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**Folder Title:**  
Arrival Statement--Brussels, Belgium 5/28/89 [OA 6265] [1]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DAN MCGROARTY *DMG*

THROUGH: CHRISS WINSTON *W*

RE: ARRIVAL STATEMENT - BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

I. SUMMARY

On Sunday, May 28, at 6:00 p.m., you will deliver a statement after you have arrived in Belgium. You will be greeted by Belgian Prime Minister Martens.

II. DISCUSSION

The statement discusses the important role Belgium plays in the Atlantic Alliance, and the opportunities you look forward to in the course of the NATO discussions.

McGroarty/Dooley  
May 23, 1989  
6:00 p.m.  
Draft 2

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BRUSSELS ARRIVAL STATEMENT  
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM  
MAY 28, 1989

It is a pleasure to be back once again in Brussels, and I am especially pleased that my first visit as President of the United States comes as the nations of NATO celebrate 40 years of alliance -- and the longest period of peace and freedom Europe has known in the modern age.

Americans and Belgians share the memories of war and hard-won peace in this century. Flanders, the Battle of the Ardennes, Bastogne: those names are part of our history as well as your own -- part of our shared heritage of freedom, and the sacrifices it requires.

Belgium -- no stranger to conquest and division -- recognized from the first the importance of alliance in the post-war world. Today, as permanent home to NATO and the European Community, Brussels stands at the center of a Europe free, at peace, and prosperous as never before -- a Europe that is steadily moving towards a single market, and unprecedented political and economic opportunities. In Brussels, the signs of this European renaissance are everywhere.

Belgium has been a good friend and a valued ally -- one that has always acted with alliance interests in mind. Early in this decade, Belgium was one of five NATO nations that made the

difficult decision to base INF systems on its soil. Those deployments gave us the leverage we needed to negotiate the first-ever arms reduction treaty. That's the kind of courageous and realistic approach that explains NATO's success. NATO is at once ready to ensure the common defense, and, when Soviet actions -- not just words -- warrant it, to reduce arms and seek to diminish tensions with the East.

I am looking forward to important discussions with King Baudouin [BOW-DWIN] and the NATO heads of government. I look forward as well to my meeting with Prime Minister Martens, my discussions with President Delors of the European Community and Secretary General Woerner of NATO.

The future of NATO depends on the Alliance's ability to deal with our enduring security concerns and our evolving economic relationship. We look to Belgium to continue to play its important role in our close and cooperative transatlantic partnership.

Thank you.

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
DAVID BATES  
RICHARD BREEDEN  
ANDREW CARD  
JAMES CICONI  
DAVID DEMAREST  
MARLIN FITZWATER  
BOYDEN GRAY  
FRED MCCLURE  
BONNIE NEWMAN  
ROGER PORTER  
BRENT SCOWCROFT  
STEVE STUDDERT  
CHASE UNTERMAYER  
SUSAN PORTER ROSE  
ED ROGERS  
JOE HAGIN  
JIM WRAY  
CHRISS WINSTON

BOBBIE KILBERG  
PATTY PRESOCK  
LINDA CASEY  
ROBERT GUTTMAN  
TIMOTHY MCBRIDE  
ROSE ZAMARIA  
TONY LOPEZ  
DAVID VALDEZ  
BILLY DALE  
JAY ALLISON  
BRUCE ZANCA  
LAURIE FIRESTONE  
CASEY HEALEY  
JEAN LAMB  
DEB ANDERSON  
USSS/PPD OPS  
WHCA AUDIO/VISUAL  
WHCA OPERATIONS  
MEDICAL UNIT  
PRESIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENTS

THRU: STEPHEN M. STUDDERT

FROM: JOHN G. KELLER, JR. *JGK*  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND  
DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVANCE

SUBJECT: TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT TO ROME, BRUSSELS,  
BONN, AND LONDON, MAY 26 - JUNE 1, 1989

For your use and planning purposes, the attached is the proposed tentative schedule for the Trip of the President to Western Europe, May 26 - June 1, 1989.

This schedule is subject to change.

**DRAFT**

**DRAFT**

Revised 4/28 12:30 pm

**SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH**

**FOR**

**ROME, ITALY**

**MAY 26 - 28, 1989**

**Friday, May 26, 1989**

6:45 am (B) Depart White House en route Andrews Air Force Base.

(Flight Time: 10 Minutes)

6:55 am (B) Arrive Andrews Air Force Base.

7:00 am (B) Depart Andrews Air Force Base en route Rome, Italy.

(Flight Time: 9 Hours)  
(Interchange: Yes)  
(Time Change: Ahead 6 Hours)

10:00 pm (B) Arrive Ciampino Airport, Rome, Italy.  
(4:00 pm E.D.T.) \* Possible Greeting by Prime Minister

10:15 pm (B) Depart Airport en route Macao Barracks LZ.

(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

10:30 pm (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ and proceed to Motorcade.

10:35 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Villa Taverna.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

10:40 pm (B) Arrive Villa Taverna for RON.

**DRAFT**

Saturday, May 27, 1989

- 9:05 am Depart Villa Taverna en route Villa Madama.  
(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
- 9:25 am Arrive Villa Madama for Meeting with Prime  
Minister De Mita.  
\* Participants: 3 on 3
- 10:00 am Conclude Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting.  
\* Participants: 6-8 on 6-8
- 11:40 am Depart Villa Madama en route Quirinale Palace.  
(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
- 12:00 noon Arrive Quirinale Palace for Meeting with President  
Cossiga.  
\* Participants: 3 on 3
- 1:15 pm (B) Begin Lunch hosted by President Cossiga.  
NOTE: Mrs. Bush will join the President at this  
time.  
\* No Toast
- 2:45 pm (B) Depart Quirinale Palace en route Villa Taverna.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 3:00 pm (B) Arrive Villa Taverna for Private Time.  
(Private Time: 1 Hour 45 Minutes)
- 4:45 pm Depart Suite and proceed to Reception Room for  
Reception hosted by President.
- 5:30 pm Conclude Reception.
- 5:35 pm (B) Depart Villa Taverna en route Vatican.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

- 5:50 pm Arrive Vatican, Cortile San Damaso for Brief Ceremony.
- 5:55 pm Departs Cortile San Damaso and proceeds to Papal Library.
- 6:00 pm Arrives Papal Library for Private Audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II.
- 7:00 pm Concludes Private Audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II.
- (B) 7:00 pm Mrs. Bush joins Audience.
- 7:15 pm Other U.S. Party Members join Audience.
- 7:35 pm (B) Depart Papal Library and proceed to Sala Clementina.
- 7:40 pm (B) Arrive Sala Clementina for American Seminary Greeting.
- 7:50 pm (B) Depart Sala Clementina and proceed to Holding Room.
- \* Possible Tour of Chapels for President
- 7:55 pm (B) Arrive Holding Room.
- 8:10 pm (B) Depart Holding Room and proceed to Motorcade.
- 8:15 pm (B) Depart Vatican en route Villa Madama.
- (Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 8:30 pm (B) Arrive Villa Madama for Dinner hosted by Prime Minister De Mita.
- \* Toast  
\* Dark Business Suit
- 10:20 pm (B) Depart Villa Madama en route Villa Taverna.
- (Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 10:30 pm (B) Arrive Villa Taverna for RON.

# DRAFT

Sunday, May 28, 1989

- 8:00 am (B) Depart Villa Taverna en route Macao Barracks LZ.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 8:10 am (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.
- 8:20 am (B) Depart LZ en route Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ.  
(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)
- 8:45 am (B) Arrive Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ and proceed to Motorcade.
- 8:50 am (B) Depart Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ en route San Francesco Church.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 9:00 am (B) Arrive San Francesco Church for Church Service.
- 9:55 am (B) Depart San Francesco Church en route Sicily-Rome American Cemetery.  
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
- 10:00 am (B) Arrive Sicily-Rome American Cemetery for Ceremony.
- 11:00 am (B) Depart Sicily-Rome American Cemetery en route LZ.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 11:10 am (B) Arrive Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ.
- 11:15 am (B) Depart Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ en route Macao Barracks.  
(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)
- 11:40 am (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.
- 11:45 am (B) Depart LZ en route Villa Taverna.  
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

11:50 am (B) Arrive Villa Taverna

12:00 noon (B) Begin Lunch with Prime Minister De Mita.

1:15 pm (B) Conclude Lunch and begin Private Time.

(Private Time: 1 Hour 15 Minutes)

2:30 pm (B) Begin American Embassy Community Greeting.

3:00 pm (B) Depart Villa Taverna en route Macao Barracks LZ.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

3:05 pm (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.

3:10 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Airport.

(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

3:25 pm (B) Arrive Airport.

3:30 pm (B) Depart Rome, Italy en route Brussels, Belgium.

(9:30 am  
E.D.T.)

(Flight Time: 2 Hours 30 Minutes)

(Interchange: Yes)

(Time Change: None)

**DRAFT**

Revised 4/28 12:30 pm

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH  
FOR  
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM  
MAY 28 - 30, 1989

Sunday, May 28, 1989

6:00 pm (B) Arrive Brussels International Airport, Brussels,  
(12:00 noon Belgium.  
E.D.T.)

- \* Met by Prime Minister Martens
- \* Honor Guard

6:10 pm (B) Depart Airport, accompanied by Prime Minister  
Martens, en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.

(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)

6:35 pm (B) Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg and proceed inside.

6:40 pm Begin Meeting with Prime Minister Martens.

- \* Participants: 6-8 on 6-8

7:10 pm Conclude Meeting with Prime Minister Martens and  
proceed to Suite.

7:15 pm Arrive Suite for RON.

Monday, May 29, 1989

8:40 am Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO  
Headquarters.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

# DRAFT

- 8:55 am Arrive NATO Headquarters and proceed to Secretary General's Office.
- \* Met by NATO Secretary General Woerner
- PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
- 9:00 am Arrive Secretary General Woerner's Office for Meeting.
- PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
- 9:30 am Depart Secretary General's Office and proceed to Conference Room 16 Foyer.
- 9:35 am Arrive Conference Room 16 Foyer for Coffee.
- 9:45 am Arrive Conference Room 16 for Opening Ceremony.
- OPEN PRESS
- 10:00 am Depart Conference Room 16 and proceed to Conference Room One.
- PHOTO OPPORTUNITY (outside Conference Room 16)
- 10:15 am Arrive Conference Room One for First Working Session.
- CLOSED PRESS
- 12:35 pm Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Motorcade.
- 12:40 pm Depart NATO en route King Baudouin's Downtown Palace.
- (Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
- 1:00 pm Arrive King Baudouin's Downtown Palace for Lunch.
- 2:35 pm Depart King Baudouin's Downtown Palace en route NATO Headquarters.
- (Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
- 2:55 pm Arrive NATO and proceed to Conference Room One.
- 3:00 pm Arrive Conference Room One for Second Working Session.

- 6:00 pm Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Motorcade.
- 6:05 pm Depart NATO Headquarters en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 6:20 pm Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg for Private Time.  
(Private Time: 1 Hour 25 Minutes)
- 7:45 pm Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route Val Duchesse.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 8:00 pm Arrive Val Duchesse for Working Dinner.
- 10:30 pm Depart Val Duchesse en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 10:45 pm Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg for RON.

Tuesday, May 30, 1989

- 8:40 am Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO Headquarters.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 8:55 am Arrive NATO Headquarters and proceed to Conference Room One.
- 9:00 am Arrive Conference Room One for Third Working Session.
- 11:30 am Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Holding Room.
- 11:35 am Arrive Holding Room.  
(Private Time: 50 Minutes)
- 12:25 pm Depart Holding Room and proceed to Luns Press Theatre.
- 12:30 pm Arrive Luns Press Theatre for Press Conference.

# DRAFT

- 1:00 pm Depart Luns Press Theatre and proceed to Motorcade.
- 1:05 pm Depart NATO en route Berlaymont.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 1:15 pm Arrive Berlaymont for Meeting with EC President De Lors.  
\* Participants: TBD
- 2:00 pm Depart Berlaymont en route Brussels American School.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 2:15 pm (B) Arrive Brussels American School for Tri-Mission Embassy Community Greeting.
- 2:50 pm (B) Depart Brussels American School en route Airport.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 3:00 pm (B) Arrive Airport and proceed board Air Force One.
- 3:10 pm (B) Depart Brussels, Belgium en route Bonn, FRG.  
(9:10 am E.D.T.)  
(Flight Time: 1 Hour 5 Minutes)  
(Interchange: Yes)  
(Time Change: None)

*Jaques Delors & Pres.  
HQ of Commission of EC  
Berlaymont Bldg*

*Pres.  
Baker  
Amb Kingen  
Moakher  
Sununu*

*seawright  
Fitz  
Ridgeway*

*Delors  
Frans Andriessen VP  
Martin Bangemann VP  
David Williamson Sec. Gen.  
Norst Krenzler Dir. Gen.  
Pascal Lamy chef de cabinet*

**DRAFT**

Revised 4/28 12:30 pm

**SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH**

**FOR**

**BONN, WEST GERMANY**

**MAY 30 - 31, 1989**

**Tuesday, May 30, 1989**

- 4:15 pm (B) Arrive Bonn/Koln Airport, Bonn, FRG and proceed  
(10:15 am to board Marine One.  
E.D.T.)
- 4:20 pm (B) Depart Airport en route Park LZ.  
(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)
- 4:35 pm (B) Arrive Park LZ.
- 4:40 pm (B) Depart Park LZ en route Villa Hammerschmidt.  
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
- 4:45 pm (B) Arrive Villa Hammerschmidt for Ceremony.
- 5:00 pm (B) Conclude Ceremony and proceed inside for Meeting  
with President Von Weisacker.  
\* Participants: 5 on 5
- 5:25 pm (B) Depart Villa Hammerschmidt en route Chancellory.
- 5:35 pm Arrive Chancellory for Small Meeting with  
Chancellor Kohl.  
\* Participants: 1 on 1 (?)
- 6:40 pm Depart Chancellory en route Ambassador's  
Residence.  
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
- 6:45 pm Arrive Ambassador's Residence for Private Time.  
(Private Time: 1 Hour 20 Minutes)

8:05 pm (B) Depart Ambassador's Residence en route Redoute Castle.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

8:15 pm (B) Arrive Redoute Castle for Dinner hosted by Chancellor Kohl.

- \* Toasts and Remarks
- \* Black Tie

10:30 pm (B) Depart Redoute Castle en route Ambassador's Residence.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

10:40 pm (B) Arrive Ambassador's Residence for RON.

## Wednesday, May 31, 1989

7:45 am Depart Ambassador's Residence en route Villa Hammerschmidt.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

7:55 am Arrive Villa Hammerschmidt for Breakfast.

9:00 am Depart Villa Hammerschmidt en route Chancellory.

9:10 am Arrive Chancellory for continued Talks with Chancellor Kohl.

10:10 am Depart Chancellory en route Sussmuth Residence.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

10:20 am Arrive Sussmuth Residence for Youth Program.

10:45 am Depart Sussmuth Residence en route American Club.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

10:50 am (B) Arrive American Club for American Embassy Community Greeting.

# DRAFT

- 11:35 am (B) Depart American Club en route Park LZ.  
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
- 11:40 am (B) Arrive Park LZ.
- 11:45 am (B) Depart Park LZ en route Mainz, FRG.  
(Flight Time: 40 Minutes)
- 12:25 pm (B) Arrive LZ, Mainz, FRG.
- 12:30 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Rheingoldhalle.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 12:40 pm (B) Arrive Rheingoldhalle for Speech.
- 1:35 pm (B) Depart Rheingoldhalle en route LZ.  
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
- 1:40 pm (B) Arrive LZ.
- 1:45 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Oberwesel, FRG.  
(Flight Time: 20 Minutes)
- 2:05 pm (B) Arrive Oberwesel, FRG and proceed to Riverboat.
- 2:15 pm (B) Arrive Riverboat for Ride to Koblenz, FRG.
- 4:30 pm (B) Arrive Koblenz, FRG and proceed to LZ.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
- 4:40 pm (B) Arrive LZ.
- 4:45 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Rhein-Main Air Force Base.  
(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)
- 5:10 pm (B) Arrive Rhein-Main Air Force Base for Open  
Departure.
- 5:20 pm (B) Depart Rhein-Main Air Force Base en route London,  
(11:20 am E.D.T.) England.  
(Flight Time: 1 Hour 40 Minutes)  
(Interchange: Yes)  
(Time Change: Back 1 Hour)

**DRAFT**

Revised 4/28 12:30 pm

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH  
FOR  
LONDON, ENGLAND  
MAY 31 - JUNE 1, 1989

Wednesday, May 31, 1989

- 6:00 pm (B) Arrive Heathrow Airport, London, England.  
(1:00 pm  
E.D.T.) \* Met by: Prime Minister Thatcher  
\* Honor Guard
- 6:15 pm (B) Depart Airport en route Winfield House.  
\* Accompanied by: Prime Minister Thatcher  
(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)
- 6:30 pm (B) Arrive Winfield House for RON.

Thursday, June 1, 1989

- 10:15 am Depart Winfield House en route Number 10 Downing  
Street.  
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
- 10:30 am Arrive Number 10 Downing Street for Small Meeting  
with Prime Minister Thatcher.  
\* Participants: 1 on 1
- 11:30 am Conclude Small Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting.  
\* Participants: 4-5 on 4-5
- 12:40 pm Depart Number 10 Downing Street en route  
Buckingham Palace.  
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

# DRAFT

12:50 pm (B) Arrive Buckingham Palace for Lunch with Queen Elizabeth.

- \* Ceremony
- \* Participants: 30 - 35

2:30 pm (B) Depart Buckingham Palace en route American Embassy.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

2:35 pm (B) Arrive American Embassy for Community Greeting.

3:00 pm (B) Depart American Embassy en route Winfield House.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

3:10 pm Arrive Winfield House.

\* SCHEDULE TO BE DETERMINED

5:10 pm Arrive Winfield House for Private Time.

(Private Time: 2 Hours)

7:10 pm Depart Winfield House en route Number 10 Downing Street.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

7:25 pm Arrive Number 10 Downing Street for Dinner.

- \* Toast or Speech ?
- \* Business Suit
- \* Participants: 40 - 45

9:30 pm Depart Number 10 Downing Street en route Heathrow Airport.

(Drive Time: 40 Minutes)

10:10 pm (B) Arrive Heathrow Airport.

10:30 pm (B) Depart London, England en route Pease Air Force Base.  
(5:30 pm E.D.T.)

(Flight Time: 7 Hour 15 Minutes)  
(Interchange: Yes)  
(Time Change: Back 5 Hours)

# DRAFT

12:45 am Arrive Pease Air Force Base and proceed to board  
Marine One.

12:50 am Depart Pease Air Force Base en route  
Kennebunkport, Maine.

(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

1:05 am Arrive Kennebunkport for RON.

2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Proprietary to the United Press International 1989

April 30, 1989, Sunday, BC cycle

ADVANCED-DATE: April 25, 1989, Tuesday, BC cycle

SECTION: Washington News

LENGTH: 1703 words

HEADLINE: The Bush Cabinet: Where the action is

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

KEYWORD: 100-Cabinet

BODY:

The following outlines, in capsule form, the actions of some of the most active Cabinet department and the problems of others in the Bush administration's first 100 days.

**Agriculture** The hottest agriculture-related matter of the administration technically did not involve the agency, but concerned a ban Bush placed on the import of Chilean grapes after two grapes were found to be contaminated with cyanide. The administration generally was praised for its quick response. It later began a new inspection procedure and imports resumed.

Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter, however, was criticized for being slow to respond to the public outcry over pesticide residues on food.

Yeutter also scored a modest victory with an agreement that keeps world agricultural trade reform talks on track. Those negotiations were deadlocked for four months because of a disagreement between Europe and the United States on how far to move towards free trade.

Yeutter also expressed interest in changing farm policy to possibly allow the government to cut farm spending while also giving farmers more freedom in looking for money-making crops.

However, still ahead are major challenges in the congressional rewriting of farm policy and in the handling of demands to aid drought-hit farmers. Only two of the 10 sub-Cabinet posts at the Agriculture Department have been filled.

**Defense** The Pentagon was stalled for weeks as the administration and Congress battled over Bush's choice of John Tower as defense secretary. Once Tower was defeated and Dick Cheney approved, the administration began to outline priorities in a defense budget that Bush had wanted frozen, but was actually cut.

Cheney announced that some weapons programs would be slashed and the administration also would scale back money being spent on the "Star Wars" missile defense program.

Bush, who promised to modernize the nation's nuclear arsenal, agreed to a compromise that would include some MX missiles on railroad cars, favored by

Proprietary to the United Press International, April 30, 1989

Cheney, with some Midgetman missiles on trucks, favored by Congress.

Toward the end of Bush's 100 days, an explosion in a gun turret aboard the battleship USS Iowa killed 47 sailors.

Education President Bush stressed in the campaign that he wanted to be known as the 'education president' and tried to highlight the issue through public appearances. He kept President Reagan's education secretary, Lauro Cavazos, in the post and proposed \$441 million worth of new school programs. Included was \$250 million to reward schools showing great progress and another \$7.6 million in teacher awards. However, the plan came under fire from some Democrats who complained it would take money from other deserving programs in order to pay for the new initiatives.

Bush also surprised many Republicans when he countered a longstanding GOP position by saying the government could not afford tuition tax credits for people who send their children to private schools. He later said he favored the idea, but could not push it because of budget restraints. HUD Bush's nomination of energetic former Rep. Jack Kemp, R-N.Y., a conservative darling, as secretary of Housing and Urban Development was widely hailed by critics who have long complained the housing issue was being ignored.

In the first 100 days, Kemp kept up a steady stream of concern and compassionate rhetoric, but the primary policy initiative to date has been aimed at a smaller but more visible and immediate problem -- drug dealing in public housing complexes. A new Kemp initiative would loosen eviction rules to make it easier for public housing authorities to rid their projects of drug dealers.

Health and Human Services The administration has moved slowly in this area, mainly because many of key positions at the agency remain vacant. Health Secretary Louis Sullivan took office in March after a somewhat rancous confirmation process in which critics harshly criticized his abortion views.

Bush has been praised for a proposed expansion of Medicaid to help poor women and infants, but harshly criticized for proposing to reduce Medicare by \$5 billion for fiscal year 1990.

Bush also has proposed spending \$5 million in Medicaid to immunize preschool children who are eligible for food stamps. Children up to age 5 would be able to get immunized simply by having their parents show the clinic a food stamp card.

One of Bush's major initiatives has been in child care in which the president has proposed giving low-income families a refundable tax credit of up to \$1,000 per child under age 4. He also proposed increasing funding for the Head Start program, reducing homelessness with a new \$25 million program and encouraging adoption with \$141 million in federal incentives.

Interior, EPA

Bush pleased environmentalists by appointing William Reilly, a professional environmentalist, as head of the Environmental Protection Agency, but there is growing concern about the president's commitment to protecting federal lands.

Proprietary to the United Press International, April 30, 1989

Reilly persuaded Bush to publicly support an accelerated phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons, chemicals linked to depletion of the Earth's ozone layer. The administration also won praise from environmentalists for opposing construction of the Two Forks dam in Colorado. Bush has not yet unveiled his promised proposal to reduce acid rain, but he has transformed the atmosphere in Congress, where action now appears likely after eight years of stalemate.

However, environmentalists criticized the appointment of former Rep. Manuel Lujan, R-N.M., as interior secretary, charging he was too 'pro-development.' The same charges have been raised against nominees to head the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management and National Park Service, some of whom worked for controversial Interior Secretary James Watt in the Reagan administration.

The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska aggravated Bush's image problems in this area, especially since he has strongly supported legislation to open Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling.

Justice Unlike predecessor Edwin Meese, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh avoided becoming a lightning rod for controversy since taking over the Justice Department under Reagan last August.

In his handling of the Oliver North Iran-Contra case, the former Pennsylvania governor demonstrated an agility for eluding the kind of political land mines that could spoil his own future ambitions. He assented to protests from U.S. intelligence agencies and, in an effort to protect classified information, forced Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh to drop the central charges. Yet, he also refused to block Walsh from prosecuting the other charges, allowing the trial to go forward and blunting allegations of an administration cover-up.

Thornburgh, one of two Cabinet holdovers from the Reagan administration, has not entirely dodged controversy. He thrust himself into the center of the volatile abortion issue, urging that the Supreme Court overturn the 1973 Roe vs. Wade ruling and let states decide the issue on their own.

He has also focused much energy on the war against drug traffickers.

Labor Bush's first 100 days were marked by two clashes with organized labor. One, over how much to increase the minimum wage, could also provoke his first veto fight with Congress. The other involved the strike against Eastern Airlines.

Bush, under pressure during the campaign, proposed an increase from \$3.35 an hour to \$4.25 if it were tied to a six-month sub-minimum wage for beginning workers. But congressional Democrats have pushed for a more substantial increase of \$4.55 an hour, with a 60-day training wage. Bush has promised to kill any measure that does not conform to his levels. Democrats have vowed to continue to push their increase until Bush signs it.

In the Eastern strike, the president rejected calls by labor to intervene and prevent the walkout by ordering a 60-day cooling-off period. Bush also said if striking machinists employed secondary boycotts he would seek new laws outlawing them in the transportation industry.

State Unlike some administrations that controlled foreign policy from the White House, the Bush administration's tone has been set by Secretary of

State James Baker, a very close friend of the president. With Baker's flair for negotiation, the new key word in Foggy Bottom is accommodation - avoiding fights with Congress over such issues as aid for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels.

So far, Baker has gotten high marks from Congress, which reached a deal with the administration on humanitarian aid for the Contras. He also has been praised by Western European governments and has begun an active plan to push the peace process forward in the Middle East. One rumble of discontent comes from Israel, and some of its supporters in Congress, who fear Baker is putting too much pressure on the Israelis to come to terms with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The other rumbles, still like distant thunder, come from diverse sources: foreign service officers and some allies who feel neglected.

Treasury in the Treasury Department, Bush did two things very early that the Reagan administration avoided: drafting one plan to rescue hundreds of ailing savings and loans and another to ease the burden of debt on Third World nations.

The \$157 billion thrift rescue received generally positive reviews, even though taxpayers would have to foot much of the bill over 10 years. The Senate approved a version that was backed by Bush, although the House had yet to act by the end of Bush's first 100 days.

The debt-relief plan was welcomed as a more realistic approach than previous policy, but critics hit it for being too little, too late.

On another economic matter, Bush and Congress struck a very early deal on the federal budget. However, the pact was vague and critics said it used gimmicks and flawed forecasts to meet deficit-cutting targets without raising taxes.

Although praised by Bush as a good first step, the pact put off most of the tough decisions that he and Congress will eventually have to face.

7TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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April 29, 1989

SECTION: World politics and current affairs; AMERICAN SURVEY; Pg. 30 (U.K. Edition Pg. 50)

LENGTH: 573 words

HEADLINE: Defence;  
I'll take both

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, DC

BODY:

MR DICK CHENEY, the defence secretary, failed last week to persuade his boss to abandon the Midgetman missile. So the decision, six years in the making, about how to modernise America's land-based nuclear missiles has been taken in a characteristic split-the-difference fashion. President George Bush has decided to settle for neither his predecessor's rail-mobile MX, nor Congress's road-mobile Midgetman. He wants both.

The defence budget Mr Cheney sent to Congress this week proposes to put the existing 50 MSx on rail cars by 1992 (at a cost of \$ 5.4 billion) and to build no more. Mr Cheney has pledged to build and deploy between 250 and 500 single-warhead Midgetmen by 1997, two years later than would be achieved if work began immediately, at a cost of at least \$ 25 billion. Mr Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, says that congress will accept that compromise.

Mr Cheney's new budget is not a bold document. His task was to adjust the Reagan budget, which proposed 2% real growth this year, for President George Bush's promises -- first of zero real growth and then (in a deal with Congress) of a \$ 3.7 billion cut. So Mr Cheney has cut \$ 10 billion from the Reagan budget for fiscal 1990 and \$ 9.9 billion from 1991. Instead of any big bites, he chose to nibble around the edges. He plans to cancel only one big programme, the V-22 or Osprey, a creature born of the unlawful union between a helicopter and an aeroplane, and popular in the Marine Corps as a way of getting from ship to shore without getting your feet wet.

Mr Cheney's biggest cut comes in the Strategic Defence Initiative, which will get \$ 4.6 billion, \$ 1 billion less than Mr Reagan proposed in January. Over four years he would give \$ 33 billion to SDI instead of \$ 40 billion. He could justify this, if he wanted to, by saying that he is restoring deterrence by making missiles mobile rather than striving to make deterrence obsolete. But this would anger SDI's fervent apostles on the right, so Mr Cheney chose to wax lyrical instead about "brilliant pebbles", a scheme for filling the sky with 10,000 little rockets equipped with tiny computers and designed to seek out incoming missiles. It has the advantage over previous SDI schemes of being cheaper, and the disadvantage of being, so far, mainly a dream in the ever-fertile mind of Mr Edward Teller.

Mr Cheney slipped away from another cherished goal of the Reagan administration, that of having 15 aircraft-carrier battle groups in the Navy, by planning to retire the USS Coral Sea in 1990, earlier than planned. He will

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reduce the number of troops in the army by 7,900, or 1%. The remainder of his cuts come from stretching out the costs of programmes over more years, something begun under his predecessor. The Stealth bomber will yield \$ 1 billion in fiscal 1990 from a year's postponement and small savings come from slowing down the rate at which Apache helicopters, anti-submarine aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and coastal mine-hunting ships are acquired.

Some of these cuts will hurt. Grumman, which builds the Osprey and the F-14D navy fighter, whose production will cease, is especially hard hit. Several congressmen are prepared to do battle on its behalf. And yet Mr Cheney has done little more than postpone inevitable decisions. Coming late to the job, he had little time. He promises more interesting changes next year.

GRAPHIC: Illustration, no caption

17TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

## The Associated Press

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April 27, 1989, Thursday, PM cycle

SECTION: Washington Dateline

LENGTH: 605 words

HEADLINE: Missile Deal Has Opponents from Both Parties

BYLINE: By DONNA CASSATA, Associated Press Writer

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

KEYWORD: Congress-ICBM

## BODY:

Lawmakers are predicting a fight over President Bush's proposal to develop two kinds of land-based nuclear missiles and are targeting the committee chairman who helped work out the deal without consulting colleagues.

House Democrats who support the Midgetman missile on Wednesday called the Bush proposal a "sucker play" that will ultimately use financial constraints to eliminate the single-warhead missile they support. Under the plan, a 10-warhead, rail-mobile MX missile would be deployed first.

But both supporters and opponents were upset with House Armed Service Committee Chairman Les Aspin's failure to consult with them on what they considered a deal between the White House and the chairmen of the Armed Services panels - Aspin in the House and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., in the Senate.

"It is not a rebellion," Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., said after a meeting Aspin held with about a dozen House Democrats. "It is a reminder to him that he was never authorized to make this kind of deal."

The two-missile plan is putting Frank in the position of supporting the MX, which liberal Democrats have opposed in the past, in order to avoid supporting two mobile systems.

Rep. Les AuCoin, D-Ore., said the meeting became a bit testy when members pointed out that "consultation is different than notification." The Oregon Democrat said his colleagues left "a reminder card."

The genesis of the MX - Midgetman plan is Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's original recommendation to move the nation's 50 MX missiles from silos to deployment on railroad cars rather than developing the Midgetman.

But President Bush chose quick deployment of the MX and research-and-development funding for the Midgetman.

The Associated Press, April 27, 1989

The Pentagon budget calls for \$1.2 billion funding in fiscal 1990 for the MX and \$100 million on the Midgetman.

"If you go through with those figures you might as well kiss the Midgetman missile good-bye," said Rep. Nicholas Mavroules, D-Mass.

"It's really a one-missile package," said AuCoin, who charged that "sequencing MX first is just a sucker play."

Aspin, chairman since 1985, said he spoke for himself in discussions on the MX and Midgetman missiles. "I was talking from my own point of view and what was necessary to get through in the House," he said.

At the House Armed Services hearing with Cheney, Aspin sought assurances that the Midgetman missile would not be squeezed out and suggested possible legislation to ensure development of the strategic weapon.

Aspin also argued that the two land-based missiles are necessary as a bargaining chip for U.S. arms control negotiators dealing with the Soviet Union.

"This issue of getting a consensus on where we go on land-based missiles is fundamental to whether we get a START agreement," said Aspin, who told reporters he raised that point after Frank left the meeting.

Frank said he had consulted with Republicans Vin Weber of Minnesota, Newt Gingrich of Georgia and Joseph McDade of Pennsylvania about defeating the Midgetman.

"I think Les (Aspin) miscalculated the extent to which the Democrats will fall in line," Frank said. "And President Bush miscalculated Republicans falling in line to support the Cheney plan."

Weber, who called the plan to fund Midgetman a "bad decision," said budgetary constraints and demands of various domestic programs may force the hand of many lawmakers.

"While there has been debate in the House over MX vs. Midgetman that debate has mainly taken place just among the defense intelligentsia of the Congress," Weber said. "The problem among the rank-and-file membership has been increasing hostility to defense spending."

What Congress needs to do now is to help instead of hinder Mr. Cheney. The help should take two forms. The first is to maintain broad fiscal discipline on both the administration's instincts and Congress' own. The budget should be held relatively steady in real terms, not increased as the services would like it to be but not used as a savings-and-loan to finance domestic spending programs,

The problem is that all these systems, plus the two strategic weapons on hold, still won't fit within the likely future budget. Mr. Cheney did sturdily propose to kill one major weapon from this next generation, the V-22 or Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft the Marine Corps wanted to ferry troops to shore. The secretary rightly said the cost of roughly \$ 25 billion wasn't worth it. The Osprey's advocates on the armed services committees quickly protested. But the secretary has many more such decisions ahead of him if he is to bring military policy and fiscal policy into synch.

The new budget would also abandon the never-affordable window-dressing of a 600-ship Navy led by 15 carrier battle groups. Some older ships would be retired earlier than previously planned, and the carrier battle group goal reset at 14. One quick effect would be to reduce the pressure on the Navy to buy more aircraft. For the rest, Mr. Cheney would begin to close out this generation of weapons to pave the way for the next. He would stop buying the current model of attack submarine, the latest versions of the Air Force F-15 and Navy F-14 fighters and the Army's Apache attack helicopter. Instead the Navy would go straight to a new model of attack sub, the Navy and Air Force to the advanced ATF and ATA tactical aircraft they have been developing and the Army to the futuristic LHX or light helicopter experimental that has been its goal.

At the strategic level, Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney want the Air Force to improve the new weapons -- MX missile, B-1 bomber -- it already has. The MX would be made rail-mobile, the B-1 merely made to work. A second missile, the Midgetman, and a second bomber, the B-2 or Stealth, both of which would be extremely costly, would be put on varying degrees of hold. The Stealth particularly needs to be rethought, now that the B-1 has been built. The strategic Defense Initiative programs would likewise be scaled back and somewhat better focused. All told, a kind of holding pattern.

THE BUSH administration's first defense budget takes some useful steps toward the greater discipline and leaner programs that sound military and fiscal policy both require. Major decisions are left unmade, but this may not be a propitious time to make them. Not only is the secretary, Dick Cheney, still too new. Negotiations aimed at reducing conventional forces in Europe have just begun, while strategic arms control talks with the Soviets and further budget talks with Congress both lie ahead. The context for defense budget decisions is unusually unsettled.

BODY:

HEADLINE: Mr. Cheney's First Budget

LENGTH: 548 words

SECTION: OPINION EDITORIAL; PAGE A22

April 27, 1989, Thursday, final edition

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24TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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either. The second is not to second-guess overmuch. Mr. Cheney is not going to put national security at risk. If he wants and has the guts to kill the Osprey, let him. The problem has never been that secretaries made too many such decisions, but too few. For a man in just his sixth week on the job, Mr. Cheney is doing fine.

TYPE: EDITORIAL

SUBJECT: BUDGET; ARMED FORCES; WEAPONS SYSTEMS

ORGANIZATION: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

NAME: RICHARD B. CHENEY

37TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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April 26, 1989, Wednesday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1

LENGTH: 1206 words

HEADLINE: Cheney Outlines \$ 10 Billion In 'Painful' Defense Cuts;  
Joint Chiefs Endorse Plan-With a Warning

BYLINE: George C. Wilson, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney yesterday outlined to the House Armed Services Committee \$ 10 billion in "very, very painful" budget cuts for next year that he said represent "a fundamental shift in direction" in arming the nation.

Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed the lowered budget but warned in the bluntest terms since becoming the nation's top military officer in 1985 that in the view of the leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps the downward path of funding is uncomfortably risky to the nation's defense capability.

"I would vastly prefer a dollar figure that would permit us to keep our current force structure, without sacrificing quality, until we have a clearer understanding of where the Soviet Union is going, of the arms reduction calculus and of the international climate," Crowe said. "In my judgment, there are too many uncertainties on the horizon at this time to justify force cuts."

Cheney cut both manpower and weapons in reducing President Ronald Reagan's fiscal 1990 budget request from \$ 305.6 billion to \$ 295.6 billion, not counting money the Energy Department contributes for nuclear warheads. Since not all the money Congress appropriates will be spent at once, the cuts will reduce spending from Reagan's projected \$ 293.8 billion in fiscal 1990 to \$ 289.8 billion.

Cheney's former colleagues focused on the decisions he made to achieve the \$ 10 billion reduction rather than on the question of the total amount of cuts, since the House and Senate budget committees had dictated the lower defense budget.

His intention to cancel the Marines' V22 Osprey troop-carrying plane and halt production of the Navy's F14D fighter appeared to cause the most heartburn among members of the hawkish House Armed Services Committee.

Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) told a reporter midway through the hearing that Cheney "is in trouble" on those and other cancellations. A number of lawmakers were vowing to reverse some of Cheney's decisions on cuts as the defense authorization bill wends its way through the legislative mill. Yesterday's hearing was the opening skirmish.

Even though \$ 2.5 billion has already been spent on the Osprey, Cheney said its mission of carrying Marines from ships to shore was too "narrow" to justify the \$ 27 billion it would cost to build the planned fleet of 602 planes. He

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said Marines could be flown to shore in existing helicopters. Crowe endorsed the cancellation. With propeller engines that tilt, the Osprey is designed to take off and land like a helicopter, but fly horizontally at a conventional plane's speed. The aircraft has made several hovering test flights, but has not completed full flight trials.

As for the F14D, the defense secretary said that so few -- 12 a year -- would be built under the inherited Reagan budget that each aircraft would cost about \$ 75 million. Given budget restraints, Cheney contended, it makes more sense to stop building new versions of the swing-wing twin-engined Tomcat and renovate existing models instead. The renovation work would be done at the Grumman Corp. plants on Long Island.

"You are putting Grumman out of business!" declared Rep. George J. Hochbrueckner (D-N.Y.), in a protest that typifies the political pressure Cheney's cuts have generated.

Although Congress is focusing on the fiscal 1990 budget, Cheney was obligated to present a two-year defense budget covering fiscal 1990 and 1991. He disclosed that he intends to make these additional economies over the two fiscal years:

Army. Deactivate one mechanized brigade of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colo., as part of cutting the active-duty force of 772,000 men and women by 8,000 people; cancel the new version of the OH58 helicopter known as AHIP (Army helicopter improvement program) and halt production of the AH64 Apache attack helicopter at the close of 1991; cancel the M88 vehicle designed to tow broken-down tanks.

Navy. Retire the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea; build one rather than two Los Angeles-class attack submarines; transfer four frigates of the 1052-class from the active fleet to the reserves in fiscal 1990 and four in 1991; retire 33 old destroyers, 11 in 1990, 11 in 1991 and the rest later; retire 73 P3 antisubmarine aircraft and reduce active-duty manpower by 6,000 people.

Air Force. Slow development of the B2 Stealth bomber by one year to redress technical problems; halt production of the F15 fighter with the 1991 buy; transfer the National Aerospace Plane to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; retire WC130 aircraft used to plot hurricanes; cut 3,200 people from the active-duty payroll.

Strategic Defense Initiative. Reduce Reagan's request from \$ 5.6 billion to \$ 4.6 billion. Cheney said the Pentagon will focus on "brilliant pebbles," a defense consisting of rings of orbiting rockets that could be directed to destroy incoming warheads by collisions, not explosives.

In discussing these and other cuts, Cheney said he had decided it was preferable to cancel programs outright "rather than go back to the hollow forces of the 1970s." He said there was no way to squeeze \$ 10 billion out of the fiscal 1990 budget without "breaking some china, stepping on some toes."

In defending the administration's decision to lower the national goal of 15 carrier battle groups to 14, Cheney said he would not ask the Navy, with fewer ships, to patrol the same areas of the world as it does now. Instead, he said, the Navy would go into such areas as the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf less often than it has in the past, barring emergencies.

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Crowe called this willingness to tailor commitments to forces available "extremely significant. I agree with the secretary 100 percent that we can adjust our deployment" and still have the Navy fleet cover the world's hot spots.

Aspin sought assurances that the Midgetman missile would not be squeezed out of the Pentagon budget if Congress went along with Bush's proposal to put the existing 50 MX missiles on rails first and build the small missile later. Cheney said this was not the administration's intention. The Midgetman under Bush's plan would receive \$ 100 million in fiscal 1989; \$ 100 million in 1990; \$ 200 million in 1991; \$ 250 million in 1992; \$ 300 million in 1993, and \$ 350 million in 1994.

If Congress appropriates the money, the 10-warhead MX could be mobile by 1992 and the first single-warhead Midgetman missiles would be deployed by 1995, Cheney said. He added that the administration plans to build between 250 and 500 Midgetmen.

Rep. Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) told Cheney that the Reagan five-year defense plan he inherited would cost \$ 45 billion more to implement than there was in the Reagan budget, charging the failure to match the blueprint with money available was "deceptive accounting."

Cheney replied that he understood the \$ 45 billion shortfall listed in the secret part of the Pentagon budget was a planning assumption, not a deceitful practice, that defense programs would cost about 2 percent less a year than projected. "If it's not a valid assumption, if it's dead wrong," said Cheney of the \$ 45 billion planning wedge, "we won't use it."

GRAPHIC: ILLUSTRATION, DEFENSE SECRETARY RICHARD B. CHENEY TESTIFYING ON BUDGET PLAN YESTERDAY AT HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING. MICHAEL DREW; PHOTO, JAMES K.W. ATHERTON

TYPE: NATIONAL NEWS

SUBJECT: WEAPONS SYSTEMS; BUDGET; ARMED FORCES

ORGANIZATION: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

NAME: RICHARD B. CHENEY; WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.

McGroarty/Dooley  
May 23, 1989  
6:00 p.m.  
Draft 2

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BRUSSELS ARRIVAL STATEMENT  
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM  
MAY 28, 1989

It is a pleasure to be back once again in Brussels, and I am especially pleased that my first visit as President of the United States comes as the nations of NATO celebrate 40 years of alliance -- and the longest period of peace and freedom Europe has known in the modern age.

Americans and Belgians share the memories of war and hard-won peace in this century. <sup>1918, 1940</sup> Flanders, the Battle of the Ardennes, <sup>pp. 1113 - 1114</sup>  
<sup>p. 1113</sup> Bastogne: those names are part of our history as well as your own -- part of our shared heritage of freedom, and the sacrifices it requires.

Belgium -- no stranger to conquest and division -- recognized from the first the importance of alliance in the post-war world. Today, as permanent home to NATO and the European Community, Brussels stands at the center of a Europe free, at peace, and prosperous as never before -- a Europe that is steadily moving towards a single market, and unprecedented political and economic opportunities. In Brussels, the signs of this European renaissance are everywhere.

Belgium has been a good friend and a valued ally -- one that has always acted with alliance interests in mind. Early in this decade, Belgium was one of five NATO nations that made the

*Encyclopedia  
of Military  
History  
Ernest  
Dupuy & Trevor  
N. Dupuy  
Nappert & Row  
1970*

X

X

difficult decision to base INF systems on its soil. Those deployments gave us the leverage we needed to negotiate the first-ever arms reduction treaty. That's the kind of courageous and realistic approach that explains NATO's success. NATO is at once ready to ensure the common defense, and, when Soviet actions -- not just words -- warrant it, to reduce arms and seek to diminish tensions with the East.

I am looking forward to important discussions with King Baudoin and the NATO heads of government. I look forward as well to my meeting with Prime Minister Martens, my discussions with President Delors of the European Community and Secretary General Woerner of NATO.

The future of NATO depends on the Alliance's ability to deal with our enduring security concerns and our evolving economic relationship. We look to Belgium to continue to play its important role in our close and cooperative transatlantic partnership.

Thank you.

# # #

FAX

WHITE HOUSE ADVANCE OFFICE  
Brussels, Belgium

From Washington:  
Fax no. 395-2000-ask operator for  
5516 (dial tone) 218  
(WH 5516 (tone) 218

From Belgium:  
217-0579, ext 21

DATE 5-22-89

FAX 202-456-6218

TEL

TO: PEGGY

FROM: ANDREA RALFORD

SUBJECT:

Please pass attached message to above addressee as soon as possible.  
Thank you.

May 20 1:00 pm

## VISIT OF PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH

TO

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

May 28-30, 1989**EVENT:** Luncheon with King Baudouin I**DATE:** Tuesday - May 29, 1989**TIME:** 12:50 p.m. - 2:35 p.m.**LOCATION:** Royal Palace  
Brussels, Belgium**HOST:** King Baudouin I**ATTENDEES:****U.S. Participants**

THE PRESIDENT

**Belgian Participants**

King Baudouin I

Lt. Colonel Ben Gilbert Schrijvers, Master of  
Ceremonies of the CourtColonel Guido Mertens, Chief of  
Military Household StaffAmbassador Gerard Jacques, Grand Marshall of the Court  
Manfred Woerner - Secretary General, NATO**NATO Participants**

Prime Minister Martens (BE)

Prime Minister Mulroney (CA)

Prime Minister Schlueter (DE)

Chancellor Kohl (GE)

Prime Minister Papandreu (GR)

Prime Minister Hermansson (IC)

Prime Minister De Mita (IT)

Prime Minister Santer (LU)

Prime Minister Lubbers (NL)

Prime Minister Brundtland (NO)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva (PO)

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales (SP)

Prime Minister Ozal (TU)

Prime Minister Thatcher (UK)

President Mitterand (FR)

May 20 1:00 pm

- 2 -

**PRESS:** Pool Photo of NATO Participants with King Baudouin

**OFFICIAL GREETING**

**SCENARIO:** **OFFICIAL GREETING**

THE PRESIDENT will arrive by motorcade at the Court of Honor inside the Royal Palace. THE PRESIDENT will be greeted inside the foyer by Colonel Schrijvers, Master of Ceremonies of the Court.

THE PRESIDENT will be escorted to a landing on the second floor where he will be met by Ambassador Jacques, Grand Marshall of the Court, and by Lt. Colonel Goormans, Commander of the Palace.

**RECEPTION**

THE PRESIDENT will be escorted to the Salon du Vase by Ambassador Jacques, where THE PRESIDENT will be met by King Baudouin I.

After greeting the King, THE PRESIDENT will join a reception in progress with the other NATO leaders in the Salon du Vase. (NOTE: PRESIDENT Mitterrand will arrive after THE PRESIDENT has greeted the King and will briefly join the reception.)

**PHOTO SESSION**

THE PRESIDENT, King Baudouin I, the other NATO country leaders, and Secretary General Woerner will be escorted to the Salle de Musique (Music Room) for a group photo.

**PRESS POOL COVERAGE**

May 20 1:00 pm

- 3 -

**LUNCHEON AND COFFEE**

After the group photo has been taken, THE PRESIDENT, King Baudouin I, the other NATO country leaders, and Secretary General Woerner will proceed to the Salon des Tapisseries for the luncheon.

**NO TOASTS**

After the luncheon has concluded, the King will either invite THE PRESIDENT and the other guests to join him for coffee at the table or while standing in the Salon du Vase.

Upon conclusion of the coffee, THE PRESIDENT and the other guests will be jointly escorted by the King to the ground level foyer for departure.

THE PRESIDENT will depart, in protocol order, en route NATO Headquarters.

\*\* TOTAL PAGE.04 \*\*

2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright (c) 1985 McGraw-Hill, Inc.;  
Aviation Week and Space Technology

March 25, 1985

SECTION: MISSILE ENGINEERING; Pg. 28

LENGTH: 763 words

HEADLINE: Cruise Missiles Are Operational In Belgium

DATELINE: Brussels

BODY:

First flight of 16 nuclear cruise missiles has become operational at the Belgian air force base near Florennes, 55 mi. southeast of Brussels. The missiles arrived only hours after the Belgian cabinet decided to accept them.

The Belgian government said the remaining 32 missiles, which are to be deployed in 1987, would be delayed up to six months if the Soviet Union continues negotiating for a reduction in intermediate range nuclear weapons.

The Belgian government survived a parliamentary no-confidence measure raised as a result of the deployment on a 116-93 vote.

Netherlands' Deployment

The Dutch government, which is to make its decision on deployment Nov. 1, supported the Belgian decision but said it would have no effect on the Netherlands. Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers said "any other [Belgian] decision would have given the wrong signal" to the Soviet Union. He said the decision is a "signal to the Soviet Union that, without measures from their side, NATO will not stray from its deployment timetable."

But Lubbers said he remains hopeful the Netherlands can avoid deploying its own missiles. "We are proceeding according to our own criteria as laid down in June, 1984," he said.

The Netherlands said last year it would definitely begin deploying 48 cruise missiles at a Dutch air force base at Woensdrecht in southwest Holland if more Soviet SS-20 missiles are deployed on Nov. 1 than when the decision was announced June 1 (AW&ST June 11, 1984, p. 24). U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization officials have increased their estimates of the number of Soviet SS-20s twice since then.

The cruise missiles began arriving at Florennes less than three hours after Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens announced his decision to Parliament, and 19 hr. after the cabinet decision.

The 16 missiles and their nuclear warheads are being stored in a security depot which has been modified for nuclear storage. They are to be moved to a specially designed bunker later.

The cabinet made its decision to go ahead with deployment after foreign minister Leo Tindemans failed to obtain concessions from the Soviets in a

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meeting in Moscow. Tindemans asked Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko to agree to disassociate the intermediate range nuclear weapons from strategic and space weapons, but Gromyko refused.

"If the Soviet Union had been able to accept a separate accord on medium-range weapons, Belgium would have delayed deployments of the first nuclear missiles until the end of the first session of negotiations," Tindemans said.

The Soviets' refusal means the Geneva negotiations are likely to take a long time, so there is no reason to delay Belgium's deployment, Martens said. "The Belgian government used all means at its disposal up until the last minute to persuade the Soviet Union to make a serious gesture of disarmament," he said. "There was no sense in delaying.

Martens told the Parliament that the missile decision was the most difficult Belgium has faced since World War 2.

"The Soviet Union's deployment of nuclear missiles aimed at Europe beginning in 1977 seriously upset the balance of power," he said. "This is why NATO took the dual-track decision in 1979 at the request of the countries of Western Europe. This included an offer [to cancel deployment in return for a reduction in Soviet missiles] which was intended to persuade the Soviet Union, through negotiations, to dismantle the SS-20 missiles."

Belgium is the fourth European nation to begin deploying new intermediate range nuclear missiles. Cruise missiles have previously become operational in Britain and Italy, and improved Pershing 2 missiles are in service in West Germany. Germany is scheduled to deploy cruise missiles later in the decade.

Antinuclear protestors, participating in a demonstration in Brussels Mar. 17, said opposition to the missiles would continue despite the government decision. More than 40,000 protestors, including many members of Martens' own party, marched through Brussels during the peaceful protest. An estimated 400,000 protestors had taken part in a similar protest in 1983.

Parliamentary support for the deployment was stronger than expected because support from right-wing members who are not part of the ruling coalition more than offset defections by two coalition members. The ruling parties have only a six-vote majority in the Parliament.

The Parliamentary vote Mar. 20 followed a 15-hr. debate. Martens had said the decision was irrevocable even if his government failed to win the no-confidence vote.

5TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Copyright (c) 1985 The New York Times Company;  
The New York Times

March 21, 1985, Thursday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section A; Page 10, Column 4; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 437 words

HEADLINE: BELGIAN PARLIAMENT BACKS DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES

BYLINE: AP

DATELINE: BRUSSELS, March 20

BODY:

The Belgian Parliament approved the deployment of cruise missiles today after an all-night debate, and NATO officials said the decision should push the Dutch Government to do the same.

The vote, 116 to 93, came just before 5 A. M. after a 15-hour debate. The Government made the deployment decision last week, subject to parliamentary approval, and the first 16 missiles were deployed immediately afterward.

Prime Minister Wilfried Martens said in the debate that his coalition Cabinet had decided on deployment 'out of an intense sense of duty' to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The alliance decided in 1979 to deploy 572 medium-range cruise missiles and Pershing 2 missiles in Belgium, Italy, Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands to counter Soviet SS-20 missiles already in place.

NATO officials said they felt the Belgian vote was pivotal in moving the Dutch Government toward a similar decision.

The Netherlands decided in June that it would take the 48 cruise missiles assigned to it if the Russians deployed more SS-20's by November 1985, and that it would deploy none if the number of Soviet missiles did not increase.

If an arms reduction agreement were to be reached in the meantime by the United States and the Soviet Union, the Dutch Government said, the Netherlands would deploy the number of missiles agreed upon by the two sides. A Dutch decision is expected Nov. 1.

In Belgium, the first missiles arrived at the Florennes air base, 40 miles south of here, hours after the Government made its decision last week.

Prime Minister Martens said the rest of the 48 cruise missiles to be deployed in Belgium were due in 1987. The cruise missile is a low-flying, pilotless craft. It was developed from the German Buzz Bomb of World War II.

Parliamentary approval was uncertain until, just before the debate began Tuesday, dissidents in Mr. Martens's Christian Democratic Party said they would reverse their position and vote with the Government.

(c) 1985 The New York Times, March 21, 1985

The chief maverick, Luc van den Brande, who is the party's floor leader, said, 'I will vote 'yes' because personal reasons must sometimes take a back seat to extraordinary circumstances,' an allusion to party unity.

'I still believe the Government should not yet have decided on the deployment,' he said, adding that Belgium should have made a last effort to enhance chances of an East-West accord on medium-range missiles.

Antimissile protesters in the parliamentary gallery threw down paper bags filled with dirt from Florennes during the debate. The demonstrators were removed from the chamber by security personnel.

SUBJECT: MISSILES; CRUISE MISSILE; UNITED STATES ARMAMENT AND DEFENSE; ARMAMENT, DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES; MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS; LAW AND LEGISLATION; NATIONAL SECURITY

ORGANIZATION: NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ( NATO)

GEOGRAPHIC: EUROPE; BELGIUM; NETHERLANDS

4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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December 31, 1983, Saturday, PM cycle

SECTION: International

LENGTH: 370 words

HEADLINE: Pershing-2 missiles operational in West Germany

KEYWORD: Missiles

BODY:

The first U.S. Pershing-2 missiles deployed in West Germany now are operational, and Belgium has given the go-ahead for deployment of U.S. cruise missiles if no agreement is reached between the superpowers on medium-range weapons.

Peter Kurt Wuerzbach, parliamentary state secretary in the West German Defense Ministry, said a 1979 NATO plan to have the first Pershing-2 missiles operational before the end of the year has been carried out.

Wuerzbach gave no details, but government sources said nine Pershing-2 missiles have been made operational at the U.S. Army base at Mutlangen near Stuttgart.

The missiles were shipped to the base, operated by the 56th U.S. Field Artillery Brigade, last month after the West German parliament approved the NATO deployment plan.

The plan calls for West Germany to receive all 108 Pershing-2 missiles to be deployed in Europe and 96 of the 464 cruise missiles to counter Soviet SS-20 missiles.

The other Pershing-2 missiles are to be deployed before 1988. Deployment of the cruise missiles is scheduled to start in 1986.

Wuerzbach repeated Western readiness to negotiate with the Soviets to reach an agreement limiting the number of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The Soviet Union walked out of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on limiting medium-range missiles last month, after the Bonn parliament approved deployment.

'The missiles now deployed will be dismantled if the Soviet Union scraps the missiles it has deployed in such a large quantity,' he said.

In Belgium, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens said Friday his country would continue with the NATO deployment program 'in the absence of a negotiated solution' between the United States and the Soviet Union.

'This, however, is not an irreversible solution,' Martens said after the Christian Democrat-Liberal government made its semi-annual evaluation of the situation at its final meeting of the year.

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KEYWORD: ΜΙΣΣΙΣΙΠΙ

HEADLINE: ΜΙΣΣΙΣΙΠΙ-Σ ΜΙΣΣΙΣΙΠΙ ΟΠΕΙΣΤΟΝΑΤ ΤΗ ΜΕΣΤ ΡΕΛΩΝΑ

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SECTION: ΙΝΦΟΡΜΑΤΙΟΝΑΤ

DECEMBER 31 1983 23:00:00 BY CLYDE

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Proprietary to the United Press International, December 31, 1983

' ' Belgium's ultimate aim remains the conclusion of an agreement that would make any allied deployment superfluous,' he said.

Preparations for the installation in Belgium have begun at the Florennes air force base, 45 miles south of Brussels. The Belgian deployment is scheduled for 1985 or 1986.

re renamed Ghana (q.v.). His party won the general election and he became Prime Minister of the Gold Coast which, as an independent state, gained its status in March 1957. Nkrumah became President of the Republic within the Commonwealth on 1 July 1960. He was the dominant African leader throughout the central and western regions of the continent, bringing closer union with neighbouring states, supporting the remaining technically non-aligned but showing great respect for the interests of Africa and some sympathy for the Chinese and Romanian regimes. He trusted French-oriented groupings among the African leaders, exerting influence of other independence leaders who did not want to be 'redeemer' and 'Africa's Gandhi'. At home, his rule was authoritarian and from 1963 to 1965 he interfered with the Government's extravagance, both personal and for the country. A slump in cocoa prices, led to inflation and economic stagnation. In February 1966 Nkrumah travelled to China on an official visit. He fled the country, his government was overthrown by a military coup in Guinea, later travelling to Romania for medical treatment in a sanatorium there at the end of April 1972. Ghana was buried in a national leader at a funeral in his birthplace.

Allied invasion of Europe began with landings on the Normandy coast at the river Orne and St Marcouf on 6 June 1944 (D-Day). The western beaches: British and Canadian on the eastern, American on the western. General Montgomery (q.v.) was Supreme Allied Commander, the immediate field commander was General Montgomery (q.v.). Artificial harbours ('Mulberry') were built in the Channel and linked to the shore by articulated caissons. Landed vehicles, guns and equipment could be landed and used. Fighting continued in Normandy for a month, the U.S. Army landed at Cherbourg on 27 June and the British and Canadian on 9 July, thus enabling tanks to break through the German defences. The city was liberated on 25 August, Brussels on 2 September and the Rhine was crossed near Aachen on 12 September (D-Day + 68).

When Italy entered the Second World War in June 1940, General Graziani to advance from Libya to Cairo and the British to maintain imperial prestige for the fascist regime and opening up the Persian oilfields. British strategy, at first centred on clearing the southern Mediterranean coast from the Italian peninsula. Graziani's offensive was successful but petered out after penetrating some sixty miles into Egypt. A major British offensive on 9-11 December 1940 was repulsed. In two months occupied most of Cyrenaica. In January 1941 (q.v.) and the Afrika Korps again advanced into Egypt. The British (q.v.) in June and repulsed by Auchinleck (q.v.), in July 1942. In May and June 1942 Rommel's second offensive was repulsed on the British Eighth Army, although Cairo and the Suez Canal were threatened at the first battle of Alamein in July 1942. The second battle of Alamein (qq.v.) offensive, which began with the second

battle of Alamein on 23 October 1942, carried allied forces across Libya and into Tunisia (q.v.) within four months. British and American forces landed in French north-west Africa ('Torch', q.v.) on 8 November 1942. The two armies converged on Tunis, where the Germans offered a sustained defence. All Axis troops in North Africa formally surrendered on 12 May 1943.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.).** A 'North Atlantic Treaty' was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States, providing for mutual assistance should any one member of the alliance be attacked (although not automatically providing for immediate military action). Greece and Turkey joined N.A.T.O. on 18 February 1952, the German Federal Republic on 9 May 1955. The treaties were a product of the 'cold war' and the blockade of Berlin (qq.v.), but the organization itself was built up as an integrated military force under the later tensions imposed by the Korean War from September 1950 onwards. Friction has developed at times between American policies, which aimed at using N.A.T.O. as a means of creating a political and economic 'Atlantic Community', and the needs of the growing European Community. President de Gaulle's suspicion of American intentions led to the withdrawal of French forces from N.A.T.O. command in the spring of 1966, requiring the removal of N.A.T.O. headquarters from Fontainebleau to Brussels. Disputes between two N.A.T.O. members, Greece and Turkey, have at times weakened the effectiveness of the Organization in the Mediterranean, the Greeks withdrawing all their units from N.A.T.O. on 17 August 1964 because of tension with Turkey over Cyprus (q.v.).

**Northcliffe, Lord (Alfred Charles William Harmsworth, 1865-1922,** created a baron 1905, viscount 1917), British newspaper magnate. Born the son of a Dublin barrister, became a journalist on leaving school in 1880 and founded *Answers* in 1888, the first weekly to use a crisp style and sensationalism. Assisted by his younger brother, Harold (in 1913 created Viscount Rothermere, 1868-1940), he built up a successful business in periodicals, branching out into daily journalism with the *Evening News*, 1894. In May 1896 he founded the *Daily Mail*, on sale at a halfpenny, half the price of most dailies. By 1899 the *Mail* had twice the circulation of any other newspaper. He founded the *Daily Mirror*, 1903, and was proprietor of the *Observer*, 1905-11, and *The Times*, 1908-22, but always regarded the *Daily Mail* as his most important enterprise. Largely for publicity purposes he financed new ventures in motoring, aviation and polar exploration. Throughout the First World War he pressed for vigorous leadership, heading a diplomatic mission to America in 1917, and became director of propaganda to enemy countries on his return. In this role he encouraged the subject-nationalities of Austria-Hungary to demand independence. In later years Northcliffe suffered from megalomania, but his style and methods transformed British journalism, introducing the tendentious headline and the bright story which would appeal to a huge reading public.

**Northern Ireland.** In the seventeenth century Protestant immigrants, many of them Scottish Presbyterians, settled in parts of Ulster (q.v.), imposing a social pattern on certain areas different from the rest of the country: this division was

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Navajo to Opium

T H E E N C Y C L O P E D I A  
**AMERICANA**  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L E D I T I O N

COMPLETE IN THIRTY VOLUMES  
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1829

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GROLIER INCORPORATED

International Headquarters: Danbury, Connecticut 06816

**NORTH AMERICAN PHALANX**, fá'langks, the most important colony founded by the Fourierists in the United States. It was organized in 1843 and located in Monmouth county, N. J. The organization was on the joint-stock principle, and all the members engaged in the cooperative labor of the colony. They were paid a certain amount for labor, for talent (or administration), and for capital invested. The rule was to pay the highest prices for the hardest and most disagreeable labor.

Work was at first mostly agricultural, with products sold outside the colony, but later mills were built, and a considerable amount of manufacturing was done. A common school education was provided, and there was a library and reading room. However, the colony lacked many of the elements of culture that distinguished the life of Brook Farm in Massachusetts. Management was good and the colony prospered. But in 1853, dissensions resulted in the secession of some members and the founding of a new phalanx. In 1854 the mills burned, a serious loss that severely crippled the colony. The organization was formally dissolved in 1856.

**NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW**, an American periodical published in Boston, Mass., from 1815 to 1877 and then in New York City until 1940. Regarded as the most important American periodical of the review type, it was founded by William Tudor, Edward T. Channing, and Richard Henry Dana, Sr. It had as contributors most of the leading American writers of the 19th century, including Longfellow, Emerson, Henry James, and Mark Twain.

**NORTH ANDOVER**, a town in Essex county, Mass., situated on the Merrimack and Shawsheen rivers about 30 miles (48 km) north of Boston. Originally settled in 1646 as part of Andover, it became a separate town in 1855. Gov. Simon Bradstreet of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and his poet wife Anne lived there for several years.

The town's chief manufactures are woolen goods, textile machinery, wood products, plastics, and telephone-transmitter equipment. Merrimack College and the Merrimack Valley Textile Museum are located there. Population: 20,129.

**NORTH ARLINGTON**, a borough in Bergen county, N. J., situated on the Passaic River about 5 miles (8 km) north of Newark. It is both a residential and an industrial community. Chief industries are the manufacture of plastic products, cement blocks, rubber and metal products, toys, and paint and food processing. There are also plant nurseries there.

First settled in 1677, North Arlington was incorporated in 1896. The borough is governed by a mayor and council. Population: 16,587.

**NORTH ATLANTIC CURRENT**, also called North Atlantic Drift, an ocean current that forms the northern part of a general, clockwise circulation pattern in the North Atlantic Ocean. From off the east coast of the United States, it flows northeast and spreads around the British Isles into the North Sea and along the Norwegian coast, producing in these regions a climate warmer than it would be without the current. The Soviet port of Murmansk, for example, is ice-free the year round because of this current. See also GULF STREAM.

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)**, a collective defense alliance of certain European nations, the United States, and Canada, created in 1949.

**The Postwar Setting of the Alliance.** The peace that was envisaged at the end of World War II involved a number of assumptions. The first of these was that the Allies, associated in war by the defeat of common enemies, would remain associated in time of peace. Another was that the peace between the Allies and the defeated enemy countries would be easily, and indeed readily, agreed upon. A third assumption was that the peace would be effectively maintained on a universal basis, by a world organization based on the principle of collective security.

Beginning with the Yalta Conference of the Big Three in 1945, a serious divergence of views among the Great Powers became apparent. The first assumption was threatened. The Allies had committed the making of the treaty of peace to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been set up at the Yalta Conference, its functions and objectives being implemented considerably by the Potsdam Conference of the same year. After more than a decade of discussion, however, only the Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Finnish treaties had been concluded. The council remained deadlocked over the provisions of the German and Austrian treaties. Finally, on May 15, 1955, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France on one side and Austria on the other signed at Vienna a state treaty for the reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria. The prospects for a German treaty had been so discouraging that during 1954 the Western occupation powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, and France) entered into a number of major agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany. These provided for the termination of the occupation regime in western Germany, defining the relations between themselves and the republic, and arranging for its admission to the North Atlantic and western European communities. A new attempt to bring about German reunification was made at the Geneva Conference of the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union in 1955. The foreign ministers of the four powers met in October 1955, but the views of the Soviet Union and the Western powers on the conditions of reunification were so diverse that the goal of reunification was abandoned.

The United Nations could not maintain a peace that the Allied powers had declined to make. The assumption of Great Power cooperation again failed of realization. The veto power vested in the permanent members of the Security Council made impossible the employment of the sanctions and security provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding a breach of the peace. The Soviet Union made repeated use of this device to advance its own world policies and to restrain the policies of the Western powers. Soon the postwar world became divided into two clearly defined and opposing camps, each seeking to attain its ends through delayed peace arrangements and through the United Nations. The rift that had opened between the Soviet Union and the Western occupying powers widened to include the Communist world led by the USSR and the free world led by the United States.

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
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A NATO honor guard stands at attention under member nations' flags at NATO headquarters in Belgium.

These groups found themselves stalemated,  
because of the deadlock over the peace negotia-  
tions and because of the failure of the United  
Nations to function on a universal and collective  
basis. Both therefore sought other means to  
press their policies, maintain their security, and  
achieve their objectives. The Soviet Union did  
not wait long. During the war it had annexed  
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Parts of Poland,  
Finland, Romania, Germany, and Czechoslovakia  
were also annexed. This meant an addition of  
25 million people and over 183,000 square miles  
(474,000 sq km) of territory. The Soviet Union  
also altered by various means the composition  
of the governments of certain enemy and liber-  
ated satellite countries. By this means, Albania,  
Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Poland, Hun-  
gary, and Czechoslovakia were reduced to the  
status of Soviet satellites. In September 1947  
the Communist governments organized the  
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform),  
and in January 1949 they set up a Council for  
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). These  
bodies provided the machinery for political and  
economic cooperation among the Communist  
states. A network of bilateral treaties between  
the USSR and each of these countries and be-  
tween the satellite nations themselves completed  
the formation of the Soviet satellite system. The  
addition of the satellites brought a population  
of over 87 million and more than 390,000 square  
miles (1,010,000 sq km) of territory within the  
Soviet orbit.

Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. It was in  
the Mediterranean area that the West made its  
first postwar stand against the spread of Com-  
munism. Since Britain was no longer in a posi-  
tion to give military and financial aid to Greece,  
there was a real possibility that Greece would be  
lost to the Communists. In that event Turkey  
and the Middle East would be exposed to in-  
creased Soviet pressure. Under the Truman Doc-  
trine enunciated in 1947, financial and military  
aid was extended to both Greece and Turkey.  
Moreover, western Europe was in financial  
difficulties. On June 5, 1947, in an address at  
Harvard University, Secretary of State George

C. Marshall declared that Europe must "have  
substantial additional help, or face economic,  
social, and political deterioration of a very  
grave character." Such aid, he said, would not  
be against any country or doctrine, but "against  
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." Sup-  
plementing the economic purpose of the Marshall  
Plan or European Recovery Program was the po-  
litical objective of preventing any Soviet domina-  
tion of western Europe that might result from  
economic depression or disaster. The Soviet  
Union not only declined to participate in any  
negotiations for aid, but attacked the proposals  
as encroachments of American capitalism and  
imperialism.

The new policy was not a one-sided opera-  
tion. The United States needed Europe in its  
own plans for security. With twice the popula-  
tion of the United States and with great skills  
and techniques, Europe is central to the non-  
Communist world. Next to the United States,  
it has the most extensive industrial equipment  
in the world. Its science and technology, cou-  
pled with those of the United States, make pos-  
sible effective resistance to Soviet aggression. Its  
military manpower and its weapons production  
afford the West great striking power.

The aid extended under the Truman Doctrine  
and the economic assistance provided for under  
the Marshall Plan did much to relieve an in-  
creasingly acute situation. In addition, the or-  
ganizations established under the Marshall Plan,  
especially the Organization for European Eco-  
nomic Cooperation, or OEEC (which set up a  
clearinghouse known as the European Payments  
Union for its member states), afforded an op-  
portunity for the "close economic cooperation"  
that was required "among the participating  
states." This development might be described  
as the beginning of European or Atlantic com-  
munity regionalism.

Formation of Western European Union and Council  
of Europe. These measures, however, did not pro-  
vide soldiers, weapons, or funds for  
security. They also meant that the United  
States was on the contributing end and that  
the member nations were on the receiving end.

Security, it was realized, must be a matter of mutuality, reciprocity, and regional effort, buttressed by a substantial degree of self-help. The free nations of Europe felt compelled to take regional action to defend their security as well as to protect their common cultural, social, and economic heritage. The idea was given valuable support by the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, who declared in the House of Commons in January 1948 that western Europe must consolidate, not by directive but through brotherhood, and on a regional basis, failing world cooperation for this purpose.

This regional security began modestly with the Dunkirk Treaty of March 4, 1947, under which Britain and France pledged alliance and mutual assistance for a period of 50 years. Then, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg put into effect a customs-union agreement that came to be known as Benelux; it went into effect in 1948. From these two agreements there developed in 1948 what became known as the Western European Union.

Soviet domination of the satellite states progressed rapidly early in 1948, with Czechoslo-

vakia coming under full Communist control that year. Communist successes in eastern Europe stirred the countries of western Europe to action. The representatives of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg met at Brussels on March 4, 1948, to discuss the establishment of Western European Union (WEU) by means of a treaty of mutual assistance. On March 17 the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Mutual Defense was signed, to be in effect for 50 years. Canada and the United States were kept informed of the objectives and achievements of the plenipotentiaries. The essential feature of the treaty was the establishment of a system of mutual defense, supported by arrangements for cultural and economic cooperation. The principal organ of the Brussels Treaty Organization was the Permanent Consultative Council, consisting of the foreign ministers of the signatories, organized so that they could consider any threat to security or any economic disturbance. The defense ministers were to constitute a Western Defense Committee, implementing Article 4 of the treaty, which pledged to any attacked mem-

## THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

### PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

### ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

### ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

### ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop

their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

### ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

### ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

### ARTICLE 6<sup>1</sup>

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include

<sup>1</sup>This article was modified by the Greece-Turkey protocol of Oct. 22, 1951, to read as follows:

"For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack—

"(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

"(ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

under full Communist control. Communist successes in eastern Europe and the countries of western Europe. Representatives of Britain, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg met in March 4, 1948, to discuss the possibility of a treaty of mutual assistance and Cultural Collaboration. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was signed, to be in effect on March 17, 1948, to discuss the objectives and achievements of the Brussels Treaty Organization. The essential feature was the establishment of a system of mutual assistance, supported by arrangements for economic cooperation. The Brussels Treaty Organization, consisting of the signatory governments, was to constitute a Western European Council, implementing Article 1 which pledged to any attacked member

"all military and other aid and assistance" to the power of the member nations. A military organization known as Uniforce, was also set up, with headquarters at Fontainebleau, under the command of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Birmensham.

The establishment of the Western European Union proved to the USSR that aggression would be met with the combined power of western Europe, and it convinced the United States of the earnestness and sincerity of the five nations. Even more significant was the fact that it led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

An additional organization of western European states, called the Council of Europe, was agreed upon on Jan. 28, 1949. The statute creating the council was signed on May 5 of that year. The new body included the five Brussels Treaty powers, with the addition of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and Italy. Others joined later. It excluded all non-European states and, unlike the Brussels Treaty, included most of the western European nations. The trend of this organization was toward Eu-

ropean integration or federalism rather than association for security purposes on a mutual basis. The headquarters of the council was established at Strasbourg. A committee of ministers, one from each country, is the principal governing body. A Consultative Assembly, speaking for the council rather than as an instrument of individual governments, and enjoying broad representation, has little power but is very articulate. Clashes between the two bodies seem both perpetual and inevitable.

The position of the United States regarding the security of western Europe on a regional basis became abundantly clear. On the day that the Brussels Treaty was signed, President Harry Truman pledged that the consolidated effort of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves would be matched by United States determination to help them do so. Even more impressive was the resolution sponsored by Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg, which was passed by the Senate on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4. It urged that the president pursue the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-

## TREATY

and collective capacity to

## ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever in any of them, the territorial integrity, independence or security of any of them is threatened.

## ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. If they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercising its individual or collective self-defence, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked, taking forthwith, individually and in conjunction with the other Parties, such action as may be necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the area.

In the event of an armed attack and all measures taken for the defence thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be taken only if the Security Council has taken no action and it is necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

## ARTICLE 6

The provisions of Article 5 in the event of an armed attack against one or more of the Parties is deemed to include

as was modified by the Greece-Turkey Protocol of 1951, to read as follows: "In the event of an armed attack against one or more of the Parties is deemed to include

territory of any of the Parties in Europe, North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands in the Aegean Sea of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; or forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties in any of the territories mentioned above or over these territories or any of the territories in which occupation forces of any of the Parties are stationed on the date when the Treaty enters into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the Black Sea north of the Tropic of Cancer."

an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupied territories of any Party in Europe, on the islands in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

## ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

## ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, in which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

## ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform

each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

## ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

## ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

## ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

defense" in keeping with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and called for the "association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security." These presidential and legislative expressions of approval cleared the way for immediate negotiation.

**North Atlantic Treaty.** Preliminary negotiations in advance of the North Atlantic Treaty were conducted among the five Brussels powers, the United States, and Canada, who agreed unanimously on certain principles: (1) that the treaty should be within the framework of the United Nations; (2) that, while promoting peace and security, it should positively resist aggression; (3) that it should be based on mutual aid and self-help; (4) that it should include nonmilitary features; and (5) that it should be implemented by a formal organization. Those negotiating the treaty also wished to bring other countries of western Europe into the defense group. At length, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the Brussels powers (the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), the United States, Canada, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Iceland.

On Oct. 22, 1951, the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to a protocol that would admit Greece and Turkey, and on Feb. 18, 1952, the two countries acceded to the treaty. Subsequent protocols provided for the admission of West Germany, effective May 9, 1955, as the 15th member of NATO, and of Spain, effective May 30, 1982, as the organization's 16th member.

**Organization of NATO.** The organization of NATO is both complicated and elaborate. On the civilian and policymaking side is the North Atlantic Council. Its meetings, held twice a year, are generally attended by the foreign, defense, and finance ministers of the member states. Each member state also has a permanent representative. Acting together, these representatives form a continuing body. The council determines major NATO policies, assumes financial and administrative responsibility for NATO in behalf of the member states, and supplies necessary linkages between NATO's civilian and military bodies.

The International Secretariat is headed by the secretary-general, who is the administrative and planning head of NATO. An international staff that serves under him is recruited on the basis of merit and represents NATO as an international body.

The military structure of NATO is determined by the North Atlantic Council. The Military Committee advises the council on military affairs and directs the subordinate military bodies. The committee's work is supported by the International Military Staff.

There are three commands in the area covered by NATO: the European, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Channel. The European Command is under the Allied Command Europe (ACE), which is subdivided into subordinate commands and is headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), with headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE) near Mons in Belgium. The Atlantic Command is under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), and the Channel

Command is under the Allied Command Channel (CINCHAN). There is also a Canada-U. S. Regional Planning Group.

The NATO Crisis of the 1960's. Early in the problems threatening the integrity and the existence of NATO came to a head.

The major problem was the position of France on many NATO questions, coupled with the transience of French President Charles de Gaulle. The German problem, the key to a new balance of power in Europe, remained. The character and extent of the continuing Soviet threat was always at the bottom of the controversy. The debate on NATO strategy, especially regarding nuclear weapons, widened and deepened the breach between the powers. The question of what the future organization of the alliance should be.

On March 7, 1966, President de Gaulle informed U. S. President Lyndon B. Johnson that France, while adhering to the basic terms of the Atlantic Alliance, would take measures "to reassert on her whole territory the full exercise of sovereignty" now reduced by Allied troop presence therein and by their use of her air space. France would withdraw from the integrated commands and end the use of her forces by NATO. On March 10, 1966, a French aide-memoire was addressed to the other 14 NATO members. The French government argued that NATO no longer related to the world situation as it did in 1949, for the following reasons: (1) threats to European security were no longer seriously imminent or menacing; (2) Europe, having been reconstructed economically, recovered its own "means of action"; (3) the United States monopoly of nuclear power had yielded to a balance of nuclear power between the United States and the Soviet Union; and (4) Europe was no longer the center of international crises.

Accordingly, France proposed to withdraw land and air forces stationed in Germany and assigned to the Allied command in Europe. This step would require its withdrawal from the integrated commands then covering the French troops so assigned—Supreme Allied Command Europe and Allied Forces Central Europe Command, or AFCENT—and the transfer from French territory of the headquarters of these commands. (At that time both SHAPE and AFCENT headquarters were located near Paris.) French implementation of certain bilateral agreements, especially those with the United States, would cease. The French government insisted on continued participation in the alliance and its willingness to share in the military defense of the area covered by the treaty. A second aide-memoire was sent by France to the other NATO members on March 29, 1966, reaffirming and implementing the first memorandum.

The 14 NATO partners of France, surprised and stung by the bold and unusual course France had taken, issued a "common declaration" on March 18, 1966. In it they reaffirmed the effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance as an "instrument of defense and deterrence" and their belief in the necessity and permanence of the organization. "No system of bilateral arrangements," it declared, "can be a substitute." And the treaty organization were far more than mere "instruments of common defense."

President Johnson, on March 23, 1966, replied to President de Gaulle's letter of March 7, challenging the validity of most of the positions

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continued by the French president and arguing for continued observance by France of its commitments to NATO. The United States replied, on April 12, 1966, to the second French aide-memoire, protesting the French interpretation of the character and status of the organization and the ensuing French action. It also criticized the termination of United States military agreements under certain bilateral agreements. In response to the French attitude, the United States announced to remove its facilities from France.

The "new" NATO, without France as a participant, was not under way. The Supreme Headquarters, Europe (SHAPE) was located at Casteau near the Mons area in Belgium, about 30 miles (50 km) southwest of Brussels. AFCEUR was transferred to Brunssum, the Netherlands. The NATO Defense College was moved to Brussels. The North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee were to have their headquarters at Brussels. Clearly the action of France considerably deranged the working and operations of NATO. Nevertheless, the 14 full members showed a determination to carry on and a readiness to adapt to changed situations and conditions. The secretary-general declared that France had been drawn from the integrated military part but continued to participate in the council, several committees, and several agencies. Finally, the determination shown by the 14 active members assured a continuing viable NATO for the future.

**NATO and the Unification of Germany.** The most baffling continuing problem of NATO was posed by Germany. One of West Germany's aims in accepting integration into the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance was to secure support from the Allies for German reunification. The Paris Protocol of 1954 virtually imposes an obligation for such support. It is true that only three NATO members were parties to the Protocol of Occupation and participated in the reconstruction of Germany as a free and independent nation. But membership in NATO shifted the obligation of the three powers to a general European one.

Because Germany could well determine the new balance of power in Europe, German reunification remained the pivotal problem. The Soviet Union understandably favored the status quo and pressed the argument against the Western Allies, especially West Germany. "Why not peace now?" could be a compelling argument. The NATO powers could not forget their obligation to Germany without serious consequences within NATO itself. French unilateral action had crippled NATO's ability to meet this situation. Military readiness, whether multilateral or unilateral, tended to enhance the German status quo and to play into the hands of the Warsaw powers.

**Dispute over Soviet Intentions.** An issue dividing NATO members was the seriousness of the Soviet "threat" to the West. This threat was the occasion, if not the cause, of the original Atlantic Alliance and organization.

General de Gaulle argued that the threat, if it still in fact existed, had been substantially reduced and modified, and therefore the organization might well be terminated. Some in the United States wrote and spoke in behalf of an exclusively European organization, both political and defensive in nature, justified partly on the basis of the supposedly changed character of the Soviet Union.

Although admitting that the Soviet Union had changed the tone of its communications and softened the style of its procedures and approaches, many nevertheless argued that at bottom there was no change in the Soviet Union's ultimate objectives and that the subjection of Europe to its will remained its goal. "Peaceful coexistence" was represented as a temporary Soviet stance. Soviet positions on Germany, on Europe, and on important phases of disarmament, it was held, remained fixed and inflexible. Those holding this view maintained that the Soviet Union was committed to the destruction of NATO, the severance of Europe from its American ties, and the isolation of the United States from world affairs. Nor, according to their argument, should one be deluded by Soviet-bloc recommendations that the NATO and Warsaw pacts be terminated and replaced with a general European security treaty. They contended that the threats of the Soviet Union, both current and potential, had not disappeared; that no positive concessions to the Allies on major questions had been forthcoming; and that the Western Allies, by means of a general and generous détente, could easily find themselves defenseless if NATO were weakened or abandoned. Their countries and peoples would then be at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

**Conflict between Member-States.** The first conflict between two NATO member-states occurred in 1974. With Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 in response to a Greek-led coup on the island-republic, Greece withdrew from NATO's military wing, thus jeopardizing NATO's position in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East. When Turkey blocked Greece's return to NATO's military wing, Greece threatened to deny the United States the use of its naval bases and facilities. Ultimately Greece and Turkey composed their differences, which led to the reintegration of Greece into NATO's military structure on Oct. 20, 1980.

**Strategic Control of Nuclear Weapons.** The strategic debate on the use of nuclear weapons by NATO raised fundamental questions. Should the United States continue its exclusive control of the nuclear weapons of the Atlantic Alliance? Or should this control be shared? If so, how should the sharing be allocated? Should there be a European nuclear force independent of the United States? Should a "nonproliferation" treaty override any and all arrangements for a nuclear force within NATO? France had taken unilateral action regarding atomic weapons, and the United States monopoly had been under serious attack. A nonproliferation treaty, coupled with a binding legal obligation, could seriously affect present and future nuclear policies and activities of the NATO allies. The idea of a separate European nuclear force, both widely supported and attacked, seemed to hang on the possibility of European nuclear sufficiency without the United States.

By the late 1970's, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group agreed on the stationing of medium-range U.S. nuclear missiles in western Europe and recommended that NATO's nuclear arms be modernized. Nevertheless certain member-states were wary of moving ahead with the deployment of nuclear weapons for fear that it would accelerate the arms race with the Communist bloc.

**Reorganization of NATO.** There remained the organizational side of NATO. France, making a fundamental distinction between the alliance and the organization, would in theory at least

continue the former and abandon the latter. It was clear that NATO, like all things of human invention, must at certain intervals undergo fundamental change. Such was the situation regarding NATO. The organization showed remarkable firmness and flexibility in adjusting to the changes dictated by French unilateral action. Some would continue the original treaty and organization on a multinational basis through the modification and improvement of existing arrangements. Others would develop a unified European political system with its own military command that could function either independently or as a partner in a world non-Communist system with the United States and Canada as the other principal partners. There was also the proposal of a political alliance of states within which a nuclear force could be set up, with the power of decision committed to the nuclear powers as well as to those non-nuclear ones whose interests were most vitally affected.

A question as old as the alliance itself was how to achieve greater equality in planning and decision making when the member-nations were so unequal in size, economic resources, population strength, and military power. Despite considerable cohesion, there were rival national concerns and conflicting national policies.

Much criticism of the imbalance in consultation within NATO had been directed at the United States. The United States was conscious of the inequality of both responsibility and decision making among the Atlantic nations, and it proposed to share more generously the power to decide and the obligation to assume regional and world responsibility. However, disunity within NATO, combined with divergent and sometimes irreconcilable national policies, deterred the nations of Europe from exercising this right and assuming this obligation.

Dealing with these problems was the major responsibility of the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies. However, its numerous communiqués, resolutions, and directives did not lead to final decisions and permanent solutions. Prime ministers and presidents as well as foreign, defense, and finance ministers were likewise concerned on a national basis. Parliamentary bodies were also deeply involved in NATO problems. From such consultations and discussions, a strengthened alliance and a revitalized organization might emerge that could fulfill most of the hopes and expectations of the Western world.

CHARLES E. MARTIN<sup>o</sup>  
University of Washington

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**NORTH BAY**, a city in Ontario, Canada, situated on the northeast shore of Lake Nipissing, on the Trans-Canada and Ferguson highways, 180 miles (290 km) north of Toronto. The leading industry is the manufacture of hardware, cutting and mining equipment, frozen foods, and tools. There are also planing mills, tanneries, and saw yards. North Bay is a summer resort and the seat of Laurentian University and a teachers college. Nipissing Game Preserve and Timagami Provincial Forest are about 20 miles (32 km) northwest of the city.

North Bay was founded in 1882. It was incorporated as a town in 1890 and as a city in 1925. In 1953, uranium, tantalum, and columbium were discovered in the Manitou Island, 11 miles (11 km) offshore. Population: 51,268.

**NORTH BERGEN**, bûr'gən, a township in New Jersey, situated in Hudson county, just north of Jersey City. A residential and industrial community, it has plants producing clothing, textiles, knit goods, embroidery, buttons, jewelry, watch leather products, pens and pencils, metal goods, batteries, electrical equipment, paper boxes, light bulbs, beverages, lumber, and plumbing supplies. Incorporated in 1861, North Bergen is governed by a commission. Population: 47,019.

**NORTH BORNEO**, formerly a British territory since 1963, the state of Sabah in East Malaysia, occupying the northeast corner of the island of Borneo. See BORNEO; MALAYSIA.

**NORTH BRABANT**, brā-bānt', a province in the Netherlands, bounded by the Dutch provinces of Zeeland on the west, of South Holland and of Gelderland on the north, of Limburg on the east, and by Belgium on the south. North Brabant (Dutch, Noord-Brabant) has an area of 1,800 square miles (4,911 sq km), and its capital is 's Hertogenbosch. Its economy is based on agriculture and the manufacture of electrical equipment, pharmaceuticals, leather products, and textiles.

Once part of the medieval duchy of Brabant, it joined the United Provinces of the Netherlands in 1648. Population: (1977 est.) 2,011,578.

**NORTH CANADIAN RIVER**, one of the principal rivers of Oklahoma, 843 miles (1,357 km) long. It rises in northeastern New Mexico and flows east through the panhandles of Texas and Oklahoma and southeast through central Oklahoma past Oklahoma City.

The North Canadian formerly joined the Canadian River a few miles east of Eufaula, Okla., but a dam built below the junction formed the Eufaula Reservoir, backing up the water along the North Canadian and Canadian rivers. The North Canadian River is dammed 3 miles (5 km) north of Canton in west central Oklahoma to create Canton Reservoir, which is used for flood control and irrigation.

**NORTH CAPE**, a promontory of the island of Mageröy in northern Norway at latitude 71° 10' 20" N and longitude 25° 47' 40" E. It rises to an altitude of about 1,007 feet (307 meters) above the Arctic Ocean and is visited by tourist ships. Although it is often regarded as the northernmost point of Europe, Knivskjellodden, an island 4 miles (6.5 meters) to the west-northwest, lies at latitude 71° 11' 8" N.

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Major obstacle was the Hürtgen Forest. The attack, on a narrow front, reached the Roer River, but crossing could not be attempted until the dams near Schmidt had been seized to prevent the Germans from flooding the valley. A major offensive for this purpose was begun (December 13).

**1944, November 16–December 15. Lorraine Operations.** Patton's Third Army captured Metz (December 13) and battled its way across the Seille River.

**1944, November 16–December 15. Alsace Operations.** Devers' group made deep gains; Seventh Army's French 2nd Ar-

mored Division\* thrust through the Saverne Gap of the Vosges Mountains to liberate Strasbourg (November 23), rousing French national morale to a peak. The French First Army overran Mulhouse. Devers was now on the Rhine from Karlsruhe to below Strasbourg, and again from Mulhouse to the Swiss border; but the deep Colmar pocket in between was still firmly held by Wiese's German Nineteenth Army.

\* Bitter personal enmity existed between Leclerc and de Lattre de Tassigny; hence, the 2nd French Armored Division was never under the latter's command.


*German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), December, 1944–January, 1945*

*The German Plan.* Hitler had prepared a striking force to split the Allies. His armor would rip through to Antwerp, crippling their supply. He hoped to destroy all Allied forces north of the line Antwerp–Brussels–Bastogne, just as in 1940. Success depended on three elements: (1) a breakthrough, (2) seizure of Allied fuel supplies and the key focal points of communication in the area St.-Vith and Bastogne, and (3) widening of the initial gap to increase the flow of invasion. Hitler's commanders, though dubious of success, obeyed orders.

**1944, December 16–19. The German Blow.**

The operation was launched after a period of fog, rain, and snow blanketed Allied aerial observation and hobbled combat capabilities. The striking force, from north to south, consisted of the Sixth SS (General Sepp Dietrich) and Fifth (Gen-

eral Hasso von Manteuffel) Panzer armies—24 divisions, 10 of them armored. The Seventh Army (General Ernst Brandenberger) was to cover the southern flank. The initial wave—8 Panzer divisions—disrupted the U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and strategic surprise was complete. (SHAEF




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December, 1944–January, 1945

ing force to split the Allies. His plan for supply. He hoped to destroy Bastogne, just as in 1940. Success in the seizure of Allied fuel supplies near St.-Vith and Bastogne, and the invasion. Hitler's command-

so von Manteuffel) Panzer armies divisions, 10 of them armored. The First Army (General Ernst Brandenberger) was to cover the southern flank. The initial wave—8 Panzer divisions—disrupted the U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and surprise was complete. (SHAEP



intelligence estimates had dismissed all probability of any immediate major German offensive capability.) The 106th Division, just arrived on the front, and the 28th Division, recuperating from severe fighting at Schmidt, were shattered. A paratroop drop in the area Eupen-Monschau, and a spearhead force of English-speaking German soldiers in American uniforms, added to panic and confusion behind the assault zone. But on the north flank, the U.S. V Corps, halting its own offensive toward the Roer dams, held firm, as did the U.S. 4th Division on the south. Canalized between these shoulders, the attack roared on toward the Meuse. Two U.S. armored divisions were rushed in by Bradley as immediate reinforcement. Eisenhower then committed the SHAEF reserve—the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions (recuperating near Reims from their Maas operation). Truckborne, they arrived (December 19)—the 101st (under Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe) at Bastogne, a check to Fifth Panzer Army's progress, and the 82nd (Major General Matthew B. Ridgway) to bolster the northern flank. Montgomery began shifting 1 British corps to backstop the operation along the Meuse. At Bradley's order, Patton (December 18) halted his Third Army's advance in the Saar to begin an amazing 90° shift in direction to the north, to hit the German southern flank.

#### 1944, December 20–26. Allied Recovery.

Eisenhower transferred command of all U.S. troops north of the bulge to Montgomery, leaving only Patton's army under Bradley. Despite a desperate defense of St.-Vith by the U.S. 7th Armored Division (Brigadier General R. W. Hasbrouck), the Sixth Panzer Army forged slowly ahead (December 19–22), but the delay had been fatal to the German plan. The V Corps was still presenting an impenetrable front, while the U.S. VII Corps was hurrying southwest to seal the remainder of the northern flank. At Bastogne, the 101st Airborne, with some other units—some 18,000 men in all—resisted all efforts of the Fifth Panzer Army to overrun their perimeter. However, the invading tide, lapping around Bastogne, progressed northwest toward the Meuse. Model, commanding Army Group B, quite properly desired now to shift the

weight of the German assault to Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army, but Hitler, obstinate and ignorant, insisted the decisive blow be struck by his SS pet, Dietrich. By December 22, Patton was attacking north toward beleaguered Bastogne on a 2-corps front, while Devers' 6th Army Group extended its left to cover his advance. Dietrich's penetration in the Manhay-Stavelot area, and Manteuffel's spearheads—Panzer Lehr and 2nd Panzer divisions—were grinding to a halt with empty fuel tanks at Celles, almost in sight of the Meuse, to be struck by American and British counterattacks (December 25–26). Hitler's gamble had failed. Patton's Third Army punched a hole through Manteuffel's troops to reach Bastogne (December 26), and, with the first clear weather, Allied air began pounding German supply trains west of St.-Vith.

#### 1944, December 26–1945, January 2. The Battle for Bastogne.

Hitler insisted on the capture of Bastogne, and a furious battle raged for a week while the German tide ebbed elsewhere in the Bulge under Allied pressure. Attempting to disrupt Allied air support, the Luftwaffe made its last offensive strike (January 1), some 800 planes attacking airfields in France, Belgium, and Holland, and destroying 156 Allied planes. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the Germans, and the Allied air offensive over the Ardennes area and German rear elements continued.

#### 1945, January 3–16. Allied Counteroffensive.

On the northern flank of the German penetration, Montgomery unleashed Hodges' U.S. First Army. German offensive efforts near Bastogne were repulsed, and Patton's increasing efforts, supported by XIX Tactical Air Force, shrank the southern face of the German penetration. Hitler permitted withdrawal of the Sixth Panzer Army (January 8; see p. 1122). The Bulge was eliminated (January 16). Hodges' First Army returned to Bradley's control (January 18), but Simpson's Ninth Army remained in Montgomery's 21st Army Group.

COMMENT. *Hitler's Ardennes offensive was a gamble, pure and simple. The blow was checked first by the resistance of the U.S. elements on both shoulders, next by Hasbrouck's stand at St.-Vith and McAuliffe's epic defense of Bastogne. Hitler's re-*

fusil to shift the weight of the attack to the flank making the best progress was stupid. When the German armor was unable to overrun Allied fuel depots to replenish its tanks, the end was inevitable. The net result was a delay of about 6 weeks to Allied operations in the west, while Hitler had expended the slim reserves with which he otherwise might have checked the coming Russian spring offensive. German losses were some 120,000

men killed, wounded, or missing, 600 tanks and assault guns, 1,600 planes, and 6,000 vehicles. Allied losses (mostly American) were approximately 7,000 killed, 33,400 wounded, 21,000 captured or missing, and 730-odd tanks and tank destroyers. Among the Americans were 86 prisoners captured by the 1st SS Panzer Division at Malmédy on December 17th, then lined up and ruthlessly machine-gunned to death.


### The Eastern Front


#### RUSSIAN WINTER OFFENSIVE

Following a series of probing attacks, the Soviet armies launched a concerted drive as winter hardened roads and froze the waterways.

1944, January 15-19. Liberation of Leningrad. Two Russian army groups fell on the German Eighteenth Army, investing Leningrad. General L. A. Govorov's Leningrad Front, crossing the frozen Gulf of Finland, pierced the German left, while General Kirill A. Meretskov's Volkhov Front swept over frozen lakes and swamps

to penetrate the German right. Novgorod was taken (January 19). German forces under General Georg Lindemann escaped annihilation only by rapid withdrawal. A third Russian group—General M. M. Popov's Second Baltic Front—threatened further envelopment and caused the retirement of General von Kuechler's entire





vital artery of supply for the German front. A spectacular drive was made by the U.S. 1st Division was checked by orders from higher command, to permit the French the honor of capturing the city and erasing the stain of the disaster (see p. 835). Bullard's First Army launched its final attack (October 10), driving for Montmédy. By the armistice ended all hostilities.

### British, French, and American Offensives

**September 27–October 17. Storming of the Hindenburg Line.** One day after the beginning of the American offensive, a German army group flung itself against the Hindenburg Line. Trading space for time in front, Boehn's army group maneuvered to withdraw after a succession of gallant British attacks drove back the last of the Hindenburg Line (October 5). To Haig's surprise, the British were unable to achieve a breakthrough, and the momentum of the drive slowed down in the face of the German defense.

**1918, September 28–October 14. Offensive in Flanders.** British-Belgian troops of King Albert's army group swept over the Ypres Ridge, but then slowed down as swampy country choked all supply, and Rupprecht's army group fought back grimly.

**1918, October 17–November 11. Advance to the Sambre and the Scheldt.** Because of American progress in the Meuse-Argonne, a German retreat all along the line became necessary. Ludendorff hoped that he could re-establish a new line west of the German border and by a determined defense through the winter force the Allies to grant generous terms. But his hopes were foiled by the pressure being maintained all along the Allied lines. In a renewed British assault, Rawlinson's Fourth Army broke through German defenses on the Selle River (October 17). Byng's Third Army forced a crossing lower down (October 20). The drive threw back Boehn's army group with the loss of 20,000 prisoners. At the same time the Belgians and British began to move again in Flanders. The German Army began to crack.

### The German Collapse

**1918, October 6. Request for an Armistice.**

As the front lines began to crumble, the new German chancellor, Prince **Max of Baden**, sent a message to President Wilson, requesting an armistice on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points (see p. 977). An exchange of messages concluded (October 23) with Wilson's insistence that the U.S. (and the Allies) would not negotiate an armistice with the existing military dictatorship.

**1918, October 27. Resignation of Ludendorff.**

Just before formal dismissal, Ludendorff resigned to permit the desperate German government to comply with Wilson's demand. Hindenburg, however, retained his post as German commander in chief, with General **Wilhelm Groener** replacing Ludendorff as Quartermaster General (Chief of Staff).

**1918, October 29–November 10. Revolution in Germany.**

Inspired by the Communists and sparked by a mutiny of the High Seas Fleet, disorders, revolts, and mutinies flared inside Germany. A new Socialist

government took power and proclaimed a republic (November 9). The Kaiser fled to Holland (November 10).

**1918, November 7–11. Armistice Negotiations.**

A German delegation, headed by a civilian, **Matthias Erzberger**, negotiated an armistice with Foch in his railway coach headquarters on a siding at Compiègne. Agreement was finally reached at 5 A.M., November 11, 1918. The terms, which were in effect a German surrender, provided that the German Army must immediately evacuate all occupied territory and Alsace-Lorraine; immediately surrender great quantities of war matériel (including 5,000 guns and 25,000 machine guns); evacuate German territory west of the Rhine, and three bridgeheads over the Rhine, to be occupied by the Allies; surrender all submarines; intern all other surface warships as directed by the Allies.

**1918, November 11. The Armistice.** Hostilities ceased at 11 A.M.; the terms of the armistice immediately became effective.

COMMENT. *Comparisons are invidious.*


*The American Expeditionary Force was the vital factor in the final Allied victory; the Meuse-Argonne offensive was decisive; 6 other American divisions played important spearhead roles elsewhere on the front during the final Allied advances. But the question whether Allied victory could have been achieved without the Americans should not be debated. The American role was to add a final increment of numbers and fresh initiative, permitting the much larger, and more experienced, Allied armies to achieve equally spectacular successes in the final weeks of the war.*

### The Italian Front

**1918, June 15–22. Austrian Offensive.**

Germany during the spring transferred her troops in Italy to the Western Front, insisting that the Austrians crush Italy singlehanded. The argument had weight, since Russia was out of the war. Both Conrad (now commanding on the Trentino front) and Borojevic, on the Piave, demanded command of the decisive effort. A compromise decision by Archduke **Joseph** permitted them to attack simultaneously. Since the mountainous terrain and lack of lateral communications would prevent mutual support, the available re-

ally had some 600,000 men in II. The Dutch Army theoretic and of General Henri G. Win- h countries had elaborate de- networks, with further arrange-



g dikes. The troops, however, less modern and less complete ous deficiency, however, was ould remain neutral, neither int defensive plans with the ort to carry on even informal

*German Plans.* Following overwhelming terror bombardment, Army Group B would overrun Holland. Moving more slowly into Belgium to encourage the Allied left-flank armies to rush to the assistance of the Low Countries, Army Group A would then hurl an armored drive through the Ardennes Forest and via the Stenay Gap into France. Thus splitting the Allied armies (cutting off those which had advanced into Belgium), Army Group A would continue westward to Calais and roll the northern portion of the Anglo-British forces against the anvil of Army Group B in the Low Countries. Subsequent, prompt southward exploitation of the gap would then roll the southern French armies back upon the Maginot Line, where Army Group C would be waiting.

*Allied Plans.* The French were still thinking in terms of the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, a southwesterly sickle movement through Belgium. The Allied plan proposed, therefore—just as the Germans expected—to meet the expected invasion on the Dyle Line of Belgium, pivoting the First Army Group about the northern tip of the Maginot Line.

**BATTLE OF FLANDERS,**  
MAY 10—JUNE 4

*Invasion of the Low Countries*


**1940, May 10. The German Assault.** Following predawn bombardments of all major Dutch and Belgian airfields, Army Groups A and B crossed the Belgian and Dutch frontiers. Initially the main effort was on the right, by Army Group B, in Holland. Paratroop drops in the vicinity of Rotterdam, The Hague, Moerdijk, and Dordrecht quickly paralyzed the interior of the Netherlands. Early in the day, glider and parachute units landed on the top of powerful Fort Eban Emael, northern anchor of the main Belgian defense line, neutralizing it, while other German troops crossed the Albert Canal, which should have been defended by Eban Emael's guns. The violence and success of the initial German attacks, combined with terror bombings of the interior regions of both countries, threw their populace into confusion and panic.

**1940, May 10. Churchill Becomes Britain's Prime Minister.** News of the early German successes aroused great alarm in Paris and London. Prime Minister Chamberlain, whose government had been tottering because of failures in Norway and general lack of popular support, resigned to permit lionhearted **Winston S. Churchill** to lead a coalition British government in the face of the German avalanche.

**1940, May 11-14. Fall of Holland.** Pressing its initial advantage, German Army Group B pressed steadily forward, despite frantic

Dutch flooding of much of the countryside. By the 13th, German main elements had begun to force their way into the so-called Fortress of Holland, joining up with most of the paratroops, who had seized and held the key bridges over the Rhine estuary. At the same time, German spearheads met advance elements of the French Seventh Army (**Henri Giraud**) near Breda, and drove them back toward Antwerp. The Queen of the Netherlands and her government escaped by ship to England from The Hague. Germany demanded complete surrender, on pain of the destruction of all Dutch cities by aerial bombardment (May 14). As proof of its intentions, the Luftwaffe brutally destroyed the entire business section of **Rotterdam** while negotiations were in process. Winkelman surrendered.

**1940, May 11-15. Fall of Belgium.** Following a similar pattern of bombings, the German Sixth Army (Reichenau) drove southwest. Fort Eban Emael fell to its audacious attackers. As the Germans poured across the Albert Canal, the Belgian Army retired to the Dyle Line, to be reinforced (May 12) by elements of the BEF and the First French Army (**Georges Blanchard**). By the 15th, some 35 Allied divisions—including most of the BEF—were in the area Namur-Antwerp, with the German Sixth Army probing the Dyle Line in their front and the Eighteenth (**Georg von Kuechler**), now turning southward from Holland, threatening their left flank. At about the same time, these Allied units realized that to their right



rear the French center was being torn apart.


#### *Northern France*

1940, May 10–12. **Advance through the Ardennes.** The German hammer blow—Rundstedt's Army Group A—moved through the difficult Ardennes simultaneously with the assaults on Holland and Belgium, but by nature of the terrain and road net did not reach the Meuse until May 12. This calculated delay was sufficient to coax the Allied forces north of the Sambre in motion into Belgium. Leading the 3 German invading columns was General Paul L. E. von Kleist's Panzer Group (5 armored and 3 mechanized divisions), to its north General Hermann Hoth's Panzer Corps (2 armored divisions). Never dreaming that the Germans would make their main effort through the hilly, forested Ardennes, General André-Georges Corap's Ninth French Army and General Charles Huntziger's Second had their weakest elements in the Stenay Gap area, while the Ardennes Forest itself was screened only by small French cavalry and Belgian chasseur units, which were quickly brushed aside. With first word of the German advance, both French gener-

als hurried their cavalry forward to cross the Meuse and delay until both armies could establish themselves on the river.

1940, May 13–15. **Across the Meuse.** But Corap was slow, and Huntziger's cavalry was outflanked. Supported by devastating dive-bombing attacks against accurate French artillery, one of Hoth's armored divisions forced a river crossing at Haux; General Georg-Hans Reinhardt's corps of Kleist's Panzer Group was similarly getting over at Monthermé and General Heinz Guderian's corps at Sedan (May 13). Despite the now frantic efforts of the French, the bridgeheads were quickly expanded. The French Ninth Army was completely shattered, and the Second Army's left pulverized (May 15). The German armor, spearheaded by Stuka dive bombers, roared west on a 50-mile front, while behind them fast-moving German infantry poured through the gap.

1940, May 16–21. **The Drive to the Channel.** All too late, Gamelin ordered up divisions from the French general reserve, and from the armies south of the German drive, into a new Sixth Army (General Touchon) to plug the gap. General Henri Giraud, succeeding the inefficient Corap, attempted to regroup the Ninth Army in



their cavalry forward to cross and delay until both armies lish themselves on the river.

1-15. Across the Meuse. But slow, and Huntziger's cavalry ked. Supported by devastating ng attacks against accurate illery, one of Hoth's armored rced a river crossing at Haux; org-Hans Reinhardt's corps of izer Group was similarly get-at Monthermé and General rian's corps at Sedan (May e the now frantic efforts of the bridgeheads were quickly ex-he French Ninth Army was shattered, and the Second t pulverized (May 15). The mor, spearheaded by Stuka rs, roared west on a 50-mile behind them fast-moving Ger-y poured through the gap.

21. The Drive to the Chan-oo late, Gamelin ordered up m the French general reserve, ie armies south of the German a new Sixth Army (General o plug the gap. General Henri ceeding the inefficient Corap, o regroup the Ninth Army in

the face of the tidal wave, but it was completely routed (May 17), and Giraud was captured. Brigadier General Charles A. J. M. de Gaulle's 4th Armored Division made 3 successive punches into the German south flank from Laon (May 17-19), but after limited success (the only successful French attacks of the campaign) his gallant troops were turned back by dive bombers and counterattacks. Gamelin was relieved, General Maxime Weygand taking supreme Allied command (May 19). German armor reached the seacoast west of Abbeville, completely splitting the Allied forces and severing communications with the BEF's base port, Cherbourg (May 31). While the French to the south attempted to hold the line of the Somme and Aisne rivers, the severed northern grouping found itself being pinned against the sea.

#### 1940, May 21-25. Exploitation in the North.

The German armor wheeled northward in 3 prongs, from the seacoast to Arras, while the Fourth (Günther von Kluge), Sixth, and Eighteenth Armies pressed in from the east on the French First Army, the BEF, and the Belgian Army. Lord Gort, on the First Army left, sent a task force south behind the French to bolster the right flank and to counterattack the German armor at Arras, but this effort was repulsed by General Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division (May 21). Guderian's armored corps captured Boulogne and isolated the British garrison of Calais (May 22-23). Dunkirk was chosen as substitute British base. The unbearable pressure of the German attack forced the Allies off the Escault River line into an ever-shrinking perimeter, with the full force of the German armor knocking against the BEF detachment on the Allied right (May 25). Complete and speedy annihilation of the penned-in Allies appeared certain.

#### 1940, May 25-27. The Belgian Surrender.

Meanwhile, on the Allied left, the Belgian Army was being pulverized by German attacks. King Leopold, deciding that further resistance was hopeless, surrendered to save further bloodshed, thus exposing the left flank of the Franco-British army to further assault. There could now be no hope of holding any part of Flanders. Churchill ordered the Royal Navy to help evacuate the British troops from Dunkirk.

1940, May 26-28. Hitler's Stop Order. By the Führer's command, the armored attack from the south was halted peremptorily. This incredible order permitted the hasty organization of perimeter defenses around Dunkirk and the equally hasty concentration of evacuation craft from the British Channel ports. The Luftwaffe was given the mission of pulverizing the Dunkirk perimeter. But the Germans in the air met an intensive, continuous attack by the RAF Fighter Command which, from bases in southern Britain, nullified German operations in a series of spectacular air battles.

#### 1940, May 28-June 4. Evacuation from Dunkirk.

Hitler rescinded his stop order and the German armor resumed assaults on the Allied right, to be checked by 3 British divisions aligned in deep zonal defense. A conglomeration of some 850 British vessels of every shape, size, and propulsion—most of them manned by civilian volunteers—converged on Dunkirk to begin the most amazing exodus in history. In 8 days, more than 338,000 men—among them 112,000 French and Belgian soldiers—were lifted. The troops streamed in orderly lines over wharves and beaches and through the surf, while overhead Spitfires of the Royal Air Force beat off most of the Luftwaffe's attempts at strafing, and their comrades along the ever-shrinking defensive perimeter held back German assaults. On the final night (June 4), General Harold Alexander, commanding the rear guard, personally toured the beaches and the harbor to verify the fact that the last living British soldier had been embarked, then himself got into a boat. Next morning the Germans overwhelmed the fragments of the First French Army gallantly screening the evacuation. The Battle of Flanders had ended.

COMMENT. *Aside from the duplicity and treachery of the Nazi attacks on Holland and Belgium, the actual military operations of the German Army were, with one exception, clear-cut in ruthless efficiency. Hitler's strange stop order, arresting the armored assault on the boxed-in Allied armies in Flanders, cannot be charged against the German commanders. It appears to have been motivated by Goering's plea that the Luftwaffe be permitted to give the coup de*

*grâce and thus have full share in the glory of victory. Added, perhaps, was Hitler's fear that miraculously the French might mount a counterattack from the south and wreck his plans of conquest.*

*On the other side of the ledger, the Allied operations, having no strong, centralized control, either prior to or during the action, were disjointed and ineffective. The initial French troop distribution, with the weight of forces behind the Maginot Line defenses, was ridiculous. Friction and distrust between*

*British and French commanders complicated the situation. Indecision was the most marked characteristic of the French high command. The over-all handicap was the Allied reliance on fortifications per se, which throttled the spirit of the offensive. Much has been made of the decay of patriotic fiber in France, sapping the warrior spirit; but the troops of the First French Army, battling without hope in front of Dunkirk while their British comrades were being evacuated, certainly behaved most gallantly.*

#### THE BATTLE OF FRANCE, JUNE 5-25, 1940

With amazing precision the German armies regrouped for the conquest of France, in accordance—except for minor changes—with previously prepared plans. Bock's Army Group B was poised on the line of the Somme extended east to Bourg. Rundstedt's Army Group A continued east to the Moselle in front of the Maginot Line, and Leeb's Army Group C stretched from there to the Swiss border. Facing it, behind the Somme, the Aisne, and the Maginot Line, the bewildered French forces were regrouping, with Army Group 3 (Besson was now on the left, Billotte having been killed in an auto accident) extending from the sea east to Rheims, Army Group 4 (Huntziger) continuing on to the Meuse and thence to Montmédy, and Prételat's Army Group 2 behind the Maginot Line. The best that Weygand could produce—with half of France's available strength already dissipated and the remainder shaken—was a defense in depth behind the Somme and Aisne. His concentration was hampered by incessant Luftwaffe bombings, dislocating rail centers and blocking troop movements on the roads. He had available only 65 divisions, 3 of them armored units already badly mauled, and 17 others fortress troops or second-line reserve units. All elements were under strength, all lacked equipment, and the general morale was very low.

**1940, June 5-13. Renewed German Assault.** Army Group B, spearheaded by Kleist's Panzers, struck from the Somme. Smashing through the Tenth French Army (Félix Altmeyer), the Germans reached the Seine west of Paris (June 9) and the armor turned westward to pin the French IX Corps and the British 51st Highland Division, one of the few remaining BEF elements still in France, against the sea at St.-Valery-en-Caux. This force surrendered (June 12). The French Seventh Army to the east put up a stiffer fight. But to restore his flank Weygand ordered Army Group 3 to withdraw to the Seine (June 8). Rundstedt's Army Group A launched its main-effort assault next day against the left of the French Group 4, east of Paris. His Panzer spearheads, under Guderian, were reinforced by Kleist's Panzers of Group B, rapidly shifted eastward. Despite valiant resistance in depth by the French

Fourth Army (Edouard Réquin), and a series of counterattacks, Guderian's tanks crunched through at Châlons and roared southward. Kleist's armor crossed the Marne at Château-Thierry at the same time. The breakthrough was complete. The French government abandoned Paris for Bordeaux, toward which refugees in countless thousands were already pouring (June 10). Paris was declared an open city (June 13) and next day German troops marched in.

**1940, June 10. Italy Enters the War.** Mussolini, deciding now that France could not win, declared war and ordered an invasion of southern France.

**1940, June 13-25. The Pursuit.** The French armies disintegrated, while German columns spread west, south, and east. German armor swept the coastal ports from St.-Nazaire north to Cherbourg. Other Germans crossed the Loire (June 17) and

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# THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY

from 3500 B.C. to the present

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R. ERNEST DUPUY and TREVOR N. DUPUY

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Revised Edition



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## Introduction

Belgium covers a strip of land just under 200 miles (320 kilometers) long and 100 miles (160 kilometers) wide bordering the North Sea between France and Holland. With more than 10 million people, Belgium is the second most densely populated country in the world. It is a divided nation, populated by two distinct peoples. The Flemish, who speak Dutch (Flemish), inhabit the northern half of the country and account for 56% of the population. The French-speaking Walloons live in the other half. The capital, Brussels, is officially designated a dual-language area.

Belgium is the world's most heavily industrialized country with only 5% of the working population engaged in agriculture (though they still manage to produce two of Europe's greatest pâtés and any number of fine sausages). Besides being good businessmen, the Belgians also work very hard—partly to make up for what has so long been denied them. In the course of history, the Belgians have been ruled by the Romans, Vikings, French, Spanish, Austrians, Dutch, English, and Germans. Many of Europe's greatest battles have been fought on Belgian soil—from Waterloo and earlier, to the long-slogging encounters of World War I. During World War II, this territory witnessed both the initial *Blitzkrieg* of Nazi Panzer units and Hitler's final desperate counterattack against the advancing Allies in the Ardennes—an offensive that has gone down in history as the  Battle of the Bulge .

The south of the country is a wild wooded area, with mountains rising to more than 2,000 feet (610 meters). In the Dutch-speaking north, on the other hand, the land is flat and heavily cultivated, much as in neighboring Holland. Here stand the medieval Flemish cities of Ghent and Bruges, with their celebrated carillons and canals—not to mention the 50 miles (80 kilometers) of sandy beaches that make up the country's northern coastline. To the northeast lies Antwerp, the country's main seaport. This city, where the painter Rubens lived, is now the world's leading diamond-cutting center.

Brussels stands in the very center of the country. A booming, expanding, and often very expensive city, it is now the capital of Europe. Here the Common Market (EEC) has its headquarters, as does NATO. The city boasts more ambassadors than any other in the world—approximately 160. Partly as a result of this concentration of power and partly because of the Belgians' celebrated love of good food, Brussels has become one of the most renowned gastronomic cities in the world. Those without expense accounts, beware! Belgian cuisine adds French flare to Dutch-size portions—which means that you seldom have to order very much.

Perhaps in order to work off all this good living, the Belgians are fanatical bicyclists. Several of the great legendary figures of the *Tour de France* have been Belgians. And despite its name, this annual race (the world's greatest and most grueling) usually has a stage or two running through Belgium.



Major obstacle was the Hürtgen Forest. The attack, on a narrow front, reached the Roer River, but crossing could not be attempted until the dams near Schmidt had been seized to prevent the Germans from flooding the valley. A major offensive for this purpose was begun (December 13).

**1944, November 16–December 15. Lorraine Operations.** Patton's Third Army captured Metz (December 13) and battled its way across the Seille River.

**1944, November 16–December 15. Alsace Operations.** Devers' group made deep gains; Seventh Army's French 2nd Ar-

mored Division\* thrust through the Saverne Gap of the Vosges Mountains to liberate Strasbourg (November 23), rousing French national morale to a peak. The French First Army overran Mulhouse. Devers was now on the Rhine from Karlsruhe to below Strasbourg, and again from Mulhouse to the Swiss border; but the deep Colmar pocket in between was still firmly held by Wiese's German Nineteenth Army.

\* Bitter personal enmity existed between Leclerc and de Lattre de Tassigny; hence, the 2nd French Armored Division was never under the latter's command.


*German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), December, 1944–January, 1945*

*The German Plan.* Hitler had prepared a striking force to split the Allies. His armor would rip through to Antwerp, crippling their supply. He hoped to destroy all Allied forces north of the line Antwerp-Brussels-Bastogne, just as in 1940. Success depended on three elements: (1) a breakthrough, (2) seizure of Allied fuel supplies and the key focal points of communication in the area St. Vith and Bastogne, and (3) widening of the initial gap to increase the flow of invasion. Hitler's commanders, though dubious of success, obeyed orders.

**1944, December 16–19. The German Blow.**

The operation was launched after a period of fog, rain, and snow blanketed Allied aerial observation and hobbled combat capabilities. The striking force, from north to south, consisted of the Sixth SS (General Sepp Dietrich) and Fifth (Gen-

eral Hasso von Manteuffel) Panzer armies—24 divisions, 10 of them armored. The Seventh Army (General Ernst Brandenberger) was to cover the southern flank. The initial wave—8 Panzer divisions—disrupted the U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and strategic surprise was complete. (SHAEF




tion\* thrust through the Sa- of the Vosges Mountains to isbourg (November 23), rous- national morale to a peak. 1 First Army overran Mul- rs was now on the Rhine from o below Strasbourg, and again ouse to the Swiss border; but olmar pocket in between was held by Wiese's German Nine- y.

sonal enmity existed between le Lattre de Tassigny; hence, h Armored Division was never r's command.

ember, 1944–January, 1945

force to split the Allies. His uly. He hoped to destroy ogne, just as in 1940. Success eizure of Allied fuel supplies St.-Vith and Bastogne, and invasion. Hitler's command-

von Manteuffel) Panzer armies ons, 10 of them armored. The rmy (General Ernst Branden- s to cover the southern flank. wave—8 Panzer divisions—dis- U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and rprise was complete. (SHAEF



intelligence estimates had dismissed all probability of any immediate major German offensive capability.) The 106th Division, just arrived on the front, and the 28th Division, recuperating from severe fighting at Schmidt, were shattered. A paratroop drop in the area Eupen-Monschau, and a spearhead force of English-speaking German soldiers in American uniforms, added to panic and confusion behind the assault zone. But on the north flank, the U.S. V Corps, halting its own offensive toward the Roer dams, held firm, as did the U.S. 4th Division on the south. Canalized between these shoulders, the attack roared on toward the Meuse. Two U.S. armored divisions were rushed in by Bradley as immediate reinforcement. Eisenhower then committed the SHAEF reserve—the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions (recuperating near Reims from their Maas operation). Truckborne, they arrived (December 19)—the 101st (under Brigadier General **Anthony C. McAuliffe**) at Bastogne, a check to Fifth Panzer Army's progress, and the 82nd (Major General **Matthew B. Ridgway**) to bolster the northern flank. Montgomery began shifting 1 British corps to backstop the operation along the Meuse. At Bradley's order, Patton (December 18) halted his Third Army's advance in the Saar to begin an amazing 90° shift in direction to the north, to hit the German southern flank.

#### 1944, December 20–26. Allied Recovery.

Eisenhower transferred command of all U.S. troops north of the bulge to Montgomery, leaving only Patton's army under Bradley. Despite a desperate defense of **St.-Vith** by the U.S. 7th Armored Division (Brigadier General **R. W. Hasbrouck**), the Sixth Panzer Army forged slowly ahead (December 19–22), but the delay had been fatal to the German plan. The V Corps was still presenting an impenetrable front, while the U.S. VII Corps was hurrying southwest to seal the remainder of the northern flank. At **Bastogne**, the 101st Airborne, with some other units—some 18,000 men in all—resisted all efforts of the Fifth Panzer Army to overrun their perimeter. However, the invading tide, lapping around Bastogne, progressed northwest toward the Meuse. Model, commanding Army Group B, quite properly desired now to shift the

weight of the German assault to Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army, but Hitler, obstinate and ignorant, insisted the decisive blow be struck by his SS pet, Dietrich. By December 22, Patton was attacking north toward beleaguered Bastogne on a 2-corps front, while Devers' 6th Army Group extended its left to cover his advance. Dietrich's penetration in the Manhay-Stavelot area, and Manteuffel's spearheads—Panzer Lehr and 2nd Panzer divisions—were grinding to a halt with empty fuel tanks at **Celles**, almost in sight of the Meuse, to be struck by American and British counterattacks (December 25–26). Hitler's gamble had failed. Patton's Third Army punched a hole through Manteuffel's troops to reach Bastogne (December 26), and, with the first clear weather, Allied air began pounding German supply trains west of St.-Vith.

#### 1944, December 26–1945, January 2. The Battle for Bastogne.

Hitler insisted on the capture of Bastogne, and a furious battle raged for a week while the German tide ebbed elsewhere in the Bulge under Allied pressure. Attempting to disrupt Allied air support, the Luftwaffe made its last offensive strike (January 1), some 800 planes attacking airfields in France, Belgium, and Holland, and destroying 156 Allied planes. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the Germans, and the Allied air offensive over the Ardennes area and German rear elements continued.

#### 1945, January 3–16. Allied Counteroffensive.

On the northern flank of the German penetration, Montgomery unleashed Hodges' U.S. First Army. German offensive efforts near Bastogne were repulsed, and Patton's increasing efforts, supported by XIX Tactical Air Force, shrank the southern face of the German penetration. Hitler permitted withdrawal of the Sixth Panzer Army (January 8; see p. 1122). The Bulge was eliminated (January 16). Hodges' First Army returned to Bradley's control (January 18), but Simpson's Ninth Army remained in Montgomery's 21st Army Group.

COMMENT. *Hitler's Ardennes offensive was a gamble, pure and simple. The blow was checked first by the resistance of the U.S. elements on both shoulders, next by Hasbrouck's stand at St.-Vith and McAuliffe's epic defense of Bastogne. Hitler's re-*

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THE  
ENCYCLOPEDIA  
OF MILITARY  
HISTORY  
from 3500 B.C. to the present

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R. ERNEST DUPUY and TREVOR N. DUPUY

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Revised Edition



1817

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
OPERATIONS IN 1914

Western Front

THE OPENING BATTLES

1914, August 3-20. Belgium Overrun. A specially trained German Second Army task force of about 30,000 men under General Otto von Emmich crossed the Belgian frontier between the Ardennes

and the Dutch border, a narrow corridor guarded by Liège, one of the strongest fortresses of Europe. A night attack (August 5-6) penetrated the ring of 12 outlying forts. Heavy fighting followed, in which German Major General Erich F. Ludendorff distinguished himself, as did the Belgian commander, General Gérard M. Leman. German bombardment by 42-cm. howitzers (heaviest used to this time) systematically reduced the concrete



and steel cupolaed defenses. Liège surrendered (August 16). The German First Army (General Alexander von Kluck) and the Second (General Karl von Bülow) poured through the Liège corridor and across the Meuse. Hastily mobilized Belgian field forces were brushed aside to the north of Tirlemont (August 18-19) and Brussels occupied (August 20). After some skirmishing along the Meuse (August 12-16), the Belgians, personally commanded by King Albert, fell back on the fortress of Antwerp.

1914, August 14-25. Battles of the Frontiers.

The Germans and the Anglo-French armies met each other head on in 4 almost simultaneous actions:

1914, August 14-22. Battle of Lorraine. An early advance to Mulhouse in Alsace (August 8) by the French right-wing Army of Alsace (General Paul Pau) was followed by a full-scale offensive southeast of Metz by the French First (General Auguste Dubail) and Second (General Noël de Castelnau) armies (August 14-18). After planned withdrawals, the German Sixth

Churchill and the First Sea Lord, and comparable standards of efficiency as well as numbers. The Russian, and were to play only minor

August, 1914

	German	Home Waters	High Seas Fleet
Total			
	13	(13)	(13)
	5	(4)	(4)
	22	(22)	(10)
	41	(32)	(17)
	144	(144)	(80)
	30	(30)	(24)*

proximate, and varied considerably during... all old battleships (see discussion in... for action, and 15 under construction... had 3 more completed, but not yet ready... thinner armor and greater speed. Britain not yet ready for action. Britain had 1... armed, light cruisers. in commission. This figure is approxi-

uld develop from a reconnais- particularly the German Zeppelin... h reconnaissance and bombing... also used from the outset.

(Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria) and Seventh (General Josias von Heeringen) armies turned in violent converging counterattacks. The French were thrown back to the fortified heights of Nancy, where they barely managed to stop the German drive. The French XX Corps, under General Ferdinand Foch, played a decisive role in holding Nancy.

**1914, August 20-25. Battle of the Ardennes.**

The advancing French Third (General Pierre Ruffey) and Fourth (General Ferdinand de Langle de Cary) armies met headlong the German Fourth (Duke Albrecht of Württemberg) and Fifth (Crown Prince Wilhelm) armies, comprising the pivot of the Schlieffen Plan maneuver. After 4 days of furious fighting, the outnumbered French were repulsed with shocking losses, falling back to reorganize west of the Meuse, with their right flank on the fortress of Verdun.

**1914, August 22-23. Battle of the Sambre.**

To the north, the German First, Second, and Third (General Max von Hausen) armies were beginning to sweep west and southwest. In accordance with the contingency provisions of Plan XVII, Joffre ordered the French Fifth Army (General Charles Lanrezac) into the Sambre-Meuse angle to meet this unexpected move. The German Second and Third armies struck Lanrezac southwest of Namur, defeating him and forcing him to retreat. The Belgian defenders of Namur were hammered into submission by some of Bülow's troops and siege guns after a brief siege (August 20-25).

**1914, August 23. Battle of Mons.** The British Expeditionary Force (Field Marshal Sir John French), 4 divisions and over 100,000 strong, had promptly and efficiently crossed the Channel and concentrated in the vicinity of Le Cateau, left of the French Fifth Army. Upon Joffre's request, the BEF moved into Belgium in co-operation with Lanrezac's advance toward Namur (August 21). Near Mons the British were struck by the full weight of aggressive von Kluck's First German Army. Outnumbered, the British fought back stoutly, their fire discipline taking heavy toll of the close German formations. Sir John French was prepared to continue the fight next day, but the retreat of Lanrezac's Fifth Army from the Sam-

bre left him without support; the BEF therefore withdrew during the night. French was bitter about Lanrezac's unannounced withdrawal, which he believed had jeopardized the existence of his own BEF.

*COMMENT. The French offensive had failed completely—at a cost of some 300,000 casualties. But Moltke overestimated the extent of the German victory. His communications with his armies were poor, his information faulty. Believing that the success in Lorraine was a decisive victory, he ordered his left to continue its offensive against the fortified Nancy heights, hoping thus to obtain a double envelopment of the entire French field forces. The Ardennes and Sambre battles he also considered decisive, and so he renewed the orders for his right-wing armies to continue their sicklelike sweep, with the First Army still to swing west of Paris. He decided to send to the Sixth and Seventh armies reinforcements originally intended for the right-wing armies, to provide more weight to his new offensive in Lorraine. Confident that the French armies were on the verge of destruction, he also detached 2 corps from the right to hasten by railroad to the Eastern Front, where the Russians had shown unexpected initiative. (Ironically, these 2 corps, whose absence would vitally affect the outcome of the Battle of the Marne, were still en route at the time the Battle of Tannenberg made their presence unnecessary in the east.) As a result of these and other detachments to contain the Belgian Army at Antwerp and to besiege the French fortress of Maubeuge, the 3 German right-wing armies had been bled from a total strength of 16 corps to 11. The already watered-down Schlieffen Plan—dependent upon a right-wing hammer blow—was thus still further modified from the concept of its creator.*

*Joffre, on the other hand, had kept close touch with his subordinate commanders and was well aware of the actual situation. He knew that, despite tactical defeats, morale of his troops was still high. He was now also aware of the German plan. Seemingly oblivious of the disastrous results of his own Plan XVII, he calmly prepared for a counterattack. This would be a Schlieffen Plan in reverse, pivoting about Verdun and the Nancy heights, where his First and Second armies were ordered to hold on at all costs.*

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*While the Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies and the BEF were to continue their south-westerly withdrawals, Joffre drew units from his embattled right flank and from reserves in the interior of France to create 2 new armies. The Sixth, under General Michel J. Maunoury, was to assemble—first near Amiens, later in and around Paris—west of the German right wing, prepared to attack east. The Ninth, under General Foch, would be gathered in close support behind and between the Fourth and Fifth armies to provide weight for a counterattack against the German main effort. This attack was to be launched when the 4 Allied left-flank armies had fallen back to the general line of the Somme River-Verdun.*

#### 1914, August 25–27. Battle of Le Cateau.

Marshal French's BEF, hard-pressed by the German First Army, fought daily rear-guard actions. Attempting a stand (August 27) to relieve his exhausted II Corps troops, General Horace Smith-Dorrien became engaged in the biggest battle the British Army had fought since Waterloo. This corps fought off a double envelopment by the full strength of Kluck's army; the survivors successfully disengaged when night fell. The price was high: 7,800 casualties out of 40,000 men engaged.

1914, August 29. Battle of Guise. Joffre, to relieve German pressure on the BEF, ordered the Fifth French Army, itself pressed hard by the German Second Army, to make a 90-degree shift westward to attack the left flank of the German First Army. The initial attack got nowhere, but General Louis Franchet d'Esperey, commanding Lanrezac's I Corps, smartly moved from reserve to hit and halt the pursuing German Second Army, thus achieving the first French tactical success in the campaign. Bülow called on Kluck (August 30) for help.

1914, August 30–September 2. Kluck's First Dilemma. The German First Army had driven the BEF from its front; for the time being—as Kluck saw it—the British were out of the picture. On the right, some slight clashes had occurred with French troops (actually part of Maunoury's assembling Sixth Army, but in Kluck's opinion unimportant scattered elements). Bülow on the left had called

for help. Aggressive Kluck, thinking the French Fifth Army now to be the left-flank unit of the opposing field forces, and unable to communicate with Moltke, threw the remnants of the Schlieffen Plan into the discard. He shifted his direction of march to the southeast to roll up the Fifth Army (August 31). This change would cause him to pass east of Paris; he knew nothing of the French concentration in the fortified area of the capital. By September 2, Kluck's left flank was on the Marne at Château-Thierry, his right on the Oise, near Chantilly.

#### 1914, September 1–2. Joffre's Reaction.

Aware of the German change in direction through air reconnaissance, Joffre ordered the Sixth Army to complete its concentration in the Paris area. He ordered the general retirement to continue until the Fifth Army was out of immediate danger of envelopment. Thus he was forced to abandon his originally planned counterstroke from the Somme-Verdun line. Foch's newly forming Ninth Army continued its concentration between the Fourth and Fifth armies. Joffre was concerned by British lack of responsiveness to his orders, but a visit to Field Marshal French by the British War Minister, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, soon changed Sir John's attitude and he began to co-operate.

1914, September 3–4. Kluck's Second Dilemma. Belatedly Moltke sent a message to Kluck, agreeing to the move east of Paris, but complicating matters by ordering Kluck to guard the right flank of the Second Army, which would thus become the spearhead of the modified German wheel. But Moltke, whose intelligence had informed him of the French concentration near Paris, did not realize that his First Army had been moving at amazing speed under Kluck's driving leadership, and that its advance units were much farther south than those of the slower-moving Second Army. And Moltke failed to explain the reason for his order. For Kluck to have obeyed the order would have meant halting his army for 2 days, which he believed would permit the French either to escape or to rally. Again being unable to communicate directly with his commander, unaware of the situation in Paris, and trying to act in accordance

with the apparent intention of Moltke's order, Kluck reasoned that its purpose was to assure that the French were driven southeast of Paris. His own First Army

was ideally situated for this task. Accordingly, pugnacious Kluck continued southward, across the Marne, his right flank wide open, just east of Paris.

#### BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPTEMBER 5-10

Joffre's counterattack order (September 4) directed the Sixth Army to attack eastward toward Château-Thierry; the BEF was to move on Montmirail, with the Fifth Army, supported by the Ninth, prepared to conform. The Fourth Army would hold, prepared to advance, and the Third would strike westward from Verdun. On the success of this proposed double envelopment of the German right wing, as Joffre well knew, rested the fate of France. September 6 was to be D day.


Meanwhile Maunoury's Sixth Army, temporarily under the regional command of General **Joseph S. Galliéni**, energetic military governor of Paris, had begun to carry out Joffre's warning orders by an advance from Paris toward the Ourcq River, where Kluck's right flank lay invitingly open. Only the aggressive initiative of the German right-flank corps commander, General **Hans von Gronau**, saved Kluck's army from surprise envelopment (September 5). As it was, Kluck believed that the French activity on his right was only a spoiling attack and merely detached one additional corps to help Gronau to repel it, while pressing southward with the rest of his army in pursuit of the BEF and the French Fifth Army. Not until this **Battle of the Ourcq** had raged for 2 days did Kluck realize the French intentions (September 7). By this time most of his army was south of the Marne. Pulling back north of the river, Kluck rapidly changed his front and turned his entire army westward in savage counterattacks that halted the French and forced Maunoury to fall back on the defensive (September 7-9). Only the arrival of reinforcements rushed from Paris by Galliéni—some in commandeered taxicabs—permitted Maunoury to stem the impetuous German advance.

By this time the action had become general along the entire front west of Verdun. Kluck's westward shift, undertaken on the assumption that the BEF was no longer a threat, widened the already existing gap between his army and that of von Bülow, which was still moving south. Into this gap now moved the BEF, slowly, since Marshal French underrated the recuperative powers of his troops. Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army (Lanrezac had been relieved) battered at part of the German Second Army along the **Petit Morin**.

Farther southeast, Foch's Ninth Army, attacking north at **St.-Gond**, found itself confronting the rest of the Second Army while Hausen's Third Army struck its right. A surprise night bayonet attack by 4 divisions of Hausen's army threw part of Foch's army into confusion (September 8). Foch's response was to order an immediate renewal of his own assault; the German advance was halted, but Foch's position was precarious.

At **Vitry-le-François**, Langle de Cary's Fourth Army battled desperately but indecisively with the Duke of Württemberg's Fourth Army and part of the Third. At Revigny in the Argonne Forest, General **Maurice Sarrail**'s Third Army (Ruffey had been relieved) stopped the Crown Prince's Fifth Army, while at Nancy and along the Alsace frontier the French First and Second armies—even though attenuated by drafts for Joffre's new formations to the west—clung successfully to the heights, despite a succession of attacks by the reinforced German Sixth and Seventh armies. (Schlieffen had warned against any such attacks.)

Moltke, worried by rumor and pessimistic fragmentary reports from his subordinates, sent a general staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel **Richard Hentsch**, to in-



spect the front (September 8). Hentsch's orders were oral; they still remain somewhat of a mystery. He arrived at the Second Army's headquarters just as news was received that its right flank was being turned by a vigorous night attack by Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army. This was probably the turning point of the battle. Bülow—personally defeated—was about to retreat. Kluck's First Army was making headway in the northwest against Maunoury's left, but the BEF's advance through the gap threatened Kluck's own left and rear.

Hentsch tacitly approved Bülow's planned retreat and, later the same day, in Moltke's name ordered Kluck also to withdraw (September 9). Moltke, now realizing that his offensive had failed, ordered a general retirement to the line Noyon-Verdun. Within 5 days the Germans, having disengaged without serious interference from the exhausted Allies, were organizing their new positions. The Battle of the Marne thus ended as a strategic Allied victory and Joffre emerged as savior of France. That same day Moltke was relieved, General **Erich von Falkenhayn** replacing him (September 14).

**COMMENT.** *France's initial offensive plan had failed because it was entirely unrealistic in concept and in execution. The German plan—sound and workable—failed because of the inefficiency of Moltke, who first emasculated the plan, then lost all personal touch with his army commanders and with their progress. Joffre, on the other hand, emerged as a strong and capable leader, who kept in close touch with his subordinates. His reconstruction of a counterattack upon the wreckage of his initial plan was masterful, its execution assisted by the marvelous resiliency of the French Army. The BEF's part was that of a sound professional soldiery. The clash of personalities and mutual distrust existing between Sir John French and Lanrezac prevented better use of the BEF, as did French's excessive caution in the counter-attack. Casualties on both sides were enormous: the Allies lost about 250,000 men; German losses were somewhat greater. In 3 weeks of war, each side had lost more than half a million men in killed, wounded, and captured. The Battle of the Marne, tactically indecisive, was a clear-cut strategic victory for the Allies. Had it ended differently, the history of the 20th century would have been altered fundamentally. It was the world's most decisive battle since Waterloo.*

#### THE "RACE TO THE SEA,"

SEPTEMBER 15—NOVEMBER 24

1914, September 15–18. First Battle of the Aisne. Slow in their pursuit, the Allied

armies, seeking to envelop the German right, were rebuffed from the hastily prepared German field fortifications. Both sides now extended their operations northward, attempting each to outflank the

ly situated for this task. Accordingly Kluck continued southward across the Marne, his right flank on, just east of Paris.

#### SEPTEMBER 5–10

ordered the Sixth Army to attack and move on Montmirail, with the intention of forming the Fourth Army to strike westward from Verdun. The German right wing, as the Sixth Army was to be D day.

Under the regional command of the Governor of Paris, had begun to move from Paris toward the Ourcq River.

Only the aggressive initiative of General **Hans von Gronau**, saved the day. As it was, Kluck believed in a boiling attack and merely delayed it, while pressing southward against the French Fifth Army. Not did Kluck realize the French army was south of the Marne. He halted his front and turned his flank, halting the French and forcing a retreat (September 7–9). Only the arrival of reinforcements—commandeered taxicabs—permitted a retreat.

Along the entire front west of Paris, the assumption that the BEF was up between his army and that of the French now moved the BEF, and the cooperative powers of his troops. The BEF (relieved) battered at part of the front.

At St.-Gond, found itself in the hands of Hausen's Third Army struck its flank. Hausen's army threw part of its response was to order an immediate advance was halted, but Foch's

The Army battled desperately but was repulsed. The Third Army and part of the Third Army. Sarrail's Third Army (Ruffey's Third Army, while at Nancy and the German armies—even though attenuated—clung successfully to the line. The German Sixth and Seventh Armies.

Intermittent reports from his subordinates—Colonel **Richard Hentsch**, to in-

other. Both failed, in bitter fighting in Picardy (September 22-26) and Artois (September 27-October 10). Meanwhile, behind the German lines, beleaguered Maubeuge had fallen (September 8) and the fortress of Antwerp, systematically bombarded (October 1-9), surrendered. The Belgian Army fell back to the west along the coast. An extemporized British naval division, rushed to reinforce the Antwerp garrison, also escaped, but with loss of 1 of its 3 brigades.

1914, September 22-25. Verdun and St.-Mihiel. Farther south, repeated German attacks against Verdun were repulsed (September 22-25), but the Germans did seize the strategic St.-Mihiel salient (September 24), to which they would cling until 1918.

1914, October 18-November 24. Battles in Flanders. The final actions of the "Race to the Sea" were the Battle of the Yser (October 18-November 30) and the bloody First Battle of Ypres (October 30-



French poilus march single file through a dense field of barbed wire

November 24), in which the BEF was nearly wiped out in a successful, gallant defense against a heavily reinforced German drive, ordered by Falkenhayn, who expected to capture the Channel ports. The British were aided by French troops, under Foch, rushed north by Joffre.

1914, December 14-24. General Allied Attack. From Nieuport to Verdun an allied offensive beat unsuccessfully for 10 red days against the rapidly growing German system of field fortifications. The era of stabilized trench warfare had begun: the spade, the machine gun, and barbed wire ringed down the curtain on maneuver, from the North Sea to the Swiss border. A costly French attempt at breaking through in Champagne—the First Battle of Champagne (December 20)—was still in progress as the year ended. By this time, operations on the Western Front

had cost the Allies nearly 1 million casualties. German losses were almost as great.

### *Eastern Fronts*

#### OPERATIONS IN EAST PRUSSIA

##### *The Russian Offensive*

1914, August 17-19. Invasions of East Prussia. The Russian Northwest Army Group under General Yakov Grigorievich Jilinsky, consisting of General Pavel K. Rennenkampf's First and General Alexander Samsonov's Second armies, advanced into East Prussia. Opposing them was German General Max von Prittwitz' Eighth Army, widely disposed from the Baltic south to Frankenu, and based on the fortress of Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Its mission

ember 22-25. Verdun and St. Farther south, repeated German against Verdun were repulsed (er 22-25), but the Germans did strategic St.-Mihiel salient (Sep-4), to which they would cling 8.

ber 18-November 24. Battles in The final actions of the "Race ea" were the Battle of the Yser (18-November 30) and the first Battle of Ypres (October 30-

was one of elastic defense and delay in accordance with the modified Schlieffen Plan.

1914, August 17. Battle of Stallupönen. The center of Rennenkampf's widely strung advance met General Hermann K. von François's I German Corps, was badly mauled by the alert François, and was thrown back to the frontier with loss of 3,000 men. François then retired on Gumbinnen.

1914, August 20. Battle of Gumbinnen. Slowly the Russians advanced again. Prittwitz, aware also of the Russian Second Army's advance far to his southern flank,

feared envelopment. Aggressive François persuaded him to attack. François's own corps smashed in the Russian right flank, driving it back for 5 miles. Other German attacks were not successful, and a drawn battle resulted.

*The Tannenberg Campaign*

1914, August 20. German Change in Command. Prittwitz, in near panic after his unsuccessful attack against Rennenkampf, and with Samsonov's army posing a potential threat to his line of communications, telephoned Moltke, at Coblenz, to report his decision to withdraw to the Vistula



the field of barbed wire


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*Fronts*

OPERATIONS IN EAST PRUSSIA

*Russian Offensive*

August 17-19. Invasions of East Prussia. Russian Northwest Army Group General Yakov Grigorievich Jilinski, consisting of General Pavel K. Rennenkampf's First and General Alexander Samsonov's Second armies, advanced into East Prussia. Opposing them was German General Max von Prittwitz' Eighth Army, disposed from the Baltic south to Thorn, and based on the fortress of Thorn (Kaliningrad). Its mission



and to request reinforcements to be able to hold that river line. Moltke at once relieved Prittwitz of command, appointing in his place elderly General Paul von Hindenburg, called from retirement, with brilliant General Erich Ludendorff, hero of Liège (see p. 935), as his chief of staff. Thus was created a team destined for world renown.

1914, August 22. Ludendorff's Plan. After studying reports from the east, Ludendorff telegraphed orders to the individual corps commanders, directing a concentration against Samsonov's Second Army, while delaying Rennenkampf's First Army farther east. Joining Hindenburg later that day for the rail trip east, Ludendorff re-

ported his actions; Hindenburg approved. When they arrived at Marienburg, Eighth Army Headquarters, next day, they discovered that Lieutenant Colonel Max Hoffmann, Prittwitz' capable chief of operations, had already prepared for practically the same movements and dispositions that Ludendorff had ordered (August 20). (The coincidence is especially interesting as evidence of the uniform thought process of the German Army General Staff in dealing with an unexpected situation.) While one lone cavalry division was delaying fumbling Rennenkampf, the bulk of the German army was shifting south, by rail and road, against the equally incompetent Samsonov.

## OPERATIONS IN 1915

*The Global Situation*

Turkey's entrance had changed the war's complexion. Russia, already shaken by the reverses of 1914, was now almost completely cut off from Franco-British war supplies, upon which she was dependent for a long-continued war. The western Allies, at the same time, were anxious to regain access to the Ukrainian grain fields. These considerations prompted a strategic debate in Britain between "Easterners" and "Westerners." A strident segment of British officialdom, led by capable and energetic Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, urged immediate action to seize the Dardanelles and to restore the vital Mediterranean-Black Sea supply route to Russia through the Turkish Straits. British War Minister Field Marshal Horatio Herbert, Lord Kitchener, was equally insistent that a decision be obtained on the Western Front, and deplored any diminution of strength there for a peripheral operation in the east. He was strongly supported in this position by French military and political opinion. Nevertheless, in early January, after lengthy and heated debate in the British War Council, an amphibious operation against the Dardanelles was grudgingly approved.

In the Central Powers' camp also, strategical opinion was divided. The Hindenburg-Ludendorff team urged an all-out effort against faltering Russia. Falkenhayn, though reconciled to the fact that the war had become one of attrition, believed that it would have to be won in the west; he predicted that tactical victories in the east would be meaningless because of the space of Russia and her vast manpower resources. The Kaiser sided with Hindenburg. Accordingly, the Germans adopted a defensive posture in the west, while seeking a decision against Russia.

*Western Front*

**1915, January 1-March 30. Allied Offensive in Artois and Champagne.** This, a continuation of the **First Battle of Champagne** (see p. 940), was a major effort by Joffre to liberate the extensive and valuable areas of France held by the Germans. A series of attacks against the western face of the Noyon salient and in the area between Reims and Verdun were unsuccessful. Limited German counterattacks along the La Bassé Canal and near Soissons stabilized the situation (January 8-February 5). Renewed Allied assaults (March) made little headway. The British made an initial breakthrough in a well-planned attack at **Neuve Chapelle** (March 10), but poor management prevented an adequate follow-up; the Germans quickly re-established the line (March 13). French casualties approached 400,000 during this period; British and German losses were also heavy.

**1915, January 19-20. First German Air Raids on England.** Bombing attacks by

Zeppelin dirigible airships (under German Navy control) caused relatively minor casualties and more anger than panic. Eighteen more such raids occurred during the year. The largest of these was a mass attack on London (October 13).

**1915, April 6-15. Battle of the Woëvre.** Repeated French assaults against the north face of the St.-Mihiel salient were repulsed with heavy losses.

**1915, April 22-May 25. Second Battle of Ypres.** Allied preparations for another co-ordinated offensive were spoiled by a surprise German attack preceded by a cloud of chlorine gas emitted from some 5,000 cylinders. This was the first use of poison gas in the west. Two German corps drove through 2 terrorized French divisions and bit deeply into British lines, creating a wide gap. The Germans, however, had made no preparations to exploit such a breakthrough and had few reserves available because of their build-up in the east. Local counterattacks by the British Second Army finally stemmed the German advance after bitter fighting. German

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inch of naval blockade. The German high command now focused its attention on the one major weapon left to it on the high seas: the submarine.

*Turkish Fronts, 1914*

**October 29. Turkish Declaration of War against the Allies.** This was proclaimed by the guns of the Turkish fleet including the erstwhile German *Goeben* (*Breslau*), now commanded by German Admiral von Souchon, in a bombardment without warning of Odessa, Sevastopol, and Theodosia on the Russian Black coast. This Turkish alignment with the Central Powers closed the Dardanelles to the Allies, thus physically separating Russia from them.

## CAUCASUS FRONT

**November-December. Turkish Offensive Against the sage advice of General Liman von Sanders, chief of the German military mission to Turkey, Enver Paşa, Turkish war minister, began an invasion of the Russian Caucasus.**

**December 29. Battle of Sarikamish.** Turkish advance toward Kars was defeated and rebuffed with severe losses by an General Vorontsov in winter months. The struggle here continued as the year ended.


## MEDITERRANEAN REGION

**November-December. British Reaction.** Britain announced the annexation of Cyprus (November 5). Declaring a protectorate over Egypt (December 18), the British began moving troops there for defense of the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, British cruisers shelled the Dardanelles without effect (November 30).

## MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT

**October 23. British Landings.** British Army troops, who had already been rushed to Bahrein to protect oil reserves there, began an invasion of southern Mesopotamia. Local Turkish garrisons were driven back; Basra was captured by the British (November 23).

## WORLD WAR I



losses were some 35,000 men; the British lost 60,000, the French about 10,000.

**1915, May-June. Battles of Festubert and Souchez (Second Battle of Artois).** After limited gains, the British were stopped near Festubert (May 9-26). The French did only slightly better in their efforts to seize the commanding height of **Vimy Ridge** near Souchez (May 16-June 30). The Allies, exhausted by their costly and unsuccessful assaults during the first half of the year, spent the rest of the summer in resting, reorganizing, and reinforcing. The Germans, who had also suffered severely, were happy to take advantage of the lull, and by the end of the summer had also reinforced the west with troops from their successful operations in the east. Both sides had come perilously close to expending their ammunition reserves and were now waiting for munitions production to catch up with consumption.

**1915, September 25-November 6. Renewed Allied Offensives in Artois and Champagne.** This was another major co-ordinated effort planned by Joffre, and was again unsuccessful. In the **Second Battle of Champagne** the French lost more than 100,000 men and the Germans some 75,-

000. At the same time, in the **Third Battle of Artois**, the French continued their attacks against **Vimy Ridge** (September 25-October 30) while the British, a few miles north, smashed at **Loos** (September 25-October 14). The minor gains made were out of proportion to the casualties suffered: more than 100,000 French, 60,000 British, 65,000 German.

**1915, December 17. Change in British Command.** Blamed for the failure at Loos, Field Marshal French was relieved and General Sir **Douglas Haig** was placed in command of the BEF, which now comprised 3 armies.

**COMMENT.** Increase of lethal fire power, both machine gun and field artillery, had revolutionized combat tactics and had given the advantage to the defense, which was able to bring up reserves to limit a penetration before the attackers could move forward sufficient reserves and artillery to exploit a breakthrough. This was particularly critical on the Western Front, where a continuous battle line prevented classical offensive maneuvers. The Germans, recognizing the change long before the Allies, had adopted an elastic defense, in 2 or more widely separated lines, highly organized with

entrenchments and barbed wire, heavy in machine guns, and supported by artillery echeloned in depth. Assaulting troops broke through the first line only to be decimated by the fire from the succeeding lines and pounded by artillery beyond the range of their own guns.

Appalling losses had been suffered during 1915 on both sides: 612,000 German, 1,292,000 French, and 279,000 British. The year ended with no appreciable shift in the hostile battle lines scarring the land from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps.


### The Italian Front

1915, May 23. Italy Declares War on Austria. Adroit Allied diplomacy, offering substantial territorial gains, caused Italy to abrogate the Triple Alliance and to enter the war. The total strength of the Italian Army, commanded by General

Luigi Cadorna, was about 875,000, but it was deficient in artillery, transport, and ammunition reserves. The Italian plan was to hold the Trentino salient into Italy by offensive-defensive action, while operating eastward offensively in the Isonzo salient projecting into Austrian territory. The immediate objective was Gorizia, but Italian military men dreamed of advancing through Trieste to Vienna.

**Austrian Dispositions.** Despite the Triple Alliance, Austria had heavily fortified the entire mountain frontier with Italy. Austrian Archduke Eugene was in over-all command of the Italian front. General Svetozan Borojevic von Bojna, with some 100,000 men, held the critical Isonzo sector.

1915, June 23-July 7. First Battle of the Isonzo. The Italian Second Army (General Pietro Frugoni) and Third Army




(Emanuele Filiberto, Duke of Aosta), totaling approximately 200,000 men and 200 guns, battered in vain against the Austrian defenses.

1915, July 18-August 3. Second Isonzo. Cadorna, bringing up more artillery, tried again. The Austrians, reinforced by 2 additional divisions, held firm. The Italians broke off the struggle when their artillery ammunition gave out. Italian losses in these two battles amounted to about 60,000 men; the Austrian casualties totaled nearly 45,000.

1915, October 18-November 4. Third Isonzo. The Italians, reorganized and strengthened, and supported now by 1,200 guns, struck once more at Gorizia and were again repulsed.

1915, November 10-December 2. Fourth Isonzo. This was really a continuation of the third battle. When the offensive broke off, no material gain had been made to show for the Italian loss of 117,000 men in the 2 battles. The Austrians had lost almost 72,000 men.

COMMENT. As in France, the invol-



At the same time, in the Third Battle of the French continued their attack on Vimy Ridge (September 25-30) while the British, a few miles away, pushed at Loos (September 25-30). The minor gains made were proportionate to the casualties suffered: more than 100,000 French, 60,000 British, and 100,000 German.

On October 17, a change in British command was proclaimed for the failure at Loos. General Sir Douglas Haig was placed in command of the BEF, which now comprised the British and Commonwealth armies.

By the end of 1915, the increase of lethal fire from machine guns and field artillery, the evolution of more sophisticated and mechanized combat tactics and the realization that the defense had the advantage, which brought up reserves to limit a penetration, the attackers could move forward reserves and artillery to exploit breakthroughs. This was particularly true on the Western Front, where a concrete line prevented classical offensives. The Germans, recognizing the situation long before the Allies, had developed an elastic defense, in 2 or more echeloned lines, highly organized with

stroyer and was trying to catch up with his battle cruisers.) *Von der Tann*, her guns already out of action, remained in line only to spread the British fire. Both *Seydlitz* and *Derfflinger* broke into flames but remained in action as the German battle cruisers swung past the British battle line at short range. Then German destroyers sped in toward Jellicoe's battleships to make a torpedo attack and spread a smoke screen. Jellicoe, wary of torpedoes, saved Scheer by himself turning away. By the time he had resumed his battle line, the German High Seas Fleet had disappeared westward into the dusk as Scheer made another 180 degree turn. Amazingly, none of the German battle cruisers had been sunk in their courageous "death ride."

But the battle was not over. Scheer knew that the British fleet was now between his fleet and its home ports, and that Jellicoe was steaming to cover the entrances to those ports. Scheer also knew his fleet could not survive a renewed general battle. After dark he boldly turned to the southeast, deliberately crashing into the formation of light cruisers at the tail of Jellicoe's southbound fleet. He finally battered his way through in a chaotic midnight battle of collisions, sinkings, and gunfire. The British cruiser *Black Prince*, suddenly engulfed in the midst of the Germans, was sunk in 4 minutes. The German predreadnought battleship *Pommern* was cut in two. By dawn, Scheer was shepherding his cripples toward the Jade anchorage, and Jellicoe realized that his quarry had escaped.

The British now turned back to their bases. They had lost 3 battle cruisers, 3 cruisers, and 8 destroyers; they had 6,784 casualties. The Germans lost 1 old battleship, 1 battle cruiser, 4 light cruisers, and 5 destroyers; casualties were 3,039.

COMMENT. *Jutland marked the end of an epoch in naval warfare. It was the last great fleet action in which the opponents slugged it out within eyesight of one another. A drawn battle tactically, it made no change in the strategic situation, other than to make the Germans realize that they had no chance of defeating the Grand Fleet. Of the commanders engaged, Beatty, Hipper, and Hartog stand out, gifted with that "Nelsonian touch" which neither Jellicoe nor Scheer (both able professionals) appeared to have. In general, both sides behaved with the utmost gallantry.*

#### SUBSEQUENT NAVAL OPERATIONS, JUNE-DECEMBER


The remainder of the year saw one timid sortie of the High Seas Fleet (August 18), which ended as a fiasco, both opponents running home without making contact—Scheer deceived by a false airship report, Jellicoe because he feared a submarine ambush. Two German light-cruiser raids were made on the British coast (August 19 and October 26-27), and several auxiliary cruisers slipped through the British blockade to ravage Atlantic commerce. But in the main, German naval effort was now concentrated on submarine activities. Tremendous toll was taken of Allied shipping: 300,000 tons per month by December.

#### OPERATIONS IN 1917

##### *Global Situation*

Allied strength had grown during 1916. Toward the end of the year, at another Allied conference called by Joffre at Chantilly, there had been general agreement to continue a policy of joint Anglo-French large-scale operations on the Western Front in conjunction with simultaneous Russian and Italian offensives. These would have priority over all operations elsewhere, although new British Prime Minister David Lloyd George decided to undertake a major campaign in Palestine as well.

The western Allies at this time did not realize the extent of Russia's instability. The retirement of Joffre (December 31, 1916), who was succeeded by Nivelle, the hero of Verdun, immediately complicated the co-ordination of the Allied operations.



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iring accurately at Beatty's ships ng and was now being pounded e chase to the north continued, r 6 P.M., Beatty sighted Jellicoe's allel columns, preceded by Rear ttle cruisers and 2 light cruisers. m the Germans, but Beatty, still t of the Germans, to get himself ow also turned behind Beatty. y around Scheer and block him d Hood's squadron to his right l around the German battle line. h fleets was within range and a German battle cruisers caught the jammed out of action. On the h all on board by *Derfflinger's* rior also went down.

ging arc of the Grand Fleet and over of a smoke screen and de- llt and perfectly executed simul- w minutes his ships were out of ad of pursuing, continued south- Germans and their bases. Then, back toward the British, appar- nly the entire German fleet was is time it seemed that the Ger- t projectiles.

rn away, while the 4 remaining *erfflinger*, most gallantly charged Hipper had transferred to a de-

Unity of command was nonexistent. Nivelle, planning a giant joint Anglo-French offensive, to be carried out with "violence, brutality, and rapidity," clashed with Haig on their command relationship. The French government supported Nivelle and the British were divided. British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who distrusted Haig and admired charming, English-speaking Nivelle, placed the BEF under Nivelle's command, to the horror of Haig and of Sir William Robertson, the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Through this bickering, and Nivelle's own imprudent announcements, secrecy was lost.

Ludendorff, aware of the Allied preparations and particularly fearing for overextended German lines in the west, deliberately chose a defensive attitude on both major fronts while forcing Austria (with German assistance) to take decisive action against Italy, which he believed could be defeated in 1917. The Kaiser approved this strategic concept, and also concurred in the inauguration of unrestricted submarine warfare, regardless of American opinion. He virtually granted unlimited authority to the military high command.

### *United States Entry*

1917, January 31. **Germany Proclaims Unrestricted Submarine Warfare.** To offset growing hostility in the U.S., covert negotiations were already in process by German diplomats for a German-Mexican-Japanese alliance.

1917, February 3. **The U.S. Severs Relations with Germany.** This was a protest against unrestricted submarine warfare. Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and other Latin American nations followed suit, as did China (March 14).

1917, March 1. **Zimmermann Note.** Publication of a proposed German defensive alliance with Mexico in case of war between Germany and the U.S., with the proviso "that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona" caused a wave of American fury. Alfred Zimmermann, German Foreign Secretary, had sent the coded proposition, which contained the further suggestion that Mexico urge Japan to join the Central Powers, to von Eckhardt, German Minister to Mexico (January 19). British naval intelligence, intercepting and decoding it, gave a copy (February 24) to Walter Hines Page, U.S. ambassador to Britain. He immediately turned it over to the State Department, which released it to the press (March 1). U.S. intelligence sources later verified the authenticity of the note.

1917, March 13. **U.S. Merchantmen Armed.** President Wilson's decision to arm for self-defense all vessels passing through war zones was announced by the State and Navy departments.

1917, April 6. **The U.S. Declares War against Germany.** This followed the sinking of several American ships and President Wilson's war message to Congress (April 2). War against Austria-Hungary was not declared until 8 months later (December 7).

1917, April-June. **U.S. Preparations.** The Army would have to be built. Major General John J. Pershing was selected to command the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and the 1st Division (an amalgamation of existing Regular Army units) was shipped to France (June). Pershing's plan called for a 1-million-man army overseas by May, 1918, with long-range provision for 3 million men in Europe later. A draft law—the Selective Service Act—was passed (May 19) and the nation went into high gear. The Navy was ready (see p. 975).

### *The Western Front*

1917, February 23-April 5. **German Withdrawal.** Ludendorff had prepared a much shorter, highly organized defensive zone—the Hindenburg Line, or Siegfried Zone—some 20 miles behind the winding, overextended line from Arras to Soissons. Hindenburg approved, and decided to withdraw to the new line, which could be held with fewer divisions, thus providing a larger and more flexible reserve. Behind a lightly held outpost line heavily sown with machine guns lay 2 successive defensive positions, heavily fortified. Behind these again lay the German reserves concentrated and prepared for counterat-

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tack. Each successive defensive line was so spaced in depth that, should one be taken, the attackers' artillery would have to displace forward before progressing against the next. Between the original line and the new zone, the countryside had been devastated; towns and villages were razed, forests leveled, water sources contaminated, and roads destroyed. The actual withdrawal, conducted in great secrecy, began February 23 and was completed by April 5.

1917, April 9–15. **Battle of Arras.** This was the British preliminary to the Nivelle Offensive. The British First (General H. S. Horne) and Third (General Sir Edmund Allenby) armies, following a heavy bombardment and gas attack, crashed into the positions of the German Sixth Army (General L. von Falkenhausen). British air supremacy was rapidly gained. Canadian troops stormed and took **Vimy Ridge** the first day. The British Fifth Army (Hubert Gough), assisting on the south, made little progress. The British advance was finally slowed down in succeeding days of battle. Although this was a British tactical victory, there was no breakthrough. British casualties were 84,000; German, about 75,000.


1917, April 16–20. **Nivelle Offensive (Second Battle of the Aisne, Third Battle of Champagne).** The French Reserve Army Group (Alfred Micheler), heavily reinforced, assaulted on a 40-mile front between Soissons and Reims to take the **Chemin des Dames**, a series of wooded, rocky ridges paralleling the front. The Sixth (Mangin) and Fifth (Olivier Mazel) armies were closely supported by the Tenth (Denis Duchêne), and backed by the First (M. E. Fayolle). French strength in the attacking armies totaled 1,200,000 men and 7,000 guns. The German Seventh (Max von Boehn) and First (Fritz von Below) armies held the sector, fully cognizant of French plans as a result of Nivelle's confident public boasts of victory. Just before the attack, German flyers swept the sky of French aerial observation and German artillery fire destroyed French tanks still in march column. The French rolling artillery barrage moved too fast for the infantry, who met preplanned artillery and machine-gun fire, and sectional counter-

attacks. With exceptional gallantry, however, the French managed to reach and take the first German line, but were then stopped. Repeated attacks gained little ground. The whole affair was a colossal failure, costing the French nearly 120,000 men in 5 days. German losses, despite 21,000 captured, were much less. Compared with similar attacks in previous years, such losses might not have seemed excessive, had Nivelle not promised a breakthrough and victory.

1917, April 29–May 20. **Outbreak of Mutiny in French Armies.** Widespread mutiny followed the Nivelle Offensive disaster. Political repercussions simultaneously shook the nation. Nivelle was replaced by Pétain (May 15). After a 2-week period in which the entire Western Front was nearly denuded of French combat troops, Pétain quelled the mutiny and restored the situation with a combination of tact, firmness, and justice. By amazingly efficient censorship control, French counter-intelligence agencies completely blotted out all news of the mutiny. When it finally trickled to Ludendorff, it was too late; renewed British attacks to distract his attention had already drawn German reserves to the northern front. The full extent of the mutiny was not known to the outside world for more than a decade.

1917, June–July. **British Offensive in Flanders.** Haig, after an abortive renewal of the fighting around Arras to relieve German pressure on the French, had determined to break through between the North Sea and the Lys River. The Ypres salient was selected, but success could only be gained after first taking the dominating Messines Ridge. Plans for an assault had been begun many months earlier by competent, methodical General Sir **Herbert Plumer**, Second Army commander.

1917, June 7. **Battle of Messines.** After a 17-day general bombardment, British mines packed with 1 million pounds of high explosive tore a wide gap in the German lines on the Ridge. Under cover of this surprise and of British aerial superiority, in a carefully planned and organized attack, Plumer's Second Army successfully gained the position at cost of 17,000 casualties. German losses were 25,000, including 7,500 prisoners. Elbowroom



German pursuit planes attacking Allied observation planes

had been gained for the main offensive, and the clear-cut victory bolstered British morale.

1917, July 31–November 10. Third Battle of Ypres (Passchendaele). Following an intensive bombardment, the British Fifth Army (Gough) assaulted northeast against the German Fourth Army (Friedrich Sixt von Armin). The French First Army (François Anthoine), on the left, was the pivot of maneuver; on the right, Plumer's Second Army covered the main effort. The low ground, sodden with rain, had been churned to a quagmire by a 3-day bombardment. Overhead the Allies had won temporary air superiority. All surprise had been lost, however, by the long preparation, and the German defense in depth was well organized. After some early gains, the attack literally bogged down. Haig now placed Plumer in command of the operation. After typical careful planning, a series of limited attacks on narrow fronts began (September 20); the British inched forward against determined counterattacks. Mustard gas was used here by the Germans for the first time, while German planes flew low to strafe British infantry with machine guns. The taking of Passchendaele Ridge and Passchendaele village (November 6) concluded the offensive. The British-held Ypres salient had been deepened for about 5 miles, at great cost—some 300,000 British and 8,528 French casualties. German losses are estimated at 260,000. But Haig, still determined to keep pressure on the Germans to permit the French armies to

recover from the mutiny, had another card to play.

1917, November 20–December 3. Battle of Cambrai. General J. H. G. Byng's British Third Army struck General Georg von der Marwitz' German Second Army positions in front of Cambrai in complete surprise and under most favorable terrain conditions. At dawn, some 200 tanks followed a sudden burst of artillery fire into the German wire. Behind them moved wave after wave of infantry. The German defense collapsed temporarily and the assault bit through the Hindenburg Line for 5 miles on a 6-mile front, except at Flesquières, where German artillery knocked out tanks and the British infantry was unable to close in support. Although 2 cavalry divisions were poised to exploit the breakthrough, infantry reserves were weak, and too many tanks had been put in the first waves. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the defending army group, rushed reinforcements to Marwitz. A large proportion of the British leading tanks became casualties—more from mechanical breakdown than by artillery fire—and the advance slowed down. German counterattacks fell on the salient (November 30) and Haig ordered a partial withdrawal (December 3). Casualties on both sides were approximately equal: about 45,000. The British took 11,000 prisoners; the Germans, 9,000. Cambrai marked a turning point in Western Front tactics on 2 counts: successful assault without preliminary bombardment and the first mass use of tanks.

COMMENT. *The most important lesson emerging from the entire western campaign of 1917 was the necessity for unity of command. Haig and Nivelle between them in two disjointed offensives had squandered more than one-half million men and exhausted the resources of two splendid war machines without appreciable effect. In Haig's defense, however, it should be noted that his persistent costly attacks in Flanders and Artois were largely intended to attract German attention from the weakness of the French armies farther south; in this he was successful, and to him must go at least part of the credit for France's survival through 1917.*

*As the year ended, acquisitive eyes in both Britain and France turned to the as yet*

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*untouched human resources of the United States.*

### *The Italian Front*

1917, April. Allied Planning. Cadorna feared that the Germans would send troops to aid the Austrians in an offensive on the Italian front. Because of this, Nivelle sent Foch to meet Cadorna to work out plans for French and British assistance in such an event. Franco-British-Italian staff officers worked out a program for reinforcements to be rushed into Italy in emergency.

1917, May 12—June 8. Tenth Battle of the Isonzo. Cadorna, despite promises to aid the Allied offensive, did not get started until after the battles of Arras and the Aisne were over. Once again the Italians attempted to batter their way through, over mountainous terrain. After a 17-day battle, gains were small but losses huge: some 157,000 Italian casualties against about 75,000 Austrians. Following some minor give and take on both Isonzo and Trentino fronts, Cadorna decided to make a supreme effort with 52 divisions and 5,000 guns.

1917, August 18—September 15. Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo. The Italian Second Army (General Luigi Capello), heavily reinforced, assaulted north of Gorizia, while the Third (Duke of Aosta), to its south, drove into the rocky hills between Gorizia and Trieste. The southern assault was speedily stopped by the left wing of Austrian General Borojevic's Fifth Army, but Capello's Second Army on the north made a clear-cut advance, capturing the strategically important Bainsizza Plateau. Outrunning their artillery and supply, the Italians were then forced to stop. The net result was an incipient collapse of Austrian arms. The Austrians asked for German help.

1917, October 24—November 12. Battle of Caporetto (Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo). A new Fourteenth Austrian Army (7 of its divisions and much of its artillery were German), under German General Otto von Below, was concentrated behind the Tolmino-Caporetto-Piazza zone. Using novel "Hutier tactics" (see p. 972), it suddenly crashed against the Italian Second Army. Surprise bombardment, with

clouds of gas and smoke shells, disrupted Italian signal communications. Then the German assault elements loomed through mist and rain on the demoralized defenders. Cadorna, having learned of the projected assault, had ordered defense in depth, but Capello—a capable officer—was ill and the acting commander of the Second Army ignored the instructions. By-passing strong points which would be mopped up later by reserves, the German assault elements streamed through the zone, uprooting the Second Army. The Austrian Tenth Army on the right and the Fifth Army on the left supported the main effort. The Italian Third Army withdrew in good order along the coast, but part of the so-called Carnic Force on the northern Alpine fringe was trapped. Farther west the Italian Fourth Army hurriedly fell back to conform with the situation as the battered Second Army was driven in succession from defensive lines along the Tagliamento and Livenza rivers. By November 12, Cadorna managed to stabilize his defense from Mt. Pasubia, south of Trent, to the Piave and along that river to the Gulf of Venice. There the Austro-German offensive slowly ground to a halt, having outdistanced its supply. The catastrophe cost the Italians 40,000 killed and wounded plus 275,000 prisoners, 2,500 guns, and huge stores of goods and munitions. Austro-German losses were about 20,000. By this time French and British reinforcements, in accord with the plan prepared earlier in the year, were moving in, 11 divisions in all, under British General Plumer. Cadorna was now removed from command, being replaced by General Armando Diaz.

*COMMENT. Caporetto is a prime example of the military principles (or virtues) of surprise, objective, mass, and economy of force. Below had but 35 divisions in all against the Italian 41, but was far superior in strength at the point of impact. Had he possessed cavalry and armored cars to exploit his success, the battle might have been decisive. As it was, the Italians were badly shaken, but still capable of carrying on the war. A direct result of this disaster to Allied arms was the Rapallo Conference (November 5), which set up a Supreme War Council, the first attempt to attain over-all Allied unity of command.*

## OPERATIONS IN 1918

*Global Situation*

The Allies entered the year in a state of frustration. The rosy promises of early 1917 had been unfulfilled. Except in the Near East, where Allenby's dynamic leadership had culminated in the capture of Jerusalem—with its tremendous psychological uplift to Christendom—Allied offensives had bogged down in a welter of cross-purpose and disunity of command. Russia had collapsed. The German U-boat campaign still threatened the maritime pipeline of supply from America. Finally, many months would still pass before American armed forces could bolster up lost Allied man power. Both Britain and France were therefore on the defensive. The Supreme War Council did no serious planning. Haig (who had been refused reinforcement by Lloyd George) and Pétain agreed among themselves on mutual support should a German offensive be launched. Some attempt at organization of defense in depth was made.

Nor had the Central Powers been successful. They all felt the strangulation of Allied naval blockade. Austria was at the end of her resources, Turkey and Bulgaria were wobbling, and the burden of the war fell heavier and heavier on Germany. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had established a virtual military dictatorship over Germany, and exercised almost as complete authority over the subservient governments of Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

*The American Build-up*

Having entered the war without previous preparation, the U.S. was faced with organizing, equipping, training, transporting, and supplying an expeditionary force in Europe. The little Regular Army provided the leaven for 2 successive waves of man power: the National Guard and the draftees produced by the Selective Service Act (May 19, 1917). From a strength of 200,000 men and 9,000 officers (including 65,000 National Guardsmen then serving on the Mexican border), the Army swelled to over 4 million men, including 200,000 officers. Some 2 million in all served overseas. Based on Pershing's recommendations, a divisional organization of approximately 28,000-man strength was adopted. It consisted of 2 infantry brigades of two regiments each, an artillery brigade, an engineer regiment, 3 machine-gun battalions, and trains and supporting services. Forty-two of these divisions, which were nearly double the strength of their European counterparts, reached France. Though Pershing understood the need and importance of entrenchments, he eschewed what he considered to be a defeatist concept of trench warfare. Training was predicated on the spirit of the offensive—mobile combat—with stress on individual marksmanship.

Overseas, the Service of Supply became an empire in itself, manning 9 base sections. Pershing chose the Lorraine area east of Verdun as the American combat zone. The pipeline of supply from the United States went to ports in southwestern France, and movement overland conflicted little with the Allied efforts farther north. Except for small arms, ordnance needs were filled by America's allies. So too with airplanes; American production was limited to the Liberty engine.

Overseas transportation, the province of the U.S. Navy, was in part provided by the German merchant fleet seized in American ports, plus an improvised fleet of the American merchant marine—much of it built with remarkable celerity, some British ships, and neutral shipping sequestered or leased. The combined fleet car-

ried more than a million American soldiers to France without loss of a single vessel—on eastbound voyages. (The remaining million shipped overseas went on Allied ships, mostly British.)

The Navy, whose personnel waxed to 800,000, was primarily concerned in anti-submarine and convoy activities, though a division of 5 battleships joined the British Grand Fleet and 3 other battleships operated in Irish waters against surface raiders. In all, some 79 American destroyers took part in convoy work, and 135 subchasers also operated in European waters. An important part of U.S. Navy participation was in the laying of 56,000 of the 70,000 mines comprising the North Sea mine belt—from Scotland to Norway. Naval air squadrons took part in bombings of German submarine bases along the Belgian coast. A Marine brigade became part of the AEF.

American combat participation in World War I was based on "co-operation," as Pershing's directive put it. The U.S. was not technically an Ally. Its expeditionary force was to be "a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved." Pershing's directive ran counter to the Allies' desires. They distrusted the inexperienced Americans' military ability, and they were short of man power. From the beginning Pershing was cajoled, coaxed, and finally threatened, in fruitless efforts to have him turn the AEF over *in toto* as a replacement reservoir for the French and British armies. War Secretary Newton D. Baker and President Wilson upheld Pershing when Clemenceau and Lloyd George went over his head to Washington with their demands.

### *The Fourteen Points*

In an address to Congress on January 8, 1918, President Wilson laid down his "only possible program" for peace. The policy included (1) open covenants, openly arrived at; (2) freedom of the seas in war and peace; (3) removal of trade barriers; (4) national armament reductions; (5) impartial adjustment of colonial claims; (6) evacuation of Russian territory and independent solution by Russia of her political development and national policy; (7) evacuation and restoration of Belgium; (8) evacuation and restoration of all occupied French territory and return of Alsace-Lorraine; (9) readjustment of Italian frontiers on lines of nationality; (10) autonomy for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, restoration of occupied territories, and Serbian access to the sea; (12) Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire to be assured secure sovereignty, but other nationalities under Turkish domination to be freed; (13) independence of Poland, to include territories with predominantly Polish population, with free Polish access to the sea; (14) formation of an association of nations ensuring liberty and territorial integrity of great and small alike.

### *Operations on the Western Front*

#### LUENDORFF'S OFFENSIVES

During the winter of 1917-1918, Ludendorff realized that Germany's only hope of winning the war lay in a decisive victory in the west in 1918, before the weight of American man power could have a significant effect. With Russia knocked out of the war, he believed that this could be done. Shifting most German forces from the east, he instituted an intensive training program in preparation for an all-out offensive to be launched as early as possible in the spring. The best units were developed into "shock troops," to be spearheads of the planned assaults. His intention was to smash the Allied armies in a series of hammer blows. Recognizing the diver-

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
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gent interests of the French (concerned with protection of Paris) and the British (interested in maintaining their lines of communications with the Channel ports), he intended to drive a wedge between the two Allied armies and then destroy the British in subsequent assaults. Preparations were made with remarkable efficiency.

### *The Somme Offensive*

**1918, March 21. The First Offensive.** The Germans began their drive at dawn in heavy fog. Three German armies—Seventeenth (Otto von Below), Second (Marwitz), and Eighteenth (Hutier), from north to south—struck the right flank of the British sector—the Third (Byng) and Fifth (Gough) armies—on a 60-mile front

between Arras and La Fère. The objective was to break through, dislocate, and roll up the British, wheeling to the north and splitting them from the French on their right. Following a surprise 5-hour bombardment by more than 6,000 cannon, the specially trained German shock elements rolled through the fog, using "Hutier tactics"—infiltration behind a rolling barrage and passing of strong points which would




be later mopped up by reserves, accompanied by artillery neutralization of battery positions and observation posts (see p. 972). No limits were set to the advance; each division pressed as far and as fast as possible, with close-support elements passing through and taking up the advance whenever a local assault should bog down. Gough's Fifth Army, spread thin on a 42-mile front lately taken over from the French, collapsed, exposing the Third Army's right and forcing its withdrawal, but Byng, better organized in depth, held the German Seventeenth and Second armies to limited gains. Hutier, continuing on Gough's heels, reached and passed the Somme. All British reserves were committed to plug the gap and some French units also reinforced. But Pétain was more con-

cerned with protecting Paris than he was with assisting Haig. The British commander hastily appealed to the new British Chief of Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson, and the War Minister, Lord Milner, for the appointment of "Foch or some other French general who will fight" to take supreme command.

**1918, March 23–August 7. Artillery Bombardment of Paris.** A remarkable long-range German cannon began a sporadic bombardment of Paris from a position 65 miles away. This amazing achievement of German ordnance technology seriously hurt morale of Parisians and inflicted 876 casualties, but did not significantly affect the war. Actually there were 7 "Paris Guns," with a caliber of about 9 inches,

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the barrels 117 feet long, with a maximum range of 80 miles.

**1918, March 26. Foch Appointed Allied Co-ordinator.** In an emergency meeting of the Supreme War Council at Doullens, Foch was appointed co-ordinator for the Western Front.

**1918, April 3. Foch to Supreme Command.** At Beauvais, the War Council appointed Foch commander in chief of the Allied forces in France. Pershing, who had already (March 27) generously offered his 8 available divisions in France to Foch in the emergency, agreed in principle to the appointment.

**1918, April 5. End of the Offensive.** Meanwhile the German drive, after gaining a 40-mile-deep salient, lost momentum. Paris had been bombarded by long-range artillery (75 miles; March 21–April 6). Foch's shifting of reserves checked the German assault after it reached Montdidier, and Ludendorff brought it to a halt. Allied losses mounted to about 240,000 casualties (163,000 British, 77,000 French), including 70,000 prisoners and 1,100 guns. German casualties were almost as high, most of them in the specially trained shock divisions. Over Haig's protests, Gough was relieved by the British government; his shattered Fifth Army was taken over by General Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth Army headquarters.

**COMMENT.** *The most serious consequence of the offensive, from the German point of view, had been the institution of an Allied unified command. Thus, despite its initial brilliant tactical success, the offensive was a strategic failure. There were 3 main reasons for this: (1) Lack of logistical mobility. Once a breakthrough had been made, the Germans found themselves advancing across land devastated by 4 years of war, particularly by their own "scorched earth" measures at the time of the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line (see p. 968). They did not have the means of keeping up a flow of ammunition, food, and other supplies to their troops advancing through a veritable quagmire. (2) Lack of strategic mobility. The same problem prevented them from fully exploiting the gap with fast-moving mobile forces, or even from providing adequate reinforcements and replacements to the breakthrough troops. (3) Lack of mobile tactical fire support. Once the breakthrough was*

*made, the front-line infantry quickly outran its artillery, which was unable to advance in any significant numbers through the roadless morass. Thus, when the British were finally able to move reserves into the gap, the Germans lacked sufficient fire power to maintain the momentum of their drive or to deal adequately with the British fighter planes strafing them.*

#### *The Lys Offensive*

**1918, April 9. Ludendorff's Second Offensive.** Again the Germans struck the British sector, this time in Flanders on a narrower front, threatening the Channel ports. The German Fourth Army (Sixth von Armin) struck Plumer's Second Army in a Hutier-type attack. (Plumer had returned from Italy at Haig's request.) **Ferdinand von Quast's** German Sixth Army on its left clawed through the positions of Horne's First Army, demolishing a Portuguese division.

**1918, April 12. "Backs to the Wall."** Haig's order forbidding retirement galvanized British resistance. The German drive was halted (April 17) after a 10-mile advance which included recapture of Messines Ridge. Foch, gathering a reserve force behind the British, placed only part of it in the line (April 21), much to Haig's dissatisfaction. After a series of further attacks and counterattacks, Ludendorff finally called the operation off. Again, and for the same reasons as before, he had achieved tactical success but strategic failure. No breakthrough had been effected, and the Channel ports were safe. The cost had been great—another 100,000 British casualties—but again German losses had been almost as great. Ludendorff's carefully trained and prepared shock troops were sadly depleted, the morale of the survivors badly shaken.

#### *The Aisne Offensive*

**1918, May 27. Third German Offensive.** This time Ludendorff struck along the Chemin des Dames, a diversion against the French preparatory to a planned final and decisive blow to be struck against the British in Flanders. The German First (**Bruno von Mudra**) and Seventh (Boehn) armies attacked the French Sixth Army (Duchêne) with 17 divisions in the assault, preceded by tanks. Duchêne's 12

divisions (3 of them British) were surprised in shallow defenses along a lightly held 25-mile front and collapsed. By noon the Germans were crossing the Aisne; by evening they were crossing the Vesle, west of Fismes, and reached the Marne (May 30).

**1918, May 28. Battle of Cantigny.** Meanwhile, as Pershing was rushing the 2nd (Major General Omar Bundy) and 3rd (Major General J. T. Dickman) divisions to reinforce the French, ~~the first American offensive of the war took place at Cantigny, 50 miles northwest.~~ The 1st U.S. Division (Major General Robert Lee Bullard) attacked the village, a strongly fortified German observation point, taking all its objectives, and then repulsed a series of violent German counterattacks (May 28 and 29). While only a local operation, its success, against veteran troops of Hutier's Eighteenth Army, boosted Allied morale.

**1918, May 30–June 17. Battles of Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood.** The U.S. 2nd and 3rd divisions were flung against the nose of the German offensive along the Marne, moving into position through the retiring troops of the French Sixth Army. The 3rd Division held the bridges at Château-Thierry against German assaults, then counterattacked and, with assistance from rallying French troops, drove the Germans back across the Marne at Jaulgonne. The 2nd Division, taking over the sector of the French XXI Corps between Vaux and Belleau, west of Château-Thierry, checked German attacks. Ludendorff called off his offensive (June 4). The 2nd Division then counterattacked, spearheaded by its Marine brigade. In 6 successive assaults the Germans were uprooted from positions at Vaux, Bouresches, and Belleau Wood, losing some 9,500 men and more than 1,600 prisoners.

*COMMENT. The net result of the third German drive had been to make a serious dent in the Allied front, a salient some 30 miles wide and more than 20 miles deep. Ludendorff determined to exploit this success by another diversionary drive, prior to his proposed Flanders stroke. It would be a 2-pronged affair converging on Compiègne, the Eighteenth Army attacking southwesterly, the Seventh Army westerly.*

#### *Fourth and Fifth German Offensives*

**1918, June 9–13. Noyon-Montdidier (Fourth) Offensive.** Forewarned by German deserters, Foch and Pétain were ready. French defenses were organized in depth. A counterpreparation artillery bombardment disrupted the Eighteenth Army's assault. Some gains were made, but a Franco-American counterattack halted the advance (June 11). The Seventh Army's attack was quickly snubbed (June 12). By this time, 25 American divisions were in France, 7 of them at the front. French and British leaders were making strenuous efforts to incorporate American troops into their respective armies permanently; Pershing was resisting this.

**1918, July 15–19. Champagne-Marne (Fifth) Offensive.** Ludendorff, clinging to his plan for an all-out drive against the British in Flanders, attempted one more preliminary offensive in Champagne to pinch out the strongly fortified Reims area. Boehn's Seventh Army would advance up the Marne through Épernay to meet Mudra's First Army and Karl von Einem's Third attacking south toward Châlons. Foch, already planning a major counteroffensive, was again warned of the blow by deserters, aerial reconnaissance, and prisoners. German shock troops were tripped by an Allied artillery counterpreparation (night of July 14–15). East of Reims the attack was halted in a few hours by Henri Gouraud's French Fourth Army.

**1918, July 15–17. Second Battle of the Marne.** West of Reims, where the defenses were neither so strong nor so deep, the German Seventh Army penetration carried to the Marne, some 14 divisions crossing the river. The stout defense of the U.S. 3rd Division again snubbed the attack there. Then Allied aircraft and artillery destroyed the German bridges, disrupting supply and forcing the attack to halt. Ludendorff, admitting defeat, now prepared for a general withdrawal from the Soissons–Château-Thierry–Reims salient to reduce the front held by his depleted forces. In 5 months he had lost half a million casualties. Allied losses had been somewhat greater, but American troops were now arriving at a rate of 300,000 a month.

## THE ALLIED COUNTEROFFENSIVE

*The Aisne-Marne Offensive*


1918, July 18–August 3 **Allied Aisne-Marne Offensive.** The French Tenth (Mangin), Sixth (Jean M. J. Degoutte), and Fifth (Henri M. Berthelot) armies, from left to right, assaulted the Marne salient. The Ninth Army (M. A. H. de Mitry) was in reserve. In a series of smashing attacks, the Germans were rolled back all along the line, despite desperate resistance and skillful handling. The U.S. 1st and 2nd divisions spearheaded the Tenth Army's attack—the main effort. The 1st Division captured 3,800 prisoners and 70 guns from the 7 German divisions it encountered. Its casualties were 1,000 killed and 6,000 wounded. The 2nd Division, capturing 3,000 prisoners and 75 guns, suffered 5,000 casualties in all. Six other American divisions also took part—the 4th, 26th, and 42nd in Major General Hunter Liggett's I Corps with the French Sixth Army, and the 3rd, 28th, and 32nd in Major General Bullard's III Corps with the Ninth Army (which moved into line between the Sixth and Fifth armies). Ludendorff called off his proposed Flanders drive (July 20), concentrating his efforts to stabilize the situation along the Vesle.

The Marne salient no longer existed. In reward for the victory, Clemenceau promoted Foch to Marshal of France (August 6).

COMMENT. *The entire July operation, German offensive and Allied counteroffensive, is sometimes called the Second Battle of the Marne. Strategically, it was the turn of the tide; the initiative had been wrested from the Germans. Ludendorff's gamble to conclude the war successfully had failed. The front had been shortened by 28 miles, the important Paris-Châlons railway line re-established, and all menace to Paris ended. On the Allied side, troops of 4 nations—France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy—had successfully participated in a unified operation. Allied morale soared as German dropped. Ludendorff had lost 30,000 more prisoners, more than 600 guns, 200 mine throwers, and 3,000 machine guns.*

*The Amiens Offensive, August 8–September 4*

1918, August 8–11. **First Phase.** Haig, in conjunction with the French Aisne-Marne offensive, threw Rawlinson's British Fourth Army and the French First Army (M. Eugène Debeny, attached by Foch to Rawlinson's command) against the German Eighteenth (Hutier) and Second



The Paris gun

*and Fifth German Offensives*

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(Marwitz) armies. Expecting an Allied attack farther north in Flanders, the Germans were caught off guard by a well-mounted assault secretly prepared. The Canadian and Anzac corps jumped off without preliminary bombardment, preceded by tanks, and bit deep through a dense fog. More than 15,000 prisoners and 400 guns were captured. On their right, the French bombarded first, then advanced. Despite near panic among their front-line troops, the Germans managed to re-establish a position 10 miles behind the former nose of the salient. The French Third Army (Georges Humbert), on the right of the First, entered the action (August 10), forcing the evacuation of Montdidier. Haig cautiously paused (August 11) to regroup, despite Foch's wishes to maintain unremitting pressure on the Germans. Both Allied and German air forces took part in the initial fighting after the fog cleared.

#### 1918, August 21–September 4. Second Phase.

Progressively, the British Third Army on the left and the French armies on the

right took up the assault. The British Fourth Army in the center joined in (August 22), followed by the British First Army (Horne) on the far left. Ludendorff ordered a general withdrawal from both the Lys salient in Flanders and the Amiens area. His plans were disrupted when the Anzacs penetrated across the Somme (August 30–31), taking Péronne and threatening St.-Quentin. The Canadian corps, shifted to the north flank, broke through near Quéant (September 2). The entire German situation deteriorated, necessitating retirement to the final position—the Hindenburg Line. By this time Haig had expended his reserves and could not further exploit his victory. German casualties were more than 100,000, including some 30,000 prisoners. Allied losses were 22,000 British and 20,000 French. Tactically and strategically, the Allies had gained another major victory, cracking German morale.

COMMENT. Ludendorff's bitter statement that August 8 had been the "Black Day" of the German Army tells the story. He said flatly: "The war must be ended!"

#### St.-Mihiel Offensive, September 12–16

Pershing's insistence on a separate and distinct United States Army operating on its own assigned front was reluctantly accepted by Foch (July 24). Reduction of the St.-Mihiel salient was the first mission. The U.S. First Army, with the French II Colonial Corps attached, took over the sector (August 30). Foch, planning an all-out Allied offensive, then attempted to change Pershing's plan and divide part of the American forces between the French Second and Fourth armies. After sharp disagreement, Foch accepted Pershing's position, but the American agreed to shift his army and attack with the French in the Argonne Forest immediately upon conclusion of the St.-Mihiel operation.

Ludendorff, well aware of the threat, started evacuation of the salient (September 8).

Supported by a conglomerate Allied air force of some 600 planes—American, French, Italian, and Portuguese—under American Colonel William Mitchell, the First Army attacked both faces of the salient (September 12). The French corps held the nose. The assault—both ground and air—was completely successful; the converging attacks met at Hattonchatel by nightfall on the first day, and the salient was entirely cleared (September 16); more than 15,000 prisoners and some 250 guns were taken. American casualties numbered 7,000. The strategic importance of the victory was great; since 1914 the St.-Mihiel salient in German hands had constituted a standing threat to any Allied movements in Champagne. In addition, the First Army proved itself to both friend and foe to be a competent entity. This was the largest American operation since the Civil War. Pershing at once turned to the tremendous job of shifting his entire army some 60 miles, and entering another major offensive without any rest.



Lieutenant Frank Luke, American ace, with his Spad

#### FOCH'S FINAL OFFENSIVES

##### *The Concept*

Foch planned a double penetration, in 2 major assaults. One of these was to be a Franco-American drive from the Verdun area toward Mézières, a vital German supply center and railroad junction. The other was to be a British offensive between Péronne and Lens, with the railroad junction of Aulnoye as its objective. Seizure of these 2 vital railroad junctions would jeopardize the entire German logistical situation on the Western Front. Supplemental assaults would be made in Flanders by a combined British-Belgian-French army group, and between La Fère and Péronne by another Franco-British force.

##### *The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 26–November 11*

###### 1918, September 26–October 3. First Phase.

Having efficiently shifted by night more than a million men with tanks and guns over an inadequate road and rail net, Pershing launched the First Army—3 corps abreast—in attack at 5:25 A.M. On its left the French Fourth Army (H. J. E. Gouraud) attacked also. The American zone lay astride the Meuse Valley, including the Argonne Forest on its left, the Aire Valley, and the heights on both sides of the Meuse. The German defenses (Gallwitz's army group to the east, the Crown Prince's to the west) consisted of 3 heavily fortified lines taking clever advantage of the rugged and heavily wooded terrain. Initial rapid advance was finally slowed in the Argonne Forest and in front of Montfaucon as the Germans rushed in rein-

forcements. The American drive lost momentum on the line Apremont-Briucelles (October 3), having penetrated the first 2 German positions.

###### 1918, October 4–31. Second Phase.

Replacing a number of his assault divisions by veteran troops from the St.-Mihiel operation, Pershing renewed the offensive. There was no room for maneuver; the First Army battered its way slowly forward in a series of costly frontal attacks, and the actual combat zone was widened to include the east bank of the Meuse, where the Germans had excellent observation from the Heights of the Meuse. The Argonne Forest was cleared, facilitating the advance of the French Fourth Army, on the left, to the Aisne River. Pershing regrouped his forces into a group of 2 armies (October 12). The newly constituted Second Army, commanded by Bullard,


took up the assault. The British Army in the center joined in (August 2), followed by the British First Army (Horne) on the far left. Ludendorff ordered a general withdrawal from the Lys salient in Flanders and the same area. His plans were disrupted as the Anzacs penetrated across the front (August 30–31), taking Péronne and threatening St.-Quentin. The Canadian Corps, shifted to the north flank, broke through near Quéant (September 1) and the entire German situation deteriorated, necessitating retirement to the final line—the Hindenburg Line. By this time Foch had expended his reserves and could not further exploit his victory. German casualties were more than 100,000, including some 30,000 prisoners. Allied losses were 22,000 British and 20,000 American. Tactically and strategically, the Allies had gained another major victory, and German morale.

*Ludendorff's bitter statement: "August 8 had been the 'Black Day' for the German Army tells the story. The war must be ended!"*

United States Army operating under Foch (July 24). Reduction of the St. Mihiel salient by the First Army, with the French Fourth Army (August 30). Foch, planning an offensive, Pershing's plan and divide part of the First and Fourth armies. After sharp fighting the American agreed to shift to the Forest immediately upon con-

vacuation of the salient (Sep-

tember 12). The French corps was completely successful; the salient was captured in the first day, and the salient yielded 10 prisoners and some 250 guns. The strategic importance of the salient in German hands had constituted a major strategic gain. In addition, the First Army was a competent entity. This was the first time at once turned to the west, and entering another major




prepared for an offensive northeast, between the Meuse and the Moselle, while the First Army, now under Liggett, continued its slow northward battering-ram progression. Clemenceau, exasperated by the Americans' slow progress, tried unsuccessfully to have Pershing relieved. Foch, aware of the nature of the opposition, well knowing that the American offensive—threatening the part of the front most vital to the Germans—was drawing all available German reserves from elsewhere for its defense, declined to support Clemenceau. As October ended, the First Army had punched through most of the third and final German line.

**1918, November 1–11. Final Phase.** With rested divisions replacing tired ones, the First Army jumped off again, smashing through the last German positions northeast and west of Buzancy, thus enabling the French Fourth Army to cross the Aisne. In the open now, American spearheads raced up the Meuse Valley, brushing aside last-ditch German defensive stands, reaching the Meuse before Sedan (November 6) and placing destructive artillery fire on the Mézières-Montmédy

rail line, vital artery of supply for the entire German front. A spectacular drive on Sedan by the U.S. 1st Division was abruptly checked by orders from higher authority, to permit the French the honor of taking the city and erasing the stain of the 1870 disaster (see p. 835). Bullard's Second Army launched its final attack (November 10), driving for Montmédy. Next day the armistice ended all hostilities.

#### *Final British, French, and Belgian Offensives*

**1918, September 27–October 17. Storming the Hindenburg Line.** One day after the beginning of the American offensive, Haig's army group flung itself against the Hindenburg Line. Trading space for time on this front, Boehn's army group managed to withdraw after a succession of costly and gallant British attacks drove through the last of the Hindenburg Line positions (October 5). To Haig's surprise, he had been unable to achieve a complete breakthrough, and the momentum of his drive slowed down in the face of skillful German defense.



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of the drive slowed down in the face of  
stubborn German defense.

1918, September 28–October 14. **Offensive  
in Flanders.** British-Belgian troops of  
King Albert's army group swept over the  
Ypres Ridge, but then slowed down as  
swampy country choked all supply, and  
Rupprecht's army group fought back  
grimly.

1918, October 17–November 11. **Advance  
to the Sambre and the Scheldt.** Because of  
American progress in the Meuse-Argonne,  
a German retreat all along the line be-  
came necessary. Ludendorff hoped that he  
could re-establish a new line west of the  
German border and by a determined de-  
fense through the winter force the Allies  
to grant generous terms. But his hopes  
were foiled by the pressure being main-  
tained all along the Allied lines. In a re-  
newed British assault, Rawlinson's Fourth  
Army broke through German defenses  
on the Selle River (October 17). Byng's  
Third Army forced a crossing lower down  
(October 20). The drive threw back  
Boehn's army group with the loss of 20,-  
000 prisoners. At the same time the Bel-  
gians and British began to move again in  
Flanders. The German Army began to  
crack.

### The German Collapse

1918, October 6. **Request for an Armistice.**  
As the front lines began to crumble, the  
new German chancellor, Prince **Max of  
Baden**, sent a message to President Wil-  
son, requesting an armistice on the basis  
of Wilson's Fourteen Points (see p. 977).  
An exchange of messages concluded (Oc-  
tober 23) with Wilson's insistence that the  
U.S. (and the Allies) would not negotiate  
an armistice with the existing military  
dictatorship.

1918, October 27. **Resignation of Luden-  
dorff.** Just before formal dismissal, Lu-  
dendorff resigned to permit the desperate  
German government to comply with Wil-  
son's demand. Hindenburg, however, re-  
tained his post as German commander in  
chief, with General **Wilhelm Groener** re-  
placing Ludendorff as Quartermaster Gen-  
eral (Chief of Staff).

1918, October 29–November 10. **Revolution  
in Germany.** Inspired by the Commu-  
nists and sparked by a mutiny of the High  
Seas Fleet, disorders, revolts, and mutinies  
flared inside Germany. A new Socialist

government took power and proclaimed a  
republic (November 9). The Kaiser fled  
to Holland (November 10).

1918, November 7–11. **Armistice Negotia-  
tions.** A German delegation, headed by  
a civilian, **Matthias Erzberger**, negotiated  
an armistice with Foch in his railway  
coach headquarters on a siding at Com-  
piègne. Agreement was finally reached at  
5 A.M., November 11, 1918. The terms,  
which were in effect a German surrender,  
provided that the German Army must im-  
mediately evacuate all occupied territory  
and Alsace-Lorraine; immediately surren-  
der great quantities of war matériel (in-  
cluding 5,000 guns and 25,000 machine  
guns); evacuate German territory west of  
the Rhine, and three bridgeheads over the  
Rhine, to be occupied by the Allies; sur-  
render all submarines; intern all other  
surface warships as directed by the Allies.

1918, November 11. **The Armistice.** Hos-  
tilities ceased at 11 A.M.; the terms of the  
armistice immediately became effective.

COMMENT. *Comparisons are invidious.*  
*The American Expeditionary Force was the  
vital factor in the final Allied victory; the  
Meuse-Argonne offensive was decisive; 6  
other American divisions played important  
spearhead roles elsewhere on the front dur-  
ing the final Allied advances. But the ques-  
tion whether Allied victory could have been  
achieved without the Americans should not  
be debated. The American role was to add a  
final increment of numbers and fresh initia-  
tive, permitting the much larger, and more  
experienced, Allied armies to achieve equally  
spectacular successes in the final weeks of  
the war.*

### The Italian Front

1918, June 15–22. **Austrian Offensive.** Ger-  
many during the spring transferred her  
troops in Italy to the Western Front, in-  
sisting that the Austrians crush Italy sin-  
glehanded. The argument had weight,  
since Russia was out of the war. Both  
Conrad (now commanding on the Tren-  
tino front) and Borojevic, on the Piave,  
demanded command of the decisive ef-  
fort. A compromise decision by Archduke  
**Joseph** permitted them to attack simulta-  
neously. Since the mountainous terrain  
and lack of lateral communications would  
prevent mutual support, the available re-

OPERATIONS IN 1914

Western Front

THE OPENING BATTLES

1914, August 3-20. Belgium Overrun. A specially trained German Second Army task force of about 30,000 men under General Otto von Emmich crossed the Belgian frontier between the Ardennes

and the Dutch border, a narrow corridor guarded by Liège, one of the strongest fortresses of Europe. A night attack (August 5-6) penetrated the ring of 12 outlying forts. Heavy fighting followed, in which German Major General Erich F. Ludendorff distinguished himself, as did the Belgian commander, General Gérard M. Leman. German bombardment by 42-cm. howitzers (heaviest used to this time) systematically reduced the concrete

Churchill and the First Sea Lord, of comparable standards of efficiency as well as numbers. The Russian, and were to play only minor

1914, August, 1914

	German	Home Waters	High Seas Fleet
Total			
13	(13)	(13)	
5	(4)	(4)	
22	(22)	(10)	
41	(32)	(17)	
144	(144)	(80)	
30	(30)	(24)	


proximate, and varied considerably during

ing all old battleships (see discussion in early for action, and 15 under construction had 3 more completed, but not yet ready

thinner armor and greater speed. Britain not yet ready for action. Britain had 1

armed, light cruisers. in commission. This figure is approxi-

ould develop from a reconnaissance particularly the German Zeppelin reconnaissance and bombing also used from the outset.



and steel cupola defenses. Liège surrendered (August 16). The German First Army (General Alexander von Kluck) and the Second (General Karl von Bülow) poured through the Liège corridor and across the Meuse. Hastily mobilized Belgian field forces were brushed aside to the north of Tirlemont (August 18-19) and Brussels occupied (August 20). After some skirmishing along the Meuse (August 12-16), the Belgians, personally commanded by King Albert, fell back on the fortress of Antwerp.

1914, August 14-25. Battles of the Frontiers. The Germans and the Anglo-French armies met each other head on in 4 almost simultaneous actions:

1914, August 14-22. Battle of Lorraine. An early advance to Mulhouse in Alsace (August 8) by the French right-wing Army of Alsace (General Paul Pau) was followed by a full-scale offensive southeast of Metz by the French First (General Auguste Dubail) and Second (General Noël de Castelnau) armies (August 14-18). After planned withdrawals, the German Sixth