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# FOIA MARKER

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Speechwriting, White House Office of  
**Series:** Speech File Backup Files  
**Subseries:** Chron File, 1989-1993

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**OA/ID Number:** 13669  
**Folder ID Number:** 13669-004

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**Folder Title:**  
Cuban Independence Day 5/22/89 [OA 6265] [1]

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Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
<b>G</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>

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# The Miami Herald

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 1989

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## No thaw with Cuba, Baker says

### Confidential memo sent to U.S. diplomats

WASHINGTON — (AP) — Secretary of State James Baker said in a confidential memo that the Bush administration is not contemplating improved relations with Cuba "because Cuban behavior has not changed sufficiently to warrant a change in U.S. attitudes."

Baker said in the three-page document, distributed to all diplomatic posts and to selected U.S. agencies, that he was writing the memo to counter speculation about a possible warming trend in U.S.-Cuban relations.

He noted that the speculation accelerated following the December deal under which Cuba agreed to a phased withdrawal of its military forces from Angola.

While praising Cuba's agreement to withdraw its troops, Baker said that major impediments remain to better relations.

"Cuba provides the U.S.S.R. major political, strategic and intelligence benefits that it otherwise would not have," Baker said in the memo, a copy of which was obtained by the Associated Press on Tuesday.

"Cuba continues to engage in military adventurism abroad and to support subversive movements in the Western Hemisphere to the detriment of peace, stability and democratic processes.

"Further, the Cuban government persists in its internal repression and violation of the basic human rights of its citizens. Cuba has not changed its basic policies."

The document was dated March 1989 but was not more specific with respect to timing. Each page bore a "confidential" stamp.

Baker said Cuba is involved in a public diplomatic effort to reinforce the impression that there will be an improvement in relations with the United States. He said an end to the trade embargo, imposed by the United States in 1960, "would benefit greatly the failed Cuban economy and enhance Cuba's image and prestige."

It would also undercut U.S. ef-

## U.S.-Cuba thaw unlikely, Baker memorandum says

CUBA / from 1A

distance from Cuba, he said.

But, he said, Cuba "has steadfastly failed to offer any concrete proposals of its own to satisfy longstanding and well-known U.S. concerns."

As described by U.S. officials, Cuba has demonstrated a more accommodating attitude toward the United States over the past 18 months, and there has been an improvement in the ability of the two countries to work out differences on nonstrategic issues, such as immigration.

Cuban officials have disclosed that the head of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Ramon Sanchez Parodi, will be replaced shortly by Jose Antonio Arbesu, a vice chief of Cuba's America Department, a party organization that oversees Cuba's relations with other nations in the Western Hemisphere.

Former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams told a reporter Monday that the Cuban shift indicates a willingness to intensify discussions with the United States on issues that have divided the two countries.

He noted that Arbesu had been instrumental in the negotiations leading to the agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

*Curt —  
this a good  
paragraph!  
Shiner*

①

Preamble missing

It is extremely unfortunate that present conditions exist in Cuba. A situation in which a country so close to ours is governed by a totalitarian regime that is ~~constantly~~ constantly and desregarding <sup>←</sup> violating the principles of human rights and democracy and has promoted the export of terrorism and military adventurism around the world.

(2)

But our resolve will not waiver, and we will follow a consistent course of ~~promoting~~ ~~supporting~~ the concept of a free Cuba

We support ~~in~~ <sup>for</sup> Cuba a truly ~~representative~~ democratic electoral process. One that will respect the personal freedoms and human rights for all individuals. One that will ~~observe~~ observe accepted international standards of behavior. Under present conditions we will not support ending the trade embargo or accepting Cuba in the family of nations.

This is why my administration is so committed to ~~providing~~ ~~the~~ ~~truth~~ objective news ~~and~~ ~~information~~ to Cuba by way of Radio Martí and in the future by way of TV Martí, so that the long <sup>time</sup> suffering people of Cuba can be better informed.

As Jose Martí once said "Honor, honra" (to honor others, ~~to~~ honor oneself). ~~And~~ And so we take this opportunity to celebrate Cuban Independence Day when as a result of joint efforts of Cubans and Americans Cuba became an independent nation eighty seven years ago, on May 20<sup>th</sup> 1902.

(3)

I also take this opportunity following Martí's adage to honor the Cuban-American community which has already in just over two decades made such a positive contribution to the economic and spiritual ~~level~~ <sup>well-being</sup> ~~of~~ ~~our~~ ~~great~~ ~~country~~.

~~As~~ We look ~~at~~ ahead with hope, in spite of the obvious difficulties, when a free Cuba and the United States can renew its historic relationship.

promoting liberty and democracy around the globe.



Steele Hill

Chief Counsel

5th circle at the Cashier

College at Judiciary

is Same

U.S. DC. 20510

1 2 1

# Who's Who of Cuban Americans

7/6/1

00070960 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Nagera, Humberto  
OCCUPATION(S): psychiatrist; psychoanalyst; educator; author  
?

1/6/1

00096061 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Smith, Jose J.  
OCCUPATION(S): airline executive

1/6/2

00095947 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Smith, Richard Alfred  
OCCUPATION(S): government official

1/6/3

00095818 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Roman, Agustin A.  
OCCUPATION(S): clergyman

1/6/4

00095666 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Unanue, Emil Raphael  
OCCUPATION(S): immunopathologist ←

1/6/5

00095391 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Rodriguez, Juan Alfonso  
OCCUPATION(S): technology corporation executive

1/6/6

00094166 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Gutierrez, Horacio Tomas  
OCCUPATION(S): concert pianist

1/6/7

00093205 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Fox, Arturo Angel  
OCCUPATION(S): Spanish language educator

1/6/8

00093171 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Garcia-Menendez, Alberto Augusto  
OCCUPATION(S): history educator

1/6/9

00092774 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Dominguez, Jorge Ignacio  
OCCUPATION(S): government educator

1/6/10

00092399 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Pedraja, Rafael R.  
OCCUPATION(S): food scientist

?t //11-22

1/6/11  
00091959 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo  
OCCUPATION(S): economist; educator

1/6/12  
00091860 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Cardenes, Andres Jorge  
OCCUPATION(S): violinist; educator

1/6/13  
00091539 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Gil, Peter Paul  
OCCUPATION(S): management educator; consultant

1/6/14  
00091183 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Jomarron, Will C.  
OCCUPATION(S): publishing executive

1/6/15  
00090011 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Gracia, Jorge Jesus Emiliano  
OCCUPATION(S): philosopher; educator

1/6/16  
00090008 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Gramatges, Daniel Alberto  
OCCUPATION(S): banker

1/6/17  
00090007 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Gomez-Sicre, Jose Romualdo  
OCCUPATION(S): art critic and historian; art consultant and evaluator

1/6/18  
00089990 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Salazar, Alberto  
OCCUPATION(S): runner

1/6/19  
00089648 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Diaz-Verson, Salvador, Jr.  
OCCUPATION(S): insurance company executive

1/6/20  
00087028 WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Colligan, Richard Vincent, Jr.  
OCCUPATION(S): advertising executive

1/6/21  
00086669 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Zayek, Francis Mansour  
OCCUPATION(S): bishop

1/6/22  
00085554 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Williams, John Horter  
OCCUPATION(S): civil engineer; diversified company executive

?t //22-33

1/6/22  
00085554 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Williams, John Horter  
OCCUPATION(S): civil engineer; diversified company executive

1/6/23  
00083443 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Ulbricht, John  
OCCUPATION(S): artist

1/6/24  
00081213 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Suarez-Murias, Marguerite C.  
OCCUPATION(S): emeritus language and literature educator

1/6/25  
00079232 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Silva, Felipe  
OCCUPATION(S): former tobacco company executive

1/6/26  
00074477 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Sabates, Felix Nabor  
OCCUPATION(S): ophthalmologist

1/6/27  
00073543 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Pinsof, Nathan  
OCCUPATION(S): advt. co. exec.

1/6/28  
00072229 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Otero, Manuel Jesus  
OCCUPATION(S): psychiatrist

1/6/29  
00070960 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Nagera, Humberto  
OCCUPATION(S): psychiatrist; psychoanalyst; educator; author

1/6/30  
00069387 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Mora, Rafael Alberto  
OCCUPATION(S): psychiatrist

1/6/31  
00064972 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Leon, Tania Justina  
OCCUPATION(S): composer; music director; pianist

1/6/32  
00062669 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Korbel, John Joseph  
OCCUPATION(S): economics educator

1/6/33  
00054782 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Goizueta, Roberto Crispulo  
OCCUPATION(S): food company executive

1/6/34

00054423 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Gil, Federico Guillermo  
OCCUPATION(S): political science educator

1/6/35

00053093 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Fornes, Maria Irene  
OCCUPATION(S): playwright-director

1/6/36

00051846 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Estevez, Luis de Galvez  
OCCUPATION(S): designer; mfr.

1/6/37

00049332 WA42, FS1, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
del Regato, Juan Angel  
OCCUPATION(S): radio-therapist and oncologist; educator

1/6/38

00048721 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Dalley, George Albert  
OCCUPATION(S): government official; consultant

1/6/39

00048138 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Cowley, Luis M.  
OCCUPATION(S): psychiatrist; educator

1/6/40

00046380 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Cassidy, Harold Gomes  
OCCUPATION(S): chemistry educator

1/6/41

00046320 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Casado, Antonio Francisco  
OCCUPATION(S): city official

1/6/42

00045623 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
De Armas, Frederick Alfred  
OCCUPATION(S): foreign language educator

1/6/43

00044951 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Bustamante, Rodrigo Antonio  
OCCUPATION(S): physician

1/6/44

00043497 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Bosch, Jorge Jose  
OCCUPATION(S): manufacturing executive

?t //45-55

1/6/45

00042272 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Benitez, Mario Antonio

1/6/46  
00039912 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Adolfo, (Sardi+318 a, Adolfo F.)  
OCCUPATION(S): fashion designer

1/6/47  
00038579 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Castillo, Pedro Antonio  
OCCUPATION(S): investor

1/6/48  
00038537 WA42, WA43, WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Campaneria, Miguel  
OCCUPATION(S): dancer

1/6/49  
00035481 WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Suarez, Xavier Louis  
OCCUPATION(S): lawyer; mayor

1/6/50  
00034605 WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Lopez, Lourdes  
OCCUPATION(S): ballerina

1/6/51  
00033811 WA44 Record provided by: Marquis  
Andrews, George R.  
OCCUPATION(S): U.S. ambassador to Mauritius

1/6/52  
00033038 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Casariego, Jorge Isaac  
OCCUPATION(S): psychiatrist; educator

1/6/53  
00032854 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Sununu, John H.  
OCCUPATION(S): governor of New Hampshire

1/6/54  
00032747 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Rey, Carmen Rosello  
OCCUPATION(S): researcher; food scientist

1/6/55  
00032184 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Piedra, Alberto M.  
OCCUPATION(S): diplomat  
?t //56-69

1/6/56  
00031783 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Falla, Enrique C.  
OCCUPATION(S): chemical company executive

1/6/57  
00030986 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Garcia, Oscar Nicolas

*I thought  
he was Lebanese*

1/6/58

00030481 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Martinez, Raul L.  
OCCUPATION(S): mayor; real estate broker; publisher

1/6/59

00030410 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Justiz, Manuel Jon  
OCCUPATION(S): educator; researcher

1/6/60

00029179 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
de Armas, Raul  
OCCUPATION(S): architect

1/6/61

00029095 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Senior, Enrique Francisco  
OCCUPATION(S): investment banker

1/6/62

00028157 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Boggs, Danny Julian  
OCCUPATION(S): government official; lawyer

1/6/63

00026966 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Menendez, Carlos  
OCCUPATION(S): banker

1/6/64

00025211 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Zayas-Bazan, Eduardo  
OCCUPATION(S): foreign language educator

1/6/65

00025187 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Navarro, Antonio (Luis)  
OCCUPATION(S): diversified international company executive

1/6/66

00024027 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Reich, Otto Juan  
OCCUPATION(S): government official

1/6/67

00023961 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Baloyra, Enrique Antonio  
OCCUPATION(S): political science educator

1/6/68

00023875 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
de Leon, Lidia Maria  
OCCUPATION(S): magazine editor

1/6/69

00023401 WA44 Record provided by: Biographee  
Martinez, Alice Conde  
OCCUPATION(S): association executive

~~Staffed~~ Staffed at 1pm for 5pm this Evening

(Smith/Blessey)  
May 18, 1989  
Draft Three  
CUBA

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY  
ROOM 450, OEOB  
MONDAY, MAY 22, 1989

My friends, it is truly a pleasure to be with you to celebrate this wonderful occasion: The 87th anniversary of Cuban independence.

Now, I know that the official anniversary was Saturday, not today. Let's get that straight [PAUSE] . . . after all, remember Pearl Harbor.

But, you know, I would be delighted to be here on any day. For we Americans owe a debt of gratitude to the Cuban people.

That debt dates back to 1776, when George Washington's troops were dreadfully short of food and supplies. Some of you may remember how the women of Havana banded together and raised 1.2 million livres for the cause of American freedom.

One hundred and twenty-six years later, another people fought bravely for the cause of freedom. For it was on May 20, 1902, after a long and brutal struggle, that the Cuban Republic was born.

We gather here to remember that victory. And the fact that freedom knows no boundaries. Perhaps it was the Abraham Lincoln of Cuba, that great patriot Jose Marti [Mar-TEE], who said it best. He remarked, "To beautify life is to give it an object."

My friends, our object is human liberty. And a free, united, and democratic Cuba. As President, I am absolutely, unalterably committed to Cuba Libre. And I will never falter in that support.

I know that you are with me. And so is America. For we oppose those who mock the rights we treasure: rights of speech, religion, assembly, and economic freedom. And in response, our demand is plain and simple: "Democracy, Mr. Castro -- not some time, not some day, but now."

This morning, I call on Fidel Castro to free all political prisoners. And to conform to accepted international standards regarding human rights. I challenge him to allow unrestricted access to organizations monitoring their compliance. And a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

On this, Cuban Independence Day, I challenge Castro to take concrete and specific steps to begin democracy's electoral process. And to allow free and unrestricted travel to and from Cuba for all persons -- including present citizens and residents.

This I pledge: Unless these conditions are met -- basic conditions, elemental -- we will oppose Cuba's re-entry to the Organization of American States. And this, too, I promise: We will continue Radio Marti. We will create TV Marti. We will see that the people of Cuba know the truth -- about their dictator, and about the world.

In short, we want to advance that day when Cuban Independence Day achieves a new and richer meaning:

- Freedom from the evil of tryanny and oppression;
- Freedom from the economic misery wrought by communist misrule;
- The freedom that can liberate lives and lift the human heart -- yes, the freedom of democracy.

To achieve that freedom, heroes must lead the way. Well, in a sense they already have, and are. For Cuba can claim many heroes -- those who struggled valiantly almost ninety years ago, and those who struggle today.

Heroes, for example, like Dr. Claudio Benedi, here in this audience, who has condemned -- eloquently, repeatedly -- Castro's

violations of human rights. Or another great patriot of the Western Hemisphere -- a hero of our times.

I'm referring, of course, to Armando Valladares. He spent 22 years in Castro's prisons. And he wrote a book about that ordeal, and his ultimate release. It's titled Against All Hope. And it describes how he survived beatings, starvation, and unspeakable horror.

I'm sure many of you have read this unforgettable tribute. A tribute to the arching human spirit -- to that will to live which helped endure the cruelest of regimes. A tribute, also, to the courage of the Cuban people -- resolute and unafraid.

My friends, that courage has helped you endure. And it will one day unite a million free Cuban-Americans with their long-suffering Cuban brothers.

For if hope can stay alive in the heart of Armando Valladares, surely we will see Cuba free again.

Thank you for coming here, God bless you, God bless America, and Viva Cuba Libre.

# # # #

*R. W. ...  
20, May 16, 1989  
C. S. ...*

(Smith/Blessey)  
May 16, 1989  
Draft One  
CUBA

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY  
ROOM 450, OEOB  
MONDAY, MAY 22, 1989

Ladies and gentlemen, friends.

You know, the Cuban people have long been noted for their warmth of hospitality. This morning, it is my pleasure to try and return that favor.

My friends, it is truly a delight to be with you. And to gather here on this special day: The 87th anniversary of Cuban independence.

*En un país unido se gana la libertad.*

We meet as patriots of a common hemisphere. For today, especially, we are all Cubans. We are all Americans. And we echo those words of the Cuban patriot JOSE Marti [Mar-TEE], who said, "To beautify life is to give it an object."

*Not to me*

My friends, our object is human liberty. And individual dignity. And a free, united, and democratic Cuba.

You know, a great hero -- a patriot -- is with us today. His name is Armando Valladares. He spent 22 years in Castro's prisons. And he wrote a book about that ordeal, and his ultimate release. It's titled Against All Hope.

I'm sure many of you have read this unforgettable tribute. A tribute to the arching human spirit -- to that will to live which helped endure the cruelest of regimes. A tribute, also, to the courage of the Cuban people -- resolute and unafraid.

My friends, that courage has helped you endure. And it will one day return you to your homeland -- to serve justice, love liberty, and spur the noblest impulses of mankind.

Armando Valladares has written, "Man is nature's most wonderful creature." Amigos, in Cuba and the United States, ours can be a wonderful future. Thank you for coming here, God bless you, and God bless America.

# # # #

My friends, our object is human liberty. And a free, united, and democratic Cuba. As President, I am absolutely, unalterably committed to Cuba Libre. And I will never falter in that support.

I know that you are with me. And so is America. For we oppose those who mock the rights we treasure: rights of speech, religion, assembly, and economic freedom. And in response, our demand is plain and simple: "Democracy, Mr. Castro -- not some time, not some day, but now."

This morning, I call on Fidel Castro to free all political prisoners. And to conform to accepted international standards regarding human rights. I challenge him to allow unrestricted access to organizations monitoring their compliance. And a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

On this, Cuban Independence Day, I challenge Castro to take concrete and specific steps to begin democracy's electoral process. And to allow free and unrestricted travel to and from Cuba for all persons -- including present citizens and residents.

This I pledge: Unless these conditions are met -- basic conditions, elemental -- we will oppose Cuba's re-entry to the Organization of American States. And this, too, I promise: We will continue Radio Marti. We will create TV Marti. We will see

(Smith/Blessey)  
May 16, 1989  
Draft One  
CUBA

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY  
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MONDAY, MAY 22, 1989

Ladies and gentlemen, friends.

You know, the Cuban people have long been noted for their warmth of hospitality. This morning, it is my pleasure to try and return that favor.

My friends, it is truly a delight to be with you. For we Americans owe a special debt to the Cuban people. And we gather here on a special day: The 87th anniversary of Cuban independence. *feel of this man*

Our debt as Americans dates back to 1776, when George Washington's troops were dreadfully short of food and supplies. Some of you may remember how the ladies of Havana banded together and raised 1.2 million livres for the cause of American freedom. *books of livres*

One hundred and twenty-six years later, the cause of freedom was again upheld. For it was on May 20, 1902, after a long and brutal struggle, that the Cuban Republic was born.

We meet today to celebrate that victory. And the fact that freedom knows no boundaries, no ethnic origin. For today, we are all Cubans. We are all Americans. And we echo these words of the Cuban patriot Jose Marti [Mar-TEE], who said, "To beautify life is to give it an object." *was quite*

My friends, our object is human liberty. And individual dignity. And a free, united, and democratic Cuba.

You know, a great hero -- a patriot -- is with us today. His name is Armando Valladares. He spent 22 years in Castro's prisons. And he wrote a book about that ordeal, and his ultimate release. It's titled Against All Hope.

I'm sure many of you have read this unforgettable tribute. A tribute to the arching human spirit -- to that will to live which helped endure the cruelest of regimes. A tribute, also, to the courage of the Cuban people -- resolute and unafraid.

My friends, that courage has helped you endure. And it will one day return you to your homeland -- to serve justice, love liberty, and spur the noblest impulses of mankind.

(Smith/Blessey)  
May 18, 1989  
Draft Three  
CUBA

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY  
ROOM 450, OEOB  
MONDAY, MAY 22, 1989

My friends, it is truly a pleasure to be with you. For we Americans owe a debt of gratitude to the Cuban people. And that debt is never more evident than on this wonderful occasion: The 87th anniversary of Cuban independence.

Our debt as Americans dates back to 1776, when George Washington's troops were dreadfully short of food and supplies. Some of you may remember how the women of Havana banded together and raised 1.2 million livres for the cause of American freedom.

One hundred and twenty-six years later, the cause of freedom was again upheld. For it was on May 20, 1902, after a long and brutal struggle, that the Cuban Republic was born.

We gather here to celebrate that victory. And the fact that freedom knows no boundaries. Perhaps it was the Abraham Lincoln of Cuba, that great patriot Jose Marti [Mar-TEE], who said it best. He remarked, "To beautify life is to give it an object."

My friends, our object is human liberty. And a free, united, and democratic Cuba. As President, I am absolutely,

unalterably committed to Cuba Libre. And I will never falter in that support.

I know that you are with me. And so is America. For we oppose those who mock the rights we treasure: rights of speech, religion, assembly, and economic freedom. And in response, our demand is plain and simple: "Democracy, Mr. Castro -- not some time, not some day, but now."

This morning, I call on Fidel Castro to free all political prisoners. And to conform to accepted international standards regarding human rights. I challenge him to allow unrestricted access to organizations monitoring their compliance. And a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

On this, Cuban Independence Day, I challenge Castro to take concrete and specific steps to begin democracy's electoral process. And to allow free and unrestricted travel to and from Cuba for all persons -- including present citizens and residents.

This I pledge: Unless these conditions are met -- basic conditions, elemental -- we will oppose Cuba's re-entry to the Organization of American States. And this, too, I promise: We will continue Radio Marti. We will create TV Marti. We will see that the people of Cuba know the truth -- about their dictator, and about the world.

My friends, that world is ours to shape -- by our principles, and by our deeds. We can shape it through such pioneers as Dr. Claudio Benedi, here in this audience, who has condemned -- eloquently, repeatedly -- Castro's violations of human rights. Shape it, as all of you have, through the quality of your lives.

In short, you -- we -- can give our kids a better land than we inherited. And for guidance, let us look to the heroes of today.

There is a man -- a patriot -- here who is such a hero. His name is Armando Valladares. He spent 22 years in Castro's prisons. And he wrote a book about that ordeal, and his ultimate release. It's titled Against All Hope.

I'm sure many of you have read this unforgettable tribute. A tribute to the arching human spirit -- to that will to live which helped endure the cruelest of regimes. A tribute, also, to the courage of the Cuban people -- resolute and unafraid.

My friends, that courage has helped you endure. And it will one day return you to your homeland -- to serve justice, love liberty, and link a million free Cuban-Americans with their long-suffering Cuban brothers.

Armando Valladares has written, "Man is nature's most wonderful creature." Mes amigos, ours can be a wonderful tomorrow -- for ourselves, and for our children.

Together, let us reach that goal. And let us look forward to that day when Cuban Independence Day achieves a new and richer meaning:

-- Freedom from the evil of tyranny and oppression;

-- Freedom from the economic misery wrought by communist misrule;

-- The freedom that can liberate lives and lift the human heart -- my friends, the freedom of democracy.

Thank you for coming here, God bless you, and God bless America.

# # # #

(Smith/Blessey)  
May 17, 1989  
Draft Two  
CUBA

227 people

**DRAFT**

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY  
ROOM 450, OEOB  
MONDAY, MAY 22, 1989  
2:30 p.m.

My friends, it is truly a pleasure to be with you. For we Americans owe a special debt to the Cuban people. And we meet this morning on a special day: The 87th anniversary of Cuban independence. *in recognition of*

**DRAFT**  
Our debt as Americans dates back to 1776, when George Washington's troops were dreadfully short of food and supplies. Some of you may remember how the ladies of Havana banded together and raised 1.2 million livres for the cause of American freedom.

One hundred and twenty-six years later, the cause of freedom was again upheld. For it was on May 20, 1902, after a long and brutal struggle, that the Cuban Republic was born.

We gather here to celebrate that victory. And the fact that freedom knows no boundaries. For today, we are all Cubans. We are all Americans. And we echo these words of the Cuban patriot Jose Marti [Mar-TEE], who said, "To beautify life is to give it an object."

Cuban desk

My friends, our object is human liberty. And a free, united, and democratic Cuba. As President, I am absolutely, unalterably committed to Cuba Libre. And this I pledge: I will never falter in my support.

I know that you are with me. And so is America. For we oppose those who mock the rights we take for granted: rights of speech, religion, assembly, and economic freedom. And in response, our demand is plain and simple: "Democracy, Mr. Castro -- not some time, not some day, but now."

This morning, I call on Fidel Castro to free all political prisoners. And to conform to accepted international standards regarding human rights. I challenge him to allow unrestricted access to organizations monitoring their compliance. And a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

For not the same day

On this, Cuban Independence Day, I challenge Castro to take concrete and specific steps to begin democracy's electoral process. And to allow free and unrestricted travel to and from Cuba for all persons -- including present citizens and residents.

~~For Fidel Castro, the time has come to put up or shut up.~~

For unless these conditions are met -- basic conditions, elemental -- we will oppose Cuba's re-entry to the Organization of American States. And this, too, I promise: We will continue

Radio Marti. We will create TV Marti. We will see that the people of Cuba know the truth -- about their dictator, and about the world.

What I'm talking about, of course, is as old as America -- building a tomorrow brighter than today. It won't be easy. It will make time. But we can, and must, build it together -- for Cuba and the United States.

We can build it through family, church, love of country, and love of work. Build it in our schools, in our police force, and in small and large business. We can lift tomorrow through such pioneers as Dr. Claudio Benedi, here to my right, who has condemned -- eloquently, repeatedly -- Castro's violations of human rights. Lift it, as all of you have, through the quality of your lives.

In short, you -- we -- can give our kids a better land than we inherited. And for guidance, let us look to the heroes of today.

There is a man -- a patriot -- here who is such a hero. His name is Armando Valladares. He spent 22 years in Castro's prisons. And he wrote a book about that ordeal, and his ultimate release. It's titled Against All Hope.

Against All Hope

I'm sure many of you have read this unforgettable tribute. A tribute to the arching human spirit -- to that will to live which helped endure the cruelest of regimes. A tribute, also, to the courage of the Cuban people -- resolute and unafraid.

My friends, that courage has helped you endure. And it will one day return you to your homeland -- to serve justice, love liberty, and spur the noblest impulses of mankind.

Armando Valladares has written, "Man is nature's most wonderful creature." Mes amigos, ours can be a wonderful tomorrow -- for ourselves, and for our children. Thank you for coming here, God bless you, and God bless America.

# # # #

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# The New Encyclopædia Britannica

in 30 Volumes

MACROPÆDIA  
Volume 5

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Knowledge in Depth

FOUNDED 1768  
15 TH EDITION



Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.  
William Benton, Publisher, 1943–1973  
Helen Hemingway Benton, Publisher, 1973–1974  
Chicago/Geneva/London/Manila/Paris/Rome  
Seoul/Sydney/Tokyo/Toronto

Auxiliary forces include a part-time civil-defense body. Military service is compulsory for citizens between 17 and 45 years of age.

The Ministry of the Interior is charged with the maintenance of public order and state security, rehabilitation of prisoners and prison management, and fire fighting.

**Social services. Education.** The eradication of illiteracy was given high priority by the revolutionary government. In 1961, the "Year of Education," 707,212 men and women were officially declared to have achieved literacy. Dissolution of all private schools was one of the first acts of the revolutionary government, and a fundamentally altered, state-directed education system was introduced. It includes general education, 12 grades preceded by a preschool stage; higher, or university, education; teacher-training education; adult education, directed toward the eradication of residual illiteracy and toward continued study by working people; technical education, parallel to middle-level general education; language instruction; and specialized education. Education is free at all levels, with supplementary scholarships to cover living expenses and medical assistance.

Fidel Castro once remarked that "education is the revolution," and the revolutionary government has acted on that view. Education expenditures are the highest in Latin America. In all schools, fewer than 1,000,000 students were enrolled in 1959, in contrast to nearly 3,100,000 in 1976.

**Health.** Medical care is free, and mortality rates have been reduced. It was reported that by 1974 infant mortality rates were about 28 per 1,000 live births—a rate that compares very favourably with the rest of the Americas, including some developed areas. By 1974 the official ratio of doctors to population was 1:1,000, a favourable ratio for a developing country. The Ministry of Public Health (Minsap) requires physicians to work for the rural medical service in needy areas for two years after graduation.

**Housing.** Urban real-estate rental was prohibited under the Urban Reform Law of 1960, and it was made possible for families to own their homes by paying the current rental sum for not less than five or more than 20 years. By 1970 some 270,000 families had acquired titles to houses and apartments in this fashion, and 100,000 rural families had achieved free use of formerly rented lands. The traditional rural *bohío* ("hut") is being slowly replaced by more modern housing units. New towns and fishing villages have also been constructed.

**Social assistance and welfare.** Homes for the aged are under the direction of Minsap, but the *círculos infantiles*, institutions for the day care of children under seven years of age, are run by the Federation of Cuban Women. The *círculos infantiles* and *jardines de la infancia* are both intended to free women to work. The women's federation also supervises more than 8,000 social workers. Physical education and sports, under a national body, are an integral part of Cuban education. The Ministry of Interior Commerce is in charge of the fixing of prices for, and distribution and sale of, foodstuffs and notions (*abarrotes*), working as closely as possible with community groups. In 1968 more than 55,000 till-then privately operated sales outlets were placed under the ministry.

**Social indexes.** Cuban society has been transformed since 1959. The traditional public graft and corruption and also prostitution, gambling, and vice became targets of a strenuous campaign, and the official claim that the campaign has been successful seems to be warranted. The long-term investment program has been accompanied by the elimination of mass unemployment as it existed in the 1950s and access to consumption by formerly economically marginal sectors of the population. There is, however, a marked imbalance between money in circulation and goods and services available. Wages and prices are rigidly controlled and quota systems strictly enforced. For example, workers are moved to areas where labour is scarce by simply assigning them ration cards valid only in the sectors where their services are required. Farm incomes are controlled by regulation of the storage of agricultural products and by production limits. Overall,

private ownership of the means of production is now limited to the 200,000 or so small farmers, and the working class is officially ascribed a leading role in Cuban society.

#### CULTURAL LIFE AND INSTITUTIONS

The cultural life of the Cuban people has also undergone a major transformation as part of what is regarded by the authorities as an ongoing revolutionary process. The government believes that mass culture is essential to the fulfillment of its economic and social aims and since 1959 has played a leading role in cultural life. This policy has been embodied in a set of directives, such as that creating a system of cultural organizations to take artistic displays to the remotest regions. Traditional Cuban culture, it was felt, was generally limited to Havana (and, to a much smaller extent, the provincial capitals), and was almost entirely privately endowed and thus subject to the vagaries of private fortunes, tastes, and interests. The National Cultural Council (Consejo Nacional de Cultura, or CNC) directs a program of education in music, plastic arts, ballet, dramatic arts, and modern dance; by 1970 more than 10,500 students were enrolled in provincial and regional schools of the National School of Fine Arts (Escuela Nacional de Arte Cubanacán). Amateur groups led by CNC instructors are also popular.

**The theatre.** Cuban theatre has been state-supported since 1959, coming under CNC direction, except in the case of the university cultural extension departments. There are six national dramatic groups, whose directing councils create their own repertory. Their activities are centred on Havana, but they travel frequently in the provinces. Provincial theatre groups characteristically present their entertainments on tour. Cuban critical opinion acknowledges that the national theatre suffers from lack of maturity but emphasizes that the drive to seek a unique national expression while utilizing the full range of tradition has produced a number of important works. The Casa de las Américas (House of the Americas) has held a number of Latin-American theatrical festivals. The Casa del Teatro (House of the Theatre; attached to the International Institute of Theatre) is a major centre of information and research on Cuban and international themes, while the lyric theatre stimulates interest in opera and operettas by conducting exchange programs with other countries.

**Music and ballet.** Cuban music has Spanish and African roots. Various organizations have disseminated modern influences, and soloists participate in exchange programs and tour rural areas under CNC sponsorship. Cuba's foremost contemporary artistic figure is undoubtedly the prima ballerina and founder (1948) of the Ballet Nacional de Cuba, and head of its school, Alicia Alonso, a dancer of international acclaim. The Ballet of Camagüey was established in 1971.

The National Symphony Orchestra has a chamber orchestra and instrumental ensembles attached and accompanies opera, operetta, and ballet. It makes annual tours of the island, as do its provincial equivalents. Festivals of Cuban music and song are held at intervals, encompassing works of every genre from every period. Performing musical groups range from the traditional *charangas* to popular orchestras.

**Folklore.** In 1959 the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore was created within the Academy of Sciences of Cuba, with the aim of collecting and classifying the Cuban cultural heritage. It formed the National Folklore Group (Conjunto Nacional Folklórico), which performs Afro-Cuban dances nationally and internationally. The activities of the folklore group are complemented by the Institute of Literature and Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences. The legacy of Fernando Ortiz, a pioneer investigator of black customs, and the work of the Central University of Las Villas on popular culture deserve special mention.

**Art.** Cuba has some two dozen galleries, three art museums, and community cultural centres ready to display the works of Cuban painters. The Palacio de Bellas Artes and the Casa de las Américas both organize major

The  
campaign  
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Touring  
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National  
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Group

exhibitions from time to time. The revolutionary government emphasizes that it is not enough to open the galleries for increased public attendance if there has not been some prior education of the viewers, and effort is directed toward increasing public interest and artistic awareness.

**Literature and publishing.** Publishing is centralized in the Book Institute, an arm of the government, which produced 33,900,000 volumes in 1974—34 times the 1958 figure. About 70 percent of the titles are reference works, usually with scientific or technical content, and many of them are distributed free in support of national educational goals. The government-controlled press includes *Granma* ("Grandmother"), organ of the Communist Party, named for the yacht that brought Fidel Castro to Cuba in 1956; and *Juventud Rebelde* ("Rebel Youth"), the organ of the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (Organization of Communist Youth), as well as a wide range of provincial newspapers, magazines, and specialized reviews. The National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists (Unión Nacional de Escritores y Artistas Cubanos, or UNEAC), founded by Nicolás Guillén (a "social" poet whom the government considers the national poet), sponsors writers' competitions.

Although Cuba's pre-revolutionary literary production had, in many cases, achieved a very high quality, activity was sparse and unintegrated. New, often younger, writers now make their living principally (and in some cases solely) by writing. The annual competition of the Casa de las Américas, one of the most important in the Spanish language, brings world figures to Cuba.

Cuban poets maintain, perhaps surpass, pre-revolutionary standards, but many critics feel that fiction writing began to decline in the early 1970s, when works tended to become more directly related to revolutionary topics. The winner of the Casa de las Américas prize in 1971, *La última mujer y el próximo combate* ("The Last Woman and the Next Battle"), by Manuel Cofiño López, has a typical theme: the efforts (successful) of a new state farm director to eliminate corruption in the enterprise and to draw the peasants into the revolution.

**Film making, radio, and television.** Cuban film making has been stimulated by the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and Industry (Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematográfica; ICAIC), which aims to make serious films and to see that those films are available to the general populace. The government program of distribution has 560 mobile film units. The ICAIC also has an extensive film library and supports a cinematographic studies centre, which trains future technicians for the industry. The very active Cuban Broadcasting Institute (Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusión; ICR) has five national stations and more than 30 provincial stations. Two national television channels are supplemented by a local channel in Santiago de Cuba. Both institutes are agencies of the government.

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(I.E./R.E.Cr./Ed.)

## Cuba, History of

At the time of the Spanish discovery of Cuba, the native population formed two groups totalling 50,000. The Ci-

boney and Guanahatabey occupied western Cuba. The more numerous Taino, who occupied the rest of the island, were highly developed agriculturalists and a peaceful people, related to the Arawakan peoples of South America who had migrated to the Greater Antilles. Their houses, called *bohíos*, formed villages ranging from single families to communities of 3,000 persons. They had pottery, polished stone implements, and religious spirits called *zemis*, which were represented by idols of wood, stones, and bones. The Taino diet included potatoes, manioc, fruits, and fish.

**The Spanish colonial regime, to 1898.** Christopher Columbus discovered Cuba for Spain during his first voyage, on October 27, 1492. Diego Velázquez began permanent settlement in 1511, founding Baracoa on the northeastern coast with 300 Spaniards and their African slaves.

**Establishment of the colony.** Within five years the island had been divided into seven municipal divisions, including Havana, Puerto Príncipe, Santiago de Cuba, and Sancti Spiritus. Each municipality had its own cabildo, or town council, governing its legal, administrative, and commercial affairs. From 1515, elected representatives of each cabildo formed a body that defended local interests before the royal council, especially matters such as the slave trade and the encomienda (an estate of land and the Indians inhabiting it). A bishopric, subordinate to Santo Domingo, was founded at Baracoa in 1518 but later moved to Santiago de Cuba.

**Colonial life before 1763.** The island's limited gold deposits discouraged early settlement. The colony became a staging ground for the mainland exploration of Yucatán, Florida, and the Gulf Coast. Such expeditions as that of Cortés, which attracted 400 Spaniards and 3,000 Indians, depleted the colonial population. The small number of permanent resident Spanish colonists used the Indians in encomienda. But by 1550 the encomienda was no longer feasible, because the island's Indian population had declined dramatically to about 5,000 because of social dislocation, maltreatment, epidemic diseases, and emigration. Throughout the 17th century, colonial life was made more difficult by the ravages of hurricanes, epidemics, the attacks of rival European countries trying to establish bases in the Caribbean, and freebooters. By 1700 peace had returned, and the population had grown to about 50,000. The *flota* system (regularly scheduled fleets between Spain and Spanish America) increased the commercial and strategic importance of Havana, while ranching, smuggling, and tobacco farming occupied the colonists. The administrative costs depended, however, on irregular subsidies from New Spain until 1808.

**The plantation society, 1763–1898.** The 18th century brought intensified agricultural development. The main changes came with the growing dependence on sugarcane cultivation and the importation of African slaves. In 1740 the Havana Company was formed to stimulate agricultural development by increasing the importation of slaves and regulating the export trade. The company was unsuccessful, selling fewer slaves in 21 years than the British sold during a ten-month occupation of Havana in 1762. Reforms of Charles III of Spain (ruled 1759–88) further stimulated the development of the sugar industry.

Between 1763 and 1860 the island's population increased from less than 150,000 to more than 1,300,000. Slaves made the most dramatic growth, increasing from 39,000 in the 1770s to some 400,000 in the 1840s. In the 19th century Cuba imported more than 600,000 Africans, most of them after an Anglo-Spanish agreement to terminate the slave trade in 1820. The Cuban insistence on the slave trade raised considerable diplomatic controversy between Spain and Great Britain between 1817 and 1865.

In 1838–80 the Cuban sugar industry became the most mechanized in the world, utilizing steam-powered mills and narrow-gauge railroads. Expanding *ingenios* (sugar mills) dominated the landscape from Havana to Puerto Príncipe, expelling small farmers and destroying the is-

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Cuba

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Years' War

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land's famous large hardwood forests. By 1850 the sugar industry accounted for 83 percent of all exports and in 1860 Cuba produced nearly one-third of the world's sugar production. The sugar revolution propelled a new rich class of slave owners to political prominence. Mexican Indians and Chinese augmented the labour force, and in 1865 the African slave trade ended, although slavery was not abolished until 1886.

*The end of Spain's empire.* The demands of sugar—labourers, capital, machines, technical skills, and markets—strained interracial relations, aggravated political and economic differences between metropolis and colony, and laid the foundation for the break with Spain in 1898. Spanish colonial administration had been corrupt, inefficient, and inflexible. The United States had shown a lively and growing interest in the island, and expeditions by U.S. filibusters won support in the United States, especially in the Southern slave states. After the 1860s the U.S. tried many times to purchase the island.

Spain's failure to grant political autonomy, while increasing taxes, led to the outbreak of the first war of independence—the Ten Years' War (1868–78)—which led to a military stalemate. The rich sugar producers of western Cuba and the vast majority of the slaves failed to rally to the Nationalists, themselves divided over the questions of slavery, complete independence, and annexation to the U.S. Unable to find a military solution, Spain promised to reform the island's political and economic system at the Convention of Zanjón (1878). Many Cubans, including the Nationalist leader Antonio Maceo, however, refused to accept the Spanish conditions.

By 1895 the political and economic crisis had grown more severe. U.S. investment had reached \$50,000,000, and its annual trade with Cuba amounted to about \$100,000,000. Cuban political organizations in exile were coordinated and mobilized by the poet and propagandist José Martí. War broke out again on February 24, 1895.

Fighting quickly spread throughout the island. Spain deployed more than 200,000 troops. Both sides killed civilians and burned estates and towns. By 1898 commercial activity had come to a standstill. Excited by the "yellow press" and a mysterious explosion aboard the USS "Maine" in Havana Harbour, the U.S. declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898. In August Spain signed a peace protocol in Washington, ending hostilities.

*United States occupation, 1899–1901.* Cuban independence, granted by the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898), began January 1, 1899, under U.S. occupation. The military governor, Gen. John Brooke, tried to exclude Cubans from government. He disbanded the Cuban army and conducted a census before being replaced by Gen. Leonard Wood, a former military governor of Santiago City. Wood sought to mitigate political division and supervised elections that gave Cuba its first elected president, Tomás Estrada Palma.

The military occupation restored normality. The Americans built a number of schools, roads, and bridges; they modernized Havana and deepened its harbour, but they were primarily interested in preparing the island for incorporation into the U.S. American economic, cultural, and educational systems prevailed, and the franchise was designed to eliminate Afro-Cubans from politics. The Platt Amendment (1901) gave the U.S. the right to oversee Cuba's international commitments, economy, and internal affairs, and to establish a naval station (Guantánamo Bay).

*The Republic of Cuba, 1902–58.* A republican administration begun on May 20, 1902, under Estrada Palma faced difficulties over U.S. influence. Estrada Palma tried to retain power in the 1905 and 1906 elections, which were contested by the Liberals, leading to rebellion and a second U.S. occupation on September 29, 1906. U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft failed to resolve the dispute, and Estrada Palma resigned. For the U.S. Charles Magoon administered a provisional government of Cuban civilians under the Cuban flag and constitution. An advisory law commission revised electoral procedures, and on January 28, 1909, Magoon handed over the government to the Liberal president, José Miguel Gómez.

Meanwhile, Cuba's economy grew steadily, as sugar prices continually rose until the 1920s.

*Presidencies and dictatorships, 1909–58.* The Gómez administration (1909–13) set a pattern of graft, corruption, maladministration, fiscal irresponsibility, and social insensitivity—especially toward Afro-Cubans—that characterized Cuban politics until 1959. The Afro-Cubans, led by Evaristo Estenoz and Pedro Ivonet, organized to secure better jobs and more political patronage and to protest a ban of political associations based on colour and race. In 1912 government troops put down large demonstrations in Oriente; 3,000 Afro-Cubans lost their lives. The pattern of corruption was followed by María García Menocal (1913–21), Alfredo Zayas (1921–25), Gerardo Machado (1925–33), Fulgencio Batista (through puppets 1934–39 and himself 1940–44 and 1952–59), Ramón Grau San Martín (1944–48), and Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948–52). Machado and Batista, who overthrew Machado in 1933 with U.S. support, were the most notorious, holding power through manipulation, troops, and assassins.

The income from sugar was augmented by vigorous tourism based on hotels, casinos, and brothels; Havana became especially attractive during the years of U.S. Prohibition (1919–33). Yet the prosperity of the 1920s, '40s, and '50s enriched only a few Cubans—mainly politicians and their families. For the majority, poverty (especially in the countryside) and lack of public services were appalling: with a national per capita income of \$353 in 1958—among the highest in Latin America—unemployment and underemployment were rife, and the average rural worker earned \$91 per year. Foreign interests controlled the economy, owning about 75 percent of the arable land, 90 percent of the essential services, and 40 percent of the sugar production. Nevertheless, there was no widespread economic discontent in 1958, when Fidel Castro supplanted Batista.

*The Castro regime from January 1, 1959.* Batista's fall resulted as much from internal decay as from the challenges of Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement (commemorating Castro's attack on the Moncada military fortress in Santiago on July 26, 1953), the Federation of University Students (later absorbed into the Young Communists Union), and other groups. Castro had been a candidate in the aborted elections of 1952. His defense argument for his part in the Moncada attack, edited and published as "History Will Absolve Me," was a political manifesto. Released from prison in 1955, Castro and some friends went to Mexico to prepare for the overthrow of the Cuban government. An enlarged group, including the Argentinian revolutionary Ernesto (Che) Guevara, landed in Cuba in December 1956 and were almost annihilated in their first attack. From the Sierra Maestra the survivors fought a guerrilla campaign. When the Fidelistas took control on January 1, 1959, they numbered fewer than 1,000.

The 26th of July Movement had vague political plans, relatively insignificant support, and totally untested governing skills. They quickly forged a strong following from among the poor peasants, the urban workers, the young, and the idealistic of all groups and ages. The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba), dating back to 1925, assumed the dominant role in political organization, and the state modelled itself on the Soviet bloc countries, becoming the first socialist state in the Americas.

*Abolition of capitalism.* The first stage of the new regime was dominated by the progressive dissolution of capitalism, between 1959 and 1963. In those confusing and difficult years, the government eliminated the remnants of Batista's army as well as the former labour unions, political parties, and associations of professional persons and farmers. New institutions emerged: the Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos, or CTC, reconstituted 1970), the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, or INRA, founded in 1959), the Cuban Institute of Cinematic Art and Industry (Instituto Cubano del Arte y Industria Cinematográfica or ICAIC, 1959), the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de

# background notes

# Cuba



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs

August 1985



**Official Name:**  
**Republic of Cuba**

## PROFILE

### People

**Nationality:** *Noun and adjective*—Cuban(s). **Population** (1983): 9.946 million; 70% urban, 30% rural. **Avg. annual growth rate:** 1.1% **Density:** 89/sq. km (225/sq. mi.). **Ethnic group:** Spanish-African mixture. **Language:** Spanish. **Education:** *Years compulsory*—6. **Attendance**—92% (ages 6–16). **Literacy**—96% (ages 10–49). **Health:** *Infant mortality rate*—slightly less than 21/1,000. *Life expectancy*—74.7 yrs. **Work force:** *Agriculture*—25%. *Industry and commerce*—47%. *Services and government*—28%.

### Geography

**Area:** 110,860 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about the size of Pennsylvania. **Cities:** *Capital*—Havana (pop. 1.9 million). *Other cities*—Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Holguin, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Pinar del Rio. **Terrain:** Flat or gently rolling plains, mountains up to 6,000 ft., and hills. **Climate:** Tropical.

### Government

**Type:** Communist state. **Independence:** May 20, 1902. **Constitution:** 1976.

**Branches:** *Executive*—president, Council of Ministers. *Legislative*—National Assembly of People's Government, headed by Council of State. *Judicial*—subordinate to Council of State.

**Political party:** Communist Party (PCC). **Suffrage:** All citizens aged 16 and older, except those who have applied for permanent emigration. National elections were held in 1981 for the National Assembly of the People's Government, and municipal elections for local assemblies were held in 1984.

**Administrative subdivisions:** 14 provinces, 169 municipalities.

**National holidays:** Jan. 1, Revolution

Day; May 1, International Workers Day; July 26, Moncada Barracks attack anniversary.

**Flag:** White star centered on red equilateral triangle at staff side, three blue and two white horizontal stripes in the background.

### Economy

**DNI** (disposable national income, 1983): \$15.8 billion. **Annual growth rate** (1983 claimed for gross social product): 5.3%. **Per capita income** (1983): \$1,590.

**Natural resources:** Metals, primarily nickel.

**Agriculture:** *Products*—sugar, tobacco, coffee, citrus and tropical fruits, rice, beans, meat, vegetables.

**Industry** (33% of labor force): *Types*—sugar, food processing (major), oil refining, cement, electric power, light consumer and industrial products.

**Trade:** *Exports*—\$6.5 billion (f.o.b. 1983): sugar and its byproducts 75%, petroleum reexports 9%, seafood 4%, nickel oxide and sulfide 3%, tobacco and its products, rum, fruits. *Major markets*—USSR, Eastern Europe, China. *Imports*—\$7.2 billion (c.i.f. 1983): capital equipment 22%, intermediate products 66%, consumer goods 12%. *Major suppliers*—USSR, Eastern Europe.

**Official exchange rate:** 1 Cuban peso = US\$1.13.

### Membership in International Organizations

UN and some of its specialized and related agencies, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)—observer, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), International Sugar Council, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)—nonparticipating member, Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Latin American Economic System (SELA), Group of 77, Non-Aligned Movement.

## PEOPLE

The Cuban people are mainly of Spanish and African origins. The 1981 census indicates that 12% of the population is black, 66% white, and 22% of mixed ancestry.

Before 1959, Roman Catholicism was the religion of 85% of the people, but Afro-Cuban faiths, Judaism, and most Protestant Christian sects also were represented. Although it maintains diplomatic relations with the Vatican, the Castro regime has discouraged religious practices and has circumscribed the activities of religious groups since 1959.

## GEOGRAPHY

Cuba is the largest island in the West Indies and lies on the northern boundary of the Caribbean Sea, about 145 kilometers (90 mi.) south of Key West, Florida. Including the Isle of Youth and some 1,600 adjacent keys and islands, Cuba accounts for more than one-half of the West Indian land area.

The island extends about 1,200 kilometers (745 mi.) from west to east; its width ranges from 35 to 200 kilometers (22–125 mi.). Cuba's coastline, indented by hundreds of bays and inlets, is about 4,020 kilometers (2,500 mi.) long and includes the larger keys. The harbors of Havana, Guantanamo, and Bahia Honda (on the northern coast, west of Havana) are among the best in the world. Most of the northern coast is steep and rocky, and the southern coast (except for the mountainous eastern end) is low and marshy. The rivers, generally short, narrow, and shallow, are navigable only for short distances, if at all.

About three-fifths of Cuba is flat or gently rolling, with many wide, fertile valleys and plains. The rest is mountainous or hilly. Three main groups of mountains are in the eastern, central, and western sections of the island. The most rugged of these is the Sierra Maestra range in the eastern section, where peaks rise to almost 1,830 meters (6,000 ft.) above sea level.

Cuba is in the tradewind belt, making its climate generally semitropical, although it is situated entirely in the Tropic Zone. The average annual temperature is about 23°C (75°F), dropping in winter to about 21°C (70°F) and rising in summer to about 27°C (81°F). Cuba has two seasons—the dry season, from November to April, and the wet season, from May through October. Rainfall averages 10%–25% more than

in the eastern United States but is less than in most places in the same latitudes. The country's yearly rainfall averages 137 centimeters (54 in.), with about 75% occurring as short, heavy downpours in the wet season.

## HISTORY

Cuba was discovered and claimed for Spain by Christopher Columbus on October 28, 1492. Havana was important as a commercial seaport between Spain and its colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Eventually, settlers moved inland, devoting themselves mainly to sugarcane and tobacco farming. As the native Indian population died out, slaves were brought from Africa to work on the plantations.

Cuba was the last major Spanish colony to become independent. Efforts to win independence began in 1850, when Cuban planters financed and led several expeditions against Spanish garrisons on the island. The struggle developed into the Ten Years' War, which broke out on October 10, 1868, under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, whom the Cubans consider the father of their country. In 1892, Cuba's greatest national hero, Jose Marti, known as the apostle of Cuban liberty, initiated plans for a general uprising, and on February 24, 1895, the "Grito de Baire" (the Call from Baire) announced the beginning of Cuba's final struggle for independence. The Cuban patriots were under the leadership of Jose Marti and Antonio Maceo (both of whom died in battle), Maximo Gomez, Calixto Garcia, Juan Gualberto Gomez, Salvador Cisneros, Tomas Estrada Palma, and Bartolome Maso.

The United States entered the conflict on the side of the revolutionaries when the U.S.S. *Maine*, anchored in Havana Harbor to protect U.S. citizens, was sunk by an explosion of unknown origin on February 15, 1898, precipitating the Spanish-American War. On December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished its rights over Cuba in the Treaty of Paris. Three years of U.S. administration followed—a period of reconstruction—and independence was proclaimed on May 20, 1902.

In this period, the United States attached the Platt Amendment to Cuba's original constitution of 1901, giving the United States the right to intervene to preserve Cuban independence and a stable Cuban Government. This amendment was abrogated in 1934 under the "Good Neighbor" policy.

On July 2, 1903, by agreement between the United States and Cuba, the 116-square kilometer (45-sq. mi.) area that is now the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay was leased. This agreement was reaffirmed by a treaty in 1934, according to which only mutual agreement or U.S. abandonment of the area can terminate the lease.

Political conditions following independence were unsettled. Internal opposition to the established government led, under the Platt Amendment, to a brief reintroduction of U.S. administration in 1906–09.

Gen. Gerardo Machado, elected president in 1924, forcibly extended his rule until he was deposed by a popular uprising in 1933. Later that year, Army Sgt. Fulgencio Batista led an army and student revolt that established him as Cuba's dominant political personality for more than 25 years. After ruling through a series of presidents, Batista was elected president in 1940. Retiring after his elected term, Batista was succeeded by elected Presidents Ramon Grau San Martin (1944) and Carlos Prío Socarras (1948). In March 1952, Batista seized the presidency in a bloodless coup, shortly before the regularly scheduled elections, justifying this action by alleging widespread lawlessness and general corruption and mismanagement in the government. However, his new regime became repressive and increasingly unpopular.

On July 26, 1953, an armed opposition group led by Fidel Castro Ruz attacked the Moncada army barracks at Santiago de Cuba. The attack was unsuccessful, and many of those not killed were imprisoned, including Castro. He was released by President Batista under an amnesty in May 1955 and went into exile in Mexico. There he formed a revolutionary group, the "26th of July Movement." After training in Mexico, Castro landed by boat in Oriente Province on December 2, 1956, with 81 followers. All but 12 were soon captured, killed, or dispersed. From this nucleus, Castro's forces eventually grew to several thousand. While a number of other groups in Cuba also actively opposed Batista, Castro's "26th of July" forces provided the spearhead for the revolutionary opposition that forced Batista to flee Cuba on January 1, 1959. In his struggle against Batista, Castro became a national hero for much of the population, and his assumption of power following Batista's flight was widely acclaimed. At the time, Castro embodied the hopes of most Cubans for a return to democratic government and a purge of graft and corruption.

These high hopes proved ephemeral.



Panoramic View of Havana.

Within months many Cubans opposed to communism, including leaders of the opposition to Batista, were arrested and executed or sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Moderates were forced out of the government, and hundreds of thousands of Cubans fled the island. On December 2, 1961, Castro publicly declared himself to be a Marxist-Leninist.

Castro's early promises of agrarian reform to benefit the peasants resulted in state ownership of most of Cuba's land and in the organization of state farms. The country's business and industrial sectors were completely nationalized, and its economy came under the direction of the state. The legislature was abolished, and effective freedom of expression and all opposition to political activity were soon terminated.

## GOVERNMENT

Cuba was ruled by decree from January 1959, when the Castro regime took power, until the adoption of the new constitution. Although presented in 1975, the constitution was adopted in December 1976, when the National Assembly of People's Government first met.

Under the new constitution, Cuba is organized along much the same lines as the Soviet Union, with a party-

government structure. The Communist Party, described in the constitution as "the highest leading force of the society and state," is headed by a Politburo. Executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, which heads the government. Legislative power, to the extent there is any, resides with the National Assembly of People's Government (roughly the equivalent of the U.S.S.R.'s Supreme Soviet), which is headed by the Council of State. Fidel Castro presides over all three organs. He is the First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and president of both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Article 61 of the constitution declares that citizens' freedoms cannot be exercised "contrary to the existence and objectives of the socialist state." The OAS Human Rights Commission reported in 1983 that "the Communist Party . . . is a force above the state itself."

The constitution specifies that the courts shall be "a system of state organs independent of all others." All courts, including the People's Supreme Court, however, are subordinated to the National Assembly of People's Government and thus to the Council of State.

Administratively, Cuba is divided into 14 provinces plus the city of Havana and 169 municipalities.

## Principal Government Officials

President, Councils of State<sup>1</sup> and Ministers; First Secretary of the Communist Party<sup>2</sup>; and Commander in Chief (FAR)—Fidel Castro Ruz  
 First Vice President, Councils of State and Ministers; Second Secretary of the Communist Party; General of the Army—Raul Castro

### Ministers

Armed Force (FAR)—Raul Castro  
 Foreign Affairs—Isidoro Malmierca  
 Interior—Ramiro Valdes

Ambassador to the United Nations—Oscar Oramas

## POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Communist Party is Cuba's only legal political party. All pre-1959 political parties and political organizations have disappeared, and Cuba's trade union, women's federation, and youth and other mass organizations have been reshaped, primarily to direct public energies toward the goals established by government and party.

The party is composed of the prerevolution Communist Party of Cuba (in existence since 1925 under a variety of names), which was absorbed, with two other main political groups supporting the revolution, into a new political entity formed by Castro in July 1961. Further refinements resulted in the emergence in late 1965 of the present Cuban Communist Party, which held its first congress in 1975. Its Politburo and Central Committee together include most of the country's military and civilian leaders.

## ECONOMY

Since the early 1960s, Cuba's economy has been a centrally planned, nonmarket system in which nearly all economic activity is formulated by a Central Planning Board and executed by large state trusts or enterprises. Basic public services are provided by the state, either

<sup>1</sup>Vice Presidents of the Council of State include: Juan Almeida, Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Ramiro Valdes.

<sup>2</sup>The following, along with Fidel and Raul Castro, are members of the Communist Party Politburo: Juan Almeida, Ramiro Valdes, Guillermo Garcia, Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Pedro Miret, Armando Hart, Sergio del Valle, Jose Ramon Machado, Osmani Cienfuegos, Julio Camacho, Jorge Risquet.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



TO: DAVID DEMAREST

MAY 17th 1989

FROM: **TONY BENEDI**  
**Deputy Director for Scheduling**  
**Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling**

- For Your Information
- For Your Action
- For Your Files
- As Requested
- For Your Comments and Suggestions
- Let's Discuss
- Please Return

COMMENTS:

Could you please see if at Mondays Cuban event the Presidents remarks could have some mention of my father included.

DR. CLAUDIO F. BENEDI

He will be at the event, and as you can see from the attached, he as been involved in the Cuban community all of his life. His work in documenting the "Institutional Violations" in Cuba ( as stated by Pres. Reagan on the attached) is very well known.

David, please let me know what you think!

Many thanks.

*Handwritten note:*  
We can talk to Dr. Claudio Benedi on this.

MEMORIAL NOTE: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RONALD REAGAN, AT THE WHITE HOUSE, ON DECEMBER 8, 1988, BEFORE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SOVIET CAPTIVE NATIONS (LITHUANIAN), AFRICA, ASIA AND THIS HEMISPHERE--DR. CLAUDIO F. BENEDI WAS THE ONLY CITIZEN OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE HONORED AT THE CEREMONY. PRESIDENT REAGAN, HIMSELF, WROTE THIS DEDICATION TO DR. CLAUDIO F. BENEDI, AND RECOGNIZED THE "BENEDI DOCTRINE" ON THE INSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, AND IN DEFENSE OF THE HUMAN BEING, HIS LIBERTY AND DIGNITY. THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION PROVIDES STRONG SUPPORT TO THE CAUSES OF AMERICAN SECURITY AND FREEDOM FOR CUBA AND NICARAGUA.

To Dr. Claudio F. Benedi - Many thanks for your dedication & pioneering work in Denouncing & Documenting the "Institutional Violations" of Human Rights in Cuba.  
Ronald Reagan

## Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights Day, and Human Rights Week, 1988

*By the President of the United States of America*

### A Proclamation

The second week in December commemorates two important dates. December 10 marks the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and December 15 marks the date almost 200 years ago when, in 1791, the first 10 amendments to the United States Constitution—our Bill of Rights—were ratified.



AND BENEDI 7

## In Human Rights

Claudio Benedí was born in Santiago de Cuba. He received his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Havana as well as a Doctorate in Economics, Political and Social Sciences.

Dr. Benedí served as an economic and legal adviser to private banks in Cuba from 1948 to 1960 and to the Central Bank of Honduras from 1960 to 1963. He was founder and Director of Coffee Growers of America, based in El Salvador, from 1948 to 1958, and was Secretary of the Board of Directors of the Pan American Coffee Bureau based in Wall Street, in New York City.

Claudio Benedí was co-founder with Guillermo Martínez Márquez of the Organization of American States' Commission on Human Rights before which he has repeatedly condemned violations by Castro's government. The institutional violation of human rights is that which is committed by the Cuban socialist state, by decree, on its citizens, denying them all basic freedoms. The state is empowered by the socialist constitution published in the 1976 Official Gazette. Claudio Benedí's denouncement and documentation of such practices is internationally known as the Benedí Doctrine.

This year the World Committee 'Pedro Luis Boitel' Pro-Cuba's Political Prisoners, nominated Claudio Benedí for the Nobel Peace Prize, for his defense of human rights.



CLAUDIO BENEDI

JUNTA PATRIOTICA CUBANA,  
AREA METROPOLITANA DE WASHINGTON,  
Merrifield, VA.

("Pacta Sunt Servanda"—"One Agrees Freely, But Is Bound by the Agreement", F. Francisco de Vitoria)

Honorable Chairman of the Fifteenth Period of Sessions of the General Assembly, Organization of American States (OAS).

Honorable Chancellors, Ambassadors and Representatives of the Republics of the Americas.

**DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAS:** In complying with a historical duty, at the same time we are exercising a right, it is our privilege to address you, and through your intercession the governments and peoples of the Americas, to reiterate, as participants in the Inter-American System and persons born in the Cuban State, the position of the Cuban people and its rights in the concert of the American nations, of which we are a part. We do this, besides, in the condition of representatives and on behalf of the organizations comprised in the Cuban Patriotic Board.

As you well know and we have reiterated, the Cuban State, from which we derive, is a part of the Inter-American System and a member of the Organization of American States (OAS). What is excluded is the current Marxist-Leninist regime, because of its being incompatible with the Inter-American System.

The Cuban State has underwritten, together with the States of the Americas that you represent, those treaties, covenants, agreements and resolutions that are in force in the Inter-American System, the oldest and most representative of all regional systems in the world. But both you and we "are bound by the agreement."

In the Cuban State is a member of the Organization of American States, as it is recorded in its covenants and has been widely recognized in your previous deliberations, such a state must, of necessity, have some manner of representation. "We are the voices of those who have none."

The current totalitarian Cuban regime is a true satellite, that represents in our hemisphere the Soviet neo-colonialism, but never a representative of the Cuban people, with which is even more incompatible than with the Inter-American System, because it runs counter to its history, traditions, culture, morals and idiosyncrasy. That regime is an instrument for the interference of an extra-continental power (the Soviet Union) in the internal affairs of the Americas.

In the Seventh Consultation Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Americas, assembled in accordance with the Treaty of Rio, which is as the NATO of the Americas, in San Jose, Costa Rica, it was stated:

"1. The intervention or threat of intervention, albeit conditioned, on the part of an extra-continental power, in the internal affairs of any Republic of the Americas, is hereby condemned, and we underline that acceptance of the threat of intervention from an extra-continental power by any American State endangers the solidarity and security of the Americas, obligating the Organization of American States (OAS) to condemn it and to reject it also with an equally energetic attitude."

Nobody has the right, then, because of shortsightedness, ineptitude or cowardice, or rather due to naïve neutrality, to ignore that the satellite regime of Castro has "accepted the threat of intervention from an extra-continental power" (the Soviet Union) and that "he has endangered the solidarity and security of the Americas." What should

your attitude be, in the compliance of your own agreements?

The Ninth Consultation Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations, assembled in accordance with the Treaty of Rio, and convened at the see of the OAS in Washington, D.C., in 1964, agreed upon the following:

"1. That the present government of Cuba, since its installation in 1959, has developed, supported and otherwise conducted a policy of intervention in the American Continent, with methods, propaganda, provision of funds and training for sabotage and guerrilla operations, supplying armaments and assisting those movements that tend to the subversion of national institutions through the use of force, in order to install communist regimes . . ."

"2. That said assistance to subversion generally adopts the form of a political aggression . . ."

Therefore, the Ninth Consultation Meeting resolve:

"a. To condemn the current government of Cuba as an aggressor and because of its intervention in the internal affairs of other States, violating their territories and sovereignties."

That condemnation, approved by the American States that you represent in this Assembly, is in force, and it becomes even more necessary and urgent that when it was approved that it be strictly complied with, since the current government of Cuba is a threat that imperils the other American States and has made a mockery of those agreements and resolutions that you have approved. It also continues to intervene in the internal affairs of other States, violating their sovereignties, and is going to continue doing that, because it is consistent with its Marxist-Leninist nature.

The Soviet Union has provided the Cuban regime with billions worth of armaments, in an arms race unparalleled in the Americas. Only last year it shipped 64,000 tons of armaments to Cuba, that not only have been utilized to arm a million members of the militias, but also to be exported to other countries in this hemisphere, such as Nicaragua, Grenada and the communist guerrillas in El Salvador. Last November, U.S. reconnaissance planes verified that Soviet-bloc ships arrived in Cuba loaded with armaments, unloading some and transferring others to Nicaraguan ships, especially heavy weapons. Therefore, the arms race is ongoing, even on the eve of this Assembly.

Cuba has, as it has been verified and you well know, a base for nuclear submarines at Cienfuegos Bay, where reportedly Soviet nuclear submarines have been repaired. Now it has been publicly stated that the Cuban regime is building, precisely in Cienfuegos, a nuclear plant, presumably for peaceful uses, but there exists the danger that it can be devoted to bellicose uses.

The Cuban communist regime has now an extense variety of warplanes, Mig-23 and Mig-27, capable of transporting nuclear warheads. The Mig-27 have a long-range capability and are much more dangerous, as carriers of offensive nuclear weapons, than the IL-28 that were in Cuba in 1962 and triggered the nuclear missile crisis. Besides, there are in Cuba over 12 Soviet Bear-class bombers (TU-95-D & TU-95-F). Bombers Bear TU-95-F are intended for anti-submarine warfare and are capable of attacking targets both on land and in the sea. The Soviet Union has these bombers permanently in Cuba now. Besides, the Soviets have built eleven airfields for warplanes.

It has been verified that Golf- and Echo-class nuclear submarines have visited Cuba in several instances.

### SUPPORTING THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE TREATIES

• Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I submit for the Record two documents recently presented to the Organization of American States by Dr. Claudio Benedi, Washington director of the Junta Patriotica Cubana.

Mr. President, these are excellent statements outlining the importance of the Monroe Doctrine, the fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy. America should be enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and the Symms Cuba Resolution in Central America today. The Monroe Doctrine is the essence of American foreign policy, and the Symms amendment reaffirming it overwhelmingly passed both Houses of Congress in 1982 and again in 1983. It is important to emphasize that the Symms Cuba Resolution simply reaffirms the fundamental principle of American foreign policy. The U.S. Congress is strongly on record as opposing Soviet subversion and aggression in the Western Hemisphere, and opposing a Soviet military base in Cuba. We are strongly in favor of self-determination for freedom-loving Cubans.

These documents were presented by Dr. Benedi to the OAS as a statement representing the freedom-loving Cuban people. The presentation was made at the recent OAS meeting in Cartagena de Indias in Colombia. One of Dr. Benedi's main recommendations is that the Castro regime in Cuba be prevented from ever rejoining the OAS as a voting member. I applaud Dr. Benedi's honorable efforts on behalf of freedom-loving Cubans everywhere, and I support Dr. Benedi's valiant efforts to defend liberty and human rights. Indeed, Dr. Benedi is one of America's bravest and most effective freedom fighters.

In addition, Mr. President, I also ask that two additional documents, one dated April 15, 1986, and the other dated April 18, 1986, be printed in the Record. These two documents deal with the "Benedi Doctrine"—the institutional suppression of human rights in Communist totalitarian Cuba.

The material follows:



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1988

GREETINGS TO EVERYONE ASSEMBLED FOR THE EIGHTH ANNUAL  
CONVENTION OF THE JUNTA PATRIOTICA CUBANA

Dear Friends:


Congratulations on your eighth annual convention.

Your many efforts and accomplishments in behalf of liberty and human rights throughout the Western hemisphere are of great importance to all freedom loving peoples. Your dedication and persistence are an example to all of us who are working to export democracy all across the globe.

Dr. Claudio Benedi is just one member of your group whose work has influenced thousands of individuals in this important endeavor. Dr. Benedi's writings on the "institutional violations" of human rights have gone a long way toward defining the problems we face; I am convinced that -- though the obstacles are many -- our brothers and sisters in Cuba, and throughout the world, will be free one day soon.

Best wishes for a successful conference, and Viva Cuba Libre!

Sincerely,



George Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1988

Greetings to everyone assembled for the Eighth Annual Convention of the Junta Patriotica Cubana.

You can be proud of your many efforts in support of American security and of the need for liberty and respect for human rights in Cuba and everywhere throughout the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world. Your understanding of freedom and its blessings, and of the human cost of their absence, is both personal and profound -- as exemplified by the works of your members, such as those of **Dr. Claudio Benedi about institutional violations of human rights by Cuban and other communist regimes.** Your determination reminds mankind that the desire for liberty can never be quenched; that is a tribute to you, a cause for hope, and a blessing for all of us.

You have my very best wishes now and for the years to come. God bless you, and Viva Cuba Libre.

*Ronald Reagan*

Union City, N.J., Miercoles, Abril 29 de 1987

**AHORA**

# Nominado Benedi al Nobel

## Creó doctrina en derechos humanos

El Comité Mundial Pedro Luis Boitel Pro Presos Políticos Cubanos ha nominado al Dr. Claudio F. Benedi, como candidato al Premio Nobel de la Paz, por su defensa de los derechos humanos.

Benedi ha denunciado lo que el llama "violación institucional de los derechos humanos en Cuba".

De acuerdo con Benedi la violación institucional es aquella que se comete en la constitución y en las leyes.

El afirma que en Cuba se violan los derechos humanos consagrados en la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, así como la Declaración Universal de los Derechos del Hombre, de las Naciones Unidas.

La "violación institucional de los derechos humanos" ha sido llamada en América y Europa la "Doctrina Benedi", y ha sentado un precedente en el Derecho Internacional Americano.

Benedi afirma que la violación

institucional en Cuba evidencia la contradicción entre el sistema marxista-leninista y el sistema democrático vigente en el mundo occidental.

Hay, afirma el Dr. Benedi, "una transculturación, que impone por la fuerza el estado totalitario, valores y principios extraños y ajenos a la civilización judeo-cristiana, cuya axiología de valores esta vigente en el mundo libre".

El nominado ha desarrollado su labor desde que se constituyó la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA).

De acuerdo con el CMLPB, las denuncias sobre la violación de los derechos humanos en Cuba, ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) de la OEA, y en otros foros, hechas por el Dr. Benedi, han logrado, entre otras cosas:

Salvar vidas de presos y presas políticos cubanos.

Aliviar las torturas y mejorar

el tratamiento a los presos y presas políticos cubanos.

Demostrar la a-juricidad del sistema totalitario implantado en Cuba.

Llamar la atención sobre la situación de aquellos adversarios del régimen cubano declarados "no personas", los cuales carecen de derechos y protección.

Las denuncias del Dr. Benedi nutrieron siete informes sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Cuba.

A solicitud del Dr. Benedi la OEA ha acordado elaborar un octavo informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Cuba. La Comisión ha aprobado, además, varias resoluciones condenando al régimen cubano, entre ellas la resolución sobre Pedro Luis Boitel, uno de por los menos siete prisioneros cubanos que murieron en huelgas de hambre.

Debido a sus informes, el gobernante cubano Fidel Castro fue acusado en la Decimo Sexta

Asamblea General de la OEA, celebrada en Guatemala.

Los alegatos y denuncias de Benedi, tanto ante la comisión de la OEA como ante otros organismos e instituciones en este hemisferio han ayudado positivamente a crear una estructura jurídica para tutelar y proteger los derechos humanos en varios países. Los principios básicos de los alegatos jurídicos de Benedi, han servido de basamentos y orientaciones en la defensa de los derechos humanos en América y en el mundo, según alega el CMLPB.

La universalidad e indivisibilidad en la defensa de los derechos humanos inherentes a la dignidad de la persona humana y trascendente, señala el CMLPB, lo hacen acreedor a esa nominación, puesto que la posición del Dr. Benedi, alcanza una dimensión material y espiritual, no lograda por otros americanos en la lucha por la vigencia de los derechos humanos.

Se le atribuye a Benedi la frase "Salve una vida en las aguas del



Dr. Claudio F. Benedi

Caribe", cuando miles de cubanos trataban de huir clandestinamente de Cuba. Muchos murieron en el empeño pero se salvaron al cuando los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y de tres países de América movilizaron embarcaciones comerciales y militares para recoger las aguas del Caribe a los que ha-

El Dr. Claudio F. Benedi abogado, economista, internacionalista, escritor, orador, conferencista, periodista y diácono la Iglesia Católica.

May 20, 1988

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
DURING CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY  
CEREMONY

The Roosevelt Room

1:03 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Speaking for myself, and I think speaking for the Vice President also, it gives us great pleasure to join with the Cuban-American community in commemorating the anniversary of a great day in the cause of a free Cuba: the establishment of the Cuban Republic, 86 years ago.

On that day, May 20, 1902, the bonds of friendship between the peoples of Cuba and of the United States were reaffirmed. The birth of the Cuban Republic was the culmination of a long and arduous struggle: of revolts, political imprisonment, executions, and exile.

Today, that passion for a free Cuba remains alive in the hearts of thousands of Cubans everywhere. Cuban-Americans have demonstrated what a free people can accomplish unencumbered by tyranny, and I am confident that the time will come when the spirit of freedom will reign in Cuba itself. (Applause.)

And let me just say -- throughout this administration, in good times and bad, I've always known that I could look to the Cuban-American community for support. Your support -- your friendship -- has meant more to me than I can say. Having suffered personally the evils of communism, you have an acute understanding of the danger that communist expansion poses to this hemisphere. (Applause.) You have stood in support of people everywhere who seek freedom, such as the people of Nicaragua.

And let me assure you, as far as this administration is concerned, the freedom of Cuba is a non-negotiable demand. (Applause.) We will never, ever, negotiate away the dream of every Cuban-American -- a dream that I, too, hold in my heart -- that Cuba will again join the family of free and democratic nations.

Only 90 miles of ocean separate the island of Cuba from the United States, but between our governments is an unbridgeable gulf -- the gulf between freedom and tyranny, between respect for human rights and the rejection of individual freedom. "Within the revolution, everything," Castro has proclaimed, "Against the revolution, nothing." Well, "nothing" has meant no freedom of speech, assembly, religion, or economic activity. "Nothing" has increasingly meant a Cuba dependent on subsidies from the Soviet Union to keep its unworkable communist economy from complete ruin.

"Everything" has meant every conceivable cruelty, abuse, and torture -- to the point that Cuba, today, has the worst human rights record in the entire Western Hemisphere. "Everything" means the Cuban political prisons where, writes that brave freedom fighter, Armando Valladares, Castro's prisoners "have been held longer than any other political prisoners in Latin America, perhaps in the world. The violence, repression, and beatings are facts of life for them. And today, at this very moment, hundreds of them are naked, sleeping on the floor."

remains unbroken. If they who suffer so greatly will not negotiate away their freedom with Castro, neither will the United States of America. (Applause.)

Jose Marti said, "One revolution is still necessary: the one that will not end with the rule of its leader. It will be the revolution against revolutions, the uprising of all peaceable men who will become soldiers for once so that neither they nor anyone else will ever have to be a soldier again."

Well, at a time when young Cubans are shipped abroad to advance foreign designs, the rulers in Havana are necessarily worried about the new generation's interest in Marti's message.

In this anniversary of the Cuban Republic, I join a million free Cuban-Americans in reaffirming our solidarity with the long suffering Cuban people. In the heart of the Americas, the long night of totalitarian rule can not endure forever. Long live the dawn of freedom! **Viva Cuba Libre!** (Applause.)

END

1:10 P.M. EDT

*Chris*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDY CARD

FROM:

ANTONIO BENEDINI <sup>AB</sup>

SUBJECT:

SLAIN CUBAN-AMERICAN POLICE OFFICER

Attached please find the file of the first Hialeah Florida police officer slain in the line of duty. As you know my father, Dr. Claudio Benedi, is very active in the Cuban community. He has asked me to set up a tour for the visiting deceased officer's family who will be attending the Peace Officer's Memorial Service on Monday, May 15, 1989.

Upon hearing the story of Officer Emilio F. Miyares, I thought it may be of interest to our speechwriters to consider some mention of a Cuban-American officer killed by a robber in the line of duty. This would go a long way in the Cuban community in Florida and across the country as well as in the law enforcement field. Another positive aspect in touching the Cuban community next week is that Saturday, May 20th, is the 87th Anniversary of Cuba's Independence. Given that on May 20th the President will be in Maine, this recognition is an indirect acknowledgement of the Cuban people and their contributions to our country on this important week.

Please let me know what you think, and if you need any further information.


Many thanks.

HIALEAH POLICE DEPARTMENT  
**NEWS RELEASE**

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OFFICER EMILIO FIDEL MIYARES

PERSONAL DATA



BORN HAVANNA, CUBA, 4/24/59  
AGE 27

MARRIED TO THERESA MIYARES  
CHILDREN:

EMILIO JOSE, AGE 7 YRS.

JESSICA MARIE, AGE 4 YRS.

OFFICER MIYARES STARTED WITH  
THE HIALEAH POLICE DEPARTMENT  
NOVEMBER 30, 1980 AS A COMPLAINT  
OFFICER IN THE COMMUNICATIONS  
SECTION.

GRADUATED FROM THE POLICE ACADEMY  
MAY 13, 1983.

ASSIGNED TO THE NARCOTICS UNIT  
DECEMBER 29, 1985.

ASSIGNED TO MOTORCYCLE SQUAD  
JUNE 29, 1986

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INFORMATION RELEASED BY: SGT. JORGE HIERRO UNIT: MEDIA RELATIONS

DATE: 11/7/86 TIME: 12:45AM (0045HRS)

## Hialeah officer lived for his family

By FELICIA R. LEE  
Herald Staff Writer

Emilio F. Miyares, 27, joined the Hialeah Police department on May 13, 1983. Thursday night he became the first Hialeah police officer to be shot and killed in the line of duty. He was killed with his own revolver.

He was a man described by friends and colleagues as a "good kid" who was well-liked, enjoyed a good laugh and was dedicated to his family.

The 1977 graduate of Hialeah High was married to Teresa and had a son, Emilio Jose, 7, and a daughter, Jessica Marie, 4.

His parents are Ana and Emilio Miyares. He had a brother, Leonardo. A native of Havana, Cuba,



Miyares

Miyares became a U.S. citizen in 1980.

"Why him? Why anybody?" asked fellow officer George Fraga. The two met in their sophomore year in high school. For two years, they shared a gym locker.

"He had a good sense of humor," Fraga said. "He was always playing around and joking around."

"He was a family man, very mature," said Chief Raleigh Jordan. "He loved his job. He was a good officer. As a matter of fact, he was an outstanding officer. He really liked his job and paid the price."

Before he was sworn in, Miyares joined the department as a civilian police officer on Nov. 30, 1980. He was a complaint officer.

Fraga remembers Miyares telling him he had just taken the police officer exam. "It was always in the back of his mind" to become a police officer, Fraga said.

Two and a half years later,

Miyares became a patrol detective. He joined the narcotics unit in December 1983. In June, he transferred to traffic enforcement as a motorcycle officer.

During his three years with the department, Miyares received a commendation for assisting in the arrest of a burglary suspect.

The Rev. Miguel Restrepo, the former pastor at All Angels Episcopal Church, which Miyares attended, remembered the slain officer as an easygoing family man.

"He was friendly, talkative, happy, sincere, very responsive with his family," Restrepo said.

Michael de Jesus Jr., the son of the officer who helped capture the man suspected of shooting Miyares, remembered his friend as "just a great guy, always joking.

De Jesus recently quit his job with the Hialeah police department and joined the fire department. He did so because he feared the violence of his work.

Herald staff writer Desiree F. Hicks contributed to this report.

# Local News

Sunday, November 9, 1986

The Miami Herald

Section B



CAROL GUZY / Miami Herald Staff

At funeral for Hialeah Officer Emilio Miyares, colleague Guillermo Perez is comforted by Barbara Garcia.

# 1,000 officers salute comrade

By CARLOS HARRISON  
Herald Staff Writer

Emilio Miyares had been an altar boy at All Angels Episcopal Church.

He had been to that altar to be confirmed, to be married, and to see his 7-year-old son and 4-year-old daughter baptized.

Saturday, the 27-year-old Hialeah Police officer's flag-draped coffin rested in front of the same altar.

His widow, Teresa, sat beside the casket, silently mouthing his name. His mother sat beside her.

More than 1,000 police officers from 30 departments joined them at the Miami Springs church to honor the first officer to be shot and killed in Hialeah's 61-year history.

Metro-Dade Police covered for Hialeah's officers to allow everyone in the department, including dispatchers, a chance to attend the funeral. Other officers came from as far away as Palm Beach to pay their respects to Miyares.

Mourners filled the church's aisles and pews. Hundreds more spilled out onto the lawn and driveway to listen to the hour-long memorial service over loudspeakers.

Miyares died Thursday night, the bottom of his heart blown away. He had wrestled with a robbery suspect who managed to get Miyares' gun and shoot the kneeling officer three times in the chest.

"Greater love hath no man than this, to give his life for his friend. Officer Emilio Miyares has done that for us. He's given it for his community and for his department," said Hialeah's Acting Police Chief Raleigh Jordan.

Jordan had interviewed Miyares in 1980, when the young man joined the department as a complaint officer in the



Teresa Miyares, officer's widow.

communications section.

Col. Jose Mendez had listened to Miyares' request to become a motorcycle officer in the traffic division.

"Citizens complain that police are busy handling tickets instead of stopping criminals," Mendez said in Spanish in his eulogy. "Emilio stopped a criminal to make this a better place to live. For that, he paid with the dearest price God gave to us."

Mendez broke into open sobs at the end of his remembrance. He cried for the rest of the service.

Miyares was remembered as a family

man who always wore a smile. He grew up on the same Hialeah street as his wife, Teresa, and courted her through high school. They were married at All Angels four months after he graduated from Hialeah High.

"He wanted Momma and the family to have it all and he wanted to give it to them. In this way he let me know they were his purpose in life," said Sgt. Bob Leon. Miyares taught Leon's son to fish.

Officer John Rodriguez Jr. said it was up to Miyares' friends, family and fellow officers to keep his memory alive.

"Together we can hold and keep what Emilio was. We have to always remember and keep Emilio with us. He was a precious gem," Rodriguez said.

The same officers had worked with Miyares and later helped track down the suspects in his slaying. They captured one a block from the home of Miyares' parents, another on Miami Beach.

One of the suspects, Samuel Rivera, remained in good condition at Jackson Memorial Hospital on Saturday recovering from injuries sustained during his capture. His brother Alberto, the second suspect, went to a bond hearing Saturday morning. Bond was denied.


Three hours later in Miami Springs, Miyares' coffin was carried from All Angels church by eight helmeted motorcycle officers. The organist played *The Strife Is Over, The Battle Done*.

Pairs of grieving uniformed police officers embraced each other on the lawn, wiping tears from their eyes. Then they mounted their motorcycles, stepped in their cars and followed the long black hearse to Vista Memorial Park, 14200 NW 57th Ave., where Miyares was buried.

A church bell tolled 39 times, until the hearse was out of sight.

# The Miami News

Friday, November 7, 1986



The Miami News • J. ALBERT DIAZ  
Policeman's relative is consoled at hospital

## Shots end brief career of good cop in Hialeah

**MICHAEL CARRIER**  
Miami News Reporter

Emilio Miyares blended in well with Hialeah's other motorcycle policemen from the minute he donned the shiny, tight mid-calf black boots and the white and black helmet.

He was the epitome of courtesy to motorists he stopped for traffic violations and was recognized by superiors for being dedicated and energetic.

Last night, Hialeah police wept with Miyares' family and neighbors. The 27-year-old "good cop" was dead, killed by a single gunshot to the chest, fired from his own service revolver by a man Miyares had struggled with in a crowded Hialeah shopping mall.

Miyares, the father of a 7-year-old son and 4-year-old daughter, was the first policeman shot to death in the department's 61-year history and the first to die in the line of duty in 20 years.

"They really enjoyed him. He got along with everybody. He was dedicated," Miyares' commander,

Please see SHOOT, 7A

# SHOOT, from 1A

Lt. Wayne Shatas, said of the young lawman's relationship with his brother officers. "His loss is going to be real bad for us."

Hialeah police have captured a man they say shot Miyares and are looking for a second suspect.

Police said the arrested man — who identified himself to police as Samuel Rivera, 20 — is charged with one count of first-degree murder, two counts of armed robbery and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

Though fingerprints on file with the FBI, Hialeah police discovered the suspect also has used the aliases of Alberto Martinez, Alberto Martinez Rivera and Alberto Rivera, listing his age as somewhere between 20 and 23.

Police said Rivera is from Puerto Rico and his last recorded address was in Manhattan, N.Y., three years ago.

Rivera was in Jackson Memorial Hospital today being treated for minor injuries suffered in a car crash after the fatal shooting. He also was being treated for dog bites from a police dog that sniffed him out as he tried to hide, a police spokesman said.

Hialeah officer Michael de Jesus, who fired three shots during the chase, said he thought he wounded the fleeing man. Hospital officials refused to divulge Rivera's injuries.

It was about 6 p.m. yesterday when Miyares and another motorcycle officer, Felix Quintela, roared up to the Dollar General Store in Palm Springs Mall to check out a complaint that two suspicious men were lurking in the aisles of the discount store.


Gladys Orr, a store employee, said employees had become worried the two men were going to rob them. They became even more frightened, store employees said, when they noticed what looked like a machine gun in a bag one of the men carried.

Before the police arrived, the men walked out. Miyares and Quintela began searching the area, police said, and sighted the two men at the rear of the mall adjacent to the store.

Hialeah police spokesman Sgt. Jorge Hierro said the two officers had questioned the men briefly when one of them grabbed the bag with the machine gun and fled into the mall. Miyares ran after him. The other man fled and escaped while being chased by Quintela. Police and witnesses said Miyares fought violently in the walkway between a vacant store and the clothing store Almacenes Diaz.

Hialeah resident Joyce Camp-

## Hialeah



bell, who was in the nearby Sunshine Scissors beauty shop, said the man got behind the officer and drew the policeman's service revolver from his holster.

He then fired three times, said Olga Rodriguez, who was also in the beauty shop. "Bang, bang, bang," she said. "The officer fell."

One bullet shattered a plate glass window of the clothing store and another slammed into Miyares' chest and went out his side, police said. As shoppers ducked and merchants ran to close their sliding glass doors, Rodriguez and Campbell watched the man trot away from the fallen Miyares, the policeman's revolver still in his left hand.

"There was shouting and people ducking and that poor policeman was just lying there," Campbell said.

The gunman fled northward out of the mall, and at gunpoint accosted a woman in the parking lot, stealing her Oldsmobile Cutlacs. As backup officers began to arrive, officer Rudy Toth saw the gunman in the Oldsmobile and began the chase.

Detective Ed Royal said the driver fled eastward on West 49th Street, firing at officers with Miyares' gun. Weaving through the residential streets and with police converging on him, the suspect slammed into a parked Mercury Marquis near East Fifth Avenue and 45th Street, police said.

Hierro said the man fled the wreck with de Jesus and others in pursuit. De Jesus said he fired twice as the man jumped a fence. Police sealed the area and put a trained dog out to join the search. The dog found Rivera hiding under some patio furniture in somebody's back yard.

The other suspect was described as a Latin male, about 5-foot-10 and 150 pounds. He had a sparse mustache and appeared to have gone several days without shaving, possibly sporting a goatee, police said. He was wearing light-colored pants and a brown and beige shirt, police said.

As his fellow officers hunted his alleged assailants, Miyares was transported to Hialeah Hospital, where more than two dozen devastated relatives and friends began to gather. The motorcycle officer, who joined the force in 1980 as a civilian in the communications section, died shortly after arrival.

Back at the mall, shoppers gaped at Miyares' boots, gunbelt and helmet strewn across the blood-stained floor long after he was carried away. The bag and the machine gun were recovered at the scene.

Motorcycle officers on the evening shift were dismissed early. They and other policemen gathered in small groups in a parking lot at the hospital, sitting on car hoods in the cool night — talking about the friend they had lost. Quintela was extremely upset, they said. Inside, sobbing relatives tried to console one another.

"This is just a terrible, terrible thing. It's tough," said Hierro, who had accompanied Miyares' distraught wife, Theresa, from the mall to the hospital.

"You always know this can happen, but it doesn't help you prepare for it when it actually does," Lt. Shatas added. And he looked down at the ground and turned and walked away.

# LOCAL NEWS

Wednesday, July 8, 1987

The Miami Herald

Section B



MICHEL duCILLE / Miami Herald Staff

Teresa Miyares, wife of slain officer Emilio Miyares, wipes away a tear as verdict is read.

## Man convicted of gunning down Hialeah cop in shopping mall

By JAY DUCASSI  
Herald Staff Writer

Samuel Rivera, who shot and killed a Hialeah policeman with the officer's own gun and claimed it was self-defense, was convicted of first-degree murder Tuesday.



Miyares

The jury took four hours to convict Rivera after a week-long trial and will return Thursday to recommend a sentence. Prosecutors are seeking the electric chair.

"We had a very good self-defense argument, but a police officer was the person killed. In these cases, public indignation sometimes outweighs hard evidence," said court-appointed defense lawyer Ron Guralnick.

Rivera claimed that officer Emilio Miyares, 29, struck him with his revolver before trying to arrest him as a suspect in an attempted robbery at Hialeah's Palm Springs Mall. Rivera said he grabbed the officer's gun during the ensuing struggle and shot the policeman because he feared for his life.

But four witnesses who saw the Nov. 6 shooting testified that Miyares never drew his gun and told Rivera to calm down moments before the shooting.

The jury "wouldn't buy that a nine-time convicted felon was the only person who told the truth," said Assistant State Attorney Gary Rosenberg, who helped prosecute the case.

Besides murder, the 12 jurors found Rivera guilty of armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, robbery, armed burglary, carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony.

Rivera, 22, dressed in a bright print shirt and white slacks,

showed no emotion as the verdict was read.

The victim's widow, Teresa Miyares, buried her face in her hands and wept when the verdict was read. She refused to talk to reporters afterward. Friends said she did not want to talk until after the sentencing phase.

Miyares also left behind a 7-year-old son and a 4-year-old daughter.

According to prosecutors, Miyares, a motorcycle officer, confronted Rivera after getting a call about a robbery attempt at a Dollar General store at the mall.

The officer chased Rivera through the mall. Rivera said he ran because he was holding a gym bag with a semiautomatic pistol and two clips with 69 bullets inside. Rivera said he and his brother Albert had bought the weapon from a man on the street shortly before the shooting.

Rivera said he threw down the bag moments before the struggle



Samuel Rivera: Said he acted in self-defense.

with the officer began.

During closing arguments Tuesday, Guralnick said that Rivera had meant to kill the officer, he would have used the gun he had just purchased.

After the shooting, prosecutors said, Rivera ran into the mall parking lot, held the officer's gun to a woman's head and stole her car. After a chase, he was arrested by officers who tracked him to the yard of a home.

"We'll appeal, no doubt," Guralnick said. "I hope the jury has the good sense to understand that this is not a premeditated murder, that it doesn't deserve the death penalty."

# Officer's killer sentenced to death

By PATRICK MAY  
Herald Staff Writer

Samuel Rivera was sentenced Tuesday to die in the electric chair for killing a Hialeah police officer last fall during a struggle over the policeman's gun in a busy shopping mall.

"Your conduct was that of an urban terrorist," Circuit Judge Martin Greenbaum told Rivera, 23. The judge, passing his first death sentence in his three years on the circuit bench, called the murder of officer Emilio Miyares "an amoral, predatory act, debased in nature, cold and calculated."

About 80 people, many of them Hialeah officers, jammed the small courtroom.

"Finally justice has come through," motorcycle officer Suzanne Boucher, 25,

said in the hallway. "He had no defense. I hope he rots in hell."

Teresa Miyares sat silently throughout the hearing, six feet from the man who killed her husband Nov. 6.

Of the sentence, she said: "I think it was fair. At least he's not coming out on the streets again. At least he'll never put anyone through the suffering I've been through."

Rivera was convicted July 7 of killing Miyares, the father of two, during a struggle over the officer's gun in Hialeah's Palm Springs Mall.

Prosecutors Malcolm Purow and Gary Rosenberg said Rivera and his brother, Albert, had tried to rob a Dollar General discount store at the mall moments before

confronting the officer in the lobby.

Rivera grabbed the officer's gun. As Miyares was on his knees with arms raised, Rivera fired five times. Two shots went wild. Three hit the policeman.

Rivera asked Greenbaum to spare his life. "I am sorry the officer died. I know he has children and I am sorry. Twenty-five years in prison is a great enough punishment. Please pardon my life."

Rivera's mother and father sat nearby, but left quickly after the sentencing.

Fellow officers Tuesday described Miyares as a mild-mannered, trusting cop who always gave people the benefit of the doubt.

"He was a fantastic police officer," said Maj. Anthony Martin, a friend of Miyares who trained him to be a motorcycle officer.

"He was a very trusting person. That was his downfall. He was kind of like a puppy dog who you had to train to be a watchdog."

Col. Raleigh Jordan, acting police chief in Hialeah, said modern police training places too much emphasis on public relations and that officers' actions are under such scrutiny that their on-the-job vigilance is sometimes compromised.

"When I was on the streets, we were not that nice to people like Rivera," he said. "Especially in South Florida, when you never know who you're talking to, even on a routine traffic stop.

"The police officer," Jordan said, "stands between the sword and the wall."

## Hialeah cop slain in mall

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1986



ANDREW INNERARITY / Miami Herald Staff

grieving woman is escorted from Hialeah Hospital after officer died of his wounds.



ANDREW INNERARITY / Miami Herald Staff

Police officer inspects scene where fellow policeman was shot down in Hialeah Thursday night.

# Officer, 27, shot cornering suspect

By STEPHEN J. HEDGES  
*Herald Staff Writer*

A Hialeah police officer was shot and killed with his own gun Thursday evening during a struggle with a robbery suspect inside the Palm Springs Mall in Hialeah.

The suspect was arrested minutes later.

Emilio Miyares, a 27-year-old motorcycle officer, a husband and the father of two, was pronounced dead at Hialeah Hospital shortly after the 6 p.m. shooting. He was the first Hialeah officer shot and killed in the line of duty.

The robbery suspect, who fled in a blue Oldsmobile Cutlass and led police on a chase through Hialeah, was captured by an off-duty officer in a residential back alley, according to police. He was found hiding under outdoor furniture on the patio of a home at 560 E. 46th St., police said. He was taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital and was listed in stable condition with dog bites and wounds suffered in a car crash.

Please turn to COP / 19A

# Police officer is fatally shot in Hialeah mall

COP / from 1A

occurred.

A witness said she saw Miyares and the suspect struggle and fall.

"I hear a commotion, and I turn and I see the police officer coming out with the guy and they're arguing," said Mildred Lareano, an 18-year-old St. Thomas University student who was shopping at the mall. "I see them arguing all the way down the hallway, and then all of a sudden they fall down on the floor. The next thing I know I hear three shots. The guy stands up. He looks at the gun and runs out the door."

Police said they rushed to the mall, at 555 W. 49th St., after an employee at the Dollar Store called and said two suspicious-looking men had just walked in. Miyares and Officer Felix Quintela, also a motorcycle patrolman, stopped the two men in back of the mall, according to Maj. Michael Russo. They asked to see identification. Both suspects said they didn't have any and then bolted.

One ran away from the mall, police said. But a second man, clad in white pants and shirt and carrying a blue nylon gym bag, ran toward a set of loading docks. Miyares gave chase on his motorcycle, according to a Builder's Square employee who was on the loading dock. The employee, who would not give his name, said the suspect ran along the loading dock and into the store. Miyares got off his motorcycle and followed.

Seconds later he emerged, struggling with the suspect but in control, according to Lareano. The man was still carrying the blue bag, which police later said contained a machine-gun pistol. Then the shots rang out.

After the shots were fired, police said the suspect jumped into a 1980 blue Oldsmobile Cutlass and sped out of the mall's parking lot. Police followed the speeding car east on West 49th Street, south on Red Road, and then east on East 45th Street and into a block of homes. Metro-Dade and Opa-locka police joined the pursuit. A Metro-Dade police helicopter took off and rushed to catch up with the speeding car. About 30 police cars responded.

The chase ended with a crash on East 45th Street when the suspect, trying to turn and avoid a police car driving west on East 45th Street, slammed into a Mercury Marquis.

The suspect, apparently armed with Miyares' revolver, climbed out of the Cutlass and ran down an alley, police said. Police cars circled the block, stopped and sealed off the area. A crowd quickly gathered.

Off-duty Officer Michael de Jesus, 55, gave chase.

"As he went over one fence I ordered him to stop," de Jesus said. "He turned and pointed the revolver at me and I fired a shot. He kept running. I called for him to stop again. I fired two more shots.

"I thought he was hit because he fell over the second fence, but he kept running. He ran into a yard ... and dived into some bushes.

Police dogs caught up with the man, hiding under patio furniture.

"I understand one of the dogs did a pretty good job on him," de Jesus said.


Domingo Fiallo, who lives at 560 E. 46th St., was home when the bleeding suspect ran into his back yard.

"We heard the commotion and saw the police cars and heard three shots," Fiallo said. "We saw a policeman who told us to stay inside the house and stay down. We were afraid. He could have entered the house and taken us hostage."

The shooting suspect, described by police as about 22 years old, was taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital.

A police officer guarding him said the suspect had dog bites and other wounds. He said the man wasn't cooperating and "already tried to run once" while at the hospital.

Paramedics caring for Miyares at the mall had urgently called for



VIVIEN E. RIPPE/Miami Herald Staff

Air Rescue One, Metro-Dade's emergency helicopter. It was under repair and not available. They took Miyares to Hialeah Hospital by ambulance. Later Maj. Michael Russo, who spoke with doctors, said the helicopter probably wouldn't have helped.

"I don't think anything would have saved him," he said.


Miyares, father of a 7-year-old son and 4-year-old daughter, died shortly after he was rushed into the operating room. At Hialeah Hospital, a crowd of officers, friends and family gathered and huddled in hushed but emotion-filled groups near the emergency room.

"He was a family man, very mature," said Police Chief Raleigh Jordan. "He loved his job. He really liked it, and he paid the price."

Herald staff writers Tina Montalvo, John Garcia, Felicia R. Lee, Desiree F. Hicks, Jay Gayoso and Steve Rothaus contributed to this report.

# The Miami News

Friday Afternoon, November 7, 1986



Door was shattered by one of the shots, and officer's helmet was left behind where he fought with suspect


Special to The Miami News - JOE RAEDLE

## 2 arrested in killing of Hialeah policeman

MICHAEL CARRIER

Miami News Reporter

Police today arrested a second man in the shooting death of Hialeah policeman Emilio Miyares, who was killed during a struggle with a robbery suspect in a crowded shopping mall.



Miyares

Alberto Rivera was arrested about 5 a.m. at his apartment at 1760 Normandy Isle Drive, where he lives with his wife and two children, said Hialeah police Sgt. Jorge Hierro. Rivera, who did not resist arrest, was charged by police with first-degree murder and burglary, Hierro said.

Rivera's brother, Samuel Rivera, 20, was arrested yesterday shortly after the fatal shooting and charged with one count of first-degree murder, two counts of armed robbery and one count of possession of a firearm during the com-

Please see SHOOT, 7A

# SHOOT, from 1A

mission of a felony.

Detectives said today they believe the Rivera brothers had been checking out the Dollar General store at Palm Springs Mall for a robbery. A bag found at the shooting scene, believed to have been carried by one of the brothers, contained a KG-9 machine gun, Hierro said.

Miyares, 27, a Hialeah policeman for six years, was killed by a single gunshot to the chest. The fatal shot allegedly was fired by Samuel Rivera with the patrolman's own service revolver as the two men struggled inside the Hialeah mall at about 6 p.m. yesterday, Hierro said.

Miyares, the father of a 7-year-old son and 4-year-old daughter, was the first policeman shot to death in the department's 61-year history and the first to die in the line of duty in 20 years.

Today, the flag at Hialeah police headquarters flew at half-staff. Last night, Hialeah police wept with Miyares' family and neighbors.


"They really enjoyed him. He got along with everybody. He was dedicated," Miyares' commander, Lt. Wayne Shatas, said of the young lawman's relationship with his brother officers. "His loss is going to be real bad for us."

Samuel Rivera is from Puerto Rico, has been in Miami about a month and may have been living with his brother's family, said Hialeah Lt. Douglas Foulk. He was unemployed, Foulk said. Rivera's last recorded address was in Manhattan, N.Y., three years ago.

Samuel was arrested numerous times in New York on charges including armed robbery, narcotics possession, larceny and dealing in stolen property, Foulk said. Hialeah detectives did not know the outcome of any of the New York cases, he said.

Samuel has used the aliases of Alberto Martinez, Alberto Martinez Rivera and Alberto Rivera, listing his age as somewhere between 20 and 23, police said.

He was in Jackson Memorial Hospital today being treated for minor injuries suffered in a car crash after the fatal shooting. He also was being treated for dog



bites from a police dog that sniffed him out as he tried to hide, a police spokesman said.

Hialeah officer Michael de Jesus, who fired three shots during the chase, said he thought he wounded the fleeing man. Hospital officials refused to divulge Samuel Rivera's injuries.

It was about 6 p.m. yesterday when Miyares and another motorcycle officer, Felix Quintela, roared up to the Dollar General Store in Palm Springs Mall to check out a complaint that two suspicious men were lurking in the aisles of the discount store.

Gladys Orr, a store employee, said employees had become worried the two men were going to rob them. They became even more frightened, store employees said, when they noticed what looked like a machine gun in a bag one of the men carried.

Before the police arrived, the men walked out. Miyares and Quintela began searching the area, police said, and sighted the two men at the rear of the mall adjacent to the store.

Sgt. Hierro said the two officers had questioned the men briefly when one of them grabbed the bag with the machine gun and fled into the mall. Miyares ran after him. The other man, now believed by police to have been Alberto Rivera, fled and escaped while being chased by Quintela. Police and witnesses said Miyares fought violently in the walkway between a vacant store and the clothing store Almacenes Diaz.

Hialeah resident Joyce Campbell, who was in the nearby Sun-

shine Scissors beauty shop, said the man got behind the officer and drew the policeman's service revolver from his holster.

He then fired three times, said Olga Rodriguez, who was also in the beauty shop. "Bang, bang, bang," she said. "The officer fell."

One bullet shattered a plate glass window of the clothing store and another slammed into Miyares' chest and went out his side, police said. As shoppers ducked and merchants ran to close their sliding glass doors, Rodriguez and Campbell watched the man trot away from the fallen Miyares, the policeman's revolver still in his left hand.

"There was shouting and people ducking and that poor policeman was just lying there," Campbell said.

Samuel Rivera fled northward out of the mall, and at gunpoint accosted a woman in the parking lot, stealing her Oldsmobile Cutlass. As backup officers began to arrive, officer Rudy Toth saw Rivera in the Oldsmobile and began the chase.

Detective Ed Royal said Rivera fled eastward on West 49th Street, firing at officers with Miyares' gun. Weaving through the residential streets and with police converging on him, the suspect slammed into a parked Mercury Marquis near East Fifth Avenue and 45th Street, police said.

Hierro said the suspect fled the wreck with de Jesus and others in pursuit. De Jesus said he fired twice as the man jumped a fence. Police sealed the area and put a trained dog out to join the search. The dog found Rivera hiding under



Slain patrolman's gunbelt and boots lie on mall floor as police discuss the case

The Miami News - J. ALBERT DIAZ

some patio furniture in somebody's back yard.

The second suspect, Alberto Rivera, allegedly fled to a vacant residence at 514 W. 46th St., where changed clothes, then called a taxi which took him to his Miami Beach apartment, Hierro said.

As his fellow officers hunted his alleged assailants, Miyares was transported to Hialeah Hospital, where more than two dozen devastated relatives and friends began to gather. The motorcycle officer, who joined the force in 1980 as a civilian in the communications

section, died shortly after arrival.

Back at the mall, shoppers gaped at Miyares' boots, gunbelt and helmet strewn across the blood-stained floor long after he was carried away. The bag and the machine gun were recovered at the scene.

Motorcycle officers on the evening shift were dismissed early. They and other policemen gathered in small groups in a parking lot at the hospital, sitting on car hoods in the cool night — talking

about the friend they had lost. Quintela was extremely upset, they said. Inside, sobbing relatives tried to console one another.

"This is just a terrible, terrible thing. It's tough," said Hierro, who had accompanied Miyares' distraught wife, Theresa, from the mall to the hospital.

"You always know this can happen, but it doesn't help you prepare for it when it actually does," Lt. Shatas added. And he looked down at the ground and turned and walked away.



IS RELEASE

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EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY  
VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH  
CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY LUNCHEON  
MIAMI, FLORIDA  
TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1986

Today, May 20th, is a day of anniversaries.

First, it's the 84th anniversary of Cuban independence -- for which U.S. fighting men like Theodore Roosevelt joined Cuban champions of freedom like Jose Marti in battling to free Cuba from a colonial tyrant.

Today is also your fifth anniversary -- the fifth anniversary of the Cuban American National Foundation. And a proud five years it's been.

In the past half dozen years you've beaten the odds and won the establishment of Radio Marti, which is, by the way, broadcasting my words today.

But you've done more than that. Time and again you've brought home the truth about Castro and his regime to the nation and the world.

And time and again you've stood for the freedom of men and women everywhere... for the cause of freedom fighters from Nicaragua to Angola.

Truth, freedom, democracy -- for more than two centuries this has been the cause of patriots not only in this country but throughout the Americas and it's your cause, as well.

Patriot -- you know, that's a word that describes your chairman, Jorge Mas... your president and the distinguished former Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations, Jose Sorzano... and your executive director, Frank Calzon.

I have great respect for these three Americans. I salute them and I salute this organization and all it stands for -- freedom and democracy, particularly a free and democratic Cuba. That's what I stand for, too.

-more-

I've mentioned two anniversaries. There's one other -- the anniversary of the first broadcast from Radio Marti just one year ago today. Radio Marti has a growing audience inside Cuba. Of course, there's one fellow who doesn't much like it.

Fidel Castro thinks Radio Marti is there to give him Hell. It reminds me of something Harry Truman once said. He said, "I didn't give 'em Hell. I just told them the truth and they thought it was Hell."

On this day of Cuban American anniversaries, I want to talk with you about Cuba and America, and I'd like to start with something here at home, here in Miami.

Anyone who has seen Miami as I have over the years, knows about what writer George Gilder has called the "Cuban Miracle" in America.

He knows about the new businesses that Cuban Americans have started in this city -- over 19,000 by the end of last year.

He knows about the rebirth of Miami that has come from the Cuban love of family, love of work and creative, enterprising spirit.

Because of you, Miami is one of America's most vibrant cities. You're the kind of pioneers and entrepreneurs who have built America from its earliest days. And you're the most eloquent testimony I know to the basic strength and success of America as well as to the basic weakness and failure of communism and Fidel Castro.

Think of this. Today there are one million Cubans living in the United States. There are 10 million Cubans living in Cuba. Same culture. Same heritage. But the one million Cubans in the United States produce twice as much wealth each year as all 10 million Cubans living in Cuba. That tells the failure of Castro. There's more.

In 1958 Cuba was the fourth wealthiest country in this hemisphere in terms of earnings-per-person. Today, after 27 years of Castro, it's 16th, behind such countries as Panama, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago.

In 1958 a baby was less likely to die as an infant in Cuba than a baby born in Spain, Puerto Rico, German or Italy. Today the Cuban baby is more likely to die.

Under Castro, Cuba has had more than 24 years of food rationing, but just two years ago Castro called for "ten years of austerity."

It reminds me of a joke that I've heard that Russians tell each other... at least when the secret police aren't around. It goes -- question: what would happen if communists took over the Sahara desert. Answer: in a few years even sand would be in short supply.

In just over a quarter century Castro has taken one of this hemisphere's strongest, most productive economies and ruined it. To keep Cuba afloat, he's become the hired help of the Soviet Union. He gets his sugar subsidy and in return he sends young Cubans to Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua to fight and die for his Soviet bosses. It's a sad truth but under Castro today Cuba has only two big exports -- sugar and death.

But it's not always the death of Cuban soldiers. Castro claims he doesn't sponsor terrorism or drug smuggling into the United States. Yet in the last few years he's been tied to both.

For example, right now, there lives in Cuba under Castro's protection a terrorist who worked for Cuban sponsored and directed Puerto Rican radicals. He is wanted by the FBI. He took with him to Cuba a portion of \$7 million he helped steal 3 years ago from a Connecticut bank.

To take another example, in 1982 four aides to Castro were indicted by a Federal grand jury in Washington on drug smuggling charges. They are safe in Havana, protected from justice.

If Castro isn't helping smugglers, if he isn't helping terrorists, then he shouldn't fear turning any of these people over to stand trial in this country.

Castro has destroyed Cuba's economy and, through subservience to the Soviet Union, humiliated Cuba before the world. But his sins against his country and his countrymen go far deeper than that.

The great Cuban patriot, Jose Martí, wrote, "Everytime a man is deprived of the right to think I feel a child of mine has been murdered." Few regimes in world history have ever tried as thoroughly and brutally to deprive the right to think, few have ever tried to suppress all human rights as have Castro and his henchmen.

In Latin America today, over 90 percent of the people live in democracies or countries going the democratic route. When the President and I entered office the number was fewer than a third.

In 1981, many countries in Latin America had prisoners without names, calls without numbers. In the last six years, most of those calls have been opened and most of those prisoners have gone free.

Not in Cuba. Yes, a few have been released. I know you've heard the testimony of martyrs like Jorge Valls, Armando Valladares and Andres Vargas-Gomez.

The Americas Watch committee reports that there are "more long term political prisoners in Cuba than anywhere else in the world." They say that Cuba is the only country in this hemisphere that doesn't have a domestic human rights monitoring organization and that shuts the door on international human rights groups, as well.

Castro boasts of the medical care all Cubans can receive. But Amnesty International reported in 1985 that, for political prisoners, "The extent of medical care seemed to vary with the conduct of the prisoners." If you don't play along, you don't get treatment.

Today the State Department is releasing a survey of human rights abuses in Cuba. It pulls together many reports about Castro's human rights abuses. And it cites specific cases.

I believe that it's not enough to say generally that Cuba denies freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of religion and the press, or that trials are summary and that in prison men, women and children are tortured. All that is true. But the generality doesn't convey the full truth.

The full truth is in the specifics -- and the specifics I am about to give you are all from the State Department report.

Specifics, such as that in 1984 five teenagers got prison terms of 1 to 5 years for painting on a wall the words, "Viva USA" and "Viva Reagan," and that the year before a young man was executed for belonging to a group of students who painted anti-government slogans on a wall.

Specifics, such as that a writer received 8 years for keeping in a drawer notes to himself that were critical of communism.

Specifics, such as that in 1983 three Jehovah's witnesses were executed for having a mimeograph machine to reprint religious tracts, and that just to own a Christmas tree is to risk imprisonment.

Or that, in 1983, 11 farmers were executed for refusing to sell their crops to the government for less than the cost of growing them and for burning them in front of the government warehouse.

Or that, also in 1983, Castro sought the death penalty against five workers who talked about forming an independent union. When they were given jail terms instead, Castro had the sentences thrown out, a new trial called with a new judge and got his death warrant. Then he imprisoned the judge who had defied him, the defense lawyers and other lawyers who were part of the case. Only after international protest did he commute the death sentence to thirty years in prison, which was what the lawyers got, too.

Specifics, such as that a boy of 12 was thrown into prison on vague political charges, kept there for a sentence of 9 years. When that sentence was up in 1971, he wasn't released. He's still in prison. He was let out for a few minutes in 1984, told he was going to the airport and freedom, then yanked back into his cell.

Specifics such as the physical and psychological brutality to political prisoners, for example keeping them in inhumanly small cells, almost naked, without food, sometimes without water, no word allowed from the outside, suffering beatings and humiliations.

In testimony before an international human rights panel last month, Teresa Mayan, a former Castro prisoner, said that, "If anybody says this all happened years back, I am here to tell them it is still happening."

When I hear people talk about easing the embargo on Cuban goods, I want to ask them, "What about the political prisoners, particularly the very dedicated ones, the plantados?"

We're tightening the embargo, not loosening it. And we're doing the right thing.

And when I hear Americans praise Castro or say that communism is just something that people in, for example, Nicaragua might prefer the same way that they might prefer democracy, I want to ask them what about the children in Castro's prisons? What about the mother whose crime was only wanting to know where her disappeared son had gone? We cannot turn our backs on these people or on the spread of the communist system in our hemisphere.

The voices cry out from behind the prison walls. We must hear them. We must not ignore them. Their cause is our cause... and the cause of all free men and women.

That's why we must help the Contras in Nicaragua, the freedom fighters in Angola and those who struggle against communist tyranny all over the world.

Castro once said, "History will absolve me." History won't absolve him. History has never absolved a tyrant. History is on the side of freedom and democracy... for history is the record of the human spirit as it combats the forces of evil in this world.

I believe in the spirit of man. I believe that freedom and justice will ultimately prevail. I look to a day when this hemisphere is free and democratic from the Arctic Circle to Terra del Fuego... to a day when every young American of whatever country can look forward to the opportunities in life that Cubans in the United States have used so well... to a day when we see an open economy and a free government, freedom of worship and freedom of speech, freedom of the press in a free, strong, proud and democratic Havana.

Viva Cuba libre. Vayan con dios. Muchas gracias, mis amigos.

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
# Familiar Quotations

*A collection of passages, phrases and  
proverbs traced to their sources in  
ancient and modern literature*

FIFTEENTH AND 125TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION  
REVISED AND ENLARGED

## John Bartlett

*Edited by EMILY MORISON BECK  
and the editorial staff of Little, Brown and Company*



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## Markham — Martí

- 1 A man to match the mountains<sup>1</sup> and the sea.  
*Lincoln, The Man of the People*  
[1901], st. 1
- 2 The color of the ground was in him, the red  
earth,  
The smack and tang of elemental things.<sup>2</sup>  
*Ib. st. 2*
- 3 He went down  
As when a lordly cedar, green with boughs,  
Goes down with a great shout upon the hills,  
And leaves a lonesome place against the sky.  
*Ib. st. 4*
- 4 He drew a circle that shut me out—  
Heretic, rebel, a thing to flout.  
But Love and I had the wit to win:  
We drew a circle that took him in.  
*Outwitted*

## George Moore

1852-1933

- 5 After all there is but one race—human-  
ity.  
*The Bending of the Bough*  
[1900], act III
- 6 The difficulty in life is the choice.  
*Ib. IV*
- 7 The wrong way always seems the more rea-  
sonable.  
*Ib.*
- 8 A man travels the world over in search of  
what he needs and returns home to find it.  
*The Brook Kerith* [1916], ch. 11

## Henry Van Dyke

1852-1933

- 9 Raise the stone, and thou shalt find me;  
cleave the wood and there am I.<sup>3</sup>  
*The Toiling of Felix* [1900], pt. I,  
prelude
- 10 So it's home again, and home again, America  
for me.  
My heart is turning home again, and there I  
long to be.  
*America for Me* [1909], st. 2

<sup>1</sup>A man to match his mountains, not to creep / Dwarfed  
and abased below them.—WHITTIER, *Among the Hills*  
[1869], prelude

Bring me men to match my mountains.—SAM WALTER  
FOSS [1858-1911], *The Coming American*

<sup>2</sup>See Beston, 802:17.

<sup>3</sup>See *The Sayings of Jesus*, 126:14.

Raise ye the stone or cleave the wood to make a path  
more fair or flat; / Lo, it is black already with blood some  
Son of Martha spilled for that.—RUDYARD KIPLING, *The*  
*Sons of Martha* [1907]

- 11 Not to the swift, the race:  
Not to the strong, the fight:<sup>4</sup>  
Not to the righteous, perfect grace:  
Not to the wise, the light.  
*Reliance*, st. 1
- 12 The lintel low enough to keep out pomp and  
pride:  
The threshold high enough to turn deceit  
aside.  
*For the Friends at Hurstmont.*  
*The Door*
- 13 Self is the only prison that can ever bind the  
soul.  
*The Prison and the Angel*
- 14 The first day of spring is one thing, and the  
first spring day is another. The difference be-  
tween them is sometimes as great as a month.  
*Fisherman's Luck* [1899], ch. 5

## Edgar Watson Howe

1853-1937

- 15 What people say behind your back is your  
standing in the community.  
*Country Town Sayings* [1911]
- 16 There is nothing so well known as that we  
should not expect something for nothing—  
but we all do and call it Hope.  
*Ib.*

## José Martí

1853-1895

- 17 Life on earth is a hand-to-hand mortal comb-  
at . . . between the law of love and the law  
of hate.<sup>5</sup>  
*Letter* [1881]
- 18 Love is . . . born with the pleasure of  
looking at each other, it is fed with the neces-  
sity of seeing each other, it is concluded with  
the impossibility of separation!  
*Amor* [1881]
- 19 Oh, what company good poets are!<sup>6</sup>  
*Longfellow* [1882]
- 20 A knowledge of different literatures is the  
best way to free one's self from the tyranny  
of any of them.  
*On Oscar Wilde* [1882]
- 21 To beautify life is to give it an object.  
*Ib.*

- 22 Man needs to suffer. When he does not  
have real griefs he creates them. Griefs pu-  
rify and prepare him.  
*Adúltera (Adulterous Thoughts)*  
[1883]

<sup>4</sup>See *Ecclesiastes* 9:11, 27:17, and John Davidson,  
684:13.

<sup>5</sup>Translated by JAMES NELSON GOODSSELL.

<sup>6</sup>See John Adams, 38:15.

## Wilcox — Markham

## Ourget

1935

ure what light is to

*Physiologie de l'Amour*  
*Moderne* [1890]

think, otherwise we  
ng as we have lived.<sup>5</sup>  
*émon de Midi* [1914],  
conclusion

## Bontine

## ne-Graham

1936

es nothing that it does  
e its own reward . . .

hard enough to bear,  
ominy of popular ap-

*Success* [1902]

uld go to any heaven  
horses.

*o Theodore Roosevelt*  
[1917]

Hawk<sup>7</sup>

1931

tter to live in: always  
cool in summer; easy  
nd animals know bet-  
nite man; nobody can  
does not have all the  
e, and good water.

*Statement in old age*

## arkham

1940

f centuries he leans  
s on the ground,  
in his face,  
rden of the world.

*with the Hoe* [1899],<sup>8</sup>  
st. 1

blers in all lands,

ou give to God?

*Ib. st. 3*

ce que la lumière est à la

se, sans quoi l'on finira par

- 1 Terrible times in which priests no longer merit the praise of poets and in which poets have not yet begun to be priests.

*On "El Poema de Niágara" of  
Pérez Bonalde [1883]*

- 2 A nation is not a complex of wheels, nor a wild horse race, but a stride upward concerted by real men.

*A Glance at the North American's  
Soul Today [1886]*

- 3 Men are products, expressions, reflections; they live to the extent that they coincide with their epoch, or to the extent that they differ markedly from it.

*Henry Ward Beecher [1887]*

- 4 A grain of poetry suffices to season a century.

*Dedication of the Statue of  
Liberty [1887]*

- 5 Hatred, slavery's inevitable aftermath.

*Woman Suffrage [1887]*

- 6 Others go to bed with their mistresses; I with my ideas.

*Letter [1890]*

- 7 Man needs to go outside himself in order to find repose and reveal himself.

*Vivir en Sí (To Live in Oneself)  
[1891]*

- 8 Poetry is the work of the bard and of the people who inspire him.

*Poesia [1891]*

- 9 Mankind is composed of two sorts of men — those who love and create, and those who hate and destroy.

*Letter to a Cuban farmer [1893]*

- 10 Men have no special right because they belong to one race or another: the word man defines all rights.

*Mi Raza (My Race) [1893]*

- 11 I wish to leave the world  
By its natural door;  
In my tomb of green leaves  
They are to carry me to die.  
Do not put me in the dark  
To die like a traitor;  
I am good, and like a good thing  
I will die with my face to the sun.

*A Morir (To Die) [1894]*

- 12 This is the age in which hills can look down upon the mountains. *Ib.*

- 13 Only those who hate the Negro see hatred in the Negro.

*Manifesto of Montecristi [1895]*

- 14 The spirit of a government must be that of the country. The form of a government must come from the makeup of the country.

Government is nothing but the balance of the natural elements of a country.

*Our America [1891]*

- 15 I have lived in the monster [the United States] and I know its insides; and my sling is the sling of David.

*Letter to Manuel Mercado [1895]*

### Cecil John Rhodes

1853-1902

- 16 I desire to encourage and foster an appreciation of the advantages which will result from the union of the English-speaking peoples throughout the world, and to encourage in the students from the United States of America an attachment to the country from which they have sprung without I hope withdrawing them or their sympathies from the land of their adoption or birth.

*His will, establishing the Rhodes  
Scholarships*

- 17 Educational relations make the strongest tie. *Ib.*

- 18 So little done—so much to do.<sup>1</sup>

*Last words*

### James A. Bland

1854-1911

- 19 Carry me back to old Virginny,  
There's where the cotton and the corn and  
taters grow;  
There's where the birds warble sweet in the  
springtime,  
There's where this old darky's heart am  
longed to go.

*Carry Me Back to Old Virginny  
[1875], st. 1*

### Sir James George Frazer

1854-1941

- 20 Dwellers by the sea cannot fail to be impressed by the sight of its ceaseless ebb and flow, and are apt, on the principles of that rude philosophy of sympathy and resemblance . . . to trace a subtle relation, a secret harmony, between its tides and the life of man. . . . The belief that most deaths happen at ebb tide is said to be held along the east coast of England from Northumberland to Kent.<sup>2</sup>

*The Golden Bough [1922],<sup>3</sup> ch. 3*

<sup>1</sup> See Tennyson, 532:15.

<sup>2</sup> See Shakespeare, 207:13, and Dickens, 549:3.

<sup>3</sup> Abridged one-volume edition. The original appeared in twelve volumes [1890-1915].

# Fidel Castro and the United States Press

John H. Wallach

**JOHN WALLACH** is the Foreign Affairs Editor for *Hearst Newspapers*. He first visited Cuba in 1970 and has written frequently on his experiences and conditions there.

Mr. Wallach received the Overseas Press Club Award in 1979. He appears frequently on *Meet the Press*, *Washington Week in Review* and reports regularly for *British Broadcasting Corporation* (BBC). He hosted a twelve-part Foreign Policy Association Series on Latin America for *National Public Radio*.

**FIDEL CASTRO AND  
THE UNITED STATES PRESS**

**By John P. Wallach**

**The Cuban American National Foundation**

**1987**

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# Fidel Castro and the United States Press

*John P. Wallach*

A look at Fidel Castro's image in the U.S. press and some reasons that he has generally received such sympathetic coverage. The paper examines Castro's ability to manipulate the press, citing examples and outlining strategies that he has used repeatedly. The paper also discusses the self-interest of the journalist as an incentive for providing sympathetic coverage of Castro and the Cuban revolution.

*One remarkable thing about Castro is how durable his image has been. It is amazing the extent to which American journalists have succeeded in divorcing the political and economic realities from the image. No matter how many refugees come out, how many political prisoners tell the horror stories, Castro's image is untarnished. It is even more incredible that Castro's image is maintained and promulgated by supposedly hard-nosed probing reporters.*

—Dr. Paul Hollander  
University of Massachusetts

## Introduction

When Fidel Castro graduated at seventeen from high school, not an ordinary public school but a private Catholic seminary called Belén, the legend under his photo in the graduation class yearbook concluded: "The ham in him will not be lacking."

There are few modern political heroes on the world stage who have been more successful in manipulating the media coverage of themselves than this bearded, aging revolutionary. One only has to recall the titles of interviews. Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, who filmed more than thirteen hours of interviews with Castro in June and

July 1974, called the book drawn from their experience simply *With Fidel*. The subtitle was *A Portrait of Castro and Cuba*.

Castro and indeed Cuba were secondary. The notion that was paramount was the fact that these two quasi-journalists (Mankiewicz had been a Peace Corps director and later Robert Kennedy's campaign manager; Kirby similarly was a Peace Corps director in Ecuador and then George McGovern's press secretary) had been permitted to peek behind the tightly controlled curtain of censorship that Castro had established by denying to give many previous interviews. Kirby and Mankiewicz were on a first-name basis with Fidel; consequently, the title.

The point is almost too obvious to mention. But consider the title of Barbara Walters's interview as broadcast in a full hour almost three years later. The June 9, 1977, ABC special was called "Fidel Speaks: An Interview with Barbara Walters." This was not to be the mountain coming to Mohammed, but Mohammed coming to the mountain.

How can I forget my own excitement when I was able to get a visa to travel to Cuba in 1972. It was an exotic land, off-limits to almost all of my colleagues. Naturally, the visa I was granted was to report on the July 26 commemoration of the nineteenth anniversary of the unsuccessful 1953 attack on the Moncada barracks that is celebrated as the start of the Cuban revolution.

Indeed I began my very first story, dispatched from Havana on July 25, 1972, with these words:

"We want you to see Cuba when the people are happy," a Cuban diplomat explained before leaving Mexico City. So this American correspondent, tightly gripping the immigration documents that will get him back into Mexico sometime next month, boarded Cubana Airlines Flight 465, a Soviet Illyushin-18 propjet, for the three-hour trip from Mexico City.

The point is that the trip into Cuba was as important as almost any story that I would write once there.

The four-engine plane is crowded with Castro supporters coming to this once-a-year, quasi-religious rite. On board, among others, is an Indian diplomat, a group of French tourists, a Japanese newsman, several British engineers, two American leftists sporting "Victory to the Revolution" buttons and a Soviet embassy courier jealously guarding his nation's padlocked diplomatic pouch.

Even the in-flight service was deemed worthy of comment:

As the Cubana flight is airborne, attractive mini-skirted stewardesses (those were the days of the mini-skirt) offer the passengers hard candies, soon followed by Cuban rum mixed with ginger or cola and subsequently followed by a delicious lunch of chicken fricassee, rice, peas, cake, sweet dark coffee and beer on the rocks.

I went on to describe the newspapers—*Granma* offered in Spanish and English, and full photographs of Castro embracing African and East European leaders.

When I returned from the three-week trip, I was an instant celebrity. Mildred Hilson, one of New York City's most prominent hostesses, a widow who was then in her early seventies and had been one of Mamie Eisenhower's closest friends, threw a dinner party in my honor at her thirty-sixth-floor suite in the Waldorf Towers. The guest list was impressive, particularly for a twenty-nine-year-old reporter. My dinner partners that night included Governor and Mrs. Nelson Rockefeller; Mr. and Mrs. Walter Cronkite; Robert Gray, who had been Dwight Eisenhower's appointments secretary; Mayor and Mrs. John Lindsay; Barbara Walters; and Jackie Onassis. The evening would have been a triumph but for one fact: Mrs. Hilson insisted I show the slides of my trip after dinner and accompany them with a short narration. Within minutes of the beginning of the slide show, every one of the distinguished guests excused themselves one after another, until only Barbara Walters, Mildred Hilson, and I were left.

### Castro's Superhuman Image

Fidel Castro has always been bigger than life, the most fashionable revolutionary the modern world has known. Frank Mankiewicz to this day is impressed with Castro's apparel. "He wears those fatigues but they're designer fatigues . . . I mean they're not the kind of fatigues you'd expect to get if you entered the Army," he told me. "They're very light weight, well cut—I wouldn't be surprised if they were Oscar de la Renta." But it's not Castro's outward appearance that has made him so fashionable. It is the fact that he fits to a glove the image of a revolutionary that we have in our own minds. It is trite to say that if Castro did not exist, we would have to invent him. The fact, however, is that we have invented him.

Castro is more interesting because of what he tells us about ourselves than any other legendary or even fictional history book character. He epitomizes all those characteristics admired most by Western

intellectuals. He was born the son of a poor, pick-and-shovel laborer for the United Fruit Company, whose sugar plantations were on the northern shores of Oriente Province. His father became a wealthy landowner—the very epitome of a capitalist success—sending his children to the best schools and leaving them a sizeable inheritance, only to have his eldest son, Fidel, after graduating from law school, turn his back on the family fortune and become an underground (and underdog) guerrilla fighter.

We were always ready to give Castro the benefit of the doubt because of our puritanical revulsion for Latin “dictatorships” in the Batista model. “I suppose that what you are saying,” Mankiewicz suggested to Castro at one point during their interview, “is that in a certain form, the socialist government of Cuba involves itself in the ordinary life of the Cuban in a more or less easygoing way—a less demanding way than other Communist governments, right?”

The idea that Castro, as the romantic embodiment of our own liberal traditions, could establish a humane, caring society where a cruel dictatorship had existed—becoming the world’s first “good” Communist—is nowhere more cryptically expressed than in this sentence from Herbert Matthews’s February 1957 interview with him in the *Sierra Maestra*: “It is a revolutionary movement that calls itself socialistic. The program is vague and couched in generalities, but it amounts to a new deal for Cuba, radical, democratic and therefore anti-Communist.” Indeed, Castro’s idealism reminded Julian Bond of nothing so much as the “connection between socialism and Christianity.”

Just listen for a moment to the disappointment in the voice of Andrew St. George shortly before he returned to Cuba in July 1960, fearful that his “warm wartime friendship with Fidel” would be a thing of the past. “My phone functioned fitfully, requiring peculiar repairs and wiring,” the journalist wrote of his last visit following the triumph of the revolution. “Overnight I became an ‘imperialist agent’, instead of an honored hero of the revolution. Today, newsmen from the *other* side—Russians, Czechs, Bulgarians, Red Chinese—are inaugurating a new cycle as the ‘Heroic Correspondents of Our Anti-Imperialist Struggle’.” Surely Castro could not have forgotten that “the only magazine article he ever wrote” appeared in *Coronet*, which was St. George’s principal employer.

This sense of personal betrayal led St. George to conclude: “Tragically, Castro probably does have the timbre of a great new Latin leader—the irresistible personality, the instinct for timely social reform, the sure touch with the masses. But as a result of his mistakes, Fidel Castro does not even rule Cuba today.” He went on to bemoan

the fact that Castro had to share power with his brother Raúl and “El Che,” Che Guevara. “If Fidel recognizes his mistakes before it’s too late, he and his country may still have a great future,” St. George concluded.

Not only did we in those early days want Castro to be charismatic, a reformer with a social conscience, a revolutionary, a guerrilla fighter, and the personification of the noble “masses,” but we wanted him to be all-powerful as well. In a world of McCarthyism, of dull, imperfect, and even corrupt politicians, Castro was the romantic hero of our bedside novels. “It was as if,” Norman Mailer wrote in 1959, “the ghost of Cortez had appeared in our century riding Zapata’s white horse. You were the first and greatest hero to appear in the world since the Second War . . . the answer to the argument of Commissars and Statesmen that revolutions cannot last, that they turn corrupt or total or eat their own.”

Castro, in short, had completed the same voyage as Homer’s odyssey through Iliad and had been crowned king of the Western intellectuals. To a question of what it meant to be a professional revolutionary, Castro was quoted as replying: “I can’t stand injustice.” Jean-Paul Sartre even noted, during a visit to the Sierra Maestra hideout, that long after midnight, “Castro is the most wide awake . . . Castro can eat the most and fast the longest. [They] . . . exercise a veritable dictatorship over their own needs [and] roll back the limits of the possible.”

### **Castro’s Manipulation of Media Images**

The projection of superhuman and at the same time profoundly human attributes onto Castro is something he has been aware of, and able to manipulate brilliantly from his first day in power. That should not come as a complete surprise because he was a journalist of sorts himself, interestingly a sports reporter for a magazine called *La Calle* and then for a Cuban newspaper. Hero worship was nothing new to Castro. He was almost signed by the Washington Senators as a relief pitcher. In the late 1940s he wrote for a time under the pseudonym Alejandro, was coeditor of *La Acción*, the strongly anti-Batista newspaper at the University of Havana Law School, and contributed articles to *Bohemia*, the most respected periodical in Cuba. As a self-styled intellectual, Castro had a strong sense of the importance and power of words.”

Castro’s three trips to the United States—on his honeymoon in late 1948, when he returned on a fund-raising drive in 1955, and his triumphant visit to Washington in 1959—must have made him keenly

aware of the power of a free press. “He clearly understood that the United States was the media market of the world and that this is where you had to make your impact,” British-born Peter Bourne, the closest thing to a real intellectual in the Carter administration, told me. Anyone who doubts Castro’s ability to bend words to his own use should read a transcript of his appearance on “Meet the Press” on April 19, 1959. “There is no doubt for me between democracy and communism,” he said. “Not only democracy as a word. That is why we call our ideas humanism, because we not only want to give freedoms to the people, but to give them a way of getting their life: to eat, to live—not only theoretically.”

Even in those early days of Castro’s rule, when he was vehemently denying that he was a communist, he had the traditional Marxist perception of the role of information in a socialist state, namely that all power flows from the top unless you happen to be in a capitalist country like the United States. Then you conveniently ignore the elected government for the much more revolutionary “public opinion” of the people. “That is our way of doing things,” Castro told the nationwide television audience. “We go first to the public opinion, and when public opinion supports our cause, it will be easier that the government support and understand our cause.” Making no bones whatsoever about to whom he was appealing, Castro added confidently: “It is a matter of public opinion because this country is a country of public opinion.” He never tried very hard to hide his contempt for the idea of a free press.

“We do not have your same perceptions,” he told Walters in 1977. “Our concept of freedom of the press is not yours. I say this very honestly. I have nothing to hide. If you ask if a newspaper can appear against socialism, I can say very honestly, no, it cannot. In that sense, we do not have the freedom of the press that you possess in the United States, and we are very satisfied about that.”

Castro’s attraction for communism was easy to understand. It offered him an institutionalized structure to get hold of power, supreme and absolute power. No other system would allow him to do that without being accused of being just another Latin American dictator. But Castro was smart enough to know that he had to rationalize this shortcoming, even for the most liberal believers in the U.S. media. To do away with one of the most precious rights enjoyed by the greatest democracy in the world, Castro knew he had to come up with a vision of himself and particularly his own place in history that would transcend such petty things as ideology and human rights. Now more than

ever he needed the right words and the media to communicate them to the American people. When asked whether he was a communist or believed in Marxist ideology, Castro replied with comments such as, "I'm committed to a theory of humanitarian socialism." He was so adept at using words that Sol Landau, who filmed an interview with him for public television in 1967, declared him "a man who has been steeped in democracy."

Again projecting what we most wanted Castro to become—not what he was—Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy wrote: "First and foremost, Fidel is a passionate humanitarian . . . in the meaningful sense that he feels compassion for human suffering, hates injustice because it causes unnecessary suffering, and is totally committed to building in Cuba a society in which the poor and the underprivileged shall be able to hold up their heads."

Castro told the "Meet the Press" panel: "Democracy is my ideal" and "I am not a Communist." The phrase he preferred was "a revolutionary idealist." He also pledged that there would be free and open elections in Cuba "as soon as possible" and with absolute certainty within the next four years. Bourne believes this adroit use of the media—and particularly democratic-sounding reassurances—was a very calculated effort to buy time so as to prevent the United States from intervening in Cuba's internal affairs.

When we examine how Castro sees himself, it is above all as one of the great figures in history. "One would have to say he is unbelievably egotistical," Bourne admits. But also a genuine intellectual, or so he would have us believe. Bourne obtained a receipt from a bookstore in Mexico City where Castro purchased many books during his period in exile. The books included the story of Hannibal's victorious military campaign to defeat the Romans; Rommel's memoirs; *The Life and Times of Disraeli*; *The Works of Lenin* and Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. David Cate wrote that while imprisoned, Castro spent all of his time reading works by St. Thomas Aquinas, John of Salisbury, Luther, Knox, Milton, Rousseau, and Thomas Paine.

"[Castro] views himself in the same category as Julius Caesar and Napoleon. He regards himself as being in their company," Bourne told me. That, in turn, allows Castro the luxury of believing that he is beyond ideology. I mean people do not ask: "Was Napoleon a communist?" Bourne believes that Castro genuinely sees himself as someone who is neither anti-American nor pro-Soviet. "He regards himself as being among the great thinkers of history for whom the ideological things are purely small-time tactical issues. Even with Lenin," Bourne

suggests, “he was much more interested in Lenin as a person who created a successful revolution than he was in whether Marxism was a valid theoretical basis on which to run a country.”

The historical figure that Castro seems most fond of comparing himself to is an American: Abraham Lincoln. He etched for Mankiewicz and Jones in one paragraph the epitaph that he probably envisions for himself:

If you ask me for an American that I deeply admire, I would say Lincoln. I believe he was one of the most moving characters in history—especially how he worked in the fields and cut down trees; how he was so poor and lived under such difficult conditions; how he had to go through so many hardships in order to learn to read and write, to study; how he picked up the banner of justice during his time and so bravely and wisely struggled against all these difficulties; how he became the President of the United States; how he had to carry on a war, when he so loved peace. It must have been a real struggle for such a peaceful man to find himself involved in a civil war. And then for his life to have ended so dramatically, so unfairly.

Whether he genuinely fears for his life or not, Castro has turned the assassination of Lincoln and the CIA efforts to do away with him into the single most important *modus vivendi* of his existence. Everything revolves around the mystique of his constantly evading plots to assassinate him, even to the point where he is able successfully to use the real assassinations of the Kennedy brothers—“Robert and John” as he calls them—to bolster the belief that he remains the number-one target on the CIA “hit list.”

It is hardly accidental that almost all the interviews Castro has given to network correspondents took place at night, often well after midnight. Mankiewicz ascribes this simply to Castro’s being “basically a night person.” But the other element that runs through almost everyone’s experience in interviewing him is the element of surprise: his showing up unexpectedly, often at inconvenient hours.

What left the most lasting impression was Castro’s apparent lack of fear among his own people. After two nights of interviewing, Castro suggested to Mankiewicz and Jones that “we go out tomorrow morning and I’ll show you some of the countryside.” At about ten or eleven o’clock, Castro showed up and “we climbed into his jeep, Kirby Jones, me, Saul Landau and a cameraman. Castro drove. And now began really the most astonishing part of the whole trip.”

“It was amazing,” Mankiewicz said. “Open jeep, cars would pull up alongside, they’d see him, they’d wave, ‘Hello Fidel.’ I mean, for a dictator, it was a pretty astonishing performance. Plus the fact, of

course, that everyone in Cuba is armed. The government has given everyone a gun.” The drama is an essential part of keeping the myth alive. Mankiewicz fondly recalls the night of Labor Day in September 1974 when he returned with Dan Rather to film an interview with Castro for “CBS Reports,” the program Edward R. Murrow had immortalized. It was to become a vehicle for Rather, who had been relieved of his White House assignment after dozens of CBS affiliate stations complained that he was too antagonistic toward Richard Nixon.

When Nixon was forced to resign in August 1974, CBS brought Rather to New York. “They had to find something for him to do, quickly, as a face-saver,” Mankiewicz said. That fit the plans of Mankiewicz and Jones because none of the networks were interested in the thirteen hours of interviews they had brought back, particularly because much was instantly dated in the wake of Nixon’s resignation. “Well, now they needed something to get on the air in a hurry for the first program. So they said,” Mankiewicz recalls, “All right, if Castro will allow you to go back with Dan Rather, and talk a little bit about Ford and maybe some other things, then we’ll buy your material, and we’ll use a blend of the two as the first program in the new series.” But much to their horror, they discovered that New York’s senior Republican senator, Jacob Javits (who was trying to head off a liberal Democratic challenge from Ramsey Clark), and Rhode Island’s Senator Claiborne Pell were visiting Cuba at the same time with a press contingent of about a hundred television and newspaper reporters. “Gordon Manning [vice-president of CBS News] let it be known that if anybody got an interview with Castro on the air, we were done—that we had to have the first one,” Mankiewicz said.

The press people accompanying the two senators were waiting for the meeting with Castro to break up, anxious to snare what they hoped would be a question-and-answer session with the Cuban leader. Rather had left the Riviera Hotel to cover the expected news conference as well. “I’m sitting in my hotel room, sweating it out, shaving. And there’s a knock on my door,” Mankiewicz recalls. “I go to the door, and my God, there is Fidel Castro. I’m in my underwear, and I’m wearing a back brace because my back is giving me trouble, and my face is covered with shaving cream, and here is the *líder máximo*.”

“He said, ‘May I come in?’ and I said, ‘Sure, come in.’ And I quickly got the stuff off my face, and pulled on my pants. And he said to me, ‘I want some advice. I’ve never been in an American election campaign before. I don’t want to appear to be helping one man [Javits] as against the other [Clark], but on the other hand I want to be courteous. I don’t

want to hurt Mr. Javits, who is a reasonable man. Tell me what you think I should do.”

An obviously excited Mankiewicz replied: “Well, let me tell you first of all it’s your country, and I know our financial success has no bearing on you, but I must tell you that if you give anybody an interview over there, we will be, and I used the Spanish word, ‘*aruinados*’ which means, as you might gather, ruined.” Castro was said to have paused, and then said quietly. “Ah, well, all right.” He went to the Habana Libre, the former Hilton Hotel, where the meeting with Javits and Pell was to take place, and announced that there would be a photo opportunity but he would not answer questions.

There was pandemonium. “Why won’t you answer our questions?” a reporter shouted. “Because,” Castro replied, “I have promised an exclusive interview to another group.” “Is that the Mankiewicz group?” the reporter asked. “Yes, it is,” Castro replied. “I’m going to give them an exclusive or they will be ‘*aruinados*’.” “But,” the reporter protested, “they’re amateurs and we’re professionals.” To which Castro replied: “Yes, I know, but they got the interview, didn’t they?” An interesting footnote, perhaps, is the fact that in the final CBS product forty-eight minutes of Rather’s questions to Castro were used, representing almost one-half of the two hours Rather spent with the Cuban leader. Only three to four minutes of the thirteen hours that Mankiewicz and Jones had filmed were used in the Rather program because CBS refused to air an interview that had been produced independently.

The flair for the dramatic is a boon to correspondents who want to write about him. Such a one-on-one relationship with any world leader is what reporters dream of. But if the “friendship” is important to the writing press, the “ham in him” virtually guarantees high ratings for television correspondents for whom visuals are as important as what is said. The opening of the Barbara Walters 1977 interview is particularly noteworthy. Water literally splashes across the bow of a speeding Cuban patrol boat as Walters asks her first question: “Is it true that we are the first Americans to cross the Bay of Pigs in 16 years?” Castro responds, “As I remember, it’s the first time.” And then he jokes, “You didn’t come here to invade the coast, did you?”

In fact, a visit to the Bay of Pigs or Playa Girón is practically obligatory for all foreign journalists during the first week of their stay in Cuba. I doubt that Castro could even remember the number of newsmen who were escorted to the museum built there to commemorate the abortive 1961 invasion. His deft use of the words “As I remember,” however, covers the lie and allows Walters and ABC to begin their

interview with precisely the visual image required to get across the message that “we are now entering forbidden waters.”

The most effective use of visual imagery occurs during the interview when the camera pans shots of Castro picking up small, adoring children on the beach and cradling them in his arms. In the next shot, he is delivering a salute to passing crowds that seems almost patriarchal, a cross between a blessing a pope might render to his flock and Hitler’s smart return of a Nazi salute from the admiring masses. Those two back-to-back images are used to cover this line of narration: “He says he dislikes the cult of personality and blames China’s Mao Tse-tung for making himself a god.”

Walters inadvertently puts her finger on one of the secrets of Castro’s success when she says to him, “You are a man of big mystery to us. First of all, why the mystery? You come from nowhere. You seem to disappear. We hear you have no one home. You seem to be a man of secrecy and mystery.” To which he replies: “So then we could say we are facing the theory of mystery. So then I’m the first to ask myself: Where is the mystery? And who are the ones who invent the mystery?”

He then deftly turns everything around to underscore the perception that he wants us to have: that since the Bay of Pigs, he is obsessed with nothing so much as the effort to stay alive. “Why should I tell the CIA and the tourists that we are going to make a trip?” he says to Walters. And she falls, hook, line and sinker for the bait. “One would say he seemed obsessed with the CIA, until he tells you that he knows of at least twenty assassination attempts against his life,” she announces with a serious, dramatic tone of candor.

The CIA becomes the whipping dog for everything, the excuse that enables Castro to explain away all that he promised in the earlier days of his regime. When pressed on the absence of a free press in Cuba, he responds: “As long as hostility against Cuba exists, and as long as there is counterrevolutionary activity supported by the United States, we will not allow any paper that goes against the revolution, simply like that.” He pauses for dramatic effect. “Besides, who pays for it: the CIA?” Concludes Walters: “He feels that the CIA has trained so many terrorists, not only Cuban exiles but also terrorists around the world, that even if the United States has stopped direct attacks against him, the CIA and this group have a life of their own, and that life continues to threaten his.” Without being fully conscious of it, perhaps, she has tacitly legitimized his fears and concerns by underscoring them for him.

Castro even pokes fun at the CIA to deflect questions that he does

not want to answer. When Walters persists in asking him how many paramilitary Cuban advisers there are in Ethiopia, he responds: "Why do you make so many detailed questions on these matters? I cannot work free of charge for the CIA." And he adds, in case anyone missed the point, "I will not work even being paid, or for a salary, much less for free." It is an "inside" joke that provokes a good round of on-camera laughter.

But he can't afford to joke about the one thing that has successfully shielded him from criticism by liberals in the Western media: the genuine murder plots that have been hatched against him. Indeed, it is hard to imagine Fidel would have been able to consolidate power as successfully as he has without the existence of a credible and personal "threat" against his own life.

Castro is deadly serious, even when he summons up the chutzpah (as he often does) to suggest that the United States itself will one day become a socialist nation. "But if one day the people of the United States decide they want socialism, I ask myself: Will the CIA agree? Will the Pentagon agree?"

We project a great deal onto the figures we cover. If they are astute, as Castro is, they can easily take advantage of our own hunger for distinction. Thus, Mankiewicz is struck, above all, by three traits: Castro's height, his spontaneity, and the "softness" of his hands. What does he remember about the last time Castro surprised him, arriving at his hotel room an hour or so before midnight and staying up until four a.m. to talk about the energy crisis? "He called room service to get some margaritas sent up and maybe a sandwich," said the astonished Mankiewicz.

What is the great intellectual most interested in discussing and learning from a visiting American?

He talked to us at great length about American automobiles . . . whether the heater was an extra element and the air conditioner . . . how in extremes of climate automobiles are built. He talked to us about municipal taxes, about how New York, for example, pays for those bridges. People from New Jersey come to New York. How do you get people from one jurisdiction to pay for the support of government in another jurisdiction? We talked about baseball. And movies. He liked "The Godfather." "Godfather II," the one [that takes place] in Havana. We talked about cigarette smoking and the public health hazards, and capital punishment.

Hardly the grist of intellectual discourse he would like us to believe is his stock and trade.

"[Castro's] hands are very soft," Mankiewicz noted with similar amazement. If Castro were a concert pianist, one would think nothing

of his having soft hands, but the hands of a guerrilla leader are supposed to be hard and dirty.

Our unthinking capacity to project onto Castro what we want him to be—for our purposes as much as his—is beautifully capsulized in Walter’s introduction of her guest: “He is 6 [feet] 2 [inches], a massive man, and this adds to his image. Add, too, a keen sense of humor, an apparent warmth for the people he likes, and a gallantry with strangers. . . . He enjoys driving, but rarely drives himself these days, although with us he took the wheel of his Russian-made jeep, with his rifle across the dashboard, and then. . . .” Guess what comes next? “He drives, talks and smokes all at the same time. Except when driving he wears a .45 caliber automatic on a belt around his hip.” And guess what? “He is surprisingly soft-spoken almost as if he knows it will be a surprise.” The drama is in the fact that a guerrilla leader is supposed to be loud and gruff, not articulate and soft-spoken.

Most reassuring perhaps to our own image of what a self-styled revolutionary should be is the perception of Castro as the embodiment of power and good. American liberals do not like to use power. Its use is somehow immoral. It was no accident that Jimmy Carter delayed for so long in ordering an Iran rescue mission, and then when he did order it, instructed the commandos to check back with him at every stage of the operation. It probably was doomed from the start because Carter did not like to wield power. Although clearly well-intentioned, his human rights policies also were a convenient excuse for avoiding the use of U.S. power in support of less-than-100-percent-pure democratic leaders in the Philippines, Iran, South Korea, Argentina, and elsewhere. Carter, in short, was a power-hater.

In contrast, Castro somehow came to embody morality and power at one and the same time. Thus, we excuse the fact that he is a dictator. That is hardly relevant in the context of a reformer who is in direct touch with his people. “Many people in this country,” reported Walters, “feel that Cuba is Fidel and Fidel is Cuba. Some people,” she added, “even think he is a dictator.” The “even” is intended to imply that such an outrageous thought is not shared very widely. Castro himself told Mankiewicz and Jones: “Today, each Cuban citizen can say as Louis XIV said, ‘L’Etat—c’est moi’ [I am the State]. And this identification between the citizen and the power is decisive, for without it the Revolution could not have maintained itself.”

### **The Willing Suspension of Disbelief by the Press**

It is we who make the leap, who engage in what English teachers call “the willing suspension of disbelief.” Angela Davis reported, for

example, that Castro was indeed human. "He made mistakes, human errors, and people loved him" for it. "Fidel was their leader, but most important he was also their brother in the largest sense of the word." Here, then, is an intellectual who is also a doer, not a dreamer; whom Paul Hollander described as "the man who at last bridged the gap between word and deed: . . . with great skill he cultivated important Western intellectuals, at any rate during the beginning stages of the new regime." In short, he is a courageous man who is unafraid to use power and uses it for the common good. The fact that in three decades of power no one, not a single Cuban, ever was consulted at the ballot box is dismissed as irrelevant when matters of such historic consequence are at stake.

"So there we were driving around," recalls Mankiewicz. "He took us by some housing developments, and then we drove out to the beach, Santa Rosa, I think. And there we got out and started walking along the beach, and . . . then this amazing thing happened. Someone saw him from the ocean, and then suddenly everybody comes out of the water, it's like a reverse lemming drive, and they all stand around and talk for a while on the beach." What does Mankiewicz conclude from this? "On the way back to the car, on the beach, I said to him, 'It's just like an American politician going to Coney Island during an election campaign.' " To which Castro replied: "Yes, but the difference is that I come back after the election."

What impresses us, because we have to come up with a rationale for subjugating the importance of things such as free elections, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, is Castro's almost unbelievable ability to spout off all kinds of figures; in short, his instant recall. His impressive ability to provide statistics becomes a substitute for asking the people what they think of him. Again, through the personal relationship he permits a hand-picked group of correspondents to have with him, we project onto him the totally untested assumption that Castro is popular with the Cuban people.

"I went there to talk to him about health care and he knew off the top of his head all the infant mortality rates of every province in Cuba. He knew all the latest World Health Organization plans in terms of their world health policies," gushes Peter Bourne. He admits that "part of it is that he's been there [in power] for 30 years so obviously he's had a chance to learn a lot whereas somebody who's President for only four years might not because it's such a transient situation."

Part of Castro's undeniable charm, says Bourne, is that he appears to be so forthcoming. "He has a tendency to talk voluminously," he says, "so that he controls the situation. With journalists I think he does

very, very well because he controls the interview, but at the same time he's so forthcoming that they really feel they're getting a lot out of him. You know, people don't go away disappointed but they haven't then necessarily gotten what they ought to have gotten from him."

The spontaneity Castro demonstrated when he turned up unexpectedly in Mankiewicz's hotel room is even more evident in the show he puts on for other visiting newsmen. In my case, I was promised I would meet the *líder máximo* once I had fulfilled the obligatory part of the bargain: visiting health care centers, mental hospitals, vocational schools, sugar plantations, housing projects, cattle ranches, farms, and fertilizer factories for the necessary indoctrination. I was told that if an interview occurred, Fidel probably would appear, almost magically, without advance warning, at some farm or factory we were in the course of visiting. "Like the kings and princes of folktales, he would suddenly and unexpectedly materialize in different parts of his realm and minister to the needs of the poor," writes Hollander.

When Walters asked why he prohibited visits by the International Red Cross to inspect conditions inside Cuban prisons, Castro replied: "Actually, we do not allow it. We are very allergic to all forms of investigation and interference in our internal affairs." It was the first time in the interview he used the royal "we." Fidel could just as easily have said, "L'Etat—c'est moi."

When he speaks, wrote the *Nation's* Elizabeth Sutherland, "it is as if his own dedication and energy were being directly transfused into his listeners with an almost physical force."

This is how I described his electrifying performance on July 26, 1972:

Jabbing one, two or three fingers into the air to underscore a point, shaking his torso vigorously, or delicately fingering one of five gooseneck microphones, Castro remains an incredibly effective political orator. It was an unusual scene—a prime minister in drab army olive fatigues, unbuckling his gun belt, stowing his firearms beneath the lectern and occasionally resting a hand on his full beard.

I used these quotes: "We represent a moral position. We are a banner." And I referred to Castro's prediction that all of Latin America would prove "our fatherland of the future." We marvel at this phenomenon when we probably should recoil in horror. It never occurred to me that the last political figure who spoke of a "fatherland" was a twentieth-century German leader who also claimed to have psychic powers to communicate with his people.

"In many ways he is real softie," says Bourne. "Time after time he

has done things out of compassion. That shows a susceptibility to emotional appeal which is quite contrary to his public image.” Bourne admits that the “cynics” say this is a reflection of Castro’s “absolute power,” which resembles nothing so closely as that of Emperor Julius Caesar. “But the people in Cuba say, ‘If only I could speak to Fidel he would solve my problem.’ ” The record shows numerous examples of mothers and fathers who have made personal appeals to Castro to free their sons from prison. “That is absolutely true,” confides Bourne. “I have story after story of people who, you know, the husband was sentenced to 30 years for trying to overthrow Fidel and finally the mother and children got to Fidel and gave him a sob story and Fidel had the person released.”

Thus, we endow the emperor with the power of forgiveness, rendering him human after all. As evidence that Castro is not the “repressive, repulsive harshness of the cartoon tyrant he is often made out to be,” St. George also recounts this story of the dispensation of royal mercy: “When, not long ago, someone pleaded with Castro for a fellow revolutionary whom he had sent to prison for seven-and-a-half years, Castro began to count on his fingers worriedly: ‘How much time has he already spent in jail? Three months? Well, if he was given seven and a half years, he must spend at least six or seven months in jail before we can think of letting him go’.”

This picture of royal mercy is often contradicted by such human rights watchdogs as Amnesty International, which pointed out in its 1984 report that it was “concerned about the government’s practice of not releasing long-term political prisoners who had completed their sentences.”

René Dumont, a French agronomist, noted that “travelling with Castro I sometimes had the impression that I was visiting Cuba with its owner, who was showing off its fields and pastures, its cows if not its men.” Waving his magic wand, Castro discovers a bridge in bad shape and orders it immediately repaired. Fifty miles further along the same road, his jeep gets stuck in the mud. “See to it that a good asphalt road is built here,” Castro orders. Driving through a region that has experienced a recent drought, he orders, “I want an agricultural school here.”

Mankiewicz boasts that Castro knew the annual construction rate of schools, housing, factories, and hospitals. “He knows the number built and being built, their scheduled dates for conclusion, and the building plans projected for the next five to ten years.” Also, he knows how many students will graduate in the next five years; the monthly water

temperature at fishing ports; the stress levels of concrete and “he knows, almost hourly, sugar’s price on the world market,” says Mankiewicz. These or comparable figures could be cited by many communist leaders throughout the world. But when Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu demonstrates an equally impressive facility, we dismiss it as the ravings of someone who rules a virtual police state. When Castro displays his dexterity with figures, his instant recall is transformed into an almost paternal beneficence.

Wrote David Caute: “Castro is like a loving, intelligent and autocratic father who, when he has decided what is best for his children, sits them on his lap and asks them gently to express their own wishes . . . when they are finished he ‘persuades’ them precisely why they really want to do what he wants them to do.”

But Castro’s concept of himself as a father figure is not entirely innocent. “I have a very different vision of the world,” he told Walters. “My family is very large. I have nine and a half million brothers. My family is not only Cuba. My family is Angola. My family is the liberation movement in southern Africa. My family is made up of all the progressive, revolutionary peoples of the world.” If we were to ask Castro today, undoubtedly his arms have extended even further: to Nicaragua, to the guerrillas of El Salvador, and to other corners of the world.

When asked about the export of revolution, the response generally is a variant of the same answer he gave Mankiewicz and Jones in 1974: “I can assure you that Cuba is above all an exporter of sugar. It is an absurd assumption that revolutions can be exported, because they either spring from the people of the nation or else no one can carry them out for them.”

Castro has never hidden his zeal to become a worldwide revolutionary. “The United States will have to face the fact that, in the future, Cuba will not be the only revolutionary country in this hemisphere. In the future,” he told Mankiewicz and Jones, “the United States will have to deal with one, two, ten socialist countries in this hemisphere, and maybe even with a union of these peoples.”

As far as any “right” the United States may have to resist this inevitable, preordained historical tide, Castro serves notice that is simply out of the question. “The United States has to learn to live in peace with the rest of the world because peace interests all of us. Nothing would please us more than to know that the United States is going to follow with regard to Latin America a policy of respect and a policy of nonintervention.” In other words, what’s mine is mine and

what's yours is mine. This is traditional communist claptrap meant to cleverly disguise the use of Cuba as a Soviet surrogate to change social and political systems by force.

Perhaps it was inadvertent, but visual images televised during the Walters interview also lend credence to Castro's presumed right to send his military forces to other continents. At one point she actually discusses the physical similarities between Cuba's terrain and that of much of Africa: "The barren, rocky, tropical terrain of Cuba seems to provide Castro with a natural, tactical understanding of other underdeveloped countries. These sites that he showed us in southeastern Cuba, near the mountains, are not unlike those to be seen in Africa." An interesting leap of faith is made: the viewer is asked to assume that because Cuba may resemble Africa in climate and terrain, the physical resemblance may somehow endow Castro with a "natural" right to intervene in the internal affairs of underdeveloped nations.

### **Castro versus Nixon**

It probably is due to the fact that Richard Nixon was one of the few U.S. politicians to remain unimpressed with Castro that led to Castro's almost pathological hatred for him. "Nixon is the only person I know who has met with Castro and come away with a negative impression," says Bourne.

The two men met in March of 1959 chiefly because President Eisenhower deliberately arranged to fly to Augusta to play golf so that he could avoid meeting with Castro. Although still classified, the memo Nixon sent to the State Department after the meeting reportedly called Castro "a very dangerous man" and instructed John Foster Dulles to begin preparing an anti-Cuban strategy that would one day restore democracy.

Much has been written about the vicious twist of the "x"—replacing it with a Nazi swastika—every time Nixon's name appeared in the Cuban press. When I visited Cuba in 1972, Castro went out of his way to make clear that he could talk with George McGovern, who was challenging Nixon for the presidency, but never with the Republican standard-bearer. "Whoever told this gentleman that he can play around with the Cuban revolution?" Castro asked thousands of wildly cheering Cubans in the emotional high point of his July 26 speech. With bitter invective, he added: "We simply say that the doors of Cuba have been closed totally to the maneuvers of Nixon."

To make clear that he was indeed siding with McGovern, Castro referred to "one of the candidates who is in favor of ceasing the

blockage [trade embargo]" against Cuba. "With that government we might talk," he said, but never so long as the U.S. demanded that Cuba give up its military ties to Moscow. Castro was referring to the 1972 Democratic party platform, which stipulated that Cuba could not become a Soviet base for exporting revolution. "We would like to tell those gentlemen, for a starter, that in our territory, we do as we damn please!" Castro declared. And he served notice that "whenever the United States wants to hold discussions with us, the subject will not be Cuba. It will be Latin America."

It is not the purpose of this paper to probe the depths of the animosity between Castro and Nixon. It is worth noting, however, that Castro was so knowledgeable about U.S. politics and so adept at manipulating the media that he seldom missed an opportunity to vent his hatred for the Republican politician.

In her interview, Walters quotes Castro saying that "I am certain that if there were CIA plans to assassinate me, Richard Nixon did not change them." She also makes clear that the Cuban leader blames Nixon and not Kennedy for formulating the plans for the CIA-sponsored invasion at the Bay of Pigs. "John Kennedy, he insists, only inherited the plan. His fault, Castro says, was in carrying it out," Walters explains.

Watergate, of course, was a godsend to Castro. Mankiewicz recalled an anecdote that amply illustrated how obsessed Castro was with Nixon during the summer of 1974, specifically about two months before he was forced to resign. After completing the second full day of filming at the Presidential Palace, in late June 1974, Castro dropped the two reporters back at the Habana Libre but asked that the crew remain behind for another few weeks to film his delivery of the annual July 26 speech.

"Now July 26th was pretty late for Nixon," Mankiewicz said. "I remember Castro had read my book on Nixon and argued with me about whether Nixon would be impeached. I said I thought he would be." Castro disagreed but "finally by the time we were about to leave, he said, 'You know, I agree with you. I think he will be.' " Mankiewicz and Jones returned to Washington but left the crew and producer Saul Landau behind.

Castro apparently wanted to play a bit part in the Watergate hearings. "He obviously knew that there was a good chance he was going to be on American television," Mankiewicz said. So he had a separate platform erected for the Mankiewicz crew, just to the right of his podium and a few feet away from the other cameras that were filming his speech for networks throughout the rest of the world. "He came to

a certain point in the speech, and he sort of nodded to Saul Landau . . . turned toward the platform where our camera was, and looking right at the camera said: 'They hired Ex-Cubans to try to overthrow the government of Cuba, and all they succeeded in doing was overthrowing the government of the United States.' And then he turned back to the audience."

Mankiewicz was in Cuba in June 1974, when Nixon was holding his climactic summit meeting in Moscow with Leonid Brezhnev. "Well, what do you do when Nixon, the man with the swastika, is the honored guest at the head of the socialist fatherland?" Mankiewicz said. Castro decided simply to omit any mention of Nixon's name "and it's hard to write major news stories every day and not use the President's name if he's in Moscow." Instead, he was referred to in a number of ways: as leader of the Western alliance; as president of the United States; as head; as chief, even as the chief magistrate but never as Richard Nixon or President Nixon.

### **The Journalist's Desire for Distinction**

Parallels can be drawn among all the interviews Castro has granted to the elite press. For example, the timing of the interviews frequently coincides with the delivery of his impassioned and inflammatory July 26 speech commemorating the 1953 attack on the Moncada barracks. There also is continuity from one interview to another; Mankiewicz deliberately asked Landau to be his and Jones's producer because he knew Landau had previously interviewed Castro and Castro liked the results. Dan Rather likewise latched onto Mankiewicz, who also was well liked by Fidel. Also, it is unusual to obtain the prized interview without the reporter's having served an internship of several weeks, which provides the Cubans with a chance to imbue the visitor with Cuban-style, anti-American patriotism. Once admitted into the forbidden kingdom, reporters are surprised to have Castro visit them in their hotel rooms or to happen upon him in the fields, the country preacher ministering to his flock.

Mankiewicz, from what he saw of Castro, concluded: "I think he could be the leading elected politician in any free country. He has enormous charisma. And he knows how to manipulate the media." Bourne recalls Castro's asking for a copy of *The Powers That Be*, David Halberstam's prize-winning epic about the media elite. Castro learned his lessons well.

Castro also is adept at flattering reporters' egos. He made sure Mankiewicz knew he had read his latest book. He asked Bourne to get

him a copy of *The Powers That Be*. Such attention to detail is evident in his carrying aboard the jeep that took Walters around Cuba, “perhaps for our benefit,” she notes, a volume of *The Selected Works of Ernest Hemingway*. With both Mankiewicz and Bourne, he asked them to become valuable intermediaries, setting up back channels to Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter. K. S. Karol wrote of the praise lavished on C. Wright Mills: “One day, Fidel Castro had looked him up in his hotel, telling him straight out that his *Power Elite* had been a bedside book of most of the guerrilleros in the Sierra Maestra.” Ditto for Sartre, McGovern, Mailer, and dozens of other intellectuals courted by Castro.

Castro began to “use” the media when he conceived the idea of inviting Herbert Matthews to interview him in his Sierra Maestra hideout. Because of censorship imposed by the Batista government, Castro could not reach ordinary Cubans even to communicate the fact that he was alive. Matthews often is credited with trying to create sympathetic public opinion for Castro throughout much of the world. Castro probably regarded him in far more parochial terms, as the only way he could reach the Cubans at home. He said as much during his February 1957 interview with Matthews: “The Cuban people hear on the radio all about Algeria, but they never hear a word about us or read a word, thanks to the censorship.” He told Matthews, “You will be the first to tell them.”

It was a marriage made in journalism’s heaven. The fact is that Matthews needed Castro as much as the Cuban guerilla leader needed him. The *New York Times* correspondent was nearing sixty and the end of his career. He believed, according to colleagues, that he never got the credit he deserved. Here was the chance to get the scoop of a lifetime. The front-page headline read: “Cuban Rebel Is Visited in Hideout”; the subhead: “Castro Is Still Alive and Still Fighting in Mountains.” When Batista denounced the story as a lie, the *New York Times* got “fired up” and ran a photograph of Matthews and Castro. It was not a very clear picture, which the *Times* apologized for. Its quality “is poor because of lack of light,” the legend said. But it got enormous play—three columns wide by four columns high—to underscore the point that its reporter had indeed gotten an exclusive.

So adroit had Castro been in exploiting the opportunity that even today, almost thirty years after the interview, jokes still make the rounds in Havana about how Fidel put one over on Matthews. “Castro only had about fifteen men with him in the Sierra Maestra. And while the interview was going on,” Bourne said Castro had boasted to him, “Raúl would march in a group of ten men, and then they would be

marched off stage, they would change hats, and be marched on stage again." Castro was so successful that Matthews's three lengthy articles were laced full of references to "Castro, with about three hundred troops," and to "our other camp where the rest of our troops are."

### Conclusion

It is worth ending this study where we began—with a look at those ideals that we projected onto Castro and that reflect more of our own values than any actually possessed by the undeniably charismatic Cuban leader. "His is a political mind rather than a military one," wrote Matthews. "He has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the Constitution, to hold elections." In the McCarthy era, when almost anyone with those aspirations would have been suspect, the idea that a new leader could emerge who was noncommunist and also a devout believer in democracy was balm for the romanticist's vision of the United States.

To a nation looking to restore its own belief in the values that were part of its birth, here was a revolution that like our own was easy to identify with, it even had a leader who freely quoted our founding fathers. If the United States was experiencing moral decay, here was what Saul Landau called "the first purposeful society that we have had in the Western Hemisphere for many years . . . the first society where human beings are treated as human beings, where men have a certain dignity, and where this is guaranteed to them."

The litmus test was none other than Castro himself. "The personality of the man is overpowering," Matthews wrote. "It was easy to see that his men adored him. Taking him as one would at first, by physique and personality, this was quite a man—a powerful six-footer, olive skinned, full-faced, with a straggly beard."

Here, too, then was a genuine dark-skinned Third Worlder who fit the bill we had drawn up for the true revolutionary. Endowed with spontaneity, humor, a familiarity with literature and political thought, and above all with suffering, we could accept Castro as the virtual George Washington of the underdeveloped world. In embracing him, we could put all our guilt complexes behind us. Here was a symbol of the need to do away with repressive dictatorships, world hunger, overpopulation, and disease all wrapped into one. So intense was our fascination that Matthews, in 1957, described the details of his facial movements. "His brown eyes flash; his intense face is pushed close to the listener and the whispering voice, as in a stage play, lends a vivid sense of drama." Twenty years later, Kirby Jones was just as hypno-

tized by his aura. "What is your formula for being successful? What would you advise someone to do if they wanted to lead a revolution?" Jones asked Castro.

"Well, it helps to be taller than anyone else in the country," Castro replied. "You have to be very healthy but it helps if you are big." Noted Mankiewicz (in full candor), "This is not something people talk about very much, but it's true. And you can see it standing there on the beach. He's a full head taller than most Cubans!"

I am hard pressed to think of a better phrase than "the willing suspension of disbelief." It is almost incredible that anyone would judge the success of a revolution, or indeed the humanity of it, on the basis of the height of its leader. This is yet another illustration of how Castro has mesmerized the U.S. media.

I recall a "documentary" I was shown in Havana in 1972. In it a machine gunner pops out of a giant wedding cake. The wedding is that of Luci Baines Johnson, Lyndon Johnson's daughter, and it is taking place at the White House. The disguised guerrilla proceeds to mow down all the guests in a rapid flurry of fire. The next image is one of Nazi firing squads punctuating every phrase of Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech with a rapid volley of rifle shots. The documentary, titled "LBJ," was made by Santiago Alvarez, at the time one of Cuba's most skillful filmmakers and political propagandists. The film alleges that the assassinations of the two Kennedys were part of a sinister conspiracy spearheaded by Johnson. In a clever pastiche, LBJ is even shown toying with a rifle at his Texas ranch immediately following newsreel shots of each assassination and the funeral procession.

The brief footage underscores several things. First of all, the film is about hate—pure, unadulterated hate. It espouses that hate is justified because there are, as Communist dogma states, "good" and "bad" Americans. The Kennedys and Martin Luther King were good Americans; LBJ and Nixon were not. But more important, what this documentary showed is something far more dangerous: the deliberate corruption of American ideals. It is as if Castro, casting himself in the role of a founding father, takes everything valuable to us and through a cruel parody turns the same value system against us.

Alvarez made another "documentary" that depicted Mickey Mouse being machine-gunned in Vietnam. There could hardly be a more cryptic example of what is at the basis of Castro's use of the media. It is a perverse effort to turn us against ourselves.

As long ago as 1959, Castro said this on "Meet the Press": "I read this morning at the Lincoln Memorial and the Jefferson Memorial that

declaration that appears in the Constitution of the United States, that all men are born with some rights—self-evident rights: to justice, freedom and life. And I want to ask, what would you do with those who abolish that right? What to do with those who abolish that right? That is the question I put to the public opinion of the United States.”

Abraham Lincoln was a great American because he respected those freedoms that Castro despises. Castro is right in asserting that Lincoln rose from humble stock; that he worked in the fields and cut down trees; that he overcame personal hardships to run for Congress and triumphed over injustice by leading a divided nation in a war against itself. But Lincoln’s triumph was the triumph of the individual and the triumph of personal freedom. It is the antithesis of everything that Castro stands for: power centralized in one man whose own charisma is the only glue that holds the nation together. That is anticonstitutional, antidemocratic, antilibertian, and anti-American.

Perhaps Castro was writing his own epitaph when he said of Lincoln: “It must have been a real struggle for such a peaceful man to find himself involved in a civil war. And then for his life to have ended so dramatically, so unfairly.” His appeal is to our emotions. And that, finally, is the last place where we must judge Fidel Castro, regardless of his unquestioned success in conveying what he wants us to see and hear of him in the media.

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**THE CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION  
1988**

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Only when the toll of narcotics on American society was reaching a magnitude and pervasiveness that could no longer be characterized as merely one of those episodic societal "problems," the U.S. Government has declared a "war on drugs." No matter how well-intentioned, however, that slogan serves to obscure an understanding of the full nature of the phenomenon and, therefore, of the requirements of combatting it. The term "war" still connotes a crusade rather than a conflict — something that is reminiscent of the "war against poverty." What the United States should be mobilizing on an urgent basis is a comprehensive defense — call it a "strategic defense" — against a true form of warfare waged against it from abroad.

Failure to recognize the nature of this war is steeped in a failure (or unwillingness) to recognize the identity of the forces waging it. Thus, whatever "external enemy" image there has emerged in the United States in the context of the narcotics problem has been dominated by the Panamanian *caudillo*, General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Overlooked, however, has been compelling evidence that Noriega is merely one mercenary within a network which, in the Western Hemisphere at least, has its main command center in Havana, Cuba. At stake here is the identification of not only the principal source but also the central motive behind the offensive against the United States — the motive not merely of greed (Noriega) but of strategic-ideological warfare (Fidel Castro).

### **The Synergism of "Narco-Terrorism"**

Moreover, the focus on strictly the flows of narcotics to the United States has tended to obscure an understanding of the multifaceted "weapons system" that is involved. Only recently, for example, has the term "narco-terrorism" come into usage. It denotes the linkages between international terrorism and international drug-trafficking.

What is surprising is that it has taken so long for the relationship between those two "multinational enterprises" to be recognized. Even before conclusive evidence began to accumulate in recent years, logic should have dictated that the convergence of terrorism and the narcotics trade is as natural and compelling a phenomenon as, historically, the union of the coal and steel industries.

In fact, the latter analogy fails to do justice to the mutual attraction of terrorism and the narcotics trade. The coal and steel industry represents a "vertical" conglomerate in the manufacture of a category of goods. Terrorism and the drug trade are parallel "industries" that interact synergistically. Both rely on international infrastructures that extend largely underground and can be shared to achieve mutual

benefits. For the terrorist, drug-trafficking provides the cash with which to purchase weapons and finance operations. The drug-trafficker uses terrorist methods to insure the sources of his supply and the discipline and integrity of his organization. In this way, their *modi operandi* converge. Whether the motivation is profit or ideology, or some combination of both, the end product is societal disruption through violence that knows no national borders and that functions, by definition, outside the norms of international diplomacy and war.

By far the largest beneficiaries of the convergence of the two international "industries" are its "silent partners": the sponsoring states. For them, narco-terrorism is a weapons system that can be aimed, either with precision or with random effect, upon target societies. It serves to terrorize, to disrupt, to subvert, to destabilize and to undermine the very foundations of those target societies.

Moreover, it is a weapons system that not only pays for itself, but garners huge net profits in hard currency. In the process, the flows of those funds in the form of "money-laundering" carve deep inroads into the banking institutions and thereby the main economic arteries of the target societies. As one American expert on terrorism has testified: "Running drugs is one sure way to make big money in a hurry.... Moreover, the directions of the flow are ideologically attractive. Drugs go to the bourgeois countries, where they corrupt and they kill, while the arms go to pro-communist terrorist groups."<sup>1</sup>

## **The Cuba-Colombia-Panama Connection**

Such testimony becomes more persuasive when rendered by those with first-hand knowledge of both the process and the rationale in a "sponsoring state." José Blandón Castillo, a former intelligence aide to General Noriega, provided the evidence that enabled the U.S. prosecutors in Miami to indict Noriega for his involvement in drug-trafficking activities to the United States. Blandón's testimony before a grand jury in Miami in January 1988, and subsequently before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism and International Communications, not only conveyed the information on Noriega, but also enlarged previous evidence concerning Cuba's role in the drug flow to the United States.

Blandón testified that Castro had implemented an overall system for the management of the drugs-and-arms traffic in Central America and the Andean countries, the major sources of narcotics, and between them and the United States. This had the effect of deepening Cuban inroads in those states. According to Blandón, "Fidel Castro's theory went back to this.... If you want to have an influence on Colombia's political world, you have to have an influence on the drug-trafficking world, too." And he went on to describe Castro's rationalization of the

central thrust of the effort: "The war in Central America waged by the United States made it easier, or at least gave him the moral justification, to do anything against the United States, anything that was necessary."<sup>2</sup>

Blandón described the joint ventures of General Noriega, Fidel Castro, the Colombian insurgent movement M-19 and the Medellín Cartel in overseeing and protecting drug shipments from Colombia through Cuba to the United States, the laundering of the money in Panama, and the provision of arms to Marxist-Leninist rebels in Central America. Blandón revealed that in 1984 such operations were carried out simultaneously in Panama, Nicaragua and Colombia, and that Nicaraguan leaders were paid in cash for their part in the transactions. He testified:

Fernando Ravelo-Renedo, the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, was the contact person between the guerrilla movement, the M-19, and the drug movement.... In the case of Colombia, there is a link between drug-trafficking and the guerrilla movement, and part of their coordination is done by the Latin American Department [sic] of the Communist Party of Cuba, led by Manuel Pinero [sic], who is also the head of all subversive movements in Latin America.... Ravelo traveled to Panama and dealt with Noriega as an officer who was in charge of those operations.... The Republic of Panama was converted into a huge empire in order to commit certain crimes, and it was part of a general project in the hands of Colombia's drug-traffickers. This project aimed to penetrate other countries like Nicaragua and other armed forces, such as in Honduras.... Only two or three months ago, there was a large shipment which was hidden in lumber exported from Honduras to the United States [and seized in Miami]. This international network has been able to penetrate the Central American armed forces and, because of this, security problems...affecting the democracies in Latin America, especially in Central America, are jeopardized [sic].<sup>3</sup>

## Patterns of Operations

Blandón's testimony represented a valuable confirmation and updating of Cuba's role. In November 1983, the *Miami Herald* published a heretofore secret report by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) concerning the Cuban Government's participation in drug-trafficking to the United States.<sup>4</sup> The report dated Cuba's involvement to 1961 — that is, shortly after Castro and his *barbudos* seized power in Havana.

It identified the Castro regime's motive in the drug trade as primarily profit, but suggested that the regime uses the narcotics network also to move arms and other illegal commodities. It concluded: "Considering the increasing volume of drug-trafficking activity in the Caribbean, the proximity of Cuba to the United States, the benefits to be derived from minimal participation, and the motivating ideas of the government of Cuba, it is likely that Cuba's involvement with drug trafficking will continue and possibly increase."<sup>5</sup>

That has proven to be an understatement. "We [the Department of State] now also have detailed and reliable information linking Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas."<sup>6</sup> The drug ring referred to in this statement by Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian who at the time was in custody in Mexico. He subsequently disappeared and was reported killed in an airplane crash in 1983. Enders went on to explain:

In return for Guillot's services, the Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking by permitting mother-ships carrying marijuana to take sanctuary in Cuban waters while awaiting feeder-boats from the Bahamas and Florida.... When the boats left Colombia, they left with the Cuban flag in order to let the Cuban Government know that they were coming in friendly. The Cuban Government boats would come to the mother-ships to escort them onto a Cuban key, which is called Cayo Paredón Grande.... The mother-ship will be escorted there, and it is met by Cuban intelligence officers, who will then view the exchange when boats coming from the United States would come to Cayo Paredón Grande to transfer the narcotics from the mother-ship into the smaller vessels. Those boats were escorted to a limit close to the United States.... The Cuban Government had advised these drug smugglers that, as long as they fly the Cuban flag, the U.S. Coast Guard will not interfere so as not to cause an international incident.<sup>7</sup>

The Senate Subcommittee which heard Enders' testimony learned from another source: "The Government of Cuba has been providing marijuana to the smugglers that has been grown in Cuba, and the Cuban boats are using a radar system to detect the U.S. Coast Guard in order to find a clear way into the United States to assist them in smuggling."<sup>8</sup>

On November 15, 1982, four close aides to Castro were convicted on charges of smuggling drugs to the United States. But as frequently happens, they were convicted in absentia, beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement agencies. The hope was expressed, as in similar instances, that the offenders might be apprehended once they travel to a third country. They were René Rodríguez-Cruz, a senior official of the DGI (Cuban Intelligence Service) and a ranking member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, Aldo Santamaría-Cuadrado, a Vice-Admiral of the Cuban Navy and a member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, who supervised the protection and resupplying of ships transporting drugs from Colombia to the United States through Cuba; the already mentioned former Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, Fernando Ravelo-Renedo; and Gonzalo Bassols-Suárez, a former Minister-Counsel of the Cuban Embassy in Bogotá and also a member of the Cuban Communist Party. Fernando Ravelo-Renedo and Bassols-Suárez were in charge of the arms-for-drugs connection with the Medellín Cartel and M-19 in Colombia.<sup>9</sup>

On February 7, 1983, a former member of the DGI testified in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami. He described Cuban involvement in international drug operations as a multifaceted, methodical campaign aimed at undermining the United States and its international stature:

One of the reasons for this drug traffic with the United States is to throw the U.S. off in Central America, and this big operation of drugs coming up to Miami is part of that. They are trying to create an atmosphere of crisis in the southern United States, and then throw you off and work up in the northern areas, bringing equipment and medical equipment and supplies and other stuff through Panama.... In all of this, the Soviet Union is involved. Since Fidel Castro took over the chairmanship of the nonaligned countries, they have tried, through the Soviet Union, to undermine the United States in the eyes of the world, just like the Soviets did in Vietnam, where they undermined the prestige of the United States, and another one of their operations there was the heroin for the U.S. forces.<sup>10</sup>

The testimony and evidence continue to pile up. In 1986, the President's Commission on Organized Crime drew an even more elaborate picture of Cuba's role within a larger network of communist countries controlling a substantial part of the global narcotics flow. The Commission reported:

A number of hostile foreign governments, motivated either by a need for hard American currency, or by a more ideological desire to undermine governments in Europe and the United States, actively facilitate drug trafficking activities. Cuba and Nicaragua blatantly aid traffickers smuggling drugs from Colombia to the United States; the Bulgarian government assists traffickers transporting drug shipments from Southwest Asia to Western Europe. All three countries are geographically well-positioned to service trans-shipment points for drugs en route to Europe or the United States, and all allow trafficking routes to cross through their sovereign territory, thus providing a way for traffickers to circumvent drug-interdiction authorities.<sup>11</sup>

The most recent evidence for Cuba's involvement in drug trafficking came in three indictments handed down between October 1987 and March 1988 by the aforementioned grand jury in Miami.<sup>12</sup> All three indictments involved the connections between drug rings and Cuban officials in the routine use of Cuban ports for trans-shipment of Colombian cocaine destined for the United States. In one case the prosecutor played a tape-recording of a defendant stating that "the money went in Fidel's drawer."<sup>13</sup> The indictments implicated Noriega in drug-trafficking with the Medellín Cartel in Colombia, Fidel Castro in Cuba and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.

## **The Nicaraguan Connection**

There is abundant evidence as well that the Castro regime lost little time after the consolidation of the Sandinista regime in Managua to harness its Nicaraguan allies to the narcotics operations. Antonio Farach, a former minister in the post-revolution Nicaraguan Government, testified that he first learned of Nicaragua's involvement in drug-trafficking to the United States on the occasion of a visit by Raúl Castro to Managua in 1981.<sup>14</sup> According to Farach, a purpose of the Cuban Defense Minister's visit was to establish a narcotics infrastructure "for the Nicaraguan Revolution" with Cuba's help. When he questioned this, Farach was told by Nicaraguan officials of two moral and political justifications for their state-sponsored drug-trafficking:

In the first place, drugs did not remain in Nicaragua; the drugs were destined for the United States. Our youth would not be harmed, but rather the youth of our enemies. Therefore, the drugs were used as a political weapon, because in that way we were delivering a blow to our

principal enemy. In addition to a political weapon against the United States, the drug trafficking produced a very good economic benefit which we needed for our revolution. We wanted to provide food to our people with the suffering and death of the youth of the United States.<sup>15</sup>

Farach also testified to the personal involvement in the drug offensive by Humberto Ortega, President Daniel Ortega's brother and Nicaragua's Defense Minister, as well as of Tomás Borge, the veteran Sandinista and Minister of the Interior.<sup>16</sup>

Farach's revelations were corroborated by Alvaro José Baldizón Aviles, a defected former Chief Investigator of the Special Investigations Commission of the Nicaraguan Ministry of the Interior (MINT) and the source of substantial information regarding Sandinista operations before his death in late June 1988 (under circumstances that have yet to be completely clarified). Baldizón testified that "in 1982 a MINT directive was issued which stated that all cocaine, precious metals and U.S. dollars recovered during MINT operations must be sent to Tomás Borge's office. The proceeds from the sale of these objects were to be used to help finance MINT's international activities."<sup>17</sup>

On March 16, President Reagan in his televised accusation of the Sandinista regime, displayed a photograph and asserted: "The Sandinistas have been involved themselves in the international drug trade. This picture, secretly taken at a military airfield outside Managua, shows Frederico Vaughn, a top aide to one of the nine commandantes who rule Nicaragua, leaving an aircraft with illegal narcotics bound for the United States. No, there seems to be no crime to which the Sandinistas will not stoop — this is an outlaw regime."<sup>18</sup>

Today, the Sandinistas continue to use the drug-and-arms traffic not only to obtain badly needed foreign currency, but also to cut in-roads of undermining influence into neighboring Central American countries. Their principal method is that of providing cocaine at discount-value as payment for support and services rendered to the Sandinistas.

Costa Rica has been a major proving-ground for this method. When drug-trafficking began on a large scale from Nicaragua through that country, initially the rural police in Costa Rica were bribed with payments in U.S. dollars. Very quickly, however, drugs were substituted at a liberal rate for dollar payments, with the incentive to the recipients that they could earn much larger sums than previously by selling the narcotics. Thus, in December 1986, one gram of 75 to 80 per cent pure cocaine was sold in the streets of San José for \$6.00, while at the same time it cost \$60.00 even in Bogotá, Colombia.<sup>19</sup> What happened, of course, was that, given the easy availability of the drugs, the payees themselves became users. Corruption was thus com-

pounded by addiction, setting a pattern of destabilization that is evident not only in Costa Rica, but in other regional nations as well.

Baldizón, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, reported on the explanation given to him by Tomás Borge's assistant that Nicaragua was involved in cocaine traffic in the United States in order "to obtain the dollars needed to finance espionage activities for the Fifth Directorate and some operational expenses of the Interior Ministry's Superior Directorate."<sup>20</sup> Baldizón continued:

I was also informed that the activity involved giving protection, lodging, refueling and access to the landing strip in Montelimar to Colombian traffickers traveling to the United States. They added that this protection was extremely profitable for the Government of Nicaragua. The explanation concluded with a statement that the connection with the Mafia had been established by Captain Paul Atta, head of H-and-M (Heroes and Martyrs) investments company, and this information was known to some of Captain Atta's officials. They pointed out to me that some Aero Commander and Navajo aircraft, seized from people related to Somoza's government, had been given to the Mafia.<sup>21</sup>

The H-and-M Enterprise in Nicaragua has a counterpart organization in Cuba. The two are investment-holding agencies which were created, according to Baldizón, to invest in other countries on behalf of their governments "in a way that is covert — in other words, that would not show these governments as the investors.... This was not limited to drug trafficking but also investments in hotel, real estate and restaurants, and also they are making a lot of money with the pirating of video-tapes."<sup>22</sup>

Baldizón described a meeting attended by a Cuban adviser from the Fifth Ministerial region in August 1984:

...Cocaine traffic was discussed over lunch, touching on different aspects: They expressed the Sandinista view that Yankee imperialism was armed to the teeth, believing that the Soviet Union was going to attack the U.S. as part of a nuclear war. But the Yankees did not realize that Yankee imperialism was going to perish, eaten from within by covert ideological subversion, the drug traffic and the economic competition with Japan and the European Economic Community....<sup>23</sup>

In terms of the drug traffic, Borge's assistant explained that "1) it destroys and corrupts American youth so as to weaken and harm future generations; 2) it provides a mechanism whereby American youth finances liberation movements; and 3) the network used for cocaine distribution is used for the traffic of weapons bought on the black market."<sup>24</sup>

## **The Larger Latin-American Arena**

A large number of Congressional hearings have provided evidence about drug flows in Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras and other Latin American countries in which the Cuban-Colombian connection is conspicuous. In turn, the linkages between terrorist and insurgent groups and traffickers are more substantial in such "source countries" as Colombia and Peru. An example of such an alliance came to light in the spectacular M-19 raid on the Colombian Palace of Justice on November 6, 1985, in which the President of the Colombian Supreme Court and eleven justices were murdered. What is less well known about that episode is that the raiders also destroyed the extradition documents relating to Colombian drug-traffickers, who had financed the raid.<sup>25</sup>

In Peru, the civil conflict has made a mockery of American hopes of eradicating the coca plant from the Andes. Coca production has risen from approximately 12,000 hectares several years ago to about 114,450 metric tons in 1987,<sup>26</sup> notwithstanding one of the more concentrated eradication and crop substitution efforts in Latin America supported by the United States. To the north, the pervasive involvement by Mexicans in the flow of drugs to the United States, and of arms to terrorist organizations worldwide — as well as the Mexican Government's role in providing, in effect, a safe haven to traffickers — has helped to erode not only Mexico's economy, but also its relations with the United States. According to one authoritative report: "Mexico remains the largest single country source for heroin and marijuana entering the United States."<sup>27</sup>

## **The Soviet-Cuban Strategic Agenda**

It is hardly a coincidence those countries in the Western Hemisphere most deeply involved in the narcotics-flows to the United States are also principal hosts and sponsors of the funding, arming and training of terrorist organizations. Nor can it be considered a coincidence that those countries also enjoy close ties with Cuba and/or the Soviet

Union. A State Department and Department of Defense report in 1985 on Soviet influence in Central America and the Caribbean warned of an "emerging alliance between drug smugglers and arms dealers in support of terrorists and guerrillas."<sup>28</sup> It is inconceivable that Cuba will pursue the international drug-trafficking policy without tacit approval from the Kremlin.

Not only have the Soviets acknowledged the use of terrorism and the promotion of drug abuse as legitimate weapons in the "battle against imperialism," but they have officially linked the two forms of warfare. The 1979 edition of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* provided a list of measures to be used in peace-time in order to promote Soviet foreign policy objectives. These measures are contained in the definition of *razvedkaz*: the literal English translation of that term is "reconnaissance," but it embraces more broadly all functions of intelligence and the clandestine operations associated with it. The *Encyclopedia* gave the definition as follows: "reconnaissance [is] carried out with the aim of supervision of the political, economic, military and moral potential of actual or possible enemies; basic tasks within special reconnaissance include the organization of sabotage and diversionary terrorist acts and the conduct of hostile propaganda for these purposes."<sup>29</sup> It followed with the recommendation of the use of "biological weapons, narcotics, terrorist activities, poisons" and other methods.

This definition accords with a decision made at the "Tri-Continental Conference" of world revolutionary groups held in Havana in January 1966. The decision called for the planned destabilization of the United States and explicitly detailed such activities as the exploitation and undermining of American society through the trafficking of drugs and the promotion of other corrupting criminal activities.<sup>30</sup>

Based on all the evidence, it appears that Castro accepted the Soviets' recommendation to exploit any perceived weaknesses in the United States, and that the flow of narcotics has become a salient of Cuba's strategy. Not only has that salient been steadily expanded, but Castro has been able to capitalize on the growing, associated "support network" — and particularly the tentacles of narco-terrorism — to strengthen Cuba's influence in strategic parts of the Hemisphere more generally. While in earlier years narco-terrorism was used opportunistically as a source of profits and as a convenient means of creating self-sustaining insurgencies, today it is a major channel through which the Cuban-Soviet strategy is implemented to exert political influence on a state level in Latin America.<sup>31</sup>

The Soviets, especially since Gorbachev's succession, have been actively supporting on a diplomatic level the progressive political isolation of the United States. Douglas Payne has described Soviet tactics as follows:

The Soviets have endeavored to portray themselves to Latin American countries as a benign and undemanding friend who appreciates their problems and sides with them on all issues over which they are at odds with the United States... They are strongly supportive...on the issue of Latin American debt, encouraging the radical approach of a full continental moratorium.<sup>32</sup>

In significant respects, the strategic linkage between Moscow and Havana have been strengthened by Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy, which was codified at the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1986. Essentially, in keeping with the priority domestic objective of restructuring and bolstering the Soviet economy, the "new thinking" calls for sustaining the "march of socialism" at lower cost — of avoiding the creation of client regimes, particularly in the Third World, that would impose chafing burdens on Soviet treasure and resources. Cuba, which has been such a burden over the years and which is forever sensitive to a further dwindling of Soviet assistance to Havana, can well sympathize with this imperative. The joint agenda of Soviet-Cuban strategy in the Hemisphere thus reads: preservation and expansion of Marxist-Leninist regimes with minimum economic support, and the further estrangement of the United States from Latin America, in large part by moving the Organization of American States (minus the United States) toward the ranks of the global "nonaligned movement."

The flows of narcotics, arms and terrorism fit ideally into that agenda of a strategy that has the added advantage, especially from Moscow's vantagepoint, of being economically self-sustaining. It is this strategy that forms the background for the spectacle that has unfolded in Panama. Thus Blandón has described how Castro acted as a mediator among Noriega, the Medellín Cartel and the M-19 Movement in order to keep the flows of drugs and money-laundering activities in place, and how he, Blandón, was sent by Noriega to Havana to arrange for Castro's intervention in the latter's behalf. He found Castro eager to cooperate: "...Fidel feared that Noriega would be replaced in Panama.... His [Castro's] interests were political, they were economic and they were interests linked to the war which was being waged with the U.S."<sup>33</sup> Blandón continued: "Fidel Castro made Panama a window, or as an opportunity for business, in order to get Western technology and in order to export some of his goods from Cuba...."<sup>34</sup>

## **A Multi-Effect Weapons System**

The "war being waged with the U.S." continues to escalate. What has been presented here is only a representative sampling of the massive

evidence that links Cuba, the international drug trade and international terrorist organizations. The evidence does not consist, as has been alleged, of merely a repetition of unnamed sources. There are over 100 public references in the United States — in numerous Congressional hearings as well as in court cases — that identify the various countries and organizations acting in concert with Cuba and its sponsoring state, the Soviet Union, in trafficking drugs to the United States. Much of this material, which also details drugs-for-arms transactions, is publicly available, albeit in the form of thick, closely-printed verbatim transcripts in which there is no synthesis, analysis or codification of the material.

The evidence is thus compelling that narcotics, more than “simply” a plague spawned by festering forces in modern “post-industrial” society, have been shaped into a powerful, “strategic” weapons system. It is a weapons system which wreaks its direct damage in lethal and disabling addiction, and its “collateral damage” in the corruption and other socially enervating criminal activities that flourish around the drug trade, as well as in the more general undermining of the target society.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime*, The President's Commission on Organized Crime, Report to the President and the Attorney General, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1986), p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> All of José Blandón Castillo's testimony of February 9-10, 1988, was copied longhand from the original transcript. The official report has not yet been published. Quotes from the testimony appeared in many daily newspapers. See *Washington Times*, February 11, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Miami Herald*, November 20, 1983.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Congress, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 23, 1982), pp.2-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3, Special Agent Pinón's testimony.

<sup>9</sup> "The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic," Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, U.S. Congress, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1983), pp. 100-683.

<sup>10</sup> The District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida, Number 82-643-Cr-JE, Miami, Florida, February 7, 1983.

<sup>11</sup> *America's Habit*, op. cit. p. 144.

<sup>12</sup> *Washington Post*, March 10, 1988.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> "The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating Drug Traffic," op. cit., pp. 45-46.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator's Perspective" (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1986), p. 13.

<sup>18</sup> As recorded in the *New York Times*, March 17, 1986. p.A12.

<sup>19</sup> The author's survey.

<sup>20</sup> Testimony of Alvaro José Baldizón Aviles, U.S. Senate, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on Judiciary, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1985), pp. 24-35.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Lewis A. Tambs, "Narco-Terrorism and the Struggle for the Soul of Western Civilization: A War that Must Be Won," Paper presented at the White House Conference for Drug Free America, Washington, DC, March 3, 1988.

<sup>26</sup> INM International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1988), p.16.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1985), p. 38.

<sup>29</sup> *Sovetskaya Voyenna Entsiklopedia*, Vol. 7 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), p. 493; also in S. Pope, "Diversion: An Unrecognized Element of Intelligence?" *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 3, No.

2, 1987, pp. 133-151. Also see Victor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz — the Soviet Union's Special Force," *International Defense Review*, September 1983, p. 1210.

<sup>30</sup> See Duncan W. Raymond, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 66-70.

<sup>31</sup> For Soviet-Cuban relations, see "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in the Hemisphere," a research paper presented to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Department of State, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 14, 1981), pp. 3, 6 and 8.

<sup>32</sup> Douglas W. Payne, "A Chronicle of the Central American 'Peace Process'," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1987, p.17.

<sup>33</sup> Blandón's testimony, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

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*The preoccupation with the "war on drugs" within the United States and with Panamanian General Noriega as the "external enemy" has obscured an understanding of the broader reaches of this battlefield, of a truly "strategic" offensive being waged against the United States, of the multifaceted "weapons system" invoked in this offensive, and of the identity and aims of the forces involved. The evidence, readily available but largely ignored, points to a synergistic merger of the international networks of drug-traffickers and terrorist organizations. It depicts a well-organized web in the Western Hemisphere that embraces, among other facets, drug cartels and insurgent groups in Colombia and elsewhere, trans-shipment points for narcotics and arms in Nicaragua, Cuba and Mexico, and "money-laundering" in Panama. The network's lines of command converge in Havana, Cuba. The evidence is compelling, moreover, that the central objective behind the network — and the offensive — is not simply profits, but the undermining of American society.*

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NSCRAMBLING CUBAN MESSAGES

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**THINKING ABOUT CUBA**  
**Unscrambling Cuban Messages**

by Mark Falcoff

The Cuban American National Foundation, Inc.  
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**Mark Falcoff**

## **THINKING ABOUT CUBA: UNSCRAMBLING CUBAN MESSAGES**

Few issues in U.S. foreign policy have provoked as much enduring controversy as our relations with revolutionary Cuba. Although the accumulated evidence is simply overwhelming that Fidel Castro consciously chose his country's destiny as an ally and pawn of the Soviet Union, there is still a significant body of opinion within the United States — radiating from certain quarters of academe, the quality press, and the leftist clerisy — that assumes that the Cuban dictator was reluctantly forced into his present role by a blind, insensitive, ungenerous government in Washington. Since this sort of revisionism feeds on issues and needs that have only the slightest connection with the ostensible topic of discussion, it is not likely to go away. But the controversy itself is of more than historiographical or cultural interest. For from the latter view there follows a clear policy corollary: that because U.S. hostility has failed to dissuade Castro from meddling in the troubled waters of the Caribbean, Central America, Africa, and the Middle East, perhaps it is time to try "normalizing" relations and negotiating our differences.

This idea has been around for some time, first advanced by the McGovernite wing of the Democratic party, and eventually put to the test after 1977 through the opening of low-level diplomatic missions in both Washington and Havana. Although subsequent Cuban activities in Angola and the Horn of Africa led even the Carter administration to drastically revise its estimates of Castro's intentions, the advocates of what might be called unconditional normalization remain unconvinced — and unrepentant. Confronted with the baldest evidence of continued Cuban adventurism, as in Central America, they either deny the accuracy of the data,<sup>1</sup> or attempt to shift the blame back to the United States. ("Cuba was forced to do what it did because of U.S. blunders and

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<sup>1</sup>For example, see Mark Falcoff, "The El Salvador White Paper and its Critics," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, IV, 2 (1982), pp. 18-24.

errors.”) The most recent salvo in this campaign took the form of an article by Wayne Smith, recently retired chief of the U.S. Mission in Havana, in which the Reagan administration was accused of willfully turning aside three Cuban offers in 1981 and 1982 to initiate substantive discussions of outstanding issues.

Beneath this controversy lie two different ways to think about Cuba, and therefore, about U.S.-Cuban relations. One is to focus upon the discrete disparities of power between the United States and the island, which necessarily tends to emphasize Cuba’s relative weakness and vulnerability. This makes it possible to explain away Castro’s conduct in terms of his purported perceptions of U.S. policy, and to exculpate Cuban actions by citing U.S. official rhetoric. From this perspective, Cuban policy is always seen as merely reactive for which purpose it is necessary to systematically play down the Soviet connection, because that would suggest the existence of agendas far less amenable to U.S. rectification.

The other is to see the Cuban government as being launched upon a vast historic enterprise of its own, one that in the absence of external aid would be purely quixotic, to be sure, but under the present circumstances extremely dangerous to the security of the United States and its allies. Much liberal hand-wringing notwithstanding, this approach does not overemphasize Cuban subordination to Soviet purposes; rather, it takes the Cubans at their own word, and most seriously, purely on their own terms. It is also the only one that can offer any realistic suggestions for U.S.-Cuban policy in the future.

## A LOOK BACKWARD

Perhaps the most important single fact about Cuba is that its relationship to the United States has been vastly different from that of any other Latin American country. Throughout the nineteenth century, while the island remained under Spanish control long after its sister nations had established their independence, various American statesmen — following a logic of geographical or strategic determinism — sought to acquire it through purchase or annexation. The idea of Cuba as an integral part

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<sup>2</sup>Wayne Smith, “Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 48 (fall 1982), pp. 158-174.

of the United States was extraordinarily slow to die: as late as 1900 or 1901, after the United States had defeated Spain and occupied the island under a clear commitment to withdraw as expeditiously as possible, key figures in the U.S. military establishment and the government of occupation sturdily opposed the idea of self-determination. Eventually a compromise was reached: the United States opted to transfer authority to an elected government, but forced the infant republic to recognize a "special relationship," embodied in a rider to an army appropriations bill known as the Platt Amendment. This proviso, which the Cubans were compelled to carry over textually into their new constitution, conceded to the United States the right to intervene militarily and replace existing authority on the island whenever, in its sole opinion, "life, liberty, or property" appeared to be in peril.

Although the Platt Amendment was finally abrogated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934, the overwhelming economic and strategic weight of the United States in Cuba remained so great that it was no exaggeration to say, as Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith (1955-1958) once did, that to the day of Castro's accession, the representative to the United States was the second most important man in the country after the president. "And at times," he added in an unfortunate coda, "even more important than the President."

At the other end of this relationship, the reaction was by no means unambiguous. While the United States could not avoid acting in various ways as a goad to Cuban nationalism, it also constituted a sharp role of attraction. For much of the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, the prospect of annexation was as appealing to its planter class (fearful of Spanish abolitionist policies) as it was to U.S. expansionists or southern ideologues. Although the U.S. civil war and the career of José Martí (1853-1895) did much to refocus energies on independence, there were still some Cubans of importance right up to the American occupation who imagined that some form of absorption by the United States was inevitable, perhaps even ultimately desirable. One of these was the first president of the Cuban Republic, Tomás Estrada Palma.

The idea of political union with the United States finally disappeared after the new structures were in place. But American economic influence, already very great in the sugar industry before Cuban independence, expanded thereafter to cover an astonishing range of activities — tobacco, minerals, transportation, banking, insurance, above all, in a huge range of light industrial products. At issue was not merely geographic proximity

ty or comparative advantage, but decided consumer preferences. Even now Cuban taste for things North American continues unabated, although in a somewhat different form. "Cuba wants to be a Communist country all right," a British scholar remarked after visiting the island in the early 1970s, "but it wants to be Communist in a very American way," citing the romance with pop art, films, skyscrapers, and — something which by then the United States had apparently gone on to lose — a naive worship of material progress for its own sake.

The observation itself speaks to an essential point: the U.S.-Cuban relationship before 1959 could not be resumed in cold economic statistics; it always possessed a strong qualitative dimension. On one hand, Cubans have always considered the United States the principal point of reference for any evaluation of their own society. Hence, no matter how well the Cuban economy might have performed in comparison to that of other Caribbean nations, or even to major republics of South America, it was not, after all, *those* economies to which Cuba compared itself. The mere presence of the United States 90 miles away — holding up a model which perforce could never be fully replicated — thus constituted a permanent force for the destabilization of Cuban politics. To the extent that the United States can negotiate past the walls Castro has erected around his people, this is still the case.

On the other hand, since the United States interfered so frequently in Cuban politics — first in 1898, and then, under the Platt Amendment, in 1901, 1906-1909, 1921, 1933 — this not unnaturally led Cubans to blame Washington for all of their country's shortcomings. The fact that the purpose of these interventions might have been to restore financial integrity or assure honest elections was quite beside the point, at least as far as Cubans were concerned, since in the end they brought neither. Instead, as a byproduct, these interventions generated a "second wave" of Cuban nationalism which, in the words of one historian, often tended to lapse into "little more than a febrile, hysterical anti-Americanism."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>C.A.M. Hennessy, "The Roots of Cuban Nationalism," in R.F. Smith, ed., *Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba*, (New York: Huntington, 2nd edition, 1979), p. 28.

## CUBANS "REMEMBERING" THEIR HISTORY

José Martí was a great visionary with a remarkable capacity to recast his dreams into unforgettable Spanish poetry and prose. His notion of a strong, independent Cuba, free of racial and economic distinctions, projecting its benevolent influence throughout the Caribbean basin and indeed the entire Spanish-speaking world, continued to haunt the island's intellectuals and reproach its politicians long after his death in the first days of the Second War of Independence (1895-1898). In fact, it was precisely his premature disappearance that gave life to his legend: he did not survive, as did so many leaders of the second and third rank, to be discredited by the actual practice of governing. Instead, reflecting upon the corruption, jobbery, and casual violence of Cuban politics, many succumbed to the notion, "If only Martí had lived . . ."

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**"The capacity of the Soviets to give Castro a  
role on the larger stage of world politics . . .  
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Cuban nationalism.**

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By the 1930's a sense of thwarted national destiny had come to overwhelm Cuban historical consciousness. A new generation of historians, whose outstanding figures were Emilio Roig de Leuschenring, Herminio Portell-Villá, and Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, began to argue in an extended form — in books, pamphlets, articles, and lectures — that Cuba had been diverted *ab initio* by the United States from the course which Martí and other patriots had outlined for it. For example, they held that the United States had consistently opposed Cuban independence, and had entered the war against Spain only after it had been essentially won by the Cuban patriot forces; or that, at any rate, General Shafter owed his victory at San Juan Hill to plans conceived by General Calixto García; or (this, more probably) that the American invasion force that won that battle could not have successfully debarked without the diversionary tactics of Cuban guerrillas. It was even suggested that corruption had been *introduced* into Cuban politics by the American intervention of

1906-1909, because the reigning proconsul, Judge Charles Magoon, had once been a machine politician in Chicago.

This irredentist mood, conceived in the 1920s when the first bloom of independence had worn off, grew to full-blown maturity in the 1930s and 1940s, nourished by the continued frustrations of Cuban politics. The dictator Gerardo Machado was finally overthrown in 1933 after four years of struggle by politicians, students, and soldiers. But U.S. diplomacy, in the person of Ambassador Sumner Welles, undermined Machado's successor Ramón Grau San Martín in such a way that the latter was overthrown in March 1934, by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. Logically, the United States was blamed for aborting Cuba's serious essay in populism although when Grau and his protégé Carlos Prío Socarrás each took their turn at the residence in 1944 and 1948, they proved very hollow prophets indeed; both regimes were notable for their cynicism and corruption, so much so, in fact, that many Cubans hailed the return of Batista in 1952.

Likewise, the U.S.-Cuban Reciprocity Treaty, signed with Batista's government in 1934, could be interpreted as an attempt to chain the island to monoculture and dependence on the U.S. market, although at the time the only alternative for the Cubans was to toss their unsalable sugar surpluses off the Havana wharf and starve. It was also the 1934 treaty that paved the way for the sugar quota, a portion of the U.S. domestic market (usually about 25 percent) automatically reserved for Cuban producers. Cuban nationalists often referred to the quota as a "yoke of imperialism," but when the Eisenhower administration chose to lift the yoke in 1960, Ché Guevara accused it of "economic aggression."

In this atmosphere of perpetual recrimination, no aspiring Cuban politician with serious ambitions could afford to appear less than an utterly uncompromising nationalist. But the economic and geographical realities of the day necessarily fixed limits on what could be done to lessen the island's dependence on the United States. This was the first lesson that every Cuban chief executive was obliged to learn. It explains why, on one hand, each was destined to disappoint his followers and, on the other, why until 1959 Cuban nationalist were still waiting for someone to pick up Martí's fallen banner. Put another way, as long as no Cuban leader was willing to ally his country with another great power, there was no way of effectively counterbalancing the predominance of the United States. But whatever the shortcomings of these men, they were serious patriots who had no desire to withdraw from one sphere of

influence merely to enter another. The historical uniqueness of Fidel Castro consists precisely in the fact that of Cuban leaders he alone was sufficiently willing to sacrifice the relative welfare and independence of his country to settle its historical scores with the United States. Doing this exacted a price so high that all but the most left-wing (or opportunistic) of Cuban nationalists refused to accompany him.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

This means that Castro's Cuba is a strange and volatile mixture of nationalism and communism. The nationalist component dictates not merely a proud rejection of the United States, which in itself would be understandable enough. It also informs an unconfessed desire for self-immolation, on one hand, and a messianic urge to project itself throughout Latin America and the world, on the other. These are, to be sure, very old themes in Cuban history. As Alistair Hennessy reminds us, the former can be found in the patriot armies of 1895, which were quite prepared to destroy the agricultural wealth of the island to expel the Spaniards. And Cuban nationalism under Martí was "always . . . couched in Latin American and universalist terms, not those of narrow Cubanism."<sup>4</sup> The sinister shadow of the first legacy fell over the missile crisis of 1962; that of the second continues to darken Cuban relations with the Puerto Rican terrorists, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the violent Left in El Salvador, not to mention parties, movements, and regimes halfway and more around the world.

The communist component is too obvious to require elaboration. But under this heading the important point to grasp is that if Marxism-Leninism were the *only* feature of the Cuban regime, its inclination to export revolution would be seriously curtailed by the tasks of constructing "socialism in one island," striving, as it were, to become a sort of tropical Bulgaria. While there is considerable dispute over who is ultimately responsible for Cuba's failures over the past 20 years, no one but the most dogmatic Marxist ideologues have suggested that Castro's economy is some sort of advertisement for socialism. If all he wished to do was to convert the island into a Marxist economic system that actually worked,

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., loc. cit.

the full enormity of that task alone would absorb every ounce of the Cuban dictator's energies — and keep him out of trouble elsewhere.

The reverse side of this coin is that if Castro were merely an intransigent Cuban nationalist, or a die-hard Yankeephobe, he might create a few incidents at the United Nations or spend some unpleasant hours on the short-wave band, but he would be quite limited in his capacity to do much beyond this. For example, however one chooses to interpret Castro's intervention in Angola and the Horn of Africa — whether under pressure from the Kremlin or in function of a spurious "proletarian internationalism" — without Soviet logistical support the adventure would have remained, at best, a gleam in the Cuban dictator's eye. It is, after all, the capacity of the Soviets to give Castro a role on the larger state of world politics that appeals to him and allows him to pervert what otherwise would necessarily be a more inward-looking, and for that reason more constructive, form of Cuban nationalism.

## UNSCRAMBLING CUBAN MESSAGES

The past is thus an indispensable tool for the interpretation of Cuban foreign policy intentions in the present and future. The substance of these has not changed very much over the years, and on the surface, remains deceptively simple: Cuba has repeatedly offered to sit down and discuss with the United States their outstanding differences, once Washington agrees to do so "on a plane of equality." This sounds reasonable enough. The confusion arises when U.S. commentators imagine this to refer to a decent regard for Wilsonian notions of self-determination and the juridical equality of states. What the Cubans really mean by this statement is a recognition of their right to play a great power role, as if its foreign policy goals were due the same deference as those of the Soviet Union or China.

It is striking how many Americans who ought to know better miss this essential point. One is Wayne Smith, who faithfully records but does not quite know how to unscramble Cuban messages. Thus, in his version, the Cubans were *compelled* to intervene in Angola. Prior U.S. involvement there, he explains, threatened to bring about the defeat of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, and "the Soviets and the Cubans [could not] permit a cheap U.S. victory."<sup>5</sup> A similar logic in-

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<sup>5</sup>"Dateline Havana . . .", p. 170.

forms his account of Cuban involvement in Ethiopia. Having armed the Somalis, who then proceeded to mount an irredentist invasion of the Ogaden region, the United States (perhaps unintentionally) forced the Cubans to step in and aid their allies. In Central America, he adds, "Cuba will only stop supporting subversive groups if the United States also ceases to do so."<sup>6</sup>

The problem with these explanations is that they focus strictly on the formal-legal structure of international relations and utterly ignore the flesh-and-blood realities of geopolitics and international stratification. The harsh truth is that Cuba is simply not an important enough country in its own right to be *forced* to do anything outside its boundaries. It is certainly not the Soviet Union, although by combining the two ("The Soviets *and the Cubans* could not permit . . .") Smith cleverly obscures the point. Moreover, U.S. national interests simply cannot be treated on a "plane of equality" with Cuban aspirations — or fantasies. A case can certainly be made for the imperatives of great-power or regional interests when they work to the benefit of the Soviet Union in given areas, such as Poland. Wayne Smith even understands them when they appear to favor the Soviets in Africa. It is not clear why he feels that similar concerns on the part of the United States are somehow out of hand, or even more strangely, why Cuban agendas should be piggybacked onto those of more significant international actors.

A second difficulty arises when Cuban claims are taken at face value, in a sort of inverse rendition of "my country, right or wrong." Insofar as these involve evaluations of U.S. actions, the latter are invariably inflated so as to make them seem grotesquely disproportionate. Here again, Smith provides us with some invaluable examples. Between January and November 1981, he writes, the United States stepped up its "war of nerves" against Cuba, by which he means the establishment of Radio Martí, tightening the trade embargo, and "stimulating speculation that it might take military measures."<sup>7</sup> The Cubans then put 500,000 men under arms, strengthened military ties with Moscow, and bought "large quantities of arms" from the Soviets. "Surely," Smith writes, "the U.S.

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 163.

could not expect the Cubans to *disarm* in the face of U.S. threats."<sup>8</sup> In other words, the United States opens a radio station, cancels some tourist flights, and talks tough — while the Cubans arm to the teeth.

Now, one could easily argue that a foreign policy based on hollow threats alone is worse than none at all, but there is still a difference between words — no matter how intemperate — and actions. There is also a difference between actions of greater or lesser magnitude. And finally, to express concern over Cuban adventurism is not the same thing as asking the Cubans to disarm altogether, which request has never been made at any point by any U.S. government, a fact Smith is admirably equipped to know.

Or again, in December 1981, Smith writes, the "Cubans informed the United States that they had ceased shipping arms to Nicaragua, perhaps reflecting a softening of their own position in order to improve the atmosphere for negotiation."<sup>9</sup> Perhaps — but then, again, perhaps not. To be informed of something is not *prima facie* evidence that it has actually happened. The Cubans are well-known for temporarily shutting off shipments to Central America so as to be able to publicly claim that they are not arming Nicaraguans or Salvadorans — which remains technically true — for that morning. Also, it would be quite possible to assemble a voluminous catalogue of *post hoc* admissions by Castro that he had indeed shipped arms to Central America at given points in the past, which, when interpolated into the record, would prove that the Cuban dictator is a liar who confesses the truth — retroactively.

Likewise, in January 1981, after the failed "general offensive" of revolutionary forces in El Salvador, Smith reports that Cuban arms shipments to that country declined. "At the same time," he relates, "the Cubans signaled a desire for improved relations, and a disposition to exchange views [with the United States] on El Salvador."<sup>10</sup> This amounts to saying that in exchange for opening discussions (which, like U.S. "talks" with the North Koreans, could go on for infinity without resolving a single point of importance), the guerrillas in El Salvador could expect to receive 50 rifles a day instead of 100.

Further, one must really ask whether U.S. covert involvement in Ethiopia or Angola can be equated with the commitment of a major

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 164 (emphasis added).

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 160-161.

Cuban expeditionary force, one which, in fact, decisively turned the tables there in favor of the Soviets. One may also be permitted to doubt that U.S. assistance to "subversive groups" in Central America (presumably, anti-Sandinista forces operating on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border) can really be compared to the massive Cuban involvement not only in Nicaragua itself, but throughout Central America and the Caribbean, leaving aside altogether the activities of thousands of Cuban security advisers in Africa and the Middle East.

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Third and finally, there is a tendency to confuse Cuban willingness to normalize relations with a readiness on Castro's part to revise his country's international role. As any diplomat will admit, the ordinary stuff of foreign affairs, taken on a day-to-day basis, is rather dull: consular matters, trade and sanitary regulations, drug enforcement, and so forth. In this undramatic mainstream, the Cubans would have no difficulty whatever functioning with the United States — indeed, one can think of all sorts of reasons why they might actually wish to, beginning with the fact that the Cuban economy is in very serious trouble. At present the Castro regime not only owes something approaching \$9 billion to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries, but what is surely more significant in the present context, it has recently been compelled to request rescheduling of \$3.4 billion in hard currency loans owed to Western trading partners and Japan. If economic relations with the United States were suddenly normalized, American bankers, who have performed so brilliantly in places like Poland, would be in a position to extend a lifeline of liquidity to one more failed socialist experiment.

But there is an important political dimension to all of this that must not be missed. The resumption of full economic relations between the United States and Cuba would summon to life once again an organized community of interest in Washington, New York, and elsewhere in the United States whose role would inevitably become that of advocating and defending Castro's policies. Functionally these people would play much the same role as the right-wing businessmen who before 1959 used to complain that the State Department and the American press were too hard on the dictator Fulgencio Batista. True, the personalities involved would be different; they would represent a different kind of economic community; they would employ different arguments; but the international implications of their role would also be different and more dangerous.<sup>11</sup>

There is also a bureaucratic dimension to diplomacy that makes simple formulas like "the resumption of discussions" or "the exchange of views" far more complicated and treacherous than might appear at first glance. Once negotiations begin, those involved require a vested interest in keeping them going, so that they cannot be said to have failed. The fact that these negotiations might lead absolutely nowhere is the least of it: if, once discussions are underway, Castro decides to do something new and dramatic in Central America or elsewhere, he will be able to count upon an organized chorus within the State Department urging that no effective U.S. response be undertaken. ("Talks are underway, and we must do nothing to impair them!") Stylized shock and disappointment will resound through the editorial columns of the prestige press, and a new chapter in the Black Legend of American foreign policy will be born.

The truth is that a resumption of relations with the United States under circumstances that succeeded in separating international issues from all other matters has *always* appealed to Castro. Smith interprets this as a healthy sign of Cuban pragmatism<sup>12</sup>, as if it were some sort of favor to the United States, when in fact, it would simply permit the Cuban dictator to reduce the domestic costs of Cuba's great power role. Even today Castro is enough of a nationalist to want to reduce Cuba's heavy economic dependence on the Soviet Union, all the more so because the Soviets have at given times and places used their influence to restrain him

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<sup>11</sup>For a preview, see Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Cuba Lobby: Supplying Rope to a Mortgaged Revolution," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *Cuban Communism* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 4th edition, 1981), pp. 505-527.

<sup>12</sup>"Dateline Havana . . .", p. 171.

from some of his more bizarre projects. It may also be that Castro feels he should have a greater voice within the councils of Soviet communism in deciding precisely which revolutionary theaters should receive priority in the dispatch of Cuban soldiers and intelligence operatives. This would obviously be easier if he could locate a new source of economic leverage. Whether the United States might wish to provide it is quite another matter.

## A LONG WAIT

That Cuba would benefit from a normalization of relations with the United States cannot be doubted; it is far less clear, however, what advantages would accrue to the other party. For if the past 20 years have established that it is perfectly possible for a small Latin American country — under very special circumstances — to defy the United States and live to tell about it, they have also proven the United States can live without Cuban sugar, tobacco, rum, winter vegetables, beaches, and tourist hotels. In fact, the only thing that Cuba has that the United States could really use is the one thing it cannot presently offer — an admission, however tacit, that the island's ambitions have far outrun its capabilities, and that the nationalist revolution has pursued its goals so blindly and intransigently as to become almost a negation of itself. To make that statement would require a separation of one of the two central strands that have made up Cuban policy since the revolution, and as long as Castro is alive and in control of events, this is not at all likely. Hence, U.S. diplomacy must settle in for a long wait.

This is a counsel that will dissatisfy many. For in foreign relations as in much else, Americans are a practical people in a hurry to get things done. How often we seem to say, "Let us deal with the concrete issues, so that we can move on to the bright, sunny uplands of aid and trade, tourism, and scientific exchanges." The fact that other societies might prefer to make ancient grudges or *folies de grandeur* the stuff of their foreign policy makes no sense to us, and therefore we refuse to take those attitudes seriously. When our excessive pragmatism fails to engage the unwilling partner, we slump into doubt and despair, asking ourselves what *we* have done wrong.

Such notions betray an ethnocentrism of the highest order — curious because it is practiced here by people who could normally be expected to

regard the view of other nations as equal in value (if not indeed superior in wisdom) to those of our own. For whatever reason, in the Cuban case they have forgotten that other nations have other memories. If they cannot turn history around and make it end differently, they certainly have no obligation to make life any easier for the victor.

Undoubtedly some day the United States will want to resume full diplomatic relations with Cuba. But before that can happen, the Cubans themselves will have to rethink the meaning of their national experience, much as the Chinese seem to have done. They can be helped along to do this, but no one can finish the job for them. And there is no point in pretending that honeyed words to gullible (or alienated) Americans will ever replace the aerial photograph as the truest indicator of Cuban intentions.

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# Political Imprisonment in Cuba

A Special Report From  
Amnesty International

**The Cuban American National Foundation** wishes to express its gratitude to Amnesty International for its continued efforts on behalf of political prisoners in Cuba and elsewhere.

**POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT  
IN CUBA**

**A SPECIAL REPORT FROM  
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL**

**The Cuban-American National Foundation**

**1987**

**Amnesty International** is an international human rights organization that seeks to free political prisoners and better human rights conditions throughout the world. In 1977, in recognition of its work, Amnesty International received the *Nobel Peace Prize*.

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# Amnesty International

## POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT IN CUBA

### Introduction

During the early years of the revolution which brought Fidel Castro to power in January 1959, thousands of political opponents were tried by Revolutionary Tribunals and convicted of crimes against the security of the State on accusations of “counter-revolutionary activities” (a charge covering a variety of political activities including armed political opposition) and related crimes against the security of the State. Evidence in Amnesty International’s possession suggests that the summary procedures followed in these trials did not always conform to internationally recognized standards for a fair trial; for example, the right of defense appears to have been severely limited. Sentences imposed by the Revolutionary Tribunals (abolished in 1973) were harsh, often as much as 60 or 90 years. The death penalty was also widely applied during the period immediately after the revolution: hundreds of political prisoners were sentenced to death by Revolutionary Tribunals and executed by firing squads. In the 1970’s the judiciary underwent a number of changes. For instance, the new Penal Code introduced in 1979 fixed a maximum sentence of twenty years for crimes not punishable by the death penalty and thirty years as a possible alternative to the death penalty. It is believed that, in accordance with Article 3.2 of the new code which reads “...la nueva ley es aplicable al delito cometido con anterioridad a su vigencia si es más favorable al encausado.” (The new law is applicable to crimes committed prior to its coming into force if it is favourable to the accused.), those still serving their prison terms at that time had their sentences reduced accordingly.

In September 1978, a release program was announced by the government bringing about the release of almost 4,000 political prisoners between December 1978 and the end of 1979. Those released included hundreds of *plantados* — a category of prisoner known for their refusal on

political grounds to take part in the government's "rehabilitation" programs (these originally involved prisoners' participation in political re-education and paid manual work, though later "rehabilitation" is said to have focused on the work schemes only), and to wear the prison uniform worn by ordinary (as opposed to political) prisoners. Some 250 *plantados* were not included in the 1979 releases and remained imprisoned in several prisons, principally Combinado del Este in Havana, Boniato in Oriente Province and Kilo 7 near Camagüey (for details of the situation of *plantados* and the conditions in those prisons, see below). Since then, a number have been released upon expiry of their sentences while many others were reportedly held for variable periods of time after their original sentence had expired. As many as 50 prisoners are known to have been kept beyond their original sentence between 1977 and 1983. All, however, were subsequently released. Amnesty International appealed to the Cuban Government on behalf of the re-sentenced prisoners on the grounds that the prisoners were kept in detention following summary proceedings which did not conform to internationally recognized standards.

The practice of not releasing political prisoners after the expiry of their original sentence seems to have first appeared in the mid-1970s when, according to official statistics, many prisoners serving terms of ten or twelve years were released only after having served between one and four additional years in prison. With few exceptions, it appeared that formal judicial procedures were not used to re-sentence prisoners. In some instances, prisoners were reportedly subjected to summary trials on charges such as having "a rebellious attitude," often because they had participated in hunger strikes or refused to work and/or wear prison uniform. (The *plantados* reportedly claimed that such regulations and tasks constituted a denial of their political prisoner status.) Most, however, were simply informed orally by prison guards that they had been re-sentenced to a further period of imprisonment, usually one or two years, although some were given what appeared to be official court documents stating that a further sentence had been passed.

Following a hunger strike staged by 11 *plantados* in Boniato Prison in October/November 1982 in protest against their continued detention after completing long sentences, many were transferred to a maximum security building in the prison and reportedly told by the authorities that their release was imminent. From the last months of 1982 until August 1983 approximately 35 *plantados* were released from both Boniato and Combinado del Este Prisons. Many had served two years in excess of their original sentences.

One such long-term political prisoner released in 1983 was Raúl del

Valle Vilardel. Arrested on 7 November 1961 and later given a twenty-year sentence by the Havana Revolutionary Tribunal, he was due for release in November 1981. However, he was not freed from Boniato Prison until 6 April 1983 — 21 years and 5 months after his arrest. An official document issued by the Cuban penal services to Raúl del Valle on the day of his release shows the sentence and the date of his arrest and release, but gives no explanation as to why he was not released when the twenty years expired.

Amnesty International has not been able to establish whether any prisoners have been re-sentenced in this way in the past two or three years, although it is thought that some prisoners may have been tried for a second time while still serving their sentence after having tried to escape or for having breached prison discipline.

Because of the difficulties in obtaining information from sources within the country, Amnesty International is unable to give a precise figure. The organization has the names and background details of some 500 prisoners but this figure only refers to prisoners being held in closed prisons (as opposed to other type of prison regime in which prisoners work, for example, on building projects) and therefore the real figure is higher.

At the time of writing, Amnesty International has received the names of some 90 political prisoners who have been released in the course of 1986, some upon expiry of their sentence and others as the result of interventions by foreign delegations. They include many of the long-term *plantado* prisoners. In September 1986, a group of 68 former political prisoners and members of their families arrived in Miami. While some had been released only days earlier, many had been released earlier in the year or during 1985.

## **PRISONS AND PRISON CONDITIONS**

The majority of known male political prisoners are currently held in the high security prisons known as *Centro Penitenciario Combinado del Este*, Combinado del Este Penitentiary, on the outskirts of Havana, and in Boniato Prison, near Santiago de Cuba in the east of the country. Others are held at “Kilo 7” Prison in the Province of Camagüey; Holguín Prison in the Province of Holguín; the *Centro de Seguridad Nieves Morejón*, between Guayos and Sancti Spiritus in the Province of Sancti Spiritus; and other prisons in Cienfuegos, Pinar del Río, Matanzas and Baracoa. Many other political prisoners are known to be held at a number of work centres where they carry out construction, agricultural and other kinds of skilled and unskilled work.

Most female political prisoners are believed to be held at the *Centro de*

*Reeducación para Mujeres de Occidente*, on the outskirts of Havana (nicknamed by the prisoners “*Manto Negro*”, “Black Cloak”), and at the *Centro Femenino Penitenciario* in Camaguey.

### Prison Regime

According to a publication of the Ministry of Justice dating from 1985 called *El Sistema Jurídico Penal en Cuba*, The Penal Legal System in Cuba, “the main function of the penitentiary institutions in Cuba is to correct and re-educate the convicts in work habits, the strict observance of law and respect for social living conventions, to prevent them from perpetrating new crimes.” Amongst the “fundamental means of correction and re-education of convicts” are the following:

“— the progressive penitentiary regime, through which the convict’s situation may be improved according to his attitude towards work and other indicators, and pass from a more severe phase to another less rigorous.

— socially useful work, as a means of education, which is done according to a work regime similar to that applicable to all workers in the country...”

In addition to these, the prisoners are said to be provided with “indispensable living conditions according to acceptable dietary, sanitary and hygienic norms”, free hospitalization and medical care, socio-educational activities, general and technical professional education, and sport and recreational activities. They are also said to have the possibility of using the *pabellones conyugales*, conjugal pavilions, so that married prisoners may maintain their relationship with their partner, and to be permitted “to exchange mail with residents outside the penitentiary, as well as to receive visitors and consumer goods.” All of these, according to the brochure, “indicate the respect shown to the dignity and human rights of the convicts.”

As already mentioned above, over the years large numbers of political prisoners have, as a political act, consistently rejected participating in the rehabilitation program, known as the *Plan Progresivo*, Progressive Plan, and have refused to wear prison uniform and to adhere to other aspects of prison discipline. They have become known as *plantados*, literally “those who stand firm”. At the time of writing, some 80 long-term *Plantados* are believed to be held in Combinado del Este, Boniato and Kilo Siete prisons. However, Amnesty International has recently received reports that there

is a group of prisoners mostly convicted in the 1980s known as the “new *plantados*” in Combinado del Este Prison, nineteen of whom went on hunger strike in January 1986, apparently in protest at the suspension of family visits. In a letter smuggled out of the prison, they also claimed to have been deprived of sunlight for two years and that they were not receiving adequate medical attention. Amnesty International has so far received no further information concerning the outcome of the hunger strike.

Because of their refusal to engage in any activities which they believe to be incompatible with their beliefs, the long-term *plantados* have claimed that they have frequently been denied certain of the “privileges” that, according to the publication cited above, are guaranteed to prisoners. Amnesty International has often received reports that they have been denied visits, access to correspondence (both sending and receiving), adequate medical care, fresh air, etc., although, in some cases, it is believed that the prisoners themselves have refused to see their relatives in protest at the conditions imposed by the authorities for such visits, i.e. that the prisoners have to be strip-searched and to wear the prison uniform. They have also participated in a number of hunger strikes in order to put pressure on the Cuban authorities to accede to their demands. Several reports have also been received by Amnesty International of *plantados* having been badly beaten by guards or placed in cells whose grilled doors have been totally covered with steel plates, known as *celdas tapiadas*, for prolonged periods after refusing to obey an order or refusing to conform to prison discipline, or of being held in other kinds of punishment cells for several weeks at a time. Many of the long-term *plantados*, most of whom have spent a least 15 or 20 years in prison, are reported to be suffering from serious illnesses. Their condition may have been compounded by ill-treatment and the effects of the hunger strikes, prolonged detention and a reportedly inadequate diet. As already stated above, medical treatment is in principle freely available to all prisoners and every major prison has a prison hospital. However, Amnesty International has received reports that on occasion medical care has been withheld or only very basic assistance provided as a form of punishment. Serious illnesses, however, do appear to receive attention, and several prisoners have reportedly been released on health grounds, although a number of others have died in prison in recent years, apparently as the result of illness or old age, for example, Aramis Taboada (1985), Guido Faramiñan Fernández (1985) and Felipe Hernández Martínez (1981), all in Combinado del Este; Ubaldo Hernández Consuegra (1985) and Santiago Roche Valle (1985), the latter apparently from the effects of hunger strike, in Kilo Siete. Amnesty International is not in a position to judge whether insufficient

medical treatment was provided.

### **Boniato Prison**

Most of the *plantado* group of prisoners are held in Boniato or Combinado del Este high security prisons. Those held at Boniato in a section known as Boniatico appear to have been singled out for particularly harsh treatment at certain times. Following a hunger strike in November 1982, their conditions are said to have worsened: all *plantados* are said to have been denied visitors and were allowed to receive and send almost no correspondence; reading material and regular exercise periods were reportedly forbidden to them. This regime was reportedly eased towards the end of 1984 when some *plantados* were said to have been granted limited rights to visits and correspondence. A high wall is said to have been constructed close to the maximum security building where the *plantados* are held, cutting out daylight from their cells, and obscuring any view of the recreation area which they previously had from cell windows. Former prisoners suggest that this wall is intended to further isolate the *plantados* by ensuring that no messages can be transmitted in or out of Boniato via other prisoners in the recreation area. The two-person cells have a hole in the floor serving as a toilet and water is available three times a day. They originally had bars on the windows and doors, but these have now reportedly been covered with steel plates so that there is no daylight, and are known as *celdas tapiadas* like the ones in Combinado del Este Prison.

One former *plantado* prisoner held in Boniato reportedly went on hunger strike in January 1983 when medical assistance was apparently denied to him for an urological problem. According to the testimony of another former prisoner, he was removed from his cell and taken to a closed cell in the infirmary with no light, water or toilet. After thirteen days he reportedly lapsed into unconsciousness and was fed intravenously. When he woke up, he found that he had been dressed in the uniform worn by the common prisoners. He apparently removed the uniform and announced he was going on hunger strike again, this time for fourteen days. He was transferred in May 1983 to Combinado del Este Prison, where he was told that he would be operated on, but subsequent reports as of mid-1984 suggest that this did not happen.

### **Combinado del Este Prison**

Long-term *plantado* prisoners in Combinado del Este are also held together as a group on the second floor of one of the three prison

buildings. They are placed in 2-, 8- and 12-person cells, containing bunkbeds, a hole in the ground which serves both as a toilet and as a drain for the water from the shower head, and which is separated from the beds by a thin metal sheet or wall. There are reportedly no windows, just long narrow grates, overlooking a patio or a passageway. Temperatures are said to be extreme, very hot in summer and cold in winter. Meals are provided three times a day and, unlike Boniato, *plantado* prisoners are reportedly allowed out of their cells to eat. Some ex-prisoners have stated that the food was often rotten and inadequate, although others have contradicted this.

At Combinado del Este also, *plantado* prisoners have frequently been denied correspondence and visits for long periods of time but this is not believed to be the case at present. The official Cuban newspaper, *Granma*, is regularly available and an official weekly, *Bohemia*, is said to be sporadically available. In 1980, books were reportedly confiscated from the *plantados* and they were allowed to keep only three books each, which had to be books published officially in Cuba. As in Boniato, ex-prisoners have reported periodical arbitrary and intentional denial of food, water, medical attention, and articles, such as eating utensils, toothbrushes and shoes, as well as beating by guards and prison officials.

### **Kilo Siete**

Little is known about conditions at Kilo Siete, although reports received by Amnesty International from ex-prisoners indicate that at least for *plantados*, they are similar to those in Boniato and Combinado del Este.

### **Conditions for Women Prisoners**

Teresa Mayans, who was released from the *Centro de Reeducación para Mujeres de Occidente*, just outside Havana, in 1983 after spending a year there told Amnesty International that she was allowed four visits per year of one and a half hours each from members of her family. In principle, she was allowed one letter every four months but did not receive any at all during the year she spent in prison. Prisoners were also allowed one package of food every four months of up to 20 lbs but she stated that guards sometimes smash up the parcels. Women she met in prison who were sentenced to ten years or more reportedly received visits only once or twice a year. Prisoners were allowed books from Cuba and Eastern Europe, as well as the government newspaper *Granma*. Common prisoners were allowed to work in a small workshop making jeans for which they received 1 or 2 pesos a month (\$1 or \$2).

At the time of her arrest in April 1982, she was taken to the headquarters of the *Departamento de Seguridad del Estado* (DSE), State Security Police, known as Villa Marista, in Havana, where she was reportedly strip-searched and then left in a cell with blinding electric lights constantly on for several days. She was held by the DSE for two months during which time she was interrogated on several occasions. During the interrogations, she was reportedly threatened that her son, who was arrested at the same time, would be shot. She was later released on bail until her trial.

Together with her son and husband, she was tried on 15 October 1982 for trying to leave the country illegally (Article 247.1 of the Cuban Penal Code — *salida ilegal*, considered by the Cuban authorities to be a common crime). She was sentenced to one year's imprisonment while the two men were sentenced to three years each. Upon conviction, she was taken to the *Centro de Reeducación para Mujeres de Occidente*, where she was initially held for seven months in a cell with a common prisoner accused of killing her mother who, according to Teresa, was being bribed with extra food rations by the authorities to make her life unbearable. After that, she was put in with a group of 32 common criminals, some of whom were mentally unstable or were suffering from serious ailments, such as syphilis, tuberculosis and parasitism, for which adequate medical attention was apparently not provided. They were kept in a cell 5m x 2m [16.5' x 6.5'] with three layers of bunks for 24 women. No ventilation was apparently available in the cell and they were seldom allowed outside —if they were, it was usually when the sun was hottest.

Teresa Mayans also met many young women held there on criminal charges, some of whom were reportedly taken to the *Departamento Técnico de Investigaciones* (DTI), Technical Investigations Department, for interrogation where, according to several women she met, male interrogators reportedly subjected them to sexual harassment while questioning them. Many women were also reportedly beaten by prison guards.

Teresa Mayans herself claims that just over a month prior to her release from the women's prison, she suffered a fracture of the coccyx as a result of being pushed to the ground by a guard during a protest by other prisoners in which she herself claims not to have participated. She said that despite being in pain, she was told that medical assistance could not be provided because there was no orthopedist available and that as she was soon to be released, she should put up with the pain as best she could until then.

On another occasion, a police officer reportedly told her that her son was seriously wounded and in danger of dying. Her son, Salvador Blanco,

was reportedly beaten up by a common prisoner while in prison and needed 22 stitches on his cheek, but was apparently at no point in danger of death. She believes that the news of his condition was deliberately exaggerated in order to worry her.

Upon release, Teresa Mayans was reportedly taken by a police officer to her place of work where she was presented to an assembly of her former colleagues and expelled from the Communist Party (and consequently from her job) with no right of appeal. Salvador Blanco and his father, Dr. Martinez Lara, were released from prison in April 1985. Salvador and Teresa both left Cuba in December 1985 and are currently living in France.

## **PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE**

At a press conference on socialist legality in Cuba, reported in the international edition of *Granma*, dated 14 April 1985, the Deputy Minister of Justice, Ramón de la Cruz, stated that "Any unbiased observer can come to the conclusion that in our country there's absolute respect for human rights. For example, those involved in crimes against state security and confined to prison have all had maximum guarantees. All were tried by the corresponding court and had the opportunity to have counsel, either selected by them or appointed by the court. None of them are prisoners of conscience. All engaged in concrete activities. Thousands of counter-revolutionaries, who had been serving time have left Cuba, and not a single one showed signs of ill-treatment."

Despite these assurances, Amnesty International has come to the conclusion that a number of political prisoners in Cuba are prisoners of conscience under the terms of the organization's mandate and may have been subjected to certain kinds of ill-treatment.

### **1. People imprisoned on charges of "enemy propaganda"**

One charge that is sometimes applied to those who disagree with the Cuban system of government or are critical of some of its methods is that of *propaganda enemiga*, enemy propaganda. According to Article 108 of the Cuban Penal Code (see Appendix for full text), anyone who "incites against social order, international solidarity or the Socialist State, by means of oral, written or any other kind of propaganda" or "prepares, distributes or possesses" such propaganda, faces imprisonment for between one and eight years. If such activities are carried out via the mass media, the penalty is between seven and fifteen years' imprisonment.

Amnesty International is currently working for the release of four

Prisoners of Conscience imprisoned under the terms of Article 108:

### **Ariel HIDALGO GUILLEN**

41-year-old academic and writer Ariel Hidalgo Guillén was arrested on 19 August 1981 and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment under Article 108.1. Little information is available concerning his trial. The main evidence against him is said to have consisted of the testimony of members of the local *Comité de Defensa de la Revolución* (CDR), Committee for the Defense of the Revolution, who said, among other things, that he "talked too much". Amnesty International believes, however, that he may have been convicted because of an unpublished manuscript entitled *Cuba, the Marxist State and the New Class: a Dialectical Materialist Study*, which the police reportedly found when they searched his home before the trial. The book strongly criticizes from an orthodox Marxist viewpoint the new ruling class in Cuba and other communist countries.

Ariel Hidalgo graduated in history from the University of Havana in 1975. During the 1970s he wrote a number of political and historical articles, several of which were published in official Cuban journals. In 1976 he wrote *Origins of the Worker Movement and Socialist Thought in Cuba*, which was used as a university textbook until 1981. When the book was published, he was described as a professor of social economics at the Manolito Aguiar Workers' College, where he is thought to have worked until his arrest.

He is at present serving his sentence in Combinado del Este Prison where he is said to have spent the first fourteen months in solitary confinement. He was then moved to an ordinary cell and his wife was allowed to visit him for two hours each month. In August 1984 the visits were reportedly cut to three a year. His health is said to be poor.

### **Edmigio LOPEZ CASTILLO**

Edmigio López Castillo was detained on 25 March 1980 and also charged under Article 108.1. Together with another man, Luis Ruiz (who was released in December 1985 upon completion of his five-year sentence), he was accused of attempting to send abroad so-called "anti-government propaganda", part of which reportedly consisted of cartoons drawn by Ruiz. 63-year-old Edmigio López was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. He had previously been detained in October 1967 in connection with the so-called *Microfacción* trial that took place in 1969 and which resulted in the imprisonment or expulsion from the Cuban

Communist Party of a number of “dissidents”. He was sentenced on that occasion to twelve years but was released in 1973 after serving four years and seven months. Prior to that, he had worked as a journalist for the newspaper *Hoy, Today*, in Havana, and between 1963 and 1965 he held a diplomatic post at the Cuban Embassy in Moscow.

Prior to his last arrest, he had also reportedly been trying to obtain visas to travel abroad. (See section on *People imprisoned for leaving the country illegally* below.) His eyesight is said to be extremely bad as a result of glaucoma for which he is reportedly receiving medical attention, although Amnesty International has received allegations that it is not adequate.

### **Gregorio PEÑA ESTRABAO**

Gregorio Peña Estrabao was arrested on about 28 July 1982 in Las Tunas and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment under Article 108.1, reportedly after he had received a letter from abroad that included a press cutting criticizing the Cuban Government. He had previously been arrested in 1979 and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, of which he served two and a half, for *salida ilegal*, trying to leave Cuba illegally. Amnesty International believes that he was arrested on the second occasion solely because of his known or alleged anti-government views. He is believed to be currently held at a prison in the town of Las Tunas about which little is known.

### **Andrés José SOLARES TESEIRO**

Andrés José Solares Teseiro was arrested on 5 November 1981 and charged with “enemy propaganda” on the grounds that he was thinking of organizing a political party, to be called the Cuban Revolutionary Party, in opposition to the Cuban Communist Party, and that he had drafted several letters (which were not actually sent) to international personalities, among them Francois Mitterand and Edward Kennedy, asking them for advice and information on how to do so. He was also accused of sending a letter to a cousin in the USA, which was apparently intercepted by the Cuban authorities, in which he criticized the Cuban social system. All the documents that were seized and which appeared to be the only evidence against him were ordered to be burned after the trial, at which he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. It is not clear where he was held for the six months prior to his trial. He is at present being held in Combinado del Este Prison in Havana although at one time he was held at La Cabaña Prison, also in Havana. At Combinado del Este Prison, he is reportedly only allowed one visit every six months from his wife, although

his mother has seen him once, and he is not allowed to officially receive or send letters. Between November 1984 and October 1985 he is said to have been held in a punishment cell accused, together with other prisoners, of trying to provoke a riot in the prison. As a result, he is also said to have been prevented from doing paid prison work which enabled him to help support his family outside the prison.

Andrés Solares studied engineering at the *Instituto Superior Politécnico "José Antonio Echevarría"* in Havana. He subsequently worked as a civil servant, specializing in maritime engineering, and reportedly headed several construction projects for the *Empresa de Construcción de Obras de Arquitectura* (ECOA), Architectural Construction Enterprise. He also taught engineering and economics at Havana University. In the early 1970s, he received two UNESCO scholarships to study in the United Kingdom. Until this point, he is said to have been a strong supporter of the Cuban Government. However, after returning to Cuba, he reportedly complained about not being allowed to travel to the United Kingdom to obtain his doctorate and as a result of this and later also for severely criticizing, in the course of his lectures at the *Instituto Superior de la Economía*, the methods and behaviour of various government officials and bodies, he was called in for questioning several times by the State Security Police.

Andrés Solares was tried by the *Sala de Delitos contra la Seguridad del Estado del Tribunal Provincial Popular de la Habana*, Court of Crimes against State Security of the Havana Province People's Tribunal. He was reportedly unable to speak to his defense lawyer before the trial. In early 1985, he discovered that three of the five magistrates, including the president of the court, that judged the case had been dismissed from their posts and tried for *prevaricación* (misconduct) and other offenses. In accordance with Cuban law, Solares applied to have the proceedings against him nullified and requested a new trial but apparently received no response at all from the authorities.

Amnesty International has received no evidence that Andrés Solares has ever used or advocated violence and has therefore adopted him as a Prisoner of Conscience since he appears to have been detained solely on account of the peaceful expression of his beliefs.

## **2. People imprisoned for trying to leave Cuba illegally**

According to Article 247 of the Cuban Penal Code (see Appendix for text), those who leave or try to leave Cuba without fulfilling the legal formalities face from six months to three years' imprisonment. The sentence for those who use violence or intimidation in order to leave or try

to leave is from three to eight years. Those who by deceit, coercion, force, violence or intimidation try to enter an embassy (to seek asylum) risk between one and eight years' imprisonment. According to Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, everyone shall be free to leave any country, including their own. Amnesty International therefore believes that anyone held under Article 247 who has neither used nor advocated violence can be considered to be a Prisoner of Conscience under the terms of its mandate.

Since 1979, tens of thousands of Cubans have been allowed to emigrate, mainly to the United States. However, Amnesty International has continued to receive reports that administrative procedures for leaving the country are extremely slow and bureaucratic and that some individuals, whose skills are particularly valued, such as medical doctors, or who are considered to constitute a risk to the Cuban authorities, from a political point of view, have faced harassment and, in some instances, imprisonment as a result of having expressed their wish to leave or having initiated enquiries with the authorities with a view to seeking emigration. Amnesty International has received reports that some people who have applied to leave the country, while not being imprisoned, have been unable to continue with their normal occupation and in some cases forced by police order to do manual work on construction sites or other kinds of unskilled labour.

One case of imprisonment for *salida ilegal* is that already mentioned above of Teresa Mayans, her son Salvador Blanco and husband Alfredo Martínez Lara, who were accused by the authorities of planning to defect while on an official trip abroad and sentenced under Article 247 to three years' imprisonment in the case of the two men and one year in the case of Teresa Mayans. Salvador Blanco was a well-known actor and television personality, Dr Martínez a prominent psychiatrist and Teresa Mayans a popular film actress. As already mentioned above, after serving their sentence, Teresa Mayans and Salvador Blanco were able to leave Cuba for France. In mid-September 1986, however, Amnesty International learned of the re-arrest of Dr Martínez Lara, apparently after he went to the airport to see off a group of former political prisoners who were being allowed to go to the USA. The precise charges against him are not known but he was believed to be held at the headquarters of the State Security Police in Havana as of October 1986.

### **Ricardo BOFILL PAGES**

Another example is that of former Prisoner of Conscience Dr. Ricardo Bofill Pagés, a university professor, who has been arrested on several

occasions for political reasons. In between his various terms of imprisonment, he is reported to have applied on several occasions to leave Cuba. Despite well-publicized statements by the Cuban authorities that anyone who wants to leave Cuba is free to do so, he has consistently been refused permission to leave. He was granted conditional release from his latest term of imprisonment in August 1985, apparently on health grounds, but was again unable to succeed in his attempts to obtain official permission to leave the country to join his wife in the USA. He was reportedly subjected to close surveillance and was unable to obtain employment. On 28 August 1986 he entered the French Embassy in Havana, with a view to obtaining political asylum. At the time of writing, he is still there. The Cuban authorities are understood to be refusing to let him leave on this occasion because he was only released conditionally and has therefore not yet completed his sentence. The precise conditions under which he was released are not known to Amnesty International.

Dr. Bofill was first detained in 1967 as a consequence of an internal struggle within the Cuban Communist Party — the so-called *Micro-facción* trial of 1969 — and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, of which he served five. In April 1980, he was re-arrested on charges of illegal possession of foreign currency which he claimed was necessary to buy a ticket to travel abroad. Having been released in April 1982, he was again arrested in September 1983 after granting an interview to two French journalists — a few months earlier he had sought asylum in the French Embassy but left following assurances from the Cuban authorities that he would not be re-arrested. The precise charges on the occasion of his 1983 arrest are not known to Amnesty International but Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez told the organization that he was being held for his "counter-revolutionary activities". Some reports suggest that it was, at least in part, because of his activities as President of the unofficial *Comité Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos*, which functions clandestinely and is reportedly made up of prisoners and ex-prisoners. Some reports say that he was sentenced on this occasion to seventeen years but Amnesty International has no details of his trial.

### **Gustavo and Sebastián ARCOS BERGNES**

Another former political prisoner who, upon reportedly being refused official permission to leave the country, resorted to illegal means, is Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, currently serving a seven-year sentence for attempting to leave the country illegally, illegal possession of firearms, attempting to smuggle property considered part of the national patrimony, and illegal possession of foreign currency. He had fought with

Castro during the Cuban Revolution and from 1960 till 1966 was Cuban Ambassador to Belgium. In 1967, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, it is believed for "counter-revolutionary activity" although the precise charges are not known. He was released after serving three years and applied to leave Cuba but permission was refused. His wife and children had left Cuba several years earlier. When Gustavo heard that his son had been seriously injured in a car accident, he, together with his brother Sebastián, a dentist and former government official, his nephew also called Sebastián, and several others, tried to leave illegally by boat. Having been picked up by coastguards, they were tried in early 1982. Gustavo, who is 60, was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and his brother, believed to be slightly younger, to six. Recent reports indicate that they have been held for the entire period together in the same small cell measuring 2 m x 2.5 m [6.5' x 8'] in Combinado del Este Prison and that they are both very thin and suffering from anemia. Gustavo is said to be in serious need of medical attention for significantly elevated blood pressure and Amnesty International has requested that he be given all necessary care, including transfer to an outside hospital if appropriate. The two brothers were allowed out of prison for two hours last year to attend their mother's funeral. (Gustavo's son is now believed to be in Cuba receiving medical treatment at the expense of the Cuban Government.)

The cases of Gustavo and Sebastián Arcos are being investigated by Amnesty International in order to obtain more information about the precise circumstances of their attempt to leave the country.

### **3. Other political prisoners**

As already mentioned, there are believed to be at least several hundred other political prisoners currently in detention in Cuba for politically-related offenses. In many cases, the charges are criminal ones; however, Amnesty International has concluded that in several cases there is reason to believe that the person may have been convicted solely on account of his/her known opposition to the Cuban Government. In Cuba all press and media are government-controlled and independent human rights groups are unable to operate officially. It is therefore extremely difficult to obtain precise information concerning political prisoners. A great deal of the information at Amnesty International's disposal has come from relatives or friends of the prisoners living abroad, who have either left since the prisoner was detained or who have managed to correspond with them, often clandestinely, since then. Amnesty International has also received copies of some trial documents which indicate that political

detainees may sometimes be convicted despite serious lack of evidence.

Amnesty International is currently investigating the cases of two prisoners whom the organization believes may have been arrested and convicted on account of their past opposition activities or known or alleged political beliefs:

### **Felix José AGUDO ESCUDERO**

Felix José Agudo Escudero was arrested on 17 October 1984 in Manatí, Las Tunas and accused of sabotage under Article 109.1 ch of the Cuban Penal Code. He is said to have willfully damaged for political motives the machinery at the "Argelia Libre" Sugar Mill, where he had been employed for ten years, latterly at least as Head of Machinery. The Court of Crimes against State Security of Santiago de Cuba sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment in May 1984. While there seems to be no doubt that serious damage was actually caused at the sugar mill, which may have been the result of negligence on the part of Félix Agudo, Amnesty International is concerned at the apparent lack of substantiation in the sentencing document (of which the organization has a copy) of the allegation that the damage was willfully caused for political motives. No suggestion is made, for example, that he had contact with opposition groups. The only basis for the allegation seems to be the fact that he was previously convicted in 1963 for *atentar contra los poderes del Estado*, committing an outrage against the powers of the State, for which he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, of which he served seven. In the latest trial against him, he was declared to be an "*elemento desafecto al proceso revolucionario*", "hostile to the revolutionary process", with no substantiation other than his previous conviction given.

Another matter of concern is that his trial may not have conformed to internationally-recognized legal standards for a fair trial. Amnesty International has received allegations that political prisoners have little time to prepare their defense and that contact with their defense lawyer is very limited. (See section on detention and trial procedures below.)

### **Amado RODRIGUEZ FERNANDEZ**

Amado Rodríguez Fernández was arrested on 17 July 1984 in Santiago de Cuba on charges of rebellion (Art. 104), enemy propaganda (Art. 108-1-a) and b) and speculation (Art. 274-c). He was sentenced to 15 years on the first two charges and 6 months for speculation and hoarding, which apparently consisted of storing and selling nail varnish on the unofficial market (something quite widespread and by and large tolerated

by the authorities). He is currently serving his sentence in Boniato Prison. He had previously been arrested in November 1961 and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment, apparently accused of being an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He was pardoned and released in 1979. Amnesty International is concerned that Amado Rodríguez may have been arrested and convicted in the present instance solely on account of his non-violent opposition to the Cuban Government. The charge of "rebellion" does not appear from the sentencing document to have been substantiated. Amnesty International is further concerned at allegations that the original charges recommended by the Prosecution were changed three times as a result of pressure from the *Departamento de Seguridad del Estado* (DSE), State Security police, who had reportedly predicted to Amado Rodríguez, while in pre-trial detention, that he would get a 15 to 20 year sentence. In the end, Rodríguez was reportedly accused by the judge of "thinking of rebelling". Without the rebellion charge, the maximum penalty would have been eight years. Amado Rodríguez reportedly appealed unsuccessfully against the final sentence on the grounds that although there may have been evidence to justify the charge of enemy propaganda, insufficient evidence was presented to prove the rebellion charge.

## **IMPRISONMENT OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS**

In recent years, Amnesty International has received a number of reports indicating that many Jehovah's Witnesses are imprisoned in Cuba. On 1 July 1974, the Ministry of Justice, by Resolution No. 227, withdrew the official registration of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the Register of Religions on the grounds that they encouraged citizens not to carry out "elementary duties" such as defending the nation in accordance with the law, bringing up their children to respect and obey the Cuban Constitution and laws and to respect the flag and other national symbols.

Of the cases known to Amnesty International, those concerned are usually charged with specific offenses, such as refusing to do military service (sentence = 2-4 years) or telling their children not to salute the flag, rather than being a member of the sect itself.

Although information about imprisoned Jehovah's Witnesses is not easily available, partly because information about their arrest is not made public and partly because they themselves seem to have a policy of not publicizing such events, Amnesty International is aware of several cases, among them two who were held in Combinado del Este Prison serving terms of eight years' imprisonment each for offenses related to their

religious activities and who were reportedly released in May 1983 on humanitarian grounds. Another man, Felipe Hernández Martínez, believed to be involved in the same case, reportedly died in prison in 1981 as a result of respiratory arrest. The circumstances surrounding his death are not known to Amnesty International. Three others, since released, were reportedly imprisoned for organizing a religious procession.

According to some reports, those who are imprisoned for refusing to do military service are often asked again if they will serve in the army upon their release, and when they refuse, they are imprisoned again. According to released prisoners, as of 1984, about one hundred Jehovah's Witnesses were believed to be held in Combinado del Este Prison but Amnesty International has been unable to confirm their number or to obtain their names.

Amnesty International has also received reports that Seventh Day Adventists are imprisoned in Cuba for refusing to work on Saturday, their Sabbath, and refusing to send their children to school on that day. However, the organization has not received details of any recent such cases.

## THE DEATH PENALTY

The death penalty is provided for at least 22 categories of offense under the Cuban Penal Code, falling under six headings: Crimes against the external security of the state, crimes against the internal security of the state, crimes against peace and international law, other acts against the security of the state, offenses against collective security, and crimes against the person (see AMR 25/01/81 for details).

In all cases, a penalty of ten to thirty years' imprisonment is provided as an alternative punishment to the death penalty. The death penalty is not applicable to women pregnant at the time of the offense or the time of sentencing nor to persons under 20 years of age. Execution is by firing squad.

Cases in which the death sentence might be applicable are heard by the provincial courts (*tribunal provincial revolucionario*). Any appeal, if made, is heard by the Supreme People's Tribunal (*Tribunal Supremo Popular*). If the death sentence is upheld by the Supreme Court, a second appeal can be lodged with the Council of State (*Consejo de Estado*), which is presided by Fidel Castro.

At a press conference reported in the Cuban press in April 1985, the Deputy Minister of Justice, Ramón de la Cruz, explained that the death sentence was "a legal weapon that could not be dispensed with for the time being". He went on to say that "a verdict of death by a court occurs

only in exceptional cases of particularly abhorrent crimes”.

No official statistics on death sentences carried out have ever been published in Cuba, to Amnesty International's knowledge. While no credible reports have been received by the organization of the death penalty having been carried out during 1985-86 and no information concerning pending death sentences has been received, Amnesty International is concerned at a number of reports received between 1980 and 1984, according to which the death sentence had been called for by the courts in several cases. While in some cases the sentence is known to have been carried out or to have been commuted, in other cases no further news was received. The Cuban authorities have consistently failed to answer Amnesty International's requests to provide information about the application of the death penalty in Cuba, in particular the names of those executed and the charges they were convicted on, or to comment on specific reports of executions the organization has raised with them.

### **Reports of death sentences received by Amnesty International 1980-84**

- December 1980      Four people were sentenced to death and executed for “attempting to commit sabotage”.
- 1980/81              Three brothers, Cipriano, Ventura and Eugenio García Marín, were reportedly executed, accused of occupying by force the Papal Nuncio's residence in Havana, where they were hoping to obtain asylum. (Their mother, who was also arrested at the same time, was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment and is currently held in Havana Women's Prison, where she is said to be suffering from psychological problems.)
- June 1981            Abilio González Llanes (28) and Rofolfo Alonso Roche (21) were reportedly sentenced to death and executed for attempting to burn a bus.
- Emilio Reloba Cardulis (42) was reportedly executed at about the same time for burning down a sugar cane factory.
- October 1982        Ramón Toledo and Armando Hernández González were reportedly executed for plotting against the life of Fidel Castro. Several other people are believed to

have been arrested in connection with the same case (known as the *Causa de Menocal*) and to be currently serving prison sentences.

- November 1982 Juan Carlos Espinoza (29) was reportedly executed after being tried on charges related to the sabotage of a sugar mill.
- January 1983 Five men — Exequiel Díaz Rodríguez, José Luis Díaz Romero, Angel Donato Martínez García, Benito García Olivera and Carlos García Díaz, were reportedly sentenced to death on 25 January 1983 for "terrorism, sabotage, enemy propaganda and other acts against state security". The Cuban authorities denied that they were sentenced to death and said that they had been sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. However, Amnesty International has received a copy of the appeal judgement on the case dated 6 April 1983 in which it is clear that the five men concerned were initially sentenced to death and had the sentence reduced to 30 years only as a result of the appeal.
- February 1983 Antonio Carralero Ayala was reportedly executed on 24 February 1983. One source said that he was shot with five others for "conspiring against the powers of the State" while another source said he was executed, together with one other, for "sabotage".
- May 1983 Carlos Alberto Gutiérrez (23) was reportedly executed in Santiago de Cuba, accused, according to one report, of "terrorism". Another said it was for "painting anti-government slogans".
- 1983 Five lawyers were reportedly sentenced to death but subsequent reports indicated that their sentences were commuted to varying terms of imprisonment. No firm information is available about the grounds for their arrest, although one report says two of them were accused of espionage and others of corruption. One of them, Aramis Taboada, well known for defending prisoners held for politically-related offenses, later died, reportedly of a heart attack, in prison in 1985.

- March 1984      Diego Lorenzo Roche Periche (21) was, according to released prisoners, shot in Boniato Prison on 19 March 1984 after committing a politically-related offense, the exact nature of which is not known to Amnesty International.
- 1984              Six young political prisoners were reportedly shot at Boniato Prison, according to a former prisoner now in exile.
- early 1984      Two young men from San José de las Lajas were reportedly executed for "throwing nails on the Havana-Santa Clara highway".

## DETENTION AND TRIAL PROCEDURES

Detention and trial procedures are laid down by the Code of Penal Procedure, the Penal Code and the Constitution.

Trial procedures have substantially evolved in formal terms since the early years of the present government when Revolutionary Tribunals dealt with political trials. Most of the long-term prisoners known as *plantados* were tried and convicted by these tribunals. Their procedures are reported to have been summary, with insufficient opportunities for the defense, the court-appointed lawyer often limiting the plea to asking for leniency. For this reason, over the years Amnesty International has requested the Cuban Government to inform the organization of the precise charges against these prisoners and to provide details of their trials. Although Amnesty International has not received evidence that many of these prisoners qualified as Prisoners of Conscience, the organization has asked for a judicial review of their trials and sentences.

Revolutionary tribunals were abolished in 1973 when a series of reforms of the judiciary began. Until then, the Penal Code and other legal texts consisted of a combination of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary laws and procedures, and many of those enacted after 1959 dealt specifically with political offenses, including acts of violence. Such offenses were encompassed by the term "counter-revolutionary offenses" and were dealt with in the Penal Code under the chapter on "Offenses against the Security of the State".

According to the *Ley de Organización del Sistema Judicial*, Law of Organization of the Judicial System, of 1977 all present-day Cuban courts are made up of professional and lay judges, with equal rights and duties. All lay judges are elected and serve a two-and-a-half year term.

The lay judge is involved in all litigation, debates and votes on all sentences handed down by courts at all levels and on all issues. She/he is involved in both establishing the facts as well as ruling on the crime and passing sentence. *Delitos contra la seguridad del Estado*, offenses against the security of the State, are tried at provincial level in the *tribunales provinciales populares*, people's provincial tribunals, where the court is presided over by three professional judges (one of whom presides) and two lay judges. From there, appeals may be made to the highest court in Cuba, the *Tribunal Supremo Popular*, Supreme People's Tribunal. In certain exceptional cases, "determined by the public and social importance and significance of the matter or because of the personal characteristics of the alleged culprits", the Supreme People's Tribunal may deal with a case in the first instance (Article 399 of the Code of Penal Procedure).

Professional judges are selected by the Council of Ministers from a list of nominees, serve a set five-year term and can be removed at any time by the Council of Ministers. The President of the Supreme People's Tribunal is appointed for a seven-year term by the President of Cuba with the agreement of the Council of Minister, and presides over the Council of Government of the Supreme People's Tribunal which, under the direction of the Council of Ministers, directs and administers the entire court system.

### **The Rights of the Defendant**

According to Article 58 of the Cuban Constitution, in force since 1976, "every accused person has the right of defense... No violence or pressure can be used against people to force them to testify" and furthermore, "all statements obtained in violation of the above precepts are null and void, and those responsible for the violation will be punished, as outlined by law". Article 57 states *inter alia* that "the person who has been arrested, or the prisoner, is inviolable in his personal integrity."

Articles 245 to 249 of the Code of Penal Procedures lay down the procedures which the authorities must follow once somebody has been arrested. The Code designates the following agents in the process; the police, the accused, the *instructor* (investigator), who can either be from the police or the DSE, the *fiscal* (public prosecutor) and a tribunal of the first instance, which, in the case of crimes against state security, is normally the *Tribunal Provincial Popular*, People's Provincial Tribunal, although in some exceptional cases, as already mentioned above, the *Tribunal Supremo Popular*, Supreme People's Tribunal, deals with the case.

The procedure is as follows: The police cannot hold a detainee for more than 24 hours without advising the *instructor*, who then has 72 hours to free the detainee or to bring the case before the *fiscal*. The *fiscal* has 72 hours to decide whether to impose a custodial measure or to free the detainee, which requires a written decision stating the legal grounds. If the *fiscal* decides on a custodial measure, the case is then brought before the competent tribunal which has 72 hours to confirm, modify or quash the decision of the *fiscal*, also on the basis of a written resolution stating the legal grounds. The case is sent back to the *fiscal* who hands over the file to an instructor who "*sin dilación*" (without delay) must notify the accused of the decision of the tribunal and of his/her right to designate a lawyer.

From this moment, "the accused will be a party to the proceedings and can present evidence in his favour either himself or through a defense lawyer" (*el acusado será parte en el proceso y podrá por sí mismo o por medio de su defensor proponer pruebas a su favor*). The tribunal may, however, decide for state security reasons that the accused and the lawyer may not have access to the trial indictment during the preparatory stage prior to the trial hearing (Article 249).

A number of remarks can be made on the provisions of the Code of Penal Procedures. For example, there is no mention of any procedures governing incommunicado detention and the requirement or indeed, need for judicial arrest warrants. There is no specific mention of the places where preventive detention may legally take place, nor is there any mention of any statutory rights detainees may have during the period of pre-trial detention to meet family and lawyers, nor the frequency with which this might take place.

The Code of Penal Procedures allows up to ten days from the time of arrest before a detainee is formally informed of his/her indictment. It is only at this stage that a lawyer can be appointed. This means that a detainee is unable during the initial days of detention to seek and obtain legal advice or to challenge the legality of the arrest.

The *habeas corpus* procedure, as defined by Article 467 of the Code of Penal Procedures, stipulates the following: "Any person deprived of their freedom and not charged and who has not been granted the formalities and guarantees provided for by the Constitution and law, must be released either at their own request or at the request of another person by means of a very short *habeas corpus* procedure addressed to the competent courts."

("Toda persona que se encuentre privada de libertad fuera de los casos y sin las formalidades y garantías que prevén la constitución y las leyes, debe ser puesta en libertad, a petición suya o de cualquier otra persona, mediante un sumarísimo proceso de *habeas corpus* ante los tribunales competentes.")

However, Amnesty International is not aware of any case in which this procedure has been followed. The procedure does not seem to be relevant when there is reason to believe that the detainee is being subjected to ill-treatment in the detention facilities of *Seguridad del Estado* since even if the tribunal accepts the application for *habeas corpus*, Article 467 states that the holding authority has 72 hours to bring the detainee before it, unlike Codes of Penal Procedure in other countries which stipulate that this should be done immediately.

Over the years, Amnesty International has received abundant and consistent allegations from former political prisoners that the legal counsel available in Cuba is very limited. Prisoners usually have very little time, if any, to talk to their lawyer prior to the hearings which although by law (unless otherwise decided by the court) are public, in practice appear to offer very little opportunity for the general public to attend if they wish to do so. For example, the trial of Teresa Mayans, her husband and son (already mentioned earlier) reportedly took place in a very small courtroom which only lawyers or people studying to be lawyers were permitted to enter.

In the case of offenses against the security of the State, the role of the *Departamento de Seguridad del Estado* (DSE) appears to be a dominant and powerful one. Not only do they seem to be able to hold a prisoner virtually incommunicado for weeks and months at a time but the evidence that they submit during the trial does not appear to be questioned by the court. Furthermore, in some cases such as that of Amado Rodríguez (see above), who was accused of "rebellion" and sentenced to fifteen years in April 1985, it is alleged that the DSE put pressure on the *fiscal* (public prosecutor) to sentence him for "rebellion", which carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years, rather than "enemy propaganda", which in this case would have carried a sentence of eight years. Amnesty International is concerned that the official sentencing document in this case does not appear to substantiate the charge of rebellion and that his conviction may have been obtained as a result of pressure put on the prosecutor's office by the DSE because of Rodríguez' previous record of opposition activities rather than for any specific activity he may have been carrying out at the time of his arrest.

### **Defense lawyers**

In Cuba there is no private exercise of advocacy. Lawyers must belong to a *bufete colectivo*, collective lawyers' office, in order to be able to practice law. Their functions are defined in Article 169 of the *Ley de Organización del Sistema Judicial* (LOSJ), Law of Organization of the

Judicial System, as follows:

“On acting before the courts, the function of the lawyers is to duly defend the interest that they represent, BY NOT ABUSING THE RESOURCES AND DEFENSE MEASURES GUARANTEED BY LAW IN A WAY THAT IS LIKELY TO PREVENT JUSTICE FROM ACCOMPLISHING THE SOCIAL FUNCTION THAT CORRESPONDS TO IT.” (Emphasis added.) (“Los abogados tienen como función, al actuar ante los tribunales, defender debidamente el interés que representan, EVITANDO ABUSAR DE LOS RECURSOS Y MEDIOS DE DEFENSA QUE LA LEY GARANTIZA EN FORMA TENDENTE A IMPEDIR QUE LA JUSTICIA PUEDA CUMPLIR LA FUNCION SOCIAL QUE A ELLA CORRESPONDE.”)

In the *Reglamento de Bufetes Colectivos* (RBC), the rules governing the functioning of the collective lawyers' offices, Article 3 defines eight points as being their main objectives, four of which are clearly related to their function of supporting the socialist system in Cuba:

4. To promote the importance of respect for socialist legality (*Promover los valores de respecto a la legalidad socialista*);
5. To work for the development of a socialist judicial conscience (*Trabajar por el desarrollo de la conciencia jurídica socialista*);
6. To contribute to the ideological, political, judicial and cultural improvement of its members and administrative personnel (*Contribuir a la superación ideológica, política, jurídica y cultural de sus miembros y del personal administrativo*);
8. To promote amongst its members the international spirit of solidarity that our revolution practices (Elevar a sus miembros el espíritu solidario e internacionalista que practica nuestra revolución).

The Code of Ethics of the *bufetes colectivos* lists twelve shortcomings (*faltas de ética*) which may be the subject of disciplinary measures, including expulsion from the *bufetes*. For example, Article 2 refers to:

- j. Acting in a way likely to prevent justice from accomplishing its social function (*Actuar en forma tendente a impedir que la justicia pueda cumplir en su función social*);
- k. Adopt in the exercise of their legal function an individualist attitude,

without a collective working spirit (*Desenvolverse en el ejercicio de su función letrada con una actitud individualista, sin espíritu colectivo de trabajo*).

Study of the provisions of the *Ley de Organización del Sistema Judicial*, the rules governing the functioning of the *bufetes colectivos*, trial records and testimony of former political prisoners seems to support allegations by the latter that in practice the political detainee is at the mercy of the authorities and in particular of the Department of State Security. Although the prisoners do have access at some stage to a lawyer, do appear before a court and do have the right of appeal which they often take up, political prisoners consider that from the moment they are arrested by the DSE, their fate is sealed, the trial being merely a formality. Lawyers appear to be just auxiliaries and ancillaries in this process rather than clearly defending the interests of their client. Those who do so risk being seen to endorse the defendant's political views. Furthermore, in most cases known to Amnesty International, the defense lawyer hardly sees the defendant before the public stage of the trial.

There appear to be a limited number of lawyers willing to take up political cases and the same names tend to appear in such trials. One of the lawyers most wellknown for defending political prisoners was Aramis Taboada, who took up the cases of many political prisoners from the early 60's onwards. Taboada was himself arrested in 1983, reportedly on charges of corruption. However, Amnesty International has received allegations that while he may have been involved in some kind of malpractice, the real reason for his detention was his attitude in the case of several people tried and convicted on charges of sabotage who were sentenced to death. Aramis Taboada reportedly alerted international opinion about the death sentences passed against his clients. Because of unconfirmed allegations that the people concerned had tried to form a Solidarity-type trade union in Cuba, the Cuban authorities showed deep annoyance and embarrassment at the publicity the case attracted in the world media and went outside of its established policy by making a public statement on the matter.

## **APPENDIX**

### **RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE CUBAN PENAL CODE**

#### **Article 108 ENEMY PROPAGANDA**

1. A penalty of one to eight years' loss of liberty will be incurred by anyone who:
  - a) incites against social order, international solidarity or the socialist state, by means of oral, written or any other kind of propaganda;
  - b) making, distributing or possessing propaganda of the kind mentioned in the previous paragraph.
2. Anyone who diffuses false news or malicious predictions likely to cause alarm or discontent in the population, or public disorder will incur a penalty of one to four years' loss of liberty.
3. If, in the execution of the deeds foreseen in the previous paragraphs, the mass media are used, the penalty will be seven to fifteen years' loss of liberty.
4. Anyone who allows the use of the mass media referred to in the previous paragraph will incur a penalty of one to four years' loss of liberty.

#### **[Artículo 108 PROPAGANDA ENEMIGA**

1. Incurrir en sanción de privación de libertad de uno a ocho años el que:
  - a) incite contra el orden social, la solidaridad internacional o el Estado socialista, mediante la propaganda oral o escrita o en cualquier otra forma;
  - b) confeccione, distribuya o posea propaganda del carácter mencionado en el inciso anterior.
2. El que difunda noticias falsas o predicciones maliciosas tendentes a causar alarma o descontento en la población, o desorden público, incurre en sanción de privación de libertad de uno a cuatro años.

3. Si para la ejecución de los hechos previstos en los apartados anteriores, se utilizan medios de difusión masiva, la sanción es de privación de libertad de siete a quince años.

4. El que permita la utilización de los medios de difusión masiva a que se refiere el apartado anterior, incurre en sanción de privación de libertad de uno a cuatro años.]

#### **Article 247**

### **ILLEGAL DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL TERRITORY**

1. He who, without complying with the legal formalities, leaves, or carries out acts with the intention of leaving national territory, will incur a penalty of six months to three years' loss of liberty.

2. If in the carrying out of the deed mentioned in the previous paragraph violence or intimidation against persons or force against things is employed, the penalty will be three to eight years' loss of liberty.

3. The offenses foreseen in the previous paragraphs will be penalized independently from those that may be committed for or at the time of their execution.

#### **[Artículo 247**

### **SALIDA ILEGAL DEL TERRITORIO NACIONAL**

1. El que, sin cumplir las formalidades legales, salga o realice actos tendentes a salir del territorio nacional, incurre en sanción de privación de libertad de seis meses a tres años.

2. Si para la realización del hecho a que se refiere el apartado anterior, se emplea violencia o intimidación en las personas o fuerza en las cosas, la sanción es de privación de libertad de tres a ocho años.

3. Los delitos previstos en los apartados anteriores se sancionan con independencia de los que se cometan para su ejecución o en ocasión de ella.]

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