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THE OLD GUARD





THIRD INFANTRY REGIMENT

1784 – 1984

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THE OLD GUARD - The History, Customs, and Traditions of the Third United States Regiment of Infantry

Compiled from material gathered by the historians of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Infantry in the years 1953 - 1984 and by SFC Thomas M. Heski, historian for the 3D Battalion 3D Infantry (USAR).

EDITED BY SFC THOMAS M. HESKI AND MAJOR JAMES A. LUNDELL IN HONOR OF THE BICENTENIAL CELEBRATION OF "THE OLD GUARD".

1784 - 1984

Compliments of ISG Thomas M. Heski
Co. C, 3rd Bn, 3rd Infantry (The Old Guard)

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LINEAGE OF THE OLD GUARD



General Anthony Wayne.

HISTORY OF THE THIRD UNITED STATES INFANTRY

3D INFANTRY
(THE OLD GUARD)
LINEAGE

Constituted 3 June 1784 as the First American Regiment authorized by the Continental Congress.

LTC Josiah Harmer was placed in command of the regiment, which was to be comprised of volunteers from the state militias of Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.

Redesignated 29 September 1789 as the Regiment of Infantry.

This change of name is attributable to the fact that the Constitution had been ratified, and the government itself was reorganized. LTC Harmer was still in command.

Redesignated 3 March 1791 as the 1st Infantry.

After the stunning defeat of Harmer's troops in their first major campaign against the Indians, Congress authorized the establishment of a second regiment of Infantry. The units were given numerical designations.

Redesignated 5 March 1792 as the 1st Sub-Legion of the Legion of the U.S.

Following its second major defeat at the hand of the Miami Indians, the young army faced a major reorganization. Congress adopted the term "Legion" for the army, and assigned numbers to the four "sub-legions" that comprised the force. The entire Legion was placed under the command of "Mad Anthony" Wayne, who whipped the force into fighting shape, and who led it in the victories at Fort Recovery and Fallen Timbers in 1794.

General Wayne had assigned distinctive colors to each of the Sub-Legions; The Third Sub-Legion was identified by "yellow binding on their caps, yellow plumes and block hair." The yellow used by the First Sub-Legion was a buff shade, similar to the natural buff color of rawhide. During the war of 1812, Third Infantry soldiers actually used natural rawhide woven into their black knapsack straps to identify themselves and their unit. This buff and black knapsack strap became a tradition which was officially adopted by the Old Guard.

Redesignated 30 May 1796 as the 1st Infantry of the United States Army.

The 1st Regiment of Infantry regained its former title and became one of four infantry units in the new United States Army.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY



HISTORICAL SUMMARY

Consolidated May-October 1815 with the 5th, 17th, 19th, and 28th Infantry Regiments to form the 3d Infantry.

In the post-war demobilization of 1815, the unit which had been known as the First American Regiment, the 1st Infantry, and the 1st Sub-Legion was consolidated with four other units to form one of the eight remaining regiments. Each regiment was assigned a numerical designation based on the position of its commanding officer in the officer's seniority system. The commander of the old 1st Regiment was the third highest ranking colonel, so his regiment was designated the 3rd Infantry Regiment.

The 3rd Infantry has thus been in continuous service since 1784, save for eighteen months following its deactivation in Berlin in 1946.

The history of the 3rd US Infantry (The Old Guard) is divided into three sections. The first concerns itself with the contribution made by the Old Guard during the westward expansion of the United States. It is titled, "Pioneer Duty." The second records the unit's performance in war. It is appropriately entitled "The Battle Record." The final section recounts the Old Guard's traditional role in the peacetime Army. The title of this section is "The Peacetime Missions."

PIONEER DUTY

The role of the Army began with the organization of the First American Regiment in 1784. For over six years the First American Regiment was the only federal Army unit on the frontier, which at the time comprised much of the area now occupied by the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan. The unit built forts all along the Ohio River, providing a peaceful deterrent to Indian and settler disputes. Once established, the Regiment made the territory safe for development, and permitted the frontier to advance further west.

From 1796 to 1803 the 1st Infantry was stationed near the site of Detroit. In the latter year, a detachment from the 1st began the construction of Ft Dearborn, a post destined to become the city of Chicago. Within the next few years, the 1st Infantry's influence was felt to the ends of the continent. Both CPT Meriwether Lewis (of Lewis and Clark fame), and 1LT Zebulon Pike (discoverer of Pike's Peak) were members of the unit. Their explorations laid the groundwork for the future expansion of the frontier.

Following the war of 1812, after the demobilization and reorganization of the Army, the new 3rd Infantry Regiment (1817) constructed Fort Howard near the present site of Green Bay, Wisconsin. Eventually, they garrisoned a number of lesser outposts on the northern frontier. One of these small posts eventually became Saginaw, Michigan.

As the Northwest Territory was divided and each section progressed toward statehood, the frontier pushed further westward. 1826 found the 3rd Infantry in St Louis, Missouri, where, with the assistance of the 1st Infantry, it constructed Jefferson Barracks, the guardian of "the Gateway to the West." The next year, the 3rd constructed and garrisoned Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Territory, which was named after the Regiment's Commander, COL Henry Leavenworth.

The uniformed pioneers of the 3rd Infantry were scattered throughout the west during the middle years of the nineteenth century. From the 1830's to the 1880's, during times of peace, there were seldom more than two companies of the unit at any one post. The Regiment had extended stays in New Mexico Territory, in Indian Territory, in Kansas, and in Montana Territory. During these periods, the troops were used for every imaginable task involved in making life more bearable, not only for the Army, but for the future civilian inhabitants of the land. The tasks began with the construction of a network of forts, and included the building of roads and bridges, dredging of rivers, and the stringing of telegraph lines. All of these were undertaken in addition to the Indian campaigns against various tribes.

From 1904 to 1906, the Old Guard was involved in the taming of the last frontier -- Alaska. Stationed at five forts on the Alaskan mainland, the 3rd Infantry was placed under the control of the Army Signal Corps, while it assisted in the development of the first telegraph system in that territory. The two years that the unit spent in maintaining and repairing the lines brought official recognition, and an expression of gratitude from the Chief of the Signal Corps.

The final act of pioneer duty performed by the 3rd Infantry, was the construction of Ft Pepperrell, Newfoundland, in 1941.

THE BATTLE RECORD

The very beginnings of the unit's battle record are its darkest. In 1790, the Regiment of Infantry, and in 1791, the 1st Infantry, suffered defeats at the hands of the Miami Indians in Ohio. Untrained and undisciplined troops, low morale, and a lack of coordination between units, combined with inadequate support channels, and a lack of organization in the War Department, contributed to the ineffectiveness of the force. The defeat of 1791 was so disastrous that Congress was prompted to reorganize and enlarge the entire Army. The resulting force was known as the Legion of the United States. The legion was divided into four Sub-Legions, the 1st Sub-Legion being the predecessor of the present 3rd Infantry. The proven fighter of the Revolution, "Mad Anthony" Wayne, was placed in command of the Legion.

General Wayne disciplined his troops thoroughly. When he was satisfied that the Legion was prepared, he launched an expedition against the Miamis (1794). The Legion was victorious at the battles of Fort Recovery and Fallen Timbers. That campaign is reflected in the streamer Miami, which is carried with the 3rd Infantry colors.

The War of 1812 found the 1st Infantry operating close to the Canadian border. The setbacks that followed the first years of the war were reversed in 1814. In July of that year American forces (including contingents of every regiment which was to be reorganized into the 3rd Infantry in 1815) defeated British Regulars on Canadian soil in the battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane. Both of these battles, and the entire campaign in Canada, are reflected in 3rd Infantry campaign streamers.

From 1840 to 1842, the 3rd Infantry participated in the Second Seminole Indian War in Florida. It was a war marked by infrequent skirmishes, high death rates from disease, and improved military tactics. Under the leadership of

Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Alan Hitchcock, the soldier's soldier of the era, the 3rd Infantry's reputation as a fighting unit was enhanced both by its operations in the field, and its behavior in garrison. The streamer Seminoles was awarded to the Regiment for its service in the war.

There were two major campaigns in the Mexican War of 1846-1847. The 3rd Infantry played a vital role in both of them. The first campaign was led by Brigadier General Zachary Taylor. General Taylor was in command of the "Army of Observation" which had been sent to the Texas-Mexican border when relations with Mexico deteriorated. The first battle of the war took place on 8 May 1846 when a Mexican force attacked Taylor's army at Palo Alto, Texas. It was repulsed and followed by an American offensive against Mexican entrenchments at Resaca de la Palma, Texas. The 3rd Infantry figured prominently in both engagements. By the 10th of May, the Mexicans had retreated across the Rio Grande into Mexico.

Taylor's advance into Mexico began on 18 May 1846. The route of march led directly to Monterey, Mexico, 130 miles from the Texas border. A large and firmly entrenched force of Mexicans awaited the 3rd in Monterey. On the 21st September 1846, the 3rd Infantry was part of the first wave to attack the .ty. Enemy artillery positioned at street intersections, and narrow streets bounded on each side with buildings were filled with infantrymen. Muskets extended from every window. In penetrating the first line of defense the Regiment found itself drawn into a situation in which there was no cover. The losses that resulted reflect the nature of the barrage that met the unit. Over forty enlisted men and five officers, including the three senior officers, were killed. The unit held its ground until a lack of ammunition made withdrawal a necessity; and even then it remained under Mexican fire during the night and into the morning of the 21st-22nd. The anniversary of that day in battle has since been chosen as the unit's Organization Day.

In December 1846, the 3rd was transferred to a force under the command of General Winfield Scott. The second major campaign began formally on 9 March 1847 when General Scott's army participated in the first large scale amphibious landing undertaken by the US Army. The landing occurred at Vera Cruz on the eastern coast of Mexico. The 3rd Infantry was among the first ashore. From Vera Cruz, the Army made straight for Mexico City, 200 miles to the west.

The battles of Cerro Gordo (18 April), Contreras (19-20 August), and Churubusco (20 August) were fought on the march to the Mexican capital. The bayonet charges at Cerro Gordo and Churubusco, which were undertaken by the 3rd Infantry, were praised personally by General Scott. Near the gates of Mexico City, the 3rd stormed the final citadel, the formidable Chapultepec with bayonets on 13 September. That charge also brought praise from General Scott. The next day, the 3rd Infantry had the honor of marching at the head of the line of American troops as it entered the Mexican capital. It was at this time that General Scott gave the unit its nickname; he turned to his staff as the 3rd passed in review, and said, "Gentlemen, take off your hats to the Old Guard of the Army."

The New Mexico Territory was the home of the 3rd Infantry for ten years following its return from Mexico. Twenty-seven separate engagements with the Indians are recorded in the unit's records of that time. The final battle was a night attack by Navajos on Fort Defiance (30 April 1860). The attack was repulsed by an infantry charge of four companies from the Regiment. The force returned shortly after dawn, having lost only one man while thoroughly routing

the Indians. The campaign streamers New Mexico 1856, 1857, 1858, and 1860 were awarded on the basis of the Old Guard's tour in that territory.

The Civil war broke out while the Regiment was in Texas. When the Regiment was ordered to Washington, D.C., three companies could not evacuate Texas in time, and they were captured by Confederate troops of Texas.

The first Union campaign in Virginia began and ended at Bull Run. The Union, expecting a quick and decisive victory, received a rude awakening. Most of the volunteer units panicked when faced with the possibility of defeat. They turned and ran. The 3rd Infantry formed part of the rear guard which halted the Confederate advance. Skirmishers from the Regiment covered the Union withdrawl giving order to the retreat, and preventing the defeat from turning into a rout. A short while after the battle, President Lincoln reviewed the Provost Guard of the capital, of which the 3rd was then a part. At the review, the general accompanying the President turned to Lincoln as they approached the position of the Old Guard and said, "Mr President, these are the men that saved your Army at Bull Run." To which the President was heard to reply, "Yes, I have heard of them."

For most of the Civil War, the 3rd Infantry was assigned to, and participated in the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. In 1864, the Old Guard manned harbor defenses in New York City. Two companies saw action in Florida in 1861 and 1862 before joining the rest of the unit in Washington. The Peninsula Campaign; Manassas; Fredericksburg; Chancellorsville; Antietam and Gettysburg; the campaigns in Virginia in '62 and 63; and the final drive to Appomattox, all found the 3rd in the Army of the Potomac, or the short lived Army of Virginia. For its service during the war, the Regiment displays twelve campaign streamers on its Regimental colors.

Following the Civil War, the regiment returned to the frontier. It was spread thin over the territory between Western Kansas and the Rocky Mountains. The campaign streamer Commanches is in tribute to that service. By 1870, most of the Indian unrest in the area had subsided.

In 1878, the Regiment began a ten year tour in Montana Territory. During this period, the Regiment was awarded the streamer Montana 1887 for its participation in battle for that year.

The Old Guard saw battle in the Spanish-American War after a ten year period of garrison duty at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Volunteers filled the ranks of the Regiment when war was declared, and in April of 1898 the Regiment set out for Cuba. Pausing in Mobile, Alabama, for training, the unit landed in Cuba on 22 Jun 1898. It participated in the battle of El Caney on the 1st of July, and was under fire near San Juan Hill during most of July. Since these engagements were part of the Santiago Compaign, the Regiment was awarded the streamer of that name. The losses to the unit during this short conflict were chiefly from disease.

The incident at Leech Lake, Minensota, came just two weeks after the regiment's return to Ft Snelling in September of 1898. A detail was sent from Ft Snelling to quell the disturbance. Instead, when the offending "agitators" were placed under arrest, the angry mood of the Leech Lake reservation erupted into open conflict. A three day fire fight ensued leaving six soldiers dead and ten wounded. The disorder quickly evaporated upon the arrival of a sizable force of reinforcements from Ft Snelling.

Leech Lake was unique in the annals of American ... as for several reasons. The 30-40 caliber Krag-Jorgenson rifle was employed for the first time in combat in this engagement. The last medal of Honor awarded in the Indian Campaigns was awarded to Private Oscar Burkhard "for distinguished bravery in action against hostile Indians."

Most important, on 5 October 1898, the last American soldiers involved in engagements with Indians died in this engagement.

It was just a month after the Leech Lake incident that the Old Guard received orders to the Philippine Islands. A rebellion against the newly granted American authority in the Philippines (one of the provisions of the peace treaty with Spain) was undertaken by a group of Filipinos who had been our allies in the war against Spain. The "insurgents" felt that the U.S. was infringing on their right to self-government. It was called the Philippine Insurrection, and the 3rd Infantry was stationed in the area surrounding Manila. The unit, for the most part, were on patrol or in garrison during that first guerrilla war fought by US forces on foreign soil.

In 1909, the 3rd returned to the Philippines, to the Island of Mindinao. The campaign streamer Jolo 1911 was awarded to the Regiment during this tour. That brought the total number of streamers for service in the Philippines to five.

There followed a span of almost 30 years before the Old Guard participated again in war. From January 1941 until September 1943, a contingent of the Regiment (then divided into three active battalions) was stationed near St. John's, Newfoundland. The unit's mission was to protect the port of St. John's. This mission was part of the continental defense perimeter set up as a precaution against enemy invasion. For six months the 3rd Battalion lived on board a troop ship in St. John's harbor, and then lived in tents for another six months while they constructed Ft Pepperrell. The Old Guard's service in Newfoundland, and its service as a training and demonstration unit in training camps in the Southeast, is reflected in the American Theater streamer, which is of distinctive colors, but is without inscription.

When the Old Guard finally was shipped overseas, in March 1945, the German resistance had all but collapsed. Even though the Regiment saw no actual combat, it was awarded the campaign streamer Northern France for its presence in that area of operations prior to the German surrender.

The Vietnam conflict brought eleven more streamers to the Regimental Colors. The gallant service of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry from 1967 to 1970, and of the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry from 1967 to 1971, continued the unit's tradition of battle service. The 2nd Battalion was awarded a Valorous Unit Award (embroidered Saigon-Long Binh) in 1968. It, too, flies with the Regimental Colors. Both battalions were awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallentry with Palm in 1969 and in 1971.

The first Old Guard Medal of Honor winner since the Indian Wars, was assigned to the 2nd Battalion in Vietnam. On 3 July 1967, Corporal Michael F. Holland received mortal wounds when he threw himself on an enemy grenade which threatened his entire squad. The Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously on 15 December 1971.

THE PEACETIME MISSIONS

During the years when a unit is not at war, garrison duty and training are the order of the day. Each tour of peacetime duty has found the 3rd Infantry constantly sharpening the skills necessary for success on the battlefield. The first of these tours was during 1792-94, when the 1st Sub-Legion, as part of the Legion of the United States, was whipped into shape by General "Mad Anthony" Wayne. This training led to those first victories at Ft. Recovery and Fallen Timbers.

Perhaps the most significant tour of training duty was the year the 3rd Infantry spent at the "School for Brigade Drill" at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri (1843-44). It was then that the unit received its first nickname "The Buff Sticks" for the outstanding soldierly appearance of its men. The discipline and training received at the time served the unit well in the War with Mexico.

During the unit's first tour at Ft Snelling (1888-1898) it was engaged in learning and instructing the latest systems of tactics and training. As one of the few Regular Army units in the area, it conducted the training of National Guard units in the Northern Midwest. Its state of readiness was proven by the performance of its missions in Cuba and the Philippines.

The Old Guard's second tour at Ft Snelling (1921-1941) was taken up with the usual garrison duty, and was supplemented not only by a training program for the National Guard units, but one for young men. Over a period of years, the Civilian Military Training Camp at Ft Snelling trained thousands of young men in the military skills usually taught to recruits when they first join the army. The training received from the 3rd Infantry went a long way in preparing the future soldiers of WWII for their destiny. This experience as a training cadre was likely responsible for the entire Regiment being assigned to training missions during the Second World War.

Following the end of the war, the 3rd Infantry was assigned to be part of the American Occupation Force in Berlin. The Regiment remained on that duty until even the oldest regiment in the Army was caught in the post-war demobilization, and it was deactivated on 20 November 1946.

On 6 April 1948, the 3rd Infantry Regiment was reactivated on the Capital Plaza. It had been decided that The Old Guard, as the oldest infantry regiment, would be the ideal choice as the Ceremonial Unit of the Army. It was felt that infantrymen, and an infantry unit should be the ceremonial troops in honor of the Infantrymen who did so much in the winning of the war. The ceremonial mission, in combination with the National Capital defense mission, had been performed (since 1942) by Military Policemen of the 703rd and the 712th MP Battalions. Since the 3rd Infantry was inactive, neither troop movements nor retraining was necessary. The MP Battalions were inactivated and the personnel in them were simply transferred into The Old Guard upon its reactivation. The men of the 703rd were transferred to the 1st Battalion, 3rd Infantry, and those in the 712th became the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry.

Since 1948, the 3rd Infantry has been involved in its present mission. The 1st Battalion has been at Ft Myer since 1948, and at Ft McNair since 1957. The 2nd Battalion was at Ft McNair from 1948 to 1957. For a time, during the Korean War, the ceremonial unit was severely decimated by the constant rotation of infantry troops from continental units to units based in Korea. In

1899-1902 — The 3rd goes "over there" to the Phillipine Islands to assist in checking the rebellion of Phillipine insurrectionaries, and restoring peace and stability to a war torn land.

1904-1906 — Now in Alaska, soldier-ecologists from The Old Guard help stop the senseless slaughter of caribou by commercial interests, construct part of the first telegraph, built roads, and policed the Final Frontier.

1909-1912 — Another tour in the Phillipines. This time it is a peaceful mission concentrating on bringing civilization to the Jungle Islands. There is some trouble with Moro Tribesmen; who have the notion that it is a sin <u>not</u> to kill white men.

1917 — With the Great War raging in Europe, the Old Guard was placed on security duty on the Mexican border and training recruits for "The Great War". On the 3rd Infantry roster for the year were the names: James A. Van Fleet, later Field Commander in Korea; Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Army Air Force Chief of Staff during WWII; and Matthew B. Ridgeway, Chief of Staff of the Army during the 1950's.

Sep-Nov 1921 — The Old Guard is transferred to its old home at Fort Snelling, The troops hike from Camp Perry, Ohio, to Ft Sheridan, Illinois, and from there to Ft Snelling. The 950 mile march is a record one for peacetime. The Regiment is greatly reduced in strength at this time. First Sergeant Warren Donald <u>is</u> Company L. Each evening he falls himself in, gives himself the proper commands, sees that his hat is on straight, and reports to the commanding officer. For the next twenty years the Old Guard establishes a reputation as "Minnesota's Own" that continues to the present day.

13 Jan 1941 — The 3rd Battalion, 3rd Infantry leaves Ft Snelling and is sent to Newfoundland, becoming the first American unit shipped out of the country in anticipation of our entrance into the Second World War. Its post is Ft Pepperrell, one of the northernmost outposts in the North American security cordon.

7 Mar 1945 — Following the duty in Newfoundland, and after the Regiment was reunited as a training regiment at Camp Butner, N.C. and Ft Benning, GA, the Old Guard finally gets to go overseas. Arriving in France too late to engage in combat, the 3rd is involved in the processing of POW's in Germany and is eventually assigned to Berlin as part of the Army of Occupation.

20 Nov 1946 — The Army's oldest unit is deactivated in Berlin.

6 Apr 1948 — The Old Guard is reactivated in an impressive ceremony on the Capitol Plaza. The two MP battalions that had been the Army's ceremonial troops were simply transferred into two battalions of the 3rd Infantry. They continued with their regular duties with the added bonus of combat infantryman's pay.

fact, Company H, which was a provisional company of basic trainees being groomed for the ceremonial duties of The Old Guard, was shipped out of Ft Myer almost immediately after their graduation (1951).

In 1967, the 5th, 6th and 7th Battalions of the 3rd Infantry were activated, at reduced strength, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Assigned to the 6th Infantry Division, these contingents of The Old Guard were used mainly as support troops, and, to a lesser degree, as demonstration troops. By the end of 1969, all three had been deactivated.

The 1st Battalion (Reinforced), 3rd Infantry (The Old Guard) is the only unit of the historic 3rd Infantry still on active duty. The performance of its ceremonial mission, the fulfillment of its obligation to present the best impression of the United States Army to the world, and its constant observance of Old Guard customs and standards, are all, now, a part of a heritage of over two hundred years of service. Such a mission would be an honorable duty for any unit. It is a fitting mission for The Old Guard.

205TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

On 24 June 1921, the 205th Infantry Brigade was constituted as part of the 103rd Division, United States Army. The 103rd served in Germany during World War II.

The post war years were years of reorganization for the unit. It was inactivated 22 September 1945, then redesignated on 15 April 1947 and allocated to the US Army Reserve. On 18 May 1959, the unit was inactivated at Council Bluffs, Iowa. The Brigade was reborn on 16 February 1963 (The 205th Infantry Brigade)(Separate), one of four Reserve Brigades in the United States Army Reserves and consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, three Infantry Battalions (one of which consisted of the 3rd Battalion 3rd Infantry), one mechanized Infantry Battalion, one artillery and one armor Battalion.

The 205th Support Battalion was created and activated on 2 January 1964. Its mission was to provide support for the Brigade in medicine, supply, transportation, and maintenance. At the same time Troop E 4th Cavalry was added for Armor reconnaissance.

On 4 July 1976, the 205th Infantry Brigade (Sep) was reorganized as a light Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light).

As of September 1984 the Brigade contained the 3rd Battalion 3rd Infantry (The Old Guard) headquartered at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, with companies in Fort Snelling, Mankato, and Cannon Falls, Minnesota.

CHRONOLOGY

A LOOK AT SOME IMPORTANT DATES IN OLD GUARD HISTORY

CHRONOLOGY: A LOOK AT SOME IMPORTANT DATES IN OLD GUARD HISTORY

2 Jun 1784 — The Continental Congress disbands the last of the Continental Army with the exception of 80 artillerymen at Fort Pitt and West Point who are needed to guard supplies remaining from the Revolution.

3 Jun 1784 — Congress creates "a body of troops to consist of 700 non-commissioned officers and privates properly officered." Enter the First American Regiment. The Resolve states the necessity of these troops for "securing and protecting the north-western frontiers of the United States and their Indian friends and allies, and for garrisoning the posts soon to be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty."

1794 — Apparently his majesty does not appreciate our efforts to build an Army, for his troops still occupy the forts on our side of the Great Lakes. With Congress smarting from two straight defeats at the hands of the British supported Indians, General "Mad" Anthony Wayne is appointed the commander of the Legion of the United States. The original regiment is now called the 1st Sub-Legion. Under "Mad" Anthony the Legion inflicts defeat on the Indians at Fallen Timbers and Fort Recovery, thus opening the frontier to peaceful settlement.

5 Dec 1800 — Meriwether Lewis is promoted to Captain in the 1st Infantry (a new name for the 1st Sub-Legion). He has never even heard of the Louisiana Purchase, much less thought of exploring it.

17 Aug 1803 — A detachment from the 1st Infantry reaches the southern end of Lake Michigan, having set out a month earlier from Detroit. They built Ft Dearborn at a place called "Chikago," an Indian word for skunk.

1806 — 1LT Zebulon Pike, 1st Infantry, discovers Pike's Peak. Earlier, he explored the headwaters of the Mississippi, laying the groundwork for the Lewis and Clark expedition.

1814 — The War of 1812 sees the Army expanded to 46 infantry regiments. Men from the 1st, 17th and 19th regiments emerge victorious at the battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane in Canada.

1815 — Following the post-war demobilization, the 1st, 17th, 19th, 5th and 28th, infantry regiments are combined to form the new 3rd Infantry. The heritage of those units belongs to the present day 3rd Infantry.

1817 — Major Zachary Taylor takes command of a 3rd Infantry detachment which has built Ft Howard near Green Bay, Wisconsin. The Old Guard would again be in Taylor's command during the Mexican war and when he becomes commander-in-chief.

1826 — Near St Louis, which is to become the gateway to the West, the 3rd Infantry builds Jefferson Barracks. It becomes the Army's gateway to the west.

May 1827 — The commanding officer of the 3rd directs the construction of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In these days of the frontier, it is not unusual for infantrymen to build bridges, forts, and roads. The overall term for such details, is pioneer duty.

Oct 1840 - Apr 1843 — The entire 3rd Infantry Regiment, numbering around 690 men, is sent to Florida to participate in the Seminole Indian War.

9 May 1846 — Resaca de la Palma. In this, the second battle of the Mexican War, the 3rd Infantry takes a prominent role in the assault on the trenches the Mexicans have set up on Texas soil, and takes part in the pursuit that follows, as the Mexicans retreat across the Rio Grande.

21 Sep 1846 — The first day of the battle of Monterey. One of the most memorable days in Old Guard history sees an effective battle force of 262 men decimated by 52 casualties, including over half of the regimental officers. The mission of the day was to take an enemy battery set up in the streets of the city and to advance as far as possible after that. The battery was taken under a murderous hail of musket fire, but the advance could go no farther. In later years the day was observed by the officers of the Regiment as a reminder of the valiant efforts shown on that day in 1846.

18 Apr 1847 — At Cerro Gordo, the 3rd conducts a bayonet assault up the fortress of El Telegrafo. General Winfield Scott wrote in his report that "... the style of execution ... was the most brilliant and decisive." In 1922, the Regiment was granted permission to march with bayonets fixed in commemoration of the charge.

23 Aug 1847 — The second major bayonet assault undertaken by the 3rd in the war is at Churubuso.

13 Sep 1847 — Chapultepec, the last fortress in the path to Mexico City, is taken by the brigade which includes the 3rd Infantry.

14 Sep 1847 — Victory! The American Army marches into Mexico City. At the head of the column of troops is the 3rd Infantry. General Scott doffs his hat as they pass, and he calls them the "Old Guard of the Army".

Fall 1849 — Back on frontier duty, six companies (out of ten) help build a fort at El Paso del Norte, Texas; soon to be called Fort Bliss. Following this, the regiment "settles down" to eleven years of protecting settlers, fighting Indians, and guarding mail and supply wagons throughout the Texas-New Mexico frontier.

April 1861 — Enroute to the Texas coast, and from there to Washington, D.C., the 3rd must pass through San Antonio, which is rumored to be a den of rebel sentiment. Trouble is anticipated, but the Old Guard is not about to take evasive maneuvers. The regiment marches into town with "colors flying, band playing, drum major nearly turning himself inside-out with his baton, and every man as fine as brass and bullion could make him." No incidents are reported. All but three companies of the Regiment make it through the hostile territory. Companies "A", "F", and "I" are captured by Confederates just short of the post of Indianola, Texas, where the rest of the Regiment had set sail for the North.

July 1861 — Washington society turns out in carriages and with picnic lunches to watch the first major battle of the Civil War at Bull Run. The 3rd Infantry ends up covering the retreat of the untrained Union volunteers, and deters the rebels from a follow-up attack on the Capital. Soon after, as part of the provost guard of Washington, the 3rd is reviewed by President Lincoln. When General McDowell pointed to the 3rd and told the President "there are the men that saved your army at Bull Run," Lincoln replied, "Yes, I have heard of them."

April 1865 — After four years of participating in virtually every campaign of the Army of the Potomac, the 3rd Infantry is present at Appomattox, and from there returns to Washington to await another return to the frontier.

1874-1877 — After ten years in various posts in Kansas, the Regiment is part of the large Army contingent sent to the South to enforce civil rights' legislation. The two main posts in this tour are Jackson Barracks in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Holly Springs in Mississippi.

July 1877 — The 3rd Infantry is ordered to Pennsylvania to assist in restoring order to the riot torn city of Wilkes Barre, following the railroad strike of that year. From there the regiment begins eleven more years on the Frontier, this time in Montana.

Spring 1888 — The 3rd Infantry Regiment begins ten years of garrison duty at Fort Snelling, Minnesota.

1893 — Taking time out from garrison duties at Ft Snelling, a detachment of 3rd Infantrymen travel to the Columbian Exposition in Chicago and demonstrate the latest Army weapons and tactics in a War Department exhibit.

1898 — Once again war is declared. In preparation for its assignment to Cuba, the 3rd encamps at Mobile, Alabama. Its part of the invasion included a successful attack at El Caney, and a supporting role in the battle of Santiago. A contingent was called out to suppress a rebellion of Chippewa Indians at Leech Lake, Minnesota. It was the first Indian uprising since the last Indian battle at Wounded Knee, and the last in the 19th century.

1 Jul 1957

A reorganization of the 3rd Infantry is effected, based on the Pentomic concept. The missions of the unit remain the same but the personnel of the 2nd Battalion are absorbed by the 1st Battalion, the term "Battalion" is replaced by the term "Battle Group," and the 1st Battle Group, 3rd Infantry takes on the organization that the Old Guard has since had. Company A is at Ft McNair, and Companies HHC, B, C, D and E are at Ft Myer. The 2nd Battle Group, 3rd Infantry is reactivated in Korea.

16 Feb 1963

The 205th Infantry Brigade (Sep), one of four Reserve Brigades in the United States Army was reborn. It consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Three Infantry Battalions, (one of which was the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Infantry), one mechanized Infantry Battalion and one artillery and armor Battalion.

20 Sep 1963

Another Army-wide reorganization brought the designation "Battalion" back into use. Under the ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions) System, the 1st Battle Group becomes the 1st Battalion (Reinforced), 3rd Infantry. The term "Reinforced" is attributable to the provision of the ROAD system that calls for three rifle companies per battalion -- the 1st Battalion, has five. With the activation of H Company as a support unit (in 1971), the reasoning behind the designation "Reinforced" becomes even more clear.

CUSTOMS, TRADITIONS & INSIGNIA





HERALDRY AND THE OLD GUARD COAT OF ARMS

The shield is the principal part of the coat of arms. The basic design of the shield is broken up by lines which are connected to form various shapes called charges. The following charges are affixed to the Old Guard Coat of Arms.

The CREST is made up of the torse and the crest. The torse is a representation of two pieces of silk twisted together to form a wreath on which the crest rests. The crest represents some facet of the history of the organization which the coat of arms represents. In heraldry, the crest is placed on top of a helmet, and the torse holds it in place.

ESCUTCHEON: A shield shaped charge centered in the shield.

BORDURE: A charge which outlines an escutcheon.

CHIEF: A charge which covers the top third of the shield.

The ESCUTCHEON of the Old Guard Coat of Arms contains a vert (green) hill, with gules (red) battlements on the mount, all on a field of argent (white). These colors are the colors of the Mexican Republic. The hill and battlements represent the fortresses of Cerro Gordo, Churubusco, and Chapultepec, which were stormed by the 3rd Infantry in the Mexican War.

The CHIEF of the coat of arms is azure (blue) with three argent (white) Maltese Crosses. The Maltese Cross was the badge of Sykes' Division, with which the Old Guard served during the Civil War. The three crosses represent the numerical designation of the unit.

The BORDURE of our coat of arms is taken from the shield of the United States' Coat of Arms. This is a singular honor afforded the Old Guard, because of its distinction as the oldest infantry unit in the Army.

(Heraldic information obtained from; Heraldic Design, by Hubert Allcock; Tudor Publishing Co., NY, 1962.)

HERALDRY (AGLtr 425.5 Coat of ARms 10 Jan 1921)

Arms within a bordure of the United States, a hillvert crowned with battlements gules on a field argent. On a chief azure three crosses patee of the field. Encircling the escutcheon an infantry officer's dress belt (para 2, Special Regulation 42, 1917), with plate in chief proper inscribed with the motto "Noli Me Tangere" in base, and in chief "3 Infantry 1784," in front of an old pattern bayonet and drum major's baton from the Mexican War crossed in saltire proper. Crest on a wreath argent and azure an infantry officer's cocked hat of 1784 with white plume proper.



The Old Guard Coat of Arms depicted here is the informal coat of arms. The formal coat of arms appears on the organizational colors without the baton, the bayonet, or the officer's dress belt.

COLORS OF THE OLD GUARD

The 3rd Infantry colors, buff and black, can be traced back to the 18th century. Yellow (buff) hat bindings, yellow plumes and black hair were assigned to the 3rd Sub-Legion when that unit was formed in 1792. In 1815, when the 3rd Infantry Regiment was reorganized, the members of the Regiment felt themselves to be the inheritors of the old 3rd's traditions, and so adopted the colors buff and black as their own. Though the 3rd's roots are more properly placed with the 1st Sub-Legion (see page 1), the colors mistakenly adopted in 1815 have remained a firm tradition of the Regiment.

THE UNIQUE BUFF STRAP

The Buff Strap is officially classified as distinctive regimental trimming. The Old Guard is the only unit in the Army wearing any kind of regimental trimming.

During the early part of the nineteenth century, members of the 3rd Infantry Regiment "wove" strips of rawhide (natural buff color) into the black shoulder straps of their knapsacks. The black and buff colors were in keeping with the traditional regimental colors, while the effect of the woven strap distinguished the 3rd from other units in the Army.

In 1922, the Old Guard requested and received permission to display a "Knapsack Strap" on the left shoulder as the "one distinctive and peculiar marking of the Regiment." Meant to be a link with those earlier knapsack straps of the 1800's, the buff strap (as it soon became known) has been worn continuously since 1922. It is a strip of black leather, 1/2 inch wide, with a strip of buff leather, 1/4 inch wide "woven" in such a way so that two strips of buff leather 1 3/4" ling appear in front, and three strips of the same length appear in back.

THE COCKADE STORY

The "cockades," which members of the Old Guard wear on their epaulettes, are not cockades at all. Officially designated as regimental distinctive insignia, they are replicas of the "officers cocked hat of the 1784 style" which is the crest of the 3rd Infantry's Coat of Arms. A cockade is the cloth badge that is affixed to the left front of the hat. It is under the term "cockades" that the insignia has been known, however, and the term will no doubt stick.

The metal devices that the 3rd Infantry now wears first appeared at Fort Snelling in 1922. A single cockade on the left shoulder was used as a fastening device for the buff strap. With the development of a self-fastening buff strap, the use of the cockade was transferred to the overcoat, and later, to the campaign hat. In 1929 its use was discontinued.

In 1948, following the reactivation of the 3rd Infantry, the cockades returned to the Old Guard uniform, one on each epaulette. On 10 April 1959, after years of unofficial use, the Department of the Army officially designated the "cockade" as the distinctive insignia of the Old Guard.

ORGANIZATION DAY - IT'S NOT A BIRTHDAY

While 3 June 1784 is the date that the Old Guard's ancestor, the First American Regiment, was constituted, it is a date of no other special historical significance.

21 September, however, marks the anniversary of the 3rd Infantry's participation in the battle of Monterrey, during the Mexican campaign of 1846. On that day, the regiment, while engaged in house to house fighting against a heavily entrenched and vastly overwelming force, took their objectives while sustaining 52 casualties out of an effective strength of 262 men.

The men of the regiment never forgot the heavy toll or the valiant efforts of that day in Monterrey. In the years after the battle, the date was chosen by the regiment as one "... upon which the officers should assemble for its proper observance." In 1920, Colonel Paul Giddings, the regimental commander, officially instituted 21 September as a regimental holiday (originally called 3rd Infantry Day") "... to commemorate the valiant role the regiment played on that day... (and the) ... part the 3rd United States Infantry has played in the military history of our country."

Since 1920, Organization Day has been observed with a parade in the morning, athletic events in the afternoon, and a dinner-dance in the evening.

REGIMENTAL MOTTO - NOLI ME TANGERE

Translated as "Touch Me Not," "Don't Tread on Me," or as "Hands Off," the basic connotation of Noli Me Tangere is the same. It is a traditional holdover from the famous motto of the Revolutionary Army, and is shared equally by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry.

WE MARCH WITH BAYONETS FIXED

The 3rd Infantry is one of the few units in the Army authorized to pass in review with bayonets fixed. The practice commemorates the bayonet assault that the regiment undertook with the 7th Infantry up Telegraph Hill at Cerro Gordo, Mexico, on 18 April 1847.

The heights of Cerro Gordo were occupied by Mexican artillery and, though the Americans had artillery positions that could bombard the hill, their only means of driving the enemy off was a direct assault. General Winfield Scott wrote in his account of the battle, that "the style of execution which I had the pleasure to witness, was brilliant and decisive. The brigade ascended ... (they) drove the enemy from (the breastworks) ... and after some minutes of sharp firing, finished the conquest with the bayonet."

In 1922, the regimental commander, Colonel Alfred Bjornstad, requested and received official permission to commemorate the Old Guard's bayonet assault at Cerro Gordo by marching his troops with bayonets fixed. Since then the order "Fix bayonets" has been a distinctive part of all 3rd Infantry parades and ceremonies.

THE NICKNAME THE OLD GUARD

It is related that the 3rd Infantry received its nickname on 14 September 1847 at the gates of Mexico City. The 3rd was given the honor of marching at the head of the column of American troops entering the defeated capital. As the regiment passed by the reviewing officers, General Scott turned to his staff and said, "Gentlemen, take off your hats to the Old Guard of the Army."

THE CHAPULTEPEC BATON

The oldest and most valuable trophy of the Old Guard is the Chapultepec Baton. It was presented to the 3rd Infantry in 1848 by General Persifor Smith, the commander of the division of regulars of which the 3rd was a part.

Made of the wood of the flag pole that stood in the Grand Plaza of Mexico City, and of native Mexican silver, the baton was presented in commemoration of the 3rd Infantry's part in the Mexican campaign, and especially for its assault against the fortress of Chapultepec outside of Mexico City.

Tradition has it that the Chapultepec Baton was presented to a member of the 3rd Infantry Band, who took part in the assault on Chapultepec armed only with a drum major's baton. Thus, for many years, the baton was in the possession of the successive drum majors of the band. In later years, the baton was mounted and was presented as the "Buff Stick Trophy" to the company that won the annual "Buff Stick Inspection." In recent years, the baton has been displayed in the Old Guard Museum.

THE PRESIDENTIAL BATON

During the reconstruction of the White House in 1950-52, there were many momentos made from the timber that had stood in the presidential mansion since 1815. One of those momentos is the Presidential Baton.

On 10 April 1952, President Harry S. Truman presented a three and one-half foot baton of 136 year-old white pine to the Old Guard. The presentation was made in commemoration of the 3rd Infantry's long service to the nation, and for its service as the Presidential Escort and Army Ceremonial Unit in Washington, DC.

The name "Presidential Baton" was suggested by members of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, stationed at Fort McNair.

CONTINENTAL UNIFORMS

The Continental Color Team is an Old Guard tradition. Regimental records show that the color sergeants and the drum major of the 3rd Infantry Band wore Revolutionary War-style uniforms at Ft Snelling in 1922. A contemporary description stated that the purpose of the unit was "... to recall to the mind of every member of the 3rd Infantry the long and honorable history of the

regiment ... from a period which followed closely upon the Revolutionary War."

The Continental Color Team serves the same function today. The five man unit is comprised of two armed guards and three color sergeants, who carry the National Colors, the US Army Colors, and the unit colors of the Third US Infantry. The blue, white, and red uniforms of the team are exact replicas of the 1784 style infantry uniforms worn by the Old Guard's predecessor, the First American Regiment.

STATIONS OF THE OLD GUARD

STATIONS OF THE OLD GUARD

1784 - 1973

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Aug 1784	Reg't. Headquarters	Schuylkill River in Penns.
Oct 1784	Reg't. Headquarters	Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania
Dec 1784	Reg't. Headquarters	Fort McIntosh, Penns.
Aug 1785	Heart's Company	Fort Pitt
Sep 1785	Doughty's Company	Fort McIntosh
Oct 1785	Doughty's Company Heart's Company Strong's Company Zeigler's Company (later transferred to Ft. Finney) Finney's Company	Fort Harmar, Ohio Fort Finney, Ohio
1786	Furguson's Company	Fort McIntosh
Jul 1786	Mercer's Company	Fort McIntosh
Aug or Sep 1786	McCurdy's Company	Fort Steuben, Ohio
Sep 1786	Hamtramck's Company	Fort Steuben
Oct 1786	Hamtramck's Company	Fort Harmar and later Fort Knox
1787	McCurdy's Company Ziegler's Company Ferguson's Company Mercer's Company	Fort Harmar Fort Knox Fort Finney
Apr 1787	Heart's Company	Fort Franklin, Venango, PA
Dec 1789	Reg't. Headquarters	Fort Washington, Ohio
Jun 1792	Regiment	Ohio River camp 27 miles from Pittsburgh
May 1793	Regiment	Fort Washington
Dec 1793	Detachment Regiment less	Fort Recovery, Ohio Fort Greenville
Jul 1794	Regiment	Fort Defiance, Ohio
Sep 1794	Regiment	Fort Wayne, Indiana

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Jul or Aug 1796	Regiment	Detroit, Michigan
Aug 1803	Regiment	Fort Dearborn, Illinois
Mar 1813	Regiment	Fort Meigs, Ohio
Jun 1813	Regiment	Stony Creek, Canada
Nov 1813	Regiment	French Creek, New York
Jul 1814	Regiment	Chippewa, Canada, then to Lundy's Lane, Canada
Aug 1814	Regiment	Fort Erie, Pennsylvania
Oct 1814	Regiment	Chippewa and Cook Mills, Canada
May 1815	Regiment	Detroit
Jul 1815	Regiment	Fort Mackinac
Jul 1816	Detachment Regiment less	Fort Dearborn. Fort Howard, Wisconsin
Jun 1821	Reg't. Headquarters	Fort Howard
Jun 1822	Detachment	Fort Saginaw
Jul 1826	Regiment	Camp Smith
Aug 1826	Regiment	Portage of Fox and Wisc. Rivers
Sep 1826	Regiment	Camp Miller, MO
May 1827	Regiment	Fort Leavenworth
1827	Detachment	Fort Armstrong, Illinois
May 1829	Regiment	Jefferson Barracks
Dec 1830	Companies A, C, E, G, I, K.	Natchitoches (Arkansas Territory)
Apr 1831	Companies A, C, E, G, I, and K.	Kiamiche
Nov 1831	Companies A, C, E, G I, and K.	Fort Towson, Arkansas
Sep 1831	Companies B, D, F, H	Fort Jesup, Louisiana
Apr 1836	Companies B, D, F, H	Camp Sabine, Texas
Sep 1836	Companies B, C, F, H	Fort Jesup

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Spring 1837	Detachment	Camp Sabine
Nov 1837	Detachment	Sabine Bay, LA
Fall 1838	Regiment	Shreveport, Louisiana
Oct 1840	Headquarters 3 companies 1 company each:	Fort Brooke, FL Cantonment Morgan and Cedar Key Fort Pleasant Fort Robert Gamble Fort Hamilton Fort Stansbury Fort Ocilla Fort Brooke
April 1843	Regiment detachment (K & I)	Jefferson Barracks, MO Fort Leavenworth
Apr or May 1844	Regiment	Camp Wilkins, LA
Jul 1845	Regiment	Corpus Christi, TX
Mar 1846	Regiment	Fort Brown, TX
May 1846	Regiment	Palo Alto, TX then Reseca de la Palma then Matamoros
Sep 1846	Regiment	Monterey and Walnut Springs
Mar 1847	Regiment	Vera Cruz
Apr 1847	Regiment	Cerro Gordo
Aug 1847	Regiment	Pueblo and Contreras and Churubusco
Sep 1847	Regiment	Chapultepec and Mexico City
Jul 1848	Regiment	Camp Jefferson Davis, Miss.
Oct 1848	Co's. A, B, C, E, I, K Co's. D, F, G, H	Camp Saldo, Texas Jefferson Barracks
Apr 1849	Companies D, F, G, H	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jul 1849	Companies D, F, G, H	Santa Fe, New Mexico territory
Sep 1849	Companies A, B, C, E, I and K	El Paso, Texas
1849-1860	Reg't. Headquarters	Santa Fe Fort Fillmore, NM Fort Marcy, NM Albuquerque, NM

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Apr 1860	Reg't. Headquarters	Fort Defiance, NM
1849-1860	Company A	Fort Garland, NM
	Company H	Fort Marcy
	Company I	Fort Fillmore
	Company K	Fort Los Lunas, NM
	Companies B, C, E, G	Fort Defiance
Aug 1860	HQ, B, D, G, H, K	Ft Clark, Texas
	Companies A, C, E	Ringgold Barracks
	Companies F, I	Fort McIntosh
Apr 1861	HQ, B, D, G, H, K	Fort Hamilton, NY
Mar 1861	Companies C, E	Fort Hamilton
Apr 1861	Companies C, E	Fort Pickens, FL
	Companies A, F, I	Surrendered near Indianola, TX
May 1861	HQ, B, D, G, H, K	Washington, D.C.
Jun 1861	HQ, B, D, G, H, K	Carlisle Barracks and back to D.C.
Jul 1861	HQ, B, D, G, H, K	Bull Run
Nov 1861	Companies C, E	Pensacola, FL
Jan 1862	Companies C, E	Fort Pickens
Apr and May 1862	Regiment	Yorktown, Virginia
Jun 1862	Regiment	Gaines Mill, Virginia
Jul 1862	Regiment	Malvern Hill, Virginia
Aug 1862	Regiment	Groveton and Bull Run, VA
Sep 1862	Regiment	Antietam, Maryland
Dec 1862	Regiment	Fredericksburg, Virginia
May 1863	Regiment	Chancellorsville, Virginia
Jul 1863	Regiment	Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Aug 1863	Regiment	Alexandria, Virginia then New York City (Riot Duty)
Nov 1863	Regiment	Rappahannock Station, VA
Dec 1863	Regiment	Fort Hamilton, New York Fort Richmond, New York Fort Columbus, New York

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Oct 1864	Regiment	Camp Relief, Washington, D.C.
Feb 1865	Regiment	Petersburg, Virginia
Apr 1865	Regiment	Appomatox, Virginia
Jul 1865	Regiment	Washington Arsenal, D.C.
Oct 1865	Regiment	St Louis, Missouri
Spring 1866	Regiment	Fort Leavenworth
1866-1874	Reg't. Headquarters	Fort Leavenworth Fort Riley Fort Harker Fort Dodge Fort Wallace Fort Hays (and back to Riley)
1866-1874	One or More Companies	Fort Larned, Kansas Fort Ellsworth, Kansas Fort Zara, Kansas Fort Lyon, Colorado Terr. Fort Reynolds, Colorado Terr. Camp Supply, Indian Terr.
May 1874	Regiment	Holly Springs, Mississippi
Sep 1874	Regiment	Jackson Barracks, Louisiana
Jul 1877	Regiment	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Sep 1877	Regiment	Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
Nov 1877	HQ, and 6 Companies Remaining Companies	Helena, Montana Fort Missoula, Montana
Nov 1877 - May 1878	Company G	Camp Baker, Montana
Spring 1878	HQ and 6 companies	Camp Assiniboin, Montana Territory
Fall 1878	Headquarters, later companies C, E F & G Company A	Fort Shaw, Montana Fort Benton, Montana
Spring 1879 - Fall 1886	Companies B & C	Fort Ellis, Montana
Summer 1880	Company K	Fort Maginnis, Montana

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Summer 1881	Company A	Fort Shaw
Fall 1881	Company K	Fort Shaw
Fall 1887	Companies B & E	Fort Custer, later back to Ft Missoula
Spring 1888	HQ, A, D, E, H, K C, F, I, B Company G	Fort Snelling, Minnesota Fort Meade, South Dakota Fort Sisseton, South Dakota (then to Fort Snelling)
1889-1894	Detachments were at these posts for different lengths of time (HQ at Ft Snelling).	Camp Douglas, Wisconsin Fort Sully, South Dakota Sisseton and Wahpeton Indian Reservations, South Dakota Chicago, IL Leech Lake, MN Camp Lake View, MN Grand Forks, ND Fort Keogh, MT
Apr 1898	Regiment	Mobile, AL
Jun 1898	Regiment	Santiago, Cuba
Jul 1898	Regiment	El Caney, Cuba and near San Juan Hill
Aug-Sep 1898	Regiment	Camp Wykoff, Long Island then to Ft Snelling
Oct 1898	Detachment	Leech Lake, MN
Jan-March 1899	Regiment	Ft Snelling to NY City and then to Manila, Philippine Islands
May 1899	Regiment	Baliuag, Luzon
Oct 1899	Regiment	San Fernando, Luzon
Nov 1899	HQ, F, G H E	Guagin Bacalor Santa Rita
Dec 1899	HQ	Caloocan (then back to San Fernando)
Apr 1900	HQ, Band, D B E A	Caloocan Malabon Meycauayan and Polo La Lomboy

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Apr 1900 Cont'd	L	Guicquinto and Bigoa
	M	Bulacan
	F, G	Malolos
	H, I	Hagonoy
	C	Calumpit
	K	Apalit and Santo Tomas
April 1902	Regiment	San Francisco, California, then to Fort Thomas, Kentucky (Minus Company K)
	Company K	Columbia Arsenal, Tennessee
Dec 1902-Jul 1903	Detachment	Canton, Ohio
1903	Companies E, F, G, H	Columbus Barracks, Ohio
Jun 1904	Regiment	The Presidio, San Francisco, CA
Jul 1904	HQ, C, A, B	Fort Seward, Alaska
	Company D	Fort Davis, Alaska
	Companies E & F	Fort Liscum, Alaska
	Companies G & H	Fort Egbert, Alaska
	Companies L & M	Fort St Michael, Alaska
Aug 1904	Companies I & K	Fort Gibbon, Alaska
Sep 1906	Reg't. HQ, and the 2nd Bn	Fort Lawton, Washington
	1st & 2nd Bn's	Fort Wright, Washington
Aug 1909	Reg't. HQ, and the 3rd Bn	Zamboanaga, Philippine Islands
	1st & 2nd Bn's	Jolo Jolo, Philippine Islands
1912	Regiment	Madison Barracks and Ft Ontario, NY
May 1916	Regiment	Camp Eagle Pass, Texas
		Camp Del Rio, Texas
Fall 1920	Regiment	Camp Sherman, Ohio
Aug-Nov 1921	Regiment	Camp Perry, Ohio, then to Ft Sheridan, IL, and then Ft Snelling
Fall 1939 - Jun 1940	Regiment	Maneuvers at Ft Jackson, SC, Ft Benning, GA, and then Louisiana
Jul 1940	Regiment	Fort Snelling

DATE	SPECIFIC UNIT	LOCATION
Nov 1940	1st Battalion	Ft Crook, Neb then Ft Leonard Wood, Missouri, Deactivated Jun 1941
Jan 1941	3rd Battalion	Newfoundland (Ft Pepperrell, when built)
Feb 1942	1st Battalion Company C	Ft McAndrew, Newfoundland Harmon Field, Newfoundland
Jul 1942	Reg't. HQ's	Ft Pepperrell
Sep 1943	HQ's, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Bn's plus support units.	Camp Butner, North Carolina
Mar 1944	Regiment	Fort Benning, Georgia
Feb 1945	Regiment	Camp Miles Standish, Mass.
Mar 1945	Regiment	Camp "Lucky Strike", France
Apr 1945	Regiment (attached to 106th Inf Div.)	Rennes, France
May 1945	Regiment	Various detachments to points throughout west-central Germany
Apr 1946	Regiment	Berlin, Germany
Nov 1946	REGIMENT DEACTIVATED	
Apr 1948	REGIMENT RE-ACTIVATED	
	1st Battalion	Fort Myer, Virginia
	2nd Battalion	Fort McNair, Washington, DC
Jul 1951	Ceremonial Company becomes A Company 1st Battalion	Fort Myer
Jul 1957	1st Bn redesignated as 1st Battle Group 3rd Inf (HHC, A, B, C, D, E)	Fort Myer
	2nd Bn redesignated 2nd Battle Group 3rd Infantry	Korea
Feb 1963	3rd Bn, 3d Inf, USAR attached to 205th Inf Bde (Sep)	Ft Snelling, MN

Jul 1963	2nd BG deactivated	Korea
Sep 1963	1st BG redesignated as 1st Bn (Reinf) 3rd Inf	Fort Myer
Jun 1966	2nd Bn, 3rd Inf activated.	Fort Benning, then to Viet Nam
Jul 1966	4th Bn 3rd Inf activated.	Hawaii, then to Viet Nam
Nov 1967	5th Bn, 6th Bn, and 7th Bn, 3rd Ind activated as part of the 6th Inf Division	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Feb 1969	6th Bn, 3rd Inf deactivated	Fort Campbell
Jul 1969	5th and 7th Bns deactivated	Fort Campbell
Oct 1970	2nd Bn, 3rd Inf deactivated	Fort Benning
1971	4th Bn, 3rd Inf deactivated	
Jul 1971	H Company 1st Bn, (Reinf), 3rd Inf activated	Fort Myer

BATTLE STREAMERS



CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

BATTLE STREAMERS

3RD INFANTRY REGIMENT

Indian Wars

Miami
Seminoles
Comanches
New Mexico 1856
New Mexico 1857
New Mexico 1858
New Mexico 1860
Montana 1887

War of 1812

Canada
Chippewa
Lundy's Lane

Mexican War

Palo Alto
Resaca de la Palma
Monterey
Vera Cruz
Cerro Gordo
Contreras
Churubusco
Chapultepec

Civil War

Bull Run
Peninsula
Manassas
Antietam
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville

Civil War (Cont'd)

Gettysburg
Texas 1861
Florida 1861
Florida 1862
Virginia 1863
Appomattox

Spanish-American War

Santiago

Philippine Insurrection

Malolos
San Isidro
Luzon 1899
Luzon 1900
Jolo 1911

World War II

American Theater
(without inscription)
Northern France

Vietnam

Counteroffensive Phase 2
Counteroffensive Phase 3
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive Phase 4
Counteroffensive Phase 5
Counteroffensive Phase 6
Tet 1969 Counteroffensive
Summer-Fall 1969
Winter-Spring 1970
Sanctuary
Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive Phase 7

BATTLE HONORS

INDIAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1794

DATE	PLACE AND UNIT	HONOR
30 Jun 1794	Fort Recovery, Ohio (1st Sub-Legion)	Miami
20 August 1794	Fallen Timbers, Ohio (1st Sub-Legion)	

WAR OF 1812

28 April to 9 May 1813	Siege of Fort Meigs on the Maumee River, Ohio	Canada
6 June 1813	Stony Creek, Upper Canada	
1-2 November 1813	French Creek, New York	
1 August to 16 September 1814	Siege and assault of Fort Erie	
17 September 1814	Sortie from Fort Erie	
15 October 1814	Chippewa, Upper Canada (not Battle of Chippewa)	
19 October 1814	Cook Mills, Upper Canada	
5 July 1814	Chippewa, Upper Canada	Chippewa
25 July 1814	Lundy's Lane, Upper Canada	Lundy's Lane
8 May 1846	Palo Alto, Texas	Palo Alto
9 May 1846	Resaca de la Palma, Texas	Resaca de la Palma
21-23 September 1846	Monterey Mexico	Monterey
9-28 March 1847	Vera Cruz, Mexico	Vera Cruz
17-18 April 1847	Cerro Gordo, Mexico	Cerro Gordo
18-20 August 1847	Contreras, Mexico	Contreras
18-20 August 1847	Cherubusco, Mexico	Cherubusco
13 September 1847	Chapultepec and City of Mexico	Chapultepec

THE CIVIL WAR

25 April 1861	Surrender at Saluria Lavaca Bay, Texas	Texas, 1861
21 July 1861	Bull Run, Virginia	Bull Run
22-23 November 1861	Bombardment Confederate Lines about Pensacola, Florida	
1 January 1862	Fort Pickens, Florida	Florida, 1861-62
9-12 May 1862	Fort Pickens, Florida	
5 April to 4 May 1862	Siege of Yorktown, Virginia	Peninsula
27 June 1862	Gaines Mill, Virginia	
30 June to 2 July 1862	Malvern Hill, Virginia	
29-30 August 1862	Groveton and Bull Run, Virginia	Manassas
16-17 September 1862	Antietam, Maryland	Antietam
11-15 December 1862	Fredericksburg, Virginia	Fredericksburg
1-3 May 1863	Chancellorsville, Virginia	Chancellorsville
1-3 July 1863	Gettysburg, Pennsylvania	Gettysburg
7 November 1863	Rappahannock Station, Virginia	Virginia, 1863
26 November 1863	Mine Run Campaign, Virginia	
8-9 April 1865	Appomattox Court House, Virginia	Appomattox

INDIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1840 TO 1888

October 1840 to March 1843	Florida	Seminole War (1840-1843)
20 March 1856 to 20 April 1860	27 engagements in New Mexico	New Mexico 1856, 1857, 1858, 1860
25 December 1868	Wichita Mountains, North Fork Red River, Indian Territory	Comanches

11 June 1870	Camp Supply, Indian Territory	
2 June 1871	Fort Larned, Kansas	
5 November 1887	Crow Agency, Montana	Montana, 1887
	THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR	
22 June to 17 July 1898	Santiago, Cuba	Santiago
1 July 1898	El Caney, Cuba	
1-3 July 1898	San Juan, Hill, Cuba	
	THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION	
25 March 1899	Malabon, P.I.	
31 March 1899	Malolos, P.I.	Malolos
22 April 1899	Novaliches, P.I.	
29 April to 1 May 1899	San Rafael, P.I.	
2 May 1899	Baliang, P.I.	
4 May 1899	Maasin, P.I.	San Isidro
17 May 1899	San Isidro, P.I.	
23 May 1899	San Idefonso, P.I.	
23 May 1899	Maasin, P.I.	San Isidro
4 December 1899	Dinalupijan, P.I.	
5 December 1899	Orani, P.I.	Luzon, 1899, 1900
11 June 1900	Balubad, P.I.	
27 November to 27 December 1911	Jolo, P.I.	Jolo
	WORLD WAR II	
13 January 1941 to 21 September 1943	Newfoundland	WW II American Theater (No Inscription)

6-10 April 1945	France	Northern France

VIETNAM

1 July 1966 31 May 1967	Phase II
1 June 1967	Phase III
29 January 1968	
30 January 1968	TET
1 April 1968	

COMMANDERS
&
SERGEANTS MAJOR



THIRD UNITED STATES INFANTRY

REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS

OLD FIRST REGIMENT

1784-1790	Brig. Gen. Josiah Harmer
1790-1803	COL John F. Hamtramck
1803-1808	COL Thomas Hunt
1808-1815	COL Jacob Kingsbury

PRESENT THIRD INFANTRY

1815-1818	COL John Miller
1818-1821	COL Joseph Lee Smith
1821-1825	COL Ninian Pinkney
1825-1834	COL Henry Leavenworth
1834-1840	COL James B. Many
1840-1848	MAJ Gen. Ethan A. Hitchcock
1852-1855	COL Thomas Stanford
1855-1861	COL Benjamin L. E. Bonneville
1861-1862	COL Charles F. Smith
1862-1869	COL William Hoffman
1869-1871	COL G. W. Getty
1871-1879	COL DeLancey Floyd-Jones
1879-1888	COL John R. Brooke
1888-1895	COL Edwin C. Mason
1895-1903	COL John H. Page
1903-1904	COL H. L. Haskell
1903-1910	COL T. C. Woodbury
1910-1914	COL Henry Kirby
1914-1915	COL William A. Mann
1915-1917	COL Robert L. Hirst
1917-1918	COL Frederick R. Day
1918-1919	COL Gustave A. Wieser
1919-1921	COL Paul Gidding
1921-1923	COL A. W. Bjornstad
1923-1924	COL E. M. Norton
1924-1925	COL W. R. Sample
1925-1928	COL W. E. Welsh
1928-1931	COL Walter C. Sweeney
1931-1932	COL David L. Stone
1932-1934	COL Charles J. Nelson
1934-1936	COL John Randolph
1936-1937	COL Charles F. Thompson
1937-1939	COL Martin C. Shallenberger
1939-1940	COL Maurice D. Welty
1940-1943	COL Paul H. Brown
1943-1944	COL Paul N. Starlings
1944-1945	COL John S. Moore
1945-1946	COL Herbert Vander Heide
1946-1948	COL Jesse B. Matlack
1948-1950	COL James V. Cole
1950-1952	COL William W. Jenna
1952-1954	COL Dennis M. Moore
1954-1955	COL Robert L. Cook

1955-1956	COL Fielder P. Greer
1956-1958	COL Mark F. Brennan
1958-1960	COL Christopher W. Chaney
1960-1962	COL Richard M. Lee
1962-1963	COL John W. Gorn
1963-1964	LTC Richard E. Cross
1964-1968	COL Joseph B. Conmy, Jr.
1968-1970	COL Robert M. Daugherty
1970-1972	COL Myron E. Lee, Jr.
1972-1974	COL Harvey H. Perritt, Jr.
1974-1976	COL Robert H. Clark
1976-1977	COL Robert D. Weigand
1977-1979	COL Donald C. Hilbert
1979-1981	COL Stanley G. Bonta
1981-1982	COL Don Phillips
1982-	COL Robert G. Krause

THIRD BATTALION, THIRD INFANTRY, USAR
(ACTIVATED 16 FEBRUARY 1963)

BATTALION COMMANDERS

1963-69	LTC George A. Sellner
1969-72	LTC George L. Chase
1972-74	MAJ Fred P. Mischuk
1974-76	MAJ Raymond H. Orbell
1976-77	LTC Elmer D. Schwankl
1977-79	LTC Donald G. Beuhler
1979-81	LTC Allan J. Gummert
1981-82	LTC David M. Adamson
1982-84	LTC Frank E. Moody
1984-	MAJ Robert L. August

THIRD BATTALION, THIRD INFANTRY, (USAR)

BATTALION SERGEANT MAJORS

1963-66	MSG Fred H. Jasper
1966-68	MSG George Daly
1968-74	CSM Richard G. Munson
1974-77	CSM Edward C. Lorentz
1977-78	MSG Lowell D. Larson
1978-80	SGM James J. Tebbe
1980-83	SGM Stanley R. Weckworth
1984-	MSG Jerald A. Spores

MEDAL OF HONOR WINNERS



MEDAL OF HONOR
WITH
SERVICE RIBBON AND ROSETTE

THIRD UNITED STATES INFANTRY MEDAL OF HONOR WINNERS

The Medal of Honor is the highest military award for bravery that can be given to any individual in the United States of America. Conceived in the early 1860's and first presented in 1863, the award may be awarded for a deed of personal bravery or self-sacrifice above and beyond the call of duty.

The following Third Infantry soldiers won the nations highest award:

*1. Holland, Michael J. (Vietnam Era) Type - Rank and organization: Corporal, US Army, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry, 199th Infantry Brigade. Place and date: Long Khanh, Providence, Republic of Vietnam, 3 July 1969. Entered service at: Richmond, VA. Born: 15 April 1949, Richmond, VA. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. CPL Holland distinguished himself while serving as an ammunition bearer with the weapons platoon of Company D, during a reconnaissance patrol mission. As the patrol was moving through a dense jungle area, it was caught in an intense crossfire from heavily fortified and concealed enemy ambush positions. As the patrol reacted to neutralize the ambush, it became evident that the heavy weapons could not be used in the cramped fighting area. CPL Holland dropped his recoilless rifle ammunition, and ran forward to join his commander in an assault on the enemy bunkers. The assaulting force moved forward until it was pinned down directly in front of the heavily fortified bunkers by machinegun fire. CPL Holland stood up to draw enemy fire on himself and to place suppressive fire on the enemy positions while his commander attempted to destroy the machinegun positions with grenades. Before the officer could throw a grenade, an enemy grenade landed in the position. CPL Holland alerted his comrades and his commander hurled the grenade from the position. When a second enemy grenade landed in the position, CPL Holland again shouted a warning to his fellow soldiers. Seeing that no one could reach the grenade and realizing that it was about to explode, CPL Holland, with complete disregard for his safety, threw himself on the grenade. By his dauntless courage, CPL Holland saved the lives of his comrades although he was mortally wounded by the explosion. CPL Holland's extraordinary heroism, at the cost of his life, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the US Army. *Awarded Posthumously.

2. Fegan, James (Indian Campaigns) Type - Rank and organization: Sergeant, Company H, 3d US Infantry. Place and date: At Plum Creek, Kans., March 1868. Entered service at: - - -. Birth: Ireland. Date of issue: 19 October 1878. Citation: While in charge of a powder train en route from Fort Harker to Fort Dodge, Kans., was attacked by a party of desperadoes, who attempted to rescue a deserter in his charge and to fire the train. SGT Fegan, single-handed, repelled the attacking party, wounding 2 of them, and brought his train through in safety.

3. Herron, Leander (Indian Campaigns) Type - Rank and organization: Corporal, Company A, 3rd US Infantry. Place and date: Near Fort Dodge, Kans., 2 September 1868. Entered service at: - - -. Birth: Bucks County, PA. Date of Issue: Unknown. Citation: While detailed as mail courier from the fort, voluntarily went to the assistance of a party of 4 enlisted men, who were attacked by about 50 Indians at some distance from the fort and remained with them until the party was relieved.

4. Smith, Robert (Indian Campaigns) Type - Rank and organization: Private, Company M, 3rd US Infantry. Place and date: At Slim Buttes, Montana, 9 September 1876. Entered service at: - - -. Birth: Rahway, NJ. Date of issue: 16 October 1877. Citation: Special Bravery in endeavoring to dislodge Indians secreted in a ravine.

5. Burkard, Oscar (Indian Campaigns) Type - Rank and organization: Private, Hospital Corps, US Army (attached 3rd Infantry). Place and date: At Leech Lake, Minn., 5 October 1898. Entered service at: Hay Creek, Minn. Born: 21 December 1877, Achern, Germany. Date of issue: 21 August 1899. Citation: For distinguished bravery in action against hostile Indians. (Note: This, the last Medal of Honor won in an Indian campaign, was awarded for an action during the uprising of Chippewa Indians, on Leech Lake, northern Minnesota, 5 October 1898.)

MINNESOTA'S OWN



PRIVATE OF INFANTRY (FULL DRESS)

THE THIRD INFANTRY IN MINNESOTA

Fort Snelling was founded by the 5th United States Infantry and it is appropriate that the largest military unit within its borders today should be an Infantry regiment - The 3rd United States Infantry. This regiment - the oldest regiment of Infantry in the United States Army, dates its history from 1784. It has had a colorful career in all wars from the American Revolution to Vietnam. Its battle streamers are many and varied. It was during the Mexican War that it earned the name of the "Old Guard" in 1848 from General Winfield Scott at the Victory parade at Mexico City, that marked the end of the Mexican War.

The Third Infantry also known as "Minnesota's Own", as a large share of its personnel, officers and men were drawn from this section of the country, served at Fort Snelling from 1888 - 1898, and 1921 - 1941. It has always claimed the Twin Cities as "Home". While at Fort Snelling, the Third Infantry trained students in the Citizens' Military Training Camps, Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and officers and enlisted men of the Reserves and the National Guard of Minnesota.

Today, The Third Battalion, Third Infantry, 205th Infantry Brigade (Separate)-(Light), USAR is headquartered at Fort Snelling, Minnesota with companies in New Prague, La Seur, Mankato, and Cannon Falls, Minnesota where the Third Infantry once again serves as "Minnesotas Own."

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True West, November, 1983.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Lineage and Honors

3d INFANTRY
(THE OLD GUARD)

Constituted 3 June 1784 in the Regular Army as the First American Regiment to consist of companies from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania

Organized August - September 1784 in Pennsylvania and New Jersey (New York and Connecticut companies organized in 1785)

Redesignated 29 September 1789 as the Regiment of Infantry

Redesignated 3 March 1791 as the 1st Infantry

Redesignated in 1792 as the Infantry of the 1st Sub-Legion

Redesignated 31 October 1796 as the 1st Infantry

Consolidated May - October 1815 with the 5th Infantry (constituted 12 April 1808), the 17th Infantry (constituted 11 January 1812), the 19th Infantry (constituted 26 June 1812), and the 28th Infantry (constituted 29 January 1813) to form the 3d Infantry

Consolidated August - December 1869 with one half of the 37th Infantry (see ANNEX) and consolidated unit designated as the 3d Infantry

(2d and 3d Battalions inactivated 18 November 1921 at Fort Snelling, Minnesota; activated 8 June 1922 at Fort Snelling, Minnesota)

Assigned 24 March 1923 to the 7th Division

Relieved 15 August 1927 from assignment to the 7th Division and assigned to the 6th Division

Relieved 1 October 1933 from assignment to the 6th Division and assigned to the 7th Division

Relieved 16 October 1939 from assignment to the 7th Division and assigned to the 6th Division

Relieved 10 May 1941 from assignment to the 6th Division

(1st Battalion inactivated 1 June 1941 at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; activated 14 February 1942 in Newfoundland)

(2d Battalion [less Headquarters and Headquarters Company] inactivated 1 September 1942 at Fort Snelling, Minnesota [Headquarters and Headquarters Company concurrently inactivated in Greenland]; battalion activated 22 October 1943 at Camp Butner, North Carolina)

Inactivated 20 November 1946 in Germany.

3d INFANTRY
(THE OLD GUARD)

Regiment (less 2d Battalion) activated 6 April 1948 at Fort Myer, Virginia (2d Battalion concurrently activated at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.)

Reorganized 1 July 1957 as a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental System

Withdrawn 16 January 1986 from the Combat Arms Regimental System and reorganized under the United States Army Regimental System with Headquarters at Fort Myer, Virginia

ANNEX

Constituted 3 May 1861 in the Regular Army as the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry

Organized May 1865 - September 1866 at Fort Wayne, Michigan; Newport Barracks, Kentucky; and Fort Columbus, New York

Reorganized and redesignated 23 November 1866 as the 37th Infantry

One half of the 37th Infantry consolidated August - December 1869 with the 3d Infantry and consolidated unit designated as the 3d Infantry (remaining half of the 37th Infantry consolidated in June 1869 with the 5th Infantry and consolidated unit designated as the 5th Infantry)

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

War of 1812
Canada
Chippewa
Lundy's Lane

Mexican War
Palo Alto
Resaca de la Palma
Monterey
Vera Cruz
Cerro Gordo
Contreras
Churubusco
Chapultepec

Civil War
Bull Run
Peninsula
Manassas
Antietam
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville
Gettysburg
Appomattox
Texas 1861
Florida 1861
Florida 1862
Virginia 1863

Indian Wars
Miami
Seminoles
Comanches
New Mexico 1856
New Mexico 1857
New Mexico 1858
New Mexico 1860
Montana 1887

War with Spain
Santiago

Philippine Insurrection
Malolos
San Isidro
Luzon 1899
Luzon 1900
Jolo 1911

World War II
American Theater, Streamer without Inscription
Northern France

3d INFANTRY
(THE OLD GUARD)

Vietnam
Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer-Fall 1969
Winter-Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I

DECORATIONS

Valorous Unit Award, Streamer embroidered SAIGON - LONG BINH

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered WASHINGTON, D.C., 1969-1973

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Mildred E. Hedberg

MILDRED E. HEDBERG
Brigadier General, USA
The Adjutant General

1850 Tomas Masaryk, first president of Czechoslovakia, born
Daniel Webster made his antisecession speech in the Senate
1870 First male and female Grand Jury impaneled (Wyoming)
1872 Piet Mondrian, Dutch artist, born
1875 Maurice Ravel, French composer, born
1876 Telephone patent granted to Alexander Graham Bell
1889 Ben Ames Williams, novelist, born
1907 Wild prairie rose became the North Dakota state flower
1908 Semblance of peace restored in Nevada gold-miners' strike
1912 Discovery of the South Pole announced by Amundsen
1913 Dynamite explosion killed 55 in Baltimore
1926 First successful radio-telephone call made between New York and London
1927 Tange, Japan, rocked by an earthquake
1936 German troops began to occupy the Rhineland
1938 Spanish insurgents killed 1,000 in Barcelona air raids
1945 U.S. forces crossed the Rhine at Remagen Bridge
1949 First homes at Levittown, Long Island housing development, went on sale
1950 Coplon and Gubicher were found guilty of espionage
1957 Suez Canal opened after four months of closure by Egypt
1962 OSO I satellite launched
1965 Queen Louise of Sweden died
1970 Total eclipse of the sun
1962, 1973, 1984, 2057, 2068 Ash Wednesday
1905, 1916, 2000, 2079 Shrove Tuesday

* - THIS IS THE DATE OF OUR EVENT.

March 8th

Feast of St. Senan of Scattery
648 AD St. Felix of Dunwich died (Feast Day)
690 St. Julian of Toledo died (Feast Day)
1144 Pope Celestine II died
1198 Philip elected King of Germany
1550 St. John of God, patron of the mortally sick, died (Feast Day)
1556 Charter granted for founding Holy Trinity College at Oxford, England
1618 Johann Kepler discovered the third law of planetary motion
1702 King William III of England died and Anne, his sister-in-law, was proclaimed Queen
1766 Hirosaki, Japan, shaken by an earthquake
1787 Karl von Grafe, "Father of plastic surgery," born
1801 British forces landed in Egypt
1841 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Supreme Court Justice, born
1844 King Charles XIV of Sweden, born Jean-Baptist Bernadotte of France, died
1845 Commodore Perry's treaty with Japan ratified by the U.S.
1849 Thomas Swing was appointed first U.S. Secretary of Interior
1853 Isaac Winslow filed for a patent on canning corn
1858 Ruggiero Leoncavallo, opera composer, born
1862 Confederates defeated at Pea Ridge, Arkansas
Confederate ironclad Merrimac sank the Union's Cumberland and Congress
1865 A canal began to connect Amsterdam with the North Sea
1869 Hector Berlioz, composer, died
University of Deseret organized (Salt Lake City, Utah)
1894 New York state passed a dog-licensing law
1895 The constitutional convention of Utah finished its job
1896 Volunteers of America held its first public meeting
1901 Dust storms began in Algeria that were to deposit almost 2 million tons on Europe
1909 South Dakota adopted its state flag
1916 Germany declared war on Portugal
1917 Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, inventor, died
1920 Switzerland and Cuba joined the League of Nations
1921 Dato, Premier of Spain, assassinated in Madrid
1930 William Howard Taft, 27th U.S. President, died
1931 * Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke to the nation via radio
1942 Japanese landed on New Guinea
1950 First shipment of planes under the NATO agreement landed in France
1954 Japan signed a mutual trade pact with the U.S.
1957 Ghana entered the United Nations
1958 U.S. Navy was without a battleship, the last having been added to a "mothball" fleet
1965 First U.S. ground combat unit landed in Viet Nam
1970 Last day of the World Championship Gold-Panning Contest at Rosamond, California
Start of the two-day Chingay Procession, the gathering of the Chinese clans, in Malaysia

Festival of Teahouses (Okinawa)
1971 Harold Lloyd, comedian of early films, died
1972 Airship (Zeppelin) Europe had its maiden voyage
1905, 1916, 2000, 2079 Ash Wednesday
2011, 2095 Shrove Tuesday

March 9th

Feast of St. Gregory of Nyssa
1152 AD Frederick I ("Barbarosa") crowned King of Germany
1440 St. Frances of Rome died (Feast Day)
1451 Amerigo Vespucci, explorer, born
1463 St. Katherine of Bologua died
1629 Czar Alexis Mikhailovich of Russia born
1661 Jules Mazarin, French cardinal-statesman, died
1793 Imprisonment for debt abolished in France
1796 Napoleon married Josephine
1857 St. Dominic Savio died (Feast Day)
1862 Battle of the "ironclads," the Monitor and the Merrimac
1882 First U.S. patent issued for false teeth
1885 North Carolina state flag adopted
Bread treated with carbon dioxide patented
1888 William I, Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, died
1899 Congress voted $50 million for defense in the Spanish-American war
1902 Edward Durrell Stone, architect, born
1904 Maryland state flag adopted
1911 Utah state flag adopted
1913 Alan Ladd, actor, born
1916 Pancho Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico (Mexican Revolution)
1918 Mickey Spillane, mystery writer, born
1922 New Jersey became the last state to ratify the Prohibition Amendment
1923 A meteorite fell near Ashdon, England
1932 Henry Pu Yi became the ruler of Manchuria as a Japanese puppet state
1933 President granted money control powers by Congress
1944 U.S.S. Leopold torpedoed in the Atlantic
1955 Matthew Henson, black member of Peary's Arctic expedition, died
1961 Russia sent the first dog into space in Sputnik 9
1963 Dynamite plant explosion at Madderfontain, South Africa
1970 Islamic New Year 1390
2011, 2095 Ash Wednesday
1943, 2038 Shrove Tuesday

March 10th

New Hampshire Primary Election Day
241 BC Carthaginian fleet defeated off the Aegates Islands by the Romans in the First Punic War
320 AD The Forty Martyrs were killed (Feast Day)
1040 Harold I, King of England, died
1302 Dante, author, threatened with burning should he return to Florence, Italy
1410 Wire invented
1452 Ferdinand, King of Spain, born
1496 Columbus left Hispaniola to return to Spain
1503 Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor, born
1527 Baber, by victory at Kanwaha, became ruler of Northern India
1617 Peace of Stolbova signed by Russia, Poland, and Sweden
1628 Marcello Malpighi, discoverer of capillary circulation, born
1629 King Charles I of England dissolved Parliament, not to recall it for 11 years
1640 Gardiner's Island, first English settlement in New York, founded
1643 End of the first fair at Irbit, Russia
1776 Louise, Queen of Prussia, born
1779 The Potato War over Bavarian succession ended
1785 Thomas Jefferson appointed to replace aging Benjamin Franklin as U.S. Minister to England
1812 Lord Byron's Childe Harold's Pilgrimage first published
1813 The Order of the Iron Cross founded in Prussia
1817 Blanketeers marched on London
1826 King John II of Portugal died
1844 King Edward VII of England married Alexandra of Denmark
1845 Alexander III, Czar of Russia, born
1858 Dr. Livingstone left England for Africa, again
1864 Maximilian II, King of Bavaria, died
1867 Lillian D. Wald, founder of the Henry Street Settlement House, born
1871 Grand Lodge of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks incorporated
1876 "Mr. Watson, come here please; I want you." (first telephone use)
Anna Hyatt Huntington, sculptor, born
1880 First Salvation Army Mission to the U.S. landed in New York
1889 King John of Abyssinia killed battling the dervishes
1896 A hat-tipping device patented in the U.S.

GEN. ~~Col.~~ Powell's Remarks

MR. PRESIDENT. SECRETARY CHENEY. MEN AND WOMEN OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE CAMPAIGN IN PANAMA IS NOW PART OF THE GLORIOUS TRADITION OF OUR NATION AND ITS ARMED FORCES. FOR AS LONG AS THE STARS AND STRIPES FLIES OVER THIS NATION, THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN WHO HELPED TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO PANAMA IN DECEMBER 1989 WILL BE REMEMBERED.

THE CAMPAIGN STREAMER BEING AFIXED TO THE COLORS OF EACH OF THE SERVICES TODAY TAKES ITS PLACE NEXT TO THOSE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES, WORLD WAR I AND II, KOREA, VIETNAM, GRENADA, AND FROM MANY, MANY OTHER MILITARY CAMPAIGNS IN OUR NATION'S HISTORY.

ON THE SURFACE, THE STREAMER IS BUT A PIECE OF MULTI-COLORED CLOTH. BUT FOR EVERY AMERICAN -- AND ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE OF US WHO WORE A UNIFORM IN DECEMBER 1989 -- IT WILL ALWAYS REPRESENT UNSELFISH SACRIFICE.

IT IS THE SACRIFICE THIS NATION HAS ALWAYS BEEN WILLING TO MAKE TO RIGHT A WRONG OR TO HELP PEOPLE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD THROW OFF THE TERRIBLE BONDS OF OPPRESSION AND TYRANNY.

IT IS THE SACRIFICE THIS NATION'S LEADERS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO MAKE IN TIMES OF CRISIS. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO LEAD WHEN IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO DO NOTHING IS WHAT HAS MADE AMERICA A SHINING LIGHT IN A WORLD TOO OFTEN SHROUDED IN DARKNESS.

AND IT WILL ALWAYS REPRESENT THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES WHO WENT TO PANAMA AND MADE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE FOR THEIR COUNTRY.

SOME SAY THAT THIS SORT OF PATRIOTISM AND CITIZENSHIP BY EXAMPLE IS OUTDATED -- THAT IT HAS NO PLACE IN THE LAST DECADE OF THE 20TH CENTURY. OTHERS WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE WE HAVE OUTGROWN THE TRADITIONAL VALUES WHICH MADE THIS NATION SO GREAT.

ALL I HAVE TO SAY TO THESE DISBELIEVERS IS "JUST CAUSE." THESE TWO SIMPLE, PROPHETIC WORDS PROVE BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT THAT AMERICA REMAINS A NATION OF PATRIOTISM AND OF SOLID VALUES.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, IN A WORLD REELING UNDER THE WEIGHT OF HISTORIC CHANGES, OUR ACTIONS TO HELP THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO THEIR LAND SPOKE LOUDER THAN ANY WORDS POSSIBLY COULD. THE 26,000 TROOPS INVOLVED IN OPERATION JUST CAUSE SHOWED THE WORLD THAT AMERICA IS WELL AWARE OF ITS LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES -- AND THAT WE ARE BOTH WILLING TO AND FULLY CAPABLE OF EXERCISING THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL.

THOSE OF US IN UNIFORM GATHERED HERE TODAY STAND IN PLACE OF OVER TWO MILLION OF OUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS WHO SHARE IN THIS HONOR. FOR OVER TWO HUNDRED YEARS, CITIZEN-SOLDIERS SUCH AS WE HAVE ANSWERED WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE CALLED.

ONCE AGAIN, WE HAVE BEEN CALLED. ONCE AGAIN, OUR NATION FOUND IT NECESSARY TO FIGHT FOR ITS PRINCIPLES. AND, ONCE AGAIN, AMERICAN SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN WERE UP TO THE TASK. WE DIDN'T START THE FIGHT, BUT, BY GOD, WE DID END IT.

IT IS WITH GREAT PRIDE THAT I STAND HERE TODAY, WITH MY FELLOW SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES. TO OUR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND TO OUR SECRETARY, I SAY THANK YOU. THANK YOU FROM ALL OF US IN UNIFORM FOR PROVIDING THE LEADERSHIP WHICH HAS MADE THIS SPECIAL MOMENT IN HISTORY POSSIBLE.

MR. PRESIDENT, WE ARE PROUD TO WEAR THE UNIFORM IN SERVICE TO THIS GREAT NATION. WE ARE PROUD TO BE AMERICANS.

STREAMER SET U.S.ARMY

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

1. LEXINGTON 1775
2. TICONDEROGA 1775
3. BOSTON 1776
4. QUEBEC 1775, 1776
5. CHARLESTON 1776, 1780
6. LONG ISLAND 1776
7. TRENTON 1776
8. PRINCETON 1777
9. SARATOGA 1777
10. BRANDYWINE 1777
11. GERMANTOWN 1777
12. MONMOUTH 1778
13. SAVANNAH 1778, 1779
14. COWPENS 1781
15. GUILFORD COURTHOUSE 1781
16. YORKTOWN 1781

WAR OF 1812

1. CANADA 1812-1815
2. CHIPPEWA 1814
3. LUNDY'S LANE 1814
4. BLADENSBURG 1814
5. McHENRY 1814
6. NEW ORLEANS 1814-1815

MEXICAN WAR

1. PALO ALTO 1846
2. RESACA DE LA PALMA 1846
3. MONTEREY 1846
4. BUENA VISTA 1847
5. VERA CRUZ 1847
6. CERRO GORDO 1847
7. CONTRERAS 1847
8. CHURUBUSCO 1847
9. MOLINA DEL REY 1847
10. CHAPULTEPEC 1847

CIVIL WAR

1. SUMPTER 1861
2. BULL RUN 1861
3. HENRY & DONELSON 1862
4. MISSISSIPPI RIVER 1862-1863
5. PENINSULA 1862
6. SHILOH 1862
7. VALLEY 1862
8. MANASSAS 1862
9. ANTEITAM 1862
10. FREDERICKSBURG 1862
11. MURFREESBOROUGH 1862-1863
12. CHANCELLORSVILLE 1863
13. GETTYSBURG 1863
14. VICKSBURG 1863
15. CHICKAMAUGA 1863
16. CHATTANOOGA 1863
17. WILDERNESS 1864
18. ATLANTA 1864
19. SPOTSLYVANIA 1864
20. COLD HARBOR 1864
21. PETERSBURG 1864-1865
22. SHENANDOAH 1864
23. FRANKLIN 1864
24. NASHVILLE 1864
25. APPOMATTOX 1865

INDIAN WARS

1. MIAMI 1790-1795
2. TIPPECANOE 1811
3. CREEKS 1813-1814, 1836-1837
4. SEMINOLES 1817-1818, 1835, 1855-1858
5. BLACK HAWK 1832
6. COMMANCHES 1867-1875
7. MODOCS 1872-1873
8. APACHES 1873, 1885-1886
9. LITTLE BIG HORN 1876-1877
10. NEZ PERCES 1877
11. BANNOCKS 1878
12. CHEYENNES 1878-1879
13. UTES 1879-1880
14. PINE RIDGE 1890-1891

WAR WITH SPAIN

1. SANTIAGO 1898
2. PUERTO RICO 1898
3. MANILA 1898

CHINA RELEIF EXPEDITION

1. TIENTSIN 1900
2. YANG-TSUN 1900
3. PEKING 1900

PHILLIPINE INSURRECTION

1. MANILA 1899
2. ILOILA 1899
3. MALALOS 1899
4. LAGUNA DE BAY
5. SAN ISIDIRO 1899
6. ZAPOTE RIVER 1899
7. CAVITE 1899-1900
8. TARLAC 1899
9. SAN FABIAN 1899
10. MANDANAO 1902-1905
11. JOLO 1905, 1906, 1913

MEXICAN EXPEDITION

1. MEXICO 1916-1917

WORLD WAR I

1. CAMBRAI 1917
2. SOMME DEFENSIVE 1918
3. LYS 1918
4. AISNE 1918
5. MONTDIDIER-NOYON 1918
6. CHAMPAGNE-MARNE 1918
7. AISNE-MARNE 1918
8. SOMME OFFENSIVE 1918
9. OISE-AISNE 1918
10. UPRES-LYS 1918
11. ST. MIHIEL 1918
12. MEUSE-ARGONNE 1918
13. VITTORIO VENETO 1918

WORLD WAR II, AMERICAN THEATER

1. ANTISUBMARINE 1941-1945

WORLD WAR II, ASIATIC PACIFIC THEATER

1. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 1941-1942
2. BURMA 1941-1942
3. CENTRAL PACIFIC 1941-1943
4. EAST INDIES 1942
5. INDIA-BURMA 1942-1945
6. AIR OFFENSIVE-JAPAN 1942-1945
7. ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 1942-1943
8. CHINA DEFENSIVE 1942-1945
9. PAPUA 1942-1943
10. GUADALCANAL 1943-1944
11. NEW GUINEA 1943-1944
12. NORTHERN SOLOMONS 1943-1944
13. EASTERN MANDATES 1944
14. BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO 1943-1944
15. WESTERN PACIFIC 1944-1945
16. LEYTE 1944-1945
17. LUZON 1944-1945
18. CENTRAL BURMA 1945
19. SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES
20. RYUKYUS 1945
21. CHINA OFFENSIVE 1945

WORLD WAR II THEATER

1. EGYPT-LYBIA 1942-1943
2. AIR OFFENSIVE-EUROPE 1942-1944
3. ALGERIA-FRENCH MOROCCO 1942
4. TUNISIA 1942-1943
5. SICILY 1943
6. NAPLES-FOGGIA 1943-1944
7. ANZIO 1944
8. ROME-ARNO 1944
9. NORMANDY 1944
10. NORTHERN FRANCE 1944
11. SOUTHERN FRANCE 1944
12. NORTH APPENNINES 1944-1945
13. RHINELAND 1944-1945
14. ARDENNES-ALSACE 1944-1945
15. CENTRAL EUROPE 1945
16. PO VALLEY 1945

KOREAN WAR

1. UN DEFENSIVE 1950
2. UN OFFENSIVE 1950
3. CCF INTERVENTION 1950-1951
4. FIRST UN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1951
5. CCF SPRING OFFENSIVE 1951
6. UN SUMMER-FALL OFFENSIVE
7. SECOND KOREAN WINTER 1951-1952
8. KOREA SUMMER-FALL 1952
9. THIRD KOREA WINTER 1952-1953
10. KOREA SUMMER 1953

VIETNAM SERVICE

1. VIETNAM ADVISORY 1962-1965
2. VIETNAM DEFENSIVE 1965
3. VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1965-1966
4. VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE II 1966-1967
5. VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE III 1967-1968
6. TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1968
7. VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE IV 1968
8. VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE V 1968
9. VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE VI 1968-1969
10. TET 69/ COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1969
11. VIETNAM SUMMER-FALL 1969
12. VIETNAM WINTER-SPRING 1970
13. SANCTUARY COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1970
14. VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE VII 1970-1971
15. CONSOLIDATION I 1971
16. CONSOLIDATION II 1971-1972
17. VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE 1972-1973

GRENADA 1983

3D US INF. (TOG)
CAMPAIGN BATTLE STREAMERS

INDIANS WARS

1. MIAMI
2. SEMINOLES
3. COMANCHES
4. NEW MEXICO 1856
5. NEW MEXICO 1857
6. NEW MEXICO 1858
7. NEW MEXICO 1860
8. MONTANA

WAR OF 1812

9. CANADA
10. CHIPPEWA
11. LUNDY'S LANE

MEXICAN WAR

12. PALO ALTO
13. RESECA DE LA PALMA
14. MONTEREY
15. VERA CRUZ
16. CERRO GORDO
17. CONTRERAS
18. CHURUBUSCO
19. CHAPULTEPEC

CIVIL WAR

20. BULL RUN
21. PENINSULA
22. MANASSAA
23. ANTIETAM
24. FREDRICKSBURG
25. CHANCELLORSVILLE
26. GETTYSBURG
27. TEXAS 1861
28. FLORIDA 1861
29. FLORIDA 1862
30. VIRGINIA 1863
31. APPOMATTOX

SPANISH AMERICAN WAR

32. SANTIAGO

PHILLIPINE INSURRECTION

33. MALOLOS
34. SAN ISIDIRO 1899
35. LUZON 1899
36. LUZON 1900
37. JOLO 1911

WORLD WAR II

38. AMERICAN THEATER
39. NORTHERN FRANCE

VIETNAM WAR

40. COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE II
41. COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE III
42. TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE
43. COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE IV
44. COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE V
45. COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE VI
46. TET 1969 COUNTEROFFENSIVE
47. SUMMER-FALL 1969
48. WINTER-SPRING 1970
49. SANCTUARY COUNTEROFFENSIVE
50. COUNTEROFFENSIVE PHASE VII
51. VALOROUS UNIT
    (SAIGON LONG BINH)
52. MERITORIOUS UNIT
    (WASHINGTON DC 1969-1972)
53. SUPERIOR UNIT
    (WASHINGTON DC 1984-1985)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 5, 1990

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

1:08 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: This morning I met with the Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh, to discuss the legal process related to the prosecution of General Noriega.

We are committed to a fair trial and to providing all the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution and laws. The Attorney General assures me that our case is strong, our resolve is firm, and our legal representations are sound.

Our government is not seeking a deal with Noriega. Our policy remains that we brought him to this country for prosecution. I will be ever mindful of this legal process in the days ahead and will not comment on any aspect of this prosecution or any matters that could even inadvertently affect the outcome of this case. And I'm going ask others from this administration to do the same.

Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy Secretary of Treasury Robson have just given me a report on the economic reconstruction efforts in Panama. The first action that the United States took after General Noriega was removed from power was to release some $400 million in money that was withheld by virtue of our economic sanctions -- sanctions which are now being lifted -- $140 million, I believe, is already in Panama. The revitalization of the Panamanian economy is a major priority in the months ahead, as our efforts for humanitarian assistance. And I would say here I've been very grateful for the medical supplies that have gone to Panama.

I can report today that considerable progress has been made so far in returning Panama to a normal state of affairs. The new government has taken charge and President Endara is working tirelessly to meet the needs of his people. Both Under Secretary Robson and Eagleburger were very high in their praise of Mr. Calderon, Mr. Ford and, of course, President Endara. They're discussing housing programs, business development, bank loans that will help spur economic growth. We are committed to be a part of that process.

I want to assure all of the countries of Latin America that United States policy remains one of a friendly, supportive and respectful neighbor. We have worked hard and intensively to consult bilaterally and multilaterally with Latin America, and we will continue to do that. I personally will be involved in that.

At the Latin American summit in Costa Rica, I pledged that we would work with the countries of this hemisphere to build a better life for the citizens. Our policy of cooperation is firm. Yesterday, I had a lengthy discussion with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain who is so well respected in this hemipshere as well. And I share his deep, personal interest in seeing that the countries of this hemisphere pull together on behalf of democracy and economic freedom.

I know the yearnings of my fellow leaders in this hemisphere -- leaders in Latin America -- and I believe they will support the new government of Panama and they will support the United

States as we work together in this hemisphere. I've asked the Vice President, Dan Quayle, to visit a number of these Latin American countries within the next several weeks to personally deliver this message. I view this as very, very important diplomacy. And I am determined not to neglect the democracies in this hemisphere. Some have felt that we were so infatuated with the change in Eastern Europe that we were in the process of neglecting this hemisphere. And that is not the case. And the Quayle trip, in my view, will help. I have been undertaking consultations directly with leaders since I've been President. I will resume that, as I said, and the Vice President will be in a position to explain very clearly not only U.S. policy, but our aspirations for Panama and, indeed, for this entire hemisphere.

So that's where we are, and I'd be glad to take a few questions.

Q Mr. President, you said that the government is not seeking any kind of a deal concerning Noriega.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Does that mean that you are irrevocably ruling out any reducing of charges, increasing of charges? And also, since the indictment runs from '81 to '86 and you had many contacts, apparently, with Panama during that period, were you ever aware of any drug activities on the part of Noriega?

THE PRESIDENT: On the first part of the question, there's no such plan. The man's entitled to to whatever is granted him under our law. So there isn't any such plan.

Secondly, I have made some statements in reply to your second question, so punch it in the computer, and I'll have nothing more to say about it because I do not want, even inadvertently, to prejudice this case. But my actions are, in my view, totally unrelated.

Q Mr. President, with General Noriega out of Panama and safely in custody in this country it seems like you may have a difficult choice in deciding how to maintain order in Panama. Do you envision keeping a U.S. military peacekeeping force there beyond the usual contingent of 12,000 troops, or would you like to see the Panamanian Defense Forces reconstituted?

THE PRESIDENT: One, I'd like to see their police forces, whatever emerges, reconstituted. Two, we will get our forces that went in out as soon as possible. Three, I will just say this because your question obviously understands this, but to those listeners out there, South Com has had a force there and that force, under the treaty, will remain there. But the answer is, we want to get those additional augmented forces out as soon as possible, and we will.

Q Mr. President, I'd like to try to follow up a question you were asked when you were here last about secrecy and the two missions by General Scowcroft to China. As I'm sure you may be aware, Secretary of State Baker was asked about the first -- what we then thought was the first China mission on one of the weekend talk shows, and he indicated that it was indeed. It turned out to be the second. He has since acknowledged quite openly that his answer was false and that he felt constrained to give that answer to protect the secrecy of the mission. And I wondered first, sir, whether you felt it was worth it for him to have to do that? And second, whether that sort of thing is acceptable in your administration?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me simply say that some things will be conducted in secrecy. And I know you don't like it. Your business is to get everything out in the open, and my business is to conduct the foreign affairs of this country in the way I think I was elected to -- and for the most part, that will be in the open. But this move into Panama was held in secrecy, and I think the American people understand that.

My move to send people to China was controversial. Some think that the best way to make change for human rights in China is isolation. Don't talk to them. Try to punish them by excommunication. I don't feel that way. And so I asked these people to go forward, and I don't think Jim Baker would ever deliberately mislead somebody, and so I will stand with him.

Q Sir, I believe he indicated that he felt he had to do that and that he knew what he was doing, that he had to do it. And I wondered how you felt about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Ask him about it. I support my Secretary of State.

Q You talk about your concern about prejudicing the case, but as you well know, you have called Noriega a thug and other people in the administration have gone further. You've said he's poisoning our children. Haven't you already done that and --

THE PRESIDENT: I think I've heard all kinds of characterizations of him in the press, columnists, even commentators, presidents, members of the United States Congress. He is now in custody. Time for rhetoric is over. Time for answering hypothetical questions that might prejudice the trial is over. I would go back, Lesley, to help you on that, to Watergate, where there were hearings -- hearings held, charges made over and over again, editorials written and voiced, and yet the people received a fair trial. So I am convinced that our system of justice is so fair that the person will get a fair trial. But I can tell you from my standpoint, I am going to bend over backwards and not answer hypothetical questions or not do anything that might prejudice that.

Q Can I have a follow-up, please? I want to actually follow up on Helen.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, that's a separate question. (Laughter.)

Q But it's a follow-up. Reducing of charges. Are you saying that if he wants to go for that, if he wants to try to go for reducing of charges, that we will entertain it? You said --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying he has a right to do what he wants and let the legal process determine how that should work out.

Q You're not ruling it out.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not ruling it in. I'm just saying he's got his rights and we ought not to stand up here and try to define narrowly what they are.

Q Mr. President, based on your opening remarks and your comments about the Vice President's trip, it would indicate that you're concerned about relations with Latin America. Has the actions you've taken set it back?

THE PRESIDENT: To some degree I am concerned. Because I am well aware of how our friends south of our border, including my friend, President Salinas, look at the use of American force anywhere. So I am concerned about it. I think it's something that's correctable because I think they know that I have tried a lot of consultation, that we have exhausted the remedies in this particular case of multilateral diplomacy. But given the history of the use of U.S. force, I would be remiss if I didn't face up to the problem that we must go forward diplomatically now to explain how this President looks at the protection of American life; that we acted, in our view, well within our rights, but that we will continue consultation. But look, I felt strongly about the protection of American life. So we've got to get them to understand that this isn't a shift away from what some had termed excessively timid diplomacy.

Q Well, Mr. President, wouldn't that indicate that actually you were continuing old American policies that have upset the people in Latin America?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, to the degree -- if there is that perception, then it's up to me and the Secretary. And in this instance, the Vice President's trip takes on enormous importance to convince the people of the truth. And that is that we are not reverting to just a willful -- what's the word I'm groping for here -- use of force that has no rationale. But when it comes to the protection of American life, please our friends south of the border, understand this President is going to protect it.

I'll tell you one thing that's helped on this, to the degree there is a problem at all. And that is the way the Panamanian democracy is now starting to move forward, the certification of the three people who had been deprived of their right to hold office by the previous regime. That's been an enormous help. And then I think the other thing is the reception, the public reception in Panama for our action. It has been overwhelming -- overwhelming.

Q On that, sir, Lee Atwater, the Chairman of the RNC, says Panama is a political jackpot for you and it could will wipe out the disenchantment, for example, for the way you handled China. Without saying that's why you went into Panama, sending troops in, is one effect of it that it is a political jackpot?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Jesse Jackson doesn't think so. He talked to my wife. And so there's differences of opinion on that. But I didn't do something for political reason. That's not the reason I do that. I did it to protect American life. A President's called on to take certain actions. We're not going in to try to furbish a political image; that's ridiculous.

Q Having said that, though, have you now neutralized the Democrats on foreign policy? Is this the last time George Mitchell can ever accuse you of having a timid foreign policy?

THE PRESIDENT: Knowing George, he'll find a reason, he'll find a way. And that's his job. Look, we're going into an election year. But I want to try if I can to separate the response -- and he's been supportive of this. Let's give the man credit. But I don't think it's laid to rest or put off bounds any criticism of the President by Democratic opposition if that's the question -- no, absolutely not.

Q Mr. President, do you anticipate that the combat troops -- the bulk of the additional combat troops sent into Panama will indeed be out by the end of this month, as some administration officials have said? And secondly and more broadly, do you now see an expanded role for the American military in small, regional issues like this one, or more particularly in the war against drugs, since there was a strong connection to this operation?

THE PRESIDENT: I see no parallel between the situation here where American lives are at stake and you had an indicted person who usurped power and declared war against the United States -- I don't think you can draw a parallel between that unique situation and then other countries.

What was the other part of it?

Q The bit about whether you see these additional combat troops able to come home, all of them.

THE PRESIDENT: As soon as possible. And I have made clear to the Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who is down in Panama right now, I believe that this is what we should do, this is what they themselves want to do. Some U.S. forces that went in are already out, so I would look for an early return.

Q General time frame?

THE PRESIDENT: Can't help you. But as soon as General Powell gets back, we'll have a more --

Q What about the international law implications? Isn't this something that you are also going to talk to the Latin American countries?

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely.

Q Isn't this setting a precedent? What is the explanation behind it?

THE PRESIDENT: The right to protect American lives granted under the U.N. Charter, and we will protect lives of citizens, and we will go forward with that. The State Department, as I understand it, has already spelled that out. But I think you raise a good point. Yes, we should make very clear why we acted and under what authority we acted, as we did.

Q Mr. President, you just described Panama as a unique case. And I'd just like to ask you sort of a philosophical question. If the criteria you listed here -- protecting American lives, having exhausted all the other diplomatic options -- presented themselves again, should we look in a Bush presidency for more such deployments in military force if your criteria were met?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if you can spell out what the criteria is, and then if you can look to the future to see the situation surrounding it. I can't visualize another situation quite this unique. But let me just say when American life is threatened -- we were concerned in El Salvador, for example -- a civilian hotel could well have been occupied by a guerrilla force that would have threatened the use of -- threatened American life. That concerned me. And indeed, we moved forces not in some macho way, but to try to protect the lives of American citizens. But I think most people understood that. But I don't see -- David, I don't see another real parallel here looming on the horizon at all.

Q Mr. President, back to the issue of China. Your decision to send emissaries to China carried some cause for you. Have you seen any payoff yet? Have you had any response from the regime there that is productive or encouraging for you?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it does carry some, and I think some who are familiar with the situation have been quite supportive -- and some quite critical -- I will admit that. As I indicated, some favor isolation -- don't talk and let them come to us. I think one of the great things that happened to us is -- under the Shanghai communique and prior to that is the fact that we had a kind of contact and they began to see -- began to facilitate our contact -- help facilitate the changes and the reforms that have taken place. So I want to see those go forward again.

Is that responsive? I can't remember --

Q Let me ask you specifically -- are we close to a resolution on the issue of the dissidents who are --

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know the answer to that. I don't know the answer to that. They know my position, and it is one of adherence to human rights, I might add. The thing I object to about this whole one is the assigning of motives to the other person. You can question the tactics, but I refuse to let my political critics get me down in terms of they understand human rights and I don't.

I want to see, through the contacts that we've made, change that can be manifested in several ways. Now, there has been some. The Voice of America, for example, now has -- they have a person permitted to go there. There's been a reiteration of the sale

of missiles which we are very much in our -- I think in the interest of peace in the world. So there's been progress. And hopefully -- I would like to hope that there would be more.

Q Mr. President, as you know, Mikhail Gorbachev has been visiting the Baltics in his country to deal with the growing independence or autonomy movement there. Have you encouraged him to allow those movements to continue, or do you consider that essentially an internal affair of the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he's got his own internal affairs, but he knows of our advocacy of peaceful change. And to the man's credit, he has been the big advocate of peaceful change. He has been the advocate of reform. I mean, you've got to link it, Jerry, to Eastern Europe to some degree. And I realize -- and we can discuss this -- that the problems are different. But give the credit that I don't think any of us a year ago from this day would have given in terms of Soviet adherence to -- Gorbachev adherence to change, given the dynamic upheaval in Eastern Europe.

Now, he's facing problems inside the borders of the Soviet Union. The Baltics -- recently this other one -- and he keeps reiterating his conviction about peaceful change. So I support that. But we did have an opportunity to discuss in broad philosophical terms this question at Malta.

Q Are you confident as a result that there's not going to be a crackdown?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm certainly not buying into the hypothesis that there will, and I hope that this approach that he has taken for which we give credit will prevail.

Q Yes, Mr. President, several times today you've made reference to the U.S. right to -- indeed, your obligation to protect American lives. Today, an American nun is being buried here in the United States. Even the Catholic order she represented there in Nicaragua claims that she was killed by Contra forces.

THE PRESIDENT: -- did claim that? I heard --

Q Representatives of that group say the Contra forces have been known to operate in that area using those tactics, and perhaps they didn't recognize the pickup truck that they were driving in. What do we know about who may have killed those nuns, and what are you doing to communicate to the Contra -- are you trying to call them off?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we're not calling them off because we don't know they were called on. And I'm interested in your hypothesis because you're telling me that some have concluded that it was the Contras. The Contras have denied that. Some have suggested it might be the other side. And the answer is, I deplore the loss of that nun's life. And similiarly, there was another that I believe was killed that was a Nicaraguan there. And I deplore that loss of life. But it is murky. It is extraordinarily murky, similarly to the situation in El Salvador.

But I want to take this opportunity to speak out against it. But we don't know the answer to it. And in El Salvador, we've said, find out. We'll give you whatever technical assistance we can. And we want to find the answer to this question.

Q But you're not confident then that the Contras didn't --

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know the answer to your question. They've said they didn't -- others are accusing them. And I don't know, and I don't think our government knows. I'd share it with you if they did.

Q Mr. President, in Panama we saw women leading troops

in combat for the first time. Are you comfortable with women in that role and would you support changes in restrictions on women in combat?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I think this is a matter -- I'd willingly accept -- listen to recommendations from the Defense Department. But these were not combat assignments. But anytime you have a highly trained, gung-ho volunteer force and they're caught up in some of the firefights that went on, a person, man or woman, can be inflicted into a -- put into a combat situation.

But it's my understanding -- and I think Cheney took a question on that today -- that these were not combat roles. And so I would let the heroic performance of these people be weighed and measured and then see if the Defense Department wanted to recommend to the President any additional changes.

Q Do you have assurances from Moscow that the operation in Panama won't hurt U.S.-Soviet relations?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm confident -- they didn't seem overly enthused about it, by Mr. Gerasimov's statement, but on the other hand, we -- I don't agree with him at all, but I don't think it's going to fundamentally flaw the relationships between ourselves and the United States. *

Q Do you think that the Latin leaders have been hypersensitive to the -- given the fact that in back channels, apparently, they've been supportive of the invasion? Can you say if that is correct? And then also because of that, do you think they're hypersensitive in their public statements about U.S. force in the region?

THE PRESIDENT: I like to feel that, given the way the situation is resolved, there is more support than has manifested itself in votes at the United Nations or in public statements. The Vice President's trip will help on this. My own consultations will help decide -- give me a clearer answer to your question, but I am absolutely convinced, given what happened and the reason why it happened, that if there's damage I can repair it, we can repair it, the State Department and whoever else is involved can repair it.

Q But is it hypersensitive, their reaction so far?

THE PRESIDENT: I think predictably so.

Q Mr. President, some countries think the precedent now of Panama -- feel that their sovereignty might be violated if the United States pursues drug dealers in their countries. And there has been some change in laws that can be -- that they are worried about this in the sense of the CIA, the FBI going out, being able to apprehend people outside the United States territory.

THE PRESIDENT: And so the question is what?

Q Do these countries have reason to be worried that the precedent of Panama might serve as --

THE PRESIDENT: Oh. Panama was more than that. Panama had clearly other ingredients that caused American action. It wasn't a simple case of going after a person who had been indicted for narcotics. And we know you had the abortion of democracy, but you also had this threat to the lives of Americans.

* Soviet Union

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 13, 1989

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

9:44 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: I have a statement I'd like to make, And then -- some time constraints -- I'd be glad to answer a few questions.

I believe that the American flag is a unique and special symbol of our nation and it should be protected from desecration. And our administration has proposed a constitutional amendment to protect the flag because we believe that is the most lasting and legally correct means of protection -- a constitutional amendment. And yesterday the House of Representatives agreed to a Senate bill providing statutory protection for the flag. And when this measure comes to the House, I will allow the bill to become law, but without my signature. And I'm withholding that signature to signal our belief that a constitutional amendment is the best way to provide lasting protection for the flag.

Now we will continue to work for such an amendment. And I can understand the rationale of those who voted for this legislation, but in my view, it is not the ultimate answer and, therefore, I will not put my signature on the legislation.

I would now be glad to take questions, all of which I'm sure will be on the flag. (Laughter.)

Q Sorry to disappoint you, Mr. President. You have said on several occasions that you knew everything at the time of the Panamanian coup and you didn't feel that there were any really problems in retrospective. At the same time, there are many reports that you've changed the rules of procedure on handling -- on crisis management and that you have asked the Hill for more authority to operate during a coup, or plan a coup, or whatever. Can you straighten this out for us?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me help you out.

Q And obviously, there were glitches or you wouldn't have spent two weeks trying to defend yourself -- I mean, the administration.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not sure I agree to the last part. But --

Q Well, you have spent two weeks trying to explain to the American people what happened.

THE PRESIDENT: No, this is the first chance -- shot I've had at explaining.

Q Not you per se, but your administration.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. No, I -- what was the first part of the question? (Laughter.)

Q That you have changed the procedures on crisis management.

THE PRESIDENT: No. Look, here's -- coming back, here's my position. I have not seen any fact in all the reports that have come out that would make me have done something different in terms of use of force. And I reiterate that. Now, in terms of procedures, I'll simply say any time we can make improvements, so much the better. But there has not been an intelligence gap that would have made me act in a different way. And so -- and I repeat that. And there's been endless interviews and discussions and stories -- many of which are false -- that come out as to what we were asked to do or not to do. But I've seen no fact that would make me change my view. And I've seen allegations that we had -- if when I said I wanted Noriega to get out there, that implied use of force. I hope I would never be reckless enough as a Commander-in-Chief to make a blanket commitment to use of force without knowing the facts regarding some coup attempt.

We want to see Mr. Noriega out. I'll repeat that. I've been very heartened by the reports from various leaders in our hemisphere about what Noriega should do. But I don't see any serious disconnects at all. And if we can fine-tune our crisis management systems, so much the better. And I think that's what you're reading about now.

Q Have you asked for greater authority from the intelligence committees to act in case of a coup?

MR. PRESIDENT: No, I have not. But we've had a very good meeting with two leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee -- Boren and Cohen -- the other day. But I have not asked for that. We may, we may.

Q You're satisfied with the power you have?

MR. PRESIDENT: Well, I want as broad a power as possible and I think under the Constitution, the President has it. But I'll be working with the -- has broad powers -- broader than some in the Senate or the House might think. I may have a difference with some on interpreting what the powers of the President might be. But I want to work cooperatively with these committees, and it is with that in mind that we invited Boren and Cohen here. But I've not made specific requests of them. We might. We might do it, but we have not done it yet.

Q Mr. President, Democratic leaders in Congress are urging you not to veto legislation that removes a ban on federal financing of abortions for the poor. House Speaker Foley says your position is harsh -- terribly harsh on the poorest, most vulnerable American women. Will you let that legislation become law?

MR. PRESIDENT: My position is well-known and well-stated. And right now there is some negotiation and discussion going on. I have not read the conference language, and so we are going to be meeting with some of the various, most interested, congressional parties on this and see what can be resolved. I'm not looking for any conflict over this. I'm not going to change my position any. But let's see how those negotiations come out and we'll start discussing that today. But I've not changed my position.

Q But you're leaving it open about whether or not you would veto this.

MR. PRESIDENT: Well, because I'm told, Terry, that the conference language may be able to avoid a veto on my part.

Q Mr. President, in other words, you are willing to negotiate or accept a compromise that in some way would allow federal funding for abortions in cases of rape or incest?

MR. PRESIDENT: Now, I've already said what I'm willing to do -- discuss the conference language.

Q Let me ask you specifically. Are you willing --

MR. PRESIDENT: Is this a follow-up?

Q Yes. Are you willing to compromise?

MR. PRESIDENT: I'm not willing -- I've already told you my position.

Q Let me ask you a question about your position. Can you explain why you believe it's all right for women who can afford an abortion on their own, that in cases where they are raped or in cases of incest, that it's permissible; but that for poor women who cannot afford abortions, it is not permissible to help them get abortions in cases of rape and incest?

MR. PRESIDENT: Owen, the only answer I can give you on that is to go back to the original Hyde Amendment and to the position that I took and will stay with. And to some there might be a contradiction there. To me there is none.

Q Just to follow, sir -- I mean, it's not a question of a contradiction. It seems that if you can pay it yourself, it's okay under those circumstances, but the message, it seems, is that if you can't afford it yourself, tough luck. And isn't that a moral conflict in your own position?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think it's a moral conflict in my own position.

Q Mr. President, could I return to Panama for an instant? Would you -- what message are you sending -- you say you want Noriega out -- what message are you sending the PDF now? Would you like them to attempt another coup, or is that out of the question?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think anything is out of the question. I think that, from what I've seen and the reports I've heard out of Panama, things are more unsettled than before about the fate of Noriega. I would simply reiterate that we have no problem with the PDF itself. I think this rather sophisticated argument that if you say you'd like to see Noriega out, that implies a blanket open carte blanche on the use of American force -- I don't want to mislead somebody. And to me that's a stupid argument that some very erudite people make. But it -- I'd like to see him out of there. And so would our colleagues -- my colleagues south of our border. And I notice what Carlos Andres Perez said. And I notice what Felipe Gonzalez is saying. And I think that people now see more clearly than ever the reason from Panama's standpoint why this man should be out -- say nothing of the fact that he is an indicted drug dealer and I would like to see him brought to justice.

Q Mr. President, I'd just like you specifically to clear up on this, if I may. Have you issued or do you plan to issue precise, clearer guidelines to diplomatic and military personnel on the scene in Panama to improve communication with possible dissident elements or contacts with dissident elements within the Panamanian military? Would you be inclined to use U.S. force more rapidly if the opportunity presents itself again?

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't mind using force if it could be done in a prudent manner. So in other words, I'm not ruling out the use of force for all time. I am reiterating the fact that it was not proper to use force under the existing circumstances. And I feel more confident in that than I ever have. More confident, not less confident -- from anything I've seen.

What was the second part?

Q The first part was, have you authorized or are you going to authorize wider latitude --

THE PRESIDENT: No. I'm going to look at each situation. Now, if we can do better in terms of communication and what I would call fine-tuning a crisis management structure, absolutely. And I think we're already beginning to do that. I'm not suggesting there are procedures we can't follow, but to the fact that I say that should not indicate that I think there was something fatally wrong here. I mean, you've got to look at each situation at the time. You've got to look at each individual attempt to get rid of Mr. Noriega. And there have been several.

Q What would you do differently?

THE PRESIDENT: Nothing now. That's exactly my point.

Q Returning to the abortion issue for a moment, perhaps it might be helpful to clarify your position. Are you opposed to federal funding to help pay for the abortion for young women who are victims of rape or incest? Are you unalterably opposed or is there some room for a compromise?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I'm opposed. And I hope -- we'll see what we can do in terms of the conference committee to see if there is room for flexibility.

Q On capital gains -- there are some reports on the Hill this morning of a deal in the works on the capital gains tax reduction. Are you confident that there will be such a reduction over a two year period, perhaps not a permanent period? And would you accept some sort of IRA relief as part of the deal?

THE PRESIDENT: Look, the mixing of IRA and capital gains in this debate is troublesome to me. We early on took a very clear-cut position on capital gains. When I became President there was no doubt at all as to where I stood on this one and there was no doubt that this was a priority. And so we moved, and moved to have it as part of our original proposal.

Of course, we're interested in getting -- facilitating the machinery and seeing things move forward. And in principle, IRAs encourage savings and it's something a president should try to do. But what I don't like to see is that the last month here -- the suggestion raised that our insistence on capital gains is extraneous or that it is something that is holding up the reconciliation process when it was a fundamental part of it to begin with.

But whether there's some room for compromise in that or -- and I want to credit our leadership -- Senator Dole is doing a superb job. Whether there's room to compromise on it, I'd leave it to those that are negotiating on that right now.

Q Just to follow up -- you don't seem to be flatly ruling out IRA then.

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not ruling out anything in that regard. I am ruling in capital gains. But I'm not suggesting that by answering the question that way that we go off on a -- that this is some instruction to our side in the Senate to do something different on IRA.

Q I want to go back to what you called your critic's "stupid" argument about Panama.

THE PRESIDENT: That one argument is the one -- not all the other critics.

Q You've said since the beginning of the year that you thought Noriega should go.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q And you said so loudly and publicly. But when push came to shove a few weeks ago it wasn't clear the U.S. did very much

to lend a hand.

THE PRESIDENT: Right.

Q So the question is, is it responsible or consistent to, on the one hand, call publicly for Noriega's ouster, but then to do nothing --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, absolutely, totally consistent. I want to see him out of there and I want to see him brought to justice. And that should not imply that that automatically means, no matter what the plan is, or no matter what the coup attempt is, or what the effort is, diplomatically and anything else, that we give carte blanche support to that.

Follow on.

Q Some people would say you don't have to give carte blanche support to all situations like that, but you have to lend a hand --

THE PRESIDENT: To the support that we didn't get. In other words, what they're trying to argue -- look, let's be fair with each other. What they're saying is -- and it's only a handful of critics -- you said you wanted Noriega out, you say you have no argument with the PDF -- an element tries to get him out and you didn't support him. And I'm saying, yes, I want him out and, yes, we have no argument with the PDF, but I am not going to give carte blanche support to an operation, particularly when they don't ask for this support.

And I have to reserve that right. I have at stake the lives of American kids and I am not going to easily thrust them into a battle unless I feel comfortable with it and unless those general officers in whom I have total confidence feel comfortable.

So my argument is with the argument. My argument is with the argument that when I say I'd like to see Noriega out, that that means carte blanche commitment on my part of American forces. I'm not going to do that.

Q Mr. President, The LA Times is reporting today that the Justice Department has given the FBI the go-ahead to arrest fugitives in foreign countries without the foreign country's consent. Now this reverses the Carter administration's policy. Can you tell us what led up to this event? And perhaps Noriega --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I'm --

Q Perhaps Noriega has something to do with that since he's a fugitive. The FBI can go into Panama now?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm embarrassed to say I don't know what it is you're -- I'll have to get back to you with the answer to your question. Marlin, will you take care of that?

MR. FITZWATER: I'm not sure that's happened.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what it is. I've not seen The LA Times report, so I'll just have to not comment until I do.

Q Mr. President, your explanation of why you did not back the coup seemed to imply that it would almost have to be an American operation or an American-planned operation before you would use American troops. Is that a misreading of what you said?

THE PRESIDENT: A little bit, yes. A little bit.

Q Well, could you explain by what you just -- I'm only a little bit off?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, just a hair. (Laughter.) Because

if the circumstances under this coup plan had been different and the requests had been different and the facts on the ground had been different in terms of what we knew, we might well have done something different. So is that helpful?

Q I'm not sure. One other question on Panama, if I may. You said back in the spring that we believe Mr. Endara and Mr. Ford had won the election in Panama, yet you have not recognized them as the government of Panama. And I know your Vice President a week or so ago said Mr. Ford was the duly-elected Vice President of Panama. Have you given any thought to recognizing them?

THE PRESIDENT: There's been some discussion of that, but we have not made any final determination on that, and it's not clear. It's not clear whether that would facilitate the change in Panama we want or whether that would compel us to do some of the things differently that we're doing that might result in that change.

Yes, Gerry, and then we've got two here. And then I've got go because I've got a 10:00 a.m. -- No, that's the fifth one. Flag question? Go right ahead -- (laughter) -- and then we'll come -- you're back on. One, two, three. I can't take them all, honest.

Q Mr. President, during the campaign, Michael Dukakis was ridiculed partly by members of your campaign for vetoing a bill mandating teachers say the Pledge of Allegiance during school classes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I remember it.

Q Are you politically afraid, sir, to veto the flag statute if you truly believe it's the wrong way to go?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I think it's an expression -- an overwhelming expression on the part of the Congress to do something about the protection of the flag. So I'm not going to veto it. But I don't think it's enough. So I'm saying I'm not going to sign it. And that's a symbol that I don't think it's enough. But I don't want to set the clock way back and rule out the legislation, even though I don't think it's enough. I don't see a parallel at all. Although I read an argument that was thrown out there on that. I don't agree with it.

Q Mr. President, there's another controversial issue up on the Hill in the last couple of weeks, which is catastrophic health insurance for the elderly. As somebody who initially supported that program, don't you think you have more of an obligation to figure a way out of the current mess than to simply say you want the program to continue, but that it's up to the Congress to figure out a way to reduce the premiums that have to be paid to keep it in force?

MR. PRESIDENT: No. (Laughter.) You got a follow-up?

Q Yes. I mean --

MR. PRESIDENT: You asked me a question. Do I feel it? And I said, no.

Q Fair enough. (Laughter.)

MR. PRESIDENT: And I don't.

Q But if that's the case, why not offer a suggestion about how to keep the program from repeal and keep it financially viable at the same time?

MR. PRESIDENT: Well, we got very able congressional leaders who don't agree on this. And it isn't all that clear what ought to be done on it. And so we are letting the congressional process hash this out. And if there's something that's unsatisfactory to us, well, I've no hesitancy to step in there.

Q Mr. President, you mentioned the remarks of the Prime Minister of Spain earlier. One of the things he said was to propose a deal -- I guess it's a new proposal of an old deal -- where General Noriega would step down in exchange for the U.S. dropping criminal charges against him. Is that a deal you can live with?

MR. PRESIDENT: I don't recall that part of his statement. But, Tom, I can't do that. It would send an impossible signal to -- in this fight against drugs. I can't drop a good indictment. And I'm told by the Attorney General the indictments are sound -- that it isn't some grandstanding appeal. I can't drop those indictments or encourage that they be dropped. I'm not sure a president can drop an indictment, anyway. But I would not encourage that. If that's the sine qua non, it's too much.

Q Mr. President, when you were saying before that you wouldn't allow a carte -- when you wouldn't allow a carte blanche to any attempted coup in Panama, you were reserving to yourself the right to evaluate the merits of any potential coup. This implies, however, better communications with the participants than you had. In fact, it appears that the United States didn't know a good deal of the time what was going on during the crucial hours of that Tuesday coup in Panama. What sort of urgency -- here's the question -- what sort of urgency are you giving to improving those procedures?

MR. PRESIDENT: We're reviewing the procedures to see if there's some -- if we can't do it better. But let me just reiterate -- there's enough known about this that nothing different would have happened. And I keep coming back to that as the fundamental point. That isn't to say we can't do things better. But you've got to look at where these -- in this particular instance, the people where coming from -- what their objectives were.

I know what the United States objectives are. One, Noriega brought to justice; and very important, a Panama under democratic rule -- not deny the people the very election that they had. And so these are our objectives. These are the objectives of the United States. And I will look at whatever comes up in the future with those objectives in mind.

Q Just to follow up, on the day of the coup --

MR. PRESIDENT: Hey, I've got a 10:00 a.m. meeting.

Q On the day of the coup, we hear about telephone calls that aren't returned. We hear about people who are using phone numbers that they are given for contact with the U. S. and when they call they do not get help. The officials dither --

MR. PRESIDENT: That's well worth looking into.

Q -- and opportunities are lost.

MR. PRESIDENT: Exactly.

Q This is what I mean when I suggest the urgency about it.

MR. PRESIDENT: No, I think you've got a good point there. And we will be doing everything we can to fine-tune the mechanism. Everyone knows that when you have a combat situation, and there was with the PDF and the coup people, it isn't all that clear. But to the degree we can improve our communications, fine. But I don't feel -- again, I want to just end up where I started -- I don't feel -- in looking at all the charges and the allegations of this nature and having them assessed, both here and down in Panama by our leaders, that it would have lead me, as the President, to do something different in this particular coup. But you raise a very good point. When I hear something -- that there was, you know, a phone number given and nobody answers the phone, we'll find out what's the importance, what's the significance of that. I really do

have a 10:00 a.m.

Q How's your hand?

THE PRESIDENT: This is not a --

Q -- budget plan --

THE PRESIDENT: Lesley, I was hoping you'd ask. No, it's fine. Totally good.

Q Secretary Baker said the military was involved --

Q Why did you put a gag order on members of the administration, telling them not to second-guess how you and other members of the administration handled the Panamanian crisis?

MR. PRESIDENT: We've been blessed in this administration by a good team who don't like the game of who's up, who's down, who's winning, who's losing, who's looking good, who's in, who's out. And I did not have to have any gag order because all of them are singing from the same sheet of music. So, there wasn't a gag order.

Q You didn't tell people to stop complaining?

MR. PRESIDENT: No.

Q A week ago?

MR. PRESIDENT: No.

Q Did you get angry?

MR. PRESIDENT: And I didn't get angry. I didn't get angry.

Q What did you get?

MR. PRESIDENT: What I did say is, I don't want to see any blame coming out of the Oval Office or attributed to the Oval Office in the face of criticism. I'm not in the blame business. Blame, if there's some to be assigned, it comes in there. And that's where it belongs.

Q If someone drops the ball, is there no punishment? Is there no --

MR. PRESIDENT: Can we pick some -- huh? (Laughter.) They'll find out about it.

Q Has anybody been fired lately?

MR. PRESIDENT: No, and they're not going to be over this because they all did a good job. A good job. And that's why I feel relaxed, even in the face of criticism. I really do. I mean, normally I might be a little more tense. I wouldn't blow up, I don't think. And that's why I had ulcers 20 years ago because I didn't, I kept it all inside. But I learned now to get out there, do your best, get the best information you can, have confidence in good people. And those fundamental principles are guiding me now. And I can understand people criticizing and wishing it had come out different. And I can understand instant hawks appearing from where there used to be the feathers of a dove, because some of it's political and some of it is the understandable frustrating they feel about this man still staying in office. But all -- I've got a certain responsibility. And it is to have good people there, make the best decision you can. And so, I'm not misleading you. I never felt, you know, anger or blowing up. It's absurd. And I haven't lost any confidence and our top people that are handling these matters, including -- and I want to repeat it here -- our military officers in Panama. None at all. And certainly not General Powell.

Q But you are sorry it didn't work.

Q How do you rate yourself in your first foreign crisis?

Q What do you say the odds are of another coup, sir?

MR. PRESIDENT: The American people are strongly supporting the position I took. And they're not dumb.

END 10:08 A.M. EDT

March 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: CHRISTINA MARTIN

SUBJECT: Meeting with U.S. Military Commanders

On Thursday, March 15, you will present the Panama Campaign Streamers to representatives of the four service branches that fought in Panama. The ceremony will take place in Ceremonial Hall, Fort Myer, before an audience of 1200. Colonel Powell and Secretary Cheney will both speak prior to your remarks. You are scheduled to speak for 5 to 7 minutes.

Col. Powell's remarks are currently drafted to center around the history of the streamers and Sec. Cheney's are based on the symbolism of the streamers and personal anecdotes from his Christmas visit to Panama. Both remarks praise the dedication of our forces, their exemplary teamwork, as well as professionalism.

In an attempt, to personalize your remarks, we are interested in your recollections from the meeting Tuesday, February 27, in the Roosevelt Room with U.S. Military Commanders, and your visit with wounded soldiers in late December 1989. Thank you.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo	From Christina Martin to David Demarest Re: Memo to President [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	03/03/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Speech File, Backup
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Panama Elections 3/8/90 [2]

Date Closed:	10/14/2004	**OA/ID Number:**	13708-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:	2004-2265-S	**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

March 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: CHRISTINA MARTIN

SUBJECT: Memo to President

David, Mark and I have started working on the remarks for next Thursday's Panama Campaign Streamers event and are experiencing some difficulty with repetition. Due to the fact that there will be three speakers and the subject is rather limited, we would like to personalize the President's remarks by using his recollections of last Tuesday's meeting with U.S. Military Servicemen active in Panama. Several staff members have told me that the President was extremely moved by what he heard, however the NSC staff that was present did not take notes.

When we find ourselves in situations like this we usually write memos to the President. Since Chriss is out sick, I would like to run this by you. If you would like to go about this in another manner or take it up personally with the President, please do. Our draft is due on Monday, but we can always wait for a reply. I will be at home [redacted] or through signal) or at work for most of the weekend, please feel free to call if you have any questions or need help. Thanks! P-6, (6)(6)

NOTE: Please pass memo to Jim Cicconi.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PLAQUE

PURPOSE—In recognition of the need for a symbolic item to be displayed to represent the United States Army, on 29 January 1974 the Secretary of the Army approved the design of the first official Department of the Army plaque. The new plaque, which may be reproduced only in color, is a highly visible, readily identifiable symbol of the Army. It reflects the Army's traditions, ideals, and contributions not only to the Revolution but also to the development of the United States.

DESIGN—The plaque design is derived from that of the official Department of the Army seal which has been in use since the Revolution. It is emphasized, however, that the plaque is an additional item; it does not replace the seal. In addition to being in color, the plaque differs from the seal in several other respects. The inscription "Department of the Army," is used instead of "War Office"; the flags have been rearranged; and the Arabic numerals 1775 have been substituted for the Roman numerals MDCCLXXVIII. The official seal is retained without change. In keeping with its original purpose, the seal is used in the authentication of DA documents and records, such as commissions, appointment certificates, and court papers. In the future, the seal design, formerly reproduced as a bronze-colored plaque, may not be used for three-dimensional and other display items, and it may not be reproduced in color.

DISPLAY—The adoption of the Department of the Army plaque represents continuous efforts to graphically identify the modern professional Army and its purpose. It is the officially authorized item to symbolize the Army which may be displayed by Army organizations and officials designated by Headquarters, Department of the Army. Its use in Army exhibits is encouraged. The design may not be reproduced in any form unless it is in proper colors, and its use for purposes other than plaques will be only as authorized by The Institute of Heraldry, US Army, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia 22314.

SYMBOLISM—The central element of the Department of the Army plaque is a Roman cuirass, a symbol of strength and defense. The United States flag, of a design used in the formative years of the nation, and the United States Army flag emphasize the role of the Army in the establishment and protection of the nation. The sword, esponton (a type of half-pike formerly used by subordinate officers), musket, bayonet, cannon, cannon balls, mortar, and mortar bombs are representative of traditional Army implements. The drum and drumsticks are symbols of public notification of the Army's purpose and intent to serve the nation and its people. The Phrygian Cap (often called the Cap of Liberty) supported on the point of the unsheathed sword and the motto "This We'll Defend" on a scroll held by the rattlesnake signify the Army's constant readiness to defend and preserve the United States. The date "1775" refers to the year of the Army's establishment. The colors of the design elements are those traditionally associated with the ideals of the United States and of the Army. Blue is symbolic of loyalty, vigilance, perseverance, and truth. Red denotes courage, zeal, and fortitude. White alludes to deeds worthy of remembrance. Black is indicative of determination and constancy. Gold represents achievement, dignity, and honor.

TITLE 3—THE PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10736

ADOPTING AN OFFICIAL SEAL FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

WHEREAS the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, has caused to be made, and has recommended that I approve, a seal for the Department of the Navy, the design of which accompanies and is hereby made a part of this order and which is described, in heraldic terms, as follows:

On a circular background of fair sky and moderate sea with land in sinister base, a three-masted square-rigged ship under way before a fair breeze with after topsail furled, commission pennant atop the foremast, National Ensign atop the main, and the commodore's flag atop the mizzen. In front of the ship a Luce-type anchor inclined slightly bendwise with the crown resting on the land and, in front of the shank and in back of the dexter fluke, an American bald eagle rising to sinister regarding to dexter, one foot on the ground, the other resting on the anchor near the shank; all in proper colors. The whole within a blue annulet bearing the inscription "DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated on each side by a mullet and within a rim in the form of a rope; inscription, rope, mullet, and edges of annulet all gold;

AND WHEREAS the central device of the seal is essentially the same as that used for more than one hundred years and reflects the denomination given in the act of April 30, 1798, which officially established the Department of the Navy; and

WHEREAS it appears that this seal is of suitable design and appropriate for use as the official seal of the Department of the Navy:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, I hereby approve this seal as the official seal of the Department of the Navy.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 23, 1957.



[F. R. Doc. 57-8829, Filed, Oct. 23, 1957; 2:36 p. m.]

Chapter 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE SEAL

ion A—Nature and Uses

1-1. Description and Significance. The official Air Force colors of ultramarine blue and Air Force yellow are used prominently on the Air Force Seal. Ultramarine blue is used for the circular background of the Seal. Air Force yellow is used as trim. The following describes the Air Force Seal and the meaning of its many parts (figure 1-1):

a. The Coat of Arms in the center of the Seal has two parts:

(1) The Crest is made up of the eagle, wreath, and cloud form. The American bald eagle symbolizes the United States and its airpower and is depicted in its natural colors. The Wreath under the eagle is made up of six alternate folds of metal (white, representing silver) and light blue. This repeats the metal and color used in the shield. The white clouds behind the eagle show the start of a new sky — The Department of the Air Force.

(2) The Shield, right below the eagle and th, is divided horizontally into two parts by ule line representing clouds. The top part bears an Air Force yellow thunderbolt with flames in natural color which shows striking power through the use of aerospace. (The thunderbolt consists of an Air Force yellow vertical twist with three natural color flames on each end crossing a pair of horizontal wings with eight lightning bolts radiating saltirewise.) The background of the top part is light blue (representing the sky). The lower part is white (representing metal silver).

b. The 13 white encircling stars represent the original 13 colonies.

c. The Air Force yellow numerals under the Shield are 1947. This is the year the Department of the Air Force was established.

d. The band encircling the whole design is white edged in Air Force yellow with black lettering. The inscription reads: "Department of the Air Force" on the top part and "United States of America" on the lower part.

Figure 1-1. Department of the Air Force Seal.

1-2. Use of the Seal:

Official Policy:

!) Use of the Seal or any part of it is permitted only as authorized in this regulation. Specific exceptions are approved by the

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10538

ESTABLISHING A SEAL FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

WHEREAS the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps with approval of the Secretary of the Navy has caused to be made, and the Department of Defense has recommended that I approve, a seal for the United States Marine Corps, the design of which accompanies and is hereby made a part of this order, and which is described as follows:

Standing upon the western hemisphere of the terrestrial globe containing the lines of latitude and topographical outlines of North, Central, and South America, an American bald eagle with wings displayed horizontally and inverted holding in his beak a scroll inscribed with the motto "SEMPER FIDELIS", all bronze. Behind the western hemisphere a foul anchor bend sinister-wise with stock, arms, and flukes in slight perspective, all bronze, on a scarlet background and within a dark blue band edged in gold circumscribed by a gold rope rim and inscribed "DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY · UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS" in gold letters. The central device of the seal is the emblem of the United States Marine Corps;

AND WHEREAS it appears that such seal is of suitable design and appropriate for establishment as the official seal of the United States Marine Corps:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, I hereby approve such seal as the official seal of the United States Marine Corps.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 22, 1954.

October 31, 1977
NUMBER 1005.9

ASD(MRA&L)

Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Order of Precedence of Members of Armed Forces of the United States When in Formations

Refs.: (a) DoD Directive 1005.8, subject as above, October 8, 1957 (hereby cancelled)
(b) Title 10, United States Code, Section 133(b)

A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive reissues reference (a) to update the listing of organizations and to change the order of precedence. Reference (a) is hereby superseded and cancelled.

B. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this Directive apply to the Military Departments.

C. PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE

By virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, under the provisions of reference (b), and pursuant to agreement with the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Commerce, members of the Armed Forces of the United States and Merchant Marine midshipmen shall take precedence in the following order when in formations:

1. Cadets, United States Military Academy
2. Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy
3. Cadets, United States Air Force Academy
4. Cadets, United States Coast Guard Academy
5. Midshipmen, United States Merchant Marine Academy*
6. United States Army
7. United States Marine Corps
8. United States Navy
9. United States Air Force
10. United States Coast Guard

*Added

11. Army National Guard of the United States
12. Army Reserves
13. Marine Corps Reserve
14. Naval Reserve
15. Air National Guard of the United States
16. Air Force Reserve
17. Coast Guard Reserve
18. Other training organizations of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, in that order, respectively.

Provided, however, that during any period when the United States Coast Guard shall operate as part of the United States Navy, the Cadets, United States Coast Guard Academy, the United States Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard Reserve, shall take precedence, respectively, next after the Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy, the United States Navy, and the Naval Reserve.

D. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This Directive is effective immediately. Forward two copies of implementing regulations to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) within 30 days.



Deputy Secretary of Defense

Salute With Guns

Theoretically all salutes were originally the act of the one who first saluted, rendering himself or his ship powerless for the time during which the honors were rendered. For example, in the days of Columbus, after firing a salute, an appreciable time -- approximately half an hour -- was required before the guns could be fired again. Thus the ship first rendering the honors feared no attack, and the gesture was one of friendship and confidence. Firing blank cartridges is a comparatively modern invention, occasioned, it is said, by the fact that a complimentary cannon ball once proved fatal to the honored personage. (The "present arms" salute of today was originally a gesture of literal presentation.)

Salute (twenty-one guns). The origin of the twenty-one-gun international salute is of interest. Originally warships fired salutes of seven guns, the number seven having probably been selected because of the mystical and symbolical significance given it in the Bible.

Although by regulations the salute at sea was seven guns, shore batteries were allowed to fire three guns to the ship's one. The difference was due to the fact that in those days the storage of powder aboard ship was a matter of serious concern, because of lack of facilities for maintaining low and even temperatures in the magazines. Since powder easily spoiled at sea but could be better kept on land, three times as many guns were, therefore, prescribed. Again, the figure three was probably selected as a multiple because of mystical and symbolical significance.

When powder that was not so difficult to preserve at sea came into general use, the number of guns for the naval international salute was raised to twenty-one. By common agreement the international salutes of all nations are now twenty-one guns.

International salutes grew out of custom and usage. The custom began with the strong nations exacting from foreign vessels acts of submission, sometimes even by force, but in the 17th century the question of such ceremonials became a matter of negotiation. Although saluting was originally forced upon the vessels of smaller nations to compel them to recognize the superiority of the greater, in the final recognition of the principle of equality between nations, it became customary to render salutes "gun for gun."

Salute over a grave. Originally the three volleys fired into the air were supposed to drive away evil spirits as they escaped from the hearts of the dead. It was thought that the doors of men's hearts stood ajar at such times, permitting devils to enter. Today the gun salutes are fired as a ceremonious gesture of respect.

EXTRACT from NAVAL ORIENTATION, NAVPERS 16138-B,
June 1953. P. 485-86.

21-Gun Salute

Like so many deeply-rooted traditions of the sea, it is difficult to pin-point it's origin.

The number of guns fired was not always the same. In 1778, when John Paul Jones received the first national salute to the stars and stripes in Quiberon Bay, Ranger fired thirteen guns and the French answered with nine -- the standard salute rendered to a republic at that time.

As for the 21-gun salute itself, Navy Regulations for 1818 prescribed that "when the President shall visit a ship of the U. S. Navy he is to be saluted with 21 guns." It is interesting to note that at this time there were 21 states, and that the gun salute varied in number after 1818 with the number of states, and did not become standardized at 21 for some time. The 1865 Regulations stated that: "A foreign sovereign or the chief magistrate of any foreign republic, when visiting a vessel of the Navy, shall be received with the same honors prescribed for the President (21 guns)." In 1875 the U. S. and Britain agreed on a gun-for-gun return of salutes, the British at that time using a 21-gun salute for a head of state.

BATTLE STREAMERS

In January 1971 the U.S. Navy joined the other military services in the use of battle streamers. Commenting on the meaning of the new streamers displayed with the Navy flag, Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, said that "ships and men who performed so gallantly in the American Revolution, at Tripoli, Lake Champlain, Manila Bay, on Atlantic convoy, at Midway, Leyte, in Korea and in Vietnam will be honored and esteemed through succeeding generations."

The use of battle streamers had its beginnings in antiquity when various emblems were carried into combat. Armies of Egypt and Assyria, for example, placed sacred objects at the tops of poles, then adorned them with streamers. The eagle of Imperial Rome was recognized throughout the known western world.

In time solid objects gave way to cloth banners. Medieval knights attached distinctive streamers to their lances. Colors became a rallying point in battle, an honor to bear and defend. Among the most prized trophies of war were the tattered standards of a defeated enemy.

The U.S. Army adopted battle streamers in 1920, the first American military service to initiate their usage. They were introduced into the Marine Corps in 1939, and in 1956 the Air Force followed. In 1968 the Coast Guard authorized use of battle streamers.

Many of the practices relative to streamers and their display are similar among the services. There are, however, differences, particularly regarding the number of streamers and use of embroidered devices.

The Army carries a separate streamer for each important action in all wars in which that service has participated. Army streamers are embroidered with the name of the action commemorated. Currently [1971] the Army allows 156 streamers, and the Air Force, employing the Army system, carries 64.

Unlike the Army-Air Force practice, the Marines use one ribbon for each war, campaign, or theater of operations. Specific actions or battles are highlighted by bronze and silver stars embroidered on the ribbon. The Marine Corps shows 42 streamers, and the Coast Guard uses 27, unadorned by either stars or lettering.

The Navy's battle streamers, spanning the period from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam, number 27. Like the Marine Corps, the Navy flies a single streamer for each campaign, war, or theater of operations, with embroidered stars used for individual battles and operations determined to be suitable for special recognition.

Stars on the Navy streamers follow the practice initiated during the World War II period for ribbons and medals—that is, a bronze star for each action, and a silver star in lieu of five bronze stars. The Navy applies stars to appropriate ribbons throughout its history, whereas the Marine Corps uses stars to commemorate service in this century only.

The Presidential Unit Citation, Navy Unit Commendation, and Meritorious Unit Commendation streamers each carry a number rather than stars. This figure represents the number of times that the respective award has been conferred upon Navy units.

Navy streamers are 3' long and 2¾" wide. Where a medal has been awarded for a particular war or service, the coloring and design of the streamer are the same as the ribbon from which the medal is suspended. Conflicts and operations for which no medal was issued have ribbons specially designed for use as streamers.

Today's battle streamers affixed to the military flags of the United States are colorful symbols and reminders of sacrifice, service and a proud heritage—a tribute to the men and women of the armed forces, past and present, who have responded in America's times of need.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From Christina Martin to David Demarest Re: Memo to President [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	03/03/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Speech File, Backup
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Panama Elections 3/8/90 [2]

Date Closed:	10/14/2004	**OA/ID Number:**	13708-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:	2004-2265-S	**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

March 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: CHRISTINA MARTIN

SUBJECT: Memo to President

David, Mark and I have started working on the remarks for next Thursday's Panama Campaign Streamers event and are experiencing some difficulty with repetition. Due to the fact that there will be three speakers and the subject is rather limited, we would like to personalize the President's remarks by using his recollections of last Tuesday's meeting with U.S. Military Servicemen active in Panama. Several staff members have told me that the President was extremely moved by what he heard, however the NSC staff that was present did not take notes.

When we find ourselves in situations like this we usually write memos to the President. Since Chriss is out sick, I would like to run this by you. If you would like to go about this in another manner or take it up personally with the President, please do. Our draft is due on Monday, but we can always wait for a reply. I will be at home [redacted] through signal) or at work for most of the weekend, please feel free to call if you have any questions or need help. Thanks! P-6, (b)(6)

NOTE: Please pass memo to Jim Cicconi.

Lt. Col.
USMC

[redacted] P-6, (b)(6)

CM: call

March 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: CHRISTINA MARTIN

SUBJECT: Meeting with U.S. Military Commanders

On Thursday, March 15, you will present the Panama Campaign Streamers to representatives of the four service branches that fought in Panama. The ceremony will take place in Ceremonial Hall, Fort Myer, before an audience of 1200. Colonel Powell and Secretary Cheney will both speak prior to your remarks. You are scheduled to speak for 5 to 7 minutes.

Col. Powell's remarks are currently drafted to center around the history of the streamers and Sec. Cheney's are based on the symbolism of the streamers and personal anecdotes from his Christmas visit to Panama. Both remarks praise the dedication of our forces, their exemplary teamwork, as well as professionalism.

In an attempt, to personalize your remarks, we are interested in your recollections from the meeting Tuesday, February 27, in the Roosevelt Room with U.S. Military Commanders, and your visit with wounded soldiers in late December 1989. Thank you.

PANAMA AT A GLANCE 172

Population: 2,370,000

Geography: 29,208 square miles, slightly larger than West Virginia.

Economy: Chief industries are oil refining and international banking. Chief crops are bananas, pineapples and cocoa.

Politics: On Wednesday, the Electoral Tribunal controlled by strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega nullified Sunday's national elections. Observers say the opposition won those elections by a 3 to 1 margin. Noriega is under indictment in the United States on drug trafficking charges.

History: First sighted in 1502 by Rodrigo de Bastidas, sailing with Columbus under Spanish flag. Broke from Spain and became Colombian province in 1821. Declared independence in 1903, with U.S. naval forces deterring action by Colombia. Gave use, occupation and control of the Canal Zone to the United States in 1903. In 1977, the two countries signed new treaties under which the United States gradually relinquishes control of the canal and Canal Zone, completing the process at noon, Dec. 31, 1999.



THE CANAL

Size: Fifty miles long from deep water in the Atlantic to deep water in the Pacific. Requires about nine hours for the average ship to transit the canal.

Cost: Tolls are based on net tonnage. The average toll for oceangoing commercial ships is about $26,890.

History: France attempted to cut through the Isthmus of Panama in the late 1800s, but failed. The United States purchased rights and properties from the French Canal Co. and began construction in 1904. Project was completed in 10 years at a cost of about $387 million.

Passage: About 12,000 vessels move through the canal annually.



WHERE THE TRAFFIC GOES

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SHIPPING

East Coast to Far East	40%
Europe to West Coast and Canada	10%
East Coast to western South America	8%
Other	42%

SOURCE: Panama Canal Commission

COMPILED BY JAMES SCHWARTZ

SOURCES: Panama Canal Commission, World Almanac, Department of Defense

THE WASHINGTON POST

N.Y.TIMES:05-12-89

Noriega's Foes Say Vote Must Stand

By LINDSEY GRUSON
Special to The New York Times

PANAMA, May 11 — The Panamanian opposition today rejected the Government's decision to annul the presidential election and said it was prepared for talks only if Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega stepped down as military leader.

Ricardo Arias Calderón, the senior vice-presidential candidate, and other opposition leaders reiterated their support for talks. But they said the Government must recognize what monitors say was an opposition election victory.

"It's a bad joke on the Panamanian people," said Mr. Arias Calderón, who emphasized that he was speaking for the entire three-man slate. "We clearly reject it. I have no doubt that the opposition won."

The opposition presidential candidate, Guillermo Endara, was confined to a hospital today after being beaten on Wednesday. Doctors said Mr. Endara was partly paralyzed but had recovered full motor control and would be hospitalized for three days for tests. "He looked good and told me, 'I feel good,' " said Alfredo Arias, a close friend and aide.

Rural Violence Reported

Mr. Endara and other opposition leaders were attacked at the end of a motorcade by pipe-wielding assailants in civilian clothes. Government officials and Western diplomats said the attack was carried out by members of the military seeking to stop developing negotiations between the Government and the opposition.

The streets of the capital were quiet today, but the decision to annul the election, announced late Wednesday, led to violence in some rural areas, Roman Catholic Church officials said.

The church officials said priests had reported that Government-organized paramilitary groups, known as Dignity Battalions, had taken over at least two rural towns. Western diplomats said members of the squads had also rounded up opposition supporters in outlying areas, beat them and ransacked their houses.

"In practical terms this is a coup," said an official close to the Roman Catholic Church. "It's an indirect way of ackowledging the victory of the opposition. It was a constitutional coup, the final act of a giant fraud."

Annulment of Vote Defended

The Electoral Commission's decision was announced after a meeting at the Presidential Palace of senior military and political leaders.

The commission, which was appointed by General Noriega, defended its decision to annul the elections, blaming "obstruction by foreigners" and a lack of tally sheets. Independent election monitors, who said the opposition had won the election by 3 to 1, have reported that many tally sheets were stolen at gunpoint by the armed forces.

Yolanda Pulice de Rodríguez, the commission president, said it was up to the executive branch to decide what to do after Sept. 1, when the term of Manuel Solís Palma, the incumbent President, is to expire.

> The nullifying of Panama's election is called a bad joke.

Mario Rognoni, a pro-Government legislative candidate and a business leader, said the decision to annul the elections was opposed by large parts of the Government coalition. He said there was growing sentiment within the Government to seek some type of negotiated solution to the crisis.

Transition Government Proposed

The crisis began 18 months ago when an associate of General Noriega charged that the general was involved in drug trafficking and had arranged the assassination of political opponents. It deepened last year when the United States started seeking to oust the general, who had been indicted by two grand juries in Florida on Federal drug trafficking charges.

Mr. Rognoni said the Government wanted to talk without conditions. He proposed a transitional national unity government and added that the two sides could discuss any issue, including the retirement of General Noriega, the de facto ruler whose official role is commander of the 15,000-member Panamanian military.

"Everybody feels it's the need of the country to come to some kind of agreement," he said, emphasizing that he was speaking as a senior member of the Government coalition. The violence Wednesday made some Government politicians fearful that this country is plunging into the political polarization and violence that characterizes most of is neighbors.

"Yesterday we all came to the realization that you have radical groups on both sides that are uncontrollable," Mr. Rognoni said. "You can't tell me that we have the hoodlums and the goons and they have the nuns and the priests."

Benjamin Colamarco, the commander of the paramilitary groups, said in a telephone interview today that the attack was commanded by military officers. Opposition leaders today showed pictures, taken immediately before the assault, of the attackers changing from transit police uniforms into T-shirts with Dignity Battalion logos.

Candidate Freed From Jail

The opposition candidate for a second vice presidency, Guillermo (Billy) Ford, who was also beaten on Wednesday, was released from jail after being held by the government for most of the night. In an interview, he said that soldiers had fired into his car during the attack but that military officials had treated him well after his arrest.

Before being released, Mr. Ford, a businessman and political newcomer who emerged as the opposition's most dynamic candidate during the campaign, said the military had put him on trial and sentenced him to a year without parole for what it charged was attacking the armed forces and inciting a riot.

Louis Martins, a senior aide to Mr. Endara, was under arrest and remained incommunicado in custody today after being kidnapped Wednesday outside his office by four heavily armed civilians. Opposition figures said he appeared to have been beaten.

NTR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

tr during
cooperation + coordination
had broken for Am

strong support, always
be enthusiasm

historic concern 11:30

Enlisted

SAN ANTONIA HOSPITAL
Con.
All kids at hospital
were heroic

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

quality of faces

"Pics of light" SA community

PD Plank in SA

4 killed shoulder + aviatory
wounded Seal, Disabling
Noriega's support

Close conflict w/PDF in
Latinos, soldado bought
it both soldiers

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Acosta
scared, "good guys
did what ~~the~~ had to do"
patriotic selling card

all training

Phelps

2200 parachutes
Tajikos Int'l
& Tinajikos last

night drops
coordination

WASH. TIMES: 05-11-89

Latin states, Europe denounce Panama's election

By James M. Dorsey
WASHINGTON TIMES

5/12/89

PANAMA CITY, Panama — Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega found himself increasingly isolated yesterday as Latin American and European nations joined the United States and opposition figures here in condemning irregularities in Sunday's presidential election and in warning his regime not to announce a fraudulent polling result.

Growing international condemnation of the Panamanian election and the ensuing political turmoil in the country — including yesterday's beatings of opposition candidates — would appear to strengthen the Bush administration's hand in crafting a strategy for dealing with the Noriega regime.

At a meeting with Latin American and European diplomats, the opposition candidates — Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Arias Calderon and Guillermo "Billy" Ford — urged the diplomats to assist in forcing the government to announce the true election results.

Mr. Endara earlier this week declared himself president-elect, claiming the opposition had won the election.

The Latin American and European diplomats repeated their message yesterday during a meeting with the candidates of the pro-Noriega coalition.

During that meeting, Carlos Duque, Gen. Noriega's candidate for president, denounced "U.S. intervention" in what he described as a "fair and honest election," diplomatic sources reported.

Mr. Duque said the attack on the three opposition candidates was a result of the climate created by the United States and the opposition and claimed they had been hit by demonstrators' stones.

Several diplomats present at the meeting, including those from West Germany, said they "abhorred" the attitude displayed by Mr. Duque and his colleagues. Sources said the European Community would issue a statement this morning expressing deep concern and urging Panama to recognize the will of the people.

Some sources said the ambassadors are waiting for a response from Gen. Noriega.

Latin condemnation of the electoral process has begun to cut across political lines.

Venezuelan Foreign Minister Enrique Tejara Paris warned yesterday the Latin Group of Eight would expel Panama if the election proved to be fraudulent. He said the group — Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Colombia — were discussing joint action.

The Group of Eight was founded to seek a solution to the Nicaraguan civil war and has since broadened its mandate to include economic cooperation between its members.

Panama's membership in the group was suspended last year after Gen. Noriega ousted U.S.-backed President Eric Arturo Delvalle, who had tried unsuccessfully to fire Gen. Noriega after the general was indicted on drug smuggling charges in Florida.

"The Peruvian government denounces and will reject any manipulation of the election results and will reject as well any intervention from outside Latin America," said Peru's ambassador to Panama, Mario Castro Arenas.

Peru "denounces . . . and will reject any manipulation of the election results."

Venezuela sent a similar message to Panama's pro-Noriega government, headed by Manuel Solis Palma.

Nicaraguan and Guatemalan observers of Sunday's election were quoted as saying they had seldom — if ever — seen such a blatant manipulation of balloting.

Mr. Arenas and other diplomats said a possibility for mediating an end to the crisis remained as long as the government refrained from declaring the pro-Noriega Coalition for National Liberation (COLINA) the victor of the elections.

The government initally had promised to announce the election results on Monday but has given preliminary figures for less than 10 percent of the vote. The figures show COLINA with a 2-to-1 lead. Government-controlled newspapers have already declared Mr. Duque to be president.

In Washington yesterday, a White House official said the president and his national security staff were closely watching Panama but had not settled on a plan to oust Gen. Noriega.

"We're mostly waiting for action from Noriega," said the official.

But, he said, "We haven't stopped thinking" about a range of options, including a military raid aimed at installing opposition forces that independent observers have said should be declared winners in Sunday's balloting.

However, Brig. Gen. Marc Cisneros said, "The threat we are most concerned about is the threat to Americans.

"We have communicated to the [Panamanian military] — I personally communicated to them — that any confrontation, any shooting involved, we were going to hold them responsible. Any threat, armed threat against us here, we're going to consider it as directed by the government. And I think that Noriega knows that very clearly," Gen. Cisneros said.

He said U.S. military forces would not show "any reluctance" if Americans were hurt, adding, "They know what the threshold is."

The general noted that no U.S. citizens have been hurt in street violence since the crisis erupted almost two years ago. He declined to say how or when his warning had been communicated to Gen. Noriega.

"There are a lot of undisciplined goons out there dressed in civilian clothing . . . that are acting in defense of Noriega. They are guided by the PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces]," Gen. Cisneros said.

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Noriega and Team Set in the Saddle

Thumbing his nose at US and foes, Panama's strong man walks off with another fake election win

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By Brook Larmer
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

PANAMA CITY

GEN. MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA won't budge. Just hours after his electoral machine manufactured an implausible victory for his hand-picked candidate, General Noriega faced a fiercely divided nation — and a spirited march of more than 5,000 angry protesters.

But instead of giving ground, the country's de facto ruler went on the offensive: Not only did a small phalanx of riot police hold off the marchers, but plain-clothed military units and paramilitary marksmen scared them away with random shooting in which at least four people, including one journalist, were injured.

The relatively easy imposition of his will in Sunday's fraud-marred elections (most opinion polls show the opposition actually winning by a 3-to-1 margin) shows how firmly Noriega is in control — and how hard it will be for either the United States or the opposition to force the general out of power.

"Noriega is like a bull in a ring," says a European diplomat. "For over a year, people have waved their white handkerchiefs and told it to leave. But the bull isn't impressed. Now you either have to kill it or get a good *torero* [matador] to entice it out of the ring."

For the past two years, both the US and the opposition have proven to be ineffective bullfighters, continually outwitted by the bull.

The conservative, middle-class opposition to Noriega erupted in June 1987, soon after the general's former second-in-command accused him of everything from fraud to politically motivated murder.

Eight months later, with Noriega seemingly outflanked by the opposition, the US waved its first red flag at the military strong man: A US federal grand jury indicted Noriega on drug-smuggling charges in early 1988.

But instead of hastening his demise, the indictment only gave Noriega more incentive to dig in his heels. Even today, after a year of damaging economic sanctions, Noriega seems more strongly entrenched than ever.

Matters finally came to the point last weekend where the US, which for decades has had almost unlimited influence shaping this country, had virtually no power to control the outcome of the elections.

"For the first time – and this is a scandal – the United States can't pick its President," says a foreign envoy ironically.

Even the presence during the election of former US President Jimmy Carter, regarded here as a talented diplomat since co-signing the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977, had no effect on Noriega's win-at-any-cost attitude.

Several opposition leaders pinned their final hopes on Mr. Carter, whose prestige here helped him lead a team of American election observers specially invited by the government. With his access to Noriega, they said, he would be able to help negotiate some sort of compromise.

Election fraud is not a new phenomenon in Panama. In fact when Noriega stole the 1984 election for another candidate, the US did not raise any ruckus. Instead, it praised 'democratization' in the region.

But even the patient Carter said he lost hope for a fair election when he found electoral officials counting falsified voting sheets that lacked the signatures of opposition party representatives.

The disappointed ex-president said in a press conference Monday night that "the government has taken this election by fraud." According to his associates, Carter's public outrage cost him one last chance to meet with Noriega.

So all roads to compromise seem blocked.

For the moment, at least, top US policymakers say they are not seriously considering a military operation aimed at Noriega. But they are still searching desperately for the right mix of force and good fortune to coax the military leader from his throne.

Carlos Duque, the self-proclaimed victor of the ruling coalition, indicates that the Noriega regime — despite its anti-American rhetoric — wants to talk with the US. Now that the elections are over, says Mr. Duque, "there are no more excuses" for the US not to negotiate with Panama.

But, in fact, the elections have given the US the best opportunity in more than a year to intensify its campaign against Noriega. Above all, the US has tried to turn the passive Panamanian opposition into a fiery movement such as the one that helped oust dictator Ferdinand Marcos from the Philippines in 1986. But up until now, the opposition has demonstrated neither the capacity nor the character to launch such a movement.

Among most Panamanians, there seems to be a greater sense of resignation than desperation. Nevertheless, mounting evidence of fraud coupled with the display of violence have stoked considerable anger that could make the streets of Panama a scene of protest in coming days.

On Monday morning, five armed men and a pro-Noriega legislator reportedly stormed a local gymnasium where the district electoral board was counting the votes for all of San Miguelito, an enormous lower-class barrio that represents more than 10 percent of the national vote.

Jorge Luís Marciaga, a witness at the scene, bitterly recounts how the armed men removed the election officials, carried away most of the electoral documents, and left hundreds of official tallies scattered across the gym floor.

Despite the indignation over such blatant incidents, fraud is not a new phenomenon in Panama. In fact, in the country's 86-year history, there have only been two relatively honest elections (1930 and 1962).

Even as recently as 1984, Noriega stole the presidential elections and installed his hand-picked candidate, Nicolas Barletta, according to two high officials who were involved.

BUT instead of raising a ruckus, the US continued pointing proudly to Panama as part of the "wave of democratization" that was washing over Latin America.

"It's not fraud or democracy that really interests the US," charges a Panamanian government official. While the main US interest in Panama is to keep control of the canal and strategic US bases here beyond the year 2000, when the Panama Canal Treaty requires the US to leave Panama, it has turned that desire into a "vendetta against Noriega," he says.

To further isolate and pressure Noriega, US officials say they are considering a menu of options, all of which would lead more to a Cuban-style isolation than greater communication:

- Recall Ambassador Arthur Davis and gradually reduce the size of the US Embassy here from 100 to 40 people.
- Tighten economic sanctions, focusing more on freezing Noriega's personal assets.
- Prohibit Panamanian airplanes from landing in the US and vice versa.
- Gradually eliminate links American residents have with the Panamanian economy, thus cutting a lifeline that has helped Noriega survive.
- Cut the size of US troop presence in Panama, dropping as many as 6,000 of the 10,000 military troops stationed here.

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A Two-Year Siege of the Noriega Regime

June 6, 1987 Col. Roberto Díaz Herrera, second-in-command of the Panamanian Army, publicly accuses the commander, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, of electoral fraud and political murder. The accusations set off the first anti-Noriega protests, which the police suppress with tear gas and clubs.

June 10 President Eric Arturo Delvalle, installed by General Noriega, declares a state of emergency suspending most basic rights. The opposition announces the creation of Civic Crusade, a coalition of about 200 business and labor groups.

July 26 A man is shot and killed during an opposition march in the town of El Valle, the first fatality in the unrest. The opposition press is shut down.

Sept. 24 Breaking longstanding United States Government support for Panama's military-dominated Government, the United States Senate unanimously approves a non-binding resolution urging Panama to establish a civilian government or face a cutoff of American aid.

Feb. 4, 1988 The first of two drug and racketeering indictments against General Noriega is handed up by a Federal grand jury in Tampa, Fla.

Feb. 25 President Delvalle tries to dismiss General Noriega, but is instead ousted himself by the National Assembly and goes into hiding. Former Education Minister Manuel Solís Palma, a Noriega ally, is appointed acting President.

March 4 Panama closes banks after huge withdrawals by depositors.

March 16 General Noriega puts down a coup attempt led by the police chief. Continuing street protests bring the capital to a halt.

April 8 President Reagan orders United States citizens to withhold all payments to the Panamanian Government as part of an economic campaign against General Noriega.

May 8 Panama's banks quietly open for limited withdrawals after two-month closure.

May 25 Secretary of State George P. Shultz announces that talks on a deal for General Noriega's departure have collapsed.

Sept. 27 Mr. Solís Palma, at the United Nations General Assembly, condemns United States "aggression" against Panama.

April 7, 1989 Panama announces the arrest of a United States citizen accused of running a clandestine anti-Noriega radio. Government officials say it is part of a United States plot to create unrest.

May 7 National elections take place with charges of fraud by the opposition. Exit polls give the opposition a large lead.

May 9 First official results give General Noriega's candidate a 2-to-1 lead. President Bush declares the Panamanian elections fraudulent and calls for international pressure for General Noriega's resignation.

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Panama votes Sunday amidst cries of fraud

By James M. Dorsey
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

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PANAMA CITY — Panamanian opposition leaders ended their election campaign yesterday with a mass rally, charging the government is stacking in its favor Sunday's vote for a new president.

Vice presidential candidate and leader of the opposition Christian Democratic Party Ricardo Arias Calderon said fraud was built into the voter register. He addressed a news conference hours before thousands of opponents of strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega gathered in downtown Panama City.

Mr. Arias Calderon said the opposition was nevertheless taking part in the elections because of "a definite hope that our victory will be such that we will be able to neutralize the fraud being prepared as long as it is not accompanied by crude forms of oppression."

Mr. Arias Calderon said a close look at registration revealed various forms of apparent fraud, including:

- The addition of 168,467 unexplained voters to the register.

Mr. Arias Calderon said the number of eligible voters since the last elections in 1984 had grown by 29 percent from 915,000 to 1,184,000. He said Panama's demography accounted for a rise of only 16.8 percent in that period.

- The duplication of more than 100,000 names by issuing to loyal voters multiple identity cards needed to cast the ballot.
- The listing of an unspecified number of dead persons as registered voters.
- Circulation of forms among goverment workers requesting they not only provide their own ID card numbers and political affiliation but also those of three relatives or friends.

In addition, Mr. Arias Calderon and Western diplomats said the goverment totally controls the electoral tribunal overseeing the vote. They said the government also used petty obstruction tactics such as banning public transport yesterday to prevent people from attending the opposition rally.

One diplomat quoted a taxi driver who said he was threatened with revocation of his license if was caught working after mid-morning.

Gen. Noriega's presidential candidate, Carlos Duque, has scheduled his final campaign rally for today, and the pro-government press predicts half a million people will be there to cheer him.

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Panama Offers First Vote Result

Opposition Halts Protests, Urges Diplomatic Pressure

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By William Branigin
Washington Post Foreign Service

PANAMA CITY, May 9—The Panamanian government today began releasing election results based on returns that foreign observers have described as fake, amid signs that Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega plans to disdain domestic and international condemnation of Sunday's elections.

Opposition leaders refrained from calling for new demonstrations after protesters were violently dispersed Sunday. Instead, they took a diplomatic tack, conferring with foreign envoys as part of an effort to marshal international repudiation of the Noriega regime and recognition of an opposition victory.

While officials in Washington spoke of a need for the Panamanian people to maintain pressure on Noriega, there was little evidence of such pressure here.

The capital of this country of 2.2 million people was quiet as Panamanians returned to work. Sunday, the government had ordered public buses off the streets and decreed the closure of all offices and businesses in a move to keep street protests to a minimum.

In an incident this evening that underscored continuing tensions, pro-Noriega paramilitary agents and riot troops surrounded the house of Panamanian Archbishop Marcos McGrath and fired into the air while he was meeting inside with opposition presidential candidate Guillermo Endara and his run-

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ning mate, Ricardo Arias Calderon. No one was reported injured in the incident.

A Panamanian television cameraman was fatally shot in the chest by a suspected government agent, and several journalists and protesters were wounded by birdshot when riot troops opened fire to disperse street demonstrations near the government's vote-counting center.

In a news conference, Endara rejected the idea of U.S. military intervention in Panama, but offered no alternative for preventing the proclamation of Noriega's handpicked candidate, Carlos Duque, as president.

Asked later about plans for new street demonstrations, Endara said, "We will move at the appropriate moment."

Uncertainty and indecision seemed to reign in both the government and opposition camps. There were unconfirmed reports of a debate within the hierarchy of Noriega's Panama Defense Forces, as well as the government coalition he controls, over how to deal with an apparently massive victory by the opposition in the elections for a president, two vice presidents, 67 legislators and 505 district representatives.

Panama's Roman Catholic Church and international observers, including former president Jimmy Carter, have said the opposition won by a margin of three to one. Carter said last night that Noriega's forces were manufacturing false tally sheets to replace real ones that showed an "overwhelming" opposition win.

"They are having to steal massively, much more than they contemplated," a U.S. official said today. He added that this has aggravated "unrest" in the Panamanian military.

"This is not a happy military, and this unhappiness has been exacerbated by the election fraud," the official said.

How serious the alleged unrest might be, or whether it represents U.S. wishful thinking, could not immediately be ascertained. Other U.S. officials say Noriega has consolidated his grip on the military since a failed coup attempt in March 1988.

According to an opposition leader who claims to have inside information from the government, Noriega and his advisers are considering several options, including the annulment of the elections and the naming of a ruling junta.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

Florida Sens. Bob Graham (D), Connie Mack (R) return to Miami from Panama.

The pro-Noriega director of the government's Electoral Press Center, Boris Moreno, denied that any annulment was being considered.

"We have invested a lot of money in these elections," he said, estimating that the government had spent more than $6 million to organize them. Former commerce minister Mario Rognoni has put campaign spending by the parties in Noriega's Coalition of National Liberation at more than $40 million. The opposition charges that these funds come from state coffers.

At the government's vote-counting center, officials began issuing results. Nearly 48 hours after the polls closed, "official" presidential returns from only four provinces were posted, representing fewer than 81,000 of Panama's 1.18 million registered voters.

These results showed Duque with 51,752 votes, followed by Endara with 26,878 and minor candidate Hildebrando Nicosia with 2,232.

In what a foreign election observer described as a "surreal" scene, the results were displayed on a lighted stage in front of government television cameras in an otherwise deserted auditorium.

According to the Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition's count of its own tally-sheet copies, Endara was leading with 68.6 percent of the vote, compared to 22.9 percent for Duque and 3.5 percent for Nicosia. The alliance said the figures were based on returns from half of all polling places.

"There is no question that the vote shows that Guillermo Endara is the next president of Panama," said his running mate, Arias Calderon. He called for a strict international "quarantine" against Noriega, similar to the repudiation of Nicaraguan ruler Anastasio Somoza in the late 1970s. Asked why people were not in the streets protesting today, the candidate said, "They have an instinct to live."

"Everyone wants to see blood in Panama, and the Panamanians don't want blood," said civic opposition leader Alfredo Maduro in reply to the same question. "We want a civil transition."

However, the lack of opposition activity today struck some observers as strange. "This morning I woke up and said, 'Where is everybody?' " a European diplomat said. "They [the opposition] are going to let Noriega keep on ruling." He added, "This is not passive resistance. This is no resistance."

Opposition leaders suggested that the formal proclamation of Duque as president could trigger upheaval.

Bush Considers Military, Other Options In Response to Election Fraud in Panama

U.S. Administration Urges World Condemnation Of Polling 'Irregularities'

By Gerald F. Seib
And Robert S. Greenberger
Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON – President Bush accused Panamanian strongman Manuel Antonio Noriega of perpetrating "massive irregularities" in last weekend's election, and the White House said it is considering military force as one option to use in response.

The president urged Gen. Noriega to "heed the call of his people" and resign as leader of Panama's military forces. Officials said privately that detailed options have been worked out for American responses if Gen. Noriega remains in power. But they also said that there is continuing uncertainty among advisers about how harsh the U.S. reaction should be.

Gen. Noriega

In addition, former President Jimmy Carter, who was an international observer of the Panamanian election, counseled Mr. Bush in a White House meeting against using any military force. Mr. Carter argued that military force would "alienate" the Panamanian people, and he also argued against abrogating the Panama Canal treaties.

Meanwhile in Panama City, Gen. Noriega stepped up harassment of opposition leaders and the Roman Catholic Church.

The turmoil in Panama is shaping up as Mr. Bush's first foreign-policy crisis. But officials said that it could be several more days before an administration plan of action is put in place, because the White House doesn't want to act until the Noriega regime releases its voting results.

Seeking Condemnation

It is clear, though, that a top administration priority is to generate widespread international condemnation of the Panamanian election, particularly in Latin America, so that the U.S. won't be accused of acting alone when it does respond. "I call on all foreign leaders to urge Gen. Noriega to honor the clear results of the election," Mr. Bush said in a brief question-and-answer session with reporters in the Oval Office.

A senior U.S. official added later that President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela had called for a meeting of the Organization of American States, as well as a separate session of the foreign ministers of a group of Latin nations known as the Group of Eight, to discuss Panama.

President Bush heard reports from both a U.S. government observer team he sent to Panama to monitor the election, and from a separate international observer team led by Mr. Carter. Both groups reported that there was widespread popular support in Panama for candidates opposed to Gen. Noriega but that Noriega loyalists used widespread fraud to ensure that opposition candidates were defeated.

The Bush administration was surprisingly blunt in declaring that it is weighing military moves if Gen. Noriega's regime, as expected, announces that his supporter Carlos Duque defeated opposition candidate Guillermo Endara for president. "We have been considering options that range from the use of military force to various economic and commercial moves related to a U.S. presence in that country," White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said.

Dispatching More Troops

One option being considered is dispatching additional troops to Panama to supplement the 10,500 troops stationed at American airfields and bases there.

Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.), one of the election observers who met with Mr. Bush yesterday, is one of several legislators urging the administration to either move U.S. military dependents in Panama onto military bases or remove them from Panama as a sign to Gen. Noreiga that the U.S. is preparing for tougher measures.

The Pentagon says there are about 10,000 military dependents and an additional 4,000 Defense Department employees, such as teachers, in Panama.

A direct American military attack on Gen. Noriega and his forces seems unlikely, in part, because U.S. military leaders remain cool to such a move in a nation where the Pentagon has sought good working relations with the populace. In addition, American diplomats fear that a military attack would damage the U.S.'s image in Latin America.

Another option would be to impose a total trade embargo on Panama. The current economic sanctions against Panama, which froze tax payments and usage fees for the Panama Canal, are directed at denying capital to the regime. There is some concern that taking the added step of a total trade embargo would drive out the middle class. The middle class is the backbone of the resistance to Gen. Noriega, who was indicted on drug-trafficking charges in Florida last year.

One reason President Bush must act quickly is the looming crisis over the selection of the next canal administrator. Under the canal treaties, by next Jan. 1 Panama will choose the administrator, who runs the canal on a daily basis.

The administrator would be nominated by Panama's president, approved by President Bush and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. However, the Bush administration, which has said it won't have dealings with Panama as long as Gen. Noriega remains in power, may refuse to accept an administrator chosen by the general's hand-picked president. Such a refusal would violate the treaties, which require the U.S. to relinquish control of the canal to Panama by the end of 1999.

Moreover, even if President Bush accepts the Panamanian nominee, conservative U.S. senators who oppose the treaty have said they will use the confirmation hearing as a forum to debate whether the U.S. should abrogate the pact.

Earlier yesterday in Panama City, government troops with masks and shields posted themselves outside the home of Archbishop Marcos G. McGrath, where opposition candidate Endara was holding talks along with his two vice presidential running mates. Shots were fired in the air and a military helicopter hovered low over the house as the men, who later left unharmed, watched from the porch. The incident took place one day after the church had released the results of its own election monitoring, which projected a landslide victory for the opposition.

"They are trying to intimidate us with such measures," opposition vice presidential candidate Ricardo Arias Calderon said in an interview last night. "But we will not be intimidated. We will continue to fight openly and peacefully."

–Frederick Kempe in Panama City contributed to this article.

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THE UNITED STATES AND PANAMA: RECENT KEY EVENTS

Jimmy Carter and Omar Torrijos

Sept. 7, 1977: President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos sign new Panama Canal treaties in Washington, giving Panama control of the canal at noon, Dec. 31, 1999. The accords guarantee the waterway's neutrality and replace the Panama Canal Co., a U.S. government agency, with a Panama Canal Commission supervised by Americans and Panamanians.

April 18, 1978: The U.S. Senate ratifies the treaties, adding a proviso that permits U.S. intervention if the canal's operation is interrupted. The proviso notes that U.S. action shall not be "interpreted as a right of intervention" in Panama's sovereignty or internal affairs.

Oct. 1, 1979: The first phase of the treaties is implemented as U.S. control of the Panama Canal Zone officially ends.

July 31, 1981: Torrijos dies in an airplane crash in western Panama.

June 1986: U.S. newspapers report that Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's army commander, traffics in drugs and supplies arms to Colombian rebels. Noriega denies the charges.

Manuel Antonio Noriega

June 11, 1987: Panama imposes a 10-day "state of urgency" after violent antigovernment protests triggered by accusations that Noriega rigged presidential elections in 1984. Noriega denies the charges.

June 26: The U.S. Senate calls for free elections and urges Noriega to step aside for an independent investigation. Panama's leaders condemn the action as U.S. interference.

June 30: A crowd of 5,000 protesters attacks the U.S. Embassy in Panama City.

Nov. 4: The U.S. government warns citizens not to travel to Panama because of "deliberate harassment."

December: All U.S. military and economic aid to Panama is suspended until democracy is restored.

Feb. 5, 1988: The U.S. Justice Department unseals indictments charging Noriega with international drug trafficking.

Feb. 26: President Eric Arturo Delvalle is ousted by the National Assembly when he tries to fire Noriega.

March 1: Delvalle, still recognized by the United States as Panama's legitimate president, freezes Panama's assets abroad and urges a boycott of all payments to the Noriega regime.

March 4: Panama's government closes the nation's banks.

March 11: The United States announces it will withhold a $7 million payment by the Panama Canal Commission to the Noriega regime. President Ronald Reagan also suspends trade preferences for Panama.

Eric Arturo Delvalle

April 8: Reagan bars U.S. companies and individuals from making payments to the Panamanian government.

March 1, 1989: A State Department report says Panama is still not cooperating with U.S. drug control efforts and cannot receive foreign aid funds from Congress.

Compiled by James Schwartz

SOURCES: The Washington Post, Facts on File

THE WASHINGTON POST

WASH. TIMES: 07-21-89

OAS calls for elections in Panama by Sept. 1

By Lauren Weiner
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

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The Organization of American States yesterday called for Panamanians to hold new elections after Sept. 1, when the term of the country's current president ends, but did not specifically urge strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega to give up power.

Foreign ministers of the 31-nation group met for two days without agreeing to spell out the meaning of a key phrase calling for a "transfer of power September 1."

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said yesterday's statement meant "Gen. Noriega must go." He said the new elections must be held not "in one, two or three years, but as soon as possible."

The United States is "happy with the results," said another U.S. official, because the document demands a democratic transfer and has the support of all the OAS countries.

But Panamanian Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter said the statement meant merely that Panamanian President Manuel Solis Palma — hand-picked by Gen. Noriega after the general fired Eric Arturo Delvalle in February 1988 — would be replaced, not Gen. Noriega.

Mr. Ritter called the U.S. interpretation interference in Panama's internal affairs, which the organization prohibits. He also pledged his government's cooperation with the OAS mediating team, which has a renewed mandate to seek a solution to the crisis by Aug. 23.

The four-member team sent to foster negotiations among the military, the Noriega-controlled government and the opposition includes the foreign ministers of Ecuador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the general secretary of the OAS.

The winning slate in Panama's May 7 election was to have taken power Sept. 1. Gen. Noriega voided the election after widespread reports of a sweeping victory by the opposition.

A Panamanian opposition politician who observed yesterday's meeting strongly opposed the OAS statement, saying it made unilateral concessions to Gen. Noriega.

Opposition politicians said the statement effectively recognized the government's annulment of the election. Also, they said, the statement eliminated the outcome of the election as a subject for discussion without winning any assurances that Gen. Noriega would even discuss stepping down.

The crisis in Panama, which began in mid-1987, intensified in February 1988 when U.S. prosecutors in Florida charged Gen. Noriega with drug trafficking and racketeering.

The United States had hoped the OAS would push to have Guillermo Endara, the opposition candidate, installed as president.

Frustration with the protracted deliberations of the OAS last month led Sen. Connie Mack, Florida Republican, to urge President Bush to recognize Mr. Endara's presidency. Mr. Mack suggested using the estimated $240 million held in U.S. escrow accounts from funds frozen to Panama to establish a government in exile.

Mr. Mack said the escrow funds should not be released "except to a democratically elected government of Panama, and not to any interim government that may be established as part of an OAS solution."

• *This article is based in part on wire service reports.*

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PANAMA CRISIS

OAS Confronts Noriega Problem

Even optimists see little chance for solution as foreign ministers gather, patience wears thin

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By Linda Feldmann
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

WHEN the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere gather here today for another go-around on Panama, there will at least be some news to discuss: For the first time since Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega annulled the May 7 elections, all parties to Panama's political crisis – including, most significantly, the military – sat down together this week and talked.

But even the most optimistic observers concede that the Organization of American States (OAS), which sponsored the discussions, still faces long odds in its mission to help resolve the situation in Panama. It is likely that this week's talks there were as much aimed at buying time as anything else, official and outside analysts say.

In order to extend its mandate, the expected result of today's OAS meeting, the organization's four-man delegation to Panama needed to have something to show for its efforts.

For General Noriega, keeping the OAS talking is harmless and forestalls an eventual next step in the drive by the United States to get him out – which could be a return to unilateral action, administration officials say.

Looming in the not-too-distant future is the real deadline: Sept. 1. That is when, under Panama's Constitution, a new government is to take office. Until now, a formula for transition that would satisfy everybody has proved elusive. The OAS has been working on the idea that a "government of reconciliation" – with representatives from the governing party and the opposition, plus an "independent" figure – could take over until new elections are held, OAS diplomats say. But the OAS mission requires patience, which is in short supply, especially from the US, they add.

For some Bush administration officials, Panama has become a test for whether the 31-member OAS, the embodiment of Latin multilateralism, can be counted on to handle tough issues.

Under President Reagan, the US preferred to go it alone in Latin America, shunning the OAS and falling behind in its budget payments. (It still owes $26 million.)

Under President Bush's more conciliatory approach, the OAS is getting fresh consideration and a new US ambassador, Luigi Einaudi, who is respected in the region as a longtime State Department expert in Latin affairs.

OAS officials and some US administration officials complain that it is unfair to use Panama as a test case for the OAS, and that it is so early in the Bush administration that the new team is not in place. Mr. Einaudi, for example, has not been confirmed yet.

"We're getting a raw deal," said a senior OAS diplomat, who grew visibly agitated over the use of the phrase "test case." "The US government spent two years digging itself into a hole on Panama, and, then, when it ran out of realistic options, it dumped the problem on the OAS. Then they expect a resolution in just a few months."

After Panama's May 7 presidential elections, which Noriega annulled after it was widely reported that his candidate lost, the OAS held an emergency session.

The result was a four-man commission – led by Ecuadorean Foreign Minister, and former UN negotiator, Diego Cordovez – which has since made three trips to Panama.

According to OAS sources, the first trip was aimed at getting the lay of the land.

On the second, the commission presented options. At that point, Noriega told OAS Secretary-General João Clemente Baena Soares that there was no need for the Panamanian military to take part in any dialogue. But this week, during the third trip, Noriega reversed himself.

According to the Associated Press, Noriega's political representatives said that they would entertain proposals for the general's departure, if the following demands were fulfilled: the departure from Panama of US Gen. Marc Cisneros, who commands the US Army troops that defend the Panama Canal; the departure of US Gen. Fred Woerner, head of the US Southern Command; and an end to US economic sanctions against Panama.

The Panamanian opposition considers that position a nonstarter. In fact, it will be difficult to get the opposition to accept anything that does not recognize what it feels is its rightful victory on May 7, say OAS sources. Some external opposition figures have expressed

concern privately that the OAS commission, to save face, will settle for a less-than-adequate solution for Panama.

If the commission fails altogether, some oppositionists say, that leaves only one alternative: direct US military action to remove Noriega.

US officials who call Panama a test for the OAS say they don't necessarily expect the OAS "to deliver Noriega's head on a platter, with garnish," as one State Department official put it. They say they understand how intractable the problem is, and that Noriega's iron grip on power makes it extremely difficult to scare or coax him out of Panama. (A recent spate of "retirements" from the military, for example, is seen by analysts as Noriega further consolidating his control. By freeing room at the top, he can buy off junior officers with promotions and raises, they say.)

But if the OAS ultimately fails in its mediation efforts, it cannot stop there, these officials say. It could also consider economic sanctions of its own, a withdrawal of ambassadors from Panama, or expulsion of Panamanian military attachés from their own countries. But for now, at least, there does not appear to be much momentum for further action on Panama if mediation fails, US and OAS officials say.

The Latin tradition of nonintervention in other countries' internal affairs also mitigates against further action. A State Department official adds that most Latin American nations have more urgent concerns than Panama – such as debt and drugs.

At press time, the Bush administration had not decided how it would approach today's meeting.

Over the weekend, Bernard Aronson, the newly installed assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, made a quick tour of Central American capitals, with Panama on his agenda.

On July 12, three senators with histories of involvement in Panama sent a letter to President Bush urging that the OAS commission's mandate not be extended beyond today's meeting because it would only play into Noriega's hands. The senators, Alfonse D'Amato (R) of New York, Jesse Helms (R) of North Carolina, and John Kerry (D) of Massachusetts, interpreted the US approach of lying low in the OAS as "a failure to support the forces of democracy" in the region.

The three senators also urged a delay in the confirmation of the new US ambassador to the OAS, "particularly if our policy is to play a passive role which is more consistent with observer status. . . ." Assistant Secretary Aronson reportedly said this letter undermined US efforts.

WASH. POST: 07-21-89

OAS Calls for Power Transfer in Panama by Sept. 1, New Election

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By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Organization of American States, ignoring U.S. fears of giving Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega a possible way to retain control in Panama, yesterday called for establishment of a transitional government by Sept. 1 followed by new presidential election "as soon as possible."

Foreign ministers of the 31-nation group concluded two days of private negotiations by instructing three mediators to help Panamanian factions negotiate "through democratic mechanisms and in accordance with domestic procedures in effect in Panama, a transfer of power on Sept. 1 and the holding of free elections as soon as possible."

U.S. officials said they had agreed reluctantly to this course because it offers hope of getting rid of Noriega. However, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who headed the U.S. delegation, also spelled out the U.S. understanding of the instructions in order to warn Noriega and his supporters in the Panamanian Defense Forces not to manipulate the OAS plan to stay in power behind the scenes.

U.S. officials fear that indefinite phrases such as "a transfer of power" and "domestic procedures in effect in Panama" could permit Noriega to replace the figurehead provisional president, Manuel Solis Palma, with another civilian under his control.

If that happened, U.S. officials warned, the Noriega-controlled transitional government might seek to delay new elections indefinitely or repeat the electoral fraud that marred Panama's May 7 presidential balloting. When Noriega failed to get his hand-picked candidate elected, he annulled the results, moving the OAS to try to resolve the resulting crisis.

"Let us be clear about what the United States believes we have decided here," Eagleburger said. "There must be a transfer of power through democratic means by Sept. 1 . . . that must reflect the will of the Panamanian people. The report of the commission makes clear what must happen before Sept. 1 for the transfer of power to happen: General Noriega must go.

"New democratic elections must be held as soon as possible. Not in one year or two years or three years—but as soon as possible."

However, despite two days of closed-door bargaining, the United States was unable to prevail over the reluctance of Latin American members to adopt language that might be construed as interfering in Panama's internal affairs. The OAS instruction also did not say specifically that Noriega must give up command of the defense forces, which is a major U.S. goal. The United States did get agreement that the OAS mediating commission of three foreign ministers—appointed May 17—should report by Aug. 23 about the prospects for transferring power by the Sept. 1 deadline.

The Panamanian constitution calls for a new president to be installed on Sept. 1, and the United States wanted the OAS mediating commission to support the claim of Guillermo Endara, the U.S.-supported opposition candidate in the recent election. The commission's failure to do that prompted Eagleburger's statement.

The three mediators—Foreign Ministers Diego Cordovez of Ecuador, Mario Palencia Lainsiesta of Guatemala and Sahadeo Basdeo of Trinidad—have reported that there is a chance of an agreement between Noriega and the opposition.

JORGE RITTER
. . . said government will cooperate

Panamanian Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter, a Noriega loyalist, said yesterday his government will cooperate fully with the mediating team, but there has been no real sign that Noriega is willing to surrender command of the Defense Forces.

N.Y.TIMES:05-10-89

Transcript of Bush's News Conference on the Panama Vote

Special to The New York Times 6/172

WASHINGTON, May 9 — Following is a transcript of President Bush's news conference today on the Panamanian elections, as recorded by the Federal News Service:

OPENING STATEMENT

Well, let me first make a brief statement. I'd like to comment on the Panamanian elections. I met with the Murtha delegation to hear their report, and I have now received a preliminary report from President Ford and President Carter. President Carter and his whole delegation will be here shortly to give me a full report.

In addition, we have the report of other observer groups, including that of the Archbishop of Panama, which demonstrate clearly that despite massive irregularities at the polls, the opposition has won a clear-cut, overwhelming victory.

Honoring Election Results

The Panamanian people have spoken. And I call on General Noriega to respect the voice of the people. And I call on all foreign leaders to urge General Noriega to honor the clear results of the election.

And I might add that I applaud the statement by Peru's Alan Garcia, who has spoken out against the fraud. I noted with interest that the Archbishop of Panama felt that 74 percent of the vote went to the opposition. And I understand that Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela is talking to some of the neighboring countries there to encourage a joint statement against the fraud that has taken place and calling on Noriega to honor the results of this election.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What would you do — what do you do otherwise?

Q. Mr. President, what kind of military force are you considering? We were told that that's one of the options.

A. The election results have not been handed in formally, announced, and until they are I will not discuss the options of the United States. I will simply again call on General Noriega to honor the will of the people.

Voice of the People

Q. Have you spoken to foreign leaders?

Q. Mr. President, you called on him a year ago to do precisely the same thing, as did Mr. Reagan, and nothing happened. Why should it be any different —

A. Because there has been a massive voice of the people heard. There has been a statement for democracy so loud and so clear that perhaps even General Noriega will listen to it. And I want to — I would like to think that he will heed the call of the people and that he would listen to the international outcry that is building and that he would step down from office, in which case the relations with the United States would improve dramatically and instantly.

Talks With Leaders

Q. Have you spoken to foreign leaders? Do you plan to speak with foreign leaders?

A. I probably will, and without going into who I have spoken to, the answer is yes. You know, we've had foreign visitors here and talked to them and —

Q. Have you — do you really think you have a military option? And on what basis could you go into someone else's country?

A. Helen, I'm not going to say what our options are. I've not discussed that here today. I have, obviously, discussed options with my own top advisers. I listened very intently to the members of Congress that came in, and some of them had specific suggestions. But I want to see General Noriega do what I've just encouraged him to do and what other foreign leaders apparently are encouraging him to do.

U.S. Effectiveness

Q. Have you put yourself in a box here by making such a public point of being upset about these elections and then, if Noriega decides to stay anyhow, that it looks like the United States is being ineffective?

A. I don't think the United States is ever in a box when it speaks out in favor of free, fair elections and honoring the will of the people. That's what we stand for. And so I don't think there's any box involved.

Stance on Canal Treaty

Q. Some members of Congress have called for the abrogation of the canal treaty. Is that in any way a possibility in your mind?

A. I want to see General Noriega do what I've just encouraged him to do. I want to see the will of the people honored.

Q. But under any circumstances would you —

A. I'm not going to go into hypothetical questions at this point.

Q. Have you talked to him? Have you given him any personal ultimatum?

A. Put it this way: General Noriega knows my position.

Q. How?

A. Never mind. He knows.

Q. Did you call him up?

A. And he's been told in recent — and he knows about it through recent contacts.

Orders to U.S. Bases

Q. Have you issued any orders regarding the military on the bases in Panama, the latest state of alert, and are you anticipating increasing their numbers?

A. I will discuss at the appropriate time what options — what course of action I will take, but I'm not going to do that now. What I want to do now is encourage, this last moment, for General Noriega to heed the appeal of those people who favor democracy and to heed the will of the Panamanian people. So, I don't want to go beyond that in terms of deployment of U.S. force.

Q. Did you give him a deadline?

A. I don't believe in deadlines.

WALL ST.J.:05-01-89

Missed Opportunity in Panama Election Opens Hornet's Nest for the White House

WASHINGTON INSIGHT

By Robert S. Greenberger
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON—Next Sunday's presidential election in Panama offers the Bush administration an opportunity to promote democracy there. But, so far, the uncoordinated U.S. effort is reminiscent of last year's Panama debacle presided over by the Reagan team.

Panamanian dictator Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's hand-picked candidate is widely expected to win the election through fraud. Yet President Bush waited until last week to issue his first comments on the coming vote, calling for "free and fair elections" and saying that "the days of rule by dictatorship in Latin America are over."

The administration hasn't adequately backed up its words with actions that would show Gen. Noriega the U.S. means business. Despite urging from State Department officials, for instance, the Pentagon has refused to order dependents of U.S. military personnel in Panama to return to the U.S.

Harassment Alleged

By Pentagon count between February 1988 and last week, Gen. Noriega's troops have subjected American personnel to 679 incidents of harassment, ranging from stopping school buses for alleged license-plate violations to beatings and even one rape. Removing the U.S. civilians, who are potential hostages in a showdown with Gen. Noriega, might have delivered a message that the administration won't tolerate such behavior. That, in turn, might have bolstered the sagging morale of the general's political opposition.

Instead, the U.S. military's Southern Command in Panama gave Gen. Noriega a pre-election boost. It recently announced in its newspaper, Tropic Times, that it plans to move its headquarters back to the U.S. The U.S. is committed by treaty to withdraw its troops and give up control of the strategically important canal by the end of the century, but announcing plans so far in advance played into the hands of Gen. Noriega, who strongly opposes the U.S. presence.

Even when it has tried to help the situation, the Bush administration has stumbled over itself. For instance, the U.S. reportedly is conducting a $10 million covert effort to aid the political opposition, but a leak last week to U.S. News and World Report about the undertaking allowed Gen. Noriega to assert that his opponents are Central Intelligence Agency stooges.

Dramatic Gesture

"There doesn't yet seem to be a focus in the administration as to what to do about this problem," complains Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar. He says the administration should dispatch Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to Panama to underscore U.S. interest in the election.

Now, the administration must face the consequences of Gen. Noriega's expected success in stealing the election. For one thing, the bitter debate here about turning over control of the Panama Canal probably will be reopened.

Under the treaty, the Panama Canal Commission, the U.S. agency that runs the canal, must for the first time be headed by a Panamanian beginning in January. This official will be recommended by Panama's president, appointed by President Bush, and then confirmed by the Senate.

Assuming Gen. Noriega controls the nomination, Mr. Bush will face an unappealing choice. He either will have to accept the Panamanian nominee, and thus renege on his administration's insistence that the U.S. won't deal with Panama as long as Gen. Noriega remains in power. Or he will have to reject Panamanian nominees and violate the treaty.

Opposed to Treaty

Moreover, a Senate confirmation hearing would provide the ideal forum for lawmakers who oppose the treaty. Sen. Lugar, a treaty supporter, warns that "there's going to be a backlash here, a backlash against the treaty. People who are inclined to demagogue will do it."

Abrogating the treaty would damage U.S. diplomatic relations throughout Latin America. But to defend it, Mr. Bush would have to risk an embarrassing political fight with his own conservative allies.

The U.S. reaction to Panama's election will send more immediate bad signals to the region too. Watching carefully is Daniel Ortega, the president of Nicaragua, who has pledged to hold elections in his country next February. If the U.S. isn't prepared to lead a regional effort to punish Gen. Noriega for making a mockery of democracy in Panama, what incentive will there be for Mr. Ortega to preside over "free and fair" elections in Nicaragua?

Former Secretary of State George Shultz told Sen. Lugar that one of his biggest regrets was that he left the Panama problem unresolved. The bungled Reagan administration effort left Mr. Bush few good options for dealing with Gen. Noriega. But Mr. Bush will have to share the blame if the Panamanian dictator remains in power.

N.Y.TIMES:05-10-89

Stern but Steady on Panama

The year's prize for brazenness goes to Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama. With all the world watching, including two former U.S. Presidents, he turned a 3-to-1 victory for the opposition into a triumph for his own hand-picked presidential candidate, Carlos Duque. According to Jimmy Carter and surveys coordinated by the Roman Catholic Church, the winner by a landslide was the challenger, Guillermo Endara.

Plainly, Panama's arrogant godfather cares nothing for foreign opinion. Having survived the Reagan Administration's effort to destroy him with economic sanctions, General Noriega may believe he's invulnerable. Yet over time he assuredly cannot ignore what Panamanians think. They have done something courageous. The Bush Administration would repay them poorly by doing something dumb, like sending additional troops and talking about abrogating the Panama Canal treaties.

The first instinct for many Americans would be to seek instant retaliation for General Noreiga's insult to democracy. But unilateral sanctions haven't worked, and extralegal means to destroy his grip are likely to produce a new dictator, not a democratic Panama. For that reason it's hard to imagine a more harebrained idea than armed intervention and the abrogation of the treaties, as suggested by Senators Connie Mack and Bob Graham. This time, President Bush's wait-and-see caution seems right on target.

Any response has to take account of Panama's size and history. Panama's two million citizens live in two cities separated by jungles and joined by a waterway. The country was all but created in 1903 by the U.S., which wrested territorial rights to the canal from the tiny republic. Thus the treaty negotiated by Mr. Carter, giving Panama control of the canal by the year 2000, is seen by most Latin Americans as an act of restitution.

Treaties are made with countries, not regimes, and a crooked vote is not grounds for abrogation. Further, armed intervention would risk sabotage of the canal's intricate and priceless locks. That's one reason the Pentagon has long opposed military moves, which would also embroil the 10,000 U.S. troops stationed in Panama. Meanwhile, those who would encourage one or another of General Noreiga's ambitious rivals forget that Washington once looked on the general himself as its client in Panama and helped consolidate his power.

Further economic sanctions are pointless. They have already caused great hardship to Panamanians without toppling its strongman. Indeed, it would make sense to offer to ease them as part of a regional strategy meant to help encourage a democratic challenge, in the Philippines mode. Like Ferdinand Marcos, General Noriega could well be undone by his contemptuous disregard for even the appearances of legitimacy.

Central Americans once habitually manipulated elections, and North Americans didn't much care. Uniformed caudillos repeatedly rigged ballots in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Starting with the leftist threat in Nicaragua a decade ago, however, Washington began to show real concern for democratic elections. North Americans can now credibly cry foul over General Noriega's theft and seek justice for his people. But Washington cannot achieve these laudable ends if it emulates his disdain for law and civilized opinion.

WASH.POST:05-12-89

Latin Nations Denounce Noriega's Move on Vote

U.S. Warned Not to Intervene Militarily

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By Julia Preston
Washington Post Foreign Service

MIAMI, May 11—Latin American nations, with the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua, strongly condemned the government of Panama today for annulling Sunday's elections, while Latin leaders across the board cautioned the United States against a military intervention.

As President Bush called for "regional diplomacy" to resolve the Panamanian crisis, it remained unclear whether the Latin democracies would be able, or willing, to confront Panama's leader, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega.

In Venezuela, President Carlos Andres Perez called for coordinated action among Latin nations and said the vote annulment, announced Wednesday night in Panama City, was "worse than the fraud itself."

At the Organization of American States in Washington, Venezuela called for an extraordinary meeting early next week of foreign ministers to discuss Panama. The OAS Permanent Council is to meet Friday to confirm the meeting. Perez urged the United States to work within the OAS in dealing with the Panamanian issue.

Bush and Perez have talked several times on the phone in recent days, according to administration officials, who indicating their hope that Perez will take the lead in organizing Latin America's response to the crisis.

Several Latin American officials said the situation in Panama today can be compared to warring Nicaragua in June 1979, when the OAS—in a rare act of unity—called for dictator Anastasio Somoza to resign. The move hastened the collapse of the Somoza regime, which came a month later.

A statement by the European Community in Brussels also condemned the annulment, saying it implied "the nonacceptance of the sovereign will of the Panamian people." The governments of EC members West Germany, Spain and Britain also denounced the action separately.

Mexico recalled its ambassador for consultations, news services reported, while in Peru, the office of President Alan Garcia released a statement saying the government "denounces and rejects" Panama's move to void the elections as "a maneuver against the liberty of the Panamanian people designed to prolong the term of the present government."

But, the statement added, Peru "rejects any act of violence or threat of intervention from any power, which our government would take to be an attack on all Latin nations." Garcia, a left-wing social democrat, has been one of Noriega's sharpest and most persistent critics during the crisis.



CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ
... presses for action by OAS

Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo called the decision to void the election "incredible and unacceptable" and said the bloody beating Wednesday of opposition leaders by Noriega-sponsored paramilitary gangs was "shameful."

Colombia's foreign minister, Julio Londono, said his government is "deeply worried" that the events "restrict the legitimate expression of the sovereignty of the Panamanian people." He also called on Panama to return to a clean electoral process but reiterated a commitment to nonintervention and indirectly warned Washington against abrogating the 1977 Panama Canal treaties.

In Chile, the Foreign Ministry said the government "views with concern" the violence and the voiding of the balloting. "We also view with concern a rise in interference by some countries in Panama's internal affairs," the ministry said.

In Costa Rica, Guido Fernandez, an aide to Nobel Peace laureate President Oscar Arias, said Bush's announced plans to add troops to bases in Panama "appear to be preventive, not aggressive." He added that Washington has shown "a much more mature and prudent reaction" during this crisis than in past years.

On Wednesday, the Group of Eight, a coalition of Latin democracies, issued a joint statement expressing "profound concern" over the events, "which could remove the government of Panama even further from the Latin democratic community." There have been relatively orderly elections so far this year in El Salvador, Paraguay and Bolivia, and Argentines are scheduled to go to the polls Sunday.

The Group of Eight includes only Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, as Panama was suspended in February 1988 after Noriega unseated U.S.-backed president Eric Arturo Delvalle and installed a hand-picked replacement. Officials in several Latin capitals today interpreted the group's statement as a nod to the United States to take strong action short of military intervention.

Cuba and Nicaragua backed Noriega in nearly identical terms, blaming the events on U.S. interference and warning that Washington "pretends to set itself up as the judge of all the political processes in our countries," in the words of a Cuban Foreign Ministry statement.

The statement also warned there would be an "explosive reaction" in Latin America in the event of a U.S. military action."

Nicaragua has offered to send troops to fight alongside Noriega's Panamanian Defense Forces if U.S. troops are commited to war in Panama.

A Test of Wills

Bush sends troops to Panama, but can U.S. pressure oust Noriega?

It was election time in Panama in the regime of Manuel Antonio Noriega, and he was debating the opposition—his way. The images seared viewers around the world: goons in red or blue T shirts, slicing like sharks through the crowd, viciously beating their victims with guns and tire irons. The helmeted police, quietly watching. The silver-haired candidate, his face and shirt bloody, stumbling away from his attacker, pleading with a soldier, being thrown into a car and driven away. "I don't think anyone can see the pictures," said President Bush's spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in Washington, "and not get a pretty clear idea of what General Noriega is all about."

The ugly scene signaled a new foreign-policy test for George Bush, and it prompted him to a new show of American force: the largely symbolic dispatching of more than 1,800 additional U.S. troops to Panama, to help safeguard American lives there and add to the diplomatic pressure on Noriega to give up his dictator's power. "We will not be intimidated by the bullying tactics, brutal though they may be, of the dictator Noriega," the president vowed. That was one step in a calibrated set of U.S. moves, ranging from moral suasion to outright cheerleading for an uprising in Panama, and it won Bush a burst of bipartisan support. Lawmakers from House Speaker Jim Wright to Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole hailed the program as a measured, statesmanlike response. In a NEWSWEEK Poll, 73 percent of a national sampling expressed confidence in Bush's handling of the Panama issue (page 37).

Had Noriega finally overreached himself? There were signs that his regime's brutality had inspired defiance, not intimidation, in his political victims, and the Roman Catholic Church was taking a bold new role in Panama, with 10 bishops condemning the fraud and violence and calling for troops to cease attacks on civilians at the weekend. Bush's stand was also winning support from friendly governments. Most tellingly, Latin American officials—who normally resent anything approaching U.S. intervention in the region—seemed likely to issue a strong statement condemning Noriega at this week's special meeting of the Organization of American States.

But the public praise for Bush's boldness masked deep misgivings at home and abroad. Like Ronald Reagan before him, Bush seemed to be running a bluff in a test of wills that the dictator might well win. If Noriega hangs tough, as one White House aide conceded, "the bottom line is, there's nothing much we can do." Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger gave a closed-door briefing for more than 70 members of Congress, and afterward, said a source who was there, "some people were shaking their heads and saying, 'God help us.' What does all this solve?" There was clear potential for a humiliating stalemate; worse, the troops in Panama could be drawn into an escalating confrontation. The Pentagon wanted no part of such risky business, but hawks at State were pressing Bush to test Noriega's mettle—and Bush was siding with the hawks. The first showdown could happen as soon as this week.

If it came, the clash could focus on a relatively minor issue: under the 1977 treaties turning over the Panama Canal to Panamanian control, the United States is entitled to maintain its bases in Panama, moving people and goods among them, un-



RON HAVIV—AFP



WESLEY BOCXE—SIPA

A message from the general: *On Election Day, troops roughed up voters and stole the tally sheets. And at a protest rally, goons beat up the candidates, including Guillermo Ford (left).*

til the change of command at noon on Dec. 31, 1999. But as part of the past year's standoff between Reagan and Noriega, the Panamanians have been sporadically harassing American personnel and operations. In all, U.S. officials have chalked up more than 700 incidents, ranging from petty bureaucratic delays to the stopping of convoys carrying troops and supplies. So far, U.S. policy has been to keep a low profile; convoys were scaled back sharply. But Bush has decided to resume full-scale use of convoys, and the Army began moving the incoming troops to U.S. bases across Panama. As a senior Bush aide put it, "If they don't get out of the way, we'll run through their barricades if we have to. The president was very clear about that. We're not looking for a fight, but we intend to be tough about insisting on our rights." The calculation was that Noriega would back down, and, at least for the moment, he obliged: Panamanian troops dismantled roadblocks that had been erected before the election. "Noriega is smart enough not to provoke us," the official said.

Burglar tools: Crafty as the dictator is, however, he does make mistakes. Indeed, if Noriega hadn't badly misjudged the election odds, the whole crisis could probably have been avoided. He aimed to install a new president, Carlos Duque, with a show of popular support. As his own polls reckoned it, he was close enough to winning that he might have had to steal only a few

LARRY DOWNING—NEWSWEEK

MANOOCHER DEGHATI

Heading for a showdown: *As the troops arrived in Panama, Bush planned a test of Noriega's mettle. Would he block the con...*

votes—perhaps as few as 10,000 among 1.2 million registered voters. So Noriega agreed to let foreign observers watch the vote, including an international delegation headed by ex-presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford. The burglar tools were ready: likely opposition voters found they had been secretly re-registered in remote precincts, and names were added to the voting lists; at least one precinct sported more voters than residents. The 15,000 troops of Noriega's own Panamanian Defense Forces were armed with cards entitling them to vote in any precinct. Premarked ballots were prepared to be handed to docile voters and dropped into the ballot boxes with no further ado. But the chicanery was meant to be inconspicuous, with a nudge from the computer if needed.

What went wrong was simply a landslide against Noriega. The turnout was unexpectedly large and the voters equally determined. At least some of the PDF troops, rushed in buses from one polling place to another, betrayed their mission: they ... early and often for the opposition's Guillermo Endara. Preliminary counts taken ... the opposition and the Roman Cat... Church showed Endara running ah... Duque by as much as 3-1. By the time Nori... ga's people realized how the tide was ... ning, it was too late for conventional me... ures; wholesale theft was needed. Armed troops confiscated ballots and tally ... at gunpoint, roughed up precinct worker... and opposition observers and deli...

After the goon squads: *A bodyguard for the opposition ticket, killed in the melee at the protest rally, being carried from the scen...*

WESLEY BOCXE...

BILL GENTILE FOR NEWSWEEK

counterfeit tally sheets to the central electoral tribunal in Panama City. The fraud was crude and unmistakable, and Carter was refused entry to the central counting-house. "I hope there will be a worldwide outcry of condemnation," he said, and there was: observers from neighboring states registered grave concern, and Australia's shadow foreign minister called it "the most blatant fraud I've ever seen." When Carter reported his findings to George Bush in Washington, Bush denounced the "massive irregularities" and once again called on Noriega to step down.

Smurf sinister: Noriega hovered in uncharacteristic indecision for three days. Opposition marches were broken up with tear gas and shotgun pellets, but no official count was announced; in Washington, hopes rose that the dictator might actually bow to the overwhelming reality. Instead, an even harder line was signaled with the beating of Endara and his two vice presidential candidates, Guillermo Ford and Ricardo Arias Calderón. As their motorcade wound through Panama City, summoning growing crowds to chant "Justice, justice," blue trucks incongruously decorated with cartoon Smurfs broke up the gatherings with blasts of water mixed with tear gas. Then troops with riot shields blocked the way, and the goon squad appeared.

They wore red or blue T shirts labeled "Dignity Battalions," the mark of the civilian militia set up by Noriega last year ostensibly to resist a U.S. invasion. They hauled the candidates from the back of a pickup truck, beating them with tire irons, fists and guns. A bodyguard was killed. Endara, bleeding from a three-inch scalp wound, was hospitalized and tested for brain damage. Arias Calderón escaped with minor injuries. Ford was driven away; when he reappeared a day later, he said he had been secretly tried, sentenced to a year in jail, then turned loose without explanation. But by then, Noriega's election commission had reached its decision: the election was nullified. With no irony at all, the panel explained that the vote had been tainted by foreign obstruction—and a lack of tally sheets.

In Washington, Bush appeared in the White House press room to announce that the conflict was between Noriega and his people, and America was on the people's side. To prove it, he asked other governments in the hemisphere to join in condemning Noriega. He said the U.S. ambassador to Panama, Arthur Davis, would be recalled, along with most of the embassy staff. Government employees and dependents in Panama would be brought onto bases or sent to safety elsewhere, and U.S. businessmen would be urged to get their relatives out of the country. Washington would continue the economic sanctions that have eroded Panama's economy by 20 percent in the past year. More than 1,800 soldiers and Marines would reinforce the 4,700 combat troops already on scene, and "I do not rule out further steps in the future." Furthermore, NEWSWEEK learned that Bush planned a covert program to encourage a People Power uprising against Noriega, perhaps with PDF backing. As he told reporters at the weekend, the people of Panama "should do everything to get him out of office."

So far, so good. The trouble was that none of this added very much to the pressure on Noriega, who had long since shrugged off the economic sanctions and previous U.S. troop movements to Panama. The hope for an uprising seemed largely wishful thinking, since Panamanians have never been militant and the opposition has produced no charismatic leaders (page 39). If Noriega chose to ignore the heat, other measures were available. But all of them had major drawbacks. The options, and their flaws:

■ **Tighten economic sanctions.** Washington could cut down still more on the flow of money and trade to Panama, ending in what has been called the "economic nuclear bomb" of a total trade embargo. The problem is that the measures already taken have decimated the Panamanian economy and badly hurt most Panamanians without measurably affecting Noriega

Handling Noriega: A Newsweek Poll

Most Americans support President Bush's policy on Panama, but not U.S. military or covert action to oust General Noriega—nor any deal to drop drug charges against him (58 percent). Bush's approval rating has risen to 62 percent.

How important is it to the U.S. that Gen. Noriega should give up power?

71%	Very important
16%	Somewhat important
5%	Not too important
3%	Not at all important

BILL GENTILE FOR NEWSWEEK

How much confidence do you have in President Bush's ability to handle the situation in Panama?

29%	A great deal
15%	Little
44%	A fair amount
8%	Almost none

Do you favor or oppose the following options for U.S. policy toward Panama now:

	FAVOR	OPPOSE
Persuade other nations in the region to pressure Noriega to surrender power	81%	14%
Send more U.S. troops to the U.S.-controlled canal area	58%	36%
A U.S. military invasion to overthrow Noriega	32%	59%
A secret U.S. operation to unseat Noriega	42%	50%

For this NEWSWEEK Poll, The Gallup Organization interviewed a national sample of 750 adults by phone May 11-12. The margin of error is plus or minus 4 percentage points. Don't know and other answers omitted. The NEWSWEEK Poll © 1989 by NEWSWEEK, Inc.

LES STONE—IMPACT VISUALS

A new kind of defiance: *In spite of the beating, Endara vowed to keep fighting*

himself. U.S. officials say he takes his cut from the illicit drug trade and the estimated $565 million that 50,000 resident Americans contribute to the economy. "The way things are going now," says a State Department official, echoing the notorious Vietnam line, "we're going to destroy Panama with the sanctions to help save it."

■ **Target Noriega's finances.** In theory, Bush could try to track down Noriega's assets overseas and ask friendly governments to freeze them. But even supposing the funds could be found and the allies would cooperate, says a Bush aide, what then? "If you seize his bank accounts, he opens new ones with fresh drug money somewhere else. He's not a stupid guy. You're talking big-time power here." Not only that, but a wounded Noriega might retaliate, seizing U.S. hostages and creating another long Iran-style crisis. "Some people don't realize that if we drive Noriega into a corner, he's capable of anything," says a senior Pentagon source.

■ **Send commandos to get Noriega.** A surgical strike is tempting, but the risks are enormous. "You get basically one chance," says a Pentagon officer. "The last thing you want to do is go in shooting and not know where Noriega is." Intelligence is said to be weak to nonexistent; as part of the Reagan freeze with Panama, U.S. military and intelligence agencies were told to drop all contacts with PDF sources. Since last year's failure of an abortive PDF coup against Noriega, he has purged the defense forces and surrounded himself with bodyguards, and he is said to sleep in at least two different places every night. Even if a strike force located the dictator, he might be killed in the attempt—an outcome that would be both illegal and inflammatory to world opinion.

■ **Invade Panama.** The good thing about a full-scale invasion, military men say, is that it would work. "Of course we could overthrow Noriega," says a senior Pentagon source. "But there would be bloodshed. We would have American boys coming home in body bags. And we would pay a terrible political price, too." For one thing, although many Panamanians say they would welcome a U.S. strike, such an invasion would trigger nationalist resentment and erase any anti-Noriega sentiment in the PDF, leaving the occupying Americans with the problem of governing the country. Worse, it would fuel the chronic anti-Yankee sentiment throughout Latin America, created by more than a century of heavy-handed U.S. interference in hemispheric affairs. "Killing Panamanians would unite the entire hemisphere against us," warns the Pentagon official.

The U.S. Presence

Ten bases are home to more than 10,000 U.S. troops. Convoys between the bases—permitted by the treaties—may be the flash point for a U.S.-Panamanian clash.



IB OHLSSON-NEWSWEEK

What that leaves is the diplomatic alternative—a steady pressure from neighboring countries for Noriega to leave the scene, reinforced by covert U.S. support for People Power in the streets and discontent in the PDF. In Washington, officials maintain without offering any evidence that revolt in the PDF is a live possibility, and they are encouraged by the opposition leaders' bravery after last week's beatings. Endara vowed to fight on against Noriega, and Ford promised: "We will not be in hiding... You got a Ford in your future, I can assure you." The church's new activism might also help rouse the country from its usual political lethargy.

Subtle forms: But the focus this week will be on the diplomatic front, and here Bush faces handicaps dating from just a year ago: when several Latin American governments tried to put together a quiet move to persuade Noriega to leave, the Reagan government brushed them aside to attempt its own cruder—and still ineffective—moves. By contrast, Bush welcomes Latin help. But to avoid lingering suspicion and resentment, he has left the lead role in the diplomatic effort to Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, who set up this week's special OAS meeting to discuss the Panamanian crisis. For all the regime's open brutality and repression, there is still deep reluctance in several governments, notably Mexico's, to breach the principle of nonintervention. Pérez was trying hard to persuade his colleagues that, as he put it, "sometimes nonintervention becomes the most subtle form of intervention," and then to work out an acceptable statement denouncing Noriega. Even so, he doubted that any OAS action could be unanimous.

It was even harder to predict whether diplomatic censure would have any effect on Noriega. Thus far, he has shown few traces of sensitivity to world opinion; some think that, given the Panamanians' passivity and Noriega's grip on the PDF, he could squat indefinitely in Panama City, growing fat on alleged drug profits.

Others are more sanguine. "I think he cares more than he lets on" about world opinion, says Ambler Moss, a former U.S. ambassador to Panama and negotiator of the canal treaties. And Aurelio Barría, a leader of Panama's opposition National Civic Crusade now living in exile in Miami, points to the recent precedents in Haiti and the Philippines: the weight of world disapproval, he says, "worked with [Ferdinand] Marcos and Jean Claude [Duvalier]."

In those cases, of course, world opinion was reinforced by discontent in the military forces and something close to turmoil in the streets. But Moss thinks diplomatic isolation, particularly from other Latin countries, could fuel Panamanians' anger at Noriega. In the end, the optimists say, a delegation of OAS leaders might call on Noriega and persuade him to get out—as a similar group helped Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza decide to yield power to the Sandinistas in 1979.

Anticipating that happy ending, both Pérez and Spain's Prime Minister Felipe González let Noriega know he could find sanctuary in their countries. But nobody expects him to go any time soon. It could be months or years before the combined pressures take their toll. For George Bush, there are no good options left; having turned up the heat and raised the expectations of his own countrymen, the question now is whether he has the patience and stamina to wait Noriega out.

LARRY MARTZ *with* CHARLES LANE *in Panama City,* JOHN BARRY, THOMAS M. DEFRANK *and* DOUGLAS WALLER *in Washington and bureau reports*

Will the Strongman's Foes Fight Back?

ARTURO ROBLES—JB PICTURES

A galvanized rank and file: *Noriega opponents destroy a progovernment campaign billboard*

Is this any way to overthrow a dictator? As part of an anti-Noriega campaign last year, the National Civic Crusade, the flagship organization of the opposition, scheduled a protest rally in Panama City. But when the time came, few of the middle-class businessmen and professionals who belong to the NCC showed up. Instead they went to Expocomer 88, a trade show in another part of town. From the first wave of antigovernment protests in 1987, the United States has stressed to Panama's opposition leaders that if they wanted Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega out, they must dislodge him. Last week President Bush underlined that point again. But the dictator's opposition has so far been weak, enabling him to keep his stranglehold.

Noriega has exploited the fact that Panama, for years a U.S. protectorate, has no experience with political violence. "Nothing in our culture has prepared us to fight with arms," says a Panamanian diplomat. Hoping to capture the nonviolent spirit of the Philippines' People Power movement, the opposition has tried to bring down Noriega with strikes and business closures. But the general played rough in response. His brutality easily cowed the opposition. "In any other Central American country, a murder generates more violence," said a European diplomat in Panama last week. "Here, it deflates violence."

The anti-Noriega crusade has also sputtered for lack of a central figure like Corazon Aquino, or a clear-cut ideology to impassion the people. Opposition leaders from the prosperous classes failed to make a bridge to their poorer countrymen; the "BMW revolution," as the opposition has been called, drew only a 2 percent credibility rating in a 1988 poll. The opposition also lacks an organizational structure: except for the Christian Democrats, the "parties" in the coalition were vehicles for individual politicians.

Much of the opposition's inertia can be traced to the Panamanian people's residual psychological dependence on the United States. For all the talk by other Latin Americans that gringo intervention would rally the people to Noriega's side, it is not difficult to find Panamanians who want an American fix. "[The Americans] should just pick [Noriega] up and the people around him and take them all away," says a pharmacy clerk. Others take a bottom-line view. "The opinion of the people," says truck driver Enrique Navarro, "is that it would be better if they invade than that we die of hunger."

But amid last week's frustrations, there were hopeful signs. The Roman Catholic Church, which helped bring down Ferdinand Marcos, is beginning to bolster the opposition openly. The election itself finally galvanized rank-and-file Panamanians. "They used this election to build themselves a viable democratic force," said Ken Wollack of the National Democratic Institute, which monitored the vote. This time, Noriega's violent tactics may have backfired. Photographs of the beatings of Guillermo Endara and Guillermo Ford made the candidates world famous and enhanced their stature. The moment was not lost on the new leadership: last week they stood before a chanting crowd, waving Endara's bloody shirt and vowing to make Noriega sorry.

JAMES N. BAKER *with* CHARLES LANE *in Panama City and* DOUGLAS WALLER *in Washington*