki 3/21/90 [1]

Pinksheet Number: RML1542
OA/ID Number: 13709-009
Date Closed: 10/15/2004
FOIA/Sys Case #: S
Re-review Case #: 2004-2265-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Steph –

This is the Poland file –

2 things to check:

1) Polish-America Enterprise
Are they going to be there?
Are the names correct
(spelling etc)?

– Arrival – 2nd ff

2) Any NSC inserts coming –
factually correct? (You
know the NSC...)

Thanks!!

D...

Acknowledgments

Card. Krol?
? who would replace
? another Pol. church leader
? who's w/ him

Warsaw - Krakow

wreath-laying

Fr. Pop - St. Stanilas Church - Warsaw

night beg - dinner w/ Lech VP invited Lech to wreath-laying

Zoret greathouse

walking up driveway

Pol sec - pulled Pol flag off car left only Am flag

VOA - 1000s people
along streets
greater ~~crowds~~

balcony ~~balcony~~ above
entrance - over street

Long live Reagan -
Long live Bush

Tim McBride

Rich Podkowski

Comm state, great appreciation
for Am - 1987

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED REMARKS

TOAST FOR DELIEVERY BY THE PRESIDENT
AT THE STATE DINNER IHO
POLISH PRIME MINISTER TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI

5/21 Mazo Wiecki

Mr. Prime Minister and members of the Polish delegation, it is a great honor and privilege to welcome you to the White House this evening. I know how tired you must still be from your long journey to the United States, and from your very busy schedule today. I hope you will consider this evening a time to relax and feel that you are among friends.

Mr. Prime Minister, I regret that my two trips to Poland in the last three years did not give me quite enough time to learn how to speak your beautiful language. I am afraid that it will take some additional visits before I can offer this toast in Polish. But I think that as our relationship grows, we can consider making Polish a mandatory language in our school systems so that perhaps one of my successors will be able to recite from Mickiewicz.

Mr. Prime Minister, as you look around the room I think you can see why Americans feel so enriched by our long friendship with the Polish people. Polish-Americans, of whom there are many here tonight, have made a truly extraordinary contribution to the cultural, political and economic life of the United States.

Recent events in Poland have helped bring our two nations even closer to one another. Mr. Prime Minister, I believe that your leadership has been the reason for this. You have led your country on a journey to democracy and freedom which only a short time ago would have been thought unimaginable. We have watched your progress with great awe and admiration.

Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to recall the visit to the White House of one of your predecessors.

I am speaking about the great Polish patriot, pianist, diplomat and leader, Ignace Jan Paderewski.

If Paderewski could be here with us tonight, I think he would be a most contented guest. He would see that his own life's devotion to a democratic and free Poland is at long last being fulfilled and that the leadership of his beloved country is in such capable hands.

Paderewski took charge of a coalition government in Warsaw in January 1919. It was a fateful time for Poland, because after almost 125 years of foreign domination Poland was again to be free and was again to take its place among the nations of the world.

Paderewski faced terrible challenges at home. The Polish economy had been devastated by war and by foreign occupation. Enormous sacrifice would be required of the Polish people. They would need a leader whom they could trust and follow.

He also understood the need for a new political order in the world, and for this reason he was a most vigorous and persuasive advocate of the League of Nations.

I believe that in many respects, the government that you lead, Mr. Prime Minister, is charged with continuing and completing the work that was begun by Paderewski. And I believe that he would agree with me that you are certainly a most worthy successor. You have lead your country at a critical time, and you have earned the trust and admiration of your people. You have introduced a truly breathtaking economic transformation involving great hardships. The affection of the Polish people for you is a mark of your leadership.

The terrible events of 1939 which again brought Poland under foreign occupation must never be repeated. We have learned many lessons from that inter-war period. Perhaps most of all from from the American perspective, we have learned that our fate is tied to the fate of Europe, that the ocean that separates us is really very small.

Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to propose a toast to Poland's freedom and democracy and may she never be separated from them again.

TELEFAX COVER SHEET

VOICE OF AMERICA • CZECHOSLOVAK SERVICE

RETURN FAX, Washington (202) 475-6208

DELIVER TO: Ms. Peggy Dooley
White House speech writing
(FAX NUMBER): 456-6218

Miroslav S. Dobrovodsky, Chief, Czechoslovak Service, VOICE OF AMERICA
330 Independence Ave., S. W., Washington, D.C. 20547, United States
Tel.: (202) 475-2208, 475-2209

COMMENTS:

Enclosed are parts of "Havel elected President" program with English traslation of some of his interviews he has given over the years to the VOA-Czechoslovak. Also 2 pages from The New York Times magazine, Oct. 25,1989 and a letter by V. Havel to the Prosecutor General of Czechoslovakia from 1985. Hope some information may be of use to you.

Number of pages (including cover sheet): 16

VOA Program Dec 29/89

JUSTIFICATION: Havel elected President of Czechoslovakia, and Reaction

This broadcast was prepared on the day of the election to office of the first non-communist President since 1948. VOA-Czechoslovak polled over a dozen prominent Czechoslovak citizens about their reaction to the election. We chose the three statements that we feel are representative of the mood and atmosphere prevailing in Czechoslovakia. Included in this broadcast is a summary of President Havel's activity over the past fifteen years, including excerpts from several interviews Mr. Havel granted the VOA. In the last excerpt, Mr. Havel highly praised the VOA-Czechoslovak. Also included is a reading by one of the most famous Czech actors, Jan Triska, now residing and successfully pursuing his career in California, of Vaclav Havel's Erasmus Prize acceptance speech. [redacted]

December 1989.

Announcer:

In the next few minutes you will hear the reaction of several Czechoslovak citizens to the election of playwright Vaclav Havel to the office of the President of Czechoslovakia.

Voice:

My name is Jan Kacer, and I work as a director at the Na Vinohradech Theater in Prague. You ask me what the election of Vaclav Havel to the office of President of Czechoslovakia means to me. First of all, it means a great new hope, and also the logical conclusion to all the great work Vaclav Havel has done. First he worked on himself, examined the prevailing situation and conditions, then he made a profound study of all that was happening here. He studied the totalitarian system, the diminished humanity, he studied the lack of freedom. When he had had learned everything, he began to use his knowledge, made it a reality. And so, as far as I am concerned, there is no question about who should be President. Because the fact that all this happened in Czechoslovakia is actually Vaclav's work, it is inspired by him. And not just inspired, it is fulfilled, finished by him.

Voice:

I am Dana Nemcova, from Prague, and I am a psychologist. This year I am a speaker for Charter 77. I, of course, feel happy, am in a holiday mood. As I approached the Castle, I kept repeating to myself that psalm, the one that says, "When they brought forth the Babylonian captives, we felt as if we were dreaming." That's about how I felt during the entire ceremony, during the presidential vote. I believe that the election of Vaclav Havel to the presidency is a guarantee that in the future, or at least during the next six months, free elections will be guaranteed by law.

Voice:

Good evening. I'm Stanislav Sarsky, and I'm and actor of the State Theater in Ostrava. Well, today we've had an absolutely wonderful day, which will be entered not only in history books, but will forever remain in our hearts. Because I believe that we will once again, finally, rule in our own cause. Vaclav Havel has become the President of our country. Though we speak about it, we can't seem to be able to find the right words. That which seemed impossible a month ago is now reality. It is a victory of morality, ethics. And the truth has won out. As it says on the Presidential Seal. We will see what happens next. But I think everything will work out fine.

Announcer:

And now, let us go to Slovakia, to Bratislava. Journalist Ota Plavkova, who has only recently, and after 20 years of forced non-accreditation, regained her membership in the Journalists' Guild, spoke of the feelings and hopes of all generations of Czechs and Slovaks.

Voice:

I am simply--and humanly--happy. For my children, for my grandchildren. After 21 years of sadness, suffering, and lack of justice and gratefulness from the people,

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I feel as if suddenly I had grown wings. Unfortunately, I am ill at this time, but even that is not very important now. Vaclav Havel as President of the county--that is a blessing for the generations that come after us. It means the awareness, the guarantee that those who come after us will never have to so desperately, to the death, fight such a hydra-headed totalitarianism as was created here by that monstrous communism. True education, and a free world, will be open to our children, they will not be lied to, their spines will be straight. Children, young people who will be free to learn without that ballast, phraseology that was sometimes more difficult to bear than was the fact that we were fired from our jobs. Though I do not like to use long words, I can find none other that will convey the same message: Mr. Vaclav Havel's character is clean, crystal clear. He is modest and wise and humane. He is the personification of all the best that is and has been--and surely will be--the Czech people. I, a Slovak, am happy and proud for all the world to see that he is my President, too. Mr. President, we Slovaks too will help you. Because all of us good people still have much to do to stand this fragile, commencing democracy on its feet and to strengthen it. Mr. President Havel, we thank you and wish you good health.

Announcer: Live

On the occasion of Vaclav Havel's election to the Czechoslovak Presidency, we will take a nostalgic look at some of the events that have occurred in his life. The program was prepared by Ludek Brezina.

Voice: Live

In Prague's Old Town Square, they are probably still celebrating Vaclav Havel's election to the Presidency. Two months ago, who would have dared to even imagine that Czechoslovakia's communist regime would crumble and that Gustav Husak, who had been placed in power by Soviet tanks, would be replaced at the Castle by Vaclav Havel, the first non-communist President since 1948. Therefore, something unimaginable has become reality. The events of the past few weeks may lead someone to the erroneous conclusion that everything had been easy, and that only a few days of determined activity were enough to remove the communist regime. The fact remains that this process had begun toward the end of the seventies, at the birth of the first grass roots initiative in Eastern Europe, Charter 77, which from the beginning tried to reform the communist system by peaceful means. For their efforts, the Charter's members, headed by Vaclav Havel, were persecuted, demeaned and imprisoned. Some of them, such as Professor Jan Patocka and Pavel Wonka, did not return from prison. And if not for world-wide outrage at the authorities' treatment of Vaclav Havel, he too may no longer be with us. Despite these hardships, the Charter continued in its activity, and its members never regretted the price they had to pay.

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the birth of the Charter, Vaclav Havel spoke with us about the past decade.

Havel - Tape

Havel:

After all, when we began this work, we were fully aware that we were leaving ourselves open to harassment, and that we may not influence anything at all. This risk we took was present at the very birth of the Charter. I don't believe that the Charter was the result of any kind of cold-blooded political calculations, but as an act of moral liberation, a straightening of the spine of each citizen who demands

4.

his rights as a citizen. This is a demand that is never truly fulfilled, there is never any certainty that it will lead to anything. If you look at it from the perspective that we didn't know what would come out of it all, then the fact that the Charter still exists after 10 years, and today is the oldest human rights organization in the Soviet Bloc, that it is a living organization, that it obviously commands from society a great deal of respect--that alone is a great success. And I feel that it was worth the price we paid.

Voice:

For his courageous activity in the area of human rights, for speaking the truth, and for his principles, Vaclav Havel has earned the respect of the entire world. It had even become the norm that visiting western delegations would first meet with Havel, then they would deal with Czechoslovak state and party officials. That, of course, did not make Havel's situation in Czechoslovakia any easier. The constant lack of knowledge of what the authorities would do to him next, when and under what circumstances he might be arrested, forced Havel to always carry a toothbrush with him. Though he often joked about it, the specter of jail was not a comfortable one. This spring, after his most recent release from prison, he spoke about it with one of our reporters.

!!

cut Havel

Havel:

Of course, I'm glad to be free, even though it seems to me that this life on the outside may be a little demanding. Even more demanding than it was before my latest incarceration. They left me relatively alone in that jail, as opposed to being on the outside, though it is a paradox. By that I don't mean to recommend jail to anyone. And of course I am glad to be free.

Voice:

Vaclav Havel has earned recognition not only for his human rights activities, but also for his literary work. His plays, which often describe the absurdity of a dogmatic regime, have become a permanent part of the repertoire of theaters all over the world. Nevertheless, Czechoslovak audiences are not familiar with them, because they are not allowed to be staged in Czechoslovakia. His plays have earned Vaclav Havel several prestigious international awards, including Holland's Erasmus of Rotterdam Prize for 1986, which is awarded for significant contributions to European culture. The fact alone that in the past the Prize had been awarded to people such as Charlie Chaplin, the painters Kokoschka and Chagall, sculptor Henry Moore, and others, is evidence of Europe's great esteem of Vaclav Havel. In his speech, which was read at the Rotterdam celebration by actor Jan Triska, Havel addressed the fact that Europe is a continent divided, and how to work on changing that fact.

cut TRISKA

Triska, reading Havel's speech.

Please allow me to thank the Erasmus Prize Committee for this great honor not only in my name, but in the name of all the people of Eastern Europe who are trying to speak and create freely, or those who sympathize with them. The fact that I live in that part of Europe which is separated from you, and which the Erasmus Prize will enter for the first time today, quite naturally brings to my mind the question of how to deal with the division of our continent. More and more often we hear from everywhere, whether it be from governments or all sorts of non-conformist civic

movements, about a European continent built on friendly cooperation of independent and equal nations, a continent which would radiate peace, instead of the threat of a martial confrontation of superpowers. No matter how sincere each articulator of this vision, it is an unbelievably beautiful thought. Unfortunately, for now it is only a vision. Europe is divided by a high wall, the physical symbol of which is the Berlin wall. What can we do to one day turn this beautiful vision into reality? What can we do to ensure that each European nation be independent and equal,and unafraid of its neighbors? What can we do to ensure that each European nation enjoy political democracy and social justice, so they can help other, less developed countries of this world in a manner that would truly reflect their capabilities? What can we do to ensure that each and every European may feel safe and free, trust the law, and live a dignified and meaningful life? How can we change things so that our younger citizens do not have to spend many years of their lives learning to kill people, and so our European scientists can spend their time finding ways to preserve nature instead thinking up constantly better and bigger weapons? I believe that each of us can do at least two things. And I feel great satisfaction that both of them can be seen as loosely paralleling the legacy of that great European, Erasmus of Rotterdam. First: We all have the opportunity to again and again repeat that we want what we want. And in spite of all harsh political realities, and in spite of all restrictions deriving from human nature and the moral, religious and social state of contemporary civilization, we can all loudly articulate our ideals and actively promote them. We can sacrifice many of our ideals, as we can sacrifice much of our private happiness, if we agree at least a little with Czech philosopher Jan Patocka, when he said that there exist things worth suffering for. We can all accept that strange, logical and at the same time enigmatic imperative which states that one should act in the manner in which he feels all should act. Each one of us should simply understand that no matter how unimportant or powerless he is, he can change the world. The mystery of this imperative stems from the unbelievable thought that any of us can, so to speak, shake the earth. The logic lies in the fact that should I, you, he, we,everyone not decide on this road, that not even the world we live in can move, that world we create together, for which we are responsible. Each one of us must start at home. If we wait for one another, we would wait for ever. It is not true that it is impossible. The power over oneself, as dictated by each person's character, origins, degree of education, and self realization, is the only thing that even the most helpless of us does have. And at the same time, it is the only thing that cannot be taken from any of us. He who employs this imperative may not accomplish anything. But certainly the one who will not even try will accomplish nothing.

T.G. Ash: "His real work is writing plays."

Announcer: Live

Shortly after he received the Erasmus Prize, we spoke with Vaclav Havel about what the award means to Czechoslovakia, to the next round of activity in the name of human rights.

Havel: Havel

I believe that it is very valuable as far as Charter 77, and other local independent organizations, are concerned. And I believe that it is very important to Czechoslovakia, for several reasons. It is a clear sign that people in the west are not unconcerned about us, that they watch us, and that people are interested in what is happening here as far as human rights in this country are concerned, and that is something that can't but help us. I myself became convinced of this, because yesterday, when you broadcast my speech, beautifully read by Jan Triska, I

VOA ✓

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immediately noticed a great response from my fellow citizens. Because almost everyone listens to your station. And everyone saw this as great encouragement, were happy about it, almost as if each one of them had received that award.

Announcer: Live

Appreciation of Vaclav Havel's work could have peaked in no other way than in his election to the Presidential office.

[redacted]

VOA News

[redacted]

EUR-17 HAVEL DETAINED 8/2/89

POLICE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAVE DETAINED DISSIDENT PLAYWRIGHT VACLAV HAVEL FOR THE SECOND TIME IN THE PAST 24 HOURS.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST WAS DETAINED WEDNESDAY ON HIS WAY TO HAVE LUNCH WITH THE WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR. THE PLAYWRIGHT, WHO SERVED FOUR MONTHS IN PRISON EARLIER THIS YEAR, WAS HELD IN CUSTODY FOR ABOUT THREE HOURS ON TUESDAY.

WESTERN NEWS REPORTS SAY THE BONN GOVERNMENT HAS PROTESTED THE DETENTION.

(REU, AP, AFP)

ENS/RMC/MGW

Právě jsme obdrželi zprávu, že

4:35 pm

Československá policie dnes podruhé v rozpětí 24 hodin zadržela dramatika a oběžníka lidských práv Václava Havla. Václav Havel byl dnes zadržen cestou na oběd se západoněmeckým velvyslancem v Československu. Havel, jenž začátkem tohoto roku strávil 4 měsíce ve výkonu vězeňského trestu, byl již včera zadržen ke třihodinovému výslechu. Západní tiskové zprávy uvádějí, že západoněmecká vláda [redacted] proti dnešnímu zadržení Václava Havla protestovala.

A society at the end of its patience

Czechoslovak dissident Vaclav Havel explains how his country is overcoming its fear of Communist repression

AT A time when Poland, Hungary and the USSR are trying (with various understandable complications) to change a Communist-type totalitarian system into a somewhat more democratic one, the Czechoslovak government is resisting this trend tooth and nail. Although it loudly affirms support for "restructuring" and "democratisation", it is in fact changing nothing, or allowing only small changes mostly forced by pressure from "below".

The policy is more than understandable. This government was put in power by Brezhnev's tanks: opposition to reform has become its ideological identity card, and the strengthening of its pervasive power an everyday practice. It is quite natural that it does not want to change things suddenly, for fear it might cut the branch on which it is sitting. But this society, for so long run down, silenced and atomised, is slowly beginning to lose patience.

Encouraged by events in neighbouring countries — Solidarity MPs now sit in the Polish parliament, and multi-party elections are due in Hungary within a year — and disgusted by the inability of the government to solve the ever-multiplying problems, Czechoslovak society is beginning to wake up. People are beginning to interest themselves more in public affairs, to seek out truthful information, and to lose their fear of expressing their real opinions in public.

Thanks to this, the so-called "dissidents" — in other words, people involved in the independent initiatives (of which the oldest and best known is Charter 77), who do not hesitate to express their views freely without regard for the consequences — are already ceasing to be seen as some isolated group of suicides and madmen, for so many years silently admired by the public but unable to expect from them any visible support. Anger with the state's police means that fear of dissidents is vanishing.

The spontaneous and independent demonstrations of August, October and December 1988, and the subsequent events of January 1989 — when huge crowds came out on the streets of Prague — with all that followed them, are clear evidence of this movement.

When I heard with my own ears great crowds of people chanting "Long Live Charter" or "Charter will win", and when later, after four months in prison following the January demonstrations, I saw on video young people chanting "Release Havel", it made a deep impression on me, and my surprise was mixed with satisfaction. I realised suddenly that the bleak and enduring efforts of those "suicides", with which they had paid with years in prison, had not been in vain and are beginning to be revalued.

The slogan "Long Live Charter" pleases me not just as a tribute to Charter 77's efforts over the years, but above all as an expression of the awakening desire for freedom, which the word "Charter" serves as an easily chanted symbol that leaves no one in any doubt about the free-minded ideals of those who are chanting it.

It is of great importance that, after 20 years, thousands of well-known artists and scientists active in the establishment structures — and therefore with every reason to be cautious — plucked up the courage to object to the police actions in January, and unhesitatingly gave their signatures in protest, jointly with those much-feared "dissidents" defamed by the authorities for so many years.



Havel: at the crossroads of history

This social awakening has so far culminated in the petition *Several Sentences*, which was launched in June, and which concerns not only the defence of society against concrete lawlessness but also its positive self-expression.

The signatories are telling the government that the only way out of the blind alley in which Czechoslovakia finds itself, and an essential precondition for any democratisation of the system, is a fundamental change in the social climate which — in the words of the petition — must restore "a spirit of freedom, trust, tolerance and pluralism".

The petition voices several straightforward and easily realisable demands — such as the release of all political prisoners, and freedom of speech, association and worship — the granting of which would make possible the creation of such a climate.

It stems from the quite logical proposition that if the changes in the system are not to be just temporary, partial, muddled and hasty, they must be preceded by a matter-of-fact discussion, and conditions must be created to make such a discussion possible. *Several Sentences* has already been signed by thousands of people, from famous actors to unknown workers, from leaders of independent initiatives to members of the Communist Party, from Catholics to former Communist functionaries.

It is being signed throughout the country, despite a very rapid and sharp condemnation by the authorities, who — in the spirit of their Stalinist, perverted way of thinking — described this peaceful call for dialogue as "an attempt at confrontation". What will happen next nobody knows.

It may be that these authorities, who have in the past opted for confrontation, will implement new repressive measures and try once again to cow society (which of course will be increasingly difficult). Or this may have been just a first, emotional reaction prompted by fright.

It is possible even in their circles that common sense will prevail and we will be able to hope at last that even Czechoslovakia may start on the road to free self-awareness and increasing self-reform, without having to pay for it in misery, disorder and human lives. At this moment almost everything is possible. The situation is more open than at any time in the past 20 years.

I am not writing about this just as a titbit of information from a small and unimportant country. I am writing it as someone who realises that in this country, for many different (including geopolitical) reasons, and whether we like it or not, decisions have always involved more than just ourselves. A number of European, and later even world, conflagrations have, from our country's earliest history to the present day, most frequently originated (but also terminated!) here.

We are a country which since time immemorial has represented a crossroads of different spiritual and political movements, and where, thanks to that, European history has been tangled and untangled. We are a country where, on more than one occasion, the fate of others has been decided, or their destiny unwittingly foreshadowed. So may be the case today. Czechoslovakia may become (perhaps without particularly wanting it) the place in which decisions will be taken about both this great movement which we are witnessing in the Soviet bloc, and the hopes of all Europe for a better future.


Maybe today this small and, for some people, uninteresting country will become again the "testing terrain" on which we shall see exactly what is happening: whether (as Mikhail Gorbachev promises) the genuine desire of the Communist world is to step over its shadow and give priority to universal values in place of those of power and prestige, or whether at the last moment the desire for freedom and human dignity will have to give way at the crossroads of history to the dubious ideals of a monolithic empire with its system of omnipotent satraps.

We cannot rule out that the destiny of *Several Sentences* will be to provide the first explicit indication of how this test is proceeding.

Vaclav Havel, a distinguished Czechoslovak playwright, has long been a leading dissident and is an organiser of the 'Several Sentences' petition, described by signatories as the most important opposition initiative for more than 10 years.

Hypocrisy in high places

New York Times Magazine
Oct. 25



Vaclav Havel has gained renown as a playwright and dissenter.

"Horizon" ?

THE CZECHS' DEFIANT PLAYWRIGHT

never forgot my first language. Occasionally I've translated Czech literature into English, including Havel's last two plays for their American productions, and I was eager to meet the playwright. I was also afraid — not only for myself as a Czechoslovak-born American going to visit a famous dissident in a totalitarian country, but for Havel, too — that my interview might harm him.

Yet my fear that Havel might be endangered by my visit — or indeed by this article — proved unwarranted. While the ordinary people I met in Prague were painfully circumspect, I discovered a paradoxical truth: in a totalitarian society, only the dissident enjoys freedom.

"IS THIS PLACE BUGGED?"

"Almost certainly, but it doesn't matter. I'm not going to change what I say because

02. 08. 90 03:53PM, *VOA, EUROPEAN DIV.

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the

Monol
throw
cozy

one's job and position in normal society — to become at once an official dissident.

HAVEL IS [illegible]PU-tably a superstar in Czechoslovakia. Everybody knows his name and what he stands for, yet because he is banned from all public media — the stage, newspapers and television — his face is quite unknown. "Sometimes I'll go somewhere, say to an office to pay a bill," he says, "and someone will read the name written there and exclaim, 'Is that really you?' And I'll say 'Well, yes, it's me,' and he'll say, 'But are you *our* Vaclav Havel?' And then he'll clasp my hand or embrace me. It's not that these people are necessarily familiar with my writings — they just know about me from the Voice of America or BBC, they know that I'm in trouble with the regime, and they like me for that."

Havel involuntarily glances at the ceiling and patiently answers questions about his safety and security. "No, I don't think the house is watched these days. But on occasion I still have the so-called *ostraha*, police surveillance. Usually that involves three Secret Police agents who sit outside the house in a car, or who stand outside of my apartment. They follow me wherever I go, and sometimes even walk right alongside of me, trying to make small talk. There was a time when I had the *ostraha* continuously for almost a year."

Surveillance creates problems. "There are often people who want to stop and talk to me on the street [illegible] get in trouble if they [illegible] identified. So when I'm under surveillance I have [illegible] to indicate to them somehow that they should keep on walking."

"Of course," Havel continues, "I have a lot of friends who are perfectly free to visit me no matter what. These are other so-called dissidents — historians or journalists or philosophers, people who once had a true profession and who now work in men's rooms or boiler rooms, or as cleaning women or the like. They have nothing to lose."

Why is it that most people find it hard to face losing the successful real-estate developer in Prague. The playwright's father was a famous restaurateur. Young Vaclav spent the first 12 years of his life as a "poor little rich boy" with maids, governesses, cooks, gardeners and chauffeurs. "I was ashamed of my advantages, longed to be like other children, not because I was a precocious social revolutionary but simply because I felt an invisible wall between me and the others. Add to that the fact that I was a fat child and everyone ridiculed me for it."

In 1948, the Communists came to power and the Havel family assets were seized by the state. Once again Havel was ostracized, this time for his "class origins." Being a former poor little rich boy in Communist Czechoslovakia was no better than being one in the present; it provided sufficient grounds to deprive him of the opportunity for higher education. "Sometimes I wonder whether I didn't actually begin to write to somehow overcome that basic experience of being an outsider," says Havel.

Yet his writing has once again made him something of an outsider. The royalties Havel receives from abroad for his plays and books, though taxed heavily by a government eager for Western currency, allow him to live in a far more lavish style than most ordinary Czechoslovak citizens.

Havel is clearly a man who enjoys the comforts of life. His apartment has recently been remodeled and little expense has been spared: a new kitchen with shining stainless steel appliances and gleaming counters has already been installed, while other renovations are still in progress. He is well aware that his luxurious living circumstances expose him to envy and criticism: "I'm happy to be living in this fine apartment. I know they can kick me out of it any time they want. The reason I can be free is simply because I say the hell with it. Let them take my apartment. Let them not put on my plays. Let them throw me in prison. I'm not going to change what I say or how I live."

VOA REFERENCE

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The King of Chianti
Italy's Distinguished Red Wine

Ain't love Gund?

1101 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

8/25/85

Translation

Vaclav Havel's letter to the Prosecutor General of the CSSR

Mr. General Prosecutor:

I consider it my duty to inform you about actions, taken against me by certain sections of the security police, because I am convinced that these actions were arbitrary and that there was no reason whatsoever for them to be taken; they were illegal and damaged at home and abroad the reputation of the Czechoslovak state apparatus.

Since the spring I have been planning - after so many years - a week's vacation trip around the CSSR; that I will visit places I do not know and visit some of my friends who live outside of Prague. I planned to take the trip with my friend, Jitka Vodnanska, and because of her time schedule, the trip was planned from August 9th to August 17, 1985. I have been talking openly about this trip and I corresponded about it with those of my friends whom I planned to visit. I surmised, then, that the organs of the secret police were well informed about it which did not matter to me, since I had no reason to keep the trip a secret. (It may be that this conjecture on my part could be viewed as an expression of unfounded suspicion that the police is violating the secrecy of mail; this suspicion, however - after so many experiences in the past - was not unfounded, which, in this particular case, was confirmed by the fact, that homes of some of my friends, whom I planned to visit, were, the day I was supposed to be there, surrounded by the police; in other cases the local police were informed of my planned visit and were instructed to report immediately the arrival of my car. This police preparation could not have been based on anything else but on information obtained from my correspondence).

Four hours before our planned departure from Prague, a car, Tatra 613, arrived in front of our house. Three members of the security police, in civilian clothes, informed me that their task is to follow me on the territory of Prague, which they did. When we have with Jitka Vodnanska left Prague and started our trip, they stopped following us - but not until another car, Tatra 613, with other three members of the security police in civilian clothes took over the surveillance; they did not mask their "mission", they talked quite freely to me about it. Our first stop was the home of our friend Ladislav Lis in Peklo near Ceska Lipa. When we arrived there, the police from Ceska Lipa was there and took over our surveillance (another proof that the police was well informed of our trip). They walked behind us when we took a walk in the woods and later they stayed in front of the Lis house.

At about 8 p.m. the house was filled with a great number of members of the security police, who came to conduct a search of the house, whose goal was to find a document of Charter 77 concerning the 17th anniversary of the invasion of 1968. As law prescribes, they asked Ladislav Lis to hand over the document voluntarily. Lis replied that he does not have the document. They said that they will await further instructions. As was later ascertained, another group of members of the security police entered the home of Jiri Dienstbier, Charter 77 spokesman, with the same request. Dienstbier gave them the requested document and there was no reason to conduct a house search. Despite that, a search was conducted by the police.

knew very well where we were going. However, they did ask for an I.D. from several people whom we gave a lift and at one stop they checked our car for safety and looked at all our documents and looked through our luggage.

On August 15, 1985, when we arrived in Olomouc, where more police became engaged in our surveillance, I decided to prevent or forestall other eventual complications (especially because we were nearing the ticklish Czech-Slovak border) to write a letter, addressed to Col.Riha or another high officer of the security police in Prague, who is responsible for decision on actions concerning me personally. In my letter I referred to their assurances that there are some spheres in which it is possible to arrive at some agreement and I reminded them that they told me not to hesitate to call on them, should I find myself in some unclear situation (they even gave me their direct telephone number). Recalling their assurances, I tried to reach some type of an "agreement" (if it can be called that). I wrote in my letter that if they view my trip across CSSR with displeasure (if they view it as improper or suspicious or undesirable) and if they intend to follow it with further actions or if these actions should escalate (for example if they are going to subject me and other persons to new interrogations and house searches) that I am prepared, of my own free will, to end the trip and return home. However, if they are going to stick with surveillance only, that I will continue my trip (I am used to constant surveillance and if surveillance should be a barrier to my movement, I would not be able to move at all). I handed the letter over to those who were following me and they promised to forward it to Prague. I also asked the addressee in my letter for an answer through those, who were following me.

During the years I have been informed many times by interrogators, that the duty of the security police - in my case the STB - is to try to prevent criminal activity (however, it goes without saying, that their idea as to what constitutes criminal activity differs sharply from mine), to forestall confrontations, to warn, etc.etc. In view of this I considered my letter to the STB as a way of giving them a chance to warn me and as a signal, that I am ready, should a warning be given, to follow it. I also stressed that an eventual serious new confrontation - which I would like to prevent - would have a wide publicity (as was the case because of the confrontation in the home of Ladislav Lis), in which the authorities are not interested and neither am I (my "ambition" is not to enter into the subconscious mind of people as a man, who is being arrested every week.)

We continued our trip. I received no message, no warning and no hint which would in some way be an answer to my letter, which I then regarded as a quiet agreement of the police with the continuation of our trip - and as a sign that no serious complications will arise.

How mistaken I was !

On August 16th, 1985, around 8 p.m., we arrived in Bratislava and stopped at the home of my friend, Miroslav Kusy, where we wanted to stay overnight. We planned to end the trip the next day at my summer home in Vlcice near Trutnov. About 10 minutes after we entered the Kusy's home, the doorbell rang and the home was filled with members of the security police armed with authorization to search the house. I was again detained and taken to the Ministry of Interior in Bratislava where I was subjected to the same interrogation as a week ago in Prague.

(I was

In the meantime we had dinner with our friends in Lis house, while members of the security police were still waiting for further instructions. After a lenghty exchange of words, we at least made most of them leave the house and wait outside. Four remained inside the house and for three hours silently watched us. At about 11 p.m. more police entered the house and started to conduct a house search (which was unnecessary, since the police already had the document) At the same time I was detained and taken to Prague to the police station in Bartolomejska ulice, where I was subjected to a short interrogation. I was asked two questions: (1) what do I know about the Charter 77 document and (2) what was the goal of my vacation trip. I told them the truth, that I do not know anything about the document and that my trip was recreational and had nothing to do with my citizen's involvement, and, therefore, nothing with the August Charter 77 document. This document was not found in Lis's house or in my house, and there was no reason to connect our names with it - even if we thought that possession of such a document was something suspicious - nor to delay us. Despite that I was accused of being "under suspicion for preparation of a criminal offence of hooliganism"(!) and I was detained for 48 hours. As I later found out, Ladislav Lis and Jiri Dienstbier were also detained for the same number of hours.

This, first detention, had no substantiative reason and could not lead to any disclosure of new facts which would substantiate the charge against me and which would open new possibilities for a possible indictment. That was the reason why I was released after a 48 hour detention and any suspicion, held against me, expired.

On August 12, 1985 I returned to the Lis' house, where J.Vodnanska waited for me and where was my car. After a 2 day delay, senseless delay, we continued on our trip - without surveillance. I was under the impression - wrongly, as it turned out - that the police accepted my vacation trip and that it did not view it as "suspicious". We arrived, the same day, to the summer home of Vlasta Chramostova and Stanislav Milota in Prysek. We discovered, in the evening, that the house is under surveillance. A car, with civilian members of the security police was standing outside. In the morning I asked them, whether their task is to follow us or if we should expect further complications. I told them clearly, that if the police still regards my trip with suspicion and if it intends to disrupt it in various ways, if it intends to interrogate my friends because of our visit, if it intends to detain them or search their houses or homes - that I am prepared to end my trip prematurely and go to my summer home in the mountains, in Krkonose. I was assured by the police that I am free to continue my trip and that there will be no more complications. I will only be under surveillance.

That was also the case. We visited, during the next few days, several friends (we had to make changes in our original plan, because of the two days delay; however, it is worth mentioning that - as I found out later - the police had under surveillance the homes of those friends, whom we could not visit, because of the delay and because we had to take a different route in order to accomplish the trip) and some historical places. We were under surveillance constantly by members of the civilian security police, who had several cars at their disposal. In places, where we had to stay overnight, the police that followed us, transferred the surveillance to the local police until the next overnight stop. All of them talked with me and behaved quite correctly. When we lost our way, they told us which way to go - this again points to the fact that

they

It concerned the August document of Charter 77 and the reason for my trip across the CSSR. Again I became a subject of "suspicion" - this time, for change, "...for preparation of a criminal offence of incitement...". Even though my previous detention clearly indicated that I was - even from the point of view of the STB - under suspicion without a reason and even thought the police (who had me under constant surveillance) did not find any new facts, which could make me a suspect again - I became, for the second time a suspect for the same reason I was a suspect before - namely, that my trip is in some way connected with Charter 77 and its August document. This time the suspicion was twice without reason, it was senseless. No document was found and it was obvious that my trip had no connection with it. If the police, despite all the evidence to the contrary, still felt that my trip was suspicious, it had plenty of time and many occasions to prevent my alleged "preparations for criminal offences" and warn me against such actions, as the police is, according to law, required to do. I could have been warned during my first detention or at any time during the trip across CSSR, while I was being constantly followed by the police and under its surveillance. I could have also been warned against taking the trip - or continuing the trip - in reply to my letter (which, by the way, was a great compromise on my part: knowing full well that I will not do anything during the trip that might be construed as a criminal act, I, in fact, asked the police whether it wants to warn me against continuing the trip; at the same time I let the police know that I was willing to abide by any eventual recommendation).

Despite all this, and despite the fact that I have explained all this during the first interrogation, during the first detention, I was again, as a suspect, detained. I was followed into detention by Miroslav Kusy, Tomas Petrivy (who was visiting the Kusys and was there when the police arrived) and by Jitka Vodnanska, who is not a Charter 77 signatory and she cannot, therefore, be under suspicion for any such allegations. House searches were conducted in the homes of Miroslav Kusy and Tomas Petrivy. Besides various documents concerning the European Peace Movement, exile and ethnic newspapers and books (including my book, which was thoroughly checked by the authorities - letters from prison -) which I always transport from Prague to my summer home and which the police confiscates regularly, the police took many other things, which normally are not being confiscated: 25 casettes of tapes of publicly performing singers, bands (including the Pink Floyd group, John Lennon, etc.), container for these tapes, address book belonging to Jitka Vodnanska, paper and a map of the CSSR, showing our marking the roads over which we were travelling.

I protested my detention in Bratislava and I staged a hunger strike to give my protest more power.

When I was released from detention on the afternoon of August 18 1985, I was taken to my car which was in front of the Ministry of Interior. An elderly man came from the building(he did not introduce himself, it could have been a deputy Minister or a janitor) and authoritatively ordered me to leave Bratislava immediately (he did not even let me make a phone call) ;he also told me that I should not come back for the next 20 years and that I should relate the same message to my friends.

While Jitka Vodnanska was the same morning (against her will, because she wanted to travel with me and had in my car all her things, including keys to her apartment) placed on a train and in the company of the security police travel to Prague, I was, in the afternoon, led out of Bratislava by a police escort (allegedly for 20 years) and then followed all the way to Prague, in Prague and then from Prague to my summer home in the country, where we arrived on August 19th,1985.

Charter 77 has, from its founding, stressed (and I have said so and written about it many times) that it is a citizens' initiative, based on a right to petition, guaranteed by the Constitution and that all the persecution and criminalization of its work is in violation of the Constitution of the CSSR, International Covenants on Human Rights, many other laws, as well as with a healthy mind. Even had my trip acros CSSR been in conection with Charter 77, it would not have been, in my view, a reason for any police actions against me. My trip - as has been ascertained through all that interrogation, all the searches and surveillance, had nothing to do with Charter 77. It was not regarded in that light even by those, who would like to view activities, connected with Charter 77 as criminal activities, and there was no reason at all for such police action, on such a scale. The consequences of my trip can be summarized in this way:

(1) My trip, directly or indirectly, for various lengths of time, employed, according to my estimation, about 300 members of the security police (I am not even counting the expenses for gas, etc.) which cost the Czechoslovak government at least 100 times more than it cost me (for the trip)
(2) The trip was spoiled for me a little bit, but not completely. I will certainly remember it longer than I would had it been an uneventful trip.
(3) All the senless actions, taken without any reason whatsoever with regard to August 21st, including my two detentions and the detention of five other persons, brought to the attention of the public, at home and abroad, the almost forgotten anniversary and the practice that the regime, brought to power with the assistance of the intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries, is using (against its citizens); these police actions have also brought to the attention of the public Charter 77 document (_with which I became familiar after my return home from foreign broadcasts) and provided for the document a colorful addendum. The eyes of International public have, thanks to certain sections of the Ministry of Interior, focused on our country and in a way, which did not bring it any glory.
(4) The fact that the police had so many easy opportunities to warn me about the trip and to dissuade me from it, did not use these opportunities, leaves me with an impression - for reasons about which I can only speculate - that someone was very interested in bringing attention to all these confrontations.

Your task is to watch over the implementation of laws in our country. I ask you, therefore, to examine what happened what I described here in the light of our laws, examine the authority of the security police and, above all, examine it with regard to wider political interests of the Czechoslovak state.

Vaclav Havel

August 25, 1985

TOAST AT STATE DINNER / PRIME MINISTER MAZOWIECKI
THE WHITE HOUSE / MARCH 21, 1989 / 7:15 PM

MR. PRIME MINISTER. HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL SZOKA [SHAW-KAH]. DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, AND FRIENDS OF POLAND: BARBARA AND I ARE DELIGHTED TO HOST THIS DINNER TONIGHT -- AND, AS I SAID THIS MORNING, TO RETURN IN SOME SMALL MEASURE THE WARM HOSPITALITY WE HAVE FELT ON OUR VISITS TO POLAND.

ON OUR LAST VISIT -- THIS PAST JULY -- THAT WARM HOSPITALITY WAS COUPLED WITH A HEAT WAVE IN WARSAW -- 90 DEGREES PLUS -- THAT WOULD HAVE DONE WASHINGTON PROUD. // EVERYWHERE WE WENT, BARBARA AND I FELT RIGHT AT HOME -- AT ONE POINT, BARBARA EVEN SAW ONE FELLOW IN THE SQUARE AT GDANSK WEARING A <u>BUSH-QUAYLE '88</u> T-SHIRT. //

I REMEMBER MY FIRST VISIT TO YOUR COUNTRY, IN THE FALL OF 1987. SOLIDARITY WAS OUTLAWED, UNDERGROUND -- BUT STILL VERY MUCH ALIVE. //

I REMEMBER WELL MEETING WITH SOLIDARITY. // AFTERWARD, AS I RODE TO LAY A WREATH AT THE GRAVE OF FATHER POPIELUSZKO [POP-AY-WOOSH-KO], IN PROTEST, THE STATE SECURITY AGENTS REMOVED THE POLISH FLAG FROM OUR CAR. //

THAT WAS IN 1987. TWO YEARS LATER I WENT BACK TO POLAND, IN THE SUMMER OF '89. I THOUGHT BACK TO THAT FIRST VISIT -- ABOUT THAT INCIDENT WITH THE POLISH FLAG -- AS I WAS RIDING THROUGH GDANSK, SOLIDARITY'S BIRTHPLACE, TO THE MONUMENT OF THE THREE CROSSES. THOUSANDS OF POLES LINED THE STREETS -- IN THEIR HANDS, THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN FLAGS. AND OF COURSE, THE RED-AND-WHITE OF POLAND -- YOUR NATIONAL FLAG, AND THE BANNER OF SOLIDARNOSC, HIGH ABOVE THE CROWD. //

WHAT A WORLD OF CHANGE IN THOSE TWO YEARS. ON THAT FIRST VISIT IN 1987: EVERYWHERE, UNDENIABLE DETERMINATION, BUT JUST AS UNDENIABLE, DEEP ANXIETY -- OVER THE FATE OF SOLIDARITY AND THE FUTURE OF POLAND.

ON MY RETURN THIS PAST SUMMER, ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION OF '89 -- EVERYWHERE, I FOUND A FEELING OF HOPE. A FEELING THAT POLAND ONCE MORE HELD ITS DESTINY IN ITS HANDS. THAT THE TIME HAD COME ONCE MORE FOR POLAND TO LIVE IN FREEDOM -- FOR EUROPE TO BE WHOLE AND FREE. //

MR. PRIME MINISTER, I ASSURE YOU: ALL AMERICANS AGREE THAT POLAND'S TIME HAS COME -- AND ALL AMERICANS -- ALL OUR PRAYERS -- ARE WITH YOU AT THIS TIME OF POLAND'S REBIRTH. //

OUR MEETINGS THIS MORNING ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL. WE SPOKE FROM THE HEART. IN CANDOR. AS FRIENDS. //

TONIGHT, MR. PRIME MINISTER, I OFFER THIS TOAST:

TO OLD AND ENDURING FRIENDS -- THE NATIONS OF POLAND AND AMERICA;

TO THE FUTURE OF A FREE POLAND;

AND TO YOU, MR. PRIME MINISTER, LET ME RETURN THE KIND WISH YOUR COUNTRYMEN MADE ME -- IN THE HALL OF THE SEJM [SAME]. IN THE STREETS OF WARSAW, AND THE SQUARE AT GDANSK: <u>STO' LAT</u>. // MAY YOU LIVE A HUNDRED YEARS. //

# # #

WE HAVE BEEN FORTUNATE TONIGHT TO WITNESS THE PERFORMANCE OF ONE OF THE GRAND MASTERS OF THE PIANO -- AN AMERICAN ARTIST WHOSE RISE TO INTERNATIONAL ACCLAIM BEGAN BACK IN 1970, WHEN HE WON THE CHOPIN COMPETITION IN WARSAW.

SINCE THEN, GARRICK OHLSSON HAS PLAYED THE GREAT CONCERT HALLS ON FOUR CONTINENTS -- AND TONIGHT, THE WHITE HOUSE. MR. OHLSSON, ON BEHALF OF ALL OUR GUESTS, I THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR MUSIC WITH US.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 16, 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Enterprise Funds for Poland and Hungary

The President today announced his designations for the Polish-American Enterprise Fund and for the Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund. The President is extremely pleased with the high caliber and range of professional diversity of the individuals who have agreed to serve on the organizing Boards of Directors for the two Funds. The U.S. Directors are:

Polish-American Enterprise Fund

John P. Birkelund, CEO, Dillon, Read & Co. (Chairman)
Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Center for Strategic & International Studies
Charles Harper, Chairman and CEO, CONAGRA
Nicholas Rey, Managing Director, Bear, Stearns and Co.

Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund

John Whitehead (Chairman)
Daniel Burke, CEO Capital Cities/ABC
George Gould, Vice Chairman, Klingenstein Fields & Co.
Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs International
Paul Marer, Indiana University

In accordance with the SEED Act of 1989, which authorized $300 million in support of private sector development, these two Boards will be responsible for managing the funds appropriated by Congress to promote the private sectors in Poland and Hungary. They may make loans, grants and equity investments, in addition to sponsoring technical assistance, training and other measures designed to foster the rapid growth of private business in all sectors of the Polish and Hungarian economies.

The Funds will be private, non-profit organizations. These Boards of Directors will be joined by representatives from Poland and Hungary respectively. Each Fund will keep appropriate records of its activities and will file an annual report that includes the statement of an independent auditor.

# # #

ARRIVAL STATEMENT / PRIME MINISTER MAZOWIECKI OF POLAND
THE SOUTH LAWN / MARCH 21, 1990 / 10:00 AM

MR. PRIME MINISTER. ALL THE MEMBERS OF YOUR DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION. AND TO ALL THE MANY FRIENDS OF POLAND WHO HAVE JOINED US HERE THIS MORNING: WELCOME TO THE WHITE HOUSE. //

AND LET ME RECOGNIZE THREE DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN BOARD MEMBERS OF THE POLISH-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE FUND: CHAIRMAN JOHN BIRKELUND, NICHOLAS REY AND LANE KIRKLAND. //

ARRIVAL STATEMENT / PRIME MINISTER MAZOWIECKI OF POLAND
THE SOUTH LAWN / MARCH 21, 1990 / 10:00 AM

MR. PRIME MINISTER. ALL THE MEMBERS OF YOUR DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION. AND TO ALL THE MANY FRIENDS OF POLAND WHO HAVE JOINED US HERE THIS MORNING: WELCOME TO THE WHITE HOUSE. //

AND LET ME RECOGNIZE THREE DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN BOARD MEMBERS OF THE POLISH-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE FUND: CHAIRMAN JOHN BIRKELUND, NICHOLAS REY AND LANE KIRKLAND. //

To Peggy

Date _____ Time 11:40

WHILE YOU WERE OUT

M Bugajski

of _____

Phone 775-3262
Area Code Number Extension

TELEPHONED	✓	PLEASE CALL	✓
CALLED TO SEE YOU		WILL CALL AGAIN	
WANTS TO SEE YOU		URGENT	
RETURNED YOUR CALL			

Message _____

Lipien 475-2251

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March 24, 1989, Friday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section A; Page 10, Column 3; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 1439 words

HEADLINE: Leader of Choice for Polish Radicals

BYLINE: By JOHN TAGLIABUE, Special to the New York Times

DATELINE: WARSAW, March 23

BODY:

As the Solidarity union negotiates Poland's future with the Communist leadership, Solidarity's leaders find their ranks swelled by radical young workers and students who support the union but reject the talks with the Government.

Some gravitate toward radical factions with ill-defined programs but stirring names, like Fighting Solidarity. Others favor fundamentalist nationalist organizations like the Young Poland movement in Gdansk. While some loyally uphold Solidarity's founder, Lech Walesa, others have grown to abhor his striving for compromise with the Communist authorities.

When Andrzej Gwiazda, a renegade Solidarity leader and opponent of Mr. Walesa from the union's heyday nine years ago, addressed Warsaw university students this month, hundreds flocked to hear him. In a report entirely unsympathetic to Mr. Gwiazda's position, Solidarity's most prominent underground weekly, Tygodnik Mazowsze, nonetheless confessed that ''a large segment of youth is searching for an authority it can oppose to Walesa and the roundtable talks.''

One of the magnets for the youths who support the union but oppose the talks is an anti-Communist nationalist fringe group headed by Leszek Moczulski. Mr. Moczulski's living room has the feel of a one-room museum, with its maze of small busts and porcelain figures of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, the Polish independence fighter who ruled the country between the world wars. On one wall is a heroic pencil sketch of the marshal in military pose, on another is one of a few death masks of him known to exist.

Leading the Radical Youth

Marshal Pilsudski symbolizes an unfettered Poland for Mr. Moczulski, a 58-year old lawyer and former journalist some regard as a mad dreamer for pursuing the goal of what he calls Poland's ''total independence of the Soviet Union.'' His organization, called the Confederation for an Independent Poland, lacks the successful history, the numbers and official recognition of Solidarity. But as Solidarity agreed to sit down to talks with the Government, the Confederation found itself catapulted to the lead of the radical youth.

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(c) 1989 The New York Times, March 24, 1989

As in many things Polish, there is much romanticism in all this. Groups like Fighting Solidarity choose their names to suggest a kind of call to arms, and Mr. Moczulski calls the young members who keep order at the Confederation's marches and rallies strzelcy, or marksmen, for Marshal Pilsudski's crack units - although Confederation members are not armed, and the groups reject violence.

Indeed, the cloak-and-dagger atmosphere around the groups, and their leaders' penchant for boasting, may veil the organizations' real strength. But the Government evidently judged them enough of a threat in February to order a crackdown on their activities that resulted in many arrests and violent clashes. Also, many of the strikes and worker protests that rippled across Poland recently were their work.

Thus, as the Government warms to Solidarity, it has increasingly attacked the Confederation and allied groups. At a meeting of party leaders in strike-prone Silesia last weekend, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Polish party leader, said: ''Unfortunately, things are occurring today under the symbol of the nation that are far removed from its tremendous historical significance. Countless strikes and strike alerts, protest actions, brawls and demonstrations, for and against, and no one knows for what and why.''

Ending 'Soviet Hegemony'

If the Confederation is a headache for the general, it is proving to be more troublesome for Mr. Walesa. As he travels through Poland seeking support for the roundtable talks with the Government, Mr. Moczulski is often close behind. This month, Mr. Moczulski visited six universities in five days, and nearly as many coal mines, addressing students and young workers disgruntled over Solidarity's flirtation with the Communists. Last week he was in Lublin and Cracow, then went to Silesia to the technical school in Gliwice.

The Confederation sprang up in 1979 in the stormy period that preceded the formation of Solidarity, after an earlier group Mr. Moczulski was involved in, the Committee in Defense of Civil and Human Rights, dissolved over political squabbling and personal ambitions among its leaders. Mr. Moczulski spent most of the Solidarity period in jail.

The crackdown in February coincided with the Confederation's first national congress since 1984. At that meeting, more than 200 delegates produced a 55-page political and economic program based on the demand for ''freedom from Soviet hegemony, freedom from the Communist party's monopoly.''

The confederation's relations with Solidarity have always been complicated. Some Moczulski supporters accuse Solidarity of not having interceded with the Government for their leader when he was in jail during most of Solidarity's 15 months of legal existence. And though Mr. Walesa invited Mr. Moczulski to join a citizens' committee of workers, artists and intellectuals in a kind of brain trust in autumn of last year, Mr. Moczulski declined to join, saying that its functions and purpose were ill defined.

Free and Open Elections

Still, he maintains close ties with Solidarity leaders, and indeed the Confederation oftens serves as a kind of link between the more moderate Solidarity faction around Mr. Walesa and the radical fringe. Nevertheless,

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Mr. Moczulski confesses that ''fundamental differences of interest'' divide the Confederation and the union. ''We want Solidarity to be rebuilt,'' he said, ''but Solidarity is prepared to pay for its rebuilding, and they are paying with us.''

''For us, Solidarity is not the most important thing,'' he said. ''Our goals go further, free elections and an independent state.''

The Confederation's economic programs, like those of most of the people who oppose the talks, are a mix of murky proposals, surrounding a plan for the Government to cut its spending by 50 percent and redirect the money toward controlling inflation and increasing pay. In its latest program, the Confederation's proposed political solution for Poland's ills is free and open elections as a means of ending Communist rule and achieving total independence from the Soviet Union.

The Confederation's leaders have traditionally embraced the argument that attainment of independence would not threaten Soviet security interests in the region. Referring to the leaders around General Jaruzelski, Mr. Moczulski said: ''The international situation is favorable. Free elections are now more dangerous for Jaruzelski than for the Russians.''

Threat of More Violent Protests

''The Russians got along with Afghanistan until the tanks rolled in,'' he said. ''And today they are able to get along with Finland and Austria,'' the European states that enjoy neutral status in the shadow of the Soviet Union. The implication is that Moscow would accept a neutral Poland, if free elections produced such a demand.

As firmly as he demands free elections, he rejects Solidarity's talks with the authorities and the election-law agreement they have produced. The elections are only partially free because although more than one candidate will run for each seat, 65 percent of the seats will be allotted to the Communists and 35 percent to the Solidarity -based opposition.

If those laws fail to guarantee open and free elections, Mr. Moczulski said, then the radical groups will not only boycott the elections, but also picket the polling stations and seek to dissuade Poles from voting. ''If the election is a hoax,'' he said, ''we will use all means to demask the hoax. We will go to prison, if going to prison will show what we think of such elections.''

In general, such breakaway groups as the Confederation believe that any changes short of totally free elections will not resolve Poland's problems, but only lead to a new strikes and protests more violent than those that shook the nation last year.

And they warn of the international implications of such renewed violence. ''If an explosion comes here,'' Mr. Moczulski said, ''it will be the end of perestroika and glasnost, and dialogue between East and West. The situation is threatening not only for Poland.''

In that they echo other critics of the union. Speaking at Warsaw University this month, Mr. Gwiazda, the veteran Solidarity leader who broke with Mr. Walesa, disparaged Solidarity's talks with the leadership. ''They do not

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notice that they are doing so without the participation of society,'' the bearded, ascetic looking Mr. Gwiazda said. ''And compromise always turns against those who abandon their ideas.''

GRAPHIC: Photo of Leszek Moczulski, leader of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (NYT/Jaroslaw Szulecki)

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ORGANIZATION: SOLIDARITY UNION (POLAND)

NAME: TAGLIABUE, JOHN; MOCZULSKI, LESZEK

GEOGRAPHIC: POLAND; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR)

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March 24, 1989, Friday

SECTION: INTERNATIONAL; Pg. 9

LENGTH: 117 words

HEADLINE: Walesa warning of 'stones and strikes' in streets

BYLINE: By Our Eastern Europe Correspondent

BODY:

Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity trade union, said yesterday that unless round-table talks with the government were successfully concluded people would take to the streets with "stones and strikes" to further their aims.

Mr Walesa's warning came a day after Solidarity negotiators said they had hit last-minute problems at the talks - in their seventh week - between the government and opposition.

Mr Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Solidarity's spokesman, said there were problems over what powers a newly-created senate and president should have. The two sides are due to meet again on March 30 to try to settle their differences before signing an agreement on Poland's political future on April 3.

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March 23, 1989, Thursday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: TEMPO; Pg. 12; ZONE: NW

LENGTH: 104 words

HEADLINE: Kramer gets green light on Walesa film

BYLINE: By John H. Richardson, Los Angeles Daily News

DATELINE: LOS ANGELES

BODY:

After years of fighting Lech Walesa and the trade union Solidarity, the Polish government is now making an abrupt and dramatic about-face by encouraging negotiations to allow an American to make a movie about Walesa's life in Poland.

The director is Stanley Kramer, the socially conscious director of "Judgment at Nuremberg" and "On the Beach." The movie, to be called "Polonaise" and released in 1990, will be about Walesa's rise from shipyard electrician to the 1983 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Kramer said in an interview with the Associated Press that he was making plans for shooting the movie elsewhere.

TERMS: POLAND; LABOR; MOVIE

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Summary of World Broadcasts

March 21, 1989, Tuesday

SECTION: Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS; POLAND

PAGE: EE/0414/B/ 1

LENGTH: 869 words

HEADLINE: LECH WALESA'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN GDANSK

SOURCE: (a) PAP in English 2033 gmt 16 Mar 89

Text of report

(b) Warsaw home service 1800 gmt 16 Mar 89

Text of report from Gdansk by Andrzej Trojanowski

1615 gmt 16 Mar 89

BODY:

We cannot look at the new political situation of this country that has been shaped as a result of the round-table debate in the old manner and on the basis of the hitherto experiences, Lech Walesa told a press conference in St Brygida's Church in Gdansk Thursday [16th March].

He did not agree with treating the round-table discussion in the categories of making concessions. The basic task, he said, is seeking the ways of agreement so that the situation in Poland could improve. When everybody became aware of that, everything started to go on smoothly. After the May strikes I was entering the talks having in fact two issues on my mind Solidarity and trade union pluralism. And this has been settled, though it seemed to be very difficult. But there are new issues that surprised both me and society, the issues we did not expect elections, Senate, office of President and others.

Of course, the round table cannot settle everything. We but open up possibilities for pluralism and after the opening up of a broad road society must organise itself, act and, if need be, correct all that was done wrong by Walesa and others.

Asked about the recent statement by the citizens' committee attached to him, Walesa stressed that the taking on of co-responsibility for the matters of the country is possible on the moment of creating an opportunity of co-participating in the political life. We are discussing and arguing the issue because there is a concept to ''judge and clear up all the mistakes'' first and then to ''join'', or to use the situation and opportunities that emerge while leaving settlements for the future or give them up in the name of supreme national reasons. I am for the latter concept, he added.

In response to questions by PAP journalists, Walesa said that it is groundless to speak about Poles' stagnation. The interest in the round-table issues and reforms is immense. At meetings in different towns I saw many

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people who want to be actively engaged in Polish issues. We have crowds of people willing to work. All they need are proper conditions, he said.

In reply to questions about the starting of activity by Solidarity, Walesa pointed out that the union, as a non-political organisation, does not plan and has no right to join, for example, the elections to the Sejm. It wants to be organised in a wise way so as to operate properly and enter the road of normal trade union activity. Till now, we were disposed to fight the errors and not to carry out creative work which we are learning now, he stressed.

During the Thursday press conference Lech Walesa, asked for his assessment of the situation in our country, said, among other things

[Walesa, recording] From the point of view of expectations and hopes, I would assess it as very good, especially as people want a great deal, they have hopes; however from the point of view of satisfying these hopes and these expectations well here I would say that we have little chance, because, first and foremost, the economic situation is rotten; and secondly, we are after all creating new things, and new things have no reference and therefore I am very uncertain as to whether what we are creating will be accepted, whether we shall take advantage of pluralism the economic, social and union one and other associations, which might in the future create new goods which could be shared out later, in a better and more organised way. All this constitutes building up.

Until now myself included we were set rather for a struggle with this evil, with this system which has become stuck, and so on. And we were certainly not ready for creative work that is, for exchanging these bad things with programmes and people. We had nowhere to do this, for it could not be done underground; the opposition fought and struggled exclusively with systemic faults and with the things, the evil things that we were coming across.

[Reporter] Another question concerned the assessment, from the ethical point of view, of the strike of the Polish Post Office workers.

[Walesa] Of course, ladies and gentlemen, this should be viewed from the ethical side, just as you said, Sir. But at the same time, we should give some thought to why they are doing this well it is because they were being dealt with in an unethical way they earn too litte, and they could not find solutions to many matters, and many years of precisely unethical conduct led to such a situation.

This does not mean that I approve; I appealed once again, and I continue to appeal we cannot go on grabbing the blanket and tugging it towards us it is too short to cover anything anyway ; we should wait just these few days organise ourselves and act slightly dif ferently. So I continue to be an opponent of today's strikes, I call for them not to happen; but I cannot cite moral bases since they have not been dealt with morally. Therefore we must remember not just one morality but the other as we ll.

[Note According to Polish TV (1615 gmt 16 Mar 89), speaking about the Gdansk shipyard Lech Walesa said ''We must rescue the shipyard, and we will. Obviously, it must work better, function better -hat is its chance.'']

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March 19, 1989, Sunday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section 4; Page 2, Column 4; Week in Review Desk

LENGTH: 473 words

HEADLINE: THE WORLD;
As Warsaw Relaxes, Hints of a Looser Bloc

BYLINE: By JOHN TAGLIABUE

DATELINE: WARSAW

BODY:

NOT since the Prague Spring of 1968 has a movement to end total Communist control of an East bloc nation gained such momentum.

In a cautious demonstration of willingness to share power with political opposition, Poland's leaders next month are expected to approve accords legalizing the banned Solidarity trade union, providing its supporters one-third the seats in Parliament and restoring Poland's upper house of Parliament with free and open elections.

Continued Communist dominance appears assured. The Government plans call for a newly established office of President of the Republic, which is expected to be filled by the present leader, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, a Communist who will have sweeping powers regarding domestic and foreign security and foreign affairs, assuring the party a decisive voice in national affairs.

But the changes nonetheless reflect the struggle within the regime to loosen Communist control, if only to make the economy more productive and avoid the labor strife that shook the country last year.

What is happening in Poland, said Jacek Kuron, a Solidarity strategist, ''is an experiment that is decisive for the bloc.''

Few doubt that the shape of Eastern Europe is changing more than in any similar period since 1945. What Moscow evidently wants are changes that will lead to greater economic efficiency and political stability.

Still, the leeway afforded by Moscow has meant that centrifugal forces within the Warsaw Pact have become stronger.

Hungary assails Rumania over Rumanian treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, while Poland and East Germany squabble over territorial waters on their border.

Governments in Prague and East Berlin repress dissent, while those in Warsaw and Budapest permit it.

''The reforms we are introducing today, were they at all possible in the 1970's?'' the Polish Communist Party's principal ideologist, Marian

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Orzechowski, said in a recently published interview. ''Certainly not.''

A Quiet Consensus

What the Polish Government and Solidarity appear to be seeking is a sufficiently liberal agreement to impress the West to cooperate more closely on political and economic projects.

How far will Moscow let its most audacious allies move in this direction? The feeling is, in Warsaw and Budapest, quite far.

Yet there is also a kind of quiet consensus among the advocates of change that the trends in Moscow are not irreversible and gains must be made while the sun continues to shine.

''If Moscow's program of perestroika is overturned,'' Mr. Kuron said, ''and we in the meantime have constructed our own political pact, which will somehow be able to hold, then if there is a kind of rollback, we will have achieved something and we can defend it.''

''As we all know,'' he said, ''there is never a return to the starting point.''

GRAPHIC: Lech Walesa (left) and a Solidarity associate, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, at talks with Government officials in Warsaw last month. (Associated Press)

SUBJECT: POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

NAME: TAGLIABUE, JOHN

GEOGRAPHIC: POLAND; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR); EUROPE, EAST

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March 18, 1989, Saturday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 4; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 318 words

HEADLINE: Solidarity: Political deal hinges on economic one

BYLINE: By Paula Butturini, Chicago Tribune

DATELINE: WARSAW

BODY:

The political agreement that would legalize Solidarity and create a president and a second chamber of parliament could fall apart unless communist authorities agree to a union demand to index wages in the face of double-digit inflation, a senior Solidarity adviser has said.

Bronislaw Geremek, one of Solidarity leader Lech Walesa's chief advisers, said Thursday that agreement on economic and social problems - especially the thorny issue of wage indexation - was the crucial problem facing negotiators for the government and the outlawed union.

Last week, five weeks after opening round-table talks on the future of the nation, the political committees for both sides announced they had worked out an agreement by which Solidarity would be legalized if the opposition agreed to take part in nondemocratic elections to the lower house of parliament, support the creation of a powerful national president and participate in free elections to a new upper house.

But Geremek, who heads the Solidarity team that hammered out the political accord, said the question of tying wages to Poland's galloping inflation rate, currently about 74 percent a year, was a necessary condition for a final agreement.

Piotr Konopka, a Solidarity leader from Gdansk, echoed Geremek at a news conference late Thursday. "The national executive committee decided that the matter of indexation is the condition for the whole contract."

The hardening of the Solidarity position on indexation appeared aimed at pressuring communist authorities to reach some kind of agreement on tackling the country's serious economic problems. The union leadership made no indications that the talks were in any imminent danger of collapse.

Solidarity has been urging the authorities to temporarily index 85 percent of workers' wages while inflation is climbing as the government tries to implement a far-reaching economic reform.

TERMS: POLAND; GOVERNMENT; LABOR; GROUP; RELATION

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2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright (c) 1989 The Economist

April 8, 1989

SECTION: World politics and current affairs; EUROPE; Pg. 51 (U.K. Edition Pg. 55)

LENGTH: 1155 words

HEADLINE: Poland's new deal

BYLINE: FROM OUR WARSAW CORRESPONDENT

BODY:

IF IT had happened in 1980, when Solidarity was first created, it would have been a miracle. If it had happened even six months ago, it would have seemed astonishing. Now, set against the fast pace of Hungary's reforms and the excitement of the recent election in the Soviet Union, the agreements signed on April 5th between the Polish government and the Solidarity -led opposition seem almost commonplace in Eastern Europe. Yet the documents, which for the second time this decade give Solidarity the right to exist, go much further than either the communist party feared or Solidarity dreamed nine years ago. Poland's communists look prepared to make a formal surrender of their monopoly of power.

They have not done so easily. In the nine years between the previous attempt at a historic compromise and this one Poland saw the virtual collapse of the party, the imposition of martial law, the banning of Solidarity and relentless economic misery. By creating what it calls a "socialist parliamentary democracy", the party hopes to win back both its authority and enough support to carry out a painful reform of the Polish economy. It has had to accept that it can do neither without a deal with the opposition.

For Solidarity and its leader, Mr Lech Walesa, this has been a far from trouble-free second coming. Until the last moment the talks threatened to collapse. Poland's official trade unions were refusing to sign because of a dispute over how much workers should be compensated for rising prices. What should have been a triumphant closing ceremony turned into an embarrassing muddle, so much so that Polish television switched to a football match.

The crisis-weary Poles are showing far less enthusiasm for this agreement than they would have in the heady days of 1980. At Warsaw dinner parties the round-tablers are jokingly called stolarzy ("carpenters"). But the changes they have agreed on, if they are really carried out, will poke a big hole in party power.

Top of the list is Solidarity. An act of parliament will again legalise it as a trade union. It will keep its regional and national leadership intact. Local recruiting offices are already open. Both rural Solidarity and the independent students' union are also to be legalised.

At elections due in June, 35% of the seats in the Sejm (parliament) will for the first time be freely contested. But the contest will be among the opposition only. The communist party and its tame allies will have the remaining seats. There is an understanding that at subsequent elections all

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seats will be openly contested. Two big constitutional changes were agreed on late in the negotiations. There is to be both a new executive president and a senate (an upper house of parliament).

Fearing the results of open elections, even for only one-third of the seats in the Sejm (now to be the lower house of parliament), the party wanted a strong president. Whoever gets the job will be responsible for foreign affairs and defence, will have the right to dissolve parliament and will also have the right to veto laws passed by parliament. The first president is to be chosen by the two houses of parliament. He will probably be none other than General Jaruzelski, the party boss. After this president has served six years in the post, his successor will be chosen by popular election.

The senate is the opposition's counterweight to the new president. All seats will be filled by popular vote. The senate will have the power to veto laws passed by the lower house, and it will take a two-thirds majority in the lower house to override the senate. While its powers will be limited by both the president and the lower house, the fact that it is to be freely elected will give it hard-to-ignore moral authority.

There is to be greater press freedom. The government has agreed to the re-birth of Solidarity's weekly paper. There will be a Rural Solidarity weekly, as well as regional union papers. In addition, the opposition will be allowed to publish a daily newspaper with a circulation of 500,000. After much haggling, the opposition also won the right to one hour on state radio and 30 minutes on state television every week.

Agreement on economic policy proved hardest. From the start, the opposition negotiators decided to concentrate on two demands: that wages be indexed to the rise in prices and that increases in food prices be gradual. Although these may not be the brightest of economic policies in a country with huge food subsidies and 60%-plus annual inflation, the opposition decided they were necessary to prevent social unrest and further strikes.

There was broad agreement that there would be some sort of wage indexation, although workers are unlikely to be compensated fully for price rises. The two sides accepted the need to cut the budget deficit as a way of tackling inflation, to improve living standards and to reduce Poland's $ 38-billion foreign debt. There was, however, no indication of how all these things were to be reconciled.

This is still not the end of the list. Private schools will be permitted -- meaning that the Catholic church will be able to run its own schools. Private health care will be extended, and there will be extra money to improve the state health service. There is a commitment to do more for the environment. Pollution from Poland's heavy industry is probably the worst in Europe.

It all sounds good on paper. Will it really happen? There are already signs of mounting opposition to the deal from within the party-run establishment. The official trade unions, thought to be linked to conservatives in the communist party, were holding out for 100% wage indexation. They circulated a document in several factories and mines blaming Solidarity for trying to "sell out" the workers.

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Their attempt to cause trouble is not only a sign of division within the party; it could also pose problems for Solidarity. The government-backed unions are trying to portray themselves as the true and uncompromising voice of the workers: "outflanking Solidarity to the left", as one commentator put it. They are even calling for strikes for the first time in their history. The official unions will have to compete directly with Solidarity for members, so they want to land the first blows.

What happens next will also depend on the reaction of Poland's neighbours, both to the east and the west. Will western banks judge favourably an economic reform which increases the power of trade unions? Mrs Thatcher managed a painful but successful restructuring of Britain's economy by strong, single-party government and by breaking union power in the biggest industries; Poland is doing the opposite. And the Russians? One opposition leader, Mr Jacek Kuron, rendered the hardest-boiled judgment: "This couldn't be happening if they didn't want it to happen."

GRAPHIC: Picture, The irrepressible face of Solidarity

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Summary of World Broadcasts

August 25, 1989, Friday

SECTION: Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS; POLAND

PAGE: EE/0544/B/ 1

LENGTH: 527 words

HEADLINE: TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI ON SOLIDARITY TV PROGRAMME

SOURCE: Polish TV 2005 gmt 22 Aug 89

Text of recording

BODY:

[Mazowiecki] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I am happy to be in the Solidarity television studio and thanks to this studio I may meet you. This way I am able above all to thank all those who have over the last few days, from the moment of the assignment of myself as Premier by the Pesident, as the man who has the mission of creating a government, sent me good wishes, expressions of goodwill, and also expressions of condolence. I am glad that I am able through this studio to speakabove all to members of Solidarity, all those who brought about the situation whereby I am here. I remember all, many of all those friends from August 1980, from May and August 1988, with whom we were together in Gdansk. As Lech Walesa said recently, yesterday, at the meeting of the National Executive Committee (KKW) in Gdansk, we slept there together, under a table, on foam cushions, during the strikes.

I am glad that I can speak to our fraternal Solidarity, Individual Farmers' Solidarity (NSZZ 'S' RI), that is developing so fully and that will, I think, be transforming our countryside. I speak at a moment that is important for Poland, a moment that is also important for me personally, but it is not me who is most important here, the most important thing. Poland is the most important thing, and the moment in which we are. It has fallen to us, at this moment, to take on real responsibility for the state. This is a great task, and a very diffiuclt task, as we are taking on this responsibility for the state at a difficult moment, a very diffiuclt moment, one when a lot has failed, when many of us are angry (?at) unsuccessful things, and above all there is a lot of hopelessness. But, I think that the time is such, demanding this of us, for us to break with this feeling of hopelessness, to look around. Not just making ourselves aware what is bad, but making ourselves aware of how we can come out of this.

I do not come with any miraculous prescription, for no one has any such thing and it is impossible. I come on the other hand with a good will and with a strong will to pursue democracy in Poland consistently and also to seek to finally rebound off this critical bottom, off the bottom of the economic crisis and to start to live just as we deserve, like a normal, modern nation in Central Europe which can create here a real life, this is free and reasonably prosperous. We will not achieve this at once, and it would be unwise and naive if I were to declare or promise this. But I do declare two things. I declare consistency in activity and truth in our mutual relations; also, this difficult truth. I would like to be faithful to this. I think that the task of the

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government that I am to form will be above all the creation of the possibilties of action for people, organisations, economic and social organisms. And that the state is not to do everything, but that it has precisely to open up these possibilities. And so I think that we ought to awaken hope in ourselves. We used to say that there is no freedom without Solidarity, and now it comes for us to take on responsibility for the state, and we must make a good job of it.

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August 25, 1989, Friday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 4; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 353 words

HEADLINE: Major events in recent Polish history

BODY:

Sept. 1, 1939: Germany invades Poland. Soviet Union attacks from the east 16 days later. Poland spends rest of war under German and Soviet occupation.

April, 1943: Soviet Union breaks relations with exiled Polish government in London.

July 22, 1944: Soviets install "Polish Committee of National Liberation." Six months later they recognize this committee as Polish government.

June 28, 1945: Following Yalta conference, Soviet-dominated Polish Provisional Government of National Unity is formed.

September, 1980: Discontent underlying strikes is intensified by revelations of government and Communist Party corruption and mismanagement. Party leader Edward Gierek ousted.

Dec. 13, 1981: Workers threaten general strike and Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski declares martial law, interning thousands of Solidarity members, including Lech Walesa.

Oct. 8, 1982: Solidarity is banned and official trade union alliance is created to take its place.

Nov. 11, 1982: Walesa is freed.

July 22, 1983: Jaruzelski lifts martial law but leaves many restrictive edicts in place.

1984-87: Amnesty is approved for political prisoners and eventually all are freed.

August-September, 1988: Strikes spread across Poland, creating worst labor strife in seven years. Strikes end when Walesa asks for time to talk with the government.

Feb. 6, 1989: Negotiations begin with government.

April 5, 1989: Deliberations conclude with endorsement of new "social contract," including overhaul of legislative system and partly democratic elections. Solidarity is granted legal status.

June 4, 1989: Solidarity is overwhelming winner over Communist Party in legislative elections.

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Aug. 16, 1989: Peasant and Democratic Parties, former Communist Party allies, endorse Walesa's plan for a governing coalition led by Solidarity.

Aug. 18, 1989: Jaruzelski approves Solidarity-led coalition.

Aug. 19, 1989: Jaruzelski nominates journalist and Solidarity activist Tadeusz Mazowiecki to be prime minister.

Aug. 24, 1989: The Sejm, the lower house of the National Assembly, overwhelmingly approves Mazowiecki as prime minister.

TERMS: POLAND; GOVERNMENT; CHANGE; CHRONOLOGY; LABOR

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August 25, 1989, Friday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 1; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 1375 words

HEADLINE: Poland's evolution: Prisoner to premier

BYLINE: By Paula Butturini, Chicago Tribune

DATELINE: WARSAW

BODY:

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, whose strongly anti-Communist views led to official reproof and a jail cell, was elected prime minister of Poland Thursday, breaking the Communist Party's political stranglehold on Eastern Europe since World War II.

The lower house of parliament voted 378-4, with 41 abstentions, to confirm Mazowiecki, a 62-year-old Roman Catholic journalist in the inner circle of the leadership of the Solidarity independence movement.

The speaker of the house, Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, described the election as historic. It was ironic as well.

Mazowiecki succeeds Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, who as interior minister in December, 1981, signed arrest warrants that sent Mazowiecki and other Solidarity leaders to prison as part of the martial-law crackdown on the opposition.

In a sign of the dramatic changes that have upended the Polish political scene since then, it was Kiszczak, smiling broadly, who first pumped Mazowiecki's hand in congratulation after the vote and who caught his arm when he stumbled on the steps of the dais.

Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, his eyes brimming with tears, watched a live broadcast of the election at his home in the northern port of Gdansk.

"In the name of the whole (Solidarity) union, I convey the wish to Tadeusz Mazowiecki that the government under his leadership will become a government of all Poles, effectively guiding our country from a totalitarian system to democracy," Walesa said.

One of Mazowiecki's first actions after the vote was to place a 10-minute call to Pope John Paul II. The Polish-born pontiff was a beacon of hope in strongly Roman Catholic Poland during martial law and the dark years following.

Mazowiecki's election severed the chain of Communist power that has dominated Eastern Europe for more than four postwar decades. But the party's continued dominance in the region remains in place in the face of growing challenges in nearly every nation in the Communist bloc.

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A Soviet spokesman in Moscow referred to Mazowiecki Thursday as a "partner," duly elected by parliament and embodying its trust.

"At the end of the month, the government will be formed in Warsaw and will set out its program," Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuri Gremitskikh said. "Let them go ahead, considering their national interests and international commitments."

President Bush immediately congratulated Mazowiecki; praised Walesa, Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev; and pointedly repeated his pledge last month of $238 million in economic support for Poland.

Poland has "pursued a path of democratic change," said Bush, adding: "These developments hold promise not only for a peaceful democratic transition in Poland, but also for a broader process of European reconciliation, toward a Europe whole and free."

Mazowiecki addressed the Soviet issue squarely during his inaugural speech, pledging that his new government will "maintain good-neighborly and friendly relations with the Soviet Union."

"We understand the obligations of the commitments stemming from the Warsaw Pact," he added. "Addressing all its members, I declare that the government we are going to form will respect this pact."

It was the only line of his speech that drew applause from Communist deputies, now in the minority in parliament.

Later, in his first news conference as prime minister, Mazowiecki reiterated that pledge and sought to play down any potential threat from Solidarity to the East bloc's military alliance.

"I don't think that people who aim at reforms in socialist countries should be identified with opponents of the Warsaw Pact - with those who want to undermine the pact," he said.

Mazowiecki's remarks echoed the refrain Solidarity has been uttering since Walesa derailed the Communist Party's traditional parliamentary coalition earlier this month by coaxing two minor parties to switch their allegiance to the union.

In an obvious effort to allay hard-line Communist fears throughout the bloc and to avoid any intervention or draconian measures like a return to martial law, Solidarity has repeatedly pledged not to upset the Communist military alliance nor to shut the party out of its new government.

Such declarations would have carried little weight during the years that Leonid Brezhnev was the supreme Communist leader. But in the era of reforms promulgated by Gorbachev, they appear to have satisfied the Kremlin - at least for now.

Moscow's comment, accompanied by a congratulatory telegram, was the clearest signal yet that Gorbachev will not do anything to halt the far-reaching changes that President Jaruzelski has introduced in Poland: talks with the opposition,

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re-legalization of Solidarity, partly democratic elections and, finally, a non-Communist prime minister.

Mazowiecki's immediate task will be to form a coalition government that includes - and can satisfy - all pro-reform forces in parliament: Solidarity; its two new coalition partners, the United Peasant and Democratic Parties; and the Communists.

Finding the proper equation to satisfy all sides will not be easy.

The Communists have been demanding more than the Defense and Interior ministries that Solidarity has said it would grant them.

The Peasants and the Democrats, minor parties in lock-step with the Communists for decades, also are demanding strong Cabinet representation. They fear that Solidarity and the Communists might work out an agreement that could cut them out of power before they try to establish an independent role.

Mazowiecki hopes to complete a Cabinet agreement by next Thursday. After that, parliamentary commissions must approve his nominations and parliament must vote on the government as a whole.

Only then will Mazowiecki be able to initiate the programs he hopes will pull Poland out of the social, economic and political morass into which it has sunk.

So far the new prime minister has been short on details about his plans but he has not shied away from sketching a broad vision of a Poland that is vastly different from the one he has inherited.

Addressing parliament Thursday, Mazowiecki outlined sweeping plans that, if enacted, would profoundly change the face of socialism in Poland. They included:

- Restoring "normal political life" in which opponents are not eliminated but brought into political partnership.

- Transforming the state from an entity that deals with and guarantees all aspects of life and commerce to one that opens possibilities for individual and collective action.

- Introducing a genuine market economy to replace the central planning.

- Revamping the legal system to give every citizen rights in accord with international pacts and agreements.

- De-monopolizing the state-run mass media, the main arm of the party's propaganda machine.

- Imposing a tough anti-inflation package.

Only the final two proposals might be able to be enacted quickly. The rest would likely evolve over a long period, if in fact they made any headway at all.

Given the current state of the Polish economy - runaway inflation, empty shops, endless lines, a $39 billion external debt - Mazowiecki's chances for

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success may lie chiefly with Polish workers and whether they are willing to wait long enough for the new government's programs to be enacted and take effect.

Workers are angry already as they see their buying power dwindle with each new paycheck. Strikes have been breaking out for months all over the country, but several of them were suspended Thursday to mark Mazowiecki's election.

Given the cyclical nature of modern Polish history, in which successive new leaders promised economic and political changes, only to be ousted when the promises fell flat, Mazowiecki stressed the importance of society's response to his new government.

"The main question is whether there will be a psychological breakthrough in Poland, if people understand this is a new chapter in Polish life," he said. "The greatest danger for the new government is, I think, if there is no understanding of the extremely difficult situation we are in, if instead of a certain credit of patience, there occurs the phenomenon of impatience, especially hatred or distrust."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: AP Laserphoto. Solidarity members signify their support Thursday as parliament's lower house elects their colleague Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Polish prime minister.
PHOTO: AP Laserphoto. Solidarity's Lech Walesa enjoys the day's political events on his TV set in Gdansk.

TERMS: POLAND; GOVERNMENT; CHANGE; LABOR; FIRST; HISTORY; UNITED STATES; REACTION; SOVIET UNION

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August 25, 1989, Friday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 5; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 126 words

HEADLINE: A vote of no confidence

BYLINE: Reuters

DATELINE: WARSAW

BODY:

A Polish army colonel who voted against Solidarity newspaper editor Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister Thursday said he had done so because he believes that journalists should not run governments.

Asked by reporters why he had voted against Mazowiecki, Col. Jozef Blaszczyk said: "He is a journalist. His predecessor was a journalist, and look what happened."

The colonel was referring to Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the Communist Party leader who was prime minister for less than a year, from September, 1988, until last month.

Rakowski was editor in chief of the party journal Polityka from 1958 to 1982. Mazowiecki, who was elected prime minister by a vote of 378-4 with 41 abstentions, is editor of the Solidarity weekly Tygodnik Solidarnosc.

TERMS: POLAND; GOVERNMENT; CHANGE; LABOR; REACTION; MILITARY

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August 25, 1989, Friday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 5; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 684 words

HEADLINE: On day of victory, Poles remember a martyred hero

BYLINE: By Joseph A. Reaves, Chicago Tribune

DATELINE: WARSAW

BODY:

This was a day worth dying for. And many had.

It was a day worth praying for. And many had.

But for the two tired women lugging plastic shopping bags into a churchyard at dusk Thursday, the day the Communist Party relinquished total power in Poland was a day they never dreamed would come.

"It's unbelievable," said Regine Graczyk, 61, just after a top adviser to the Solidarity trade union became Poland's first non-Communist prime minister in 45 years.

"A few years ago people were telling us there was no hope. They were saying Solidarity was dead and the Communists would rule forever. But look at us now. It's wonderful."

Graczyk and her friend, Irina Rachan, 65, spent the day doing what they do many other days: standing in line for hours to buy food. Poland's comatose economy is a key reason the Communists are being shunted aside.

Another key reason is the heavy-handed abuse of power that marked the Communists' reign since July, 1944.

Nothing captured those two indictments more vividly than the sight of these two tired and sweaty friends setting down their flimsy shopping bags to kneel and pray at the foot of the grave of Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko.

Father Popieluszko, an ardent Solidarity activist, was kidnaped Oct. 19, 1984, as he drove home alone in his car. His body was found 11 days later and authorities eventually admitted he was murdered by secret police.

The death of the enormously popular 37-year-old priest outraged the nation and rekindled the spirit of Solidarity, which had been crushed three years earlier with the imposition of martial law.

"Your heart breaks when you come here and think of all this priest did for us," said Rachan, who lives in Kielce, 100 miles south of Warsaw, but comes to the capital regularly to shop and see her friend Graczyk.

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"I visit Father Jerzy's grave every time I come."

So do tens of thousands of other Poles. Father Popieluszko is buried outside St. Stanislaw Kostka Church, where he was pastor and chaplain to the Warsaw steelworkers' union.

In the early days of martial law, with most of Solidarity's top leaders arrested, it was Father Popieluszko and Pope John Paul II who did the most to keep Solidarity alive.

Father Popieluszko railed against repression. The Pope led weekly prayer broadcasts back to his native Poland from the Vatican. Both men were remembered during Solidarity's moment of glory Thursday.

One of the first things Tadeusz Mazowiecki did after being elected prime minister was to place a 10-minute telephone call to the Pope.

The asphalt entryway to St. Stanislaw Kostka still bears the Polish slogan Czuwamy ("We are alert"), which was painted in Solidarity's red-and-white colors the day after Father Popieluszko disappeared.

Nearby, his grave is covered with a giant red marble cross linked by huge black chains to 58 stones laid out in the shape of a rosary. A makeshift eternal flame burns a few feet away where two wooden kneelers wait for the steady stream of mourners and admirers.

"In the five years since he was killed, the numbers have never dwindled," says Malgorzata Gasiorowska, a music theory specialist who, along with scores of others, was taking her turn standing guard over Father Popieluszko's grave.

"I think the reason the people still come is because they know the importance of truth. We lived for 45 years being constantly lied to. Father Jerzy was the only one during martial law who had the courage to speak the truth."

The quest for truth and justice has been Solidarity's rallying call since its founding in 1980. Mazowiecki was quick to sound it again after his election.

"The future government must tell society the truth," the new prime minister said in a somber but moving acceptance speech. "Of basic importance is the problem of law and abiding the law. For 45 years, the law in Poland has been treated as an instrument."

"When I heard the prime minister speak today about truth and law, I thought immediately of Father Popieluszko," said Gasiorowska, the volunteer guard. "He is the patron of truth in Poland."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: AP Laserphoto. Tadeusz Mazowiecki gives the Solidarity sign after being elected prime minister Thursday by Poland's lower house of parliament.

TERMS: POLAND; GOVERNMENT; CHANGE; FIRST; LABOR; REACTION

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Facts on File World News Digest

August 25, 1989

SECTION: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PAGE: Pg. 614 A1

LENGTH: 168 words

HEADLINE: Solidarity's Mazowiecki Confirmed as Polish Premier; First Noncommuni;
Facts on Mazowiecki

BODY:

Tadeusz Mazowiecki was born on April 18, 1927, a son of a physician in the city of Plock. He was trained as a lawyer, but mainly earned a living as a journalist.

By the mid-1950s, Mazowiecki had emerged as one of Poland's leading Roman Catholic intellectuals and religious activists. In 1958, he founded the liberal Catholic monthly journal Wiez (Link), which he edited until 1981. He counted Pope John Paul II among his friends.

Mazowiecki was first elected to parliament in 1961, but was barred from reelection in 1970 for investigating the massacre of shipyard workers in Gdansk that year. [See 1970, p. 929B2]

In 1980, he helped Lech Walesa negotiate the agreement that brought the Solidarity union into existence. He became a close adviser to Walesa and spent one year in an internment camp when martial law was imposed in 1981. [See 1981, p. 921A1; 1980, p. 657C2]

Mazowiecki was serving as the editor of Solidarity's weekly newspaper Tygodnik Solidarnosc when he was named premier.

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31ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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August 25, 1989, Friday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 8, Column 1; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 1271 words

HEADLINE: OPENING NEW ERA, POLES PICK LEADER

BYLINE: By JOHN TAGLIABUE, Special to The New York Times

DATELINE: WARSAW, Aug. 24

BODY:

Opening a fresh chapter in the nation's political life, Poland's Parliament ended more than 40 years of one-party rule today by electing Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a devout Catholic and Solidarity supporter, to be the country's first non-Communist Prime Minister since the early postwar years.

In a tense Parliament, the Solidarity candidate, Mr. Mazowiecki, got 378 votes, with 4 against and 41 abstentions. To win, he needed the votes of 212 of the 423 legislators present.

The stage for Mr. Mazowiecki's election was set earlier, when none of the legislators voiced objections to a resolution accepting the resignation of the incumbent Prime Minister, Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, who failed against Solidarity resistance to assemble a cabinet.

Since 1945, when a Communist-dominated cabinet was installed under the watchful eye of the Soviet occupying forces that had driven out the Germans, the political structure of Poland has been dominated by Communists. It now appears that Poland, driven by impending economic disaster, has taken advantage of the changes wrought in the Soviet Union under President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and is about to enter a period of experimentation.

Moved by 'Proof of Trust'

As the results were announced, Mr. Mazowiecki, who watched from a bench at the front of the chamber, stood and bowed deeply, while the legislators rose to their feet to applaud.

The new Prime Minister then strode to the speakers' platform and, his voice wavering, told the legislators that he was moved by the ''proof of trust.''

''I count on this moment becoming significant in the consciousness of my compatriots,'' he said, ''so that we can revive Poland by common effort, not because of my person, but because of the needs of Poland and the historic moment.''

After the vote, Mr. Mazowiecki strode to the benches of the Communist cabinet, and shook the hands of its members, beginning with General Kiszczak. He then received the warm wishes of Solidarity's leaders, who ascended the steps to the Government bench one by one to shake his hand and embrace and kiss him.

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Difficult Talks Ahead

Mr. Mazowiecki, a graying 62-year-old writer and adviser to Solidarity since its founding nearly nine years ago, will hardly have time to savor the taste of victory.

The departing Communist regime leaves Poland's economy in shambles, yet retains a strangle grip on the army and the police, the principal tools of social control, and over the national television and radio, the principal instruments of its propaganda. Even as Solidarity's leaders were celebrating their triumph, Mr. Mazowiecki faced difficult talks with the Communists over his Cabinet and its program.

Under arrangements that led to Mr. Mazowiecki's nomination by the Communist President, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Solidarity agreed to accord the Communists the two key ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs.

Solidarity strategists said they expected the toughest battle over control of television and radio, as well as for the Foreign Ministry, for which General Jaruzelski as President bears ultimate responsibility, and which the Communists believe should go to one of their members. Broader Solidarity strategists say the Communists must get a portfolio in the area of the economy.

Communists Vote for Mazowiecki

Before the vote today, the Communist floor leader, Marian Orzechowski, said Communist deputies would have ''full freedom of choice.'' In the end, nearly all the Communist legislators either voted for Mr. Mazowiecki or abstained, as did Mr. Orzechowski. Only four Communist deputies voted against.

For the Solidarity leadership, it was a moment of triumph. Lech Walesa, the union founder who was the power broker behind the nomination of Mr. Mazowiecki, watched the election, which was broadcast on national television, at his home in the Baltic seaport of Gdansk, where the union was born Aug. 31, 1980.

In a statement after the vote he said he wished the new Cabinet would become ''a Government of all Poles, effectively guiding the country from a totalitarian system to democracy.''

It was day of most startling turns. After meeting General Jaruzelski and addressing a news conference, the newly elected Prime Minister, the former editor of a prominent Catholic monthly, spoke by phone for about 10 minutes with the Polish-born Pope, John Paul II, a friend.

Telegrams From East and West

Congratulatory telegrams arrived in Warsaw from leaders in East and West, but perhaps the most welcome messages came from Moscow.

At a news conference in Moscow, Yuri Gremitskikh, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, urged Poland's new Government leaders to set out their programs, ''considering their national interests and international commitments.''

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The Soviet Council of Ministers sent a telegram expressing confidence that Polish-Soviet ties would continue to develop based on ''sovereign equality and respect, mutual benefit and mutual responsibility.''

In an address to Parliament before the vote, Mr. Mazowiecki presented the broad outlines of his Government's future program. Its central issue, he told the legislators, would be, ''the state of the national economy.''

Long-Term Strategy

Indicating his Cabinet would move quickly to broaden capitalism in Poland, he said the ''long-term strategic aim of Government activity'' would be to ''restore to Poland those economic structures that have been known and tested for a long time.''

''What I have in mind'' he said, ''is a return to the market economy and to a role of the state similar to that in economically developed countries.''

Suggesting that his Government would seek to put an end to the era of social engineering that characterized the economy under Communist planners, he added: ''Poland can no longer afford ideological experiments.''

But the near-term goal of Government, he made clear, would be the ''absolute and urgent need to face up to inflation.'' That struggle, he said, would be bitter for Poles, but the Government would do all in its power ''to reduce the painful effects.''

No Mass Dismissals

Poland faces soaring inflation, flagging industrial production and a crushing $39 billion foreign debt. Asked at his news conference later in the day if his Government would honor its debt repayment commitments, Mr. Mazowiecki replied, ''I think that countries must repay their debts.'' He added, ''On the issue of debt, the essential element of justice should be taken into account in international relations.'' Care was needed, he said, so that debts ''do not strangle the possibilities of the development of debtor nations.''

Mr. Mazowiecki took pains to assure potential foes that no mass dismissals would occur. ''We will not form a new army or militia,'' he said, directing his words to the Communist-dominated security forces that remain a potential tool of Communist repression. ''The point is to create such legal guarantees that everybody, even within these institutions, can feel that they are serving the people.''

He also sought to allay concerns among Poland's East bloc allies, and most notably the Soviet Union.

''We would like to maintain good neighborly and friendly relations with the Soviet Union,'' he said. ''A chance is emerging for the first time for relations between our nations to be based on friendship and cooperation, and not to be reserved for only one party. It is a great chance that cannot be wasted.''

He also assured his listeners that his Cabinet would, ''understand the importance of the commitments stemmming from the Warsaw Treaty,'' the East bloc military alliance.

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GRAPHIC: photo of cleaning women listening to speech by Tadeusz Mazowiecki (AP)

ORGANIZATION: SOLIDARITY UNION (POLAND)

NAME: MAZOWIECKI, TADEUSZ; TAGLIABUE, JOHN

GEOGRAPHIC: POLAND

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182. N. W. Graham, "Russian-American Relations, 1917–1933: An Interpretation," *American Political Science Review*, XXVIII (June 1934), 408–409. For an analysis of the documents that led to this position, see Stanley K. Hornbeck, "The American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia," Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.

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Chapter Three

WOODROW WILSON AND THE REBIRTH OF POLAND

KAY LUNDGREEN-NIELSEN

Although the Polish state was reestablished more than sixty years ago, the debate over the factors that were decisive for Poland's restoration has raged for years. Many factors contributed to the creation of a Polish state. The policy of President Wilson was one of them.

During the First World War, as in the Second World War, the American leaders avoided participating in discussions on territorial problems, especially those which concerned eastern Europe, before the war was over.[1] In both cases, the vital, direct American interests in that part of the world were not great.[2] However, even though the United States did not have a large stake in the Italian-Yugoslavian conflict, it became deeply involved in this affair. The problem was that, in Wilson's opinion, American policy toward Italy was becoming a threat to his vision of a peace settlement. Although he was not a rigid doctrinaire, neither on the problem of Italy nor on other questions, it is worth briefly mentioning his general principles, for his policy on Poland is not clear without reference to them.[3]

Wilson favored the worldwide development of self-governing, democratic states. He believed that a world consisting of such states, organized within a League of Nations, would be the best guarantee for peace in the future. As far as new frontiers were concerned, therefore, the principle of national self-determination should guide the postwar settlement. These democratic states in the League of Nations would work for disarmament; the new order would preserve the peace more effectively than the old diplomacy, which relied on the

balance of power, military and secret alliances, annexations, armaments, strategic frontiers, and hard economic conditions imposed on the defeated. Wilson did not regard the Allied European states as wholly and loyally committed to these ideals. In 1917–1918, the Americans acquired an unfavorable impression of the policy of Italy and later also of France.[4] In January 1918, Wilson was already aware of the danger of a Latin bloc as a counterweight to a presumed Anglo-Saxon bloc, and Wilson was ready to fight such a combination.[5]

The implementation of Wilson's principles raised many problems. Even if the complex situation in Europe after the war had not added to the difficulties, some of the principles, such as national self-determination, left many practical problems unsolved. The mixed nationalities in eastern Europe posed a special problem, but, on the other hand, Wilson always had reservations concerning this principle: he realized that, in some cases, other considerations—diplomatic, strategic, or economic—might be important.[6] Although Wilson wanted the new states and the defeated autocratic states to emerge as democracies, his belief in self-government and self-determination at times placed him in a dilemma. What should happen if a people did not want a democratic system? Did the victors have the right to impose it from the outside? Wilson faced this dilemma in Russia and in Germany's transition from an autocratic imperial government to a democratic parliamentary republican system.[7] In both cases, the "Mexican lesson" influenced Wilson; he perceived that military intervention would not solve internal problems which required a national or popular resolution.[8]

Despite this realization, Wilson preferred the development of democracies; and he did, at times, encourage it by using other means, such as food relief. Even so, democratic states might very well be anything but peaceful; public opinion and the parliaments might be nationalistic. A strong and aggressive nationalism erupted in most countries after the First World War. Public opinion in the United States, led by the Republicans, was certainly no exception to this development. Wilson's appeal in April 1919 to the Italian people was a failure because of popular pressure for national aggrandizement. Strong and aggressive nationalism, which public opinion supported, also existed in most of the new or reestablished states in eastern and southeastern Europe.[9]

The implementation of Wilson's principles met other difficulties.

While the war was fought and won by the United States together with the Allies, an American peace was not possible unless Wilson used the overwhelming financial power of the United States to press his views on the Allies. But such a policy entailed the risk of breaking the alliance and wrecking the whole work of the peace conference, including the establishment of the League of Nations, the most important element in the Wilsonian peace structure.[10] The Americans did not use their financial weapon, and Wilson's political position in the United States, after the congressional elections in November 1918, was weakened. The peace was therefore a compromise between different interests.

The problems which surrounded the reestablishment of Poland added to these ambiguities. Before the peace conference, Wilson did not have specific ideas about the reestablishment of Poland. His policy on Polish problems developed gradually during 1917 and 1918. In his public declarations, he made only vague pronouncements. In a famous statement in the speech of January 22, 1917, Wilson recognized the principle of a Polish state, just as the Central Powers, in their Manifesto of November 5, 1916, had stated that they would do. "Statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland," Wilson declared.

These few words on Poland were the only words in that speech about territorial settlements. On the other hand, his laconic remarks fell very much short of the Polish desires that one of the Polish leaders in the United States, the famous pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski, expressed in a long memorandum to Wilson. Paderewski favored a big Poland, a federation of the United States of Poland.[11]

Wilson made his statement in January probably in reaction to the international situation and not in response to any pressure by Polish Americans. Most historians maintain that, during both the First World War and the Second World War, pressure from Polish Americans had a large influence upon American Presidents. Wilson, of course, was well aware that the Poles in America constituted a part of the electorate, but it is remarkable that his statement in January 1917 came *after* the presidential election of 1916. Polish-American organizations were rather weak and divided. Later, Wilson did not let Italian or Jewish opinions influence his policy.[12]

Paderewski was a leading member of one of the Polish groups in the United States. Through his acquaintance from late 1915 onward with

Colonel House, Paderewski hoped to influence American policy toward Polish problems. There is no doubt that he charmed and flattered House. Yet it is quite another question as to how far this acquaintance influenced political decisions. When the Allied debate on the Polish problem was most acute—that is, during the Paris Peace Conference—the influence of Colonel House was declining.[13] The problem of the importance of personal acquaintances also has another dimension, since Wilson and the American leaders could and *did* try to influence Paderewski to induce Policy policymakers to follow *their* principles.

In 1917, plans existed to create a Polish government and a Polish army in America. The French also permitted the establishment of a Polish army in France and, later, the formation in 1917 of the Polish National Committee (KNP), which was soon seated in Paris. The American government, however, was the last of the great powers to recognize the KNP in 1917. The Americans complained that the KNP was reactionary and unrepresentative; it included no socialists, peasants, or Jews.[14] The KNP, which Roman Dmowski headed, did not represent democratic ideals in the eyes of most Americans.

During the war, The Inquiry, which Wilson established in 1917, did detailed work on Polish problems and future frontiers. As Wilson phrased it, these experts would establish the factual basis for a "scientific peace." Recent scholarship has established that these experts, most of whom were academics, were more conservative than Wilson and were more concerned with America's economic and strategic position than with the principle of national self-determination.[15] The leading experts in the United States on Poland were Professors Robert H. Lord of Harvard University and Isaiah Bowman of The Johns Hopkins University. Most of the literature on the peace conference has overemphasized the influence of the American experts and their preparatory work. The British, for example, were also very well prepared. Moreover, Wilson's advisers frequently disagreed on Polish affairs, and Wilson did not always follow their advice, especially when they departed from Wilson's own principles. Wilson's independent attitude concerning Poland was embodied in Point Thirteen of his Fourteen Points Address.[16] The vagueness of his statement was deliberate, for the diplomatic situation was far from clear, and he also had to consider the views of the Allies. American policy toward Austria-Hungary was not clarified before the middle of 1918. Until then,

Wilson did not dismiss the possibility of the continued existence of Austria-Hungary. Polish Galicia was part of the Hapsburg Empire; in 1918, the Allies still had plans for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, and, in 1917, for a Polish state within a federalized new Austria-Hungary.[17]

When the Allies abandoned their attempts at a separate peace with Austria-Hungary in April 1918, the path lay clear for statements of support for the subject nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Versailles Declaration of June 3, 1918, demonstrated that all the Allies and the United States now favored a united and independent Polish state with access to the sea. The final defeat of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918 forced the Poles and the great powers to make their ideas about Poland more concrete.

The situation in and around Poland was confused at the time of the Armistice. Russia was in chaos and was experiencing both civil war and foreign intervention; Germany had a revolution; and Austria-Hungary had disintegrated. In Galicia (Austrian Poland), fighting broke out in November 1918 between Poles and Ukrainians. The German troops withdrew in an orderly fashion from Russian Poland, but German soldiers were still in territories east of Poland, from the Ukraine to the Baltic states. When the Polish state emerged in November 1918, the problem of the representation of Poland at the Paris Peace Conference was unsolved. In Warsaw, Józef Piłsudski took power from the Regency Council—the Polish agency which the Central Powers had established—and soon formed a socialist government. The Allies did not support this regime, since they had recognized Dmowski and the KNP since 1917. Dmowski and his National Democratic party now had aspirations to seize power in Poland.

The State Department was well aware of the internal quarrels of the Polish factions.[18] Officially, however, it had recognized only Paderewski in America during the war, and it was not involved in these internal problems as much as the French and the British governments. On the other hand, the American peace commissioner, General Tasker H. Bliss, tended to support Piłsudski; he thought that Dmowski was a reactionary.[19] Wilson stated in December 1918, on board the *George Washington*: "As for the form of Poland's government he would only say that he was in favor of their having any government they damned pleased."[20] He had learned his "Mexican lesson" well. This statement meant that Wilson would not prevent the ruling gov-

ernment—that is, the government appointed by Piłsudski and headed by Jędrzej Moraczewski, from remaining in power, and that Wilson had assumed a position against the KNP's pretensions to power in Poland.

In the middle of January 1919, an agreement made between Paderewski and Piłsudski in Warsaw solved the problem of Polish representation. Dmowski reluctantly approved it in Paris, and Piłsudski remained as Chief of State and Paderewski as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The American leaders probably hoped that Paderewski could and would influence Poland in a democratic direction. They were the first to recognize the new Polish government, just as they were the first to recognize the new government of Yugoslavia. Colonel House eagerly recommended this to Wilson, who at once approved.[21]

There is no evidence that shows direct American involvement in the formation of the Paderewski government. Herbert Hoover's later explanation that his food mission to Poland had an important influence is not sufficient or necessary. Piłsudski had considered a change of government for weeks before the food mission arrived, and there were many reasons for the compromise with Paderewski.[22] Piłsudski hoped to gain Allied help and recognition by nominating Paderewski and by placing the KNP under his control. On the other hand, Hoover certainly had a political aim in sending food to Central and East Central Europe: he wanted to stop Bolshevism. The first ships with food landed at Danzig in the middle of February 1919.[23]

The Polish compromise, just before the peace conference opened in January 1919, meant that Dmowski and Paderewski were the Polish plenipotentiaries, and that representatives from Piłsudski were incorporated into the KNP. The expanded KNP represented Polish interests in Paris until normal state agencies were established. During the conference, however, this formal compromise was not carried out. Dmowski and his men did not regard themselves as subordinate to the Polish authorities in Warsaw, and, since they held different ideas on more questions than did Piłsudski and Paderewski, a dualism in the conduct of Polish foreign policy existed. The great powers were aware of these differences and used them for their own ends.[24]

It is essential to examine the attitude of President Wilson himself to understand completely the American policy toward the reestablishment of Poland. Very often, however, it is impossible to learn much

about his position. His opinions are frequently recorded, not by himself, but by others—his close collaborators, foreign visitors, Polish or Allied politicians, and ambassadors. This type of evidence must be examined very carefully. Wilson rarely gave precise instructions to his delegates, either about Poland or about many other problems.[25] The various plans that his advisers and experts favored were, therefore, not necessarily identical to his own ideas. In the autumn of 1918, Lansing, House, and The Inquiry favored including Danzig as part of Poland. When Dmowski and Paderewski presented the Polish territorial demands to Wilson in September and October 1918, Wilson found them excessive. He told Dmowski in clear terms that arguments about strategic frontiers carried little weight with him, and that Poland would have to rely on the League of Nations for security. Dmowski was taught the same lesson as the Italians, who also spoke as representatives of the "old diplomacy."[26]

One of the most difficult questions concerned the interpretation of Wilson's phrase, "with access to the sea," which appeared in Point Thirteen. Wilson's French, Polish, and American listeners provide most of the sources concerning his views, but all the scant evidence points to the conclusion that, before the conference and at its beginning, Wilson did not favor giving Danzig to Poland. As late as January 21, 1919, the American experts in The Inquiry advocated giving Danzig to Poland. However, on the next day Wilson told his Allied colleagues that "Danzig must remain an open question."[27]

Wilson wanted to be sure that the great powers wrote the peace settlement; otherwise his policy would be very difficult to execute. But the divergent views among the great powers created a host of problems. In close cooperation with the British, Wilson wanted to stop the tendency toward local military *faits accomplis*, which threatened to decide many questions *before* the peace conference had discussed them. An Allied warning of January 24, 1919, was based on Anglo-American cooperation, and the French only reluctantly adhered to it. The statement was "a solemn warning that possession gained by force will seriously prejudice the claims of those who use such means. If they expect justice, they must refrain from force and place their claims in unclouded good faith in the hands of the Conference of Peace." The British and Americans were thinking of the Poles, the Rumanians, the Italians, the Serbs, the Hungarians, and, possibly also, the French, who, through military force and *coups*, could forestall the decisions of

the conference.[28] Neither the British nor the Americans had their own vital interests in specific Polish frontiers. In principle, both wanted to create a strong and viable state, but, in their opinion, that meant, as far as possible, a state within ethnographical lines. The French leaders had another definition of a strong Poland and of its function in the French security system.

Since the disappearance in 1917–1918 of France's old ally, Russia, Poland, in French planning, gradually assumed the role of an anti-German barrier. Because of the civil war in Russia, the French hoped that Poland would be an anti-Bolshevik bulwark.[29] The French leaders were prepared to use economic, historical, and strategic arguments to further these aims and to establish precedents for their own borders with Germany. The problem of Danzig was a good example.

Since November 1918, the French and the Poles had proposed to transport the Polish Army in France, under the command of Colonel Józef Haller, to Poland through Danzig, and accompanied by Allied troops. In January and February 1919, common American and British opposition blocked this proposal. Wilson and Bliss certainly understood that Haller might use his troops against both Germany and the new Polish government. Wilson pointed out that, in dispatching Polish troops to Poland, "we should not only be sending armed men, but strong partisans on Polish questions." He certainly had no desire for a right-wing coup in Poland; he steadfastly refused to send American troops to Poland to accompany Haller's army, and he avoided supporting the French policy, which tended to favor military solutions to political problems.[30] Ferdinand Foch, Dmowski, and Dmowski's close associate, Count Jan Horodyski, tried, unsuccessfully, to win Anglo-American support for the transport of Haller's army by using anti-Bolshevik arguments. This stratagem failed totally. Wilson firmly rejected the use of military weapons to fight Bolshevism. Instead, his solution lay in the food weapon; his instrument was Hoover's Relief Organization.[31]

The attempt to forestall the decisions of the peace conference regarding Danzig did not succeed. But during February and March 1919 the territorial problems were discussed both informally between the American and British experts and formally in the territorial commissions of the conference. Most of this time Wilson was not in Paris, and, apparently, he left his delegation without precise instructions. When he returned on March 14, he discovered that Colonel House

had compromised on several issues with the British and the French and that the territorial commissions were ready with their proposals.

Did the work of the American experts, Lord and Bowman, and of Colonel House correspond to Wilson's policy on Polish problems? Lord, Bowman, and House, like the British experts, Sir Esme Howard, Hamish James Paton, and Frederick H. Kisch, maintained that Danzig should be part of Poland, a position which was contrary to the prevailing view in the Foreign Office during 1917 and 1918, and which was contrary to Wilson's previous statements. Part of the British delegation expressed doubt and opposition in February, but, by the middle of March, all the British experts, including Foreign Secretary Balfour, accepted the proposal to award Danzig to Poland. Whether Wilson approved of this decision is not known, but he probably left House in Paris without instructions, and House favored giving Danzig to Poland.[32] In his memoirs, Dmowski states that House told him that Wilson was in favor of including Danzig as part of Poland.[33] This evidence must, however, be used cautiously, since House very often was not loyal to Wilson.[34]

When he returned to Paris, Wilson may have accepted the report of the Polish Commission. He pointed out—in accordance with his general view—that it was not entirely possible to follow the ethnographical principle, there or elsewhere. Wilson also drew attention to the general situation in Poland: "The Allies were creating a new and weak state, weak not only because historically it had failed to govern itself, but because it was sure in future to be divided into factions, more especially as religious differences were an element in the situation."[35] Wilson talked about the religious situation, but he could also have been thinking of the severe political schism. Remarkably enough, however, he very quickly changed his mind and took the same position as did Lloyd George, who in the beginning had not questioned the proposal on Danzig. In fact, American activity with respect to Danzig and other Polish problems was much greater than the existing treatments of the question have thus far indicated.

After his return to Paris in March, Wilson concluded that the proposals for the peace treaty with Germany, as House had negotiated them, and the behavior of the new states of eastern Europe, did not correspond to his principles and policy. He viewed the policy of the French and the Italians as being in large measure responsible for the fight between the old order and the new order. The character of the

peace was at stake. House's concessions were one of the factors to blame for this development,[36] and both Lloyd George and Wilson probably, already on March 27, began to think of revising the proposal on Danzig.[37]

For Wilson, the same principle governed the issues that surrounded Teschen, the Saar, Fiume, and Danzig. If he agreed to Polish economic claims on Danzig, he had to agree to Czech claims to Teschen, French claims to the Saar, and so on.[38] If Wilson permitted the Poles or the Ukrainians to forestall the decisions of the peace conference—contrary to the declaration of January 24, 1919—by military force in eastern Galicia, or if he permitted the Poles to use Haller's army either against the Ukrainians or against the Germans in Danzig, he thought that his principles for a peace settlement would be gravely injured.

At the end of March and the beginning of April 1919, therefore, Wilson reacted strongly. His activity on both the Italian and Polish problems was so great because these states were weaker than France and Great Britain. In April, he compromised frequently with the French and the British, but on Italy and Poland he tried to impose his principles, in the last case in close cooperation with the British. He worked eagerly on the details of the frontiers and of the status of Danzig. He took time for meetings with the American and British experts and made handwritten proposals.[39] In fact, Wilson disapproved of the work of his own experts and did not take their advice. Lord and Bowman were still firmly in favor of Danzig going to Poland and of strong measures against the Ukrainians in eastern Galicia. Wilson worked hard to make Danzig a free state, and he avoided unilateral actions in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict; in fact, in response to the reports of an American representative in Poland, General Francis Joseph Kernan, Wilson acted against what he thought was Polish militarism and imperialism.[40] Kernan, in several letters to General Bliss, sharply criticized the French in Poland, and he contradicted the frequent Polish contentions about the Bolshevik threat. On the contrary, General Kernan reported that the real threat was Polish militarism and imperialism. In Paris, Bliss and Wilson wholeheartedly supported Kernan's interpretations, and not those of Lord. Wilson and Bliss were disappointed at the behavior of the new states, which behaved very much like the worst among the existing states—for instance, France and Italy.[41] This mood was reflected in Wilson's actions on Polish affairs.

Wilson's active part in establishing the Free State of Danzig has been mentioned. He was just as active in working out a solution for the transport of Haller's army which would make military *faits accomplis* impossible either at Danzig or in eastern Galicia. Foch's attempts to persuade the Council of Four to approve either a route for Haller via Rumania to eastern Galicia or via Danzig would have had quite the opposite effect. The French proposals strengthened the American-British suspicion of the underlying motives and led to the final solution which wholly satisfied American-British policy: Haller's army was to go through Germany by railway. This solution was identical to a British proposal of October 1918; in March 1919, the Germans also favored it.[42] From the middle of April 1919 onward, Haller's troops gradually arrived in Poland without untoward episodes. The British and the Americans clearly stated that their transport had no connection with decisions on frontier problems and that its purpose was purely defensive; moreover, they had frustrated Foch's intention to use Haller's army for a war against Russia or the Ukrainians.[43]

The Americans persistently warned the Poles to stop their military activities in eastern Galicia or else to risk drastic American pressure. In April 1919, the Americans and British agreed that the commission in Paris which should force the Poles and the Ukrainians to stop fighting ought not to have a French chairman.[44] Telegrams were sent from the peace conference after March 19 on British and American initiative to stop the fighting in eastern Galicia. But the Poles—unknown to the peace conference—after that day were on the offensive, and these orders worked to their disadvantage. Bliss and Wilson were well aware that the new states were very much dependent on American aid. Thus Wilson halted trains with supplies to Poland, and he personally tried to influence Paderewski in Paris.[45] At the end of April, Bowman plainly told the Poles the essence of the American policy: the United States feared that Poland was going to be an aggressive and imperialistic state.[46] The existence of the government of Paderewski was at stake, and the Americans seemed willing to risk its collapse. Just as the British and the Americans discussed at the end of April whether the Ebert-Scheidemann regime in Germany ought to give place to a government more amenable to Allied aims, they also discussed the value of the Piłsudski-Paderewski regime. In both cases, the alternatives were not enviable. British and American leaders feared that extremist parties from the right (in Germany, the military; in Poland, the Dmowski group) or the left (Bolshevism) would take

power. Moreover, Poland was an Allied country. Therefore, Paderewski, on the explicit recommendation of the first American Minister in Poland, Hugh Gibson, got more than warnings and pressures from the Council of Three before he left for Poland in the beginning of May. The Big Three thanked him for his efforts in Paris, and he was promised a much needed loan.[47]

Dmowski in Paris had closely cooperated with the French. The work in the territorial commissions and the sending of a French military mission to Poland seemed to show that his policy was right—and he himself certainly had no doubts about that.[48]

Piłsudski's envoys for weeks had criticized Dmowski's alliance with the French and his deliberate ignoring of the British and Americans.[49] Thus, Paderewski journeyed to Paris at the beginning of April to repair important but badly tended fences. Paderewski in Paris and Piłsudski in Poland tried to make Polish policy fit British and American principles. Paderewski stressed the democratic character of the new Polish state, but he tried in vain to obtain a revision of the Allied decisions on Danzig, Marienwerder, and eastern Galicia. Paderewski made a last attempt to propose a plebiscite in Danzig, at a much later date, but Wilson and Lloyd George turned it down.[50] On the other hand, Wilson's tendency to defend his principles after his return in March worked to the advantage of the Poles in their conflict with Czechoslovakia over Teschen. No explicit instructions from Wilson about this problem exist, but it is hardly a coincidence that the American experts after March 25 tried to revise the pro-Czechoslovak decision, which was based on economic and historical arguments.[51] It is not known whether Wilson knew that most of the Poles in Teschen who would suffer from a pro-Czechoslovak decision were workers, but, as Klaus Schwabe has shown concerning the Saar and Upper Silesia, he was very concerned about the fate of the workers.[52] The result was that, during April, Lansing succeeded in postponing a pro-Czechoslovak decision, and, for the time being, the problem was left to direct Polish-Czech negotiations. This move had a clear anti-French tendency.[53] Piłsudski and Paderewski tried to appeal to Anglo-Saxon ideas on national self-determination concerning the eastern frontiers of Poland. On April 19, when Piłsudski conquered Wilno, he soon issued a declaration in this sense which favorably impressed the American representatives. In Paris, Paderewski openly criticized Dmowski's annexationist proposals and instead advanced a federal

solution.[54] During the meetings in the expanded KNP in Paris, for instance, on March 2, the Poles had discussed their disagreement on the eastern frontiers of Poland and on the future rule in these areas. Dmowski had prevented this disunity from appearing in public, but in April the Polish groups did not hide their internal conflicts.[55]

Wilson's views on the exact line of Poland's eastern frontiers are not known. According to his principles, only indisputably Polish populations belonged to Poland. The chaos in Russia, however, made Allied decisions difficult. General Bliss, who usually had the same views on Polish problems as Wilson, wanted to determine the Polish eastern frontier very quickly in Paris. He intended to make it quite clear to the Poles that the conference would not recognize any expansion beyond that frontier. The views of the British delegates were exactly the same. Both Wilson and Bliss disagreed with those people, especially some French military leaders, who thought that Bolshevism could be stopped through military means. Instead, good government, social reforms, and food were the essential means to stop Bolshevism.[56] General Kernan, who in March had visited the eastern areas of Poland, had seen no sign of a Bolshevik threat to Poland. His analysis, which very much impressed the Americans in Paris, was that the real threat consisted of Polish militarism and imperialism, which was encouraged by French officers in Poland.[57] Wilson's advisers, Lansing, Bliss, and Henry White, agreed with Kernan, and Wilson took their advice. He ordered Bliss to talk with Paderewski. It is interesting to note that the Polish account of their meeting stresses the anti-Bolshevik arguments, while the American account hardly takes any notice of this part of Paderewski's exposition. Bliss interpreted Polish military expansion in eastern Galicia exactly as did General Kernan.[58]

The Americans and British, in April and May 1919, tried energetically to stop Polish military expansion in eastern Galicia. Nonetheless, in Paris, Lord and Bowman—contrary to the position of the British and of Wilson—were willing to discuss during the meetings of the territorial commissions final frontiers which far exceeded borders drawn according to strictly ethnographical principles. In fact, Lord was very much in agreement with the French representative, General Henri Le Rond, and both perceived the need for strategic frontiers. Probably Lord was without clear instructions from Wilson and followed his own pro-Polish tendency, just as he had done in February 1919 in the Lord-Howard agreement. Because of the British attitude,

the proposal of the Polish Commission on a provisional minimum border line closely followed ethnographical principles, and this line was the origin of the boundary later known as the "Curzon Line."

Piłsudski, who was not interested in the whole of eastern Galicia, wanted to obey the orders from the peace conference to stop the Polish offensive, but both he and Paderewski in April and May faced opposition among leading generals and from Dmowski's followers in the Sejm (the Polish parliament) and in the press. Dmowski's negative attitude in Paris toward Anglo-American pressure and his confidence in French support and in the strength of his followers in Poland led the Anglo-Americans to doubt the value of promises that Paderewski and Piłsudski gave. The actual dualism in the conduct of Polish foreign policy made the Anglo-Americans suspicious of Polish policy.[59]

However, in May 1919, Wilson was less willing than the British to press the Poles too hard and to risk the fall of the Paderewski government. Wilson thought, after all, that that government was a bulwark against anarchy. Just as Wilson negotiated with Clemenceau and Lloyd George and made compromises with them, even though he disagreed with them on many issues, so he accepted the Polish regime as better than the possible alternatives. The fear of the coming into power of chauvinistic groups in all those countries determined his actions, since the existence of such governments imperiled a Wilsonian peace. In Poland, Wilson also feared that extreme leftist groups might seize power.[60] Both Paderewski and Piłsudski in Poland used the Allied pressure to convince their political opponents. In the important debate in the Sejm, Paderewski exposed his policy as being in accordance with Wilson's principles.[61]

Another delicate problem also drew the Allies' attention to internal Polish problems and differences of policy. Pogroms and anti-Semitism were well-known phenomena in parts of eastern Europe. The Allies quickly realized that they had to make some guarantees for minorities, particularly Jews. The American Jewish organizations were in close cooperation with east European Jews. Pressure on Wilson to make arrangements to make Jews secure in the new states, including Poland, was therefore very strong. The demands of Polish Jews amounted, in effect, to the creation of a separate Jewish nation within the Polish state. It is remarkable that Wilson did not yield to this demand, for the British and American policy to protect Jews in Poland was in response to the strong position in Poland of Dmowski's National

Democratic party. Dmowski's anti-Semitism was well known to Wilson, Lloyd George, and their advisers. Indeed, Dmowski never concealed his anti-Semitism in his conversations with Allied leaders or with American Jews.[62] Paderewski's and Piłsudski's statements respecting tolerance for the Jews were not enough to permit the Allies, especially the Americans and the British, to drop the project of a special treaty for minorities between Poland and the Allies. On the other hand, neither Wilson nor Lloyd George wanted to support Jewish demands for what amounted to a state-within-a-state in Poland. In spite of strong Jewish pressure, frequent rumors in the Western press on pogroms in Poland, demonstrations in New York, and questions in Congress, Wilson stuck to his original position.

Hugh Gibson, the first American Minister to Poland, investigated the problem. His reports, however, were pro-Polish, as were those of his British and French colleagues: they carefully explained the reasons for some of the episodes and tried to minimize the importance of them. The great difference, however, was that, while the British advisers in London and Paris did not believe these reports, the Americans were impressed, and Gibson, at the end of June, traveled to Paris to explain his case. Much against the advice of American Jews, Wilson accepted a plan worked out by his advisers, Lord, Hoover, and Gibson, and approved by Paderewski, for an American mission to Poland to investigate the Jewish problem. The Jews did not want the prominent American Jew, Henry Morgenthau, to head the mission, but Wilson stubbornly stuck to his decision to name him. According to Morgenthau, Wilson "did not want zionism dragged in." One of Piłsudski's men in Paris, Kazimierz Dłuski, was introduced to Morgenthau by Lord, who informed him that Dłuski was an opponent of Dmowski and a pro-Semite. Dłuski in July accompanied Morgenthau in the train to Warsaw.[63] The French, in cooperation with Dmowski, were strongly suspected of obstructing the Anglo-American initiatives for guarantees to the Jews, but the Americans and the British stuck to the idea of special protection.[64]

Although Wilson sided with the British concerning Polish problems during most of the peace conference, the final debate on the fate of Upper Silesia resulted in a sharp disagreement between Wilson and Lloyd George. There had been no discussion in the Polish Commission on the problem of Upper Silesia; in March, Lloyd George had not attacked that decision. But in May 1919, the Germans showed

signs of refusing to sign the peace treaty without revisions, especially concerning the eastern frontier of Germany. Their desire for revision, with which Lloyd George sympathized, very much annoyed Wilson. He did not want to alter the territorial decisions and tried vainly, through Lord, to counter the British policy by collaborating with the French and the Italians over the Polish settlement. The British proposal of a plebiscite was not against Wilson's principles, although he reminded Lloyd George that a plebiscite did not necessarily follow his interpretation of Point Thirteen. Wilson and Lord were also convinced that the Poles would win the plebiscite, at least in the mining districts. The concession for the sake of Allied unity was, therefore, in the eyes of the Americans not great. It is worth noting that neither Wilson nor Lloyd George in 1919 questioned the decision, later controversial in western Europe, to give the Polish Corridor to Poland. Both leaders and their advisers did not favor that solution in 1917–1918, but in 1919, with the great German defeat, they faced a different situation.[65]

The settlements at the Paris Peace Conference were the results of compromises between the great powers. With respect to Polish problems, Wilson for the most part cooperated with the British, since his ideas on the territorial and political settlement in Europe coincided more often with British than with French policy. Because the British and the Americans were without military means of pressure in eastern Europe, it was essential for them to have local governments with ideals as close as possible to their own.[66] The lack of military means and the chaos in Russia made some of the American and British advisers favor Polish schemes for federalism in the East; and such a solution was in accordance with the principle of self-determination. This frontier was, however, not determined by the great powers, but by the Polish-Soviet War in 1920.

Disillusionment quickly replaced Wilson's belief in the new democratic states. The new strong nationalism was a danger as great as the so-called Bolshevik threat. Wilson was aware of Polish domestic problems; both British and American policy on Poland was based on intimate knowledge of the Polish situation, not, as has often been stated, on ignorance. Wilson saw the policy of Dmowski's group as a challenge to his visions: Dmowski was anti-Semitic; reactionaries surrounded him; and he collaborated most closely with the power which Wilson identified most with the old order—France.

Wilson, however, never voiced the same deep distrust of the Poles as did Lloyd George. Wilson drew quite other conclusions from his knowledge of internal weakness and disunity in Poland. He wanted to help and strengthen the new state to make its existence more secure. He often defended Poland against Lloyd George at the conference. Wilson excused Polish participation in the war on the side of the Central Powers. He supported Paderewski and Piłsudski, although at times he used economic pressure to make them comply with his policy. But Wilson regarded this as a prop to Paderewski against his domestic opponent. In this way, Wilson not only supported the reestablishment of Poland but also the creation of a new democratic state which would be an essential part of the fundamental structure of his peace—the League of Nations.

NOTES

1. Geir Lundestad, *The American Non-policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943–47* (Oslo, Norway, 1978).

2. Dagmar Perman, *The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State* (Leiden, 1962); Peter Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin* (New York, 1976).

3. Dragan R. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia, 1917–1919* (Boulder, Colo., 1972); Klaus Schwabe, *Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden* (Düsseldorf, 1971); Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe, 1914–18* (Princeton, N. J., 1957).

4. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia*, pp. 112–29.

5. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe*, pp. 199–202.

6. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia*, pp. 60, 65, 282, 289, 305; Schwabe, *Deutsche Revolution*, pp. 58, 315, 418, 633; Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe*, pp. 369–71.

7. Schwabe, *Deutsche Revolution*, pp. 36, 60–61.

8. Eugene P. Trani, "Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia: A Reconsideration," *Journal of Modern History*, XLVIII (Sept. 1976), 444, 460; Schwabe, *Deutsche Revolution*, pp. 60–61.

9. Ivo J. Lederer, *Yugoslavia and the Paris Peace Conference* (New Haven, Conn., 1963), pp. 196–202, 206; Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia*, pp. 45, 58–59, 211; Schwabe, *Deutsche Revolution*, pp. 497, 510, 576; Perman, *The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State*, pp. 103–109; Sherman D. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1962).

10. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia*, pp. 13, 44; Schwabe, *Deutsche Revolution*, pp. 54, 305–306, 626.

11. For a detailed and documented account of the problems mentioned in this essay, see my book, Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, *The Polish Problem at the Paris*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1st Meeting -
corresponded warm fashion

Havel themes

Poland led the way

Pol-Am ties

border issues - indirect
no decs re: Pol made w/out Pol

courageous econ reform
pers. credit @ M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Janusz Bugajski
Boo-guy-ski

Interned - bestseller
Dec. 81 - ^ ~~summ~~ late 82

rumors M killed

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Oct. 80 weekly

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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THE OFFICIAL VISIT
TO
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OF
HIS EXCELLENCY
TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI
PRIME MINISTER
OF
THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

MARCH 20 TO 23, 1990

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

TUESDAY
MARCH 20

2:30 pm- 2:40 pm	Greeted by Deputy Chief of Protocol Fitzgerald and New York Welcoming Committee, John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, New York.
3:15 pm- 4:05 pm	United States Presidential Aircraft to Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.
4:05 pm- 4:10 pm	Greeted by Welcoming Committee.

TUESDAY
MARCH 20

4:15 pm- 4:25 pm — United States Presidential Helicopters to Washington Monument Grounds, Reflecting Pool.

4:25 pm- 4:35 pm — Greeted by Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger and Chief of Protocol Reed.

4:35 pm — Arrive Blair House.

Private evening.

Overnight: Blair House.

WEDNESDAY
MARCH 21

10:00 am- 10:30 am	Arrival Ceremony with The President and Mrs. Bush, South Lawn, The White House.
10:30 am- 10:45 am	Meeting with The President, Oval Office, The White House.
10:45 am- 11:30 am	Expanded Meeting with The President, Cabinet Room, The White House.
12:00 pm- 12:30 pm	Meeting with Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, Thomas Jefferson Room, Department of State.
12:30 pm- 1:45 pm	Working Luncheon with Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, James Madison Room, Department of State.
2:00 pm- 2:30 pm	Meeting with Senator De Concini and Representative Hoyer, Blair House.
3:30 pm- 4:15 pm	Webster Meeting with Secretary of Defense Cheney, Blair House.

WEDNESDAY
MARCH 21
(Continued)

4:30 pm- 5:15 pm	Meeting with Secretary of the Treasury Brady, Blair House.
7:15 pm- 7:45 pm	Refreshments with The President and Mrs. Bush, Yellow Oval Room, The White House.
7:45 pm- 10:35 pm	Reception, State Dinner, and After-Dinner Entertainment with The President and Mrs. Bush, East Room and State Dining Room, The White House.

Overnight: Blair House.

Entertainment ?

Garrick Ohlsen
winner, Chopin comp.

THURSDAY
MARCH 22

10:00 am- 10:30 am	Meeting with The Vice President, Vice President's Office, Old Executive Office Building.
10:45 am- 11:30 am	Wreath-Laying Ceremony at Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, visit Paderewski Memorial, and visit grave of President Kennedy, Arlington National Cemetery.
12:00 pm- 12:30 pm	Meeting with Senator Mitchell and Senator Dole, Room S-221, United States Capitol.
12:30 pm- 2:00 pm	Luncheon offered by Senate Leadership in honor of Prime Minister Mazowiecki, Room S-211, United States Capitol.
2:30 pm- 3:30 pm	Meeting with House Leadership, Room H-324, United States Capitol.
3:30 pm- 4:30 pm	Meeting with House Foreign Affairs Committee, Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building.
4:30 pm- 4:45 pm	View Kosciusko historical documents, Library of Congress.
5:00 pm- 5:30 pm	Meeting with Secretary Dole, Blair House.
7:30 pm- 9:30 pm	Reception offered by Prime Minister Mazowiecki, Polish Embassy.

Overnight: Blair House.

FRIDAY
MARCH 23

9:30 am- 10:45 am	Interview with McNeil-Lehrer Newshour, WETA-TV Studios, Arlington, Virginia.
11:15 am- 1:00 pm	Reception offered by United States Chamber of Commerce, followed by Meeting with Members, United States Chamber of Commerce Building.
1:30 pm- 2:30 pm	Press Conference, National Press Club.
3:40 pm- 3:45 pm	Farewell Ceremony with Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, Chief of Protocol Reed, and Farewell Committee, Washington Monument Grounds, Reflecting Pool.
3:45 pm- 3:55 pm	United States Presidential Helicopters to Andrews Air Force Base.
4:00 pm- 4:50 pm	United States Presidential Aircraft to O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.
4:50 pm	Resume private schedule upon arrival.

March 14, 1990

PLANNING MEETING
STATE VISIT OF PRESIDENT OF POLAND
2:00 pm, Situation Room

Bill Sittmann
Bob Hutchings
Brenda Hilliard

Social Office: Laurie Firestone
Cathy Fenton
Press Office: Doug Davidson
Communications: Peggy Dooley
Military Office: Dave Bonwit
VP's Office: (Everyone travelling)

State:
Protocol: Jennifer Fitsgerald
Bill Black
Marlene Terrell
SS: Marilyn Wyatt
Polish Desk: Christopher Hill

Sat.: Alex Johnson

CSIS

Janusz Bugajski

Lih pee en Boo-guy-ski

top 3

M in Roundtable?

here Nov?

note to VOA

E Ger + Hung elections

parliamentary parliamentary

1st Round of 2-round ballotings

2nd Apr-8

pers info on M?

Peggy:

Thanks for Poland info.
Will need to know name of M.'s weekly -- is it Tygodnik Solidarnosc?? Also other info on it, if possible.

Did M. visit here with Lech in November?

also - pls. check
Reuss Jon Stones on
Poland - (States of
Round Table Talks)
on Mar 21, 1989
(Mar 20-22). Thanks

Jon

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TO PEGGY DOOLEY

WHITE HOUSE

FROM TED LIPIEN

VOA / POLISH

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8-22-89

BACKGROUND REPORT

NEWSMAKER: TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI

TED LIPIEN-WASHINGTON

() - VOICED AT:

INTRO: TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI, DESIGNATED TO BE (WATCH FOR UPDATES IF APPROVED BY "THE SEJM"- THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT) POLAND'S FIRST NONCOMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER SINCE 1947 IS AN OPPOSITION JOURNALIST AND A LONG TERM ADVISOR TO THE SOLIDARITY TRADE UNION MOVEMENT. AS VOA'S TED LIPIEN REPORTS, PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE (WATCH FOR UPDATE) ALSO HAS VERY CLOSE TIES TO POLAND'S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

VOICE: SIXTY-TWO YEAR OLD PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE (WATCH FOR UPDATE) HAS HAD A VERY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH BOTH POLAND'S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SOLIDARITY TRADE UNION MOVEMENT. HE IS ALSO KNOWN AS A POLITICAL MODERATE WILLING TO ACCEPT REASONABLE COMPROMISES IN DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

IN THE LATE 1950'S, TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI FOUNDED THE INDEPENDENT CATHOLIC MONTHLY "WIEZ," WHICH PROMOTED DEMOCRATIC IDEAS WITHIN RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY STATE CENSORSHIP. HE WAS ALSO ONE OF THE CO-FOUNDERS OF THE WARSAW CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS CLUB, WHOSE MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE PRO- DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN POLAND.

IN THE 1960'S MR. MAZOWIECKI WAS ONE OF THE FEW INDEPENDENT CATHOLIC MEMBERS OF POLAND'S PARLIAMENT (SEJM), WHICH AT THAT

TIME WAS LARGELY POWERLESS AND TOTALLY DOMINATED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE GROUP OF INDEPENDENT CATHOLIC DEPUTIES WAS OFTEN CRITICAL OF THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES, BUT BELIEVED IN WORKING WITHIN THE SYSTEM FOR A SLOW CHANGE. HOWEVER, EVEN THIS VERY MODERATE OPPOSITION FORCE IN THE PARLIAMENT WAS PERCEIVED AS A THREAT BY THE GOVERNMENT AND FORCED TO GIVE UP THEIR SEATS.

MR. MAZOWIECKI WAS ONE OF SEVERAL CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS WHO IN AUGUST 1980 WENT TO GDANSK TO ADVISE THE STRIKING WORKERS IN THEIR NEGOTATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES AND BECAME THEIR CHIEF ADVISOR . THE NEGOTIATIONS ENDED WITH THE SIGNING OF THE GDANSK AGREEMENTS, WHICH GAVE BIRTH TO THE FIRST INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN THE COMMUNIST BLOCK.

DURING 1981, MR. MAZOWIECKI WAS THE CHIEF EDITOR OF "TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC," A WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE PUBLISHED BY THE SOLIDARITY TRADE UNION. THE MAGAZINE WAS INDEPENDENT FROM THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES, BUT AS WITH ALL LEGAL PUBLICATIONS IN POLAND WAS STILL SUBJECT TO STATE CENSORSHIP. HOWEVER, UNDER MR. MAZOWIECKI'S LEADERSHIP, "TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC" BECAME ONE OF THE MOST FREE NEWSPAPERS IN POLAND, AS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES AND SOLIDARITY INTENSIFIED THROUGHT 1981.

WHEN GENERAL WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI IMPOSED MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND ON DECEMBER 13, 1981, MR. MAZOWIECKI WAS ONE OF SEVERAL THOUSAND OPPOSITION LEADERS PUT IN INTERNMENT CAMPS. HE WAS RELEASED MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER HIS ARREST, BUT IN THE MEANTIME SOLIDARITY AND "TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC" HAD BEEN BANNED.

AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON, MR. MAZOWIECKI BECAME A CLOSE ADVISOR TO SOLIDARITY'S LEADER LECH WALESA, AND AGAIN ADVISED THE

WORKERS DURING STRIKES AT THE LENIN SHIPYARD IN GDANSK LAST YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS TRYING TO CONVINCE THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES TO RESUME A DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY.

FACED WITH A DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS AND A PROSPECT OF MORE STRIKES AND UNREST, THE GOVERNMENT FINALLY AGREED TO OPEN FORMAL TALKS WITH SOLIDARITY. MR. MAZOWIECKI WAS ONE OF THE INITIATORS OF THE SO-CALLED "ROUNDTABLE TALKS." HE HEADED THE OPPOSITION NEGOTIATING TEAM WHICH LAST APRIL WON RELEGALIZATION OF SOLIDARITY .

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, HELD LAST JUNE, BROUGHT THE COMMUNIST PARTY A CRUSHING DEFEAT. UNDER LESS THAN DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RULES, THE COMMUNISTS HAD, HOWEVER, A GUARANTEED MAJORITY IN THE PARLIAMENT WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE TWO SMALLER PRO-GOVERNMENT PARTIES: THE PEASANT PARTY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. WHEN THESE PARTIES WITHDREW THEIR SUPPORT, POLAND'S NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT GENERAL WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI ASKED MR. MAZOWIECKI LAST WEEK TO FORM A FIRST NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN POLAND SINCE 1947.

MR. MAZOWIECKI IS NOT A MAN WHO HOLDS GRUDGES AND IS WILLING TO WORK WITH COMMUNIST OFFICIALS WHO AT ONE TIME PUT HIM IN PRISON. THIS INCLUDES BOTH GENERAL WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI AS WELL AS GENERAL CZESLAW KISZCZAK, WHO TRIED BUT COULD NOT FORM A COMMUNIST-LED GOVERNMENT. IT IS EXPECTED (CHECK FOR UPDATES) THAT MR. MAZOWIECKI WILL LET THE COMMUNISTS CONTROL AT LEAST TWO KEY CABINET POSTS IN CHARGE OF THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE.

AS A POLITICAL MODERATE, MR. MAZOWIECKI IS ALSO LIKELY TO REASSURE MOSCOW THAT POLAND WILL NOT TRY TO LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT. BUT HIS BIGGEST TASK BY FAR WILL BE TO REFORM THE POLISH

ECONOMY, WHICH HAS COLLAPSED AFTER MORE THAT FORTY YEARS OF COMMUNIST RULE.

MR. MAZOWIECKI DOES NOT HAVE MUCH EXPERIENCE IN RUNNING THE ECONOMY, BUT HE HAS THE SUPPORT OF LECH WALESA AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE MUCH CLOSER TO THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HIERARCHY THAN SOME OF THE OTHER OF MR. WALESA'S ADVISORS, SUCH AS BRONISLAW GEREMEK, JACEK KURON AND ADAM MICHNIK. SOME OF THEM ARE FORMER MARXISTS AND ALTHOUGH THEY BROKE WITH THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES LONG TIME AGO, ARE KNOW TO FAVOR SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SOLUTIONS TO POLAND'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER POLAND'S NEWLY-DESIGNATED (CHECK FOR UPDATES) PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ALBE TO CONVINCE THE POLISH WORKERS OF THE NEED FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC SACRIFICES. IT IS ALSO UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE HAS SUFFICIENT POLITICAL SUPPORT TO OVERCOME POSSIBLE RESISTANCE FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY BUREAUCRACY OR EVEN TO PREVENT STRIKES BY WORKERS DISSATISFIED WITH THEIR CONSTANTLY FALLING STANDARD OF LIVING. POLITICAL OBSERVERS AGREE THAT MR. MAZOWIECKI'S FUTURE WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN SOLVING POLAND ENORMOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. (SIGNED)

(SIGNED)

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THE CONCISE BAKER'S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MUSICIAN'S

"...one of the great books of the century..."*

Nicolas Slonimsky

of Marchesi and Padre Mattei at Bologna, and of Furlanetto at Venice; his first opera was *Don Pomponio* (1813; not perf.); then came *Annetta e Lucinda* (Milan, Oct. 17, 1813); up to 1835 he had produced over 40 operas on various Italian stages, when the failure of *Carlo di Borgogna* (Feb. 21, 1835) at Venice temporarily checked the flow of dramatic composition; he went to Viareggio, near Lucca, and established a very successful school of music there, for which he wrote several short treatises—*Corso teoretico-pratico di lezioni di armonia* (1863), *Cenni storici sulla musica e trattato di contrappunto* (1864)—and built a private theater. Later he removed the school to Lucca. In 1840 Pacini, who prided himself on rapid work, wrote his dramatic masterpiece, *Saffo,* in 28 days (Naples, Nov. 29, 1840; enthusiastically received). Forty more operas followed up to 1867; the best were *Medea* (Palermo, Nov. 28, 1843), *La Regina di Cipro* (Turin, Feb. 7, 1846), and *Niccolò de' Lapi* (Florence, Oct. 29, 1873; posthumous production). Pacini also wrote numerous oratorios, cantatas, masses, etc.; a *Dante* symph.; an Octet; 6 string quartets; other chamber music, vocal duets, and arias. He was an active contributor to several musical papers; publ. memoirs, *Le mie memorie artistiche* (Florence, 1865; enlarged by Cicconetti, 1872; revised by F. Magnani, 1875). His brother, **Emilio Pacini** (b. 1810; d. Neuilly, near Paris, Dec. 2, 1898), was a distinguished librettist.

Pacius, Fredrik (Friedrich), German-born Finnish composer; b. Hamburg, March 19, 1809; d. Helsinki, Jan. 8, 1891. He studied violin with Spohr and composition with Hauptmann. He served as a violinist in the Royal Chapel in Stockholm (1828–34); then went to Helsinki, where he organized a choral society (1835) and later (1845) established regular symph. concerts there. Pacius wrote the first Finnish opera, *Kung Karls jakt* (to a Swedish libretto); it was staged in Helsinki on March 24, 1852. He was the author of the Finnish national anthem, *Maamme laulu,* set to the words of the Swedish poem *Vartland,* later trans. into Finnish (1848); he also wrote many other songs of a Swedish-Finnish inspiration. Among his other works are the opera *Loreley* (Helsinki, April 28, 1887); Violin Concerto (1845); numerous choral works and songs.

Paderewski, Ignacy (Ignace) Jan, celebrated Polish pianist and composer; b. Kurylowka, Podolia (Russian Poland), Nov. 18, 1860; d. New York, June 29, 1941. His father was an administrator of country estates; his mother died soon after his birth. From early childhood, Paderewski was attracted to piano music; he received some musical instruction from Peter Sowinski, who taught him 4-hands arrangements of operas. His first public appearance was in a charity concert at the age of 11, when he played piano with his sister. His playing aroused interest among wealthy patrons, who took him to Kiev. He was then sent to Warsaw, where he entered the Cons., learned to play trombone, and joined the school band. He also continued serious studies of piano playing; his teachers at the Warsaw Cons. were Schlözer, Strobl, and Janotha. In 1875 and 1877 he toured in provincial Russian towns with the Polish violinist Cielewicz; in the interim periods he took courses in composition at the Warsaw Cons., and upon graduation in 1878 he was engaged as a member of the piano faculty there. In 1880 he married a young music student named Antonina Korsak, but she died 9 days after giving birth to a child, on Oct. 10, 1880. In 1882 he went to Berlin to study composition with Kiel; there he met Anton Rubinstein, who gave him encouraging advice and urged him to compose piano music. He resigned from his teaching job at the Warsaw Cons. and began to study orchestration in Berlin with Heinrich Urban. While on a vacation in the Tatra Mountains (which inspired his *Tatra Album* for piano) he met the celebrated Polish actress Modjeska, who proposed to finance his further piano studies with Leschetizky in Vienna. Paderewski followed this advice and spent several years as a Leschetizky student. He continued his career as a concert pianist. On March 3, 1888, he gave his first Paris recital, and on Nov. 10, 1888, played a concert in Vienna, both with excellent success. He also began receiving recognition as a composer. Anna Essipoff (who was married to Leschetizky) played his piano concerto in Vienna under the direction of Hans Richter. Paderewski made his London debut on May 9, 1890. On Nov. 17, 1891, he played for the first time in N.Y., and was acclaimed with an adulation rare for pianists; by some counts he gave 107 concerts in 117 days in N.Y. and other American cities and attended 86 dinner parties; his wit, already fully developed, made him a social lion in wealthy American salons. At one party, it was reported, the hostess confused him with a famous polo player who was also expected to be a guest, and greeted him effusively. "No," Paderewski is supposed to have replied, "he is a rich soul who plays polo, and I am a poor Pole who plays solo." American spinsters beseeched him for a lock of his luxurious mane of hair; he invariably obliged, and when his valet observed that at this rate he would soon be bald, he said, "Not I, my dog." There is even a story related by a gullible biographer that Paderewski could charm beasts by his art and that a spider used to come down from the ceiling in Paderewski's lodgings in Vienna and sit at the piano every time Paderewski played a certain Chopin étude. Paderewski eclipsed even Caruso as an idol of the masses. In 1890 he made a concert tour in Germany; also toured South America, South Africa, and Australia. In 1898 he purchased a beautiful home, the Villa Riond-Bosson on Lake Geneva, Switzerland; in 1899 he married Helena Gorska, Baroness von Rosen. In 1900, by a deed of trust, Paderewski established a fund of $10,000 (the original trustees were William Steinway, Major H.L. Higginson, and Dr. William Mason), the interest from which was to be used for triennial prizes given "to composers of American birth without distinction as to age or religion" for works in the following categories: symphonies, concertos, and chamber music. In 1910, on the occasion of the centennial of Chopin's birth, Paderewski donated $60,000 for the

construction of the Chopin Memorial Hall in Warsaw; in the same year he contributed $100,000 for the erection of the statue of King Jagiello in Warsaw, on the quinquecentennial of his victory over the Teutonic Knights in 1410. In 1913 he purchased a ranch in Paso Robles in California.

Although cosmopolitan in his culture, Paderewski remained a great Polish patriot. During the First World War he donated the entire proceeds from his concerts to a fund for the Polish people caught in the war between Russia and Germany. After the establishment of the independent Polish state, Paderewski served as its representative in Washington; in 1919 he was named prime minister of the Polish Republic, the first musician to occupy such a post in any country at any period. He took part in the Versailles Treaty conference; it was then that Prime Minister Clemenceau of France welcomed Paderewski with the famous, if possibly apocryphal, remark: "You, a famous pianist, a prime minister! What a comedown!" Paderewski resigned his post on Dec. 10, 1919. He reentered politics in 1920 in the wake of the Russian invasion of Poland that year, when he became a delegate to the League of Nations; he resigned on May 7, 1921, and resumed his musical career. On Nov. 22, 1922, he gave his first concert after a hiatus of many years at Carnegie Hall in N.Y. In 1939 he made his last American tour. Once more during his lifetime Poland was invaded, this time by both Germany and Russia. Once more Paderewski was driven to political action. He joined the Polish government-in-exile in France and was named president of its parliament on Jan. 23, 1940. He returned to the U.S. on Nov. 6, 1940, a few months before his death. At the order of President Roosevelt, his body was given state burial in Arlington National Cemetery, pending the return of his remains to Free Poland. Paderewski received many honors. He held the following degrees: Ph.D. from the Univ. of Lemberg (Lwow, 1912); D.Mus. from Yale Univ. (1917); Ph.D. from the Univ. of Cracow (1919); D.C.L. from Oxford Univ. (1920); LL.D. from Columbia Univ. (1922); Ph.D. from the Univ. of Southern Calif. (1923); Ph.D. from the Univ. of Poznan (1924); and Ph.D. from the Univ. of Glasgow (1925). He also held the Grand Cross of the French Legion of Honor (1922). A postage stamp with his picture was issued in Poland in 1919, and 2 postage stamps honoring him in the series "Men of Liberty" were issued in the U.S. in 1960.

As an artist, Paderewski was a faithful follower of the Romantic school, which allowed free, wellnigh improvisatory declensions from the written notes, tempi, and dynamics; judged by 20th-century standards of precise rendering of the text, Paderewski's interpretations appear surprisingly free, but this very personal freedom of performance moved contemporary audiences to ecstasies of admiration. Also, Paderewski's virtuoso technique, which astonished his listeners, has been easily matched by any number of pianists of succeeding generations. Yet his position in the world of the performing arts remains undiminished by the later achievements of younger men and women pianists. As a composer, Paderewski also belongs to the Romantic school. At least one of his piano pieces, the *Menuet in G* (which is a movement of his set of *6 Humoresques* for piano), achieved enormous popularity. His other compositions, however, never sustained a power of renewal and were eventually relegated to the archives of unperformed music. His opera *Manru,* composed in 1897–1900, dealing with folk life in the Tatra Mountains, was produced in Dresden on May 29, 1901, and was also performed by the Metropolitan Opera in N.Y. on Feb. 14, 1902. Another major work, a Symph. in B minor, was first performed by the Boston Symph. Orch. on Feb. 12, 1909. His other works included a Piano Concerto in A minor (1888); *Fantaisie polonaise* for Piano and Orch. (1893); Violin Sonata (1880); songs; and the following compositions for piano solo: *Prelude and Capriccio; 3 Pieces (Gavotte, Mélodie, Valse mélancholique); Krakowiak; Elégie; 3 Polish Dances; Introduction and Toccata; Chants du voyageur* (5 pieces); *6 Polish Dances; Album de mai* (5 pieces), *Variations and Fugue; Tatra Album* (also arranged for Piano, 4-hands); *6 Humoresques de concert* (which includes the famous *Menuet in G*); *Dans le désert; Miscellanea* (7 pieces); *Légende;* Sonata in E-flat minor (1903). A complete list of Paderewski's works was publ. in the *Bolletino bibliografico musicale* (Milan, 1932).

Padilla, Lola Artôt de, Spanish soprano, daughter of the baritone **Mariano Padilla y Ramos;** b. Sèvres, near Paris, Oct. 5, 1876; d. Berlin, April 12, 1933. She was trained solely by her mother, the singer **Désirée Artôt.** After singing in salons and concerts, she was engaged by Albert Carré for the Opéra-Comique in 1903. Later she toured as a concert singer through Europe; was engaged at the Komische Oper in Berlin in 1905–8 as prima donna; in 1909–27, was a member of the Royal (later State) Opera in Berlin; then retired.

Paër, Ferdinando, significant composer; b. Parma, June 1, 1771; d. Paris, May 3, 1839. He was a pupil of Fortunati and Ghiretti. His career as an opera composer began in 1792, when he produced the operas *Circe* (Venice) and *Le astuzie amorose* (Parma). In that year he was also appointed honorary maestro di cappella to the court of Parma. In Vienna, from 1797–1802, his style underwent a change, both harmony and orchestration showing increased variety and fullness; *Camilla, ossia Il sotterraneo* (Vienna, Feb. 23, 1799) is considered his best opera. Paër succeeded Naumann as court Kapellmeister at Dresden in 1802; *Leonara, ossia L'amore conjugale* (Dresden, Oct. 3, 1804) is identical in subject with Beethoven's *Fidelio.* In 1807 he went to Paris, becoming maître de chapelle to Napoleon and conductor of the Opéra-Comique; later (1812) he succeeded Spontini at the Italian Opera, where he remained, through the vicissitudes of Catalini's domination and the joint conductorship of Rossini (1824–26), his successful rival on the stage, until his forced resignation in 1827 (he was held to blame for the poor financial condition of the theater). In 1828 he re-

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ignace Jan Paderewski (1860-1941)

Polish pianist, composer and statesman.

Extensive speaking and concert tour of U.S. in order to raise funds for Polish refugees displaced by the war, and to create interest among Americans in the future of a unified and free Polish nation.

Feb, 1915 → Dec. 24, 1915

(Wilson Papers # 35, Pg. 391)

At a dinner in honor of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Paderewski gave a piano concert in the East Room after the

→

dinner and met Wilson for the first time

Feb. 22, 1916


(Wilson Papers # 36, Pg. 207)

At that dinner, Paderewski played Chopin.

(Wilson: WW I. 1917-1921)

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Paderewski visited the White House
again in November of 1919.


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Volume II · 1795 to the Present

n camps. Józef Haller escaped into
de his way via Murmansk to France.
e Polish lands destroyed Dmowski's
olish Question effectively in Russia.
ailed from Petrograd for the West. In
portunity of besmirching Piłsudski as
Ally', and added to the scare which
ng Jews with German agents. He
activists and Jews including August
ier to Scotland Yard, and persuaded
nsfer the work of the PKI to trusties
e time, he flattered the Foreign Office
ıs of 'half-a-million or even a million
ıuld lay down their lives for the Allied
ed governments would recognize the
ndence which he was now advocating.
; awarded an honorary doctorate at
.17 In Paris, he made contact with
s, but was inhibited by the strong
arist authorities. In Lausanne, he joined
; of the CAP, and prepared for the re-
KNP. The whole burden of Dmowski's
was to win official recognition for his
e sole and exclusive representative of a
ent. He nearly succeeded. But, for the
ld change so long as the western govern-
egard the Polish Question as an internal
Russian ally.

volution in Russia changed the scene
gence in Petrograd of Russian liberals
ıted with the Polish Circle of the *Duma*
ıt a declaration on Poland high on the
ent's agenda. The Proclamation was made
It proclaimed an 'independent Poland'
ails to a future Constituent Assembly.[18]
9 April by a general Declaration of the
ıl Self-Determination. At the end of the
a Polish Liquidation Commission under
an associate of the Cadets, and Chairman
sh Associations'. Lednicki's task was to

prepare for the transfer of Russian state property to Polish control. This was quite impossible owing to the continuing German occupation of all the Polish provinces.

It is true that the Provisional Government's Proclamation on Poland was preceded on 21 March 1917 by a similar declaration made by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Peasant Deputies.[19] But this Bolshevik initiative cannot be considered as anything more than a private statement of intent. At this stage, the Bolsheviks had no authority in Russia; and their pronunciations on Poland carried no more weight than the resolutions of workers' committees in Warsaw, Berlin, or Tokyo on the future of Russia. Their earliest authoritative statement on the Polish Question came in the third clause of the Decree of 29 August 1918 denouncing the former secret Treaties, including the Partitions. Even then, they had no means of enforcing their views, and no intention of making specific commitments. No one knew what the Bolsheviks understood by 'Poland'.

The February Revolution in Russia coincided with the rapidly intensifying American interest in the problems of the war. At a meeting with Paderewski in November 1916, President-elect Woodrow Wilson recorded his first known expression of sympathy for the idea of an independent Poland. On 21 January 1917, in his first State of the Union Address to the Senate, he made mention of a 'united Poland' and its right of 'access to the sea'. One year later, on 8 January 1918, the thirteenth of Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' on peace aims spoke of a 'united, independent and autonomous Poland with free, unrestricted access to the sea'. This generous statement of American views on Poland was the only such statement by a leader of the Powers which was not extracted by the force of events.[20]

In 1917–18, the policy of all the Western Powers towards Poland changed out of all recognition. Partly as a result of the American entry in the war on their side, partly as a result of the Russian collapse, but largely as a result of their desperate search for any means possible of embarrassing Germany, they abandoned their former rigid opposition to Polish Independence. But they did so grudgingly. As late as 11 March 1917, the French government signed an undertaking with Russia not

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the interview by visiting St. Brigida's Church in Gdansk, where I talked with Walensa's priest, Father Jankowski. Later, when Mr. Walesa stopped by the church after work, we talked about Solidarity's struggle for recognition and about reform in Poland. He said then that both reform and recognition were inevitable."

"Next to Pope John Paul II, Walesa is the most charismatic person I've ever met," Lipien says. "I talked with Pope John Paul II several times, but the most memorable conversation was even before he became pope. I had interviewed him in 1976 during his visit to Washington as Archbishop of Krakow. The interview was rebroadcast by VOA the day he was elected pope."

The VOA Polish staff has interviewed all the major government and non-government people in Poland. Before the formation of the new Solidarity government, international broadcasting's function in Poland was especially critical. Voice of America Polish Service Deputy chief Marek Walicki says his own experience of "being able to see the leading actors of the historical drama in action was unforgettable."

"I talked with prime minister-to-be Tadeusz Mazowiecki last September 1988, Walicki continues, "just a few hours after his return with Walesa from Warsaw. It was the day after most of the Solidarity strikes had been called off. It was also the anniversary of the beginning of World War II, and I could hear church bells tolling for the occasion. I was waiting for Mr. Walesa and Mr. Mazowiecki in the rectory of St. Brigida's Church in Gdansk, but Walesa had gone directly from Warsaw to the Lenin shipyards to call for an end to the remaining strikes. I spotted Mr. Mazowiecki in the rectory and approached him. In response to my request for an interview, he said, 'Not now, I'm dead tired. We've just come from Warsaw, and I have to sleep a few hours.' So I sat down on a bench, prepared to wait as long as necessary. After about 20 minutes, Mr.

[redacted]azowiecki came back and said, 'I can't keep you waiting any longer. Let's talk now.' So I pushed the buttons on my tape recorder. I asked Mr. Mazowiecki if he was satified with Walesa's talk with General Kiszczak and how he saw Poland's political future. He said that the future of the political process in Poland depended on meeting the basic demand of the striking workers, the re-legalization of Solidarity. 'But we have a breakthrough. In the long run, I'm an optimist.' Mr. Mazowiecki was so tired and his voice was so soft that I almost had to press the microphone to his lips. But he radiated will power. I felt he was a man with a vision."

"I've been an international broadcaster for 30 years," says Walicki," but our coverage of the events leading up to the roundtable talks between General Jarulzelski's government and Solidarity, the trade union's subsequent legalization, and the formation of the first non-Communist government in the Soviet bloc were the most memorable moments in my career."

Program director Mirek Kondracki coordinates the current events activities of the Polish Service. "I also anchor the fourth hour of 'America Calling Europe,' a program of political opinion and interviews designed for the Polish intelligentsia," he says. "In 1987 I interviewed a former Communist Party vice premier about the failure of economic reforms, a failure that ultimately brought down the Jaruselski government. I recently talked with Andrzej Drawicz, the new chairman of Polish Radio and Television, about the media climate now that Solidarity is in power."

"With the advent of a freer, more pluralistic media under the Solidarity government, VOA and other international broadcasters face a far more competitive situation," continues Kondracki. "Poland has a sophisticated radio audience, and Polish cultural programs and