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TOKYO

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By WILLIAM GRAVES
SENIOR ASSISTANT EDITOR

Photographs by DAVID ALAN HARVEY
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC PHOTOGRAPHER

A Profile of Success

東京
その成功横顔

Already at one with the well-ordered confusion of her city, a private-school commuter awaits her train at Shinjuku, Japan's largest station, transited by nearly three million people daily. Prosperity has arrived in a blur to a teeming city that still reflects images of its cultural traditions. Characters **(above)** *depict the English title.*

IT WAS THE EARTHQUAKE'S second shock that caught me by surprise. When the first tremor struck, I did all the right things: shouted *"Jishin!"* (Earthquake!) to the two children, snapped off the apartment's gas main, pushed the youngsters under the kitchen table, and joined them there as the room rocked violently around us.

As with most earthquakes in Tokyo, the rocking soon subsided, and after a few moments I got to my feet while the children remained under the table. A second later I was jolted to the floor by a sudden aftershock. Feeling slightly foolish, I looked up after a time and saw the face of Tatsuo Kimura regarding me from the kitchen door.

"Graves-san," he said politely, "if that were a real earthquake, the children would be fine. I am sorry I cannot say the same for you."

No one knows how many lives Mr. Kimura's earthquake truck has saved—only the future, and a massive shock in Tokyo, may tell. Against that grim possibility Tatsuo Kimura and his crew tour the neighborhoods of Japan's capital for their employer, the Tokyo Fire Department, teaching as

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ny lives Mr. Ki- as saved—only shock in Tokyo, possibility Tat- ur the neighbor- their employer, nt, teaching as

many as possible of the city's 12 million residents how to survive a major earthquake.

The half-hour course includes a brief lecture and an optional test in the large chamber on Mr. Kimura's truck. The chamber is furnished like a typical Japanese kitchen, and it can be shaken by a powerful hydraulic system at any level on the Japanese earthquake scale.

Mr. Kimura seldom pushes the controls beyond level 3, though in fact the machine can go as high as level 7, the top of the Japanese scale. That is one level above the force of the 1923 earthquake that claimed

Invasion of things Western first took a foothold in the Ginza district, where traditional kimonos occasionally pass glitzy mannequins. But the high-fashion path that the world now beats to Tokyo is two-way: While Western models are de rigueur here, their Japanese counterparts steal the show in New York and Paris. The Ginza has long had the luster of money about it. It was the site of the mint (gin means "silver") from 1612 to 1800. Today a square foot of Ginza real estate commands $18,000.

as many as 140,000 lives in the Tokyo area.

During a later test, I performed to Mr. Kimura's satisfaction. I asked him then who had invented the earthquake truck.

"I am not sure," he replied, "but I believe it was developed in this country." He smiled modestly. "Who but a Japanese would think of such a thing?"

PRECISELY that question is echoed around the world today with a mixture of envy and frustration. Thanks to the same technology and skill that produced Mr. Kimura's earthquake truck, Japan has captured global markets in everything from motorcycles and minicomputers to laser-disc video systems and, more recently, high-fashion design.

The result is a staggering Japanese foreign trade surplus approaching 100 billion dollars, 85 percent of it with the United States alone—a fact that does little to improve Japanese-American relations. Although cracks have begun to form in the foundations of Japan's success, they are still barely visible, and time alone will tell whether they mean serious trouble ahead.

At center stage stands Tokyo, glittering symbol of the country's new wealth and international influence. Once a manufacturing giant itself, Tokyo has long since been transformed into a control room for the colossal economic engine that is Japan's modern industry.

Tokyoites respond to their new global status with a mixture of pride and a lingering sense of inferiority. In the land of the world's most advanced and efficient automakers, some customers nevertheless order a Mercedes or Ferrari from abroad with left-hand

drive, the wrong side for Japan, just so there will be no doubt that the machine is imported.

Other imports bear stunning price tags. On one of my first days in Tokyo after an absence of many years I went on a window-shopping tour along the Ginza, still the commercial heart of the city. In terms of dress the crowds that swirled around me might have come from any large Western city. The kimono has virtually disappeared, and instead all is designer jeans, T-shirts, well-cut business suits, and the very latest in women's fashions.

What Tokyo buys is as striking as what it wears. In a specialty shop just off the Ginza, I found imported cantaloupes priced at 10,000 yen (roughly $65) apiece, apples for $5.25 each, and a box of gleaming cherries at a cost of $240. I stopped to count the cherries—there were 104 of them, for an average of $2.30 per cherry.

In part such prices stem from the cost of Tokyo itself: Not far from the specialty shop lies the city's most expensive land, an area of the Ginza selling for $18,000 a square foot.

Space, or the lack of it, rules every aspect of Tokyo life both at work and at play. No import today carries a higher price tag than that venerable Scottish pastime, golf. Nine out of ten golf courses in Tokyo belong to private clubs, and a membership in one of the best recently cost $900,000.

"Many clubs have stopped taking new members," a Japanese golfer explains. "As a result, memberships are often bought and sold like stocks—more for the investment than for the pleasure of the game.

"Even so," he adds, "most clubs are hopelessly crowded. If I want to play at my club on a weekend, I have to reserve a month in advance. At a public course on *any* day of the week, I have to reserve three months ahead and pray for good weather—there is no such thing as a rain check."

All honor to the children: *A seven-year-old daughter's portrait is preserved at Meiji Shrine on Seven-Five-Three Day, celebrated for children of those years, around November 15. Such ages were considered milestones for the young to achieve in bygone days of high child mortality.*

***Humble fishing village** called Edo became a powerhouse after Tokugawa Ieyasu (**left**), first of a great dynasty of shoguns, or military rulers, chose it as his headquarters in 1590. After the shogunate fell in 1867, Edo was renamed Tokyo—the new capital. Disaster has continually changed the city's blueprint. In the great fire of 1657 many of the 100,000 victims perished when trapped by the Sumida River. As a remedy, one of the first bridges built was the Ryogokubashi (**right**). Mount Fuji, beyond, still skyscrapes the horizon (**below**) when smog and haze abate sufficiently—now an average of 78 days a year, compared with 13 in 1965. The Sumida, however, remains polluted. With the vertical reach for living space, sunshine rights are a burning issue, and developers are required to compensate those overshadowed by their buildings. The city's open space totals only 10 percent.*

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

FUKUI ASAHIDO CO. LTD. (FACING PAGE AND ABOVE)

LIKE NEARLY ALL great modern cities, Tokyo long ago took to the air to ease its space problems. Though it is no longer the world's largest metropolis—Mexico City and São Paulo, Brazil, both have larger populations—Tokyo nonetheless jams its 12 million residents into 800 teeming square miles and moves them around the city with legendary efficiency. Yet the cost is considerable. The Japanese National Railways alone, which serves Tokyo as well as the country, has a current deficit of 85 billion dollars—greater than the Mexican national debt.

Only one-tenth of Tokyo is open space, as compared with Washington, D. C., which has 34 percent devoted to parks and public areas. But what little open space Tokyo has, it cherishes dearly and sees to it that others may do the same. "This city," says an expatriate New Yorker admiringly, "is probably one of the very few left that's so safe the parks at night are still for lovers."

Home, on the other hand, is no place for lovers. The average Tokyo family of four occupies a mere 700 square feet of living space, about the same as an American one-bedroom apartment. If the Tokyo family wants to buy a modest two-bedroom condominium in the downtown area, prices start around $400,000.

And still the Japanese flock to Tokyo. The city has one-tenth of the country's population but relatively few natives—three out of every four Tokyoites were born someplace else. Like the rest of their countrymen, Tokyo residents are the longest-lived people in the world today, reaching an average of 74.5 years for men and 80 for women.

With the continuing influx the only direction is up, and as Tokyo soars skyward, it is increasingly concerned with the health of those below. The city has pioneered in what the Japanese call *nisshoken*—sunshine right—a law requiring compensation for residents who are cast into shadow by neighboring tall buildings.

"Nisshoken is important, especially in winter," declares a Tokyo lawyer specializing in the field. "Unlike Americans, we Japanese have almost no central heating, and we depend on sunlight in winter to help warm our houses."

By a complex formula the law requires high-rise builders to pay households they overshadow a onetime compensation ranging from $420 to $1,260 for each hour of sunlight lost on a winter day.

Special cases, particularly those involving children, have resulted in far higher settlements. According to one story, the builder of a skyscraper in the prosperous Shinjuku area failed to take nisshoken into account. Halfway through construction he found, to his horror, that the building would permanently overshadow a neighboring kindergarten playground.

Whether from an excess of public spirit or



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Not every case of nisshoken is settled as happily. Akira Matsumoto, as he asked to be identified, is a quiet man in his 50s who lives with his wife and two children in a second-floor apartment above the family's small rice shop in the Jimbo-cho area.

The Matsumotos today live in perpetual darkness, thanks to high-rise buildings on three sides and a doorway facing north into a narrow street.

"The builders *(Continued on page 620)*

Generations apart *suggest a shift in society. The middle-aged embody Yamato damashii, the "Japanese spirit" that rebuilt, in an economic eye blink, a war-torn nation into one with a trade surplus nearing 100 billion dollars. Young people have been called the "bean-sprout generation"—fast-growing but weak, more leisure-oriented, less dedicated to the company. In a recent survey, fewer than half the new job recruits planned to stay with their first firm until retirement.*

TOKYO: Giant in motion

WORLD'S LARGEST CITY *in the early 18th century* **(below)**, *Edo contained 1.3 million people. With its castle now the Imperial Palace, the emperor's home, the old town is the hub of metropolitan Tokyo* **(right)**, *with 12 million people shoehorned into 800 square miles. Toshima-ku, the most crowded ward, counts 57,200 per square mile.*

The city's history is much more of the mind than the eye. From hundreds of earthquakes and fires, typhoons and floods, Tokyoites have rebuilt, creating a numbing urban hodgepodge. Here and there green walls of oxidized copper testify to the prewar era in buildings that survived the catastrophic U. S. firebombing in 1945. It destroyed almost half the city and killed nearly 100,000. Today rebuilt, the city is laced together by an efficient subway system of ten lines totaling about 150 miles, as well as the 101-year-old Yamanote Line that loops central Tokyo.



Railroad, station
Expressway
Subway
Map represents central Tokyo

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

PEABODY MUSEUM OF SALEM, MASSACHUSETTS

***Getting down to business** after quitting time, office workers depart a Shinjuku complex **(left)** for a round of drinks and dinner together. Stalls serving yakitori—barbecued snacks—are favorites in the Ginza **(right)**. Far more than just a drink with the gang, the practice is called nemawashi, or root-binding. It cements relationships and lets workers seek consensus for new ideas in an informal group, rather than be hurt by rejection back at the office. Most companies treat the ritual as an investment, with supervisors adding it to their budgets and senior men picking up part of the tabs of their subordinates.*

*Today's businessmen are spiritual heirs of the samurai, elite warriors of the Edo period. The samurai abolished their own special status amid the winds of modernization, spurred by contact with the outside world, that swept through Japan in the 1870s. In a ceremonial and nostalgic display **(above)** a group of samurai don their old swords and armor—declared illegal as everyday dress after 1876—to honor the adoption of the Meiji Constitution of 1889, 21 years after the fall of the last shogun.*

Only a few are out of step with the pace of prosperity, as revealed by a lunchtime scene in Shinjuku. Tokyo's unemployed reflect the low national rate of 2.7 percent. Many of the down-and-out work as day laborers.

With less work and more play the aim of the young, the work week is shrinking from five and a half to five days, and the leisure industry now produces 16 percent of the gross national product. New applicants seek "in" jobs with trendy firms such as liquor producers.

would not listen," Mr. Matsumoto told me sadly. "We asked them to leave a little space between their walls and ours, so a bit of sunlight would filter down. But they were greedy and built right up against us."

The case went to court, but for reasons still unclear the family lost. The builders thereupon offered a pittance in compensation. Mr. Matsumoto refused, not because of the amount but because, as he told me, "One does not sell the sunlight from one's life."

I asked why he didn't move, and he shook his head. "I have spent my whole life selling rice in the Jimbo-cho area. Where would I find such wonderful neighbors and customers again?"

To older Japanese, Mr. Matsumoto's staunch resistance is an example of *Yamato damashii*, or Japanese spirit, which succeeds when all else fails. Many adults today believe the younger generation is sadly lacking in such spirit.

"Our young people have been called *moyashiko*—the bean-sprout generation," a Tokyo businessman told me. "Like bean sprouts they grow fast and in the dark and have no strength."

Such sentiments are universal among adults the world over, but the Japanese character lends special emphasis.

"Older Japanese made enormous sacrifices to rebuild their country after World War II," says Tracy Dahlby, a highly respected American journalist based in Tokyo for many years. "Those people created something of a miracle in their own eyes, and they expect a measure of sacrifice from those who are going to inherit it.

"Of course," Tracy adds, "many younger Japanese know very little of World War II—to them Pearl Harbor is simply a popular honeymoon resort."

ONE OF THE MAJOR SACRIFICES demanded of young Japanese today concerns education. So extreme is parental pressure to gain entrance into good schools and universities that Japanese refer to the selection process as *shiken jigoku*—examination hell.

"We even have entrance exams for kindergarten classes!" declares Atsuko Takagi, an attractive 21-year-old junior majoring in design at a top Tokyo university. I met Atsuko one evening along with a group of her fellow university students at a small café in Shinjuku.

Inevitably talk turned to the bean-sprout label, and reactions were mixed. Some of the group flatly rejected the charge, and others simply considered it outdated.

"I think it is a matter of different values," a young history student remarked. "Our parents worked hard to build Japan into a prosperous country, and to them the symbols of wealth are important: Some people show off their child's university diploma as if it were a brand-new Nissan limousine. But to us it is more important where you go in the Nissan than who sees you driving it."

"It is extremely difficult to get into a good university," Atsuko added, "but once you are accepted, it is easy to stay there. The university does not require you to work, and many students hardly ever open a book. Yet they receive their diplomas just the same."

Another student nodded. "Some Japanese companies are just as bad," he said. "When they interview graduates for jobs, they do not look for brains or imagination. They look for people who are popular and get along with others—what you Americans

call team players. The companies tell the student, 'Never mind your grades; we will take you and then train you our way.'"

THINGS ARE DIFFERENT at Sony. The giant Tokyo-based electronics firm that has become a world symbol for Japanese quality and craftsmanship has no interest in mediocrity. To maintain sales of seven billion dollars a year, Sony hires only the best. The company looks at everything from grades to background and character before choosing and training its future executives.

Despite a crowded schedule, Sony's co-founder and current chairman of the board, Akio Morita, agreed to meet me at company headquarters in south Tokyo.

Mr. Morita's research-and-development teams are currently at work perfecting an ultra-high-quality video system that may one day become the world standard for television broadcast and reception.

"We call it the Sony HDVS, for high-definition video system," Mr. Morita explained. "Today in your country the standard television screen contains 525 'scanning lines,' or horizontal lines, that make up the picture. The HDVS has more than twice that number—1,125 lines, to be exact. The improvement in picture quality is quite noticeable."

Stunning is more like it. I later watched an HDVS test featuring scenes of a candle flickering in a breeze. One could virtually feel the heat of the flame, and when the candle blew out, I half-expected the smoke to come out of the video screen.

I asked Mr. Morita how Sony managed to read the American market so successfully, producing one runaway best-seller after another in the electronics field. For the first time he smiled.

"Many reasons," he answered, "but I would say the first three are quality, quality, and again quality. Many Americans think that is something new to Japanese industry, but quality is an age-old tradition among us.

"It is true that before World War II we exported cheap products to the United States. But that is what America wanted from Japan at the time. Today it is far different, and the main difference is quality. I like to think Sony has had something to do with it."

DESPITE the acknowledged high quality of Japanese goods, the country's huge trade surplus stems from other factors as well, not all of them universally admired. Many countries complain that Japan exports its own goods freely but refuses to buy from others in return.

"They have a point," says Bill Rapp, an expert on Japanese economic affairs and a senior executive with BankAmerica in Tokyo. Amid the barrage of threats and accusations from both sides in the U. S.-Japan trade dispute, I turned to Bill for facts.



PRIVATE COLLECTION OF JUNSHIN HAYASHI

Haven for body and soul, *the Buddhist temple of Asakusa Kannon* ***(above)*** *draws multitudes to burn incense and enjoy shops and amusements. When the great earthquake of 1923 touched off an inferno* ***(left)****, thousands flocked to the temple and were saved by its open space—but as many as 140,000 others perished. Today many skyscrapers incorporate an anti-quake design, because the earth beneath Japan never sleeps. Though few tremors are felt, an average of three a day occur.*

"They're there for anyone to see," Bill said when I called on him at his office near the Imperial Palace. "Americans tend to think of Japanese workers as some sort of super-robots who can outproduce anyone in the world. But that's nonsense. The fact is that per capita productivity in the United States today is still roughly 28 percent greater than in Japan.

"Basically," Bill added, "three main industries keep this country rolling. They are automobiles, steel, and electronic goods, and the Japanese government has protected and subsidized all three at one time or another. The idea of Japan's superefficiency in every field is simply a myth." I started to interrupt, but Bill held up a hand.

"Consider these points. The Japanese economy is fast becoming like ours—that is, a service economy specializing more in distribution and retail than in manufacture. It's already a 60 percent service economy, compared with our figure of 70 percent.

"But Japan's retail-and-distribution system is incredibly archaic and inefficient. Even in Tokyo it's nearly all based on the small one-family shop or firm that occupies space but is barely marginal. As a result, there's very little mass distribution here as we know it—and you can't run a service economy today without that."

If Japan is so inefficient, I asked, how does it pile up a hundred-billion-dollar foreign-trade surplus in a single year?

"Hard work in the export field," Bill acknowledged, "and with the help of extensive trade barriers. Let's take wood products for example. In this country today there are approximately 700 plywood manufacturing plants, and probably less than 50 of them can compete with foreign producers in terms of cost and efficiency. But just try importing a shipment of plywood from Seattle and you'll run into high tariffs and more red tape than you can believe.

***Making a wish** for heroic strength, students practice on a professional sumo wrestler **(facing page)**. Sumo is still a big draw, but it cannot match baseball mania. Fans of Tokyo's Seibu Lions **(below)** return by subway from a game of the 1985 Japan Series; the Lions ultimately lost to Osaka's Hanshin Tigers. Tokyoites also relish tennis and golf, but a golf club membership can cost $900,000.*

"It's the same with all kinds of imported goods," Bill added, "from petrochemicals and telecommunications equipment to rice and even aluminum baseball bats. It's not just the U. S. that's complaining. Labor-intensive countries like Taiwan and South Korea are hurting even worse, because there's no way they can invade the Japanese market with their low-priced goods."

JAPANESE INDUSTRY has already undergone a massive invasion at home by a relatively new phenomenon—the working woman. From a state of virtual unemployment following World War II, Japanese women today constitute nearly 40 percent of the country's work force and are gaining rapidly on the men.

"But not in terms of salary," declares Mariko Fujiwara, a director of research at Tokyo's Hakuhodo Institute of Life and Living. "The Japanese woman," says Mrs. Fujiwara, "receives little more than half the

A long hot soak together *keeps the gossip flowing in the sento, or public bath. A father follows parental duty by bringing in his young daughter for a scrub, at left, but for adults the facilities have long been segregated. Mixed bathing, practiced after the first commercial bath opened in 1591, now survives mostly in a few hot-spring resorts in the countryside. The sento lives on by both tradition and necessity, since one-fourth of the city's housing units still lack private baths.*

salary of a man doing comparable work. There's still a strong attitude here of the young woman employee as *shokuba no hana,* or office flower, who's there more for decoration than for actual work."

At least one woman in Tokyo performs both functions superbly. Kiyomi Saito is a highly successful international bond broker who at 34 could pass for a Miss Universe candidate. I had seen a brief article on Kiyomi in a Tokyo magazine and called at her office at Morgan Stanley International, a global investment firm, to learn more about her.

A graduate in economics from Tokyo's top-ranked Keio University, Kiyomi worked in Tokyo for several years, was married, divorced, and then decided to visit the United States. The visit involved a master's degree in business administration from the Harvard Business School in 1981. With degree in hand, Kiyomi decided that she and corporate Japan were ready for each other.

"I was only half right," she recalled, smiling. "I was ready for *them,* but they were interested in men, not women.

"If you're a young man in Tokyo," she said, "and you want to be successful, you go to a good university, then you join a big company and get on the corporate escalator. If you have brains and ambition and a little patience, you can ride that escalator all the way to the top.

"But if you're a woman," Kiyomi continued, "you can't even *find* the escalator, and if you do, somehow it's not working. When I applied for my first job here after Harvard, the interviewer asked, 'Can you play 18 holes of golf, are you any good at mah-jongg, can you drink right along with the men?' It was a long time before I found a spot where those things didn't really matter."

On a good day now Kiyomi may sell 50 million dollars' worth of U. S. Treasury bonds, Eurobonds, and such things as "lollipops," broker's slang for bonds issued by the Louisiana Power & Light Company. She likes her position at Morgan Stanley and works well with major Japanese firms. I asked if she would ever join such a firm, and she smiled.

"If I ever did," she answered, "you'd see a lot more women on the escalator."

I THOUGHT OF KIYOMI and her escalator not long afterward in a Tokyo department store. In such places tradition dies slowly, and teams of attractive young women still greet shoppers at the entrances to escalators with a graceful bow and a murmured *"Irasshaimase"* (Welcome). The job

"Violently running tribes," *or* bosozoku, *a generic name for motorcycle gangs, now run more cautiously after a police crackdown. This group calls itself Little Saint* ***(left)****. In an outpouring of dance and dress re-creating the fifties craze they never knew, other young people flood Yoyogi Park on Sunday, including Makoto Inagaki and his son, Tatsuya* ***(above)****.*

is literally back-bending; a Tokyo columnist once calculated that each young woman bows an average of 665,600 times a year. That was if the woman worked five days a week, the columnist explained. For a six-day week the total would be 798,720 bows.

Such minimal jobs help explain Japan's phenomenal unemployment rate of only 2.7 percent of the work force, compared with 7 percent or more in the United States. Japanese employers start young women at salaries as low as $8,000 a year and keep them on till they marry or reach the age of 30, then ease them out and replace them with younger women at the original low salary.

Master of persuasion, Tojuro Sawamura (below) prepares for the role of a samurai's lover in a Kabuki play at the National Theater. Men have been cast in female roles since women were banned from Kabuki in 1629. In avant-garde dance called buto, members of the Sankai Juku troupe make their entrance (facing page). Last year in Seattle one was killed when his rope snapped.

The mystery to Westerners is how anyone can survive on such income in a city of staggering prices. "It's simple—we just don't eat imported cherries," jokes my friend Minoru Aoo, on the staff of Tokyo's prestigious *Japan Economic Journal.*

"As for single young women," Minoru adds seriously, "they normally live with their parents till they marry. We have a saying that single young women are the richest people in Tokyo, because they're fed and housed and have all their expenses paid—except possibly for their makeup."

Other factors help, such as an income tax that averages less than 10 percent for middle- and low-income groups.

"But subsidy is really the name of the game," says Minoru, who represented the *Journal* in Los Angeles for several years. "Few people could make it in Tokyo unless their company helped them out in a number of ways.

"I have a friend," he said, "who's married and has two children. He earns about $42,000 a year as a sales manager for a big Tokyo steel firm. Since his company owns his apartment building in the suburbs, he pays only $80 rent a month for what Tokyo real estate agents call a mansion—two tiny bedrooms, plus a kitchen, dining room, and living room.

"The company also pays for his parking space at home, his yearly pass on the commuter train, and a variety of medical and other benefits, plus quite a good pension plan. His wife doesn't work, but she's very careful with the family budget.

"Altogether," Minoru concluded, "they lead a pretty good life, including tennis on weekends, piano lessons for the children, and a couple of family vacations a year. And they still manage to save 20 percent of their income—the rule of thumb for most Japanese families."

One of the specters that haunts people like Minoru's friend is the possibility of being transferred to another city, either in Japan or abroad. Though companies normally pay a substantial part of the costs of moving, many families cannot face the prospect of

Identity masked, a protester (left) demands freedom for a convicted murderer. Supporters claim prejudice because he belongs to the burakumin, descendants of outcasts whose tasks, such as slaughtering animals, were regarded as unclean.

For a mark of distinction, a customer is adorned by a tattoo artist (right). The profession has close ties to the underworld yakuza that deals in organized vice and accounts for much of the city's minuscule crime rate.

uprooting themselves and their children and beginning a new life elsewhere.

The result is a significant number of what the Japanese refer to as *tanshinfunin zoku*—single-body transfer people—men who leave their families behind and move to other cities, often remaining for years with only rare visits home.

The effect can be devastating on the Japanese family, the very unit the husband and wife sought to preserve. Divorce and juvenile delinquency, both rarities in years past, are on the rise, and some Tokyo housewives whose children have grown up and left home have taken to prostitution. "It's rarely just for the money," a marriage counselor assured me. "For most wives it's more a matter of companionship—anything is better than being totally alone."

NO AMERICAN, at least, can feel totally alone in Tokyo—the city is too much like home. Despite the highly publicized flood of Japanese goods pouring into the United States, things American somehow continue to find their way into nearly every corner of Tokyo life. Witness, for example, the astronomical success of Tokyo's new Disneyland and the fact that one of the highest priced issues on the Tokyo Stock Exchange is Seven-Eleven Japan. In everyday Tokyo life, however, nothing is more visible and quintessentially American than the T-shirt, nearly always inscribed in English.

During my travels around the city I made note of some of the more bizarre slogans displayed on T-shirts. Some were nonsensical, such as "Summer Is Born of the Passion of 1921" and "Dreamfashion Expects 100% Powerful Action." A second type featured presumably intentional puns such as "Afternoon Coffee Brake" and "Planter's Pinch."

Finally, a third category seemed born of subtle but unconscious error. One of my favorites adorned a strikingly pretty girl and read simply, "The Real McCloy." But the all-time winner was worn by a bespectacled and extremely sober-looking university student that proclaimed "Ivy's League."

In Tokyo's more rarefied realm of high fashion, Western influence is equally strong. The majority of professional models in the city's world of haute couture are American and European women. Conversely, Japanese models have become increasingly popular in the New York and Paris salons. The seeming paradox is a familiar story to Fumihiko Umezawa and his colleagues, for they have been reshaping Japanese faces to look like Western ones for more than half a century.

Dr. Umezawa is assistant director of Tokyo's famed Jujin Hospital, a center of cosmetic surgery that has served Japanese and foreign women since 1933 (page 643). Dr. Umezawa graciously received me in the hospital's consultation room, whose walls are

adorned with impressive before-and-after photographs of former patients.

The most common operation today, Dr. Umezawa said, is a fairly simple one in which the surgeon adds a fold to each eyelid.

"Most Japanese women," he explained, "have the so-called single eyelid, a totally smooth layer of skin without a crease in it. By contrast, many Western women—especially models—have the double eyelid, with a horizontal crease near the edge. Your American model, Brooke Shields, has such eyelids, and they are much admired here."

I asked how complicated the double eyelid operation is, and Dr. Umezawa dismissed it with a wave. "In most cases," he said, "it is done under local anesthetic and takes between 10 and 15 minutes. The surgeon simply stitches a crease into each eyelid. The patient may go home immediately."

Barring complications, I learned, the basic operation costs $1,000, and nearly every patient considers it worthwhile. A Jujin face-lift costs around $4,000, compared with as much as $10,000 in the United States today.

"A number of American women used to come to us for that," Dr. Umezawa said. "But the yen is worth more against the dollar now, and perhaps it is not quite the bargain it once was."

So skillful are Jujin surgeons that American women ran the risk of difficulty on their return home. "We provided a certificate saying they had had a face-lift," Dr. Umezawa said. "Sometimes, you see, they did not resemble their passport photograph at all."

QUITE A DIFFERENT TYPE of cosmetic surgery is practiced among the *yakuza*, Japan's equivalent of the Mafia. Some 2,500 "families" totaling an estimated 110,000 members nationwide control everything from gambling and prostitution to pornography shops and "protection" for businesses.

Nowhere is the yakuza's presence more apparent than in Kabuki-cho, Tokyo's colorful nightclub and massage-parlor district in Shinjuku. After weeks of careful negotiation by a Japanese friend, one of the leaders of the yakuza agreed to meet photographer Dave Harvey and me at his Kabuki-cho office, ostensibly the headquarters of a small book-publishing firm.





***They long for a little garden** and a house of their own, but many Tokyoites make do with a steel box in the sky. Modern apartment complexes mirror one another in Minamisuna district (**right**). In a similar building on land reclaimed from Tokyo Bay—a process nearly four centuries old—the family of Masahiko Iida, a systems engineer (**below**), enjoys affluence amid cramped quarters.*

Average living space for a family of four is 700 square feet. Land is precious, rent high. But corporate paternalism often comes to the rescue by owning the building and subsidizing employees' rent as well as paying for parking at home and transportation to work.

Mr. Yoshida, as he asked to be called, proved to be a cheerful and dapper man in his mid-50s, dressed in a neat business suit set off by an enormous jade stickpin. He welcomed us with traditional cups of green tea and gave us a brief history of the yakuza.

The portrait was outrageously slanted, with little mention of crime and heavy emphasis instead on good works in the form of yakuza contributions to charity and volunteer activities during civil emergencies such as fires and earthquakes.

"Like the samurai of old we believe in absolute loyalty and discipline," Mr. Yoshida said proudly. "Disobedience or mistakes are punished by the ancient yakuza code of *enko zume*, or shorten finger. Under the code a first offense is punished by cutting off the end joint of the little finger of the offender's left hand. Normally such punishment is enough, but if the person persists in his misguided ways, another joint, and even a third and a fourth, may be removed.

"In the old days," Mr. Yoshida continued, "the offender was required to do the cutting himself, to show his spirit. But now"—a note of disapproval crept into his voice—"someone else does the cutting and often a friend of the victim even helps to hold his hand steady."

I noted that Mr. Yoshida's hands were unmarred. Later that evening he took us to a neighborhood restaurant where his *kumi*, or family, had planned an informal social gathering. Some 40 guests showed up, and though they were all neatly dressed, they were the hardest-looking lot I have seen in many a year, with not a smile among them. We took a table and sipped coffee while the members talked and visited back and forth, always with a respectful nod to Mr. Yoshida when they passed us.

I couldn't help noticing that a good many left hands lacked the end joint of the little finger, and a good many more hands were simply tucked out of sight in jacket pockets. Then an enormous man with close-cropped hair sat down nearby and put his left hand across his neighbor's chair.

I was shocked to note that four fingers of the hand lacked not just one end joint but two—a grand total of eight missing joints. I was obviously looking at one of the toughest or else the most hopelessly inept yakuza in the history of organized crime. At that moment Mr. Yoshida caught my glance and shook his head. "Ah no," he explained, "that is not punishment—as a young man he caught his hand in a milling machine."

HAPPILY FOR TOKYO it has so far escaped the worst of modern crime's most lucrative business—narcotics. Older Tokyoites assured me that despite the younger generation's many shortcomings, the use of hard drugs is not among them. To confirm the fact, I called on Hiroshi Fujita, deputy chief of drug enforcement for the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. Mr. Fujita informed me that my friends were sadly mistaken: In recent years the use of heroin, for instance, had grown at an alarming rate—roughly 25 percent in a single year.

In my own city of Washington, D. C., which has about one-twentieth the population of Tokyo, the number of arrests for possession of heroin averages more than 1,700 a year. I asked Mr. Fujita what the figure was in Tokyo, and he gave me a grim look.

"In 1983," he replied, "we had 29 cases of suspected heroin possession in Tokyo. The next year the number had grown to 36 cases—an increase of nearly a quarter."

The figures seemed ridiculously small for a city of 12 million people, and my surprise must have shown. Mr. Fujita misunderstood. "Of course," he added quickly, "those were *suspected* cases—the convictions were not so numerous."

However small the crime in Tokyo, it is seldom forgotten; the memory of the law is as long as its proverbial arm. My friend Dai Iwai, the National Geographic Far East representative, has his offices in the Roppongi entertainment district of Tokyo. In 1975 a bicycle belonging to one of Dai's employees was stolen from the rack outside the building. The police were duly notified and given the serial number that each of Japan's estimated 55 million bicycles have indelibly stamped on the frame.

Last autumn, slightly more than ten years after the theft, a policeman appeared at Dai's office with the stolen bicycle. It had been identified a day or two earlier in a routine check of a subway-station parking lot.

Every now and then, however, Japanese

Success runs in the family, *and grades are rungs on the ladder, so Tsunekazu Matsudaira keeps a close eye on the homework of his elder son, Kazuhisa (left), who hopes to become a teacher. He and his brother have no tutors, unlike many middle-class children, and rely solely on their parents for help.*

An executive with Kokusai Denshin Denwa, Japan's major telecommunications corporation, Matsudaira owns a Western-style home in the fashionable Seijo area (below). His family, prominently intertwined with Japan's history, includes a grandfather who served as ambassador to the United States and a great-grandfather who was in line to become shogun before the overthrow of the regime.

ingenuity gets the better of Japanese justice. Tokyoites still smile over the unknown genius who built an exact replica of a bank's overnight deposit box. After dark he attached the replica to the wall of the bank alongside the real deposit box and put a sign over the latter: "Out of order, use other box." Early the next morning he collected the night's receipts and disappeared forever into Tokyo legend.

When it comes to exact replicas, Yasuaki Iwasaki and his team of master craftsmen have few equals in the world. At their kitchen workshop in the Ota-ku area of Tokyo they create a dazzling array of culinary masterpieces ranging from tender filets mignons and grilled Dover sole to delicate chocolate mousses and wafer-thin meringues that would bring tears of envy to the eyes of a French pastry chef.

Every item is for sale, and none is for consumption, since Iwasaki creations are fashioned of vinyl plastic and are strictly for display. One sees them throughout Japan in restaurant and tearoom show windows, enticing customers with such startling realism that newcomers are often fooled into thinking them actual food.

At Mr. Iwasaki's invitation I visited the four-story Iwasaki Company food workshop and followed him cautiously among mountain ranges of unfinished chocolate sundaes, pizzas, and that fairly recent Japanese craze, Big Macs.

Plastic food displays are something of a Japanese specialty, and I asked Mr. Iwasaki how the idea originated. "From funerals," he answered. "Traditionally at Buddhist funerals a symbolic offering of food is placed with the body. Often the foods were made of wax, and some were so realistic I believe they inspired the idea of displays for the living."

No item in Mr. Iwasaki's catalog is cheap. A Big Mac, for example, lists at $18—roughly six times the cost of the real thing. For $1,750 one can order an elaborate custom-made wedding cake, and $300 buys a whole raw fish so lifelike it almost wriggles before one's eyes.

Because of the Japanese love of raw foods, Mr. Iwasaki devotes an entire floor to such displays. We paused beside two older workers who were carefully hand-painting samples of sashimi, or sliced raw fish, and a variety of sushi balls. I remarked that the results looked astonishingly real, and Mr. Iwasaki gave me an injured look.

"To be a sushi chef in a restaurant," he said with dignity, "requires no more than four or five years' apprenticeship. But to be an *Iwasaki* sushi chef, one must train many more years than that."

Soaking away jet lag, Tooru Imafuku, a pilot and 14-year veteran of All Nippon Airways, relaxes in his Setagaya district home with his children—Arata, in his arms, Wataru, left, and Kaoru, rear. For their children's future, as well as their own retirement and medical emergencies, most middle-class parents manage to save 20 percent of their income.

The electronic age is fast overtaking Mr. Iwasaki's business of display. At a science exposition in the city of Tsukuba north of Tokyo I watched a modeling demonstration conducted by computer imaging in the kimono section of a Seibu department store. By means of a system combining the computer with a laser disc, a customer can project her own portrait on a video screen wearing any one of 59 patterns and colors of

An "A" in cleanliness goes to pupils who serve lunch (below) in their classrooms at private Rikkyo Primary School. Day one of a child's education is recorded by parents at Bancho Elementary School (facing page). The continuing pressure-ridden process to enter top schools is termed examination hell and can even include entrance exams for kindergarten.

kimono stocked by the store. The image was realistic, but it struck me as slightly gimmicky. Most women, after all, prefer to try on a dress physically, to see how it feels as well as looks. The Japanese saleslady undertook my education.

"To put a kimono on properly," she explained, "requires at least 20 minutes. If a customer wanted to try on each one of our 59 patterns, it would take her more than 19 hours. This way"—she gestured at the screen—"it takes less than ten minutes."

Ironically such speed and precision have doomed the kimono itself, at least in terms of its creation by age-old techniques. I talked one day with Yasutaka Komiya, a wonderfully burly but gentle man of 61 who resembles a wrestler far more than what he is—a traditional dyer of kimono fabric whose genius has earned him the revered Japanese designation of living national treasure.

Like his father before him, who was also a living treasure, Yasutaka Komiya dyes the fabric by use of traditional hand-cut rice paper stencils, which he orders from a few surviving stencil cutters.

"They are dying out," he said of the cutters. "The stencils are now made by computer-guided machines and they are clever imitations, but still that is what they are—imitations. Anyone can tell the difference."

I frankly could not, when Mr. Komiya showed me samples. The designs were so intricate—they are still known as *Edokomon,* or roughly "Edo small design"—that it was hard to tell the handmade item from the machined copy. I had no trouble, however, appreciating the extraordinary beauty of the fabric he dyes by the ancient method.

"It, too, will pass," he said of the technique. "First the stencils and then the dyeing; there is little hope for either one. I do not believe others will take up the art in an age when technology replaces the human hand, even though it can never replace the spirit."

To Mr. Komiya the loss is more than the passing of a treasured art form; it is a threat to the quality of all Japanese life.

"In the past we have abandoned a good many of our traditions," he told me, "and we have paid dearly for it. If we continue to follow that path, in time we will become mere copies of what we once were, just like the stencils. I fear that is the way Tokyo and this country are going."

OTHERS have more confidence in Tokyo's future. During my last days there I called on two men, both devoted in separate ways to the quality of their city's life. The first was Koji Kakizawa, a brilliant representative from Tokyo to the Diet, Japan's national legislature, who at 52 is a symbol of the city's achievements in the environmental field.

Mr. Kakizawa's home district includes Nihonbashi, the heart of old Tokyo, located beside the Sumida River. As a boy in the

1930s Koji swam and fished in the river, experiences he still recalls with pleasure.

"It was a fine clean river in those days," he told me at his Diet office overlooking the city. "Then came the war and massive industrial expansion, followed by the destruction and gradual rebuilding. Those were hard times, not prosperous ones, and Tokyo gave little thought to the quality of life—we were grateful for any life at all."

The Sumida became an open sewer that neither fish nor child dared venture into. "There were geisha houses along the bank," Mr. Kakizawa recalled, "and the methane gas from the river was so powerful it turned the silver pins in the geishas' headdresses black overnight. Eventually the houses moved away."

The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 with its tens of thousands of foreign visitors focused the city's attention, and shame, on its appalling pollution. By then Tokyo traffic policemen assigned to duty at downtown intersections had taken to carrying small cylinders of oxygen with them for an occasional breath for relief from the automobile exhaust fumes.

In 1967 the Diet passed landmark legislation that launched Tokyo and Japan on their long and remarkable comeback. Subsequent laws sponsored by Koji Kakizawa and his fellow environmentalists in the Diet have made Tokyo one of the cleanest big cities in the world, with many pollution standards considerably higher than those in the United States.

"We have come quite a distance, but there is still much to be done," Mr. Kakizawa said as I rose to go. I asked if he had any particular goal, and his answer was instantaneous: "To swim with my grandchildren in the Sumida River!"

FINALLY there was Kiyoshi Muto, a man as diminutive in size as his stature is great among architects of the world. Professor Muto has spent most of his 83 years attempting to ensure that no earthquake will ever again bludgeon his city to death as did the shock of 1923.

At that time young Kiyoshi was an engineering student at Tokyo Imperial University. On the terrible day the earthquake struck, Saturday, September 1, Kiyoshi was visiting a professor's home near Aomori, 350 miles to the north of Tokyo. That probably saved his life and later inspired him to pursue his ultimate career.

When transportation was finally restored and Kiyoshi could return to Tokyo, he was appalled to find the city flattened—the earthquake and fire had destroyed half a million houses, plus a number of modern concrete buildings. It was sometime during the first week that Kiyoshi saw the pagoda.

"It was an old one, in Ueno Park," Professor Muto told me over coffee one afternoon at his office in a Shinjuku skyscraper. "All around it was complete devastation, and there stood the pagoda—five stories and about a hundred feet of graceful wooden structure that looked as if a good breeze could blow it down. Obviously the old designers and builders knew something about earthquakes that we had forgotten."

Intrigued, young Kiyoshi threw himself into a structural analysis of pagodas, a project that resulted in a paper on the subject delivered to a world conference on earthquakes held in Tokyo in 1930.

What Kiyoshi had learned was that the old pagodas were built on a principle of flexibility, with thousands of interconnecting wooden parts that absorbed and dissipated the force of an earthquake as it traveled up and down the structure.

Over the years that followed, Kiyoshi Muto translated the principle into a design for modern skyscrapers. He called the design *jukozo,* or flexible structure, and lectured on the principle at several Tokyo universities.

From a modern perspective jukozo was a revolutionary concept, and Japanese architects were wary of it. Even as late as the 1960s Japanese architectural theory still favored extremely deep concrete foundations as the only defense against earthquakes.

Undeterred, Professor Muto conducted physical tests on his theory and pioneered in the use of computers to study the effects of earthquakes on buildings. He constructed buildings of his own several stories high and systematically crushed them with enormous hydraulic jacks in the manner of earthquakes to discover their flaws. One by one he eliminated the flaws, and architects around the world began to take notice.

"We built the first jukozo skyscraper here

Dictates of fashion made smoking all the rage in the Edo period, as shown by a woman and her pipe (right), despite antitobacco edicts of the shoguns. A modern craving for chic has created 53 years of excellence in cosmetic surgery at Jujin Hospital (below), where surgeons add a fold to a Japanese woman's eyelids, making her eyes appear desirably round. Last year the hospital performed about 8,000 such operations, twice as many as a decade ago. Other patients had noses or chins restructured or received face-lifts.

IDEMITSU MUSEUM OF ART

__The young will get second billing__ in the Tokyo of tomorrow, unlike the actresses on this poster. Within 15 years one of every five Japanese will be 60 or older. Life expectancy is unmatched, 80 years for women, 74.5 for men. Where will they live in a society changing from one of the developed world's youngest to its oldest?

in 1968," Professor Muto told me. "It is 482 feet high and contains 36 stories—not a world record by any means, but the tallest building in Tokyo at the time."

Over the following 18 years Professor Muto and his associates designed some 25 skyscrapers in Japan, a few in other cities but most in Tokyo, the tallest one standing 742 feet high and containing 60 stories. Professor Muto's dream is to design a 100-story giant before he retires. Meanwhile, from a physical vantage point of little more than five feet he can survey Tokyo's soaring skyline and in a true sense call it his own.

I asked the inevitable question: What would happen to that skyline in a major earthquake, not a level 3 but a level 6 such as the 1923 shock?

"There would be casualties, of course," Professor Muto replied soberly. "That cannot be avoided, but I believe they would not be so severe as last time. As for the skyscrapers, they would stand." He smiled at a sudden image. "They would sway like the hula dancers in your Hawaiian Islands, they would bend and ripple, but they would not break and they would not fall. They are designed to stand the very worst."

I thanked him then and said good-bye. It was early April, and a week later I joined a group of Japanese and American friends at Ueno Park for the traditional cherry blossom viewing, a rite of almost mystical proportions in Japan. After a picnic lunch I took a walk through the park and came upon Professor Muto's pagoda, soaring serenely above the pale white canopy of blossoms.

In a sense modern Tokyo had begun on this spot, born of an ancient symbol of art and survival. It occurred to me that the sight would have cheered my friend Mr. Komiya, the kimono dyer, greatly. Far from abandoning the past, Tokyo is actually building on it for the future. There is no better foundation in all the world. □

ently felt that he could safely undertake to destroy this last potential rival. After sufficient tension had developed, he mobilized his armies, and in two desultory and unimpressive campaigns, the old warrior finally reduced the great castle and destroyed its inmates. He then made more territorial adjustments favourable to the Tokugawa forces and returned again to his home at Sumpu. A year later, in 1616, he sickened and died, having accomplished what a century of warriors had attempted and failed: he brought enduring pre-eminence to his own family and a lasting peace to Japan.

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(C.D.T.)

Tokyo–Yokohama Metropolitan Area

The Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area is an urban agglomeration on the Pacific coast of central Japan, including the capital city of Tokyo, the port city of Yokohama, and the manufacturing centre of Kawasaki. Tokyo means eastern capital, the name given the city when the capital of Japan was moved eastward in 1868 from Kyōto, meaning capital. The name Yokohama derives from the fact that the original fishing village was situated on a lateral (*yoko*) beach (*hama*) of Tōkyō-wan (Tokyo Bay).

The inmost part of the Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area is the central city of Tokyo (with a 1970 population of 9,000,000), a part of the urban prefecture (*fu*) of Tokyo, with a population of more than 11,000,000—comprising Tokyo, neighbouring industrial and residential cities, and rural districts, including the Bonin Islands (Ogasawaraguntō) in the Pacific. Tokyo-fu is not entirely contained in the Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area, which is a conurbation comprised of Tokyo proper, Yokohama, Kawasaki, and their contiguous urbanized municipalities; the metropolitan area's population in 1970 was over 22,000,000.

HISTORY OF THE TOKYO AREA

The eastern part of the present central city of Tokyo was originally called Edo ("estuary"), because it stood at the point where the Sumida-gawa (Sumida River) enters Tōkyō-wan. A castle was built overlooking the marshy lowland of the river in 1457. The river separated the ancient provinces of Musashi in the west and Shimohusa in the east, and the castle occupied an important strategic position.

The area had been inhabited in prehistoric times by peoples of the Jōmon (2500–250 BC) and the Yayoi (250 BC–250) cultures. The Yayoi lived on uplands and cultivated rice on marshy deltas and in valley bottoms. With the consolidation of a Japanese empire in the 6th century, the area became part of Musashi Province. Musashi and its surrounding regions were peripheral because the central government was located farther west. They rose in importance when the Tokugawa shoguns (supreme military commanders) established their military government in Edo in 1603. The old castle was rebuilt and enlarged. The town was laid out in the 17th century and became the residence of the whole Tokugawa hierarchy. By the mid-19th century Edo had become a metropolis with a population of 1,200,000. After the fall of the Tokugawa shoguns and the re-establishment of the authority of the emperor, the capital of Japan was moved from Kyōto to Edo in 1868; the city was then renamed Tokyo.

Growth of Tokyo area

The municipal area of Tokyo city at the end of the 19th century consisted of 15 wards (*ku*). Together with the surrounding counties, it formed Tokyo Urban Prefecture. It had become not only the political but the commercial and financial centre of the country. Its growth was checked by the great earthquake and fire of September 1, 1923, which severely damaged the downtown areas of Tokyo and Yokohama. During Tokyo's reconstruction the streets were widened, and many steel-and-concrete buildings were put up. At the same time, there was a growth of suburbs. At the beginning of the 1930s Tokyo city had 2,000,000 people and the suburban municipalities 3,000,000. In 1932, 20 new wards were added. During World War II, metropolitan Tokyo (Tōkyō-to), was established by amalgamating the city and its surrounding suburbs and counties. Large parts of Tokyo and Yokohama were destroyed by U.S. air raids in 1944 and 1945. After the war, starting in the 1950s, the Tokyo area grew enormously with the expansion of the Japanese economy.

The port of Kanagawa (later Yokohama), which was opened in 1859, expanded along with Japan's export trade. The city was completely new and Western in its characteristics. In 1872 it was connected to Tokyo by railroad. Along with Tokyo it was largely destroyed in the great earthquake and fire of 1923 and severely damaged by U.S. air raids in 1945. By 1970 Yokohama was the third largest city in Japan, after Tokyo and Ōsaka.

Kawasaki, situated between Tokyo and Yokohama, was formerly a post town on the Tōkaidō Highway. The Tokyo–Yokohama railway had a station there, and it became a centre of industrial development. The city expanded rapidly during the 1930s, was almost completely destroyed in World War II, and was subsequently rebuilt. The coastal area is the centre of heavy industry, including iron and steel, petroleum refining, chemicals, and thermoelectric power. Electrical machinery, food, and other light industries are in the centre of the city. In the 1970s Kawasaki was the leading industrial city of Japan. Its inland area was becoming a residential suburb of Tokyo.

THE CONTEMPORARY CITY

The Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area extends inland from the western coast of Tōkyō-wan. The city of Tokyo lies at the mouth of the Sumida-gawa. To its east, around the northern end of Tōkyō-wan, are suburbs comprising the prefecture of Chiba, which is separated from Tokyo by the Edo-gawa (Edo River). To the north of Tokyo city are the suburbs of Saitama Prefecture (Saitama-ken). South of Tokyo, separated from it by the Tama-gawa, is the great industrial centre of Kawasaki. The port of Yokohama (Yokohama-kō) lies southwest of Kawasaki. Still farther south, on Miura-hantō (Miura Peninsula) and around Sagami-wan (Sagami Bay), are other municipalities that are part of the Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area. The metropolitan boundary in the southwest is roughly delimited by the Sagami-gawa.

The original terrain consisted mostly of marshy river deltas and a few areas of sand dune. The present coastline is lined with warehouses, docks, and industrial sites. To the southeast of Yokohama is the rocky coast of Miura-hantō, with the naval harbour of Yokosuka (Yokosuka-kō). Farther south, on Sagami-wan, are the historic town of Kamakura and other resort places. The southern coast of Sagami-wan is crowded with vacationers in summer.

Soil and environment. The east side of the Sumida-gawa consists of thick alluvial soil, which has settled as much as 13 feet in some places as the groundwater has been drawn off for industrial purposes. In the early 1970s efforts were being made to contain this process by regulating the use of groundwater. Higher land in the metropolitan area consists of layers of volcanic origin on top of sand and gravel, sloping gently upward toward the mountains in the west.

To the south of Tokyo lies a hilly section varying in height from 164 to 656 feet. In the 1960s it was developed as a residential area expected to accommodate a population of 500,000. Farther south and west, these plains and hills end in the steep Okutama and Chichibu mountains, consisting of old geologic formations cut by the Tama-gawa and its tributary valleys. The steeper slopes are wooded, and the foothills are terraced with cultivated fields; the river supplies water to Tokyo. The mountains form part of the Chichibu-Tama National Park.



The Tokyo—Yokohama metropolitan area.

The climate of Tokyo is generally mild, although the summers are hot and humid. The annual mean temperature is 58.5° F (14.7° C). The January mean is 38.7° F (3.7° C), and the August mean is 79.5° F (26.4° C). Japan's climate is controlled by the summer and winter monsoons: in summer, masses of warm, humid air from the Pacific; in winter, a flow of cold, dry air from Siberia. There are rainy seasons in early summer and mid-autumn. Tokyo usually experiences two or three typhoons a year during the rainy seasons. The average annual rainfall is about 62 inches (1,563 millimetres), compared to 25–32 inches in London and about 40 inches in New York.

In mid-winter, temperatures may fall below freezing in the mornings. From January to March there are several snowfalls. The plum and camelia bloom in January on the southern coast of the metropolitan area, and Tokyo's spring reaches its climax in March and April with cherry blossoms and many varieties of flowers. The iris and azalea blossom in May, followed by the gloomy monsoon month of June. In the summer months the blue and purple hydrangea appear. After the autumnal rains, the trees begin to turn—the maples red, the ginkgo yellow. This is the season when chrysanthemum shows are held.

Wild animals are rare in the metropolitan area, except in the mountains where wild boars, foxes, and monkeys are found. Trout live in the mountain streams; in the lowlands the streams are too polluted for fish. Birds are relatively abundant in the residential areas, particularly doves, sparrows, crows, gulls, and swallows that winter in southern countries. The Imperial Palace moats are visited by several kinds of duck from northern regions. The



The Imperial Palace with the Niju-bashi (Double Bridge), used only on formal state occasions and on national holidays, in the foreground.
Shinichiro Morimoto—Orion Press

Japanese bush warbler, great tit, dusky thrush, bull-headed shrike, grey starling, and others are seasonal visitors, and in the suburbs one can see the white egret and hear the song of the skylark.

Industrialization, motorization, and population growth have brought water and air pollution. Fujiyama (Mt. Fuji), about 55 miles away, used to be visible on a clear day in winter from the centre of Tokyo, but today it can be seen only when the factories are shut down for the January holidays or when a strong wind blows away the smog. The prefectural and municipal governments have established Public Damage or Environment Conservation offices in an effort to combat pollution.

Plan of the old city

City plan. The inner part of Tokyo was the old town of Edo. The town was dominated by the castle of Edo, now the Imperial Palace where the emperor lives. The castle and the adjacent area where the high feudal lords had their dwellings was encircled by two moats, the *uchi-bori* ("inner moat") and *soto-bori* ("outer moat"). Unlike European medieval cities, Japanese castle towns had no walls. The warriors and lords lived between and outside the moats, forming the *yashiki-machi* ("residential town"). Along the roads and in the town area were merchants' shops and the houses of nonwarriors, comprising the *machiya* ("town house") section. Shintō shrines and Buddhist temples formed *tera-machi* ("temple town") on the urban fringes. These religious buildings were not only places of worship, amusement, and shopping on festival days but were also used for defense.

The castle and the residences of the feudal lords had beautiful gardens, some of which have been preserved and are now open to the public. The town area was divided into rectangular blocks named after various occupational groups: *gofuku-chō* ("silk-goods town"), *sakana-machi* ("fish town"), *kaji-chō* ("blacksmith town"). The residential areas of the lower samurai class also had their functional names: *okachi-machi* ("infantry town"), *takasho-machi* ("hunters with hawk"). There were also landscape names: *ta-machi* ("paddy town"), *hayashi-chō* ("wood town"), *komagome* ("horse grazing"), and *fujimi-chō* ("town from which Fujiyama can be seen"). Some of these names are preserved today, but most have disappeared with urban reorganization.

The centre of trade was Nihonbashi ("Japan Bridge"), from which five main highways began and which is still the zero-mile mark of the national-highway system. Nihonbashi and its vicinity was a busy wholesale marketplace and also a retail and financial area. The banks of the rivers and canals were crowded with boats coming from Ōsaka and other coastal regions of Japan. On the highways there were post towns every few miles. The first post towns from Edo were Shinagawa, Shinjuku, Itabashi, and Senju, all now part of Tokyo city.

The marshy downtown area had to be drained with canals, and the Tone and Ara rivers had to be prevented from flooding. As Edo grew, water for its 1,000,000 inhabitants was brought in by aqueduct and distributed through wooden pipes; this system became the basis of modern Tokyo's water supply.

The early houses were made of wood, and Edo was so repeatedly in flames that fires were called the flowers of Edo. A great fire in 1657 damaged large parts of Edo, destroyed the main tower of the castle, and killed 100,000 inhabitants. After the earthquake and fire of 1923, the downtown area was largely rebuilt, and it was rebuilt again after World War II.

The main shopping street is Ginza Street, running northeast to southwest and lighted brightly at night. A stroll on the Ginza is popularly known as Ginbura. The northern extension of Ginza is Nihonbashi Street, a busy central shopping area that includes the best department stores. It passes through Tokyo's financial district. From Ginza a street leads westward to Hibiya Park and the Imperial Palace. Nearby are the government-office district and the Yūrakuchō amusement centre.

The Marunouchi district

To the east of the Imperial Palace, separated from it by broad gardens and a moat, lies the Marunouchi business district, the heart of Japanese business activity, with offices and banks, the Chamber of Commerce, the railroad station, the Central Post Office, and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation building.

Tokyo's Metropolitan Government Office is situated at the southern end of Marunouchi district. To the north, across the outer moat, is the Kanda area, with many universities, bookstores, publishers, and hospitals. Other important areas are Taitō, in the north, and Shiba, in the south—commercial and residential areas of high population density. To the east of the Sumida-gawa is Kōtō, a low-lying marshy area drained by canals that create a checkerboard effect, which is an industrial and working class district.

In the western part of Tokyo is the uplands residential area, a quiet, tree-shaded section where most foreign embassies are located. The University of Tokyo, Waseda University, Keio University, and other universities and research institutes are in this area. Farther west, and southwest, of the Yamanote electric railroad, are middle class residential neighbourhoods the growth of which began after the earthquake of 1923 when city dwellers moved outward into the upland fields. In these areas the houses are generally frame, with some multistoried apartment houses. With the improvement of commuting



Yokohama harbour.
Takanori Ishii—Bon

facilities, Tokyo's eastern and northeastern suburbs have also been growing as middle class residential areas.

Yokohama

The growth pattern of Yokohama and Kawasaki has been similar to that of Tokyo. The whole area within 20 to 30 miles of Tokyo's central station has become a commuting area. Older towns have become suburbs of Tokyo. Yokohama's business district is concentrated around its port. At the northern end of the business district, near Sakuragi Street Station, is the central shopping street of Isezaki. South of the business district is the hilly Yamate residential area, separated by Moto-machi Street where there are many exotic shops. The northern coast of Yokohama is an industrial area. Just south of the port, new industrial and port facilities have been established along the coast at Honmoku and Negishi.

Tokyo and Yokohama are divided into wards (*ku*), composed of towns (*machi*) having several thousand inhabitants each; some towns are further divided into smaller towns or districts known as *chō*. Originally these towns and districts were neighbourhood units, but they now function only as postal addresses and for purposes of registration. The older towns each have a tutelary deity (*uji-gami*) with a shrine. Residents of a town visit the shrine on festival days to pray for safety and prosperity. These festivals are full of colour: stalls are set up, and there is music and dancing. Among the more famous shrines are the Asakusa, Sano, Kanda Myojin, Nezu, and Fukagawa, dating from the Edo period. The Meiji Shrine in Tokyo, dedicated to the Emperor Meiji and his consort, is a kind of national monument and centre of pilgrimage for the whole country.

Transportation. Tokyo is the national traffic centre; it is also an important international nodal point of the western Pacific and the Far East. The metropolitan area is spanned with a dense network of electric railways, bus lines, and motor highways. Tokyo Station is not only the central railroad station of the metropolis but also central for all Japan. Trains to Ōsaka and beyond start from Tokyo Station. Another important Tokyo terminal is Ueno Station, from which lines run to various parts of northern Japan. Shinjuku Station is the terminus of trains from central Honshu and some trains from the east. Interurban service in the Tokyo area is by the Japan National Railways and various privately owned electric lines.

Tokyo and Yokohama formerly had trains that have now been replaced by buses and subway lines. The Tokyo subway system had 80 miles of line in the early 1970s. A subway was under construction in Yokohama.

Tokyo's system of automobile expressways consists of a loop around the central business district and seven radial lines connecting with the national expressways. There were 2,025,000 registered automobiles of all kinds in greater Tokyo in the late 1960s, and in the Yokohama area there were 724,000. The ratio of persons to automobiles in Tokyo was about 10.1 to one.

The city's airports

The Tokyo International Airport is at Haneda, about eight miles southwest of the city. It is the terminus of overseas airlines from Asia, North and South America, Australia, and Europe, as well as of domestic lines from Ōsaka, Fukuoka, Okinawa, Chitose on Hokkaido, and many other cities. Atsugi Airport, west of Yokohama, is used by some domestic lines. A new international airport under construction near Narita, 30 miles east of Tokyo, was opened in 1972.

Tōkyō-wan has four major ports. Yokohama is the largest, handling 163,000 tons of cargo annually in the late 1960s. Kawasaki and Chiba are industrial ports, with tonnages of 61,000 and 51,000 respectively. The port of Tokyo handled 40,000 tons of cargo. Ferryboats carrying cars have several lines across Tōkyō-wan.

Building styles. In Tokyo Urban Prefecture there were 3,100,000 dwellings in the late 1960s. The city of Yokohama had 500,000 and Kawasaki 250,000. These dwellings vary from the tiny wooden house of two or three stories sandwiched between high office buildings to the large suburban homes of the well-to-do. Some people live over their shops or behind them. The best residential area is in the Yamanote Loop, once the site of feudal residences in the Edo period but now given over to middle class frame houses with gardens. As part of social and economic reforms instituted after World War II, the large estates in this area were subdivided into small lots or adapted to such other uses as clubs or restaurants; some of them became public gardens. The uplands are now being invaded by office buildings and apartment houses. Throughout the metropolitan area there are many housing developments, ranging in size from several hundred homes to more than 10,000. Building is carried on by the Japan Housing Corporation, municipalities, prefectures, and private companies.

About three-fourths of the dwellings in Tokyo Urban Prefecture are made of wood, although the number of fireproof concrete-and-steel houses is increasing. Building styles are a mixture of Eastern and Western. While few purely Japanese buildings remain, even a modern apartment will have one or two rooms with a tatami (reedmat) floor and sliding doors. In Kawagoe, an old castle

town about 23 miles from Tokyo, are traditional merchant houses with heavy tile roofs and plaster walls.

The central business districts of Tokyo, Yokohama, and other cities consist mainly of steel-and-concrete buildings. Their maximum height was formerly limited to about 100 feet to prevent earthquake damage, but taller buildings were permitted in the late 1960s. In 1971 Tokyo had three 40-story office buildings. Outside of the central business district, buildings tend to be small in area because of the high price of land.

Government buildings

Central Tokyo. In the governmental district of Kasumigaseki, southwest of the Imperial Palace, one can study building styles by eras. The Sakurada Gate, formerly one of the entrances to the castle of the shoguns, leads across the moat to the outer garden of the palace. The entrance passage is crooked for reasons of defense. To the left, in Hibiya Park, is the Supreme Court building of reddish brick, put up in the 19th century; to the right of it are the dun-coloured Metropolitan Police Board and the ministry of local government, built in the 1920s. Next to the latter is the ministry of foreign affairs, a postwar building with wide glass windows and central heating and air conditioning. The National Diet Building beyond is made of granite from the islands of the Inland Sea (Seto-naikai). Overlooking these governmental buildings is the Kasumigaseki Building, rising 482 feet (147 metres).

Toichi Sakakibara



The Kasumigaseki Building, overlooking the Shinkansen express train, which runs through downtown Tokyo.

The Marunouchi district to the east of the Imperial Palace was developed as a business centre on vacant land formerly owned by the government. Marunouchi means inside castle; in this district is the outer-moat zone of the Edo castle, where the feudal lords had their mansions. A commercial centre was built there around the turn of the 20th century, consisting of red-brick buildings of three or four stories. These gave way in the 1920s and 1930s and after World War II to steel-and-concrete office buildings that are resistant to fire and earthquake. The Mitsubishi Bank and the Dai-Ichi Life Insurance Building are in Renaissance style. The postwar buildings are of lighter and taller construction, an example being the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Office. The former Imperial Hotel, designed by Frank Lloyd Wright in 1916, withstood the earthquake of 1923 and was torn down in 1967 and replaced by a plainer, taller structure in 1970.

The uptown area to the south has changed much less; many older buildings are still preserved. The old lecture hall of Keio University, of wooden construction with black-and-white-checkerboard walls, belongs to the early Meiji period. The Akasaka Detached Palace was completed in 1909.

To the north, near the Kanda-gawa (Kanda River), one finds a contrast of building styles and civilizations in the Seidō (a Confucian shrine rebuilt in 1935), the Kanda Myojin Shrine (a Shintō shrine rebuilt in 1934), and the Nicolai Cathedral (Greek Orthodox, dating from 1884).

The Shinjuku development

New building. Recent buildings include the Palaceside Building adjacent to the northern moat, occupied by the Mainichi Press; Tokyo Cathedral with a sky-piercing tower, and the National Theatre. One of the highest structures in the world is a 1,092-foot (333-metre) TV tower, erected in 1958 and modelled on the Eiffel Tower in Paris; it dominates the Tokyo skyline. The Shinjuku Railway Station on the western Yamanote line was being developed in the early 1970s as a civic centre. The complex includes the station, two department stores, and other buildings with offices and shops. Nearby will be a second Marunouchi commercial district. Towering above it is the 46-story Keio Plaza Hotel. Similar complexes were being developed elsewhere in the metropolitan area—for example, at the Shimbashi Station in the central business district and at Yokohama Station. Department stores have decentralized by locating at railway stations throughout Tokyo—Shinjuku, Shibuya, Ikebukuro, Veno, and Asakusa—where they compete with the stores of the central business district of Ginza–Nihonbashi.

Demography. The total population of the Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area in 1970 was about 22,000,000. The city of Tokyo proper had slightly less than 9,000,000; Yokohama had about 2,200,000, and Kawasaki had nearly 1,000,000. Each day another 1,000,000 entered the area to work. The average population density of Tokyo proper was 40,207 persons per square mile. The density for Yokohama was 13,761 and for Kawasaki 19,399.

The population of the metropolitan area is growing, partly through migration from other parts of Japan and partly from natural increase. While the central city's population declined slightly from 1965 to 1970, that of other parts increased; growth rates were highest in the outer suburbs, some of which increased by more than half in the period 1965–70. Generally speaking, the western part of Tokyo and the uplands are middle and upper class residential areas. Blue-collar workers live east of the Sumida-gawa and in the industrial areas of Kawasaki and Yokohama. Tokyo is a melting pot for all Japan, and in the downtown area one can hear the Kwansai (Ōsaka–Kyoto) accent and the Tōhoku (northeastern region) dialect. Most of the many foreigners in the metropolis do not live in national enclaves. Exceptions are the Chinese in Yokohama and Koreans in several areas.

Economic life. The Tokyo metropolitan area is the largest commercial centre of Japan, and its port of Yokohama is the country's largest. Most important businesses and banks have their head offices in the central business district, as do foreign companies and banks. Before World War II, Tokyo was Japan's second industrial city after Ōsaka, but since the war Ōsaka has declined in comparison to Tokyo. In the late 1960s Tokyo Urban Prefecture accounted for 12.1 percent of the country's annual manufactures and Kanagawa Prefecture (including Yokohama, Kawasaki, and neighbouring cities) for another 10.4 percent.

Manufacturing. The Tokyo–Kawasaki–Yokohama manufacturing zone, also known as Keihin, is one of the four major industrial agglomerations in Japan. In the late 19th century, manufacturing developed within the cities of Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama. It later expanded into the suburbs: along the Tōkaidō Line (a railroad) to the southwest; westward to Sagamiōno, Tachikawa, Hino, and Hachiōji; along the Ara-kawa to the northwest; along the Takasaki and Tōhoku rail lines to the north; along the Jōban line to the northeast; and around the northeastern coast of Tōkyō-wan into Chiba Prefecture. If one includes in this industrial area the four prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa (Yokohama), Saitama (to the west of Tokyo), and Chiba (to the northeast), there were in the early 1970s a total of about 130,000 manufacturing enterprises with more than 2,800,000 workers.

Tokyo itself has much light manufacturing, including textiles, toiletries, and printing and publishing. It is a centre of cultural activity and information. It also produces goods requiring an abundant labour force, such as electrical products, cameras, and automobiles. A large proportion of the establishments are family-size or relatively small shops with fewer than 30 workers, most of them subcontracting to larger concerns. The Yokohama–Kawasaki district is an area of heavy industry specializing in chemicals, machinery, metallurgy, petroleum refining, ships, motor cars, and fabricated metal products. A new centre for iron and steel, petroleum refining, petrochemicals, electric power, and other heavy industries is the Chiba–Ichihara coast at the northeast end of Tōkyō-wan. Another heavy-industrial centre has sprung up at Kashima about 60 miles northeast of Tokyo on the Pacific coast. The machinery and light industries have been decentralizing inland from Tokyo in the area 30 to 60 miles from the city, where a number of industrial parks have been established.

Commercial and service industries. Tokyo is a centre of wholesaling, drawing goods from all over the country and abroad and distributing them into the surrounding area. It is also Japan's financial centre. The banks, insurance companies, stockbrokers, and similar establishments are concentrated in the central business district.

By courtesy of the Japan National Tourist Organization



Harumi Street in Tokyo's Ginza district, a principal shopping area located in the eastern part of the city.

Utilities. The water used in Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, and other parts of the metropolitan area is supplied by aqueduct systems. Local waterworks and private industrial and residential systems supplement the supply. Tokyo draws its water from the Tama and Edo rivers; there are reservoir dams at Murayama and Yamaguchi and at Ogōchi on the upper Tama. To meet increasing demand, new dams have been built on the upper Ara and Tone rivers, which are connected by a canal with the Murayama–Yamaguchi reservoirs. Yokohama, Kawasaki, Yokosuka, and neighbouring towns get their water from the Sagami-gawa, which is dammed at two points. Most of the metropolitan area is supplied with gas by the Tokyo Gas Company. Gas plants are located mainly on the coast, where domestic and imported coal, petroleum, liquid gas, and natural gas are brought in by ship. Petroleum and bottled propane gas are also widely used for heating and cooking.

The city's electric supply

The Tokyo Electric Company serves the whole Kantō region, as well as Yamanashi Prefecture and the eastern half of Shizuoka Prefecture. About 35 percent of the power comes from hydroelectric stations on the Tone and Kinu rivers in Kanto, the rivers Katsura, Shinano, and Azusa in central Honshu, and Inawashiro-ko (Lake Inawashiro) in the Tohoku region of northern Honshu. Another 65 percent of the Tokyo area's power comes from thermal stations located on Tōkyō-wan and at Kashima to the northwest. To meet future needs of the metropolitan area, one 960,000-kilowatt hydroelectric station and three thermoelectric stations with a combined output of 2,700,000 kilowatts were under construction in the early 1970s. Tokyo also drew from two atomic power stations, one at Tokai, 65 miles northeast, and another on the Fukushima coast, 120 miles northeast, of Tokyo.

Public institutions and services. Tokyo is not only the national capital but also the centre of the Kanto region, which comprises the prefectures of Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gumma, Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa. It houses all the institutions of the national and regional governments, as well as the offices of the local government and of government corporations, such as the telephone and telegraph corporation. Most of these are located near the Imperial Palace. Foreign embassies and international institutions have their offices in the central business district and in the western part of the city.

Because Tokyo is the place of political decision, nearly all of Japan's prefectures have offices there. Major cities and towns have their Tokyo offices. Federations of local government, such as the Mayors' Association, are located in Tokyo, as are the headquarters of political parties and many other semigovernmental institutions.

Efforts to break up and decentralize this massive agglomeration of power have never succeeded. The migration of governmental offices out of Tokyo will apparently be limited to research sections. In the early 1970s a new university-and-research town was under construction in Tsukuba, about 40 miles northeast of Tokyo.

Public health. The Tokyo–Yokohama metropolitan area shares the problems of other large urban areas with respect to pollution, noise, and lack of air and sunlight. Its inhabitants nevertheless live better than people in small cities and towns because they enjoy superior medical care and social services.

Because the population is relatively young, the birth rate in Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama is higher than the national average; in 1969 the birth rate in Tokyo Urban Prefecture was 20.3 per thousand, and in Kanagawa Prefecture it was 22.7, as compared with the 1969 national average of 18.5. The death rate was likewise lower, being 4.9 per thousand in both prefectures as compared with the national average of 6.8. The infant mortality rates were 12.0 and 11.9 per 1,000 live births, a little lower than the national average of 14.2. In 1970 there were about 758 persons for every physician in the prefecture of Tokyo and 1,174 in the prefecture of Kanagawa. In Tokyo city there were 105 persons per hospital bed. These ratios are very low for an Asian country and compare favourably with those of western Europe. The medical school of the



Komazawa Olympic Park, Tokyo.
Shinichiro Morimoto—Orion Press

University of Tokyo, founded in the latter part of the 19th century, is known for its Institute of Medical Science. The medical school of Keio University is another research hospital. A number of university hospitals in Tokyo are open to the public, but most hospitals are run by the national, prefectural, and municipal governments or public organizations such as the Red Cross. There are special hospitals for children, the aged, and patients suffering from cancer, tuberculosis, or heart disease.

Tokyo has always been a city of fires, stemming from crowded conditions and flammable building materials. In Tokyo Urban Prefecture there were 8,844 fires in 1969. The fire departments of all Japanese municipalities fight fires and other hazards such as traffic accidents, floods, and earthquakes. Tokyo has a metropolitan police agency to maintain order in the capital city. There are also mobile police that can be called in case of large-scale violence. Kanagawa Prefecture has its own police force, as do Yokohama and other large municipalities.

Education. In Tokyo as in other large cities more than 90 percent of the ninth-year graduates go on to high school. In the late 1960s there were more than 1,600 primary schools with 1,265,000 pupils in Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures together; more than 1,000 junior high schools with 554,000 pupils; and more than 550 high schools with 598,000 students. There are also public and private kindergartens.

Colleges and universities

In the early 1970s the Tokyo metropolitan area had 116 universities and 110 junior colleges, with enrollments in the late 1960s of 608,000 and 75,000 students respectively. Almost half of all Japan's university and college students are to be found in the prefectures of Tokyo and Kanagawa. The century-old University of Tokyo has ten faculties and many research institutes. Other leading universities are Tokyo Kogyo University (engineering), Hitotsubashi University (trade and commerce), Tokyo University of Education, and Tokyo Geijutsu University (music and arts). There are also national universities for industry and agriculture, languages, medicine, dentistry, the merchant marine, and other fields. The prefectural and municipal universities are Tokyo Metropolitan and Yokohama Municipal. Among private universities, Waseda and Keio are the oldest and most highly regarded, especially in the fields of literature, politics, and business. The largest university is Nihon, with 72,000 students.

Culture and recreation. Tokyo is at the centre of national cultural activity. It is also the home of various institutions for national and international cultural communication. Modern Japan has been strongly influenced by the West, to which Tokyo and Yokohama have been gateways; Western technology and life styles first took root in those cities.

If Tokyo has been less a centre of Japanese traditions than have Kyōto, Ōsaka, and Nara, it has many valuable cultural properties from the past. The Imperial Household Agency Library and the Tôyô Bunko hold collections of classical books. There are the National Archives and the National Diet Library. The National Museum in Ueno Park concentrates on the art and history of Japan and Asia. The Kokuritsu Kagaku Hakubutsukan (National Science Museum), the Zoological Garden, and the National Museum of Western Art are also located in Ueno Park, as is the Metropolitan Gallery of Fine Art. Elsewhere in Tokyo there are numerous smaller collections and galleries. Near the Imperial Palace are the National Museum of Modern Art and the Technical and Engineering Museum. Tokyo and Yokohama also have their own local historical records and exhibits, such as the museum of folkways, in the city of Musashino, and the museum of old houses, in Kawasaki.

A whole range of theatre is available, from the traditional Kabuki to modern drama. Symphonic works, operas, and various other kinds of Western music and dance are performed.

The media. Tokyo is the information centre of Japan. Nationwide radio and TV programs originate there. The three largest nationwide newspapers, *Asahi, Mainichi,* and *Yomiuri shimbun,* are issued in Tokyo. A daily economic newspaper, several English-language papers, and papers in Korean are all published there. Hundreds of other daily and weekly papers are printed and distributed, as well as more than 40 weekly magazines.

In the early 1970s Tokyo had seven television channels, including two UHF channels. There were 65 radio stations, including two FM and one shortwave. Colour TV was rapidly becoming popular.

Recreation. Tokyo's parks are not as large as those of European and American cities, but they are numerous. Among the better known are the outer garden of the Imperial Palace, Hibiya Park, Ueno Park (with its zoo), and the Meiji Shrine's Outer Garden (with its baseball stadium and other playing fields). The latter along with Komazawa Olympic Park and Yoyogi Sports Centre, was one of the main centres of the Olympic Games in 1964. In the western part of Tokyo are the smaller natural parks of Inokashira, Zenpukuji, and Shakujii, with lakes. Some of the larger private gardens of the Edo period are now open to visitors. The most impressive of these is the Inner Garden of the Meiji Shrine with its irises and water lilies, a favourite spot of the emperor Meiji. There are also several botanical gardens.

In Yokohama, the best parks are Nogeyama and Yamate, on hills overlooking the harbour, and Yamashita Park on the coast. Sankei-en (Sankei Garden), formerly a private estate, contains a collection of historic buildings brought from other parts of the country.

Suburban recreation areas include the Tama Zoological Garden, where visitors can ride by bus through the lion section, and near it the *kodomo-no kuni* ("children's country"). Places of excursion from Tokyo and Yokohama include the Okutama and Sagami valleys, the Chichibu and Tanzawa mountains, the Fuji-Hakone-Izu National Park, the Izu-hantō (Izu Peninsula) with its many hot springs, the islands of Oshima and Miyake, the Miura-hantō, and many others. There are also amusement parks with roller coasters and similar rides, such as Kōrakuen, Tamagawa, Toshimaen, and Yomiuri.

The most popular sport in Japan is baseball. Tokyo has four professional teams and Kawasaki one. There are also university teams, and the Waseda–Keio games are followed intently. There are a number of golf courses in the suburbs.

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(S.K.)

Tolstoy, Leo

The enduring fame of Leo Tolstoy, Russian author, reformer, and moral thinker, rests mainly on two novels, *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina.* A deeply contradictory man, Tolstoy was an individualistic aristocrat who in his later years tried unsuccessfully to lead the life of a poor peasant, a sensualist who ended up as an intransigent puritan, a man of singular vitality who feared death at almost every step. This extraordinary duality of character led him in middle life to abandon his career of a mere writer of fiction to become a radical Christian who propagated his belief in a life of love and faith and his rejection of property and such man-made institutions as governments and churches by a stream of essays and pamphlets and largely didactic short stories and plays.

Early years and marriage. Lev Nikolayevich, Count Tolstoy, was born on September 9 (August 28, old style), 1828, on his family's estate at Yasnaya Polyana, about 100 miles (160 kilometres) south of Moscow, in Tula Province. Tolstoy's parents died when he was a child, and he was raised by relatives. Private tutors had charge of his early education. At 16 he entered the Kazan University (now Kazan [V.I. Lenin] State University), but, disappointed with the formal instruction there, he returned to

Tolstoy
The Bettmann Archive

Yasnaya Polyana in 1847 to manage his estate and conduct his own education. In neither did he achieve much success, preferring the social whirl of Moscow and St. Petersburg to life in the country. In his diary, which he kept during most of his life, he recorded his moral transgressions. In his youthful entries there is already evidence of an unusual analytical talent in his realistic probing into the suppressed motives of his own behaviour.

Sketches of military life

Disgusted with this shiftless existence, Tolstoy in 1851 joined his soldier brother Nikolay in the Caucasus. In the following year he also entered the army and acted with bravery in several engagements against the hill tribes. Much of his leisure he spent in writing, completing his first published work, *Detstvo* (*Childhood*), which appeared in the magazine *Sovremennik* ("The Contemporary"). The material of *Childhood* is treated with conventional realism, except for digressive lyrical passages in the manner of the English novelist Laurence Sterne, whose *Sentimental Journey* Tolstoy partially translated at this time. He is autobiographical in this and in later works, for he often draws upon his own life, or the lives of those he knew well, for the content of his fiction; but what captivates readers of *Childhood* is its fresh and precise choice of significant detail and the amazing reliving of forgotten common experiences of childhood that, once recalled, exert a nostalgic charm. Sequels to *Childhood*—*Otrochestvo* (*Boyhood*) and *Yunost* (*Youth*)—lack this special charm, perhaps because an analysis of the moral failings of youngsters tends to dominate these two works. Tolstoy's experiences in the Caucasus are reflected in "Nabeg" ("The Raid") and "Rubka lesa" ("The Woodfelling"), his first short stories dealing with war. The theme is treated in a youthful spirit, but the exacting realistic analysis of military activity is tinged with that critical awareness of false heroics that became a central feature of his *Sevastopolskiye rasskazy* (1855–56; *Sevastopol*).

Transferred to the Danube front in 1854, Tolstoy participated in the siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean War. He described these experiences in his *Sevastopol* sketches, in which he contrasted the simple heroism of the common soldier with the false heroics of military leaders. At the end of the fighting in 1856, he left the army and went to St. Petersburg, where he became the idol of competing literary groups that sought his support of their social and aesthetic views. A pronounced individualist, he rebuffed the coteries and left for Yasnaya Polyana.

Early short stories

He went abroad in 1857, to France, Switzerland, and Germany. The criticism of stories based on his travels (*e.g.*, "Lyutsern" ["Lucern"]) caused him to lose interest in literature. Yet he continued to write. Between 1855 and 1863 he wrote a series of short stories—including

pler structure than those of the contemporary Chinese, which is a monosyllabic language without word endings. Therefore, many different Chinese words or morphemes became homophones (words pronounced alike) in Japanese as early as the 8th and 9th centuries; *e.g.*, the Japanese imitated the Chinese *k, k', x* (and *g*, γ) sounds with only a single *k* sound. Moreover, sound changes in Japanese during the succeeding 12 centuries produced a great number of homophones; for example, the sound sequences *au* (from Chinese *au* and *ang*), *afu, ou*, and *ofu* that were distinct from each other in Old Japanese and early Late Old Japanese have all become the same *ō* today. Accordingly, Japanese now has a great many homophonous kanji, so that the Chinese loan morphemes that clearly convey certain meanings when written with kanji would very often become incomprehensible when romanized. Moreover, kanji have more characteristic configurations than would the same words written with roman letters, and thus enable rapid reading. In addition, a high literacy rate prevails throughout the entire Japanese nation, and the people are presumed to be so accustomed to the kanji and kana that such a great change in writing as romanization would undoubtably encounter very strong resistance.

The growing popularity of hiragana

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(S.Ha.)

Japanese Mythology

Japanese mythology here refers to the indigenous mythology of Japan. Mythological forms and concepts derived from Buddhist or Chinese mythology are presented only insofar as they have influenced the development of indigenous Japanese mythology. This article includes an outline of some of the most important myths in Japanese religion as well as information on their origins, relation to legend, ritual, and art, and their use in politics. The myths of the Ainu people are not included.

SOURCES AND TYPES OF MYTH

Ethnic and social origins. The earliest collection of myths in Japan—the *Koji-ki* (712) and *Nihon-gi*, or *Nihon shoki* (720)—are by no means examples of purely indigenous religious belief. Even at this early time, the influence of China can be discerned. Both of these documents were written with Chinese characters, and the *Nihon-gi* was actually written in Chinese. Chinese ideas also permeate Japan's earliest recorded myths; this influence may be seen, for example, in Japanese notions about Yin and Yang—the division of nature into two separate, opposing categories. Furthermore, even the material that is not obviously Chinese probably had its origin far from the Japanese archipelago.

Diverse ethnic groups

The Japanese islands were inhabited as far back as the Pleistocene Epoch. Subsequently, there took place several waves of immigration from various sources, adding diverse elements to the making of the Japanese people. In earlier times, a north–south interflow of culture along the Pacific coast of Japan had created a "circa-Pacific culture." One ethnic group active in this period, the Ainu, are still found in the northernmost part of the country. Their religions and myths contain many vestiges from the days when they lived primarily by hunting and fishing. One example is their belief that game animals live in human form in another world. They come to this world as animals to be hunted and eaten by people and if the latter pay sufficient homage to their spirits, they go back to their own world with satisfaction, carrying with them gifts from their hunters. The following year they return to reciprocate the favour. This "potlatch" idea is shared by many native tribes in Eurasia and North America.

The Neolithic era lasted fairly long in Japan, where it is specifically called the Jōmon period. Archaeological artifacts from this period include female clay figures, apparently representing the Earth Mother or the goddess of fertility; earthenware decorated with viper patterns that seem to reflect a cult of the serpent; and clay masks that may have been worn by shamans (medicine men). The Japanese islands with this aboriginal culture then received successive waves of immigrants from the nearest continent (East Asia) and the Pacific. The northern continental area of East Asia consists of steppes and deserts, and lying south of it is an agrarian area with great rivers. There was a process of confluence between the peoples and cultures of the two areas on the continent, and under the pressure of moving ethnic groups there, some of them are believed to have emigrated to Japan via the Korean Peninsula and other parts of the China coast, probably including the Shantung Peninsula.

The Jōmon period was followed by the Yayoi period (*c.* 250 BC to *c.* AD 250), in which metal articles began to be used. Around this time agriculture became prevalent in Japan. Small centres of political power emerged in various parts of the country, and finally a fairly large-scale regime headed by a shamanic female sovereign came into being. The most important farm crop in Japan, rice, is believed to have been brought initially from South China, and the religion and myth of the ancient Japanese are notably characterized by rites in which farmers paid homage to their ancestral gods by offering them samples of rice they had grown and praying for a rich crop the following year.

In the subsequent Tumulus (Great Burial) period (*c.* AD 250 to *c.* AD 500), the Japanese lived in a society composed of clans (*uji*), each worshipping its own ancestral gods (called *uji-gami*) and headed by a chief (*uji-no-kami*) who both presided over religious rites and held secular power. But this role was gradually divided into a political and a religious function, and those specializing in the latter further split into a group consisting of male shrine priests (called *megi, hafuri*, or *kannushi*) and another group comprised mostly of strongly shamanic females (called *miko*). Some *miko* belonged to shrines whereas others did not. The latter included *ichiko*, who were active among common people as mediums, through whose mouths the spirits of others, both living and dead, were believed to speak. It was also believed that people were sometimes possessed by the spirits of such animals as foxes, raccoon dogs, and snakes, and had some peculiar mental experiences in that condition. It was held as well that some families were particularly akin to such spirits. Beliefs of this sort are also found in some tribes on the Asian continent, such as the Miao. In Japan, they are ap-

parently survivals from old tribal times. Some ritual dances and music performed by priests and priestesses were later secularized and became the origins of recreational theatricals and dances.

Most of the surviving Japanese myths are recorded in history books written in the early 8th century. They tell of the origin of the ruling class, and were apparently aimed at strengthening its authority. Therefore, they are not pure myths but have much political colouring. Nevertheless, they incorporate many typical folklore patterns, some of which are believed to have originated somewhere far on the Eurasian continent. For example, the story of Susanowo killing an eight-headed serpent and saving princess Inada belongs to the Perseus-and-Andromeda type of tales. One Japanese scholar, Seki Keigo, believes that the story is related to three universal folklore patterns: the Dragon Slayer, the Three Stolen Princesses, and the Twins or Blood Brothers. According to him, the myths concerning Susanowo and Ōkuni-nushi (hero of the Izumo cycle of regional myths) have the same origin. The original story was that two heroes destroyed a monster and saved a woman; then one of them betrayed the other and killed him; the latter soon came back to life and retrieved the woman by showing some evidence. To understand Japanese myth, it is essential to analyze the process of its making in the above manner and examine its components individually. But until the end of World War II, Japanese scholars were not permitted to analyze Japanese ancient history and myth with complete freedom, and little analytical work was done in that field. After the war, the new cultural freedom led to open research into Japanese mythology and a variety of novel theories about it. None has been established as universally acceptable.

Myths and genealogies

Documentary and ritual sources. Genealogies and mythological records were kept in Japan, at least from the 6th century AD and probably long before that. Even before these materials were written down, professional reciters (*katari-be*) attached to the great clans preserved traditions by word of mouth. By the time of Emperor Temmu (7th century), it became necessary to know the genealogy of all important families in order to establish the position of each in the eight levels of rank and title modelled after the Chinese court system. For this reason, Temmu ordered the compilation of myths and genealogies that finally resulted in the *Koji-ki* and *Nihon-gi*. The compilers of these and other early documents had at their disposal not only oral tradition but also documentary sources such as the "Imperial Sun-Lineage" and the "Ancient Dicta of Former Ages" in the case of the *Koji-ki*. A greater variety of sources was available to the compiler of the *Nihon-gi*. While the *Koji-ki* is richer in genealogy and myth, the *Nihon-gi* adds a great deal to scholarly understanding of both the history and the myth of early Japan. Its purpose was to give the newly Sinicized court a history that could be compared with the annals of the Chinese. In addition to these two books, there is also the *Kogoshūi* (AD 807), the records of traditions transmitted by the Imbe, a hereditary priestly clan. Other valuable records of early myths are found in provincial gazetteers (*fūdoki*) prepared in the 8th century by the order of the Imperial court. These provide a glimpse of Japanese myths not bent to serve the interests of the court. Mythological legends were also contained in liturgical prayers (*norito*) that were recited during religious services in the Imperial court.

Myths and rituals

Myths and rituals are closely related to each other. The most important ritual function of the court was to ensure a good harvest of rice. Many ceremonies were performed for this purpose, the most important being the harvest festival, or Niiname-sai.

The ancient Japanese initially did not worship their gods in shrines, but believed that the gods descended onto beautiful conical mountains, high trees, thickets, huge rocks, and other such spots, which were considered sacred. In the spring, the people invited the gods to journey from such places to their villages; in the fall, the gods were sent back. The practice of felling a sacred tree on a mountain, dragging the log down to a village, and erecting it as a *mi-hashira* (holy pillar) must be connected in some way to this old belief. To people living on a seashore, gods seemed to come from somewhere beyond the sea. At many shrines, the custom is still maintained of carrying a portable shrine back and forth to a beach at festival time.

MYTHIC THEMES AND THEIR CHARACTERS

Cosmology

Imperial court myths. The purpose of the cosmologies of the *Koji-ki* and *Nihon-gi* is to trace the Imperial genealogy back to the foundation of the world. In the beginning, the world was a chaotic mass, an ill-defined egg, full of seeds. Gradually, the finer parts became heaven (Yang), the heavier parts earth (Yin). Deities were produced between the two: first, three single deities, and, then, a series of divine couples. According to the *Nihon-gi*, one of the first three "pure male" gods appeared in the form of a reed that connected heaven and earth. A central foundation was now laid down for the drifting cosmos, and mud and sand accumulated upon it. A stake was driven in, and an inhabitable place was created. Finally, the god Izanagi ("he who invites") and the goddess Izanami ("she who is invited") appeared. Ordered by their heavenly superiors, they stood on a floating bridge in heaven and stirred the ocean with a spear. When the spear was pulled up, the brine dripping from the tip formed the Onogoro, an island that became solid spontaneously. Izanagi and Izanami then descended to this island, met each other by circling around the celestial pillar, discovered each other's sexuality, and began to procreate. After initial failures, they produced the eight islands that now make up Japan. Izanami finally gave birth to the god of fire and died of burns. Raging with anger, Izanagi attacked his son, from whose blood such deities as the god of thunder were born. Other gods were born of Izanami on her deathbed. They presided over metal, earth, and agriculture. In grief, Izanagi pursued Izanami to Hades (Yomi) and asked her to come back to the land of the living. The goddess replied that she had already eaten food cooked on a stove in Hades and could not return. In spite of her warning, Izanagi looked at his wife and discovered that her body was infested with maggots. The angry and humiliated goddess then chased Izanagi from the underworld. When he finally reached the upper world, Izanagi blocked the entrance to the underworld with an enormous stone. The goddess then threatened Izanagi, saying that she would kill a thousand people every day. He replied that he would father one thousand and five hundred children for every thousand she killed. After this, Izanagi pronounced the formula of divorce. Whatever the original meaning of this myth, it seems to be used here to account for the growth of the population of Japan.

Izanagi then returned to this world and purified himself from the miasma of Hades of the seashore. From the lustral water falling from his left eye was born the sun goddess Amaterasu, ancestress of the imperial family. From his right eye was born the moon god and from his nose, the trickster god Susanowo. Izanagi gave the sun goddess a jewel from a necklace and told her to govern heaven. He entrusted the dominion of night to the moon god. Susanowo was told to govern the sea. According to the *Koji-ki*, Susanowo was dissatisfied with his share and ascended to heaven to see his older sister. Amaterasu, fearing his wild behaviour, met him and suggested they prove their faithfulness to each other by bringing forth children. They agreed to receive a seed from each other, chew it, and spit it away. If gods rather than goddesses were born, it would be a sign of the good faith of the one toward the other. When Susanowo brought forth gods, his faithfulness was recognized, and he was permitted to live in heaven.

Susanowo's pranks

Susanowo, becoming conceited over his success, began to play the role of a trickster at the court of Amaterasu. Such tricksters, found in the myths and tales of many folk, often play the part of ribald anticreators who, in effect, bring forth a countercreation. Susanowo scattered excrement over the dining room of Amaterasu, where she was celebrating the ceremony of the first fruits. His worst offense was to fling a piebald horse into Amaterasu's

chamber, a horse he had "flayed with a backward flaying" (a ritual offense). At the sight of this monstrosity, "the women weaving the heavenly garments were so much alarmed that they struck their shuttles (*hi*) into their private parts and died" (*Koji-ki* I: xv). In another version (*Nihon-gi* I: 37 and 43), Amaterasu herself was wounded. According to the *Kogoshūi*, Susanowo broke down the divisions of the heavenly rice fields by filling up the irrigation channels, opening the floodgates, and sowing seed over again. Then he erected rods in the fields, causing the rice to deteriorate. Susanowo's own fields were described as barren (*yase*) places.

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Amaterasu, attracted by the laughter of the gods, emerges from her cave. Detail of a woodblock print by Kunisada Toyokuni II (1777–1835).

Enraged at the pranks of her brother, the sun goddess hid herself in a celestial cave, and darkness filled the heavens and the earth. The gods were at a loss. Finally, they gathered in front of the cave, built a fire, and made cocks crow. They erected a sacred evergreen tree, and from its branches they hung curved beads, mirrors, and cloth offerings. A goddess named Ame-no-uzume then danced half-nude. Amaterasu, hearing the 800 myriads of gods laughing and applauding, became curious and opened the door of the cave. Seizing the opportunity, a strong-armed god dragged her out of the cave. This story, like that of the Greek Demeter and other Near Eastern tales, is closely related to winter festivals, during which the barrenness of the land is associated with the grief of the goddess of earth. (Some scholars have wondered why a heavenly deity should do such earthly things as cultivate rice fields and hide in a cave and have speculated that Amaterasu was originally an earth goddess.) But this theme—of the celestial cave—has long been viewed by many scholars as representing a solar eclipse, its prototype being the old solar eclipse myth found among the Austroasiatic peoples of Southeast Asia.

Susanowo on earth

Having angered the heavenly gods and having been banished from heaven, Susanowo descended to Izumo, where he rescued Princess Marvellous Rice Field (Kushi-inada-hime) from an eight-headed serpent. He then married the Princess and became the progenitor of the ruling family of Izumo. Susanowo, an evildoer in heaven, became a perfect gentleman after his descent to earth. He made trees grow to provide lumber for boats, palaces, and coffins, and fathered Ōtoshi-no-kami (god of the harvest) and Uga-no-mitama-no-kami (god of rice), by a daughter of the mountain god. Susanowo was intimately associated with the processes of fertility. Among his many descendants were gods related to water, rivers, cereals, trees, and thunder. The most important member of the family of Susanowo was the god Ōkuni-nushi, the great earth chief, who assumed control of this region before the descent to earth of the descendants of the sun goddess. Molested by other gods, he once had died but was revived by the efforts of his mother. After this, he ran away to the netherworld, married a daughter of Susanowo, and returned to the upper world. Tradition says that with the help of Sukuna-bikona-no-mikoto, a midget god who had drifted ashore in a tiny boat, Ōkuni-nushi governed the country and benefitted the people by establishing the arts of healing.

Before long, Amaterasu, the leader of the celestial gods—the gods of Izumo were known as earthly gods—asked Ōkuni-nushi to turn over the land of Izumo, saying that "the land of the plentiful reed-covered plains and fresh rice ears" was to be governed by the descendants of the heavenly gods. After the submission of Izumo, Amaterasu made her grandson Ninigi (a word said to represent rice in its maturity) descend to earth. According to the *Nihon-gi*, Amaterasu handed Ninigi some ears of rice from a sacred rice field and told him to raise rice on earth and to worship the celestial gods. The grandson of the sun goddess then descended to the peak of Takachiho (meaning high thousand ears) in Miyazaki, Kyushu. There he married a daughter of the god of the mountain, named Konohana-sakuya-hime (Princess Blossoms of the Trees). At the time, the father of this princess had offered Ninigi his choice between his two daughters, the other being Iwanaga-hime (Princess Rock Durable). It was his fateful choice of beauty over durability that caused the life-span of men and even of emperors to be short from that day forth.

When his wife became pregnant in a single night, Ninigi wondered whether the child was his own. In order to vindicate her innocence, the princess set fire to her room, giving birth to three sons in the fire. The last born was Hikohohodemi-no-mikoto (Fireshade), a hunter. His elder brother, Hoderi-no-mikoto (Fireshine), was a fisherman. On one occasion, they exchanged the implements of their respective ways of life, namely, a bow and arrow for a fishhook. The younger brother then lost his brother's fishhook in the sea. When the elder brother demanded the return of his fishhook, the younger god was compelled to go into the sea to search for it. There he married the daughter of the sea god and returned with the fishhook, which he had recovered with her assistance, and also with two magical jewels that controlled the tides. With the supernatural power of these jewels, he reduced his elder brother to poverty and finally brought him to his knees by means of a flood.

The lost fishhook story

This story of Hikohohodemi-no-mikoto going into the sea to recover a lost fishhook is related to the common folklore pattern of the Lost Fishhook. Similar tales are found widely both in Oceania and on the Asian continent, and the Japanese version particularly resembles those in Micronesia and Indonesia. An interesting fact in this connection is that the descendants of the older of the brothers, Hoderi, who had lost the contest and become a subject of Hikohohodemi, were said to be the ancestors of a Kyushu tribe called the Hayato. This tribe later supplied guards for the fences of the Imperial Palace for many generations; these guards also performed a dance in the court Daijō-sai festival, holding shields decorated with a spiral pattern that was said to represent the lost fishhook. Moreover, the Hayato have been considered to share many of the characteristics of southern Pacific peoples.

The pregnant daughter of the sea god came ashore in Miyazaki and gave birth to a child on the beach. The child's name was Ugaya Fukia-ezu-no-Mikoto, later to be

the father of the first legendary emperor of Japan, Jimmu. While this is generally regarded as the watershed between the "age of the gods" and the historical age, Jimmu's eastern expedition was also a myth. The story probably reflects the memory of the historical fact that the Imperial clan once moved eastward from Kyūshū to the Yamato province. Similarly, both the story of Prince Yamato-takeru's subjugation of Izumo, Kyūshū, and the eastern provinces during the reign of the 12th emperor, Keikō, and the story of Empress Jingō or Jingū, empress of the 14th emperor, Chūai, conquering the kingdom of Shiragi in Korea have the air of myth though they are based on the historical memory of an actual Korean expedition and the conquest of domestic provinces. The life of Yamato-takeru was filled with suffering and ended, finally, in tragedy. He has many of the characteristics of the hero of the Western classical epics.

Folk myths and legends. Among the many myths that have been preserved, one seems to be strangely related to the myth of Hainuwele, a deity found in New Guinea. This is the myth of a god from whose sacrificed body various kinds of grains and tubers are produced. In Japan this myth seems to be associated with a group called the "celestial Kuma people," presumably archaic agriculturalists. The sun goddess, one variant of the story reveals, sent the moon god to visit the goddess of food. He was angered when she produced food for him from her mouth and killed her on the spot. From the body of the dead goddess grew millet, panic, rice, wheat, large and small beans, and even cattle and horses. The Kuma people took these things to heaven and offered them to the sun goddess. The latter was pleased and used these cereals as seed in her dry and wet fields.

While myth tells how things came to be and what is behind all things, legends tell about marvellous events in a specific place. Unlike fairy tales, both myths and legends are believed to be true. Because legends tend to flourish in closely knit social groups, the traditional Japanese village was virtually a hothouse for the production of folktales. In the villages, there grew up stories about the *kappa*, a goblin with a saucer-like head that holds water. When the water is spilled, the *kappa* loses his strength. Known to lurk about rivers, the *kappa* often waylays children or horses, killing them by pulling out the intestines through the anus. Another demon in Japanese folklore is the *tengu*, a creature with a long, pointed nose who lives in pine trees in the mountains, where he often abducts human beings. Tengu, it seems, were originally worshipped as mountain spirits, but gradually lost status until, partly under the influence of Shugen-dō (an order of mountain ascetics), they came to be regarded as evil goblins. The *oni* also were originally regarded as mountain spirits and played the role of farm gods. With the lapse of time, they fell in status, and under the influence of Buddhism finally turned into a sort of fiend.

Tales concerning animals

Many animals have the power to bewitch men. The cat, snake, and badger are especially important in this respect. The fox was a creature familiar to common people as it was commonly found around their villages. Hence, it came to be regarded as a messenger of Inari, one of the most popular deities in Japan. The fox was also said to bewitch people. Sometimes it disguised itself as a beautiful woman and tempted a man, who on coming to his senses some time later would find himself in an open grave or going about on all fours eating leaves, to the astonishment of his friends. Another demon is the earthquake fish, an enormous catfish whose motions cause earthquakes on the land above it. Curiously, many of these demons also have a benign aspect. The *kappa* and *tengu* sometimes teach people the arts of swordsmanship and healing. The fox has been known to sacrifice itself or its children to help cure its benefactors. The earthquake fish brings employment to impoverished artisans when it destroys buildings in earthquakes.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MYTH IN JAPAN

While myth in Greece evolved into literature and, in China, into history, in Japan the main collections of myth that have been preserved have been largely political documents. They have established divine origins for the Imperial and paraimperial families, transforming power into authority. In medieval times, the imperial family declined in actual power, and Buddhism and Confucianism came to influence Japanese mythology. Buddhism added stories of saints and *bodhisattvas* (Buddhas-to-be) to the already rich store of Japanese legends, while Confucianism added a moralizing touch. Native elements became thoroughly mixed with legendary themes from China and even India. In the middle of the Tokugawa period (1603–1867), there was a revival of interest in what was believed to be pure Japanese mythology. With the restoration of the imperial regime in 1868, this archaizing tendency in Japanese culture was given greater scope. Shintō shrines were purified of all Buddhist accretions and were reorganized under the program of State Shintō—according to which religion and politics were seen as one. Myths were included in the public school curricula and became so sanctified that they could no longer be studied critically. The literal belief in a divine emperor, who was the descendant of the sun goddess and the symbol of the sacred mission of Japan, provided a mythological foundation for the ethnocentric and nationalistic fanaticism that resulted in Japan's expansionism during the 1930s and final defeat in 1945. After World War II, mythology was largely eliminated from school curricula, while Shintō shrines lost their special government protection. More recently, however, attempts have been made to reintroduce the ancient myths into the schools. On the academic scene, scientific research on myths and folklore has been set free from the government's interference and has been stimulated by recent progress in ethnology, archaeology, history of religions, folklore studies, and other related disciplines.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. The two basic sources for knowledge of Japanese mythology are the *Koji-ki* and the *Nihon-gi*, 8th-century compilations that show Chinese influence but retain the fundamental structure of Japanese myths. The former of these, Japan's oldest written record, was first translated by BASIL H. CHAMBERLAIN as "'Ko-ji-ki' (Records of Ancient Matters)," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. 10, suppl. (1882); and more recently by DONALD L. PHILIPPI as *Kojiki* (1968). Philippi's introduction, notes, and glossary are especially helpful. The *Nihon-gi* complements the earlier work in many ways and was translated by W.G. ASTON and published in 1896 as *Nihongi, Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 697*; originally published in the *Transactions of the Japan Society*, suppl. 1, and reprinted in 1956. Another valuable source is the *Kogoshūi*, an account written according to the Imbe clan, a Shintō priestly family; it dates from the early 9th century and has been translated by G. KATO and H. HOSHINO under the title *Kogoshūi: Gleanings from Ancient Stories*, 2nd ed. rev. (1925). A good but brief discussion of the topic is E. DALE SAUNDERS' contribution, "Japanese Mythology," in S.N. KRAMER (ed.), *Mythologies of the Ancient World* (1961). The standard study is *Essai sur la mythologie japonaise* by NOBUHIRO MATSUMOTO (1928). Folklore aspects of the topic may be found in studies in RICHARD DORSON's edition of translated articles by leading Japanese folklorists, entitled *Studies in Japanese Folklore* (1963); in KEIGO SEKI, *Folktales of Japan* (1963); and in HIROKO IKEDA, *A Type and Motif Index of Japanese Folk-Literature* (1971). C. OUWEHAND, *Namazu-e and Their Themes* (1964), is a fascinating study of mythic, legendary, and folkloristic components in a collection of 19th-century pictures.

(N.M.)

Japanese Philosophy

The Japanese equivalent for "philosophy" is *tetsugaku*, a word coined when Western schools of thought were first introduced into Japan after the Meiji Restoration (1868), the great upheaval that overthrew the shogunate (which had governed Japan for over 250 years), restored Imperial rule, and opened the country to the West. Before the Meiji era, one of the two principal schools of Japanese thought arose from Buddhism and was highly tinged with a religious character and often metaphysical; a second arose from Confucianism and was essentially a system of moral philosophy. From the 18th century on there were some independent thinkers who were critical of these two major schools. Since the Meiji Restoration, the philosophies of all of these schools and thinkers have been com-

kabu-nakama, and their controlling power over city markets was thus extremely restricted. The confrontation of the city merchants with the village producers and local merchants over monopoly of commercial-goods circulation routes had grown more fierce, and the former had been forced to yield further.

Thus, the domestic reaction to the Tempō reform was comparatively calm, and the major stumbling block facing the *bakufu* was the foreign problem. The Netherlands, the only European power trading with Japan, saw that if Britain succeeded in forcing Japan to open the country, it would lose its monopoly; so the Dutch now planned to seize the initiative in opening Japan and to thus turn the situation to their own advantage. In 1844 the king of The Netherlands, William II, sent a diplomatic mission urging the *bakufu* to open the country, but Abe and the *bakufu* rulers refused this suggestion. Visits by foreign ships, however, increased progressively. In 1844, 1845, and 1846, British and French warships visited the Ryukyu Islands and Nagasaki to request commercial relations. In response, the *bakufu*, in 1845, established the new office of Kaibo-gakari for coastal defense and various diplomatic posts. The defense system of Edo Bay was also revived, the number of domains on guard duty was increased, and new gun emplacements were built. In 1848 it was decided not to revive the order to drive away foreign ships, which had been rescinded during the Tempō reform, but that extensive military preparations should be made.

Foreign rivalries in the opening of Japan

Rumours had long circulated among the various foreign countries that the United States government would send an expeditionary fleet to Japan. In 1846 Comdr. James Biddle of the American East Indian fleet appeared with two warships in Uraga Harbour (Uraga-kō) and held consultations on the question of commercial relations. When refused by the *bakufu*, he left empty-handed. The United States, however, eagerly desired ports for fuel and provisions for its Pacific merchant and whaling ships and would not give up trying to open Japan. But the *bakufu* had for so many years kept its place as overlord of the political regime by strictly maintaining the ancestral law of seclusion that it could not muster up the resolution to step forward and open the country. The opening of Japan was thus postponed until the last possible moment as a result of the vacillation of its rulers, and the opening had to be effected unilaterally by foreign pressure, backed by massive naval strength. (K.Ma.)

III. Japan since 1850

THE MEIJI RESTORATION

The term restoration is commonly applied to the political changes that returned power to the throne during the reign of Mutsuhito, who took the reign name Meiji ("enlightened rule," 1868–1912). The slogan return to antiquity (*fukkō*) made it possible to interpret sweeping changes as traditional in motivation. Actually, the Meiji changes constituted a social and political revolution that began before 1868, and political innovations ended only with the promulgation of a constitution in 1889.

Fall of the Tokugawa. The arrival of the foreigners in the 1850s provided a new issue for domestic politics and a new measure for the effectiveness of the feudal administration. When it became clear that the Shogun was unable to protect Japan from the barbarians and that his concessions to them were made in spite of their known repugnance to the Imperial court in Kyōto, the two shogunal boasts of loyalty to and protection for the court proved spurious. The slogan *sonnō-jōi* ("Revere the Emperor! Drive out the Barbarians!") was first raised by men who sought to influence shogunal policy and then taken up by others who wanted to embarrass the Tokugawa. The Shogun's ratification of the Harris Treaty and of others that followed was carried out in the face of strong opposition from the Kyōto court, and it brought to the surface antagonisms that had developed during the long years of peace and study. They centred in the Tokugawa house of Mito, which had done much to sponsor Confucian scholarship. The Mito daimyo made vigorous attempts to involve the Kyōto court in affairs of the shogunate with a view to establishing a nationwide program of preparedness. For this he was punished by the head of the Edo council of elders, Ii Naosuke. In 1860 Ii was assassinated by men from Mito and Satsuma, an act that inaugurated years of violence. Many of those who took part were young samurai from Edo; their swords availed little against the foreigners' guns, but they took a heavy toll of political enemies.

Reaction against foreign intervention

Years of extremism followed. The Tokugawa shogunate, anxious to rally support among its feudatories and to help them to prepare their defenses, relaxed its controls and regulations. In many fiefs young enthusiasts tried to push their feudal superiors into a less cautious and more strongly antiforeign position. It soon became obvious to most men that expelling the foreigners by force was impossible. Antiforeign acts provoked stern countermeasures and diplomatic indemnities, which tightened the foreign hold on the country. After the bombardment of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, there could be no doubt of the foreigners' military superiority. Thereafter, the slogans of antiforeignism and exclusion continued to be used chiefly as a means of obstructing and embarrassing the shogunate. The Edo policy makers were forced to make surface concessions to the antiforeign elements, which aroused the hostility and distrust of the treaty powers. After the arrival of the British minister Sir Harry Parkes in 1865, Great Britain, in particular, began to tire of negotiating with a shogunate that stood between it and the Kyōto court and began to consider ways of dealing directly with the latter. It gradually became clear that ultimate authority lay in Kyōto.

In some fiefs the young extremists found themselves unable to budge their superiors from their conservative positions. From Chōshū (now part of Yamaguchi Prefecture), foreign shipping in the straits of Shimonoseki was shelled in 1863. This drew a foreign bombardment the following year. Samurai opinion grew so vehement that after the fief authorities submitted to Tokugawa discipline in 1864, a swift military coup brought to power, as the daimyo's counsellors, a group of men who had led the radical antiforeign movement. But they were no longer blindly antiforeign; several had secretly travelled to England. Their aims had become national—to overthrow the shogunate and create a new government headed by the Emperor. The same men developed new militia units based on Western training methods and arms. Chōshū became the centre for discontented young samurai from other fiefs who were impatient with their leaders' caution. In 1866 Chōshū allied itself with the great fief of Satsuma in expectation of a Tokugawa attempt to crush all *tozama* daimyo opponents and erect a centralized despotism with French help.

Anti-Tokugawa alliance

The Tokugawa armies were successfully repulsed at Chōshū in 1866, causing the shogunate to lose power and prestige. The death of Shogun Iemochi in 1866 brought to power as the last shogun Hitotsubashi Keiki (or Yoshinobu), who was aware of the pressing needs for national unity. He spurned suggestions that he seek French help to put down his enemies. When he was urged by a lord of Tosa to resign his powers, he did so rather than risk a full-scale assault by Satsuma and Chōshū, confident that as lord of eastern Japan he would emerge as an important figure in whatever new political organization should develop. But the young Meiji emperor, who had succeeded to the throne in 1867, was guided by several nobles in close touch with leaders of Satsuma and Chōshū, and the last shogun was manoeuvred into a choice between giving up his land, which would risk revolt from his vassals, or appearing disobedient, which would justify punitive measures. Keiki's armies advanced on Kyōto, only to be defeated. Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa units, now the Imperial army, advanced on Edo, which was surrendered without a battle; fighting continued to the north until the summer of 1869, but the Tokugawa cause was doomed. In January 1868 the principal lords were summoned to Kyōto to learn of the restoration of Imperial rule. The next year the capital was moved to Edo, from this time on Tokyo, and the building of the modern state began.

From feudal to modern state. The Meiji government was dominated by the Satsuma, Chōshū, and court figures who had outmanoeuvred the Shogun. They were convinced that Japan would need a unified national government in order to achieve military and material equality with the Western powers. Most of them, like Kido Kōin and Itō Hirobumi of Chōshū and Saigō Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi of Satsuma, were young samurai of modest rank, but they did not represent in any sense a class interest. Indeed, their measures destroyed that class. In order to gain backing for their policies, they enlisted leaders of fiefs with which they had worked—from Tosa, Saga, Echizen—and maintained their cooperation with such court nobles as Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjō Sanetomi.

Anti-Tokugawa alliance

The cooperation of the impressionable young emperor was essential. It was taken for granted that Western strength depended on constitutionalism, which produced national unity; on industrialization, which produced material strength; and on a well-trained military. The new slogan of the day became *fukoku-kyōhei* ("rich country, strong arms"). Knowledge was to be sought in the West, the goodwill of which was essential if the unequal treaties were to be revised. Therefore, a number of missions to the West were organized. In 1871 Iwakura Tomomi led a large number of his fellow government leaders to visit Europe and the United States. The experience gained abroad strengthened convictions already formed as to measures of modernization that would be required.

Missions to the West

Abolition of feudalism. The Meiji leaders began with measures to lessen the feudal decentralization on which they blamed much of Japan's weakness. In 1869 the Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Saga leaders persuaded their daimyo to return their lands to the throne; other lords hastened to follow suit. The court took steps to regularize and make uniform administration in the fiefs, but it appointed the former lords as new governors. In 1871 the governor daimyo were summoned to Tokyo, and feudalism was declared abolished. The approximately 300 fiefs became 72 prefectures and three metropolitan districts; this number was later reduced by one-third. For the most part, the daimyo lost contact with administration, and, although they were rewarded with titles in a new European-style peerage, set up in 1884, their political importance was slight.

It was necessary to end the complex system of social stratification that had existed under feudalism; yet, it was difficult to make arrangements for the samurai, who numbered, with dependents, almost 2,000,000. In 1869 the old hierarchy was replaced with a new and simpler division whereby court nobility and feudal lords were termed aristocracy (*kazoku*); upper and middle samurai, *shizoku*; other samurai, *sotsuzoku* (a rank soon abolished); and all others, commoners (*heimin*), including the previously unlisted pariah groups. The samurai were given pensions equal to a part of their old income. When the regime found these pensions too heavy for its treasury to carry, the pensions were changed to interest-bearing but nonconvertible bonds. During the same years, the samurais' special hairdo was discouraged; the wearing of swords, the former badge of class, was later banned.

Many of the bonds were soon squandered, because few warriors had had occasion to develop commercial aptitude, and the inflation that accompanied government expenditures lessened their value greatly. In 1873, moreover, a nationwide conscription was instituted, depriving the samurai of their traditional monopoly of military service. There were a number of samurai revolts, the most serious in the southwest, which had led in the restoration movement and where warriors previously had reason to expect the greatest rewards. Some revolts, as in Chōshū, were expressions of discontent against administrative measures that deprived samurai of their importance, while in Saga the dissidents championed a proposed foreign war to employ samurai.

Samurai revolts

The last and greatest revolt came in Satsuma (1877), led by the restoration hero Saigō Takamori. The new conscript levies were hard pressed to defeat Saigō, and the government had to enlist former samurai and empty its military academies in order to put down the revolt. But the revolts merely expressed regional discontents and were never coordinated. Even in the case of the Satsuma war, the loyalties of most of the Satsuma men in the central government remained with the Imperial cause.

Fiscal and economic policies. In 1873 land surveys were begun to determine the amount and value of land on the basis of average yield in recent years, and a tax in money of 3 percent of the value was then set as the land tax. Out of the same surveys came certificates of ownership of land for farmers, who were also released from feudal controls. The land measures involved basic changes, and there was widespread confusion and uncertainty among the farmers, frequently expressed by short-lived revolts and demonstrations. The establishment of private ownership, along with measures to promote new technology, fertilizers, and seeds, soon produced a rise in recorded agricultural output. The land tax, supplemented by printed money, was the principal source of the government's income for several decades.

Although hard pressed for money, the government also began a program of industrialization, seen as essential for national strength. Aside from military industries and strategic communications, it was carried out in private hands, although the government set up pilot plants to provide encouragement. Trade and manufacturing benefitted from the new national market and legal security, although unequal treaties made it impossible to protect industries with tariffs until 1911.

In the 1880s fear of excessive inflation resulted in a decision to sell most of the new plants to private investors —usually persons who had close relations with government officials. A small number of individuals came to dominate many enterprises; they were known as the *zaibatsu*, or financial cliques. With tremendous opportunities and few competitors, the same firms appeared in enterprise after enterprise. Their aims were close to those of the government leaders, and there were often close friendships between them. The House of Mitsui, for instance, had close relations with Meiji leaders, while that of Mitsubishi was founded by a colleague of the restoration leaders.

Rise of the *zaibatsu*

National loyalties. Equally important for building a modern state was the development of national loyalties. True national unity required the propagation of new loyalties among the masses, previously inarticulate and powerless. The early restoration government, influenced by a Shintō revival, elevated a bureau of Shintō, the state cult, to the highest position in the new political hierarchy and strove to replace Buddhism with a strong cult of the national deities. Christianity was legalized in 1873, with great reluctance, at the urging of the Iwakura mission, and thereafter it seemed important to bolster traditional outlooks without risking foreign condemnation by forcing a state religion upon the Japanese. The education system proved an ideal vehicle for ideological orientation. A system of universal education was announced in 1872. For a time its organization and philosophy were Western inspired; but during the 1880s, as the government leaders saw their countrymen turning to Western ideas and learned of a new nationalist orientation of schooling in Europe, the Japanese system was altered to include emphasis on "ethics," and in 1890 the Imperial Rescript on Education laid out the lines of Confucian and Shintō ideology, which constituted the moral content of later Japanese education. Thus, loyalty to the emperor, who was hedged about with Confucian teaching and Shintō reverence, became the centre of a citizen's ideology. Meanwhile, to avoid charges of indoctrination, the state distinguished between this secular cult and actual religion; in this way, the leaders could permit "religious freedom" while requiring a form of worship as the patriotic duty of all Japanese subjects. This uniform system of mass education was also utilized to project into the nation at large the ideal of samurai loyalty that had been the heritage of the ruling class.

Constitutional movement. It was widely believed that constitutions provided much of the unity that gave Western countries their strength, and Japanese leaders were

eager to bring themselves abreast of the world in this respect. A government plan (1868) experimented with a two-chamber house, but it proved unworkable because the government leaders preferred to have their own way. The Emperor's charter oath (April 1868), however, committed the government to seek knowledge and wisdom throughout the world, to abandon customs of the past, to allow all subjects to fulfill their proper aspirations, and to allow popular opinion to influence their decisions.

Charter oath of 1868

Creation of political parties. To these statements of intent were added protests from below. A democratic movement grew out of a split in the leadership group over government policy. Itagaki Taisuke and other leaders of the Tosa faction combined with members of the Saga fief in 1873. Their demands for a punitive expedition against Korea, the obscurantist government of which had insulted Japanese envoys, had been refused because domestic reforms were to come first, and they resigned their positions. Instead of championing the old order, however, Itagaki and his friends called for a popular assembly so that future decisions would reflect the will of the people (by which they initially meant their fellow samurai) and thus preserve unity. Itagaki and his Tosa followers developed discussion and mutual-help groups and, gradually growing in political confidence and ability, organized themselves on a national basis as the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō) in 1881. It should be noted that the movement had only a narrow social and regional base at this time and that its purposes were to promote effective national unity rather than tolerance of diversity and dissent.

When the remaining Meiji leaders were asked to submit their opinions on constitutional problems in 1881, Ōkuma Shigenobu, a Saga leader, revealed a relatively liberal draft instead of first submitting it for the scrutiny of his colleagues. He also revealed sensational evidence of corruption in the disposal of government assets on the island of Hokkaido. Ōkuma was forced out of the government and he organized the Progressive Party (Kaishintō) in 1882. Itagaki's Liberal Party had a predominantly rural backing of former samurai and village leaders, many of whom objected to government taxation policies; Ōkuma's party had an urban base and attracted support in the business and journalistic worlds.

The Meiji contribution. The Emperor promised that a constitution would be instituted in 1889; the parties were urged to await the Imperial decisions quietly. The constitution was prepared behind the scenes by a commission headed by Itō Hirobumi. The period of constitution writing coincided with one of intense economic distress as the government sought to stem the inflation caused by the spending of the 1870s. But deflationary measures caused hardship in the countryside and provided a situation in which party agitation could easily kindle direct action. Several instances of this and severe government repression in the form of police and press controls forced the parties to dissolve temporarily in 1884. Itagaki travelled to Europe and returned more than ever convinced of the need for national unity in the face of Western condescension.

Economic distress of the late 19th century

Itō Hirobumi also travelled to Europe for help in preparation of the new constitution. In Germany he found what seemed an appropriate balance of imperial power and constitutional forms that seemed to offer modernity without sacrificing effective control. As a balance to a popularly elected house, Itō first organized a new European-style peerage in 1884. The government leaders, military commanders, and former daimyo were given titles and readied for future seats in a house of peers. A Cabinet system was installed in 1885, and a privy council, designed to judge and safeguard the constitution, was set up in 1888. Itō resigned as premier to head the council.

The constitution was completed by 1889, and elections for the lower house were held to prepare for the initial diet, which met in 1890. The constitution took the form of a gracious grant by the Emperor, and it could be amended only upon Imperial initiative. Its provisions were couched in general terms. Rights and liberties were granted "except as regulated by law." If the diet refused to approve a budget, the previous year's could be followed. The emperor was "sacred and inviolable"; he commanded the armies, made war and peace, and dissolved the lower house at will. Effective power thus lay with the executive, which could claim to represent the Imperial will. The education rescript of 1890 was to guarantee that future generations accept the Imperial will and authority without question. In spite of its antidemocratic features, the constitution provided a much greater area for dissent than had previously existed. The lower house could initiate legislation. Private property was inviolate, and freedoms, even when subject to legislation, were greater than none at all. The budgetary arrangements meant that increased support for the military could be had only with Diet approval. Initially, a tax qualification of 15 yen limited the electorate to about 500,000; this was lowered in 1900 and 1920, and in 1925 universal manhood suffrage came into effect. The government leaders had difficulty controlling and manipulating the lower house, despite their power of dissolution and their resources for intimidation and bribery, thus illustrating that the constitution had altered the political picture. And the party leaders' cooperation with their erstwhile enemies when given a reasonable amount of prestige and patronage showed their large areas of agreement with the Meiji oligarchs.

The constitution ended the Meiji Restoration and revolution. The government leaders soon retired behind the scenes to influence the political world as elder statesmen (*genro*) and acted to maintain and conserve the balance of ideological and political institutions they had worked out.

End of the Restoration

IMPERIAL JAPAN

Foreign affairs. Achieving equality with the Western powers had been one of the major goals since the beginning of the Meiji period. Treaty reform, designed to end the foreigners' judicial and economic privileges provided by extraterritoriality and fixed custom rates, had been attempted as early as the Iwakura mission of 1871; but the Western powers refused to consider it until Japanese legal institutions had been brought into line with those of the West. Japanese attempts at compromise arrangements in the 1880s were denounced by the press and opposition groups in Japan. The treaty provisions for extraterritoriality were formally changed in 1894, after the completion of the Meiji institutional reforms; tariff autonomy came into effect in 1911.

Relations with China. Asian matters took second place to internal problems during most of the Meiji period. In 1874 a punitive expedition was launched against Formosa to chastise the aborigines for murdering Ryukyuan fishermen. This lent support to the Japanese claim to the Ryukyus, which had been under Satsuma influence in Tokugawa times; the islands were incorporated into Japan in 1879 despite Chinese protests. Adventures in Korea, however, although espoused by nationalists and, on occasion, by liberals, were avoided by the government, which was conscious of its need for internal reform and foreign approval. The matter was complicated by a growing Chinese readiness to resist Japanese interference in the affairs of Korea, China's most important tributary state. The Chinese were alert to the danger of Japanese gains. Incidents in 1882 and 1884 that might have led to war with China and Korea were instead settled by compromise. In 1885 China and Japan agreed that neither would send troops to Korea without first informing the other.

By the early 1890s Chinese influence in Korea was clearly becoming predominant. In 1894 Korea requested Chinese assistance in putting down a rebellion. When the Chinese informed Tokyo of this, Japan quickly rushed troops to Korea and, after the rebellion was crushed, showed no inclination to withdraw. Hostilities between Chinese and Japanese forces broke out first at sea and then in Korea in July–August 1894. The Japanese navy sank or captured much of the northern Chinese fleet, and a peace treaty was negotiated at Shimonoseki between Japan and China on April 17, 1895. Both powers recognized the independence of Korea; China ceded Formosa,

Sino-Japanese War (1894–95)

the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula, granted Japan all rights enjoyed by European powers, and made significant new economic concessions; new treaty ports were opened, and Japan received an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels in gold in two installments. A subsidiary treaty of commerce (1896) gave Japan freedom to engage in trade, manufacture, and industry in China's treaty ports and provided for tax exemption within China for all goods so manufactured. Japan thus marked its own emancipation from unequal treaties by imposing even harsher terms on its neighbour. But the European powers were not yet prepared to welcome Japan as a full equal in the imperialist scramble in China. Germany, France, and Russia forced Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China. In 1898 Russia forced China to grant it the lease of that peninsula with its important naval base at Port Arthur. The war thus demonstrated that the Japanese could not maintain Asian military victories without Western sufferance. Nevertheless, the war proved a tremendous source of prestige for Japan and brought the Tokyo government much internal support; it also strengthened the hand of the army in national affairs.

Relations with the West. Instead of accepting Japanese leadership, Korea sought the help of the Russians as a counterweight. During the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900), Japanese troops took a major part in the allied expedition that rescued foreign nationals in Peking, but Russia occupied south Manchuria, thereby strengthening communications with Korea. Realizing the need of protection against a possible combination of European enemies, the Japanese government began talks that led to an Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902). Each signatory agreed to aid the other in the event of an attack by two or more powers, while remaining neutral if the other was at war with a single power. The Tokyo government was thus prepared to take a firmer line with respect to Russian advances in Manchuria and Korea. In 1904 Japanese ships attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur without the formality of a declaration of war. Japanese arms were everywhere successful; the most spectacular victory was in Tsushima Strait, where the ships of Adm. Tōgō Heihachirō destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet. But Japanese armies were strained to their utmost, and it was with relief that Japan accepted the United States president Theodore Roosevelt's offer of good offices for the negotiations that led to peace, signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, September 5, 1905. Japanese primacy in Korea was recognized, and Russia surrendered to Japan its economic and political interests in south Manchuria (including the Liaotung Peninsula) as well as the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. The victory over Russia altered the balance of power in Asia, and Japan's ability to cope with a great European power accelerated the development of nationalist movements in Asia. Within Japan, however, the failure to secure a Russian indemnity to cover the costs of the war made the treaty unpopular.

Russo-Japanese War (1904–05)

Japan as a major military power. After the conclusion of the war, Japanese leaders now had a free hand to guide the course of reform in Korea, and Korean resistance was met with force. Itō Hirobumi, sent to Korea as resident general, forced through treaties that gave Korea little more than protectorate status and forced the abdication of the Korean king. In 1909 Itō was assassinated, and the following year Korea was formally annexed to Japan. Korean liberties and resistance were crushed under military rule. By the end of the Meiji period, Japan had thus achieved equality with the West and had, in fact, become the strongest military and imperialist power in Asia.

Japan had abundant opportunity to use its new power in the years that followed. World War I found the Western powers fully occupied in Europe. Japan took part in the war in compliance with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but generally it limited its participation to the seizure of the German Pacific Islands and the German holdings on the Shantung Peninsula. When China pressed for return of these, the Japanese government presented the so-called Twenty-one Demands in January 1915. China reluctantly agreed to extend the duration of the Manchurian leases and to joint control of steelworks and ironworks in central China. The German Shantung holdings were to be settled by agreement between Japan and Germany at the time of the peace treaty; subsequently, Japan agreed to hand back the territory in return for further commercial privileges. China promised not to alienate harbours in Fukien province to any other power without Japanese approval. But the Chinese resisted group V of the Twenty-one Demands, which would have reduced China to the status of a Japanese ward. Japan had gained abundant opportunity for the exploitation of Manchuria, but the ill feeling aroused by the negotiations, together with Chinese chagrin at failure to recover its losses in the Treaty of Versailles, cost Japan any hope of Chinese friendship. Subsequent Japanese sponsorship of corrupt warlord regimes in Manchuria and North China helped to confirm the anti-Japanese nature of modern Chinese nationalism.

The Twenty-one Demands

Japanese behaviour when the Allies intervened in Siberia in 1918 after the Bolshevik Revolution furthered the impression of Japanese rapacity. One of the principal reasons for a disarmament conference in Washington, D.C. (1922), was an attempt to lessen Japanese influence. A network of treaties was worked out that placed restraints on Japanese ambitions while guaranteeing Japanese security. Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and France concluded a four-power pact that replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance; a five-power pact (with Italy) for disarmament set limitations for capital ship construction on a ratio of five for Great Britain and the United States to three for Japan. Parallel guarantees against fortifying advanced bases assured Japan of safety in Pacific waters. A nine-power pact would, it was hoped, protect China from further unilateral demands. Japan subsequently agreed to retire from Shantung, and, shortly afterward, Japanese armies withdrew from Siberia and northern Sakhalin. In 1925 a treaty with the Soviet Union extended recognition and ended active hostilities.

The mid-1920s thus saw the end of Japan's great surge forward in the Pacific and brought hope that a new quality of moderation and reasonableness, based on the absence of irritating reminders of inferiority and weakness, might characterize Japanese policy.

Constitutional government. The inauguration of constitutional government in 1890 saw a vigorous and often obstreperous opposition in the lower house of the Diet, and it was probably general determination to prove that parliamentary institutions could work in Japan that forced the party and government leaders to cooperate sufficiently to make the system work. The first Cabinets, led by Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi, and Itō, attempted to maintain the principle that the government, which in their view represented the emperor, should be aloof from parties and that it was the duty of the lower house to approve government requests. This policy failed because the parties desired to increase their power and patronage and therefore sought Cabinets responsible to the lower house. It was only the Sino-Japanese War that produced the kind of unity the constitution makers had envisaged. In the years that followed, the oligarchs formed alliances with the two parties, usually exchanging a Cabinet seat or two for support in the lower house. These arrangements proved unsatisfactory as party leaders soon raised their sights. In 1898 Itagaki and Ōkuma combined forces to form a single party, the Kenseitō, and, because this ruled out successful administration by a nonparty Cabinet, they were allowed to form a government. But their alliance was of short duration, as long-standing animosities and jealousies enabled antiparty forces among the bureaucracy and oligarchy to force their resignation within a few months.

Lower-house opposition

A discernible division now developed among the dwindling group of Meiji leaders. Yamagata Aritomo dominated the army and much of the bureaucracy. During the two years he held power after the fall of the Kenseitō Cabinet, he strengthened legal and institutional safeguards against political-party rule and secured an Imperial ordinance that service ministers should be career officers on the active list; this gave the army or navy power to break a Cabinet. Partly in reaction, Itō Hirobumi, also of

Chōshū, formed his own political party in 1900, the Rikken Seiyūkai, enlisting most of the former followers of Itagaki. Thereafter, practical political goals of power and patronage softened the hostility between oligarchs and politicians.

After 1901 both Itō and Yamagata retired from active participation in politics; until 1913 Cabinets were led by their protégés Saionji Kimmochi and Katsura Tarō. Basic decisions of politics and policy, however, continued to be made by the core group of elder statesmen, who advised the Emperor on all important decisions and selected prime ministers by rotating power between the two principal factions. Saionji was the last to be recruited into this extraconstitutional body.

Changing political patterns

With the death or enfeeblement of the first generation of leaders, the pattern of political manipulation changed. No subsequent group could match the prestige the Meiji leaders had enjoyed. The Meiji emperor died in 1912 and was succeeded by a son who took the reign name Taishō ("great righteousness," reigned 1912–26); but mental illness prevented him from approximating his father's fame. The growth in prestige and power of businessmen found expression in their control of the political parties and resulted in an increasing role for professional party politicians. The genro's last attempt to seat Katsura in 1912 ended in failure, while his successor, Adm. Yamamoto Gombe, was discredited by scandals in naval procurement. Ōkuma Shigenobu emerged from retirement to head a Cabinet during World War I and was succeeded by a military Cabinet under Gen. Terauchi Masatake. In 1918, however, discontent with Terauchi's reactionary posture and administrative incompetence combined with the rising power of the party professionals to bring about the appointment of Hara Kei (Hara Takashi) as prime minister. Hara was the first nontitled person to hold that office, and his appointment marked the first party Cabinet. His assassination in 1921 cut short his cautious efforts to reduce the power of the military and the bureaucracy and to extend the franchise. After several short-lived Cabinets, a successful party Cabinet was organized in 1924 by Katō Takaaki. The army was reduced in size; moderate social legislation was enacted; and universal manhood suffrage extended the franchise to 14,000,000 voters. Meanwhile, Japan avoided stronger steps in China's civil war and pursued a conciliatory course with Russia, despite demands from nationalists, who utilized alleged outrages in China and a discriminatory United States Immigration Act of 1924 to warn of the futility of appeasing or cooperating with other powers.

Reaction to social movements

But, as the parties grew in power, they tended to look to bureaucrats for leadership. The businessmen who supported the parties and the bureaucrats who led them shared a fear of the social movements that followed industrialization and the importation of foreign ideas. A growing labour movement had already been checked by a special police law introduced in 1900. This was strengthened under Katō in 1925, as conservatives generally began to fear subversion in labour and tenant movements. A small Communist party was organized by a group of intellectuals in 1922, and a general interest in Marxist thought contributed to more fears of subversion. Under the Meiji constitution, party governments had to make their peace with the military, with the house of peers, and with the conservatives close to the throne; whatever ideas for reform they had therefore had to be worked out with the utmost caution. Frequently, the Diet found itself virtually powerless, and this encouraged corruption and disorders in the chamber, which did little to win popular respect for the machinery of representative government. There were no institutional changes that enabled a government to be firmly based on popular support. The Meiji Constitution was so ambiguous in its provisions for the executive that the party prime ministers could achieve little unless they secured, through compromise, the cooperation of forces antagonistic to democratic government.

Social change. Changes in the social and intellectual scene outstripped those in the political. Many of them were related to the development of industry. After the Treaty of Shimonoseki the government utilized the Chinese indemnity to subsidize the Yawata Iron and Steel Works, which were established in 1897 and began production in 1901. Yawata depended on China for its ores. After 1900 Japan's population exceeded the capabilities of domestic food production so that there was need for import of food as well. Growing textile and other consumer-goods industries expanded to meet Japanese needs and to earn credits required for the import of raw materials. Heavy industry was encouraged by government-controlled banks, which provided needed capital. Strategic industries, notably steel and the principal rail trunk lines, were in government hands, but most new growth was in the private sector, albeit somewhat concentrated in the *zaibatsu* financial and industrial giants.

Social protest

The enlarged urban population produced movements of social inquiry and protest. In 1895 the industrial labour force numbered about 400,000. Several efforts to organize socialist movements speedily met with police repression. Peace preservation laws were passed in 1900 and 1925, and in 1928 it became a capital crime to agitate against private property or Japanese state policy (*kokutai*). In 1903 a small group organized the *Heimin shimbun* ("Commoner's Newspaper"); it published *The Communist Manifesto* and opposed the Russo-Japanese War in the name of the workers of Russia and Japan before being forced to cease publication. The labour and Socialist movements gained strength after World War I, but leadership was usually theoretical and doctrinaire, with little real contact with the workers. Police repression and the difficulties of organizing a labour force of diverse industrial empires such as those of Mitsui and Mitsubishi also retarded the labour movement. Meanwhile, the increasing confidence and power of management came to influence and at times control the political parties. The Katō Cabinet of 1924–26 was sometimes referred to as a Mitsubishi Cabinet.

In the countryside the principal reflection of the new trade patterns was an additional impetus to silkworm production to augment the farmers' income. Farm villages also provided the bulk of the labourers for the new industries, and farm daughters were found in many textile plants. The early 20th century was not a time of agricultural prosperity. Farmers were handicapped by growing fragmentation of holdings and increasing tenantry. The rising number of tenants resulted in the growth of tenant organizations, especially during and after World War I. Government efforts to encourage voluntary reform brought only a law for mediation of disputes in 1924. But a financial panic in 1927 aggravated rural conditions and indebtedness even before the collapse of the U.S. silk market in 1929 spelled disaster for the farmers and workers alike.

The most lasting social changes were found in the great metropolitan centres, where a growing labour force and new middle-income groups were concentrated. The Tokyo–Yokohama area was devastated by the great Kantō earthquake in 1923, and its reconstruction as a modern metropolis symbolized the growth and orientation of the urban society. The currents of enthusiasm during and after World War I were uniformly international and largely U.S. in inspiration. Western music, dancing, and sports became popular, and rising standards of living and expectation produced the need for more and better higher education. The participation of women in office work in the new enterprises and the rise of a feminist movement, however unsuccessful, marked the beginning of changes in the family system.

The educated class grew in numbers and in vigour. Currents of thought included Western-style democracy and the new radicalism of the Soviet Union; the Marxist influence went far beyond the ranks of the struggling Communist Party—which was, in any event, soon crushed by the police. Political liberalism was championed by the University of Tokyo figure Yoshino Sakuzō, who formed student and intellectual groups the title of which—Shinjinkai (New Peoples Association)—symbolized the self-conscious break with tradition. Minobe Tatsukichi, a distinguished constitutional theorist, introduced the idea

that the emperor was an organ of the state and not the sole source of sovereignty. Such men faced sharp criticism and had, in time, to resign their positions, but they had great influence and symbolized and stimulated advanced currents of thinking.

Attempts to break with tradition

The base for these new currents was precarious. Politically and institutionally, no advances—beyond the universal manhood suffrage of 1925—were scored, while, under the peace-preservation laws of 1928, a special police corps was established to seek out "dangerous thoughts." Economically, the urban classes were dependent upon the continuance of the favourable trade patterns of the 1920s. When the Great Depression at the end of the decade wrecked Japan's foreign markets and removed the possibility of the villagers' augmenting rice income with that of silk and when the irresponsibility and occasional corruption of Diet representatives contrasted with poverty elsewhere in Japanese society, many were prepared to listen to charges that the political-party government, dominated by selfish *zaibatsu* interests, had neglected Japan's markets in China, imperilled morality and decency at home, and allowed subversive trends to flourish, while the politicians reaped personal gains.

The rise of the militarists. The notion that expansion through military conquest would solve Japan's economic problems gained currency during the Great Depression of 1929. A key argument advanced to support it was that Japan's population had grown from 30,000,000 at the time of the Meiji Restoration to almost 65,000,000 in 1930; each year the problem grew worse, and the imports of needed foodstuffs increased. It was also argued that emigration to many areas was cut off because of discrimination against Oriental peoples. Efforts made by Japan and China to secure a racial-equality clause in the League of Nations covenant had been frustrated by Western statesmen who feared the anger of their constituents. So the argument ran that no recourse could be expected without resort to force.

Military distrust of party government

To these economic and racial arguments was added the military's distrust of party government. The Washington conference had allowed a smaller ratio of naval strength than the navy had desired, and the government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi in 1930 accepted and gained approval of the London Naval Conference limitations of cruiser strength over military objections. The Katō government had cut the army strength. Many service leaders had also bridled under Japan's moderation during the Chinese Kuomintang northern expedition in 1926 and 1927, and they would have preferred a much stronger stand. The Seiyūkai Cabinet under Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi reversed that policy by intervening in Shantung in 1927 and 1928. Tanaka was forced out in 1929 and replaced by Hamaguchi, under whom the policy of moderation returned. It seemed to many that such vacillation earned Japan ill will and expensive boycotts in China without gaining any advantage.

Anti-government thought. Many military leaders resented the restrictions that civilian governments had placed upon them, and their power was considerable. It would be wrong to attribute such views to all or even most of the high command, but enough army officers in particular held this position to furnish a possible focus for dissatisfaction among other groups in Japanese society. The idea of the frugal, selfless samurai was peculiarly useful as a contrast to the stock characterization of the selfish party politician.

These economic pressures and political misgivings were exploited by civilian ultranationalists who opposed parliamentary government as "un-Japanese." Since Meiji times a number of rightist organizations had formed, dedicated to the theme of internal "purity" and external expansion. They sought to preserve what they thought unique in the Japanese spirit and fought against excessive Western influences. Some originated in the Meiji period, when nationalists had felt obliged to work for a "fundamental settlement" of differences with Russia; the Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon or, more accurately, Amur Society) was one such, while others, such as the Seisantō (Productivity Society), were keyed to labour and social problems. The Kokusūikai, or National Purity Society, worked to preserve national purity, while the Ketsumeidan, or League of Blood, was terrorist. Their leaders were against political parties, big business, acculturation, and Westernization, and, by allying with other rightists, they alternately terrorized and intimidated their presumed opponents. A number of business leaders and political figures lost their lives, and the assassins' success in publicizing and dramatizing the virtues they claimed to embody had a considerable importance in the ethos of the troubled 1930s. It is clear, however, that the terrorists never had as much influence as they claimed or as the West believed.

The principal force against parliamentary government was provided by junior military officers. Largely from rural backgrounds, distrustful of their senior leaders, ignorant of political economy, and contemptuous of the urban luxuries of politicians, the officers were ready marks for rightist theorists. Many of them were animated by goals that were national-socialist in character. Kita Ikki, a former Socialist and former member of the Kokuryūkai, wrote in his outline plan for the reconstruction of Japan that the Meiji Constitution should be set aside in favour of a revolutionary regime advised by "national patriots" and headed initially by a military government, which should nationalize major forms of property, limit wealth, end party-government and peerage systems, and prepare to grasp the leadership of a revolutionary Asia. Kita helped persuade a number of young officers to take part in the violence of the 1930s, and in large measure their plots were designed to create a disorder so great that military government would follow.

Aggression in Manchuria

Anti-government acts. The Kwantung Army, which invested the Kwantung (Liaotung) Peninsula and patrolled the South Manchurian Railway zone, provided a rich harvest of officers keenly aware of Japan's continental interests and prepared to take steps to further them. They hoped to place the civilian government in an untenable position and to force its hand. The Tokyo terrorists similarly sought to change foreign as well as domestic policies. The pattern of direct action in Manchuria began with the murder in 1928 of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the warlord ruler of Manchuria. The action, though not authorized by the Tanaka government, helped bring about its fall. Tanaka's Cabinet, however, dared not investigate and punish those responsible, and this convinced extremist officers that their lofty motives would make retribution impossible. The succeeding government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi showed intentions of restraining military activists and powers, however, and the next plots centred around plans for replacing civilian government altogether; Hamaguchi was mortally wounded by an assassin in 1930. In March 1931 a coup involving highly placed army generals planned to terrorize civilian politicians into a grant of martial law, was abandoned because of disagreement among the principals.

On September 18, 1931, came the Manchurian incident, which launched aggression in East Asia. A Kwantung Army charge that Chinese soldiers had tried to bomb a South Manchurian Railway train (which arrived at its destination safely) resulted in speedy and unauthorized capture of Mukden, followed by the occupation of all Manchuria. The civilian government in Tokyo could not stop the army, and even army headquarters was not always in full control of the field commanders. Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō gave way, in December 1931, to Inukai Tsuyoshi. Inukai's plans to stop the armies by Imperial intervention were frustrated. In 1932 naval officers took the lead in extremism; a terrorist attack in Tokyo in May took the life of Inukai; the terrorists failed to secure a proclamation of martial law. The army, however, now announced that it would accept no party Cabinet. To forestall its desires for power, the last genro, Saionji, suggested retired Adm. Saitō Makoto as prime minister. Plotting continued, culminating in a revolt of a regiment about to leave for Manchuria. In February 1936 several outstanding statesmen (including Saitō) were murdered; Prime Minister Okada Keisuke escaped when the assassins mistakenly shot his brother-in-law. For sev-

Terrorism and revolts



Japanese expansion in the late 19th and 20th centuries.

eral days the rebel unit held much of downtown Tokyo. When the revolt was put down on February 29, the ringleaders were quickly arrested and executed. Therewith, the influence of the young extremists, often referred to as the Imperial Way faction (Kōdō-ha), gave way before that of the more cautious Control faction (Tōsei-ha), which had less sweeping plans for internal reform but shared many of the foreign-policy goals of the young fanatics.

The only possible source of prestige sufficient to thwart the military lay with the throne. The senior statesmen, however, were cautious lest they imperil the Imperial institution itself. The young emperor Hirohito had succeeded to the rule in 1926, taking as his reign title Shōwa. His outlook was more progressive than that of his predecessors; he had travelled in the West, and his interests lay in marine biology (of which the ultranationalists disapproved in one whose role it was to embody the Japanese mystique). The palace advisers feared that a strong stand by the Emperor would only widen the search for victims and might lead to dethronement of the monarch. As international criticism of Japan's aggression grew, many Japanese rallied to the support of their soldiers.

The road to World War II. Each advance by the military extremists gained them a new compromise concession by more moderate elements in the government and brought greater foreign hostility and distrust. Rather than attempt to thwart the military, the government agreed to reconstitute Manchuria as the "independent" state of Manchukuo. The last Manchu emperor of China, Hsüan-t'ung, was first declared regent and then enthroned as emperor in 1934. Actual control lay with the Kwantung Army, however; all key positions were held by Japanese, with surface authority for cooperative Chinese and Manchus. A League of Nations committee recommended in October 1932 that Japanese troops be withdrawn, Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria recognized, and a large measure of autonomy granted to Manchuria. The League called upon member states to withhold recognition from the new puppet state. In March 1933 Japan

Creation of Manchukuo

formally withdrew from the world body. Thereafter, Japan poured technicians and capital into Manchukuo, exploiting its rich resources to establish the base for the heavy-industry complex that was to undergird the new order in East Asia.

Consolidation and expansion. In north China, boundary areas were consolidated in order to enlarge Japan's economic sphere. In early 1932 the Japanese navy precipitated an incident at Shanghai in order to end a boycott of Japanese goods there; but Japan was not yet prepared to challenge other powers for control of central China, and a League of Nations commission arranged terms for a withdrawal in May 1932. Frustrated naval officers returned to Tokyo to carry out the violence that killed Inukai on May 15. A move southward from Manchuria into Jehol in January 1933 led to the T'ang-ku Truce in May, whereby a demilitarized zone was set up between Peking and the Great Wall. This brought the fighting to a temporary close. In 1934, Japan made it clear that it would brook no interference in its China policy and that Chinese attempts to procure technical or military assistance elsewhere would bring Japanese opposition.

Further external ambitions, however, had to wait for the resolution of domestic crises. The military revolt in Tokyo in February 1936 marked the high point of the extremist faction and the consolidation of power by the Control faction within the army. Finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo, whose policies had brought Japan out of its depression slump, was killed, and his opposition to further inflationary spending was thus stilled. When further efforts by the palace advisers to defer full power for the military failed, the leadership went to the popular but ineffective Konoe Fumimaro, scion of an ancient court family (June 1937). The same period saw the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by Chinese border armies at Sian in December 1936 and his agreement to consolidate Nationalist and Communist efforts into an anti-Japanese front. To this was added evidence that the Japanese people were not yet prepared to renounce their parliamentary system. In the spring of 1937, general elections showed a startling strength for a new Social Mass Party, which received 36 seats out of 466, and a heavy majority for the two parties (the Seiyūkai and its rival the Minseitō), which had combined forces against the government and its policies. The time seemed ready for new efforts by civilian leaders, but the field armies anticipated them.

The "China incident"

In July 1937 Japanese troops opened fire on Chinese units near Peking; thus began the "China incident." Japanese armies took Nanking, Hankow, and Canton despite vigorous Chinese resistance; to the north, Inner Mongolia and the provinces of Shansi and Shensi were invaded but not fully invested. On discovering that the Nationalist government, which had retired to Chungking in Szechwan, refused to compromise, the Japanese installed a more cooperative regime at Nanking in 1940.

Alliances. Meanwhile, Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936 and later with Italy. This was replaced by the tripartite pact in September 1940, by which Japan was recognized as the leader of a new order for Asia, and the three signatories agreed to assist each other if any one was attacked by a power not then at war. This was directed against the United States, since the Soviets and Nazis were then allied; the Soviet Union was, indeed, invited to join in the tripartite pact later in 1940.

Japanese relations with the Soviet Union were considerably less cordial than those with Germany. The Soviets consented, however, to sell their Chinese Eastern Railway holdings to the South Manchurian Railway in 1935, thereby strengthening Manchukuo. In 1937 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with China, and in 1938 and 1939 Russian and Japanese armies tested each other in two full-scale battles along the border of Manchukuo. The Soviet–Nazi pact of August 1939, however, was followed by a neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan in April 1941.

The German–Japanese tie was never a close or effective one. Both parties were limited in their cooperation by distance, distrust, and claims of racial superiority. The Japanese were uninformed about Nazi plans for attacking the Soviet Union, and the Germans were not told of Japan's plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Nor, despite formal statements of rapport, did Japan's state structure approach the totalitarianism of the Nazis. A national-mobilization law (1938) gave the Konoe government sweeping economic and political powers, and in 1940, under the second Konoe Cabinet, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was established to merge the political parties into one central organization; yet, the institutional structure of the Meiji Constitution was never altered, and the wartime governments never achieved full control over interservice competition. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association never succeeded in mobilizing all segments of national life around a leader. The emperor remained but a symbol, albeit an increasingly military one, and no *Führer* could compete without endangering the national polity. Wartime social and economic thought retained important vestiges of an agrarianism and familism that were in essence premodern rather than totalitarian.

Relations with the democratic powers

War in Europe. Japan's relations with the democratic powers deteriorated steadily. The United States and Great Britain did what they could to assist the Chinese Nationalist cause. The Burma Road permitted the transport of minimal supplies to Nationalist forces. Constant Japanese efforts to close this route were successful briefly in 1940, when the British felt they could not risk a second war. But anti-Japanese feeling had strengthened in the United States, especially after the sinking of a U.S. gunboat, the "Panay," in the Yangtze River in 1937. In 1939 U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull denounced the 1911 treaty of commerce with Japan, and thus embargoes became possible in 1940. Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to rally public opinion against aggressors included efforts to stop Japan, but, even after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, public opinion in the United States was averse to courting war by stronger measures.

The European war presented the Japanese with tempting opportunities. After the Nazi attack on Russia (1941), the Japanese were torn between German urgings to join the war against the Soviets and their natural inclination to seek richer prizes from the colonial powers to the south. In 1940 Japan had occupied northern Indochina in an attempt to block access to supplies of the Chinese Nationalists, and in July 1941 it announced a joint protectorate with Vichy France over the whole colony. The way was prepared for further moves in Southeast Asia.

The United States reacted to the occupation of Indochina by freezing Japanese assets and declaring an embargo on oil to Japan. The government was faced with the alternatives of withdrawing from at least Indochina and possibly China or seizing the sources of oil production in the Netherlands East Indies. Negotiations with Washington were carried on under the second Konoe Cabinet. Konoe was willing to withdraw from Indochina, and he sought a personal meeting with Roosevelt, hopeful of some U.S. concessions or favour with which he might convince his military leaders. But the U.S. State Department refused to agree to a meeting without prior Japanese concessions. Pressed by his war minister, Gen. Tōjō Hideki, Konoe resigned in October 1941 to be succeeded by Tōjō. Secretary of State Hull refused to agree to Japan's "final offer": Japan would withdraw from Indochina after China had come to terms in return for U.S. promises to resume oil shipments, cease aid to China, and unfreeze Japanese assets. With Japan's decision for war made, the negotiators received instructions to continue to negotiate. Preparations for the opening strike against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor were already in motion. The Japanese military elected to try to establish, through a "new order in East Asia," a co-prosperity sphere in which Japan, as the centre of an industrial bloc comprising Manchuria, Korea, and North China, would draw from the rich colonies of Southeast Asia the raw materials it needed, while inspiring them to friendship and alliance by destruction of their previous masters. But, in practice, "East Asia for the Asiatics," Japan's slogan, turned out to mean "East Asia for Japan."

Preparations for war

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World War II and defeat. The attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) achieved complete surprise and success. It also unified U.S. opinion and determination to see the war through to a successful finish. The Japanese had expected that, once they fortified their new holdings, a reconquest would be so expensive in lives and treasure that it would discourage the "soft" democracies. Instead, the U.S. fleet was rebuilt with astonishing speed, and the chain of defenses was breached before these riches could be effectively tapped by Japan.

Early successes

The first years of the war brought Japan great success. Japanese troops occupied Manila in January 1942, although Corregidor held out until May; Singapore fell in February, the Netherlands Indies and Rangoon in early March. The Allies had difficulty maintaining communication lines to Australia, and the loss of the British battleships "Repulse" and "Prince of Wales," added to the U.S. Pacific fleet disaster, seemed to promise the Japanese Navy freedom of action. Tōjō grew in confidence and popularity and began to style himself somewhat in the manner of a Fascist leader. But the U.S. Navy had not been permanently driven from the South Pacific. The Battle of Midway in June 1942 cost the Japanese fleet aircraft carrier strength it could ill afford to lose, and the battle for Guadalcanal in the Solomons ended with Japanese withdrawal in February 1943.

After Midway, Japanese naval leaders came secretly to the conclusion that Japan's outlook for victory was poor. When the fall of Saipan in July 1944 brought U.S. bombers within range of Tokyo, the Tōjō Cabinet was replaced by that of Koiso Kuniaki. Koiso formed a supreme war direction council designed as a link between the Cabinet and the high command. It was becoming evident that Japan was losing the war, but no group had a program acceptable to the military leaders. There were also grave problems about breaking the news to the Japanese people, who had been told only of victories. Great fire-bombing raids in 1945 brought destruction to every major city except the old capital of Kyōto; but the generals were still determined to continue the war, confident that a major victory or a protracted battle would be the best way of gaining honourable terms. The Allied talk of unconditional surrender provided a good excuse for continuing the fight.

In February 1945 the Emperor met with a group of senior statesmen to discuss steps that might be taken. When U.S. landings were made on Okinawa in April, the Koiso government fell. The problem of the new premier, Adm. Suzuki Kantarō, was not whether to end the war but how best to do so. The first plan advanced was to ask the Soviet Union, with which Japan was still at peace, to intercede with the Allies. The Soviet government, however, was planning to enter the Pacific war, and reply was delayed while Soviet leaders took part in the Potsdam Conference in July. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26 offered the first ray of light with its statement that Japan would not be "enslaved as a race nor destroyed as a nation."

The atomic bombs

On August 6 and 9 the atomic bombs took their toll of life in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 8 the Soviet Union declared war and on the 9th marched into Manchuria, where the Kwantung Army could offer only slight resistance. The Japanese government attempted to gain as its sole condition for surrender a qualification concerning the maintenance of the Imperial institution; after the Allies agreed to respect the will of the Japanese people, the Emperor insisted on surrender. The Pacific war came to an end on August 14. The formal surrender was signed on September 2 in Tokyo Bay aboard the USS "Missouri."

Military extremists made an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the radio broadcast of the Emperor's announcement to the nation. There were a number of suicides among the military officers and nationalists who felt themselves dishonoured, but the Emperor's prestige and personal will, once expressed, sufficed to bring an orderly transition. To increase the appearance of direct rule, the Suzuki Cabinet was replaced by that of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko.

Investigators concluded that neither atomic bomb nor Soviet entry was central to the decision to surrender, although they probably helped to advance the date. It was decided that submarine blockade of the Japanese islands had brought economic defeat by preventing exploitation of Japan's new colonies, sinking merchant tonnage, and convincing Japanese leaders of the hopelessness of the war. Bombing brought the consciousness of defeat to the people. Destruction of the Japanese Navy and Air Force jeopardized the home islands. Japan's largest armies, however, were never defeated, and this was responsible for the army's eagerness to fight on. Occupation found Japan's cities destroyed, its stockpiles exhausted, and its plants gutted. The government stood without prestige or respect. An alarming shortage of food and rising inflation threatened what remained of national strength. The time was ripe for changes.

AFTER WORLD WAR II

SCAP and its objectives. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP), received his orders for the occupation of Japan through U.S. military channels; a Far Eastern Commission made up of Pacific war Allies was to make policy in Washington and provide consultation through an Allied Council for Japan, which sat in Tokyo. In fact the occupation became an American affair, and SCAP grew into a large headquarters. SCAP worked through the Japanese government. In the early years it provided direct instructions frequently, but with time suggestions were made more discreetly.

Purposes of the occupation

Occupation purposes had been held out in general terms in the Potsdam Declaration, with its promises of freedoms and statements of intent to remove undemocratic tendencies; those purposes were defined more precisely in a document that was worked out by the U.S. departments of state, war, and navy. Its emphases were on demilitarization, so that Japan would not again become a danger to peace; on democracy, so that (although the U.S. was not to impose any particular form of government) a responsible Japanese government would guard individual rights; and on encouragement of the Japanese to develop an economy that would be adequate for peacetime needs.

MacArthur responded enthusiastically to the idea of a demilitarized and democratic Japan and utilized the complex pattern of authority under which he functioned to ward off interference from Washington or from the Allies. He rushed constitutional reform to anticipate outside suggestions and first ignored and then delayed moves for partial Japanese rearmament after the Cold War changed U.S. priorities. The occupation measures created an open historical situation in which new forces could and did rise; SCAP measures proved lasting in cases where they coincided with trends already present within Japanese society, and those measures were vital to Japan's recovery as a free society and economy.

The early months of the occupation saw SCAP move swiftly to remove the principal supports of the militarist state. The armed forces were demobilized; State Shintō was disestablished; nationalist organizations were abolished and their members removed from important posts. Also removed from active roles were all persons prominent in wartime organizations and politics, including commissioned officers of the armed services and all high executives of the principal industrial firms. In Tokyo an international tribunal tried General Tōjō and other war leaders, sentencing seven to death, 16 to life imprisonment, and two to shorter terms. Millions of Japanese were repatriated from the former colonies and from Southeast Asia. The Home Ministry, which had controlled wartime Japan through its appointive governors and national police, was abolished, and the Education Ministry was deprived of its sweeping powers to control compulsory education. Because central control and military influence were being attacked by a military government that needed centralized powers in order to be effective, the occupation's role was often contradictory. Geography and economic rationality reinforced the logic of centralization, and many of the moves toward decentralization were modified or reversed a half decade later.

Political reform. SCAP informed leading Japanese citi-

zens that constitutional reform should receive first attention. Between October 1945 and February 1946 a Cabinet committee headed by Matsumoto Jōji prepared revisions of the Meiji Constitution, but the changes were few and superficial. MacArthur's government section rushed a new draft and submitted it to the Japanese government as a basis for further deliberations. Despite the misgivings of conservative statesmen, it was approved by the Emperor and submitted for amendment to the first postwar Diet, which had been elected in April 1946 (in these elections women had voted for the first time). The constitution, slightly modified, was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and went into effect on May 3, 1947. Its preface stated the intention of the Japanese people to ensure peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty for themselves and their descendants. The constitution included a 31-article bill of rights, and Article 9 renounced war as a "sovereign right of the nation" and pledged that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." The Emperor was described as the "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." Earlier, on January 1, 1946, the Emperor had renounced claim to divinity. The constitution provided for a bicameral Diet, with the greatest power for a House of Representatives, the members serving four-year terms. The old peerage was dissolved and the House of Peers replaced by a House of Councillors, the members serving six-year terms. The prime minister was to be chosen by the Diet from its members, and an independent judiciary had the right of judicial review.

New constitution

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The new constitution thus reversed the Meiji pattern and contributed to responsible government by specifying the locus of executive authority. Despite its hasty preparation and foreign inspiration, it gained wide public support. Although the ruling conservatives desired to revise it after Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, and an official commission favoured changes in 1964, the decreasing likelihood of mobilizing the two-thirds majority of the Diet necessary to secure approval for changes gradually made the possibility moot. By then, Article 9, with its renunciation of war, had in any case been partially evaded with the ruling that self-defense (hence self-defense forces) was an inherent right.

By a peace treaty that went into effect in 1952, moreover, elements of the political pattern had already changed, and subsequent governments showed their ability to modify by administrative actions a constitution that remained unchanged. Decentralization in some fields had proved expensive and inefficient. The police, for instance, while less centralized than in the days of the Home Ministry, had returned to substantially national organization. Despite the announced goals of local decentralization, changing patterns of communications and administration had shown the logic of incorporating many small units of administration into larger units, a trend particularly marked in the countryside, where villages and towns merged to form a more rational tax structure. Article 9 had been compromised by a decision taken by SCAP to form the National Police Reserve of 75,000 men in 1950, during the Korean War. The force, later (1954) renamed the Self-Defense Forces, came to number 240,000 in the late 1970s.

Nevertheless, the basic principles of the constitution of 1947 enjoyed support among all factions in Japanese politics. Executive leadership was a chief asset of the new institutions. With the abolition of the competing forces that beset the premiers of the 1930s, the postwar prime ministers found themselves in charge of the administration and, with rearmament, of the armed forces as well. Thus, responsible leadership gradually replaced the ambiguous claims of Imperial rule of earlier days.

Economic and social changes. SCAP's political democratization was reinforced by economic and social changes that were designed to create interest groups prepared to use their new rights to safeguard and protect the new political and economic structure. Changes in the countryside, in industry, and in social legislation all had the same purpose of breaking or weakening the old pattern of hierarchic control that had distinguished the "family-state" ideal of the Meiji leaders.

Agriculture. In agriculture the occupation established a program of land reform to convert tenants into owners. Tenancy had risen after World War I, and only ineffectual measures had been taken against it by the prewar Japanese government, perhaps partly because the political parties were based largely on a rural electorate dominated by landowners. Japan's wartime governments, however, made important changes in land relationships. In their attempts to achieve national unity and equal sacrifice, they had created agricultural associations to collect all rice. Absentee landlords had received a lower rate of payment, and the tenant's relations with his landlord had become much less important. Moreover, peasant sons in the armed services had been able to send home part of their pay, while the shortage of labour had made it possible for many members of farm families to secure gainful employment in factories. Thus, important preliminaries in rural well-being, not least among them the opportunities of the black market, had taken place prior to SCAP's instructions to the Japanese government to prepare a land-reform plan.

SCAP land reform

The government plan proved inadequate in the opinion of occupation authorities, and in the spring of 1946 a SCAP plan was drawn up; it became law in October. By its terms village and prefectural land commissions were elected with tenant, owner-farmer, and landlord representation to select land for purchase and eligible purchasers from among tenants. The government then bought the land at pre-inflation prices and sold it to the tenant. Four years later, the reform had changed the ownership of more than two-thirds of Japan's cultivated acreage, and advantageous tax and price arrangements had enabled the majority of the new owners to pay for their land. The average family holding remained about 2½ acres (one hectare), and, in view of the larger population and the change in laws covering primogeniture, there was an increase of the fragmentation of land. Nevertheless, the reform helped produce a striking rise in rural prosperity.

Business. Although initial Allied plans contemplated exacting heavy reparations from Japan, the unsettled state of other Asian countries that were to have been recipients brought reconsideration. With the exception of Japanese assets overseas and a small number of war plants, reparations were very nearly limited to agreements worked out between Japan and each of its Asian victims after the peace treaty signed in San Francisco in 1951.

SCAP and the *zaibatsu*

Similar moderation marked the course of planning for deconcentration of the great *zaibatsu* firms. At first, they were considered Japan's chief potential war makers, but they later came to be seen as essential elements in economic recovery. Of 1,200 concerns marked for investigation and possible dissolution in 1948, only 28 were broken up by SCAP, though the major units of the *zaibatsu* empires—holding companies—were dissolved and their securities made available for public purchase. New legislation sought to enforce fair trading and to guard against return to monopolies. Taxes on the profits of war wiped out many large fortunes and affected all large concentrations, while capital levy, inheritance, and graduated income taxes were designed to equalize the tax burden. The extension to the business world of the removal of wartime leaders prevented any action by the senior executives of 250 concerns during most of the occupation years. By 1950 extensive changes, although far short of those initially proposed, had taken place in the industrial world. The large banks, however, had not been broken up, and they proved to be the centres for a measure of reconsolidation in the years after the occupation ended.

Labour. The balance of economic power was also affected by measures that produced a strong and vigorous labour movement, which contested with management for political and economic primacy. After the Home and Welfare ministries were dissolved, a new Labour Ministry was established in 1947. The release of all political prisoners, carried out in the early months of the occupation, freed the core of the Japan Communist Party, and most

of those released turned their attention to organizing the labour movement, hoping to use it as a path to power. Laws on trade unions and labour relations, modelled on New Deal legislation in the United States, were passed, and soon a strong union movement appeared, led by men with political ambitions. When a general strike was announced for February 1947, with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the government, SCAP issued an injunction against it. Thereafter, occupation policy was concerned with reconstruction and no longer exclusively with liberation, and steps against inflation, political radicalism, and Communist control of labour unions followed. Under the Socialist Cabinet of Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu there was emphasis on labour education, and in July 1948 SCAP ordered the government to take steps to deprive government workers—including members of the communications unions—of the right to strike. A new labour organization, the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sōhyō), was sponsored as a counterweight and gradual replacement for the Congress of Industrial Labour Organizations (Sambetsu), which had become dominated by the left. After 1951, however, Sōhyō too became increasingly antigovernment and anti-American. Although some of the occupation measures deprived labour of useful weapons for fighting its way to power, the strength of organized labour, expressed through the Socialist Party, remained significantly different politically from what it had been before the war. The government's failure to carry through a police law designed to curb labour radicalism and sabotage in 1958 demonstrated the powerful support that labour could command in the Diet, in the press, and in public opinion generally.

Labour unions

Social reforms. The social legislation of the postwar era saw energies and hopes long repressed by the Japanese government spring to full flower. The civil code, which had reinforced the power of the male head of the family with numerous legal supports, was rewritten to allow for equality between the sexes and joint inheritance rights. Women were given the right to vote and to sit in the Diet. The abolition of the peerage, which had been created in Meiji days, symbolized the modernization of society.

The years after the peace treaty, which became effective on April 28, 1952, saw a number of changes in the pattern of occupation reforms. The land system remained unaltered, and rural well-being was higher than it had ever been. Industrial reconsolidation reunited many of the earlier financial empires, which required maximum efficiency in order to compete on international markets. Proportionately, however, the old firms had not regained their former power. Social legislation, moreover, had created such strong interest groups that prospects of substantial reversals of the postwar changes seemed slight. For many of the newly liberated generation, the new order was symbolized by the marriage of Crown Prince Akihito and a commoner, Shōda Michiko, in 1959.

International relations. Japan's return to international relations at the end of the occupation found it stripped of its conquests and even deprived of some of its own territory. The Republic of China on Taiwan, the People's Republic of China on the Chinese mainland, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) all possessed military establishments far larger than Japan's Self-Defense Forces. International relations were not destined to be conducted on the pacifist lines envisioned by Article 9 of the constitution of 1947. The United States maintained its occupancy of Okinawa and the Ryukyus, while the Soviet Union occupied the entire Kuril chain in addition to reclaiming southern Sakhalin. The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, increased the urgency of a peace treaty. Arrangements were worked out between the principal non-Communist allies before and during the command of Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur as supreme commander in April 1951.

The peace treaty. The San Francisco Conference that convened in September 1951 to sign the Japanese peace treaty ratified arrangements that had been worked out earlier by John Foster Dulles under the direction of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Japan recognized the independence of Korea and renounced all rights to Taiwan and the Pescadores, the Kurils, and southern Sakhalin and gave up its rights in the Pacific islands to which it had held mandate under the League of Nations. The Soviet Union attended the San Francisco Conference, but it failed to make its objections to the treaty heard and consequently did not become a signatory. This enabled Japan to retain the hope of regaining at least the Kuril islands closest to Hokkaido—territory that it had not seized in war—through diplomatic efforts.

The San Francisco peace treaty recognized Japan's "right of individual and collective self-defense," which was exercised through the enactment of a security pact with the United States whereby U.S. forces would remain in Japan until Japan could "assume responsibility for its own defense." Japan agreed not to grant similar rights to a third power without U.S. approval. U.S. assistance was extended to the Japanese defense forces, while U.S. units, with the exception of air detachments and naval bases, were gradually removed to Okinawa.

Post-treaty relations. The peace treaty went into effect in April 1952. It made no arrangement for reparations for Japan's Pacific war victims but provided that Japan should negotiate subsequently with the countries concerned. Consequently, effective resumption of relations with the nations of Asia came only after treaties covering reparations had been worked out. These were signed with Burma in 1954, with the Philippines in 1956, and with Indonesia in 1958. In 1956 Japan also restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but without working out a formal treaty of peace. In December of that year, with the Soviet Union no longer invoking a veto, Japan became a member of the United Nations. Subsequently, Japan took an active part in UN meetings and specialized agencies. It also became a contributing member of the Colombo Plan group of nations for economic development in South and Southeast Asia, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For many Japanese, their country's return to international status and eminence was symbolized by its acting as host country for the Olympic Games in 1964 and an international fair (Expo 70) at Ōsaka in 1970. Japan also played a leading role in the creation of the Asian Development Bank in 1965–66.

Reparations treaties

China policy. At the time of the San Francisco treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had intended to delay committing Japan to either of the two Chinas, and the absence of both governments from San Francisco made this seem possible. But John Foster Dulles convinced Yoshida that the treaty would meet opposition in the United States Senate unless some assurance was given that Japan would recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan; thus, Tokyo soon negotiated a peace treaty with that regime but a treaty that did not prejudice possible subsequent negotiations with Peking. A lively trade developed between Japan and Taiwan, and Japanese contributions to the economy of Taiwan were considerable. The treaty also encouraged the development within Japan's Liberal-Democratic Party of a so-called Taiwan lobby. Because Japan's relations with Peking remained tenuous, Chiang Kai-shek was for a time able to hold the Japanese government to its commitments by threatening to cut off Taiwan trade if Tokyo considered developmental loans to the mainland.

Mainland trade relationships developed slowly in the absence of political ties. In 1953 an unofficial trade pact was signed between private Japanese groups and authorities of the People's Republic, the first of a number so negotiated. Together with the industrial countries of western Europe, Japan shortened the list of goods that were under embargo for mainland trade; as late as 1972, however, 167 items remained on that list. In addition to unofficial agreements with Japanese firms designated as friendly by Peking, the 1960s saw the development of an informal, semi-official "memorandum" trade that became increasingly important. But the Peking government made skillful use of trade for political purposes, in the hope of

Chinese-Japanese trade

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embarrassing or weakening Japan's conservative governments, and intervals of ideological tension and political instability on the mainland were soon reflected in falling levels of trade with Japan. In 1958 China's Great Leap Forward campaign resulted in a temporary closure of all trade with Japan, and in the mid-1960s the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution also resulted in a severe decline. Nevertheless, Japan gradually became China's most important trading partner.

In 1971 Pres. Richard M. Nixon's announcement of a forthcoming visit to Peking produced a rapid growth in Japanese willingness to compromise ties with Taiwan in favour of closer relations with Peking. The Chinese premier, Chou En-lai, moving with new confidence, now found it possible to attach the sort of conditions that Chiang Kai-shek had earlier worked for in the 1950s by warning that China would not trade with firms engaged in development activities on Taiwan or in South Korea (with which Japan had in 1965 negotiated a treaty establishing diplomatic relations and providing for reparations and assistance). While refusing to deal with Prime Minister Satō, Peking indicated new interest in formal relations with Japan, subject to the revocation of Japan's treaty with Taiwan. Japanese leaders showed themselves increasingly prepared to meet these conditions. The People's Republic was admitted to the United Nations in 1971; in September 1972 Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei reached agreement with Peking on steps to normalize relations, and simultaneously Japan severed its ties with Taiwan, replacing its embassy with a nonofficial office. Subsequently Japan pursued trade opportunities with the People's Republic vigorously, and in August 1978 the two countries concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship that bound both to "perpetual peace and friendship" and pledged them to oppose "hegemony" from whatever source and to foster economic and cultural relations.

Japanese-Chinese Treaty of Peace and Friendship

Postwar politics. After the surrender in 1945, Japanese politics at first returned to the pattern that had been interrupted by the militarist domination of national life. Extremists of the right were discredited by their identification with the lost war. Their major figures were removed from office or arrested, and until 1952, when all but those convicted by the international tribunal were permitted to resume their careers, little rightist organization was possible. Thereafter, some figures of the 1930s re-emerged, but the rightists lacked unity and could offer no program of leadership in Asia. They were handicapped by a decline of influence in the military and business sectors that had formerly supported their activities. Most important, rightist ideology found few listeners among the postwar generation accustomed to new freedoms. Except for a few spectacular incidents, such as the murder of the Socialist leader Asanuma Inajirō in 1960, rightist activities were limited to efforts to revive national holidays, such as February 11 (Foundation Day, for Emperor Jimmu, a campaign that succeeded in 1966), and demonstrations against the Soviet Union and China.

The left fared better for a time. With the release of political prisoners after the war, and with the repeal of the peace-preservation laws that had hampered political organization in prewar days, prominent Communist Party leaders returned to action. Although land reform deprived them of an issue they had used elsewhere in Asia, the postwar years, with their confusion and economic hardship, provided a favourable climate for Communists. A high point of Communist influence at the polls came in the general election of 1949, when Communists placed 35 candidates in the House of Representatives and received nearly 10 percent of the vote.

On the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, SCAP ordered the removal of Communist leaders from politics. Most chose to go underground, reappearing after the occupation ended. By that time popular sympathy with the Communist cause had declined markedly. The steady rise of living standards, the uncooperative attitude the Soviet Union had shown in negotiating over the Kuril Islands and in fishing treaty discussions, a popular distaste for Communist opposition to the Imperial institution, and widespread dislike of the extremist tactics shown by leftist labour unions—all combined to create an unpromising climate for Communist politicians.

While not reversed, these trends were importantly modified in the late 1960s. The spectacular economic growth of that decade produced great urban migrations that provided promising settings for mass organization and politics, and both conservative-religious (*e.g.*, Komeitō, or Clean Government Party, the political arm of the Sōka-gakkai movement) and radical political movements grew in strength. The conservative government's policy of giving priority to export development over social-welfare measures, though partly justified by a rising standard of living in which all groups shared, did little to alleviate the difficult conditions of life for many of the new recruits to the urban labour force. Communist leaders exploited their possibilities skillfully. In the mid-1960s they broke publicly with Peking to establish an autonomous and somewhat nationalist image, and their student organizations followed a relatively moderate line during anarchic disruptions at the universities in the late 1960s. These policies helped produce large pluralities in many urban elections, as in contests for the House of Councillors, where voter constituencies were large. Nevertheless, the Japan Communist Party remained far from power and found it difficult to establish satisfactory coalition arrangements with the more strongly pro-Peking Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō) and other "reformist" elements.

The vicissitudes of right and left made it natural for the prewar moderates to dominate postwar politics. Career diplomats and bureaucrats possessed the ability and command of English to enable them to work with SCAP authorities, and, because they had been out of action since the 1930s, they had not become liable to the removal of militarists from office. Thus, figures of the 1920s and '30s re-emerged, as did also the remnants of the party organizations of those years. The liaison agency, staffed largely by former diplomats, assumed immediate importance. The Cabinet that emerged shortly after the arrival of U.S. forces was headed by Shidehara Kijūrō, who was replaced in May 1946 by Yoshida Shigeru; both were diplomats. In 1947 and 1948 there was an interval of rule under Katayama Tetsu, a Socialist who headed a coalition Cabinet but who was unable to carry out a Socialist program. In 1948 Ashida Hitoshi held office for five months, after which Yoshida returned as prime minister and remained until December 1954, setting a record for modern Japanese prime ministers. Yoshida negotiated the peace treaty and the security pact in 1951 and set Japan's postsurrender course of close cooperation with the United States.

Dominance of Yoshida

Hatoyama Ichirō became a candidate for Yoshida's position, and the Liberal Party was split between their respective followers as a result. The San Francisco treaty and security pact split the Socialist Party into two factions also: the left opposing both the treaty (because it did not include the Communist countries) and the security pact with the United States, the right wing favouring the treaty while opposing the security pact.

In 1955 the Liberals and Democrats united to form the Liberal-Democratic Party (Jiyū-Minshutō), which thereafter was the dominant party.

Formation of Liberal-Democratic Party

After independence. The Korean War marked the turn from depression to prosperity for Japan. As the staging area for the UN effort in South Korea, the country profited from the many services it provided.

Economic growth. The return of independence in 1952 thus found the Japanese economy in the process of growth and change, a process that continued without interruption into the 1960s. Sustained prosperity and consistently high growth rates changed all sectors of life in Japan. The countryside, where farmers had benefitted from the land reform, began to feel the effects of small-scale mechanization and a consistent migration to industrial centres. Agricultural yields rose as improved strains of crops and modern technology were introduced, as household appliances appeared in remote villages, and as the changing, more diversified patterns of food consumption of the cities provided a market for more cash crops, truck (market) garden fruits and vegetables, and meat

products. Population control slowed the birth rate, and steady industrial growth brought full employment and even a labour shortage.

Particularly in the 1960s, the structure of the Japanese economy changed in order to concentrate on products of highly advanced technology, which emphasized Japan's need for stable, advanced trading partners instead of the Asian markets for inexpensive textiles that it had earlier developed. Improvements in transportation—*e.g.*, cargo-handling methods and bulk transport by large ore carriers —were removing the disadvantage of the greater distances over which Japan's new materials were moving. Most important of all, a large and growing domestic market was rendering invalid many earlier generalizations about Japan's need for cheap labour and captive Asian markets for inexpensive exports. By the late 1960s Japan had experienced the highest and most sustained growth rates of any country in the world for more than a decade. Japan led the world in shipbuilding, was second in the production of motor vehicles, and was third in steel production.

International policies. Japanese leaders attempting to raise the national income felt their options in international affairs severely restricted by the alliance with the United States, Taiwan, and South Korea, which prevented closer ties with the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Prosperity was a universal goal, but international politics proved sharply divisive. Public-opinion polls showed firm agreement against military power and continued horror of atomic or nuclear developments; and it was agreed that the Self-Defense Forces could not be utilized for international or UN causes.

As noted above, restoration of relations with the Soviet Union and membership in the United Nations, both in 1956, were the principal efforts and achievements of Hatoyama Ichirō, who succeeded Yoshida in 1954. Hatoyama was followed by Ishibashi Tanzan in December 1956 and by Kishi Nobusuke in 1957. Kishi, who had been named, though not tried, as a war criminal because of his membership in the Tōjō Cabinet, continued the policies of cooperation with the United States that Yoshida had initiated. But, because of his war record, he was the target of much criticism. In 1958 the Peking government, occupied with its Great Leap Forward, closed all trade contacts with Japan. At the same time, revisions in the U.S.–Japan treaty of mutual cooperation and security were being discussed. A proposed treaty revision, which was to be in force for 10 years, alarmed many Japanese who had felt only slightly involved in the original agreement negotiated at the time of independence.

U.S.–Japanese treaty revision

Issues were further complicated by plans for a state visit by Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Originally planned as a follow-up to a visit to Moscow, the visit changed drastically after the Soviet Union shot down a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane on May 1, 1960. Eisenhower's trip abroad had begun as a symbol of peace and coexistence; but it now became a strategic tour of U.S. Pacific allies and bases, and its critics charged that it was designed to sustain the falling popularity of the Kishi government. After the Kishi Cabinet used its majority to force the treaty revisions through the Diet, opposition to the Prime Minister, the treaty, and the Eisenhower visit increased steadily. Gigantic student demonstrations shook Tokyo day after day. The treaty survived, but Eisenhower's visit was cancelled, and Kishi resigned in July 1960. In 1970, when the treaty had run its course, both governments were reluctant to see a repetition of the events of 1960; they agreed to invoke its provisions indefinitely, subject to one year's revocation by either party.

Ikeda, Satō, and their successors. Kishi was followed by Ikeda Hayato in 1960. A specialist in economic policy, Ikeda set for his country the goal of doubling national income in 10 years. The goal was more than met, as Japan's economy grew at rates of more than 10 percent annually, the highest in the industrialized world. The administration of Pres. John F. Kennedy in the U.S. caught the imagination of many Japanese, and Kennedy's designation of the popular scholar Edwin O. Reischauer as American ambassador further improved Japanese–American relations. By the late 1960s the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam and the turbulence of the world student movements, in which Japanese students played a full role, threatened to disturb American relations again.

The era of Satō

Satō Eisaku, who became prime minister when Ikeda resigned because of illness in 1964, continued Ikeda's policies and proved an able and resourceful figure until he left office in 1972. In 1965 Japan entered treaty relations with South Korea. At home, Satō worked for continued economic growth and did his best to free Japan from the reminders of defeat that remained. The Bonin (Ogasawara in Japanese) and Ryukyu islands had been left under American occupation by the San Francisco treaty of peace. U.S. military bases on Okinawa (in the Ryukyus) seemed essential to American commitments to South Korea, and they were an important link to American forces in Vietnam: in the late 1960s, Japanese opposition to the Vietnam war made them highly objectionable. Satō's government secured return of the Bonin Islands in 1967, and the retrocession of the Ryukyus became effective in 1972. Satō hailed this as "the end of the postwar era." The U.S. retained bases on Okinawa, but they were now subject to the restrictions that affected other U.S. bases in Japan. Satō resigned in 1972 and two years later was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for his role in maintaining Japan's policy against nuclear weapons.

Tanaka Kakuei, Satō's successor, seemed to promise a new stage of Japanese strength. One of his first acts was to take a trip to Peking, on the heels of President Nixon, to reverse Japan's China policy by recognizing the People's Republic. Tanaka reacted to increasing public concern with problems of pollution and overcrowding by calling for the redistribution of industry throughout the Japanese islands. Soon he was being charged with worsening inflation as prices of land throughout Japan rose rapidly. More serious was the effect of the petroleum crisis of 1973 on a country completely dependent on imported oil. Outbreaks of panic buying by consumers brought much reflection on the essential fragility of Japan's economic position; the rapid rise in the price of oil seemed to indicate the end of an era of relatively cheap and abundant resources. Japan next experienced the world recession of the 1970s, and its recovery seemed slower because of the decade or more of exuberant growth that had gone before.

Tanaka scandals

The Tanaka era ended in disaster in 1974 with a scandal based on irregularities in the accumulation of his private fortune. Shortly afterward, and worse, it was charged that Tanaka was implicated in improper use of official influence to bring about the selection by Japanese airlines of airplanes manufactured by Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

Tanaka was succeeded by Miki Takeo, the leader of a small faction in the governing Liberal-Democratic Party who won favour while larger factions were in disarray because of the scandals. Miki was determined to pursue full disclosure of the Lockheed affair, and a lengthy investigation and prosecution of Tanaka and his associates was begun by the government; this culminated in the arrest of Tanaka in July 1976 and indictment on a charge of bribery. The economy continued slow. Elections to the Diet in December 1976 brought an end to the Liberal-Democrats' absolute majority, and Miki resigned. The new prime minister was Fukuda Takeo, who had rich experience in many branches of government and was considered a specialist in economic policy. The problems of the Japanese economic turndown proved difficult, however, and combined with party factional differences to bring about Fukuda's defeat in a newly designed party presidential "primary" in November 1978. He was succeeded by Ōhira Masayoshi, who announced his intention to continue his predecessors' foreign policies.

Trade policies seemed among the most difficult problems. Domestic consumption was down, inventories were high, and industries were committed to their work forces, with the result that production continued high. There followed a vigorous effort to increase exports, which resulted in Japanese manufacturers' taking larger shares of all foreign markets, including that of the United States. The yen grew stronger at the expense of other currencies, and particularly the dollar, in which most purchases of

raw materials were figured. Consequently Japan again saw its import prices diminish, although its manufactures, now more expensive in foreign markets, were rendered less competitive in price. The 1970s produced particularly large Japanese surpluses in Japanese-American trade. Japan was now the largest or second largest trading partner of virtually every country with which it traded. It was investing heavily in other countries, and its manufacturers were building plants throughout the world.

The era of Satō

The People's Republic of China was particularly important to Japan's long-range economy, and the Chinese turn from ideological rigidity to pragmatism in the 1970s, after the death of Mao Tse-tung, encouraged increasing numbers of Japanese to seek Chinese markets. In 1978 an eight-year agreement for a total of $20,000,000,000 in industrial contracts was signed with China, and in August Japan and China signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship referred to above.

Trade agreement with China

Within Japanese politics and opinion, the long-standing polarization over Japan's treaty with the United States was made obsolete by these developments. Although opponents of the treaty had long argued that the American tie and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces threatened to cut Japan off from the People's Republic, Peking now saw both that treaty and those forces as constraints against its Soviet rival and no longer criticized them. The Socialist and Communist ideology of class warfare also lost ground in the atmosphere of general affluence, and the overwhelming majority of Japanese showed that they considered themselves to be members of the middle class. Meanwhile the Liberal-Democrats' dominance had been eroded by movements of population that made Japan increasingly urban. As a result, that government's inclination to attempt revision of the constitution of 1947 had only academic interest in a situation in which it required allies in the Diet to maintain its hairline majority.

The late 1970s thus found the Japanese aware that the shibboleths of the postsurrender decades were obsolete. Japan was not poor but wealthy, not weak but a power in the international economy, not isolated but the largest trading partner of almost every country in the world. This awareness was reflected in a surge of introspection in which writers discussed the role for their country and the nature of their society. What remained was a growing consensus around general principles, summed up by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1978: Japan should adhere to its decision not to become a major military power, and should promote friendly cooperation with all nations and work to accept growing responsibility within the international community. Japan remained unusually dependent upon the stability of the world economy, but that stability in turn was more dependent upon the quality of Japanese participation than it had ever been before.

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background notes

Japan

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

February 1987



Official Name: Japan

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 377,765 sq. km. (145,856 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than California. **Cities:** *Capital*—Tokyo. *Other major cities*—Yokohama, Nagoya, Sapporo, Osaka, Kyoto. **Terrain:** Rugged, mountainous islands. **Climate:** Varies from subtropical to temperate.

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*—Japanese. **Population** (Dec. 1985 est.): 121,180,000. **Annual growth rate** (1985): 0.6%. **Ethnic groups:** Japanese; Korean 0.6%. **Religions:** Shintoism and Buddhism; Christian 0.8%. **Language:** Japanese. **Education:** *Literacy*—100%. **Health:** *Life expectancy* (1983)—males 74.2 yrs., females 79.8 yrs. **Work force** (58.0 million, 1985): *Agriculture*—9.5%. *Trade, manufacturing, mining, and construction*—34.1%. *Services*—48.1%. *Government*—5.9%.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy. **Constitution:** May 3, 1947.

Branches: *Executive*—prime minister (head of government). *Legislative*—bicameral Diet (House of Representatives and House of Councillors). *Judicial*—civil law system with Anglo-American influence.

Subdivisions: 47 prefectures.

Political parties: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito (Clean Government Party), Japan Communist Party (JCP). **Suffrage:** Universal over 20.

Flag: Red sun on white field.

Economy

GNP (1985): $1.322 trillion. **Real growth rate:** 4.5% 1985; 4.3% 1975–85. **Per capita GNP** (1985): $10,922.

Natural resources: Negligible mineral resources, fish.

Agriculture: *Products*—rice, vegetables, fruits, milk, meat, silk.

Industry: *Types*—machinery and equipment, metals and metal products, textiles, automobiles, chemicals, electrical and electronic equipment.

Trade (1985): *Exports*—$175.6 billion: motor vehicles, machinery and equipment, electrical and electronic products, metals and metal products. *Major markets*—US 37.1%, EC 11.4%, Southeast Asia 18.9%, communist countries 9.2%. *Imports*—$129.5 billion: fossil fuels, metal ore, raw materials, foodstuffs, machinery and equipment. *Major suppliers*—US 19.9%, EC 6.9%, Middle East 23.1%, Southeast Asia 23.4%, communist countries 6.5%.

Fiscal year: April 1–March 31.

Exchange rate (Sept. 1986): About 155 yen = US$1.

Total net official development assistance: $3.8 billion (1985 disbursements 0.29% of GNP).

Membership in International Organizations

UN and several of its specialized and related agencies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Court of Justice (ICJ), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Labor Organization (ILO); International Energy Agency (IEA); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); INTELSAT.

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

GEOGRAPHY

Japan, a chain of rugged islands, lies in a 3,200-kilometer (2,000-mi.)-long arc off the east coast of Asia. It comprises four main islands—Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu—and more than 3,900 smaller islands, at about the same latitudes as the United States.

About four-fifths of the country is mountainous, including many dormant and a few active volcanos. Japan's unstable geological position causes occasional earthquakes; about 1,500 seismic occurrences—mostly tremors—take place in and around Japan every year.

Japan's climate ranges from subtropical on Okinawa, similar to southern Florida, to cool on Hokkaido, like southern Maine. Most of Japan is dominated by the Asiatic monsoon, which brings a pronounced summer rainy season (most intense in early July) and mild, sunny winters. Rainfall throughout the country is at least 100 centimeters (40 in.) per year.

(Photo by David Alan Harvey © National Geographic Society)

PEOPLE

Japan is one of the most densely populated nations in the world, with 317.7 persons per square kilometer (822.9 persons per sq. mi.). The growth rate has stabilized at about 0.6% in recent years, due in part to government support of birth control and family planning programs.

The Japanese are a Mongoloid people, closely related to the major groups of East Asia. However, some evidence also exists of admixture with Malayan and Caucasoid strains. About 675,000 Koreans and much smaller groups of Chinese and Caucasians reside in Japan.

Religion

Buddhism is important in Japan's religious life and has exerted profound influence on fine arts, social institutions, and thought. Most Japanese still consider themselves members of one of the major Buddhist sects.

Shintoism is an indigenous religion founded on myths, legends, and ritual practices of the early Japanese. Neither Buddhism nor Shintoism is an exclusive religion; most Japanese observe both Buddhist and Shinto rituals, the former for funerals and the latter for births, marriages, and other occasions. Confucianism, more an ethical system than a religion, continues to have a basic and pervasive influence on Japanese thought.

About 1.5 million people in Japan are Christians, of whom approximately 60% are Protestant and 40% Roman Catholic.

Education

Japan provides free public schooling for all children through 6 years of elementary school and 3 years of junior high school. Most students go on to 3-year senior high schools, and those able to pass the difficult entrance examinations enter 4-year universities or 2-year junior colleges. Students may attend either public or private high schools, colleges, and universities, but they must pay tuition in any case. Japan enjoys one of the world's highest literacy rates, and nearly 90% of Japanese students complete high school.

Above: Seven-Five-Three Day is celebrated for children of those ages on November 15. Because of a high child mortality in the past, these ages were once considered milestones. Here, a 7-year-old's picture is taken to be preserved at Meiji Shrine.

Right: Buddhist Monk Asukusu Kunnon, Tokyo.

(Photo courtesy U.S. Embassy)

Communications

Mass communications in Japan are more extensive than those of most other advanced, industrial nations. The mass media are highly competitive, even though they are dominated to a considerable extent by four national daily newspapers—the *Asahi*, the *Mainichi*, the *Yomiuri*, and the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*—with individual circulations of 7–9 million (combined morning and evening editions). These newspapers and several smaller ones publish weekly magazines and have interests in commercial radio and television. The total combined circulation of Japan's 178 newspapers is more than 65 million (in a nation of 120 million people), and Japan publishes more than 3,500 magazines.

Radio and television follow the British pattern, with a nationwide, government-owned network competing with commercial networks. The Japanese motion picture and publishing industries rank among the largest in the world. With over 31,000 new titles published in 1983, the Japanese publishing industry brings out more new titles each year than the United States.

(Photo by David Alan Harvey © National Geographic Society)

(Photo courtesy U.S. Embassy)

Above: Baseball mania—fans returning from Japan Series.

Right: The Noh Theatre, oldest dramatic form preserved by the Japanese, attained its contemporary form during the 14th century. A principal character and a secondary figure recite and dance, while a seated chorus chants the story to the solemn music of a flute and drum.

Social Welfare

In Japan, as in other parts of Asia, care of the sick, aged, and infirm until recently has been the responsibility of families, employers, or private organizations. However, to meet the needs of an urbanized, modern industrial society, this system has changed greatly, and the government conducts a broad range of modest, but successful, social welfare programs. These include health insurance, old-age pensions, a minimum wage law, and the operation of various hospitals and institutions for orphans, the handicapped, and the elderly. All major political parties are committed to providing increased and more effective social welfare services.

HISTORY

Traditional Japanese records contain the legend that the nation was founded in 600 B.C. by the Emperor Jimmu, a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess and ancestor of the present ruling dynasty. About A.D. 405, the Japanese court officially adopted the Chinese writing system. During the sixth century A.D., Buddhism was introduced. These two events revolutionized Japanese culture and marked the beginning of a long period of Chinese cultural influence, which resulted in a strong affinity for China.

From the establishment of the first fixed capital at Nara in A.D. 710 until 1867, the emperors of the Yamato dynasty were the nominal rulers, but actual power was usually held by powerful court nobles, regents, or "shoguns" (military governors).

Contact with the West

The first contact with the West occurred about 1542, when a Portuguese ship, blown off its course to China, landed in Japan. During the next century, traders from Portugal, the Netherlands, England, and Spain arrived, as did Jesuit, Dominican, and Franciscan missionaries. During the early part of the 17th century, growing suspicions that

the traders and missionaries were actually forerunners of a military conquest by European powers caused the Shogunate to place foreigners under progressively tighter restrictions. This culminated in expulsion of all foreigners and severing of all relations with the outside world, except severely restricted commercial contacts with Dutch and Chinese merchants at Nagasaki. This isolation lasted for 200 years, until Commodore Matthew Perry of the U.S. Navy forced the opening of Japan to the West and negotiated the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854.

Renewed contact with the West profoundly altered Japanese society. In 1868, the Shogun was forced to resign, and an emperor was restored to power. The feudal system subsequently was abolished, and many Western institutions were adopted, including a Western legal system and constitutional government along pseudoparliamentary lines.

The "Meiji Constitution" initiated many reforms. Eventually, in 1898, the last of the galling "unequal treaties" with Western powers was removed, signaling Japan's new status among the nations of the world. In a few decades, by creating modern social, educational, economic, military, and industrial systems, the Emperor Meiji's "controlled revolution" had transformed a feudal and isolated state into a world power.

Kaneiji pagoda in Tokyo's Ueno Park framed by April's cherry blossoms.

Wars with China and Russia

Japanese leaders of the late 19th century, alert to internal and Western "power politics," regarded the Korean Peninsula as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." It was over Korea that Japan became involved in war with the Chinese Empire in 1894–95 and with Russia in 1904–05. The war with China established Japan's dominant interest in Korea, while giving it the Pescadores Islands and Formosa as well. Japan defeated Russia in the war of 1904–05, and the resulting Treaty of Portsmouth awarded Japan certain rights in Manchuria and in southern Sakhalin, which Russia had received in 1875 in exchange for the Kurile Islands. Both wars gave Japan a free hand in Korea, which it formally annexed in 1910.

World War I to the Present

World War I permitted Japan, which fought on the side of the victorious allies, to expand its influence in Asia and its territorial holdings in the Pacific. The postwar era brought unprecedented prosperity to the country. Japan went to the peace conference at Versailles in 1919 as one of the great military and industrial powers of the world and received official recognition as one of the "Big Five" of the new international order. It joined the League of Nations and received a mandate over Pacific islands north of the Equator formerly held by Germany.

During the 1920s, the country progressed toward establishing a democratic system of government. However, parliamentary government was not rooted deeply enough to withstand the economic and political pressures of the 1930s. During this period, military leaders were increasingly influential.

Diet building, seat of Japan's two-house parliamentary government.

Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and set up the state of Manchukuo. In 1933, it resigned from the League of Nations. The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 followed Japan's signing the "anti-Comintern pact" with Nazi Germany the previous year and was part of a chain of developments culminating in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. After 3 years and 9 months of war, resulting in the loss of 3 million Japanese lives and including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan signed an instrument of surrender on the U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Harbor on September 2, 1945.

As a result of World War II, Japan lost all of its overseas possessions and retained only the home islands. Manchukuo was dissolved, and Manchuria was returned to China. Japan renounced all claims to Formosa; Korea was granted independence; southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles were occupied by the U.S.S.R.; and the United States became the sole administering authority of the Ryukyu, Bonin, and Volcano Islands. The United States returned control of these islands to Japan by 1972 with the reversion of Okinawa.

After the war, Japan was placed under the international control of the Allied Powers through the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. U.S. objectives were to ensure that Japan would become a peaceful nation and to establish democratic self-government supported by the freely expressed will of the people. Political, economic, and social reforms were introduced. The method of ruling through Japanese officials and a freely elected Japanese Diet (legislature) afforded a progressive and orderly transition from the stringent controls immediately following the surrender to the restoration of full sovereignty when the treaty of peace with Japan went into effect on April 28, 1952.

Since then, Japan has been ruled by conservative governments that maintain close cooperation with the West. The institutions of parliamentary democracy have become progressively stronger. The post-treaty period also has been marked by tremendous economic growth.

GOVERNMENT

Japan's parliamentary government—a constitutional monarchy—operates within the framework of a constitution that became effective on May 3, 1947. Sovereignty, previously embodied in the emperor, is vested in the Japanese people, and the emperor is defined as the symbol of the state. Japan has universal adult suffrage with a secret ballot for all elective offices. The government consists of an executive branch, responsible to the Diet, and an independent judicial branch. The government is essentially patterned on the British parliamentary model, with a House of Representatives and a House of Councillors.

Executive power is vested in a Cabinet composed of the prime minist[illegible] and ministers of state, all of whom mu[illegible] be civilians. The prime minister, who must be a member of the Diet, is appointed by the emperor on designati[illegible] by the Diet and has the power to appo[illegible] and remove ministers, the majority of whom must be from the Diet.

Japan's judicial system, based on t[illegible] model of Roman law, consists of sever[illegible] levels of courts, with the Supreme Cou[illegible] as the final judicial authority. The Japanese constitution includes a bill of rights similar to the U.S. Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court has the right o[illegible] judicial review. Japanese courts do not use a jury system, and there are no administrative courts or claims courts. Because of the system's basis in Roma[illegible] law, court decisions are made in accord ance with statute law, and only Supren[illegible] Court decisions have any direct effect [illegible] later interpretation of points of law.

The constitution requires that regulations for the organization and administration of local governments be "in accordance with the principle of loc[illegible] autonomy." However, Japan does not have a federal system, and its 47 prefe[illegible]tures are not sovereign entities in the sense that U.S. states are. Most are no[illegible] financially self-sufficient but depend on the central government for subsidies. Governors of prefectures, mayors of municipalities, and prefectural and municipal assembly members are popularly elected for 4-year terms.

Principal Government Officials

Prime Minister—Yasuhiro Nakasone
Deputy Prime Minister—Shin Kanemaru

Ministers
Justice—Kaname Endoe
Foreign—Tadashi Kuranari
Finance—Kiichi Miyazawa
Education—Masayuki Fujio
Health and Welfare—Juro Saito
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries—Mutsuki Kato
International Trade and Industry—Hajime Tamura
Transport—Ryutaro Hashimoto
Posts and Telecommunications—Shunjiro Karawawa
Labor—Takushi Hirai
Construction—Kosei Amano
Home Affairs (Chairman, National Public Safety Commission)—Nobuyuki Hanashi

State Ministers
Chief Cabinet Secretary—Masaharu Gotoda
Director General, Management and Coordination Agency—Kazuo Tamaki

Director General, National Land Agency, Okinawa Development Agency, Hokkaido Development Agency—Tamisuke Watanuki
Director General, Defense Agency—Yuko Kurihara
Director General, Economic Planning Agency—Tetsuo Kondo
Director General, Science and Technology Agency Chairman; Atomic Energy Commission—Yataro Mitsubayashi
Director General, Environment Agency—Toshiyuki Inamura
Director, Cabinet Legislative Bureau—Osamu Mimura

LDP Officers
Secretary General—Noboru Takeshita
Chairman, Executive Council—Shintaro Abe
Chairman, Policy Affairs Research Council—Masayoshi Ito

Ambassador to the United States—Nobuo Matsunaga
Ambassador to the United Nations—Mizuo Kuroda

Japan maintains an embassy in the United States at 2520 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-939-6700). Consulates general are in Anchorage, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Guam, Honolulu, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York City, San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland; honorary consulates general are in Buffalo, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Miami, Minneapolis, Mobile, Philadelphia, Phoenix, St. Louis, San Diego, and San Juan; and an honorary consulate is in American Samoa. The Japan National Tourist Organization, at 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10111, also maintains offices in Chicago, Dallas, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Japan is one of the most politically stable of all postwar democracies, ruled for more than 35 years by moderate and conservative political interests. A generally close cooperation among politicians, an efficient and dedicated bureaucracy, and the business community have given cohesion to national policymaking. The political organization representing Japanese moderate conservatism is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The party is actually a coalition of several well-organized factions, the success of which depends on the factional leader's ability to obtain a position of power in the Cabinet or party. Interest in sustaining conservative control of the government has maintained the unity of these LDP factions since the party's founding in 1955 through the merger of two smaller parties.

The largest of the four opposition parties is the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Continuing ideological conflict between the Marxist class-struggle approach of its left wing and the more pragmatic approach of the right wing has kept the JSP from strengthening its own position in the Diet, while disputes with other opposition parties have frustrated attempts to form more than temporary, local-level alliances. The JSP's main support comes from the 4.5 million-member General Federation of Trade Unions (Sohyo). Although opposed to Japan's security relationship with the United States, the JSP recently has been moving to strengthen its ties with the United States.

The Komeito (Clean Government Party) is a political affiliate of the Buddhist Soka Gakkai sect but recently has attempted to expand its base beyond the sect. The party grew rapidly in its early years but has leveled off recently. The Komeito is moderate but has joined the other opposition parties in parliamentary maneuvers against the LDP.

No longer stridently revolutionary, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) has rejected close ties with the Soviet Union and China and espouses a parliamentary road to power like the major West European communist parties. However, it remains hostile to the United States. It portrays itself as a "nonthreatening" parliamentary party, emphasizes popular issues such as pollution, inflation, and deficiencies in public services, and condemns violence by radical leftist groups. It seems unlikely that the JCP will build a broad electoral base.

The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) is a moderate socialist party patterned after the European social democrats. Its membership broke away from the JSP in 1960. It is supported by Japan's second largest labor federation, the Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei).

The Liberal Democratic Party has ruled Japan continuously since its founding in 1955. Although Japanese politics are stable, the LDP cannot take its parliamentary majority for granted. In the 1983 Lower House elections, the LDP lost its majority and was able to put together a working majority within the Diet only after successful independent candidates joined the party and the LDP in a coalition government. The LDP counts on the inability of its opponents to unite. Its excellent overall performance in the economy has improved the lot of the people in the postwar era, and despite recent economic difficulties, it is still the only party that a majority of the public seems to trust to manage the economy.

This was reflected in the LDP's overwhelming victory in the July 1986 "double" elections for the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet: The LDP won 49.4% of the popular vote and 304 of the 512 Lower House seats. In the less powerful Upper House, the LDP now controls 143 of the 252 seats. All other political parties lost seats in the Lower House except for the JCP, which remained even at 27, and the tiny United Social Democratic Party, which gained a seat and now has 4. The leftist JSP, the largest opposition party, fell from 111 to 86 seats. The centrist Clean Government Party (Komeito) dropped from 59 to 57. The Democratic Socialist party fell from 37 to 26, and the New Liberal Club (NLC) dropped from 8 to 6. The NLC subsequently disbanded itself, and 5 of its 6 Lower House members rejoined the LDP.

Nakasone's strengthened position enables him to have the LDP extend his term as party president (which automatically confers the prime ministership) for one year, through October 1987. (Nakasone has served two 2-year terms since November 1982.) On July 22, Nakasone was formally reelected Prime Minister in a Special Session of the Diet.

Travel Notes

All travelers visiting Japan must have a visa, which must be obtained from a Japanese consulate before departure. Travelers transiting Japan for less than a 72-hour stay may routinely apply for a special landing permit upon arrival, provided a) their passport is properly visaed for onward travel and b) entry and departure are from the same international airport. If travelers are in any doubt regarding specific transit plans, a visa should be obtained before departure. No immunization is necessary for travel to Japan from the US.

Detailed tourist information can be obtained from the Japan National Tourist Organization, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10111.



Above: The port of Tokyo is one of the leading in Japan. Much of its land area has been reclaimed.

Right: Hitachi Tohoku facory—VCR assembly line.

Below: Fish shop, Kizhijoji.

(Photo courtesy U.S. Embassy)

(Photo courtesy U.S. Embassy)

ECONOMY

Japan has few natural resources, and only 19% of its land is suitable for cultivation. The agricultural economy is highly subsidized and protected. With great ingenuity and technical skill, resulting in per-hectare crop yields among the highest in the world, Japan maintains an overall agricultural self-sufficiency rate of about 70% on fewer than 5.6 million cultivated hectares (14 million acres). Japan produces a slight surplus of rice but imports large quantities of wheat, sorghum, and soybeans, primarily from the United States.

Hydroelectric power, although highly developed, accounts for only about 5% of Japan's energy supplies. Coal is found principally on Hokkaido and Kyushu but supplies only 15% of Japan's requirements. Coal mining is expected to decline further as industrial users refuse to continue to purchase domestic coal at two to three times the price of imported coal. Gold, magnesium, and silver meet current minimum requirements, but Japan is dependent on foreign sources for many of the minerals essential to modern industry. Iron ore, coking coal, copper, and bauxite must be imported, as well as many forest products.

Japan's exports earn only about 19% of its gross national product (GNP), much less than the percentage of other trading nations. Although small in terms of GNP, the Japanese traditionally have seen this trade as necessary for earning the foreign exchange needed to purchase raw materials for their advanced economy.

Japan's reservior of industrial leadership and technicians, its intelligent and industrious work force, its high savings and investment rates, and its intensive promotion of industrial development and foreign trade have resulted in a mature industrial economy. Along with North America and Western Europe, Japan is one of the three major industrial complexes among the market economies.

Compared with the performance of most industrial nations over the past several years, the Japanese economy has performed well. Oil imports have declined steadily as Japan has adjusted to the higher price levels, and real economic growth has continued. Japan's era of double-digit growth appears to be over, although its growth rates still are among the highest of the developed countries.

Transportation

Japan has a well-developed international and domestic transportation system, although highway development still lags. Tokyo and Osaka International Airports and the ports of Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya are important terminals for air and sea traffic in the western Pacific.

The domestic transportation system depends on the government-owned rail network. Rail transportation is supplemented by private railways in metropolitan areas, a developing highway system, coastal shipping, and several airlines. The rail system is efficient, well distributed, and well maintained throughout the country. The super express "bullet trains" take as little as 3 hours between Tokyo and Osaka, a distance of 520 kilometers (325 mi.).

Labor

Japan's labor force consists of more than 59 million workers, 40% of whom are women. Members of labor unions number about 12.5 million, or about 28.9% of the nonagricultural labor force.

Sohyo (General Federation of Labor) consists mainly of unions in the public sector; it has 4.3 million members. Domei (the Japanese Confederation of Labor), with a membership of about 2.1 million, is the federation of independent unions—mostly made up of private sector unions, as is Churitsuroren (1.5 million). The private sector unions are planning to form a new labor organization.

U.S.-Japanese Trade

The U.S. and Japanese economies are increasingly interdependent. Japan is the United States' largest trading partner after Canada, with more than $95 billion worth of goods flowing between the two countries in 1985. Japan purchased $22.2 billion in U.S. products in 1985, more than U.S. exports to the United Kingdom and West Germany combined, and an estimated $12 billion in services. More than 750,000 Americans owe their jobs to U.S. exports to Japan. Japan is the best market for U.S. farm products, buying over $5 billion annually. U.S. exports to Japan are not just raw materials and food, however; nearly half are manufacturers. Japan is the first or second best market for many U.S. manufactures, including chemicals, pharmaceuticals, photo supplies, commercial aircraft, nonferrous metals, plastics, and medical and scientific supplies.

However, the growing U.S. trade deficit with Japan is a source of major concern. The deficit in 1985 reached a record $49.7 billion. The $13 billion increase over the previous year was attributable primarily to the strong dollar and higher U.S. growth. Nevertheless, an important and troubling part of the deficit with Japan is caused by Japanese market restrictions.

Strong protectionist pressures and the desire for greater access to the Japanese market have spurred intensive U.S. Government efforts to urge Japan to open markets. At their meeting in Los Angeles in January 1985, President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed to cooperative, intensive negotiations to remove Japanese trade barriers, facilitate foreign sales, and give U.S. firms the same opportunities in Japan that Japanese firms already have in the United States.

U.S.-Japan trade talks since then have focused on four sectors where U.S. products are highly competitive: telecommunications, electronics, forest products, and medical equipment/pharmaceuticals. While important progress has been made, more action is required, and on an urgent basis, in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japanese trade relationship. Additional sector talks will continue.

Concerned by foreign criticism of its large current account surpluses, Japan is considering how to reorient its economy away from exports toward greater reliance on domestic demand for economic growth. Such structural change should over time redress many of the root causes of Japan's trade imbalance with the United States and other trading partners.

There are considerable investment flows between the United States and Japan. In 1984, U.S. direct investment in Japan was valued at $9.1 billion. Japanese direct investment in the United States amounted to $19.1 billion, much of it in the electronics and motor vehicle industries.

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DEFENSE

After World War II, the Allies completely disarmed and occupied Japan. Article IX of the Japanese constitution provides that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." During the Korean war, this position was modified by the establishment of a national police reserve force. Before the end of the occupation in April 1952, the first steps had been taken to expand and transform the force into a "Self-Defense Force" (SDF). At the same time, the Japanese Government derived from article 51 of the UN Charter the doctrine that each nation has the right of self-defense against armed attack and that this right is consistent with article IX of the Japanese constitution.

In 1954, the Japan Defense Agency was created with the specific mission of defending Japan against external aggression. Ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces were established under a joint chiefs of staff organization patterned after that of the United States.

The United States and Japan are allied under the terms of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The security relationship dates from the early 1950s, when Japan was

virtually defenseless. A security treaty and the peace treaty were negotiated in 1952. The present treaty, revised on a broader basis of equality, came into force on June 23, 1960, and became subject to abrogation by either party upon 1 year's notice in June 1970. At the time, both governments declared their intention to extend the treaty indefinitely.

The bases and facilities provided by Japan under the treaty do not exist solely for the defense of Japan. They are especially important to the U.S. ability to maintain its commitments to other allies in East Asia. U.S. military assistance to Japan was terminated at the end of 1967. Since 1952, U.S. military forces in Japan have decreased from more than 260,000 to the present level of about 55,000, more than half of whom are stationed in Okinawa. For Japan, the treaty provides a strategic guarantee against external attack.

As U.S. forces were withdrawn, the Japanese SDF expanded its capabilities and has assumed primary responsibility for the immediate conventional defense of Japan. Japan's defense roles and missions, which the United States supports, are the defense of its homeland, territorial seas and skies, and sea lines of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles. The Japanese have been increasing their defense budgets annually and are continuing to make qualitative force improvements. Japanese forces are barred by law from overseas operations. As a matter of policy, Japan has foresworn nuclear armaments and forbids arms sales abroad.

In addition to support for its own forces, Japan also provides bases and facilities to U.S. forces in Japan and contributes more than $1 billion annually to maintain them, or more than $20,000 per serviceman.

In recent years, the Japanese public has shown a substantially greater awareness of security issues and increasing support for the security treaty and the SDF. However, there are still significant political, financial, and psychological constraints on strengthening Japan's defense. An important minority in Japan advocates strict interpretation of article IX of the constitution. The defense budget must compete with popular social programs for funds. Underlying these institutional limitations is a strong antipathy, resulting from the Japanese experience in World War II, toward all things military.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Japan is a major economic power not only in Asia but in the world. Japanese foreign policy since 1952 has aimed at promoting peace and prosperity for the Japanese people by working closely with the West and through strong support of the United Nations. Japan has diplomatic relations with nearly all independent nations and has been an active member of the United Nations since 1956.

Although a military role for Japan in international affairs is precluded by its constitution and government policy, Japanese cooperation through the U.S.-Japan security treaty has been important to the peace and stability of East Asia. All Japanese governments in the postwar period have relied on a close relationship with the United States as the foundation of their foreign policy and on the mutual security treaty for strategic protection. In recent years, within the context of a close relationship with the United States, Japan has diversified and expanded its ties with other nations.

Japan's primary interests traditionally have been in Asia, and good relations with its neighbors continue to be of vital interest to Tokyo. After the signing of the peace and friendship treaty with China in 1978, ties between Tokyo and Beijing developed rapidly. The Japanese have extended significant economic assistance to aid the Chinese in various modernization projects. At the same time, Japan has maintained economic but not diplomatic relations with Taiwan and with South Korea, where a strong bilateral trade relationship thrives.

Although the Japanese have sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union, relations between Tokyo and Moscow have never been close, because the Soviets continue to occupy the Northern Territories—small islands off the coast of Hokkaido that have been occupied by the U.S.S.R. since the end of World War II. The Japanese reacted strongly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported various initiatives, including boycotting the Moscow Olympics, to express criticism of this action.

The Japanese have pursued a more active foreign policy in recent years, recognizing the responsibility that accompanies Japan's economic strength. Japan has expanded its ties with the Middle East, which provides most of Japan's oil. The Japanese also have been

Striking contrast in generations suggests changes in Japanese society.

(Photo by David Alan Harvey © National Geographic Society)

increasingly active in Africa and Latin America and have extended significant support to multilateral development projects in both regions.

Development assistance programs are increasingly important in Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese are now the world's second largest aid donor, after the United States. In 1985, Japan disbursed $3.8 billion in development assistance, or 0.29% of Japan's GNP.

U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS

The close and cooperative relationship with Japan is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia and the basis of a strong, productive partnership in addressing global issues. Despite different social and cultural traditions, Japan and the United States have much in common. Both have open, democratic societies, high literacy, freedom of expression, multiparty political systems, universal suffrage, and open elections. Both have highly developed, free market industrial economies and favor an open and active international trading system.

President Reagan has said that there is no relationship more important to peace and prosperity in the world than that between the United States and Japan. Given its economic power and its growing international role, Japan clearly has become one of the most important countries to the United States.

Bilateral trade problems attract significant attention and often generate considerable controversy within the relationship. The United States is working hard to achieve greater access to Japan's markets and has made some progress. At the same time, trade problems represent only one part of a very broad and important relationship. Overall U.S. policy toward Japan transcends these issues and is based on three principles.

First, the United States has worked to achieve a close bilateral relationship with Japan as an equal partner. The past decade has brought a significant expansion of Japan's economic and technological prowess, an increase in its defense awareness and capability, and a greater interest and involvement in international political and economic affairs. Although there still are differences in their relative political, economic, and military positions in the world, the two nations approach and conduct their relationship as equals.

Second, because of the two countries' combined economic and technological impact on the world—together accounting for 35% of world



Above: Shinjuku skyscrapers tower above the famous "double bridge," entrance to the Imperial Palace grounds. Below: Inokashira Park Kichijoji.

(Photo courtesy U.S. Embassy)

GNP and 50% of free-world GNP—the U.S.-Japan relationship has become global in scope. Although in the past the partnership has been measured primarily in economic and technological terms, in the future, it will have a larger political dimension as Japan assumes a greater international role and associates itself more actively and closely with Western political and security goals.

Third, Japan is becoming increasingly assertive in global matters and is forging a wider international role. During most of the postwar period, Japan played an international role similar to that which was followed throughout most of American history—pursuing economic interests while eschewing political involvement. But particularly since the events in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Japanese have come to realize that their own well-being is affected directly by political and security developments elsewhere in the world.

The United States encourages this trend toward a broader international political and economic role by Japan, within the framework of a continued close bilateral relationship. The United States has called for an "international partnership" with Japan, in which the combined efforts of the two countries can be utilized to promote peace and prosperity throughout the world.

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typical), whose lives fall prey to the hollowness and tedium of a disintegrating social order. They are a brood of lesser Hamlets without his compensating vision of a potential greatness. As in the plays of the Scandinavian dramatists, Chekhov's vision of this social evil is penetrating and acute, but the powerful, resistant counterthrust that makes for tragedy is lacking. It is a world of victims.

American tragic dramatists. In little of the formal drama between the time of Ibsen, Strindberg, and Chekhov and the present are the full dimensions of tragedy presented. Some critics suggested that it was too late for tragedy, that modern man no longer valued himself highly enough, that too many sociological and ideological factors were working against the tragic temperament. The long and successful career of Eugene O'Neill may be a partial answer to this criticism. He has been called the first American to succeed in writing tragedy for the theatre, a fulfillment of his avowed purpose, for he had declared that in the tragic, alone, lay the meaning of life —and the hope. He sought in Freud's concept of the subconscious the equivalent of the Greek idea of fate and modelled his great trilogy, *Mourning Becomes Electra* (1931), on Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. Although the hovering sense of an ancient evil is powerful, the psychological conditioning controls the characters too nakedly. They themselves declare forces that determine their behaviour, so that they seem almost to connive in their own manipulation. *Desire Under the Elms* (1924) presents a harsh analysis of decadence in the sexual and avaricious intrigues of a New England farmer's family, unrelieved by manifestations of the transcendent human spirit. *The Great God Brown* (1926) and *Long Day's Journey into Night* (1939–41; first performance, 1956) come closer to true tragedy. In the latter, the capacity for self-knowledge is demonstrated by each member of the wrangling Tyrone family (actually, O'Neill's own; the play is frankly autobiographical). The insistent theme of the "death wish" (another example of Freud's influence), however, indicates too radical a pessimism for tragedy; even the character of Edmund Tyrone, O'Neill's own counterpart, confesses that he has always been a little in love with death, and in another late play, *The Iceman Cometh* (1939), the death wish is more strongly expressed. Although he never succeeded in establishing a tragic theatre comparable to the great theatres of the past, O'Neill made a significant contribution in his sustained concentration on subjects at least worthy of such a theatre. He made possible the significant, if slighter, contributions of Arthur Miller, whose *Death of a Salesman* (1949) and *A View from the Bridge* (1955) contain material of tragic potential that is not fully realized. Tennessee Williams' *Streetcar Named Desire* (1947) is a sensitive study of the breakdown of a character under social and psychological stress. As with Miller's plays, however, it remains in the area of pathos rather than tragedy.

Other serious drama. The 20th century has produced much serious and excellent drama, which, though not in the main line of the tragic tradition, deserves mention. In British theatre, George Bernard Shaw's *Saint Joan* (1923) and T.S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral* (1935) dramatized with great power both doubt and affirmation, the ambiguity of human motives, and the possibility of fruitless suffering that are true of the human condition as reflected by tragedy. During the Irish literary revival, the work of J.M. Synge (*Riders to the Sea*, 1904) and Sean O'Casey (*Shadow of a Gunman*, 1923), like Faulkner's work, sought a tragic theme in the destiny of a whole people. The masterpiece of this movement, however, is not a tragedy but a comic inversion of the ancient tragedy of *Oedipus*—Synge's *Playboy of the Western World* (1907).

The drama of social protest—exemplified in such works as the Russian Maksim Gorky's *Lower Depths* (1902), the German Bertolt Brecht's *Threepenny Opera* (1928) and *Mother Courage* (1941), and the American Clifford Odets' *Waiting for Lefty* (1935)—shares the tragedians' concern for evils that frustrate or destroy human values. The evils, however, are largely external, identifiable, and, with certain recommended changes in the social order, remediable. The type shows how vulnerable tragedy is to dogma or programs of any sort. A British author, George Orwell, suggested in *Nineteen Eighty-four* that tragedy would cease to exist under pure Marxist statism. Brecht's fine sense of irony and moral paradox redeem him from absolute dogmatism but give his work a hard satiric thrust that is inimical to tragedy. Traditional values and moral imperatives are all but neutralized in the existentialist worlds of the dramas and novels of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, two outstanding philosopher-dramatists of the post World War II era. In their works, the protagonist is called upon to forge his own values, if he can, in a world in which the disparity between the ideal (what man longs for) and the real (what he gets) is so great as to reduce the human condition to incoherence and absurdity. Plays that led to the coinage of the term the theatre of the absurd are exemplified by *Waiting for Godot* (1952) and *The Killer* (1959), respectively by the Irish writer Samuel Beckett and the Romanian Eugène Ionesco, both of whom pursued their careers in Paris. Here, the theme of victimization is at its extreme, the despair and defeat almost absolute.

A coherent and affirmative view of man, society, and the cosmos is vital to tragedy—however tentative the affirmation may be. Unresolved questions remain at the end of every tragedy. There is always an irrational factor, disturbing, foreboding, not to be resolved by the sometime consolations of philosophy and religion or by any science of the mind or body; there is irretrievable loss, usually though not necessarily symbolized by the death of the hero. In the course of the action, however, in the development of character, theme, and situation and in the conceptual suggestiveness of language, tragedy presents the positive terms in which these questions might be answered. The human qualities are manifest, however limited; man's freedom is real, however marginal. The forces that bear him down may be mysterious but actual—fate, the gods, chance, the power of his own or the race's past working through his soul. Though never mastered, they can be contended with, defied, and, at least in spirit, transcended. The process is cognitive; man can learn.

Absence of tragedy in Oriental drama. In no way can the importance of a conceptual basis for tragedy be better illustrated than by a look at other drama-producing cultures with radically different ideas of the individual, his nature, and his destiny. While the cultures of India, China, and Japan have produced significant and highly artistic drama, there is little here to compare in magnitude, intensity, and freedom of form to the tragedies of the West.

In Buddhist teaching, the aim of the individual is to suppress and regulate all those questioning, recalcitrant, rebellious impulses that first impel the Western hero toward his tragic course. The goal of Nirvāṇa is the extinction of those impulses, the quieting of the passions, a kind of *quietus* in which worldly existence ceases. Western tragedy celebrates life, and the tragic hero clings to it: to him, it is never "sweet to die" for his country or for anything else, and the fascination for Western audiences is to follow the hero—as it were, *from the inside*—as he struggles to assert himself and his values against whatever would deny them. In Oriental drama, there is no such intense focus on the individual. In the Japanese Nō plays, for instance, the hero may be seen in moments of weariness and despair, of anger or confusion, but the mood is lyric, and the structure of the plays is ritualistic, with a great deal of choral intoning, dancing, and stylized action. Although a number of Nō plays can be produced together to fill a day's performance, the individual plays are very short, hardly the length of a Western one-act play. Nō plays affirm orthodoxy, rather than probing and questioning it, as Western tragedies do.

The drama in India has a long history, but there too the individual is subordinated to the mood of the idyll or romance or epic adventure. Perhaps one reason why the drama of India never developed the tragic orientation of the West is its removal from the people; it has never known the communal involvement of the Greek and Eliz-

abethan theatres. Produced mainly for court audiences, an upper class elite, it never reflected the sufferings of common (or uncommon) humanity. Only recently has the drama in China embraced the vigour and realism of the common people, but the drama is in the service not of the individual but of a political ideology, which replaces the traditional themes of ancestor worship and filial piety. In all this, the mighty pageant figure—Oedipus, Prometheus, Lear, or Ahab standing for the individual as he alone sees and feels the workings of an unjust universe—is absent.

Tragedy in Nō drama

An example from the Nō plays will illustrate these generalizations. In *The Hoka Priests*, by Zenchiku Ujinobu (1414–99), a son is confronted with Hamlet's problem—*i.e.*, that of avenging the death of his father. He is uncertain how to proceed, since his father's murderer has many bold fellows to stand by him, while he is all alone. He persuades his brother, a priest, to help him, and disguising themselves as priests, they concoct a little plot to engage the murderer in religious conversation. There are a few words of lament—"Oh why,/ Why back to the bitter World/ Are we borne by our intent?"—and the Chorus sings lyrically about the uncertainties of life. The theme of the conversation is the unreality of the World and the reality of Thought. At an appropriate moment, the brothers cry, "Enough! Why longer hide our plot?" The murderer places his hat on the floor and exits. The brothers mime the killing of the murderer in a stylized attack upon the hat, while the Chorus describes and comments on the action: "So when the hour was come/ Did these two brothers/ By sudden resolution/ Destroy their father's foe./ For valour and piety are their names remembered/ Even in this aftertime" (translated by Arthur Waley, *The Nō Plays of Japan*, 1921).

Thus the Nō avoids directly involving the audience in the emotions implicit in the events portrayed on the stage. It gives only a slight hint of the spiritual struggle in the heart of the protagonist—a struggle that is always speedily resolved in favour of traditional teaching. In play after play the action does not take place before our eyes but is re-enacted by the ghost of one of the participants. Thus, the events presented are tinged with memory or longing—hardly the primary emotions that surge through and invigorate Western tragedy at its best.

Loss of viability in the West. The absence, even in the West, of a great tragic theatre in the 20th century may be explained by the pantheon of panaceas to which modern man has subscribed. Politics, psychology, social sciences, physical sciences, nationalism, the occult—each offered a context in terms of which he might act out his destiny, were it not crowded out by the others. Modern man is not tested but harried and not by gods but, too often, by demons. In the dramas of Athens and England, tragedy was born of the impossibility of a clear-cut victory in man's struggle with powers greater than himself. In the modern drama, the struggle itself seems impossible.

The would-be hero is saved from a meaningful death by being condemned to a meaningless life. This, too, however, has its tragic dimension, in its illustration of the power of evil to survive from millennium to millennium in the presence or the absence of the gods.

Tragedy is a means of coming to terms with that evil. To assume that tragedy has lost viability is to forget that this viability was seriously questioned by the first Western philosopher to address himself to the problem. An account of the development of the theory of tragedy will reveal a resourcefulness in man's critical powers that can help to compensate, or occasionally even supersede, his lapsing creative powers. (R.B.S.)

THEORY OF TRAGEDY

Classical theories of tragedy. As the great period of Athenian drama drew to an end at the beginning of the 4th century BC, Athenian philosophers began to analyze its content and formulate its structure. In the thought of Plato (*c.* 427–347 BC), the history of the criticism of tragedy began with speculation on the role of censorship. To Plato (in the dialogue on the *Laws*) the state was the noblest work of art, a representation (*mimēsis*) of the fairest and best life. He feared the tragedians' command of the expressive resources of language, which might be used to the detriment of worthwhile institutions. He feared, too, the emotive effect of poetry, the Dionysian element that is at the very basis of tragedy. Therefore, he recommended that the tragedians submit their works to the rulers, for approval, without which they could not be performed. It is clear that tragedy, by nature exploratory, critical, independent, could not live under such a regimen.

Plato is answered, in effect and perhaps intentionally, by Aristotle's *Poetics*. Aristotle (384–322 BC) defends the purgative power of tragedy and, in direct contradiction to Plato, makes moral ambiguity the essence of tragedy. The tragic hero must be neither a villain nor a virtuous man but a "character between these two extremes, . . . a man who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty [*hamartia*]." The effect on the audience will be similarly ambiguous. A perfect tragedy, he says, should imitate actions that excite "pity and fear." He uses Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* as a paradigm. Near the beginning of the play, Oedipus asks how his stricken city (the counterpart of Plato's state) may cleanse itself, and the word he uses for the purifying action is a form of the word catharsis. The concept of catharsis provides Aristotle with his reconciliation with Plato, a means by which to satisfy the claims of both ethics and art. "Tragedy," says Aristotle, "is an imitation [*mimēsis*] of an action that is serious, complete and of a certain magnitude . . . through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation [catharsis] of these emotions." Ambiguous means may be employed, Aristotle maintains in contrast to Plato, to a virtuous and purifying end.

To establish the basis for a reconciliation between ethical and artistic demands, Aristotle insists that the principal element in the structure of tragedy is not character but plot. Since the erring protagonist is always in at least partial opposition to the state, the importance of tragedy lies not in him but in the enlightening event. "Most important of all," Aristotle said, "is the structure of the incidents. For tragedy is an imitation not of men but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. . . ." Aristotle considered the plot to be the soul of a tragedy, with character in second place. The goal of tragedy is not suffering but the knowledge that issues from it, as the denouement issues from a plot. The most powerful elements of emotional interest in tragedy, according to Aristotle, are reversal of intention or situation (*peripeteia*) and recognition scenes (*anagnōrisis*), and each is most effective when it is coincident with the other. In *Oedipus*, for example, the messenger who brings Oedipus news of his real parentage, intending to allay his fears, brings about a sudden reversal of his fortune, from happiness to misery, by compelling him to recognize that his wife is also his mother.

Later critics found justification for their own predilections in the authority of Greek drama and Aristotle. For example, the Roman poet Horace (65–8 BC), in his *Ars poetica* (*Art of Poetry*), elaborated the Greek tradition of extensively narrating offstage events into a dictum on decorum forbidding events such as Medea's butchering of her boys from being performed on stage. And where Aristotle had discussed tragedy as a separate genre, superior to epic poetry, Horace discussed it as a genre with a separate style, again with considerations of decorum foremost. A theme for comedy may not be set forth in verses of tragedy; each style must keep to the place alloted it.

On the basis of this kind of stylistic distinction, the *Aeneid*, the epic poem of Virgil, Horace's contemporary, is called a tragedy by the fictional Virgil in Dante's *Divine Comedy*, on the grounds that the *Aeneid* treats only of lofty things. Dante (1265–1321) calls his own poem a comedy partly because he includes "low" subjects in it. He makes this distinction in his *De vulgari eloquentia* (1304–06; "On the Vernacular Tongue"), in which he also declares the subjects fit for the high, tragic style to be salvation, love, and virtue. Despite the presence of these subjects in this poem, he calls it a comedy because his

E020401 JAPAN.DEFENSE SPENDING

Ever since we helped rebuild Europe and Japan after the war, we have had a partnership with out allies. Today, they are stronger -- and better able to help in meeting new challenges. They should do more, and they will do more, if I am elected.

08/22/88 '88 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

√E020403 JAPAN.US RELATIONS

Our future relations with Vietnam will depend on its satisfactorily accounting for all POW/MIA's and abandoning its inhumane domestic policies and aggressive foreign policy. We need to achieve a greater level of cooperation in our security relations with allies such as Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and friends such as China, in order to contain Soviet expansionism in the area, since the Soviet Pacific fleet is already larger than the entire U.S. Navy and Soviet SS-20 missiles remain targeted on China and Japan. We must channel competition in the region towards economic growth and away from the threat of force. By working together, we can lay the basis for a "pacific" 21st century of peace and prosperity.

06/28/88 BUSH POSITION PAPERS

There is no region of the world in which U.S. economic, political, and security interests are growing faster than East Asia and the Pacific basin. Much of our future economic growth will be driven by trade and investment across the Pacific, which already surpasses trade and investment across the Atlantic. It is welcome news for all Americans that the dynamism and growth of this vital region is being fueled by market economies where democracy is on the march.

Yet we need to ensure that our trading partners open their markets more fairly to U.S. goods and services and to contribute more equitably to sharing the burdens of maintaining the security of the free world that has make their economic success possible. We call upon Japan to join us in forging an effective new partnership by dramatically increasing its economic and security assistance to developing countries and to help solve the Third World debt crisis. We must encourage China to continue its pragmatic economic modernization policies. In the Philippines, where we have played a key supportive role in restoring"democracy, we need to marshall a multilateral effort to provide greater assistance for economic growth through private enterprise and to help the people to resist the Marxist guerrillas who now occupy a third of the country. We applaud Korea's dramatic economic success and its equally dramatic success at democratization, and we continue to view that country as a key to Asian security.

06/28/88 BUSH POSITION PAPERS

NO: 208010
DATE: 7/23/88

FOREIGN POLICY/ JAPAN

STATEMENT OF VICE PRESIDENT
GEORGE BUSH

The U.S.- Japan relationship stands at the core of a tremendous success story for America and the Free World in the Asia and the Pacific region. Today, we enjoy the best relations with Japan and China in this century. Economic growth from Korea to Thailand and Indonesia is being matched by political development as well. This, is the central fact to be remembered -- economic vitality giving rise to political maturity, all fostered by Americas, transformed Asia from the fractious and divided territory that it was in the 1960s to the most dynamic economic area of the world.

Our relationship with Japan is unique. Their economy is second only to our own. Investment and trade are at remarkable levels. Despite sharp increases in exports to Japan over recent months, we have a huge trade imbalance but we are making progress in getting Japan to open its markets. Free trade is the way to go and I will push the Japanese to open their markets just as hard as I will resist protectionist legislation in this country.

I do not believe that Japan is getting a free ride on defense. It is an important ally doing a good job of deterring war in its part of the world. Its land, sea and air power are comparable to England and Germany. Moreover, it supports our forces in Japan to the tune of more than $40,000 a year for every American soldier, sailor, or marine based on their territory. Those American bases are stable and vital elements in our ability to safeguard America and American interests in the Pacific. Rather than pushing Japan to build unnecessary military forces, I would much rather capitalize on a growing Japanese realization that their tremendously powerful economic position carries growing responsibilities with it. The Japanese are now increasing their multi-billion dollar aid program. I am happy to see this -- I encourage it and I look forward to working with the Japanese so that we can transform this amazing relationship into a new form of partnership with the U.S. continuing to play the predominant military role and with the Japanese becoming a major donor of aid to the Third World.

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I call that responsibility sharing, not just a tit-for-tat balancing of costs, but a mutual, cooperative effort that increases the strength of the Free World.

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the ASEAN side to roll back trade measures which were inconsistent with the GATT. In response, the ASEAN delegations noted the U.S. concerns and added that they were being considered primarily at the bilateral level.

The ASEAN delegation discussed the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 and the "Controlled Carriers Act." The U.S. side responded that, based on previous unsuccessful efforts to obtain a legislative exemption from the Controlled Carriers Act, it did not believe the U.S. Congress would either ratify a treaty or pass any other legislation to exempt ASEAN carriers as a class. The United States informed ASEAN that a review of the 1984 Shipping Act was due in 1989 and advised ASEAN to present its views directly to the Congress at that time. In this regard ASEAN stressed the need for the U.S. Administration to give higher priority to using its good offices, especially with the private sector, in resolving these outstanding issues as the value of ASEAN-U.S. shipping and freight was $3.5 billion annually.

Investment Cooperation

ASEAN and the United States agreed that private foreign investment had an important role to play in ASEAN's development. ASEAN informed the U.S. side of the steps being taken to improve the investment climate in the region, particularly the improvements ageed to at the third ASEAN summit with respect to the ASEAN industrial joint ventures scheme. The ASEAN side urged the United States to consider providing assistance in the following areas: (a) identifying investment projects of interest to both ASEAN and U.S. investors; (b) mounting investment missions and industrial conferences to increase U.S. business awareness of opportunities in ASEAN; and (c) organizing a workshop involving U.S. and ASEAN officials and the U.S. private sector to increase understanding concerning business conditions and expectations in ASEAN. The U.S. side affirmed that both sides agreed that private foreign investment had an important role to play in ASEAN's development. The United States believed the best way to attract foreign investment was by removing barriers rather than by providing investment incentives. The U.S. side also urged the ASEAN governments to support the U.S. proposal in the GATT new round concerning the elimination of investment measures which distort or impede trade flows.

Development Cooperation

The two sides reviewed with satisfaction the progress made in development cooperation and agreed that new areas should be identified in the context of a medium- and long-term economic cooperation program.

Date and Venue of the Next Meeting

Both sides agreed that the ninth dialogue would be held in Thailand. Both sides agreed that the date and specific venue would be determined subsequently though diplomatic channels.

[1]Press release 16. ■

U.S.-Japanese Relations in Focus

by William Clark, Jr.

Address before the University of Georgia Alumni Society's seminar on Japan in Athens on February 12, 1988. Mr. Clark is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Dr. Sigur [Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] is sorry he could not be with you, but I am delighted to be here today on his behalf to speak to you about our most important bilateral relationship: that between the United States and Japan. For two nations to be so closely intertwined as the United States and Japan today, despite dissimilar histories and a bitter war still within memory, is unprecedented. It is difficult to understand how we could have forged, during the period following World War II, such a remarkably durable alliance.

We have built this alliance over 40 years upon shared values and extensive mutual interests and on those things we need from each other. Our relationship is now deep and multidimensional. And it is important that we keep the many dimensions in mind as we confront difficult individual issues. For while the United States and Japan continue to be close partners, both in the economic arena and in terms of international political and security cooperation, it is also true that headlines about our relations these days more often than not highlight trade frictions between the two nations. Someone once said good news is no news. Still I would like to accentuate the positive, without overlooking the sore points, to bring our relationship with Japan into better focus.

Japan's extraordinary economic ascendance and our own trade and budget deficits have led many to see Japan as a hostile economic competitor and the United States as in danger of losing its preeminence as the economic and political leader of the free world. This view overlooks the many benefits our relationship with Japan brings to us and strays from the traditional American spirit of competition. We Americans are competitors. We believe competition—open and fair competition—makes us excel. That philosophy is the basis of our policy toward Japan. We are determined to bring our trade with Japan into a more balanced equilibrium, to promote our own economic interests, and to maintain our strong political and security relationship.

Japan's selection of a new prime minister last November and his visit to Washington this January provided the opportunity for a fresh look at our bilateral relationship. Ambassador [to Japan] Mike Mansfield has called it the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none. During his January visit to Washington, Prime Minister Takeshita, a most experienced and capable political leader, reaffirmed his view that Japan's relations with the United States are the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. President Reagan emphasized Japan's role as America's most important partner and ally in the Pacific. Let me touch on the reasons why the United States and Japan should view each other as close allies, as well as tough competitors.

Economic Ties

At about $115 billion last year, two-way trade between our countries is larger than the gross national product of most nations. The United States is Japan's number one export market, absorbing 36% of Japan's exports, and Japan is our number one supplier. In return Japan receives about 11% of U.S. exports, including $6.8 billion in foodstuffs last year, making Japan by far the U.S. farmer's best customer. In fact Japan bought more goods from the United States than did West Germany,

France, and Italy combined. We estimate that the $27.5 billion in goods Japan bought from us last year sustained over 700,000 American jobs.

Within Japan we are the number one foreign investor at $11 billion. American firms such as IBM, Xerox, and Schick hold significant market positions in Japan. Affiliates of U.S. multinationals had $80 billion in sales, imported $3 billion in goods from the United States, and had $2 billion in net income in Japan in 1985. And right from Georgia, the Coca Cola Company took an estimated 60% share of the Japanese soft drink market that year.

In the United States, Japanese direct investment is rising dramatically, although Japan is only the number three foreign investor behind the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, with $24 billion in direct investments. In 1985 Japanese firms employed 208,000 Americans and exported $23 billion in goods. Since then, to use the auto industry as an important example, each of the major Japanese companies has built plants here, bought more U.S.-made parts, and begun implementing plans to export cars back to Japan.

In 1986 we estimate that Japanese investors put $65 billion into U.S. money markets. Interest on our budget deficit would increase if Japanese funds did not flow in. The United States is the Japanese investment country of choice. In 1987 Japan's net overseas investment increased to an astounding total of $137 billion. Japan exports more capital overseas in global investments than it earns from its current account surplus.

Since 1981 our trade imbalance with Japan has tripled, from $18 billion to $60 billion. The U.S. global trade deficit quadrupled from $40 billion to about $170 billion over the same period. There are barriers to U.S. exports in Japan, and these must be dismantled. But the imbalance with Japan is a symptom of broader macroeconomic forces. We have a global trade imbalance problem, as well as a bilateral one.

We have worked hard with Japan to reduce these external imbalances—Japan's surplus and the U.S. deficit—while maintaining non-inflationary growth. The most visible aspect of this cooperation has been the appreciation of the yen from 265 to 130 per dollar since 1985. This has helped boost U.S. exports and helped U.S. firms win market share in Japan and at home.

At the same time, new purchases of foreign assets became economical for Japanese overseas investors. When converted to dollars at the new rate, Japan's per capita GNP now exceeds our own. Foreign travel and imported goods are great bargains now for most Japanese. And the physical volume of Japan's exports has declined along with the yen value of those exports. Growth now comes from Japan's domestic economy, not exports.

Japan's global current account surplus, which was $87 billion in 1987, and our bilateral trade imbalance are projected to decline this year. Japan is shifting from export-led to domestic-led growth policies to aid the reduction further. Japan had negative net external growth in 1987 and strong domestic expansion and is expected to have 3.7% real GNP growth in the fiscal year which ends in March.

Already, by taking measures to spur private consumption, housing investment, and public works, the Japanese Government has reduced reliance on export-led growth. An influential study, the Maekawa report issued in April 1986, contains a blueprint for alleviating the Japanese surplus and putting Japan on course for economic growth in harmony with the needs of its economic partners. It has been embraced by Japan's business leadership and supported by Prime Minister Takeshita, but only partially implemented. We encourage Japan to follow through on its recommendations.

In sum, our economic policy toward Japan has as its central goal the expansion of trade, not the limiting of it. We seek removal of individual trade barriers. We encourage appropriate structural and macroeconomic reforms in Japan. And we seek to cooperate with Japan in promoting the success of the new GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] trade round, where we both aim to establish new rules for trade in agriculture, services, and intellectual property.

Security Ties

Since 1952 when the U.S.-Japan peace treaty went into effect, Japan has become a valued U.S. ally and a staunch member of the Western community. The bilateral arrangements established under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security have been crucial to peace and stability in East Asia. That treaty, spelling out our security relationship with Japan, is the cornerstone of U.S. security policy in the Pacific.

Japan's 1947 constitution precludes the projection of force abroad or an assertive military role in international relations. But Japanese perceptions of its security requirements have been made acute by Soviet intransigence on territorial issues, by the relentless Soviet military buildup in the Pacific, and by Moscow's aggression in Afghanistan and its support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. A consensus has emerged in Japan which supports steady improvements in Japan's self-defense capabilities and expanded bilateral defense cooperation with the United States.

Our defense cooperation with Japan has never been better. Japan hosts some 60,000 U.S. troops and supports 7th Fleet ship visits and homeporting, including the only U.S. aircraft carrier battle group based overseas. Japan contributes $2.5 billion annually in "host-nation" support for U.S. Forces Japan. At over $40,000 per U.S. troop, that is the most generous "host-nation" support arrangement we have anywhere in the world. U.S. bases and facilities in Japan enable us to maintain regional defense capabilities, thus serving both U.S. and mutual security interests. We maintain these bases because it is in our own self-interest, our own self-defense, to do so.

The United States and Japan engage in extensive joint planning and exercises. Japan is participating in President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and transfers of important military technology from Japan to the United States are on the rise.

Just as Japan's "host-nation" support of U.S. forces and U.S.-Japan defense cooperation have increased, so has Japan's own self-defense efforts. Japan has undertaken to defend its territorial homeland, skies, and sealanes out to 1,000 nautical miles, providing a credible deterrent to Soviet adventurism in Northeast Asia. This allows flexibility for U.S. forces in case of emergencies in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans. None of our forces in Japan is tied to the direct defense of Japan. Their role is regional.

These defense roles are consistent with Japanese and American expectations. They are in keeping with the views of Japan's neighbors which still remain sensitive to past militarism. Japanese defense spending rose 5.4% a year in real terms over the last 10 years. For FY 1988, the Japanese defense budget is $30 billion, fifth largest in the world and second largest of any non-nuclear power.

Mutual Need and Common Values

A book on U.S.-Japan relations just published by the Council on Foreign Relations is titled *For Richer, For Poorer*, and I want to borrow the metaphor of marriage it uses to characterize the U.S.-Japan relationship. Despite the competitive frictions in our partnership, we can profit more together than apart.

In many of our industries most affected by Japanese competition, such as electronics or autos, calls for barriers or "tough action" on trade cause us to overlook quietly successful U.S.-Japanese joint operations. All the U.S. auto companies have cross-invested and cross-marketed with their Japanese competitors. Electronics giants such as IBM, Motorola, Texas Instruments, and others have joint ventures, wholly owned subsidiaries, or both in Japan. More and more, as interrelationships grow to maturity among U.S. and Japanese companies, consumers will benefit and trade will grow.

In Japan today, the younger generation, raised in relative affluence, seems to be shifting to greater consumerism. The Japanese Government can help this trend and help U.S. products by removing structural inefficiencies, such as those in agriculture and distribution, which limit sales of foreign products most.

In contrast, Japan-Soviet relations are not close. The Soviets, since World War II, have occupied and militarized four Japanese islands known as the Northern Territories. Japan joined world condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Cambodia by Moscow's clients in Hanoi. It has helped provide UN refugee relief for the victims of these cruel tragedies. Following the Toshiba Machine Company affair, the Japanese Government and Japanese firms have become increasingly wary of Soviet interest in high technology.

In a fundamental sense, our mutual security and the security our alliance with Japan provides other friends and allies in the Pacific is as strong as it has ever been. At its core, it is sustained by beliefs both partners cherish dearly. A common faith in democracy, human rights, and free enterprise has permitted two great nations to remain competitors and friends for over three decades.

It is interesting to note that in recent years, the level and frequency of the U.S.-Japan bilateral dialogue has changed dramatically. Starting with Gerald Ford, all our Presidents have visited Japan while in office. President Reagan did so in 1983 and again in 1986 for the Tokyo [economic] summit. During former Foreign Minister Abe's 4-year tenure, he and Secretary Shultz met almost 30 times. Subcabinet level meetings seem to be in almost constant session; all signs of a strong relationship with a key ally.

Despite its own self-image, Japan is not, and never has been, a poor island nation without natural resources. Japan's vibrant culture and industrious people have insured its strength and prosperity. Its modern combination of great financial power, cutting-edge technology, and strong international companies makes Japan a force to be taken seriously. It can make Japan a force for peace and progress, much as the United States has been in the postwar era.

Japan's leadership realizes that it must take actions to preserve the free market trading system, if for no other reason than to keep from being isolated in an increasingly trade-conscious world. But we need Japan to do more and have urged Japan to assume a global political role commensurate with its status as a world economic superpower. The Japanese leadership has sought to do that in numerous ways that support our shared foreign policy goals.

Japan has contributed to decisionmaking on U.S. arms control initiatives, including the U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. In the Persian Gulf, where the U.S. fleet is protecting U.S. flag ships sailing to Japan and elsewhere with energy cargoes, Japan has taken steps to increase aid flows to Oman and Jordan and to install a precise navigational aid system with a $10 million price tag for the benefit of commercial mariners from all nations.

In the Philippines, Japanese aid flows have increased enormously since the Aquino government took the stage, amounting to over $600 million in JFY 1987. Prime Minister Takeshita made his first overseas trip a visit to Manila for an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) conference last December.

In fact Japan is the world's second largest donor of foreign aid after the United States. Together we provide about 45% of all economic assistance to developing nations. It is in this area that we are at work to map out constructive, mutually reinforcing strategies to benefit nations in need of growth and nourishment. Japan is the leading donor of economic aid to China and provides Korea with economic assistance as well. Tokyo gives aid to Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, nations of strategic importance to the West. In short Japan has taken significant steps to play a larger role in the field of aid, and this has greatly benefitted stability and development in areas of vital interest to us both.

Structural changes in its economy can provide an even more important opportunity for Japanese cooperation. If Japan can accelerate imports of low and middle technology products, particularly from the developing world, it can offer a new opportunity for global economic growth which has been provided by the United States in the past. There are signs that this is happening. Japanese firms are erecting new factories in ASEAN countries, the United States, and Europe, but they have yet to export homeward as U.S. multinationals have.

We must continue to consult on international security, trade, and investment issues and encourage Japan to expand and deepen its role in the global economic institutions: the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the international development banks. Trade is only one of several economic imbalances facing the United States, Japan, and the rest of the world. The Third World debt crisis threatens the international banking system. There is a glut of agricultural production worldwide, much of it caused by too much government support and artificial incentives to produce.

Now is a time of change, fraught with opportunity. The dawn of the information age offers challenges that the free nations of the world are best posed to meet, and the United States best of all. The example of Japan's economic ascent under a democratic, free-market orientation has invigorated Asia. Around the world, the American example of democracy and free enterprise is imitated, from the Philippines to Korea to Central America. Economic and political reforms in China, Hungary, and even the Soviet Union demonstrate this is true even behind the Iron Curtain. There is a connection between freedom and economic progress. We can be proud of our example.

There are pages we can borrow from the guide to Japanese success. We

need to reduce budget deficits, to increase productivity and competitiveness, and to make more vigorous efforts to export quality goods.

Japan looks to the United States and sees lessons for itself. Japan seeks to imitate our success in higher education. Japanese brood over why a Japanese scientist won a Nobel prize for research performed in the United States, not at home where laboratories are hierarchically organized. Japanese pundits now look at the U.S. experience for clues as their own multinationals adopt overseas manufacturing strategies to survive the rapid appreciation of the yen.

After all the changes and adjustments in recent years, our $4.5 trillion economy remains significantly larger than Japan's, at $2.7 trillion. Japan's prosperity is dependent more than ours on stable overseas energy supplies. High land prices, directly related to Japan's protection of agriculture, deny most Japanese what is taken for granted by middle-class Americans, the ability to own your own home. It is amazing to read that the total price for Japan's land is more than twice that of all the land in the United States, with our natural resources and greater size.

In the U.S.-Japan relationship, as in many others, simplistic reactions to trade imbalances and economic adjustments are wrong, even counterproductive. We see rising employment, excellent products, and new technologies emerging all around us. Despite the adjustments forced by Japanese competition on many of our important industries, the bottom line is that total employment growth in the United States has outpaced that of Europe and Japan in this decade. U.S. manufacturing has achieved greater productivity to meet international competition, so that today our exports are booming and the goods-producing sector of our economy provides 22% of gross national product, which is consistent with our historical average.

So it is within the context of our global economic, political, and security partnership that we must deal with the serious trade imbalance between the United States and Japan. Our relationship today is at once broader, more complicated, and less divisible than just a few years ago. In our own interest, we must conduct our relations with Japan in such a way as to maximize the benefit for the United States and for Japan. If we do, together we will surely benefit the world. ■

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister



(White House photo by Pete Souza)

Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of Japan made an official working visit to Washington, D.C., January 12–15, 1988, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks made by President Reagan and Prime Minister Takeshita following their meeting on January 13 and the text of the joint statement on economic issues.[1]

REMARKS, JAN. 13, 1988

President Reagan

It has been a great pleasure to welcome Prime Minister Takeshita on his first visit to Washington since taking office in November. He is the leader of one of the world's great nations and one of America's most valued friends.

Our meetings were constructive and amiable. We discussed the vital issues of the day and established an excellent personal rapport. Good personal relationships between the leaders of Japan and the United States are essential as our two nations strive to confront the challenges of this century and the next.

During our discussions today, Prime Minister Takeshita and I found that our views on international questions coincide to a remarkable degree. We share an abiding commitment to democratic institutions and to free markets to protect freedom and human rights. We are dedicated to improving the economic well-being not just of our own people but of all mankind. In this regard, I was especially pleased with the Prime Minister's global economic perspective. He outlined significant plans for expanding Japanese domestic demand and stimulating growth. He reviewed Japan's plan to increase its foreign assistance budget next year to an amount second only to that of the United States. And he expressed Japan's determination to continue the process of economic adjustment.

The Prime Minister and I discussed and affirmed our support for the economic policy coordination process adopted at the Tokyo and Venice economic summits. A joint statement concerning our bilateral undertakings in that regard will be released shortly.

The U.S.-Japan treaty of mutual cooperation and security is the foundation upon which our relationship is built. I was satisfied to note that U.S.-Japan cooperation in the national security area is strong and growing and that Japan's recently announced budget provides for continued significant increases in the area of national defense. Japan's growing contribution to the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan is of immense value to the United States. I might add that Japan's national defense program is entirely consistent with the concept of self-defense and in no way poses any threat to others.

During our meetings, I briefed the Prime Minister on the details of last month's summit. We agreed on the benefits of the INF Treaty, and he was encouraged by the possibility of even further arms cuts with the Soviet Union. I was gratified that the Prime Minister expressed Japan's fullest support of our actions, and I assured him that we would consult fully with all of our allies as we continue our discussions with the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister and I recognized the danger posed to our mutual security in the export of certain kinds of high technology. The Prime Minister assured me that Japan has taken the necessary legislative and administrative measures to prevent technology leakage. I told the Prime Minister that I appreciated his actions and his commitment to the vigorous implementation of controls over exports of sensitive technology.

The Prime Minister and I concur on the importance of the new nuclear cooperation agreement. We believe it to be a good agreement, and we will exert our best efforts to have it come into force expeditiously.

The Prime Minister noted that Japan's global trade surplus is declining and underlined his determination to address bilateral issues. I was pleased with his assurance that he intends to resolve a particularly difficult trade issue—the problem of access for the U.S. construction industry—in a satisfactory manner.

We agree the Uruguay Round [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations] must succeed and that revision of the world trading system should include a comprehensive reform of trade in agriculture and services. I expressed appreciation for the Prime Minister's efforts on trade, stressing the urgency of expanding opportunities for U.S. farmers and other exporters at a time of increasing pressure for protectionism here in the United States. We concurred on the importance of keeping trade flowing and barriers down. For our part, I intend to continue my efforts to reduce our budget deficit, improve American competitiveness, and combat protectionism.

We reaffirmed our determination to conclude a new science and technology agreement, with equitable and expanding research benefits for scientists of both countries. I expressed appreciation for Japan's initiatives to provide more than $4 million in science fellowships to American researchers. We also reaffirmed the spirit of the 1983 U.S.-Japan joint policy statement on energy cooperation.

The Prime Minister and I noted with satisfaction political developments in the Republic of Korea and our intention to help make the 1988 Olympic Games a success. We also pledged to do our utmost to help the Philippine Government and its people in this period of economic adjustment.

In sum, our talks were positive and forthright, and it's been a great pleasure to have the Prime Minister here with us in Washington. I look forward to being with him again in Toronto this spring.

Prime Minster Takeshita[2]

I'm extremely pleased with the results of the cordial and candid exchange of views I had with you today.

Thanks to your efforts over the past years, the historic INF Treaty was signed last month. I look forward to its expeditious entry into force. And as one representing a member of the West, I am determined to firmly support the President in his pursuit of substantive progress in East-West relations, where much remains to be done across a broad spectrum of areas.

The President and I confirm that the cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, with the unshakable security arrangements as its cornerstone, is essential for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. I will continue my efforts, with the cooperation of the President, for further strengthening the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

I explained to the President that the Government of Japan has continued to provide the funds necessary for achieving its current defense program. Japan has also continued to increase its host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan, whose stationing is an indispensable part of the Japan-U.S. security system. Moreover, in view of the recent economic conditions adversely affecting the financial situation of U.S. forces, I noted to the President that the Government of Japan has decided on its own initiative to increase further Japan's share of such expenditures.

The President and I agreed that today, more than any other time in history, policy coordination among major countries is required to ensure sustained growth of the world economy and to correct external imbalances. In this respect, we agreed that the roles to be fulfilled by Japan and the United States are of vital importance. We shared the recognition that, together with the measures taken by individual countries, stability of exchange rates is indispensable to the achievement of these goals as described in our joint statement.

Fully aware of the heavy responsibility commensurate with Japan's status in the international economy, I am determined to carry out a vigorous economic management policy with emphasis on domestic demand expansion to promote structural adjustment to the improved market access and to strive for a further steady reduction of the current account surplus. In this connection, I explained to the President that despite an expected drop in net exports, Japan's growth for fiscal year 1988 is now projected at 3.8%, a rate higher than the previous fiscal year, through the formation of the fiscal [year] 1988 budget geared toward domestic demand expansion with a substantial increase in public works spending. I also explained the prospect for a $10 billion reduction in Japan's current account surplus for fiscal [year] 1988 through these measures. The President highly appreciated my explanation.

The President, on the other hand, explained that the measures for budget deficit reduction have been enacted based upon the recognition that deficit reduction is essential to the stability of today's world economy. I paid tribute to the President for his endeavors.

With regard to various economic and trade issues which arise as a matter of course between two increasingly interdependent economies of Japan and the United States, the President and I confirmed the basic posture that their solutions should be sought in the spirit of cooperation and joint endeavors and with the aim of expanding, and not contracting, economic exchanges.

I expressed my hope that a mutually satisfactory solution will be reached on the pending issue of access to major Japanese public works on the basis of the proposal that Japan has recently made. I also stated to the President the need for early resolutions of the pending issue of Japan-U.S. semiconductor trade.

The President and I exchanged views on the trade bill currently under deliberation in the U.S. Congress, and I expressed my firm support to the President's determination to contain protectionism. The President and I shared the recognition that this year is especially important for the success of the Uruguay Round and agreed that our two countries should take the lead in its promotion.

I explained Japan's intensive efforts to prevent the recurrence of illegal diversion of high technologies. The President highly appreciated the measures which Japan has taken for this purpose. In this connection, I expressed Japan's deep concern about moves in the U.S. Congress toward sanctions against foreign companies, including Toshiba Corporation. The President and I agreed on the importance of enhancing the cooperation in the field of science and

technology. I explained about my government's initiatives to increase the number of American scientists who will be invited to Japan for research. The President welcomed these initiatives.

I expressed my views concerning the recycling of funds to the developing countries, including the quantitative and qualitative improvement of our official development assistance, in particular, and stated that in the draft budget for fiscal [year] 1988, an increase of 6.5% over the previous year was secured for ODA [official development assistance]. In this connection, I was encouraged that the President appreciated highly my recent participation in the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] summit and my subsequent visit to the Philippines. The President and I affirmed, in particular, to continue our support to the Aquino government and to welcome the Republic of Korea's firm stride along the road of democracy, as evident in the recent presidential election, as well as to cooperate closely toward the success of the Seoul Olympics this fall.

The President and I agreed on the importance of the new Japan-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement and its prompt entry into force. The President and I, looking forward to a successful Toronto summit, agreed to meet again in Toronto.

In completing my meeting with you, Mr. President, I feel confident that we have strengthened further the foundation of the relations between our two countries. It is my determination to build upon this basis to make Japan a nation that contributes to the world.

I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to President and Mrs. Reagan for the warm welcome extended to me and my wife as well as our gratitude to the American people for their kindness and consideration during our stay.

Japan—A Profile



Geography

Area: 377,765 sq. km. (145,856 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than California. **Cities:** *Capital*—Tokyo. *Other major cities*—Yokohama, Nagoya, Sapporo, Osaka, Kyoto. **Terrain:** Rugged, mountainous islands. **Climate:** Varies from subtropical to temperate.

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*—Japanese. **Population** (Dec. 1985 est.): 121,180,000. **Annual growth rate** (1985): 0.6%. **Ethnic groups:** Japanese; Korean 0.6%. **Religions:** Shintoism and Buddhism; Christian 0.8%. **Language:** Japanese. **Education:** *Literacy*—100%. *Life expectancy* (1983)—males 74.2 yrs., females 79.8 yrs. **Work force** (58.0 million, 1985): *Agriculture*—9.5%. *Trade, manufacturing, mining, and construction*—34.1%. *Services*—48.1%. *Government*—5.9%.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy. **Constitution:** May 3, 1947.

Branches: *Executive*—prime minister (head of government). *Legislative*—bicameral *Diet* (House of Representatives and House of Councillors). *Judicial*— Civil law system with Anglo-American influence.

Subdivisions: 47 prefectures.

Political parties: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito (Clean Government Party), Japan Communist Party (JCP). **Suffrage:** Universal over 20.

Flag: Red sun on white field.

Economy

GNP (1985): $1.322 trillion. **Real growth rate:** 4.5% 1985; 4.3% 1975–85. **Per capita GNP** (1985): $10,922.

Natural resources: Negligible mineral resources, fish.

Agriculture: *Products*—rice, vegetables, fruits, milk, meat, silk.

Industry: *Types*—machinery and equipment, metals and metal products, textiles, autos, chemicals, electrical and electronic equipment.

Trade (1985): *Exports*—$175.6 billion: motor vehicles, machinery and equipment, electrical and electronic products, metals and metal products. *Major markets* —U.S. 37.1%, EC 11.4%, Southeast Asia 18.9%, communist countries 9.2%. *Imports*—$129.5 billion: fossil fuels, metal ore, raw materials, foodstuffs, machinery, and equipment. *Major suppliers*—U.S. 19.9%, EC 6.9%, Middle East 23.1%, Southeast Asia 23.4%, communist countries 6.5%.

Fiscal year: April 1–March 31.

Exchange rate (Sept. 1986): About 155 yen = US$1.

Total net official development assistance: $3.8 billion (1985 disbursements 0.29% of GNP).

Membership in International Organizations

UN and several of its specialized and related agencies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Court of Justice (ICJ), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Labor Organization (ILO); International Energy Agency (IEA); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); INTELSAT.

Taken from the *Background Notes* of February 1987, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita Adams. ■

JOINT STATEMENT, JAN. 13, 1988

President Reagan and Prime Minister Takeshita reaffirmed their support for the economic policy coordination process adopted at the Tokyo and Venice summits. The President and Prime Minister endorsed the economic goals and policies set forth in the December 22 statement of the G–7 [Group of Seven finance ministers]. They agreed that the achievement of sustained noninflationary growth and reduced trade imbalances remains a top priority of

their economic policies. They welcomed the recent actions of other industrial countries in support of these objectives, and called on the newly industrialized economies to play a more constructive role in fostering a strong world economy with reduced external imbalances.

The President stressed his determination to continue the progress that has been made in reducing the U.S. budget deficit. He indicated that the fiscal [year] 1989 budget to be transmitted to the Congress will continue the effort to reduce the budget deficit and will meet the deficit reduction objectives established in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget legislation. The President also reiterated his pledge to veto protectionist trade legislation while seeking authority for the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.

Prime Minister Takeshita indicated that Japan will pursue economic policies to continue its strong growth in domestic demand and to reduce its trade surplus. The Prime Minister reaffirmed his commitment to carrying forward structural reform of the Japanese economy through implementation of the recommendations of the Maekawa Report and by accelerating liberalization of domestic financial markets, including deregulation of domestic interest rates. To achieve sustained growth as well as to foster exchange rate stability, the Bank of Japan agrees, under the present stable price conditions, to continue to pursue the current policy stance and to make efforts to accommodate declining short-term interest rates.

The President and the Prime Minister believe that the close coordination of their policies within the framework of the arrangements adopted by the Venice summit is establishing the fundamental economic conditions for greater stability of exchange rates and that a further decline of the dollar could be counterproductive. In addition, they noted that their authorities are cooperating closely on exchange markets and have developed arrangements to assure the adequacy of resources for their cooperative efforts.

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 18, 1988.

[2]Prime Minister Takeshita spoke in Japanese, and his remarks were translated by an interpreter. ■

U.S. Japanese Relations

Background

Since 1952 when the U.S.-Japan peace treaty went into effect, Japan has become a valued U.S. ally, a major economic power, and a staunch member of the Western community. In his January 1988 Washington visit, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita restated the primacy of the U.S. relationship in Japan's foreign policy. Japan receives about 11% of U.S. exports—a share larger than that of any country except Canada—and we buy roughly one-third of Japan's exports. Our combined gross national product totals about one-third of world GNP. Close and cooperative relations with Japan form the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia. The President and Japan's Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister, and subcabinet level officials meet frequently on bilateral and global issues.

Mutual Security

Japan's cooperation with the United States under the 1960 bilateral Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security has been crucial to peace and stability in East Asia. Japan hosts 60,000 U.S. troops and supports 7th Fleet ship visits and homeporting, including the only aircraft carrier battle group based overseas. Japan contributes $2 billion in host-nation support for U.S. forces. U.S. bases and facilities in Japan enable the United States to maintain regional defense capabilities, thus serving our mutual security interests. Although Japan's Constitution and government policy preclude an assertive military role in international relations, Japan has undertaken to defend its sealanes within 1,000 nautical miles, providing a credible deterrent to Soviet adventurism in Northeast Asia and allowing more flexibility for U.S. forces in case of emergencies in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans. Defense spending increased an average 5.4% in real terms over the last 10 years, well above NATO's 3% goal. For FY 1988, the Japanese defense budget is $30 billion, fifth largest in the world and second largest of any non-nuclear power.

Economic Relations

Japan is our largest agricultural customer and our third largest foreign investor. We are Japan's largest export market and largest foreign investor. Our trade deficit with Japan was close to $60 billion in 1986 and again in 1987. Long-term capital inflows from Japan are estimated at $65 billion in 1986, with increasing direct investment in 1987. The United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany, Italy, and France make up the Group of Seven industrial nations that have worked to coordinate exchange rates and economic policies to assure stable economic growth. The yen-dollar rate reached a high point of 262 yen per dollar in February 1985 and lowered to about 130 yen per dollar by January 1988. Over time this will help reduce Japan's global current account surplus ($86 billion in 1986) as well as our bilateral imbalance. Japan is shifting from export-led to domestic-led growth policies to reduce imbalances. After enacting $36 billion in domestic stimulus measures in 1987, Japan experienced negative net external growth and strong domestic expansion and is expected to have 3.7% real GNP growth in its FY 1987 (April 1987-March 1988). Japan's exports measured by volume fell 1.9% in 1987, while imports rose by 8.2%. Japan's current account surplus should decline in 1988.

East-West Issues

Japan has supported U.S. arms control initiatives, including the U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces, which will reduce Soviet missiles in range of Japan. Japan is a member of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) that works to control strategic exports to the Soviet bloc. Following the Toshiba Machine diversion case, Japan strengthened penalties, staffing, and enforcement to prevent future diversions. Relations with the U.S.S.R. have never been close, in part because the Soviets since World War II have occupied four islands that the Japanese claim as their "Northern Territories."

Relations With Other Nations

After relations with the United States, Japan places primary importance on relations with its Asian neighbors. Ties between Beijing and Tokyo have developed rapidly since 1978, and Japan is the leading donor of economic aid to

China. Japan maintains economic, but not diplomatic, relations with Taiwan. Korea receives significant Japanese economic assistance as a result of a historic exchange of visits in 1983, 1984, and 1986 by Prime Minister Nakasone and President Chun. Japan has long-term interests in the Persian Gulf, which supplies most of its oil, and will finance a $10 million system to aid navigation by commercial ships. Tokyo provides economic aid to countries of strategic importance to the West, such as Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, and recently announced new programs for Oman ($200 million) and Jordan ($300 million) to promote regional stability. Japan has become increasingly active in Africa and Latin America through multilateral development projects. It has joined the United States in support of UN refugee relief programs, UNESCO [UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] reform, a $21 million study of alternatives to the Panama Canal, and in many other activities that benefit world peace and prosperity.

Assistance to Less Developed Countries

In 1986–90 Japan will disburse more than $40 billion in foreign assistance, increasing annual aid to more than $7.6 billion. In 1986 Japan was the second largest donor of foreign aid, and Japan could surpass the United States as the world's largest donor in the 1990s. In 1987 Japan announced a $20 billion program to recycle funds to developing countries without restricting purchases with these monies to Japanese goods. Subcabinet level consultations are held regularly to coordinate our foreign assistance programs, and the United States supports Japan's efforts to open its markets to developing countries' products. Japan's aid is distributed roughly 70% to Asia and 10% each to Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

Taken from the GIST series of January 1988, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Harriet Culley. ■

U.S. Removes GSP Status for Four Economies

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JAN. 29, 1988[1]

Because of their remarkable advancements in economic development and their recent improvements in trade competitiveness, President Reagan today has decided to remove four participants from the trade preference program that permits certain imports from developing countries to enter the United States duty-free. Effective January 2, 1989, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan will be graduated from the generalized system of preference (GSP), a move that will affect nearly $10,000 million in imports.

Since its inception in 1976, the generalized system of preferences has been a program of temporary incentives rather than permanent tariff advantages. Through the years, we have regularly reviewed the 3,000 products from 141 beneficiaries that are eligible for GSP treatment and removed benefits from those products that no longer needed preferential treatment to compete in the U.S. market. Today's action is in keeping with the original intent of the program and with its operation during the past 12 years.

Over the past decade, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have made such tremendous strides in their economic development that they can now compete effectively in the United States without preferential treatment. Indeed, they have successfully fulfilled the objectives of the program. Last year nearly 60% of GSP benefits went to these four beneficiaries, a disproportionate amount for such advanced economies. Their graduation will open additional opportunities for the remaining beneficiaries—those most in need of the program.

This move should not be interpreted as penalizing any of the beneficiaries being graduated from the program. On the contrary, it reflects the great economic successes they have had. All four are good friends and valued trading partners. But the generalized system of preferences is a development program, and when GSP beneficiaries no longer need the program benefits, they should be graduated.

America's relationship with these four advanced developing economies has entered a new phase, one that is characterized by greater equality. The United States admires their economic achievements and their advancement toward full partnership in the international trading system. We look forward to continued friendship and even closer economic ties in the years ahead.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET, JAN. 29, 1988[2]

The generalized system of preferences is a program of tariff perferences granted by the United States to developing countries to assist in their economic development. Nineteen other countries also maintain GSP programs. At present the United States grants duty-free treatment to approximately 3,000 products from 141 beneficiaries. Since the program's implementation on January 1, 1976, the value of GSP-eligible benefits has risen from $3,200 million to $13,900 million in 1986.

GSP-eligible imports from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan totaled nearly $10,000 million in 1987. These four beneficiaries alone accounted for 58% of all GSP duty-free trade in 1986 and about 60% through the first 10 months of 1987.

The President took this action after examining a broad range of economic development and competitiveness indicators, including their per capita gross national product, their economic growth rates, and their ability to export manufactured goods into the United States. He has directed the U.S. Trade Representative [Clayton Yeutter] to prepare the necessary documentation to implement his decision.

Although GSP trade with these four beneficiaries is nearly $10,000 million, their graduation from the program will have limited impact on their economies. GSP trade represents only 15%–20% of their total trade with the United States. Furthermore the average U.S. tariff on GSP-eligible items is only about 5%.

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 1, 1988.

[2]Text from White House press release. ■

JAPAN

Introductory Survey

Location, Climate, Language, Religion, Flag, Capital

Japan lies in eastern Asia and comprises a curved chain of more than 3,000 islands. Four large islands, named (from north to south) Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, account for about 98% of the land area. Hokkaido lies just to the south of Sakhalin, a large Soviet island, and about 1,300 km (800 miles) east of the USSR's mainland port of Vladivostok. Southern Japan is about 150 km (93 miles) east of Korea. Although summers are temperate everywhere, the climate in winter varies sharply from cold in the north to mild in the south. Temperatures in Tokyo are generally between −6°C (21°F) and 30°C (86°F). Typhoons and heavy rains are common in summer. The language is Japanese. The major religions are Shintoism and Buddhism, and there is a minority of Christians. The national flag (proportions usually 3 by 2) is white, with a red disc (a sun without rays) in the centre. The capital is Tokyo.

Recent History

Following Japan's defeat in the Second World War, Japanese forces surrendered in August 1945. Japan signed an armistice in September 1945, agreeing to cede control over many of its outer islands, and the country was placed under US military occupation. A new democratic constitution, which took effect from May 1947, renounced war and abandoned the doctrine of the Emperor's divinity. Following the peace treaty of September 1951, Japan regained its sovereignty on 28 April 1952. The Tokara Archipelago and the Amami Islands (parts of the Ryukyu group) were restored to Japanese sovereignty in December 1951 and December 1953 respectively. Rival conservative political groups merged in November 1955 to form the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), which has held power ever since. The Bonin Islands and the remainder of the Ryukyu Islands (including Okinawa), administered by the USA from 1945, were returned to Japan in June 1968 and May 1972 respectively.

Nobusuke Kishi became Prime Minister in February 1957 and held office until July 1960, when he was succeeded by Hayato Ikeda. In November 1964 Ikeda resigned, owing to ill health, and was replaced by Eisaku Sato, who was to become the longest-serving Prime Minister in Japanese history. Sato remained in office until July 1972, when he was succeeded by Kakuei Tanaka, hitherto the Minister of International Trade and Industry. Tanaka visited Beijing in September 1972, when he agreed to Japan's recognition of the People's Republic of China and a consequent severance of Japanese diplomatic (though not commercial) relations with Taiwan. After some electoral set-backs, Tanaka resigned as Prime Minister in December 1974. He was succeeded by Takeo Miki, a former Deputy Prime Minister.

During his premiership, Tanaka allegedly accepted bribes, totalling 500m. yen, from the Marubeni Corporation, a representative in Japan of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (a leading US aerospace company), in return for using his influence to promote the purchase of Lockheed TriStar airliners by All Nippon Airways, Japan's principal domestic airline. In July 1976 Tanaka was arrested, on charges of accepting bribes, and resigned from the LDP. In December a general election for the House of Representatives (the Lower House of the Diet) resulted in a major set-back for the LDP, which lost its overall majority for the first time. Miki resigned as Prime Minister, and was succeeded by Takeo Fukuda, who had resigned in November as Deputy Prime Minister.

The LDP suffered another set-back in July 1977, at elections for one-half of the seats in the House of Councillors (the Upper House of the Diet), and in November Fukuda carried out a major reshuffle of the Cabinet, giving ministerial office to some economic experts. In the LDP presidential election of November 1978 Fukuda was unexpectedly defeated by Masayoshi Ohira, the LDP Secretary-General. Ohira became Prime Minister in December, and a new Cabinet was formed. Lacking an overall majority in the Lower House and facing increasing opposition to proposed tax increases, the Government's legislative programme was seriously hindered.

At elections to the Lower House in October 1979 the LDP again failed to win an overall majority, and significant gains were made by the Communists. Ohira survived a challenge to his leadership of the LDP, but in May 1980 the Government was defeated in a motion of 'no confidence', proposed by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and Ohira dissolved the Lower House. Ohira died before the elections in June, when the LDP won 284 of the 511 seats, although obtaining only a minority of the votes cast. In July Zenko Suzuki, a relatively little-known compromise candidate, was elected President of the LDP and subsequently appointed Prime Minister. He faced a series of crises during 1981, including a set-back in relations with the USA and criticism from the opposition over Japan's defence policy. In November 1981 Suzuki reshuffled the Cabinet, distributing major posts among the five feuding LDP factions. The growing factionalism of the LDP and the worsening economic crisis led to the resignation of Suzuki as Prime Minister and LDP President in October 1982.

Suzuki's successor was Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was supported by the Suzuki and Tanaka factions of the LDP. In his former post, as Minister of State and Director-General of the Administrative Management Agency, Nakasone had been responsible for implementing the Suzuki Government's expenditure cuts. At elections in June 1983 for one-half of the seats in the Upper House, a new electoral system was used. Of the 126 contested seats, 50 were filled on the basis of proportional representation. As a result, two small parties entered the House for the first time. Nevertheless, the LDP increased its strength from 134 to 137 members in the 252-seat chamber. This result was seen as an endorsement of Nakasone's policies of increased spending on defence, closer ties with the USA and greater Japanese involvement in international affairs.

In October 1983, after judicial proceedings lasting nearly seven years, a Tokyo court found Kakuei Tanaka, the former Prime Minister, guilty of accepting bribes. In September 1985 he began appeal proceedings against the conviction and the sentence (a heavy fine and four years' imprisonment), and he continued to be an 'independent' member of the Diet. Despite resigning from the LDP, Tanaka remained a major influence on the party, and members of the Tanaka faction held important positions in Nakasone's Cabinet. Tanaka's refusal to resign his legislative seat led to a boycott of the Diet by the opposition, which forced Nakasone to dissolve the House of Representatives in preparation for a premature general election in December 1983. The election campaign was dominated by the issues of political ethics and Nakasone's forthright style of leadership. The LDP suffered the worst defeat in its history, losing 36 seats (and its majority) in the Lower House. Nakasone came second (behind Takeo Fukuda) in his district, whereas Tanaka was returned with an overwhelming majority. The Komeito (Clean Government Party), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the JSP gained seats, while the Communists and the New Liberal Club (NLC) lost seats. The LDP formed a coalition with the NLC (which had split from the LDP over the Tanaka affair in 1976) and several independents, and Nakasone remained as President of the LDP by promising to reduce Tanaka's influence. Six members of Tanaka's faction held posts in Nakasone's new Cabinet, including that of Minister of Finance.

Following the trial of Tanaka, a series of reforms was introduced, whereby Cabinet members were required to disclose the extent of their personal assets. However, these reforms were regarded by some as superficial. Nakasone's domestic policy was based on the 'Three Reforms': administrative reforms, particularly of government-run enterprises such as the railways; fiscal reforms, to enable the Government to balance its budget after many years of persistent deficit; and educational reforms, to liberalize the rigid examination-dominated system. In March 1984 Nakasone introduced Japan's most austere budget since 1955.

In November 1984 Nakasone was re-elected as President of the LDP, guaranteeing him two further years in office as Prime Minister, the first to serve a second term since Eisaku Sato (1964–72). The unexpected late challenge to his leadership by part of the Tanaka faction (headed by Susumu Nikaido, Vice-President of the LDP) was indicative of the widespread disaffection with Nakasone's assertive style of leadership. The continued importance of the Tanaka faction was emphasized when six members were awarded portfolios in the new Cabinet. (However, Tanaka suffered a cerebral haemorrhage in February 1985, and was too ill to contest the general election in July 1986.)

In December 1985 Nakasone reshuffled his Cabinet, preserving a balance among the five major factions. In March 1986 plans to denationalize the Japanese National Railways in 1987 were approved by the Cabinet but strongly opposed by the JSP (the transfer to the private sector was implemented smoothly in April 1987). In June 1986 Nakasone secured approval for the dissolution of the Diet in spite of objections from the opposition parties. This enabled the Prime Minister to announce the holding of a premature general election for the House of Representatives (18 months ahead of schedule) to coincide with the triennial election for one-half of the seats in the House of Councillors on 6 July. The Government hoped to benefit from the higher level of participation expected to arise from the holding of both polls on the same day. The polling resulted in decisive victories for the LDP. In the election to the House of Representatives, the LDP obtained 49.4% of the votes, its highest level of electoral support since 1963, and won a record 304 of the 512 seats. The increased LDP majority was achieved largely at the expense of the JSP and the DSP. Of the main opposition parties, only the Komeito and the Communists maintained their strength in the House of Representatives. The LDP, therefore, was able to dispense with its coalition partner, the NLC (which disbanded in August and rejoined the LDP). The new Cabinet was composed entirely of LDP members. In September the leaders of the LDP agreed to alter bylaws to allow party presidents one-year extensions beyond the normal limit of two terms of two years each, and then applied this provision to Nakasone. Nakasone could thus retain the posts of President of the LDP and Prime Minister of Japan until 30 October 1987. In December 1986 the tax committee of the LDP issued proposals for a new programme of tax reforms, including the introduction of 5% value-added tax (VAT) and the abolition of tax-free savings schemes. Because of widespread opposition, however, the VAT proposal was withdrawn from the programme before it was approved as legislation by the Diet in September 1987. Despite the rapid appreciation of the yen in relation to the US dollar in 1986, Japan's exports continued to grow, and another record trade surplus was recorded in that year. In an attempt to correct this imbalance, to reflate the domestic economy and to stabilize the Japanese currency, Nakasone relaxed his policy of domestic fiscal austerity in May 1987, when he introduced a supplementary budget, involving proposed additional spending of 6,000,000m. yen.

In July 1987 the Secretary-General of the LDP, Noboru Takeshita, left the Tanaka faction, with 113 other members, and announced the formation of a major new faction in the ruling party, the Takeshita faction. Susumu Nikaido, a former Vice-President of the LDP and the second most powerful man in the Tanaka faction, retained only about 20 supporters. The remainder of the Tanaka faction comprised a small group of independents who were uncommitted to either side. In the same month, Tanaka's political standing was weakened even further when the Tokyo high court upheld the decision, taken in 1983, which found him guilty of accepting bribes.

In October 1987 three senior politicians presented themselves as candidates to succeed Nakasone when he resigned from his post as President of the LDP: Takeshita, the Secretary-General of the LDP; Kiichi Miyazawa, the Minister of Finance; and Shintaro Abe, the Chairman of the Executive Council of the LDP and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. After negotiations with the three candidates, Nakasone nominated Takeshita as his successor. It was widely believed that Nakasone had chosen this nomination procedure, rather than putting the selection of the new President to the vote of the LDP Diet members, because he feared that the latter procedure might cause further splits in the ruling party. On 6 November the Diet was convened and Takeshita was formally elected as Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet, Takeshita carefully maintained a balance among the five major factions of the LDP. He retained only two members of Nakasone's previous Cabinet, but appointed four members of the Nakasone faction to senior ministerial posts (including Nakasone's staunch ally, Sosuke Uno, to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs). At the request of Nakasone, Kiichi Miyazawa was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and Shintaro Abe was assigned the important post of Secretary-General of the LDP. Takeshita claimed that he would work to continue Nakasone's domestic and foreign policies, with particular emphasis on correcting the external trade imbalance and further liberalizing the financial market.

Nakasone was committed to raising Japan's international status by fostering friendly relations with other world leaders. Throughout his term in office, he and his Minister of Foreign Affairs made many successful tours to numerous countries, to promote political and social links. Takeshita vowed to continue this emphasis on improving Japan's international relations. However, there is continued concern in the EEC over trade protectionism in Japan, and in the USA over the steadily worsening imbalance of bilateral trade. Partial deregulation of the financial markets has been introduced in an attempt to alleviate the problem, and in July 1985 the Government announced a three-year programme to encourage imports, amid continued criticism that it did not include any significant new proposals. Further measures to stimulate imports were introduced in 1986 and 1987. Relations between Japan and the USA deteriorated in April 1987, when it was discovered that the Toshiba Machine Company had illegally exported sophisticated submarine equipment to the USSR between 1982 and 1984. The USA claimed that these sales had endangered the security of both countries.

Japan continues to receive military support from the USA. Since 1982 Japan has been under continued pressure from the USA to increase its defence spending (which was equivalent to about 0.9% of the country's gross national product in 1983–85) and to assume greater responsibility for security in the Western Pacific area. In 1986 the Japanese Government decided to exceed the self-imposed limit on defence expenditure of 1% of the gross national product (GNP), set in 1976. The Government proposed defence spending equivalent to 1.004% of the forecast GNP in 1987/88, and also announced that it would maintain defence expenditure at around this level until 1991. This increase was welcomed by the USA but Nakasone stressed that Japan would not become a major military power. The JSP, however, accused the Nakasone Government of seeking to revive the nationalism of the pre-1945 militarist era.

Stability in South-East Asia is a vital consideration in Japanese foreign policy, since Japan depends on Asia for about one-third of its foreign trade, including imports of vital raw materials. In 1978 a treaty of peace and friendship was signed with the People's Republic of China. A meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders, held in Beijing in June 1986, ended with a pledge by both sides to reduce China's large trade deficit with Japan. This pledge was reiterated when the Japanese Prime Minister visited China in November. In 1987, however, China expressed growing concern about Japan's increased expenditure on defence and its more assertive military stance.

Japan has demanded from the USSR the return of four small islands (the 'Northern Territories') lying a few kilometres from Hokkaido, which were annexed in 1945 by the USSR. Japan claims sovereignty over the islands under the provisions of an 1855 treaty between Japan and Russia. The Soviet claims are based on possession and on the 1945 Yalta agreement, in which the USA and the United Kingdom agreed that the Kurile Islands would be occupied by the USSR. Japan, supported since the early 1950s by the USA, argues that the islands are not part of the Kuriles. There has been no progress in the matter since 1956, when Japan and the USSR resumed diplomatic relations. Consequently, the two countries have still not signed a peace treaty formally ending the Second World War.

There was a noticeable improvement in relations between Japan and the USSR in 1986. In January the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, visited Japan (the first visit of a Soviet Foreign Minister to Japan for 10 years). The two countries agreed to improve economic and trade relations, and to resume regular ministerial consultations. Japan and the USSR signed a new cultural agreement in June, when the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe, visited Moscow. In January 1987 Nakasone began a tour of Eastern Europe, the first such tour by a Japanese Prime Minister.

Government

Under the Constitution of 1947, the Emperor is Head of State but has no governing power. Legislative power is vested in the bicameral Diet, consisting of the House of Representatives or Lower House (512 seats), whose members are elected for a four-year term, and the House of Councillors or Upper House (252 seats), members of which are elected for six years, one-half being elected every three years. At the Upper House election of June 1983, an element of proportional representation was introduced, when 50 national seats were determined according to the number of votes for each party. There is universal suffrage for all adults from 20 years of age. Executive power is vested in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is appointed by the Emperor (on designation by the Diet) and himself appoints the other Ministers. The Cabinet is responsible to the Diet.

Japan has 47 prefectures, each administered by an elected Governor.

Defence

Although the Constitution renounces war and the use of force, the right of self-defence is not excluded. Japan maintains ground, maritime and air self-defence forces. Military service is voluntary. The USA provides equipment and training staff and also maintains bases. The total strength of the self-defence forces in July 1987 was 246,000, comprising: army 156,000, navy 45,000 and air force 45,000. Proposed expenditure on defence for 1988/89 was 3,670,600m. yen.

Economic Affairs

Japan is not well endowed with natural resources, and about 68% of the total land area is forested. The country is self-sufficient in rice but has to import about 50% of its requirements of other cereals and fodder crops. Mineral resources are meagre, except for limestone and sulphur, and Japanese industry is heavily dependent on imported raw materials and fuels. In 1986 the Japanese Government decided that nearly 40% of Japanese coal production was to cease by 1991 (closing about one-half of its 11 coal-mines). Apart from its high cost, the coal industry has suffered from the rising importance of nuclear power. In 1986 Japan was the world's third largest consumer of petroleum, and, because the country produces virtually none of its own, petroleum accounted for 27% of Japan's import costs in 1985. In 1986, however, the cost of petroleum imports fell sharply, to 15% of total import costs, owing mainly to the decline in international petroleum prices. The Government has authorized the construction of three nuclear and eight coal-fired power stations as part of a programme to reduce the country's dependence on imported petroleum. Nuclear energy accounted for 26.3% of Japan's electricity output in 1986, compared with 25% contributed by petroleum-fired power stations. Petroleum was previously the largest source of electricity in Japan. Japan relies on imports for 91% of its total energy requirements. Since 1969 concessions have been granted for offshore petroleum exploration in the Korean Straits, the Sea of Japan and off Hokkaido Island. Drilling began in 1971. The Japan National Oil Company (JNOC) was established in 1978.

Based on the promotion of manufacturing industries for the export market, Japan achieved and maintained a very high rate of economic growth after 1945. Gross national product (GNP) expanded, in real terms, at an average annual rate of 10.3% between 1962 and 1972, and in 1971 Japan's GNP became the second largest in the world, ranking behind only the USA (Soviet bloc countries excluded). In 1985, according to estimates by the World Bank, Japan's GNP per head was US $11,300 (at average 1983–85 prices), a level comparable to that of industrialized countries in Western Europe. Between 1965 and 1985 the average annual increase in Japan's GNP per head was 4.7% in real terms, the highest national growth rate among non-communist industrial countries. Overall, Japan's gross domestic product (GDP), measured in constant prices, increased at an average rate of 6.3% per year in 1965–80, but the rise slowed to 3.8% per year in 1980–85. The growth rate of GNP, in real terms, was 4.3% in the financial year 1985/86, but fell to 2.6% in 1986/87, owing mainly to the effect on exports of the rapid appreciation of the yen in relation to the US dollar. However, because of the strength of recovery of the Japanese economy and its ability to readjust to the situation of the strong yen (notably through domestic reflation), GNP was predicted to rise by 3.7% in 1987/88 and by 3.8% in 1988/89.

Between 1982 and 1987 the Japanese Government pursued an austere policy concerning government spending, in an attempt to reduce the budget deficit. In the 1985/86 budget the cost of servicing government bonds became the largest item of expenditure for the first time. A five-year 'freeze' on general expenditure was introduced, to enable the Government to cease issuing deficit-financing bonds to make up the 30% of government spending not covered by tax revenues. The Nakasone Government was unable to introduce value-added tax (VAT) in 1987 because of almost universal opposition, and the proportion of government spending that is covered by tax revenue is far lower than in any other advanced nation.

In September 1986 the Japanese Cabinet, reacting to pressure from US and domestic business leaders, proposed a supplementary budget for 1986/87 (involving additional spending of US $23,500m.) in an attempt to stimulate domestic growth. Priority was given to public works and new housing construction, which were allocated $20,000m. The budget proposals for 1987/88, however, projected the smallest increase in spending for 32 years. The proposals envisaged total expenditure of 54,101,000m. yen, representing an increase of only 0.02% over the corresponding total in the 1986/87 budget. Only spending on defence (increased by 5.2%) and overseas development aid (up by 5.3%) were allowed to rise significantly. An important development was the decision by the Government to exceed the self-imposed limit (set in 1976) of 1% of GNP on defence expenditure. The proposed spending on defence for 1987/88 was 3,517,400m. yen, which was equivalent to 1.004% of the forecast GNP in that financial year.

In May 1987, however, in an attempt to reflate the domestic economy (in response to continuing US protests about Japan's growing trade surplus with the USA), the Japanese Prime Minister relaxed his policy of domestic fiscal austerity substantially, when he introduced a supplementary budget, involving proposed additional spending of 6,000,000m. yen. A considerable reduction in income taxes, which constituted a part of the tax-reform programme that the Diet approved in October, was also expected to stimulate personal consumption and to contribute to domestic demand through the lessening of the tax burden. This move towards a more positive fiscal policy was continued into early 1988. The proposed 1988/89 budget, which was adopted by the Diet in January 1988, was the most expansionary budget for six years. Total projected expenditure was set at 56,699,700m. yen, which represented a 4.8% increase over the spending level of 1987/88. The rise in expenditure was partly due to greatly improved tax revenues and to the acquisition of capital revenue through the sale of the Government's shares in the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT). Defence spending was to increase by 5.2%, to 3,700,300m. yen (equivalent to 1.013% of the projected GNP), while foreign aid was to rise by 6.5%, to about 701,000m. yen, and spending on public works was to grow by 19.9%.

In 1986 Japan was one of the world's three biggest donors of development aid, and planned to double its aid budget by 1992. In May 1987 the Japanese Government pledged to recycle $20,000m. of its huge trade surpluses to indebted developing countries (notably in Latin America, but also in Asia). This was in addition to $10,000m. of aid and credits already promised by Japan. In December the Japanese Prime Minister announced plans to establish a low-interest development fund of $2,000m., linking Japan with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In 1986 the level of unemployment began to cause concern in Japan, as the high value of the yen forced manufacturers to transfer production overseas. The unemployment rate rose to 2.9% of the labour force in 1985, the highest level since records began in 1953, and remained at a similar level throughout 1986. The unemployment rate rose to a record 3.1% in mid-1987, but had dropped to below 3% by the end of the year. The average annual increase in consumer prices was 1.9% in 1983, 2.3% in 1984, 2.0% in 1985 and 0.6% in 1986. By December 1986 inflation had been eliminated, with the consumer price index at the same level as 12 months previously. In 1987 average consumer prices increased by only 0.1%, the lowest annual rise for 29 years.

In the 1980s Japan's economy was characterized by large trade surpluses. There was a massive surplus of $82,743.4m. in 1986, with exports increasing by 19.1% and imports declining by 2.4% (despite the huge appreciation of the yen against the US dollar). In 1987 imports were expected to increase as the strength of the yen lowered import prices, consumer spending grew and the Government's 'Action Programme' (including

reductions in tariffs and the simplification of import procedures), which was introduced at the beginning of 1986, promoted imports of manufactured goods (especially from Western Europe and newly-industrialized South Asian countries). Imports did, in fact, increase by more than 10% in 1987, but exports also grew by about the same amount, resulting in a record trade surplus of $96,460m. Since 1984 there has been continual criticism from the USA concerning the strength and extent of trade protectionism in Japan. In March 1987 the US Government imposed $300m. in punitive tariffs on a range of Japanese electronic goods; however, about one-half of this total had been removed by the end of the year. In 1986, as exports from Japan to Europe continued to rise, a further dispute between Japan and the EEC appeared likely. EEC officials claimed that Japanese exporters were actively transferring sales to Europe, where the appreciation of the yen in relation to local currencies had not been as marked as its appreciation against the US dollar. In 1986 the Federal Republic of Germany became Japan's second largest export market (after the USA), while exports to the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong were also considerable. In 1987 the surplus on the current account of Japan's balance of payments reached a record $86,690m., which was 1% larger than the previous year's surplus. The strength of the yen has not immediately reduced Japan's trade surplus (as initially expected), because the adverse affect on exports was offset by the fall in petroleum prices in 1986 and by reductions in the cost of raw materials and other imports. The increase in the value of the yen led to a shift in the emphasis of the Japanese economy from exports to expansion of domestic demand. In 1985 Japan became the world's largest exporter of manufactured goods, surpassing the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1986, however, the combined output of mining and manufacturing declined for the first time since 1975. After a year of very low growth in 1986/87, industrial production was projected to rise by 6.6% in 1987/88 and by 7.6% in 1988/89. This recovery in Japanese industry could be attributed to the strength of domestic demand, the fall in the cost of imports of raw materials and the increase in the transference of Japanese manufacturing companies abroad.

Farming in Japan is labour-intensive, but the proportion of the working population employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing fell from 19% in 1970 to 8.5% in 1986. Japan's agricultural labour force totalled 4.5m. in 1986. Japan produces about 71% of its total food requirements. The principal staple food crops are rice (which contributed 33% to total agricultural output in 1985), wheat, barley and potatoes. Japan is a leading fishing nation, both in coastal and deep-sea waters. Since 1976, however, the fishing industry has been seriously affected by the establishment of exclusive fishing zones by many countries. In 1986, yielding to US pressure, Japan agreed to end all commercial whaling in 1988.

Industrial activity (mining, manufacturing and construction) employed 34% of the labour force in 1986, compared with 44% in 1970. Heavy industries predominate in the manufacturing sector, particularly motor vehicles, steel, machinery, electrical equipment and chemicals. In 1985 Japan was the world's largest producer of ships and the second largest producer of passenger cars, paper, synthetic fibres, cement, synthetic resins and steel. In recent years, however, the shipbuilding market has contracted sharply, and in 1985 the world's largest operator of oil tankers, Sanko Steamship, became the biggest company in Japan ever to file for bankruptcy. In 1986/87 Japanese exports of steel declined by 7%, owing to the rise in the value of the yen and to the increase in competition from developing countries, such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (which were also increasingly competitive with their expanding shipbuilding industries). Japan's electronics industry is expanding rapidly, however, and Japanese electronic goods are now extremely competitive on the world market. Between 1980 and early 1986 there was a 120% rise in the output of electrical machinery in Japan. As a whole, Japan ranks second in the world (after the USA) in industrial production. Japan's estimated investment in technology in 1984/85 was $28,800m., which was surpassed only by the USA.

Japan has been under pressure to revalue its currency in view of the favourable conditions of Japanese exports on the world market. In September 1985, following the agreement of the Group of Five (comprising the USA, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France) to curb the continued increase in the value of the US dollar, the yen appreciated in value. The exchange rate was US $1 = 152 yen in September 1986, compared with $1 = 240 yen in September 1985. Initially, this rapid appreciation of the yen resulted in trading difficulties for Japan's export industries. In October 1986, therefore, Japan and the USA agreed on the desirability of maintaining the exchange rate at around $1 = 160 yen. At 31 December 1987, however, the rate stood at $1 = 121 yen: the US dollar's lowest level in relation to the Japanese currency since the Second World War.

As part of a major privatization scheme, Japanese National Railways were denationalized in 1987, and the Government sold its shares in NTT and in Japan Air Lines.

Social Welfare

Almost all of the population are insured under the various schemes covering health, welfare annuities, unemployment and industrial accidents. Workers normally retire at 55 years of age, with the average pension being about 40% of salary. In 1982 Japan had 9,403 hospital establishments, with a total of 1,401,999 beds (equivalent to one for every 84 inhabitants), and there were 161,260 physicians working in the country.

Education

A kindergarten system provides education for children aged between three and five years of age, although the majority of kindergartens are privately controlled. At the age of six, children are required to attend elementary schools (shogakko), from which they proceed, after six years, to lower secondary schools (chugakko) for a further three years. Education is compulsory to the age of 15, and there are plans to increase the age limit to 18. In 1985 all children aged six to 11 were enrolled at primary schools, while 96% of those aged 12 to 17 received secondary education. Upper secondary schools provide a three-year course in general topics or a vocational course in subjects such as agriculture, commerce, fine art and technical studies. Higher education is divided into three types of institution. Universities (daigaku) offer a four-year degree course, as well as post-graduate courses. Japan has more than 400 universities, both public and private. Junior colleges (tanki-daigaku) provide less specialized two- to three-year courses. Both universities and junior colleges provide facilities for teacher-training. Technical colleges (tokushu-kyoiku-gakko) offer a five-year specialized training for technicians in many fields of engineering.

Tourism

The ancient capital of Kyoto, pagodas and temples, forests and mountains, traditional festivals and the classical Kabuki theatre are some of the many tourist attractions of Japan. In 1986 there were 2,061,526 foreign visitors to Japan, and receipts from tourism totalled US $1,379m.

Public Holidays

1988: 1 January (New Year's Day), 15 January (Adults' Day), 11 February (National Foundation Day), 21 March (Vernal Equinox Day), 29 April (Emperor's Birthday), 3 May (Constitution Memorial Day), 5 May (Children's Day), 15 September (Respect for the Aged Day), 23 September (Autumnal Equinox), 10 October (Sports Day), 3 November (Culture Day), 23 November (Labour Thanksgiving Day).

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Weights and Measures

The metric system is in force.

Currency and Exchange Rates

1,000 rin = 100 sen = 1 yen.

Exchange rates (30 September 1987):
£1 sterling = 238.00 yen;
US $1 = 146.45 yen.

Statistical Survey

Source (unless otherwise stated): Statistics Bureau, Management and Co-ordination Agency, 19-1 Wakamatsucho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162, tel. (3) 202-1111, *Monthly Statistics of Japan, Japan Statistical Yearbook.*

Area and Population

AREA, POPULATION AND DENSITY

Area (sq km)	377,801*
Population (census results)†	
1 October 1980	117,060,396
1 October 1985	
Males	59,497,316
Females	61,551,607
Total	121,048,923
Population (official estimates at 1 October)†	
1983	119,483,489
1984	120,235,358
1986	121,672,326
Density (per sq km) at 1 October 1986	322.0

* 145,870 sq miles.
† Excluding foreign military and diplomatic personnel and their dependants.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES AND DEATHS*

	Registered live births		Registered marriages†		Registered deaths	
	Number	Rate (per '000)	Number	Rate (per '000)	Number	Rate (per '000)
1979	1,642,580	14.2	788,505	6.8	689,664	6.0
1980	1,576,889	13.6	774,702	6.7	722,801	6.2
1981	1,529,455	13.0	776,531	6.6	720,262	6.1
1982	1,515,392	12.8	781,252	6.6	711,883	6.0
1983	1,508,687	12.7	762,552	6.4	740,038	6.2
1984	1,489,780	12.5	739,991	6.2	740,247	6.2
1985	1,431,577	11.9	735,850	6.1	752,283	6.3
1986	1,382,976	11.4	710,982	5.9	750,641	6.2

* Figures relate only to Japanese nationals in Japan.
† Data are tabulated by year of registration rather than by year of occurrence.

PRINCIPAL CITIES* (population at 1 October 1986)

Tokyo (capital)†	8,354,615	Oita	390,096
Yokohama	2,992,926	Takatsuki	384,784
Osaka	2,636,249	Hirakata	382,253
Nagoya	2,116,381	Urawa	377,235
Sapporo	1,542,979	Omiya	373,022
Kyoto	1,479,218	Asahikawa	363,631
Kobe	1,410,834	Fukuyama	360,261
Fukuoka	1,160,440	Iwaki	350,569
Kawasaki	1,088,624	Suita	348,948
Kitakyushu	1,056,402	Nagano	336,973
Hiroshima	1,044,118	Fujisawa	328,387
Sakai	818,271	Nara	327,702
Chiba	788,930	Takamatsu	326,994
Sendai	700,254	Toyohashi	322,142
Okayama	572,479	Machida	321,188
Kumamoto	555,719	Hakodate	319,194
Kagoshima	530,502	Toyama	314,111
Higashiosaka	522,805	Kochi	312,241
Hamamatsu	514,118	Toyoda	308,111
Amagasaki	509,115	Naha	303,674
Funabashi	506,966	Koriyama	301,673
Sagamihara	482,778	Akita	296,400
Niigata	475,630	Aomori	294,045
Shizuoka	468,362	Kawagoe	285,437
Himeji	452,917	Okazaki	284,996
Nagasaki	449,382	Miyazaki	279,114
Kanazawa	430,481	Maebashi	277,319
Matsudo	427,473	Yao	276,394
Yokosuka	427,116	Tokorozawa	275,168
Matsuyama	426,658	Kashiwa	273,128
Hachioji	426,654	Fukushima	270,762
Nishinomiya	421,267	Shimonoseki	269,169
Kurashiki	413,632	Akashi	263,363
Toyonaka	413,213	Yokkaichi	263,001
Gifu	411,743	Neyagawa	258,228
Utsunomiya	405,375	Tokushima	257,884
Kawaguchi	403,015	Ichinomiya	257,388
Wakayama	401,352	Kasugai	256,990
Ichikawa	397,822	Koshigaya	253,479

* Except for Tokyo, the data for each city refer to an urban county (*shi*), an administrative division which may include some scattered or rural population as well as an urban centre.
† The figure refers to the 23 wards (*ku*) of Tokyo. The population of Tokyo-to (Tokyo Prefecture) was 11,829,363.

ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION*
(annual averages, '000 persons aged 15 and over)

	1984	1985	1986
Agriculture and forestry	4,680	4,640	4,500
Fishing and aquatic culture	440	450	450
Mining and quarrying	80	90	80
Manufacturing	14,380	14,530	14,440
Electricity, gas and water	350	330	320
Construction	5,270	5,300	5,340
Trade and restaurants	13,190	13,180	13,390
Transport, storage and communications	3,410	3,430	3,530
Financing, insurance, real estate and business services	3,830	3,920	4,150
Community, social and personal services (incl. hotels)	11,820	11,970	12,120
Activities not adequately defined	210	230	210
Total employed	57,660	58,070	58,530
Unemployed	1,610	1,560	1,670
Total labour force	59,270	59,630	60,200
Males	35,800	35,960	36,260
Females	23,470	23,670	34,940

* All figures are rounded, so totals may not always be the sum of their component parts.

Agriculture

PRINCIPAL CROPS ('000 metric tons)*

	1984	1985	1986
Wheat	741	874	876
Rice (brown)†	11,878	11,662	11,647
Barley	396	378	344
Potatoes	3,621	3,649	3,980
Sweet potatoes	1,400	1,527	1,507
Yams	160	168	n.a.
Taro (Coco yam)	347	375	n.a.
Dry beans	168	141	128
Soybeans (Soya beans)	238	228	245
Groundnuts (in shell)	51	51	47
Cabbages	3,163	3,067	n.a.
Tomatoes	804	802	816
Cauliflowers	129	129	n.a.
Pumpkins, squash and gourds	297	273	n.a.
Cucumbers and gherkins	1,070	1,033	n.a.
Aubergines (Eggplants)	637	599	n.a.
Chillies and peppers (green)	180	172	n.a.
Onions (dry)	1,099	1,326	1,252
Carrots	643	663	n.a.
Watermelons	876	820	n.a.
Melons	371	366	n.a.
Grapes	310	311	301
Sugar cane	2,553	2,636	2,150
Sugar beets	4,040	3,921	3,862
Apples	812	910	986
Pears	479	470	489
Peaches and nectarines	216	205	219
Oranges	384	331	n.a.
Tangerines, mandarins, clementines and satsumas	2,005	2,491	2,168
Other citrus fruit	336	379	n.a.
Strawberries	198	196	n.a.
Tea (green)	93	96	94
Tobacco (leaves)	136	116	118

* Data at harvest time.
† To obtain the equivalent in paddy rice, the conversion factor is 150 kg of brown rice equals 186.6 kg of paddy.

LIVESTOCK ('000 head)

	1984	1985	1986
Cattle	4,682	4,698	4,742
Sheep	22	24	26
Goats	54	51	48
Horses	24	23	23
Pigs	10,423	10,718	11,061
Chickens	309,205	316,925	325,849

LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS (metric tons)

	1984	1985	1986
Beef and veal	536,057	555,257	558,592
Pig meat	1,424,204	1,531,727	1,550,442
Poultry meat	1,685,153	1,750,005	1,802,004
Cows' milk	7,137,519	7,380,369	7,456,940
Butter*	77,604	88,933	87,718
Cheese*	69,326	68,367	73,012
Hen eggs	2,129,948	2,140,727	2,224,747
Honey	6,798	7,225	n.a.
Raw silk	10,780	9,592	8,341
Cattle hides (fresh)†	30,700	31,500	32,100

* Industrial production only (i.e. butter and cheese manufactured at milk plants), excluding farm production.
† FAO estimates (Source: FAO, *Production Yearbook*).

Forestry

INDUSTRIAL ROUNDWOOD ('000 cubic metres)

	1983	1984	1985
Sawn timber	19,392	18,946	18,814
Pulp	1,894	1,748	1,789
Veneer sheets and plywood	442	457	433
Others	10,262	11,360	11,908
Total	31,990	32,511	32,944

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, *Report on Demand and Supply of Lumber.*

Fuel wood ('000 cubic metres): 524 in 1984; 521 in 1985.

SAWNWOOD PRODUCTION ('000 cubic metres)

	1983	1984	1985
Coniferous (soft wood)	24,110	23,788	23,869
Broadleaved (hard wood)	5,491	4,810	4,534
Total	29,601	28,598	28,403

Source: FAO, *Yearbook of Forest Products.*

Fishing

('000 metric tons, live weight)

	1983	1984	1985*
Freshwater fishes	93.5	90.3	89.1
Chum salmon (Keta or Dog salmon)	133.5	136.4	178.7
Flounders, halibuts, soles, etc.	258.1	260.7	215.2
Pacific cod	104.1	114.0	117.6
Alaska pollack	1,434.4	1,604.9	1,533.2
Pacific sandlance	120.2	164.4	122.5
Pacific saury (Skipper)	239.7	210.0	245.9
Japanese jack mackerel	134.5	139.4	158.1
Japanese scad	44.0	98.2	71.7
Japanese amberjack	155.9	152.5	151.0
Japanese pilchard (sardine)	3,745.1	4,179.4	3,866.9
Japanese anchovy	207.6	224.1	205.8
Skipjack tuna (Oceanic skipjack)	352.7	446.2	314.7
Yellowfin tuna	116.0	119.4	134.4
Bigeye tuna	132.0	127.9	154.9
Other tuna-like fishes	172.2	190.6	186.5
Chub mackerel	804.8	813.5	771.9
Other fishes (incl. unspecified)	1,347.0	1,318.2	1,317.7
Total fish	9,595.3	10,390.0	9,835.6
Marine crabs	100.9	98.7	99.6
Other crustaceans	113.1	117.7	99.2
Pacific cupped oyster	253.2	257.1	251.2
Japanese scallop	213.2	209.2	226.8
Japanese (Manila) clam	160.4	128.3	131.7
Other marine clams	80.9	98.1	95.9
Japanese flying squid	192.1	173.7	132.5
Other squids and cuttlefishes	346.5	352.2	395.4
Other molluscs	89.0	83.3	82.4
Other sea creatures†	110.1	112.8	93.3
Total catch†	11,254.8	12,021.1	11,443.7
Inland waters	209.8	202.7	205.2
Atlantic Ocean	117.9	206.0	202.1
Indian Ocean	82.3	54.1	56.9
Pacific Ocean	10,844.8	11,558.3	10,979.5

* Provisional.

† Excluding aquatic mammals (including whales, *see* below).

Source: FAO, *Yearbook of Fishery Statistics.*

WHALING*

	1983	1984	1985
Number of whales caught	4,605	4,313	3,025

* Figures include whales caught during the Antarctic summer season beginning in the year prior to the year stated.

Aquatic plants ('000 metric tons): 711.4 in 1983; 762.5 in 1984; 707.5 in 1985.

Source: FAO, *Yearbook of Fishery Statistics.*

Mining

	1984	1985	1986
Coal ('000 metric tons)	16,645	16,383	16,012
Zinc ore ('000 metric tons)	253	253	222
Iron ('000 metric tons)	324	338	291
Manganese ('000 metric tons)	62	21	6
Silica stone ('000 metric tons)	13,973	14,357	13,637
Limestone ('000 metric tons)	169,821	164,156	162,358
Chromite (metric tons)	7,420	11,920	10,642
Copper ore (metric tons)	43,309	43,208	34,978
Lead (metric tons)	48,735	49,951	40,327
Gold ore (kg)	3,220	5,309	10,280
Crude petroleum (million litres)	476	623	736
Natural gas ('000 cu m)	2,132,069	2,224,640	2,105,385

Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

Industry

SELECTED PRODUCTS

		1984	1985	1986
Wheat flour[1]	'000 metric tons	4,227	4,243	4,231
Sugar*	'000 metric tons	2,147.2	2,079.2	2,057.9
Distilled alcoholic beverages	'000 hectolitres	9,030	9,260	8,955†
Beer[1]	'000 hectolitres	45,819	48,511	49,966†
Cigarettes[1]	million	306,900	308,500	292,000
Cotton yarn (pure)	metric tons	390,709	392,526	399,156
Cotton yarn (mixed)	metric tons	46,031	44,505	45,527
Woven cotton fabrics (pure and mixed)	million sq m	2,089.8	2,060.9	1,974.2
Flax, ramie and hemp yarn	metric tons	6,404	6,293	8,848
Jute yarn	metric tons	8,794	6,577	5,669
Linen fabrics	'000 sq m	24,786	25,274	34,229
Jute fabrics	'000 sq m	612	481	327
Woven silk fabrics (pure and mixed)	'000 sq m	115,116	114,538	108,221
Wool yarn (pure and mixed)	metric tons	120,930	123,427	112,109
Woven woollen fabrics (pure and mixed)[2]	'000 sq m	327,134	325,601	312,964
Rayon continuous filaments	metric tons	79,714	76,381	75,787
Acetate continuous filaments	metric tons	31,107	28,213	26,986
Rayon discontinuous fibres	metric tons	266,562	244,910	217,210
Acetate discontinuous fibres[3]	metric tons	41,140	38,427	36,972
Woven rayon fabrics (pure and mixed)[2]	million sq m	632.2	656.3	638.8
Woven acetate fabrics (pure and mixed)[2]	million sq m	64.6	63.0	61.5
Non-cellulosic continuous filaments	metric tons	648,114	653,638	615,571
Non-cellulosic discontinuous fibres	metric tons	767,037	792,287	787,240
Woven synthetic fabrics[2, 4]	million sq m	3,296.8	3,067.6	2,859.4
Leather footwear[5]	'000 pairs	55,708	53,387	51,975
Mechanical wood pulp }	'000 metric tons }	9,127.3	9,278.9	9,240.0
Chemical wood pulp[6] }	'000 metric tons }			
Newsprint	'000 metric tons	2,553.4	2,592.1	2,640.6
Other printing and writing paper	'000 metric tons	4,551.1	4,746.4	4,949.5
Other paper	'000 metric tons	4,324.7	4,451.5	4,681.9
Paperboard	'000 metric tons	7,915.4	8,678.9	8,789.9
Synthetic rubber	'000 metric tons	1,160.5	1,158.0	1,153.4
Motor vehicle tyres	'000	143,311	149,513	147,517
Rubber footwear	'000 pairs	64,998	62,367	58,064
Ethylene (Ethene)	'000 metric tons	4,385.7	4,226.9	4,291.4
Propylene (Propene)	'000 metric tons	2,980.7	3,057.1	3,166.9
Benzene (Benzol)	'000 metric tons	2,217.6	2,279.4	2,260.9
Toluene (Toluol)	'000 metric tons	811.2	829.3	830.3
Xylenes (Xylol)	'000 metric tons	1,400.9	1,523.5	1,570.2
Methyl alcohol (Methanol)	'000 metric tons	280.1	254.3	220.8
Ethyl alcohol (95%)	kilolitres	167,627	179,197	168,782
Sulphuric acid (100%)	'000 metric tons	6,451.4	6,580.0	6,562.4
Caustic soda (Sodium hydroxide)	'000 metric tons	3,085.3	3,074.1	3,076.4

continued overleaf

continued

		1984	1985	1986
Soda ash (Sodium carbonate)	'000 metric tons	1,036.2	1,057.1	1,020.8
Ammonium sulphate	'000 metric tons	1,829.4	1,837.0	1,783.4
Nitrogenous fertilizers (a)[7]	'000 metric tons	1,075	1,210	953
Phosphate fertilizers (b)[7]	'000 metric tons	647	641	464
Liquefied petroleum gas	'000 metric tons	8,139	8,354	7,831
Naphtha	million litres	11,672	10,348	9,672
Motor spirit (Gasoline)[8]	million litres	36,383	36,453	34,332
Kerosene	million litres	26,841	24,248	24,089
Jet fuel	million litres	3,737	4,327	4,020
Gas oil	million litres	24,782	25,468	26,123
Heavy fuel oil	million litres	76,441	65,117	61,589
Lubricating oil	million litres	2,228	2,256	2,233
Petroleum bitumen (Asphalt)	'000 metric tons	5,137	5,001	5,573
Coke-oven coke	'000 metric tons	51,275	51,742	48,139
Cement	'000 metric tons	78,851	72,847	71,264
Pig-iron	'000 metric tons	80,403	80,569	74,651
Ferro-alloys[9]	'000 metric tons	1,418	1,389	1,105
Crude steel	'000 metric tons	105,588	105,279	98,275
Aluminium (unwrought):				
primary	'000 metric tons	286.7	226.5	140.2
secondary[10]	'000 metric tons	840.3	866	865
Electrolytic copper	'000 metric tons	935.1	936.0	943.0
Refined lead (unwrought)	metric tons	278,494	285,372	283,142
Electrolytic, distilled and rectified zinc (unwrought)	metric tons	754,445	739,624	708,032
Calculating machines	'000	83,713	86,031	64,211
Radio receivers	'000	13,589	12,995	13,204
Television receivers	'000	15,512	17,727	13,863
Merchant vessels launched	'000 g.r.t.	9,395	9,354	7,750
Passenger motor cars	'000	7,073.2	7,646.8	7,809.8
Lorries and trucks	'000	4,319.5	4,544.7	4,407.6
Motorcycles, scooters and mopeds	'000	4,026.3	4,536.3	3,396.6
Cameras:				
photographic	'000	15,338	17,040	17,383
cinematographic	'000	79.1	51.1	7.8
Watches and clocks	'000	221,907	257,354	281,703
Construction: new dwellings started[11]	'000	1,187.2	1,236.1	1,364.6
Electric energy[1]	million kWh	648.572	671,952	676,359
Town gas	teracalories	121,840	124,515	130,673

* Twelve months ending September.
† Provisional.
[1] Twelve months beginning 1 April of the year stated. [2] Including finished fabrics.
[3] Including cigarette filtration tow. [4] Including blankets made of synthetic fibres.
[5] Sales. [6] Including pulp prepared by semi-chemical processes.
[7] Figures refer to the 12 months ending 30 June of the year stated and are in terms of (a) nitrogen, 100%, and (b) phosphoric acid, 100%.
[8] Including aviation gasoline. [9] Including silico-chromium.
[10] Including alloys. [11] Including buildings and dwelling units created by conversion.

Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Construction.

Finance

CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE RATES

Monetary Units
1,000 rin = 100 sen = 1 yen.

Denominations
Coins: 1, 5, 10, 50 and 100 yen.
Notes: 500, 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000 yen.

Sterling and Dollar Equivalents (30 September 1987)
£1 sterling = 238.00 yen;
US $1 = 146.45 yen;
1,000 yen = £4.202 = $6.828.

Average Exchange Rate (yen per US $)

1984	237.52
1985	238.54
1986	168.52

INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
(US $ million at 31 December)

	1984	1985	1986
Gold*	831	931	1,037
IMF special drawing rights	1,927	2,116	2,218
Reserve position in IMF	2,219	2,275	2,382
Foreign exchange	22,283	22,328	37,657
Total	27,260	27,650	43,294

* Valued at 35 SDRs per troy ounce.

Source: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

GENERAL BUDGET ESTIMATES
('000 million yen, year ending 31 March)

Revenue	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88
Taxes and stamps	38,550	40,560	41,194
Public bonds	11,680	10,946	10,501
Others	2,270	2,583	2,406
Total	52,500	54,089	54,101

Expenditure	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88
Social security	9,574	9,835	10,090
Education and science	4,841	4,845	4,850
Government bond servicing	10,224	11,320	11,334
Defence	3,137	3,344	3,517
Public works	6,369	6,223	6,082
Local finance	9,690	10,185	10,184
Pensions	1,864	1,850	1,896
Total (incl. others)	52,500	54,089	54,101

MONEY SUPPLY ('000 million yen at 31 December)

	1984	1985	1986
Currency outside banks	22,113.6	23,406.8	26,198.0
Demand deposits at deposit money banks	64,260.7	65,572.7	72,016.4
Total money	86,374.3	88,979.5	98,214.4

COST OF LIVING (Consumer Price Index; average of monthly figures. Base: 1985 = 100)

	1984	1985	1986
Food (incl. beverages)	98.3	100.0	100.2
Housing	97.5	100.0	102.5
Rent	97.4	100.0	102.6
Fuel, light and water charges	100.4	100.0	95.0
Clothing and footwear	96.7	100.0	102.2
Miscellaneous	98.7	100.0	102.0
All items	98.0	100.0	100.6

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS ('000 million yen at current prices)

	1983	1984	1985
Government final consumption expenditure	27,996.2	29,448.8	30,748.3
Private final consumption expenditure	167,809.3	175,984.3	184,427.2
Increase in stocks	217.3	1,137.8	2,540.0
Gross fixed capital formation	79,217.3	83,176.0	87,623.5
Total domestic expenditure	275,240.2	289,746.9	305,339.0
Exports of goods and services	39,274.5	45,066.0	46,307.1
Less Imports of goods and services	34,258.2	36,865.5	35,531.6
Gross domestic product	280,256.5	297,947.5	316,114.5
Factor income received from abroad	4,211.5	4,953.4	5,768.4
Less Factor income paid abroad	3,900.4	4,448.2	4,631.1
Gross national product	280,567.6	298,452.7	317,251.8
Less Consumption of fixed capital	38,393.8	40,715.4	43,581.7
Statistical discrepancy	−1,087.5	−1,278.8	−1,461.8
National income in market prices	241,086.3	256,458.6	272,208.3

1986 ('000 million yen): Gross national product 330,752.

Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity

	1983	1984	1985
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	9,264.3	9,625.6	9,949.0
Mining and quarrying	1,220.6	1,207.6	1,225.7
Manufacturing	81,415.6	88,845.0	94,257.3
Electricity, gas and water	8,875.7	9,658.1	10,549.1
Construction	22,097.3	22,437.0	23,128.9
Wholesale and retail trade	41,773.5	42,288.6	43,313.3
Transport, storage and communications	17,300.0	18,716.3	19,652.4
Finance and insurance	15,886.7	16,540.5	17,782.2
Real estate	27,360.7	29,204.8	30,996.6
Public administration	13,121.7	13,765.3	14;358.1
Other services	52,675.8	56,853.5	62,882.4
Sub-total	290,992.0	309,142.3	328,094.9
Import duties	1,187.1	1,337.3	1,268.1
Less Imputed bank service charge	13,010.0	13,810.9	14,710.2
Total	279,169.0	296,668.7	314,652.7
Statistical discrepancy	1,087.5	1,278.7	1,461.8
Gross domestic product	280,256.5	297,947.5	316,114.5

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (US $ million)

	1985			1986		
	Credit	Debit	Balance	Credit	Debit	Balance
Goods and services:						
Merchandise f.o.b.	174,015	118,029	55,986	205,591	112,764	92,827
Freight	7,371	3,680	3,691	6,699	3,950	2,749
Insurance on merchandise	261	364	−103	239	446	−207
Non-merchandise insurance	−248	178	−426	−77	400	477
Other transportation	4,812	11,049	−6,237	4,378	9,457	−5,079
Tourists } Other travel }	1,137	4,814	−3,677	1,463	7,229	−5,766
Investment income	22,107	15,267	6,840	29,086	19,613	9,473
Military transactions	1,629	—	1,629	2,101	—	2,101
Other government services	1,038	392	646	904	453	451
Other private services	7,404	14,932	−7,528	8,907	17,084	−8,177
Total	219,526	168,705	50,821	259,291	171,396	87,895
Unrequited transfers:						
Private transfer payments	347	624	−277	354	939	−585
Reparations	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other government transfers	77	1,452	−1,375	65	1,530	−1,465
Total	424	2,076	−1,652	419	2,469	−2,050
Total current account	219,950	170,781	49,169	259,710	173,869	85,845
Capital flows:						
Long-term capital:						
Direct investments	642	6,452	−5,810	226	14,480	−14,254
Trade credits (net)	29	2,817	−2,788	−40	1,836	−1,876
Loans (net)	−75	10,427	−10,502	−34	9,281	−9,315
Securities (net)	3,851	59,773	−55,922	−17,867	101,977	−119,844
External bonds	16,619	3,729	12,890	23,383	4,971	18,412
Others (net)	−64	2,346	−2,410	−63	4,521	−4,584
Balance	21,002	85,544	−64,542	5,605	137,066	−131,461
Short-term capital:						
Trade credits (net)	—	1,367	−1,367	—	1,464	−1,464
Others (net)	431	—	431	—	145	−145
Balance on capital account	21,433	86,911	−65,478	5,605	138,675	−133,070
Net errors and omissions	3,991	—	3,991	2,458	—	2,458
Overall balance (net monetary movements)			−12,318	267,773	312,540	−44,767
of which:						
Gold and foreign exchange reserves			197			15,729
Others			−12,515			−60,496
of which: commercial banks			−10,848			−58,506

Source: Bank of Japan, *Balance of Payments, Monthly*.

JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (US $ million)

	1984	1985	1986
Official:			
Bilateral grants:			
Donations	1,064	1,185	1,703
Reparations	543	636	855
Technical assistance	521	549	849
Direct loans	1,363	1,372	2,143
Total	2,427	2,557	3,846
Capital subscriptions or grants to international agencies	1,891	1,240	1,788
Total	4,319	3,797	5,634
Other Government capital:			
Export credits	493	−152	−858
Direct investment capital	380	−1	332
Loans to international agencies	−130	−148	−198
Total	743	−302	−724
Total official	5,062	3,495	4,910
Private:			
Export credits	−655	−994	273
Direct investments	1,489	1,046	2,902
Other bilateral security investments	6,828	5,138	5,315
Loans to international agencies	2,306	2,832	1,326
Donations to non-profit organizations	41	101	82
Total	10,009	8,123	9,898
Grand total	15,070	11,618	14,809

External Trade

PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES (US $ million)

Imports c.i.f.	1984	1985	1986
Food and live animals	15,190.8	14,787.4	18,245.9
Meat and meat preparations	1,897.0	1,926.6	2,586.9
Fresh, chilled or frozen meat	1,807.1	1,884.0	n.a.
Fish and fish preparations*	4,096.2	4,610.0	6,426.4
Crustacea and molluscs (fresh and simply preserved)	2,099.3	2,284.7	n.a.
Cereals and cereal preparations	4,743.3	3,950.7	3,485.2
Wheat and meslin (unmilled)	1,113.9	973.8	885.5
Maize (unmilled) for feeding	1,668.9	1,362.7	1,158.1
Fruit and vegetables	1,827.9	1,828.1	2,363.8
Sugar, sugar preparations and honey	449.4	344.2	452.8
Raw sugar	294.5	209.6	278.9
Coffee, tea, cocoa and spices	1,128.0	1,138.7	1,593.1
Beverages and tobacco	835.8	760.0	940.5
Crude materials (inedible) except fuels	19,152.9	17,715.0	17,292.0
Oil-seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels	2,209.6	1,875.2	1,567.7
Soya beans (excl. flour)	1,447.2	1,206.1	1,072.4
Wood, lumber and cork	2,209.6	3,720.4	4,044.4
Rough or roughly squared wood	3,931.8	3,699.6	2,922.8
Textile fibres and waste	2,483.8	2,155.1	1,863.3
Cotton	1,342.4	1,048.7	818.4
Raw cotton (excl. linters)	1,308.4	1,021.3	797.1
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap	6,572.1	6,232.1	5,763.4
Iron ore and concentrates	3,199.1	3,044.9	2,759.3
Non-ferrous ores and concentrates	2,334.2	2,229.0	2,080.0
Copper ores and concentrates (excl. matte)	1,254.7	1,209.3	1,227.5
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc.	60,337.1	55,799.2	36,903.8
Coal, coke and briquettes	5,321.5	5,209.3	4,943.9
Coal (excl. briquettes)	5,310.9	5,196.5	4,926.5
Petroleum and petroleum products	45,486.2	40,574.9	24,116.6
Crude and partly refined petroleum	39,379.0	34,599.4	19,480.8
Petroleum products	6,107.2	5,975.5	4,635.8
Residual fuel oils	2,129.7	2,019.5	1,093.2
Gas (natural and manufactured)	9,529.3	10,006.1	7,843.3
Animal and vegetable oils and fats	372.3	328.9	244.7
Chemicals	8,346.4	8,072.7	9,733.1
Chemical elements and compounds	4,370.4	4,142.4	4,566.0
Organic chemicals	2,432.4	2,410.6	2,849.0
Inorganic chemicals	677.3	742.1	766.6
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	1,258.5	1,291.9	1,724.4
Basic manufactures	11,932.2	10,885.5	12,389.5
Textile yarn, fabrics, etc.	1,925.5	1,891.1	2,173.9
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	1,201.4	1,264.3	1,927.9
Iron and steel	1,911.7	1,479.5	1,761.8
Non-ferrous metals	4,699.6	4,041.6	3,654.7
Aluminium and aluminium alloys	2,076.0	1,861.3	1,641.0
Machinery and transport equipment	10,808.9	11,106.3	13,283.1
Non-electric machinery	4,494.6	4,727.9	5,317.8
Electrical machinery, apparatus, etc.	3,989.0	3,795.2	4,506.1
Transport equipment	2,325.3	2,583.1	3,459.2
Aircraft and parts†	928.4	1,483.0	1,776.8
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	6,087.5	6,349.2	8,633.4
Clothing (excl. footwear)	1,949.1	1,995.1	2,852.7
Other commodities and transactions	3,439.4	3,743.5	8,741.7
Re-imports	1,045.3	1,568.9	1,544.5
Non-monetary gold	2,245.7	2,026.7	6,983.9
Total	136,503.0	129,538.7	126,407.8

* Including crustacea and molluscs.
† Excluding tyres, engines and electrical parts.

Exports f.o.b.	1984	1985	1986
Food and live animals	1,289.9	1,202.0	1,365.9
Beverages and tobacco	149.7	113.7	110.4
Crude materials (inedible) except fuels	1,249.6	1,240.2	1,414.1
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc.	504.9	589.9	588.1
Animal and vegetable oils and fats	148.2	111.4	90.5
Chemicals	7,625.7	7,697.7	9,483.8
Chemical elements and compounds	3,121.1	3,242.9	3,953.4
Organic chemicals	2,370.6	2,511.8	3,141.3
Plastic materials, etc.	2,350.8	2,260.6	2,842.6
Basic manufactures	30,137.0	28,835.8	29,600.0
Rubber manufactures	1,972.5	1,894.7	2,040.3
Rubber tyres and tubes	1,633.9	1,544.6	1,642.2
Textile yarn, fabrics, etc.	5,317.7	4,900.1	5,444.8
Woven textile fabrics (excl. narrow or special fabrics)	3,545.6	3,360.6	3,706.4
Fabrics of synthetic (excl. regenerated) fibres	2,248.3	2,033.5	2,133.3
Non-metallic mineral manufactures	2,272.1	2,147.5	2,362.3
Iron and steel	13,852.1	13,565.8	12,706.2
Bars, rods, angles, shapes, etc.	1,715.4	1,777.4	1,437.1
Universals, plates and sheets	5,706.3	5,209.2	5,249.9
Thin plates and sheets (uncoated)	2,609.9	2,420.9	2,581.2
Tubes, pipes and fittings	3,741.7	3,659.5	3,398.7
Non-ferrous metals	1,501.4	1,466.9	1,563.7
Other metal manufactures	3,812.0	3,458.4	3,912.8
Machinery and transport equipment	102,680.0	108,387.4	133,325.6
Non-electric machinery	27,879.4	29,537.2	38,380.7
Power generating machinery	3,834.8	3,788.9	4,939.0
Internal combustion engines (non-aircraft)	2,800.0	2,884.7	3,841.8
Office machines	7,554.3	7,785.2	11,305.4
Metalworking machinery	2,020.8	2,599.2	3,636.9
Heating and cooling eqipment	1,887.0	1,588.0	1,793.1
Electrical machinery, apparatus, etc.	29,245.0	29,700.9	35,518.5
Electric power machinery	2,136.6	2,057.8	2,453.2
Telecommunications apparatus	11,076.7	12,242.1	13,643.6
Television receivers	1,904.7	2,624.8	1,727.2
Radio receivers	2,819.8	2,654.4	2,755.5
Thermionic valves, tubes, etc.	5,816.1	4,953.4	6,342.4
Transport equipment	45,555.6	49,149.4	59,426.4
Road motor vehicles and parts*	34,334.3	n.a.	50,929.4
Passenger cars (excl. buses)	21,898.7	25,402.2	32,945.2
Lorries and trucks (incl. ambulances)	6,372.0	7,396.0	8,021.8
Parts for cars, buses, etc.*	3,518.7	5,227.7	8,253.3
Motor cycles and parts	2,597.8	2,625.9	2,686.3
Motor cycles	2,043.7	2,092.4	2,064.1
Ships and boats	7,352.6	5,929.4	4,878.5
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	24,654.5	25,751.9	31,125.0
Scientific instruments, watches, etc.	9,268.4	10,046.1	12,407.8
Scientific instruments and photographic equipment	6,160.0	6,830.9	8,509.3
Watches, clocks and parts	1,747.0	1,730.2	1,963.4
Musical instruments, sound recorders, etc.	9,222.1	14,537.4	17,559.7
Sound recorders, phonographs and parts	n.a.	9,230.4	11,228.6
Sound recorders and phonographs	8,665.9	n.a.	9,909.6
Other commodities and transactions	1,674.4	1,758.6	2,047.8
Re-exports	1,595.6	1,712.6	1,975.0
Total	170,113.9	175,637.8	209,151.2

* Excluding tyres, engines and electrical parts.

PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS* (US $ million)

Imports c.i.f.	1984	1985	1986
Australia	7,296.4	7,452.2	6,980.3
Brazil	1,990.8	1,840.2	1,874.6
Brunei	2,202.5	1,892.2	1,285.2
Canada	4,945.1	4,772.9	4,895.4
China, People's Republic	5,957.6	6,482.7	5,652.4
France	1,236.0	1,323.7	1,855.1
Germany, Federal Republic	2,684.4	2,928.0	4,297.8
India	1,132.4	1,188.6	1,297.0
Indonesia	11,175.5	10,119.0	7,310.9
Iran	2,868.8	2,505.8	1,383.3
Italy	1,048.9	1,049.8	1,495.4
Korea, Republic	4,212.7	4,091.9	5,292.0
Kuwait	1,588.5	1,162.3	1,156.6
Malaysia	4,412.1	4,330.1	3,845.6
Mexico	2,259.8	1,869.9	1,439.0
Oman	2,419.7	3,065.9	1,615.7
Philippines	1,418.6	1,243.1	1,220.7
Qatar	2,593.6	2,185.1	1,126.5
Saudi Arabia	14,734.1	10,244.7	5,204.8
Singapore	1,775.4	1,593.9	1,463.3
South Africa	1,610.8	1,843.9	2,228.7
Switzerland	1,964.9	1,758.1	2,571.2
Taiwan	3,203.9	3,385.5	4,690.5
Thailand	1,039.6	1,026.9	1,390.9
USSR	1,394.0	1,429.3	1,972.0
United Arab Emirates	7,720.3	8,916.3	5,947.2
United Kingdom	2,266.6	1,816.8	3,573.4
USA	26,862.0	25,093.0	29,054.4
Total (incl. others)	136,503.0	129,538.7	126,407.8

Exports f.o.b.	1984	1985	1986
Australia	5,184.3	5,379.0	5,226.8
Belgium and Luxembourg	1,349.5	1,492.9	2,221.1
Canada	4,297.3	4,520.2	5,526.1
China, People's Republic	7,216.7	12,477.4	9,856.2
France	1,935.4	2,083.1	3,151.7
Germany, Federal Republic	6,621.6	6,937.8	10,477.3
Hong Kong	6,559.1	6,509.2	7,160.6
India	1,167.8	1,596.4	2,099.4
Indonesia	3,073.1	2,172.5	2,661.6
Iran	1,692.1	1,347.7	1,144.5
Iraq	806.0	1,305.6	1,210.2
Italy	1,032.1	1,116.7	1,723.2
Korea, Republic	7,226.8	7,097.2	10,474.5
Kuwait	1,431.9	1,536.1	1,219.0
Malaysia	2,874.8	2,168.2	1,708.4
Mexico	887.9	994.0	1,032.0
Netherlands	1,815.5	2,071.1	3,261.0
New Zealand	1,162.9	1,072.4	1,102.5
Panama	3,444.0	3,326.1	3,196.8
Philippines	1,079.9	936.6	1,088.1
Saudi Arabia	5,634.1	3,890.0	2,761.7
Singapore	4,610.2	3,860.5	4,576.6
South Africa	1,839.9	1,019.9	1,355.2
Sweden	1,009.4	1,094.2	1,438.3
Switzerland	1,089.4	1,160.8	1,886.8
Taiwan	5,986.2	5,025.5	7,851.8
Thailand	2,424.6	2,030.4	2,029.7
USSR	2,518.3	2,750.6	3,149.5
United Arab Emirates	1,126.3	1,164.4	1,032.5
United Kingdom	4,675.0	4,722.8	6,646.8
USA	59,937.3	65,277.6	80,455.6
Total (incl. others)	170,113.9	175,637.8	209,151.2

* Imports by country of production; exports by country of last consignment.

Source: Ministry of Finance, *The Summary Report, Trade of Japan.*

Transport

RAILWAYS (traffic—million)

	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
National railways			
Passengers	6,797	6,884	6,941
Freight ton-km	27,086	22,721	21,625
Private railways			
Passengers	11,741	11,869	12,048
Freight ton-km	560	513	509

ROAD TRAFFIC
('000 licensed vehicles, year ending 31 March)

	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
Cars	25,028	25,848	25,828
Buses	230	231	231
Lorries	8,382	8,306	8,418
Special purpose vehicles	912	944	942
Total	34,551	35,328	35,420

Source: Ministry of Transport.

SHIPPING

Merchant Fleet (registered at 30 June)

	1984	1985	1986
Vessels	10,425	10,288	10,011
Displacement ('000 gt)	40,358	39,940	38,487

Source: *Lloyd's Register of Shipping.*

International Sea-borne Traffic

	1984	1985	1986
Vessels entered:			
Number	38,980	39,856	40,129
Displacement ('000 net tons)	347,907	352,589	345,284
Goods ('000 metric tons):			
Loaded	94,800	94,307	88,123
Unloaded	603,159	603,684	598,908

Source: Ministry of Finance.

CIVIL AVIATION (domestic and international services)

	1984	1985	1986
Passengers carried ('000)	51,018	50,337	53,640
Passenger/km (million)	64,601	65,529	70,934
Freight ton/km* ('000)	2,699,260	3,089,530	3,589,650

* Including excess baggage.

Original Source: Ministry of Transport.

Tourism

	1984	1985	1986
Foreign visitors	2,110,346	2,327,047	2,061,526
Money received (US $ million)	970	1,137	1,379

Communications Media

('000)

	1984	1985	1986
Television subscribers*	31,062	31,509	31,955
Daily newspaper circulation†	48,232	48,232	48,569

* At 31 March. † In October.

Education

(1986)

	Institutions	Teachers	Students
Primary schools	24,982	454,760	10,665,404
Lower secondary schools	11,190	289,885	6,105,749
High schools	5,491	270,630	5,259,307
Technological colleges	62	5,875	49,174
Junior colleges	584	46,580	396,455
Graduate schools and universities	465	192,733	1,879,532

Directory

The Constitution

The Constitution of Japan was promulgated on 3 November 1946 and came into force on 3 May 1947. The following is a summary of its major provisions:

THE EMPEROR

Articles 1–8. The Emperor derives his position from the will of the people. In the performance of any state act as defined in the Constitution, he must seek the advice and approval of the Cabinet though he may delegate the exercise of his functions, which include: (i) the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; (ii) promulgation of laws, cabinet orders, treaties and constitutional amendments; (iii) the convocation of the Diet, dissolution of the House of Representatives and proclamation of elections to the Diet; (iv) the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and as well as the granting of amnesties, reprieves and pardons and the ratification of treaties, conventions or protocols; (v) the awarding of honours and performance of ceremonial functions.

RENUNCIATION OF WAR

Article 9. Japan renounces for ever the use of war as a means of settling international disputes.

Articles 10–40 refer to the legal and human rights of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution.

THE DIET

Articles 41–64. The Diet is convened once a year, is the highest organ of state power and has exclusive legislative authority. It comprises the House of Representatives (511 seats) and the House of Councillors (252 seats). The members of the former are elected for four years whilst those of the latter are elected for six years and election for half the members takes place every three years. If the House of Representatives is dissolved, a general election must take place within 40 days and the Diet must be convoked within 30 days of the date of the election. Extraordinary sessions of the Diet may be convened by the Cabinet when one quarter or more of the members of either House request it. Emergency sessions of the House of Councillors may also be held. A quorum of at least one third of the Diet members is needed to carry on Parliamentary business. Any decision arising therefrom must be passed by a majority vote of those present. A bill becomes law having passed both Houses except as provided by the Constitution. If the House of Councillors either vetoes or fails to take action within 60 days upon a bill already passed by the House of Representatives, the bill becomes law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives, by at least a two-thirds majority of those members present.

The Budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives. If, when it is approved by the House of Representatives, the House of Councillors votes against it or fails to take action on it within 30 days, or failing agreement being reached by a joint committee of both Houses, a decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet. The above procedure also applies in respect of the conclusion of treaties.

THE EXECUTIVE

Articles 65–75. Executive power is vested in the cabinet consisting of a Prime Minister and such other Ministers as may be appointed. The Cabinet is collectively responsible to the Diet. The Prime Minister is designated from among members of the Diet by a resolution thereof.

If the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors disagree on the designation of the Prime Minister, and if no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or if the House of Councillors fails to make designation within 10 days, exclusive of the period of recess, after the House of Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

The Prime Minister appoints and may remove other Ministers, a majority of whom must be from the Diet. If the House of Representatives passes a no-confidence motion or rejects a confidence motion, the whole Cabinet resigns unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within 10 days. When there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, or upon the first convocation of the Diet after a general election of members of the House of Representatives, the whole Cabinet resigns.

The Prime Minister submits bills, reports on national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet. He exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches of the Government. The Cabinet's primary functions (in addition to administrative ones) are to: (a) administer the law faithfully; (b) conduct State affairs; (c) conclude treaties subject to prior (or subsequent) Diet approval; (d) administer the civil service in accordance with law; (e) prepare and present the budget to the Diet; (f) enact Cabinet orders in order to make effective legal and constitutional provisions; (g) decide on amnesties, reprieves or pardons. All laws and Cabinet orders are signed by the competent Minister of State and countersigned by the Prime Minister. The Ministers of State, during their tenure of office, are not subject to legal action without the consent

of the Prime Minister. However, the right to take that action is not impaired.

Articles 76–95. Relate to the Judiciary, Finance and Local Government.

AMENDMENTS

Article 96. Amendments to the Constitution are initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and are submitted to the people for ratification, which requires the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet may specify.

Amendments when so ratified must immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of the Constitution.

Articles 97–99 outline the Supreme Law, while Articles 100–103 consist of Supplementary Provisions.

The Government

HEAD OF STATE

His Imperial Majesty HIROHITO, Emperor of Japan (succeeded to the throne 25 December 1926).

THE CABINET
(March 1988)

Prime Minister: NOBORU TAKESHITA.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance: KIICHI MIYAZAWA.

Minister of Justice: YUKIO HAYASHIDA.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: SOSUKE UNO.

Minister of Education: GENTARO NAKAJIMA.

Minister of Health and Welfare: TAKAO FUJIMOTO.

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: TAKASHI SATO.

Minister of International Trade and Industry: HAJIME TAMURA.

Minister of Transport: SHINTARO ISHIHARA.

Minister of Posts and Telecommunications: MASAAKI NAKAYAMA.

Minister of Labour: TARO NAKAMURA.

Minister of Construction: IHEI OCHI.

Minister of Home Affairs and Chairman of the Public Safety Commission: SEIROKU KAJIYAMA.

Minister of State and Chief Cabinet Secretary: KEIZO OBUCHI.

Minister of State and Director-General of the Management and Co-ordination Agency: OSAMU TAKATORI.

Minister of State and Director-General of the Hokkaido Development and Okinawa Development Agencies: SHIGERU KASUYA.

Minister of State and Director-General of the Defence Agency: TSUTOMU KAWARA.

Minister of State and Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency: EIICHI NAKAO.

Minister of State, Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission: SOICHIRO ITO.

Minister of State and Director-General of the Environment Agency: TOSHIO HORIUCHI.

Minister of State and Director-General of the National Land Agency: SEISUKE OKUNO.

Director of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau: OSAMU MIMURA.

MINISTRIES

Imperial Household Agency: 1-1, Chiyoda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 213-1111.

Prime Minister's Office: 1-6, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-2361.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: 1-2, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel.(3) 502-8111.

Ministry of Construction: 2-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 580-4311.

Ministry of Education: 3-2, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-4211.

Ministry of Finance: 3-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-4111; telex 24980.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2-2, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 580-3311; telex 22350.

Ministry of Health and Welfare: 1-2, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (3) 503-1711.

Ministry of Home Affairs: 2-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-5311.

Ministry of International Trade and Industry: 1-3, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 501-1511; telex 22916.

Ministry of Justice: 1-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (3) 580-4111.

Ministry of Labour: 2-2, Kasumigaseki 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 593-1211.

Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications: 1-3, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 504-4798; telex 2225234.

Ministry of Transport: 2-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 580-3111.

Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-7271.

Cabinet Secretariat: 2-3, Nagato-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-0101.

Defence Agency: 9-7, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 408-5211.

Economic Planning Agency: 3-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-0261.

Environment Agency: 1-2-2, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-3351; telex 33855.

Hokkaido Development Agency: 3-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (3) 581-9111.

Management and Co-ordination Agency: 3-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-6361.

National Land Agency: 1-2-2, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (3) 593-3311.

Okinawa Development Agency: 1-6, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-2361.

Science and Technology Agency: 2-2, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (3) 581-5271.

Legislature

KOKKAI
(Diet)

The Diet consists of two Chambers: the House of Councillors (Upper House) and the House of Representatives. The 512 members of the House of Representatives are elected for a period of four years (subject to dissolution). For the House of Councillors, which has 252 members, the term of office is six years, with one-half of the members elected every three years.

House of Councillors

Speaker: MASAAKI FUJITA.

Party	Seats after elections* 26 June 1983	6 July 1986
Liberal-Democratic Party	137	142
Japan Socialist Party	44	41
Komeito	26	25
Japanese Communist Party	14	16
Democratic Socialist Party	11	12
New Liberal Club	2	2
Second Chamber Club	2	3
Salaried Workers' Party	—	3
Tax Party	—	2
Social Democratic Federation	—	1
Independents	—	4
Others	13	—
Vacant	3	1

* One-half of the 252 seats are renewable every three years. At each election, 50 of the 126 seats were allocated on the basis of proportional representation.

House of Representatives

Speaker: KENZABURO HARA.

General Election, 6 July 1986

Party	Votes	% of votes	Seats
Liberal-Democratic Party	29,875,496	49.42	304
Japan Socialist Party	10,412,583	17.23	86
Komeito	5,701,277	9.43	57
Japanese Communist Party	5,313,246	8.79	27
Democratic Socialist Party	3,895,927	6.45	26
New Liberal Club	1,114,800	1.84	6
Social Democratic Federation	499,670	0.83	4
Other parties	120,627	0.20	—
Independents	3,515,042	5.81	2
Total	60,448,668	100.00	512

Political Organizations

The Political Funds Regulation Law provides that any organization which wishes to support a candidate for an elective public office must be registered as a political party. There are over 10,000 registered parties in the country, mostly of local or regional significance. The conservative Liberal-Democratic Party has the support of big business and the rural population and is also by far the richest of the political parties. The proportion of votes for the two socialist parties increased slowly at each election after 1952. The split between the two parties reflects a long-standing division between supporters of a mass popular party (now represented by the DSP) and those seeking a class party on Socialist lines. The Communist Party of Japan split in 1964, the official party being independent and supporting neither the USSR nor the People's Republic of China.

Democratic Socialist Party—DSP (Minshato): 19–12, Shiba Sakuragawa-cho 1, Minato-ku, Tokyo; tel. (03) 501-1411; f. 1960 by a right-wing breakaway faction of the Socialist Party of Japan; advocates an independent foreign policy; 72,000 mems (1983); Chair. RYOSAKU SASAKI; Sec.-Gen. SABURO TSUKAMOTO.

Japan Socialist Party—JSP (Nippon Shakaito): 1–8–1, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (03) 580-1171; f. 1945; seeks the establishment of collective non-agression and a mutual security system, including Japan, the USA, the USSR and the People's Republic of China; 55,000 mems (1983); Chair. TAKAKO DOI; Sec.-Gen. MAKOTO TANABE.

Japanese Commmunist Party—JCP: Sendagaya 4–26–7, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo; tel. (03) 403-6111; f. 1922; 400,000 mems (1987); Chair. Presidium KENJI MIYAMOTO; Chair. TETSUZO FUWA; Sec.-Gen. MITSURU KANEKO.

Komeito (Clean Government Party): 17, Minamimoto-machi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo; tel. (03) 353-0111; f. 1964; advocates political moderation, humanitarian socialism, and policies respecting 'dignity of human life'; 183,000 mems (1986); Founder DAISAKU IKEDA; Chair. JUNYA YANO; Sec.-Gen. NAOHIKO OKUBO.

Liberal-Democratic Party—LDP (Jiyu-Minshuto): 1–11–23, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 581-0111; f. 1955; advocates the establishment of a welfare state, the promotion of industrial development, the improvement of educational and cultural facilities and constitutional reform as needed; follows a foreign policy of alignment with the USA; 3.6m. mems (1985); Pres. NOBORU TAKESHITA; Vice-Pres. KIICHI MIYAZAWA; Sec.-Gen. SHINTARO ABE; Chair. of Exec. Council MASAYOSHI ITO.

New Liberal Club—NLC (Shin Jiyu Club): 1–11–28, Nagato-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; tel. (03) 581-9911; f. 1976 by splinter group of LDP; rejoined LDP Aug. 1986; Leader YOHEI KONO; Sec.-Gen. TOSHIO YAMAGUCHI.

Progressive Party: f. 1987 by breakaway group from the New Liberal Club; Leader SEIICHI TAGAWA.

Salaried Workers' Party (Salaryman Shinto): c/o House of Councillors, 1–7–1, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; advocates reform of the tax system; Leader Prof. SHIGERU AOKI.

Second Chamber Club (Ni-In Club): c/o House of Councillors, 1–7–1, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo; successor to the Green Wind Club (Ryukufukai), which originated in the House of Councillors in 1946–47; Sec. ISAMU YAMADA.

Social Democratic Federation—SDF (Shaminren): Yotsuya Bldg, Yotsuya 2–1, Tokyo; f. 1977 as the Socialist Citizens' League; Leader HIDEO DEN.

Tax Party (Zeikinto): c/o House of Councillors, 1–7–1, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.

Diplomatic Representation

EMBASSIES IN JAPAN

Afghanistan: Olympia Annex, 5th Floor, 31–21, Jingumae 6-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150; tel. (03) 400-7612.

Algeria: 10–67, Mita 2-chome, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153; tel. (03) 711-2661; telex 23260; Ambassador: NACEREDDINE HAFFAD.

Argentina: Chiyoda House, 17–8, Nagata-cho 2-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 592-0321; telex 22489; Ambassador: ENRIQUE J. ROS.

Australia: 1–14, Mita 2-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108; tel. (03) 453-0251; telex 22298; Ambassador: GEOFFREY MILLER.

Austria: 1–20, Moto Azabu 1-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 451-8281; telex 26361; Ambassador: Dr MICHAEL FITZ.

Bangladesh: 7–45, Shirogane 2-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108; tel. (03) 442-1501; telex 28826; Ambassador: A. K. N. AHMED.

Belgium: 5, Niban-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102; tel. (03) 262-0191; telex 24979; Ambassador: MARCEL DEPASSE.

Bolivia: Kowa Bldg, No. 38, Room 804, 8th Floor, 12–24, Nishi-Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 499-5441; telex 32177; Ambassador: Dr ARNOLD HOFMAN-BANG SOLETO.

Brazil: 11–12, Kita Aoyama 2-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107; tel. (03) 404-5211; telex 22590; Ambassador: LUIZ PAULO LINDENBERG SETTE.

Bulgaria: 36–3A, Yoyogi 5-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151; tel. (03) 465-1021; Ambassador: PETAR BASHIKAROV.

Burma: 8–26, Kita Shinagawa 4-chome, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 140; tel. (03) 441-9291; Ambassador: U THEIN AUNG.

Cameroon: Tokyo; Ambassador: ETIENNE NTSAMA.

Canada: 3–38, Akasaka 7-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107; tel. (03) 408-2101; telex 22218; Ambassador: BARRY CONNELL STEERS.

Central African Republic: 4–11–19, Seta, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 158; tel. (03) 707-5061; telex 24793; Ambassador: JOSÉ-MARIA W. PEHOUA.

Chile: Nihon Seimei Akabanebashi Bldg, 8th Floor, 3–1–14, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105; tel. (03) 452-7561; telex 24585; Ambassador: EDUARDO BRAVO WOODHOUSE.

China, People's Republic: 3–4–33, Moto Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 403-3380; telex 28705; Ambassador: ZHANG SHU.

Colombia: 10–53, Kami Osaki 3-chome, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 141; tel. (03) 440-6491; Ambassador: Dr JOSÉ MARÍA VILLARREAL.

Costa Rica: Kowa Bldg, No. 38, Room 901, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 486-1812; Chargé d'affaires (a.i.): ANA LUCÍA NASSAR SOTO.

Côte d'Ivoire: Kowa Bldg, No. 38, Room 701, 7F, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 499-7021; telex 26631; Ambassador: PIERRE NELSON COFFI.

Cuba: 2–51 Minami Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 449-7511; telex 22369; Ambassador: AMADEO BLANCO VALDÉS-FAULY.

Czechoslovakia: 16–14, Hiroo 2-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150; tel. (03) 400-8122; telex 24595; Ambassador: RUDOLF JAKUBIK.

Denmark: 29–6, Sarugaku-cho, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150; tel.(03) 496-3001; telex 24417; Ambassador: W. THUNE ANDERSEN.

Dominican Republic: Kowa Bldg, No. 38, Room 904, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 499-6020; telex 33701; Ambassador: ALFONSO CANTO.

Ecuador: Kowa Bldg, No. 38, Room 806, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 499-2800; telex 25880; Ambassador: NELSON THURDEKOOS VÉLEZ.

Egypt: 5–4, Aobadai 1-chome, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153; tel. (03) 791-8613; telex 23240; Ambassador: SAMY M. SABET.

El Salvador: Kowa Bldg, No. 38, 8th Floor, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 499-4461; telex 25829; Ambassador: Dr ERNESTO ARRIETA PERALTA.

Ethiopia: Roppongi Hilltop House, B-1, 4–25, Roppongi 3-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 585-3151; telex 28402; Ambassador: (vacant).

Fiji: Noa Bldg, 10th Floor, 3–5, Azabudai 2-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 587-2038; telex 32150; Ambassador: (vacant).

Finland: 3–5–39, Minami Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 442-2231; telex 26277; Ambassador: PAULI OPAS.

France: 11–44, Minami Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 473-0171; Ambassador: BERNARD DORIN.

Gabon: 16–2, Hiroo 2-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150; tel. (03) 409-5119; telex 24812; Ambassador: AHMED NDIMAL.

USSR: 2–1–1, Azabudai, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 583-4224; Ambassador: NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH SOLOVEV.

United Arab Emirates: Kotsu Anzen Kyoiku Centre Bldg, 7th Floor, 24–20, Nishi Azabu 3-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 478-0650; telex 23552; Ambassador: MOHAMMED DARWEESH BENKARAM.

United Kingdom: 1, Ichiban-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102; tel. (03) 265-5511; telex 22755; Ambassador: Sir JOHN WHITEHEAD.

USA: 10–5, Akasaka 1-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107; tel. (03) 583-7141; telex 22118; Ambassador: MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD.

Uruguay: Room 908, No. 38 Kowa Bldg, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 486-1888; telex 25622; Chargé d'affaires a.i.: GUSTAVO PULLEIRO.

Venezuela: 7th Floor, No. 38 Kowa Bldg, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 409-1501; telex 25255; Ambassador: FERNANDO BÁEZ-DUARTE.

Viet-Nam: 50–11, Moto Yoyogi-cho, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151; tel. (03) 466-3311; Ambassador: DAO HUY NGOC.

Yemen Arab Republic: 8th Floor, Room 807, No. 38, Kowa Bldg, 12–24, Nishi Azabu 4-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 499-7151; telex 32431; Ambassador: MUHAMMAD ABDUL KODDOS ALWAZIR.

Yugoslavia: 7–24, Kita Shinagawa 4-chome, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 140; tel. (03) 447-3571; telex 22360; Ambassador: TARIK AJANOVIĆ.

Zaire: Harajuku Green Heights, Room 701, 53–17, Sendagaya 3-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151; tel. (03) 423-3981; telex 24211; Ambassador: MITIMA KANENO MURAIRI.

Zambia: 3–9–19, Ebisu, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150; tel. (03) 445-1043; telex 25210; Ambassador: BONIFACE SALIMU ZULU.

Zimbabwe: 3–11–23, Minami Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo 152; tel. (03) 473-0266; telex 32975; Ambassador: Dr NYAMAYARO HERBERT KATEDZA.

Judicial System

The basic principles of the legal system are set forth in the Constitution, which lays down that the whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law, and enunciates the principle that no organ or agency of the Executive shall be given final judicial power. Judges are to be independent in the exercise of their conscience, and may not be removed except by public impeachment, unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. The justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Cabinet, the sole exception being the Chief Justice, who is appointed by the Emperor after designation by the Cabinet.

The Court Organization Law, which came into force on 3 May 1947, decreed the constitution of the Supreme Court and the establishment of four types of inferior court—High, District, Family (established 1 January 1949), and Summary Courts. The constitution and functions of the courts are as follows:

THE SUPREME COURT

This court is the highest legal authority in the land, and consists of a Chief Justice and 14 associate justices. It has jurisdiction over Jokoku (appeals) and Kokoku (complaints), prescribed specially in codes of procedure. It conducts its hearings and renders decisions through a Grand Bench or three Petty Benches. Both are collegiate bodies, the former consisting of all justices of the Court, and the latter of five justices. A Supreme Court Rule prescribes which cases are to be handled by the respective Benches. It is, however, laid down by law that the Petty Bench cannot make decisions as to the constitutionality of a statute, ordinance, regulation, or disposition, or as to cases in which an opinion concerning the interpretation and application of the Constitution or of any laws or ordinances is at variance with a previous decision of the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice: KOICHI YAGUCHI.

INFERIOR COURTS

High Court

A High Court conducts its hearings and renders decisions through a collegiate body, consisting of three judges, though for cases of insurrection the number of judges must be five. The Court has jurisdiction over the following matters:

Koso appeals from judgments in the first instance rendered by District Courts, from judgments rendered by Family Courts, and from judgments concerning criminal cases rendered by Summary Courts.

Kokoku complaints against rulings and orders rendered by District Courts and Family Courts, and against rulings and orders concerning criminal cases rendered by Summary Courts, except those coming within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Jokoku appeals from judgments in the second instance rendered by District Courts and from judgments rendered by Summary Courts, except those concerning criminal cases.

Actions in the first instance relating to cases of insurrection.

District Court

A District Court conducts hearings and renders decisions through a single judge or, for certain types of cases, through a collegiate body of three judges. It has jurisdiction over the following matters:

Actions in the first instance, except offences relating to insurrection, claims where the subject matter of the action does not exceed 900,000 yen, and offences liable to a fine or lesser penalty.

Koso appeals from judgments rendered by Summary Courts, except those concerning criminal cases.

Kokoku complaints against rulings and orders rendered by Summary Courts, except those coming within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts.

Family Court

A Family Court handles cases through a single judge in case of rendering judgments or decisions. However, in accordance with the provisions of other statutes it conducts its hearings and renders decisions through a collegiate body of three judges. A conciliation is effected through a collegiate body consisting of a judge and two or more members of the conciliation committee selected from among citizens.

It has jurisdiction over the following matters:

Judgment and conciliation with regard to cases relating to family as provided for by the Law for Adjudgment of Domestic Relations.

Judgment with regard to the matters of protection of juveniles as provided for by the Juvenile Law.

Actions in the first instance relating to adult criminal cases of violation of the Labour Standard Law, the Law for Prohibiting Liquors to Minors, or other laws especially enacted for protection of juveniles.

Summary Court

A Summary Court handles cases through a single judge, and has jurisdiction in the first instance over the following matters:

Claims where the value of the subject matter does not exceed 900,000 yen (excluding claims for cancellation or change of administrative dispositions).

Actions which relate to offences liable to fine or lesser penalty, offences liable to a fine as an optional penalty, and certain specified offences such as habitual gambling and larceny.

A Summary Court cannot impose imprisonment or a graver penalty. When it deems proper the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment or a graver penalty, it must transfer such cases to a District Court, but it can impose imprisonment with hard labour not exceeding three years for certain specified offences.

A Procurator's Office, with its complement of procurators, is established for each of these courts. The procurators conduct searches, institute prosecutions and supervise the execution of judgments in criminal cases, and act as representatives of the public interests in civil cases of public concern.

Religion

The traditional religions of Japan are Shintoism and Buddhism. Neither is exclusive, and many Japanese subscribe at least nominally to both. Since 1945 a number of new religions (Shinko Shukyo) have evolved, based on a fusion of Shinto, Buddhist, Daoist, Confucian and Christian beliefs.

SHINTOISM

Shintoism is an indigenous religious system embracing the worship of ancestors and of nature. It is divided into two cults: national Shintoism, which is represented by the shrines; and sectarian Shintoism, which developed during the second half of the 19th century. In 1868, Shinto was designated a national religion, and all Shinto shrines acquired the privileged status of a national institution. Complete freedom of religion was introduced in 1947, and state support of Shinto was banned. There are an estimated 81,000 shrines, 101,000 priests and c. 90m. adherents.

BUDDHISM

World Buddhist Fellowship: Rev. FUJI NAKAYAMA, Hozenji Buddhist Temple, 3-24-2 Akabane-dai, Kita-ku, Tokyo.

CHRISTIANITY

In 1982 the Christian population was estimated at 1,266,402.

National Christian Council in Japan: Japan Christian Centre, 2-3-18-24, Nishi Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160; tel. (03) 203-0372; telex 27890; f. 1923; 14 mems (churches and other bodies), 14 assoc. mems; Chair. Rev. KUNIHIRO SATO; Gen. Sec. Rev. MUNETOSHI MAEJIMA.

The Anglican Communion

Anglican Church in Japan (Nippon Sei Ko Kai): 4-21, Higashi 1-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150; tel. (03) 400-2314; f. 1887; 11 dioceses; Primate of Japan Most Rev. CHRISTOPHER ICHIRO KIKAWADA, Bishop of Osaka; Gen. Sec. Rev. TIMOTHY HIROMICHI KOHNO; 57,165 mems (1986).

The Orthodox Church

Japanese Orthodox Church (Nippon Haristosu Seikyoukai): Holy Resurrection Cathedral (Nicolai-Do), 1-3, 4-chome, Surugadai Kanda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101; tel. (03) 291-1885; three dioceses; Archbishop of Tokyo, Primate and Metropolitan of All Japan Most Rev. THEODOSIUS; 24,783 mems.

Protestant Church

United Church of Christ in Japan (Nippon Kirisuto Kyodan): Japan Christian Center, Room 31, 3-18, Nishi Waseda 2-chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160; tel. (03) 202-0541; telex 27890; f. 1941; union of 34 Congregational, Methodist, Presbyterian, Reformed and other Protestant denominations; Moderator Rev. TOSHIO USHIROKU; Gen. Sec Rev. JOHN M. NAKAJIMA; 201,063 mems (March 1987).

The Roman Catholic Church

Japan comprises three archdioceses and 13 dioceses. There were 432,805 adherents in 1986.

Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference of Japan (Chuo Kyogikai): 10-1, Rokubancho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102; tel. (03) 262-3691; telex 32624; f. 1973; Pres. Mgr PETER SEICHI SHIRAYANAGI, Archbishop of Tokyo.

Archbishop of Nagasaki: Cardinal JOSEPH ASAJIRO SATOWAKI, Catholic Center, 10-34, Uenomachi, Nagasaki-shi 852; tel. (0958) 46-4246.

Archbishop of Osaka: Mgr PAUL HISAO YASUDA, Archbishop's House, Koyoen Nishiyama-cho 1-55, Nishinomiya-shi 662, Hyogo-ken; tel. (0798) 73-0921.

Archbishop of Tokyo: Mgr PETER SEIICHI SHIRAYANAGI, Archbishop's House, 16-15, Sekiguchi 3-chome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112; tel. (03) 943-2301.

Other Christian Churches

Among other denominations active in the country are the Christian Catholic Church, the German Evangelical Church, the Japan Baptist Convention, the Japan Baptist Union, the Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Korean Christian Church in Japan (10,000 mems) and the Tokyo Union Church.

OTHER COMMUNITIES

The various other religious groups have about 1,200 shrines and temples and 15,000 priests.

The New Religions

Many new cults have grown up in Japan since the end of the Second World War. Collectively these are known as the New Religions (Shinko Shukyo), of which the following are the most important:

Rissho Kosei-kai: 2-11-1, Wada Suginami-ku, Tokyo 166; tel. (03) 383-1111; telex 2322455; f. 1938; Buddhist lay organization based on the teaching of the Lotus Sutra, active inter-faith co-operation towards peace; Pres. Rev. Dr NIKKYO NIWANO; 6.2m. mems with 233 brs worldwide (1986).

Soka Gakkai: 32, Shinano-machi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160; tel. (03) 353-0616; telex 33145; f. 1930; the lay society of Nichiren Shoshu (Orthodox Nichiren Buddhism); membership of 7.95m. households (1987); Buddhist groups promoting education, international cultural exchange and world peace; Hon. Pres. DAISAKU IKEDA; Pres. EINOSUKE AKIYA.

Bahá'í Faith

The National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá'is of Japan: 2-13, 7-chome, Shinjuku Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160; tel. (03) 209-7521.

The Press

The average circulation of Japanese daily newspapers is the highest in the world after the USSR and the USA, and the circulation per head of population is highest at about 565 copies per 1,000 inhabitants (1984). The large number of weekly news journals is a notable feature of the Japanese press. In 1984 a total of 2,700 magazines were published by 1,200 magazine publishing companies. Technically the Japanese press is highly advanced, and the major newspapers are issued in simultaneous editions in the main centres.

The two newspapers with the largest circulations are the *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Other influential papers include *Mainichi Shimbun*, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, *Chunichi Shimbun* and *Sankei Shimbun*.

PRINCIPAL DAILIES

Tokyo

Asahi Shimbun: 3-2, Tsukiji 5-chome, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104; tel. (03) 545-0131; telex 22226; f. 1879; Man. Dir (Editorial Affairs) T. NAKAE; circ. morning 7.9m., evening 4.7m.

Daily Sports: 1-1-17, Higashi-Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105; tel. (03) 571-6681; f. 1948; morning; Man. Editor TAKASHI KONDO; circ. 410,000.

The Daily Yomiuri: 7-1, 1-chome, Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 242-1111; f. 1955; morning; English; Editor TAKEMOTO IINUMA; circ. 45,000.

Dempa Shimbun: 11-15, Higashi Gotanda 1-chome, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 141; tel. (03) 445-6111; telex 2424461; f. 1950; morning; Man. Editor HAJIME NINOMIYA; circ. 285,000.

Hochi Shimbun: 1-1, 2-chome, Hirakawa-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102; tel. (03) 265-2311; f. 1872; morning; Man. Editor TOKUTEI ENDO; circ. 654,000.

The Japan Times: 5-4, 4-chome, Shibaura, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108; tel. (03) 453-5311; telex 2422319; f. 1897; morning; English; Chair. TOSHIAKI OGASAWARA; Pres. J. SUZUKI; circ. 57,000.

Komei Shimbun: 17, Minami-motomachi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo; tel. (03) 353-0111; organ of the Komeito political party; circ. 800,000, Sunday edn 1.4m.

The Mainichi Daily News: 1-1-1, Hitotsubashi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 212-0321; f. 1922; morning; English; also publ. from Osaka; Man. Editor TAKAHARU YOSHIZAWA; combined circ. 40,000.

Mainichi Shimbun: 1-1, 1-chome, Hitotsubashi, Chiyoda-ku, Toyko 100; tel. (03) 212-0321; telex 22324; f. 1872; Gen. Man. and Editor KEN KONDO; circ. morning 4.2m., evening 2.2m.

Naigai Times: 14-14, 7-chome, Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104; tel. (03) 543-1061; f. 1949; evening; Editor-in-Chief KENICHI TOUYA; circ. 296,000.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun: 9-5, 1-chome, Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 270-0251; telex 22308; f. 1876; morning, evening and weekly (English edn: The Japan Economic Journal); economic news; Man. Editor T. OHTA; circ. morning 1.37m., evening 1.36m.

Nihon Kogyo Shimbun: 7-2, 1-chome, Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 231-7111; f. 1933; morning; business and financial; Pres. TERUMI NAGATA; Man. Editor HIROSHI KONDO; circ. 409,000.

Nihon Nogyo Shimbun (Agriculture): 2-3, Akihabara, Taito-ku, Tokyo 110; tel. (03) 255-5211; f. 1928; morning; Man. Editor MASAO OKU; circ. 503,000.

Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun (Industrial Daily News): 8-10, 1-chome, Kudan-kita, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102; tel. (03) 263-2311; f. 1917; morning; Man. Editor NAGARU SHIBUYA; circ. 545,000.

Nikkan Sports: 5-10, 3-chome, Tsukiji, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104; tel. (03) 542-2111; f. 1946; morning; Editor FUMIKI OKAZAKI; circ. 728,000.

Nikkan Suisan Keizai Shimbun (Fisheries): 6-8-19, Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106; tel. (03) 404-6531; f. 1948; morning; Man. Editor SHOICHI SAKANE; circ. 57,000.

Sankei Shimbun: 7-2, 1-chome, Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 231-7111; f. 1950; Man. Editor Y. HOSOYA; circ. morning 801,839, evening 355,000.

Sankei Sports: 7-2, 1-chome, Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100; tel. (03) 231-7111; f. 1963; morning; Man. Editor SHUNICHIRO KONDO; circ. 649,000.

Seikyo Shimbun: 18, Shinano-machi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160; tel. (03) 353-6111; telex 33145; f. 1951; organ of Soka Gakkai Buddhist movement; Prin. Officer EINOSUKE AKIYA; circ. 4.7m.

Shipping and Trade News: Tokyo News Service Ltd, Tsukiji Hamarikyu Bldg, 3-3, Tsukiji 5-chome, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104; tel. (03) 542-6511; telex 2523285; f. 1949; English; Man. Editor S. YASUDA; circ. 15,000.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 20, 1989

Memorandum to Chriss Winston

From: Jim Pinkerton

Re: Comments on upcoming Asia trip speeches

Below are my comments/corrections/concerns for the President's speech drafts. I know that some of these drafts have been forwarded, and I do not raise them lightly. However, I do think these suggestions merit your serious consideration. I have reviewed some of the more egregious passages with Roger Porter. He concurs with some of them, although he has not had an opportunity yet to look at all of them.

Elmendorf AFB

p. 3 para 2 I really question whether Hirohito's first trip out of Japan was to Alaska. I suspect at a minimum he went to Korea and Manchuria prior to Alaska, as both were Japanese possessions/ conquests prior to 1945.

On a lesser note, I wonder why we refer to Alaska as the gateway to Asia. What about Hawaii? For that matter, what about San Fransisco? I admit it's no big thing, but what's the upside of putting it in? Surely there are other nice things to say about the 49th state.

p.3, para 4 I really question the appropriateness of citing Billy Mitchell on the way to Japan. He is best known as a prophet of air power, and his prophecy was fulfilled when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. In any case, "fighter pilot" is an inadequate description of Mitchell.

CCTV opening statement

p. 2, para 3, second sentence I really question the appropriateness of this. Are we really on safe diplomatic ground telling the Chinese that they "one of the first nations to feel this new breeze and like a young tree in a winter wind, you have learned to bend and adapt to new ways and new ideas"? I understand the general thrust of what this says, and agree that it is in keeping with the new breeze theme of the Inaugural, but I'd hesitate before I took this message to the oldest civilization on earth. Do they equate themselves to "a young tree"? Do they agree that they have "learned to bend." Let's be careful here! We don't want to sound patronizing.

CCTV cont.

p.2 para 4 I strongly doubt that the Chinese care much about working with us to stop the spread of international drug trafficking, and I wonder whether or not it will even come up. Surely this paragraph does not embrace the agenda that the President and the Chinese leaders will actually discuss.

p. 3, para 2 In view of the phenomenon of female infanticide which is widely reported to be common in China, I wonder if this sentiment is not best kept to oneself when one is a guest.

Mitterand toast

p. 2, para 3, sentence 2. I don't think the sentence reads very well as is. I would rewrite it to make a better point: "Let us cooperate to secure the blessings of prosperity at home and to share these blessings with the world."

?

p. 3, para 5 The second clause of the sentence "just as we are yours;" is confusing and/or redundant. I would put a period after "brethren."

American Embassy Staff in Tokyo

p. 1, para 1, sentence 2. I think this is terribly worded as is. I would rewrite it to: "We were deeply moved by the dignity of today's memorial service. He [or the Showa Emperor] was the world's longest-reigning monarch; and the respect and affection of the Japanese people was fully commensurate with his long reign."

p.1, para 2, sentence 2. I don't want to be picky, but I would double-check to make sure that the Emperor and the Empress are properly treated as equals in terms of etiquette. I'm not sure that the Japanese have the same approach to this as we do.

p. 1, para. 3 I would not say "delighted" at any point during a speech given just after a state funeral. I would rewrite to "Barbara and I want to share with you some thoughts..."

p.1, para 5 I just don't think this jocular tone is appropriate for a US President on foreign soil having just returned from a state funeral.

p.2, para 2 Having cited this proverb, which seems to emphasize the importance of work, we then drop the thought and talk about "professionalism and commitment." I'd say "Your hard work and commitment..." Also, "enrich the ties that bind" is an awkward mixed metaphor.

US Embassy Tokyo, cont.

p.2, para 3 I would delete the reference to the Prime Minister's 65th birthday. It's not appropriate, and it's not relevant.

p.2 para 7 When a leader is talking to his subordinates, it is not really right to ask them for their prayers. A president can ask the nation for its prayers; but upfront and personal, it's more correct to simply ask them for their continued dedication.

p.2, para 8 The President shouldn't wish them "good luck." He's the one who's leaving! The hosts wish the departing guest good luck, not vice versa.

Embassy Greeting, Beijing

p.1, para 3 I think the joke at the end of this sentence is a dud. And I particularly worry, given the vagueries of the translation process, about someone mistaking the President's humorous reference to a "bear" for an allusion to the Soviets.

p.2 para 1 The first full sentence here does not make good sense as written. I would break it into two: "I know, as few in Washington know, of the incalculable value of your contributions and sacrifice. Without you, our work would be impossible."

p.2 para 2, line 3 I'll assume that "impact" is a diplomatic term of art that the audience and the press will understand. If so, I have no objection.

p. 3, para 4 Shades of Kiplingesque romanticism here. Is Sichuan a city? If so, then it presumably doesn't have any "bamboo forests" in it. If it is not a city, then where are the US consulates?

deleted

National Assembly of Korea

p.1, para 4, last sentence. This quotation from Churchill disturbs me. It is one thing to use this quote to a Western audience that is fully familiar with Churchill's sense of humor and is totally aware of the Western liberal democratic tradition from which he derives. It is quite another to go to a new democracy, with little in the way of democratic tradition, and spring this ironic bon mot on them. What are the chances that even half of the people of South Korea will grasp the President's shadings. I think this is a potentially very serious faux pas, one that could really confuse our hosts as to what it is we believe in and what it is we expect from them.

National Assembly, cont.

p. 4, last graf, last line. As I understand this trip, the President will already have met with President Roh. If so, then why not mention him by name along with Takeshita and Deng?

p.7, para 2 Having set the Koreans up with this quote from an Indian, the least we can do is add a sentence after the quote like this: "That light shines brighter than ever."

p.9, para 1 Do we really want to say that "The United States [and S.Korea] share similar responsibilities"? Is that the President's vision. Let's hone down more precisely what we expect of them and what we expect of ourselves.

Also, somewhere in this speech I would make use of the "new breeze" motif. A good place would after the last sentence in para 4.

I'm sorry if these comments are coming somewhat late in the process. I did not receive these drafts until the afternoon of Sunday, 2/19.

#

cc: Roger Porter
Jim Cicconi

JAPAN
McGroarty/Dooley

Draft Remarks for President's
Meeting with American Embassy Staff
February 25, 1989

Barbara and I have made our first overseas trip to attend the funeral of the late Emperor and pay our respects and those of the American people to His imperial Majesty the new Emperor. We were greatly moved by the solemn dignity of yesterday's memorial service and the affection in which the late Emperor was held by his people. While we join our Japanese friends in mourning the passing of the Emperor, we are pleased that we could be here and call upon Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress this morning.

Barbara and I are delighted to have this opportunity to meet with you here at the Embassy. I understand that during Ambassador Mansfield's tenure here, you used to call the Embassy the "Bar None Ranch," since he never tired of saying that the US-Japan relationship was the most important bilateral relationship in the world, BAR NONE. As a Texan -- and as someone who appreciates the importance of US-Japan relations and the hands who tend the relationship daily -- I like that.

From my own diplomatic experience, I know and appreciate that there is no more dedicated and loyal group of people than the men and women -- American and foreign -- of our Foreign Service. I also know what a burden a presidential visit can be and want you all to know how much we appreciate the hard work and excellent planning that has gone into this visit.

I am delighted that the first foreign visitor to Washington of my administration was the Prime Minister of Japan. That underscores again the importance both nations attach to our relationship. Our meetings were but the beginning of maintaining the closest possible consultation between us as we work to resolve our differences and pursue our many common interests.

We have problems, but with your help we are tackling them. We are also turning our attention to such global problems as poverty and the environment and will be devoting an increasing share of our energy and resources to solving those.

In conclusion, let me say again how much we appreciate your support. Thank you and good luck.