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January 29, 1990
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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: COMMONWEALTH CLUB, SAN FRANCISCO
Noon, Wednesday, February 7th, 1990

((Acknowledgements to come.))

((A few minutes ago, I asked a 49er fan what he thought was the turning point in the Super Bowl. He said "the National Anthem."))\\\

((Of course, not all recent memories in the Bay Area have been pleasant ones. I'm sure you remember the last time I was in this town, after this city suffered a tragedy and found renewal. May I make a personal observation about the earthquake? I remember a clutter of car wrecks, collapsed buildings, flattened freeways\\ and a menacing black cloud rising from the Marina District. Some damage remains. But today I've seen something else -- the people of the Bay Area have stood up, dusted themselves off and rebuilt. **The devastation and danger are past. Because you came together, San Francisco is as beautiful as ever\\ -- San Francisco is back.**))\\\

I have come back to California for another reason -- to thank our men and women in uniform. I came to thank them, not just because they keep America safe and free. I came to thank them because they make possible the wonderful changes that are sweeping the world. And I have come to you -- no-nonsense,

hardnosed businessmen and women that you are -- to deliver a straightforward, but hopeful, message about our national security.

In 1986, defense expenditures consumed 6.5 percent of our Gross National Product. As you know, I just submitted my 1991 budget to Congress, which cuts defense for the fifth year in a row -- to almost 5 percent of GNP.

I am submitting this budget at a time when the postwar world we know -- the world that began in 1945 -- is changing before our very eyes. So to understand where we are going, let me first review where we have been and where we are today.

The first generation of postwar leaders had the cautionary example of their predecessors. They remembered that visionary statesmen, after the First World War, had outlawed large navies. They remembered that their predecessors had even outlawed war itself. But no pact prevented World War Two.

So by 1945 our leaders had acquired a patience,\\ a pragmatism,\\ born of a sober appraisal of the world as it was. And from Harry Truman, to John F. Kennedy, to Ronald Reagan, we paid any price, we bore any burden, in the defense of liberty. We paid with part of our national wealth. And some brave Americans paid with their very lives.

Yet our leaders sought peace even as they prepared for war. It was during the Truman Administration, in this very city, that men and women of great vision and high ideals came from around

the world to create a parliament of nations. And so it was in San Francisco, 45 years ago, that the United Nations was born.

So we strived to balance our role as peace-keeper with that of peace-maker. We created NATO **and** the United Nations; we rebuffed Soviet expansion **and** encouraged Soviet reform.

Those who crafted this new policy, and called it containment, predicted that if we blocked the easy path of expansion, then the Soviet Union would one day have to confront its inhumane, illogical system. The purpose of this confrontation was not to defeat or to humiliate the Soviets. The purpose was to lead to a "mellowing of the Soviet Union." It took a half a century to vindicate this strategy, and at long last we can say it works: **And that is why the Cold War today is in retreat.**\\\

Our leaders also rejected the old notion of spheres of influence, seeking instead to create new centers of power in Europe and Asia. This is happening today, and this is good, for no sane man or woman is nostalgic for the Cold War. We are inspired by the Revolution of '89 -- delighted to see a man of letters and conscience in Prague move from prison to the presidential palace. We are heartened to see the Berlin Wall fall, setting off a shockwave that upended a tyrant in Romania.

And we are grateful for something more. The likelihood of a war with the Soviets has always been small, thanks to our strength and that of our Allies. Now, thanks to the courageous reforms of a dynamic Soviet leader, **the threat of war is smaller**

than ever before.\\\ Like Harold MacMillian before him, President Gorbachev freely acknowledges that empire is a burden, more problem than protection. And so now "the winds of change" are shaping a new destiny for the nations of the Continent -- that of a Europe whole and free.\\\

So why should we be cautious? San Francisco, Oakland, Marin -- your cities are linked by great bridges. And you understand better than anyone that bridge building is dangerous. Bridges must be built with patience and care. And if they are, then the bridges we build will last for generations.

Well, I am trying to finish a bridge begun by others long ago. I am trying to finish a bridge that will lead us from seemingly endless conflict to the promise of a lasting peace. But a bridge between nations must be reinforced with realism.

As President, I receive a briefing every morning from the Central Intelligence Agency. And I get from the CIA the best intelligence available to any world leader today. Yet I often find that the events reported to me by the CIA in the morning are overcome by the news in the evening. The world is simply moving too fast for any person or organization to predict what will happen next. With so much that is unpredictable, I must still weight the promising future against today's reality.

For example, my most recent proposal, warmly received by President Gorbachev, was to reduce land forces on both sides in Central Europe to 195,000 troops. That's the outlook, and it holds great promise.

But the reality? -- Reality is that the Soviets still have almost 600,000 men under arms in Central Europe today.

Another example: Because of the new openness in Moscow, we hope to slash the number of strategic weapons on both sides to 6,000. That's the prospect for change, and it holds great promise.

But the reality? -- the Soviet Union still has ((number)) strategic weapons. And they are still developing, at a furious pace, two new mobile strategic weapons systems and a strategic defense.

I am your Commander-in-Chief. I am bound by the Constitution to defend and protect the United States of America. And I cannot, as some would have me do, predicate our defense on the promising, but as of yet unfulfilled, proposals for the future. Our national defense strategy is not a response to the professed intentions of other nations, **but to the weapons they hold in their hands.**\\ That's the reality we face.

You certainly don't do business on the basis of a promise. You do business on the basis of collateral. And I will seek from the Soviets the collateral to implement a new peace. In international terms, collateral means: **soldiers decommissioned, tanks dismantled, and nuclear missiles demolished.**\\\

Some see our methodical approach as endangering the process of change. I see our approach as **essential** to change, as the **only** way to a lasting peace. We have shown that American resolve leads to Soviet reform. We have shown that American strength is

the catalyst for arms control. We must not let impatience ruin all we have achieved.

Let me discuss several aspects of our defense strategy that we must not change through sheer impatience.

First, we will continue to deter a global war. To do so, we will still need what the folks in the Pentagon call a forward defense. Let me tell you what a forward defense means. America spans a continent, but in strategic terms, we are an island nation. And an island nation must defend itself **before** a threat can reach its shores. **And that is why we have, and will continue to have, a forward presence -- military forces with global reach.**

Second, we will, of course, continue to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear war. **And that is why I will aggressively pursue a Strategic Arms Reduction ~~Treaty~~ TALKS with the Soviet Union.**\\\ But arms control and strategic modernization are not competing strategies. Rather, they work together to make the world a safer place.

Just this morning, I visited Lawrence Livermore Labs and met those visionary men and women who strive to make an all-out nuclear strike on our country, or a limited strike from a madman, even more unlikely than it is today. Of course, some complain of the cost of developing such technologies. They should first consider the cost of not doing all we can to protect the cities and children of America. After all, 15 countries in the world are developing ballistic missile technology, many with chemical and biological weapons. That is why I will seek to persuade the

Soviets, through our Defense and Space talks, to use SDI to help us all make a transition to safer world.

So far, I have spoken of what will remain constant. Now let me address ways in which our 1991 defense strategy is a dramatic departure from the military strategies of the past.

First, new threats are emerging outside of the Cold War. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Persian Gulf, where only the U.S. Navy could secure the flow of oil to the industrial democracies. Ever since the Mayaguez incident, most conflicts involving U.S. forces -- like Libya or Panama -- have had nothing to do with Soviet expansionism.

But they had everything to do with terrorism, narcotics, or both. Narco-gangsters are already a threat our national health and our national spirit. Now they are even taking on the dimensions of a geopolitical force. And they must be dealt with as such -- **by our military -- in the air and on the seas.**\\\

So we will need forces adaptable to conditions **anywhere** in the world. We need will agility, readiness, sustainability. We will need speed and stealth. We will need to be able to open a sealane, arrest a drug lord or repel a missile.

In short, we must now deter both a global war and limited conflicts with sophisticated new powers. And for this reason, we **doubly** need to continue the modernization of our forces. It is my duty, and mine alone, to commit American fighting men to combat. And I will not accept the trade-off of **dollars** for increased risk to American **lives**.

Those who serve on the front lines are not abstractions to me. Just yesterday, I visited at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, near Barstow, where our fighting forces are preparing for combat anywhere in the world. And it was at this very base that we trained many of our troops who fought with such distinction in Panama. As more new threats emerge on the horizon, we will need to be ready to fight under any conditions anywhere in the world, even it means that some of our forces are not as well prepared for combat in Central Europe.\\

((You know, I read that Khrushchev once spoke to the Commonwealth Club from lunch until 11 p.m.\\\ Perhaps he began his speech with these words: "Let me make just a few brief observations . . .))\\\

So I'll get to my final concern -- how all this change in our defense budget affects us at home. Many speak of the peace dividend. Few discuss the short-term cost of peace. After all, those who volunteered to serve in the Armed Forces, and are decommissioned, suffer disappointment and dislocation. And I know that communities suffer as well.

Some of the bases that have been proposed for closure are in this area. So I have come to San Francisco today to assure you that **if a base is closes, it doesn't close the federal obligation.**\\

Civilians who are laid off will receive top priority for placement in other DOD positions. The Homeowner's Assistance Program will protect military and civilian personnel from falling

real estate prices. And the Office of Economic Adjustment will work with communities to develop powerful new economic assets, new ways to use old bases. The Bible speaks of beating swords into plowshares. We are transforming military runways into municipal airports; military bases into industrial parks and community colleges; and missile hangers into factories.

((That still leaves a lot of decommissioned soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. So I am here today to propose a way they can make a contribution to our national security **after** they have left the service. They have, after all, what many Americans lack -- a strong background in math and the sciences. So let us challenge these men and women to educate yet another generation of American children.\\

((I propose an exemption of 50 percent of military retired pay from federal taxes for those who enter full time into the teaching of elementary and secondary school youth\\ . . . **and a 100 percent exemption for those who teach in the classrooms of the inner city.** Some will be alternatively certified. For those men and women still in the military, I propose that they be allowed to acquire the necessary teaching credentials at reduced cost prior to retirement.

((This is as much an investment in our national security as any other defense program. I began my Presidency by saying that the purpose of power is to help people. Let us allow these men and women of our Armed Forces to keep the American people competitive in the 21st century.))

I have no doubt the American people will support these measures for a continued strong defense. The polls show that. My travels around America tell me that. But to have the means to negotiate reductions and ensure the peace, I will need the support, cooperation and consultation of Congress.

You know, I started by joking about the 49ers winning the Super Bowl during the National Anthem. But I don't care how many passes Joe Montana completed. He knew better than to rest on his laurels at the beginning of the fourth quarter. So should we. If Congress will work with me, **then peace itself will be the greatest dividend of all.**\\\

We can now envision a time when military competition is past; when all the competitive instincts of modern man will be diverted to commerce; when the warriors of the future will be businessmen and women like you, briefcase in hand.

Thank you for inviting me to San Francisco. God bless you, and God bless America.

# # #

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8TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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September 16, 1988, Friday, NASSAU AND SUFFOLK EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 17
Other Edition: City Pg. 15

LENGTH: 732 words

HEADLINE: Massachusetts Is Foes' Battleground

BYLINE: This story was reported by Jack Sirica and Susan Page and was written by Ellis Henican.

KEYWORD: MASSACHUSETTS; MICHAEL DUKAKIS; GEORGE BUSH; PRESIDENT; CANDIDATE; CAMPAIGN; ELECTION; 1988; issue

BODY:

Vice President George Bush yesterday ridiculed Michael Dukakis' claim of having revived his home state's economy, saying that the "Massachusetts miracle" so often touted by the Democratic governor is nothing but a "Massachusetts mirage."

If the Democrats return to the White House, Bush told a more-than-receptive crowd at the old-line Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, "they'd bring back inflation, skyrocketing interest rates and falling incomes. And at a time when foreign competition is becoming even stronger, they would knock the foundations out from under the expansion and lose America its place as economic leader of the world."

Dukakis, cognizant of the need not to let Bush dictate the day's campaign dialogue, had planned a "presidential-style event," press secretary Dayton Duncan said: a visit with firefighters at Yellowstone National Park in Montana. But it didn't take much time for him to get drawn into a long-distance spat.

"If this nation had 3 percent unemployment and had 10 years of balanced budgets and had the record that we have, we could be looking forward to a future of strength and optimism and jobs for everybody," he said.

Yesterday's back-and-forth, the latest in an intensifying series of sniping between the candidates, came as one national poll called it a dead heat, suggesting that the Democrats may finally have stemmed their recent decline.

Three other national surveys released this week also called the race tied or placed Bush slightly ahead.

"It's obvious that we have bottomed out and we're beginning to come back up," Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, the Democratic vice-presidential nominee, said while campaigning in Shreveport, La.

Now under the firmer hand of resurrected campaign strategist John Sasso, Dukakis traveled to Montana intent on delivering the nation's thanks to the nearly 10,000 firefighters who have been battling devastating blazes since June.

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(c) 1988 Newsday, September 16, 1988

He even deflected questions about his position on the National Park Service's controversial policy of letting naturally occurring fires run their course. "This isn't the time to discuss what might have been or what should be," he said, as scripted.

But there was Bush, out on the West Coast, hammering away at the governor's hometown record - a cornerstone of the Democratic campaign.

Using an Olympic metaphor two days before the Summer Games open, Bush said his opponent should be crowned "gold medal winner in the tax-and-spend competition."

The vice president laid out an awful-sounding litany: A state government that "piled up $ 7.4 billion in debt"; 26,000 manufacturing jobs lost since 1983 - "more than any other state in the country"; and a bigger per-capita spending hike than any other state, 47.8 percent between 1983 and 1987.

Massachusetts, the vice president said, "is approaching a fiscal fiasco that might best be described as a budgetary Three Mile Island," a reference to the serious accident at the Pennsylvania nuclear power plant in 1979.

Later, upon arriving in Los Angeles, Dukakis said: "Anybody who'd compare my state's economy to Three Mile Island must be suffering from a meltdown."

With word of the vice president's commentary filtering in, Dukakis and his aides dished up their own version of what happened in Massachusetts: five tax cuts in the past five years; an increase in service and white-collar jobs to more than offset the loss in manufacturing employment; strong fiscal ratings from the big financial houses; and taxes and fees - as a percentage of per capita income - lower than nearly any other state.

And Dukakis himself weighed in with this:

"If you compare that to what's happened with Mr. Bush and the administration of which he is a part, if you think about the kinds of fiscal mess that I'm going to inherit as the next president of the United States when I walk in there, when you look at these economic burdens that states particularly out here in the West have been asked to carry the last eight years as the prosperity of the coasts pass them by, I think you'll see a very, very sharp contrast, and I think it's a very good example of why we need a Democratic administration."

Bush, meanwhile, told a group of California high school students yesterday that he hopes Lt. Col. Oliver North is found innocent of Iran-contra charges, but he declined to rule out a pardon if the former White House aide is convicted.

GRAPHIC: AP Photo-Bush accepts applause from San Francisco Commonwealth Club

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3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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October 24, 1989, Tuesday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 805 words

HEADLINE: Baker Sounds Positive Note In Arms Talk

BYLINE: Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

Secretary of State James A. Baker III called yesterday for "steady steps" of progress across a broad front in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations, declaring that "we face the clearest opportunity to reduce the risk of war since the dawn of the nuclear age."

Baker, in his second speech in a week defining a U.S.-Soviet agenda in the Bush administration, expounded an unusually positive view of the possibilities for far-reaching understandings with Moscow. Uncertainty about the fate of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's reform program, which some in the administration earlier cited as the justification for caution, should provide "all the more reason, not less, for us to seize the present opportunity" to make agreements to reduce superpower arsenals and the Soviet military threat, Baker said.

"If the Soviets have already destroyed weapons, it will be difficult, costly and time-consuming for any future Kremlin leadership to reverse the process and to assert military superiority. And with agreements in place, any attempt to break out of treaties will serve as one indicator of an outbreak of old thinking," Baker told San Francisco's Commonwealth Club in an address also made available here.

Baker depicted the recent Soviet shift on strategic defense at his meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyo., with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze as a major concession by Moscow that can facilitate completion of a strategic arms reduction treaty (START). Shevardnadze made clear at that meeting that a pact on cutting strategic offensive arms need not be delayed by space-defense issues.

"We look favorably" on the move, said Baker. "This Soviet decision to no longer hold START hostage to resolution of defense and space issues removes a key obstacle to a START treaty while enabling us to proceed with our SDI [strategic defense initiative] plans," he said.

The Soviet shift on strategic defense has been debated by experts and others inside and outside the administration: some see the separation of strategic defense from the negotiation of an offensive arms treaty as highly significant, and others term it merely cosmetic. Baker's statement placed him -- and to a degree, the Bush administration -- more clearly than before in the first camp.

The tone and substance of Baker's address were notably more positive about the opportunities for progress in relations with Moscow than most of his earlier addresses, including the relatively cautious speech last Monday in New York which was hailed in some quarters as denoting a shift in administration

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policy.

Baker aides said yesterday that both speeches were intended to sum up rather than break new policy ground, though they were visibly elated at the praise drawn by last week's address. The administration had been under attack on Capitol Hill and elsewhere for timidity in the face of historic change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

While Gorbachev's domestic reforms are still in mid-passage, Baker said yesterday, "the political face of Soviet power is being changed already." The prospect of similar reforms in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, he said, means that "the political foundations of a Europe divided by force since 1945 are crumbling away."

Baker set out four arms-control principles which he said guide the U.S. search for "a stable, predictable strategic relationship:"

Reductions in "first-strike, surprise attack capabilities" in conventional land armies in Europe and in nuclear arms. He described allied and U.S. negotiating positions as directed to this end.

Greater "predictability through openness" in military activities, which he said could enhance confidence and reduce fears of aggressive Soviet intent. Baker also expressed hope that enhanced authority of the newly elected Supreme Soviet legislative body will bring "detailed and searching public debate" in Moscow on Soviet military programs.

A broadened arms-control agenda, with heavier emphasis on the growing problems of chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and other advanced weapons in the Third World. For the second time in a week, Baker expressed concern about North Korea's nuclear program.

Making Soviet shifts permanent through institutional means, including effective verification and destruction of weapons. Regarding compliance with earlier accords, Baker welcomed the Soviet decision to destroy its radar at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. The United States has long described the installation as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and yesterday in Moscow, Shevardnadze did so as well.

In summing up, Baker seemed to depart from President Reagan's avowed goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, saying, "We cannot dis-invent nuclear weapons nor the need for continued deterrence."

TYPE: NATIONAL NEWS, FOREIGN NEWS

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES; U.S.S.R.; WEAPONS SYSTEMS; ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

NAMED-PERSONS: JAMES A. BAKER III

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The San Francisco Chronicle

JANUARY 9, 1990, TUESDAY, FINAL EDITION

SECTION: DAILY DATEBOOK; E2

LENGTH: 297 words

HEADLINE: Chamber Symphony Celebrates the Fall of the Wall

BYLINE: Joshua Kosman, Chronicle Staff Critic

BODY:

The Chamber Symphony of San Francisco and the Commonwealth Club celebrated the opening of the Berlin Wall on Sunday evening with a concert in the First Unitarian Church.

The concert, co-sponsored by the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Goethe Institute, drew an enthusiastic audience to hear music by German and Eastern European composers.

If there were ample indications of a hastily prepared musical event, that seemed somehow in keeping with the breathless pace of events in Europe during recent months.

After opening remarks by German Consul General Walter Koenig, conductor Jean-Louis Le Roux led a reduced complement of players in concertos by Handel and Bach. Handel's Concerto Grosso in G Minor, Op. 6, No. 6, got the concert off to a handsome start. It sounded fleet and distinguished, with bright string sonorities and vibrantly etched textures.

The Third Brandenburg Concerto began with a stirring opening but soon bogged down, sounding scrappy and under-rehearsed. Harpsichordist Susan Harvey contributed a nicely turned mini-cadenza to the minimalist slow movement.

Non-German composers were held until after intermission. Pianist Roy Bogas made a grandiloquent pass through the Polonaise in A-Flat, Op. 53, of Chopin. To conclude, he was joined by violinist Roy Malan and cellist Andor Toth Jr. for Martinu's Concertino for Piano Trio and String Orchestra _ a charming work, full of fetching musical ideas and deft interplay among the soloists.

Dietrich Ebelding also led members of the Pacific Singing Society, a consortium of 17 German choruses throughout California, in his own arrangements of the ''Sanctus'' from Schubert's German Mass in F, D. 105, and ''Die Ehre Gottes aus der Natur,'' Op. 48, No. 4, by Beethoven.

SUBJECT: MUSIC; REVIEW

NAME: Chamber Symphony of San Francisco

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The Honorable George Bush, President of the United States



Wednesday, February 7, 1990

Grand Ballroom, San Francisco Hilton

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Foreign Affairs 40's x

George Kennan

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1) ANY SPECIFIC MENTION OF "PEACE DIVIDEND" IN THE PAST? ESP. ~~1930~~ 1920s, 1930s?

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Steve Lagerfeld

Vivian
Jeff 697-8191

Army Historica
272-0291

272-0315
Res. + Analysis

395-4970

(1) Col. Mike Hayden OMB-NSC

1986 - D.O.D. Outlays = 6.3% of GNP

1991 - D.O.D. Outlays = 5.0%

6.3%	6.2%	5.9%	5.7%	5.2%	5.0% ←
1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991

For the 5th Year in a row, the GNP share of Defense outlays has been reduced.

(2) United Nations Conference on International Organization
— San Francisco, CA
April 25 - June 26, 1945

50 Countries in attendance drew up charter, ratified by the majority (including China, France, USSR, UK, USA) on June 26, 1945.

Poland was 51st to sign.

START

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Kruschev

Manyguez

Then we shall know what we are trying to do. The Russians will know it. Europe will know it. We shall be trying to do a great thing which is simple and necessary: to settle the main actual consequences of this particular war, to put an end to the abnormal situation where Europe, one of the chief centers of civilization, though liberated from the Nazis, is still occupied by its non-European liberators.

We shall be addressing ourselves to an objective to which our own power is suited—be it in diplomacy or in war. We shall be seeking an end that all men can understand, and one which expresses faithfully our oldest and best tradition—to be the friend and the champion of nations seeking independence and an end to the rule of alien powers.

George F. Kennan

CONTAINMENT THEN AND NOW

The word "containment," of course, was not new in the year 1946. What was new, perhaps, was its use with relation to the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations. What brought the word to public attention in this connection was its use in an article that appeared in 1947, in this magazine, under the title of "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," and was signed with what was supposed to have been an anonymous X. This piece was not originally written for publication; it was written privately for our first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, who had sent me a paper on communism and asked me to comment on it. It was written, as I recall, in December 1946, in the northwest corner room on the ground floor of the National War College building. At the time I was serving as deputy commandant for foreign affairs at the college. I suppose it is fitting that I, for my sins, should try to explain something about how the word "containment" came to be used in that document, and what it was meant to signify.

One must try to picture the situation that existed in that month of December 1946. The Second World War was only a year and some months in the past. U.S. armed forces were still in the process of demobilization; so, too, though to a smaller extent (because the Russians proposed to retain a much larger peacetime establishment than we did), were those of the Soviet Union.

In no way did the Soviet Union appear to me, at that moment, as a military threat to this country. Russia was at that time utterly exhausted by the exertions and sacrifices of the recent war. Something like 25 million of its people had been killed. The physical destruction had been appalling. In a large portion of the territory of European Russia, the devastation

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Editor's Note. This article is adapted from a speech presented at the National Defense University in 1985; it was published in *Containment: Concept and Policy*, edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, pp. 23–31. Portions appeared in the *Los Angeles Times*, December 29, 1985.
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had to be seen to be believed. Reconstruction alone was obviously going to take several years. The need for peace, and the thirst for peace, among the Russian people was overwhelming. To have remobilized the Soviet armed forces at that time for another war effort, and particularly an aggressive one, would have been unthinkable. Russia then had no navy to speak of and virtually no strategic air force. It had never tested a nuclear weapon. There was uncertainty over when Russia would test one, and there was even more uncertainty over when, or whether, it would ever develop the means of long-range delivery of nuclear warheads. The United States itself had not yet developed such delivery systems.

In these circumstances, there was no way that Russia could appear to me as a military threat. It is true that even then the Soviet Union was credited—and credited by some of my colleagues at the War College—with the capability of overrunning Western Europe with its remaining forces, if it wanted to do so. But I myself regarded those calculations as exaggerated (I still do); and I was convinced that there was very little danger of anything of that sort. So when I used the word "containment" with respect to that country in 1946, what I had in mind was not at all the averting of the sort of military threat people talk about today.

What I *did* think I saw—and what explained the use of that term—was what I might call an ideological-political threat. Great parts of the northern hemisphere—notably Western Europe and Japan—had just then been seriously destabilized, socially, spiritually and politically, by the experiences of the recent war. Their populations were dazed, shell-shocked, uncertain of themselves, fearful of the future, highly vulnerable to the pressures and enticements of communist minorities in their midst. The world communist movement was at that time a unified, disciplined movement, under the total control of the Stalin regime in Moscow. Not only that, but the Soviet Union had emerged from the war with great prestige for its immense and successful war effort. The Kremlin was, for this and for other reasons, in a position to manipulate these foreign communist parties very effectively in its own interests.

As for the intentions of the Stalin regime toward the United States, I had no illusions. I had already served three tours of duty in Stalin's Russia—had in fact just come home from the last of these tours when I came to the War College; and I had nothing but suspicion for the attitude of the Stalin regime

toward us or toward the other recent Western Allies. Stalin and the men around him were far worse—more sinister, more cruel, more devious, more cynically contemptuous of us—than anything we face today. I felt that if Moscow should be successful in taking over any of those major Western countries, or Japan, by ideological-political intrigue and penetration, this would be a defeat for us, and a blow to our national security, fully as serious as would have been a German victory in the war that had just ended.

One must also remember that during that war, and to some extent into the post-hostilities period as well, the U.S. government had tried to win the confidence and the good disposition of the Soviet government by fairly extensive concessions to Soviet demands with respect to the manner in which the war was fought and to the prospects for the postwar international order. The United States had raised no serious objection to the extension of the Soviet borders to the west. Our government had continued to extend military aid to the Soviet Union even when its troops were overrunning most of the rest of Eastern Europe. We had complacently allowed its forces to take Prague and Berlin and surrounding areas even when there was a possibility that our forces could arrive there just as soon as theirs did. The Russians were refusing to give us even a look in their zone of occupation in Germany but were demanding a voice in the administration and reconstruction of the Ruhr industrial region in western Germany.

Now there seemed to be a danger that communist parties subservient to Moscow might seize power in some of the major Western European countries, notably Italy and France, and possibly in Japan. And what I was trying to say, in the *Foreign Affairs* article, was simply this: "Don't make any more unnecessary concessions to these people. Make it clear to them that they are not going to be allowed to establish any dominant influence in Western Europe and in Japan if there is anything we can do to prevent it. When we have stabilized the situation in this way, then perhaps we will be able to talk with them about some sort of a general political and military disengagement in Europe and in the Far East—not before." This, to my mind, was what was meant by the thought of "containing communism" in 1946.

One may wish to compare that situation with the one the United States faces today, and to take account of the full dimensions of the contrast—between the situation we then

confronted and the one we confront today. I must point out that neither of the two main features of the situation we were confronting in 1946 prevails today; on the contrary, the situation is almost exactly the reverse.

I saw at that time, as just stated, an ideological-political threat emanating from Moscow. I see no comparable ideological-political threat emanating from Moscow at the present time. The Leninist-Stalinist ideology has almost totally lost appeal everywhere outside the Soviet orbit, and partially within that orbit as well. And the situation in Western Europe and Japan has now been stabilized beyond anything we at that time were able even to foresee. Whatever other dangers may today confront those societies, a takeover, politically, by their respective communist parties is simply not in the cards.

One may say, yes, but look at Soviet positions in such places as Ethiopia and Angola. Fair enough. Let us look at them, but not exaggerate them. Aside from the fact that these places are mostly remote from our own defensive interests, what are the Russians doing there? With the exception of Afghanistan, where their involvement goes much further, they are selling arms and sending military advisers—procedures not too different from many of our own. Can they translate those operations into ideological enthusiasm or political loyalty on the part of the recipient Third World regimes? No more, in my opinion, than we can. These governments will take what they can get from Moscow—take it cynically and without gratitude, as they do from us. And they will do lip service to a political affinity with Moscow precisely as long as it suits their interest to do it and not a moment longer. Where the Russians acquire bases or other substantial military facilities, this has, of course, greater military significance. But it is not an ideological threat.

On the other hand, whereas in 1946 the military aspect of our relationship to the Soviet Union hardly seemed to come into question at all, today that aspect is obviously of prime importance. But here, lest the reader be left with a misunderstanding, a caveat must be voiced.

When I say that this military factor is now of prime importance, it is not because I see the Soviet Union as threatening the United States or its allies with armed force. It is entirely clear to me that Soviet leaders do not want a war with us and are not planning to initiate one. In particular, I have never believed that they have seen it as in their interests to overrun Western Europe militarily, or that they would have launched

an attack on that region generally even if the so-called nuclear deterrent had not existed. But I recognize that the sheer size of their armed forces establishment is a disquieting factor for many of our allies. And, more important still, I see the weapons race in which we and they are now involved as a serious threat in its own right, not because of aggressive intentions on either side but because of the compulsions, the suspicions, the anxieties such a competition engenders, and because of the very serious dangers it carries with it of unintended complications—by error, by computer failure, by misread signals, or by mischief deliberately perpetrated by third parties.

For all these reasons, there is now indeed a military aspect to the problem of containment as there was not in 1946; but what most needs to be contained, as I see it, is not so much the Soviet Union as the weapons race itself. And this danger does not even arise primarily from political causes. One must remember that while there are indeed serious political disagreements between the two countries, there is no political issue outstanding between them which could conceivably be worth a Soviet-American war or which could be solved, for that matter, by any great military conflict of that nature.

The weapons race is not all there is in this imperfect world that needs to be contained. There are many other sources of instability and trouble. There are local danger spots scattered about in the Third World. There is the dreadful situation in southern Africa. There is the grim phenomenon of a rise in several parts of the world of a fanatical and wildly destructive religious fundamentalism, and there is the terrorism to which that sort of fundamentalism so often resorts. There is the worldwide environmental crisis, the rapid depletion of the world's nonrenewable energy resources, the steady pollution of its atmosphere and its waters—the general deterioration of its environment as a support system for civilized living.

And finally, there is much in our own life, here in this country, that needs early containment. It could, in fact, be said that the first thing we Americans need to learn to contain is, in some ways, ourselves: our own environmental destructiveness, our tendency to live beyond our means and to borrow ourselves into disaster, our apparent inability to reduce a devastating budgetary deficit, our comparable inability to control the immigration into our midst of great masses of people of wholly different cultural and political traditions.

In short, if we are going to talk about containment in the

context of today, then I think we can no longer apply that term just to the Soviet Union and particularly not to a view of the Soviet Union drawn too extensively from the image of the Stalin era, or, in some instances, from the even more misleading image of our Nazi opponents in the last great war. If we are going to relate that term to the Soviet Union of today, we are going to have to learn to take as the basis for our calculations a much more penetrating and sophisticated view of that particular country than the one that has become embedded in much of our public rhetoric. But beyond that, we are going to have to recognize that a large proportion of the sources of our troubles and dangers lies outside the Soviet challenge, such as it is, and some of it even within ourselves. And for these reasons we are going to have to develop a wider concept of what containment means—a concept more closely linked to the totality of the problems of Western civilization at this juncture in world history—a concept, in other words, more responsive to the problems of our own time—than the one I so lightheartedly brought to expression, hacking away at my typewriter there in the northwest corner of the War College building in December of 1946.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

SUPERPOWERS AND REVOLUTION. Edited by Jonathan R. Adelman. New York: Praeger, 1986, 256 pp. $38.95.

When states which are deemed by one or both superpowers to be significant in the geopolitical balance of power erupt into revolution or local war, Washington and Moscow have decisions to make: to weigh the risks, costs and advantages of this course or that; to decide on action or inaction; to try to act together to contain the dangers or separately to exploit them. The contributors to this volume look into the problems of revolution and intervention by considering specific instances where the Soviet Union (in the cases of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Afghanistan) or the United States (in China, Vietnam, Guatemala, Chile and Iran) had such decisions to make. These studies are, for the most part, carefully and thoughtfully done, without great new revelations and with more sureness of touch, for obvious reasons, on the American than on the Soviet side.

GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH. Edited by Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1986, 278 pp. $35.00.

In this book, written by social scientists for social scientists and building on an earlier volume, *The State as Terrorist*, the authors spend much of their energies in establishing definitions, classifications and theories to fit the multifarious phenomena of "state terrorism." One enlightening chapter shows how "national security ideology" has become the rationale for terror and repression in Latin America. Another and certainly controversial chapter compares the records of the United States and the Soviet Union on various forms of state terrorism—and here one catches the "anti-imperialist" tone of much of the book—to the definite disadvantage of the U.S. There are indeed in this "agenda" many judgments, explicit or tacit, interspersed among the definitions and theories.

CLANDESTINE RADIO BROADCASTING. By Lawrence C. Soley and John S. Nichols. New York: Praeger, 1986, 288 pp. $47.95.

Clandestine broadcasting is "illegal, political, and frequently misleading." It is also often difficult to track down where it is coming from, who is controlling it, and how effective it is. In this ambitious and impressive study two academic specialists in the field of political communication have endeavored to cover the history of such broadcasts from the beginnings in the 1930s through the use of psychological warfare and deception in World War II to the manifold practice of "gray" and "black" propaganda that has punctuated the conflicts of the postwar period. The latter part of the book deals with areas of special interest (e.g., East Europe, the Caribbean

THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT

by X

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.

The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: "Unevenness

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of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries."[1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push be given.

For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression—or too impatient to seek it—in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support for their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categorical denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of the Marxian-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*: "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." And it was with this set of conceptions that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.

Now it must be noted that through all the years of prepara-

[1] "Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe," August 1915. Official Soviet edition of Lenin's works.

tion for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed of Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism [2] would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital holdings there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought; and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.

The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period—the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people—made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with "war Communism" and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.

Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.

[2] Here and elsewhere in this paper "Socialism" refers to Marxist or Leninist Communism, not to liberal Socialism of the Second International variety.

And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the overbrooding presence of "the word."

Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed—and found it easy to believe—that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.

Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to

sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy" which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.

This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.

By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and

tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930s, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.

Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the masters of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.

As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.

But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored

in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.

II

So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we

should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final *coup de grâce*. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland"—that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union—should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counterrevolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.

This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.

On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to

the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of the thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable—nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself

require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries—policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government,

it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.

III

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.

But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?

The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.

The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.

To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.

Here only the younger generation can help. The younger generation, despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous; and the Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously increased by the war. Such things as normal security and

placidity of home environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether that is not going to leave its mark on the overall capacity of the generation now coming into maturity.

In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development, while it can list certain formidable achievements, has been precariously spotty and uneven. Russian Communists who speak of the "uneven development of capitalism" should blush at the contemplation of their own national economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sectors of economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period one of the great industrial nations of the world while it still has no highway network worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways. Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled worker of the west.

It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasm and of radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity.

Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or group of individuals to others.

This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin's pinnacle of preeminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook

the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself.

It is always possible that another transfer of preeminent power may take place quietly and inconspicuously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again, it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those "incredibly swift transitions" from "delicate deceit" to "wild violence" which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.

But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the Party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in three years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the Party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the Party members are persons who have entered since the last Party congress was held. Meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.

It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in age, outlook and interest between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these Party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy.

Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of the higher spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for the membership at large has been

exercised only in the practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only a crust concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin. That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel *Buddenbrooks*. Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farthest advanced, he compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light shines most brightly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

IV

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet re-

gime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating

effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the bandwagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.

In would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, messianic movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure on this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

Unrest in China • Reagan's Legacy after Iran • The Administration Effort to Fund the Contras

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

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOR

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

FEBRUARY 7, 1990

EVENTS:

Brilliant Pebbles Briefing
Weapons Vault Tour
Brief Remarks to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories Employees
Commonwealth Club Head Table Staff Photo
Commonwealth Club Luncheon
Major Donor Reception

DRESS:

Men -Business Suit
Women -Day Dress

CONTACTS:

Presidential Advance Office
John G. Keller, Jr. - 202/456-7565

Trip Coordinator
Patricia L. Conrad - 202/456-7565

San Francisco, California Signal - 415/399-1290
- 202/395-5505

ADVANCE:

Judd Swift -LEAD
Steve Ross -PRESS
Pat Sullivan -USSS
Jerry Johnston -WHCA
Sean Byrne -MIL AIDE
Terry Lang -AFI
John Page -HMX

WEATHER:

Partly Cloudy/High 60's

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOR

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

FEBRUARY 7, 1990

8:45 am (P.S.T.) THE PRESIDENT arrives San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California and proceeds to Marine One.

Met by:

The Honorable James Watkins
Secretary of Energy

The Honorable Art Agnos
Mayor of San Francisco

The Honorable Lionel Wilson
Mayor of Oakland

The Honorable Chuck Corica
Mayor of Alameda City

Dr. John Tsu
The Secretary of Education's Regional Representative for Region 9

Mr. Albert Chang, Immediate PAst President, San Francisco Chinese American Republican Club

Ms. Arlene Chow
Current President, San Francisco Chinese American Republican Club

Dr. Patricia Gee
President, California Chinese American Republican Association

Mr. Wayne Yee
Assistant to Dr. John Tsu, Department of Education, Region 9

Mr. Bok Pon
Chinese American Leader in San Francisco

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

Due to Helicopter Space and Classification of Livermore Briefings, All Guests and Staff will not travel to Livermore. Please check Helicopter Manifests carefully. Those Not travelling to Livermore will be transported directly into downtown San Francisco.

8:50 am THE PRESIDENT boards Marine One and departs San Francisco International Airport en route Livermore Laboratory Landing Zone.

HELICOPTER MANIFESTS:

Marine One:

THE PRESIDENT
Sec. Watkins
Gov. Sununu
Gen. Scowcroft
M. Fitzwater
T. McBride
Doctor
Mil Aide
2 USSS

Nighthawk II

1 WHCA T/O
1 Medic
9 USSS

Nighthawk III

S. Rogich
J. Keller
P. Bateman
E. Rogers
D. Valdez
L. Casey
D. Proctor
Col. Nickel
J. Swift
Medic

Nighthawk IV

G. Fendler
J. Herrick
24 Press
2 WHVD
2 USSS
WHCA A/V
Official Photographer
Stenographer

(Flying Time: 20 Minutes)

9:10 am THE PRESIDENT arrives Livermore Laboratory Landing Zone and proceeds to Motorcade.

Met by:

Dr. John H. Nuckolls
Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories

9:15 am THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, boards Motorcade and departs Livermore Laboratory Landing Zone en route Livermore Laboratory, Building 111.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Lead	J. Swift
Spare	T. McBride Doctor
LIMO	THE PRESIDENT
Follow Up	
Control	Gov. Sununu Gen. Scowcroft Mil Aide
Support	M. Fitzwater S. Rogich J. Keller Official Photographer Medic

WHCA	
Staff I	E. Rogers
Guest I	Sec. Watkins Mr. Nuckolls
Camera I	
Camera II	G. Fendler
Wire I	
Wire II	
Staff Van	All Remaining Staff
Guest Van	All Remaining Guests
Press Van I	J. Herrick
Press Van II	
Press Van III	

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

Upon arrival at Livermore Laboratory, Building 111, Guests and Staff not participating in Briefing will be escorted to Holding Rooms.

Guests and Staff not manifested in Secure Package Motorcade will be escorted to Building 123 for Address to Employees.

9:20 am THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, arrives Livermore Laboratory and proceeds to Building 111.

9:22 am THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, arrives Building 111 and proceeds to California Room.

Met by:

Lawrence Livermore Associate Directors

EVENT: BRILLIANT PEBBLES BRIEFING

CLOSED PRESS

9:28 am — THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, arrives California Room and begins participation in Brilliant Pebbles Briefing.

10:03 am — THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, concludes participation in Brilliant Pebbles Briefing, departs California Room and proceeds to The Weapons Vault.

EVENT: WEAPONS VAULT TOUR

CLOSED PRESS

10:05 am — THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, arrives The Weapons Vault and begins participation in Tour.

10:25 am — THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, concludes participation in Tour, departs The Weapons Vault and proceeds to Motorcade.

10:27 am — THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, boards Motorcade and departs Building 111 en route Building 123.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Spare — T. McBride
Doctor

LIMO	THE PRESIDENT Sec. Watkins Dr. Nuckolls
Follow Up	
Control	Gov. Sununu Gen. Scowcroft Mil Aide
Support	M. Fitzwater J. Keller Official Photographer Medic

(Drive Time: 3 Minutes)

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

Upon arrival at Building 123, Guests and Staff will be escorted to Staff Viewing Area.

Please board Motorcade no later than 10:35 am for transport to Landing Zone.

10:30 am THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, arrives Building 123 and proceeds to Off-Stage Announcement Area, Auditorium.

EVENT: BRIEF REMARKS TO LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES

OPEN PRESS

OFF-STAGE ANNOUNCEMENT

BRIEF REMARKS

TOAST LECTERN

10:31 am THE PRESIDENT is announced onto Stage and proceeds to Seat.

10:32 am THE PRESIDENT is introduced for Brief Remarks by Mr. John Nuckolls.

10:33 am THE PRESIDENT gives Brief Remarks.

10:38 am THE PRESIDENT concludes Brief Remarks.

10:41 am Mr. John Nuckolls introduces Dr. Lowell Woods

10:42 am THE PRESIDENT is presented a Brilliant Pebbles Model by Dr. Woods.

10:45 am THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls departs Stage and proceeds to Motorcade.

10:50 am THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, boards Motorcade and departs Building 123 en route Livermore Laboratory Landing Zone.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Lead	J. Swift
Spare	T. McBride Doctor
LIMO	THE PRESIDENT
Follow Up	
Control	Gov. Sununu Gen. Scowcroft Mil Aide

Support	M. Fitzwater S. Rogich J. Keller Official Photographer Medic
WHCA	
Staff I	E. Rogers
Guest I	Sec. Watkins Dr. Nuckolls
Camera I	
Camera II	G. Fendler
Wire I	
Wire II	
Staff Van	All Remaining Staff
Guest Van	All Remaining Guests
Press Van I	J. Herrick
Press Van II	
Press Van III	

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

10:55 am THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by Mr. John Nuckolls, arrives Livermore Laboratory Landing Zone and proceeds to board Marine One.

11:00 am THE PRESIDENT departs Livermore Laboratory Landing Zone en route Fort Mason Landing Zone.

HELICOPTER MANIFESTS:

Marine One:

THE PRESIDENT
Gov. Sununu
Gen. Scowcroft
M. Fitzwater
T. McBride
Doctor
Mil Aide
2 USSS

Nighthawk II

1 WHCA T/O
1 Medic
9 USSS

Nighthawk III

S. Rogich
J. Keller
P. Bateman
E. Rogers
D. Valdez
L. Casey
D. Proctor
Col. Nickel
J. Swift
S. Broadbent
Medic

Nighthawk IV

G. Fendler
J. Herrick
2 WHVD
S. Ross
24 Press
2 USSS
WHCA A/V
Official Photographer
Stenographer

(Flying Time: 25 Minutes)

11:25 am THE PRESIDENT arrives Fort Mason Landing Zone and proceeds to Motorcade.

11:30 am THE PRESIDENT boards Motorcade and departs Fort Mason Landing Zone en route San Francisco Hilton Hotel.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Lead	J. Swift
Spare	T. McBride Doctor
LIMO	THE PRESIDENT
Follow Up	
Control	Gov. Sununu Gen. Scowcroft Mil Aide
Support	M. Fitzwater S. Rogich J. Keller Official Photographer Medic
WHCA	
Staff I	E. Rogers
Camera I	
Camera II	G. Fendler
Wire I	
Wire II	
Staff Van	All Remaining Staff
Guest Van	All Remaining Guests
Press Van I	J. Herrick
Press Van II	
Press Van III	

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

11:35 am — THE PRESIDENT arrives San Francisco Hilton Hotel and proceeds to Lombard Room.

EVENT: COMMONWEALTH HEAD TABLE STAFF PHOTO

CLOSED PRESS

11:40 am — THE PRESIDENT arrives Lombard Room and begins participation in Staff Photo.

11:55 am — THE PRESIDENT concludes participation in Staff Photo, departs Lombard Room and proceeds to Off-Stage Announcement Area, Grand Ballroom.

11:58 pm — THE PRESIDENT arrives Off-Stage Announcement Area and holds briefly.

EVENT: COMMONWEALTH CLUB LUNCHEON

OPEN PRESS

RUFFLES AND FLOURISHES

OFF-STAGE ANNOUNCEMENT

HAIL TO THE CHIEF

REMARKS

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

12:00 pm — THE PRESIDENT is announced onto Dais and proceeds to Seat.

12:05 pm Lunch is served.

12:30 pm — THE PRESIDENT is introduced for Remarks by Dr. Joseph Fink, President of Dominican College and Quarterly Chairman of the Commonwealth Club.

12:35 pm THE PRESIDENT Remarks.

12:50 pm THE PRESIDENT concludes Remarks and begins participation in Question and Answer Session.

1:30 pm THE PRESIDENT concludes participation in Question and Answer Session, departs Dais and proceeds to Imperial Room.

EVENT: MAJOR DONOR RECEPTION

CLOSED PRESS

1:35 pm THE PRESIDENT arrives Imperial Room and begins participation in Mix and Mingle.

2:00 pm THE PRESIDENT concludes participation in Mix and Mingle, departs Imperial Room and proceeds to Motorcade.

2:05 pm THE PRESIDENT boards Motorcade and departs San Francisco Hilton Hotel en route San Francisco International Airport.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Lead	J. Swift
Spare	T. McBride Doctor
LIMO	THE PRESIDENT
Follow Up	

Control	Gov. Sununu Gen. Scowcroft Mil Aide
Support	M. Fitzwater S. Rogich J. Keller Official Photographer Medic
WHCA	
Staff I	E. Rogers L. Atwater J. Cicconi
Camera I	
Camera II	G. Fendler
Wire I	
Wire II	
Staff Van	All Remaining Staff
Guest Van	All Remaining Guests
Press Van I	J. Herrick
Press Van II	
Press Van III	

(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)

2:30 pm — THE PRESIDENT arrives San Francisco, International Airport and proceeds to board Air Force One.

2:35 pm (P.S.T.) — THE PRESIDENT departs San Francisco, California en route Omaha, Nebraska.

(Flying Time: 2 Hours 50 Minutes)
(Interchange: No)
(Time Change: Ahead 2 Hours)
(Food Service: Dinner)

ago I referred to it as the "Revolution of 1989" -- a quiet revolution that continues even now.

What I didn't mention -- which you also understand -- is how the world's movement toward democracy and freedom is a direct result of our ability to stand firm in the face of threats to peace and stability.

The strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrent -- developed through the efforts of our National Laboratories, and the Departments of Energy and Defense -- has helped to guard the peace so precious to all of us.

Now the labs are also developing technologies to strengthen deterrence through strategic defenses. Together with strategic modernization and arms control, programs like "Brilliant Pebbles" complement our ability to preserve the peace.

If the technology I've seen today proves feasible -- and it looks very promising -- no war planner could be confident of the consequences of a ballistic missile attack. The comprehensive defensive system we are now researching -- and committed to deploy -- will serve to strengthen deterrence.

Even as we work to reduce arsenals, and reduce tensions, we understand the continuing, crucial role of strategic defenses. They can underwrite arms control, by diminishing the advantages

of cheating. They can defend us against accidental launches, or attacks from countries with unstable leadership.

So a vigorous research, development, and testing program at our National Laboratories will be as crucial as ever, as we adapt both the size and shape of our nuclear deterrent. We are working on significant reductions in arms -- but we will settle for nothing less than the highest confidence in the survivability, effectiveness, and safety of our remaining forces.

The scientific expertise of laboratories like Livermore will also serve the national interest on problems like economic competitiveness, education, energy, space exploration, waste cleanup, and sound environmental practices.

These will be enormously important challenges in the future -- challenges that your skills and talents will help us meet squarely and well. I'm confident that the Livermore Laboratories will be a crucial part of our ability to meet the challenges of the new decade -- and the next century.

Thank you. God bless you. And God bless the United States of America.

# # #

Mark-

1. Lawrence or Livermore
   is fine

2. 6.3 in 1986 GNP not 6.5

3. 6-26-45 Charter signed

4. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

5. Khrushchev spoke from 8 pm - 11 pm

6. Mayaguez Incident

7. Adm. Frank Kelso
   Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
   & CAC Atlantic Command

Rose

33 - 4/331

Rebecca Fuinight

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TELECOPIER COVER SHEET

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REMARKS:

The last item Mike Hayden asked me to send you was a list of the success stories in converting closed bases successfully to other uses that have productive benefits for the surrounding communities. The list is attached.

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Date 2/5 Time 7:40

WHILE YOU WERE OUT

M Mike Hayden

of

Phone 4970

Area Code | Number | Extension

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CALLED TO SEE YOU		WILL CALL AGAIN	
WANTS TO SEE YOU		URGENT	
RETURNED YOUR CALL			

Message

Operator

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23-020

To Christine

Date Time 12:20

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M Steve Lofgren

of Army History Museum

Phone 272-0313

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CALLED TO SEE YOU		WILL CALL AGAIN	
WANTS TO SEE YOU		URGENT	
RETURNED YOUR CALL			

Message

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