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United Nations Press Release

Department of Public Information
Press Section
United Nations, New York

Press Feature No. 217
September 1986

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS

The Headquarters of the United Nations stands on the eastern shore of Manhattan island, on the banks of New York City's East River. To its 18 acres come representatives of the earth's 5 billion people, to discuss and decide issues of peace, justice and economic and social well-being. Here, also, men and women of the United Nations staff, or Secretariat, work to carry out these decisions. The tall glass façade of the Secretariat Building and the low-slung, subtly curved General Assembly edifice, together with the United Nations' blue and white flag, have become the instantly recognizable symbols of the world Organization.

It is not just symbols, however, but a workshop that the visitor sees when crossing United Nations Plaza to enter this international enclave. Two distinct types of work are carried out at the Headquarters. The delegates deliberate in the General Assembly Building and the adjoining Conference Building, while most of the international staff of the United Nations service meetings, collect information and prepare reports in the 39-storey Secretariat Building.

The United Nations Headquarters was designed to serve four major groups: delegations, who now represent 159 Member States and who send more than 3,000 persons to New York each year for the annual sessions of the General Assembly; the Secretariat, numbering about 7,075 persons in New York out of a total of over 18,917 throughout the world; visitors, who average 1,413 a day; and journalists, of whom more than 450 are permanently accredited while twice that number are present during major meetings.

To accommodate those groups efficiently, there are separate facilities for each. The staff enter through the Secretariat Building at East 43rd Street; delegates have an entrance at the west side of the General Assembly Building at 44th Street; and visitors have access to the complex through the north end of the Assembly Building, between 45th and 46th Streets. The general public may attend open meetings, for which admission tickets are made available without charge. They may visit public areas in the General Assembly Building and may tour other areas with United Nations guides.

(more)

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2)			

SUBJECT: Re: Buch's Speech to UNGA.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 5, 1989

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NATIONAL DRUG POLICY

The Oval Office

9:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. This is the first time since taking the oath of office that I felt an issue was so important, so threatening that it warranted talking directly with you, the American people. All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs.

Drugs have strained our faith in our system of justice. Our courts, our prisons, our legal system are stretched to the breaking point. The social costs of drugs are mounting. In short, drugs are sapping our strength as a nation. Turn on the evening news or pick up the morning paper and you'll see what some Americans know just by stepping out their front door: Our most serious problem today is cocaine and, in particular, crack.

Who's responsible? Let me tell you straight out.

Everyone who uses drugs. Everyone who sells drugs. And everyone who looks the other way.

Tonight, I'll tell you how many Americans are using illegal drugs. I will present to you our national strategy to deal with every aspect of this threat. And I will ask you to get involved in what promises to be a very difficult fight.

This -- this is crack cocaine seized a few days ago by Drug Enforcement agents in a park just across the street from the White House. It could easily have been heroine or PCP. It's as innocent looking as candy, but it's turning our cities into battle zones and it is murdering our children. Let there be no mistake, this stuff is poison. Some used to call drugs harmless recreation. They're not. Drugs are a real and terribly dangerous threat to our neighborhoods, our friends and our families.

No one among us is out of harm's way. When four-year-olds play in playgrounds strewn with discarded hypodermic needles and crack vials -- it breaks my heart. When cocaine -- one of the most deadly and addictive illegal drugs -- is available to school kids -- school kids -- it's an outrage. And when hundreds of thousands of babies are born each year to mothers who use drugs -- premature babies born desperately sick -- then even the most defenseless among us are at risk.

These are the tragedies behind the statistics. But the numbers also have quite a story to tell. Let me share with you the results of the recently completed Household Survey of the National Institute on Drug Abuse. It compares recent drug use to three years ago. It tells us some good news and some very bad news. First, the good.

As you can see in the chart, in 1985, the government estimated that 23 million Americans were using drugs on a "current" basis -- that is, at least once in the preceding month. Last year, that number fell by more than a third. That means almost nine million fewer Americans are casual drug users. Good news.

Because we changed our national attitude toward drugs, casual drug use has declined. We have many to thank: Our brave law-enforcement officers, religious leaders, teachers, community activists, and leaders of business and labor. We should also thank the media for their exhaustive news and editorial coverage and for their air time and space for antidrug messages. And finally, I want to thank President and Mrs. Reagan for their leadership. All of these good people told the truth -- that drug use is wrong and dangerous.

But as much comfort as we can draw from these dramatic reductions, there is also bad news -- very bad news. Roughly eight million people have used cocaine in the past year, almost one million of them used it frequently -- once a week or more.

What this means is that, in spite of the fact that overall cocaine use is down, frequent use has almost doubled in the last few years. And that's why habitual cocaine users -- especially crack users -- are the most pressing, immediate drug problem.

What, then, is our plan? To begin with, I trust the lesson of experience: No single policy will cut it, no matter how glamorous or magical it may sound. To win the war against addictive drugs like crack will take more than just a federal strategy. It will take a national strategy, one that reaches into every school, every workplace, involving every family.

Earlier today, I sent this document, our first such national strategy, to the Congress. It was developed with the hard work of our nation's first Drug Policy Director, Bill Bennett. In preparing this plan, we talked with state, local and community leaders, law enforcement officials and experts in education, drug prevention, and rehabilitation. We talked with parents and kids. We took a long, hard look at all that the federal government has done about drugs in the past: What's worked, and -- let's be honest -- what hasn't. Too often, people in government acted as if their part of the problem -- whether fighting drug production, or drug smuggling, or drug demand -- was the only problem. But turf battles won't win this war. Teamwork will.

Tonight, I'm announcing a strategy that reflects the coordinated, cooperative commitment of all our federal agencies. In short, this plan is as comprehensive as the problem. With this strategy, we now finally have a plan that coordinates our resources, our programs and the people who run them.

Our weapons in this strategy are the law and criminal justice system, our foreign policy, our treatment systems, and our schools and drug prevention programs. So the basic weapons we need are the ones we already have. What's been lacking is a strategy to effectively use them.

Let me address four of the major elements of our strategy.

First, we are determined to enforce the law, to make our streets and neighborhoods safe. So to start, I'm proposing that we more than double federal assistance to state and local law enforcement. Americans have a right to safety in and around their homes. And we won't have safe neighborhoods unless we're tough on drug criminals -- much tougher than we are now. Sometimes that means tougher penalties. But more often it just means punishment that is swift and certain. We've all heard stories about drug dealers who are caught and arrested -- again and again -- but never punished. Well, here the rules have changed: If you sell drugs, you will be caught. And when you're caught, you will be prosecuted. And once you're convicted, you will do time. Caught. Prosecuted. Punished.

I'm also proposing that we enlarge our criminal justice system across the board -- at the local, state and federal levels alike. We need more prisons, more jails, more courts, more prosecutors. So tonight, I'm requesting -- altogether -- an almost

$1.5 billion increase in drug-related federal spending on law enforcement.

And while illegal drug use is found in every community, nowwhere is it worse than in our public housing projects. You know, the poor have never had it easy in this world. But in the past, they weren't mugged on the way home from work by crack gangs. And their children didn't have to dodge bullets on the way to school. And that's why I'm targeting $50-million to fight crime in public housing projects -- to help restore order and to kick out the dealers for good.

The second element of our strategy looks beyond our borders where the cocaine and crack bought on America's streets is grown and processed. In Colombia alone, cocaine killers have gunned down a leading statesman, murdered almost 200 judges and seven members of their Supreme Court. The besieged governments of the drug-producing countries are fighting back, fighting to break the international drug rings. But you and I agree with the courageous President of Colombia, Virgilio Barco, who said that if Americans use cocaine, then Americans are paying for murder. American cocaine users need to understand that our nation has zero tolerance for casual drug use. We have a responsibility not to leave our brave friends in Colombia to fight alone.

The $65-million emergency assistance announced two weeks ago was just our first step in assisting the Andean nations in their fight against the cocaine cartels. Colombia has already arrested suppliers, seized tons of cocaine and confiscated palatial homes of drug lords. But Colombia faces a long, uphill battle, so we must be ready to do more.

Our strategy allocates more than a quarter of a billion dollars for next year in military and law enforcement assistance for the three Andean nations of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. This will be the first part of a five-year, $2-billion program to counter the producers, the traffickers and the smugglers.

I spoke with President Barco just last week, and we hope to meet with the leaders of affected countries in an unprecedented drug summit, all to coordinate an inter-American strategy against the cartels. We will work with our allies and friends -- especially our economic summit partners -- to do more in the fight against drugs. I'm also asking the Senate to ratify the United Nations Antidrug Convention concluded last December.

To stop those drugs on the way to America, I propose that we spend more than $1.5 billion on interdiction. Greater interagency cooperation, combined with sophisticated intelligence-gathering and Defense Department technology can help stop drugs at our borders.

And our message to the drug cartels is this: The rules have changed. We will help any government that wants our help. When requested, we will for the first time make available the appropriate resources of America's armed forces. We will intensify our efforts against drug smugglers on the high seas, in international airspace and at our borders. We will stop the flow of chemicals from the United States used to process drugs. We will pursue and enforce international agreements to track drug money to the front men and financiers. And then we will handcuff these money launderers and jail them -- just like any street dealer. And for the drug kingpins, the death penalty.

The third part of our strategy concerns drug treatment. Experts believe that there are two million American drug users who may be able to get off drugs with proper treatment. But right now, only 40 percent of them are actually getting help. This is simply not good enough.

Many people who need treatment won't seek it on their own. And some who do seek it are put on a waiting list. Most programs were set up to deal with heroin addicts, but today, the

major problem is cocaine users. It's time we expand our treatment systems and do a better job of providing services to those who need them.

And so tonight, I'm proposing an increase of $321 million in federal spending on drug treatment.

With this strategy, we will do more. We will work with the states. We will encourage employers to establish employee assistance programs to cope with drug use. And because addiction is such a cruel inheritance, we will intensify our search for ways to help expectant mothers who use drugs.

Fourth, we must stop illegal drug use before it starts. Unfortunately, it begins early -- for many kids, before their teens. But it doesn't start the way you might think, from a dealer or an addict hanging around a school playground. More often, our kids first get their drugs free, from friends, or even from older brothers or sisters. Peer pressure spreads drug use. Peer pressure can help stop it.

I am proposing a quarter-of-a-billion-dollar increase in federal funds for school and community prevention programs that help young people and adults reject enticements to try drugs. And I'm proposing something else. Every school, college and university -- and every workplace -- must adopt tough but fair policies about drug use by students and employees. And those that will not adopt such policies will not get federal funds. Period.

The private sector also has an important role to play. I spoke with a businessman named Jim Burke who said he was haunted by the thought -- a nightmare, really -- that somewhere in America, at any given moment, there is a teenage girl who should be in school, instead of giving birth to a child addicted to cocaine. So Jim did something. He led an antidrug partnership, financed by private funds, to work with advertisers and media firms. Their partnership is now determined to work with our strategy by generating educational messages worth a million dollars a day -- every day for the next three years -- a billion dollars worth of advertising, all to promote the antidrug message.

As President, one of my first missions is to keep the national focus on our offensive against drugs. And so next week I will take the antidrug message to the classrooms of America in a special television address, one that I hope will reach every school, every young American. But drug education doesn't begin in class or on TV. It must begin at home and in the neighborhood. Parents and families must set the first example of a drug-free life. And when families are broken, caring friends and neighbors must step in.

These are the most important elements in our strategy to fight drugs. They are all designed to reinforce one another, to mesh into a powerful whole, to mount an aggressive attack on the problem from every angle. This is the first time in the history of our country, that we truly have a comprehensive strategy.

As you can tell, such an approach will not come cheaply. Last February, I asked for a $700-million increase in the drug budget for the coming year. And now, over the past six months of careful study, we have found an immediate need for another $1.5 billion. With this added $2.2 billion, our 1990 drug budget totals almost $8 billion -- the largest increase in history.

We need this program fully implemented -- right away. The next fiscal year begins just 26 days from now. So tonight, I'm asking the Congress -- which has helped us formulate this strategy -- to help us move it forward immediately.

We can pay for this fight against drugs without raising taxes or adding to the budget deficit. We have submitted our plan to Congress that shows just how to fund it within the limits of our bipartisan budget agreement.

Now, I know some will still say that we're not spending enough money. But those who judge our strategy only by its price tag simply don't understand the problem. Let's face it, we've all seen in the past that money alone won't solve our toughest problems.

To be strong and efficient, our strategy needs these funds. But there is no match for a united America, a determined America, an angry America. Our outrage against drugs unites us, brings us together behind this one plan of action, an assault on every front.

This is the toughest domestic challenge we've faced in decades. And it's a challenge we must face -- not as Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives -- but as Americans. The key is a coordinated, united effort. We've responded faithfully to the request of the Congress to produce our nation's first national drug strategy. I'll be looking to the Democratic majority and our Republicans in Congress for leadership and bipartisan support. And our citizens deserve cooperation, not competition; a national effort, not a partisan bidding war.

To start, Congress needs not only to act on this national drug strategy, but also to act on our crime package announced last May; a package to toughen sentences, beef up law enforcement and build new prison space for 24,000 inmates.

You and I both know the federal government can't do it alone. The states need to match tougher federal laws with tougher laws of their own -- stiffer bail, probation, parole and sentencing.

And we need your help. If people you know are users, help them -- help them get off drugs. If you're a parent, talk to your kids about drugs -- tonight.

Call your local drug prevention program. Be a Big Brother or Sister to a child in need. Pitch in with your local Neighborhood Watch program. Whether you give your time or talent, everyone counts.

Every employer who bans drugs from the workplace. Every school that's tough on drug use. Every neighborhood in which drugs are not welcome. And most important, every one of you who refuses to look the other way. Every one of you counts.

Of course, victory will take hard work and time. But together we will win -- too many young lives are at stake.

Not long ago, I read a newspaper story about a little boy named Dooney, who, until recently, lived in a crack house in a suburb of Washington, D.C. In Dooney's neighborhood, children don't flinch at the sound of gunfire. And when they play, they pretend to sell to each other small white rocks that they call crack.

Life at home was so cruel that Dooney begged his teachers to let him sleep on the floor at school. And when asked about his future, six-year-old Dooney answers, "I don't want to sell drugs, but I'll probably have to."

Well, Dooney does not have to sell drugs. No child in America should have to live like this. Together as a people we can save these kids. We've already transformed a national attitude of tolerance into one of condemnation. But the war on drugs will be hard-won, neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, child by child.

If we fight this war as a divided nation, then the war is lost. But if we face this evil as a nation united, this will be nothing but a handful of useless chemicals.

Victory. Victory over drugs is our cause, a just cause and, with your help, we are going to win.

Thank you, God bless you, and good night.

END 9:23 P.M. EDT

West. By leaving the most technically challenging R&D work to us, the Soviets are able to begin their own programs at a point higher up the learning curve. The savings that result are enormous. What is more, letting us go first permits the USSR to introduce refinements that improve the system's performance or flexibility (or both).

One such noteworthy improvement in the Soviet shuttle program was the decision to place the main engines on the core vehicle rather than on the orbiter. As a result, the Soviets have the ability to fly the former, called the Energiya, *without the shuttle.* In its stead can go a payload estimated to exceed fifty tons. The United States has not had such a capability since it closed down the Saturn V series at the end of the Apollo program.


This leads us to a related point. The Soviet space program has established a truly prodigious launch capacity. By one recent estimate, taking into account its fleet of expendable launchers, the shuttle, and Energiya, the USSR will be able by the year 2005 to lift some five million pounds into orbit. The Pentagon, however, has been unable to identify Soviet programs that would account for much more than half that.

So just what else do the Soviets intend to put into space? One reasonable guess is that they are preparing for the eventual deployment of space-based systems for intercepting ballistic missiles. While such a deployment would give the lie to the Soviet Union's professed commitment to the ABM Treaty and to its strenuous objections to the American SDI program, it would be perfectly consistent with the USSR's investment in strategic defenses and space-launch capabilities. It would be self-delusion to regard the Soviet shuttle program as nothing more than a modest—and belated—effort to catch up with us.

First Step to Democracy

NOT EVEN THE most utopian liberal bonehead believes that democracy can be established in South Africa in one swell foop. The best anyone can hope for is democracy on the installment plan. Each stage will be partial and so, by strict democratic criteria, unsatisfactory. But the alternative to this gradualism is worse: continued racial oligarchy—or revolution leading to ideological oligarchy.

Last month's local elections fitted this pattern exactly. They were an important but inadequate step toward non-racial democracy. Fair-minded reporting would have cited the 30 per cent black turnout for contested seats, which, in the face of considerable intimidation, was a remarkable sign of civic responsibility. Far-seeing leaders in the church, in law, and in the academy would have seen these first black votes as a resounding blow against the theoretical foundations of apartheid. And a sensible Western policy



would have given the elections a qualified welcome as a useful first step.

Nothing like that happened. The West has taken to dismissing any concession from Pretoria as cosmetic and valueless. Two years ago, the United States Congress rewarded P. W. Botha's wide-ranging reform program by imposing economic sanctions, and Congress is at present considering still more Draconian measures. The Reagan Administration, running scared of liberal congressional and media opinion, remained silent on the elections—merely abstaining alongside Britain when the UN voted to condemn them.

The consequences are clear from the results among the white electorate. The Conservative Party, which rejects the reform program in its entirety, has gained ground. On the present figures, it would double its representation in a parliamentary election.

Sanctions and boycotts have produced not a willingness to surrender white privileges, as their advocates predicted, but defiance and intransigence by white South Africa. They have also encouraged militant blacks to refuse the path of compromise and seek political change through violence, terrorism, and intimidation. They offer not an alternative to bloodshed and anarchy, but a catalyst for them.

This is a bankrupt and immoral policy. Forcing Congress to face up to that fact and change it must be an early task for the Bush Administration.

Prescription for Protection

CONSIDER the following hypothetical case. Someone invents a pill that prevents heart disease but has one side effect: if taken by a pregnant woman, it induces an abortion. Plainly, we would allow it onto the market because it has a universally acknowledged therapeutic use. Equally plainly, we would tie its sale to a doctor's prescription to prevent abortion on demand far beyond the limits to which *Roe* v. *Wade* has been carried. But would not some doctors, either financially unscrupulous or fanatically pro-abortion, then prescribe the pill to healthy pregnant women for use

ment to a single society. This means legislating low-income housing not only for working-class communities like Yonkers but for places like Pound Ridge, New York, where Judge Sand has his country house, and alongside the condos and co-ops of leftish liberals everywhere. That we haven't done this indicates the scope of the problem, but if we don't do it we had better not condescend to the recalcitrant councilmen of Yonkers. ELIZABETH POCHODA

Invisible Man

Fifty years from now, when social historians look back on the 1988 elections, an obscure campaign commercial from Maryland may tell a great deal about political advertising in the United States. For the grosser tactics of the Bush-Quayle team—the racist code word here, the inflammatory face of Willie Horton there—do not fully convey the true quality of Republican propaganda, which is both subtler and more unified than many may have noticed. In Maryland, Alan Keyes has been waging an uphill struggle for a seat in the U.S. Senate, and Ronald Reagan has been trying to help him. Two weeks before Election Day, Reagan stopped in Baltimore just to work a pricey roomful of Republicans on Keyes's behalf; and the President has also taped a rather striking pro-Keyes commercial, which seems to air on all local channels every fifteen minutes.

What makes the ad striking is the candidate's complete absence from it. Instead of Keyes, President Reagan, rouged and twinkly eyed as ever, appears in a medium close-up and delivers a brief "personal testimonial" marked by the usual laid-back pseudopopulism: "I'm from California, but if I were from Maryland, I'd vote for Alan Keyes for the United States Senate." After this brief presidential spiel, there appears only a card, and a voice-over tersely repeats the candidate's name and the office sought.

Why this meticulous avoidance of the candidate's own face? His face, which has been reproduced on billboards and public conveyances throughout the state, is by no means an ugly one; indeed, it is at least as appealing as the President's. That face, however, does clearly publicize the fact that Alan Keyes is black—which surely explains why Keyes, in his own commercials, does not appear beside, before or after Ronald Reagan.

Keyes's nonappearance tells us something about the Republicans, and it tells us something, too, about the needs of propaganda. In speaking to the angry, straitened animal within each one of us, propaganda must speak not just fiercely but repeatedly; repeatedly and simply. Never can the message seem in any way self-contradictory or ambivalent, or else the animal becomes confused and won't obey it. To send a mixed signal, then, could be even more damaging to one's message than would a clear rebuttal from the other side.

Through both its national and local commercials, the Bush campaign (as Leslie Savan noted in *The Village Voice*) has managed to associate the Democrats with filth, both actual and metaphoric—the heavily fouled waters of "Dukakis's Boston Harbor," the multiracial line of "hardened criminals" streaming in and out of "Dukakis's furlough program," the funky, bug-eyed head of black rapist Willie Horton. Against these atavistic images, whose impact has been bolstered daily by sly racist innuendoes and the scatological punning on Dukakis's name, "Bush-Quayle" has taken on the same transcendent air of gleaming purity that surrounds any other product sold on television. Thus it is not simply fear to which the Bush commercials have appealed but an even deeper reaction—a morbid squeamishness, a phobic revulsion, referring all at once to floating garbage, felons, blacks, black felons, Democrats.

Like all propaganda, this primal strategy requires absolute consistency; and so the face of Alan Keyes, while all right by itself on the back of a bus, can never be juxtaposed with Ronald Reagan's face—not even if "the President wants to encourage black leadership in the Republican Party," as White House press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater put it to reporters at the Keyes fund-raiser. George Bush too, for that matter, may be personally tolerant, but the Bush-Quayle propaganda calls, in its own disquieting way, for total segregation. MARK CRISPIN MILLER

Mark Crispin Miller teaches in the writing seminars at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Boxed In: The Culture of TV *(Northwestern University Press).*

Nut 'n' But

Say what you like about the U.S. election campaign, at least George Bush and Michael Dukakis did not sink to using talking squirrels to harvest the black vote. P.W. Botha did. Two rodents named Nut and But were the stars of a $2 million media blitz to persuade South African blacks to take part in the October 26 election of segregated town councils. Animals were chosen in the belief that blacks would relate to them better than to human figures, which inescapably display racial characteristics. Lions, elephants, mice and dogs were passed over in favor of the cuddly, industrious squirrels. "Our studies showed this animal was kosher," an official of the South African Bureau of Information explained.

The vote was a referendum—with the regime setting the ground rules—on whether black South Africans would accept Botha's reform of the apartheid system. It was also the centerpiece of a counterinsurgency strategy that seeks to crush black activism while co-opting a sizable bloc of black votes by pouring money into the townships. The operation is called WHAM—for Winning Hearts and Minds. In the last municipal elections, in 1983, only 21 percent of eligible blacks turned out. The government blamed poor voter education and intimidation by black radicals. Nut and But were the response to the first problem. For the second, the government used a variety of tactics: banning antiapartheid organizations, making it a crime to advocate a boycott and staging the ballot over a two-week "prior vote" period to undermine boycott efforts.

But the strategy fell flat. Talking squirrels proved no match for those who worked to make the boycott stick: church leaders and community groups; the street committees that directed the uprising in the townships from 1984 to 1986; and the grass-roots network of the country's largest black trade union organization, Cosatu. In the end, the black turnout was only a fraction higher than it was in 1983.

The box in which the ruling National Party is trapped has now shrunk considerably. The reform component of its grand design for blacks is in tatters. Quite as alarming to Botha is the ominous advance of the intransigent Conservative Party, which took two-thirds of the seats in the Transvaal heartland with its millenarian appeals to those fearful of a government surrender to the black hordes.

In a fatuous appeal on the eve of the election, Foreign Minister Pik Botha pleaded, "It is time to unite . . . there is no time for acrimonious exchanges and divisions." In the morning-after hangover, which way would the regime turn to shore up its support? Would it free the ailing Nelson Mandela? Or would it crack down further on dissent? The answer was swift and depressing—a monthlong closing of the country's best-known opposition newspaper, the liberal *Weekly Mail*, which suggests that South Africa can now look forward to more of apartheid's harshest instincts.

GEORGE BLACK

UNCIVIL LIBERTIES.

CALVIN TRILLIN



I think this would be the proper time to acknowledge any mistakes I've made in my coverage of the 1988 presidential campaign. I do not include outright lies in this category. It's my hope that making a regular custom of correcting errors sometime around the end of a campaign will serve as an example for my fellow columnists—except, of course, for those who have registered with the appropriate Federal authorities as infallible.

I want to thank all of you for your letters pointing out mistakes or taking issue with some of my conclusions—although I'd like to say to Mrs. D.B., of Canton, Ohio, that honest people should be able to disagree without the use of such words as "dingbat" and "airhead." As for the general criticism that I ought to be ashamed of myself for making a living by writing snide, underhanded and generally unfair remarks about my betters, I still can't think of much to say in my defense except that it's not much of a living.

I should also point out, more or less in my defense, that some of the things I've said over the past year or so about the campaign and the candidates were not meant to be taken as absolutely factual. In that category, I would include a couple of statements in my coverage of the Iowa primary, when the presidential campaign often sounded like a contest among people vying for an appointment as extension agent of the South-Central Agricultural Planning District. I would like to say in the most direct way possible that Michael Dukakis was never under the impression that you have to kill a cow to get the cheese. George Bush never said that the life of dairy farmers is particularly hard because they're often required to milk right through the cocktail hour.

Those were meant as little jokes. The same is true of the historical footnote in one column concerning the 1980 primaries, when I briefly considered taking a shot at the nomination myself. I did not actually lodge a complaint with the Fair Campaign Practices Committee—a group that I can only assume must have disbanded in despair once the current campaign got under way—accusing Governor John Connally of "unfair hair."

For those of you whose letters indicate that you took the little jokes absolutely seriously, this might be a good moment to point out that whenever you notice me using some phrase like "there was a rumor that" or "it was said that," you should probably become alert to the possibility of a little joke to follow. Yes, I realize that it would be a lot less complicated simply to label little jokes. But it would also be a lot less underhanded, and I have my reputation to think of. For those of you whose letters indicate that you see nothing at all strange about the proposition that you have to kill a cow to get the cheese, all I can say is that you ought to think about getting out a little more.

In an area in which I tried to be absolutely factual, the origins of the Pledge of Allegiance, I want to acknowledge that I was incorrect in saying that the Pledge—which first appeared in 1892, in a magazine called *Youth's Companion*—was written for the purposes of circulation promotion. According to Professor John Baer of Anne Arundel Community College in Maryland, who was kind enough to send me a summary of a speech he delivered on this subject, the magazine had a premiums department that sold, among other items, American flags—then not often seen in American classrooms. James Upham, the man in charge of the premiums department, realized that if there was a Pledge of Allegiance to the flag, every classroom would need a flag to pledge allegiance to. Because it was this stroke of American enterprise that resulted in our having a Pledge of Allegiance, I should apologize, as should many of my colleagues, for implying that George Bush's visit to a flag factory was a piece of smarmy jingoism. Under the circumstances, it was a historically appropriate piece of smarmy jingoism.

I hardly know what to say about your response to the campaign slogan I composed in an effort to counter criticism that I had nothing good to say about Senator Dan Quayle: "Vote for Dan Quayle—Definitely Not the Dumbest Guy in the Deke House." Unless and until Senator Quayle releases his college record, I don't see how so many people can be so certain I was factually incorrect about that—even Mr. R.R.M., of Indianapolis, whose letter said, "I ought to know because I finished a close second." Finally, I should say that Mr. R.R.M. is a little joke, as is Senator Quayle.

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EDITORIAL

BENNETT'S REPORT CARD

Education Secretary William Bennett has been tasting the wine again. He judges the vintage described in his new report, "American Education: Making It Work," superior to that of the disastrous year 1983, when a blue-ribbon commission declared our schools so bad as to constitute a national crisis. The stuff Bennett is savoring now is the fruit of his labor in the educational vineyards since then, and he would have us believe that the product (curriculum, test scores, numbers of graduates) is somehow better.

If so, it's not better by much, as even he admits, and a look at Bennett's five years of viniculture will tell you why. From the beginning of his tenure, the secretary has put a small mind to work on a serious problem. He does not know his history or he would realize that at no time in our past have Americans in any numbers been well educated. Any healthy inquiry into improving education must start by asking why this has always been so. Bennett exhorts, he rants, he abuses, but he has yet to offer one idea that American education can take with it into the future.

So what, then, are the Bennett ingredients for improved schools? They are these and they are tired: more discipline, tougher standards, more tests, more homework, a more standardized curriculum—and a cadre of charismatic teachers who can turn all this water into wine. But what about the sort of education that doesn't show up on a multiple-choice test? What about the qualities most Americans (and most employers) say they want in an educated person: the capacity to make judgments, the ability to learn independently, the wits to detect problems? In short, the use of the mind? The schools Bennett likes don't teach those things. They can't if they follow his instructions. All they can hope for each spring is that the standardized testing system will show they've lucked out with a good year.

LA PESTE
Daniel Singer

ON 'CIVIL SOCIETY'
Jefferson Morley

POLLS OR PROPAGANDA?
William Bollinger
Daniel M. Lund

RIGHTIST ON THE RIGHTS COMMISSION
Barry Mehler

NOAM CHOMSKY THEN AND NOW
Brian Morton

NICARAGUAN TURNING POINT

HOW THE 1984 VOTE WAS SABOTAGED

ROY GUTMAN

Nicaragua's elections of November 4, 1984, were a turning point not only in the post-Somoza history of Nicaragua but also in U.S. policy. Of the many missed opportunities to achieve at least some of the stated U.S. goals in Nicaragua, perhaps none compared with this. Policy divisions in Washington all but assured an inconclusive contest.

"One of the biggest mistakes of all, maybe the biggest mistake, was the handling of the election," said a high-level U.S. diplomatic source. "The idea of the C.I.A. and White House staff was to avoid participation in the elections. The debate was over whether to go halfway or not." The State Department's planning for the elections, meanwhile, had gone into high gear following Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's announcement on February 21, 1984, of the voting date.

In late March of that year, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State L. Craig Johnstone met Arturo Cruz Sr., the former Nicaraguan Ambassador to Washington, to discuss the elections. Over lunch at Germaine's, a Vietnamese restaurant in upper Georgetown, Johnstone asked Cruz if he would be interested in running for the presidency. "We had to be sure there would be a candidate," Johnstone said. "He was the one leader we thought they might be able to allow into an electoral process."

However, while the State Department supported Cruz's candidacy in hopes it would foster a deal in which the *contras* would "go away," members of the hard right—William Casey and Jeane Kirkpatrick at the Cabinet level, Oliver North and Constantine Menges on the National

(*Continued on Page 642*)

Mary Frances Berry, one of the last liberal members of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, said that Scott is "another appalling example of the way the Reagan Administration has corrupted" it. The commission, she told me, has become worse than useless: "It has become dangerous to anyone who is interested in furthering civil rights." □

1984 Vote

(*Continued From Front Cover*)

Security Council staff—believed the use of force was the only way to bring about democracy in Nicaragua and that the Sandinistas also had to go away, either through overthrow or removal. They supported Cruz in the expectation that he would not participate in the elections, thereby discrediting the vote. They regarded a U.S. negotiated deal with the Sandinistas as a sell-out.

For the U.S. hard-liners, the actual political situation in Nicaragua was irrelevant. They argued by syllogism. Communists never allow fair elections; the Sandinistas are Communists; for the opposition to participate in elections would legitimize Communist rule.

Although the conservatives kept a low profile, they were able to exercise substantial influence over events. Even Cruz was receiving Central Intelligence Agency funds by this time. "The other guys were able to run it by their complete penetration of the opposition," said a senior diplomat. "None of these people is independent any more."

The hard-liners worked to convince the internal Nicaraguan opposition to insist on election rules so comprehensive the Sandinistas would never accept them. Johnstone viewed these demands as "killers." President Reagan, as usual, did not choose between competing strategies or impose discipline on his subordinates but allowed the different power centers to pursue policy according to their interpretation of the goals.

In addition to the obstacles in his path at home, Johnstone faced a number of challenges in Managua. A major hitch was the divisiveness of the internal opposition, a central feature of Nicaraguan political culture that predated Sandinista rule. In an effort to gain cohesion, in 1982 the opposition formed an umbrella group, the Coordinadora Democrática, which tried to forge unity through making decisions by consensus. The group consisted of four political parties, two trade unions and representatives of six business organizations. The Coordinadora generated rhetoric and wish lists, but its cumbersome decision-making method lent itself to the tyranny of the minority of conservative businessmen, and it proved incapable of crafting a workable election strategy.

By early July, the Coordinadora had yet to choose a candidate. Under prodding by a visiting West German parliamentary delegation, a sort of rump Coordinadora consisting of two political figures, representing each end of the spectrum, got together and made the decision. They were Enrique Bolaños, a wealthy cotton grower and head of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), and Azucena Ferrey, one of the more dynamic women in Nicaraguan politics, who headed the Social Christian Party. The selection process took place "in the darkness of a tunnel," Bolaños said. They wrote down five names: Arturo Cruz; Adolfo Calero; Ismael Reyes, head of the Nicaraguan Red Cross; Alfonso Robelo; and Eduardo Rivas Gasteazora, deputy leader of the Coordinadora. "I said, 'Number one is O.K. with COSEP,' " Bolaños recalled. " 'Number two has his finger on the trigger, no good. Number four is the same as number two. Number five is very sick.' So numbers one and three were O.K. with us, in that order."

Ferrey flew to Washington and asked Cruz to run. It was July 11, and the Sandinistas had set a deadline of July 25 for the registration of candidates. Bolaños and Ferrey agreed that if Cruz was willing, he should be the candidate of the entire Coordinadora. He agreed.

Besides diverging from democratic practice, the procedure for choosing the Coordinadora candidate deprived the anointed candidate of a political base; by virtue of the timing, he had no way of creating one on returning to Nicaragua. Cruz was everyone's candidate and no one's candidate. Ferrey wanted him to run under any circumstance. Bolaños's view was close to that of conservatives in Washington—he could not foresee circumstances in which Cruz should run.

Cruz's main constituency was in Washington, and Washington was split. Johnstone clearly hoped Cruz could find his way clear to register. White House officials said they supported the goal, but their sincerity was quickly called into question. Constantine Menges at the N.S.C. played a double game. According to Cruz, Menges encouraged him to enter the contest. Behind the scenes, Menges was busy drafting rhetoric for Reagan that suggested the election would be a farce before Cruz had even tested the waters. In back-to-back speeches in mid-July, Reagan blasted Nicaragua as "a totalitarian jungle" and belittled the election as a "Soviet-style sham." The words had an immediate impact on the ground.

"Reagan's rhetoric produces the triumphalism of the hard-liners. It means you abandon strategy," said Bill Baez, a close associate of Cruz, who, as head of the leading organization of Nicaraguan cooperatives, was one of the representatives of COSEP in the Coordinadora. Cruz concurred. "As long as the recalcitrant opposition has a reading of things that the United States eventually will invade Nicaragua and kick the Sandinistas out and say, 'Here, now, we will pick a king,' we will not be able to articulate our own policy and really address the issues we have to as Nicaraguans."

Even before setting foot on Nicaraguan soil, Cruz had reason to be ambivalent. With U.S. counsel divided, he was on his own. On the eve of his departure, Cruz gave a long interview to Fred Francis, an NBC television reporter, in

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Roy Gutman is national security correspondent for Newsday. *This article was adapted from his forthcoming book,* Banana Diplomacy, *to be published soon by Simon & Schuster.* *Copyright © 1988 by Roy Gutman.*

which he assessed his chances. As the crew packed up, Cruz approached Francis. "You know I'm really not going to run. You know that." Francis threw out the interview.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the struggle had intensified between Johnstone on the one side and Menges, North and Casey on the other. Johnstone had been working with staff to prepare a new list of demands without the maximalist "killers," while his adversaries worked to avert a moderating impact. North's role by this time extended well into the policy process. At one Restricted Interagency Group meeting, Johnstone sought approval for a concept to test Sandinista promises for a pluralistic political system. North was trying to block it. "At least Constantine believes in democracy," Johnstone snapped. "You don't."

Johnstone won agreement in Washington on a modified set of conditions for participation in the elections, which Cruz essentially adopted as his own. They were: freedom of the press; freedom of assembly; access to voter registration lists and election returns; international observation of the elections; security of voting places; freedom to campaign on military bases; and postponement of the elections to allow at least ninety days of campaigning. The demand for a national dialogue between the Sandinistas and the *contras* was dropped.

But the scale-back of demands only galvanized opponents in Washington and Managua. Calero withdrew his commitment to back Cruz, and some U.S. officials urged the internal opposition to ignore the stated policy that Cruz should run if he obtained fair conditions. One such message came from the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Curtin Winsor Jr., a conservative businessman who was a political appointee and an outspoken proponent of overthrowing the Sandinistas. (Winsor once compared their rule to "an infected piece of meat" that attracts "insects.")

Winsor had known Bill Baez through business contacts for many years. At breakfast in San José on August 29, Winsor told Baez he had received word that the White House did not want the opposition to participate. "I think you should be aware of the problems and situation," Baez quoted Winsor as having said. "There is a division in the government. Some people in the State Department are saying you should participate. I represent the views of the White House. My opinion is that it is not appropriate to go."

Johnstone learned of the Baez-Winsor conversation from embassy reporting and flew to San José for a dinner with the Ambassador. "I don't know who you're getting your instructions from, but it is no known organ of government," he told Winsor. Once again, Menges was at work. He was certain that the Sandinistas would not hold a fair election and had said as much to Winsor. A further obstacle on the ground was C.I.A. operatives in Central America. "I know the C.I.A. was all against it. They were transmitting this loudly and clearly," said a source familiar with the thinking of Alfonso Robelo, the opposition leader who at the time was in San José. Cruz's son, Arturo Jr., who was frequently in the Costa Rican capital, concurred. "The State Department behaved in a very civilized way. But the sergeants of 'the Company' were behaving differently in the field. They were talking to their clients and saying 'Cruz is going to sell you out.'" And a Congressional source stated that Bolaños had at least two meetings with the C.I.A. station chief in San José at about this time.

The C.I.A. signals fortified the hard-liners in the Coordinadora in Managua, but also led to a profound misunderstanding. Those in Managua agreed with their counterparts in Washington on the intermediate goal of discrediting the elections but not on who should be the beneficiaries. The hard-liners in Managua hoped to destroy the legitimacy of the elections on the assumption that they themselves would profit. Those in Washington did it in hopes that the *contras* and the external military solution would benefit.

The crunch came in Rio de Janeiro on September 30, when Bayardo Arce, in charge of political affairs for the Sandinista Party, met with Cruz in the hotel suite of Carlos Andrés Pérez, a senior Socialist International official and former President of Venezuela.

These were the first real negotiations between the Sandinistas and the opposition since the election had been announced. It was the last best chance to resolve the Nicaragua dispute through political means. It was the decisive moment for U.S. policy. Johnstone said that, of all the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement, "that one came the closest."

The importance of the talks is undisputed. Exactly what went wrong in Rio is very much disputed. Nearly two years later, even Pérez, who chaired the talks, said he had not figured it out.

One reason is that both sides were engaged in gamesmanship. For Cruz, having registered so late in the election process, it was essential to gain a delay in the vote to avoid being accused by his associates of a sell-out. For the hard-liners in the Coordinadora, who wanted to discredit the process, it was essential to block Cruz from reaching a deal.



The Sandinistas wanted to avoid a delay but also to avoid blame for the collapse of the mediation.

Pérez urged Arce to accept conditions within which Cruz could participate. He began with the nine demands that the Coordinadora had presented to the Sandinistas, separating out statements that would be regarded as ultimatums. The meeting lasted three and a half hours.

Arce and Cruz met again the following morning, Monday, October 1, this time in the presence of Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, a close associate of Socialist International president Willy Brandt and several West German Social Democrats. Cruz was accompanied by vice-presidential candidate Adán Fletes and Coordinadora president Luís Rivas Leiva. Hanging over the talks was the latest deadline for registration, running out at midnight.

In one hour, the negotiations made remarkable progress. The Coordinadora presented its demands. In return for satisfaction, they promised to participate in the election if the date was postponed to February 24, 1985. Arce readily agreed to all the guarantees.

Cruz and his two colleagues asked for a break to confer with Managua. At the other end, opposition leaders gathered around a speaker phone in the offices of the Social Christian Party. Bolaños kept a low profile; the spokesman was Daniel Bonilla, an industrialist associate of Bolaños and perhaps the hardest of the hard-liners. And he was deeply skeptical. Bonilla was an ideologue. "Communists don't convene an election unless they have all the means to win it," he said in an interview more than a year later. "We don't believe in the elections. We would have lost. And there is nothing worse in politics than losing. That is not the worst thing. . . . It is that we would have made the Sandinistas win with our presence. My God, do you know what that means?"

After lunch the three negotiators denounced Arce's concessions as demagogy, demanded additional access to the official news media as a condition and required that the Sandinistas immediately agree to February 24 or some other postponement of election day. Then Arce dropped a bombshell. If the Coordinadora registered before midnight, the contest would be delayed until January 13, 1985, provided there was an effective cease-fire with the *contras*. Arce insisted that the Coordinadora declare a cease-fire by October 10 and that *contra* forces led by Adolfo Calero and Edén Pastora withdraw from Nicaragua by October 25. On the other hand, if the Sandinistas did not live up to their part of the bargain, the opposition could withdraw its registration any time up to October 25. The atmosphere in the room was suddenly electrified.

Cruz called Managua again. "My advice to you is you go and register," Cruz told his associates. "Do it, register, because we have all the necessary safeguards not to be trapped. Do something really meaningful, and we will really grow in stature."

"Arturo," Bonilla intoned, "whatever is going to be done is going to be done here. That is what the Coordinadora wants." Bonilla objected that the Coordinadora could not represent both the armed and the civic resistance. "I cannot have one single man representing the whole, because that would get the civic in bed with the military."

In Washington, Johnstone closely monitored the progress. He was in frequent touch with Baez, who was in Washington. Johnstone asked to be kept informed but felt Cruz should proceed. He also was in touch with Socialist International officials. "The United States government asked the S.I. to do its utmost to help the Coordinadora reach a deal," said a close associate of Brandt.

Working along with Johnstone was a senior C.I.A. official. Johnstone said each called contacts in the opposition and the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (F.D.N.) *contras* to keep them from backing away in the midst of the negotiations. The F.D.N. "were extremely concerned about not being undercut by third-force representation in elections that would legitimize the Sandinista regime," Johnstone said. He asserts that the C.I.A. supported his plan. "I was working out of the same room as the C.I.A. guy and unless some other part of the Agency was trying to undermine him, we were giving the same advice: Take part if you can get fair terms."

Despite the cold reception, Cruz thought he saw a way to bridge the differences. "This is the most exhilarating day in my whole life," he said that night. But the deadline passed without action.

A dejected looking Pérez received Wischnewski the next morning and pronounced the negotiations a failure. Actually, he had another card up his sleeve. Without telling his S.I. colleagues, Pérez had asked Arce to prepare a typed summary of the points of agreement, including the election postponement on condition of a cease-fire. Unannounced, an aide to Arce appeared with the document.

Pérez gave a copy to Cruz, who promised to return with a response at 4 P.M. Cruz checked with Managua, where he received more discouragement. Bonilla reiterated that the decision must be made in Managua.

Now Cruz dropped his own bombshell. Appearing at the appointed time, he went through Arce's paper point by point, wrote changes of wording, then agreed to it. He conditioned his signature upon a "vote of confidence" by the Coordinadora in Managua. If they did not back him, he would withdraw as their candidate. Arce reacted angrily. "In the beginning, they said a big fat no," Pérez said of Arce. "They said it was a joke to discredit the electoral process by doing this."

"I represent the Sandinista Front, and although only five *comandantes* are now in Nicaragua, I have committed myself here and now," Arce said. "But I have received no comparable pledge from Arturo Cruz; otherwise, the Coordinadora could have registered before the deadline. Either you sign now," he insisted, "or I don't sign."

Pérez stressed the significance of Cruz's personal commitment to return to Managua and put his name on the ballot, and for a brief moment Arce seemed to relent.

It was about 5 P.M. "For twenty minutes we had an agreement," said Thorvald Stoltenberg (now Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs), who had joined the talks for the S.I. The two sides shook hands. "They were very, very pleased. We were starting to drink cognac." Stoltenberg

suggested they type out the contents of the accord. Cruz dictated the final wording to Pérez. "Luís Rivas Leiva, as president of the Coordinadora, accompanied by Adán Fletes and Arturo Cruz, also agrees, both parties *ad referendum* to their respective organizations." Stoltenberg took a call from *Dagbladet*, a Norwegian newspaper, and broke the story to the press. An hour later, he had to phone the newspaper back and say the negotiations had fallen through.

Arce suddenly stood up, shook hands with the West German S.I. participants and bolted without further explanation. Cruz thought the signal had been given in New York City by Daniel Ortega. In an interview that morning in *The Washington Post*, Ortega had declared that the election would take place on schedule. "We were flexible on the date until a few days ago," he said. "The elections are going to take place on November 4. At this point we cannot continue to play with the date."

"Extending the campaign was never a position for us," said Sergio Ramírez, the campaign manager and candidate for vice president of the ruling party. "We always considered that it would be damaging for us because people would not be confident about our own elections if we did." Arce had made the offer in the knowledge it was unacceptable. Moreover, according to Ramírez, "Cruz never had authority over [*contra* military commander Enrique] Bermúdez and Calero . . . and the Coordinadora didn't have that authority."

Cruz said he had known that the Sandinistas were bluffing. "We had to be forthcoming and call their bluff, or to reach a real agreement if it was possible."

Arce went before a press conference. "Yesterday at midnight they lost their last chance to register. There is no longer any question. The elections will be held in Nicaragua on November 4."

Pérez said that information he received subsequent to the Rio meeting gave the impression that "the C.I.A. had given instructions, had put pressures [on representatives of the Coordinadora] against Cruz's candidacy, and therefore it wasn't accepted. They just didn't want someone with the prestige of Cruz to enter the elections, because it would validate them. They wanted to demonstrate there was no freedom of elections in Nicaragua." Pérez felt the "game" of the Coordinadora had been "simply to take away legitimacy."

On October 11, more than a week after the breakup in Rio, the Coordinadora changed its mind and backed the election accord. Stoltenberg of the S.I. flew to Managua, followed by Brandt, to ask for a postponement of the vote. But the Sandinistas refused. "The case was lost in Rio," Stoltenberg said.

Pérez said he never expected that the Sandinistas would let go of power, but thought the elections might have put Nicaragua on a course similar to Mexico: with left-of-center, semidemocratic, broadly based one-party rule. It was "not a solution to the problem, but it certainly was an opening." Cruz agreed, and his will be the judgment that lasts. "In hindsight," said Cruz, "we should have gone, with or without conditions." □

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told the *New York Times.* Whom does he support this year? "I'm assuming the election of Michael Dukakis. That's the first step. I supported Jesse Jackson in the primaries, but I'm very much for Dukakis. Reagan created a mythic interlude, and the new President will have to confront the problems he neglected. There will be new possibilities for talking to the people and changing things and creating another America. A Democratic Administration always opens up a space for those who stand on the left."

Dukakis-Bentsen

MICHAEL DUKAKIS's selection of Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas for his running-mate has several obvious plusses for the Democrats, not least of which is the fact that he did it the week before he went to Atlanta (no abortive Jesse-for-Veep booms at *this* convention). Dukakis can be expected to have a lot of fun with the fact that his running-mate once beat George Bush, in a Texas Senate race in 1970.

In other respects it is problematic. Bentsen is a handsome man but a dull fellow (his own stab at a presidential nomination, in 1976, cost a bucket of money, went nowhere, and folded in a matter of months). Bentsen, it is said, will help in Texas. True enough—but Bentsen was already running for re-election to the Senate; the Bentsen machine would have been pulling for the ticket in any case. What additional benefit does Dukakis gain?

But the great significance of the Bentsen pick is ideological. Dukakis has elected to spurn the Left. They won't like it, but they have no place else to go if they want to end Republican Executive hegemony, which they do. Dukakis, it is plain, intends to continue to project a moderate image. The job of puncturing that image, which George Bush must undertake, becomes all the more difficult.

Mexican Hayride

MEXICO's ever victorious Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has frequently been accused of stealing state and local elections, but never before of stealing the presidency. Over the last sixty years it has unfailingly won that office without any need for its vaunted talent for *alquimia electoral.*

This year was different. Leaders of the two main opposition parties—Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solarzano of the upstart National Democratic Front (FDN) and Manuel Clouthier of the National Action Party (PAN)—cried out, We wuz robbed. And they might be right. Of course, that doesn't mean that either Clouthier or the son of former President Lázaro Cárdenas is about to don the presidential sash come the first of December. It does mean, however, that both parties won more votes in this election than any opposition party has ever won since the PRI got going back in 1929.

Of greater importance, it means that Mexico no longer is a one-party state. Early but unofficial returns show that the PRI's candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, lost to Cárdenas in several states, including the state of Mexico and the federal district, where vast numbers of the PRI's three million bureaucrats live. That reflects a sharp division within the PRI itself: Salinas was resented by a large segment of the party because he, like his mentor, President Miguel de la Madrid, was never a party stalwart.

Government ineptitude in handling the vote count helped amplify cries of fraud. In previous years election returns began to pour in soon after the polls closed. This year a great computer layout was expected to do still better, but the computer "crashed" almost as soon as it was cranked up; five days after the election, returns were still trickling in. A spokesman for a watchdog group charged that the initial returns so frightened PRI officials that they decided to introduce "cybernetic fraud" into the count.

Whetever the immediate outcome, profound political change seems inevitable in Mexico. The near future could see far better organized opposition on both right and left and a strong advance toward the first genuine democracy in Mexico's long history.

The Spell Is Broken

With air exhaling in a *whoosh,*
Republicans and Mr. Bush
Allowed their diaphragms to flex
As Mr. Meese removed his hex,
While voters marveled, all agog
At Bush, so recently a frog.

W. H. VON DREELE

Lefebvre at Bat

THE SCHISM within the Catholic Church is sad news, and both parties are to blame. The aging Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre seems to accumulate fresh differences with Vatican II every few weeks. But at the root of his misunderstanding is his failure to acknowledge that Vatican II is, as to substance, irreversible. It is as much a part of Catholic teaching as Vatican I, with which Lefebvre has no quarrels. His position against the idea of salvation outside the Church is quite simply extinct within the vibrant Catholic community, which includes the last four popes at least. Catholics who resent this can take satisfaction in insisting that theirs is nevertheless the one

Chile Lurches Toward a Vote

Pinochet faces his foes

The moment should have been triumphal for Chile's Gen. Augusto Pinochet. His anointment last week as the military junta's candidate for president was supposed to inspire much pomp and celebration. But the cheers of "Viva Pinochet" clashed with shouts of "Assassin!" as Santiago erupted in the worst political violence of the year. Police blasted angry antigovernment crowds with water cannons and tear gas. The mobs torched four buses and destroyed two government buildings. By the time Pinochet's nomination day was over, three protesters had been killed—one reportedly by police—and more than 100 persons had been injured. In a show of force, the government also arrested 846 persons.

It was not an auspicious campaign kickoff for next month's referendum. (Pinochet is the only candidate; a "yes" vote would keep him in power until 1997; a "no" vote would mean open elections next year.) But the demonstrators may have played right into the hands of Pinochet partisans, who plan to frame the voters' choice in stark terms: their man or chaos. In his acceptance speech, Pinochet reminded Chileans of the troubles—protests, shortages, political upheaval—that preceded the overthrow of former socialist president Salvador Allende in 1973. "It is evident that we have not yet freed ourselves of the destructive presence of Marxism," the 72-year-old general said. "No Chilean should lower his guard against this danger."



CARRION—SYGMA

'No Chilean should lower his guard': *The military junta*

The opposition was quick to disavow last week's disturbances. "Any act of violence benefits the regime, and we categorically condemn them," said Patricio Aylwin, a Christian Democrat who is the spokesman for the 16-party opposition coalition. Opponents plan to focus their "No" campaign on Pinochet's unpopularity, and ask Chileans if they want to extend his rule for eight more years. Last week the coalition also released guidelines for a peaceful transition to democracy in case of his defeat. But out of concern that they might frighten voters away with tales of atrocities past, Pinochet's opponents have softpedaled their attacks on his human-rights record, one of the worst in Latin America.

Recent polls indicate that the Oct. 5 balloting will be close. Many of the 7.3 million Chileans registered—one third of whom have never voted for a president before—are still undecided. And Pinochet has been polishing up his image. His supporters are quick to point out that the junta's economic policies have restored prosperity and created tens of thousands of new jobs. And the regime actually earned some human-rights points last month, when it removed many restrictions on civil liberties for the first time since 1973.

The homecoming of one of the general's most formidable critics could also work to his advantage. On Thursday, Isabel Allende, the 42-year-old daughter of the former president, announced that she was traveling to Chile in defiance of an official ban on political exiles. By the time she arrived, Pinochet had sidestepped confrontation by lifting the ban. Later, he said all his exiled opponents—believed to number about 500—could return home. Allende's widow, Hortensia Bussi, said she would return to Chile from her exile in Mexico. Many other banned Pinochet foes, including Communist Party leader Luis Corvalán, are now eligible to come home. Their outspoken presence could heat up the campaign and allow Pinochet to rap the opposition for harboring Marxists. If the debate boils over into violence again, Pinochet could still triumph with his promise of stability. Clearly, the coming plebiscite will be not only a vote on Chile's future but also a referendum on its past.

JOSEPH CONTRERAS *in Santiago*

Mexico's Messy State of Disunion

The nightmare came true for Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) last week. President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado was only 45 minutes into his final State of the Union address when an opposition leader bellowed: "The people don't accept the electoral fraud . . . !" For seven minutes de la Madrid stood silently, while PRI legislators and those from other parties traded insults and slogans and waved ballots in the air. After the president resumed speaking, things got even worse; about 30 legislators stomped out of the hall just as he was winding down.

It was dramatic proof that the furor over Mexico's never-ending election is growing, not diminishing. At the heart of the dispute are charges the PRI grossly inflated the July vote totals of its candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. One anti-PRI watchdog group cited voting irregularities in 59 of Mexico's 300 congressional districts. And an analysis by respected academic Jorge G. Castañeda reported that in 1,762 precincts the PRI won an astonishing 100 percent of the vote. But the PRI also showed that its mastery of back-room politics had not diminished. Despite the public clamor over the fraud, the party got two electoral colleges to certify the vote tallies for each house of congress; the PRI won control of both.

Even so, the PRI leadership is under attack from within the party for being too weak. Last week labor czar Fidel Velázquez, the PRI's most powerful old-guard member, accused the party of "turning over power step by step" to the opposition, leaving only the presidency to negotiate. In fact, there is talk—serious but farfetched—among some opposition politicians of cutting a deal with the PRI that would set aside the results of the July 6 presidential election, install an interim government and call for a new election. That, said Velázquez, will never happen. For Salinas, the next step is to gain the approval of the Chamber of Deputies. The PRI has the necessary majority in the chamber. But after last week's blows from organized labor, as well as the opposition, the PRI's maneuvering room is shrinking.

STRYKER MCGUIRE *in Mexico City*

An Electoral Turmoil

Mexico's ruling party claims victory—and courts political unrest

Even by Mexican standards it was a surreal moment: 1:30 in the morning, long after the last vote in the presidential election had been cast. Inside the Salón Revolución at the Ministry of the Interior, members of the Federal Electoral Commission hadn't counted a single vote or issued a single official result. Suddenly there was a commotion in the lobby. People converged on a TV set. On the screen was Jorge de la Vega, head of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI): "We are receiving ... information that confirms our resounding, legal and incontestable triumph."

De la Vega was indulging in an old PRI tradition: the voteless victory. But last week's supercharged presidential election in Mexico was anything but traditional. The party, undefeated in presidential races since its founding in 1929, came under unprecedented, withering opposition at the polls, and an opposition candidate even dared to claim victory. Reeling, the PRI orchestrated a go-slow vote count while it considered its options. The opposition cried fraud: first when the official vote-count computer system collapsed on election night; then when results took days instead of hours to be released.

Even on the PRI's own reading, the results were hardly an endorsement. The earliest count, representing about 11 percent of the registered voters, showed Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the PRI presidential candidate, ahead with 47 percent of the vote; Cuauthémoc Cárdenas of the National Democratic Front (FDN) with 27 percent, and Manuel Clouthier of the National Action Party (PAN) with 21 percent. However, on Saturday night Cárdenas declared that on the basis of electoral returns he had obtained—but was not releasing—*he* had won the election. For Salinas to assume the presidency on the basis of fraud, Cárdenas said, would amount to a "technical coup d'état." He warned of "ungovernability" in Mexico, and called for a "popular mobilization" to keep the PRI from winning through fraud.


Clamming up: There were many reasons for the *mañana* vote count. At first, the PRI couldn't to bear to release early figures showing deep losses in Mexico City. The results in the capital were apparently so humiliating that local PRI officials demanded a recount, throwing the election into further confusion; Mexico City has 14 percent of the country's registered voters. But mostly it seemed that the party hierarchy was having trouble getting defeated congressional candidates to swallow their losses and that it sat on the results. Said one PRI source: "The local bosses started seeing some of the results, and they clammed up." The recalcitrance of the Old Guard clearly discomforted Salinas: "It is the credibility of the results that makes or breaks this new administration." "We're surrounded by alligators," added a source close to the PRI leader, "and they're not all members of the opposition parties."

The only certain result was the political transformation of Mexico. Partial returns, party data and an overheated rumor machine suggested a victory that looked almost Pyrrhic for the PRI, the longest ruling party in the noncommunist world. Salinas would get less than 50 percent of the vote; his win would be at least 25 points lower than the party's worst-ever showing. The PRI would lose badly in cen-




SERGIO DORANTES—SYGMA

A new political stage: *Salinas acknowledges supporters after the vote*



LARRY REIDER—GAMMA-LIAISON

A second force: *Cárdenas with protesters*



NUNEZ—REUTER

A stronger alternative: *PAN's Manuel Clouthier waves to supporters in Mexico City*

tral Mexico, including Mexico City. It would lose at least four of 64 Senate seats; it had never lost any. Late returns from the countryside—traditionally a PRI stronghold—might improve the party's position a bit, but the damage was extensive. Salinas recognized as much in his restrained victory speech: "The era of virtual one-party rule is ending, and we are now entering a new political stage in the life of the country." Said PAN leader Clouthier at a Saturday rally attended by more than 100,000: "The results of the election are clear and evident. The Mexican people have overcome the instruments of arbitrary power."

The dour Cárdenas, 54-year-old leader of the populist left, scored a near electoral coup. His strength among young leftists and the urban and rural poor has made him "a clear second force," as one of Salinas's closest associates put it. As the son of one of Mexico's most revered figures, Gen. Lazaro Cardenas, the president who nationalized the oil industry in 1938, Cárdenas began his campaign with substantial support. But he caught fire in recent months, especially as a lightning rod for anti-PRI sentiment. He was most impressive in Mexico City (population: 17 million), where by most estimates he won handily. Less stunning, if only by comparison, was the performance by Clouthier, 54. His folksy ways and less-is-more view of government's role enabled him to build on the PAN's decades-old tradition as a right-of-center alternative to the PRI. However, because he is seen as the candidate of the middle class and conservative elements of the Roman Catholic Church, he did not benefit to the extent Cárdenas did from the union workers and peasants who defected from the PRI in this election.



TORRES—AFP


A go-slow vote count: *Supporters of PAN demonstrate in capital*

Ugly reminder: For all that was new about this year's balloting, there was an ugly reminder of the past: a pattern of dirty politics and election fraud. The week got off to an ominous start with the still unexplained gangland-style killing of one of Cárdenas's key campaign aides. On election night Cárdenas, Clouthier and a third opposition candidate, Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, banded together to protest formally "a fraud of great proportions" that they said their lieutenants at the polls had reported to them. Some Mexican experts, however, believe the opposition overstated its case. "These may have been the cleanest elections in Mexican history," says Jorge G. Castañeda, a political scientist. "I would say they were —but with the caveat that they were so by Mexican standards."

Part of the PRI's strategy this year was to attack its own history of wholesale electoral fraud. Given past vote tampering and the opposition's strength after six years of economic crisis, the party's goal was to win but not by too much. "Salinas is aware that people are prepared not to believe his victory," says Adrián Lajous, a former government official. "And he knows that the bigger the margin, the greater the risks." In order to boost its credibility, the PRI opted, in the words of political scientist Juan Molinar, "to win losing."

That left Salinas and Cárdenas in a paradoxical situation. Though Cárdenas attracted the votes of the young and the disaffected, he espouses a return to big-government policies that nowadays seem timeworn. Salinas, at 40, made a point of being part of a "new generation." He built his entire campaign around the challenge of "modernizing" Mexico, politically and economically. He surrounded himself with the best and the brightest of the Mexican elite. And yet his victory may end up being contingent upon PRI strongholds in rural Mexico—home, as Castañeda points out, "to the most backward, poorest and most uneducated sectors" of Mexican society. It's not the tidiest ending in Mexican political history, but that may be a price that the country should be willing to pay in its wrenching transformation from one-party rule.

STRYKER MCGUIRE *in Mexico City*


HYUNGWON KANG

From disgrace to victory: Kim Dae Jung addresses a massive rally in Seoul

SOUTH KOREA

The Opposition Gets Its Day

A surprise election result opens an era of split rule

If political shilly-shallying were an Olympic sport, the South Korean electorate would enter this year's Summer Games in Seoul not only with the home-field advantage but with a good shot at the gold medal. Just eleven months ago, widespread protests forced the Democratic Justice Party to accede to election reforms that put its continuation in power at risk. In December, with opposition forces deeply divided, voters kept the incumbent party in office after all, electing Roh Tae Woo, 55, to a five-year term as South Korea's President. Last week the same voters, in a somewhat different mood, presented Roh with a legislature controlled by the opposition.

Roh thus became the first South Korean chief executive to lose majority control over the National Assembly since the country became a republic four decades ago. The Democratic Justice Party won only 125 of the legislature's 299 seats, leaving it 25 votes short of a majority. Clearly shaken by his party's poor showing, Roh declared that he "humbly" accepted the defeat and tried to find a bright side to it. Said he: "The parliamentary elections, in a sense, will offer an opportunity to advance political maturity in our country." But he acknowledged that "numerous difficulties are expected in the execution of state affairs."

The big winner in last week's voting was Kim Dae Jung, 62, whose Party for Peace and Democracy captured 70 seats, a gain of 48, to become the second largest voting bloc. That showing marked a stunning turnabout in Kim's political fortunes. Because he refused to give up his presidential candidacy and rally support the more promising Kim Young Sam, the country's other major opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung bore most of the blame for dividing the opposition vote last December, a blot that prompted his resignation as party leader two months ago. Now Kim will not only reclaim his National Assembly seat after an absence of 17 years but also appears certain to become a key legislative power broker. Kim promised cooperation with Roh but warned that it would come with conditions, starting with the release of some 1,000 political prisoners. "If the government carries out these things, we will support it," said Kim. "We don't want chaos."

Faring less well was Kim Young Sam, 60, whose Reunification Democratic Party added only seven seats to its existing 52. There was speculation that Kim Dae Jung would try to push aside Kim Young Sam and head the two opposition parties, though so far he has merely said he will seek "common ground" with other opposition parties. Meanwhile, a third and more conservative opposition group, Kim Jong Pil's New Democratic Republican Party, won a respectable 35 seats in its first election. Political insiders speculated that President Roh might be tempted to seek an accommodation with that party, which controls just enough votes to give Roh a working majority.

Political analysts chalked up the poor showing of Roh's party to overconfidence and its habit of fielding candidates on the basis of party standing rather than electability. The cloud of uncertainty produced by the election caused panic on the South Korean stock market, which plunged nearly 26 points, to 618.73, its largest one-day drop ever. But many South Koreans seemed pleased at the prospect of at last having a counterbalance to one-party rule. Said Han Sung Joo, a political science professor at Seoul's Korea University: "The government will just have to make the necessary concessions." One thing seemed sure to change. Roh has promised to submit his record to an unspecified form of referendum shortly after the Olympics in September. An Assembly vote, once considered a possible vehicle for such a test of approval, no longer seems likely. *—By William R. Doerner. Reported by K.C. Hwang and Kumiko Makihara/ Seoul*

JAPAN

From the Land of The Rising Sum

Tokyo steps up its foreign aid

In Antananarivo, capital of Madagascar, authorities are making plans to spend $3.8 million on a new fleet of garbage trucks, a purchase long deemed too expensive to contemplate. Pakistan will be spending $3 million to help finance an experimental farm in Baluchistan province. In Bolivia the government has received $11.3 million to spend on a vegetable-seed production project.

The source of the windfalls: Japan. Long criticized for its tightfistedness toward the world's poorer countries, Japan is now second only to the U.S. in handing out development assistance, and it is closing fast. According to the latest figures of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, in 1986 Tokyo gave $5.6 billion, vs. Washington's $9.6 billion. This year Japan has authorized more foreign aid than the U.S. ($10 billion vs. $9.2 billion). Japan has also begun to recycle some of its growing financial reserves throughout the developing world: at the 1987 Venice summit of industrialized nations, Tokyo pledged $20 billion in loans and other plans for helping developing nations plagued by debt. Says Masamichi Hanabusa, director-general of the Economic Cooperation Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Since our national capability has increased, we have come to look on our aid program as our contribution to international society."

The raw figures, however, make the Japanese look considerably more open-handed than they actually are. Tokyo's


THOMAS HARTWELL

Cairo: a Japanese-funded children's hospital

THE PHILIPPINES

Off Mindoro, a Night to Remember

A ferry and a tanker collide in a titanic disaster

At about 10 o'clock on a moonless night, the grungy 2,215-ton ferry *Dona Paz* coursed through the choppy waters of the Tablas Strait, some 110 miles south of Manila. The people who crammed the decks on makeshift cots and slept three or four to a bed were scheduled to be in the capital by morning, and the air was filled with anticipation. Young women from the impoverished island of Samar talked excitedly about finding jobs as maids in Manila homes. Mothers and fathers tucked their children into bed and chatted about the relatives and the sights they would soon see.

Suddenly, without warning, the *Victor,* a Philippine tanker carrying 8,800 bbl. of petroleum products, collided with the *Dona Paz.* Immediately, the tanker's cargo ignited, setting the sea aflame. As the inferno engulfed both ships, dozens of passengers leaped, diving deep to avoid the burning waters. Swimming beyond the fiery oil, Eugenio Orot, 27, surfaced hundreds of feet away from the ferry. As the anguished screams of children calling *"Nanay!"* (mother) and *"Tatay!"* (father) echoed around him, he searched desperately for his two children and wife, but to no avail. Within four hours, the *Dona Paz* and the *Victor* were gone.

Ships in the area rescued 26 people from the shark-infested waters, but no more. It was the worst peacetime maritime disaster of the century, exceeding the record of the *Titanic,* which went down in 1912 with some 1,500 on board. The worst shipping calamity occurred during World War II, when a Soviet submarine torpedoed the Nazi transport *Wilhelm Gustloff,* killing an estimated 7,700. While more than 1,600 people, including eleven crewmen from the *Victor,* were presumed dead in last week's accident, the actual count was almost certainly higher. The names of as many as 1,000 children may not have been included on the ferry's manifest. Passengers who purchased tickets after boarding also may not have been listed in the roster. Some survivors claimed to have overheard members of the crew say there were more than 3,000 people on board.



YAMSUAN—PICTURE GROUP

Survivors: a father comforts his daughter

Swimming desperately in a blazing sea.

The tragedy was not the first in the waters off the islands of Mindoro and Marinduque, among the busiest sealanes in the archipelago. Less than 40 miles from where the *Dona Paz* went down, the ferry *Don Juan* collided with an oil tanker in 1980. More than 100 drowned. Last week's disaster may have been caused by navigational errors—or negligence. One survivor alleged that at the time of the collision the *Dona Paz's* captain was watching a video in his bunk and the first and third mates were drinking beer, leaving an inexperienced apprentice in charge of the bridge. The catastrophe was all the more painful because of the approaching holidays. Calling the accident a "national tragedy of harrowing proportions," President Corazon Aquino ordered a full investigation and declared "strict sanctions must be imposed on all parties at fault." Unless Aquino pushes for a stricter law, the punishment promises to be mild: the government's Board of Marine Inquiry can levy fines of no more than $200. ***—By Howard Chua-Eoan.***

Reported by Nelly Sindayen/Manila

SOUTH KOREA

Guilt Trips

The Kims apologize, sort of

"I cannot conceal my remorse," read the ad splashed across the front page of every daily newspaper in South Korea. Unusual though it was, the public apology by Opposition Leader Kim Young Sam, 60, was only the first to be offered by losers of South Korea's first free presidential election in 16 years. Rival Dissident Leader Kim Dae Jung, 62, issued his mea culpa two days later, conceding his "unbearably heavy responsibility" for the victory two weeks ago of Roh Tae Woo, 55, the candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party. By splitting the opposition vote, the two Kims had allowed Roh to win with only 36.6% of the ballots cast.

Though their concessions were painfully apt, neither Kim backed away from charges that Roh won by cheating. Kim Dae Jung, who finished third with 27% of the vote, seemed especially bitter: "It's utterly incomprehensible that I, who was able to mobilize millions of people at my campaign rallies, should have been defeated." A more conciliatory Kim Young Sam, who drew 28%, said his party would work with Roh to revise laws for National Assembly elections. The offer seemed aimed at repairing Kim's credibility as an effective political force. Said Lee Chul, an opposition National Assembly member: "The two Kims are now turning into obstacles for democratic developments in our country. At the mention of their names, many people grimace."

Meanwhile, Roh Tae Woo moved confidently into his new role as President-elect. To help strengthen South Korea's relations with Japan, the former general met with Shintaro Abe, secretary-general of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, and chatted by phone with Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita. Roh promised to seek improved relations with China after he takes office on Feb. 25. Any warming between the two nations could reduce tensions between Seoul and Communist North Korea, a staunch Beijing ally.



H. EDWARD KIM

Roh prays with Buddhist monks in Seoul

Pursuing reconciliation in a Grandeur.

Roh promised to hold a national vote of confidence after next September's Olympic Games in Seoul and to step down if he lost the plebiscite. Pressing his theme of national reconciliation, he prayed with Buddhist monks and met with Presbyterian leaders. Roh delayed a meeting with Stephen Cardinal Kim Sou Hwan at Seoul's Myongdong Cathedral, where a band of students was demonstrating against the election. He worked hard to keep his campaign image of the ordinary man, urging a delegation of garbage collectors to call him Mister instead of the customary Your Excellency. But his ultimate sacrifice may have been giving up the traditional presidential vehicle, a bulletproof Cadillac, in favor of the far more modest Korean-made Grandeur sedan. ■

profile START skeptics, envisions the ratio going from 3-to-1 to 4-to-1. Worse yet, Kissinger and others expect us to slash our nuclear-armed submarine force in complying with START. Since the Russians, like us, wouldn't have to get rid of any submarines devoted to attacking other subs, the sea leg of our triad would then be more vulnerable (though still not very vulnerable).

5. *START won't necessarily make things worse.* Don't let Henry Kissinger get you down. To warn that the ratio of SS-18 warheads to U.S. silos may go from 3-to-1 to 4-to-1 is like worrying that someone you're about to have a duel with is concealing a second gun. For various reasons, it would make zero sense for the Russians to use more than two or three warheads per silo in a first strike. On the other hand, even a 3-to-1 ratio isn't something you want to reflect on every night at bedtime. Ideally, START wouldn't just make things no worse; it would make them better.

6. *Things can get better under START.* That's the good news. The bad news is that most of the schemes for making them better are pricey. For example, there's the Winnebago of nuclear arms: the mobile Midgetman. This missile, still on the drawing boards, would carry its launcher with it, and thus could be fired from an infinite number of sites. The effect would be to move the ratio of Soviet warheads to U.S. launch sites toward zero. This sort of wizardry doesn't come cheap, of course—30, 40, 50 billion dollars. There's a similarly expensive solution to the submarine problem. Kissinger's fear that we'd have to get rid of lots of subs under a START agreement rests on the present rules for counting sea-based missiles: each submarine is assumed to have as many missiles, with as many warheads, as it is capable of carrying. So a Trident I, whether loaded or not, would be counted as having 192 missiles. Some defense-establishment visionaries have figured out a great way around this snag: build a whole new generation of submarines that don't carry many missiles. The price tag? Don't ask.

7. *A jillion dollars saved is a jillion dollars earned.* In theory, one of the advantages of arms control is that it stems the costly proliferation of weapons. Ideally, our nation would be run by someone who could strike bargains that did this. They would be inherently stabilizing and wouldn't leave us scrambling for new, stabilizing weapons. Since that appears not to be the case, we'll have to seek *relatively* cheap ways to stabilize things under START.

8. *Never buy a weapons system without checking the discount racks.* A relatively cheap mobile-missile system is available. The administration wants to put our several dozen MX missiles (each with ten warheads) on a train that, in a crisis, would leave the station house and head down the tracks, stopping to launch at its leisure. Another approach, which has technical advantages over this Amtrak MX and probably wouldn't cost any more, was recently proposed in TNR by Brent Scowcroft, John Deutch, and R. James Woolsey ("Come and Get Us," April 18). We would take our existing, three-warhead Minuteman IIIs, put them in portable canisters, and periodically move them around from one hole in the ground to the next. This shell game, supposedly, would cost only $10 billion to $15 billion. The bargain-basement solution to the submarine problem is cheaper: rather than build a new fleet of submarines with fewer launching tubes, just cut half the launching tubes out of existing subs. We'd have to change the START counting rules, and guard against cheating, but credible experts believe the verification is doable.

9. *Bargaining chips are perishable items.* The Strategic Defense Initiative isn't the bargaining chip it used to be, back when Reagan was riding high, back before the Office of Technology Assessment had carefully appraised the idea. But the Soviet Union still seems to fear SDI. Does that mean we should cling to it dearly? Not really. Maybe the Russians just understand that Star Wars could be destabilizing, making the future look bleaker for *both* nations. After all, if a missile defense works very effectively, it has nasty side effects somewhat like those of multiple-warhead missiles with accurate warheads; it tempts one side (us, at first, but then them, once they've erected a defense) to launch a first strike, in hopes of screening out the crippled retaliatory strike. Whatever the cause of the Soviet concern about Star Wars, the upshot is that it's not too late to cash in this bargaining chip, agreeing to a ban on deployment and most forms of testing. And it's certainly not too soon; SDI probably won't fare well in the next administration anyway. In return, we could get some of the security that a well-crafted START agreement would have possessed from the beginning. For example: deeper cuts in SS-18 warheads, cuts in Soviet submarine-attacking subs, or more farseeing restrictions that would nip future sources of anxiety in the bud. Such concrete gains are vastly preferable to the dubious security promised by the administration's tortured Star Wars scenarios.

10. *We don't desperately need a START agreement.* It is possible, through tough bargaining over the fine print and clever adaptation to START's limits, to reconcile START with greater stability at a reasonable price. And this would probably be worthwhile; a START agreement could be the way station to a second, more judicious accord ten years down the road that would unequivocally make the world safer (an accord permitting, say, 3,000 warheads apiece, with a low ratio of warheads to missiles, and to delivery systems generally—all backed up by intrusive verification). On the other hand, the START accord isn't so enticing that we should make big concessions to get it signed. Besides, there's more than a week's worth of work on it yet to be done. So if, as is widely expected, no agreement emerges from the Moscow summit, it won't be the end of the world.

LITTLE LEAP FORWARD

The week before South Korea's first-ever genuine parliamentary elections, most commentators—from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* to the opposition press in South Korea

itself—were predicting a solid majority for President Roh Tae Woo's ruling Democratic Justice Party. As it turned out, the DJP won 125 out of the 299 seats—25 short of a majority—proving that corruption was low (or comfortingly inept) and that Koreans, pace the pundits, had no intention of turning their newfound democracy into an elected dictatorship.

Now, as if the experts had not sufficiently underestimated Koreans' enthusiasm for constitutional democracy, the fear is political deadlock. Under the South Korean constitution, set up on the American model, the president has executive powers but needs the cooperation of the assembly to pass a law—and a budget. Thanks to the opposition's majority in the assembly (the first such majority in South Korea's 40-year history), that's not going to be so easy.

Koreans, on the evidence of the polling, wanted it that way. They gave the opposition parties 66 percent of the vote, more than the combined vote for the two opposition leaders in the December election. But they also voted for compromise The most volatile member of the opposition and the man most likely to bring on political paralysis, Kim Dae Jung, saw his party's vote slump to 19 percent in April from his personal showing of 27 percent in the December presidential elections. The other Kim, Kim Young Sam, also saw his vote drop from 28 percent to 24 percent, as disillusioned voters took their revenge on the two men who split the opposition and allowed Roh to win last December. The big gainer was Kim Jong Pil (although it's not required by law, all opposition leaders in Korea are called Kim), whose more moderate and accommodationist New Democratic Party jumped from eight percent last December to 15 percent this time around. A former head of the hated Korean Central Intelligence Agency and a prime minister in the autocratic early 1970s, this third Kim is no radical. A born-again democrat (like almost every self-interested Korean with a history of public service), he has agreed to support the government as long as it acts "rationally and morally." He's set to be the power broker in the new assembly.

Korean voters have done what American—and now apparently French—voters like to do. They have installed a tough-minded executive and hedged him in with a touchy but amenable legislature. Paralysis is one way of describing this. Constitutionalism is another. Meaningful universal suffrage, dramatically won by Koreans last summer, is only half a democratic system. The other half—the more difficult—is separation of powers and the moderation of limited government. With their vote last month, Koreans constructed a government that both places a premium on stability (especially in the months before the Olympics in September) and keeps steady pressure on the government to liberalize further. The most critical areas—a free press law and legislative controls on the security agencies—now wait for the opposition in the assembly. All that's needed is for the three Kims to show the same level of democratic maturity as the voters.

STARVATION AGAIN

It's time for the world to get aroused about Ethiopia again, not with an outpouring of humanitarian generosity, as during the famine of 1984-85, but with a furious welling up of indignation at the government's refusal to allow international relief organizations to distribute aid in the rebel provinces of Eritrea and Tigre. Two to three million people may starve to death as a result.

Food is available: 250,000 tons from the United States, a first-ever 250,000 tons from the Soviet Union, and 760,000 tons from other countries. But the Ethiopian government is blocking relief agencies from transporting and distributing the food, apparently in revenge for recent severe military losses at the hands of separatist rebels. There is no strategic sense to the starvation policy. Enemy fighters will get enough food to stay alive. Innocent people will not.

American television networks, which picked up fast on superb BBC coverage in 1984-85, ought to send film crews into the disputed provinces and bring to life both the war story and the famine story. The Ethiopian government probably will refuse to let them in, but enterprising journalists can slip across the border from the Sudan. (When they are finished working in Ethiopia, they slip back to the Southern Sudan, where another civil war and another famine are under way.)

All available forms of protest—vigils, demonstrations, government protests, and U.N. resolutions—ought to be directed at the Ethiopian government and its diplomatic missions. Meanwhile, secondary protests ought to be focused on the Soviet Union and the United States. Ethiopia is a Soviet client. The Soviets have tried to improve their world image by matching the United States in emergency grain donations this year (though the U.S. supplies an additional $10 million for transport and medicine). The Soviets also have tried, unsuccessfully, to get Ethiopia's brutal dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, to abandon his Stalinist plans to collectivize agriculture. If Mikhail Gorbachev really means what he says about "new political thinking" in the world, he will threaten to withhold military assistance to Ethiopia, which the U.S. government estimates has been worth $3.8 billion over the last three years. The Eritrean rebellion began with Soviet assistance in 1962 (when Ethiopia was a U.S. ally). It's a mess Gorbachev ought to try to settle.

Americans should put pressure on their own government too. There's a Reagan-Gorbachev summit coming up, and Americans ought to demand that Reagan put the lives of two million Ethiopians near the top of his agenda.

NOTEBOOK

□ OH, SURE HE DOES: "Reagan remembers the strictures of Claude-Frederic Bastiat, learned long ago at Eureka College, well enough to say there is nothing inherently wrong

HAITI

Voting with Their Feet

Many threaten to boycott an election that promises to be a sham

A voodoo priest in the southern region of Grande Anse, famed for his clairvoyant powers, foresees blood in Haiti's immediate future. He is not alone. A young woman who identifies herself only as Monique has piled her four small children onto a crowded bus that is heading for the boondocks. Like many others who live in the slums that surround Port-au-Prince, Monique does not want to be anywhere near the capital city during the election scheduled this Sunday. "I'm disappearing," she whispers, her eyes darting to see if she has been overheard. South of the capital in the tiny port town of Miragoane, a doctor gives fuller voice to the fear: "It is only with bayonets they will get these people to vote."

The prognoses for Haiti's pending election vary, but none are promising. At best, the election will simply be called off. At worst, Haitians predict a bloodbath of the sort that brought last November's presidential contest to a halt just three hours into the balloting. Many Haitians are now forecasting that if Brigadier General Henri Namphy, head of the ruling junta, feels he cannot impose his choice of a President on the rest of the army, he will postpone or cancel the voting. From Port-au-Prince to Washington, virtually everybody seems to discount the possibility of a fair contest. Says a politician who ran for the Senate two months ago but refuses to participate this time: "There is nothing certain about these elections except that they will be a sham."

Certainly, voters will not be offered the full range of presidential candidates. The opposition's four leading contenders, who were expected to take 80% of the vote last November, are refusing to participate. Instead, they have called for an election boycott that is supported by some 50 civic, religious and community associations throughout Haiti. Of the 22 candidates registered for the race, twelve were associates of the former Duvalier dictatorship; under the new constitution, that should prevent them from running for public office for a decade. All twelve were disqualified from the November contest. At the end of last week Namphy, in an apparent bid to lend the elections credibility, again sidelined the Duvalierist candidates. Namphy's personal favorite is Gerard Phillippe Auguste, a little-known agronomist who heads one of Haiti's oldest populist parties.



J.P. PICTURES

Namphy remains the most important constituent

The legislative election promises to be even more of a farce. As of last week the newly seated election council, handpicked by Namphy, could not furnish the name of a single candidate for any of the 27 Senate or 77 Chamber of Deputy seats. Moreover, election conditions will hardly be democratic. Under a new electoral law, soldiers will be permitted to enter polling places, but independent observers and journalists will not. The new law also requires voters to show officials their marked ballots.

Both in Port-au-Prince and Washington, there have been calls for a multinational peacekeeping force to ensure fair and peaceful elections. But neither the Reagan Administration nor leaders of other Caribbean nations have embraced the proposal. Instead, Haiti's allies have voiced support for the elections, then adopted a wait-and-see attitude. ***—By Jill Smolowe.***

Reported by Bernard Diederich/Miami

SOVIET UNION

Patients' Rights

An end to abuses?

One of the most chilling by-products of the Kremlin's aversion to protest has been its use of the Soviet mental-health-care system as an instrument for suppressing dissent. An untold number of dissidents have been clapped into mental hospitals and sometimes kept under control with mind-numbing drugs. Now, under Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost,* or openness, Soviet psychiatric practices are finally getting what could prove to be a cathartic airing. Amid demands for reform, the Soviet press has begun printing stories of abuse, corruption and incompetence within the psychiatric establishment. On the political front, Western analysts note that since last spring, the government has released some two dozen dissidents who had been held in psychiatric institutions.

Last week Moscow took yet another reformist step by announcing that broad new legal rights would be granted to mental patients and their families. The regulations, as described by the official news agency TASS, "provide legal guarantees against possible errors and malpractice." Among other things, relatives will be given the right to legal redress of doctors' decisions concerning the confinement or treatment of a patient. The provisions also make the "illegal commitment of a patently healthy person to a mental hospital a criminal offense." Significantly, authority over an unspecified number of so-called special psychiatric hospitals will be transferred from the Ministry of Interior, which has control over the internal security forces, to the Ministry of Health. It is in these "special" hospitals that political dissidents have usually been confined.

If enforced, the law would be a significant step toward abolishing long-criticized practices. The accompanying press campaign seems to indicate that the regime means business. Recent articles have told of how local militia obtained psychiatric commitment orders for people who had done little more than complain about their neighbors or threatened to expose instances of corruption to higher authorities. There has been no suggestion by the Soviet press, however, that such abuses were sanctioned by high officials for political purposes.

Whether the new law actually reduces the power of the authorities to use psychiatric confinement as punishment could be put to an early test. Members of a Moscow-based group called Press Club *Glasnost,* composed mostly of former political prisoners, last week pointed to the case of Lev Ubozhko, 54, a Moscow dissident who spent 15 years in psychiatric hospitals before being freed last spring. They said Ubozhko had been rearrested and was being held in a psychiatric hospital at Chelyabinsk in the Urals, where he was taken after the director of a Moscow hospital refused to admit him on the ground that he appeared to be healthy. ■

price tag can be held to that if we're to buy what the panel is recommending: high-tech weapons, airlift for the Gulf, counterinsurgency programs in Central America, Third World security assistance, and anti-missile systems. However, with Paul Kennedy in one hand and the defense strategy panel's report in the other, the 1988 candidates have the grist for a vital debate about America's future as a great power.

NOTEBOOK

□ "HOUSE SPEAKER JIM WRIGHT (D-Tex.)—who was patron of the [Arias] plan, organized the Democrats in support, and fought the White House every inch of the way—has gone home to Texas, weary, it is said, of warring Latins." So writes a disappointed Mary McGrory. How tiresome, these hot-blooded Latins. Some, Nicaragua's leaders, wearyingly insist on building a 600,000-man army, an idea that Humberto Ortega, had he bothered to check with Jim Wright, would have recognized as "preposterous," "outrageous and counterproductive." And, oh, the other Latins. The rebels show up for peace negotiations in Santo Domingo and find themselves across the table not from Sandinistas, but from a Washington lawyer and a West German Socialist sent to stand in for them. "The *contras*, professing a nationalism that could not brook talking about their country's affairs with foreigners, refused to meet them," writes the exasperated McGrory. We suggest that McGrory and Wright have suffered enough at the hands of these Latins. They deserve a rest. Time to leave Nicaragua to those, Sandinista and *contra*, who persist in believing that Nicaragua's civil war is a struggle for the soul of that country rather than a moral scoreboard for self-absorbed Americans.

□ IT'S NOT WHAT YOU DO, IT'S WHERE YOU DO IT:

Israeli Soldier Kills Arab Woman

—*Washington Post*, January 4, page 1

'Massacre' In Brazil

■ BRASILIA—State troopers rushed a group of protesting gold miners on a bridge in northern Brazil, shooting many of them at close range and forcing others to fall off the span in a "massacre" that left at least 100 people missing, a federal official charged.

Nelson Marabuto, director of a federal ministerial commission, accused police of trying to cover up Tuesday night's incident by hauling away bodies from the bridge in trucks before reporters were allowed into the area.

—*Washington Post*, January 3, page 27

A democracy expires.

WHO'S KILLING HAITI?

A SHORT TWO YEARS ago, the White House had high hopes for Haiti. It was a textbook case of a "transition to democracy": an alliance between impoverished peasants and a liberal professional class toppled a military dictatorship, helped in part by the Roman Catholic Church and some prodding from Washington. There was to be an intermediate period of benign military rule, followed by free elections and continued economic aid. Philippines, the sequel.

This rosy scenario remained central to U.S. policy for the next two years, even while it became increasingly clear that what was really under way was a transition to another form of dictatorship. Only six months ago, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Elliott Abrams, spoke glowingly of the "path to democracy" in Haiti. He pointed out that "the government, the election commission, the political parties, the churches, and other responsible democratic bodies have all expressed a willingness to keep the process moving forward through dialogue and a spirit of common effort." Even as late as November, the administration was confident enough to send representatives to the island for election day, accompanied by several hundred other international observers. Just before polling day, they were briefed by the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince. As one participant remarked, "Nothing prepared us at that meeting for what was to happen." What happened was a bloodbath orchestrated by America's supposed allies, the provisional government.

What went wrong? It's not as if the administration did not foresee the difficulties. "I wouldn't say [the suspension of elections] took us by surprise," Abrams said afterward. "We were always aware of the dangers and never thought the election was a sure thing." Indeed, the State Department evidently was dubious of Henri Namphy all along, and for a while it took an appropriately firm line. Abrams said publicly in June that "some within the military and some representing the deposed clique seek to manipulate events in a way that would return Haiti to the feudal form of government [of] its Duvalier presidents-for-life." He threatened then, and again on July 9, to cut off U.S. aid if there was a "perversion of the democratic process."

Yet throughout last year, as it became evident that the Namphy regime's commitment to free elections was tentative at best, the administration was sending far softer signals. Despite the growing violence in Haiti, Abrams's July comments were the last major public statement that real strings were attached to continued U.S. aid. On July 23 the Tontons Macoutes organized a massacre that claimed some 225 lives; on July 29 troops fired on 2,500 civilians protesting the Tontons Macoutes, killing eight

and wounding 15; on October 13 presidential candidate Yves Volel was assassinated by plainclothes policemen; and on November 3 the electoral commission's headquarters was firebombed.

AT NO POINT in this litany of atrocities was there a clear, high-level denunciation in Washington of the Haitian army's involvement and its growing complicity in the breakdown of law and order. On the contrary, in October Abrams actually abandoned his hard-line position. In *Time*, in a letter to the editor, he wrote: "While mistakes have been made, the CNG [the provisional government] has contributed importantly to laying the groundwork for a new, more democratic Haiti."

It is clear now that such a low-key strategy was disastrous. Stephen Horblitt, a Haitian expert and aide to Delegate Walter Fauntroy, argues that Namphy's maneuverings were part of a simple plan to test U.S. nerve: "The lack of clarity and commitment to back up what we wanted played a role in making the military believe they could get away with literally murder. They thought we'd back down, and they were right."

Abrams denies this, saying that he sent private messages making it "crystal clear" that the administration was serious. He defends his public statements that were supportive of Namphy: "A government official is an idiot if his attitude to a foreign government he's trying to persuade is permanent attack." And he believes the Namphy regime was planning on elections until the very last week, when fear of a radical victory in the elections prompted it to unleash the violence. According to this version of events, no U.S. pressure could have helped at this point: "You cannot ask a government to commit suicide to please the United States. We tried to persuade them that democracy wouldn't necessarily threaten them, but we failed."

But part of Namphy's confidence lay in the long-term support the State Department had given him, despite the fact that he was Duvalier's first choice for successor and that he remained intensely loyal to the armed forces. The military was involved from the very beginning in activities fatal to Haitian democracy. According to Americas Watch, as early as March 1986 seven civilians were shot dead and 19 beaten in a confrontation between a busload of civilians and an army captain; in April scores of unarmed civilians were killed by troops in a demonstration at Fort-Dimanche; abuses by the army, ranging from random seizure of land to arbitrary hostage-taking and killings continued throughout the year in the major cities. Gen. Williams Regala, minister of the interior and former head of Duvalier's secret police, reacted to the accusations by publicly announcing that there was nothing to investigate and that military actions were appropriate. A year later, with a mounting catalog of military offenses, the State Department argued that the army "has endeavored to prevent human rights abuses and corruption and has prosecuted a number of individuals. Freedom of speech and assembly are respected." Military aid was not "lethal, designed to suppress free expression of ideas and to nip democracy in the bud." Thanks to U.S. aid, the number of Haitian military troops jumped from 6,500 in 1986 to 22,000 today.

This quiet U.S. support for Namphy was combined with what appears to have been blind optimism at the ambassadorial level. An Americas Watch report last November documented conclusive evidence that the military was likely to wreck the elections. But the embassy continued to report until election eve that such a result was not inevitable, and indeed risked the lives of dozens of foreign journalists and observers on election day with that assumption. There's also evidence of amateurism. According to Alex Wilde, director of the Washington Office on Latin America, at the U.S. Embassy briefing before the election one official had not even heard of the Comité de Soutiens, the leading group of liberal, professional Haitians helping to organize the elections.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S initial reaction to this policy debacle has been one of damage control. The first major chance to pressure the Namphy regime was at a January 6 Barbados conference run by Caricom, the group representing English-speaking democracies in the region. The conference was due to affirm a package of tough sanctions against Haiti unless the January 17 elections were postponed and a free election scheduled. But the Caricom communiqué, thanks largely to U.S. administration point man Edward Seaga, prime minister of Jamaica, rejected sanctions and kept open the possibility of recognizing a Haitian regime that might emerge from the rigged election. Richard Holwill, deputy assistant secretary of state for the Caribbean, went to Barbados but failed to exert any pressure for action.

The White House has announced some sanctions—the end of $100 million in U.S. economic and military aid, the cutoff of some wheat supplies, and the withholding of some $50 million in IMF money—but its disavowal of further action has destroyed the chance of future leverage. Economic pressure is ruled out because of its effect on the population, and a Venezuelan fuel-oil embargo was derailed by Caricom. Abrams describes any form of trade embargo as "exceptionally stupid": "Do we want a war with the people of Haiti? Do we want to wreck the industrial sector? Those factories and that investment which has been building up over the last five years won't come back the day Haiti becomes a democracy." Abrams now favors a policy of increasing foreign investment in the country along with quiet pressure behind the scenes. Constructive engagement, Haitian-style.

All the while, there's been little discussion of the military options, despite the fact that the Haitian army, even with U.S. bolstering, is thought to be incapable of repelling a professional operation. It has never faced an external threat, is deeply divided, and relies on several key figures whose whereabouts are known to U.S. intelligence and whose influence can almost entirely account for the recent disturbances. One would have thought that a discreet military operation designed to detain ringlead-

ers, combined with an international peacekeeping force for the duration of elections, would at least have been considered by this of all administrations. Yet it was dismissed out of hand within hours of Namphy's coup. Abrams argues that even if a force could secure new elections, it would be difficult to leave a fragile civilian regime behind to face the military. "It doesn't take guts—in fact the amount of military risk is minimal. The real question is: Is it in American interests to occupy Haiti for another 20 years?"

Yet there's plenty of evidence that the Namphy regime is sensitive to public pressure from the United States. Abrams's July 9 statement threatening tough sanctions prompted a swift government retreat from its decree taking over the election from the electoral commission. Some tough gesture is certainly overdue now. One independent agency official suggests that a warship patrolling the coast could be enough to convince Namphy that the United States means business. On January 9 the Namphy regime showed that it still cares about world opinion when it made the cosmetic gesture of removing several Duvalierists from the electoral register.

But the administration isn't listening. Last Saturday, in a front-page story in the *New York Times*, State Department officials deliberately played down its chances of having any leverage at all. Now Abrams is all pragmatic resignation. The electoral commission is "a pretty disorganized group" and "a stable democracy in Haiti is difficult to achieve." In other words, when it requires a real effort to achieve democracy in a non-communist, impoverished country, this administration doesn't really give a damn.

ANDREW SULLIVAN

CAMPAIGN '88

YES, MR. PRESIDENT

VICE PRESIDENT George Bush says he was only along for the ride in Iranamok. Yes, he attended White House meetings on the overtures to Iran in 1985 and 1986, and yes, he supported the weapons sale. But no, he wasn't aware at the time that it was arms for hostages, and no, he didn't hear a thing about the diversion of money to the *contras* in Nicaragua. In his autobiography, *Look Forward*, Bush said he had some "misgivings" about the Iran initiative, mainly over the fact that the large role played by Israel meant the administration "had only limited control over how [the policy] was carried out." He expressed his qualms to President Reagan.

If only he'd known of the fierce opposition to the arms sale by Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, then things might have gone differently. "If I'd known that and asked the president to call a meeting of the [National Security Council], he might have seen the project in a different light, as a gamble doomed to fail," he writes. Actually Bush had hints of the Shultz-Weinberger opposition. But in a televised interview with David Frost last December, he said he "never really heard them that clearly." In any case, he didn't pursue the matter, and arms were sold. From Iranamok, Bush draws this lesson: "Don't look for shortcuts and don't try to circumvent the process. Most important of all, follow the rules."

Is Bush's story credible? I think so. It's more than believable. It's indicative of the way Bush has carried out his vice presidency. He sat through meetings and said practically nothing. At one point, he expressed an opinion—his "misgivings"—but this didn't prove to be pivotal in the White House decision-making. By all accounts, including his own, he was a largely passive figure. When the policy was adopted, he supported it faithfully. And when the policy became a scandal, the lesson he learned was predictably Bushian. He rued the day that rules were broken.

Bush is a rules fetishist. He thinks that if you stick to rules and procedures, if you follow the process, all will work out fine. In Bush's scheme, ideas and policies are less important. Fill a conference room with good people and they'll come up with good policies, so long as they abide by the rules. This is nearly the opposite of what Reagan believes. For him ideology is almost everything. Reagan wanted to be president to cut taxes, build up the military, ban abortion, etc. In Bush's closing statement in the Republican presidential debate in Des Moines on January 8, he declared, "I want to be the president because I believe in public service." That's the top rule for Bush—you serve.

When Bush arrived at the White House, he found a transformed vice presidency. Walter Mondale had made the job into something, and he offered Bush five rules for keeping it that way. Bush perked up. The rules were: he should have unfettered access to the president; he should have regular one-on-one meetings with him; he should get all the same paperwork; he should be informed of all the intelligence information that goes to the Oval Office; and he shouldn't get in disagreements with Cabinet members. Bush has followed these diligently, and he's also adopted Mondale's strategy of giving his advice to the president only in private and then keeping what he said confidential. Bush has a regular Thursday lunch with the president. Even the menu stays the same—tortilla chips and salsa, cheese soup or chili, sherbert. He never blabs. Both of Bush's chiefs of staff, Daniel Murphy in the first term and Craig Fuller now, say they've never gotten an inkling of what goes on during the lunches.

On top of Mondale's rules, Bush brought five of his own. The first is that the vice president should never, ever, overshadow the president. Bush is peerless at this. But it sharply limits his role and visibility, and it's made him an uninteresting politician. When Reagan was shot in 1981, Bush was so worried about appearing aggrandizing that he refused to have his helicopter land on the South Lawn of

front-runner status in New Hampshire and nationally.

Another is organization. In New Hampshire, Bush has a chairman for every one of the state's 299 precincts; Dole has less than half that number. Bush has help from Governor John Sununu, an organizational politician. Dole has Senator Warren Rudman backing him, but Rudman's political strength lies in use of the Boston media market rather than organization. Kemp is backed by Senator Gordon Humphrey, but the right wing is split, with evangelicals backing Robertson and the *Manchester Union-Leader* endorsing du Pont. The Bush organization is calling more than 1,000 voters per day, hoping to identify 40,000 to 50,000 favorable voters to turn out on election day.

To counter Bush, the Dole campaign has to hope for a big win in Iowa that will shake Bush's New Hampshire support. A Dole victory in New Hampshire might set a Hart-like tsunami going on Super Tuesday that could sink even a battleship. But, at the moment, the likeliest prospect is for Dole to win Iowa only comfortably and for Bush to win New Hampshire. In the South on Super Tuesday, even Dole's top managers admit, Bush is far ahead. "The Bush lead in the South is so enormous," said campaign manager Bill Brock, "that we've got to come in with a lot of early wins to have some chance. They [Bush backers] view the South as their inviolable structure, their fortress."

INDEED, the South does look as though it belongs to Bush. Late polls show Bush with a 57-12 lead over Dole in Texas, 42-26 in Florida, 43-17 in Georgia, 41-24 in Kentucky, 57-20 in South Carolina, 45-24 in Alabama, 42-20 in Louisiana, 40-19 in Mississippi, and 44-24 in Virginia. According to Brock, Dole's best shots are in Oklahoma, Missouri (where Dole leads 40-25), North Carolina (home state of Dole's wife, Elizabeth), Kentucky, and Tennessee. Almost everywhere Dole is organizationally far behind Bush, who has been cultivating politicians down to the state legislator level for seven years. Dole did not have Brock on board as a full-time campaign manager until late last year, and Brock found that the campaign had no record of its expenditures or even a rundown on Dole's Senate voting record. Position papers on most issues have yet to be released. The campaign was forced to hire workers to collect petitions in Texas. It is in danger of losing Hawaii's caucuses to Robertson. And in New York it was able to file candidates in only 14 of the state's 34 delegate races even though Dole has the backing of Senator Alfonse D'Amato.

Dole tried to bypass political trench warfare with a strategic strike at Bush in January. He raised questions about Bush's leadership ability in hopes of pushing him into some massive gaffe. Bush, however, did not lose his composure, and struck back with questions that led Dole to fire his campaign finance chairman and begin muttering about dirty tricks. Bush also seems to have escaped from the press's pursuit on Iranamok. So the ship stays afloat and all enemies remain at bay. But of course what's happened so far is phony war. The real battles start about now.

MORTON M. KONDRACKE

POSTCARD HAITI

GETTING TO KNOW THE GENERAL

Port-au-Prince

You would not know from Gen. Claude Raymond's cordial welcome that he is one of the most dangerous personalities in Haiti. The general is a handsome, muscular man who looks younger than his 57 years, and whose political vocabulary is salted with standard Third World platitudes about economic development, democracy, and peace. It is only when you press him hard about the Duvalier dictatorship and Haiti's legacy of political violence that cracks begin to show in his polished veneer.

He remains an unrepentant admirer of François ("Papa Doc") Duvalier, whom he served as bodyguard and army commander, and an uninhibited critic of Duvalier's son Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc"), whom he served briefly as defense minister. "Jean-Claudism was not Duvalierism," he declares with disdain. He regrets, but not with particular vigor, the "deplorable ... unjustifiable" violence of last November 29, in which armed gunmen killed at least 34 people who had been lining up outside polling booths to vote in the first free Haitian election in three decades. But he also criticizes the international media for ignoring the alleged massacre of 1,500 voodoo priests by vengeance-seeking mobs after the Duvalier dynasty collapsed two years ago with the ignominious flight of Baby Doc. The general reserves special resentment for the United States and Israel. "Is it worse in Haiti than in Israel now? Did the Americans cut off aid to Israel? Why don't they send teams of observers to Israel? Why don't they cut off aid to Israel?" he rages.

These comments were made in a rare interview with a handful of foreign reporters. Apart from the hostile stares we received from the small army of relatives, retainers, and mean-looking bodyguards, the general, on first impression, appears no more paranoid or sinister than many other Third World military officers. Indeed, he is smoother than most. Nonetheless, it was evident from the moment we approached his family compound near the center of Port-au-Prince that General Raymond's mere proximity inspires terror for many Haitians. As we pulled up outside his gate, George, our intrepid Haitian guide, tried to hide under the dashboard. The Haitian Supreme Court affirmed shortly before the country's much-ridiculed election on January 17 that General Raymond was one of five presidential candidates whose support for the Duvalier dictatorship was so notorious that he had to be disqualified from running as a candidate for president.

But what really makes General Raymond the object of fear in the Haitian capital are the rumors about the role he or his family played in the election day massacre last No-

vember. According to scuttlebutt, which is bolstered by third- and fourth-hand eyewitness reports (the best you can get), some of the armed men who shot up voters and journalists that bloody morning used cars and vans that departed from and returned to the large driveway inside the gates to the general's compound.

The general acknowledges he is the subject of such rumors. He said that an inquiry commission set up by Haiti's military government to investigate the death squad killings had questioned him in early January. He denies any role in the slaughter, but goes on to suggest that the media's concern about it is exaggerated. In an official decree, the government announced that the results of its death squad investigation would be completed by January 15, two days before the recent army-sponsored election. When the appointed hour arrived, no report appeared, and there was no indication that its results will ever be published.

FOR THE foreseeable future, Haitians can probably expect only feeble steps away from the despotism and plunder that have long prevailed in their country's politics. If the atmosphere of the recent elections is anything to go by, the euphoria surrounding the early-morning departure of Baby Doc and his hated bride, Michelle, has been replaced by the sullen mistrust, cynicism, and fear that dominated Haiti at the height of the Duvalier reign.

The bloodshed of November washed away what little hope there was left, and testified to the hold that the ghost of Papa Doc still has over Haitian society. Despite the terms of the new constitution approved overwhelmingly in a referendum last winter, which stipulated that the November election should be run by an independent commission and that Duvalierists should be kept from running as candidates, old habits died hard. Wealthy Haitians told me they thought the electoral council committed a horrible injustice by disqualifying the presidential candidacy of Clovis Desinor, a former Duvalierist finance minister linked to the Tontons Macoute, the infamous Duvalier goon squad. (As it was, he was even excluded from the January elections.)

The Haitian army refused to supply protection for the independent electoral council. Army commanders and Duvalier die-hards convinced themselves that "communists and socialists" on the electoral council—a leftist in their eyes being anyone who did not recognize some good in Papa Doc—were conspiring to rig the November election for one of four leading candidates, a human rights lawyer named Gerard Gourgue. The existence of such a conspiracy—which even the U.S. Embassy scoffs at—is now being used by army leaders to explain, if not excuse, the November slaughter. One particularly sad aspect of the campaign for the January election was the public declarations, by most of the leading presidential candidates, that the November 29 election was indeed rigged by left-wing conspirators.

The rumor mill in Port-au-Prince now says that the army staged its own election on January 17 in the expectation that the $100 million in American military aid, which was cut off after November 29, would be restored if the army made even a feeble gesture toward democracy. But the elections were such a travesty that they may backfire on the Namphy junta. Election safeguards were laughable. Candidates were expected to print—or in most cases photocopy—their own ballots and distribute them to supporters around the country. Officials at polling places were witnessed taking one candidate's ballots out of voters' hands and substituting them with another candidate's ballots. Outside some polling places, the streets were littered with the lemons and limes that voters used to remove the supposedly indelible ink with which their fingers had been marked to stop them from voting twice. Eyewitnesses saw one fellow vote three times. In some polling places, those allowed to vote were obviously under age. Colleagues observed a five-year-old handing her ballot to an official.

The greatest flaw in the army's election, however, was visible from even a brief drive through the capital's streets. Whether the product of fear or support for an election boycott called by opposition leaders, on election day Port-au-Prince—a teeming, steaming anthill on even the holiest of holidays—was deserted of both traffic and pedestrians, except in a few of the worst slums, where residents are too poor to escape to the hills. The only traffic to slow the motorcade of General Namphy as he left the National Palace to cast his ballot around the corner was the cars of photographers and TV crews anxious to get one of the few interesting pictures of the day.

MARK HOSENBALL

Mark Hosenball is a reporter in the Washington bureau of the London *Sunday Times*.

Communism's democratic economics.

MARKETING MARX

READERS OF the daily press over the last nine months might understandably be confused about the significance of reforms occurring under Communist governments around the world. The most startling news comes from Moscow. Here a giant effort to restructure the Soviet economy coincides with a variety of social and political initiatives, including the increased emigration of Soviet Jews, Armenians, and Volga Germans, demonstrations by nationalities demanding greater political rights, and the appearance of films and plays critical of the Stalinist era. Even "socialist legality" has come up for reform, with proposals to eliminate internal exile and to drop "sluggish schizophrenia"—the malady often attributed to dissidents—as a recognized psychological ailment.

In Beijing the political liberalization that came to a halt

THE ELECTION THAT WASN'T

Port-au-Prince, Nov. 29

HAITIAN TELEVISION, like Haitian art, is inventive, surprising, surrealistic—everything you don't expect or want television to be. It will present the hour-long buildup to a major NFL football game, and then, when the game itself is scheduled to begin, switch without explanation to a basketball shootout between two Midwest college mini-powers. Or, in covering a prison where Cuban criminals are holding hostages, Haitian TV may spend 15 minutes showing a CBS commentator in front of the jail joking with his assistants and rearranging floodlights . . . that's it, no more, end of program.

Coverage of Election Day, November 29, the most tragic day in Haitian history, was no exception. At 5:15 P.M., the Provisional President, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, whose troops had joined Tontons Macoutes eight hours earlier in shooting down defenseless Haitians at the capital's polling places, appeared briefly on the government's television channel to explain why the elections had been dissolved. The Electoral Committee (CEP), which had been empowered by Haiti's new constitution to supervise the voting, had failed to maintain "law and order," he said, and had been negotiating with "foreign powers" (unnamed) to "interfere in the internal affairs of the country." (The fact that the CEP had had no weapons with which to maintain "law and order," he didn't mention.)

It was then that Haitian television truly swung into action. All other channels had been blacked out by General Namphy's CNG (the Army junta that has been running Haiti ever since the dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier, was flown to Paris on a U.S. Army jet on February 7, 1986). But it seems that the CNG was not quite ready with a newsreel being prepared to document its charge of CEP treachery. So the station presented "appropriate background music" in the form of Beethoven's Eroica Symphony. But after the second movement, the station was apparently ordered to speed up. Without pause the Scherzo followed, cut to the bone, with the Trio for horns entirely omitted; the long Finale was disposed of—no fugato, no second subject—in four minutes.

At that point the camera cut to an interminable speech by a CNG spokesman addressing a sullen crowd in Petit Goâve, charging that the CEP had prepared ballots there only for the use of "its candidate" (Gérard Gourgue or Sylvie C. Claude, presumably, since they were moderate socialists who could be counted on to reform the armed services). The other two frontrunners, Marc Bazin and Louis Dejoie II, had lived in the United States and were believed to be "pro-American."

Poll Watchers

SITTING IN FRONT of the TV at the luxury Hotel Montana, overlooking the stricken city, was a bevy of foreign TV correspondents, immobilized by gunfire. Each had his tale to tell. The NBC cameramen had witnessed an early-morning attack on a polling place at the Ecole Argentine de Bellegarde, a few blocks from the National Palace. Heavily armed Macoutes, joined by soldiers in vans, had pursued voters from room to room in the school, dismembering with machetes those who tried to escape. The crew from German television had witnessed the same scene at a voting place up the road in Pétionville: soldiers standing by while Macoutes fired into knots of helpless voters. Another reporter had been present when soldiers tossed grenades at the antennae of the Catholic radio station downtown, knocking out its transmitters. The following day Amnesty International reported the murder of the 46 prisoners—said to be unarmed civilian defense patrols for the CEP—that the government had picked up on election day in a sweep of Carrefour Feuille in the capital's southern district.

The CNG had shown its true colors, actually, long before Election Day. It was in June and July that lawlessness became widespread. Cars were stoned in the streets. Supermarkets, emptied by panicking hoarders, were forced to close. In Marigot, a Peace Corps volunteer was raped by a Haitian who had lived in the United States. A French couple on the staff of the French consulate were accosted by bandits in police uniforms and told to drive to their home, where the woman was raped and their valuables were stolen. The government did nothing to apprehend the criminals. In front of the American consulate, a consular official was slashed with a knife as she resisted kidnapping by an assailant who shouted (before the security guards gunned him down) that he had been thrown out of work by the closing of the giant Haitian-owned sugar company (HASCO) the day before. Far to the northwest, in the village of Jean-Rabel, a hundred were killed and uncounted others wounded in a pitched battle with machetes between small landowners and the landless. Again the police/armed forces refused to take sides. For the first time in hitherto hate-free Haiti, anti-American slogans began to appear on walls.

The real trouble began on June 22 when the CNG announced it was taking over control of the elections from the CEP. Crowds began to appear in the streets demanding the overthrow of the junta for violating the new constitution. Catholic priests, urged on by

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the left-leaning Radio Soleil, led the protests, and their action, reinforced by a reported threat from the American Embassy to cut off assistance under AID, obliged the CNG to restore the CEP's prerogatives. But this taste of "people power" only inflamed the protestors, who continued to demand, in a general strike, that the military abdicate. All through July and into early August the street demonstrations continued. Soldiers were instructed to fire over the heads of the rioters, but either because their aim was bad or because they feared for their lives, there were many fatalities. Innocent women and children fleeing for their lives were slain. A presidential candidate, Yves Votel, was gunned down on October 13 with a copy of the constitution in his hand, protesting the disappearance of prisoners of the CNG who were being held at the federal prison next to the Palace.

Scenarios for Anarchy

WHO WERE the instigators of the demonstrations that were bringing Haiti to the edge of anarchy? I heard three answers when I was in Haiti in August. The first, popular among American conservatives but not believed by the Embassy, was the Communist Party. The Party's small size is not necessarily an argument against its effectiveness. But the Haitian Communists are so unpopular among the peasants (small landowners), and even among the unemployed who still hope to be rehired, that this answer is improbable.

A more credible scenario targeted the Roman Catholic priests of the "liberated Left," of whom three are charismatic figures. Bishop Romélus of Jérémie is the most radical but denies that he is anti-American. A second, Père Vincent in the north, is said to have organized the strike in Jean-Rabel against the small landowners. A third is Père Aristide, who barely escaped ambush by the Macoutes near Pont Sondé on August 23. Aristide, like the other two priests, denies that he is pro-Communist or anti-American. Charismatic though they are, none of the three—and this goes for the four leading presidential candidates as well—has any of the nationwide popularity enjoyed by a Gandhi or a Nelson Mandela.

According to the third scenario, the CNG, in alliance with the Macoutes—very few of whom the CNG prosecuted for the crimes they committed under the Duvaliers—stage-managed all the violent confrontations in the capital in order to come up with a dark-horse candidate of its own. Until he publicly avowed his admiration for the two Duvaliers on *60 Minutes*, Clovis Desinor, a minister under Jean-Claude, was that candidate. When the elections were canceled and the CEP abolished on November 29, a discreet Duvalierist, Alphonse Lehans, was given an hour to state his case on the government's television channel. But three weeks before that, the CNG had already signaled its intentions regarding the elections by demolishing the CEP headquarters and burning hundreds of thousands of ballots. Then, on November 26, the army reneged on its agreement to use military helicopters to transport ballots to remote polling places. The CEP countered by renting two helicopters from Miami, but when they arrived at the airport they were seized by the army, which announced that they would not be permitted to fly "for security reasons." All trucks heading for the hinterlands were turned back by heavily armed patrols at Saint-Marc and Léogane.

In August I talked to Ambassador Brunson McKinley about the situation in Haiti. The ambassador, tall, thin, handsomely aristocratic, in a Brooks Brothers suit, had been extremely generous with his time—an hour and a half without one telephone interruption—but I was a little alarmed by his leisurely pace in that heavily guarded Embassy while Haiti was so visibly falling apart a few blocks away. With a tolerant, kindly word for everyone involved in the conflict, from General Namphy to René Théodore, the Communist leader, McKinley gave no evidence of commitment to a meaningful American policy. Why hadn't our government been able to state *publicly* that the $100-million annual aid package, on which the CNG was wholly dependent for non-lethal weapons and budget support, would be withdrawn in the event that election security failed? Was there any contingency foreseen in which American intervention *would* take place? Was Haiti's survival less important to us than tiny Grenada's? Ambassador McKinley fielded these questions—politely, humorously, noncommittally. The election would take place as ordained, he assured us.



"Presidential Candidate," by the Haitian painter Gérard. From the author's collection.

Blame America

ALL BUT humanitarian aid *was* withdrawn, to be sure, the day the elections were annulled, but this was too late to affect the chain of events. A well-known, influential Haitian intellectual—who had visited the United States and should have known better—told us that he and his friends were convinced the CNG's violent action on November 29 was taken on orders from the United States. But he could be forgiven his dark conspiracy theories so long as Charles E. Redman, the State Department's spokesman, was telling Haiti and the world that the American Administration was confident the CNG would now "ensure free and fair elections."

Was such a second election possible? The leading presidential candidates were united in saying no: not unless the CEP is reinstated and security in the streets guaranteed by a multi-national police force. The general strike called for Monday, December 7, accomplished little. The Organization of American States opposed intervention in any form. So did the Communist government in Managua, fearing no doubt to set a precedent for intervention on behalf of embattled freedom-fighters. Ironically, perhaps, only foreign intervention—U.S. protection for a second election—offers Haitians any hope of self-rule. □

The Army Casts Its Vote

Haiti faces Duvalierism without Duvalier

Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy, Haiti's de facto dictator, makes no apologies. Recently he met with a Western envoy. "Mr. Ambassador," Namphy said, strutting around his office, "how many voters do you think there are in Haiti?" The diplomat searched his memory: "About 2.8 million?" Namphy laughed. "You are wrong, Mr. Ambassador. Only one. The Army. Ha ha." The joke was on the United States, which once supported Namphy's transitional government in hope of fostering eventual democratic rule and now suffers his abuse during nightly television tirades. "Namphy and the Duvalierists have told the Reagan administration to go and screw itself," said a congressional aide, himself nearly shot while in Haiti to observe the canceled election last November. "If somebody bloodies your nose that badly, you don't walk away from it."

In a sense the United States already has. Following November's carnage, when soldiers and the paramilitary thugs known as Tonton Macoutes attacked voters and observers at the polling places, killing at least 34 people, Washington cut off more than $100 million in foreign aid. Only essential personnel remain at the embassy in Port-au-Prince. A State Department travel warning has dealt a death blow to the already anemic tourist trade. But the United States has refused Haitian-opposition requests for stronger sanctions, including a trade embargo and withdrawal of diplomatic recognition. Some opposition figures even call for sending a U.S.-led international peacekeeping force to the island. "Western countries, friendly countries, will have to decide how many deaths they can accept," says Leslie Pean, a Haitian-born poet who is now an official of the African Development Foundation in Washington. "Many out there are looking for a *deus ex machina,*" says Richard Holwill, the deputy assistant secretary of state for the Caribbean. "That's not the role of the U.S. government in this situation."

Rigged rerun: When voters go to the polls next Sunday for a military-rigged rerun of last November's vote, they will probably inaugurate an era of Duvalierism without Duvalier. This time the four major opposition candidates and many community groups have called for a boycott; having been shot at for going to the polls, voters may now be forced back to them at gunpoint. During the Duvalier regimes, voters in slums and rural villages were rounded up in trucks and forced to vote. On Sunday, soldiers will be allowed in the polling places, and the vote-counting group has been handpicked by the military, in apparent violation of Haiti's Constitution. Late last week the government dropped 11 Duvalierist candidates, including "Papa Doc" Duvalier's ex-Army chief of staff Claude Raymond and former cabinet minister Clovis Desinor, from the presidential ballot. Many Haitians had feared they would win a rigged vote, after helping to scuttle the first election. Now the military may arrange that a non-Duvalierist civilian be elected as a figurehead.

American economic sanctions have hurt the junta, but not enough to force honest elections. The United States stopped its $62 million in economic and military aid and saw to it that another $50 million in International Monetary Fund aid was cut off. Donations of American wheat worth $30 million were also stopped. Much of this money would have become available immediately—$18 million would have been paid out by Dec. 15, and another $29 million was due by Jan. 15. Among the principal losers is the regime's only large civilian constituency: public employees. The government had to cancel their customary Christmas bonuses of a month's pay and make deep cuts in regular paychecks this month. Six months from now, economists in and out of government agree, Haiti may face economic ruin if the U.S. sanctions continue. The treasury will not have enough dollars to pay for oil imports, and transport may grind to a halt. Even the military may eventually face pay cuts.

Haiti's military rulers are betting that the Reagan administration will restore aid once a civilian president is elected—and before the sanctions have hurt too badly. "Namphy has told people that in two months, the Americans will come back and tell [him] to accept aid," says a Western diplomat in Port-au-Prince. "I wouldn't be surprised if some mantle of legitimacy weren't lowered on this [election] after the fact," says Michael Hooper, executive director of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, who, unlike the U.S. Embassy, had predicted the military's deliberate sabotage of the elections, in a report for the human-rights group Americas Watch. American officials insist they have no intention of appeasing a corrupt regime, although they have also refrained from saying categorically that the United States would not recognize whatever candidate the junta arranges to have elected. Holwill bristles at such suggestions. "We have said we're not going to bestow credibility on an electoral process that is flawed," he says, then hedges a bit: "The ultimate decision is one the Haitian people have to make." Namphy and his allies are not likely to let them make it.

ROD NORDLAND *in Port-au-Prince and Washington*



CAROL HALEBIAN—GAMMA-LIAISON

Revenge: *A Macoute about to be killed last year*



CONSTANT—J.B. PICTURES

He who laughs last? *Namphy at Army Day parade*

A Colonel's Last Stand

Alfonsin and the Army

It only got worse the second time around. Former Lt. Col. Aldo Rico, who led a 1987 rebellion that jolted the government of President Raúl Alfonsín, was once again in the role of military mutineer last week. Holed up in an Army compound with more than 200 other officers and soldiers, he vowed to fight "at any cost" to redeem the honor of Argentina's armed forces. If he thought he would spark a general uprising, he miscalculated badly. Troops surrounded his outpost, fired a few warning shots—and within six hours the rebels surrendered. "Democracy has been consolidated," declared a triumphant Alfonsín. "We have again put our house in order."

Alfonsín had reason to be pleased. When Rico seized an Army infantry school last April, he demanded absolution for hundreds of officers facing human-rights charges from the "dirty war" of the 1970s, during which security forces killed at least 9,000 civilians. The insurrection highlighted long-running animosities between the military and the country's civilian government; young officers objected to prosecution for what they viewed as a legitimate war on left-wing terrorism. They also argued that they were following orders of the military junta that ruled the country at the time.



LE PENNA—SIPA

Confrontation: *Rico (right) and mutineers last year*

The confrontation eased a bit last June when Alfonsín signed legislation sharply limiting the number of officers liable for dirty-war crimes. That provoked widespread civilian protests—but apparently reassured most officers that democracy in Argentina did not mean an erosion of the military's standing in society. Not everyone was convinced, however, and Rico renewed his battle. Claiming that the Army should actually be praised for its handling of the dirty war, Rico turned his fire on Army Chief of Staff Gen. José Dante Caridi—accusing him of "military misconduct and dishonor" in allowing the armed forces to be publicly criticized and, in his view, humiliated.

That may well have been Rico's last stand. Instead of riding a groundswell of support from brother officers, he found himself facing a united and largely hostile Army. Last week's show of military solidarity partially vindicated Alfonsín's decision to limit the dirty-war prosecutions. "That legislation defused some of the junior officers' complaints," said University of Massachusetts historian Robert Potash, an expert on Argentine military affairs. "Whatever its defects, the law [makes it difficult for] officers like Rico to evoke the kind of response they got before."

Rico's defeat won't resolve all the differences dividing the president and the Army. Alfonsín plans a purge of political extremists among middle-rank military officers, according to some reports, and the generals will doubtless try to prevail on the president not to press this housecleaning too far. Having proved their willingness to defend democracy, the top brass will also be able to lobby with renewed vigor on such troublesome issues as higher pay and defense spending. As for Rico, who faces mutiny charges stemming from last year's aborted uprising, he has already spent the first of what will no doubt be many weeks playing the only role now left to him: prisoner.

JACOB YOUNG *with*
JOSEPH CONTRERAS *in Buenos Aires*

They Called an Election, But Nobody Came

Last week's presidential election in Haiti fell somewhere between fraud and farce. The Reagan administration was kinder than most, calling the results "clouded," but it has no immediate intention of resuming aid to the financially strapped government. The four most popular candidates, who sat the election out in hiding or exile, called it a "grotesque charade." For the most part, the Haitian people voted with their feet: they left Port-au-Prince and other towns rather than risk being forced to the polls. Many Haitians who stayed simply laughed at the few who did vote. Thousands were paid for their vote; the going price was $5 a vote, five times the rate during the bad old days of the Duvaliers.

Election officials became so desperate for voters that in many places they encouraged children to cast ballots. Others voted over and over. In the town of St. Marc, northwest of the capital, two truckloads of government workers and a few promilitary party activists cast ballots so often that 50 of them accounted for most of the 800 votes recorded by late afternoon; their biggest problem was cleaning off the indelible ink into which voters were required to dip a fingertip. Even Haiti's deposed dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier, had to laugh. "They ought to have organized it a little more seriously," said "Baby Doc" in a brief conversation when reached by telephone at his exile in Mougins on the French Riviera.

The election had the sole virtue of being peaceful, unlike the one canceled after widespread violence last November. "Something has changed in this country," opposition leaders said in a joint statement after emerging from hiding. "The massive abstention from the electoral masquerade of Jan. 17 has eloquently proven that." The official result was expected to be declared early this week, with Leslie Manigat, a promilitary political scientist with little political base in Haiti, the likely winner. In the end, though, it was not so much a presidential election as a referendum on the legitimacy of the military regime. It lost.

ROD NORDLAND *in Haiti*



MAGGIE STEBER—J.B. PICTURES

Not quite indelible: *At the polls*

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EDITORIALS.

Duarte's Debacle

As José Napoleón Duarte learned to his cost on March 20, you can kiss the Stars and Stripes once too often. In the previous week's breathless rush of indictments (Iran/*contra*), paratroop landings (Honduras) and resignation rumors (Panama), it was actually events in El Salvador, long neglected by Congress and the media, that may have the most significant impact on Central America's future.

Duarte's stunning defeat in the legislative and municipal elections was a long-overdue and richly deserved comeuppance for a man who thought that becoming president was more important than maintaining political integrity. For most of the past decade he has been a pathetic hostage of the armed forces, failing to grasp that he might have secured his political future had he found the courage to attempt the reforms on which his populist reputation was based.

Victory went instead to El Salvador's unreconstructed, if partially camouflaged, extreme right. Roberto d'Aubuisson's Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) was born in 1981 as a creature of Washington, drawing heavily on the model of the U.S. Republican Party. In the seven years since, it has nurtured its own perverse form of anti-Yankee sentiment. Arena's leaders, who won an overall majority in the National Assembly and a near-sweep of local government offices, despise Duarte and distrust his American patrons, with their wall charts and their small-unit tactics and their feasibility studies on nation building. Arena talks of kicking

out the U.S. military advisers and resolving the conflict in its own brutal fashion. Right-wing field commanders invoke the Hiroshima principle: If you have a war on your hands, get it over with quickly.

Inside El Salvador, the change may not be apparent right away; any reforms were dead anyway, the war stalemated, the judicial system a joke, death squad killings on the rise again. But the demise of Duarte and his Christian Democrats will be felt quickly in Washington. El Salvador has been the one area of the Administration's Central America policy where the phrase "bipartisan consensus" was anything more than a fiction, and $3 billion has flowed to keep the war going with scarcely a murmur of dissent. Democrats, having lost the fig leaf of Duarte, will find themselves in a fix of their own making: They must fund a war that no longer makes any pretense of social reform, or watch El Salvador's resilient rebel movement gain further ground. The Administration's game plan is back to square one—or worse, given the amount of political capital that has been expended and the number of options that have been exhausted. El Salvador is a wound that will now reopen because the surgery was botched in the first place.

To pursue the medical metaphor, the Nicaraguan *contras* went into last week's talks in Sapoá with the appearance of a terminally sick patient. They had won no hearts, precious few minds and not an inch of territory. Unlike the Salvadoran guerrillas, who are increasingly self-sufficient in homemade weapons, they appeared unable to survive a cutoff of external support. New injections of military hardware had acted as a temporary stimulus, like the shots of adrenalin pumped into a cardiac arrest victim.

By the time the Sandinista Army launched its March offensive against *contra* bases in the north, the patient was so close to death that it had to be strapped to a new life-support system, in the form of more than 3,000 U.S. troops. Once they were in Honduras, it was hard to see what the 82d Airborne was supposed to do, beyond getting a suntan and heading tamely back to Fort Bragg. It's equally hard to escape the sense that their arrival was less a meaningful piece of strategy than a last despairing throw of the dice.

Despite all the sound and fury, events inside Nicaragua continue to elude the Administration's control. In the hamlet of Sapoá—appropriately the scene of a last-ditch battle by Somoza's National Guard back in 1979—high-level Sandinista and *contra* delegations held their first face-to-face meeting on Nicaraguan soil and emerged with a remarkable cease-fire agreement. The accord followed unprecedented Sandinista concessions and the recognition by the *contras*—even their most recalcitrant leaders, like Adolfo Calero—that they were unlikely to secure better terms in their weakened state. At the same time, a political dialogue resumed between the Sandinistas and fourteen democratic opposition groups.

The relationship between the regional peace process and democratization inside Nicaragua is the subject of an important article by Lucia Annunziata on page 454 of this issue. There is every indication that Nicaragua's plans remain sturdily on track. The strategy of the Reagan Administration, meanwhile, appears to be hopelessly derailed.

COMING UP

Brad Kessler on Organizing the Homeless

Jesse's Movement

"What does Jesse Jackson want?" the Reverend asked a cheering crowd of fans and friends in Detroit. "I want Michigan. I want the nomination. I want to be President!" That's about the only answer Jackson will give the perplexed press, at least until further notice. Nor should he say more. No one asks, What does Mike Dukakis want? or, What did Bruce Babbitt want? Their political demands are assumed to be included in the common vocabulary. But Jackson is perceived as *other*, and therefore obscure. His motives are always in doubt. While regular candidates are audacious, creative and imaginative, he is impudent, untrustworthy and destructive before he even opens his mouth. Indeed, Jackson could read from the Ann Arbor telephone book and the Sunday morning lint-pickers on TV would find danger in every line.

But if you turn the question on its head, so to speak, some still unexamined aspects of Jackson's extraordinary campaign may come clear. What do the 3 million-plus voters (a plurality of the Democratic primary electorate so far) who have made Jackson the front-runner in all but the establishment's eyes want when they cast their ballots for this "unelectable" chimera of a candidate? What is the best they may hope to get?

Begin with the organization of the Jackson campaign. It has much in common with other Democratic efforts as a coalition of disparate constituencies, but it focuses on the coalition rather more seriously than the rest have done. When Jackson comes into a primary state he stands (or demonstrates) with the leaders and activists of labor, minorities, farmers, lesbians and gays, the handicapped, feminists and peace workers and presents their programs as his platform. He made it a point to march in Washington last April with the anti-intervention movement and in October with the gay movement because they represented two institutionalized bases of support. The institutions were important, as well as the individuals in them.

Most Democrats nowadays deny that separate interests even exist within the party's purview. But they are there, and Jackson has built his campaign unapologetically around them. What they have in common is exclusion from power; they are the lower classes in the new language of the modern American political economy. And in that sense, Jackson is running that unspeakable anomaly, that horror of all horrors, a "class campaign."

Picking up on the recognition of exclusion, New York Governor Mario Cuomo and others have been talking for

The Verdict of the People

Four million Chilean voters deal the Pinochet regime a defeat—but will the junta stay in control?



In the face of a humiliating defeat, Gen. Augusto Pinochet reverted to type. Gone were the smiles and business suits with which he had attempted to woo Chilean voters. In their place were the tight jaw and white army uniform that came to symbolize 15 years of thuggish repression. The national flag beside him, the grim-faced Pinochet vowed to "recognize and accept the majority verdict" that had denied him another eight-year presidential term. He thanked the 3 million Chileans who had supported him in last week's plebiscite—and issued a thinly veiled warning to the nearly 4 million who had not. The armed forces "have illuminated these years through their service to the republic," said the 72-year-old general. "They will also be the guide in the construction of the future Chile."

Chileans hardly needed a reminder that the dictator was still in the game. In his first public statement following the plebiscite, Pinochet insisted that he would abide by the terms of Chile's 1980 Constitution, a document he himself helped draft. Under that charter, Pinochet would remain president until March 1990; afterward, he could continue as commander in chief of the Army for the next eight years and serve as a senator for life. For the moment, the Chilean opposition seemed more inclined to savor its immediate triumph than to contemplate the struggle that lies ahead. Learning of the opposition victory, hundreds of thousands of Chileans gathered for a party around Santiago's O'Higgins Park. Chanting and dancing, the crowd was undeterred by the presence of police armed with tear gas and water cannons. "He will fall," the celebrators joyfully told one another. "He will fall."

Even the opposition seemed surprised at the magnitude of its victory. Although deeply divided by ideology, a coalition of 16 political parties mounted a skillful campaign to persuade their once demoralized countrymen to cast a vote of conscience. In the years following Pinochet's brutal 1973 coup against the leftist government of Salvador Allende, public expressions of opposition to the regime were risky. According to human-rights organizations, thousands of dissidents died; at least 660 were "disappeared." An estimated 11,000 went into exile—and to this day there remain at least 429 political prisoners in Chile, many of whom have been tortured. But after 15 years of censorship and nearly total banishment from Chile's state-controlled television, it took the opposition only 27 days to mount a media campaign calling for hope and democracy—and to defeat the well-financed forces of the incumbent president by 12 percent of the vote. That outcome required the government to conduct open, multiparty elections for a new president and Congress by December of next year.



AFP

A thinly veiled warning: *The general concedes*

There was a real possibility, however, that those elections would lead to little more than the outward appearance of democracy. "[Pinochet] is not through," said a Western diplomat in Santiago. "He's too clever and too experienced not to be able to rebound." The general's chief weapon is the 1980 Constitution, which gives the military an effective veto over both the executive and legislative branches of government. As a result, opposition leaders called upon military leaders to open talks on a wide variety of reforms. Among other things, they hoped to push the elections forward to the middle of next year. They also hoped to change a constitutional provision that allows Pinochet, the military-dominated National Security Council and the Supreme Court to handpick eight of the 35 members of the Senate. Their most important goal, however, was to change the cumbersome and time-consuming procedures that make the Constitution close to impossible to amend. "The nation has given the democratic forces a mandate to negotiate a transition to authentic democracy with the armed forces," declared Christian Democratic Party president Patricio Aylwin. "We are convinced," he added unconvincingly, "that the armed forces will respect the sovereign expression of the Chilean people's will."

State within a state: In fact, there was no immediate way to gauge the military's receptiveness to reform. It was no secret to Chileans that the heads of the Navy, Air Force and National Police had never wanted Pinochet as the junta's candidate in the first place. Would the military leaders agree to wholesale changes in a constitution that enshrines them as a state within a state? "We have lost a battle, but not the war," said Gen. Eduardo Ibáñez, governor of the eighth region, in southern Chile. "This is an electoral defeat for the government, but from the military point of view it's no more than a battle." Some political analysts argued that the size of the opposition's victory would make the brass more willing to at least consider the case for reform. "You have to give the defeated a couple of days to recover from the shock," said Ricardo Lagos, a moderate socialist who heads the Party for Democracy (PPD).



STEVEN RUBIN—J.B. PICTURES

'He will fall': *A chanting crowd in Santiago celebrates a surprisingly solid victory*

"Let's talk more seriously about [negotiations] next week." But others, including members of Lagos's own party, doubted whether the regime's current lineup would ever seriously consider reforms. "You cannot change the Constitution with Pinochet as commander in chief of the Army," argued Sergio Bitar, another leader of the PPD. "The only way is for him to resign and thereby give the armed forces some autonomy."

It was also uncertain who would speak for the opposition. One possibility was the 50-year-old Lagos, who emerged as the de facto leader of the Chilean left in the months leading up to the plebiscite. However, in the interests of promoting opposition unity, Lagos is expected to forgo a presidential bid of his own. Instead, the most viable opposition candidate may come from the ranks of the Christian Democrats—a party that has failed to produce any single charismatic leader.

Divisive issues: According to some analysts, the real question was whether the opposition would be able to hang together at all. Prior to the plebiscite, the 16 opposition parties were unable to agree on much of anything beyond the need to unseat Pinochet. Now opposition leaders could come to loggerheads over how much to demand from the generals and how aggressively to press their demands. Among the potentially most divisive issues were whether to prosecute human-rights abusers and the question of recognizing the outlawed Communist Party. By the time of the elections, some Chileans feared, the opposition could split into two competing camps: a centrist group revolving around the Christian Democrats and an alliance of left-wing parties, perhaps including the communists.



MARCO UGARTE—AFP

'A mandate': *Lagos and Aylwin embrace*

That, in turn, could increase the chances that a military-backed candidate could campaign successfully as the standard-bearer of the Chilean right. Pinochet won 43 percent of the vote in last week's plebiscite; a right-wing candidate without his record of repression might well gain a plurality—or even a majority—if the opposition is split. Some analysts even speculated that Pinochet might resign briefly from office in order to run for the presidency again. But it was equally possible, opposition leaders warned, that the general would pounce on any future turmoil as a pretext for canceling the elections and remaining as president for life. It was not enough for opposition leaders to caution their followers against violence in the streets. Pinochet was fully capable of manufacturing some turmoil himself.

Certainly, the repudiated government showed little sign of magnanimity in defeat. In isolated incidents, government riot police fired buckshot into celebrating crowds. When hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside Santiago's Moneda Palace to clamor for Pinochet's immediate resignation, police water cannons drenched them with a burning chemical spray. Apparently under orders from their superiors, the security forces paid particular attention to the international press. At least 10 journalists were injured Friday when truncheon-bearing riot cops charged their position behind police barricades near the presidential palace. Among the victims was free-lance photographer Christopher Morris, who suffered head wounds and a broken nose while covering the demonstrations for NEWSWEEK.

Firecrackers and horns: Even those incidents could not quell the sudden sense of liberation that many Chileans experienced last week. Children set off firecrackers in the Santiago slum of La Victoria; others celebrated the opposition victory by tooting plastic horns. "These political developments are unstoppable," insisted Bitar of the PPD. "There are political and social momentums that cannot be altered, and the pressures will mount greatly on [Pinochet] to go." It was unlikely that the festival atmosphere would last for long; the reality of repression was far too near. Still, Chileans deserved their moment of celebration. They were closer to real democracy than they had come in 15 years.

HARRY ANDERSON *with* JOSEPH CONTRERAS *in Santiago*

"communist." But although the group's leader, Paul Weyrich, announced that it would find Quayle "difficult to support" because of his behavior, it nonetheless helped his field organization when Quayle ran for the Senate in 1980.

In his hotly contested 1980 Senate bid, Quayle was bitterly, and somewhat unfairly, denounced by then-incumbent Birch Bayh as a pawn of the "Ku Klux Klan, the John Birchers, the New Right, and unscrupulous special-interest groups." There unquestionably were New Rightists and Birchers actively working for Quayle. But Quayle in the heat of battle appeared to bite some of the hands that were feeding him. He denounced NCPAC for its negative ad campaign against Bayh. (One right-wing group whose support Quayle didn't disown was Gun Owners of America. In a pre-election interview with *Gun Week*, he talked about his love of firearms and said, "I used to hunt a lot of dove and quail.") After his victory, Quayle chose a bizarre forum to reaffirm his criticism of NCPAC—a full-scale interview with the *Spotlight*, the weekly tabloid of the anti-Semitic Liberty Lobby. Quayle later told the *Washington Post* he did not know what the Liberty Lobby "stood for."

Noteworthy during Quayle's 1980 campaign was the behavior of his family newspapers, which by then had largely outlived Eugene Pulliam's reputation for bias. Although the news coverage of Bayh and Quayle was largely balanced, the *Indianapolis Star* became so enthusiastic in its editorial support of its late owner's descendant that it had to publish a prominent retraction after Bayh complained of inaccuracies. Particularly strident was the *Huntington Herald-Press*, Quayle's father's paper, which accused the incumbent senator of "Bayhing votes" by doing backstairs deals with Jimmy Carter for pork-barrel projects.

It is only fair to note that when Quayle was nominated for the vice presidency and faced a media "feeding frenzy" over his academic and military record, Pulliam's Indianapolis papers were among the first media outlets to track down the story of his National Guard recruitment. Old habits may die hard, but sometimes they die.

Nonetheless, family connections may have helped to shield him from additional obloquy: when the press started demanding information about Quayle's law school performance, Indiana University Law School put forward as its spokesman Associate Dean Kent Frandsen, who not only served as a judge in Lebanon, Indiana, where Quayle's family owns the local paper, but also was the man who married Quayle and his wife, Marilyn. The law school has resolutely refused to release Quayle's records. Quayle has also developed his own strong political instincts. When an Indiana National Guard general named Alfred Ahner retired in 1986, Senator Quayle inserted a tribute in the congressional record praising Ahner's "conscientious service and hard work." When the controversy over Quayle's guard enlistment surfaced a few weeks ago, it was Ahner who stepped forward to recall that there were several guard vacancies available when Quayle was recommended to him.

Gene Pulliam would probably have been proud of what his grandson has made of his inheritance of publishing, political, and personal influence. And the old man's bequest to the American right will achieve its apotheosis if Dan Quayle, a child of that movement, is elected to the vice presidency next month.

How Pinochet lost the plebiscite.

THE GENERAL'S ELECTION

BY ARTURO CRUZ JR.

WITH THE deposition by plebiscite of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the history of Chile has come full circle, returning the country to the path of stability and prosperity that once set it apart from its neighbors. Chile had begun its days as a remote province under Spanish rule, the distant frontier of a vast overseas empire. Its lands boasted of no attractions other than natural beauty: deserts in the north, snowcapped mountains in the south, and along its narrow extension, north to south, the peaks of the highest Andes on one side, and the limitless Pacific on the other. The most salient fact about the country was what it lacked—the most important thing of all to Spaniards, gold.

Colonial Chile was as a result a rather boring place. When Lima, the center of Spain's South American empire, was a glittering metropolis, Santiago was little more than a large village, lacking adornments beyond a simple plaza, dominated by the Cathedral and the magnificent Palacio de la Moneda. Yet in this very place something of a miracle occurred. After the wars of independence (1810-26), the new Spanish-American republics collapsed into internal disorder from which Chile was the very first to emerge. In 1833 the Chileans had a constitution, and in order to avoid anarchy, its leading public figures—all gentlemen-aristocrats—accepted a strong president, something akin to a constitutional monarch.

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In those days Latin Americans prized order above all other values, and Chile was regarded as a "serious country"—a real nation-state, with responsible governors, where everything was done in accordance with its national motto (which still appears on its Great Seal), "by reason or by force." Decades of order brought material progress, and the leading European historians of the day did not hesitate to place Chile in the category of a "temperate" (that is, non-tropical) republic. After some years of independent life, the contrast between Chile and Peru was striking: the terms of the colonial period were utterly reversed. Lima fell upon hard times—the victim of budgetary collapse—and in 1875 the government found it necessary to suspend payments on the foreign debt. For their part, the Chileans were so certain of their democratic future that one of their leading personalities was led to predict that "Chile has left behind it, once and for all time, states of siege, dissolutions of the Congress, press censorship, *coups de main*."

TOWARD THE END of the century, Chile began to attract European immigrants. Investors, bankers, businessmen came first; their poor compatriots followed. Both converged to produce a powerful mining oligarchy, which in turn provoked the creation of a strong trade union movement. Chileans pleased themselves to think of their nation as one more member of the European family; its principal cities even began to identify with London or Paris. The port of Valparaiso—a city of hills joined together by a network of cable cars—had a financial center with the same imposing architecture as the City of London. Santiago was beginning to acquire the look of Paris in miniature, with solid universities, elegant clubs, first-rate newspapers, beautiful museums and parks, a theater that received the best artists and touring companies of Europe, an imposing Congress building, and a National Library with reading rooms packed with avid students and scholars.

To the Latin imagination, Chile offered everything. It even could boast of its own arguments with the huge and distant republic of the north. As far as Chile was concerned, there were no important differences in power between it and the United States, and on one occasion the two countries were close to war. Chile also possessed its great personalities, individuals who attracted followers throughout the region. There was Diego Portales, the creator of the Constitution of 1833, a conservative who imposed upon the country a strong executive and an economic system inspired by notions of free trade. And there were others who evoke particular resonance in the present day—particularly Balmaceda, the president who wanted to nationalize the nitrate mines, and in so doing was forced to confront the British companies and his own social class. After Balmaceda there were no more strong presidents; the Congress, with the aid of the navy, seized and held the reins of power (1891). Balmaceda departed with a bloody flourish—committing suicide in the Argentine Legation in Santiago, where he had taken asylum on the final day of his presidential term.

The nitrate boom had enabled the Chilean elites to consolidate an orderly, prosperous society. But nitrate ceased to be important after the Germans invented a synthetic substitute during World War I; after that, the oligarchy began its slow decline, and with mass education, a new middle class stepped forward to challenge it. The Chilean middle class made the state its instrument—the great educator, the great protector of the weak, the omnipotent economic planner. With the passing of years, new names began to appear in the political chronicles, as well as new political parties. Principal among these was Christian Democracy, which fought to control the huge populist center of Chilean politics but was forced to coexist with a small universe of rivals, among which figured a tough and venerable Communist Party. The electorate became increasingly representative: in 1874 only two percent of the population could vote; in 1970 the minimum age of civic participation was lowered to 18 years, and illiterates were admitted to the franchise.

With the enlargement of the state, the middle class itself grew in size. And Chile continued to be a place of attraction for other Latin Americans, its cities preserving touches of refinement evocative of a bygone age, and its political class known for its tolerance and sophistication; its armed forces for their rigorous respect for civilian supremacy; and its universities for their devotion to learning. By the early 1960s, Christian Democracy under President Eduardo Frei (1964-70) was implementing land reform, with the aid of the Alliance for Progress.

BY THEN Santiago had become the intellectual center of a new Latin American economics and sociology, the seat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. Among other things, this institution popularized the notion that the road to the future in Latin America lay in manufacturing, in the internal market, in import substitution. This dovetailed with another idea, equally pervasive, that Latin American countries suffered from inequitable terms of international trade. For the Chilean middle class, the lesson was clear: there was no further place in their society for a laissez-faire economy. The job of the state was to intervene and to spend, to protect burgeoning industries, and to do so by increasing internal demand, by forcing redistribution of income, if necessary. Agrarian reform fit very nicely into this scheme: it was the rural version of resource-transfer, reinforcing the urban trend toward the creation of a larger domestic market.

State expenditures went through the ceiling. And in spite of the heavy weight of theory, Chile persisted in being a mining country, with most production destined for export. Copper substituted for nitrates, the American corporations replaced their English predecessors. At the end of the 1960s, copper still represented more than 80 percent of the country's exports. As Allende used to say, it was "the wage of Chile," of a Chile overwhelmed by new demands, without the economic assistance of the Kennedy years, and without a productive apparatus capable of sustaining the expectations of a middle-class society.

In the 1960s the younger generation of the middle class

began to talk for the first time of radical changes. What Chile needed, they argued, was to be rescued from capitalism and dependency. The Chilean left, meanwhile, had shed its coat and tie, and the Communist Party felt pressed to abandon its former role as a "responsible party," to escape from the trap of Chilean legality. The new revolution came in olive green, adorned with Fidel's romantic rhetoric, and the cult of Che Guevara. In the city of Concepción, some 300 miles south of Santiago, a new revolutionary political force was born, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (known by its Spanish initials, MIR). The MIR was a revolutionary alternative to the "electoral" left, a challenge that eventually compelled the radicalization of the MAPU, the Christian Democratic youth organization, by way of response.

IN SPITE OF many latent divisions, in 1970 the Chilean left managed to achieve a measure of unity, coming together to support Salvador Allende, the perennial presidential candidate of the Socialist party, in a broad front known as Popular Unity. The election was a close one; the candidate of the right, former President Jorge Alessandri, came within several thousand votes of victory. No candidate received a majority, which required the Chilean Congress to choose between the two leading contenders. With Christian Democratic support, Allende finally gained the prize. The outcome was rich in irony: though he called himself "Comrade President," Allende himself was a physician with decidedly luxurious tastes.

Allende's economists believed that the way to stimulate the economy was to declare across-the-board salary increases. For a year this worked very well indeed—millions of new pesos were pumped into the economy, and the country quickly consumed every article in its inventory. A new Popular Unity slogan was coined: "With Allende the stew-pots are full." In the midst of the party, to near-universal acclaim, the last American holdings in copper were expropriated. But while Chileans satisfied themselves in an orgy of consumption, political uncertainty began to undermine their productive forces. The young militants of the left, for whom Chilean legality never meant very much, and who placed little faith in a transition to democratic socialism, took to the streets. Their idea was to destroy the bourgeois state and create "alternative organs of people's power," confronting Allende with a fait accompli that both he and his opponents would have no choice but to respect.

But they needed a truly revolutionary act. They needed to cross their swords with the right, with reaction. For this, they needed Fidel. On the first anniversary of the new government, the gray-eyed man of radical destiny, the king of revolutionaries, arrived on a highly unconventional state visit. Allende awaited his old friend at the Pudahuel Airport, dressed in a dark business suit, accompanied by cadets from the Chilean Air Force Academy. According to the official daily *La Nación* (November 11, 1970), a million people—one-quarter of the population of the capital—went out into the streets to receive him.

Fidel stayed in Chile for 23 days. There is even a photograph of him receiving military honors with Pinochet—then commander of the Santiago military district—marching by his side. He danced with Cabinet officers, played basketball, explored fishing boats in the south, met with copper miners, and spoke, on more than 100 occasions, with students.

But by the end of his stay, the caudillo of the tropics had worn out his official welcome, so much so that Allende was unable to find time in his schedule to see him off at the airport. Not to be outdone, Fidel used his farewell speech at the National Stadium to inveigh against the "Chilean path" to socialism, and warned Allende that socialism could never be attained within the framework of bourgeois legality; other means would have to be found to achieve power; reaction had to be destroyed before one fell victim to it. (Words that, as Americans say, turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.)

Fidel had hardly left before housewives in the affluent northern district of Santiago began an unusual political demonstration—"the march of the empty pots." It was easy for the government to dismiss the "class consciousness" of the well-to-do; but the truth was that the party was over, and inflation had returned with renewed force. The march and its subsequent manifestations—a simple beating on empty pots with wooden spoons at a jointly agreed upon hour each night—then recruited women from less exalted social classes. At the same time, the miners and truck drivers went out on strike, and Chilean society was polarized, divided vertically rather than horizontally. No doubt the CIA was involved in the matter, but not to the point of being able to manufacture what was, after all, a genuine popular protest. In fact, ever since Fidel's departure the air had been thick with talk of a military coup, and Allende warned potentially disloyal officers that they would have to walk over the bodies of a million Chileans. If necessary, he said, people would take to the streets, seize bridges, public buildings, other strong points, and turn the *poblaciones* into provisional military headquarters.

AS THE NATION moved inexorably toward the coup, nobody was quite certain what Allende thought about things. Some held that his only ambition was to surrender the presidential sash to a popularly elected successor, to maintain the country's well-deserved reputation for constitutional legality. But for others, Allende ended up being something of a schizophrenic, with divided loyalties. There was Allende of the years of opposition, who had never thought to impose socialism outside the framework of Chilean legality; but there was also Allende of the years of power, surrounded by the MIR, the MAPU, as well as close relatives, nephews and nieces, daughters, sisters, who all echoed the line of the extreme left.

The coup itself took place on September 11, 1973. The first to raise the banner of revolt was the fleet off Valparaiso, and by 6:30 a.m. all of the units of the armed forces were ready to act. At 8:30 the communiqué of the service chiefs was read on the radio; the Carabineros nor-

mally assigned to the Presidential Guard withdrew from the Moneda Palace, and at 11:15 a.m. Hawker-Hunter jets began to bomb the building—the lowest point on the skyline of downtown Santiago—with British precision. By 11:30 a.m. the coup had been consummated. Allende was dead; like Balmaceda, he chose suicide as the way out of an impossible situation. Not a peep was heard from the *poblaciones*. They say that Allende never realized that Pinochet had actually turned against him; at one point, the story goes, the president is supposed to have sighed, "Poor Augusto, I suppose by now he's dead."

The Chilean armed forces expected the world to applaud the coup. After all, they had just saved Chile from communism, and what was more, they could argue that they did so with the support of the majority of the population. But by midmorning on September 11, the military coup had become something of an idée fixe for both East and West. Costa-Gavras could not have asked for a more ideal coup—this one had everything: the end of democracy, the death of socialism in freedom, the involvement of the CIA, the barbarism of the military caste, the romantic end of "Comrade President." And it provided the justification for future revolutionary militarism, largely because of the horrible vengeance that the Chilean army visited upon a helpless people—a preventive cure that, for being delayed so long, was all the more ghastly. In the first three years after the coup, more than 4,000 Popular Unity militants were killed; thousands more went into exile, each bearing his or her own tragic tale.

THE MILITARY set about reconstructing the political order along radically different lines. For the generals and admirals, there could be no return to the past, to the sloppy, undisciplined ways of "irresponsible democracy," to the vices of the old political class. But while Pinochet kept all political power in his hands, he placed the day-to-day operations of the country in the hands of a liberal technocracy. The general's economists opened wide the doors of the Chilean economy. The economic slogan of the future became privatization, and the country sought prosperity by augmenting its exports, by reordering its economy toward the outside world. Inflation, which had exceeded 352 percent in 1973, dropped to an annual rate of 31 percent; exports grew rapidly, and went from nearly $1.8 billion in 1973 to an annual average of $4.7 billion between 1977 and 1981. Savings and investment also increased; the state streamlined its administrative apparatus; and miracle of miracles, modern Chile discovered for the first time the virtues of fiscal discipline.

But in the boom of 1977-81 Chile also discovered the social costs of a new economic model; unemployment went from seven percent in 1973 to an average of 11 percent throughout the rest of the decade. The unions lost the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike became more honorific than real. If it is true, then, that between 1977 and 1981 the economy grew nearly eight percent a year, so too did the foreign debt—from $4 billion in 1973 to an astounding $17.4 billion in 1982. The middle class went on an unprecedented binge of consumption, and members of the business class—large and small—gorged themselves on apparently limitless credit. Not surprisingly, in 1980 the general won his second plebiscite (the first was merely an exercise in 1978 to protest United Nations "interference in the internal affairs of Chile") with a thumping 67 percent of the vote.

A YEAR LATER came the deluge. It began with a precipitous drop in the price of copper, followed by an investment crisis, a drop in exports, and the bankruptcy of many companies that had borrowed too heavily. Real salaries traced an even sharper line of decline, and 30 percent of the labor force found itself out of work. Unemployment revived the tradition of political protest, and once again the empty pots were heard every night in every city in Chile, even in the most elegant suburbs.

With the economic crisis and the sudden return of "social mobilization," the journalists reappeared. The hotel lobbies in Santiago began to fill up with foreign faces, and for a few weeks and even months, the country was thrown into a permanent crisis, with the fall of Pinochet expected nearly hourly. In the shantytowns, communal soup kitchens were organized once again; the Church began to lift its voice in protest; and in Santiago, Valparaiso, and Concepción, the *cabros*—the kids of the left—declared war. They took to the streets, and at night built bonfires and erected barricades. The most youthful cadres of the Communist Party began to insist on the primacy of armed struggle: they emphasized the peculiar characteristics of military dictatorship, the growing mood of popular protest.

The moment of armed struggle finally arrived in 1983, in the midst of a huge blackout in Santiago, an event that signaled the spectacular debut of the Manuel Rodriguez Front. At long last the Chilean Communist Party—the oldest in Latin America, and the party most addicted to legality—acquired a military wing. From the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua the Frentistas acquired two crucial lessons—the importance of spectacular *coups de main*, capable of capturing the popular imagination; and the notion that in Latin America the most revolutionary force is not the working class, much less the peasantry, but the huge reserve army of unemployed young people who lurk around street corners in the large cities, kids who have never had a job and who—all things remaining as they are—probably never will.

With the economic crisis, the protests multiplied and became more violent. Pinochet sent the army to patrol the streets. One day in 1986 his soldiers grabbed a couple of kids, doused them in gasoline, and set them on fire. The boy died; his companion, a young woman, survived, horribly mutilated. By that time the United States had a new ambassador in Chile, and in a highly unusual gesture, at least for a diplomat, he attended the funeral of the deceased. But about that time, things began to calm down. Fear overtook the Chilean middle class; street protests tended to remind them, as much as anything else, of the days of Popular Unity. It ceased to participate, and by the

end of the year the economy began to recover.

Not only did Pinochet survive the crisis, he took it as an opportunity to strengthen his command. Private banks were regulated directly by the state, new credits extended to an entire business class already deep in hock to foreign lenders. Businesses like *El Mercurio*—the flagship daily of Santiago—suddenly owed huge sums to the state, and were compelled every 30 days to renegotiate the conditions of their loans.

The crisis having passed, nobody now made fun of Pinochet, even though he was hardly Hollywood's idea of a military dictator. His voice was high-pitched and mouse-like; his oratorical style rambling, confused, sometimes downright undignified. Nonetheless, for better or worse, he embodied Chilean institutionality, and life without him became unthinkable for many. He had made the army, his army, the successor to the Chilean political class; he had intimidated the middle class; and he had forced the business community forever into his debt. What the outside world thought of all this did not concern him. He sought to build a Chile that could not work without him. From the first day he held the reins of power, the choice he left Chileans was simple: "Me, or chaos."

EVEN IN the most difficult of moments, Pinochet never betrayed any doubts about his mission, and certainly he never wavered in his economic policies. By the end of 1986, the gross national product had grown by six percent, investment began to recuperate, and exports were growing once again. In 1987 Chilean exports by value exceeded $5 billion, with copper representing only 41 percent of the total. In a certain way Chile has returned to its agricultural origins, exporting fruit, wood, and fish, particularly salmon; in 1988 it is expected that Chilean exports will reach $6.5 billion. Chile is also one of the few countries in Latin America capable of attracting foreign investment—not just from traditional sources such as the United States and France, but from New Zealand, Austria, Japan, South Africa. Inflation never exceeds 25 percent a year—something of a miracle in that part of the world. A fiscal deficit hardly exists. Chile also services its foreign debt with rigorous regularity—the only country in the region to do so. In fact, the contrast between the Chilean economy and that of struggling neighbors such as Peru, Argentina, and Paraguay is enormous.

Nonetheless, Pinochet's economic model does not lack for eloquent and telling critics. It is not, after all, merely a model implanted by a dictator, but represents the triumph of laissez-faire economics, the most pernicious anathema of present-day Latin American economic orthodoxy. What difference, ask these critics, does macroeconomic growth make if its benefits do not trickle down to the humble sectors of society? The question is apt, and deserves an answer, but an answer that cannot be found in neighboring republics. There is Mexico, for example, whose people have passed through the cruelest of austerity plans, but whose "revolutionary" class has nothing to show for so much sacrifice except a huge foreign debt and corruption that reaches the stratosphere. And what are we to say of the Cubans, after 30 years of subsidy from the Soviets, and revolutionary discipline to boot?

IN THE final analysis, the great challenge of Latin American economies is how to generate economic growth on the basis of internal saving, while simultaneously increasing social consumption. But there is another challenge, greater still, which is to achieve these goals within the framework of democracy and order. As the Chilean historian Gonzalo Vial has written, Chile must find its way toward harmonious development; the irony is that today the country, with all its economic solidity, is politically underdeveloped. Who could have imagined that the Chile of yesterday—the Chile of Portales, of the "temperate republic"—would become a personalist dictatorship, in thrall to caudillos who would feel perfectly at home in the tropical climes of the Caribbean?

From time to time, however, even caudillos must turn to the people for some form of consent. For this, they turn to the plebiscite, the preferred tool of tyrants and gray-eyed men of destiny. A Pinochet, after all, could not submit to the indignity of the ballot box, the indignity of standing among mere politicians. The caudillo walks alone, shares power with nobody. To Pinochet, it was of no consequence that the hopelessly fragmented opposition, divided on everything except rejection of his rule, could use the "No" as their battle cry for unity.

Pinochet played on the fears and anxieties of a Chile without his presence. Whenever the government allowed a Communist Party leader to return from exile, spouting revolutionary fervor, Pinochet himself was the first to celebrate, waving the bloody shirt of the past. By his reckoning, the great elector, that enormous "center" of Chilean politics, would remember the chaos that ruled during the years of Popular Unity.

But the general got the numbers wrong. He had understood, perfectly, the big picture but overlooked the fact that a "No" vote might simply mean that the time was ripe for *him* to leave the Palacio de la Moneda.

The great irony is that Pinochet had himself designed the formula for a perfect transition, a formula that had eluded the Chileans themselves for 15 years: the general's removal from power within a stable context, change without chaos. The Chilean middle class could vote "No" confident that it did not mean a return to chaos—after all, the armed forces themselves, "*el gran árbitro*," would be the underwriter of an orderly transition to democracy.

On October 5 nearly 95 percent of the seven-and-a-half million Chileans registered to vote did so in an orderly fashion. Over 53 percent voted "No." Many observers were dismayed that after the wear and tear of 15 years in the saddle, Pinochet could still garner over 44 percent of the vote. But even more amazing was that the caudillo, the man who had seized power in what proved to be the bloodiest of coups, now seemed disposed to let the reins be plucked from his iron fists, bowing to the superior force of Chile's history of democracy and public order. □

THE NEW REPUBLIC
OCTOBER 31, 1988

TWO CHEERS FOR CHILE

The Kirkpatrick Doctrine, set forth by Jeane Kirkpatrick in her famous 1979 *Commentary* article "Dictatorships and Double Standards," always had two possible interpretations to guide American policy. The Reagan administration has pursued both—one to its shame, the other to its considerable credit. The basic doctrine is that authoritarian dictatorships of the right are preferable to totalitarian dictatorships of the left, both for American interests and for the welfare of their own populations. One of its two possible corollaries is that the United States should support right-wing dictatorships—or, at least, not try to destabilize them, as Kirkpatrick accused Jimmy Carter of doing—because their collapse could lead to Communist takeovers, as in Nicaragua.

The other corollary is that, since right-wing dictatorships are susceptible to democratic reform in a way that Communist dictatorships are not, the United States should pressure them to change incrementally and thereby head off a possible Communist revolution. Kirkpatrick claims that this was always what she meant when she wrote her article, but Interpretation No. 1 clearly captivated the early Reagan administration, which turned a blind eye to death squads in El Salvador and military repression in Guatemala, employed agents of the brutal Argentine junta to train the Nicaraguan *contras*, and sought to repair U.S. relations with dictators such as Pinochet in Chile and Marcos in the Philippines. (This last was accomplished either by ending public criticism or by rewarding small human rights improvements with lavish praise, such as George Bush's celebrated remark to Marcos in 1981, "We love your adherence to democratic principles and democratic processes.")

In the case of Chile, the Reagan administration initially reversed the Carter policy of publicly criticizing Pinochet for torturing political prisoners and restricting liberty. It also stopped voting against Chilean applications for World Bank loans. Reagan sent as his first ambassador a political appointee, the late James Theberge, who carried out a policy of quiet diplomacy—very quiet diplomacy—that failed to move Pinochet toward reform any more than had Carter's policy of loud sanctions.

The Reagan policy toward Chile changed substantially, though, beginning in 1985. This was part of a general shift from Kirkpatrick Corollary No. 1 to Kirkpatrick Corollary No. 2 as the guide for American policy in several parts of the world. Some of the credit goes to Congress, which made it clear that it would not provide military aid to El Salvador unless the government stopped death squad killings. Part of the credit goes to countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, which independently ousted military regimes, established civilian governments, and demonstrated to the Reagan administration that democracy could be a viable alternative to both right-wing and left-wing dictatorship. By the end of Reagan's first term, democracy seemed to be the wave of the future in the Western Hemisphere, and the Reaganites, hoping to claim some responsibility, looked for ways to sustain it.

The example of the Philippines reinforced their hopes. A group of Reagan administration officials, mainly in the State Department, realized early on that the longer Marcos remained in power, the more likely the Philippines was to go Communist, with the resultant loss of strategic U.S. bases. The stunning success of "people power" seemed to validate the approach of these democratic activists in the administration. Their number included—hard to believe as it may be for critics of his Central America policies—Elliott Abrams. Some Chilean democrats think, in fact, that they are the beneficiaries of attempts by Abrams and Secretary of State George Shultz to balance a policy on Nicaragua that arouses criticism all over the world with a policy toward the notorious Pinochet that attracts the world's praise.

However that may be, since 1985 the administration has pursued a praiseworthy policy. That year it sent a new ambassador to Santiago—career diplomat Harry Barnes—who immediately set about identifying with Pinochet's democratic opposition. Christian Democrats and moderate Socialists, previously shunned, got high-level attention when they visited Washington. In early 1986 the United States sponsored a resolution at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights denouncing Chilean human rights abuses. When then-White House chief of staff Donald Regan was asked on television whether the United States was trying to destabilize the Pinochet regime, he answered that no such effort was under way "at the moment."

In 1986 and 1987 the United States abstained when Chilean applications for World Bank loans came up for approval, and got other nations to do the same, as a sign of displeasure with Pinochet's human rights abuses. Reagan critics in Congress and elsewhere asserted that the United States should have voted "No." Administration officials claimed that the United States could not have blocked the loans anyway and would have looked weak trying, and that Chile was practicing an exemplary economic policy that the United States did not want to disrupt.

In any event, Santiago clearly considered the Reagan administration an adversary. Pinochet supporters, especially Adm. Jose Toribio Merino, repeatedly denounced "foreign intervention" whenever the administration issued a human rights criticism. In three years Pinochet has refused to receive Barnes more than a handful of times. "Barnes is not the most grata of personae," an opposition leader said recently. "He is the best ambassador the United States could have sent." After Communist guerrillas attempted to assassinate Pinochet in September 1986, the general suggested in a newspaper interview that the CIA might have played a role in the attempt. When Congress voted $1 million in aid to help democratic groups organize for Pinochet's plebiscite this month, the government denounced them as hirelings of the United States.

It is partly Pinochet's own fault, and mostly due to the moderation and energy of Chile's democrats, that he was defeated by a margin of 55 percent to 43 percent. In an act of supreme hubris, he had called the vote, believing that the people would keep him in power as thanks for his establishing stability and suppressing communism. Instead, the country voted "No," in keeping with democratic traditions interrupted when the army overthrew Salvador Allende in 1973. Contrary to leftist myth, the United States did not engineer that coup, though it certainly did finance opposition to Allende's Marxist regime.

This year the United States again had a hand in aiding the opposition—but this time, in an open manner, through the National Endowment for Democracy, and in public warnings on the eve of the plebiscite that there should be no interference with the vote. American sources say Pinochet supporters in the army and the intelligence service were tempted to prevent Pinochet's defeat but that the air force, navy, and National Police objected.

The vote does not ensure democracy in Chile. The Chilean constitution guarantees that Pinochet can stay in power until March 1990, and that he can remain as commander in chief of the armed forces and a member of the all-powerful National Security Council until 1994. Opposition forces naturally want constitutional change; the moderates will settle for it after elections scheduled for next year, whereas left-wing parties want it sooner. The role for the United States is not to interfere, but to urge that the next phase of elections takes place and that all parties be willing to negotiate peaceably. There is a good chance that this right-wing dictatorship will change into a democracy, and the United States—after a bad start—can take credit for helping the process along.

NOTEBOOK

□ TNR FALL FASHION GUIDE (HARD-TO-PLEASE DEPT.):
"Dukakis has a long way to go in making voters feel comfortable with him. For the life of me, I don't understand why he wears those forbidding dark suits with coat buttoned . . ." —TNR, September 26
"First . . . he dressed up like GI Joe. . . . Two days later . . . he donned crisp khaki pants, suede outdoorsy jacket, and unscuffed Timberland boots. . . . Why did Dukakis look so silly?" —TNR, October 10
(thanks to Jeffrey Segall, Santa Barbara, California)

□ CARDS ON THE TABLE: When Bush calls Dukakis "a card carrying member" of the ACLU, is this a malicious allusion to Joe McCarthy's "card carrying Communists"? Or is it fair game—as Republicans maintain—since Dukakis himself used the phrase during the Democratic primary campaign? We think the slur is not saved by this fact. A label applied by others can take on a very different implication than one applied to oneself. For example, blacks sometimes ironically call one another "nigger," but for a white to call a black by this term is invariably offensive. Dukakis used the term "card carrying member" precisely because of its history as a McCarthyite slur. He was expressing solidarity with the victims of civil liberties abuse and their protectors. When Bush applies the label to Dukakis, the connotation is very different.

□ CASTRO CONVERTIBLE:
Talks on Cuban Pullout Adjourn Without Accord
—*Washington Post*, September 30
Accord on Cuban Pullout From Angola Reported
—*New York Times*, same day
(thanks to Bill Pascoe, Arlington, Virginia)

CAMPAIGN '88

THE OTHER DUKE

NOT LONG AGO, a group of scholars decided to find out what "Dukakis" means in the original Greek. For months they sifted through ancient texts and finally came up with an answer. It means "McGovern."

A funny joke, perhaps, but not very telling. Michael Dukakis is a liberal, but he's hardly a clone of George McGovern. The idea of a McGovern presidency is scary. A Dukakis presidency isn't. I suspect his administration would be, on balance, only slightly to the left of a Bush administration. But there's another aspect of Dukakis that I do find troubling—the Duke himself. He's slippery, de-

CHILE

Fall of the Patriarch

Pinochet loses at the polls, but democracy is not the victor yet

"He fell! He fell!"

For 15 years General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 72, has held Chile in his proud and dictatorial grasp—once even boasting that "there is not a single leaf in this country that I do not move." So why shouldn't he have believed that Chileans would vote *sí* last week in an extraordinary plebiscite on whether to extend his presidential term to 1997? But shortly before 2 a.m. on Thursday, an ashen-faced official stepped from La Moneda, the presidential palace in Santiago, and headed for a nearby government building. There he told TV viewers that the public had said *no* to the extension. The final tally, with 7.2 million votes cast: 54.7% to 43%. Despite the hour, several hundred jubilant demonstrators sounded car horns in the capital and howled delightedly, "He fell! He fell!"

The vote was a turning point on Chile's long road back to a nearly 150-year tradition of democracy, which was toppled in the 1973 coup that brought Pinochet to power. Since ousting the elected, but floundering, government of Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens, Pinochet has led a military junta that routinely uses terror to enforce its will. Deep scars remain from a 1973-76 antileftist purge in which tens of thousands of Chileans were exiled, tortured or executed. Meanwhile, the politically explosive gulf between rich and poor has steadily grown wider. "We broke an authoritarian system," said Ricardo Lagos, president of the Party for Democracy, one of the 16 groups that made up the Command for the No, which led the campaign to defeat Pinochet. "Now our work is to reconstruct a democratic system."

The vote will not transform Chile overnight. If presidential elections are held as scheduled in December 1989, Pinochet, who has already headed the country longer than any other leader, would retain power at least until March 1990. He can also remain commander of the army until 1995. Whenever the voting does take place (opposition leaders have pressed for an earlier date), Chile's traditionally fractious parties will have to agree on a field that allows the winner to emerge with enough support to govern.

For his part, Pinochet vowed not to go quietly. Wearing a crisp dress-white uniform, the general accepted "the verdict of the majority" but pledged "to complete my mandate with a patriotic sense." He buttressed the point by refusing to accept the resignation of his 16-member Cabinet, which then agreed to stay.

Pinochet's defiance produced a bizarre pattern of dancing and rioting in the streets. Police fired tear gas and water cannons at some antigovernment protesters in two days of clashes that left dozens wounded and two people dead. More than 20 foreign journalists were among the injured. On Friday hundreds of thousands of Chileans celebrated the *no* vote with a joyous rally in Santiago. Singing and swaying to music by popular groups, they called on Pinochet to step down.

The dictator hardly expected to lose the plebiscite when, in 1980, he pushed through a constitution that mandated the vote. Eager to gain democratic legitimacy, Pinochet expected a booming economy to buoy his popularity throughout the decade. But a 1982 crash ended that hope, and the subsequent recovery benefited wealthy landowners, bankers and multinational companies, while Chile's slums sank deeper into squalor. By the start of



PHOTOGRAPHS FOR TIME BY ANTHONY SUAU—BLACK STAR

Saying goodbye to the general: celebrators proclaim their joy in the capital

1988, the failure of the country's growing riches to spread to the middle and lower classes had festered into a key campaign issue. The divide had a further impact: it strengthened such radical factions as the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front, a Communist splinter group that killed five of Pinochet's bodyguards in a 1986 assassination attempt. The army replied with a wave of reprisals that further alienated many Chileans.

With the plebiscite approaching, Pinochet lifted a 15-year state of emergency in August and allowed 500 exiles to return to the country. They found a more subtle form of repression. Instead of censoring the press, for example, the regime responded to articles it did not like by jailing reporters and publishers. While labor unions are now permitted, leaders who call for industry-wide strikes risk banishment. Last February a U.S. human-rights report noted at least 100 cases of torture in 1987 by Chilean security forces.

Pinochet also miscalculated the resolve of Chile's opposition parties. Though it had barely seemed possible, long-squabbling groups ranging from the right-wing National Party to the leftist Almeyda Socialists flocked together under the anti-Pinochet banner. They took the lead in registering an astounding 92% of Chile's eligible voters, though critics cautioned that some government sympathizers might have signed under different names to swell the *sí* tally. Meantime, the *no* forces used newly granted access to TV studios to launch tuneful and compelling spots. The regime, by contrast, relied on stolid footage of factories and roads or warnings of a return to the chaos and violence of the Allende years.

Though he lagged in most of the polls, Pinochet still expected victory. But his eleventh-hour emergence as a baby kisser in civilian dress could not improve his chances. Nor could numerology sway the final outcome: deeply superstitious, Pinochet held the plebiscite on Oct. 5 apparently because five is his lucky number.

Within the government the vote immediately shifted the balance of power away from Pinochet. "I think the armed forces will treat Pinochet delicately for the moment," said a Western diplomat in Santiago. "They might gently insist on a more collegial relationship within the junta." But the military too was wounded by the vote. Known as "the last Prussian army" for its aloofness from the rest of society, the army considers the fall of its leader to be a personal defeat. That could make the armed forces sullen and defensive in coming months.



Down but not out: the strongman reviews his troops

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

PRESIDENCY:
The constitution keeps Pinochet in power until elections in December 1989. The opposition wants to speed up the vote.

LEGISLATURE:
Elected at the same time. Pinochet will keep a seat; the government can name ten out of 36 Senators. The opposition wants all seats elected.

MILITARY:
Pinochet still in command. The opposition wants him out, civilian control thereafter.

The opposition is clearly taking no chances on offending the army and triggering a possible coup. During the campaign, political leaders agreed to withdraw TV spots that showed carabinero security forces beating citizens. In return, police provided protection for opposition rallies and marches. Yet such fragile alliances could easily be shattered by embarrassing demands. For example, most opposition groups want to prosecute the military for human-rights violations. But moderate parties are willing to overlook old abuses in exchange for assurances that new ones will not occur.

Pinochet nevertheless emerged from last week's ballot in a relatively strong position. By winning 43% of the vote, he showed broader popular appeal than opposition polls had indicated—a considerable achievement for a dictator after 15 years in power. Said Labor Minister Alfonso Márquez de la Plata: "The plebiscite was a personal triumph for the President and an electoral defeat for his collaborators. It's a clear demonstration that he enjoys a great deal of civilian support."

Perhaps. For now, the key issue remains the timing of presidential elections. A quick ballot could even help the government by allowing it to support a single candidate before the opposition can produce a strong field. A long delay, on the other hand, could unravel the opposition's recent unity. But such concerns seemed remote to exultant Chileans last week. In the fall of a ruthless patriarch, the country caught a happy glimpse of both its democratic past and its possible future. *—By John Greenwald. Reported by Laura López/Santiago*

How Much Did the U.S. Help?

The CIA helped put Augusto Pinochet Ugarte into power by playing a pivotal role in the 1973 military coup that toppled the country's democratically elected Marxist government. So it seems only fitting that the U.S. used its leverage to help topple Pinochet at the ballot box. The Reagan Administration initially downplayed Pinochet's human-rights violations in hopes of persuading the junta to ease repression. The arrival of U.S. Ambassador Harry Barnes in 1985 signaled a change in tactics: Barnes repeatedly called for a return to democracy and instructed the embassy to monitor all human-rights violations.

Meanwhile, Washington sponsored a U.N. Human Rights Commission denunciation of Chile in 1986. The Administration also funneled more than $1 million to opposition groups to register plebiscite voters. Four days before the vote, Washington learned that the junta might delay the ballot. U.S. officials warned Chilean authorities against the plan, going so far as to summon Chile's Ambassador to the U.S. to an unusual Sunday-morning meeting. Said a U.S. diplomat: "Our message was that if they went ahead with the operation to postpone the election, we would publicly reveal in detail what we knew."

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by MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN
Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of *U.S.News & World Report*

END OF AN ERA

Manila

Mort Zuckerman has just returned from the Philippines, where he was a member of the presidential delegation observing the election.

There are certain deeds that suddenly make clear the nature of a ruler and his regime. In the Philippines, it was the brutal assassination on Aug. 21, 1983, of opposition leader Benigno Aquino as he disembarked at Manila airport. Instead of intimidating the leaderless opposition, the murderer's bullet and the subsequent cover-up violated the unwritten limits of Philippine politics and drastically eroded the legitimacy of the Marcos government. It focused world attention on the nature of Marcos and his cronies. And it produced the opposite effect to the one intended. As was said about an execution engineered by Napoleon, "It was worse than a crime; it was a blunder."



That was the beginning of the end of the Marcos era. The political backlash that followed the assassination coincided with a serious deterioration of the Philippine economy, a Latin American-style financial crisis and the growth of a Communist insurgency leading to the worst political crisis since the independence of the Philippines in 1946. To re-establish his lost credibility and legitimacy, especially in the United States, Marcos announced a "snap" presidential election. To create the perception that the election would be fair and honest, he agreed to astonishingly democratic reforms in the electoral process, at least as measured by Philippine standards. These reforms were codified into a new electoral law. It legitimized opposition parties to create a viable two-party system in the Philippines for the first time since the mid-1960s; it guaranteed media access to both parties; it set up an elaborate election process to insure fair voting, and it provided a citizen organization to monitor fairness.

All that was permitted by Marcos because he was convinced he could win a free election. He was sure that years of doing favors as the godfather of the Filipinos to cultivate and build local political alliances would suffice. To him, the election was not so much about his future as about his future relationships with the United States and the restoration of his credibility so that, with U.S. support, Marcos could deal with the economic crisis at home and combat the growing Communist insurgency.

Marcos miscalculated. The election campaign and the election turned out to be a disaster for Marcos. The "snap" election "snapped" back. Corazon Aquino emerged as a galvanizing figure attracting huge crowds by her poise and by the feeling that she was the means to get rid of Marcos.

Whatever the outcome, the election has already made a major contribution to the downfall of Marcos. Few at home or abroad will believe in the justice of the result, leaving Marcos without a shred of authority beyond that which he can impose by force and bribery.

The democratic reforms are something of a triumph for American policy. The U.S. sought the high ground, advocating only that the election be fair, hoping to build up democratic institutions to deal with the Marcos-succession crisis.

It is natural to focus on the melodrama of the election results, but to this observer, the most significant changes do not depend on the final count. The value of the election was in large measure a value of process. These values should be measured in Philippine, not American, terms.

What is significant is not that Marcos could and might ultimately have rigged the election. This was fully understood in the Philippines and should be in the United States. The critical change is the emergence of a two-party system after 15 years of martial law and rubber-stamp elections. The "silent majority," including the middle class and the Catholic Church, openly worked for the opposition. This may be taken for granted in America, but it represents a momentous change for Philippine politics.

Violence, intimidation, fraud and voter disenfranchisement made headlines in the United States, but they were not nearly as newsworthy in the Philippines. What is newsworthy, in my judgment, is that we have seen the creation and opera-

tion of a new structure for Philippine democracy. For one thing, the Army stayed out of the electoral process, even though it was "deputized" and could have intimidated the entire election, as it has in the past. In America, the absence of military intimidation is so taken for granted that this Philippine development didn't get the attention it deserved.

And again with the media. The real news for the Philippines—taken for granted in the United States—is that all opposition media were allowed a robust freedom. This was especially true of the dominant media, national radio rather than TV networks as in America. On television, the opposition received guaranteed free time.

The real news on the vote itself was not the examples of abuse but the emergence of correctives. Namfrel, the citizen watchdog group, attracted 500,000 volunteers, supervising about 85 percent of the precincts, compared with 150,000 people and 50-odd percent of the voting places in 1984. Namfrel has now become an independent force, even though its sympathies lie with the opposition.



PIERS CAVENDISH FOR *USN&WR*

Official U.S. observers view vote counting the day following Philippine election

Finally, there is now the chance of constitutional succession. No matter who wins the Presidency, there will be a Vice President in place to succeed the President, a major change—but who in America would think it?

What should American policy be now? It must be made in the new context of Philippine politics. Even though Marcos will probably prevail, our strategy should be to recognize that we may have to deal with him while encouraging a peaceful transition to a more democratic, reform-minded regime. We must avoid alienating the Philippine people who supported either candidate. For this reason, the United States should not pronounce too early on the election. We should take our cue from the way the Filipinos evaluate their election.

The successor to Marcos, who is 68 years old and ill, must be our most critical concern. This means we must encourage and support the Vice Presidency. Both vice-presidential candidates offer the prospect that the two parties might come together adequately to make sure the government works, to avoid violence and to provide for a peaceful constitutional transition of power. Directly attacking Marcos is dangerous, even if it makes us feel good, and street violence or coups against Marcos should be discouraged. A cycle of violent demonstrations and repressions could lead to a reimposition of martial law, thereby snuffing out a budding two-party process.

The United States must not overestimate its leverage. We cannot dislodge Marcos, as some would like. The days when Commodore Dewey could sail into Manila harbor and order the captain of his flagship to "fire when you are ready, Gridley," are gone. What we can and must do is exact a price for our aid.

Any American aid to the Philippines should be contingent on retaining and strengthening the nation's institutional democratic structures, including pressure for needed reforms in the armed forces and in the crony-dominated economy—reforms necessary in any event to stave off the growing challenge from Communist guerrillas and to change the environment that produces them.

For those reasons, sanctions would be a dangerous form of pressure. Aid cuts would further lower living standards and reduce the government's ability to combat the insurgency. They would jeopardize our bases, since there is wide perception in the Philippines that our aid is tantamount to rental for the use of the Subic Bay and Clark bases.

The United States today is, as Matthew Arnold put it, "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born." The Marcos era in substance is over, or will be within a short period. America itself is powerless to give birth to the post-Marcos era. All we can do is make sure that the procedures are in place so that the rebirth of Philippine political leadership after Marcos is in democratic terms. ■

Election result: Nightmare for U.S.

Groping for a way on Philippines

■ A Philippine election tainted by fraud and violence has yielded what Washington most hoped to avoid: A Marcos government widely discredited, yet determined to rule.

In the aftermath of the February 7 election, President Reagan at first appeared to stumble, tilting toward President Ferdinand Marcos, then settled for neutrality between Marcos and challenger Corazon Aquino. But that was not good enough for many U.S. lawmakers, including some conservatives, or even for the President's own State Department. Secretary of State George Shultz was said to have urged Reagan to take greater distance from Marcos, who, U.S. diplomats said bluntly, stole the election.

In the growing storm, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), a respected member of the Armed Services and Intelligence committees, sent Reagan a biting letter to argue that U.S. bases near Manila did not justify supporting a leader who clung to power by "fraud, intimidation and murder." Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), chairman of an official U.S. election-observer team, said aid to the Philippines should be slashed—a sentiment he shared with others—if the February 7 vote turns out to be "fatally flawed." The U.S. now provides the Philippines $250 million a year in general aid and pays $180 million more in rent for bases. Administration officials said they regarded the threat of congressional revolt as serious.

A warning from Aquino

The President's first concrete step was a quick decision to send Philip Habib, a retired diplomatic troubleshooter, to Manila to "assess the desires and needs of the Filipino people." Habib scheduled meetings with business and religious leaders as well as government and opposition politicians in a search for policy recommendations.

For his part, Marcos discounted evidence of massive cheating by his supporters and prepared to begin a new six-year term. Aquino, holding out as the official vote count—controlled by Marcos—rose against her, warned the U.S. not to "support a failing dictator."

In most U.S. assessments, she would have won the election by any accurate count. Early demonstrations on her behalf, with more to come, showed the depth of her following. The powerful Council of Catholic Bishops in Manila condemned the elections as "unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct" and for showing "a criminal use of power to thwart the sovereign will of the people." The statement by the bishops, spiritual leaders of more than 80 percent of the population, summoned Filipinos for a "nonviolent struggle" that would force the government to respect popular sentiment for political change.

Analysts in Washington, wrestling with future American policy, said the election's bitter aftermath could include anything from new rounds of street violence to, more remote, a military coup. Though the Philippine military—especially favored senior officers—has been loyal to Marcos, that could be changing. A significant number of middle-level officers, with the apparent approval of at least some generals, have been increasingly critical of the regime's corruption, economic failure, and ineptitude against a swelling Communist insurgency.


Confronted with so many uncertainties, the administration had clear interests but no clear policy. At a February 11 news conference, Reagan conceded that he was concerned about "the possibility of fraud." But he added that fraud could have occurred "on both sides." In fact, most charges of fraud were directed against Marcos's supporters, few against Aquino's. One of Reagan's advisers explained, however, that the President was trying to "position" himself for damage control rather than making a serious judgment.



Demonstrators, one waving a toy pistol,

The hope of U.S. officials in recent weeks, since shattered, was that a reasonably clean election would produce a genuine mandate for either Marcos or Aquino, preferably the latter. The Philippine government then might have the strength and credibility to combat a growing Communist insurgency and push ahead with economic and political reforms. Instead, the election's disputed outcome now confronts Reagan with an array of options, none of them certain to produce success—

- Continue business-as-usual relations with a weakened Philippine power structure, risking an increase in the already evident anti-American backlash among Marcos's opponents. Marcos's fragile health has become an in-



TIMOTHY A. MURPHY—USN&WR

Representative John Murtha, Senator Richard Lugar report as observers of Philippine election



MICHAEL WILLIAMSON FOR USNWR

shout charges of fraud in voting. Protests mounted after Aquino supporters were killed

creasingly important factor in the present political uncertainty, and American analysts doubt that he would survive a full term.

• Increase pressure on Marcos to step aside, risking defiance by him while winning points with reformers. The approach could be self-defeating, adding to confusion in a nation uncertain about the future and perhaps creating greater opportunities for Communist guerrillas of the New People's Army.

• Offer increased aid in return for reforms and cooperation between Marcos and Aquino. Some variation on this approach seems to be the administration's early choice.

The most important factor by far in shaping U.S. policy is the need to maintain operational security for Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, the two largest American military facilities outside the United States. "One cannot minimize the importance of those bases, not only to us, but to the Western World and certainly to the Philippines themselves," Reagan emphasized at his press conference. "I don't know of any more important [bases] than the bases in the Philippines."

In Congress and within the administration, however, the differences over how to secure the bases are great. Some officials—apparently including the President—argue that overwhelming strategic concerns leave no practical alternative to continuing to work with Marcos, pressing for reforms but overlooking his shortcomings as U.S. interest demands. Others dismiss that judgment as dangerously shortsighted, claiming it will push Aquino's moderate supporters toward the anti-American left and hasten the time when insurgents can pose a physical threat to the bases.



TIMOTHY A. MURPHY—USNWR

In growing tumult, Reagan dispatches diplomatic troubleshooter Habib to help develop U.S. role

If Marcos remains in power, "Congress must take steps to make it very clear that our top priority is democracy," insists Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an official U.S. observer at the election. "We need to take a risk with our bases—and they are very important—but they must be secondary to backing democracy and to the Philippine people. If not, we will lose the bases anyway."

Widespread abuses

The most immediate worry is a lack of certainty that the results will be sufficiently palatable to Filipinos to forestall chaos. "We got the worst-case scenario," said a U.S. official in Washington who professed to be surprised but "not astounded" by the extent of cheating.

Several U.S. and other international observers who witnessed the voting said they were dismayed by Election Day abuses that included vote buying, multiple voting, threats against voters, stealing of ballot boxes, tampering with returns and the intimidation, injury or even killing of some Aquino workers.

American officials are acutely aware that their ability to force change on Marcos is limited, even if they threaten to cut aid or limit new funds. Among other examples, he has resisted pressure to retire Gen. Fabian Ver, the armed forces chief of staff who was tried and acquitted in the 1983 assassination of Aquino's husband Benigno.

Adding to U.S. disappointment is the election's failure to resolve doubts about a successor to Marcos. The obviously feeble President is thought to be suffering from a degenerative disease. His vice-presidential candidate, Arturo Tolentino, is 75 and not a powerful independent player in the maelstrom of Philippine politics. The potential vacuum raises the possibility that the country could be torn apart in a post-Marcos power struggle among old-line politicians, the military and his ambitious, controversial wife Imelda.

The elections that the U.S. encouraged in the Philippines as it turned out settled nothing. They did, as Reagan said, demonstrate the vigor of Philippine politics. But as long as the outcome was to be settled by raw power, the enduring value of that merit was yet to be tested. ■

by James Wallace with Robert Kaylor in Manila

After election, can overhaul of Army come fast enough to check rebels ?

Manila's troubled outlook

Manila

■ The many economic and political problems still threatening the Philippines after the presidential election make the armed forces even more crucial to the future of this troubled country.

When voters finally chose between President Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino on February 7, the initial results were confusion. The scenes at polling places ranged from tranquility in some rural areas to fraud and violence elsewhere. According to initial reports, at least 50 persons were killed. But there were as many rumors as facts in the immediate aftermath.

A measure of the divisiveness ahead was the unofficial vote count reported from Marcos's home province. That tally: Marcos—19,718; Aquino—0. It was expected that official tallies might not be available for several days. Whoever the winner, dealing with the nation's social and economic ills will be daunting. The prospect was one in which the role of the troubled military would be crucial.

The afflictions of the military are rated so severe that, without a major overhaul, it has no hope of checking the Communist-led New Peoples Army. Analysts fear time is running short to win back the rural populace, even if democratic reforms demanded by the United States are made.

Already, the 30,000 guerrillas—only half of them armed—influence about 20 percent of Philippine villages. Should they gain the upper hand, the U.S. faces loss of vital air and naval bases. A Philippine military officer admits: "The armed forces are all that stops the NPA from removing all government institutions, and we're getting clobbered everywhere."

Of continuing concern is President Marcos's use of troops as a political tool. Just before Philippine voters went to the polls on February 7, officials deputized the armed forces to assist in the polling process if called upon. Even though troops might be necessary in a volatile election climate, the message seen by many was that the Army—so far—belongs to the President. With a final vote count expected to take up to one week, opposition leaders feared that troops might be used to switch ballot boxes en route from remote polling places.

The Army's troubles date back to 1972, when Marcos declared martial law to avoid having to step down after his second term. During the years of martial law that followed, the Army became heavily politicized, and its command structure was replaced with a network of Marcos cronies.

Marcos also tripled the military's size. The regular Army now numbers 70,000, supported by a 42,000-member paramilitary constabulary and tens of thousands of armed Civil Home Defense Force volunteers who serve as part-time village defenders. The Navy and Air Force, totaling 45,000, have little role against the insurgents. Many troops have no stomach for fighting and stay in outposts or patrol only along roads, making them easy targets. As a result, entire government units come off second best in clashes with handfuls of aggressive guerrillas.

The most visible symbol of the Army's problems is Gen. Fabian C. Ver, 66, the armed-forces commander. He was accused as an accessory to the 1983 murder of opposition politician Benigno Aquino, Jr., but acquitted in December with 25 other military men after a court refused to consider what many believed was vital evidence.

Ver is said by Western military sources to have done more damage than good to counterinsurgency operations. Yet Marcos meets U.S. pressure to replace Ver by claiming he can find no other capable commander. Says a diplomat: "Marcos feels he needs Ver to keep the Army loyal to him."

What is needed most immediately is a top-to-bottom housecleaning. Unless that happens, the future of the Philippines remains in serious doubt no matter who sits in the Presidential Palace. "We face a crisis of great dimensions," one senior Philippine officer warns. "Reform and reorganization are imperative. This is probably the last chance we will ever have." ■

by Robert Kaylor



PIERS CAVENDISH—REFLEX FOR USN&WR VIA AP

Residents of Baranguy Balutu guard ballot boxes wrested from thieves

These men stole ballots in Concepcion, then shot at press



AL PODGORSKI—CHICAGO SUN TIMES VIA AP

COVER STORY

Going into the Streets

As Marcos wins a tainted election victory, Aquino vows to go on fighting

As a parody of democracy, the scene had a certain dramatic charm. Until they were ordered into silence, hundreds of colorfully dressed spectators in the galleries of the Philippine National Assembly cheered and booed passionately as politicians on the turquoise-carpeted floor below walked through their parts. One at a time, brown envelopes containing vote totals from each of the country's 147 voting centers were presented to the legislators for inspection. Tallies were read aloud, and results posted on green tote boards that were lined up before the 200 mahogany desks of the Assembly. Charges flew that some envelopes were improperly sealed, that entire towns had been eliminated from some of the tallying documents. Jeers and accusations rocketed back and forth, and recording the objections to all the voting certificates took hours.

Inexorably, the charade moved the Philippines closer to a new turning point in a potentially explosive national drama. At week's end the National Assembly, dominated by members of President Ferdinand Marcos' ruling New Society Movement, produced its tally after angry opposition members walked out of the legislative hall to protest government railroad tactics. The rump gathering declared that Marcos, 68, had defeated his presidential rival, Corazon ("Cory") Aquino, 53, by 10,807,179 votes to 9,491,716.

Thus, in a final travesty of parliamentary procedure, the Assembly formally declared that Marcos had been re-elected President, in an election whose outcome had been shaped by vote buying, intimidation, outright fraud and bloodshed. The legislative body also proclaimed the election of Marcos' running mate, Arturo Tolentino, 75, ending weeks of speculation that the autocrat might find a way to include Aquino's vice-presidential running mate, Salvador Laurel, 57, in his newly refurbished government.

As the counting proceeded in the cool confines of the Assembly building, each vote recorded for Marcos added anger and outrage to the tension building across the far-flung archipelago. Tentatively but with increasing signs of determination, Aquino supporters were starting to take their frustrations into the streets. Waving clenched fists and chanting "Fight! Fight!," thousands of Filipinos marched in a 13-mile procession through the capital. They escorted the flag-draped coffin of Evelio Javier, 43, a regional Aquino campaign chairman who had been brutally gunned down days earlier in the province of Antique. Though far smaller in scale, the Javier funeral demonstration reminded many Filipinos of the huge out-

Anger and outrage: Aquino supporters in the funeral procession of slain Politician Evelio Javier give their campaign hand-sign JAMES NACHTWEY



pourings of grief that followed the 1983 assassination of Aquino's husband Benigno Aquino Jr.

Meanwhile, the 104-member Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines added its powerful voice to the clamor of those who claimed that Marcos had stolen the election. After a two-day meeting, the clerics sharply attacked Marcos by asserting that "a government that assumes or maintains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis." To those who agreed with them, the bishops issued a call for a "nonviolent struggle for justice."

Watching closely was the slight, determined figure of Corazon Aquino. The quiet widow who had turned into candidate and crusader, who had ignited a popular passion for change during her 57-day election campaign, continued to insist last week that she rather than Marcos was the rightful President of the Philippines. Deliberately ignoring the National Assembly hoopla, Aquino went on the personal offensive. She staged a giant rally in Manila's Rizal Park on Sunday to protest Marcos' alleged election fraud. That event was the kickoff of a protracted "People's Victory" campaign of nonviolent rallies and boycotts in coming weeks around the country.

The culmination of the Victory plan would be a nationwide general strike, accompanied by other acts of civil disobedience. Aquino's goal was to make Marcos relinquish the power he has wielded from the presidential Malacañang Palace since 1966. Said she: "Let me appeal to all friends of democracy and supporters of freedom abroad. Stand tall by these principles that you and I hold dear."



CYNTHIA JOHNSON

The President at his news conference

Careless words caused diplomatic troubles.

His reelection assured, Marcos took the initiative. He announced that he had accepted the resignation of General Fabian Ver, the controversial armed forces chief of staff whose ouster the opposition has long demanded. Marcos also reacted to a statement by President Reagan late in the week that widespread fraud by the ruling party had hurt the election's credibility. Said Marcos: "Everybody is entitled to say anything. Probably he has been wrongly informed."

Suddenly there was a prospect of dramatic political unrest and repression in the former U.S. colony, which might ultimately pose a threat to the two important U.S. military bases on the islands, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. The growing confrontation promised to redound to the benefit of the increasingly powerful Communist New People's Army, whose insurgency will soon, in the Pentagon's view, pose a real military challenge to the Marcos regime.

Few people had more reason to be concerned at the latest turn of events than President Reagan. Increasingly, the White House found itself on the spot in what Richard Holbrooke, a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, called "the most serious foreign policy crisis this Administration has faced."

As part of a U.S. bid to solve the crisis, Philip Habib, 65, a specially appointed U.S. envoy, late last week flew at President Reagan's behest to Manila. Habib's mission: to find some way of reconciling the opposing Aquino and Marcos political camps. On arrival, the diplomat immediately closeted himself for the weekend with members of the U.S. embassy staff.

Even as Habib winged on his way, the Administration was preparing to issue its

Travesty of procedure: tallying votes in the National Assembly



PETER CHARLESWORTH

Confirmed in office once again: Marcos at the Malacañang Palace



CHARLESWORTH



PETER CHARLESWORTH

Challenger Aquino and Running Mate Laurel at their headquarters



TUCCI—GAMMA/LIAISON

Philippine bishops announce their reactions to the election

statement in reaction to Marcos' proclaimed re-election. Among other things, it declared that the election had been "marred by widespread fraud and violence perpetrated by the ruling party." So extreme was the misdoing, the statement continued, that the election's credibility was "called into question, both within the Philippines and in the U.S." The White House then called on "all responsible Filipinos" to seek peaceful ways to achieve "stability in their society" and to avoid violence.

The Saturday statement, which Administration aides touted as a "major blow to Marcos," was the White House's way of extricating itself from a controversy over its earlier reaction to the questionable Philippine election. As official U.S. observers brought back eyewitness reports of widespread election cheating by Marcos supporters, President Reagan's response had been less outraged than many members of his own Administration would have liked—and than many Americans, treated to an unparalleled and intimate view of a foreign election, expected from their President. At a Tuesday news conference, Reagan had ventured the possibility that fraud "was occurring on both sides."

Reagan's words led to a flurry of congressional responses that might ultimately end in a bid to cut off all U.S. aid to the Marcos regime. Said Democratic Representative Steven Solarz of Brooklyn, chairman of the House subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs: "How we handle aid will be the test of how credibly we have disassociated ourselves from a discredited dictator."

Perhaps even more important to the Reagan Administration than the congressional reaction was a sudden freezing of relations between U.S. diplomats and the increasingly assertive members of the anti-Marcos opposition. Aquino charged the White House with tilting in favor of election theft, and anti-American demonstrations took place in front of the U.S. embassy in Manila. For his part, Marcos seized on Reagan's ill-considered remarks to try to bolster his own position.

The Reagan response raised a broader question of what exactly Washington could do to affect the political course in the Philippines, both to protect important U.S. interests and to further Filipino democracy. To many Administration critics, the answer seemed to lie in some form of anti-Marcos sanctions, but at the White House the problem was seen as more complex than that. Said an Administration official: "We're trying to stay as neutral as possible, gently pushing Marcos into making accommodations with the other side."

Neutrality had been the banner that the Administration carried into the Feb. 7 elections. Washington's oft-stated preference during the Philippine campaign was only for a fair and credible balloting process. The unprecedented foreign-press coverage meant that the campaign was scrutinized almost as if it were a U.S. election. Marcos and Aquino appeared repeatedly on interview shows; U.S. television networks sent anchors to Manila to broadcast the election finale.



PETER CHARLESWORTH

Official Observer Lugar on the scene

Eyewitness reports of widespread cheating.

What Americans saw on their television sets came as a shock. U.S. viewers were treated to a vivid documentation of Marcos supporters buying votes with money and rice, of poll watchers from the opposition who were beaten and shot after they tried to protect ballot boxes, of voting rolls that failed to include countless Aquino supporters but listed improbable numbers of pro-government voters.

The images of skulduggery at the polls were enhanced by the vast divergence in voting tallies that soon emerged between the official, Marcos-dominated Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the volunteer watchdog organization known as the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). At times COMELEC had Marcos leading by as many as 600,000 votes, while NAMFREL showed Aquino ahead by about the same number.

The sheer range and flagrancy of the cheating charged against the Marcos camp were impossible to ignore. Nonetheless, the Reagan Administration held back its comments pending the return from Manila of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, who, along with 19 other delegates appointed by the President, monitored the voting. In interviews on the scene, almost all the observers professed themselves shocked by what they had seen. But even as the Lugar delegation arrived in Washington, the Administration was speaking in a variety of increasingly dissonant voices about how the election results should be viewed and how the U.S. should respond to them.

Privately, many lower- and middle-level U.S. diplomats were outraged by what they considered gross abuses of the democratic process by Marcos supporters. But on Monday, Deputy State Department Spokesman Charles Redman tried to put a conciliatory gloss on the tumultuous balloting process. Whoever was even-

God and Man in Manila

The opening words of the document sounded like a declaration of war: "The people have spoken. Or tried to. Despite the obstacles thrown in the way of their speaking freely, we the bishops believe what they attempted to say is clear enough. In our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct."

After two days of agonizing, three rewritings and countless hours of prayer, the 104 Roman Catholic bishops of the Philippines last week openly accused the Marcos government of rigging the presidential election. They also suggested that Filipinos could use nonviolent civil disobedience to protest the outcome. The importance of the pastoral letter, which was to be read at Masses throughout the country on Sunday, is unquestionable, since 85% of the population is Catholic.

Reaction from Marcos was swift and angry. The bishops, said the President, "used the priests and nuns not only to help the opposition but to destroy the electoral process." He demanded proof of their charges and delivered a veiled threat by saying that "if the government is forced to take action against any member of the church for certain illegal acts, that does not mean that the government is fighting the church itself." Labor Minister Blas Ople said the bishops' action "clearly poses an imminent threat to the peace and tranquillity of our country during this time when so many are blinded by partisan rage."

Unflinchingly, the church hierarchy ticked off the irregularities: disenfranchisement of voters, widespread and heavy vote buying, deliberate tampering with election returns, intimidation, harassment, terrorism and murder. The bishops said that the "government has the obligation to right the wrong it is founded on." And directly addressing the Filipino people, they added, "Now is the time to speak up."

The strong words did not come easily. The bishops had gone into closed session on Wednesday in the old walled city of Intramuros to draft their views on the elections. Unanimous in their opinion that the elections had been marred by fraud, some bishops still shied away from stating their conclusions plainly. Said one of the conferees: "Talks collapsed several times because we were afraid of the term civil disobedience and because we did not want to appear partisan." But there was no way to mask their target. One bishop even went so far as to say that Marcos should be denied the right to receive Holy Eucharist.

Both sides were anxious about the outcome of the conclave. Challenger Corazon Aquino visited the conference Thursday to ask its president, Ricardo Cardinal Vidal, the Archbishop of Cebu, if the bishops would support her plans to begin a campaign of civil disobedience. At 2:30 Friday morning Vidal had another visitor: First Lady Imelda Marcos roused him to ask if the pastoral letter would incite an armed uprising. Vidal reportedly assured her, "We had never entertained any idea of violence."



SUAU—BLACK STAR

A strong voice for the opposition: Jaime Cardinal Sin

The bishops' bold gesture was an important milestone in the long Catholic tradition of the Philippines. Since Spanish conquistadores, accompanied by missionaries, arrived in the country in the 16th century, the church has engaged in a singularly successful campaign to win converts. As a result, the Philippines is the only predominantly Catholic country in Asia.

The great majority of the 13,000 priests and nuns in the Philippines are politically moderate or liberal. The hierarchy was formerly led by Julio Cardinal Rosales, a conservative who tried to stay above politics. But since his death in 1983, many of the clergy have become more activist. A small minority of priests and nuns support the Communist-dominated New People's Army insurgency against Marcos. Few clergy, though, have followed the example of the Rev. Conrado Balweg, who since 1979 has lived in the jungles with N.P.A. fighters.

The leader of the Catholic Church in the Philippines is Jaime Cardinal Sin, 57, the Archbishop of Manila. Sin, the 14th of 16 children of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, has diplomatic gifts that have been invaluable tools in guiding church policy. A wry sense of humor also helps. He calls his residence in suburban Mandaluyong "the house of Sin."

The Cardinal first employed a policy known as "critical collaboration" with the Marcos regime. He urged the government to become more democratic, and simultaneously called for restraint among the opposition. In the spirit of reconciliation, Sin was willing to work with Marcos as a mediator but never as an accomplice. During the past six years, though, Sin has drifted further and further away from the President. Gradually other members of the traditionally conservative hierarchy followed his lead. When Marcos called for early presidential elections last year, the church was ready. The groundwork for selecting opposition candidates and drafting a platform had been worked out by the so-called Jesuit Mafia, which helps form Catholic political positions. The group, which included Father Joaquín Bernas, president of Ateneo de Manila University, had already concluded that the strongest possible opposition candidate was Benigno Aquino's widow, Corazon.

During the precampaign maneuvering, Cardinal Sin met several times with Aquino and the other major opposition candidate, Salvador ("Doy") Laurel. The primate reassured Aquino that she could successfully challenge Marcos, and helped persuade Laurel to bury his own presidential aspirations and become her running mate. Sin tactfully refrained from endorsing the ticket in public, but there was no doubt about which candidate the church backed. Before the election, the Cardinal sent a letter to all Philippine parishes pointedly instructing the faithful to vote for those who showed "respect for human rights and life."

While Marcos disapproves of Sin's political role, Pope John Paul II has given the Cardinal his support. Said one Vatican official familiar with the Pontiff's thinking: "Sin is very highly regarded here, particularly for his keen intelligence."

—By John Moody. Reported by Sandra Burton and Nelly Sindayen/Manila

tually declared the winner, he said, the U.S. hoped that "the two sides can get together to avoid violence." President Reagan struck almost the same note that day in a White House meeting with a group of regional U.S. newspaper editors. While noting that he was "concerned" about reports of election fraud, Reagan declared that the Administration wanted "to help in any way we can . . . so that the two parties can come together."

Those sentiments took on a more assertive tone at a White House press briefing. Spokesman Larry Speakes stated flatly that when the hotly disputed election results were "complete," both sides should "work to form a viable government without violence." A senior White House official was even blunter. Said he: "The main thrust of our statement is not to have demonstrations in the streets just because you did not like the election. A strong government is essential to maintain a peaceful resolution of the problems that face the Filipinos."

The White House remarks could only be interpreted as a warning for Challenger Aquino. The deeply religious mother of five had warned throughout the election campaign that street protests were likely if Marcos cheated during the balloting. But the White House remarks also reflected a more conservative view of the still simmering Philippine election crisis than that held by many officials at the State Department. Simply stated, the dilemma as seen on Pennsylvania Avenue was how to strike a balance between condemnation of Marcos' activities and support for the stability of an important Pacific ally. As a senior White House official later put it, "We're in a no-win situation at this point. If we accent the fraud, it gives Marcos an excuse to throw out the election. If we side with Aquino, it's a signal to her to take to the streets. We're opting for stability, that's the key word."

Whether the White House chose the correct way to achieve that objective is another question. If the Administration stressed stability above all else, it risked giving the impression that it was siding with Marcos. That was very unlikely to make him change his ways, and could conceivably give a helping hand to the country's radical left.

But behind the choice of language was an assessment that for all the uproar following the voting, President Marcos still had the upper hand, at least in the short term. There were no signs last week, for example, that the country's 230,000-member armed forces were about to disintegrate in Marcos' hands. Said a White House official: "It's obvious that Marcos has control."

Above all, White House concern continued to focus on the two U.S. military bases, Clark and Subic Bay. Some U.S. officials feared that if Aquino ever took power, she would prove more susceptible to leftist pressure to remove the bases from Philippine territory. Others were concerned that an Aquino government would be unequipped to cope with the growing Philippine insurgency. Many simply did not believe that Aquino could ever wrest power from Marcos with anything less than armed force.

At the same time, the Philippine President's grave problems with systemic lupus erythematosus, a disease that frequently attacks the kidneys, make it likely that there will be a change in power in the country before too long. Said a senior Administration official: "Marcos isn't going to last forever. We're trying to help hold things together over there until some of the personal obstacles to change are gone."



JAMES NACHTWEY

The challenger at a memorial service for her murdered supporter

The fear was that her moderates would be overtaken on the left.

That line of argument came most strongly last week from National Security Adviser John Poindexter and his staff expert on Asian affairs, Gaston Sigur. Among others who reportedly felt the same way was White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, an ex-Marine, who said on *This Week with David Brinkley* last month that the U.S. would condemn any electoral fraud, but added that "if it's a duly elected government, so certified, you'd have to do business with it."

There was a competitive edge to the White House analysis. Some staffers apparently felt that the State Department, and in particular U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth, had prejudged the Philippine election. Said a White House official: "They in effect told us that unless Aquino won, that would be proof positive of widespread vote fraud. That falls into the realm of prognostication and outside diplomacy."

Finally, there still seemed to be a question in at least some White House minds about Aquino's qualifications for running the country. The Administration had previously said that it could work well with either presidential candidate. Last week, however, one White House official said in exasperation, "How State thinks that Aquino can govern on her own is just beyond us."

State Department staffers were dismayed by the statements that emerged from the Speakes briefing. The diplomats at Foggy Bottom requested a "clarification" of the White House views. But before that request was formally answered, President Reagan held a 40-minute meeting at the White House on Tuesday with the returning Lugar.

The Reagan-Lugar meeting was an ambiguous exercise. Sitting in on the session were Poindexter, Regan, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz. Lugar spent much of his energy at the meeting trying to convince the skeptical majority of his Executive Branch audience that they should not give up too soon on support for the unobstructed democratic process in the Philippines. The normally terse Senator spoke movingly of brave souls like an ordinary Filipino housewife who confronted armed thugs in order to defend her ballot. He urged the White House not to resign itself to a Marcos victory too quickly.

Reagan replied with an anecdote of his own. He told of a Marcos election worker who had allegedly pitched a supply of Aquino ballots into a ditch, and he doubted aloud that anyone would try to cheat by doing that. Said the President: "If he was really trying to get away with fraud, you'd think he'd have burned those ballots."

When the President emerged from that session, he mollified some State Department concerns by describing the Philippine elections as "flawed" and "disturbing." He announced the appointment of Special Envoy Habib as a would-be mediator. The choice was shrewd. A tireless career diplomat, Habib is a veteran Asia hand who retired from the Foreign Service in 1983 after serving as the President's

special emissary to the Middle East. Habib's new job, said Reagan, would be to advise on how the U.S. can "help the people of the Philippines overcome the grave problems their country faces, and to continue to work for essential reforms."

Less than five hours later, the President stunned Senator Lugar and most of the other election observers with his casual but devastating news-conference remarks. Reagan said Lugar's delegation had briefed him on the "appearance of fraud" during the voting. Then he said the observers had told him that "they didn't have any hard evidence beyond that general appearance." At this point he got in real trouble by adding that it was also possible that fraud "was occurring on both sides."

Reagan's contentious remark was a flub, pure and simple. It was based on intelligence reports from U.S. operatives in the Philippines, who stressed that fraud by Marcos forces was overwhelmingly more pervasive than any by the Aquino opposition. Reagan first made the accusation during a practice question-and-answer session with his staff before the Tuesday-night news conference. The President was corrected. But, says a Reagan aide, "he had it in his mental computer, and it couldn't be erased."

The statement turned out to be a painfully important mistake. Senator Lugar, for one, quickly bridled at the President's observation. Claiming that Reagan "was not well informed," Lugar asserted that the predominance of fraud "was by the government." Later the Senator said he would probably consider curtailment of U.S. aid to the Philippines if the balloting was discredited by an obviously orchestrated Marcos declaration of victory.

Intentionally or not, the President soon discovered that he had knocked down a hornet's nest. Increasing numbers of Congressmen used his remarks as a springboard for issuing their own foreign policy prescriptions for the Philippine mess. Two days after Reagan spoke, for example, Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, an influential member of the Armed Services Committee, sent the President a two-page letter demanding "clear statements" that the Marcos regime had committed massive electoral fraud. Nunn asked for a pledge that the White House would refuse to recognize a Marcos election victory. Finally, Nunn wanted the U.S. to terminate all aid to the Philippines if, as he put it, "the will of the voters, as expressed at the ballot box, is not followed."

Another harsh reaction on the Hill came from Congressman Solarz. After Speakes' Monday press briefing, Solarz charged that "they are smoking hashish in the White House. They appear to have lost touch with reality." A number of other Senate and House Democrats vowed to cut U.S. military- and economic-aid appropriations for the Philippines (1986 authorization: $245 million) unless the Administration agreed to something like a rejection of the election results. After the



TUGGI—GAMMA/LIAISON

A Harvard graduate and onetime provincial governor caught in election politics

Gangland Politics

Evelio Javier, director of Corazon Aquino's campaign in the remote province of Antique, was sitting on the lawn in front of the capital building, taking a break from a debate over contested votes in his region, when a white vehicle pulled into the driveway. Without warning, a man in a black knit ski mask leaped out and started shooting. Javier jumped up and ran. Zigzagging across the building's broad concrete plaza, he tried to escape the relentless barrage of bullets. At least one hit its mark. Javier stumbled and fell into a small fishpond.

Somehow, though, the fleeing man struggled to his feet and staggered across the street. By this time, other gunmen had begun to close in. Two approached from the left. Another, brandishing a .45 pistol, appeared in front of a warehouse. Javier ducked into an alley and tried to hide behind an outhouse door. But the masked killer found his prey and finished him off with a burst of gunfire.

Opposition leaders and many residents immediately claimed they knew who was behind the killing: Arturo Pacificador, a Marcos crony who is assistant majority floor leader in the National Assembly. Pacificador has operated like a warlord in Antique, wielding political patronage with his connections in the ruling party and the power he has amassed under Marcos. Opponents say he has ensured his power through alliances with the legitimate armed forces and ties to less reputable mercenaries known locally as goons. "We cannot distinguish between goons and the military here," said one provincial official afraid to have his name used. "Pacificador controls them all." A Marcos defeat was seen as a threat to such dominance.

The day following the murder, the Aquino campaign released an interview that Javier had taped before his death. "Every time I move around Antique, I have to play cat and mouse with the goons of Pacificador," said the voice of the dead man. "I have to be elusive." The accused man denied any involvement. He insisted that the murder had been committed by Communist insurgents or by Javier's political enemies.

Javier and Pacificador were longtime rivals. Javier, 43, a lawyer who studied at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and once served as provincial governor, had been an outspoken critic of President Marcos. Pacificador, 55, is an attorney who reportedly won Marcos' loyalty by purging references to bought votes from the record of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He won his seat in the National Assembly by beating Javier in one of the most controversial campaigns of the 1984 election. On the eve of the voting, seven Javier supporters were killed during a shoot-out with Pacificador and his followers. The Ministry of Justice investigated, but never released its findings.

Sensitive to the potential damage the murder could cause, particularly during a period when the country is undergoing intense international scrutiny, the Marcos administration moved to find the guilty. The day after the killing, a constabulary officer identified by witnesses as the man who pursued Javier across the plaza was arrested. The government also promised a "swift and definitive" resolution of the 1984 incident. Welcome as those actions were, they brought little comfort to the grieving family and friends of Evelio Javier, or to the thousands of Filipinos who wonder how democracy can survive amid gangland violence.



JAMES NACHTWEY

Aquino demonstrators show their feelings while awaiting the National Assembly vote tally



PETER CHARLESWORTH

Anti-American protester at the U.S. embassy

proclamation of Marcos' win, prospects for a friendly reception in Congress for further aid requests looked even dimmer.

Finally, it seemed that the new situation was prompting some influential Congressmen to examine alternative sites for the valuable U.S. military bases in the Philippines. During his Tuesday news conference, President Reagan alluded vaguely to the existence of contingency studies on where to move the sensitive facilities, an extremely difficult and costly proposition. On Thursday, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole of Kansas took that search a step closer to reality. He announced that he would formally propose legislation this week that would ask the Pentagon to evaluate the cost and feasibility of setting up alternatives to the installations. No one doubted that the cost of such a move would run into the billions.

What virtually everyone in Washington agreed on was that Marcos emerged from the election in a somewhat weakened position. Said a top Pentagon official: "It's an exceptionally unstable situation." The very instability compounded U.S. difficulties in deciding what to do next. Said a White House aide: "There's no magic solution to this situation. Nobody is claiming he has any inspiration on how to solve this."

Indeed, the number of short-term U.S. options for dealing with the Philippine crisis remained embarrassingly small. The decision to send Envoy Habib to the Philippines may have bought the Administration some time—but not much—to think further about the problem. Says a Pentagon official: "The longer it takes to come up with some sort of reasonable policy in the Philippines, the better it is for the Communists."

In that context, many of the more extreme proposals being advocated on Capitol Hill run the risk of proving counterproductive. Sweeping moves to cut off military aid to the Philippines (a modest $55 million this year) seem especially likely to do more harm than good. Morale among the often corrupt and ill-equipped Philippine armed forces is already bad. An aid cutoff might make things worse, although some Philippine military reformists dispute that. Even so, eliminating all American money might prove especially hazardous for armed-forces reformers, who have been chafing at the stagnation of the late Marcos years. Without protective U.S. influence, many of the approximately 1,200 reformers in the 14,500-member Philippine officer corps might be purged.

Selective withholding of funds, however, might have positive effects if properly done. Such calibrated coercion might allow the Administration to demand specific reforms that would allow some degree of reconciliation to take place in the Philippine political cauldron.


There is a great deal to be said for statements like the one the White House made on the weekend. As a senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide points out, every U.S. President has enjoyed enormous prestige in the Philippines—more, perhaps, than any Philippine incumbent. Marcos is aware that public U.S. statements deeply affect his legitimacy, and the threat of further broadsides might force him to make political concessions.

But the stark fact of Marcos' stubbornness cannot be overlooked. On the basis of his track record, it is not clear that Marcos would submit to even the toughest U.S. pressures. Indeed, the Philippine President, who has long honed his skills as a ruthless infighter, might lash out independently if he felt he was dangerously cornered. In an explosion of violence, the lives of his opponents might be even more directly at risk.

The limited range of those options underlined the importance of Aquino and her proposed nonviolent campaign. This is a mighty challenge for someone who has spent most of her life in the wings of politics rather than at center stage. Aquino's wrenching entry into an active role in Philippine public life can be dated from Aug. 21, 1983. On that date her husband, Opposition Politician Benigno Aquino Jr., was gunned down while getting off a China Airlines Boeing 767 at Manila International Airport on his return from three years of exile in the U.S. Suddenly his wife was catapulted into the position of a national saint.

Politics, however, had always been in her background, and she was hardly an average homemaker. The daughter of one of the Philippines' patrician political families, she was a helpmate during 28 years of marriage to the country's most prominent opposition figure. As a spouse, Aquino remained largely on the political sidelines, but within eight months of her husband's assassination, she was stumping the Philippine countryside on behalf of opposition candidates for the country's 1984 National Assembly elections. She was prodded into running in the presidential campaign by, among others, Jaime Cardinal Sin, leader of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines.

Once committed to the presidential race, Aquino quickly showed a steely determination that belied her reserved, soft-spoken manner. She displayed remarkable stamina. The galvanic response that she elicited from ordinary Filipinos as she flew from town to town during the 57-day campaign came to be known as "people power." Now a battle-hardened political veteran, Aquino intends to harness the same force in her dangerous and quixotic



CARL MYDANS

Still waiting in the wings: supporters of the 1 million-member leftist coalition known as Bayan demonstrate in the capital

struggle to occupy Malacañang Palace.

Last week she spent much of her time huddling with aides and planning strategy. Aquino and her closest advisers realized very early that they had been outmaneuvered by Marcos in the questionable election balloting. On Tuesday, the day that President Reagan gave his news conference, a group of pro-opposition legislators told top Aquino campaign officials there was no way to stop Marcos from steamrolling to victory in the National Assembly tallies. Reason: he has complete political control in two important areas of the northern island of Luzon plus the central Visayan islands. In all those regions, he would be able to pad voting results with impunity, thus overcoming any Aquino lead at the polls elsewhere.

The Aquino camp was badly shaken on Tuesday when Javier, the campaign director of Antique province, was brutally and publicly murdered by men with alleged ties to a prominent leader of the Marcos forces in the National Assembly *(see box)*. Late last week the bodies of ten more people, all said to be opposition supporters, were reportedly discovered in northerly Quirino province. At least 156 people have been killed in election-related violence since the presidential campaign began.

That grim figure was above average even for the Philippines, where violence is a traditional fellow traveler of politics. In 1961, for example, before Marcos appeared on the presidential scene, 35 people were killed during an election campaign; that is still considered a postwar low. In 1984, during National Assembly elections, more than 100 fatalities were reported.

Aquino last week was watching Washington for important political signals. She was badly stung by President Reagan's offhand reference to opposition fraud during the election. She responded immediately with a press statement that coolly noted the appointment of Envoy Habib but observed that on his last White House assignment before retirement in 1983, Habib had failed to end civil strife in Lebanon. Said Aquino: "I hope neither Mr. Reagan nor Mr. Marcos is expecting to see our beloved country go the same way." Claiming that she had been cheated out of as much as 25% of the national vote, she declared that it would be folly for her supporters to "settle down to a Western-style opposition role."

After Reagan's press-conference remarks, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Bosworth arranged a meeting with Aquino to discuss Special Envoy Habib's impending visit. The atmosphere during the session was both awkward and frigid. Bosworth, a highly regarded career diplomat who has worked hard to gain the opposition's confidence, had apparently been taken by surprise by the President's remarks. Says a key Aquino supporter who walked in on the Bosworth-Aquino meeting: "I don't know what the Japanese Ambassador looked like when they were bombing Pearl Harbor, but I imagine he looked like Steve."

Any pessimism that Aquino may have been feeling about the future, however, did not impede her actions. Before the memorial service for Javier, she paid a luncheon call on the country's 104-member Bishops' Conference to lobby for support for her People's Victory campaign and to assure the bishops of her commitment to nonviolence. Shortly afterward she went public with her Victory plans.

A key factor in Aquino's decision to go forward quickly with a civil-disobedience campaign was the fear that her moderate forces would soon be overtaken by pro-Communist groups eager to exploit the popular frustration at Marcos' formal election victory. As she planned her forthcoming rallies, Aquino continued to act forcefully to keep radical leftists from climbing aboard her campaign. One would-be partner: the 1 million-member leftist coalition known as Bayan, whose leadership is widely believed to have links to the Communist New People's Army. Aquino has every reason to be leery of newfound leftist allies. Throughout the campaign, she was repeatedly forced to rebut Marcos' accusations that she was little more than a stalking horse for the Communists.

Aquino's closest supporters are aware that leftist forces are still waiting in the wings. Says an Aquino campaign troubleshooter: "The biggest problem we have is that if Cory does not act, the moderates will be put out of business." On the other hand, he added, "if Cory acts, it will place this country on the brink of revolution."

Aquino's continuing resistance to Marcos' victory is nothing more than a calculated gamble that may yet provoke incalculable upheaval. Says Ramon Mitra, a National Assemblyman and an Aquino adviser: "We don't know whether we will be able to keep control over this. But we thought we would take the risk. We have to send a message to our friends that we are not taking this sitting down."

That stark problem was clearly in the minds of President Reagan's White House advisers when they drafted his weekend statement. It was impossible to deny that, as Reagan noted, the people of the Philippines are "at a major crossroads in their history. There are no easy answers. And in the last analysis, they will have to find the solutions themselves." One way or another, Aquino and Marcos will soon determine that solution. ***—By George Russell. Reported by Sandra Burton and Barry Hillenbrand/Manila and Alessandra Stanley/Washington***



Conciliatory and bellicose by turns: Marcos heats up the rhetoric after the rain subsides at his final rally in Manila's Rizal Park

CARL MYDANS

PHILIPPINES

Standoff in Manila

Both sides claim victory as the election ends amid violence and fraud

The contest could never really have been called fair. On one side was an ailing but wily autocrat, whose authority was waning but whose hands remained firmly clenched around the levers of political power. On the other was an unassuming but determined housewife-crusader, whose political resources were meager but whose brief and meteoric candidacy had fanned the desire of millions of her countrymen for political change. What had kept the mismatched sides in balance during the course of their 57-day election battle was a promise as potent in appeal as it was frail in prospect. The hope was that the issue would be decided democratically.

In that uncertain balance, at least for a moment last week, hung the future of the Philippines, a once vibrant Asian archipelago that is wallowing in social and economic stagnation and bedeviled by a growing Communist insurgency. On foot, by horse cart, even by boat, upwards of 24 million Philippine voters went to the polls to do something they had not done for 16 years: freely select a President. The choice appeared to be clear-cut. The candidates were President Ferdinand Marcos, 68, who has ruled for 20 years from the Spanish colonial-style Malacañang Palace, and Challenger Corazon Aquino, 53, who in the space of just ten weeks had emerged as the standard-bearer of a new force in the country, known as "people power."

There was only one clear-cut thing about the election ritual that unfolded at some 90,000 polling stations around the Philippines. Sporadically at first, then with increasing blatancy, the long-awaited exercise was marred by unsettling levels of violence, fraud, vote buying and ballot theft. More than a day after the polls closed, the official vote count by the Marcos-dominated Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had slowed to a crawl. Communications linking that effort to a parallel, informal vote count by a volunteer organization known as the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) had been severed. In many parts of the country, private citizens spent the night after the vote protecting ballot boxes with their bodies. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, who headed a 20-member delegation of official U.S. observers at the election exercise, declared that a "very disturbing pattern of incidents" had emerged. Said he: "The count is being shaped to what the President needs."

Some 18 hours after the polls closed, Marcos, in a U.S. television interview, serenely declared himself the election winner. Citing unofficial vote counts by the government-controlled Philippine press, he claimed that he had gained some 13 million votes, vs. 11 million for Aquino, a margin of roughly 54% to 46%. Marcos blandly denied any attempt at fraud. An official vote count, he said, would be available in "a few days."

Aquino also declared victory, eight hours after the polls closed. In a state-

ment, she said that "the trend is clear and irreversible. The people and I have won, and we know it." Aquino Spokesman Rene Saguisag added that the election had been "the dirtiest we have ever had."

The confused and contradictory situation was greeted with gloomy silence by the Reagan Administration, which had worked hard to try to ensure a free, fair and, above all, credible outcome to the balloting. In Washington, State Department officials said that they would delay any formal U.S. response to the election until this week. Nonetheless, Spokesman Bernard Kalb took note of the reports of fraud and violence and termed them "regrettable." Privately, one Administration official disclosed that he and his colleagues were observing the Philippine developments with "nausea." Said he: "Marcos is running scared. He is letting it all hang out, and doesn't care who sees him. It's a bigger mess than we expected."

The murky outcome left the Administration in an excruciating dilemma. It was American unhappiness with the drift of Marcos' government and ensuing social restiveness in the Philippines that led him to call the surprise election last November. For months Administration officials had been publicly warning that the far-flung country was drifting toward a dangerous right-left polarization. On the right stands Marcos. On the left is an insurgency spearheaded by the estimated 16,500 members of the Communist New People's Army, which has been steadily gaining in force. As has happened so often before, the political center was in danger of disappearing. The Administration was also worried about the fate of its two most important military installations in the Pacific, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. Both are in the Philippines, and both are subject to a lease that expires in 1991.

Marcos' call for elections caught Washington flat-footed. The strongman, who suffers from a form of systemic lupus erythematosus, a disease that often affects the kidneys, had grown increasingly withdrawn from the country's plight; he had craftily evaded previous U.S. pressures for reform. Most experts were skeptical that the vote would lead to any significant power shift in Manila. But among many Filipinos, the notion that the balloting might lead to change seemed to take on a life of its own. Philippine voters might even provide the occasion for an all too rare peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

Organizationally, the odds were always stacked in favor of Marcos and his governing New Society Movement (K.B.L.). The President's war chest bulged with about $160 million in campaign funds, and he also had at his disposal uncounted millions from the government pork barrel.

As the campaign wore on, Marcos scattered more and more giveaways from the stump. At a typical stop in the economically depressed, sugar-producing province of Negros Occidental, where anti-Marcos sentiment is known to be strong, the President went on just such a vote-getting spree. He announced the gift of $25 million in additional credits for a sugar-marketing organization, a cut in interest rates for sugar planters from 42% to 16%, a reduction in the cost of area electricity, and the electrification of some nearby towns. His audience of farmers and townspeople, many of whom had been paid between $1.50 and $2.50 to attend the rally, applauded each announcement fervidly.



SANDRO TUCCI—GAMMA/LIAISON

Challenger Aquino casts her ballot in her home province of Tarlac

"Today is my day. I hope to see you all at my inaugural."

Aside from money, he could count on a near monopoly of local political machinery. The K.B.L. controls 73 of 74 provincial governorships and all but a handful of the 1,592 mayors' offices. Virtually every one of 41,615 Filipino *barangays* (villages) has a K.B.L. ward heeler. Such a network was invaluable for getting supporters to campaign rallies, and even more important in turning out voters on election day.

Marcos' personal supervision of that network was impressive. Every night after 10 o'clock, the President for several hours fielded calls from K.B.L. officials around the country. The party hands reported on the pro-Marcos voting prospects in their locales, the lineup of poll inspectors and campaign issues. Meanwhile, more detailed election data were fed into a newly installed computer system in a presidential office building. According to opposition critics, the high-tech apparatus could be used to estimate the number of false ballots that might be required to win at each location.

Another Marcos source of strength was his hold on the country's news media. Presidential supporters own almost all of the 14 major daily newspapers and four of the five major television networks. The remaining TV outlet is owned outright by the government. Nearly all of the country's 270 radio stations owe allegiance to Marcos. Most presidential forays were covered in detail throughout the campaign, and many Marcos speeches were broadcast from start to finish.

Aquino, the widow of assassinated Opposition Politician Benigno Aquino Jr., was rarely seen on television news and was blocked by a series of bureaucratic ruses whenever she tried to buy political advertising time. The challenger's lawyer finally filed a petition against the government-owned Channel 4 in Manila to force increased coverage of her campaign. In the three days after the lawyer's petition was filed, Aquino's name was mentioned on the government channel only four times, once in a false charge that she had agreed to cede the southern part of the nation to Muslim separatists.

Aquino received some unsolicited television attention from Marcos' department of dirty video tricks. As the campaign wound down, presidential supporters put television footage of the challenger on the air on all Philippine stations. Each spot featured a female voice that sounded like Aquino's and showed the candidate in a montage of foreign war footage and other scenes of chaos. Despite Aquino's strenuous complaints, the offending spots were not removed.

In other times, such tactics might have prevailed, but the mighty Marcos machine was running against a totally unconventional movement. The Aquino campaign, long on enthusiasm and short on organization, sometimes resembled a political Woodstock. As Aquino and her vice-presidential nominee, Salvador ("Doy") Laurel, crisscrossed 68 provinces, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos from all walks of life swarmed to hear the presidential challenger repeat a simple talk. At each stop, Aquino related the alleged suffering her family had endured at the

hands of the Marcos government, culminating in her husband's 1983 assassination. She capped each speech with a slogan: *"Sobra na, tama na, palitan na!"* (Too much, enough, let's change!)

As the campaign progressed, Aquino began to outline her program in increasing detail. At a speech last week to a joint meeting in Manila of domestic and foreign Chambers of Commerce, she put forth a reform plan for an initial 100 days in office. She promised that she would attack Marcos-inspired corruption "with the zeal of a crusading housewife let loose in a den of world-class thieves." She said she would break up the last elements of the sugar and coconut monopolies run by Marcos cronies, remove taxes on seeds and fertilizers, and cut taxes on fuel and electricity. Her audience of at least 2,000 applauded enthusiastically.

Public support for Aquino reached a spectacular climax three days before the balloting, at the challenger's final rally. The gathering easily ranked among the largest in Philippine history. An enormous crush of humanity flocked to Manila's Rizal Park to hear Aquino and Laurel make their concluding speeches. A sea of yellow T shirts and banners, reflecting Aquino's campaign color, overflowed the sprawling harbor-front park. Yellow ticker tape and confetti rained down from office buildings surrounding the capacious square. In contrast to earlier Aquino rallies, which had had a decidedly homespun air, an array of professional singing and television stars held the throng's attention for three hours before the opposition candidates arrived. When Aquino and Laurel finally appeared, a cacophony of auto horns erupted, fireworks lighted the evening sky, and the crowd launched into a deafening welcome chant of "Cory! Cory! Cory!"

Aquino first led the crowd in singing the Lord's Prayer. She then castigated the Marcos regime for economic mismanagement and human-rights violations, declaring, "I am sure we have won the election." Said she, surveying the crowd: "Marcos will not be able to stop this. It's our chance to write history."

Marcos faced the same Chambers of Commerce in Manila the day after Aquino, but his reception was markedly tepid. The President attacked his opponent for naively believing that the country's Communist insurgents would lay down their arms in response to a six-month cease-fire, which is part of her campaign platform. But even though Marcos announced that he would, among other things, cut sales taxes and reduce domestic oil prices, applause from the business audience was merely polite.

Later in the day, Marcos held his own concluding rally at Rizal Park. A horde of workers had descended on the area and replaced yellow-and-green Aquino-Laurel posters with red-white-and-blue placards extolling Marcos and his running mate, Arturo ("Turing") Tolentino, 75.



ROBIN MOYER

Standing up for the power of the vote: pollwatchers guard ballot boxes in Manila



CALDERON—J.B. PICTURES

Unsettling violence: treating an opposition supporter who later died of gunshot wounds

An election marred by bloodshed, fraud, vote-buying and ballot theft.

Buses and flatbed trucks full of New Society faithful rolled in from outlying suburbs. Estimates of the crowd in the area ranged as high as 500,000. Many of those gathered for the extravaganza admitted openly that they had been paid from $2.50 to $5 to attend. As the time approached for the scheduled appearance of Marcos and his wife Imelda, helicopters flew overhead trailing red-white-and-blue smoke. Top-ranking Philippine show-business figures worked the crowd into a pleasantly receptive mood. Red-uniformed marching bands began to blare as the faithful chanted the President's campaign slogan, *"Marcos pa rin!"* (Marcos still!)

Then, just as Marcos prepared to mount the dais, disaster struck. It began to rain. As water poured down, the President's audience fled in all directions, ignoring loudspeaker pleas to stand fast and "sacrifice for what we are fighting for." Those who remained huddled closer to the speaker's platform. After the ten-minute downpour had ended, Imelda Marcos took the stage. Supporters cheered loudly when she urged the country to stand behind her husband because he was *"maka-Diyos, maka-tao, maka-bayan"* (pro-God, pro-people, pro-nation).

Marcos was conciliatory and bellicose by turn when he finally addressed the soggy gathering. For nearly 40 minutes he attacked his opponent's political inexperience and pleaded that it was the desire of the Philippine people, rather than his own wishes, that kept him in office. Then he warned that if his opponents took to the streets, "I will use the whole might and strength of the armed forces to protect the people and stop the opposition." Said he: "All we want is peace, not civil war."

The same day, Aquino received her strongest boost yet from Jaime Cardinal Sin, the ranking Roman Catholic prelate of the Philippines. The Cardinal praised the presidential challenger as someone who will "make a good President." He added, "I am tempted to ask, Is this a presidential election, or is this a contest between good and the forces of evil?" Sin's

all-but-explicit endorsement carried considerable weight in a country that is nominally 84% Catholic.

Any final doubts about the Cardinal's sympathies were ended when he turned down an invitation from President Marcos and his family to pray together for honest elections. Said the prelate: "I think they can pray without me. It's better that they pray and ask the Lord for mercy and compassion."

The day after Sin's objurgation, Marcos raised the level of political tension yet again by placing the 230,000-member armed forces on red alert. Under that status, which was extended indefinitely, all military leaves and furloughs were canceled. Marcos' reason: Aquino, he claimed, had said that his re-election would spark a civil war.

As Filipinos thronged to their polling stations, problems with voting registries began to crop up almost immediately. At the Araullo High School, a rambling wood-and-concrete structure on United Nations Avenue in midtown Manila, Policeman Oligario Remiruta, 46, lined up to cast his vote. The local poll chairman could not find Remiruta's name on the voters' list. By noon, 84 people at the school had received the same treatment.

Other peculiarities cropped up. In the Manila dockside slum of Tondo, teachers at the Imelda Marcos Elementary School complained that they were being asked to recruit ten voters each for Marcos. Well before the voting began, Marcos operatives in northerly Quezon City were openly offering indigents money to fill out their ballots in advance.

Nonetheless, both Marcos and Aquino were ready to declare victory. As he prepared to fly from Manila to his hometown of Batac in the northerly province of Ilocos Norte, the President declared that "if the difference is only 3 million [votes], I'll be disappointed." Aquino voted in her hometown of San Miguel, in the southern province of Tarlac. Said she: "Today is my day. I hope to see you all at my inaugural."

She spoke far too soon. As election day dawned in the village of Balutu, not far from Aquino's home, the atmosphere was tense. Difficulties began as soon as balloting commenced at the local elementary school, when an opposition poll watcher discovered that some 20% to 30% of the *barangay's* voters were not listed on the rolls and were therefore disqualified. Then, some 35 minutes before the 3 p.m. close of the polling station, a red vehicle with MARCOS-TOLENTINO stickers on the bumper pulled up behind the school. Six men armed with M-16 rifles that had MARCOS decals on the barrels jumped out and headed for the schoolyard. Their objective: the ballot boxes. Terror-stricken poll watchers huddled around the boxes in a nervous effort to prevent an obvious theft. At the last moment, a carload of opposition poll watchers arrived. One of the newcomers, a former Filipino Minister of Agriculture, somehow arranged to rescue the ballot boxes and have them carried by election officials to the nearby town of Concepcion for tabulation.

Many similar scenes were taking place across the country. In the Manila district of San Andres, a residential suburb, men wearing military uniforms snatched an undetermined number of ballot boxes. In the industrial suburb of Pasig, more than 100 men armed with knives, pistols and high-powered rifles ordered everyone present at one station to lie down on the floor and then walked off with the voting receptacles.

In some parts of the country, cheating hardly seemed necessary. One such place was Danao, a city on the coast of southerly Cebu island, where a road sign proclaims WELCOME TO FERDINAND MARCOS COUNTRY. Danao is the fiefdom of Businessman Ramon Durano, who owns, among other things, almost all the local cement, sugar, mining and banking industries. He may well have control over most of the 59,000 registered local voters, an unusually high proportion of the 80,000 population in the area. Not a single volunteer could be found in Danao and surrounding suburbs to act as an opposition poll watcher at the 147 local polling precincts. Said Voting Registrar Roque Loro: "New Society Movement, there are plenty. But opposition, there are none."

After the polls closed, the vote counting started slowly across the Philippines and then almost stopped. Nearly 48 hours after balloting ended, only about 28% of the votes had been officially tabulated. The government's COMELEC tally showed Marcos ahead with 3 million votes, compared with Aquino's 2.9 million. The sluggish pace of the count indicated to many opposition leaders that COMELEC was having trouble making its totals come out to the government's satisfaction. Meanwhile, the volunteer group NAMFREL said that in its unofficial tally Aquino had 5.3 million votes, while the President had about 4.5 million after 46% of precincts had reported.



CALDERON—J.B. PICTURES

Growing threat: New People's Army guerrillas paint the slogan "Bullets Not Ballots"

A murky outcome leaves the Reagan Administration with an excruciating dilemma.

As the weekend wore on, the situation in Manila remained surprisingly calm. Since Marcos had hunkered down in the presidential Malacañang Palace, it seemed that it might be up to the opposition to make the next move to break the election deadlock. Aquino's first step in that direction was a mild one. On Saturday she called a press conference to demand that Marcos concede "in the best tradition of democratic politics." Three hours later, the President held a press conference of his own to reiterate his claim to victory, by a new margin of 1.5 million votes. He reminded journalists that the formal naming of a winner was the responsibility of the National Assembly, which he controls, and even raised the vague possibility that he might declare the whole election invalid.

Sadly, the vote that many Filipinos had hoped would improve their country's doleful lot looked as if it would leave the Philippines more divided, more dangerous and angrier than ever. ***—By George Russell. Reported by Sandra Burton and Barry Hillenbrand/***

COVER STORIES

A Test for Democracy

For the Philippines and the U.S., stakes are high as Marcos faces the voters

Never in the long and turbulent history of the Philippines has there been an election campaign quite like it. In the muddy streets and squares of provincial cities and villages on the island of Mindanao last week, tens of thousands of farmers and plantation workers waited for a glimpse of an unusual political heroine, a retiring, bespectacled housewife with only nine weeks of political experience. Sometimes that vigil lasted for hours, under glaring sunshine and the occasional tropical downpour, but the crowds were quiet and uncomplaining. Finally, when the long-awaited political caravan straggled into view, the throngs invariably exploded into ecstasy. As small children ran alongside the open jeep that bore Opposition Candidate Corazon ("Cory") Aquino, 53, supporters threw yellow and white confetti and shouted a welcome: "Cory! Cory! Cory!"



JAMES NACHTWEY

In pursuit of power: an Aquino rally on Luzon

Back in Manila, the capital, a different kind of spectacle was unfolding. President Ferdinand Marcos, 68, an ailing autocrat possessed of formidable political powers, made an election foray of his own from Malacañang Palace to address 7,000 longshoremen on the city's South Pier. Everything was carefully choreographed: a stream of local entertainers kept the crowd's attention until Marcos, looking drawn, tired and weak, was escorted to the podium. The President joked about rumors that he had suffered a physical collapse, and dismissed reports of his obvious ill health as so much "black propaganda." Wife Imelda by his side, Marcos then made a fervent pitch for support as a bulwark against the growing Communist-led insurgency that is stalking the country. Said he defiantly: "Once a champion, always a champion."


For the first time in 20 years, many Filipinos were not so sure. Less than two weeks before some 30 million voters are expected to go to the polls on Feb. 7, the strange election exercise that has mesmerized the Philippines since November had blossomed into something unexpected: a real race. As city and rural folk thronged in astonishing numbers to Aquino rallies, her campaign organizers extolled the local outpouring as "people power," an antidote for the highly organized and often unscrupulous campaign machine that has kept Marcos in office since 1965. Members of the President's ruling New Society Movement, who had heard their leader predict an 80-20 victory for himself, were shading that estimate back to 60-40. At least two senior members of Marcos' Cabinet were even more cautious, predicting only a 55-45 win for the President. Exulted Linggoy Alcuaz, an official of one of the country's myriad splinter opposition parties: "There are times in history when things come to a boil, and this is one of them."

Few of his countrymen would argue with that assessment. The mood in Manila, thick with political tension ever since Marcos issued his surprise election call, grew even more claustrophobic last week with the latest campaign soundings. The rumor mills that grind endlessly in the city's crowded coffeehouses increased their outpourings of speculation. Fears flew that Marcos might try to cancel the balloting, a possibility that he has never quite rejected. Opponents of the President were worried that he intended to rig the election contest even more blatantly than other votes have been altered in the past. If that happened, they warned darkly, Aquino supporters by the tens of thousands would take to the streets. The Philippines, said Jose ("Peping") Cojuangco, Aquino's campaign manager, was "a powder keg." Agreed Jaime Ongpin, a wealthy businessman and key Aquino campaign adviser: "I have never felt more uncertain about the future than I do now."

That sentiment is widely shared in the Philippines and in Washington. In both places, there is a near overwhelming sense that a chapter of history is almost over: the Marcos era. Over the two decades since his first democratic election in 1965, the President has run the gamut of transformation, changing from a populist reformer to a modernizing strongman to, in recent years, a fading and often grotesque shadow of his former authoritarian self. In the process, he has profoundly changed his country, at times in the past for the better, but of late decidedly for the worse.

Now events in the sprawling Pacific archipelago appear to be moving rapidly beyond Marcos' fading ability to control them with anything like the skill and ruthlessness that he so often displayed in the past. While the President continues to hold sway in the Spanish colonial-style Malacañang Palace, the vacuum of authority outside the palace has reached alarming proportions. Among other things, it has led U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz to warn that the Philippines is heading toward "civil war on a massive scale" within three to five years if the insurgency spearheaded by the Communist New People's Army continues to grow *(see following story)*.

A major cause of the political deterioration is the shaky economy. Gross domestic product has declined by nearly 10% in the past two years, and in real per capita terms now stands no higher than in 1972. Underemployment among the 21 million-member work force is estimated at 40%. Foreign debt exceeds $26 billion. These results may seem no worse than those of many Third World countries, except that the Philippines lies within the most economically dynamic region in the world. Marcos blames much of the country's doldrums on external causes. His critics, who now include most of the influential Philippine business community, place much of



KELER—SYGMA

The threat of civil war: government troops on the hunt following a Communist attack

the blame for the stagnation on the regime's practices of economic favoritism, known locally as "crony capitalism."

Ricardo Pagusara, 24, a college dropout in the southern Philippine port city of Cebu, puts the country's immediate dilemma more simply. Says he: "Respect for the present government is fast disappearing. People have become so desperate that they are willing to gamble with a new, untried person." Says Enrique Zobel, a prominent pro-Marcos businessman: "The people simply want a change."

The nature of that change is a matter of major concern to the Reagan Administration. Officially, the U.S. position is that it favors no particular candidate so long as the balloting exercise is "free, fair and credible." Says U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth: "We are confident that we can work effectively with whatever government the Filipino people elect in a fair and clean election." In a country where even in the best of times election procedures have been marred by vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and other forms of fraud, that is a tall order. Last week U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar agreed to lead an official delegation of American observers to the Philippines for the balloting.

Vote rigging would be a calamity, as Assistant Secretary of State Wolfowitz put it last week, because it undoubtedly would turn large numbers of Filipinos to "radical alternatives, specifically the Communists." Wolfowitz, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also decried an atmosphere of "intimidation" that is on the increase in some areas of the Philippines. So far, at least ten Aquino campaign workers and four Marcos supporters have been slain during the presidential race.

Behind a façade of impartiality, however, the Administration has been straining for months to shape what it feels to be the inevitable post-Marcos transition. So persistent have the U.S. efforts been that Ambassador Bosworth is referred to by some Marcos aides as the "leader of the opposition." Wolfowitz's gloomy public assessment of the insurgency, for example, was part of a U.S. push to reform the corrupt and inefficient 230,000-member armed forces and paramilitary, which have been largely ineffective in combatting the Communist threat. As part of its approach, the U.S. has also offered the Marcos government moderate doses of military assistance (total budgeted for fiscal 1986: $55 million). Says a senior U.S. official: "Military aid is the only thing keeping the reform movement alive."


How alive is another matter. Marcos has proved to be a master at slipping away from U.S. attempts to lasso him into reform. Much U.S. effort, for example, has been aimed at getting Marcos to retire General Fabian Ver, the President's cousin, as armed forces Chief of Staff. Washington was pointedly critical of a Philippine court decision in December to exonerate Ver in the 1983 assassination of Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino, the President's chief political opponent and the husband of Challenger Corazon Aquino. More than any other event, the Aquino assassination galvanized popular opposition to Marcos, leading up to his snap election call. Subsequent U.S. pressure led to a vague presidential promise that Ver would "probably" retire before the elections, but last week Marcos seemed to backtrack on that.

Washington's greatest accomplishment so far has been to force Marcos to address an issue he ducked for more than a decade: naming a Vice President. At his party's nominating convention in December, Marcos chose Arturo ("Turing") Tolentino, 75, a former Foreign Minister whom the President sacked from that job for espousing views incompatible with his own. Theoretically, should Marcos die after winning the Feb. 7 elections, Tolentino would take his place. The wily Marcos may have been trying to dodge that likelihood when he chose as Vice President a man who is seven years his senior. Marcos' opponents fear that the President may still make a last-minute substitution of his ambitious wife Imelda as Vice President. Under a newly promulgated Philippine election code, such a move would be legal right up to noon of election day.

Privately, some U.S. officials see little hope of a peaceful transfer of power so long as Marcos is alive. Intelligence sources have long reported that the Philippine President suffers from a form of systemic lupus erythematosus, a disease in which human antibodies attack the body's tissue, especially in many cases the

The specter of anti-Americanism: leftist students demonstrate against the election and the military bases

CALDERON—J.B. PICTURES



kidneys. According to the same sources, Marcos has undergone one, and perhaps two, kidney transplants. He is constantly medicated, and his face shows it, usually being either drawn or puffed up from the effects of drugs. When Marcos appears at campaign rallies, he is often carried on the shoulders of guards, and he visibly flinches from pain. In the course of his long, rambling campaign speeches, his voice frequently cracks and rasps. Nonetheless, he still manages to muster the will to continue. Warns a Western diplomat: "This is still a formidable political figure."

The Reagan Administration's concern and frustration with Marcos is a far cry from its attitude a few years ago. Vice President George Bush, on a visit to Manila in 1981, gushed effusively to Marcos that "we love your adherence to democratic principles and to the democratic process." In 1982 the Philippine leader was welcomed with open arms at the White House. What stood uppermost in U.S. calculations at that time was the fact that Marcos controlled something that the U.S. badly needs: access to Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, two of the most important American military facilities in the Pacific. Says a State Department official: "The bottom line always was, and always will be, those bases."


In fact, much more is at stake in the crisis engendered by Marcos' fading grip: the stability of the Philippine archipelago and U.S. influence in the entire region. The Philippines is an important member of the Association of South East Asian Nations, a six-nation group* that has enjoyed surprising stability and prosperity in the wake of the U.S. defeat in Viet Nam. Collapse of the Philippines in the face of a Communist insurgency would severely impair the security of the remaining ASEAN members and pose a threat to U.S. allies as far away as Australia.

At the same time, Washington's failure to prevent such a collapse would be regarded as a sign of U.S. impotence, and might encourage similar insurgencies elsewhere. Yet, as in Iran, Central America and other trouble spots around the world, the U.S. has only limited means available to help in shoring up its ally—short of a military intervention that the American public and, above all, Congress would undoubtedly not support.

The U.S. interest in the fate of the Philippines goes much deeper, however, than geopolitics. It derives from the fact that from 1898 to 1946, the archipelago was a U.S. colony. While there were some shameful aspects to the colonization, notably the violence that accompanied the consolidation of American rule, no other country in Southeast Asia has received such a profound and mostly progressive transfusion of purely American values, attitudes and democratic institutions, reflected superficially in the continuing use of English as the lingua franca of the islands.

The weight of the common U.S.-Philippine heritage is symbolized by the 17,000 white headstones of the American Cemetery at Fort Bonifacio, overlooking Manila. Many thousands of other Americans are also interred in the Philippines, their lives lost in the Spanish-American War, the U.S. war of colonial domination and World War II.

*Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines.



WHEELER—SIPA/SPECIAL FEATURES

The burden of poverty: in a Manila slum, residents live by scavenging through garbage


The living ties between the two countries are also vibrant. In addition to at least 18,000 Americans who serve at Clark and Subic Bay, an additional 50,000 Americans, including many of local descent, live and work in the country; meanwhile, about 1 million Filipinos live and work in the U.S. Some 500 U.S. firms operate in the Philippines, representing about $2.5 billion in U.S. private investment. They provide 10% of all the economic activity in the Philippines and directly employ some 50,000 people. Multinational corporations, most of them with such familiar names as Dole, Procter & Gamble and Firestone, generate 20% of the sales of the top 1,000 firms in the Philippines, but they pay roughly 30% of all Philippine corporate taxes. Says a U.S. businessman in Manila: "We're a natural part of the community here, which we are not in the rest of Southeast Asia."

A Spanish, then American, colonial heritage (sometimes known as "400 years in a convent followed by 50 years in Hollywood") gave the Philippines something else: a sense of Western-style unity. But even today that cohesion can be fragile and sometimes misleading. The sense of national purpose is strongest around Manila (pop. 8 million) and other urban centers. Roughly 70% of Filipinos, however, still live in rural areas. A scattering of more than 7,000 islands spanning 1,150 miles from north to south, the republic is still a ramshackle agglomeration of people speaking 86 languages and dialects. Its citizens range from the animistic Badjao tribe of the Sulu islands to the Tagalog-speaking natives of Batangas province on the island of Luzon to the wealthy, Chinese-mestizo clans, which form a substantial portion of the country's economic oligarchy.

In such a mélange, family ties and the traditional Philippines system of reciprocal obligations between individuals, known as *utang na loob* (literally, inner debt), count for as much as the trappings of Western modernity. Regional identities are also important. Says Fred Whiting, 47, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila: "There is a great desire here to make democratic institutions work, but it is mixed with a liking for strong leaders."

Marcos is neither the longest-reigning nor the most dictatorial leader in the region. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, whose autocratic skills are legendary, has dominated his city-state for 27 years; Indonesia's President Suharto has been unchallenged for 18 years. But both of those men, as well as Taiwan's Chiang Ching-kuo, have matched their severity with an ability to provide a rising standard of living for an ever increasing number of citizens. Says Whiting: "Many of us are impressed with Marcos' political acumen but feel that some of his economic policies are questionable."

The Marcos who came to power by democratic election in 1965 was a nationalistic social reformer. In his first inaugural address, he claimed that "our government is gripped in the iron hand of venality, its treasury is barren ... its armed forces demoralized and its councils sterile." Marcos strongly identified him-



PETER CHARLESWORTH

The ties that bind: fast food in Manila

Common interests go far beyond geopolitics.

self with economic and social development, land reform and centralized government. Nonetheless, he soon began to fall back into the tradition of Tammany Hall–style politics that, as one American official wryly notes, is "part of the U.S. legacy in the Philippines." He also ran afoul of a simmering separatist insurgency among the Moros, an Islamic minority in the south of the heavily Roman Catholic country, and felt the first stirrings of the fledgling Communist New People's Army.

In 1972, three years after his re-election, Marcos declared martial law, citing the economic crisis of the day and the threat, then barely credible, of the Communist insurgency. His real motive was to remain in power beyond the constitutional limit of two four-year terms. For the next eight years Marcos ruled by decree, with the aim of building a New Society based on "constitutional authoritarianism." He claimed to be a dictator with a social conscience: he pushed forward with land reform (often at the expense of his landed political opponents) and carefully controlled trade unionism. More important, Marcos extended the sway of his New Society to virtually every *barangay* (village) in the archipelago, creating both a powerful political machine and a new economic class dependent on government patronage.

In 1981 Marcos ended martial law, after finding ways to retain some of his most important dictatorial powers. Chief among them was Amendment 6, an addition to a new constitution that he rammed through in 1973. Amendment 6 allows the President to rule by decree almost whenever he chooses. Other laws give Marcos the power to arrest alleged national-security violators at will under a so-called preventive-detention authority; the right of habeas corpus in such cases is effectively suspended. According to the U.S. State Department, some 500 to 600 people charged with national-security offenses were in Philippine jails at the end of 1985. More sinister are the so-called "salvagings" or death-squad killings, which are carried out as part of the war against subversion by right-wing vigilantes with ties to the security forces. As many as 219 salvagings were alleged to have taken place in the first five months of last year.

Marcos has always paid careful lip service, and sometimes more than that, to

Trying to Keep It Clean

"On election day, bring two pieces of bread and a bottle of water. Bring a candle too. You should stay until the voting and the counting are over. If you think these will not do, bring a 2-by-2 piece of wood and protect your ballot with it."

Vice-Presidential Candidate Salvador Laurel, who issues this warning repeatedly at opposition rallies, is not alone in voicing the fear that Ferdinand Marcos will somehow rig the Feb. 7 elections to ensure his victory. The U.S., equally concerned, has insisted that the Marcos government officially accredit the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), an independent group that helped prevent widespread fraud in the 1984 parliamentary elections, to monitor the balloting. In addition, President Reagan last week appointed a delegation of lawmakers and private citizens to observe the vote. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, agreed to take part in the mission despite some reservations. Said he: "It would be a serious mistake for the United States not to demonstrate its support for democracy in the Philippines." Other lawmakers refused to go on the grounds that any U.S. presence could serve to legitimize a questionable election result.



PETER CHARLESWORTH

Ballot boxes being unloaded in Manila last week

Marcos enjoys several significant advantages even before the balloting begins. His K.B.L. Party has a campaign war chest of $160 million, six times the amount Corazon Aquino and Laurel have at their disposal. Marcos commands the armed forces, whose troops serve as peacekeepers, and he appoints the Commission on Elections. Most important, perhaps, the President and his supporters own all five television stations in the country, and have imposed a virtual blackout on coverage of the Aquino campaign.

Geographic sprawl and an outdated balloting system make the Philippines susceptible to vote fixing. Of the 90,000 polling stations located on more than 7,000 islands, only a handful have votes tabulated by computer. The majority use paper ballots, manual counting, chalkboard addition and telephone or telex messages to relay the results.

NAMFREL has devised "Operation Quick Count," a monitoring network that relies on sheer numbers. It has recruited 150,000 Filipinos to oversee each step of the elections. Operation Quick Count will start early on election day: voters are being urged to turn up at 7 a.m., when the polls open, to make certain the ballot boxes are empty. Last week, however, the Commission on Elections said it would not allow foreign reporters or "unauthorized" observers to come within 150 ft. of polling places. Says a U.S. expert who traveled to the Philippines last month to study the election process: "It discredits the claim that the government welcomes observers and has nothing to hide."

The biggest danger of fraud, according to NAMFREL Chairman Jose Concepcion, occurs as the padlocked ballot boxes are transported from rural precincts to the municipal halls for canvassing. "On the way, the ballot transporters can make as many stops as they want for snacks, inviting the inspectors along," he says. "Meanwhile, the ballots could be switched or substituted." To prevent such irregularities, Concepcion wants convoys of five to ten cars to accompany the ballot boxes.

Once unlocked, the boxes will be placed on tables in plain view. One by one, the ballots will be counted, and the votes recorded on a blackboard. NAMFREL is suggesting that local residents look over the shoulders of those calling out the votes, surround the blackboard to ensure that the chalk does not slip, and take photographs of the final tallies. The official count will be certified with the thumbprints of observers from both major parties.

No one expects NAMFREL to guarantee a 100% clean election. But experts believe that the citizen poll-watching effort, if properly funded and implemented, should be able to reduce fraud to a tolerable level, especially if Marcos allows Operation Quick Count to publicize returns early enough to prevent massive changes in tallies later on. The best guarantee of fairness, however, is a decisive vote. Opposition tacticians think that unless Aquino commands a 12% to 15% lead when the polls close, Marcos will find a way to alter the results in his favor. By contrast, the President will have to win by a landslide if he hopes to convince his countrymen and the U.S. that his victory is legitimate. —*By John Moody. Reported by Nelly Sindayen/Manila and Alessandra Stanley/Washington*

democratic forms. Some of his more controversial authoritarian powers were ratified in a carefully orchestrated 1981 referendum, which he carried with 80%. The same year, he won a presidential election against a toothless opponent and also got approval for a constitutional amendment that stretched his four-year term to six years. In 1984 Marcos held elections for the Batasang Pambansa, or National Assembly. Opposition politicians won roughly one-third of the seats. Despite widespread accusations of cheating, the elections were judged acceptable by the Philippine community at large.

Lord Acton, the British historian who wrote that power corrupts, would have recognized a fitting subject in the Marcos regime as its authority continued to expand. For years, critics have focused on the extravagance of First Lady Imelda, a former beauty-contest winner who has channeled huge amounts of money into pet projects through her roles as governor of Metro Manila, the administrative unit that encompasses the capital and its sprawling suburbs, and as national Minister of Human Settlements. Last week a U.S. congressional inquiry was looking into allegations that the Marcos family has been secretly funneling money, possibly including U.S. aid funds, into American real estate.

Whatever the ups and downs of his health, Marcos has always insisted on keeping a patriarchal grip on the apparatus of power. An outsider who was allowed to visit a caucus of the ruling New Society Movement last year reported that the session resembled "a big meeting of all the warring tribes, in which the President was like the chief, called upon to arbitrate all of their family feuds." None of the burning national difficulties of the day, such as the Communist insurgency and the ailing economy, were discussed. Instead, local and provincial party bosses offered up their special pleading to Marcos, who listened, scolded, took matters under advisement and rendered judgment.


JAMES NACHTWEY

Laurel: a folksy campaign presence


NOLI YAMSUAN

Cardinal Sin: she listens


ROBIN MOYER

Tolentino: late choice

Nowadays, according to a Western diplomat, the lack of reality surrounding the governing machinery is even more pronounced. Says he: "It's as if the central nervous system of government has broken down. Orders are issued at the center, but nothing happens in the provinces."

The woman who has challenged the lame but still powerful Marcos machine has few formal qualifications for her dragon-slaying role. Corazon Cojuangco Aquino is nonetheless fully at home with the local perquisites of privilege and authority. Her family and that of her martyred husband Benigno are charter members of the Philippine political and economic oligarchy that was pushed aside by Marcos. Corazon Aquino's father was a sugar baron, and her maternal grandfather was a Philippine Senator. One of her cousins, Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., is reckoned to be the President's closest economic crony. He is controller of a national coconut monopoly.

Educated at private Philippine schools run by Roman Catholic nuns and at New York City's College of Mount St. Vincent, where she earned a degree in French and mathematics, Aquino originally dabbled with the idea of a career in law. Eventually she decided to concentrate on being a helpmate to her spouse. But while raising five children during 28 years of marriage, she was exposed to the rough-and-tumble of backroom politics. For most of that period her husband was considered the second most important political figure in the country, after Marcos.

In 1972, after Marcos invoked martial law, Benigno Aquino was arrested on charges of murder and subversion. Many Filipinos believe that his most serious crime was to be a virtual shoo-in to win 1973 presidential elections that were scheduled but never took place. During Aquino's 7½ years of imprisonment, his wife was the sole link between the Philippine opposition leader and his followers. In 1980, when Marcos freed Benigno so that he could have heart surgery in the U.S., she accompanied him in a three-year exile in Boston. She later said it was one of the happiest periods of her life.

That idyll ended on Aug. 21, 1983, when Benigno was shot while getting off a China Airlines Boeing 767 jetliner at Manila International Airport. The killing was initially blamed by the regime on a lone, allegedly Communist gunman, whom government security guards shot instants later. The majority of members on a Marcos-appointed commission of inquiry later said that the evidence pointed to a far-reaching military conspiracy that might have included Chief of Staff Ver. But after an eight-month trial tainted by questionable legal procedures, Ver and 24 other military defendants were acquitted.

Out of the tragedy Corazon Aquino attained the status of a national saint. She first threw that prestige openly into the political fray in the 1984 National Assembly elections, when she stumped the countryside on behalf of the splintered opposition. A deeply devoted Roman Catholic, Aquino finally decided to run for the presidency after repeated consultations with Jaime Cardinal Sin, leader of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, who encouraged her decision. Sin also brokered an alliance between Aquino and her running mate, Salvador ("Doy") Laurel, 57, head of the well-organized United Nationalist Democratic Opposition.

Reserved and moralistic by nature, Aquino has shown that she also has a steely streak. Unrelentingly stubborn concerning the alleged injustice of the Marcos government's investigation of her husband's murder, she can also crack the whip among her sometimes fractious followers. More than once, she has demonstrated a street-wise familiarity with the grittier ins and outs of Filipino politics, such as fund raising, that she learned at her late husband's side.

As a public speaker, Aquino strikes few sparks. Her voice is high pitched and lacks inflection. She seldom gestures with her hands. Nonetheless, she has the capacity to hold her audiences through simple, unaffected recitation of the sufferings of her family at the hands of the Marcos regime, and her blunt accusation that "Mr. Marcos is the No. 1 suspect in the murder of my husband." She also charges Marcos of being, because of his authoritarian methods, "the most successful recruiter for the Communists."

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Playing the card of anti-Communism.

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love. The vice-presidential nominee usually serves as Aquino's lead-off speaker, warming up crowds for the less practiced message to follow.

Increasingly, however, the shy Aquino has learned how to use her bare knuckles in political repartee. Last week Marcos accused his opponent of lacking femininity. The ideal woman, he said at a Manila rally, is someone "gentle, who does not challenge a man, but who keeps her criticism to herself and teaches her husband only in the bedroom." The President had been visibly stung by an earlier Aquino remark accusing him of cowardice for declining to campaign on the island of Mindanao, a hotbed of the Communist insurgency. Four days later Aquino told a warmly receptive audience of more than 1,200 Rotarians in Manila that Marcos was an "inveterate liar," and summed up her speech with the line "And may the better woman win!"

Marcos had further reason to be angry and humiliated later in the week, after the New York *Times* published an article claiming that Marcos' wartime record as a guerrilla fighter against the occupying Japanese, to which he makes frequent and boastful reference, was judged by the U.S. Army back in 1948 to be "fraudulent" and "absurd." Ever since his early political days Marcos has claimed to have played a hero's role as leader of a Philippine guerrilla unit called *Ang Mga Maharlika* (Free Men) between 1942 and 1944. An Army report squirreled away in U.S. Government archives shows that Marcos had instead deserted his guerrilla unit, eventually to join up with an American force during the 1944 Philippines invasion. Within hours of the article's publication in New York City, the information was being announced in Manila with banner headlines in an opposition newspaper. Marcos called the revelations "crazy" and "laughable."

During the campaign, Aquino has learned how to turn aside with a sharp reply any Marcos attacks on her lack of political experience. As she told the Rotarians, "I concede that I cannot match Mr. Marcos when it comes to experience. I admit that I have no experience in cheating, stealing, lying or assassinating political opponents."


Aquino can draw upon lots of experience in her opposition coalition. Her circle of advisers includes a number of Filipino political figures who have chafed on the sidelines of power for years. Among them: former Senator Jovito Salonga, head of a left-of-center splinter party and one of the country's best lawyers, and Jose Diokno, another former Senator and human rights activist. Aquino can call on economic expertise from the disaffected Philippine business community. She and her advisers have also been cultivating relations with high- and medium-ranking members of the armed forces. The ques-

Twin Anchors for American Might

The two U.S. military facilities in the Philippines lie at the epicenter of both the western Pacific and the presidential campaign. To the Pentagon, their eventual fate is of critical importance. As Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage said last week, "Their location astride the vital Pacific sea-lanes, plus their unmatched facilities, makes them an unsurpassable combination."

Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base are the largest U.S. military installations in any foreign country. With 18,000 men and women on active duty, they manifest the determination of the U.S. to maintain its power in the economically fastest-growing region in the world. Militarily, they project U.S. might all the way to the Persian Gulf and safeguard the sea-lanes through which 80% of the West's strategic raw materials pass.

Under an agreement that expires in 1991, the U.S. contributes $180 million a year to the Philippines for the use of the facilities. To keep them running, it injects about $350 million into the local economy, providing jobs for 53,200 Filipinos. Yet the terms, if not the arrangement itself, are almost certain to change. President Marcos said last week that access to Clark and Subic should be regulated by a formal treaty, and he has hinted that the U.S. payment should quintuple in 1988, when renewal talks begin. His opponent, Corazon Aquino, has pledged to permit an American presence until 1991. While insisting that she is keeping her options open, she says, "There will be an eventual removal of the bases."


ROBIN MOYER

Subic Bay with ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet at dock

In 1947, a year after the Philippines gained independence from the U.S., the two countries signed an agreement permitting the U.S. military to operate Clark and Subic for 99 years. In 1959 the term was shortened to 25 years, subject to renewal or cancellation every five years. During the 1979 negotiations, Marcos exploited anti-American sentiment and demanded $7.5 billion in "rent." Eventually, he settled for sovereignty over both bases plus $900 million in assistance over five years. One reason that the U.S. was willing to placate Marcos was that the Soviet Union has since 1979 slowly established a major naval complex at the fomer U.S. base at Cam Ranh Bay in Viet Nam, about 750 miles west of the Philippines. The deep natural harbor at Subic Bay, 50 miles northwest of Manila on the South China Sea, is the primary support and logistics base for the U.S. Seventh Fleet's 80 ships and 550 aircraft. Four floating dry docks can accommodate surface craft or submarines. Its supply depot is the Navy's largest, and its magazine holds 3.8 million cu. ft. of ammunition. Some 4,500 Filipino technicians keep 70 ships a month in good repair. The workers earn a typical salary of $1.80 an hour, one-seventh the amount in U.S. shipyards.

Clark, whose parade ground was once grazing land for the horses of the U.S. Fifth Cavalry, has a 10,500-ft. landing strip that can handle any U.S. Air Force plane. It is also a vital logistics base, storing 200,000 sq. ft. of ammunition and 1 million sq. ft. of war matériel, from spare parts to blankets. Nuclear weapons are believed to be stored at both Clark and Subic Bay.

The prospect of being forced to close and relocate the two bases causes shudders in Washington. Because no single location offers the advantages of Clark, the air base's functions would probably have to be distributed among facilities in Japan and Guam. An alternative for the naval station could be found at Palau. But no other site offers a skilled labor force that could duplicate the huge volume and the low cost of maintenance performed at Subic. The two bases are, as a report by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies puts it, "simply irreplaceable."

tion of whether the military is loyal to Marcos or to the national constitution remains one of the most delicate issues in the country.

Aquino is learning how to forge positions that no longer sound startlingly naive, if idealistically attractive, to her listeners. One of her earliest promises was that if elected, she would not move into Malacañang Palace; instead she would open the residence for public wedding ceremonies. Now she sounds much less like a Filipina flower child. In her Rotary speech last week, Aquino laid out a program for lifting Marcos' "institutionalized dictatorship" that included an appeal to the Marcos-controlled National Assembly to repeal the presidential powers of preventive detention and return to the rule of habeas corpus. If the Assembly balks, she will use the rule-by-decree Amendment 6 to repeal those powers herself. Aquino would then work for a series of constitutional changes that would finally eliminate the dangerous Amendment 6.

Aquino's plan for dealing with the Communist insurgency is more controversial. She says that she would, if elected, call for an immediate six-month ceasefire in order to open negotiations with the guerrillas. She would also offer a pardon to any political prisoner willing to renounce the use of force. Aquino believes that the insurgency will lose much of its momentum once Marcos leaves office. But she insists that she will use force to fight any group that seeks to overthrow a genuinely democratic government or "destroy our cultural heritage, including our belief in God." Early in her campaign Aquino gave Marcos a target of opportunity when she said that she would offer Communists who eschewed the use of force a place in her government. Later she backed away from that statement, choosing to emphasize instead her personal anti-Communist beliefs.

On economic issues Aquino has drawn cheers from Filipino businessmen by promising to return the country to the path of free enterprise. Among other things, she has vowed to break the Marcos government's bureaucratic stranglehold on the national economy, to dismantle local monopolies over sugar and coconut marketing and production, and to renegotiate the country's foreign debt.

Aquino has received two important boosts in her low-budget, grass-roots campaign. One came from the organized left, which decided to boycott the election. That decision by a variety of organizations that have proved to be susceptible to New People's Army influence made it easier for Aquino to defend herself against Marcos' charges that she is a cat's-paw for the Communist insurgents.

The other boost came from the Roman Catholic Church. With some 13,000 priests and nuns spread across the country, the church is probably the only force in the Philippines that matches the organizational might of Marcos' political machine. Two weeks ago Cardinal Sin sent a letter to all 2,200 Philippine parishes instructing the faithful to vote for "persons who embody the Gospel values of humility, truth, honesty, respect for human rights and life." Few Filipinos had to guess whom he meant. Aquino, says the Cardinal, "is always listening to me."

Increasingly, members of some influential Philippine groups that have traditionally backed Marcos seem to be shifting to Aquino. One sign: the Chinese business community is said to have begun to funnel sizable amounts of cash into the challenger's campaign.

As the final days of the campaign tick away, the level of political tension engendered by the battle can only increase. So too will the diplomatic challenge for the U.S. To the Administration's credit, policy toward the Philippines is more coherent than that on any other recent foreign challenge of similar magnitude. In contrast to the situation in Iran during the final days of the Shah, U.S. diplomats are in close contact with the opposition. Unlike Central America, the Philippines has created no major divisions between Congress and the White House, nor among the various Executive departments.


By officially adopting a hands-off stance toward the election outcome, the Reagan Administration has now swung almost as far away as possible from its earlier fond embrace of Marcos. To U.S. policymakers, a sure sign that Washington is now perceived as being impartial is that, as one diplomat says, "neither side is happy with us."

The onetime U.S. role as a colonial overlord is still firmly fixed in the minds of many Filipinos. Any direct threats against a Philippine government, even one that had rigged an election, would be widely resented. But Marcos is also on notice that he cannot count on any U.S. support whatsoever in case of civic upheaval brought on by voter fraud. Nor is it likely that either domestic or international business confidence in the Philippines would return to normal with a cloud of that magnitude hanging over the political horizon.

The important thing, as Ambassador Bosworth told a Philippine audience last year, is that the U.S. recognizes that its permanent interest in the Philippines lies not with any particular government but with the values the two countries have come to share during their long and intimate association. Said Bosworth: "We will be judged—and we will judge ourselves—by the fate of democracy in this country and by the success of your national efforts to strengthen your democratic institutions and to ensure that they function effectively. We have a moral and political stake in a democratic Philippines, which transcends all our other interests here, strategic as well as economic."

The kind of democracy Bosworth was talking about is not a matter of authoritarianism decked out with consultative rituals and slogans. It clearly involves the removal of the deformations that Marcos has introduced to the Philippine political system. No matter who wins the election, Washington seems to be willing to adhere to that position, a fact that is not being lost on Filipinos. As Richard Holbrooke, a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, puts it, "The only way Marcos can reform is to dismantle his regime."

Only the Philippine people can decide whether Marcos will be forced to do that. As the day for that decision approached, friends of the Philippines in the U.S. could only watch and wait and renew their vows not to abandon their support for the democratic aspirations of a longtime friend and ally, regardless of what turbulence might lie ahead. —*By George Russell. Reported by Sandra Burton, Nelly Sindayen and William Stewart/Manila*



JAMES NACHTWEY

Shared blood and sacrifice: Filipinos view a memorial to General Douglas MacArthur

The U.S. has a "moral and political stake in a democratic Philippines."


Marcos and the Election Mess

Washington rethinks its options after a vote marred by 'wholesale' fraud

Some countries hold elections. In the Philippines last week, they trashed one. For the government, party men and goons worked the cities and countryside, with pin money for easy voters, clubs and guns for the harder cases. For the cause of reform, priests and nuns, teachers and students, the best of the country's moderate middle class, came to guard the polls. Voters turned out by the millions. The returns were even more squalid than usual. But when the ballot boxes were emptied, there stood Cory Aquino telling Ferdinand Marcos that he was through. "The Marcos spell is broken," she said. "The people and I have won and we know it—nothing can take victory from us."

The claim came early and was several parts bluff; but all that went with it seemed to sap Marcos. He had made the worst political mistake of his life in underestimating the housewife turned candidate who challenged him. While Mrs. Aquino talked coolly of setting up a transition government and bringing a time of healing to the Philippines, the decaying strongman, his face and hands blotched, his eyes watery, his voice weak, was reduced to scratching for enough peekaboo

Even in victory, the strongman might look like a loser: *On the final day of the campaign, the president gives a speech—but after 20 years of*



ballots to save himself. As the counting went on, Aquino wrapped herself tightly in the democratic process, leaving Marcos to mutter that if the vote didn't come out his way he might reimpose martial law, arrest his tormentors and call the whole election off. "These are matters which I have thought seriously about," he warned. "I'm trying to play it by ear."

Lost credibility: Playing by his own rules was the only way Marcos had ever done things. The only trouble was that he had miscalculated Aquino's appeal to an electorate fed up with his corrupt government and autocratic ways. Government operatives and the military had done what was expected: they rigged the vote where they could and tried to intimidate voters when they couldn't. But after 20 years of mastery, Marcos was losing his grip. Aquino could beat him, as she seemed likely to do in the tally by an independent watchdog group, or Marcos could win in the official government count with votes that had been carefully squirreled away to help him stay in power. But either way, his credibility was gone, his legitimacy shattered. In victory he would look like the one thing no strongman can afford to be—a loser.

political mastery, his grip was weakening
ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA



The election mess spilled easily across the Pacific, washing up each morning in the newspapers, each evening on the TV news. While Mrs. Aquino was dismantling the president's Filipino macho, no fewer than three separate groups were counting the vote. The confusion all but guaranteed a split decision and fury all around when the tallies are complete. In the middle of the litter was a U.S. observer team headed by Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lugar started his mission as Pollyanna, convinced that democracy would win. But as Marcos's official counters dawdled over their job, as stolen ballot boxes spilled their ballots and more than 65 people were killed around assorted polling places, the mood of Lugar and the American watchdogs changed. "The fraud on the retail level was not comparable to the fraud on the wholesale level," said one angry Lugar aide. The way the Marcos regime had conducted the election, Lugar added, raised serious questions "about how we should deal with this government."

Blood and goons: From the vantage of Washington, the greatest fear was that moderates who had believed in the democratic process would defect to the left. "If Marcos just voids the election, that's when people will take to the streets," said a senior administration official. "And if [Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian] Ver turns loose his goons, there will be blood." Analysts in Washington were nervously eyeing a clique of pro-Marcos potentates who, they feared, might be tempted to stage a coup with the help of General Ver. Compounding the danger was the fact that Filipino military loyalties ran in so many different directions. In one nightmarish scenario, Washington officials worried that Army units might begin to fight among themselves, leading the Philippines toward total collapse.

U.S. military officials were prepared for all but the worst. Commanders in the Pacific had long ago worked up contingency plans to defend the vital U.S. air and naval installations in Clark Field and Subic Bay. But in the event of serious violence or a wave of anti-Americanism, an evacuation of Americans would be impossible: there are at least 100,000 Americans on the archipelago and millions of Filipinos who are American citizens, hold American passports or are resident aliens in the United States. In one far-fetched scenario, the United States might conceivably be forced to intervene directly to restore order in the Philippines, much as it did in the Dominican Republic in 1965. In that unlikely eventuality, some U.S. officials suggest, American troops could maintain martial law until a truly fair election was held and a legitimate government could take charge.

For the moment, the Reagan administration seemed inclined to bide its time and hope for the best. "What we say at this point is irrelevant," says a senior administration official. "We have tried very hard to make the elections as honest as possible, but there are limits to what we can do." Some officials suggested that the United States could help spirit Marcos away as it did with Haiti's Jean-Claude Duvalier last week. "That plan was put together in a couple of days," says one, "and there's no



ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA

'The people and I have won': *The challenger at a rally*

doubt we could do the same for Marcos."

The election reinforced the consensus in Washington that Marcos has become his own worst enemy. The concentration of virtually all political, economic and military power within the Malacañang Palace has corrupted the armed forces and gutted the constitutional system of checks and balances while billions of dollars have been looted from the nation's faltering economy. "Marcos tore down the old socioeconomic structure and replaced it with Marcos Incorporated," says a Pentagon official. "But that has left a vacuum where the rural landlords once ruled. [Communist insurgents are] filling that vacuum, and they've given better government than some of these areas have ever had."

If Marcos clings to power, essential reforms will be unlikely, and the main beneficiaries will be the communists. A week before the election, Ronald Reagan suggested that the United States would consider a "significantly larger" aid package if the election were perceived by Filipinos to be fair. That money clearly will not be forthcoming if Marcos hangs on. Instead, the White House faces the difficult task of persuading Congress not to abandon the Philippines altogether. However unsavory Marcos has been, a tough dilemma remains: if Marcos is bad, the communist-led New People's Army (NPA) is worse—and the Philippine military needs every penny it can get to stave off a defeat that would imperil Clark Field and Subic Bay. "If we were driven out of the Philippines it would be a disaster for us," argues a senior Pentagon official. "If our ideas cannot work in the Philippines, where can they work?"

The administration intends to press for a variety of crucial reforms. The priorities—and the constraints:

■ **Contain General Ver:** The need for a tougher stand on Ver is now greater than ever. Ver is perceived by many Filipinos as Marcos's evil genius—and the man most likely to determine the successor when the president finally dies. If outrage over the election leads to widespread violence in the streets, he will also be a pivotal figure. Marcos has promised repeatedly to put Ver to pasture, only to renege; Ver's role as the election's chief enforcer made the president more dependent on him. And many Washington officials believe that if cornered, Ver and First Lady Imelda Marcos might attempt to seize control of the government rather than cede any of their immense power.

Ver's grip is seen as a primary factor in the military's disarray. His cronies constitute a separate chain of command within the military, and it is not uncommon for officers loyal to Ver to wield more power than their superiors. Ver's first postelection priority may well be to crack down on a group of young officers that has been press-

How to Rig an Election

An exercise in money and muscle

In Tarlac, Corazon Aquino's home province, the goons did not bother to wait until the polls closed before they came to steal the ballot boxes. With half an hour of voting time left, three jeeps—one decked out in a Marcos bumper sticker—carried 30 armed men to the elementary school in Balutu where the polls were located. Carrying M-16 rifles, the thugs approached the school; the village head walked into the polling area and informed the voters it was time to "get the election over with." But in this precinct, people refused to be intimidated. A crowd of 100 rushed into the school to protect the ballot boxes. On their heels was a group of U.S. journalists—and three jeeploads of opposition politicians. At the sight of them, the goons fled. The crowd broke into triumphant cheers of *"Laban!"* ("Fight!"). Then 200 residents formed a procession and carried the ballots five miles to the canvassing center in Concepcion. But there the ballots were disqualified: private citizens were not authorized to deliver them.

The presidential election was less a contest between Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino than a pitched battle between the voters and fraud. Muscle and guns powered the Marcos machine. In one Manila slum, armed men raided a precinct, dumped the ballots into a storm sewer, and stuffed the boxes with replacements. In Muntinlupa, thugs fired into the air to drive away poll watchers—one of whom was a Catholic nun. In another precinct, a goon held a knife to the throat of poll watcher Christina Cuyugan until she surrendered the ballot box. On Negros Island, a group of pro-Marcos youths calling themselves the Concerned Citizens' Athletic Association took over supervision of the polling. They forced each voter to fill out his ballot and hand it over, then read it over a public-address system. "They won't frighten me," insisted a well-heeled matron who voted for Aquino. But most of the voters in that precinct took the hint—and cast their ballots for Marcos.


Pin money: While intimidation drove the machine, money greased it. Government officials, supposedly banned from the polling places, nevertheless hung around and handed money to pliant voters. In one southern city, voters entering the polling centers got envelopes marked "Merry Christmas." Inside, they found $1.50 and a sample ballot filled out for Marcos and his running mate, Arturo Tolentino. Voters in a pro-Aquino district of Manila could even make pin money without having to vote for Marcos. They were being paid a dollar to stay away from the polls.

Not that the president's supporters were completely profligate with their money. At one precinct in a poor section of Manila, poll watchers caught 55-year-old Magdalena Abellera trying to cast an irregular ballot. She told them that while riding to the polls on a bus, she encountered a woman passing out ballots constructed with carbon sheets so that when the voter wrote in his vote, a copy would be made. About 20 people on the bus accepted them, Abellera said. The deal was simple: use the ballot in



Machine politics: *Marcos*





GERRY BALDO—AFP

supporters try pistol power and free rice to influence the polls



SUSAN MEISELAS—MAGNUM

the polling place and retain the copy to prove you had voted for Marcos. Turn in the copy at a designated address in Manila and collect. It turned out the ballots were counterfeit, and her vote was disallowed. The Marcos people in the precinct, apparently, were not about to be cheated out of the votes they had paid for.

Other abuses were more prosaic. In some polling areas, officials haggled over election records or took lunch breaks, perhaps hoping that Aquino supporters would get tired of standing in line and go home. At the polls, election workers were supposed to mark the fingers of people who had cast their ballots with indelible ink to prevent them from trying to vote more than once. It soon turned out that the "indelible" ink could be, as one volunteer observer said, "washed off with a bit of spit." Many voters in pro-Aquino areas arrived at the polling places to find that their names had mysteriously disappeared from the registration lists. In Cotabato on Mindanao, Aquino supporters complained that fully half of the 50,000 voters had been disenfranchised. Similar problems occurred in Manila, an Aquino stronghold. "The Manila vote," said Sen. Richard Lugar, cochairman of the official U.S. observation team, "has been held down by systematic harassment. My own political judgment is that the government concluded the results from Manila would not be good."

It might have been worse, but for the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections, known by the acronym Namfrel. Under American pressure, the government gave Namfrel the right to obtain certified copies of each precinct count, a privilege that could expose, if not frustrate, the wholesale switching of results at the municipal or provincial level. Namfrel also fielded, by its own estimate, 500,000 volunteers, many of them priests and nuns. They wore white vests with the slogan "I am the guardian of the nation" on the back, and their job was not an easy one. In dozens of areas the volunteers were bullied or shot at. One was killed. In the Metro Manila district of Makati, thugs with U.S.-made assault rifles opened fire on Namfrel poll watchers and seized control of the building. Namfrel leader Jose Concepcion organized a march of 2,000 volunteers to "retake" the polling place. "We had to send our Namfrel marines to rescue our volunteers," Concepcion said later. "But our marines are nuns."

Glacial counting: All this, of course, occurred before the vote count began. After the counting started, it was much harder for Namfrel, the various foreign observers, and the estimated 1,000 foreign journalists on hand to find out what was going on. But there was no shortage of suspicions, particularly as the official tally by the government's Commission on Elections proceeded at a glacial pace. Many of the returns, for instance, were supposed to be collected by



ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA

Victory? *Imelda Marcos*

the Philippine Air Force from the thousands of islands in the archipelago and flown back to the capital for counting. Would the returns the Air Force delivered for counting tally with the votes the people cast? Or would the real returns be jettisoned en route and replaced by phonies? It was anyone's guess. But it was no surprise that as the counting continued, Namfrel's tally favored Aquino while the Comelec count showed Marcos ahead. Said Aquino spokesman Rene Saguisag: "This certainly must be the dirtiest election we have ever held."

Marcos, for his part, summoned reporters to Malacañang Palace and told them he was "distressed" that anyone would think the election fraudulent because "we have done everything to make it honest." The president had holed up with his military and civilian advisers in the "War Room" on the palace grounds to monitor developments. "There is no panic," said one well-wired source. "Just the chess planning of the middle and end game."

ROBERT B. CULLEN *with* RICHARD VOKEY *and* MELINDA LIU *in Manila*

ing for military reform. The obvious conclusion, says a top U.S. official, is that no real military improvement is possible while Ver is in command.

■ **Clean up the military:** The Reagan administration has pressed for military reform, with Congress using the leverage of withholding military aid as an incentive. But with Marcos and Ver thwarting all meaningful change so far, a more effective campaign is in order. Washington officials charge that as the economy has collapsed and the NPA has taken advantage of the deteriorating political climate, the armed forces have fought back by terrorizing the population and murdering suspected opponents. Troops routinely go into the field with no rations and limited ammunition. "If a truck is broken," says an administration official, "field commanders don't turn it in, because somebody else will steal it. Their logistics, planning and support system is completely broken."

According to American experts, Marcos and Ver have tried to run the armed forces in the same way that Marcos has run the economy and everything else. "So many of the things [the military has] to do are things you can't trust them to do," complains a Defense Department official. A Pentagon colleague agrees: "A lot of their problems are leadership problems. All the money in the world wouldn't fix them."

And there is every indication that if the military did have all the money in the world, it would waste or steal a large portion of it. For reasons that are now under investigation by a U.S. grand jury, the Philippine military bought 19 Sikorsky helicopters in 1983 with $63 million in Pentagon funds. But according to a U.S. military official, the choppers are "militarily useless"; most of them have been assigned to Marcos's Presidential Security Command, where they provide "VIP transport and standby emergency-lift capability." "What that means," charges an administration official, "is that Marcos and Ver bought the choppers to save their asses if everything goes to hell."

Meanwhile, young officers are growing restless and beginning to question their commanders. Some of those officers recently told an Asia Society study mission that they would continue to obey "legal" orders, but that orders to fire on post-election demonstrators would be "illegal." They also reported that some squad leaders had begun to refuse orders to go on patrol because their men were not properly equipped. "The NPA is not going to defeat the Philippine Army, any more than the Sandinistas defeated Somoza's National Guard or Khomeini defeated the shah," observes one senior administration official. "[But] unless things change, and fast, the Philippine Army is just going to collapse."



ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA

'A day of courage': *Cardinal Sin*

■ **Keep the democratic opposition alive:** If Marcos wins amid charges of widespread fraud, it is certain to radicalize many moderate Filipinos who are unwilling to wait for the president to die or be replaced. Some of the opposition's democratic fervor might still last until the important gubernatorial and mayoral elections scheduled for May. But many U.S. officials question whether the moderates, who were mostly volunteers with no permanent political machine, could sustain their energy after the presidential election. Mrs. Aquino may now rally her supporters by leading anti-Marcos demonstrations in the streets. But protests and angry rhetoric could easily lead to bloodshed or a return to martial law, forcing millions of bitterly disillusioned moderates into the communist camp. "It's terrifying," says Aquino aide Ramon Mitra. "But maybe blood purifies a cause."

The administration established contact with the opposition during the campaign, and Reagan strategists now believe that the outcome has put useful distance between the United States and Marcos. But to many Filipinos the effort seemed lukewarm. During the campaign some low-level U.S. officials briefly debated the wisdom of providing covert aid to Aquino; they quickly rejected the idea on the ground that it would not remain covert for long. The decision left the opposition starved for cash, with many of its sympathizers afraid to reveal their support. The task now is to shore up moderates and establish greater credibility with them before they defect.

The administration has made an even-handed pledge to reward reform with more aid to the islands. "Don't ask me where we're going to get the money," says Secretary of State George Shultz. "But we'll find it one way or another for a cause like this, I'm sure." Simultaneously, though, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage warns that unless the election is perceived as fair, "we would have to face up to the enormous difficulty, perhaps even the sheer impossibility, of getting from Congress the resources to carry forward our program." Clearly Aquino as president would have a better shot at the money than Marcos does. And the legacy of a rigged election would leave her in greater need than ever of backing—and protection.

■ **Curb economic corruption:** By almost any standard, the Philippine economic system is remarkably mismanaged and corrupt. Economists in the United States and Philippines estimate that Marcos and his friends have shipped as much as $20 billion out of the country; together with some U.S. intelligence analysts, they charge that Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos alone have looted at



ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA

Will moderates defect to the left? *The president burns in effigy*

least $3 billion, and perhaps as much as $8 billion, and invested it through a variety of fronts. (The Marcoses have consistently denied allegations of hidden wealth.) According to Williams College economist Stephen Lewis, crony-controlled monopolies have manipulated the prices of wheat and flour imports and of the country's chief export crops, coconut products and sugar. According to Guy Pauker, a retired Southeast Asia specialist for the Rand Corp., "They are crooks and bad managers."

Marcos has blamed his economic problems on plunging commodity prices and high interest rates on the country's $26 billion of international debt. But other nations in the region have faced similar obstacles without experiencing anywhere near the agony of the Philippines. Economic output has dropped by 9.5 percent over the past two years; during the same period, says Prime Minister César Virata, individual purchasing power has fallen by an appalling 17 percent. American officials estimate that 70 percent of all Filipinos live in poverty.


To Shultz, the solution to the Philippine business crisis is straightforward: the economy must be pried from the hands of Marcos cronies. Shultz also warns that the Philippines must reverse the financial flight that began with the crisis sparked by the Aquino assassination. Washington officials argue that if political confidence were restored, much of the money would return. That, coupled with a recovery in world agricultural prices, would help bring an end to the social and economic troubles afflicting the rural areas, thereby slowing the growth of the NPA. But after a patently fraudulent election, capital will only continue to flee. Meanwhile, the reality of rampant corruption makes Washington's aid dilemma more acute. Without major reforms, economic aid might further en-

The U.S. Ambassador: Man in the Middle

Cardinal Jaime Sin, the outspoken archbishop of Manila, likes to tell a story about U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth. Last September the cardinal celebrated a birthday mass for Ferdinand Marcos, with whom he has frequently been at odds. As a gesture of reconciliation, the president and the prelate released a pair of white doves into the air. "His dove flew off into the blue sky," Sin says with an impish grin. "But my dove flew straight to the American ambassador. Either it was waiting for instructions from Washington, or it was waiting for a visa to the United States."

In the Philippines, an American ambassador has to get used to being regarded as a very special plenipotentiary. "Everyone's expectations of the United States are so high," Bosworth said last week. "We are portrayed as both the great villain of the West and the *deus ex machina* from whom all solutions flow." Bosworth, 46, argues that "the U.S. ability to influence events in the Philippines is vastly overrated." In fact, the United States has immense clout, morally and financially, if not always politically. And Washington's man in Manila has unique standing in the Philippines—the only ambassador who really counts, other diplomats often complain.

Bosworth has enhanced the stature of his office by helping to reposition the United States in Filipino politics. Before the assassination of Benigno Aquino in August 1983, the U.S. Embassy was closely identified with the Marcos regime. But as the president seemed to lose his grip, Bosworth's predecessor, Michael Armacost, put some distance between the embassy and the government. When Bosworth arrived in May 1984, he continued the process of moving away from Marcos and cultivating the democratic opposition—a change of stance that the United States never achieved in Iran before the shah fell.



CHARLES STEINER—PICTURE GROUP

Election watch: *Bosworth (left) with Sen. Richard Lugar*

Bosworth, a Dartmouth graduate and a career diplomat, has had periodic contacts with Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel, among other opposition figures. He has kept up his meetings with Marcos as well, and he insists that he tries to "say the same things to all people," which sometimes means walking a political tightrope. Bosworth takes care not to ruffle Marcos more than he has to, and his criticism of the regime tends to be oblique. Instead of denouncing Gen. Fabian Ver, a top Marcos crony, the ambassador talks about the need for sound military leadership. Rather than denounce corrupt presidential friends who dominate the economy, Bosworth has praised more "modern" leaders of the business community.

Bosworth also works closely with key policymakers back in Washington: Paul Wolfowitz, assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs; Richard Armitage, an assistant secretary of defense, and Gaston Sigur, the National Security Council's chief expert on Asia. He maintains that "policymaking has been a collegial process." Bosworth is said to have differed with Washington on occasion over tactics or timing. When Sen. Paul Laxalt, Ronald Reagan's personal emissary, visited Manila last year to read Marcos the riot act, the ambassador wanted the mission to be much less public than it turned out to be. But on overall administration strategy, Bosworth insists: "There has never been a serious divergency in the analysis of the problems in the Philippines."

The American ambassador campaigned hard for free and fair elections in the weeks leading up to the vote. In the process, Bosworth may have used up a lot of political capital, and some people in Washington predict that a new ambassador—and perhaps another presidential emissary—will be sent to the Philippines over the next several months. In the meantime, Bosworth has cut some of Washington's ties to Marcos and has tried to give the United States new political leverage to use in dealing with whatever comes next.

MELINDA LIU *in Manila*


trench the palace cronies. Yet a cutback in aid would only worsen the nation's dangerous economic plight.

■ **Move the U.S. bases:** Ultimately, Washington must devise a fallback in case the Philippines falls. The NPA has impressed U.S. analysts with military and political tactics that officials believe might create a military stalemate by 1989 or 1990. If the rebels succeed, the United States would soon find it difficult to defend its Philippine bases. Clark Field and Subic Bay are assets that Washington does not want to abandon. And the presence of a huge and growing Soviet naval base just across the South China Sea in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay makes some policymakers all the more willing to stick with the Philippines to the end. But even without a communist victory, the dirty election may have so alienated the Philippine electorate that the base agreement might not be renewed if the opposition ever comes to power. As a result, the Defense Department has begun to make contingency plans for an immensely expensive relocation of the bases on the less desirable islands of Guam, Belau and Saipan. There is little doubt, however, that such a move would be regarded in Asia as a shameful American retreat.

If Marcos steals the election, the Reagan administration will face more pressure than ever from its critics and from Congress to reconsider the U.S. role in the Philippines. Months of reasonable prodding clearly weren't enough to bring Marcos around. The question now is how deeply the United States should engage in the mess. Administration officials argue that the election helped Washington distance itself from Marcos and reinvigorated the Philippine political system with the possibility of change. "This is a day of courage and hope," proclaimed Cardinal Jaime Sin, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila. But democracy is also fragile. If Filipino moderates see their hopes emasculated, they may yet yield to the temptation to fight force with force. Moderation itself could soon become irrelevant.

But dictatorship is fragile, too, and Marcos now faces a very vigorous opposition. "We're going to go slow," vows Jaime Ongpin, a top Aquino adviser. "We're going to wear that bastard to the ground." Aquino aide Ramon Mitra compares Filipinos to a local water buffalo, the carabao: "They put him behind a plow, they whip him. But when the carabao gets angry, he goes berserk." Filipinos who voted with hope may respond with anger, but in either case pressure for change will now grow stronger. And that will make it harder for Marcos—or anyone seeking to emulate him—to treat an entire nation so badly.

HARRY ANDERSON *with* JOHN WALCOTT *and* KIM WILLENSON *in Washington and* MELINDA LIU, RICHARD VOKEY *and* WENDY LIN *in the Philippines*



MANUEL CENETA—BLACK STAR

Swelling the ranks: *Guerrilla recruits undergo weapons training at a jungle hideout*

Targeting the NPA

Pentagon officials are studying ways to help the Philippine military deal with a growing rebel force

In the cordilleras of northern Luzon, a former Jesuit seminarian now working under the nom de guerre Libnao picked his way along a mountain trail to a barrio nestled among terraced rice paddies. His wife—the daughter of a pro-Marcos municipal official—accompanied him, along with 18 armed escorts. Laying down their weapons—an assortment of carbines, M-16s and AK-47 assault rifles—the irregulars told the villagers they were from the New People's Army. They sang the communist "Internationale." Then they launched into a discussion about land ownership, abusive government soldiers and the need for schools and health care. "Education will solve the mess left by dirty government politics," the 32-year-old Libnao said as tribesmen in loincloths and teenagers in jeans and T shirts looked on. "Let us study dialectical materialism."

American intelligence officials say the NPA is into a lot more than dialectics. The guerrillas now operate virtually everywhere in the Philippines—including the jungles and mountains around Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. Up to now, American commanders have honored a tacit agreement with their NPA counterparts: so long as U.S. forces do not help the government fight the insurgents, NPA guerrillas will not attack the airfield at Clark or the naval installations at Subic Bay. Last year the Navy even called off a training exercise at Subic Bay to avoid the risk of a Marine "aggressor" unit running into NPA guerrillas camped within the base perimeter.

For every armed clash, NPA operatives are now pulling off three political operations—collecting taxes, holding trials or staging their own brand of teach-ins. In some of the more remote areas of the Philippine archipelago, the NPA brazenly extracts protection money from Marcos's own men. American sources say they know of a Philippine constabulary commander in northern Luzon who signed a "contract" with the local NPA leader. The agreement: local loggers pay the NPA five cents a board foot, in return for which the rebels refrain from attacking a 16-mile stretch of logging road built (with U.S. aid money) by Philippine Army engineers.

With the insurgents growing in power, Pentagon officials have been studying ways to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) fight the NPA more effectively. According to NEWSWEEK sources, the options include:

■ Sending two companies of advisers, probably Army Green Berets, to the main AFP training base at Fort Magsaysay 70

miles north of Manila. The advisers would help train the 21,000 foot soldiers and 5,000 constabulary recruits who enter the service each year. "The Army is almost completely untrained," says one Pentagon expert, who claims that draftees often are sent directly into the field for on-the-job training. That practice has produced high casualties among green troops. Last year, U.S. officials say, 2 percent of the entire AFP and constabulary was killed or wounded in engagements with the NPA.


At a cost of $210 million over five years, U.S. officials estimate, the AFP could retrain two-thirds of its 72 existing 750-man infantry battalions and re-equip them with trucks and combat gear. American officials also believe that U.S. training could help improve the professionalism of the Philippine military, and discourage some of the human-rights abuses now blamed on the Army and the constabulary. "It is working in El Salvador," says one U.S. official.

- Repairing the AFP's disastrous logistics by "starving" the Philippine Navy down to 44 ships, refusing to sell high-tech weapons that are useless against the NPA and concentrating on keeping the AFP's existing helicopters and C-130 transports flying. Senior American military officers say they have already had some success in redirecting the AFP's efforts toward the insurgency. "We've gotten them off the high-tech wicket, but we've broken a lot of china doing it," says one senior officer. Why is it so hard to get the AFP to buy walkie-talkies and trucks instead of microwave communications systems and helicopters? "The procurement system consists of Marcos and [Gen. Fabian] Ver," says one official. "Money is fungible. The Ministry of Defense has remarkably little control over its money. And high-tech, high-dollar stuff is more lucrative."
- Prodding the Army into more civic-action projects. Some of the $125 million in economic support the Reagan administration has requested for fiscal 1986 could be used to buy construction equipment for AFP engineering battalions, so that they could build roads, dams and other infrastructure projects.
- Revising the agreement on the bases at Clark and Subic Bay to make the United States more responsible for their defense. U.S. officials believe the estimated $500 million that would be needed to modernize the Philippines' own air-defense system would be better spent fighting the NPA.

The NPA's exact strength is hard to determine. U.S. intelligence sources estimate that as many as 15,000 well-armed guerrillas—backed by 10,000 part-time militiamen—are operating in 62 of the country's 73 provinces, and that their numbers are growing at the rate of 20 percent a year. The rebels avoid set-piece battles, fearing the Army's superior firepower. Their strategy is to overrun isolated government detachments, police stations and civil-defense units—capturing their weapons for what insurgent spokesmen maintain is a waiting list of 50,000 would-be guerrillas. During the balloting last week, NPA guerrillas ambushed a few government officials and soldiers in the countryside. But otherwise they kept a low profile.

Some see the NPA as a home-grown insurgency in the mold of the Sandinistas or the Viet Cong. Conservatives in the United States liken it to the Khmer Rouge. A member of the NPA Central Military Staff who goes by the name Juan Gabriel denied the Cambodian analogy. The NPA "must constantly rely on the willing support, cooperation and trust of the people in fighting an enemy many times superior in firepower and logistics," he told NEWSWEEK. "If we were as fiendish as they say we are, we would have been wiped out years ago."

Still, the rebels have given no clear picture of what they would be like in power. The National Democratic Front, the insurgency's political wing, has mobilized support from students, teachers, the clergy, office workers and even some professional people—particularly in urban areas where the NPA itself has traditionally been weak. Many of them have joined up purely out of opposition to Marcos; eventually some of them might switch their support to Corazon Aquino. Meanwhile, government officials charge that the NDF is merely a front for the communists, who will dump their noncommunist allies if the rebels ever come to power.




CHARLES STEINER—PICTURE GROUP

'Let us study dialectical materialism': *Libnao*

Island Insurgents

The communist guerrillas of the New People's Army are steadily expanding their field of operations.



"We aren't sure if we can handle the party later," admits one NDF member. "But are we supposed to sit around and let Marcos continue ruining the country?"

Despite its rapidly growing numbers, the NPA has suffered reverses. Last year, according to official figures, government troops killed 2,017 guerrillas—almost as many as in all of the four previous years. The rebels have also alienated peasants caught in the cross fire of the government's battle against the insurgency. "The soldiers may kill you if you don't tell them about the NPA," says one Mindanao farmer. "But the NPA will execute you as an informer if you do." More importantly, the guerrillas are still a largely rural army without a secure rear base or the strength to capture and hold a major urban area. The rebels are not about to sweep into Manila. But the possibility that they might someday be able to do so now darkens the future of Ferdinand Marcos—and America's strategically vital interests in the Philippines.

ANGUS DEMING *with* RICHARD VOKEY *in Manila and* JOHN WALCOTT *in Washington*

'The Whole World Is Watching'

Ben J. Wattenberg, a senior fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, was on the U.S. observer team. In Batangas Province, he saw a new strain of democracy at work. His report:

Our three-man observation team is on the road early in a U.S. Embassy van to catch the opening of the polls at 7 a.m. When we arrive at our first school, San Pascual Central, long lines already snake around the courtyard. The mood is calm and festive. These people know more about election fraud and political corruption than any U.S. anchorman. But a country can be both corrupt and free; so the voters are up early this morning to exercise their franchise.

There are two schoolteachers at each voting table. And two party reps—one from Marcos's New Society Movement (KBL), one from Aquino's UNIDO. And a volunteer poll watcher from the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). In order to cast a ballot, a voter's thumb must become a printing press, affixing a thumb print in five places. The voter must sign his name in four places. When the ballot is cast, the voter's right index finger is marked with indelible ink, to prevent multiple votes. The ink is trademarked Comelec, the acronym for the Commission on Elections. The ballot boxes are locked with three separate Comelec locks. The polls are closed at 3 p.m., so that ballot boxes can't be switched in the dark.



ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA

Rumors as thick as sugar cane: *A Manila voter*

In Manila and in the provincial capital of Batangas, the rumors are as thick as the sugar cane in the fields. The indelible ink, it is said, won't last 24 hours. The military will take over the country if Aquino wins. The warlords of the north won't let Namfrel observers in. The Muslims of the south won't let Namfrel in. Marcos is spending billions to buy the election. The Army will cause trouble. The troops won't be confined to their barracks, they will intimidate the voters. Yes, they will be confined to their barracks, they won't keep law and order.

Are the rumors true? Even paranoids have real enemies. There is a historical record to go by, and it is not nice. Many observers believe that Ferdinand Marcos, once a hero, has raped the democratic process in the Philippines.

American political consultants are selling and spreading election techniques around the world: TV spots, press conferences, audio bites, media spin. But Namfrel could give the consultants a few lessons. The day before the election, our full delegation is briefed in Manila by the head of Namfrel, Jose Concepcion. Comelec can't be trusted, he says. Only 85 percent of the precincts will be covered by Namfrel. I have here a phone message from our observer in the north—a death threat—they need a media team right away. I have a message here from the south—there are reports of teams of "flying voters," ready to vote early, often and everywhere. I have here a phone message that pro-Marcos goons will cause commotion and switch ballot boxes. A wag in our delegation says it sounds like pledge night on a Jerry Lewis telethon.

Concepcion has worked his hustle well. His unstated message: if Cory Aquino doesn't win, it's a rigged election; if he needs it, Marcos will try to do whatever he can get away with. But how much could he get away with? The ultimate answer to that question is being played out back at the San Pascual Central School. It is already 2:30 p.m. The voting lines have dwindled. More than 80 percent of the registered voters have cast their ballots.

The election, at this moment, in this one remote corner of the archipelago, is no longer in the hands of the low-ballers, the thugs, the priests, the Army, the warlords, or any of the other stock characters from the central casting of modern democracy. There is a new player in the game, Felicisima P. Reyes. She is a no-nonsense schoolteacher and she is preparing to supervise the counting of the ballots of Precinct 48 in San Pascual near Batangas. She arranges the desks so that seven officials will watch and record the count. Loudly she reads out the first ballot: "Marcos."

Again: "Marcos." And again. In the back of the classroom, the people of the precinct have crowded in. I count 40, jamming the room. I look at the slatted windows: nothing but wide-open brown eyes, trained on Felicisima Reyes. Another 30 people. The silence is total.

"Marcos," she says. And then, "Aquino." And "Aquino," again and again. The eyes in the room and in the windows relax. It is Aquino country, one of the least corrupt areas in the Philippines. The final vote is Aquino 164, Marcos 110.

Most important, everyone knows the tally. When the retail vote is public, it's hard to cook the books wholesale. Almost one-third of all the voters have stayed to hear the count. They care. Don't let anyone ever tell you that only industrialized countries can exercise democracy. Right now, what has happened in Felicisima Reyes's schoolroom is the center of the geopolitical action in the world. Is democracy on a roll? It is in many places. If it stays hot, America wins.

There is a poster in the classroom, titled "Rules for Reading Aloud." Stand straight. Read with expression. Stop at periods, pause at commas. Group the words correctly. Pronounce the words clearly. That's where we are 36 hours after the vote. The Filipinos have stood up straight to try to regain their democratic birthright. There will now be a pause. The powers that be will try to figure out whether they can pull some tricks that all those eyes in all those slatted windows won't see. It won't be easy. It's too public. My guess is that the government will ultimately have to respond to the people one way or another, for the Filipinos are grouping their words correctly, and pronouncing them clearly. And the whole world is watching.

MEG GREENFIELD

The Philippine Scandal

The Reagan administration isn't dumb. I'm aware that this simple proposition will strike those who admire the administration as supremely and laughably condescending and those who despise it as an inversion of the truth. But the simple proposition needs stating for an equally simple reason: it is the essential starting point in any discussion of what is going on between the United States and the principal actors in the drama in the Philippines. For this time your friendly U.S. government was *not* being obtuse, was *not* reflexively supporting the losing side in yet another Third World disaster or backing an opposition it didn't understand. The Philippines was the one it was ready for, the one it had been diligently working on.

For a couple of years now it has been apparent that serious administration attention was being given over to averting predictable disaster in the Philippines. The politics of the place was under continuous review. Pressure was being brought insistently for required change. Much that has now happened was foreseen by us and worked against, even if it could not, as things turned out, be prevented. Elements of the American government were also in regular, discreet, constructive contact with President Marcos's democratic opposition.

No 'toppling' here: The members of the Reagan administration I have talked to over the years about all this seemed to me mindful of more than the dangers and/or uncertain results of "toppling," as in: toppling the shah, toppling Diem and so forth. They also seemed mindful of the critical truth that even though toppling was not on, Marcos was none of these men, and his country was none of their countries. It would be a mistake, I was repeatedly told, to confuse the Philippines with those other places; it had a tradition of democratic participation and a capacity for it, even, now, a hunger. The problem in the Philippines would be one of restoration, not of a grafting of alien ways on an unreceptive population. Nor was there in Washington the familiar ignorance and consequent indiscriminate anxiety about the opposition. There were people in our government who knew that opposition well enough not to see potential Castros or Borges or Khomeinis everywhere they looked, yet who also recognized the starkly different and menacing nature of the NPA insurgents in the countryside.

That was the longer-term context in which the Philippine election was approached. The immediate context was strikingly detailed and thorough. In both Manila and Washington, as voting day neared, you could hear the most elaborate range of possible scenarios being discussed, although they did have a common theme. It was widely assumed by then that Corazon Aquino would do pretty well with the voters and that Marcos and his machine would do much to cheat her out of this achievement, although up to the very end few people seemed to think that even with an honest count she would win an actual majority. The stratagems under discussion were mainly meant to protect her strong showing. There was Cardinal Jaime Sin's instruction of the poor as to how it was theologically acceptable for them to *have taken* the Marcos machine's bribes and yet in good religious conscience not vote for him. There was the poll watchers' stated anxiety about the composition (faulty? tampered with?) of the so-called indelible ink meant as a protection against vote changing. All was being guarded against, and the American government was as thoroughly versed and briefed in these minutiae as everyone else.

A good-faith outpouring: Was the election excessively prepared for, then? Did our government become trapped in its assumptions and expectations of how the thing would play out? Not exactly. Around Manila, anti-Aquino people had slapped stickers reading "WALANG ALAM!" ("KNOWS NOTHING!") on Mrs. Aquino's campaign posters. Such surely had also been the view of many in the U.S. government, and not without reason, when the inexperienced candidate first came on the scene. But over time you could see our people responding to the evidence that, whatever her shortcomings, Mrs. Aquino was much more skilled and politically estimable than they had figured; and they also were quick to acknowledge the growth of her strength. So they were not locked into their preconceptions. But two things I think did take them unawares. One was the size of the opposition vote. The other was the defiant, open way in which Marcos went about his theft and intimidation.



Marcos has made it impossible for Washington to look the other way

Much of what Reagan rightly got into trouble for saying last week—about how happy the opposition should be that so many voted for them, never mind the count—seemed tailored for a different outcome. It might even have been considered the right thing to say if Aquino had lost in a close contest in which something far short of massive cheating was assumed, a contest in whose aftermath the opposition needed to be cheered up, even as Marcos was hastened along to the end of his term. But the president's original remarks were all wrong, given what happened. Marcos did more than turn even such conservative and security-minded senators as Nunn and Dole against him. He did more than oblige Aquino to stay in the fight, incidentally creating a potential for terrible violence. He made it impossible for Reagan's government to sneak away from the election scandal.

This administration committed itself early on to political and military reform in the Philippines for practical, not just philosophical, reasons. So it bears some responsibility for the fact that the election was held at all and also for the good-faith outpouring of democratic fervor. It can only walk away from the implications of this outcome at vast cost to the American position and to American self-respect. If it is as smart as it has seemed to be up to now on the Philippines it will associate itself with the effort to get a fair result and reject collusion in Marcos's attempt to subvert it.

Reagan's Double Take

He reverses himself on Marcos-inspired election fraud, but the damage may already be done

While Ferdinand Marcos was stealing the Philippine election last week, Ronald Reagan was looking the other way. Ignoring the warnings of his own watchdogs, the president accused both sides of cheating and fatuously recommended that Corazon Aquino should cooperate with Marcos "to make sure the government works." The blunder was enormous. It seemed to give Marcos a green light to complete his theft and left a fragile opposition to conclude that it had been betrayed. Mrs. Aquino fumed in the Philippines, and editorial pages around the world took Reagan to task. Only then did the president do a tardy double take. Conceding that the elections had been marred by "widespread fraud," he finally admitted that the Marcos camp was largely to blame.

Hoping to cool everyone down, Reagan dispatched firefighter Philip Habib to Manila. His brief was to hold Marcos to old promises of reform and to urge patience on Mrs. Aquino. But the effort at damage control came dangerously late in the game. It did nothing to change the outcome of a manifestly crooked count: the National Assembly proclaimed Marcos the winner by 1.5 million comfortably padded votes. Mrs. Aquino had no intention of collaborating with the man who had cheated her. She proclaimed herself the victor, drew up plans for nonviolent civil disobedience—and took her case to the streets. "I feel like the young boy David prepared to face the giant Goliath," she told a rally in Manila's Luneta Park. "If Goliath refuses to yield, we shall . . . escalate."

The purloined election demonstrated weakness, not strength. A discredited autocrat spelled political and economic turmoil that could only help the communist insurgents of the New People's Army. The danger of bloodshed was real. "The documents for a state of emergency have already been typed," warned a Marcos aide. In one conciliatory gesture, Marcos announced that Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver, his chief enforcer, had resigned. But in reply to Reagan's scolding that "the election's credibility has been called into question," Marcos said, "He has been wrongly informed, and I intend to see to it that the correct information reaches him."


Ironically, Reagan's flip-flop damaged his own administration's measured campaign to get Marcos to clean up or step down. With rare unanimity, his professional strategists have concluded that Marcos has lost his grip and that the long-range strategic interests of the United States demand that someone with a credible mandate replace him. By pressing Marcos to call the election, U.S. officials had hoped to revive a centrist opposition, provide a political alternative to the Philippine communists and convince Marcos that he could not survive without giving in to reforms.

Avoiding blame: But conservative pragmatists within the White House—principally chief of staff Donald Regan—argued that the United States has little choice but to hold its nose and continue working with Marcos. Denouncing him, they argued, would hasten his downfall and hand Washington the blame. And while they would welcome his early departure, they worried about Aquino's call for what one official described as "French revolutionary justice." In addition, the argument ran, Mrs. Aquino has no experience in governing; her coalition may not hold together; and it is subject to subversion from the radical left.

Reagan apparently got himself into trouble by trying to straddle both lines of thought. After the election was over, Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, cabled Washington with a recommendation that the United States denounce the vote as tainted; he was supported by the two principal architects of the new American Philippine policy, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost and Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz.



Preparing to launch a second campaign in the streets:



The president meets the press: *Later, an attempt*



ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA

Corazon Aquino, proclaiming herself the real winner, addresses a postelection rally



LUKE FRAZZA—NEWSWEEK

at damage control



GREG SMITH—PICTURE GROUP

An autocracy in disarray: *A discredited Marcos makes his case*

But while leaning in that direction themselves, Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger urged that Washington withhold its verdict while the results of the vote counting were still in doubt. "If we say the election's fraudulent, we give Marcos an excuse to declare the election invalid and give Aquino a blank check to go to the streets," insisted a senior White House aide. "But if we declare there *isn't* any fraud, we help radicalize the Aquino opposition at the very time we want to encourage it to stay working within the system." At first, however, Reagan seemed to listen with just one ear: in a Monday interview with The Washington Post he minimized the evidence of fraud and suggested that despite the election's shortcomings, it would be business as usual between Washington and Manila.

Systematic fraud: Shultz and other top foreign-policy advisers mounted a campaign to draw Reagan back to his basic policy of distancing himself from the faltering Marcos regime. The U.S. Embassy in Manila began compiling hundreds of pages of evidence, detailing systematic electoral fraud. In addition, Shultz placed a phone call to Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the head of the administration's electoral observers, who was en route home from Manila. Lugar should attempt to persuade the president to remain wary of Marcos, Shultz suggested. When he met Reagan on Tuesday morning, Lugar stressed that the election had demonstrated "a real sentiment for democracy in the Philippines." Had the election been fair, he added, Aquino clearly would have won. Another member of the American delegation suggested to the president that there may have been some fraud on the part of the opposition, although he admitted that he didn't have any proof of the charge. After the meeting with Lugar, national-security adviser John Poindexter asked the CIA to take another look at the election.

In a document prepared for him by the State Department later that day, Reagan seemed to change his tone. The administration, he declared, was seriously disturbed by the reports of fraud and violence; the government of the Philippines needs "an authentic popular mandate." That was the line that Reagan was supposed to stick to in his Tuesday evening press conference, but instead, he seemed to absolve Marcos from his electoral sins. When the final vote was tabulated, he told his national audience, "we hope to have the same relationship with the people of the Philippines that we've had for all these historic years."

The president's waffling may well have reflected the positive impression he received when he attended Marcos's 1969 inauguration as an emissary of Richard

Nixon. White House officials also suggest that Reagan was impressed by Poindexter's argument that no matter how dirty the election might have been, Marcos remained crucial to American influence in the Philippines. "Sometimes," says an aide, paraphrasing Poindexter, "you have to live with the world you inherit because doing that is in your country's best interests."

Whatever the reason, the damage was already done. Mrs. Aquino bitterly denounced Reagan as "a friend of democracy who chose to conspire with Mr. Marcos to cheat the Filipinos of their liberation." Just 30 minutes after Aquino released her angry remarks, Ambassador Bosworth slipped into her headquarters in Manila to reassure her that the president hadn't really meant what he had said. Aquino coolly replied that she would await a fuller explanation from Habib but insisted that she would never agree to cooperate with the Marcos government.

How much the president's subsequent turnabout will impress her remains to be seen, but at least Habib's hands are not tied in advance. According to senior officials, Habib has two broad objectives. The first, they say, will be to convince Aquino and other opposition leaders that Marcos's time is ending—and that if they remain patient, nonviolent and united, their turn will eventually come. At the same time, Habib—an old Asia hand whose distaste for Marcos goes back almost 20 years—will convey the same argument to the Malacañang Palace, telling Marcos that a transition to newer, reform-minded leaders is long overdue. According to one scenario being floated in Washington, Habib might ask Marcos to declare Mrs. Aquino his vice president; Marcos would have to agree to make reforms and step down after a fixed period of time. It is unlikely, however, that Aquino would ever accept such an arrangement, particularly since there is no guarantee that Marcos would keep his promises.

'The People's Power'

The opposition has a game plan to squeeze Marcos out

Midmorning, and the streets of Manila are empty. Corazon Aquino has called for "days of national protest" demanding that Ferdinand Marcos step down. In the scenarios of the opposition, Marcos responds with arrests, his most radical supporters with murder. Priests take to the streets, and the most respected members of Marcos's cabinet resign. The International Monetary Fund and more than 400 creditor banks are in an uproar. Ronald Reagan finally decides that Marcos must go. Aquino makes good on an offer to allow Marcos and his cronies safe passage. And the church bells ring as Cory is proclaimed president.

So runs the opposition's most optimistic dream. The trick now is to give it life. The game plan the opposition has settled on suits Aquino's commitment to nonviolence while still giving voice to the millions of Filipinos now determined to rid themselves of Marcos. The strategy calls for a Gandhi-style campaign to deny Marcos moral or legal recognition, erode his ability to govern and strip him of his allies. "The idea is to paralyze the government," says Aquino campaign organizer Bren Guiao. "This is the only way Marcos can feel the people's power."

A series of "People's Victory" rallies, marches and prayer meetings will start this week. City, provincial and nationwide strikes will follow. Guiao estimates that the momentum of the demonstrations will last only two weeks and that the real power lies in organized civil disobedience: no payment of taxes, no workers at banks or businesses. The opposition is also organizing a boycott of all businesses identified with Marcos's family or his cronies. "Right now we have the enthusiasm and the determination," says Guiao, "but we know it can wane." Three factors, he says, will determine the success of the opposition's strategy: the drive of the people, the backing of the Roman Catholic Church and the stance of the U.S. government. "If the church supports us, we'll go a long way," Guiao says.

At a mass for Cory Aquino, Cardinal Jaime Sin, the archbishop of Manila, wore vestments in the opposition's colors of yellow and green. Sin praised Namfrel poll watchers as "people of peace" and warned that "God will not forgive Marcos" if the president sells out his countrymen.


In a society that is 85 percent Roman Catholic, such statements carry great authority. "If I didn't have the Catholic Church, I might as well call it quits," Aquino told NEWSWEEK. "They're the only ones with an organization to compete with Marcos and his party." During the election, priests and nuns helped Namfrel guard the ballot boxes. Now, as the church heads for a direct confrontation with Marcos, Aquino has appeared in public mostly at masses, prayer rallies and funeral services.

Catholic seminarians and nuns waged the first protest against the polluted vote, planting crosses in the barbed-wire fortifications around Ma-



GREG SMITH—PICTURE GROUP

Church militant: *Cardinal Sin*



Targeting Washington: *Filipinos warn*

Reagan's own prolixity last week won't make things any easier, even though he tried manfully to correct himself. Through the week, White House officials grew progressively more alarmed at the intensity of the reaction to Reagan's early slips. On Thursday, the CIA report confirmed that the election had been riddled with fraud. White House staffers prepared a turnabout statement, releasing it after the National Assembly had declared Marcos the winner. The delay only made feelings harder in the Philippines.

The snafu complicated the administration's approach to lobbying Congress for economic and military aid for the Philippines. Reagan aides intend to argue that cutting off such assistance would eliminate what little leverage the United States has over Marcos and perhaps fatally weaken the Philippine military, which receives much of its capital budget from the United States. If Aquino takes power one day, she too will need a healthy military to fend off the New People's Army.

It won't be an easy sell. Influenced by Rep. Stephen Solarz of New York, a tough Marcos critic, the House seems almost sure to cut off all but humanitarian aid to the Philippines in the wake of the electoral steal. In the Senate last week, Sam Nunn of Georgia, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, pressed for a curtailment of aid. Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado proposed putting aid into an escrow account until the Philippines has a legitimate government—and Sen. Majority Leader Robert Dole of Kansas called on the Pentagon to study alternatives to the U.S. bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay. With Nunn, a leader of conservative Democrats, and Dole, a leader of Reagan's own party, up in arms, the president is going to find it harder than ever to help the Philippines so long as Marcos stays in power.

HARRY ANDERSON *with* JOHN WALCOTT *and* KIM WILLENSON *in Washington and* MELINDA LIU *and* RICHARD VOKEY *in Manila*



ANDY HERNANDEZ—SYGMA

that anti-American sentiment is already beginning to spread.

lacañang Palace. The 120-member conference of Philippine bishops released a statement condemning the polls. "The government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis," the bishops wrote. "The way indicated to us now is the way of nonviolent struggle for justice. This means active resistance of evil by peaceful means—in the manner of Christ."

Opposition politician Ramon Mitra won a seat in the National Assembly in May 1984. "This is going to be the most bitterly anti-American country in this part of the world," he says. "Up to now Cory has refused any kind of linkage with the enemies of America—the left. In the future, demonstrations against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship will have more and more new faces. People who have less confidence in America's definition of democracy."

Aside from Marcos, the main target of the opposition strategy is Reagan. "The United States has an important role to play in bringing down Marcos, but it has no political will right now," says one top Aquino adviser. "It will take large numbers of Filipinos demonstrating nationwide to convince Reagan that he must act. We have Congress, the State Department, the bureaucrats. They're just waiting for Ronnie." Opposition leaders say the only way Washington can stop them from putting their civil-disobedience strategy into action is to get squarely behind Aquino.

Marcos has attacked Aquino for relying on "faceless advisers," who he has suggested are closet communists. One of Aquino's closest aides is Jaime Ongpin, a 47-year-old Harvard graduate on leave as president of Benguet Corp., one of Southeast Asia's major mining companies. Ongpin believes the demonstrations will channel Filipino outrage and help avoid an escalation of violence between the two sides. "All our people are screaming bloody murder," he says. "But Cory says, 'Forget the bloody murder—I will not lead anything but a nonviolent campaign'."

Ongpin believes the civil-disobedience strategy will show Washington that there can be no reform or progress as long as Marcos is in power, and that the Reagan administration will see that it must step in to forestall complete collapse—or worse. "Either the people are ready to pay the price of a long civil-disobedience campaign," he warns, "or the frustrated fringe will join up with the left."

Leandro Alejandro, president of the radical League of Filipino Students (LFS) and a leader of the communist-leaning Bayan party, stands in Plaza Miranda as 2,500 leftist workers and LFS members shout denouncements of the "U.S.-Marcos dictatorship." His Bayan party, which boycotted the vote, is sympathetic to the rebel New People's Army. "It would not be wise for the opposition to sit down and wait for U.S. support—the U.S. has pulled the rug out," Alejandro says. "I think Cory should send her people into the streets now. I don't think she should wait, because Marcos is on the defensive."

MELINDA LIU, RICHARD VOKEY *and* WENDY LIN *in Manila*


CHRISTOPHER MORRIS—BLACK STAR

Disenchanted: *A young leftist*

HOW AMERICAN BUSINESS BROKE WITH MARCOS

After the tainted election, U.S. executives in the Philippines moved fast to distance themselves from a President who plainly did not have the mandate he claimed. They were not sure Corazon Aquino could revive the economy, but they decided Marcos surely couldn't. ■ *by Roy Rowan*

AFTER YEARS of support, U.S. businessmen in the Philippines quickly turned against President Ferdinand E. Marcos. They changed their minds after the February 7 presidential election, when challenger Corazon Aquino, 53, got an avalanche of votes, and Marcos, 68, lost credibility by encouraging or condoning widespread violence and fraud. By late February, when the rebellion of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and deputy military chief Fidel V. Ramos shook Marcos's hold on power, the turnaround was well established.

U.S. executives expected Marcos to engineer an election victory. But they said his heavyhandedness so riled voters that peace and prosperity became hard to envision unless Marcos yielded power. "This is not just a political party Mrs. Aquino is heading up," said Fred C. Whiting, 47, regional director of Sime Darby International Tire Co., which manufactures Goodrich products. "It's an opposition crusade."

Whiting is also president of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. He and many Chamber members feared that the bitter frustration felt by Filipino executives and workers who believe they were cheated at the polls could flare into anti-American outbursts if the U.S. appeared to be supporting Marcos. Early statements from Washington hampered efforts of U.S. businessmen to distance themselves from the Philippine President. After watching the government television channel play and replay a waffling press conference performance by President Reagan, who seemed to be defending Marcos, an infuriated Filipino subordinate told Whiting, "Now we know why you have no friends in Latin America."

Whiting was so taken aback that he drafted a telegram to the White House urging Reagan to stay neutral. The Chamber's board of directors voted not to send it, though many shared Whiting's concern. Argued George W. Drysdale, 57, president of Marsman & Co., a small mining, pharmaceutical, and agricultural business: "If we don't stand up for our Filipino employees, they'll think we care more about profits than democracy."

Drysdale, who came to the Philippines in 1954, recalls with some misgivings the U.S business community's past approval of Marcos's strong-arm tactics. "When he declared martial law in 1972, we all breathed a sigh of relief," Drysdale admits. "Marcos brought together a good team, and anyone could get to see him." By 1975, Drysdale recalls, Marcos had made life tougher for U.S. executives by dividing Philippine industry into "little kingdoms run by the President's friends." But the economic outlook still seemed promising. Buoyed by Filipinos' long-standin



SUSAN MEISELAS—MAGNUM

After the voting, *priests working for the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) move locked ballot boxes. NAMFREL's count showed Aquino the winner.*

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE *Darienne L. Dennis*

friendliness toward Americans, Drysdale and other businessmen continued to invest.

On election eve, U.S. executives were looking hopefully past an expected Marcos victory and a period of minor turmoil to the resumption of business as usual. On February 6, the day before the election, Drysdale invited a group of American and Filipino executives to his home for breakfast to sample opinion about the economic prospects. In assessing the various possible outcomes, the group distinguished between "soft fraud" (buying votes) and "hard fraud" (grabbing the ballot boxes or tampering with the tally). If Marcos resorted to hard fraud, the gathering agreed, the Filipinos would not accept the election results, and chaos could ensue.

Even if unrest mushrooms, few U.S. businesses are likely to flee, but many will think hard before increasing their stake. More than 500 U.S. companies have investments totaling $1.2 billion in the Philippines. U.S. executives have traditionally shown a stubborn "we're here to stay" attitude; among an earlier generation, many were trapped and taken prisoner by the Japanese at the outbreak of World War II. Only a few U.S. companies have pulled out in the past few years, though they have included some big ones. Ford and General Motors closed their plants in the past 18 months because neither was making any money and both considered the economic outlook bleak.

IT IS STILL bleak. Per capita income is pitifully small and shrinking. It was $775 in 1981, $660 last year. Gross domestic product shrank about 4.5% last year. The economy recently seemed to have hit bottom, with credit for stopping the slide going to José "Jobo" Fernandez Jr., 52, the Central Bank governor, who is called the Paul Volcker of the Philippines. By tightening credit and restricting the foreign exchange outflow, Fernandez helped chop inflation from 50% a year ago to 10% today.

But Marcos appears to have financed a good part of his campaign by printing money, so a new round of inflation threatens. Fernandez had also sliced interest rates from 50% to 15%. But ten days after the election he unexpectedly announced a sharp increase in interest rates; the maximum rate on treasury bills rose from around 20% to 30%. Local executives speculated the move was meant to attract deposits to seven major banks, which Mrs. Aquino had urged her followers to boycott, and to keep flight capital from flying. Fernandez admitted the rate rise would slow the economy and probably prevent it from growing this year.

As in Latin America, U.S. banks are restructuring and rolling over their Philippine loans to avoid writing them off. The Philippines owes about $5 billion of its $26 billion in foreign debt to U.S. lenders. A key American in the loan restructuring has been John A. Lucchesi, 46, the Bank of America's Manila-based area general manager. In a 27-month period he made 23 visits back to the U.S., frequently with Jobo Fernandez or Prime Minister César Virata, to persuade U.S. commercial banks to continue extending credit to the Marcos government.

THE NOT-SO-STRONGMAN'S EYES AND EARS

■ For years Imelda Marcos, the high-flying First Lady of the Philippines, has been her country's chief international negotiator. More recently, because of her husband's eroding health, she became his eyes and ears on the domestic front. During the election campaign she stumped the islands energetically. She also is credited with engineering the choice of Arturo Tolentino, a 75-year-old considered quite pliable, to be Vice President, triggering fresh suspicions that she still considers herself the real successor. American businessmen in Manila don't think the Iron Butterfly, as she enjoys being called, is up to the job. They fear her personal extravagance and reckless public spending. "She confuses cloud nine with the bottom line," says a Filipino banker.

Immediately following the election the First Lady kept an uncharacteristically low profile, remaining out of sight in Malacañang Palace. But just before the President proclaimed his victory, she invited FORTUNE writer Roy Rowan, who has known her for many years, to dinner at an Italian restaurant. Ebullient at being back in circulation, she kept the conversation percolating for six hours. Excerpts:



SUSAN MEISELAS—MAGNUM

The First Lady *campaigning*

On the election: I was in Japan when the President called for a snap election. I said, "Oh, no!" But it's been an enriching, ennobling experience. [During the campaign] I was the advance party and went to all the lions' dens [where the opposition was strong]. There were some bad details [during the voting], some little imperfections, though how can you cheat in 93,000 precincts?

On her future role: I'm going to spend the rest of my days as First Lady being mother to the poor. It was the poor who voted for Marcos. The only people who will be hungry are the lazy ones.

On U.S. government documents discrediting claims by Marcos that he commanded a guerrilla unit in World War II: If there's anything the President is proud of, it's that he was ready to give his life for freedom.

On Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base: America without the Philippine bases would only be a Western power. I told President Reagan, "How wonderful that you come from California. You'll be more sensitive to the Pacific. With your [Philippine] bases, the sun never sets on U.S. territory."

On women in politics: Some men still think a woman's place is in the bedroom. I'm everywhere but there because I hardly ever sleep. I'm too busy working. Sure, sometimes I get impish little thoughts, but life would be boring without them.

"Banks have done quite well here," insists Lucchesi, whose loan portfolio in the Philippines comes to about $500 million. But Lucchesi recognizes the newly uncertain climate. "There's a lot of emotion out there," he said in February. "The man realizes he's on the short end of the calendar, and he doesn't want to leave a mess if he still has the power to do something about it."

The Philippines' principal hope for economic renewal is fresh capital from multinational companies. In 1984 overseas giants accounted for 67% of the profits earned by the country's 1,000 largest companies, and 89% of those profits were reinvested in the Philippines. "Not only do the multinationals bring new money," says Roberto R. Romulo, president of IBM Philippines Inc. and son of the late Philippine statesman Carlos Romulo, "they also bring new technology that a developing country like ours can't do without."

But the country's new instability is scotching those investments. James D. Black, 48, president and general manager of E.R. Squibb & Sons Philippines Corp., is no stranger to turmoil. In a long career abroad he has seen troops march through the streets of Ecuador and was in Haiti just after a gunboat lobbed a shell at Papa Doc's palace. He says: "All of my capital investments have been suspended."

Around Manila, many old Philippines hands spent much of the past month speculating on how the Marcos era might end. A prominent local political analyst offered what he called the doing-a-deal scenario: Seeing his U.S. support cracking, Marcos seeks to save face, his family, and his fortune. Shortly after being certified as winner of the election, he resigns for reasons of health. Vice President Arturo Tolentino (nicknamed Jukebox by the opposition—"Put in money and he plays any political tune you want") becomes President and declares martial law, empowering a junta to take control. The junta crafts a new constitution that calls for another election, which Mrs. Aquino wins.

By late February it was clear that it could happen a dozen other ways, but the betting was that Marcos would somehow give up power before long. Assuming the transition could occur without excessive violence, U.S. executives welcomed the prospect to a degree that almost certainly would have astounded many of them even a month before. Mrs. Aquino is a wild card, and whether she could restore stability and prosperity was far from certain. But in their view President Marcos, claiming a mandate he plainly did not have, almost certainly could not. ■

THE DEFENSE BUDGET RUNS INTO HEAVY FLAK


Congress is likely to cut back many Pentagon projects, includin the Midgetman missile and the Bradley armored troop carrie

DESPITE RONALD REAGAN'S drumbeat for a $312-billion defense budget—8% or so more than the Pentagon got from Congress last year—lawmakers are reluctant to join the march. House Majority Leader James Wright (D-Texas) says that Congress will no longer underwrite the Pentagon's "buying binge." Even the few Republicans who support the increase, such as Senators John Warner of Virginia and Dan Quayle of Indiana, do not think Reagan will get all he wants. Congress is expected to scrutinize nearly all defense proposals and kill or cut funding for many projects.

The proposed defense budget does not even ask for some military hardware on the Pentagon's wish list, including an Air Force trainer jet, the T-46, produced by Fairchild Industries, and a Navy landing craft built by Bell Aerospace and Lockheed. Nor has the Pentagon forwarded to Congress the Army's $40-million request for 820 Hellfire antitank missiles from Rockwell International and Martin Marietta. Production snafus plagued all these projects, and Congress probably would have axed them anyway.

Congress is also unlikely to honor the Pe tagon's requests for expensive programs r yet off the ground. "You don't start n weapons during a budget crunch," says congressional defense expert. The Arm still experimental lightweight helicopter, example, could be a $40-billion business Boeing, Sikorsky, and a dozen other contr tors. Congress is likely to shoot it down, s ing that the chopper is not vital. Lawmak will also whack away at Reagan's pet proj of the future, the Strategic Defense Ini tive, or Star Wars. Many defense experts lieve the budgeted 70% boost in Star W spending for fiscal 1987, to $4.8 billion, is flated to compensate for inevitable c Joshua Epstein, a defense budget analyst the Brookings Institution, notes that C gress trimmed $1 billion from the $3.8-bill Star Wars budget last year. He says the ure is unlikely to grow this year.

Appropriations for the supersleek, rad resistant Stealth bomber and the single-w head Midgetman missile are also in je



Critics *say the Bradley Fighting Vehicles can be pierced by Soviet machine-gun fire.*

Success in Stockholm could have a positive effect on the entire range of East-West relations, as both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have independently recognized. To cite just one example, it could move the entire Helsinki CSCE process ahead. The CSCE followup meeting, which opens in Vienna in November of this year, will evaluate progress in all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act. That means examining developments in human rights as well as progress in the security field. For the United States and its NATO allies, balance among all 10 principles of the CSCE is essential to the continuation of the process.

Developments on humanitarian and human rights issues in the East since the Madrid review meeting of 1980–83 have not been encouraging. Nor can we point to notable success at the post-Madrid meetings such as the Ottawa human rights forum [Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting] or the Budapest Cultural Forum. We can hope for success at the Bern Human Contacts Meeting later this year, but, in any case, the Vienna conferees will not have a very bright picture to contemplate. A meaningful and politically binding Stockholm agreement, strictly complied with by all participating states, will make it easier for Vienna to decide on continuing the Stockholm security forum in some form after the CSCE review concludes its work.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me note that our work in Stockholm lacks the drama of dealing with vital nuclear issues, as the Geneva negotiators do. As [NATO Secretary General] Lord Carrington pointed out in a speech to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs last week, the pace of our work has been something less than electric, although he also pointed out that, compared to our MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] colleagues in Vienna, we have been almost reckless in our haste. So it is little wonder that our efforts have gone largely unnoticed, both in the media and in our foreign offices. But, as the clock runs out on our deliberations, things are beginning to happen. Keep your eye on us for the 23 negotiating weeks remaining to us, and you may see something interesting—and important—begin to emerge. ■

Election Developments in the Philippines

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, JAN. 30, 1986[1]

A special election for President and Vice President will take place in the Philippines on February 7. This election is of great importance to the future of democracy in the Philippines, a major friend and ally of the United States in the Pacific. It comes at a time when the Philippines is struggling with the urgent need to reestablish a political concensus, restructure the economy, and rebuild a sense of military professionalism.

President Marcos has invited the United States to send observers to the election. Because of our respect for the Philippines and our commitment to the sovereign will of a democratic people as expressed through the electoral process, I have decided to send a delegation of official U.S. observers to the Philippines for the election. I would like the delegation to be composed of Members of the Congress from both parties and of distinguished Americans from the private sector.

I also note that the party institutes of both the Republican and Democratic Parties have jointly decided to sponsor an international observer delegation for the election in the Philippines. I am confident that both of these efforts will make a significant contribution to this important event.

The United States left a legacy of democratic institutions in the Philippines earlier in this century. Filipinos believe in elections, as long as they are fair, to resolve their political differences. To safeguard the process, the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections, or NAMFREL as it is called, will field hundreds of thousands of citizen election observers on February 7. Such citizen participation makes Americans proud to have the Republic of the Philippines as a friend and ally.

A free and fair election, if also followed by a genuine reform effort in the economic and security areas, will assist the Philippines along a path of growth, prosperity, and stability that will benefit the entire region.

The Communist Party of the Philippines, through its military arm, the New People's Army, and its front organization, the National Democratic Front, is pursuing a classic military and political strategy intended to lead eventually to a totalitarian takeover of the Philippines. The communist strategy can be defeated, but defeating it will require listening to and respecting the sovereign voice of the people.

I believe this is an important time for America to respond to the problems of a friend and ally at a critical juncture in its history. If the will of the Filipino people is expressed in an election that Filipinos accept as credible—and if whoever is elected undertakes fundamental economic, political, and military reforms—we should consider, in consultation with the Congress, a significantly larger program of economic and military assistance for the Philippines for the next 5 years. This would be over and above the current levels of assistance we are providing.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, FEB. 11, 1986[2]

The Philippine elections have captured the attention of the American public. At times we need to remind ourselves that this is a Philippine election, not an American election. Yet our interests are deeply affected by these elections—by the results, by the deficiencies of the process, and by what all this means for the future.

President Marcos invited American observers to witness the election; Senator Lugar [Richard G. Lugar, Rep.-Ind.] and Representative Murtha [John P. Murtha, Dem.-Pa.] cochaired an observer delegation at my request. They returned last night. I have heard their preliminary report this morning. Since no definite judgment on the result has yet been rendered by either the official or the unofficial Filipino electoral bodies, it is not appropriate for the United States to make such a judgment at this time.

Nonetheless, two points need to be made.

- First, it is a disturbing fact that the election has been flawed by reports of fraud, which we take seriously, and by violence. This concerns us because we cherish commitment to free and fair elections, and because we believe the

Government of the Philippines needs an authentic popular mandate in order effectively to counter a growing communist insurgency and restore health to its troubled economy.

• And second, the election itself—the obvious enthusiasm of Filipinos for the democratic process and the extraordinary vigor of the campaign—also tell us something. They tell us of the profound yearning of the Filipino people for democracy and, indeed, of the vigor of the underlying forces of pluralism and democracy. Only the communists boycotted the election.

The political process in the Philippines continues. Further it does not end with this election. Our task for the future is to help nurture the hopes and possibilities of democracy, to help the people of the Philippines overcome the grave problems their country faces, and to continue to work for essential reforms.

To help advise me on how the United States can best pursue that task and to assess the desires and needs of the Filipino people, I am asking Ambassador Philip Habib to travel to the Philippines to meet with the leaders of both political parties, with church and government officials, and with representatives of private sector groups.

Americans can never be indifferent to events in the Philippines. Our two countries have too much at stake for that. Our national interests converge. Our peoples bear genuine affection toward each other. Most important, our peoples share democratic aspirations. Those ties between our people will endure.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, FEB. 15, 1986[3]

We have followed with great interest and concern the Presidential and Vice Presidential elections in the Philippines. As the Philippines is a close friend and ally, what happens to this nation and its people is of great importance to the United States.

While maintaining strict neutrality in these elections, we have consistently urged that the process be a fair and credible one leading to a government with the strongest possible mandate. The elections were marked by heartening evidence of the continuing commitment of the Filipino people to the democratic process and the furtherance of a two-party system which should strengthen that process in the future.

Although our observation delegation has not yet completed its work, it has already become evident, sadly, that the elections were marred by widespread fraud and violence perpetrated largely by the ruling party. It was so extreme that the election's credibility has been called into question both within the Philippines and in the United States.

At this difficult juncture, it is imperative that all responsible Filipinos seek peaceful ways to effect stability within their society and to avoid violence which would benefit only those who wish to see an end to democracy. Both sides must work together to make those reforms which are needed to ensure a stable democracy, a truly professional military and a healthy economy.

Our hearts go out to the people of the Philippines. They are at a major crossroads in their history. We are proud of our long association with them and very proud of their passionate devotion to democracy. There are no easy answers. And in the last analysis, they will have to find the solutions themselves. But they will have our help—in any way we can.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 22, 1986[3]

President Marcos' Defense Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, and the acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Fidel Ramos, today announced their resignations from President Marcos' government as a result of the fraud in the recent elections. They called on him to step down because his government no longer has a popular mandate.

Minister Enrile has said: "We want the will of the people to be respected. I believe that the mandate of the people does not belong to the regime." General Ramos has said: "It is my duty to see that the sovereign will of the people is respected. I am bothered by my conscience." Minister Enrile, one of President Marcos' oldest and closest political associates, further reported his personal knowledge of vote rigging and manipulation on a massive scale.

These statements strongly reinforce our concerns that the recent Presidential elections were marred by fraud, perpetuated overwhelmingly by the ruling party, so extreme as to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the election and impair the capacity of the Government of the Philippines to cope with a growing insurgency and a troubled economy.

Many authoritative voices in the Philippines have been raised in support of nonviolence. We support these voices and expect them to be respected. We also support resolution of the issues involved by all the people of the Philippines as quickly as possible.

Ambassador Habib is now returning from the Philippines and will report promptly upon his return.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 23, 1986[3]

The American people are watching with great concern and compassion the events unfolding in the Philippines, a longtime friend and ally. The President appealed earlier today to President Marcos to avoid an attack against other elements of the Philippine Armed Forces. Regrettably, there are now reports of an attack. An attempt to resolve this situation by force will surely result in bloodshed and casualties, further polarize Philippine society, and cause untold damage to the relationship between our governments.

The United States provides military assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces in order to strengthen its ability to protect the security of the Philippines, particularly against the serious threat posed by a growing communist insurgency. We cannot continue our existing military assistance if the government uses that aid against other elements of the Philippine military which enjoy substantial popular backing.

The President urges, in the strongest possible terms, that violence be avoided as Filipinos of good will work to resolve the ongoing crisis.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 24, 1986[3]

We have received disturbing reports of possible attacks by forces loyal to General Ver against elements of Philippine forces that have come to the support of General Ramos and Defense Minister Enrile. We urge those contemplating such action to stop. Marcos has pledged to refrain from initiating violence, and we appeal to him and those loyal to him, as well as all the other Filipino people, to continue to do so.

Attempts to prolong the life of the present regime by violence are futile. A solution to this crisis can only be achieved by a peaceful transition to a new government.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, FEB. 25, 1986[4]

The President is pleased with the peaceful transition to a new Government of the Philippines. The United States extends recognition to this new government headed by President Aquino. We pay special tribute to her for her commitment to nonviolence which has earned her the respect of all Americans.

The new government has been produced by one of the most stirring and courageous examples of the democratic process in modern history. We honor the Filipino people. The United States stands ready as always to cooperate and assist the Philippines as the government of President Aquino engages the problems of economic development and national security.

We praise the decision of President Marcos. Reason and compassion have prevailed in ways that best serve the Filipino nation and people. In his long term as President, Ferdinand Marcos showed himself to be a staunch friend of the United States. We are gratified that his departure from office has come peacefully, characterized by the dignity and strength that have marked his many years of leadership.

It is the Filipino people, of course, who are the true heroes today. They have high expectations for their country and for democracy, and they have resolved this issue nonviolently in a way that does them honor.

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 3, 1986.
[2]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 17.
[3]Text from White House press release.
[4]Press release 31 of Feb. 26, which also includes the Secretary's question-and-answer session with news correspondents. ■

After the Election in the Philippines

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 20, 1986. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.[1]

I welcome this opportunity to renew our exchange of views with the subcommittee concerning the situation in the Philippines and its implications for U.S. policy.

The Philippines has just held a historic Presidential election. The outpouring of nonpartisan citizen effort to safeguard the ballot process was an inspiring testimonial to the deep yearning for democratic processes to work. There are few nations at any age which can demonstrate such fundamental and idealistic participation to defend democratic principles.

Unfortunately, however, as the President stated on February 15: " . . . it has already become evident, sadly, that the elections were marred by widespread fraud and violence perpetrated largely by the ruling party. It was so extreme that the election's credibility has been called into question both within the Philippines and in the United States." The initial findings of the Presidential observer delegation are consistent with this conclusion. We appreciate the Congress' valuable participation in the observer delegation.

The situation we address today is a difficult and complex one. The validity of the declared outcome has been seriously called into question by responsible observers both in the Philippines and abroad. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, after reviewing election developments throughout the archipelago, has described the elections as having been conducted in a fraudulent manner. The Senate, in a resolution passed yesterday, has stated its sense that "the elections in the Philippines were fraudulent and did not fairly reflect the will of the people of the Philippines."

As you know, the President has sent Ambassador Philip Habib to Manila to assess the dynamics of the situation and to advise on how the United States can "help nurture the hopes and possibilities of democracy . . . help the people of the Philippines overcome the grave problems their country faces; and . . . continue to work for essential reforms." The difficult situation which thus now pertains in the Philippines requires that we address our own responses with care and caution. While some things are clear now, many others are not, and we will await the result of Ambassador Habib's consultations, realizing that the situation will continue to be in flux for some time.

This election has permitted the open and direct expression of deeply differing views within Philippine society, but unfortunately it has failed to resolve them in a credible way. The severe damage to the credibility of the election is more tragic because it also demonstrated, in so many ways, the resilience of the democratic tradition in the Philippines.

The election was openly contested; parties were able to organize, criticize, and take their case to the people in rallies and campaign appearances throughout the archipelago. A new political coalition was able, in a short time, to become a major political force. However, now that responsible and moderate groups have been allowed to organize so openly, it will be all the worse if their hopes and aspirations are frustrated.

The commitment of hundreds of thousands of NAMFREL [National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections] volunteers and others to make the system work was inspiring. One member of our team stated that he observed "hundreds of citizens serving as poll watchers and election officials to make the system work. The violence and intimidation was a real tragedy, a betrayal by the few of the many who worked so hard to make it work." Such comments are multiplied many times by the U.S. Embassy officers and international observers who covered almost all of the 75 provinces of the country during the election. There are all too few countries in the world where such citizens' organizations could be formed and assist in monitoring election performance, but that makes the exclusion of NAMFREL workers from many key areas at the last moment all the more deeply disappointing.

The process was commendably open to the world. Hundreds of visas were issued to foreign observers. This is one of the reasons why the election was as free as it was and why we know it was as flawed as it was. But now the expressions of concern it has aroused cannot be ignored.

What Went Wrong?

The systematic disenfranchisement of voters was one of the most significant as well as unexpected developments in the election. Unanticipated to a large degree by the opposition, NAMFREL, or our own observers, this disenfranchisement became apparent throughout the country on election day, but particularly in metro Manila and other urban

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Unfortunately, however, as the President stated on February 15: " . . . it has already become evident, sadly, that the elections were marred by widespread fraud and violence perpetrated largely by the ruling party. It was so extreme that the election's credibility has been called into question both within the Philippines and in the United States." The initial findings of the Presidential observer delegation are consistent with this conclusion. We appreciate the Congress' valuable participation in the observer delegation.

The situation we address today is a difficult and complex one. The validity of the declared outcome has been seriously called into question by responsible observers both in the Philippines and abroad. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, after reviewing election developments throughout the archipelago, has described the elections as having been conducted in a fraudulent manner. The Senate, in a resolution passed yesterday, has stated its sense that "the elections in the Philippines were fraudulent and did not fairly reflect the will of the people of the Philippines."

As you know, the President has sent Ambassador Philip Habib to Manila to assess the dynamics of the situation and to advise on how the United States can "help nurture the hopes and possibilities of democracy . . . help the people of the Philippines overcome the grave problems their country faces; and . . . continue to work for essential reforms." The difficult situation which thus now pertains in the Philippines requires that we address our own responses with care and caution. While some things are clear now, many others are not, and we will await the result of Ambassador Habib's consultations, realizing that the situation will continue to be in flux for some time.

This election has permitted the open and direct expression of deeply differing views within Philippine society, but unfortunately it has failed to resolve them in a credible way. The severe damage to the credibility of the election is more tragic because it also demonstrated, in so many ways, the resilience of the democratic tradition in the Philippines.

The election was openly contested; parties were able to organize, criticize, and take their case to the people in rallies and campaign appearances throughout the archipelago. A new political coalition was able, in a short time, to become a major political force. However, now that responsible and moderate groups have been allowed to organize so openly, it will be all the worse if their hopes and aspirations are frustrated.

The commitment of hundreds of thousands of NAMFREL [National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections] volunteers and others to make the system work was inspiring. One member of our team stated that he observed "hundreds of citizens serving as poll watchers and election officials to make the system work. The violence and intimidation was a real tragedy, a betrayal by the few of the many who worked so hard to make it work." Such comments are multiplied many times by the U.S. Embassy officers and international observers who covered almost all of the 75 provinces of the country during the election. There are all too few countries in the world where such citizens' organizations could be formed and assist in monitoring election performance, but that makes the exclusion of NAMFREL workers from many key areas at the last moment all the more deeply disappointing.

The process was commendably open to the world. Hundreds of visas were issued to foreign observers. This is one of the reasons why the election was as free as it was and why we know it was as flawed as it was. But now the expressions of concern it has aroused cannot be ignored.

What Went Wrong?

The systematic disenfranchisement of voters was one of the most significant as well as unexpected developments in the election. Unanticipated to a large degree by the opposition, NAMFREL, or our own observers, this disenfranchisement became apparent throughout the country on election day, but particularly in metro Manila and other urban

centers, in opposition strongholds, and among the middle class in general.

The election experience was different from place to place. Where local authorities tried to carry out the law fairly, and NAMFREL workers were also permitted to function without intimidation, there are reports of almost model election results, sometimes favoring President Marcos, sometimes favoring Mrs. Aquino. In far too many other places, however, fraud intervened. Most serious were the many successful efforts to tamper with the results themselves. We have confirmed reports by our own Embassy and foreign observers of practices ranging from substitution of ballots, simple fraudulent reporting of results, substitution of reporting tallies, discard of any Aquino votes as invalid, and fanciful reporting of results to the canvassing centers either before the alleged vote count had even been completed or, in many cases, using totals far in excess of all registered voters in a district.

The U.S. Role

This is a Philippine problem. Every nation must address in its own way the challenge of developing strong and credible institutions.

Nevertheless, we cannot walk away from our interests and responsibilities. Our influence is not unlimited, but we should use the influence we do have and use it wisely. We intend to be helpful in any way that it is appropriate. Meanwhile, Filipinos need some time to search for viable solutions, but that time must be used well. The problems will not be solved by a return to business-as-usual or by refusing to acknowledge that this was a flawed election.

Some directions are clear. The President's offer in January of significantly increased American assistance if a free and fair election was conducted and the elected government undertook fundamental needed reforms is clearly now in abeyance. But most specific decisions on U.S. policy directions must await Ambassador Habib's return and his assessment.

Nevertheless, as we address the issues before us, some guiding principles are apparent.

- We should make clear that we support the demonstrated Philippine faith in democracy. Americans believe in government by the consent of the governed. The American consensus on this point is clear and should not be disputed. While we may debate specific policies, this should not obscure the bipartisan commitment to this goal.
- A stable and prosperous Philippines under a democratic government is of major importance to the United States. We have a large stake in the bases in the Philippines, but our stake in democracy comes first. Indeed, our interest in the bases and our interest in democracy are complementary, not mutually exclusive. We are convinced that democratic reform is the key to thwarting a communist victory that would end at one stroke both all hopes for democracy in the Philippines and our access to these important facilities.
- We should do everything we can to support the moderate forces which are represented importantly on both sides of the partisan divide in the Philippines and among many nonpartisan groups. The church, civic organizations, many military professionals, and others have demonstrated responsible commitment to viable free institutions and should receive our encouragement.
- We should oppose the use of force and violence that in the long run will benefit only those who do not believe in democratic values. A radical communist insurgency is ready in the wings to take advantage of either a breakdown of public order or popular disillusionment with institutional avenues to achieve change or redress of grievances. It is incumbent on all those who wish a better future for the Philippines to encourage restraint. The present problems will be successfully surmounted neither through martial law nor mob violence.
- Solutions must be Filipino solutions, not American solutions. As President Reagan said February 15: " . . . in the last analysis, they will have to find the solutions themselves. But they will have our help—in any way we can."

Our assessment of the situation is continuing, and major further developments will await decisions to be taken in the light of Ambassador Habib's report to the President. We are maintaining close contact with all responsible elements of the political spectrum.

We recognize that whoever leads the Philippines will need an effective and professional armed forces and will need a revitalized and dynamic economy to provide hope for individual betterment and well-being. Our existing assistance programs are addressed effectively to these objectives. Our assistance does not go to individuals but to support the economic and security needs of the Philippine people. No one should claim that U.S. assistance constitutes a personal endorsement or is for the purpose of supporting any individual's claim to power, either in the Philippines or in dozens of other countries around the world that receive U.S. aid.

The present situation confronts us with some difficult decisions, but we would caution against precipitous action. Our actions have multiple consequences, and we want to act in a way that moves things forward, not in a way that leads to violence and chaos.

We should ask of proposed actions whether they will create incentives for Filipinos to seek solutions or whether they will instead harden and deepen the divisions? Will our actions encourage or discourage the restraint that both sides need to exercise if violence is to be avoided? Will they encourage business-as-usual attitudes, or will they go to the other extreme and contribute to dangerous instability? There are no easy answers to such questions and no course of action now that does not entail some risks. But we need to address these questions, not as an excuse for inaction but to avoid recklessness.

I am aware of the significant concerns which were expressed in your first hearing on this subject in this subcommittee yesterday. We share many of those concerns. However, our decisions on the subject of foreign assistance are highly consequential. We need to get a better feel for the thinking of many elements in the Philippines and will await Ambassador Habib's own assessment on the basis of his intensive consultations there. There are large interests at stake, and, therefore, I would suggest that we pursue further consultations on a bipartisan basis in the days ahead before the committee formally proposes legislation regarding our Philippine aid program. Meanwhile, neither American nor Filipino should make the mistake of claiming that any American actions constitute an endorsement of this seriously flawed election or an American preference for one side over the other in the political drama that continues to play itself out in the Philippines.

As that drama unfolds, it will be particularly important that the integrity of the Philippine Armed Forces be maintained and, indeed, strengthened as much as possible through reform. If the Armed Forces of the Philippines disintegrates, there is only one organized armed force remaining in the Philippines. That is the communist New People's Army. No democratic or moderate leader of any persuasion would survive under those circumstances.

A significant portion of our present assistance to the Philippines is in implementation of the President's commitment at the time of the last U.S.-Philippine review of our Military Bases Agreement in 1983. Just as the Philippines has honored its commitments under that agreement, they expect us to fulfill our related obligations as well. I am confident that we will find the means to continue to do so in an honorable manner.

We recognize that there are no easy answers and that even comments which we perceive as neutral can be exploited or cause dismay among our friends. We will remain engaged, seeking to keep always in mind the principles I have noted above.

The Philippine people and the Philippine nation remain important to the United States and we to them. Powerful forces for democracy and for change have been unleashed. This election has demonstrated the great strength and support of centrists and moderates in the Philippines, but the political center is threatened both by the illegality and fraud of the election and by the forces of radicalism led by the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Thus the election has at this stage actually compounded the problems of the Philippines. As I indicated before this subcommittee in November, an election which is not perceived by the Philippine people as reasonable and fair will lead to increased polarization of the society and a growth in the communist insurgency. We still believe this to be the case.

Nevertheless we do not consider the process to be over. We would like to have your views and hope to work carefully with the Congress in the days ahead to ensure that together we avoid rash or destabilizing action yet remain true to our fundamental principles and long-term interests. As the situation develops in the Philippines, the government there will still need to tackle major problems in the military, in the economy, and in the society. We shall need to determine how we can best help those Filipinos of good faith and encourage them to overcome present crises and build a future of hope and progress for all the people of that great nation. We will want to be part of that endeavor, as is appropriate for a friend and ally.

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Commodity Markets and Commodity Agreements

by W. Allen Wallis

Address before the National Coffee Association in Boca Raton, Florida, on February 11, 1986. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

This morning I will discuss the International Coffee Agreement (ICA).

The United States has been a party to this agreement since 1968. We have a right to withdraw on 90 days notice, and, in fact, we cannot remain in the agreement after next September unless we obtain explicit authority from Congress to do so.

For about a year we have been studying the advantages of the agreement—not only the direct advantages to the United States but also the indirect advantages through effects on friendly countries. The issues are complex, but we expect to reach a conclusion by spring.

As background for discussing the coffee agreement, I will point out some general characteristics of commodity prices. Then I will consider efforts to control the movement of commodity prices. Finally, I will talk about the ICA itself. I want to emphasize that no decision has been reached about our continued participation and that the decision will not be based on economic considerations alone.

Trends and Characteristics of Commodity Prices

Turning first, then, to trends and characteristics of commodity prices in general: we are experiencing currently an interesting and instructive period in international commodity markets. In recent years, there has been a weakening of the price of internationally traded oil, and it has fallen dramatically in the last few weeks. In recent years, also, there have been substantial drops in the prices of other commodities. Since 1980, the prices of most major commodities, measured in inflation-adjusted dollars, have declined by one-third. As a result, the prices paid by U.S. consumers for internationally traded primary commodities other than fuel, after adjustment for inflation, are lower than at any time since the Second World War.

Coffee provides one of the few significant exceptions to the downward trend in commodity prices. Since the end of 1980, the inflation-adjusted dollar price of coffee has risen almost 50%—or even more, depending on which day you make the calculation.

Among the many influences on commodity prices, one of special importance was the ending of over 15 years of high inflation and the attendant temporary recession in economic activity. Commodity prices are especially sensitive to these economic fundamentals. In addition, a large part of the reason for the weakness of dollar prices of commodities has been the strength of the U.S. dollar. Commodity prices expressed in terms of other major currencies have strengthened as the world economy has recovered. A world index of real commodity prices has risen since 1982, along with steady, though modest, economic recovery outside the United States and strong recovery in the United States.

After correcting for fluctuations in exchange rates, the major determinant of inflation-adjusted commodity prices appears to be the rate of world economic growth. A recent study by Data Resources, Inc., indicates that if in the 24 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economic growth is faster than 2.6% annually, commodity prices tend to rise; and if the OECD countries grow more slowly than 2.6%, commodity prices tend to fall.

Specific commodities are subject to their own specific influences, such as the powerful effect that frost and drought have on coffee prices. Those specific influences temporarily obscure the longer term trends, which otherwise would have been about the same for coffee and other special cases as for commodities in general.

These special cases, however, illuminate certain features common to the markets for most commodities. Most commodities have volatile prices; they are highly sensitive to shortages or surges of supply. From a policy standpoint, the volatility of commodity prices is especially significant because it stimulates efforts to control markets in the hope of stabilizing them.

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Commonweal

WHAT TO DO IN THE PHILIPPINES?

WHAT DO YOU do when Goliath refuses to be dispatched? Last December Corazon Aquino reached down into the riverbed and scooped up a smooth stone: the will of the Filipino electorate to be done with corruption and dictatorship. President Ferdinand Marcos, out of the corner of his squinted eye, saw what was coming. But he did not step aside. Instead, he tried to shield himself with an election campaign full of threats, bribery, chicanery, mobilization of the army, and domination of the media — indeed, all the habits of corruption that are the product of nine years of military rule. Like the Philistine giant of old, Marcos treated his challenger with scorn: a housewife, a naif, a person manipulated by Communists or too weak to combat them. Neither the taunts, nor the censorship, nor the thuggery, nor the sudden displays of government munificence, nor the love songs of the campaigning Imelda, nor the profits from the family's New York real estate could finally suffice. On election day, February 7, Mrs. Aquino put the stone in her sling and let fly. It struck home.

No doubt, President Marcos was stunned. He did not, however, fall on his face to the ground. Instead, he began to flail about. He propped himself up through fraud and blatant vote-stealing and dubious tallying. The thirty counters who, shaken by the mounting discrepancies, linked arms and ran out of the tabulating center in a fit of conscience, risked not only their jobs but their lives. The casualties of the election now number over one hundred.

"These and many other irregularities point to a criminal use of power to thwart the will of the people," declared the Filipino Catholic Bishops' Conference in a remarkable statement. "Yet, despite these evil acts, we are morally certain the people's real will for change has been truly manifested." In effect, the bishops have certified the election victory of Mrs. Aquino while the presidentially controlled National Assembly has certified the victory of Mr. Marcos.

The United States should make the same choice as the bishops. Not, of course, because the bishops demand it (they don't); but because democracy and our long-term national interest demand it. Washington (read, Mr. Reagan) should make up for the inexcusable waffling that followed the election and be at least as forthright as the bishops. "The way indicated to us now is the way of nonviolent struggle for justice . . . active resistance of evil by peaceful means," say the bishops. The bishops do not outline a plan of resistance; they pledge solidarity with those who are willing to act so "that the will of the people be fully respected." Should not the U.S. do as much?

What levers can the United States actually pull to support the Filipinos' choice and pave the way for Mr. Marcos's exit? Several.

One combination of carrot and stick is directed at the Marcos family itself and their close associates. Carrot: free and swift passage to a safe refuge out of the

country. Stick: freezing the U.S. assets of the Marcos family as investigations of their extent and sources proceed.

A second lever is economic. We could encourage the International Monetary Fund to refuse further loans to the Philippines until Marcos is replaced by Mrs. Aquino or the winner of a fair election. The IMF has already delayed action on several loan programs in view of "chaotic" conditions in the Philippines — and the possibility that the nation's economy was injured further by Marcos's burst of campaign spending. Meeting IMF conditions is also a prerequisite for hundreds of millions in new loans from commercial banks, banks which have recently rescheduled nearly $6 billion in existing Philippine debts. Plenty of opportunities for Washington pressure here, as there are in the matter of sizable loans that Japan is already hesitant to renew to the Philippines. A firm U.S. example would strengthen the Japanese and other allies to make their lending contingent on a Marcos abdication. Obviously, U.S. economic and military aid can be held in escrow until Manilla bows to democracy. And as the Philippines' largest trading partner, the U.S. can exert any number of more subtle pressures on the Filipino business community, which is increasingly coming to recognize that their own interests and those of Mr. Marcos and Company are not necessarily the same.

A third lever involves focusing national and world attention on the safety of leaders in the Aquino campaign and Namfrel (National Movement for Free Elections) who may face assassination. Even as President Reagan, in a nationally televised press conference, was declaring American "neutrality," four provincial opposition leaders were murdered. Mutilated bodies of ten more opposition leaders were reported the following day. Mr. Evilio Javier, who was hunted down, shot, and killed, was a long-time opponent of Marcos, yet Marcos spokesmen blamed Communist insurgents for the killing. The Philippines could be swept by a wave of "disappearances." That likelihood would be considerably decreased by an official expression of U.S. outrage comparable to those Mr. Shultz addresses to Middle Eastern "state-sponsored terrorism."

Do these suggestions exaggerate American influence? Possibly. But the Philippines is a nation where Washington's blessing counts for a lot. Mr. Marcos has lasted as long as he has in part because he enjoyed that blessing. Now that he is already on the skids, removing Washington's stamp of approval may provide the critical shove. But the American decision must be clear and definitive. We do not recognize this government as legitimate, and we are not about to do so in response to a little maneuvering and tinkering.

But should the U.S. risk such an implicit endorsement of Mrs. Aquino, an untested leader whose claim to victory at the polls can never be technically substantiated? The U.S. delegation of poll watchers, led by Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, actually estimated her share of the vote as between 60 and 70 percent, an amazing margin. Perhaps more important, Mrs. Aquino has displayed a promising mixture of both a capacity for compromise and an adherence to principle. Given the support she was able to mobilize — against formidable odds, despite government-controlled media, under threat of violence — Mrs. Aquino has demonstrated her stature and legitimacy as a national leader.

There is, of course, another kind of objection to this sort of U.S. "intervention" on behalf of democracy in the Philippines. It comes in three versions. The first is the principled rejection of *any* U.S. intervention — non-military as well as military — in the internal politics of other nations. The second is the *realpolitik* argument that Washington should look only to the security of its Clark and Subic military bases. The third is the debater's gambit that critics of Marcos are inconsistent if they oppose U.S. intervention in other parts of the world.

Our own answer must be brief. Only grave considerations of national security justify armed intervention. Other forms of influence must be judged by their purposes, by the circumstances, by the likely consequences. In the Philippines, we face an unusual situation. Democracy and a narrower *realpolitick* are happily coincident: we can call the Marcos bluff on our military installations; we cannot set our strategic concerns directly athwart the rising aspirations of Filipinos for self-government. Although the press may soon be swinging back from its present enthusiasm for the underdog, and Americans will learn that the Aquino coalition, too, has its feet of clay, nonetheless, Mrs. Aquino represents a rare quantity: a genüinely democratic, moderate force enjoying real popularity. In the biblical story, David scooped up five stones; he only needed one. Mrs. Aquino may need a handful more. The U.S. should be unmistakably in her camp, not skulking in Goliath's, and not pretending to stand on the sidelines.

Report from San Salvador

VOICES IN THE NIGHT

THE ARCHBISHOP CAME TO LISTEN

STANDING NEAR THE DOOR of St. Francis church in San Salvador on the evening of January 26, Archbishop John Quinn of San Francisco was overwhelmed by what he had just seen and heard. "It was like seeing the pages of the New Testament come alive again," he said. Quinn was ready to go home for the night. Others at the church would not be doing the same. This was wartime, and the parish priest was announcing that anyone who didn't want to venture onto the streets was welcome to spend the night in the church.

Quinn had already heard a good deal about the war in the twelve hours he'd been in El Salvador. He had come to speak at a church-sponsored peace forum. But before delivering his talk, he had met and spoken with two peasants who said they had just fled a major army operation fifteen miles from the capital. They spoke of aerial bombardments and ground attacks. They said that of the civilians who had been caught in the operation, some had been killed, others wounded, and many more captured. And they added that other civilians were

WHY MARCOS CAN'T LAST MUCH LONGER

HE CLINGS TO POWER, BUT SOCIAL STRIFE AND A SINKING ECONOMY WILL BRING HIM DOWN

President Ferdinand E. Marcos is losing his country. For the first time in his 20-year rule, Marcos stands mostly alone, with only a divided military keeping him in power. The middle class and business deserted him after the flagrant ballot-stuffing and voter intimidation in the Feb. 7 elections.

But his increasing isolation creates a major dilemma for President Reagan. Opposition leaders in the Philippines warn that by failing to condemn Marcos' electoral abuses, Reagan is risking a major backlash against U. S. military and economic interests.


Although Marcos is clinging to office, he clearly miscalculated the strength of his opponent, Corazon C. Aquino. He was obliged to rely on strong-arm tactics at the polls and on tying up the vote in the National Assembly, which he controls. Those moves and his faltering health convinced the world that his power and judgment are slipping. Says a key international banker: "Marcos is out of touch. He's losing control."

But Reagan initially declined to step back from Marcos despite the fraud witnessed by international observers. Later, he said he took reports of fraud "seriously" and dispatched veteran troubleshooter Philip C. Habib to assess the situation. Although Reagan professed neutrality, his statement that there was "no hard evidence" of fraud was broadcast continuously over Marcos-controlled television as a sign of support for the President.

A FRIEND? Aquino and her followers, however, viewed Reagan's statements as legitimizing a stolen election. Says Aquino: "I would wonder at the motives of a friend of democracy who chose to conspire with Mr. Marcos to cheat the Filipino people."

Reagan's advisers wanted to keep the Administration and Marcos apart. They hoped to smooth the transition to a post-Marcos era, thereby protecting two crucial U. S. military bases and more than $2.5 billion in U. S. investment.

But after the balloting, senior U. S. officials concluded that no matter how questionable the elections were, Marcos had the power to remain in office as long as his health allows. They felt



ENKELIS/WHEELER PICTURES

VICIOUS CYCLE: BUYING POWER IS FALLING, INVESTMENT IS DRYING UP, CAPITAL IS IN FLIGHT

obliged to "do business" with Marcos because the alternative—openly backing Aquino—could spark a bloody uprising, says one official.

The officials recognize that by appearing to side with Marcos—at least in the eyes of Filipinos—the U. S. greatly complicated working with his eventual successors. "This will turn people against the bases," says one Filipino executive.

The evidence of Marcos' weakening grip on power is graphic. His ability to manage the economy has all but vanished. The Philippine peso, one of Asia's basket-case currencies, has weakened further since the election. Deposits at U. S. bank branches in Manila are surging as Filipinos shift money out of government banks, preparing to move it out of the country at a moment's notice.

Critical foreign financial support is also evaporating. While Marcos remains, Congress will resist increases in aid, and there will be a strong effort to cut the $236 million the Philippines gets now. Reagan may request new aid because of Marcos' desperate economic plight, but he's not likely to risk a major battle.

The International Monetary Fund will delay fresh loans while it reviews Marcos' campaign promises and preelection giveaways, which almost certainly will fuel inflation, already raging at 63% over the past 18 months. Hundreds of millions of dollars of commercial bank loans are tied to the IMF decision. Without increased funding, Marcos could be crippled in his fight against the New People's Army insurgents, whose ranks have swollen to 16,500.

As the Philippines slides into its worst crisis since World War II, Marcos is supported only by a circle of government insiders and military leaders. The business community has become part of the active opposition. While Marcos stays in office, there will be no surge of new investment. Says the head of one of the country's largest companies: "The election has increased uncertainty rather than decreased it."

BARBED WIRE. But Marcos is not going to leave without a tough fight. Police have erected barbed wire and blockades on streets leading to Malacanang Palace. And riot troops with helmets, truncheons, and shields are prepared to crush any pro-Aquino demonstrations. Marcos will not slip gracefully into exile. "That's not in his character," says one U. S. observer. "He's not leaving."

While he stays, Marcos has the power to take revenge on Filipino businessmen who supported either Aquino or the election watchdog group, National Movement for Free Elections. "These people are taking great risks, because in Marcos' eyes, you are either pro-Marcos or against him," says one U. S. banker. After he declared martial law in September, 1972, for example, Marcos punished enemies by closing their businesses and confiscating assets.



MARCOS, SAYS A KEY BANKER, IS "OUT OF TOUCH. HE'S LOSING CONTROL"

The election also makes life tougher for American multinationals, which were quietly hoping for an Aquino victory to restore confidence (BW—Feb. 3). They are not as worried about the wrath of Marcos as they are about a rapidly deteriorating economy. "Until the Marcos regime is over, the Philippine economy has no horizon," says Brookings Institution economist Lawrence B. Krause.

Multinationals are feeling the squeeze. Procter & Gamble Co. already has seen sales for some of its products drop by as much as 25% in the past year. "There is simply no purchasing power," says Geronimo C. Estacio, P&G's Philippine finance director. "It will take us until 1992 to get back to 1983 levels of activity."



AQUINO VIEWS REAGAN'S STANCE AS LEGITIMIZING A STOLEN ELECTION

P&G, however, has no intention of pulling out. Nor do Del Monte, Castle & Cooke, and Goodyear Tire & Rubber, which have investments in Mindanao, one of the country's most troubled regions. Says one executive: "We are praying and hoping there won't be any disturbances."

But one thing is clear: Virtually no major American company is prepared to make new investments. James D. Black, general manager of Squibb Corp.'s Philippine operations, says his U. S. bosses told him to forget the capital investments he was considering. "As long as Marcos continues in power," says Black, "there will be continued nervousness in the business community."

That nervousness is reflected in the high-tech sector. Three U. S. semiconductor makers—National Semiconductor, Advanced Micro Devices, and Texas Instruments—say they are prepared to sit tight. But Gould AMI Inc. has prepared a fallback plan. Wayne K. Moore, managing director of AMI Philippines Inc., says the company negotiated a three-year agreement with a South Korean company to shift production of integrated circuits to Korea if the insurgents loom large.

'VERY MILITANT.' At least for now, the increasing radicalization of the work force is a more pressing concern than the communist insurgency. Switzerland's Nestlé, which makes coffee and powdered liquids, is entering the third week of a strike by the militant Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) union, whose name means the May 1 Movement. "When we deal with multinational corporations, we become very, very militant, because they are agents of imperialism," says KMU leader Rolando Olalia.

Concern over labor militancy and the country's economic decline are likely to prevent companies from making smooth exits even if they want to. Several multinationals, including Baxter Travenol, Ford Motor, and General Motors, have pulled out, but the latest uncertainty means there will be few buyers.

No one knows how long it will take for Marcos to leave. He's defied earlier predictions of his demise. But the damage he's inflicted on the Philippines will take years to repair, even at the hands of the most able successor. Although the shape of a future government is still murky, many business and political leaders see the end of the Marcos era. Asserts Brookings' Krause: "The man is ill, and the regime is ending." Despite having clung to office, Marcos can look forward only to an agonizing decline.

By Dorinda Elliott in Manila and Dori Jones Yang in Hong Kong, with Boyd France and Richard Fly in Washington, William J. Holstein in New York, and bureau reports

(TOP) STEINER/PICTURE GROUP; (BOTTOM) SMITH/PICTURE GROUP

JOSEPH A. O'HARE

The Agony of Philippine Democracy

By the use of unparalled fraudulence during the recent election, the Marcos Government surrendered all claim to credibility or moral legitimacy, and the soul of the nation remains at stake.

In November 1985 the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, surprised the Filipino people and the world by calling for a presidential election in early 1986, more than two years before his term of office would have expired. He did so, he said, to confirm the credibility of his Government. In his letter of resignation to the National Assembly, he wrote: "Clearly the mandate of 1981 must be placed before the people for reexamination."

The results of that "snap election" (as it came to be called) are now in. They do not confirm the credibility or legitimacy of the Marcos Government. Violence and fraud on a grand scale made a mockery of the aspirations of the Filipino people. A week after the Feb. 7 election, the Roman Catholic bishops of the Philippines declared that the elections were "unparalled in the fraudulence of their conduct." By using such tactics, the bishops said, the Marcos regime had surrendered all claim to moral legitimacy, and the Filipino people were justified in using all peaceful means to bring about the change in government they so clearly wanted.

In the final weeks of what was surely the most extraordinary political campaign in Philippine history, the members of a study mission to the Philippines, of whom I was one, sponsored by the Asia Society in New York City, had an opportunity to witness the overwhelming commitment of the Filipino people to democratic process. Hundreds of thousands of volunteer poll-watchers had attempted to guard the integrity of the ballot against the various forms of fraud available to the Government apparatus. Businessmen, normally apolitical animals, had gambled their lives and their fortunes on the possibility of a fair election.

The design behind the visit of the study mission had been two years in the making. The trip had been planned long before there was any thought of a presidential election in February. Still, the elections were the preoccupation of everyone with whom we talked.

In calling the snap election, President Marcos had apparently calculated on his own control of a vast Government apparatus and the obvious divisions within the political opposition. He undoubtedly expected a clear and comfortable victory. In fact, it was only on Dec. 10, after several false starts, that the opposition was able to field a unified ticket, with Corazón Aquino, the widow of the assassinated Benigno Aquino running for President, and Philippine Senator Salvador Laurel, putting aside his own presidential ambitions to accept the nomination as Vice President. After an uncertain start in the first weeks of the campaign, the candidacy of Mrs. Aquino touched an emotional wellspring whose depth surprised even her most dedicated supporters and surely must have unsettled the wily autocrat in Malacanang, the presidential palace, who had ruled the Philippines for 20 years.

An official at the U.S. Embassy in Manila traced the unexpected emotional response to the Aquino candidacy to three sources: long-repressed resentment of the President after 20 years of one-man rule; an economy that has over the last two years declined precipitously and increased economic hardship for lower- and middle-class families; and, most of all, the memory of the brutal assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino when he returned from political exile in August 1983. Despite the fact that a presidentially

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«Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J., *president of Fordham University and a former editor in chief of* AMERICA, *was one of the 10 members of a study mission, sponsored by the Asia Society in New York City, that visited the Philippines, Jan. 18-28.*»

appointed tribunal acquitted all of the military officers implicated by a civilian investigative body in this assassination, most Filipinos believe that the Marcos regime was behind the Aquino murder.

Our study mission had an opportunity to discuss the present crisis in the Philippines with Government leaders, including the First Lady of the Philippines, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, and the Prime Minister, César E.A. Virata. We also met with leaders from the political opposition, from the business community, from the church and the academic world. From these conversations a clear consensus developed. It could be stated in three propositions.

First, the Philippines, if it is to survive and prosper as a society, needs a dramatic change in course and must institute fundamental political, economic and military reforms. Second, aside from professional Marcos loyalists and apologists, most other Filipinos concur that such change is not possible if Ferdinand Marcos remains in office. Third, no matter what the results of the voting of Feb. 7, the prospect of the Marcos family peacefully leaving the presidential palace and cooperating in a transfer of power seemed implausible to everyone with whom we spoke.

After 20 years of increasingly centralized rule, political reforms are necessary if local government is to function in an effective manner. Washington Sycip, head of one of the most prestigious accounting and management consulting firms in South Asia, compared the present political structure in the Philippines to a wheel with many spokes. At the hub of the wheel is President Marcos, but none of the other spokes of the wheel are really in communication with the others. Too many decisions come to the President for any effective government.

As long as the Marcos regime remains in power, the polarization of Philippine politics will continue.

Blas F. Ople, the Secretary of Labor throughout the 20 years of the Marcos regime, confirmed this view when he indicated that a greater decentralization of government would be one of the likely changes that Mr. Marcos would initiate if he were reelected. Mr. Ople was one of the few who thought that fundamental changes would take place if Mr. Marcos remained in power. "A new Marcos," he said, "will emerge out of the cocoon of the old." When pressed, Mr. Ople suggested that Mr. Marcos would recognize that this would be his last chance to redeem his place in the history of the Philippines, and he would, accordingly, be more independent of his family and friends.

Economic reforms are necessary to revive an economy that has declined disastrously since the Aquino assassination and the consequent flight of capital out of the Philippines. Since 1983, there has been a nine-percent drop in the Philippine gross national product (G.N.P.) and yet at the same time a six-percent increase in population. Business leaders in Manila traced many of the present economic ills to the privileged access to Government loans given to close friends and associates of the Marcos family. This kind of "crony capitalism" led to the failure of many Government-funded enterprises.

At the present time, over 200 such enterprises have been foreclosed by the Government. Mr. Marcos himself referred to these "nonperforming assets" as the "second N.P.A. in the Philippines." (The first N.P.A. is the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist insurgency.) Similarly, monopolies in such important industries as sugar and coconuts, controlled by Marcos associates, stifled the free forces of the market.

Perhaps the most crucial area of reform, however, remains the military. At one time, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (A.F.P.) enjoyed a very high reputation as a professional corps. Since the imposition of martial law in

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1972, however, the A.F.P. has become increasingly politicized and personalized. There have been enormous economic opportunities for favored generals, and many of them have stayed on beyond their retirement age.

The most notorious instance of personal loyalty in the A.F.P. is, of course, Gen. Fabián Ver, the Chief of Staff of the A.F.P. command. He was implicated by the citizens' commission that investigated the Aquino assassination but was acquitted by the special court appointed by President Marcos. The U.S. Government has exerted great pressure on the Marcos Government to remove Gen. Ver from command.

In late 1984, a group of younger officers in the A.F.P. began calling for reforms within the military. They issued a manifesto citing the need to end graft and corruption in the military. The superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy dismissed this anonymous letter as the work of cowards.

In March 1985, at the commencement of the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio, representatives of the classes of 1971 to 1984 marched in review displaying a sign that called for "unity through reforms." In describing this incident, one of them told us: "We had been called cowards because we had remained anonymous. So we marched before the reviewing stand to tell our commanders that they could pick their cowards from among us, 300 strong."

We met with a group of these officers of the R.A.M. (Reform the A.F.P.Movement). They told us of their growing dissatisfaction with top commanders who grew rich while troops in the field were frequently without basic supplies, ammunition and even clothing. Yet these officers hoped to initiate reforms while remaining within the command structure of the A.F.P.

The task they had set for themselves, they told us, was first of all to insist that each soldier and officer should internalize in a personal way a code of military ethics. When asked how they would respond in the event of widespread demonstrations after the election, they answered that they would follow all legal orders. They would try to control any crowds by peaceful means. But they would consider any orders to do violence to peaceful demonstrators to be illegal orders, and they would not obey them.

In the weeks leading up to the election, the reform movement had conducted seminars for army officers on how to detect fraud and prevent cheating in the elections. They had scheduled prayer vigils for clean elections at military camps. However, one of these vigils, scheduled to be held in a military camp in Manila, was canceled by order of Gen. Ver during our stay in Manila.

The actual significance of the reform movement is dif-

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
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ficult to assess. Estimates of the number of officers committed to the movement range from 700 to 1,000 officers. They have surely been infiltrated by officers loyal to the Marcos regime. When we questioned the official command of the A.F.P. about the R.A.M., the response was guarded, a cautious statement to the effect that the reform officers were only expressing the aspirations of all of the officers and men of the A.F.P.

In the event of widespread civilian disorder in the Philippines after the elections, the presence of this potential division within the military obviously constitutes a very explosive element in the political equation in the Philippines. The moral challenge posed to the officers and men of the Philippine military certainly became more acute with the postelection statement of the Philippine Catholic bishops that peaceful resistance to the Marcos regime was legitimate and morally necessary.

Without fundamental political, economic and military reforms, the danger of the Communist insurgency in the Philippines is greatly heightened. Former Senator Jovito Salonga, himself the victim of political violence in a 1971 bombing, points out that in 1965, when Ferdinand Marcos first took office as President, the N.P.A. did not exist. In 1972, when Mr. Marcos declared martial law, the N.P.A. was estimated to number in the hundreds. In 1986, the N.P.A. strength is estimated to be as high as 20,000 men and women under arms. Senator Salonga's implication is clear. As long as the Marcos regime remains in power, the polarization of Philippine politics will continue, and the radical left, with the N.P.A. as its military arm, will continue to grow.

Ironically, the Marcos forces deliberately chose to make the dangers of Communism the dominant issue in the campaign. In a spirited defense of the Marcos regime during a long dinner conversation with the study mission, Mrs. Marcos claimed that the security, not only of the Philippines, but of the free world itself, hung in the balance in the present campaign in the Philippines.

This incantation of the Communist menace was probably designed primarily for foreign consumption, particularly policymakers in the United States who tended to agree with the statement of President Reagan in a 1984 presidential campaign debate that the choice in the Philippines might be "Marcos or the Communists." There was little support for this overdrawn dilemma among those with whom we spoke in Manila. Cardinal Jaime Sin, the Archbishop of Manila, told us that he did not think the Communist issue was an important issue in the campaign, at least not in the manner posed by the Marcos forces. A member of the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila, an executive of a multinational corporation and a long-time resident in the Philippines, bluntly told us that the real choice was Mr. Marcos or the Communists. By this he meant that the longer Ferdinand Marcos continued in office, the stronger the Communist insurgency would become.

Assessing the present strength of that insurgency is not a simple matter. Various estimates—from 14,000 to 20,000—are given of the number of armed guerrillas in the New People's Army. Similarly, the extent to which the N.P.A. controls parts of the country is also a matter of dispute. The more crucial question in any event is whether the insurgency is growing or whether it has been arrested at a manageable level. Officials in the U.S. Embassy believe it is growing—at a rate of 20 percent a year. The leadership of the A.F.P., however, argue that by mid-1985 the N.P.A., as a result of the increased use of the tactics of terror in the countryside, had alienated many of their supporters and that defections to the Government were increasing.

It is the soul of a nation that is at stake, and there can be no compromise in such a struggle.

In the recent election the official Communist position, and that of their radical left sympathizers, was to boycott the election, on the grounds that it could not be credible with Marcos in power. In the view of certain leaders of the Manila business community, the credibility of the election was even more important than a change in leadership.

A reasonably fair and honest election could herald a return to a more stable business environment that would attract new foreign investment and bring back some of the capital that had fled the country since 1983. But how would one finally judge whether the elections were fair and honest? Washington Sycip and others said that the most reliable index would be the judgment of Namfrel (National Movement for Free Elections).

This citizens' volunteer organization had been founded in May 1984, when local elections were held. In those 1984 elections, 62 percent of the polling places in the Philippines were covered by Namfrel observers. Much credit is given to these observers for the surprising results of the election, which saw the political opposition gain a significant share of the seats in the National Assembly.

The leaders of Namfrel had been organizing for the local elections scheduled for May 1986, when President Marcos in November 1985 called for a presidential election. Support for the Namfrel poll-watching operation increased with the announcement of Mrs. Aquino's candidacy. Over 500,000 volunteers were prepared to work with Namfrel in monitoring the presidential elections. *(continued on p. 176)*

JOSEPH A. O'HARE

(Continued from p. 164)

The work of Namfrel received the full support of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and on several occasions U.S. spokesmen praised the organization highly. The Marcos Government reluctantly agreed that Namfrel observers would be accredited for the poll-watching operation, but in a series of free election maneuvers, the official Commission on Elections sought to inhibit the work of Namfrel wherever possible. Although Namfrel expected to have observers in all 74 provinces in the Philippines, in the end they were shut out of five provinces completely. While they had planned to cover 80 percent to 85 percent of the 90,000 voting precincts in the Philippines, in many instances the Namfrel observers were terrorized by local thugs who broke into the polling precincts.

The Government-controlled press accused Namfrel of being a front of the C.I.A. This was, according to these apologists for the regime, another instance of U.S. meddling in the Philippine electoral process. While President Marcos was officially welcoming the presence of foreign observers, the more imaginative columnists in the Government-controlled papers were protesting the presence of these "white-skinned, hirsute, AIDS-inclined meddlers."

Days before the announcement that an official delegation of observers would be sent by the United States, we asked José Concepción, the national chairman of Namfrel, whether such foreign observers would actually be helpful. He answered that the presence of foreign observers could serve to deter violence and fraud, even though he doubted that foreign observers would actually be able to detect all instances of fraud. That the election-day violence took place in Manila, where foreign observers were most numerous, was a measure of the audacity of the intimidation.

Mr. Concepción and others explained that their real fear was what they called "wholesale fraud rather than retail fraud." They were afraid that the true ballots would be switched with previously prepared Marcos ballots before the actual counting in the National Assembly. In a postelection assessment, Mr. Concepción admitted that Namfrel had not anticipated that hundreds of thousands of voters in pro-Aquino districts would be disenfranchised by manipulation of the voter registration rules.

How should the United States respond to recent events in the Philippines? The casual statement of President Reagan that there were "claims of violence on both sides" and that a healthy two-party system seemed to obtain in the Philippines surely must have been disheartening news for those hundreds of thousands of ordinary Filipinos who risked their fortunes and their lives in a struggle to recover the democratic soul of their nation.

For in the present agony of the Philippines, it is the soul of a nation that is at stake, and there can be no compromise in such a struggle. If it is not to squander its still considerable moral capital in the Philippines, the United States must keep faith with the Filipino people. President Reagan must make it clear that Washington judges the Marcos regime to be morally unacceptable and that no further economic or military assistance will be available to this ailing but ruthless autocrat who answers the aspirations of his people with every form of political assassination. ■

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Editorials

Moment of Truth In the Philippines

Ferdinand E. Marcos has been described by his critics, with grudging admiration, as the "evil genius" of Philippine politics. His extraordinary career has been built on a combination of qualities, not the least a cool capacity for deception. His fictitious record of war heroism is only the most inventive instance of this capacity, which is also demonstrated by his uncanny ability to mask the ruthless use of force by a web of legalistic evasion. Now, in the twilight of his career, his mental agility in striking contrast to his physical frailty, he is engaged in one last desperate gamble in deception: the continued claim to be the lawful ruler of the Philippines, after an election in which the cry of the Filipino people for change has been smothered by pervasive fraud and acts of brutal violence.

When Mr. Marcos calmly tells an American television audience that any irregularities reported in the recent election should be brought to a Government agency for judgment, he is under no illusion that he is fooling the Filipino people. But he is anxious to appear on American television because he believes, rightly or wrongly, that he must at least gain time in the court of American public opinion, if he is to remain in power. To this end he employs a device that has served him well in the past. He seeks to deflect the claims of justice into legalistic detours in the hope that the attention of the world will soon turn elsewhere. When this happens, he can attend to his enemies.

The most callous instance of this legalistic evasion was the Marcos response to the investigation of the assassination of Benigno Aquino. This brutal murder at the Manila International Airport, when the opposition leader returned from exile in August 1983, shocked the world. But two years later, after thousands of pages of testimony and the permanent disappearance of key witnesses, the military men accused of the crime were acquitted, among them the chief henchman of Mr. Marcos, Gen. Fabian Ver, who was then reinstated as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The world was disbelieving. Filipinos were confirmed in their cynicism, but life went on for Mr. Marcos. Washington did not conceal its distaste for General Ver, but U.S. military support for the troops under the general's command continued.

Now another moment of truth has come in the special relationship of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. While Washington's power to influence events in the Philippines may not be as decisive as many Filipinos think, there can be no doubt that the public judgment of the U.S. Government will have profound repercussions in the Philippines. The long-range interests of the United States, including the security of its military bases there, can only be threatened by the further deterioration of Philippine society.

There is no guarantee that the necessary reforms, political, military and economic, would be easily accomplished if the political opposition replaced Mr. Marcos in power. Corazón C. Aquino would face formidable problems: impossibly heightened expectations on the part of the people and the challenge of transforming the remarkable coalition of different interests that supported her candidacy into a coherent force for good government.

But Mrs. Aquino represents the hope, if not the guarantee, of needed fundamental change. For Mr. Marcos to continue in office would mean the loss of hope and the guarantee of further deception. The Filipino people have faced their moment of truth and made their choice. The United States and its leaders in Washington must now do the same.

Decision for Choice

The Commission for the Blind in the state of Washington provides funds for vocational education aimed at helping visually handicapped persons care for and support themselves. Larry Witters, a 28-year-old resident of the state, is afflicted with a progressive eye disease. He has been working as a dishwasher, but hopes to complete studies he began some time ago at the Inland Empire School of the Bible, a private Christian college in Spokane. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment would be violated if Mr. Witters were allowed to use state money to pay his tuition at the Bible college, but last month the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously overturned that decision.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the Court's opinion