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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Speechwriting, White House Office of  
**Series:** Speech File Backup Files  
**Subseries:** Alpha File, 1987-1991

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Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
<b>G</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>

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*Xtra*  
*CF: Richard Hoess*

SAMUEL D. BERGER MEMORIAL LECTURE  
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY  
SEPTEMBER 13, 1989

UNCHARTED WATERS: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY  
IN A TIME OF TRANSITION

U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE  
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER

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- 2 -

TO BE FAIR, THE UNITED STATES DID LEARN ONE IMPORTANT LESSON FOLLOWING THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS, AND THAT WAS THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE AMERICAN ROLE AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY. BUT NOW FOR THE THIRD TIME IN THIS CENTURY, WE RISK BECOMING VICTIMS OF OUR OWN SUCCESS. FOR WE ARE HEARING IT SAID THAT THE REMORSELESS POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY COMPETITION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION KNOWN AS THE COLD WAR IS NOW COMING TO AN END. WE ARE ALSO HEARING IT SAID THAT THIS IS A WAR WHICH IS ENDING LARGELY ON OUR TERMS.

WHILE I BELIEVE MUCH OF THE DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT IS PREMATURE, IT IS INDISPUTABLE THAT WE ARE ENTERING A NEW ERA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AN ERA WHICH IS LARGELY THE PRODUCT OF OUR SUCCESSFUL POST-WAR POLICIES. NOW IS NOT THE TIME, HOWEVER, FOR US TO BE PATTING OURSELVES ON THE BACK. COMPLACENCY OVER OUR SUCCESS IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR HARD-NOSED THINKING ABOUT THE NEW ORDER OF FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES THAT AWAITS US IN THE COMING YEARS. WE ARE ENTERING UNCHARTED WATERS, AND WE ARE GOING TO REQUIRE A COMPASS DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE WHICH HAS THUS FAR GUIDED US SAFELY THROUGH THE SECOND HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY.

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BUT FIRST, LET ME INDULGE IN A BIT OF COMPLACENCY OF MY OWN. HISTORY WILL RECORD THAT THE UNITED STATES, WHILE NOT ANTICIPATING THE COLD WAR, FULLY MET THE CHALLENGES AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GLOBAL POWER WHICH IT THRUST UPON US. WHAT DID WE ACCOMPLISH? FIRST, WE HELPED SAVE WESTERN EUROPE FROM ECONOMIC RUIN AND PERHAPS PERMANENT DECLINE, LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE CONTINENT'S STARTLING STRENGTH AND PROSPERITY TODAY. SECOND, WE TOOK THE LEAD IN ESTABLISHING A NUMBER OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS WHICH PERMITTED, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THE RATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF AN INTERDEPENDENT FREE MARKET WORLD ECONOMY. THIRD, WE WELCOMED OUR FORMER ENEMIES, WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN, INTO THE FOLD OF DEMOCRATIC WESTERN NATIONS, BURYING THE ENMITIES OF THE PAST AND RENDERING WAR BETWEEN AND AMONG OURSELVES PERMANENTLY UNTHINKABLE. AND FOURTH, WE, TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES IN NATO, STOOD FIRM AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSION IN EUROPE AND GLOBALLY.

THESE WERE NO SMALL ACCOMPLISHMENTS. IT IS NOT EASY FOR A DEMOCRACY TO MAINTAIN THE STEADINESS OF PURPOSE AND THE POPULAR CONSENSUS ESSENTIAL TO A SUCCESSFUL AND COHERENT FOREIGN POLICY. THE DIFFICULTY OF OUR TASK WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT WE WERE BUT ONE OF A COALITION OF DEMOCRACIES, AND THAT WE FACED A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY WHOSE MESSIANIC ZEAL WAS MATCHED ONLY BY ITS SEEMINGLY LIMITLESS ABILITY TO IGNORE THE NEEDS OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND DEVOTE VAST RESOURCES TOWARD ACQUIRING THE INSTRUMENTS OF INTIMIDATION AND AGGRESSION. WE SUCCEEDED

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BECAUSE WE AND OUR ALLIES AGREED THAT THE THREAT WE FACED IN COMMON WAS IMMINENT AND REAL, AND BECAUSE THE PEOPLES OF THE WEST WERE WILLING TO BEAR THE SACRIFICES NECESSARY TO MEET THAT THREAT.

OUR SUCCESS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. THE WEST TODAY IS STRONGER COLLECTIVELY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE WORLD WAR II. WE ARE PROSPEROUS AND WE ARE SECURE. WE ARE CONFIDENT OF OUR PURPOSE AND OF THE VALIDITY—AND UNIVERSALITY—OF OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. ON THE OTHER SIDE, COMMUNISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT AND AS A GUIDE TO ECONOMICS IS IN DISARRAY. TODAY, COMMUNISM IS THE REFUGE OF DESPOTS AND OLIGARCHS WHO CLING DESPERATELY TO POWER BUT WHO KNOW THEY ARE CONDEMNED BY HISTORY. FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO NICARAGUA, AND FROM ETHIOPIA TO CUBA, COMMUNIST ECONOMIES ARE RECOGNIZED FAILURES. THE HISTORY OF THE LAST TEN YEARS IS AN ALMOST UNBLEMISHED RECORD OF MOVEMENT TOWARD MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS THE WORLD OVER AND OF THE VICTORY OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES OVER DICTATORSHIPS OF THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT.

BUT THE RECORD OF OUR ACHIEVEMENTS IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF MY ADDRESS TO YOU THIS EVENING. INSTEAD, I WOULD LIKE DELIBERATELY TO PROVOKE REFLECTION ON THE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT SET OF CHALLENGES THE UNITED STATES IS GOING TO FACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AS WE MOVE INTO THE NEXT CENTURY.

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WHAT WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND IS THAT THE BIPOLAR WORLD OF THE POST-WAR ERA, IN WHICH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION DOMINATED WORLD EVENTS AND SET THE AGENDA FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES, IS OVER. WE ARE NOW MOVING INTO, OR I SHOULD SAY BACK INTO -- FOR SUCH HAS BEEN THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL--A WORLD IN WHICH POWER AND INFLUENCE IS DIFFUSED AMONG A MULTIPLICITY OF STATES.

OBVIOUSLY, THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN WELCOMED IN THE WEST. INsofar AS IT REFLECTS A DECLINE IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POWER AND THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DECAY WHICH NOW SEEMS ENDEMIC TO EASTERN EUROPE. BUT LET US NOT FOOL OURSELVES. IF IT IS TRUE THAT WE HAVE EMERGED VICTORIOUS FROM THE COLD WAR, THEN WE, LIKE THE SOVIETS BEHIND US, HAVE CROSSED THE FINISH LINE VERY MUCH OUT OF BREATH. BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS ARE FACED WITH A FRANKLY DIMINISHED CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS AND PROMOTE OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ON THE SCALE TO WHICH WE HAVE BECOME ACCUSTOMED.

THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL CEASE TO BE THE WORLD'S ONLY TRUE SUPERPOWERS, OR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT REPRESENT THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NOR IS THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD INTO WHICH WE ARE MOVING NECESSARILY GOING TO

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BE A SAFER PLACE THAN THE COLD WAR ERA FROM WHICH WE ARE EMERGING, GIVEN THE EXISTENCE AND INDEED THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. FOR ALL ITS RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES, THE COLD WAR WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A REMARKABLY STABLE AND PREDICTABLE SET OF RELATIONS AMONG THE GREAT POWERS. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE HISTORY BOOKS WILL TELL US THAT WE CANNOT SAY AS MUCH ABOUT THE PERIOD LEADING FROM THE BIRTH OF THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATES UP THROUGH THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

WE LIVE, THEN, IN A TIME OF TRANSITION, ONE OF RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES. THERE IS THE PROSPECT BEFORE US THAT THE EAST BLOC COUNTRIES WILL AT LAST JOIN THE FAMILY OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS, AND THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL ENJOY THE FRUITS OF PROGRESS BY EMBRACING MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS. BUT THERE IS ALSO THE DANGER THAT CHANGE IN THE EAST WILL PROVE TOO DESTABILIZING TO BE SUSTAINED, AND THAT THE NATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD WILL BE CRUSHED BY THE WEIGHT OF DEBT AND DECAY, LEADING TO INSTABILITY ON A BROAD SCALE.

IF THERE IS ONE MESSAGE I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY THIS EVENING, IT IS THAT OUR ABILITY TO MEET THE CHALLENGES IN EAST-WEST AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS WILL DEPEND SUBSTANTIALLY ON HOW WELL THE MAJOR WESTERN INDUSTRIAL NATIONS MANAGE THE TRANSITION TO A NEW SET OF RELATIONS AND A NEW DISTRIBUTION OF

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RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG THEMSELVES. CLEARLY, THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG THE U.S., WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN HAS SHIFTED OVER THE LAST DECADE. WE CAN DO SOMETHING ABOUT OUR TRADE AND BUDGET DEFICITS, BUT WE CAN DO NOTHING TO ALTER THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT THAT WE ARE NO LONGER GOING TO BE ABLE TO GET OUR WAY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AS WE ONCE DID. HOW WE ADJUST TO THIS FACT, AND HOW OUR WESTERN PARTNERS ADJUST TO THEIR NEW-FOUND INDEPENDENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THE STABLE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK THE U.S. DID SO MUCH TO FOSTER IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL, OR WHETHER WE WILL SLIP BACK TOWARD THE DARK DAYS OF AUTARKY, UNILATERALISM, AND PROTECTIONISM WHICH PROVED SO DAMAGING TO THE WEST IN THE 1920S AND 30S.

THE SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG THE LEADING WESTERN COUNTRIES DOES NOT MEAN THE U.S. MUST ABANDON ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE. ON THE CONTRARY, THE U.S. WILL REMAIN FOR LONG INTO THE NEXT CENTURY THE ONLY POWER ABLE — OR AT LEAST WILLING — TO THINK IN GLOBAL TERMS AND TO FASHION POLICIES IN THE OVERALL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE WEST. WE HAVE NOT ALWAYS DONE THIS WELL, NOR HAVE WE NECESSARILY DONE SO FOR SELFLESS REASONS, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT NONE OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS HAS THE GLOBAL REACH OR THE DISPOSITION TO TAKE THE LEAD IN SAFEGUARDING AND EXPANDING THE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS WHICH ARE VITAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. OUR CAPACITY TO PLAY THIS ROLE MAY HAVE BEEN DIMINISHED, BUT THE NEED FOR US TO DO SO HAS NOT.

FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THIS ROLE, HOWEVER, WILL INCREASINGLY REQUIRE A RECOGNITION BY OUR WESTERN DEMOCRATIC PARTNERS THAT, WITH INCREASED WEALTH AND INFLUENCE, COME INCREASED RESPONSIBILITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WEST EUROPEANS, AS THEY MOVE TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A SINGLE INTERNAL MARKET IN JANUARY 1993, WILL HAVE TO INSURE A CONTINUED OPEN TRADE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. IF WE ARE GOING TO AVOID A PROTECTIONIST SPIRAL AND A CONSEQUENT DETERIORATION IN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. SIMILARLY, THE JAPANESE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PURSUE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE OVERALL STABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS INCUMBENT ON BOTH THE U.S. AND THE WEST EUROPEANS TO FIND INSTITUTIONAL MEANS OF BRINGING THE JAPANESE INTO A CLOSER CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP ON A BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC ISSUES, SO THAT THEY CAN PLAY THE CREATIVE AND POSITIVE INTERNATIONAL ROLE WHICH IS RIGHTFULLY AND NECESSARILY THEIRS.

THE PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT WHICH WE IN THE WEST FACE PALE IN COMPARISON TO THOSE FACING THE SOVIETS TODAY. THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING THROUGH WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS A CRISIS

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OF MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV HAS HAD THE WISDOM TO UNDERSTAND THAT RADICAL CHANGE IS NECESSARY TO SAVE HIS COUNTRY FROM PERMANENT DECLINE. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME, HOWEVER, THAT THE KREMLIN HAS ENGINEERED AN IDEOLOGICAL RETREAT IN ORDER TO STIMULATE NATIONAL RECOVERY. LENIN FIRST DID SO WITH HIS MARKET-ORIENTED NEW ECONOMIC PLAN IN THE 1920S, AND STALIN SUBMERGED IDEOLOGY IN FAVOR OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AGAINST NAZI GERMANY. WE NEED TO KEEP THIS HISTORY IN MIND, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT GORBACHEV IS NO ANTI-COMMUNIST, AND THAT HE INTENDS TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION AS STRONG AS HE POSSIBLY CAN.

NEVERTHELESS, IT IS TRUE THAT THE CHANGES INTRODUCED BY GORBACHEV OFFER THE FIRST REALISTIC HOPE FOR A TRANSFORMATION IN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND FOR A QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AS PRESIDENT BUSH HAS ARGUED, WE HAVE A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY NOW TO END THE POST-WAR DIVISION OF EUROPE ON TERMS WHICH REFLECT OUR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES. THIS IS BECAUSE MR. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY HAS UNDERSTOOD THAT HIS COUNTRY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COMPETE ECONOMICALLY UNLESS RESOURCES ARE SHIFTED AWAY FROM THE MILITARY, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ENTER THE POST-INDUSTRIAL AGE UNLESS IT OPENS ITS SOCIETY TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND ESTABLISHES RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ON A NORMAL FOOTING. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT HE HAS MADE

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- 10 -

HOPEFUL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND HAS SLOWED THE OVERSEAS ADVENTURISM WHICH DID SO MUCH TO GALVANIZE WESTERN SOLIDARITY IN THE EARLY 1980S.

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AND CONFIDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

OBVIOUSLY, IT IS IN THE EUROPEANS' INTEREST AS MUCH, IF NOT MORE THAN OUR OWN, TO AVOID BANKROLLING MERELY COSMETIC SOVIET REFORMS OR TO REACH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH UNDERMINE NATO'S ABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION. AFTER ALL, THE EUROPEANS ARE CONDEMNED BY GEOGRAPHY TO LIVE IN THE SHADOW OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIET UNION IN THE LONG RUN CHANGES AS MUCH AS ALL OF US HOPE. AND WHILE THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO WILL REMAIN SECURE, IT IS INCREASINGLY INCUMBENT UPON OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES -- PARTICULARLY AS THEY UNIFY THEIR ECONOMIES -- TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE AND TO ESTABLISH A MORE EQUITABLE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT REFLECTS THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF OUR ECONOMIES.

THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL REASON WHY THE EUROPEANS WILL HAVE TO BECOME MORE RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING THEIR OWN INTERESTS. WE ARE NOW DISCOVERING THAT THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN THE SOVIET BLOC AND THE RELAXATION OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE ARE BRINGING LONG-SUPPRESSED ETHNIC ANTAGONISMS AND NATIONAL RIVALRIES TO THE SURFACE, AND PUTTING THE GERMAN QUESTION BACK ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA. WHILE AMERICAN POLICY CAN HAVE A STEADYING INFLUENCE IN DEALING WITH THESE QUESTIONS, IT IS ULTIMATELY THE EUROPEANS THEMSELVES WHO HAVE THE PRINCIPAL

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POLITICAL STAKE IN MAKING THE TRANSITION TO A NEW AND UNDIVIDED EUROPE A PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY ONE. MOREOVER, THE COOPERATIVE AND MULTILATERAL APPROACH WHICH HAS MADE FOR A PROSPEROUS AND SECURE WESTERN EUROPE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD WILL BE KEY TO OVERCOMING THE INHERENT INSTABILITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE MULTIPOLAR ERA INTO WHICH THE WHOLE OF EUROPE IS NOW ENTERING.

THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO FACE A NEW SET OF CHALLENGES OVER THE NEXT DECADE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD. HERE, TOO, THE POST-WAR STRUGGLE BETWEEN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNIST OR STATIST IDEOLOGIES FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE THIRD WORLD APPEARS TO BE MOVING IN WAYS FAVORABLE TO THE WEST. BUT WE SHOULD BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE UNDERLYING MEANING OF THE TREND TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS FREE MARKET REFORMS WHICH WE ARE WITNESSING TODAY THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD. THE FACT IS THAT THE TREND IS AGAINST INCUMBENT GOVERNMENTS EVERYWHERE, OF ALL POLITICAL STRIPES — GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE OVERWHELMED BY THE PROBLEMS OF OVERPOPULATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND STAGNANT ECONOMIC GROWTH.

CLEARLY, MANY OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS ARE OF THEIR OWN MAKING. BUT IF THEY ARE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY REFORMS, WE IN THE WEST MUST RESPOND WITH CREATIVE APPROACHES TO THE DEBT PROBLEM AND WITH A LEVEL OF INVESTMENT

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


- 15 -

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# Typical\* Procedure for Inviting a Person from the USA to the USSR

\*Procedure may vary from one location to another depending on local authorities



## The Helsinki Accords and Family Visits

Contacts and Regular Meeting on the Basis of Family Ties is the first of the Human Contacts provisions agreed to by the thirty-five member States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

According to the Helsinki Final Act:

*"the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel . . . on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families. . . cases of urgent necessity — such as serious illness or death — will be given priority treatment."*

### Recommendations for liberalized US-USSR travel procedures:

1. Establish a U.S.-Soviet bilateral working group on family visits.
2. Establish a procedure for quick action in case of serious illness or death.
3. Ease procedures and requirements for private visits; eliminate the 4-6 month-long invitation (vyzov) process.
4. Ease travel requirements for Soviet citizens, especially eliminate the 200 ruble visa/foreign passport fee. Eliminate need for Soviet citizens to appear in person to apply for a US visa.
5. Re-examine criteria of US visa denial to Soviet citizens who fit an arbitrary profile of potential defectors.
6. Open up more entry/exit points into the Soviet Union and open additional cities and regions in each country. Ease travel procedures for related Alaskan and Siberian natives living as little as 3 miles apart across the Bering Strait.
7. Repeal Soviet decrees which intimidate or restrict visitors.
8. Encourage airlines to increase availability of flights, including low-fare and charter flights.
9. Improve mail and telephone communication. Remove prohibitive duties from gift parcels.

### Visits Problems?

To register complaints about visits, contact the following government agencies. Please send a copy of your complaint to VISA.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(U.S. Congress Helsinki Commission)

House Annex #2, Room 237

Washington, D.C. 20515

and


Soviet Desk

U.S. Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

# Typical\* Procedure for Inviting a Person from the USSR to the USA

\*Procedure may vary from one location to another depending on local authorities



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**An  
Appeal for  
Freedom of Travel  
Between the United States  
And the Soviet Union  
For Millions of Relatives  
On the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary  
Of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights**

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**Обращение  
С Призывом на  
Право Свободного Передвижения  
Миллионов Родственников  
Живущих в Соединённых Штатах Америки  
И в Советском Союзе  
К Сороковой Годовщине  
Всеобщей Декларации по Правам Человека**

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**Обращение с Призывом на Право Свободного Передвижения  
Миллионов Родственников Живущих  
В Соединённых Штатах Америки и в Советском Союзе  
К Сороковой Годовщине Всеобщей Декларации по Правам Человека**

Генеральному секретарю  
Коммунистической партии Союза  
Советских Социалистических Республик, и  
Президенту Соединённых Штатов Америки.

**С**оединённые Штаты являются по существу страной иммигрантов, миллионы которых прибыли тремя большими волнами с территорий, которые занимает в настоящее время Советский Союз. Каждая группа оставляла позади членов своих семей.

Миллионы американцев утверждают что они являются выходцами с территорий Советского Союза. Около трёх миллионов американцев армянского, белорусского, Эстонского, немецкого, еврейского, латвийского, литовского, русского, украинского и других происхождений всё ещё продолжают общаться со своими родственниками.

Для родителей, детей, бабушек и дедушек, братьев, сестёр, двоюродных братьев и сестёр, тётей и дядей и даже дальних родственников необходимо поддерживать постоянное человеческое общение между собой.

**10** декабря 1988 года отмечается сороковая годовщина принятия Всеобщей Декларации по Правам Человека Генеральной Ассамблеей Соединённых Наций. Статья 13 (2) *Каждый человек имеет право покидать любую страну, включая свою собственную, и возвращаться в свою страну..*

В Заключительном акте Хельсинкского совещания, подписанного в 1975 году, Советский Союз и Соединённые Штаты, вместе с тридцатью тремя другими странами, признали:

*Государства-участники признают всеобщее значение прав человека и основных свобод, уважение которых является существенным фактором мира, справедливости и благополучия, необходимых для обеспечения развития дружественных отношений и сотрудничества. . .*

*В области прав человека и основных свобод государства-участники будут действовать в соответствии с целями и принципами Устава ООН и Всеобщей декларацией прав человека.*

*..государства-участники будут благожелательно рассматривать просьбы о поездках. . . если этого пожелают, регулярной основе для встреч с членами своих семей. . . в случаях срочной надобности – таких, как серьезная болезнь, смерть, – во внеочередном порядке.*

Американский сенатор Деннис Деконсини подтожил важность посещения родственников следующим образом:

*„Цивилизация зиждется на единстве человеческой семьи. . . без семьи не было бы и цивилизации. . . Судьба наций тесно связана с жизнеспособностью и стабильностью семьи.“*

**М**ы знаем как Советский Союз и Россия в течение истории препятствовали контактам между людьми по другую сторону границы. Но нас обнадеживают последние перемены в политике Советского Союза, обещающие большую открытость и контакты с другими странами.

Сейчас, во времена нового мышления, мы должны соединить наши усилия по поиску конструктивных мер по избежанию конфронтации и для поиска возможностей для примирения и взаимного понимания. Нам необходимо искать и созидать, взяв за основу наши взаимные интересы, и сглаживать наши различия.

Мы, как и весь мир, аплодируем прогрессу, который был достигнут нашими странами в области сокращения вооружений. Мы знаем, что благодаря гласности и перестройке многое меняется в Советском Союзе в лучшую сторону, включая права человека высказывать своё мнение и право эмигрировать.

Люди в наших странах верят, что придерживание принципов, изложенных во Всеобщей Декларации по Правам Человека, приведёт к более стабильным, надёжным и демократичным правительствам. Уважение к правам отдельного человека приведёт к уважению прав наций.

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**An Appeal for Freedom of Travel  
Between the United States and the Soviet Union  
For Millions of Relatives on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary  
Of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights**

**To the General Secretary of the Communist Party and President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and the President of the United States of America:**

**T**he United States is basically a country of immigrants, millions of whom came from the present territory of the Soviet Union, mostly during the course of three great waves. Each group left relatives behind.

Millions of Americans claim ancestry from what is now the Soviet Union. About three million Americans of Armenian, Byelorussian, Estonian, German, Jewish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, Ukrainian, and other ethnic backgrounds still keep contact with their relatives.

Parents, children, grandparents, brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts, uncles, as well as distant relatives, need to maintain regular human contact with each other.

**D**ecember 10, 1988 marks the Fortieth Anniversary of the adoption and proclamation of the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Article 13 (2) of the Declaration confirms the right of individuals to travel:

*Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.*

In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union and United States, along with 33 other countries, agreed to the following provisions:

*The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation . . .*

*In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

*. . . the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel . . . on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families. . . cases of urgent necessity — such as serious illness or death — will be given priority treatment.*

U.S. Senator Dennis DeConcini summed up the importance of family visits in these words:

*"Civilization rests upon the integrity of the human family . . . without family there could be no civilization. . . . The fate of nations is intimately linked to the vitality and stability of the family."*

**W**e are familiar with the historic practice of the Soviet Union and its predecessor to limit contact with people outside its borders. We are encouraged by recent policy changes in the Soviet Union which promise more openness and ties with other countries.

In this era of new thinking, we must join together to search for constructive ways to avoid confrontation and to find opportunities for conciliation and mutual understanding.

We must search for, and build on our common interests and work to bridge our differences.

We join the world in applauding the progress of our countries in the area of arms reduction. We note the changes in the Soviet Union due to *glasnost* and *perestroika* including improvements in the right of people to voice their opinions, and the right to emigrate.

Some individuals in our countries believe that adherence to the principles expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will result in more stable, secure, and more democratic governments. Respect for human rights of the individual will carry over to respect of the rights of nations.

**У**величение контактов между родственниками с течением времени должно привести к изменению прошлых враждебных отношений. Настоящий, прочный мир, столь необходимый в ядерный век, может наступить тогда в обозримом будущем.

Руководители Соединённых Штатов Америки и Советского Союза могут быть примером для остальных стран, каким они являются в области контроля за вооружением, культурном обмене, подерживая права членов семей посещать друг друга.

В 1987 году Американский конгрессмен Кристофер Смит предложил резолюцию, утверждающую, что содействие беспрепятственному общению семей является необходимой частью американской политики по отношению к Советскому Союзу. В предисловии он утверждает:

*«Я полагаю, что право на семейные визиты есть основное право человека и советские реформы способны потенциально улучшить атмосферу между двумя сверхдержавами...»*

**М**ы смотрим с энтузиазмом на значительные улучшения в выдаче виз Советским государством с тех пор как Кристофер Смит сделал своё заявление.

Мы приветствуем прогресс к большей свободе на что указывает указ о путешествиях от 1 января 1987 года, который упростил некоторые процедуры и позволил недавним советским эмигрантам увидеть членов своих семей.

В 1988 году более 14 000 советских людей посетило друзей и родственников в США, что является значительным повышением по сравнению с 5 700 в 1987 году, и в среднем 1 500 в год в предыдущие годы. Между тем эти цифры могут значительно повыситься при дальнейшей либерализации правил о путешествиях для миллионов родственников.

Мы разочарованы, что большинство американцев всё ещё должны оформлять туристические поездки, которые более дорогие чем частные поездки и также значительно урезают время общения с семьёй. Во время туристской поездки американцам трудно посетить родственника в больнице, побывать на кладбище или просто находить удовольствие в нормальном человеческом гостеприимстве, не нарушая советских законов.

Мы думаем, что основной проверкой глубины и значения гласности послужит распространение правила путешествий для учёных и бизнесменов на обычных людей, особенно в случаях тяжёлого заболевания и смерти родственников.

У нас вызывает тревогу произвольность в отказе в визах. Американцы получают отказ в туристских визах для встречи с родственниками; советским людям отказывают в праве путешествовать за границу произвольным решением местных официальных лиц; советским гражданам отказывают в американских визах.

Свобода путешествий должна быть правом, гарантированным законом, а не привилегией. Миллионы семей мечтают о дне, когда простые люди не будут зависеть от прилива и отлива политических соображений.

В 1985 году, перед Женевской встречей в верхах, президент Рональд Рейган сказал:

*«Посещения родственников, как основная форма культурного обмена, являются хорошим фундаментом для этого мира.»*

**Г**енеральный секретарь Михаил Сергеевич Горбачёв выразил сходное мнение в интервью, данном в 1987 году: *«Непосредственный контакт между людьми очень важен. Без него, без широкого общения и понимания между людьми, политика не может многого дать.»*

В своём заявлении в 1988 году на Московской встрече в верхах президент Рейган позволил надеяться многим членам семей, что координированное, постоянное внимание к проблеме посещения родственников обеспечит большую либерализацию политики в отношении путешествий:

*«В недавнее время немногие люди и семьи получали разрешение посетить своих родственников на Западе. Мы можем только надеяться, что немного времени пройдёт прежде чем всем будет это позволено, и украинские-американцы, прибалтийские-американцы, армяне-американцы смогут также свободно посещать свою родину, как это делает ирландец-американец.»*

*«Нас обнадеживает, что число тех, кто получает разрешения на кратковременные поездки, в том числе для посещения членов семей, растёт. Мы верим, что скоро настанет полная свобода путешествий.»*

Мы верим, что прогресс во всех сферах прав человека, которые столь ясно выражены во Всеобщей Декларации прав человека, приведёт к улучшению отношений между нашими странами и таким образом будет способствовать делу сохранения мира на земле.

По поводу сороковой годовщины Всеобщей Декларации по правам человека, мы призываем вас к уважению обязательств налагаемыми международными соглашениями о фундаментальном праве человека на свободное передвижение.

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**F**amily visits between relatives could, in time, help reverse the adversarial nature of the past relationship. A true and lasting peace, necessary in this nuclear age, can come within our grasp.

The leaders of the United States and Soviet Union can set an example for the rest of the world, as they have in arms control and cultural exchanges, by upholding the basic right of families to visit one another.

In 1987, U.S. Congressman Christopher Smith introduced a Resolution which states that promotion of unrestricted family visits is an essential part of American policy toward the Soviet Union. In his introduction he stated:

*"I believe family visitation rights are basic human rights and Soviet reforms have the potential to improve the atmosphere between the two superpowers. . ."*

**W**e are heartened by significant improvements in the granting of visas for relatives by the Soviet Union since the time of Christopher Smith's statement. We welcome the liberalization in policy instituted with the decree on travel effective January 1, 1987 which resulted in some simplification of procedures, and allowed recent Soviet emigres to exchange visits with their relatives.

In 1988, over 14,000 Soviet citizens visited friends and relatives in the U.S. — a significant increase from 5,700 in 1987, and an average of 1,500 per year in previous years. However, these numbers could increase dramatically with further liberalization of travel procedures for million of relatives.

We are disappointed that most Americans must still take tours which are more expensive than private stays, and severely limit the time available to spend with family. Tours make it difficult for Americans to see hospitalized relatives, visit gravesites or enjoy normal hospitality without breaking Soviet law.

We feel that the fundamental test of the depth and meaning of *glasnost* is whether the easing of travel procedures for business and scientific travelers will be extended to ordinary family members, especially in cases of serious illness or death.

We express our concern about arbitrary visa denials: Americans denied tourist visas to meet with relatives; Soviet citizens denied the right to travel abroad by arbitrarily decisions of local officials; Soviet citizens denied U.S. visas.

Freedom of travel should be a right guaranteed by law, not a privilege. Millions of families dream of the day when ordinary people are no longer victimized by the ebb and flow of political considerations.

In 1985, prior to the Geneva Summit, President Ronald Reagan said: " . . . the cause of peace would be well served if more individuals and families . . . could come to know each other in a personal way."

Family visits, the most basic form of cultural exchange, are a good foundation for that peace.

**G**eneral Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev expressed similar sentiments in a 1987 interview: "Direct people-to-people contact is a great thing. Without it, without broad communication and understanding between peoples, politics cannot provide much."

President Reagan gave hope to relatives that coordinated, continued, attention to the issue of family visits will bring further liberalization of travel policies by his statements at the 1988 Moscow Summit:

*"Recently, a few individuals and families have been allowed to visit relatives in the West. We can only hope that it won't be long before all are allowed to do so, and Ukrainian-Americans, Baltic-Americans, Armenian-Americans, can freely visit their homelands, just as this Irish-American visits his.*

*" . . . We're encouraged as well that the number of those permitted to leave for short trips, often family visits, has gone up. . . It is our hope that soon there will be complete freedom of travel."*

We believe that progress in all areas of human rights, so well expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, will lead to improved relations between our countries and therefore, to a safer, more peaceful, world.

On the occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we appeal to you to honor the commitments made in international agreements on the fundamental human right of freedom of travel.

## Рекомендации по облегчению контактов между США и СССР.

**1** Образовать двустороннюю американо-советскую рабочую группу, занимающуюся специально вопросами посещения родственников в другой стране, с тем, чтобы установить юридические нормы в процедуре подачи заявлений на выезд за границу, расширить возможности взаимных посещений и создать инстанцию, в которую можно было бы обращаться с жалобами на отказ в выдаче визы или в случае других помех в поездке за границу.

**2** Разработать меры, обеспечивающие ускорение бюрократических процедур в случае поездок, связанных с серьёзным заболеванием или смертью родственника за рубежом. Установить каналы срочной процедуры, позволяющей советским гражданам совершать экстренные поездки в США.

**3** Упростить процедуру рассмотрения ходатайств о поездке за границу и выдачи визы.

- а. Значительно ускорить процесс рассмотрения ходатайств («вызовов») о частных поездках родных (и друзей) в гости. Ныне эта процедура длится 4-6 месяцев. Родственникам следует предоставить такие же права получения в течение 2-5 дней множественной въездной визы, действительной в течение двух лет, которые в настоящее время предоставлены только западным бизнесменам и учёным.
- б. Отменить все ограничения, связанные со степенью родства, при рассмотрении ходатайств о частных поездках и разрешить американским туристам останавливаться на дому у их родственников и друзей по их желанию не ограничивая их только включёнными в программу экскурсиями.
- в. Отменить практику, обязывающую заполнять несколько отдельных анкет в случае посещения родственников, проживающих в различных областях Советского Союза.
- г. Разрешить американским туристам, заинтересованным в экскурсиях по Советскому Союзу наряду с посещением родных там, продлить время пребывания в каждом из городов (в настоящее время, в большинстве городов это время ограничено 3-4 сутками).
- д. Ввести в советском консульстве в Сан-Франциско анкеты и процедуры, идентичные тем, которые приняты в консульстве в Вашингтоне.

**4** Облегчить поездки за границу для советских граждан.

- а. Отменить принятую в настоящее время для советских граждан плату за визу в размере 200 рублей (равную средней месячной зарплате в СССР). За визу на поездку в социалистические страны прежде взималась плата в размере 20 рублей, но с 1 января 1988 года и сама по себе такая виза, и плата за нее отменены. По Хельсинкским соглашениям, Советский Союз обязался выдавать разрешения на поездки к родственникам за границу независимо от того, какого они происхождения и в какой стране они проживают. Отмена виз для поездок в социалистические страны в этом свете должна повлечь за собой аналогичную акцию и по отношению к поездкам в страны Запада.
- б. Предоставить молодёжи и целым семьям больше возможностей для путешествий на Запад.
- в. Увеличить срок годности документов (в частности иностранных паспортов), выдаваемых для заграничных поездок. По существующей советской практике, визы действительны только в течение шести месяцев - для каждой поездки. Необходимо обеспечить условия, по которым одного ходатайства было бы достаточно для того, чтобы сразу получить разрешение на несколько поездок в течение большего, чем ныне разрешённый, периода. Так, Венгрия выдает своим гражданам паспорт, действительный в течение пяти лет и позволяющий неограниченное число выездов за пределы государства.
- г. Отменить практику, обязывающую советских граждан лично являться в посольство США в Москве для подачи ходатайства о въездной американской визе.

**5** Установить большее число, в дополнение к существующим, советских пограничных пунктов въезда и выезда иностранных туристов. Ныне Москва является главным транзитным пунктом; нужны новые пункты и в Европейской части СССР, и на Дальневосточном побережье. Прибалтийские республики, Армения, Белоруссия, Украина и Российская Федерация, должны иметь дополнительные, свои собственные въездно-выездные пункты. Упростить процедуры для взаимных контактов представителей народностей Аляски и Сибири, разделённых по Берингову проливу подчас расстоянием, не превышающим три мили.

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## Recommendations for liberalized U.S.-USSR travel procedures:

**1** Establish a U.S.-Soviet bilateral working group on family visits in order to set standard application procedures, continue progress in improving opportunities for exchanged visits, and to create a means for appeal of visa denials or visit problems.

**2** Establish a procedure for quick action in case of serious illness or death. Set up procedure which will allow an American relative to apply and receive visa from Soviet consulate via telephone, overnight mail, or facsimile machine for emergency travel to the Soviet Union. Establish fast procedure for residents of the Soviet Union to apply for travel to the USA in emergency situations.

**3** Ease procedures and requirements for private visits.

- a. Streamline or eliminate the 4-6 month-long invitation (vyzov) process for private visas for relatives (and friends). Like Western businessmen and scientists, relatives should receive two year multiple-entry visas within 2 to 5 days.
- b. Remove relationship requirements for private visits, and allow Americans the right to stay in homes of relatives or friends, rather than confining most Americans to tours.
- c. Eliminate need for multiple applications to visit relatives in different regions.
- d. For those Americans who prefer to combine a tour with visits to relatives, increase the length of time permitted in each city (now limited to 3 or 4 days except in certain cities).
- e. Provide identical standard forms and procedures at the Soviet consulates in U.S.; and U.S. consulates in Soviet Union.

**4** Ease travel requirements for Soviet citizens.  
a. Eliminate the current 200 ruble visa fee (over one month's average salary) as the Soviet Union has done for visits to Eastern Europe.

- b. Allow entire families and more young people to travel to the West.
- c. Increase period of validity of travel permission/international passports. Under present Soviet policy visas are valid for six months — for one trip. One application procedure should allow multiple trips for an extended period.
- d. Eliminate the need for Soviet citizens to appear in person at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to apply for a U.S. visa.
- e. U.S. consulates in the Soviet Union should re-examine their policy of visa denial to Soviet citizens who fit an arbitrary profile of a potential defector.

**5** Open up more entry/exit points into the Soviet Union. Moscow is now the primary transit point for the Soviet Union. The Baltic States, Armenia, Byelorussia, Central Asia, Ukraine, Russia, and the Pacific coast should have additional entry/exit points.

Ease travel procedures for related Alaskan and Siberian natives living three miles apart across the Bering Strait.

**6** В настоящее время крайне ограниченное число населённых пунктов в Советском Союзе открыто для американских туристов - 90 для посещения с ночёвкой и ещё 90 для исключительно дневных экскурсий. Это число необходимо увеличить. Соответствующим образом, и Соединённые Штаты должны открыть большее число населённых пунктов для советских туристов.

**7** Отменить советские законодательные акты, отпугивающие иностранных туристов или ограничивающие свободу их передвижения, как то:

- а. Закон о советском гражданстве от 1 июля 1979 года, согласно которому граждане США, родившиеся на территории, ныне принадлежащей Советскому Союзу, и их дети, хотя бы и родившиеся за пределами СССР, считаются советскими гражданами.
- б. Закон от 25 мая 1984 года, по которому советские граждане принадлежат денежному штрафу за предоставление жилья, средств передвижения и других (не названных) услуг иностранцам без предварительного разрешения властей.
- в. Закон от 23 июля 1966 года, налагающий наказание на иностранцев, «сознательно нарушающих установленные правила передвижения, посещающих пункты, не перечисленные в их советских въездных визах или уклоняющихся от маршрута. . . без специального на то разрешения».

**8** Необходимо увеличить число авиарейсов, включая чартерные рейсы и рейсы с удешевлёнными билетами. ( В настоящее время билеты на рейсы, оплачиваемые рублями, раскуплены на много месяцев вперед, что создает большие трудности, особенно для проживающих в провинции. )

**9** В дополнение, необходимо улучшить и иные способы международных контактов граждан СССР и США:

- возобновить прямую автоматическую телефонную связь (без услуг телефонистов);
- отменить пошлины на подарки, пересылаемые почтовыми бандеролями;
- отменить почтовую перлюстрацию;
- обеспечить беспрепятственную доставку любых почтовых отправок.

Совещание по Безопасности и Сотрудничеству в Европе, Заключительный Акт, 1 Августа 1975 г.

*VII. Уважение прав человека и основных свобод... Сотрудничество в гуманитарных и других областях*

Государства-участники, *Желая* содействовать укреплению мира и взаимопонимания между народами...,

*Сознавая*, что развитие... контакты между людьми и решение гуманитарных проблем будут содействовать достижению этих целей.... *Исполненные решимости* поэтому сотрудничать между собой...

*Убежденные*, что это сотрудничество должно осуществляться при полном соблюдении принципов, регулирующих отношения между государствами-участниками... *Приняли* следующее:

**1. Контакты между людьми**

Государства-участники, *Рассматривая* развитие контактов в качестве важного элемента в укреплении дружественных отношений и доверия между народами,

*Подтверждая* в связи с их нынешними усилиями по улучшению условий в этой области важное значение, которое они придают гуманным соображениям,

*Ставят* своей целью облегчать более свободное передвижение и контакты... и содействовать решению вопросов гуманного характера...

*Заявляют* о своей готовности принимать в этих целях меры, которые они сочтут подходящими, а также заключать между собой, в случае необходимости, соглашения или достигать договоренностей и

*Выражают свое намерение* в настоящее время приступить к осуществлению следующего:

а) *Контакты и регулярные встречи на основе семейных связей*

Имея в виду содействовать дальнейшему развитию контактов на основе семейных связей, государства-участники будут благожелательно рассматривать просьбы о поездках с целью разрешения лицам въезда на их территорию или выезда с нее на временной и, если этого пожелают, регулярной основе для встреч с членами своих семей.

Заявления о временных поездках для встреч с членами своих семей будут рассматриваться безотносительно к стране выезда или въезда; существующий порядок оформления проездных документов и виз будет применяться в этом духе. Оформление и выдача таких документов и виз будут осуществляться в разумные сроки, в случаях срочной надобности — таких, как серьезная болезнь, смерть, — во внеочередном порядке.

Они подтверждают, что подача просьбы, относящейся к контактам на основе семейных связей, не будет приводить к изменению прав и обязанностей лица, подавшего просьбу, или членов его семьи.

б) *Воссоединение семей*

с) *Браки между гражданами различных государств*

д) *Поездки по личным или профессиональным причинам*

е) *Улучшение условий для туризма на индивидуальной или коллективной основе*

ф) *Встречи между молодежью*

г) *О спорте*

h) *Расширение контактов*

**6** Open up additional cities and regions now closed to Americans, beyond the present limit of about 90 cities for overnight stays, and an additional 90 cities for day trips. The United States should open additional regions to Soviet visitors.

**7** Repeal decrees which intimidate or restrict visitors.

- a. Soviet citizenship decree of July 1, 1979 which states that naturalized U.S. citizens born in the present territory of the USSR, and their children, although born outside the USSR, are regarded citizens of the USSR.
- b. Soviet decree of May 25, 1984 which makes Soviet citizens liable to fines for providing housing, transportation, and other [unspecified] services to foreigners without prior permission.
- c. Soviet decree of July 23, 1966 which provides penalties for foreigners who "maliciously violate travel regulations, visiting places not mentioned in their USSR entry visas or deviating from the itinerary. . . without special permission."

**8** Encourage airlines to increase availability of flights, including low-fare and charter flights. (Currently, flights payable in rubles are sold out many months in advance, making it difficult for people, especially from the provinces, to arrange a trip.)

**9** Improve other means of communication between relatives.

- reinstate direct dial telephone communications
- remove prohibitive duties from gift parcels
- stop mail censorship
- ensure delivery of all mail

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, August 1, 1975 (Helsinki Accords)

VII. *Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms*  
Co-operation in Humanitarian and other Fields

The participating States, *Desiring* to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples...

*Conscious* that increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these aims...

*Determined* therefore to cooperate among themselves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create better conditions in the in the above fields, to develop and strengthen existing forms of co-operation and to work out new ways and means appropriate to these aims,

*Convinced* that this cooperation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States... *Have adopted* the following:

**1. Human Contacts**

The participating States, *Considering* the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples,

*Affirming*, in relation to their present effort to improve conditions in this area, the importance they attach to humanitarian considerations,

*Make it their aim* to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connexion,

*Declare their readiness* to these ends to take measures which they consider appropriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be needed, and *Express their intention* now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

(a) *Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties*

In order to promote further development of contacts on the basis of family ties the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.

Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt with without distinction as to country of origin or destination: existing requirements for travel documents and visas will be effected within reasonable time limits; cases of urgent necessity — such as serious illness or death — will be given priority treatment. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the fees for official travel documents and visas are acceptable.

They confirm that the presentation of an application concerning contacts on the basis of family ties will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family.

(b) *Reunification of Families*

(c) *Marriage between Citizens of Different States*

(d) *Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons*

(e) *Improvement of Conditions for Tourism on an Individual or Collective Basis*

(f) *Meetings among Young People*

(g) *Sport*

(h) *Expansion of Contacts*



United States  
of America

## Отчет Конгресса США

Совместная Резолюция Конгресса 68  
Совместная Резолюция Сената 29

100-й конгресс  
1-ая сессия

**Выражающая отношение Конгресса к невозможности для Американских граждан поддерживать регулярные контакты с их родственниками в Советском Союзе**

Поскольку миллионы граждан Соединенных Штатов, включая представителей национальных и этнических групп, таких как Армяне, Белорусы, Эстонцы, Немцы, Евреи, Латыши, Литовцы, Поляки, Русские и Украинцы, имеют родственников в Советском Союзе;

Поскольку Советский Союз, подписав в 1975 году окончательный Акт Конференции по Безопасности и Сотрудничеству в Европе, общеизвестны под названием Хельсинские Соглашения, обязался «благожелательно рассматривать заявления о поездках с целью выехать и въехать в страну временно, и регулярно, если они того пожелают, для посещения членов их семей»;

Поскольку в том же документе Советский Союз обязался в том, что «заявления о временных визитах с целью встретиться с членами ... семьи будут рассматриваться без различий в отношении страны отправления или назначения ...; случаи срочной необходимости — такие как серьезная болезнь или смерть — будут рассматриваться в срочном порядке»;

Поскольку Советский Союз принял Хартию Объединенных Наций и подписал другие международные документы о правах человека, такие как Международное Уложение о гражданских и политических правах, т.е. документы, явно констатирующие право покидать свою страну и возвращаться в нее;

Поскольку в преддверии Женевского совещания в верхах в ноябре 1985, Президент Реган заявил, что «дело мира выиграет, если большее число отдельных лиц и семей узнают друг друга лично.»;

Поскольку частные визиты неизмеримо помогли бы нашему пониманию Советского народа и улучшению отношений с Советским Союзом, так как семейные визиты являются основной формой культурного обмена;

Поскольку не подобает правительствам решать, какая степень родства является достаточно близкой для того, чтобы разрешить родственникам посещать друг друга;

Поскольку современная политика Советского Союза делает практически невозможным для миллионов родственников в обеих странах обмениваться домашними визитами, и родственники, прибегающие к другим формам поддержания общения, таким как

переписка, телефон, телеграф и посылки, встречаются с огромными трудностями;

Поскольку советская политика накладывает ограничения, меньше чем 1000 из многих тысяч американцев, которые посетили Советский Союз в 1986 году, получили разрешение посетить родственников у них дома, и только 1500 советских граждан получили разрешение посетить своих родственников в США;

Поскольку многие американцы, обескураженные задержкой или отказом в получении частной визы для посещения членов семьи по их месту жительства в Советском Союзе, стали прибегать к групповым туристическим поездкам по Советскому Союзу как к средству повидать своих родных;

Поскольку родственники должны иметь возможность помогать и поддерживать друг друга в критических обстоятельствах, таких как Чернобыльская катастрофа, или когда специализированная медицинская помощь недоступна в определенной стране;

Поскольку в случае серьезной болезни или смерти родственники должны иметь гарантию на немедленное получение визы;

Поскольку посещение родственников выходит за рамки различий в политических взглядах, и правительства, которые разрешают нормальные и регулярные семейные визиты, демонстрируют соблюдение важнейших принципов порядочности и справедливости, разделяемых всем человечеством; и

Поскольку на Венской конференции по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе делегация Соединенных Штатов перечислила недопустимые ограничения, наложенные Советскими властями на советских граждан, желающих путешествовать за границей, и на американских граждан, желающих посетить родственников в Советском Союзе; таким образом,

*Палата Представителей и Сенат Постановляют, Что, по мнению Конгресса, —*

- (1) поощрение неограниченных визитов между родственниками в Соединенных Штатах и в Советском Союзе является неотъемлемой частью Американской политики в отношении Советского Союза; и
- (2) Президент, Государственный Секретарь и другие члены администрации должны поднимать вопрос о семейных визитах при всех подходящих обстоятельствах в обсуждении с руководством Коммунистической партии и Правительства Советского Союза.

Совместная Резолюция Конгресса 68 принято (405-0).  
Совместная Резолюция Сената 29 принято единогласно.

# Signatories to the Appeal \*

\* Organizational affiliations are for identification purposes only. Signatories join the Appeal as individuals.

Ludmilla Alexeeva  
*Helsinki Watch*

Right Rev. Bishop Alypy  
*Vicar of Chicago-Detroit Eparchy,  
Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia*

Alexander Amerisov  
*Soviet-American Review*

George B. Avisov  
*Congress of Russian Americans*

Judy Balint  
*Seattle Action for Soviet Jewry*

Most Rev. Paul Baltakis, O.F.M.  
*Bishop, Lithuanian Roman Catholic  
Church outside Lithuania*

Arnold Beichman  
*Hoover Institution, Stanford University*

Saul Bellow  
*Nobel laureate; University of Chicago*

Howard L. Berman  
*U.S. House of Representatives, California*

Yaroslav Bihun  
*The Washington Group*

Jacob Birnbaum  
*Center for Russian Jewry*

Walter Bodnar  
*Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine*

David Brower  
*Earth Island Institute*

Ronald H. Brown  
*Democratic National Committee*

Edmund G. Brown, Jr.  
*California Democratic Party*

Michael Car  
*Ukrainian-American Coordinating  
Council of Northern California*

Andrew Ceelen  
*Christian Care East/West*

Leo Cherne  
*International Rescue Committee*

Szymon Chodak  
*Concordia University*

Noam Chomsky  
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Monica Clark  
*The Catholic Voice*

Pamela Braun Cohen  
*Union of Councils for Soviet Jews*

Congress of Russian Americans

Ginte Damusis  
*Lietuviu Informacijos Centras  
(Lithuanian Information Center)*

Richard T. Davies  
*Research Center for Religion and Human  
Rights in Closed Societies;  
U.S. Ambassador to Poland, 1973-78*

Rev. Richard Deats  
*Fellowship of Reconciliation*

Midge Decter  
*Committee for the Free World*

George Deukmejian  
*Governor, State of California*

Father Luis Dolan  
*The Center for Citizen Diplomacy at  
Wainwright House*

Robert K. Dornan  
*U. S. House of Representatives, California*

Robert F. Drinan, S.J.  
*Georgetown University Law School*

Peter Duignan  
*Hoover Institution, Stanford University*

Gary Finder  
*Soviet Jewry Legal Advocacy Center*

Jonathan Fine, M.D.  
*Physicians for Human Rights*

James Finn  
*Freedom House*

Larissa Fontana  
*Ukrainian-American Community Network*

Lillian Foreman  
*Bay Area Council for Soviet Jews*

Jonathan Freedman  
*Pulitzer Prize winner;  
The Tribune, San Diego*

Milton Friedman  
*Nobel laureate; Hoover Institution,  
Stanford University*

Si Frumkin  
*Southern California Council  
for Soviet Jews*

Stanley A. Gecys  
*Lithuanian-American Community  
of the USA, Southeastern Region*

Istvan B. Gereben  
*Coordinating Committee of Hungarian  
Organizations in North America*

Sister Ann Gillen, S.H.C.J.  
*National Interreligious Task Force*

Arthur J. Goldberg  
*Former Associate Justice  
U.S. Supreme Court*

Marshall Goldman  
*Wellesley College; Harvard University  
Russian Research Center*

Ernest Gordon  
*Christian Rescue Effort for the  
Emancipation of Dissidents (CREED)*

Nancy A. Graham  
*Institute for Soviet-American Relations*

Dr. Lucile Green  
*World Citizens Assembly*

Dr. Thomas Greening  
*Journal of Humanistic Psychology*

Edward Gudava  
*Center for Democracy in the USSR*

Oscar Handlin  
*Harvard University*

Willis W. Harman  
*Institute of Noetic Sciences*

Scott Harrison  
*Amnesty International Urgent Action*

Charles Henry  
*University of California, Berkeley;*  
*former Chairman, Amnesty International*

Arthur Hertzberg  
*Dartmouth College*

Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.  
*University of Notre Dame*

Ira Michael Heyman  
*University of California, Berkeley*

Right Rev. Bishop Hilarion  
*Vicar of North American and New York*  
*Eparchy, Russian Orthodox Church*  
*Outside Russia*

Kent R. Hill  
*Institute on Religion and Democracy*

Lillian Hoffman  
*Colorado Committee of Concern*  
*for Soviet Jewry*

Arthur J. Holland  
*Mayor, City of Trenton*

Paul Hollander  
*University of Massachusetts at Amherst*

Sidney Hook  
*Hoover Institution, Stanford University*

Daniel Horodysky  
*VISA, Visits International for Soviets and*  
*Americans*

Tamara P. Horodysky  
*VISA, Visits International for Soviets and*  
*Americans*

Rev. Blahoslav Hruby  
*Research Center for Religion and*  
*Human Rights in Closed Societies*

Daiva Izbickas  
*Lithuanian Catholic Religious Aid*

Helen H. Jackson  
*Henry M. Jackson Foundation*

John E. Jacob  
*National Urban League, Inc.*

Orest Jejna  
*Attorney*

Sviatoslav Karavansky  
*Former Soviet political prisoner*

Mäido Kari  
*Estonian World Council, Inc.*

Natalia Kats  
*Bay Area Council for Soviet Jews*

Stephen Klitzman  
*American Bar Association Committee on*  
*International Human Rights*

Helmut Konsen  
*Baltic American Freedom League*

Nicholas C. Kotow  
*Ukrainian Technological Society*

Vladislav Krasnov  
*Monterey Institute of International*  
*Studies*

Gene Kudirka  
*Lithuanian-American community*

Myron B. Kuropas  
*Ukrainian National Association*

John Kwapisz  
*Center For Peace & Freedom*

Aino Lauri  
*Estonian American Republican Club*

Dr. Ernest W. Lefever  
*Ethics and Public Policy Center*

Dr. Dietrich Andre Loeber  
*University of Kiel*

Most Rev. Basil H. Losten, D.D.  
*Bishop, Ukrainian Catholic Diocese of*  
*Stamford*

Bishop Innocent Lotocky, OSBM  
*Bishop, St. Nicholas Ukrainian Catholic*  
*Diocese of Chicago*

Joseph E. Lowery  
*Southern Christian Leadership*  
*Conference*

Askold J. Lozynskyj  
*Attorney*

Weyman I. Lundquist  
*Attorney*

Craig Lunt  
*Underground Ministries*

Ceslovas Masaitis  
*Lithuanian Catholic Academy of Sciences*

Ulana Mazurkevych  
*Ukrainian Human Rights Committee*

Bruce McColm  
*Freedom House*

Dr. Mohammad T. Mehdi  
*National Council on Islamic Affairs*

Gunars Meierovics  
*World Federation of Free Latvians*

Patricia M. Mische  
*Global Education Associates*

Ellen Moore  
*Amnesty International Urgent Action*

Louis E. Moore  
*Communications Workers of America*

Most Rev. Robert M. Moskal  
*Bishop, St. Josaphat Ukrainian Catholic*  
*Diocese in Parma*

Rabbi Sheldon W. Moss  
*Soviet-American Forum*

William Ker Muir, Jr.  
*University of California, Berkeley*

Robert C. Mussehl  
*American Bar Association House of*  
*Delegates and Standing Committee*  
*World Order Under Law*

Micah H. Naftalin  
*Union of Councils for Soviet Jews*

Aleksandr M. Nekrich  
*Harvard University*  
*Russian Research Center*

Richard John Neuhaus  
*The Rockford Institute Center*  
*on Religion and Society*

Brian F. O'Connell  
*National Association of Evangelicals*

Bozhena Olshaniwsky  
*Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine*

Robert Ontell  
*Fred J. Hansen Institute for World Peace;*  
*San Diego State University*

Eugenia Ordynsky  
*Congress of Russian Americans*

Yuri Orlov  
*Cornell University*

Lawrence A. Parr  
*Center for Democracy in the USSR*

Vladlen Pavlenkov  
*Freedom of Communications*

Valdis V. Pavlovskis  
*American Latvian Association in the US*

Yulia Pessina  
*Center for Democracy in the USSR*

Dr. Nicolai N. Petro  
*Foreign Policy Research Institute*

Robert Pickus  
*World Without War Council*

Dr. Morris Pripstein  
*Scientists for Sakharov, Orlov and Shcharansky (SOS)*

Rev. Casimir Pugevicius  
*Lietuviu Informacijos Centras  
(Lithuanian Information Center)*

Earl Raab  
*Jewish Community Relations Council  
of San Francisco*

Mary Coleman Ragsdale  
*New Options*

Peter Reddaway  
*George Washington University*

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky  
*University of California, Berkeley*

Mari-Ann Rikken  
*Estonian American National Council, Inc.*

Toomas Rikken  
*Mart Laar Action Committee-U.S.*

Fr. Keith Roderick  
*Society of St. Stephen*

Françoise Rothstein  
*Women's American ORT*

Dr. Mark A. Roy  
*Foundation for International  
Human Rights*

Holt Ruffin  
*World Without War Council,  
Northwest Regional Office*

Ginetta Sagan  
*Aurora Foundation*

Zeesy Schnur  
*Coalition to Free Soviet Jews*

Albert Shanker  
*American Federation of Teachers*

Amy L. Sherman  
*James Madison Foundation*

Philip Siegelman  
*San Francisco State University*

Marian Skabeikis  
*Lithuanian Catholic Religious Aid*

Alexander Slepak  
*Slepak Foundation*

Vytas Sliupas  
*Lithuanian-American community*

Christopher H. Smith  
*U. S. House of Representatives, New  
Jersey*

Dr. Gregory H. Stanton  
*Washington and Lee University,  
School of Law*

Nina Strokata  
*Former Soviet political prisoner*

Most Rev. Stephen Sulyk  
*Archbishop of Philadelphia;  
Metropolitan for Ukrainian Catholics  
in the United States*

Darius A. Suziedelis  
*Lithuanian American Youth Association*

Nadia Svitlychna  
*External Ukrainian Helsinki Group*

Frank E. Sysyn  
*Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute*

Kathryn Szczepanska  
*Center for Democracy in the USSR*

Alicia Szendiuch  
*Ukrainian Professionals Association of  
Boston*

Ludmilla Thorne  
*Freedom House*

Jaak Treiman  
*Baltic American Freedom League*

Valentin F. Turchin  
*City University of New York*

Rama J. Vernon  
*Center For Soviet-American Dialogue*

George Voinovich  
*Mayor, City of Cleveland*

Theodore H. Von Laue  
*Clark University*

Roman Voronka  
*New Jersey Institute of Technology*

David Waksberg  
*Bay Area Council for Soviet Jews*

George Wald  
*Nobel laureate; Harvard University*

Michael Y. Warder  
*The Rockford Institute*

George Weigel  
*James Madison Foundation*

W. Bruce Weinrod  
*Heritage Foundation*

Elie Wiesel  
*Nobel laureate; Boston University*

Aaron Wildavsky  
*University of California, Berkeley*

Pete Wilson  
*U.S. Senate, California*

Wojceich A. Winkler  
*Polish American Congress,  
Northern California Division*

Robert Woito  
*World Without War Council,  
Midwest Regional Office*

Helen Yakobson  
*George Washington University*

Yuri Yarim-Agaev  
*Center for Democracy in the USSR*

Alexander S. Yessenin-Volpin  
*Mathematician*

Catherine A. Young  
*Freedom of Communications*

Mara Zigurs  
*Inroads, Inc.*

Osyp Zinkewych  
*Smoloskyp, Organization for Defense  
of Human Rights in Ukraine*

# Signatories to the Appeal from the USSR

Александр Рафаилович Анкудинов  
*Свободная миграция, шофер*

Лариса Богораз  
*Филолог*

Александр Буланов  
*Иммигрант-88*

Владимир Галитзин  
*Член комиссии по правам человека  
международного фонда за  
выживание и развитие человечества*

Анатолий Яковлевич Глазунов  
*Свободная миграция*

Сергей Иванович Григорьянц  
*Журнал „Гласность“, Движение „за  
свободу и демократию“*

Василь Гурдзан  
*Художник*

Виктор Викторович Давлятин  
*Свободная миграция, Доверие*

Анатолий Михайлович Доценко  
*Українська Гельсінська Спілка*

Евгений Дмитриевич Жуковский  
*Свободная миграция*

Вячеслав Валентинович Ильященко  
*Художник*

Галина Викторовна Зигмонд  
*Учитель*

Константин Юревич Карманов  
*Институт восточный студий*

Володимир Якович Кауфман  
*Художник*

Иосиф Григорьевич Кац  
*Пенсионер*

Михайлина Хомівна Коцюбинська  
*Літературознавець*

Игорь Евгеньевич Кирякин  
*Свободная миграция*

Ирина Владимировна Кронрод  
*Студентка*

Александр Лавут  
*Член комиссии по правам человека  
международного фонда за  
выживание и развитие человечества*

Віктор Володимирович Лазор  
*Студент*

Роза Петровна Лановая  
*Филолог*

Виктор Евгеньевич Лановой  
*Независимая психотерапевтическая  
ассоциация, психотерапевт*

Дмитро Іванович Лапичак  
*Пенсионер, инженер*

Левко Григорович Лук'яненко  
*Українська Гельсінська Спілка*

Наталья Владимировна Магазаник  
*Юридический семинар*

Августа Семеновна Манжура  
*Свободная миграция экономист*

Оксана Юрьевна Манжура  
*Свободная миграция, студентка*

Юрий Игнатович Манжура  
*Свободная миграция, физик*

Олексій Маркитан  
*Художник*

Анна Михайлівна Марченко  
*Економіст*

Микола Іванович Матусевич  
*Кооператив „Самоцвіт“*

Таміла Матусевич  
*Инженер, институт гражданского  
будівництва*

Ганна Василівна Михайленко  
*Бібліотекар, пенсіонерка*

Игорь Владимирович Мешков  
*Свободная миграция, переплетчик*

Сима Борисовна Мостинская  
*Пенсионерка*

Микола Ф. Муратов  
*Українська Гельсінська Спілка*

Михаил Осадчев  
*Инженер компьютерика*

Лев Станиславович Перелкин  
*Этнограф, Институт этнографии  
АН СССР*

Алексей Евгеньевич Петров  
*Свободная миграция*

Віктор Богданович Покиданець  
*Художник*

Тамара Л. Половникова  
*Домогосподарка*

Андрей Всеволодович Полуянов  
*Свобода миграции*

Евген Васильович Пронюк  
*Філософ*

Олег Румянцев  
*Клуб демократическая перестройка,  
комптолог*

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*Свободная миграция экономист*

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*Свободная миграция,*

Екатерина Сергиенко  
*Инициатива труда*

Анатолий Всеволодович Сиромеха  
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Вадим Слободянюк  
*Студент*

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*Юридический семинар*

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*Свободная миграция*

Борис Чернобыльский  
*Член комиссии по правам человека  
международного фонда за  
выживание и развитие человечества*

Григорий Васильевич Черных  
*Свободная миграция*

Ольга Дмитрівна Шамрай  
*Редакция „Трибуна робітника“*

Игорь Шелюто  
*Телевизионный Технический Центр*

Алексей Николаевич Шерстнёв  
*Свободная миграция слесарь*

Наталка Шимін  
*Художник*

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# Postscript

The Appeal for Freedom of Travel was drafted in November 1988; following are some of the changes that have occurred since:

- A. The Air Ministry raised the price of an airline ticket to the U.S. from 1250 to 1800 rubles (\$3000, about one year's average pay) and no longer sells tickets beyond New York or Washington, DC. Aeroflot tickets are sold out as much as one year in advance, partly because speculators are allowed to buy up tickets.
- B. Currently, Soviet citizens can exchange only 210 rubles (\$330) into dollars, no matter the length of their stay in the West. This drastic cut in currency allowance came nearly simultaneously with new baggage rules which allow Soviet citizens returning to the USSR on economy excursion fare tickets only one suitcase as free baggage. Additional baggage is charged \$108 per piece.
- C. Soviet authorities ignore rampant theft and vandalism of tourist luggage committed by baggage handlers.
- D. According to the January 1987 decree on foreign travel, visa decisions are to be made within one month. Even if local authorities do make the decision within that time, the procedure to get to that point still makes it a 4-6 month long process. In contrast, a tourist visa takes as little as two or three weeks, while a business or conference visa takes as little as **two hours**.
- E. Soviet Customs officials arbitrarily charge exorbitant customs duties from some American citizens carrying gifts for relatives.
- F. Local authorities continue to intimidate some Americans who try to visit relatives outside their tour city.
- G. Soviet citizens, some traveling thousands of kilometers, wait long hours, sometimes in inclement weather, for their interview at the U.S. Consulates in Moscow or Leningrad to obtain a U.S. visa. Some are denied U.S. visas.
- H. Increased travel and trade make opening the long-delayed U.S. consulate in Kiev and USSR consulate in New York vital to serve American and Soviet citizens.

There are constant changes in implementation of customs duties, visa regulations and application procedures. There are near-riots in OVIR lines.

Many of the new measures put into effect in 1989 create a financial squeeze on Soviet visitors and their hosts.

Proposed Soviet legislation on travel will not address underlying policy problems and will not ensure local compliance with the law.

Soviet officials continue to make promises regarding freedom of travel, just as they did at Helsinki, Madrid, Vienna, Bern, and Paris. We should not be content with mere promises, but should demand improvements in **performance** regarding freedom of travel.



*Congressional Record*  
**House Concurrent Resolution 68**  
**Senate Concurrent Resolution 29**

100th CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

**Expressing the sense of Congress  
regarding the inability of American citizens  
to maintain regular contact with relatives  
in the Soviet Union**

**Whereas** millions of United States citizens, including members of national and ethnic groups such as Armenians, Byelorussians, Estonians, Germans, Jews, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians, have relatives in the Soviet Union;

**Whereas** the Soviet Union, as a signatory of the 1975 Final Act of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, commonly known as the Helsinki Accords, committed itself to "favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.";

**Whereas** in that same document the Soviet Union pledged that "applications for temporary visits to meet members of . . . families will be dealt with without distinction as to country of origin or destination . . . ; cases of urgent necessity — such as serious illness or death — will be given priority treatment.";

**Whereas** the Soviet Union has ratified the United Nations Charter and signed other international human rights documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, documents which clearly protect the right to leave one's country and return thereto;

**Whereas** in anticipation of the Geneva Summit Conference of November 1985, President Reagan stated, ". . . the cause of peace would be served if more individuals and families . . . could come to know each other in a personal way.";

**Whereas** home visits would immeasurably aid our understanding of the Soviet people and improve relations with the Soviet Union, since family visitation is one of the most basic forms of cultural exchange;

**Whereas** it is not proper for governments to decide which relationships constitute close family ties for the purpose of determining which relatives should be allowed to visit each other;

**Whereas** the present policies of the Soviet Union make it virtually impossible for the millions of relatives in the two countries to exchange visits in their homes, and

relatives who have used other forms of communications, such as mail, telephone, telegraph, and gift parcels have experienced enormous difficulties;

**Whereas** because of restrictive Soviet policies, less than 1,000 of the many thousands of Americans who visited the Soviet Union in 1986 were allowed a private visa to stay with their relatives in their homes, and only about 1,500 Soviet citizens were allowed to visit their relatives in the United States;

**Whereas** many Americans who have been frustrated by the delay or denial in obtaining private visas to visit family members in their homes in the Soviet Union have resorted to joining package tours to the Soviet Union as a means of seeing their family members;

**Whereas** relatives should be able to comfort and assist each other in the event of medical emergencies such as those which resulted from the Chernobyl disaster, or when specialized medical treatment is not available in a particular country;

**Whereas** in the case of serious illness or death the victim's relatives should be guaranteed expeditious determination of their visa applications;

**Whereas** family visitation is an issue which transcends political differences, and governments which permit normal and regular family visitation demonstrate a commitment to basic values of decency and fairness which are shared by all mankind; and

**Whereas** at the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Follow-up Meeting, the United States delegation enumerated the inappropriate restrictions placed by Soviet authorities on Soviet citizens who wish to travel abroad and on United States citizens who wish to visit family members in the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the House of Representatives and the Senate,*  
That it is the sense of the Congress that —

- (1) the promotion of unrestricted family visits between related people in the United States and the Soviet Union is an essential part of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union; and
- (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and other members of the administration should raise the issue of family visitation at all appropriate opportunities in discussion with the leadership of the Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union.

**Senate Concurrent Resolution 29 passed unanimously July 29, 1987.**  
**House Concurrent Resolution 68 passed unanimously (405-0) October 27, 1987.**

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**An Appeal for Freedom of Travel** is a program of  
*VISA – Visits International for Soviets and Americans.*

*VISA* is a non-partisan, non-profit, human rights organization which works toward one goal: the basic right of millions of relatives in the USA and USSR to exchange regular home visits.

*VISA* is a project of the World Without War Council of Northern California.

Co-chairs: Daniel and Tamara Horodysky

For more information contact:

*VISA*  
PO Box 2361  
Berkeley, California 94702 USA  
Telephone (415) 540-VISA

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← **VISA** — Visits International for Soviets and Americans — **ВИЗА** →



**VISA**  
PO Box 2361  
Berkeley, California 94702  
(415) 540-VISA

**Board of Advisors**

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Daniel Horodysky

**Co-chair**

Tamara Horodysky

Joe Hagin  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for Appointments and Scheduling  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Joe,

Enclosed is **An Appeal for Freedom of Travel for Millions of Related Persons in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** .

We request an appointment to present the **Appeal** to the President at a public ceremony. We are available at the President's earliest convenience.

If you wish further information about our organization and us please contact one our advisors, Sandy (William) Muir, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Sandy was a speech writer for Vice President Bush.

His telephone number at his office is 415- 642-4685, Political Science Department 642-6326, (home) 653-8888.

We will be in Washington for a conference from October 5-10th. If you wish to contact us please call 703-998-8570, or leave a message at 301-365-2490.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel Horodysky  
October 4, 1989

Tamara Horodysky



← **VISA** →



PO Box 2361  
Berkeley, California 94702 USA  
telephone & fax (415) 540-VISA

**Daniel Horodysky**, Chairman  
Member, Human Rights Commission,  
International Foundation for the  
Development and Survival of Humanity



← **VISA** — Visits International for Soviets and Americans — **ВИЗА** →



**VISA**  
PO Box 2361  
Berkeley, California 94702  
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Yuri Yarim-Agaev

**Chairman**

Daniel Horodysky

**Co-chair**

Tamara Horodysky

President George Bush  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

In spite of euphoria over *glasnost* – visits between relatives in the USA and the Soviet Union, although improved during the past two years, are still fraught with great difficulties.

Changes in US policy can create conditions which will allow relatives the opportunity to visit each other just like *normal people*. (A businessperson or scientist can get a visa the same day, while a private visa to stay with relatives takes 4-6 months. Please note the enclosed diagrams of travel procedures.) Proposed Soviet legislation will *not* address underlying policy problems and will *not* ensure local compliance with the law.

The USA and USSR can set a strong, humanitarian example for the world, raising the hopes of families separated by conflicts and politics, in the Koreas, Southeast Asia, the Germanies, Mid East, Central America, and elsewhere.

The issue of family visits gained increasing prominence in the past four years: Ambassadors Michael Novak at the Bern Human Contacts Conference, Warren Zimmerman at the Vienna CSCE, Morris Abram at the Paris Conference on the Human Dimension, overwhelming, unanimous support of HConRes 68 and SConRes 29 in 1987, and President Reagan's stress on family visits at the Moscow Summit in May 1988.

We enclose **An Appeal for Freedom of Travel for Millions of Related Persons in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** addressed to you and the leader of the Soviet Union, signed by many concerned individuals representing a cross section of Americans and Soviet citizens.

Placing the Recommendations outlined in the Appeal into practice is the next logical step.

We request an appointment to discuss this issue and present this **Appeal** to you at a public ceremony. We are available at your earliest convenience.

Enclosed is a brief description of *VISA*.

Respectfully yours,

Daniel Horodysky  
October 4, 1989

Tamara Horodysky

## VISA Goal

VISA is a non-partisan, non-profit, human rights organization which works toward one goal: the right of millions of relatives in the USA and USSR to exchange regular home visits – like normal people. VISA believes it is a basic right — not a privilege — for any relatives to exchange visits in their homes.

## Visits as a Lever for Change

Millions of relatives in the USA and Soviet Union, who maintain contact in spite of wars, repression, politics, and censorship, are a valuable resource to encourage independent thought, expression and as vehicles for dissemination of information.

Improvements in the U.S. -USSR situation can set an example for other parts of the world where millions of families are also separated by wars and politics.

## VISA Background

The idea for VISA dates back to 1954 when Daniel Horodysky was denied a visa to visit his 92 year-old grandmother. In 1977, Tamara Horodysky was able to visit her 93 year-old grandfather for only one hour during a tour. Soviet *militia* (police) prevented them from meeting again. A fellow tourist was unable to visit his dying mother — *his sole purpose for taking the tour*. VISA was formed in March 1985 when our 7 year-old daughter presented a bilingual letter to a visiting Soviet dignitary asking why she couldn't exchange home visits with her cousins.

## Family Visits in the Era of *Glasnost*

During the past two years travel by Soviet citizens to the U.S. increased dramatically: from an average of 1,500 per year earlier this decade, to 5,700 in 1987, and rising to 20,000 in 1988. Travelers included people from various ethnic groups, from villages and large cities, and from all walks of life. In a few rare instances, entire families were permitted to travel together. Recent emigrés from the USSR, who had been barred from exchanging visits with their relatives, are now granted tourist visas to the Soviet Union.

In spite of *glasnost*, few visitors are granted visas to stay in private homes. Most visitors must pay for hotels and meals, but many manage to spend the night with family, albeit, illegally. Treatment of foreign visitors varies from town to town, and depends strictly upon the whim of local authorities, so some travelers still report difficulties in seeing their relatives. Soviet law still places restrictions on contacts with foreigners and on movement of tourists, especially relatives. Legally, travel by foreigners is restricted to 5% of the territory of the USSR: approximately 90 cities with Intourist hotel facilities, plus an additional 90 cities accessible during chauffeur-driven excursions.

The attached diagram graphically represents the 4-6 month long process for application for a private visa. A businessman or scientist can receive a Soviet visa on the same day, and tourists can receive a visa in 2-3 weeks.

Currently, the limiting factor on travel by Soviet citizens is the lack of Aeroflot flights to the West (payable in rubles), and the U.S. requirement that travelers appear in person in Moscow or Leningrad to complete a questionnaire with 48 items. Some Americans are still denied tourist visas to the Soviet Union.

## International Agreements Addressing Family Visits

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13 (2) states, "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." The USSR ratified the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights which are international laws binding signatory countries. The Covenants reiterate the rights of persons to leave and re-enter their country.

In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the concluding document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Soviet Union agreed to:

*"favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.*

*Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt with without distinction as to country of origin or destination: existing requirements for travel documents and visas will be effected within reasonable time limits; cases of urgent necessity — such as serious illness or death — will be given priority treatment. They will take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the fees for official travel documents and visas are acceptable."*

### What We Do

#### 1. Encourage visa applications and provide help to individuals.

VISA offers information and advice to individuals and members of ethnic groups including Armenians, Byelorussians, Estonians, Germans, Jews, Latvians, Lithuanians, Russians, Ukrainians, and others. We direct individuals with problems to the U.S. State Department and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), and highlight selected cases with press conferences and letters to various officials.

We attend ethnic festivals and conferences and provide information to ethnic newspapers, churches and organizations to inform individuals with relatives in the USSR about our organization. We respond to telephone and written requests from individuals throughout the country and overseas (including Israel, Finland, France, Canada, and West Germany) for advice regarding procedures for applying to see relatives.

#### 2. Encourage Non-Governmental organizations to raise family visits issue.

We inform American human rights, peace and cultural exchange groups about the difficulties faced by relatives, and encourage them to discuss the issue with their members, national leaders and Soviet authorities and visiting Soviet delegations. We network with many organizations throughout the U.S. including:

Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine  
Center for Democracy in the USSR  
Center for Soviet-American Dialogue  
Congress of Russian Americans  
External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group  
Fred J. Hansen Institute for World Peace  
Freedom of Communications  
Global Education for Human Rights  
Joint Baltic American Committee

League of Women Voters  
Lithuanian Information Center  
Underground Ministries  
Union of Councils for Soviet Jews  
World Without War Council-Northwest Regional Office

3. Publish newsletters and other documents to disseminate information .

We distribute newsletters and other literature to national and ethnic leaders and individuals emphasizing the humanitarian aspect of visits between relatives and Soviet obligations under international agreements.

4. Serve as source of information to national leaders and organizations.

VISA is the only organization in the U.S. focusing on family visits, and we provide information to Members of Congress, Senate, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and State Department.

In 1987, Congress unanimously passed House Concurrent Resolution 68 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 29 which addressed the issue of family visits. VISA initiated these two Resolutions which were introduced by Congressman Chris Smith (R-New Jersey), and Senators Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Paul Simon (D-Illinois), Bill Bradley (D-New Jersey), Al D'Amato (R-New York), Frank Lautenberg (D-New Jersey), and Pete Wilson (R-California).

Tamara Horodysky gave a speech at the White House in December 1987 (prior to the Washington summit). Anna Horodysky delivered her plea to Reagan and Gorbachev for easier travel to Assistant Secretary of State John Whitehead and to the Soviet Embassy.

During the Moscow Summit **President Reagan** mentioned family visits during his speeches at Spaso House and Moscow University. This was the first time that family visits received prominent exposure in the U.S. and Soviet media.

At Moscow State University President Reagan said:

*"Recently, a few individuals and families have been allowed to visit relatives in the West. We can only hope that it won't be long before all are allowed to do so, and Ukrainian-Americans, Baltic-Americans, Armenian-Americans, can freely visit their homelands, just as this Irish-American visits his."*

Spaso House:

*"Freedom of travel. . . . We're encouraged as well that the number of those permitted to leave for short trips, often family visits, has gone up. And yet the words of the Universal Declaration go beyond these steps. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. It is our hope that soon there will be complete freedom of travel."*

Dan Horodysky participated in the Paris Conference on the Human Dimension (June 1989), a follow-up to the Helsinki Conference.

## 5. Inform media about family visits.

An important thrust of our work is to inform the national media about the issue of family visits. Various newspapers including **New York Times**, **San Francisco Chronicle**, **Seattle Times**, **Washington Times**, **Christian Science Monitor** have printed letters to the editor and op-ed articles from **VISA**.

Articles about **VISA** have appeared in Moscow's underground journal **Glasnost**, Paris-based **Russkaya Mysl**, **Newark Star Ledger**, **Asbury Park Press**, **Ukrainian Weekly**, **Svoboda**, **San Francisco Chronicle**, **Daily Californian**, and others.

In May 1988, Tamara Horodysky of **VISA** was interviewed by Jane Pauley on NBC's **Today Show**. **Voice of America**, **Cable Network News**, **Radio Moscow**, and various television and radio stations have covered **VISA**.

## 6. Work With Independent Groups in the USSR.

**VISA** works with human rights activists in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Lviv. We provide them with copies of the Soviet law on travel to the West, **VISA** literature and copies of international agreements dealing with freedom of travel. Recently, we provided a personal computer to one of these groups to assist them in their work.

International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity  
Ukrainian Helsinki Union  
Sajudis  
Free Migration  
Democratic Union  
International Society for Human Rights  
Ukrainian Catholic Church

In May 1989 Dan Horodysky presented a paper at a Moscow Symposium entitled *Freedom of Movement for Everybody*, sponsored by the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity.

## **VISA Staff**

**Tamara (Toni) Horodysky**, a native of Ukraine, is fluent in Ukrainian and understands Russian and other Slavic languages. Tamara holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Chemistry from Rutgers University, and was formerly employed as a writer of technical literature. She is an active member of the Ukrainian community in the Bay area.

**Daniel Horodysky**, the founder of **VISA**, holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in the Russian Area Program, a Master of Arts in Geography from Rutgers University, and was a PhD candidate at University of California, Berkeley. He was a Fulbright Fellow in the Federal Republic of Germany (1956-57). Dan has traveled extensively throughout the world, including four trips to visit family in Ukraine. He has been a college instructor, city planner, and is retired from the U.S. Civil Service.

He is a member of the Human Rights Commission of the International Foundation for the Development and Survival of Humanity (Moscow - Stockholm - Washington, D.C.).

10/17/89

INTERNATIONAL

# Gorbachev Tells Liberal Media To Watch Step

## At Meeting, Soviet Leader Tries to Rein In Editors, Suggests That One Quit

By PETER GUMBEL

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MOSCOW—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wants to bring the nation's reformist press back into line, blaming it for contributing to the many problems he faces and even suggesting that one liberal editor resign.

Mr. Gorbachev's comments, made at a meeting with Soviet national editors and media executives Friday, indicate his growing frustration with the nation's mounting problems. According to people who attended, he didn't advocate an end to glasnost, his policy of openness. But he made clear that the press should show greater responsibility in its reporting and cut back on criticism of his reforms.

The text of his remarks hasn't been published, and editors say they have no instructions as to whether it will be. Accounts of previous such meetings with media and other groups have been printed, sometimes after a delay of several days.

Although glasnost has given the government-controlled media here much greater freedom to report and criticize, Mr. Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders still regard newspapers and TV as important propaganda tools they can use at will.

According to participants at the meeting and Soviet journalists who were later briefed by their editors, Mr. Gorbachev blamed the press for fueling a nationwide mood of despondency. In particular, he complained about some articles this summer that openly discussed the possibility of a coup or civil war in the Soviet Union, and accused the media of fueling panic buying of goods by printing stories about impending shortages.

He singled out the daily Izvestia and the weekly Argumenty i Fakty, and also gave stinging criticism of Yuri Afanasyev, a leading reformist historian who has written articles attacking the Communist Party.

The meeting lasted a little under two hours and was attended by most members of the ruling Politburo. There was no other speaker apart from the Soviet leader, and those attacked weren't given the opportunity to defend themselves.

According to participants, Mr. Gorbachev was particularly incensed by an article on the front page of Argumenty i Fakty this month that examined the popularity of members of the Soviet Parliament. The piece was based on a survey of 1,500

# Korean Car Makers Find Relief in

By DAMON DARLIN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

SEOUL, South Korea—Korean car exports have slid about 40% so far this year, but auto makers here aren't panicking.

They are enjoying domestic sales that are more than making up for lost overseas sales. South Korean consumers are expected to buy almost 500,000 passenger cars this year, up 60% from 1988. In fact, some auto executives suggest that slackened demand for their cars in the U.S. and Canada is a blessing; otherwise they wouldn't be able to keep up with demand in the more profitable local market.

"We are very lucky to easily change an export loss to domestic plus," says Hong Tu-Pyo, managing director of domestic marketing for Hyundai Motor Co.

As it is, waiting lists of a month aren't unusual for popular models. Demand is so strong that all of the domestic makers—Hyundai, Kia Motors Corp., Daewoo Motor Co. and even upstart SsangYong Motor Co.—plan to build more factories. Industry analysts predict that by 1995, South Korea will be building three million cars a year—

about half of that for export.

It's an optimistic move in an industry already facing world-wide overcapacity. But South Korean auto makers are confident that the export market will bounce back and that demand in Korea will stay strong. Currently only one in 38 South Koreans owns a car, up from one in 200 a decade ago. "In the year 2000 it will be one car per family. At that point domestic sales will slow down," says Kim Yoon Kwon, director of marketing for Daewoo Motor.

The reason for the tremendous demand is simple: South Koreans suddenly have a lot more money. "We never thought we'd own a car," says Kwang Ok Kyong, who just bought a Daewoo LeMans on a five-year loan. She and her husband started a small printing business and need the car for work as well as for weekend jaunts.

## Hefty Pay Raises

Pay raises of 60% over the past three years have given many South Koreans the money to enjoy the things they were supplying the rest of the world.

The success of newcomer SsangYong

readers' letters and contained some criticism of Mr. Gorbachev himself.

The newspaper wrote that readers assessed his role both positively and negatively. It said many thanked the Soviet leader for his "self-control, modesty, culture and ability to hear a speaker out." But others criticized him, "for imposing his opinion on other deputies, giving commentaries to many speeches, holding elections with no choice of candidate, putting pressure on the voting process and maneuvering between the right and left wings" of the Parliament. All this, the paper quoted readers as saying, "has seriously weakened his authority."

The Soviet leader apparently suggested to Argumenty i Fakty's editor, Vyacheslav Starkov, that he should resign. The comment, which Mr. Starkov relayed to his staff, has sparked anger and bitterness at the paper. Mr. Starkov has been summoned to see the Kremlin's ideology chief, Vadim Medvedev, in the near future, and may discover then if he is to be fired.

Izvestia was criticized for a front-page article last Wednesday that took a sharp look at the Parliament's activities. It attacked the level of a debate on the private-sector cooperative movement, saying "the discussion was more like a riot than a civilized exchange of points of view." And it questioned the speed with which the Parliament was adopting new legislation.

Speaking to foreign reporters, Ivan Laptev, Izvestia's editor, sought to play down Mr. Gorbachev's criticism, but he acknowledged that his paper had been singled out. The Parliament yesterday approved legislation that imposes new restrictions on the cooperative movement, enabling local authorities to set ceilings for prices and preventing the speculative sale of goods in short supply for prices higher than that charged by the state.

## Nintendo Co.

### Pretax Profit Climbed 23%, Sales Were Up 40% in Year

Nintendo Co., a Japanese maker of video games, electronic information systems and playing cards, posted a 23% unconsolidated surge in pretax profit to 61.4 billion yen (\$429 million) from 50 billion yen (\$349.9 million) for the fiscal year ended Aug. 31.

Sales surged 40% to 250.17 billion yen from 178.61 billion. Net income rose 11% to 29.62 billion yen from 26.68 billion. Per share net fell to 423.3 yen from 457.7 yen because of expenses and capital adjustments.


Without detailing specific product breakdowns, Nintendo credited its bull market upsurge in sales—including advanced computer games and television entertainment systems—to surging "leisure-oriented" sales in foreign markets. Export sales of leisure items alone, for instance, totaled 184.74 billion yen in the 12 months, up from 106.06 billion in the previous fiscal year.

## Societe National Elf Aquitaine

Agip S.p.A. and Societe National Elf Aquitaine, the state oil companies of Italy and France, respectively, submitted an offer to buy Gatoll Suisse S.A. The price wasn't disclosed.

A spokesman for Gatoll said that the Swiss oil concern was examining the offer submitted last Friday, along with two other offers, also submitted last week. Those two offers were private and the spokesman refused to identify the bidding companies.

The spokesman further said that at least two more offers are expected from other companies within two weeks.



# Back in the U.S.S.R. as the Storm Clouds Gather

By MARTIN FELDSTEIN

My second visit to the Soviet Union within six months left two very clear and disturbing impressions. First, the Soviet economy is on the verge of collapse. And, second, in the current political environment, the economic deterioration cannot continue for long without provoking a sharp political change.

Ironically, the recent political reforms are making it particularly hard for the Soviets to achieve the economic reforms that they need. And yet it is the new political freedoms that will permit the public to hold the political leadership accountable for the economy's abysmal performance. The Soviet Union's inability to reconcile economic reform and political freedom could cause a repressive political swing to the right in which both will be lost.

The increasing shortages of consumer goods—both a symptom and a cause of the worsening economic situation—are destroying the already poor system of distribution. Leningrad has had to issue ration coupons for soap, sugar and salt. Many basic goods are no longer available to all. And although consumer durables have extremely high official prices, especially relative to Soviet wages, they too have generally disappeared from the shelves.

## Black Markets

The rise of nationalism is also contributing to the economic breakdown. The Baltic states and other Soviet republics are preventing the shipment of locally made products to other parts of the Soviet Union and denying Soviet citizens who are not local residents the right to buy things in their stores. The Moscow government has retaliated by announcing that Soviet citizens from other republics who visit Moscow may not buy consumer durables, imported products and other desirable goods that may happen to be available.

This disintegration of the regular market in consumer goods encourages black markets and widespread corruption. The Soviets readily acknowledge that retailers and others involved in the distribution system help themselves to consumer goods that can be sold on the black market for much more than official prices or, better yet, for dollars or other hard currency.

The combination of shortages and of rapidly rising prices for the limited range of goods for which price increases are permitted is destroying the value of the ruble.

Although it is illegal for Soviets to trade rubles for foreign currency, this trading has become blatant. The official exchange rate is \$1.60, while the rate on the street is only 10 to 20 cents a ruble.

A primary cause of the shortages and price rises is the government budget deficit, now estimated at more than 10% of gross national product. Although a deficit need not be inflationary if it is financed by issuing bonds that crowd out private spending, the Soviets do not issue bonds but finance their deficits by adding to the cash in the hands of Soviet workers. In a Western economy, such an excess infusion

they fear that price decontrol would lead to skyrocketing inflation. Such inflation is particularly unacceptable in a nation where Lenin's promise of price stability has been repeated for more than 70 years. Moreover, since Soviets do not own shares or homes or other assets that would preserve their value during inflation, a rapid inflation would wipe out the life savings of every Soviet citizen—hardly a propitious start for a government that wants to develop confidence in capitalist ways!

The prerequisite to price decontrol and the establishment of a market economy is therefore appropriate anti-inflationary

public has come to accept.

Popular opposition to economic reform extends not only to the policies required to prevent inflation but to the basic market reforms themselves. While most Soviet economists continue to recognize the necessity of price decontrol and movement toward a market economy, they report that these notions are not supported by the mass of Soviet people.

Soviet citizens want a higher standard of living but do not see how that will follow from market forces. Instead they see price reform as eliminating the subsidies on bread and rent and adding to a general price inflation that would lower their already low standard of living. And they understand that with fewer regulations some individuals will become much richer than others, in sharp conflict with their values. With democratization, such popular opposition inevitably increases the political reluctance to act decisively.

## Some Possibilities

The deteriorating economic conditions make the continuation of current policies very unlikely. One possibility is that the leadership will accept the political risks of adopting radical reforms that simultaneously contain inflationary pressures and move toward a market economy. Or, Mr. Gorbachev might lose power to a politician prepared to adopt the needed reforms.

But there is a darker possibility. The Soviet public and many of those in government or military circles may conclude that inflation, shortages, strikes and corruption are all evidence that the Gorbachev government is too weak. They may yearn for a government that can bring back price stability, crack down on black marketeers and stop the nationalist political movements. Such a political change could spell the end of economic *perestroika* and of political liberalization. The very fear of such a political ouster might make Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues adopt a tougher, less reform-oriented stance themselves.

Those of us who want to see an increase in pluralism, democracy and market forces in the Soviet Union can only hope that the current government will have the courage to adopt the needed reforms before it is too late.

*Mr. Feldstein, former chairman of the president's Council of Economic Advisers, is a professor of economics at Harvard.*

## Board of Contributors

*Soviet citizens want a higher standard of living but do not see how that will follow from market forces.*

of cash would cause prices to rise. Soviet experts privately estimate their inflation rate at nearly 10% even though most prices are not allowed to rise. And with only a limited number of prices free to increase, the excess cash chasing a limited supply of goods causes shortages.

The fear of future inflation encourages people to spend their savings before the ruble's purchasing power decreases even further. With the interest rate limited to only 3%, any kind of good that can be stored for future use is a better investment than money in the bank.

But the shortages reflect declines in production as well as increases in demand. One cause of the reduced output is the new system of factory management in which managers are elected by the workers and have some discretion over pay and work requirements. Without the discipline from owners or creditors, managers have raised wages and met production quotas by accounting gimmicks. In addition, workers and farmers whose income is related to their own effort frequently have cut back because the rubles that they would earn by extra effort are of such limited value.

What is needed to rescue the Soviet economy is a radical reform of the price-setting process and a move toward a much more market-oriented economy. Mr. Gorbachev's economic advisers recognized that two years ago but have now abandoned those proposed reforms because

macroeconomic policies. First, the excess infusion of cash by the budget deficit must be stopped. Soviet officials acknowledge this and say that they will cut the budgetary money growth in half during the next year by a combination of reduced defense outlays, increased revenue from the sale of imported consumer goods, and the use of bond finance. But eliminating a budget deficit of 10% of GNP will not be possible without raising taxes, cutting subsidies or reducing the already low standard of public services. Any such painful changes will inevitably be criticized in the press and reflected in votes against Communist Party candidates in contestable elections.

Even more important than deficit reduction is raising the interest rate that households receive on their bank deposits. That rate must be high enough so that households will want to leave their past savings in the bank when prices are decontrolled, rather than spending them and thereby bidding up the prices of available goods. At a minimum, that is likely to require an interest rate that exceeds the inflation rate, a substantial rise from the current token rate of interest. Such a rise in interest payments would be unpopular with a Soviet public raised on the communist ideology that all capital income is unfair. Moreover, since the ownership of savings is highly concentrated, paying higher interest rates would conflict with the egalitarian standard of fairness that the Soviet

... however, the annual 2 percent decline in ... See BUDGET, Page 8

## Deficit

... were discussed at a White House meeting between Defense Secretary ... and other administration officials, according to sources. The reduction subtracted from ... in defense ...

## U.S., Soviets Nearer To Open Skies Deal

By PETER ADAMS  
Defense News Staff Writer  
WASHINGTON — Aircraft equipped with a variety of infrared sensors, cameras and radar could be flying over any corner of the United States and Soviet Union by next year as part of an Open Skies treaty.

A senior-level administration official said that the United States and Soviet Union are negotiating the details of an Open Skies treaty that could include two to three flights a week anywhere over the Soviet Union and reciprocally one flight a week over any part of the United States.

In a briefing last Tuesday in Washington, the official said

that while the Open Skies proposal is being negotiated separately from the conventional arms and the chemical weapons talks, the flights could be a valuable addition to any arms control verification regime.

In February, U.S. State Department and Soviet Foreign Ministry officials will begin working out the details of an Open Skies treaty that could be signed by the middle of the year. Any of the 16 NATO and seven Warsaw Pact nations also can sign up.

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said Soviet working groups respond.

See SKIES, Page 26

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brown landscape at intervals. The West's enthusiasm for these Please see ETHIOPIA, A8

officially adopt it and begin putting the reforms into effect. Please see LEBANON, A7

# Muscovites Hoard Goods as Consumer Crisis Grows

By MASHA HAMILTON  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

MOSCOW—It was fear that drove Valentina Grebenshikov to stand in line to buy two packages of imported razor blades for which she had no use, the same anxiety that made her, for the first time in memory, salt away in her cupboards extra sacks of flour and rice against Moscow's long winter.

It was fear, she explained, of ever-emptier store shelves, of rumors of total government rationing of food and energy, of a downward spiral in day-to-day living conditions that shows no signs of abating.

"It has gotten more difficult in the last two months. There are shortages in practically everything right now," said Grebenshikov, a 44-year-old economist and mother of two. "So, for the time being, I

buy anything that's available." In Moscow, the city to which much of the rest of the country travels for shopping sprees, a firm conviction has grown this fall that for the consumer things are worse than almost ever before.

Ask for anything from shampoo to shoes, and the salesman is likely to reply "Nyet."

While long lines and empty stores have long been an inescapable part of life in the Soviet Union, staggering shortages today in what always have been considered the basics are sparking unprecedented panic buying, Muscovites say.

And as people grow more worried and anxious, they also grow increasingly disillusioned with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika*, the restructuring of Soviet society, which has been unable so far to improve their

Please see HOARD, A9

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LOS ANGELES TIMES

# HOARD: Moscow Consumer Crisis

Continued from A1

economic plight. "Gorbachev says we are on the verge of a crisis, but he is wrong. We are already in a crisis," said 34-year-old Tatyana Oton of Klev, who came to Moscow to buy winter clothes for her three children. "I'm not worried about me. I'll survive. But I am worried about the future of my children."

Gorbachev himself acknowledged that, despite a 10% increase in consumer goods available for sale this year—three or four times the annual increases of the past—"our shops are empty."

"Sales are up 10%. There is too much money chasing the goods," he told journalists at a U.S. trade show last week. "We did not pay sufficient attention to this new development at the right time, and this has caused many uncontrolled problems and uncertainties."

"Customers are hoarding these days, and of course there are shortages," he continued. "For us today, the market is our No. 1 problem."

The shopping hysteria and hoarding of the last several weeks have magnified shortages in a

broad range of consumer goods that initially were caused by a breakdown in the transportation network and a dip in production in some industries, according to Soviet economic analysts.

Other factors cited as possibly contributing to the barren store shelves are outright sabotage by conservative opponents of *perestroika* and the raised expectations of consumers, who are buying more of certain products than they ever did before.

Glaring shortages in basic items such as soap and matches are caused primarily by panic-buying, according to Mikhail L. Berger, one of the country's most respected economic commentators. Berger, who works for the government daily *Izvestia*, points out that production of these items is no less than it was before and generally is greater.

Fear of the loss of basic, everyday goods became widespread in Moscow last month when families, returning from vacation, found no school notebooks on sale for their children. The absence of something so commonplace, which had always been available, set off alarms.

Many Muscovites say that, in preparation for winter, they are now storing nonperishable food, just in case. Here their voices often trail off, but the implication is clear. What if there are shortages in the critical items, things that have always been available except during times of war?

"I personally feel a sinking feeling, almost a physical sensation of going under," Berger said in an interview. "People like me, don't have any trust any more, any faith that the government is going to get them out of this. They aren't confident that what they see on the shelves today will be there tomorrow. So, almost without thinking, they just buy."

Economist Grebenshikov is a case in point. She saw a line outside her office and found out people were waiting to buy the imported razor blades.

"They were just snapping them up," she recalled.

So, although her husband has a full beard and the family does not even own a disposable razor, she found herself rushing downstairs when the line had shortened to buy

Please see HOARD, A10

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
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# ETHIOPIA: Donor Fatigue a Problem

Continued from A8  
farmers are now villagized, meaning they have been moved from their scattered homes into small communities, where they are given some common tools and permitted to till modest private plots.

In some cases, villagization is useful, say agronomists, because it makes available tools and equipment that farmers could not otherwise afford. But few of the experts have such good words for collectivization, a Soviet-style program that strips the farmers of all private holdings and binds them to work for their collective.

It's a system that has been acknowledged as a failure in the two places where it was created, China and the Soviet Union, and today exists in its unalloyed form only here, perhaps the least suitable place in the world.

"Collectivization requires good management because there is no individual incentive, and that's precisely what this country doesn't have," Stenson said.

One region that did have market-oriented farmers, however, is Arsi, because the Swedes had them. The government wanted to institute a more rapidly collected project. More than 100,000 farmers were collec-

tivized, about four times the ratio in the rest of the country, in the space of two years.

Meanwhile, the Swedes saw that government agricultural extension agents, who at the outset were helping to train the farmers in the use of modern equipment and cropping techniques, "from the beginning of the 1980s were concerned less and less with technical assistance and more with political propaganda," Stenson said.

Over the last 18 months, some government agricultural policies have been liberalized. The prices paid farmers by the government marketing board, to which they must sell a certain share of their crop, have been raised, encouraging farmers to grow more. Rules that prohibited the shipment of grain across provincial borders, which contributed to famines by hampering the distribution of food from places where it was abundant to those where it was scarce, have been lifted.

Although some Western agronomists say the changes are too gradual to mean much, some donors, including the European Community and the World Bank, view them positively enough to increase development aid. But many still think a more efficient use of their money is to support the small-scale

projects that exchange food for work promoting development.

There are still many complications hindering a genuine expansion of the food-for-work concept. One is the problem facing any similar proposal in the United States to make welfare recipients work: How does one avoid depriving the disabled or sick of food?

Another is the need to avoid make-work.

"Unless the thing is useful, you might as well just give the food to them," said the World Food Program's Morton. He alludes to a eucalyptus project that planted the wrong trees on the wrong land. "If you get a couple of thousand people planting trees [which] all die, it will be hard to get them to plant trees again."

Many Western donors also resist such unconventional proposals as to sell the food they contribute in Ethiopian markets, then use the cash to pay workers in places where a cash economy still exists.

But many Ethiopians do not share these misgivings.

"We should put people to work to improve the land," said Ghirmal Woldu, chief project engineer for the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, which is financing the Embatekalla water project. "What should we be, always a nation of beggars?"



THE BRO

# HOARD: Shortages Worsen in Moscow

Continued from A9

some blades to take home. "Maybe we will give them to someone as a gift," she said, "or trade for something we need."

Irina Popov, 29, is another example. She was standing in a long line in GUM, the Soviet Union's largest department store, just across from the rust-colored Kremlin walls, waiting to buy an iron for 7 rubles—or about \$11 at the official exchange rate.

"Sure, I already have an iron," she said with a smile. "But what if it breaks? I always try to buy extras. I'll probably buy two today."

Soviet officials, for their part, pin primary blame for the shortages on the distribution system.

More than 2 million tons of imported goods bought with scarce foreign currency are sitting in Soviet ports waiting to be unloaded, First Deputy Premier Lev Voronin told the Supreme Soviet, the country's Parliament, earlier this month.

That includes about 25,000 tons of food, which is rotting where it sits, as well as spare parts for trucks that are broken down and thus cannot be used to unload the trains and ships. Prime Minister Nikolai T. Ryzhkov noted later on national television.

Strikes, including a three-week walkout last summer at the country's biggest coal field, also hurt. Power stations have 4.5 million fewer tons of coal on hand than at this time last year, Voronin said, warning that rationing of heat and electricity may be necessary this winter.

"I have an image that we are riding in a communal taxi cab and the meter is ticking away and when it stops, we will all stop," Berger said. "But right now I hear that ticking all the time. It drives me crazy."

But why are failures in the transportation system so much greater this year than last? One word is on nearly everyone's lips. At first it was only whispered in the streets and hissed by people standing in lines, but last week the Communist newspaper Pravda asked on its front page "Is this sabotage?"

Many people in the capital believe that conservatives who oppose Gorbachev are purposely making things difficult for consumers so that public frustration



ROBERT D. TONSONG

Muscovites line up at a produce market; on this occasion, only some small melons were available.

will grow and *perestroika* will fail.

Pravda, in its brief front-page article raising the possibility of sabotage, reported that 13,500 freight cars packed with much-needed consumer goods were waiting in railway yards across the country, and the paper wondered why they were not being unloaded.

"Pravda correspondents saw with their own eyes unloaded freight trains that had brought to Moscow imported furniture, cosmetics, coffee, tea, soap, shampoo, washing powder and Soviet-produced television sets, refrigerators, batteries and cigarettes," the newspaper said. "More goods are stored in depots or are simply outside without anything to protect them from the weather."

Berger discounted the sabotage theory, saying that although the population is eager to find a villain, the country's economic woes can

be more closely linked to what he referred to as a mentality of dependency dating from the time of the czars.

"People are used to being told by Moscow how much sugar they should put in the cake they bake in Vladivostok," he said, referring to the Pacific port city in Siberia. "In the past, everything always had to be resolved in one place, in one building, practically in one office."

"Now that Gorbachev is encouraging them to work on their own, people simply are producing less," he said. "The ruble doesn't buy them anything, so they don't feel any motivation."

Because there is so little to buy, people rarely take a shopping list with them when they go to the store. It is less frustrating, they say, simply to scout out what is on the shelves.

But even that is often tricky.

Asked to name the items currently unavailable or in short supply in GUM, deputy director Svetlana N. Shevyakov laughed. It would be easier, she said, to list the goods that shoppers are able to find in the store.

"Just now, you can buy costume jewelry, purses, fabrics, plates and cups," she added, but all winter clothing was "deficit," the word used for "in short supply."

Shevyakov noted, however, that higher consumer expectations have contributed to the problem because Soviet people are seeing for the first time, because of Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*, or greater openness, the wide range of consumer goods available in the West.

"A man used to want one pair of shoes for autumn and one pair for winter. Now he wants three pairs for each season—and he can't find them," she said.

# COLOR TV

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# The New Dead Sea in Soviet Central Asia

By DAVID McCLAVE

In the past 30 years, the geologic equivalent of a millisecond, one of man's most devastating assaults upon nature has destroyed what was once the world's fourth largest lake, the Aral Sea in Soviet Central Asia. In the course of a generation, its level has fallen 40 feet—losing one-third of its area and 60% of its volume. Measured another way, the lost waters of the Aral Sea (called a sea because of its size and fierce storms) would fill Lake Erie.

As recently as 1973, the Aral Sea, straddling the border between the Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, supported commercial shipping and a thriving fishing industry that supplied 10% to 15% of the Soviet Union's freshwater catch. The major ports of Aral'sk in the northeast and Muynak in the south were linked by steamships that traveled the 220-mile route between them.

By 1987 these once active ports were 25 to 30 miles from the receding water. Rusting freighters and fishing boats littered the newly formed sand dunes nearby. Fishermen cast their nets out for the last time in 1983. Salinity, which had more than doubled, killed off most of the sea's aquatic life. To preserve employment in Muynak and Aral'sk, the desertbound canneries now process frozen fish shipped from the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Each year 47 million tons of dust and salt from the exposed bottom are blown over and deposited in the cotton fields and deserts surrounding the sea. The salt, combined with enormous quantities of pesticides applied to the fields, makes a poisonous mixture. Everything from drinking water to mothers' milk is contaminated. A pipeline to bring drinkable water from afar is frantically under construction. Infant mortality in the region has climbed to the highest levels in the world.

One of the greatest ecological disasters of the 20th century, it turns out, was no accident. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Kremlin decided to make the Soviet Union a leading producer of cotton by dramatically expanding the area in Central Asia under irrigation and cultivation. Some outspoken scientists and engineers expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of this plan. But the leadership openly proclaimed that the Aral Sea, an oasis in the Soviet Union's most arid region, was a dispensable resource that could be bartered at cost for crops, especially cotton and rice. *Glasnost* and rising environmental consciousness in the Soviet Union have revealed the terrible consequences of this miscalculation.

Soviet engineers and scientists were taught by Stalin to "make no small plans."

Three large deserts, the Kyzyl Kum, the Kara Kum and the Barsuki, surround the Aral Sea. To turn them into fertile and productive land, the engineers built the 800-mile-long Kara Kum Canal, the linchpin of a woefully ill-conceived water redistribution plan.

By the late 1970s, this giant irrigation ditch was fully operational and siphoning off enormous quantities of one of the sea's two source rivers, the Amudarya. This canal has poured so much water into the des-

the region an ecological disaster area. Next, a resolution was passed last September mandating measures aimed at halting the region's environmental decline.

Since then, the Aral region has hosted at least two high-powered, high-profile groups of Soviet politicians, writers, scientists and lawyers. For example, the ARAL-88 Expedition completed its 69-day mission to Soviet Central Asia last October. The expedition, led by writer Grigoriy Reznichenko, submitted its report this May. Previewing its conclusions, in an interview following the expedition, Mr. Reznichenko stated that "as a biological object the Aral Sea has perished." Other conclusions: Life expectancy is plummeting in the region; infectious diseases, especially hepatitis, are nearing epidemic levels; and unemployment is on the rise with the loss of traditional local trades and professions.

At the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in Moscow in late spring, the Aral Sea disaster was one of the most frequently cited items on a long list of Soviet ecological calamities. It is clear that some help is on the way. However, given the persistent, expensive aftereffects of the Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion and the Armenian earthquake, the Soviets will be hard pressed to finance the rescue effort, estimated at 25 billion to 30 billion rubles. Perhaps it would be best to do what one impassioned speaker at the Congress suggested: Make the restoration of the Aral Sea a critical project of international disaster relief.

Mr. McClave is a research analyst in Soviet and East European affairs at the Library of Congress.



ert that the city of Ashkhabad has resorted to flood-control barriers for protection. Withdrawals from the Amudarya and Syr-darya increased so much that not a drop of their water reached the sea in 1985-86.

In the finest traditions of Soviet monumentalism, several years ago another "nature-conquering" proposal was approved to fix the damage from the first project. Dwarfing anything conceived by the Tennessee Valley Authority, plans were drawn up to divert portions of north-flowing Siberian rivers through a long and broad canal—the Sibaral. The water was to be pumped down more than 600 miles from the Ob-Irtysh system far to the northeast. A rough analogy would be pumping the Mississippi waters at New Orleans up to irrigate West Texas. This canal was to provide relief to water-deficient parts of Soviet Central Asia and replenish the Aral Sea, the plight of which had become painfully obvious to the three million people living in its environs.

Mikhail Gorbachev canceled this project early in his tenure as Communist Party general secretary, a decision hailed as a major victory for the fledgling Soviet environmental movement. However, the unfolding ecological disaster that prompted the diversion scheme would not abate. It now seems likely that the part of the Aral Sea that escapes desertification will be a mere cluster of lifeless, briny lakes by the year 2010.

To its credit, the Soviet government has belatedly taken several steps to repudiate its earlier positions, such as that of a deputy minister who asserted that "the Aral should die beautifully." First, it declared

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## Notable & Quotable 9/19/89

Desmond Watkins, a director of Shell Petroleum, addressing the International Business Conference in London last October:

I believe that most genuinely international businesses, certainly Shell, share most of the objectives of the anti-apartheid campaign. Apartheid is incongruous with the aims and practices of business; capital is colorblind and the search for profit and economic growth is a rationalizing force.

We have hopes that market forces will bring about fundamental changes in the U.S.S.R. So with South Africa. The present South African state system is protectionist, bureaucratic, inefficient and wasteful. In this it is anti-business. Left to itself the market system will seek to develop the black community and market, train black businessmen, develop black entrepreneurs, sweep away the artificial prejudices and distinctions which inhibit economic success.

JEANE KIRKPATRICK

# The Cold War isn't over just yet

**T**HERE is something vaguely frivolous about the great debates now under way among American commentators concerning whether we have "won" the Cold War, whether Communism is "finished," whether the Idea of Freedom has triumphed.

It has been a heady experience to hear the leader of the Kremlin describe the problems and failures of his system and adopt Western strategies for dealing with them. It has been a heady experience to hear him encourage liberalization in Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union itself. It is nearly enough to make cockeyed optimists of us all.

But in fact the evidence on these questions is more mixed than most current American comment implies.

Three major contradictions have developed in the course of the broad struggle between the forces of freedom and unfreedom. These contradictions need to be taken into account in assessing who won, or indeed, who is winning:

● The contradiction between what Hegel and Marx called "the ideal" and "the real";

● The contradiction between what is happening at the center of the Soviet empire and at its periphery; and

● The contradiction within American foreign policy between the desire to support resistance movements and the desire to negotiate political settlements.

An accurate assessment of where we are requires understanding these contradictions.

First, the contradiction between "the ideal," the domain of ideas, and "the real," the material world.

It is true that the idea of freedom has triumphed in the West. Almost everyone, including the current rulers of the Kremlin, pay verbal homage to government by the people. Whatever form of politics they practice, they call it democracy. And however they organize

their economies, they acknowledge that it needs elements of a free market.

Nonetheless, a good many states — including the USSR itself, all the Warsaw Pact countries except Hungary and Poland, China, North Korea, Ethiopia, Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, et al. — still centralize their economies and vest control of everything in "the vanguard of the proletariat," that is, in the leaders of their national communist parties.

The discrepancy between the ideal and the real, between theory and practice, invites unwary optimists to imagine that the world has changed a great deal more than it has.

It is true that the trend is toward a freer society. It is possible we may strengthen that trend with wise policy. But the struggle is not over. The outcome is not certain. And it is always imprudent to assume a victory that has yet to be achieved.

Some observers consider that liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are proof enough that the Cold War is over and the West has won. But they ignore the second major contradiction: That between the center and the periphery.

It is true that under Mikhail Gorbachev more freedom of speech, press and assembly have been granted to the Soviet people than anyone predicted. It is true that more independence has already been tolerated in Hungary and Poland than anyone expected. It is also true that the people of these countries have seized the freedom offered them.

Wonderful.

But at the periphery of the "world socialist system," the forces of repression remain strong and are actually growing.

The Soviet Union's non-European client governments remain firmly entrenched — in Cuba, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Mo-

zambique, Vietnam, Laos, and so forth. It is the resistance movements — the Mujahedeen, the KPRLF (Cambodia's democratic forces), UNITA, the Contras — that have been stopped in their tracks.

This brings us to the third contradiction: The ambivalence of U.S. policy and the Bush administration in the effort to expand freedom.

George Bush has repeatedly expressed support for "freedom fighters" who struggle against Marxist governments and incorporation of their country into the Soviet world empire. But during his relatively brief tenure in power, each of the resistance movements has suffered setbacks to which U.S. policy has made a direct contribution.

Today State Department officials explain off the record that "Washington" believed Soviet troop withdrawal meant an end to Soviet ambitions for control of Afghanistan. They expected, one high official explained, "that Moscow really was looking for little more than a decent interval," between troop withdrawal and the collapse of the Najibullah government.

Apparently, it never occurred to them that Soviet troop withdrawal meant a new phase of competition. So naturally they were surprised that the Soviet Union still provides \$200 to \$300 million a month in weaponry to prop up "its" government in Afghanistan. And naturally the Mujahedeen, facing a critical shortage of ammunition, have found it difficult to hold their ground.

Like other rebel leaders, the Mujahedeen's Guliydin Hekmatyir blames the United States for much of the resistance's problem.

"The American government is responsible for Najibullah's government not falling," he told Washington Post correspondent Lally Weymouth recently. "Suddenly we face a shortage of ammunition. Just after the Geneva

accord was signed (in April '88) the supply was stopped. They preferred a deal with Moscow on Afghanistan."

His group has faced two arms cutbacks and decreased effectiveness. Now the U.S. government says it was "a mistake."

In Angola, the forces of Gen. Jonas Savimbi are also confronting critical shortages. The State Department assured Savimbi's forces (and perhaps South Africa's government) that UNITA could be resupplied through Zaire in case of South African withdrawal from Namibia. But now that resupply route is said to be endangered, in spite of the improved relations between Zaire's ruler and the State Department. It is not clear whether UNITA will receive the Stingers it desperately needs to fend off a new offensive by Cuba's troops, who have not yet withdrawn.

It is, as the Marxists like to say, no coincidence that the KPRLF and the Contras also cannot fight because they do not have the necessary arms and ammunition. Or that the administration has recently abandoned its efforts to send \$3 million to the democratic opposition candidate for president of Nicaragua — while the Soviet Union continues aid at previous levels.

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger offered an original explanation that links current retreats to the "end of the Cold War" thesis. Both superpowers, Eagleburger suggested, crossed the "finish line" "very much out of breath" and are faced with "a frankly diminished capacity to influence events."

I hope that during Eduard Shevardnadze's visit, Secretary of State James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger make him understand that the Soviet Union is really too tired and too broke to support an empire.

Then we could talk about the triumph of freedom.

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# Helping the Revolution

How can we help the great revolution sweeping through the nations escaping captivity? What are the most important questions of our time?

First, this is our revolution, too. It is to the West that the people of the surging nations look and from whom they draw strength. Most of the nations in revolt have always been part of the West in culture and history. One of the sad ironies of their long period of suffering is that the very fact of their imprisonment makes so many other Westerners forget this truth and psychologically identify them with their captors.

Second, without help the revolution, even if it is not reversed, can wither before it comes to full fruit. Already some of the governments of the West are fearful of instability, are numbingly slow, slow, to the prisoners in revolt. Can't we remember that instability comes not from freedom but from despotism, which creates ceaseless revolution against it?

The first step in helping is to understand what is happening. Even as history unfolds, it can be distorted in the chronicling. The revolution was not brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev. It takes nothing from his role to say when he and other European leaders first announced that the revolution of 1989 was being carried by V. I. Lenin's successors. Almost from the moment the Soviet empire swallowed the captive nations the light against it began.

Men and women were murdered for fighting against Soviet rule, millions. More millions, how many no one can even guess, spent decades in foul prisons.

One after another, uprisings were crushed by Soviet power — almost every decade in Poland, in the 1950's and 60's in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

It is a distortion of truth and cruel lack of grace to all who fought the revolution to say after almost a half-century of struggle, "Why, how fast..." One of the reasons this truth is obscured is that so many of the Westerners who interpret what is taking place never truly understood. They thought even the phrase "captive nation" was just propaganda.

Many preached that there was no ethical difference between Western capitalism and Communism and that different kinds of capitalism led to different kinds of capitalism. No such confusion as "imperial capitalism" or "imperial socialism" exists. The Westerners who understood that if ever Moscow withdrew the threat of the

Red Army to put down the struggle of the captive nations, the satellite regimes would eventually collapse. But even they did not foresee how quickly Mr. Gorbachev would have to do that, how soon he would have to let Soviet strength for the devastating problems at home, and how quickly it flipped out of his political control.

So help of all kinds should go to those peoples who are overthrowing their Communist rulers. Doing so, we help ourselves and our heritage. But while the once-captive nations are in revolution to destroy Communism, Mr. Gorbachev says repeatedly that he does not intend to preside over the death of Communism in his own country. Peculiar how reluctant the West is to take him at his word on this one thing.

Perhaps Mr. Gorbachev will

## Understand its roots — and when it started.

change his mind and take the steps essential to full freedom in the Soviet Union — the creation of a multiparty system, an unshackled economy and agreement to political separation by at least some of the republics so eager to live their own lives. Already Mr. Gorbachev is hearing privately from some people around him what he does not wish to hear. They tell him he cannot have both perestroika and real economic change growing out of creative energy — and the existing Soviet system which kills order Army to keep it alive, even at home.

But more likely, Mr. Gorbachev and the Communist apparatus may decide to go the other way at home — halt the reforms and tighten up to preserve the system that brought them to power.

We have time to see which way he goes before we commit our economic, technological and political power to Mr. Gorbachev.

Caution against preserving Communism is not cowardice. It is a duty to all who fought it — and are fighting it still, in the crumbling empire and in the new Soviet Union still emerging.

## POLITICS & POLICY

# The Winds of Change Battering Communism Tear Also at the Fabric of U.S. Conservatism

By ROBERT S. GREENBERGER

**Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**  
WASHINGTON—For more than four decades, anti-communism has been the glue that held the conservative movement together. But now the breathtaking collapse of the enemy is provoking a bitter fight among victors on the political right.

Hard-liners want to strike the final blow against the ailing "evil empire," even to the point of supporting the nationalist rebellions bubbling up within the Soviet Union itself. Mainstream conservatives want to declare victory in the Cold War and offer Moscow a deal that guarantees independence for Eastern Europe and stability across the continent.

"This may be the issue that divides conservatives," says Jack Wheeler, a hard-liner who conceived the Reagan Doctrine, the banner under which the previous administration supported insurgencies against Marxist Angola, Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Now, Mr. Wheeler wants to press the fight to the Ukraine and the Baltics. "The Soviets are vulnerable and it ought to be our business to exacerbate those vulnerabilities," he says.

But Richard Perle, one of the most hard-line anti-Soviet U.S. foreign-policy makers in the past decade, now assails such tactics as "terribly dangerous." The former Reagan administration official says, "The prospect for successful rebellion in a place like the Ukraine is so slim that it would be irresponsible to encourage it."

Ironically, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform efforts, which triggered the turmoil in the communist world, also provoked the debate here. "Gorbachev has made it respectable for the traditional conservatives to come out of the closet and say that instead of being obsessed by the communist threat we ought to be more concerned about America's needs," says Christopher Layne of the Cato Institute, a think tank that often reflects conservative views on foreign-policy topics.

Many mainstream conservatives are reverting to the isolationism that character-

### Lifting the Iron Curtain

**March 26** Soviet Union holds the first competitive elections in its history for seats in its new parliament.

**Aug. 24** Polish lawmakers elect Solidarity activist Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the East Bloc's first non-Communist prime minister.

**Oct. 18** Hungary's parliament changes the country's name to Republic of Hungary, shocking its East Bloc moniker of Peoples Republic of Hungary.

**Oct. 18** East German Communist Party leader Erich Honecker, who supervised the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, is replaced by Egon Krenz.

**Nov. 9** East Germany declares the end of restrictions on emigration or travel to the West.

**Nov. 14** Czechoslovakian Premier Ladislav Adamec announces that his nation will permit its citizens to travel freely to the West beginning next year.

ized traditional Republicanism before the rise of the "Red menace," while most hard-liners want to keep battling communism abroad. These contradictory positions are dividing conservatives over major foreign-policy issues, such as whether the U.S. should aid ailing Marxist economies and whether to push for substantial U.S.-Soviet arms cuts.

But the fight on the right is over more than ideology. "The conservative movement raises money through fear," says one right-wing activist. "Groups have to be able to say, 'give me \$25 or southern Africa will go communist,' and that's getting harder to sell." Indeed, rumors are circulating in conservative circles that some groups, such as the Conservative Caucus, already are having difficulties raising funds, as some big-money conservative backers begin to focus their attention more

on domestic issues. Howard Phillips, chairman of the group, says the rumors are false.

The hard-liners have begun to press their case with the Bush administration, which has adopted a cautious approach toward the startling changes under way in the communist world. At a meeting earlier this month of the Stanton Group, a regular private gathering of hard-line conservatives, Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser, was asked if the administration was seeking "the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union." He didn't give a clear reply, according to one participant.

### Cautious Instincts

The administration's cautious instincts put it on the side of the mainstream conservatives. To avoid the appearance of gloating over the chaos in the communist world, President Bush has ignored critics who are urging him to go to Berlin to show support for the East German reform movement. And Secretary of State James Baker last weekend stressed that the U.S. has assured Moscow that it won't take "unilateral advantage" of the unraveling of the Soviet empire.

The disagreement among conservatives was fueled this summer by Burton Pines, senior vice president of the conservative Heritage Foundation. In an article in "Policy Review," the organization's magazine, Mr. Pines argued that the Cold War was "melting" and it was time to cut a deal with the Soviets to ensure future stability.

Mr. Pines proposed that Moscow withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe. The

former Soviet satellites then would be given "nearly full sovereignty" that would guarantee their independence. But they would be barred from such actions as joining any military alliance or allowing foreign troops on their soil. This, Mr. Pines contended, would allay Moscow's security concerns, particularly its fear that German troops might someday once again be on its border. As part of the deal, Moscow also would receive credits and other financial help as it restructures its economy.

Mr. Pines's article prompted a barrage of criticism in the magazine's next issue. Mr. Pines's idea is based on "extremely dubious" assumptions, complained Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the Reagan administration ambassador to the United Nations. "Mistaken and self-contradictory," added Angelo Codevilla of the Hoover Institute, a conservative think tank in California.

### Long-Term Interest

The hard-liners strongly oppose helping communist regimes, both because they don't believe Mr. Gorbachev is a true reformer and because they worry that a new, improved Soviet Union wouldn't be in the West's long-term interest.

Mr. Phillips of the Conservative Caucus, for instance, notes that the International Monetary Fund currently has a mission in Poland and probably will disperse loans to Warsaw by year end. Mr. Phillips argues that because Poland owes money to the Soviet Union, the IMF, with U.S. help, could inadvertently be helping to subsidize Mr. Gorbachev.

"You have to let the sickness run its course," contends Mr. Phillips. "To give aid to communist governments is, in effect, to help the cancer survive."

Mr. Pines counters that the world is changing and that it is time to take advantage of emerging opportunities. "Every free-market factory set up in a communist country is a virus that spreads democracy," he says.

## At Garn Institute, S&L Executives Get To Rub Shoulders With U.S. Regulators

By PAULETTE THOMAS

**Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**  
KEY LARGO, Fla.—While the ethics spotlight is glaring on five U.S. senators caught up in the burgeoning Lincoln Savings & Loan Association scandal, Sen. Jake Garn of Utah is quietly taking part in a subtle form of influence peddling.

The Garn Institute of Finance, established as a think tank, has also become a magnet for S&L money and schmoozing—not to mention a political power base and rare memorial to a sitting U.S. senator.



Senate Banking Committee. Dozens of industry officials and lobbyists bought plates, happily getting the ears of the officials determining the course of the landmark S&L law, the biggest financial overhaul since the 1930s.

Participation in Garn Institute functions is open to contributors, of which the institute has many from the thrift industry. They include Thomas Spiegel, chief executive officer of junk-bond thrift Columbia Savings of Beverly Hills, Calif., who has contributed \$100,000 and who sits on the institute's board of trustees. There's also David Paul, chairman of Centrust Bank of Miami, which was re-

# SHANNON

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# Struggling Reforms

## How Gorbachev's Plan Has Left Soviet Union Without Much Soap

### Trying to Bring Efficiency, Perestroika Has Triggered Inflation, Panic Buying

### The Burden of Stalin's Legacy

By PETER GUMBEL

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MOSCOW—Back in the days when the Soviet Union was thought of as an "Evil Empire" and run by septuagenarian hard-liners, life was tough for the people, but at least they had soap.

Then came Mikhail Gorbachev, promising to change the system, making the economy more efficient and consumer goods more plentiful. Life here is still tough and in some ways tougher: Now there is precious little soap.

People line up for hours outside stores at the first hint that soap, detergent, washing powder or toothpaste might be for sale. On the black market, such items fetch three to four times the official price and more. When the nation's coal miners went on strike this summer, more soap was one of their main demands. In September, two policemen were stabbed when they tried to separate Vietnamese and Russian workers who were fighting over bottles of shampoo.



**GORBACHEV'S BROKEN ECONOMY**

First of Two Articles

"In all my life I've never seen anything like it," says Margarita Boyarskaya, a cheery woman who has worked at Moscow's Svoboda soap factory for 30 years.

For almost five years now, Mr. Gorbachev has been trying to revamp the moribund Soviet economy with a blizzard of initiatives and slogans known collectively as *perestroika*, or restructuring.

Bureaucratic red tape was to be cut, factory managers given more leeway to make their own decisions and a small amount of private entrepreneurship encouraged. All this was supposed to make life better for the average Soviet citizen and cure a Soviet budget deficit bulging from decades of subsidizing inefficient factories and farms.

But while few economists hold any reverence for the old system, and most agree it had to be revamped to halt a troubling decline, Mr. Gorbachev's attempts to make things better have yielded few positive results and have at times made things worse.

Some factory managers, for example, took advantage of their new freedom by giving themselves and their employees big raises, boosting purchasing power at the same time other managers were using their new-found freedom to raise prices and cut back production.

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This resulted in what could have been a minor shortfall of some consumer goods, but in the Soviet Union, the psychological effects have been much greater. Perestroika unwittingly helped touch off panic buying and hoarding.

If soap were the only item to disappear on Mr. Gorbachev in this manner, Soviet consumers might grin and bear it. But according to official figures, 1,000 of 1,200 everyday consumer goods in the Soviet Union are now in short supply. Public disgruntlement with perestroika has soared, influencing the government to spend a whopping \$16 billion on emergency imports of consumer goods this year. Among items being purchased abroad are 1.5 billion razor blades, 170 million pairs of tights and 40 million tubes of shaving cream.

Mr. Gorbachev and his economic planners have now acknowledged that they miscalculated just how difficult reform would be. They are preparing for what the Soviet president himself has called a more radical stage of perestroika, one that they well know could cause further short-term upsets in the economy, harden conservative opposition to the reform movement and perhaps even threaten Mr. Gorbachev's job.

### No Turning Back

"We can neither return to the beginning, nor can we stop half-way," the Soviet leader told a meeting of Soviet economists last month. "We've already lost many years."

But perestroika's own soap opera shows just how perilous it can be to tinker with an inflexible, centrally planned economy. A market economy would likely have been able to adjust to the changes brought by the Soviet leader, but they caused portions of the Soviet economy to break down.

The story begins just before Mr. Gorbachev took over in March 1985. Soviet planners were confronting a nasty problem: too much soap. Ministries and the State Planning Commission were receiving letters from government retail organizations complaining that they had more soap than they could cope with. Clearly, the forecasts of supply and demand—based largely on the previous year's production—were inaccurate. The time had come to "balance the market," as the planners like to call it.

So they cut. Imports were the big casualty. "They stopped buying because they said local production was sufficient," recalls Ram S. Rastogi, president of Chemimpex, an Indian trading firm that was one of the Soviet Union's biggest foreign suppliers. Until 1984, he says, Moscow had

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### Wholesale Trade in U.S.S.R. Remains Negligible After 5 Years of Perestroika

By PETER GUMBEL  
 Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
**KHABAROVSK, U.S.S.R.** — The words "wholesale trade" may not make many Western hearts beat faster, but for Soviet reformers they represent one of the key elements of perestroika—and one important reason for its failure so far.

Under the centralized economic system, bureaucrats in Moscow tell the nation's factories what to produce and provide them with necessary raw materials. The factories, in turn, pass their output back to the bureaucrats. Soviet advocates of economic reform reason that if only this vertical structure could be broken, with plants buying and selling directly to each other, an embryonic market system would emerge in which prices, supply and demand all play a role.

To speed the process and help managers adapt to new conditions, the Soviet government agency that allocates supplies to industry started a nationwide program to create such a wholesale system. In early 1988, the agency, Gosstab, set up 140 "commercial centers" that were to act as middlemen, bringing together industrial buyers and sellers and stimulating the growth of wholesale trade.

One such center lies at the end of a bumpy dirt road on the edge of Khabarovsk, an industrial town in the Soviet Far East. Here Vitaly Shalduga, an energetic 42-year-old former chemist, waxes enthusiastically about his job. "We must break the old psychology about producers and consumers," he says. "There can be no perestroika without a wholesale market."

With the help of East German computers, Mr. Shalduga tries to match factories and farms with equipment and goods they want to buy or sell. He also has staged auctions of such hard-to-find items as roofing tiles, with his center picking up a small commission fee for each successful transaction.

But despite the enthusiasm of men like Mr. Shalduga, wholesale trade is off to a faltering start. And now the very agency that created the commercial centers is trying to curb their activities.

One problem dogging the change-over to a horizontal economic structure was the unwillingness of Soviet managers themselves. It is much easier for them to rely on state orders and handouts than to find their own suppliers and customers. Ministries have made ample use of such inertia to keep the old system—and their powers—

most five years of perestroika, wholesale trade remains negligible.

Bureaucratic intrigue now threatens the commercial centers, which have enjoyed growing success and expect to handle trade transactions valued at about \$4 billion this year, five times the amount in 1983. The head of Gosstab who initiated the centers, Lev Voronin, has recently been promoted to a higher post in the government, as deputy prime minister "for general matters." His successor, Pavel Mostovoi, is reportedly far less supportive of economic reform and is trying to close down the centers.

Sergel Karnaukhov, a senior Gosstab official, says the organization still supports the centers, but "until the financial system recovers, the state central organs should concentrate all resources in their hands."

But Gosstab now has to fight to do so. Liberated by their freedom to do real business, rather than just give orders, some 50 of these centers in October banded together to form their own association, independent of Gosstab. Others are expected to join by the time the association holds its first nationwide conference in mid-December. "Our first aim is to defend perestroika," says Valery Kosarev, president of the new association and, like most of his colleagues, himself a former Gosstab official. "A market for goods can't exist without us."

So far, five of the centers are considering pulling out from under Gosstab's jurisdiction altogether, and Mr. Kosarev is flying around the country trying to drum up support for his cause. He hopes that as an independent organization, the association will be able to organize trade fairs, auctions and even a "trade bourse," where buyers and sellers of equipment can do business directly. Some of the centers' managers refused point-blank when told by Gosstab to provide it with all the information they had gathered about local industry's needs. They said the details were commercial secrets.

In early November, Mr. Mostovoi, the new head of Gosstab, sent invitations to representatives of the association, intending to give them a dressing down and, Mr. Kosarev presumes, to tell them they must close. After lobbying by association members, several Soviet journalists came to the rescue and wrote articles supporting their cause. The day before the meeting, a senior Gosstab representative sat down with association leaders for the first time to listen to their arguments. The question of the centers' existence was then taken off the agenda of the meeting with Mr. Mostovoi.

Despite the cease-fire, Mr. Kosarev says "trench warfare" between the associ-

### Struggling Reforms: Soviet Soap Shortage Tied to Gorbachev

Continued From First Page  
 bought 30,000 tons of detergent and 20,000 tons of toilet soap every year from India alone.

At the same time, because soap was not deemed a priority, life suddenly got harder for soap producers. One aging factory in Moscow that was undergoing renovation, its 50-year-old equipment in the midst of being replaced, suddenly found its funds for modernization frozen, according to the director, Nikolai Leshchenko. Local authorities said they needed the money for something more pressing.

The Svoboda plant in Moscow, the biggest soap-producer in the country, didn't have equipment problems. But it was forced to battle with its customers in the retail organizations. "Two months before the soap crisis started, we had to persuade them to take it," recalls Mrs. Boyarskaya, picking a bar off the table and smelling it. "The shops were overstocked and they were rejecting any kind of soap."

It took a couple of years for the soap crisis to actually set in. Despite Mr. Gorbachev's efforts to introduce greater flexibility, the Soviet system remains one characterized by rigid planning and a dangerous reliance on industrial monopolies. "The entire economy operates on the edge of crisis," says Anatoly Anshitz, a Soviet journalist who specializes in shortages. "It is geared to producing as little as necessary."

Given such conditions, it takes only one seemingly small breakdown to create enormous problems. In the case of soap, it was probably a dearth of sulphanol, a key ingredient in washing powder, that set off a chain reaction.


The nation's entire sulphanol production comes from a single plant in the Azerbaijan town of Sumgait. Trying to start up a new line, the plant had been having trouble meeting production targets, according to Soviet officials. Ethnic unrest also probably played a role. In March 1988, growing tension between Azerbaijan and the neighboring republic of Armenia erupted on the streets of Sumgait and at least 30 people were killed in a race riot.

#### Enter Perestroika

Perestroika turned this one production bottleneck into a national nightmare. Trying to encourage factory managers to make decisions rather than just obey orders, Mr. Gorbachev unwittingly triggered a surge in inflation. Using their new freedoms, factories awarded their workers big pay increases, often 30% or more. That in turn boosted demand for goods, setting off concerns that eventually sparked panic buying.

"We completely underestimated the in-

### The Plight of Soviet Consumers



than they do excess stocks. Rationing was soon introduced almost everywhere, and then the recommitments started. Last April, a plenary meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee accused the two chemical industry ministers of causing the trouble. One of them shot back with a letter to Mr. Gorbachev saying that the retail people were to blame.

An official from the State Planning Commission attacked the market research institute for not foreseeing the surge in demand. "No scientific research can foresee panic buying," sniffs Mr. Nefedov, claiming the institute did warn someone in the planning agency, who never passed it on.

Mr. Gorbachev told the Soviet parliament this fall that the soap shortage was the fault of the fledgling private-sector cooperative movement, something that he began as part of perestroika but which has become so unpopular with the people—because of allegations of profiteering—that even Mr. Gorbachev himself often finds it an easy target.

Amidst all the finger-pointing, the lumbering Soviet bureaucracy set about solving the problem. Mr. Rastogi, the Indian businessman, last year got an urgent call from the people who had cut him off a few years previously. "It was distress buying," he chuckles. "They wanted any quantity available." This year, Soviet imports of soap and detergents will total more than 200,000 tons, four times the amount bought before the import moratorium. In 1990, Mr. Rastogi says, Moscow is likely to spend more than \$200 million on purchases abroad.

#### Important Boom

The orders have been coming in so fast that he has run out of containers on which to load them in India. When he tried to send some supplies loose on board ship, he says 10% was stolen by soap-starved dockers and others when they reached the Soviet Union.

Perhaps inevitably, Soviet soap factories have been the last to feel the effects

of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, the Ministry of Oil and Chemical Industry, the Ministry of Fertilizer Production, the State Agro-Industrial Committee, the Ministry of Machine Building and Ministries of Local Industry in the nation's 15 republics.

This year, the two chemical industry ministries were merged and the agro-industrial committee disbanded. But to make things more complicated, its soap-related functions have been split between regional agricultural agencies and the Ministry of Medical Industry.

The reason for such a jumble of organizations is largely historical, linked to the growth of centralized control of the economy under Joseph Stalin. Although Mr. Gorbachev has tried to cut back the bureaucracy, his measures have so far had almost no effect. Following rough guidelines given by the state planning commission and the agency in charge of supplying materials, each ministry is still supposed to provide the necessary ingredients and equipment and oversee the operation of plants under its jurisdiction.

#### No Communication

The trouble for the Soviet economy is that communication and coordination between these bodies is almost nonexistent because some of the ministries are rivals and because, well, some reasons just defy logic.

The Ministry of Machine Building, for example, is a hush-hush place that turns out military hardware as well as machines that produce soap. It isn't even listed in Soviet phone books, what few there are, because of the military connection, and it eschews all contact with outsiders, including other soap ministries.

The advantage for the bureaucrats in all this is that when mishaps do occur, nobody quite knows whom to blame.

Mamed Aliev is one small cog in this gigantic, creaking machine. An Azerbaijani with a shock of white hair and ruffled

used to make the chemical sulphanol, which in turn is one of 13 ingredients that go into Soviet washing powder. Until recently, sulphanol was the responsibility of a completely separate ministry from Mr. Aliev's, and its plants are hundreds of miles away from the ones producing paraffin. They in turn are far from the ones making washing powder.

"Of course it would be better to produce paraffin at the same place as sulphanol," Mr. Aliev says. But "I'm a specialist in paraffin. I don't have any responsibility for sulphanol."

#### Pressure to Produce

Mr. Aliev's bosses in the ministry are now under terrific pressure to increase production. That means Mr. Aliev is, too. But he beams with a ready answer: From the first of January next year, 100,000 tons of high-quality liquid paraffin will be diverted to sulphanol production. And where does this paraffin go now? Mr. Aliev ponders before answering. "Microbiologists. It's used for making animal feed," he says. So where will the microbiologists get their supplies? He shrugs. Not his problem.

Mr. Leshchenko, whose factory modernization was halted, says one committee after another has been coming to visit him, pounding on the table and demanding more. He seems as close to breaking down as his ancient equipment.

Meanwhile, at the big Svoboda plant, managers finally added an extra shift this fall to cope with the increased demand. But even now, the third shift takes place only three times a week because of a shortage of personnel.

Why did it take so long to react? Chief accountant Sergel Loginov, in the middle of proudly explaining how Svoboda is now over-fulfilling its plan for soap production by 10%, is taken aback by the question. "We needed supplies of materials. We only started when we got guarantees that we would get the supplies," says the nervous, humorless number-cruncher. The guarantees took months of negotiation between the various ministries.

"It's a colossal task," he says. "It all takes time."

#### Bass PLC

Bass PLC, London, declined to comment on a weekend news report suggesting it will sell some of the Holiday Inn hotels in North America that it agreed to buy last summer.

The report, which appeared in London's Sunday Telegraph newspaper Sunday, said Bass may sell some of the hotels to reduce debt after its agreement last August to buy the world's largest hotel chain from Holiday Corp. Bass is funding the \$2.23 billion acquisition with £1 billion (\$1.58 billion) of syndicated two-year loans.

Concern about the company's debt level has pushed its shares down sharply on London's Stock Exchange. Bass's per-share price has fallen nearly 16% to 967 pence

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GORBACHEV'S BROKEN ECONOMY

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# U.S. Is Leaning Toward West Germany As Its Closest Trans-Atlantic Partner

WASHINGTON  
INSIGHT

By WALTER S. MOSSBERG  
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Bush administration is considering making West Germany, not Britain, Washington's closest partner in trans-Atlantic affairs.

This "tilt" toward Germany isn't yet settled policy; it may never be announced even if officials agree on it. And strong ties with Britain would continue. But the new approach to Germany is seen by some key administration advisers as the best way for the U.S. to continue exerting influence over a rapidly changing geopolitical and economic situation in Europe. And it is viewed as necessary to keep a future reunified Germany squarely in the Western camp, rather than neutralized or leaning Eastward.

Even without being formally adopted, the tilt toward Germany has been in the wind since last spring, when the administration settled a bitter fight with Bonn over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's policy on short-range nuclear missiles. Officials say that fight and its resolution led both President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker to forge a closer bond with their West German counterparts.

In particular, the cautious and conservative Mr. Baker has developed a personal rapport and respect for the bold and leftish West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Their friendship was born during an all-night, hardball negotiating session last May over the missile dispute—the kind of tussle Mr. Baker savors, and through which he has built similar ties to domestic political foes.

**Role Ceded to Bonn**  
Over the ensuing months, the U.S. openly ceded to Bonn the lead role in preparing the West's aid package for Poland and Hungary, saying it was appropriate for Europe's richest country to take charge of helping its poor neighbors, especially given U.S. budget woes. And the president's much-criticized faint response to the breaching of the Berlin Wall was partly based on a desire to do what Bonn wanted—namely, keep quiet, lest Moscow be tempted to crack down.

"The relationship to Germany is a key for us," says one U.S. official. "What we need to focus on isn't some deal on Europe with Gorbachev, but how we can work with the Germans to keep them anchored in the West."

The president and Mr. Baker frequently are in phone contact with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Mr. Genscher. The Americans were moved recently when the German leaders personally thanked them for America's steadfast protection of West Berlin over the past 40 years. Even Mr. Genscher's personal secretary emotionally thanked Mr. Baker for America's help.

During the East German turmoil, Mr. Kohl's national security adviser, Horst Teltschik, his defense minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, and his intelligence chief,

tries have made ample use of such inertia to keep the old system—and their powers—as intact as possible. As a result, after almost a decade of trench warfare between the association and Gossnab is far from over.

U.S. Mr. Genscher himself arrives tomorrow on a similar mission. And second-level Bush administration officials have been busily building ties to their own counterparts in Bonn, comparing world views.

Germany's rising prominence in Washington has been noted in London, where any perceived slackening of the prized "special relationship" with the U.S. sets off alarm bells. British officials privately complained that the May NATO meeting at which the short-range missile fight was settled was too much of a U.S.-German affair in which Washington conceded too much to Bonn.

**No Break With Thatcher**  
Naturally, Mr. Bush isn't about to break with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He even has invited her to Camp David Friday for a meeting to help him plan for his Dec. 2-3 summit with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. After decades of extraordinary closeness, the U.S. isn't eager to jettison its partnership with London.

But Mr. Baker and most of his key aides became used to viewing Germany (and Japan) as more important than Britain when they conducted economic and monetary diplomacy at the Treasury. And U.S. officials privately believe Mrs. Thatcher is out of step on some key issues that could be crucial in establishing a new stability in Europe as Eastern Europe gains a measure of independence from Moscow.

For instance, the U.S. is considering throwing its weight behind giving the European Community, which currently deals primarily with economic issues, a greater role in political and foreign policy. Administration officials also are looking for ways to increase the direct American role in the activities of the Brussels-based EC. They hope that the EC can provide a stable framework for integrating Eastern Europe into the Western orbit and toning down ancient European ethnic and national conflicts, which are now awakening as Moscow removes its iron hand.

Mrs. Thatcher opposes any accretion of power in Brussels as an assault on Britain's sovereignty and a backdoor victory for Europe's socialists. But West Germany generally has backed the idea of European countries ceding some political, as well as economic, sovereignty to the EC. In fact, German officials have argued for a strong EC as a way of assuring other countries that a reunified Germany won't be too powerful.

So a new U.S.-German "special relationship" may be forming. How it develops could be crucial in the evolution of the new European power structure and of U.S. efforts to retain its influence there.

## Canadian Steel Production

OTTAWA — Canadian steel production totaled 299,982 metric tons in the week ended Nov. 11, a 2.1% increase from 293,902 tons in the previous week and an 8.4% decline from 327,357 tons a year earlier, Statistics Canada, a federal agency, said.

buying. "We completely underestimated the increase in personal incomes. That was our main mistake," says Alexander Voronov, deputy director of the All-Union Institute for Market Research. "As the market develops, it's natural that we make quite a few mistakes," he adds humbly.

Although prices of most Soviet goods remain centrally fixed, perestroika. In the name of efficiency, enabled factories to switch production from cheap, unprofitable items to more expensive ones.

The Svoboda plant, for example, stopped making its "Wood-Nymph" and "March 8" soap brands that sold for 70 kopeks a bar, and began producing the pricier "Balsam" and "Start," which retail for 100 kopeks, or one ruble. Svoboda managers insist that they continued to turn out the same volume. But others didn't. Since their economic plans are largely calculated in rubles, not bars or tons of soap, the higher prices meant they could produce less soap and still fulfill their production quotas.

"What does the consumer stand to gain from this?" the newspaper Pravda thundered recently. "Absolutely nothing."

## The First Shortage

Vyacheslav Nefedov, a department head at the Market Research Institute, says the first shortage to hit the stores was washing powder—probably due to the sulphanol shortage—about 18 months ago. When that began disappearing from stores, people started buying up cheap soap to wash their clothes. But, of course, many factories were making less and less cheap soap, and this fact wasn't lost on consumers.

The problem was compounded by fast-spreading rumors of new shortages of all kinds of goods, and by a growing public lack of confidence in the future. A recent opinion poll commissioned by government economists found that 93.5% of Soviets believe the economy is in a "critical" or "unfavorable" condition. Worried that existing supplies would disappear and not be replenished, and with more disposable income thanks to the raises their factory managers gave them, Soviet citizens began snapping up every imaginable kind of consumer good: soap, sugar, salt—even matches.

One Moscow department store director reports seeing old women staggering out of the shop with 70 bars and more. In the Arctic town of Murmansk, supplies sold out in two days. At the Svoboda factory's shop, assistants told Mrs. Boyarskaya that they had cupboards full of the stuff at home.

"My old uncle rushed out and bought 10 bars of soap when he heard the rumors, even though he may not live long enough to use them," Mrs. Boyarskaya says. When she asked him why, he replied: "It's better to have it now, while it's available."

Soviet planners hate panic even more

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gantic, creaking machine. An Azerbaijani with a shock of white hair and rumpled collar, he is responsible for production of liquid paraffin at the Ministry of Chemical Industry. Among other things, paraffin is




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# Charles Schwab

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Following are excerpts from an article by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, as translated by the official press agency Tass from yesterday's edition of the Communist Party newspaper Pravda. The article, titled "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," was described by Pravda as having synthesized and developed ideas set forth by Mr. Gorbachev in a number of recent speeches.

Some people try to approach us that way, but the only road that leads to the truth is the road of perestroika. One can hardly argue with the way the question is put. I believe that we would have made a theoretical error if we began to impose ready-made schemes on society again, or tried to squeeze actual life into schemes. This was the characteristic feature of Stalinism with which we have parted ways....

Optimism are now being voiced increasingly often that the socialist idea is an artificial, abstract construction and therefore is devoid of a social basis. I believe that this is an idea that expressed and anticipated what has not justified itself because it is responsible for the crisis state of our society.

The founders of Marxism never engaged in inventing specific forms and mechanisms for the development of a new society. They developed the socialist idea, relying on actual social life and the practice of the revolutionary working-class movement of their time.

It is clear that the founders of Marxism and the theory they created cannot bear responsibility for the distortions of socialism over the years, of the personality cult and stagnation, and for the erroneous actions of some political figures — and not only because a century-long period separates the emergence of the theory and these events, but also due to the substance of the matter....

We now take a wider, deeper and more realistic view of socialism than in the recent past. We view it as a world process in which, along with socialist countries with different stages of socioeconomic and political development, there are also various currents of socialist thought in the rest of the world and some social movements different in their composition and motivation....

A special role in the new socialist orientation belongs to the Communist Party, which is called upon to be the political vanguard of Soviet society. The destiny of perestroika and the attainment of a qualitatively new state of society and a new aspect of socialism depend on the party's activities in this regard....

At the present complex stage, the interests of the consolidation of socialism and the concentration of all its sound forces on the accomplishment of the difficult tasks of perestroika prompt the advisability of keeping the one-party system....

And in this case, the party will promote the development of pluralism, the coexistence of opinions in society and the broadening of opinions in the interests of democracy and the people. In the efforts to renew socialism, the party may not concede the slightest to the forces of anti-socialism, to the party that would damage the party or to the spontaneity of group interests.

try must guard against "these dangerous conservatives." "When they say, 'let us steer,' sometimes I wonder if they're really saying, 'let us shoot.'" Mr. Yakovlev said.

In addition to the active party registers, Mr. Gorbachev has recently witnessed the growing influence of new "worker fronts." These groups backed by party and trade union functionaries, are demanding protection against the economic insecurity certain to come with moves toward a market economy. Responding to this new lobby, the Soviet legislature last week approved a freeze on the prices of soap, nylon, cigarettes and other consumer goods.

Mr. Gorbachev's article in the party newspaper was presented as "a synthesis and development" of several reports.

heads off on visits to Italy and the Vatican and prepares for his Milan meeting next weekend with President Bush.

The article appeared as the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, announced that the Communist Party government in Warsaw had decided to leave Moscow after a remarkably warm reception and as the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was wobbling under public pressure.

Often criticized for falsely raising public expectations of quick results, Mr. Gorbachev today concluded that the rethinking of socialism "is a process that will stretch beyond the decade into the 21st century."

Mr. Medvedev has recently been under open attack for trying to fire the editor of the country's most popular newspaper, and for intervening to limit the freedom of the press.

Mr. Medvedev has recently been under open attack for trying to fire the editor of the country's most popular newspaper, and for intervening to limit the freedom of the press.

DO NOT FORGET THE NEEDS!

Charles Krauthammer

# Our Man Gorbachev

Uncharacteristically, the hard-liners have got it wrong. They are upset that President Bush gave away the store at Malta, dubbed "the Door-mat Summit" by one critic.

What happened? At the summit Bush went from interested spectator to Gorbachev partner. He preemptively recalled all instruments of economic war (such as punitive tariffs) against the Soviet Union. He approved its partial entry into the West's economic system (observer status in the Western trading club of GATT). He gave Gorbachev and perestroika a political blessing to match the pope's.

He gave these concessions for free—before having received anything in return. No commitment to real economic reform. No pledges of good behavior in Central America. "Will someone tell me," asked a pained Richard Viguierie, "how it is in the interests of the Free World to save this failed, fatally flawed system?"

The answer is simple: it is in the highest interest of the Free World to save, to whatever extent we can, Gorbachev, because Gorbachev—not the withholding of GATT membership or squeezing the Soviets on Central America—is the key to burying this failed, fatally flawed system.

The hard-liners are missing the big picture. Their hearts are in the right place—~~ice~~ but they have got the tactics wrong. The terminal phase of the Cold War, as any war, should be focused on the center, not the periphery. The periphery was the major battleground when the center was untouchable. No longer.

It is true that the Soviets are still acting duplicitously in Central America and still trying to hang on to Afghanistan. But these are peripheral issues. From the point of view of strategy, we don't particularly care right now if the Soviets insist on spending themselves dry in Havana and Kabul. We don't particularly care if Gorbachev refuses to release prices and make the other changes essential to reviving his economy. (In the end, what hard-liner really wants a revived Soviet economy? So why insist on real reform?)

What we care is that Eastern Europe irrevocably eludes the Soviet grasp. The Soviet empire is in collapse at the center, where it counts. Every day Gorbachev remains in power is another day of further collapse. Our supreme interest, therefore, is to help Gorbachev remain in power. He has done more for rollback than John Foster Dulles could have dreamed.

Right now, we need a year. Within a year, Eastern Europe could be entirely out of the Soviet reach. It might take a year for Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary to elect non-Communist governments. Imperial restoration would then require a World War II-style reoccupation against the resistance of perhaps four legitimate democracies with wide popular support. In other words, imperial restoration will be inconceivable.

Our immediate agenda, therefore, is to help Gorbachev buy time. Help him resist the internal discontent that comes from the empty shelves and rising inflation. If that requires Western credits, or emergency food aid or some GATT-like political concession to placate the Politburo, the price is cheap.

Now is not the time to push Gorbachev on Baltic independence, on the formal dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, on the German question, on economic reform or even on Central American mischief.

*"Within a year, Eastern Europe could be entirely out of the Soviet reach."*

making. Our supreme interest is an independent East Europe—and that means the continued survival of Gorbachev and his reforms. Everything else is secondary and, if it poses any threat to perestroika, counterproductive.

Vice President Dan Quayle complains that Gorbachev's top national security advisers are still hard-line. He misses the point. We are far beyond caring about intentions. Events have outrun intentions.

No doubt, Gorbachev intends to make the Soviet Union a stronger, more efficient, more formidable power—something that is not particularly in our interest. But his actions have set in train forces that defy his control and undermine his intentions. Gorbachev could hardly have intended to give up half of Europe in six months. But it will soon be gone.

Why is Eastern Europe so central? Not only because without it the Soviet empire becomes a shell. But because de-communization there is the surest road to the de-communization of Russia. Until a few months ago, reform in Moscow was pushing reform in Eastern Europe. The process is now reversed. Soviet reformers, seeing East Europe's liberation, are inspired to demand the same at home.

In Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party has been stripped of its leading role. Gorbachev still hangs on to it. Last month, however, a motion in the Supreme Soviet to reconsider the party's leading role lost by only three votes (in a chamber of 542). Moreover, last week in Pravda, Gorbachev himself defended the leading role of the party as necessary "at the present complex stage," a remarkably telling qualification. Given Gorbachev's history, in which today's qualification becomes tomorrow's new principle, it is conceivable that some sort of political pluralism is next.

Give the man time. Gorbachev represents the greatest imperial self-transformation since Constantine converted to Christianity. These types do not come along too often. (Constantine saw the light in 312 AD.) To the extent that we can help Gorbachev, it is crazy not to.

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POLITICS & POLICY

# Bush and Gorbachev Plan to Meet Dec. 2-3 Aboard U.S., Soviet Ships in Mediterranean

## White House Avoids Calling Talks 'Summit' to Damp Expectations for Accords

By GERALD F. SEIB and WALTER S. MOSSBERG  
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
WASHINGTON — President Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will hold an informal meeting in early December, a move that should give both leaders a political boost at home.

The White House is purposely not calling the meeting a summit so that there won't be any expectation of detailed negotiations or agreements. Rather, senior administration officials said that the unexpected meeting was scheduled at Mr. Bush's request because of his preference for conducting diplomacy through highly personal and informal meetings with other leaders.

The two leaders will meet on Dec. 2 and 3, alternating the two days of meetings between a U.S. and a Soviet naval vessel in the Mediterranean Sea. The unusual sea-borne meeting won't disrupt plans for a formal summit meeting next spring or summer, at which an arms-control treaty is likely to be completed.

In announcing the meeting yesterday, Mr. Bush told reporters at the White House that neither he nor Mr. Gorbachev expects any "substantial decisions or agreements." Instead, he said that the purpose is simply for the two to get "better acquainted" and discuss a wide range of issues without a formal agenda.

Despite the informal nature of the ses-

sion and the calculated effort to hold down expectations, the meeting could pay significant political dividends for both leaders. Mr. Gorbachev badly needs a diversion from the serious economic problems and ethnic unrest he faces at home. American officials have said that a meeting with the leader of the U.S. could help bolster his stature among Soviet politicians and academics, whose support he needs.

For his part, Mr. Bush has been criticized regularly at home for moving too slowly and cautiously in reacting to Mr. Gorbachev's reforms and the historic moves away from communism in Eastern Europe. A face-to-face meeting with Mr. Gorbachev should damp such criticism, though it will hardly eliminate it.

Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D., Maine), who has been the most prominent Democratic critic of Mr. Bush's handling of the Soviet relationship, praised the president for arranging the meeting. But he added: "The mere fact of a meeting doesn't deal with the substance of policy."

Mr. Bush said that the December meeting, which was announced simultaneously in Moscow, will be held in the unusual setting of ships at sea to hold down the "fanfare" and force the two sides to limit participation to just small groups of advisers. "By doing it in this manner we can have, I would say, more time without the press of social activities or mandatory joint appearances, things of that nature for public consumption," Mr. Bush said.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, at a news conference in Moscow, said, "As the two sides plan to hold a full-scale summit in late spring-early summer next year, they found it useful, I would say even necessary, to hold an interim informal meeting." Although no specific agreements are expected, Mr. Shevardnadze said "that doesn't mean they will be without an agenda."

If the two leaders cover the subjects that have been featured in lower level U.S.-Soviet meetings, their talks would include human rights, Soviet reforms, re-

gional disputes, relations with allies, economic cooperation, arms control, and joint efforts to fight narcotics, terrorism and pollution.

The president specifically mentioned U.S. economic advice to Moscow as a possible topic. Mr. Gorbachev has for months been publicly urging the U.S. to drop its restrictions on Soviet trade. He recently told a small group of American businessmen in Moscow that he hoped to sign a general trade agreement with the U.S., possibly at the 1990 summit. The Soviets hope a trade agreement would give them Most-Favored Nation status, which would lower the tariffs on Soviet exports to the U.S.

In an unusually candid article about the latest economic woe—unemployment—Pravda yesterday reported that three million Soviets have lost their jobs as a result of perestroika and the number could grow to 16 million by the year 2005. Economists in Moscow are now proposing that the state start a system of unemployment benefits.

But one Bush administration official knowledgeable about the summit plan cautioned against assuming that there will be bold new initiatives on the Soviet economic or other issues.

"Don't take this as some big opening for major movement on economic cooperation, or arms control, or the environment,"

he said. "Those things will all come up, but in a fairly informal way."

Instead, this official said, "This is vintage George Bush. This was George Bush's own idea. It's George Bush wanting to meet a foreign leader and talk to him directly."

Aside from the Soviet economic plight and talks on cutting strategic and chemical arms, one other issue the Soviets are likely to want to raise is naval force reductions. Western analysts say that, given the meeting's setting at sea, Gorbachev is unlikely to pass up the opportunity to press once again for negotiated cuts in the navies of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact.

That theme has been a recurring one for Soviet military officials for much of this year. They argue that as the Kremlin follows through on announced plans to cut land forces—the Soviets' area of greatest strength—the U.S. should show more willingness to cut sea forces—Washington's area of greatest superiority.

One of the reasons Bush administration aides are anxious to insist that the coming meeting will be informal is to avoid comparisons with the last such loosely structured superpower gathering, former President Reagan's 1986 meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. That meeting sent shivers through the Western alliance because Mr. Reagan was pulled into discussing the possible elimination of nuclear weapons without consulting American allies.

Mr. Bush said that he initiated talks with the Soviets on the informal meeting by sending a proposal to Mr. Gorbachev last July, which the Soviet leader readily accepted. But word of the possible session was closely held by the president and a handful of top aides, and word of it didn't reach many second-level officials until the past few days. Indeed, many senior offi-

cials had been insisting for weeks that Mr. Bush wasn't interested in such an informal get-together.

Though President Bush's political critics at home have been urging him to open a more direct dialogue with Mr. Gorbachev, it actually was the arguments of leaders within the Soviet bloc itself that led the president to seek the December meeting. Mr. Bush decided he wanted the meeting after talking in Europe in July with

the leaders of Poland and Hungary, who urged him to support Mr. Gorbachev's efforts to transform the Soviet system and to urge him to loosen his grip on Eastern Europe, a senior aide said. While flying home from those discussions, Mr. Bush drafted a letter to Mr. Gorbachev suggesting an informal get-together to precede their formal summit next year.

—Peter Gumbel in Moscow contributed to this article.


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George Bush



Mikhail Gorbachev



## Business and Labor Reach a Consensus On Need to Overhaul Health-Care System

By KENNETH H. BACON  
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
WASHINGTON — After 20 years of push-and-pull proposals to overhaul the nation's health-care system, Bert Seidman of the IO is finding interest from an unexpected source. Frustrated by double-digit inflation, business and labor leaders are beginning to see the need for a major overhaul of the system.

### Rising Business Health-Care Costs

YEAR	AVERAGE COST PER EMPLOYEE	PERCENTAGE INCREASE	CONSUMER PRICE RISE
1985	\$1,724	4.8%	3.6%
1986	1,800	4.6%	3.1%

### WINN RIOR

**SOVIET UNEMPLOYMENT**  
The Soviet Union's jobless rate is soaring to 14.2%. In some areas, Pravda said, it is as high as 20%. The situation is caused by efforts to streamline bloated factory payrolls.

**AUSTRALIAN STRIKE DRAGS ON**  
An 11-week dispute involving Australian pilots has slashed the country's tourist industry. "The only people who are flying are those who have to," said Frank Moore, chairman of the Australian Tourist Industry Association. He added: "How is a travel agent going to sell a holiday when he cannot even get a return flight?" Transport NSW, which owns half of one of the country's two major domestic carriers, said the cost of the dispute had cut TWA's profits 70% in the first three months to Sept. 30.

Fred C. Ikle

## New World, Old Strategy

As history speeds ahead, nuclear strategy can't keep pace.

Ten years hence, Moscow may no longer control all of its present empire—regardless of what it now does to Lithuania. Yet, our long-term nuclear plans depend on Moscow's commanding all nuclear arms in today's Soviet Union.

Fifteen years hence, our president may be confronted by more nuclear weapons in China, Iraq, and other countries than President Eisenhower ever confronted under Soviet control. Yet, our arms control policy now seeks long-term stability through U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity, a "stability" that can be unhinged if other significant nuclear powers shift alliances.

In the future as in the past, what can go wrong will go wrong some day. Occasionally, "Chernobyls" will happen, and an irrational despot will gain power somewhere. Yet our present nuclear strategy would be impotent against accidental or irrational use of nuclear arms by anyone, anywhere.

For years to come, our nuclear strategy, and armaments will remain warped by NATO's doctrine for initiating nuclear attacks against East Germany and Eastern Europe to halt a Warsaw Pact onslaught. Yet, a divided Germany, a hostile East Europe and a militarily effective Warsaw Pact are all ghosts of the past.

Risk however, is not diminished by a strategy that compels America and Russia to plan against each other, decade after decade, as their most lethal enemy.

For the near term, to be sure, we need to hold on to our massive deterrent, as insurance, and develop strategic defense while guarding our best technology as leverage. For the long term, however, the unexpected global transformation should embolden us to reach for an exit from this Nuclear Cold War.

To begin with, it's time to recognize that NATO's hoary doctrine—to deter conventional war by threatening nuclear holocaust—has lost its military rationale and political support. This, in turn, will clear the way for drastic curbs on ballistic missiles and other hair-trigger catapults designed for doomsday.

In addition, we can build new institutions to link Washington and Moscow in the prevention of nuclear war. For example, the remarkable U.S.-Soviet arrangements for verification, already agreed to, might gradually be given ever broader scope and purposes, to lead eventually to effective controls on nuclear arms. Where President Truman was bound to fail with his Baruch Plan for controlling the atom bomb, President Bush might start us on the road toward a new, more realistic design for the 21st century.

The writer was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration.

Jean Kirkpatrick

## Moscow's Costly Empire

The Soviet Union is not having a good year. The March economic report acknowledged that total production for the month was 1.5 to 1.7 percent less than the year before. Production of food, coal and electric power had declined. So had output of textiles, footwear and oil-drilling equipment. Meanwhile, the country was confronted with an unprecedented 600,000 refugees who desperately need basic necessities.

The pinch is causing Soviet economists to look for ways to economize. One obvious choice is trade relations with the Socialist bloc. Western economists have long understood that empires are a political luxury that almost no one can afford. But Lenin and his disciples always believed that empires enrich the imperial power.

**"Russians have begun to notice that as the Soviet Union is not getting a fair shake in the world Socialist system, Russia is not getting a fair shake in the Soviet Union."**

by impoverishing its colonies. Now at long last, Soviet economists have begun to examine and discuss the high cost to the Soviet Union of assisting Socialist countries on three continents.

An article in the March issue of a leading economic journal, *Ekonomika i Zhizn*, raises doubts about whether the "world Socialist economic system" is worth the price.

The whole question of Soviet aid to its associated states is obscured by secrecy and complexity, the authors warn. Part of the "aid" consists of the Soviet habit of paying inflated prices for goods readily available elsewhere: seven to nine times more for Cuban sugar, greatly swollen prices for Vietnamese cement. A second type of "aid" involves selling goods far below the market price, as Soviets sell oil to Cuba. A third form of hidden "aid" consists of providing services at virtually no cost, as when the Soviets commit 300 of their ships to transporting Cuban products, thus freeing Cuban ships for profitable engagements. A fourth form of "aid" is the provision of credit on fantastic terms, such as allowing Mongolia 200 years to reimburse funds for a poultry farm.

An article in *Argumenty i Fakty* (March 17-23) asserts that nonequivalent conditions of trade with Cuba currently cost the Soviet Union some \$6 to \$10 billion annually. The authors see no sign of lessening Cuban dependence, "not one sector of the economy fulfilled the plan quotas in 1989 (except for transport and sugar production)

The living standard of the population is declining. Unemployment has increased."

Soviet economists also note that their trade is disadvantageous not only with Socialist countries in the Third World, but also with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, all of which profit from Soviet products delivered at discount prices. Under current practices the Soviet Union subsidizes the reorientation of the economies of Eastern Europe at a time it can ill afford to do so.

The answer to Soviet economic problems may lie in reordering its political relations, as well as adopting a market approach to trade with other countries.

The solution, according to the authors cited above, is "to separate aid from commerce and trade from politics" and get fair prices for Soviet products. The fault is not with the debtors in the Soviet countries but with the bureaucracy that sacrifices the interests of the country at home and abroad for the sake of high-sounding slogans.

Once the question "who profits?" is raised, it catches on.

Russians have begun to notice that as the Soviet Union is not getting a fair shake in the world Socialist system, Russia is not getting a fair shake in the Soviet Union. Russia contributes a disproportionate share of fuel, energy, minerals, timberland and water resources to the Soviet Union according to a recent report in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. "Russia accounts for nearly two-thirds of the U.S.S.R.'s national product." But the Soviet economy is not geared to the needs of Russia's population. Russia ranks last among the union republics in terms of the proportion of expenditures on social needs, and eighth in terms of housing provisions.

"Economic independence" is the preferred answer to the Soviet Union's trade imbalances with its Socialist dependences and to Russia's problems inside the Soviet Union.

Why not? As the autonomous republics develop national identifications and demands, why should anyone expect that the Russians will not do so?

The Baltics are not the only republics who were independent nations. So was Russia. And a democratic national Russian movement has emerged in time to win elections in Moscow and Leningrad.

This is very good news.

In the Soviet Union nationalism and democracy can go hand in hand. Both have been suppressed in the multinational internal empire. But Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Vladimir Bukovsky and generations of Russian dissidents have rightly pointed out that Russian culture has been suppressed along with that of the Ukraine and all other nationalities.

Today, virtually all the people of the U.S.S.R. support democratic self-determination for themselves and for Eastern Europe.

The age of empire has passed for the Soviet Union as for Western Europe. The sacrifice of national interest to remote colonies no longer makes sense.

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# So Where Does President Gorbachev Go From Here?

Having completed his carefully-spun power web by winning the new Soviet presidency last week, Mikhail Gorbachev celebrated with an ultimatum to Lithuania: Drop that secessionist nonsense or else. Or else what? We may soon learn. But we know one thing already: this is not the kinder, gentler Soviet leader of popular myth.

In fact, he never was. Mikhail Gorbachev is mainly a skillful, tough politician

## Global View

By George Melloan

who was driven toward political liberalism by events he could not control. Even now, he may be no better able to manage the great forces that are fracturing the Russian empire. But he could choose a harder response. What the Lithuanian ultimatum suggests is that we may be seeing the end of Mikhail Gorbachev as Mr. Nice Guy.

Keep in mind that the Soviet leader is no Vaclav Havel or Lech Walesa. They overthrew Communist parties. He heads one. He is trying to reform socialism, not kill it. Putting it mildly, he is not having much luck and that is why he will be tempted to take desperate actions.

As economic conditions worsen and western credit becomes harder to obtain, he faces further secessionist attempts. Latvia, Estonia, Georgia are lined up behind Lithuania. Even in Russia, shortages of food and other essentials are stirring civil disorder. So far, Mr. Gorbachev has made little use of military force, but that doesn't mean he won't do so if he feels more beleaguered. In last week's presidential debate, a Congressman warned of civil war. The outside world soon could be faced with some messy situations.

Recent events have conditioned western thinking in an opposite way. The decline of

Communism is being widely celebrated. Much of the world now sees it for what it always has been, a systematic tyranny through which a governing elite destroys the personal identity of masses of people. Exposure of the high living of party bosses from Bucharest to Managua has exploded the myth of Communist egalitarianism.

Even while many Western liberals were clinging to such myths, Mr. Gorbachev saw the need for changes. The destruction of human initiative had sent the Soviet economy into a tailspin that even cooked statistics could not conceal. A huge government deficit, a rising inflation that manifests itself in shortages and a declining GNP now are visible to everyone. By some estimates, many Russian workers and pensioners today have a lower level of nutrition than their counterparts of 75 years ago.

Mr. Gorbachev attempted reform because he had no choice. He knew he had to open up the system to vent some of the steam that was building up under him. And he knew he had to do something about the economy, although his "restructuring" was hardly the revolutionary change his sales talks proclaimed.

Letting Communist parties fail in East Europe did not stem from some grand democratic vision. Again, he had no choice. With his economy sinking fast, he badly needed Western trade and investment. When it became apparent that the Polish Communist Party had lost all support, he was faced with letting it fail or using force. Given his larger agenda of courting the West, plus the truculence of the Poles, military action was out of the question. So he gave tacit backing to Solidarity and sought to maintain contact after that movement's overthrow of Communism.

After Poland, the Soviet leader was forced to watch the other East European dominoes falling. Keep in mind, however, that there has as yet been no wholesale

withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. Keep in mind as well that the Soviet Communist Party has not failed and there is as yet no sign that it will. Last week, Mr. Gorbachev obtained final repeal of a constitutional provision that had awarded the Communist Party the "leading role" in Soviet politics. That opens the way to the legalization of competing parties. But the Communist bureaucracy still controls property and wealth and will be difficult to dislodge.

To be sure, the Soviet Union is becoming more democratic. Two thirds of the 2,250 seats in the congress were filled by popular vote and only one-third by the party and its various organs. This month's elections to republic legislatures and local and regional offices also were relatively

*What the Lithuanian ultimatum suggests is that we may be seeing the end of Mikhail Gorbachev as Mr. Nice Guy.*

free. But elections have not banished the party. Although it has split into factions, it dominates the political system.

All of Mr. Gorbachev's changes have had party approval. Obviously, the party sees him and his reforms as vital to its own survival, and it is most likely right.

Mr. Gorbachev already has used force on the party's behalf. When a popular front ousted the party in Azerbaijan, he sent in the Red Army and restored it to power, at least in a nominal sense. Because the Azerbaijanis don't have many friends outside the Muslim world, there were few objections in the West.

Lithuania would be another matter. The Lithuanians do have friends. For that reason, Mr. Gorbachev may treat events there differently. So far he has had trouble mak-

ing up his mind. After Lithuania's non-Communist parliament voted to secede just over a week ago, he first called the vote "illegal and invalid," even though the Soviet constitution has long maintained the fiction that members of the Soviet Union freely chose to join and are free to leave. Then he began to sound more conciliatory. And then after winning election—although by a surprisingly small vote when you consider that he was the only candidate—he got tough again. Clearly he wants to stop the unraveling of the Russian empire, where he has the means to do so.

What about Soviet power generally? As Harvard's Richard Pipes writes in a brilliant article in the March issue of Commentary, there has been no diminution of Soviet military muscle. Its nuclear buildup continues. It is building a major naval facility at Tartus, Syria, which will strengthen its power in the Mediterranean. It is expanding its Cam Ranh Bay base in Vietnam. While the military's heavy weapons do not have application for controlling internal dissent—and while troop disloyalty could be a factor in any such effort—they do have another use. They would make it very dangerous for any outside power to intervene on behalf of a threatened population.

Other well placed sources say that the world-wide espionage and political activities of the KGB have if anything been expanded. It has to make up for the loss of East European assets. Mr. Gorbachev badly needs the KGB in his corner if he is to control the party, so he continues to fund it generously.

The crucial element for Mr. Gorbachev remains the Soviet economy. If it continues to sink, even the use of force against popular uprisings might prove to be of little avail. Communism will have to go, and not just in name. Whether it will go with a whimper or a big and dangerous bang is a matter all of Russia's neighbors should worry about.

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INTERNATIONAL

Secessionist Fever Spreads in Soviet Union
Georgia Monarchists Join Bandwagon in Defiance of Gorbachev



Air's Stake in Unit
SABENA Is Investigated

STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter
LONDON—The British government
a monopoly inquiry into the
ways purchase of a 20% stake
World Airlines, a new unit of
ag carrier Sabena S.A.

By PETER GUMBEL

STAFF REPORTER OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
TBILISI, U.S.S.R.—At the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism, two dozen people
crowd into an office to hear Levan Kiladze
give a distinctly unorthodox talk.



Activists claim that they control the re-
public's police force, but that can't be ver-
ified. Still, demonstrations take place al-
most every day in Tbilisi without anything
happening to the protesters. Last Satur-
day, thousands rallied in the town center to
support Lithuania. One huge placard sar-
castically showed Mr. Gorbachev dressed
in a toga crowning himself emperor. Police
were nowhere in sight.

SOVIET OIL

Moscow doesn't intend to ask its for-
mer satellite countries in Eastern Europe
to begin paying for oil supplies with hard
currency, as rumored. In the near future,
a senior Soviet official said.

Andrei Bugrov, deputy director of the
department of international economic re-
lations at the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
also indicated that his country isn't plan-
ning any major changes in the terms of
its longstanding oil-supply contracts with
Eastern Europe.

Mr. Bugrov noted that the Soviet Union's
existing contracts with East Euro-
pean states are long-term government-to-
government accords and so can't easily
be renegotiated. He also noted that most
East European states can't afford to pay
for their crude supplies in hard currency.

Pointing out that the Soviet Union
buys manufactured goods from Eastern
European countries, the minister said the
most convenient way of paying for those
goods was through oil exports.

"For 70 years we have suffered under
the dictatorship of the proletariat," de-
clares Mr. Kiladze, a 20-year-old scientist,
to nods from the audience. "Our new state
should be built on a strict principle of hier-
archy. A monarchy is our ideal."

This is a regular meeting of the 7,000-
strong Monarchy Party, which wants to
restore the kingdom abolished in 1801, when
Georgia was annexed by czarist Russia.
Far from being a fringe group, it is one of
the biggest of several political parties in
Soviet Georgia committed to pulling the re-
public out of the U.S.S.R. and restoring in-
dependence.

This month, the monarchists and the al-
lied Georgian Independence Party took
over the Marxism-Leninism Institute and
stripped it of all traces of Marx or Lenin.
Just down the road, the National Demo-
cratic Party and two other independence
groups have moved into the republic's
Young Communist League headquarters.

"Georgia is no longer controlled by the
[local Communist] government but by us,
the democratic forces," boasts Georgy
Chanturia, the National Democrats'
leader. The republic's Communist chief,
Givi Gumberidze, seems to agree. Meeting
with leaders of the Georgian KGB security
police last week, he talked darkly of "a
vacuum of power" in the republic.

The battle raging over Lithuanian in-
dependence is just the start of Mikhail Gor-
bachev's problems with defiant secession-
ist movements. Throughout the Baltic
states, and in parts of the Ukraine and the
Caucasus, anti-Soviet radicals are seizing
power and pushing for independence. Mr.
Gorbachev will soon have to fight on sev-
eral fronts to prevent the breakup of the
Soviet Union, a task that may prove impos-
sible with the use of force.

Last weekend Estonia's Communists
voted to split with Moscow, and the re-
public is likely to follow Lithuania in declaring
independence. Activists in Latvia are close
to winning the majority they need in Par-
liament to pass their secessionist plans. In
western Ukraine, the independence opposi-
tion got a boost in local elections and poses
a major threat to local Communists.

A Desperate Scramble

Mr. Gorbachev is desperately scram-
bling to curb the growing secessionist
trend. Refusing to negotiate with the
rebels, he is trying to push a law through
Parliament to prevent republics pulling out
of the union unilaterally.

As of late yesterday he had stopped
short of crushing the Baltic revolts with
tanks, but he was turning up the heat. The
Kremlin ordered all foreigners to leave
Lithuania after soldiers yesterday occu-
pied the headquarters of the breakaway
Lithuanian Communist Party, the fifth
party building occupied by Soviet troops
since the weekend. Soviet paratroopers
earlier had invaded two hospitals and

dragged off 23 Red Army deserters who
had sought refuge there, beating some in
the process.

But the use of force is a dangerous
gamble. Mr. Gorbachev's intimidation
campaign in Lithuania is already sparking
international concerns. It could also back-
fire domestically. Activists in the various
republics, while differing widely on how to
achieve independence, are united in their
refusal to be cowed into submission.

The example of Georgia shows how
counterproductive the use of force can be.
Last April, Soviet troops armed with
shovels and tear gas broke up a peaceful
pro-independence demonstration in Tbilisi,
the Georgian capital, killing 23 people.
They unwittingly gave a major boost to in-
dependence activists, who have become
more openly radical.

"It was a big mistake by the Kremlin,
because people saw with their own eyes
that [the Soviets] are an occupation force,"
says Mr. Chanturia of the National Demo-
cratic Party. The blood that flowed on
April 9 "has united people. It is like a
mystical force."

Call for a Boycott

In the past few weeks, the Georgian in-
dependence movement has started to
throw its weight around. Last week, the re-
public's government was forced to post-
pone local elections until the fall after ac-
tivist called for a boycott. Georgian officials
feared that less than 50% of the re-
public's population would turn out, render-
ing the poll invalid under Soviet law.

Statues of Vladimir Lenin, the founder
of the Soviet state, have been pulled down
in dozens of Georgian towns and villages in
recent days. Now only two remain in Tbil-
isi. One is in the town center, under con-
stant guard. Activists have built a wire
cage around the other, which is outside a
polytechnic institute, to symbolize the tam-
ing of Soviet power.

Georgian officials have either supported
such activities, or turned a blind eye to
them. "In many places, local authorities
wanted to take down [the Lenin statues]
themselves, but we told them: no, that's
our job," says Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a
longtime dissident who now heads the Hel-
sinki Union party.

Swedes Sing a Baltic Chantey:
Yo Ho and a Bottle of Bargain Beer

Continued From First Page

deresson says one person a year on average
goes overboard on the Baltic ferries. "We
think most jump," he says, "but they are
so drunk that we cannot be sure." By cir-
cling back, he has saved two of three who
have fallen during his watch.

The 50-year-old captain has piloted oil
tankers through the Dardanelles and coal
ships across the Atlantic. But the Baltic
run demands a special skill: patience. By
law, travelers must stay offshore for at
least 24 hours to buy duty-free. So the cap-
tain sails at half-speed to stretch the short
trip into a day-long voyage. "If I dropped
anchor outside Stockholm," he says, "al-
most no one would know the difference."

No Room in the Jail

0100 hours Unsteady as she goes. The
Boomerang Disco is rocking at full tilt
when the ferry hits rough water. Swaying
dancers sway some more, lose their sea
legs and fall on the crowded floor. Disc
jockey Margareta Thelander spins a "Peo-
ple and turns off the fog machine. "Peo-
ple are blind enough already," she says.

As the ferry tilts, dancers stagger into
the lobby, clutching at posts. The floor is
carpeted with cigarette butts, broken glass
and passed-out drunks. Two men begin
wrestling but the security guard, Mr. Tho-
masson, decides not to intervene. "The

chure, the port city of Marlehamn is billed
as a "Finnish Miami Beach." In March,
it looks more like Nome, Alaska. The tem-
perature is nine degrees Fahrenheit, not
counting the wind-chill factor from a whip-
pling Baltic draft. "This is nothing," says
Lisa Pettersson, her voice muffled by a
hooded snowsuit and balaclava. "You
should be here in January."

Ms. Pettersson used to prepare smor-
gasbord on the ferries. Now she sells pick-
led gherkins and three species of frozen
fish in Marlehamn's square. She is the only
Alander in sight.

Stamps and a Stuffed Reindeer

"This one like salmon," she says,
grasping a stiff fish in her mitten. Picking
up another, she adds, "this one also like
salmon." The third, she says, is "not like
salmon." She offers three for the price of
one. "Business is not so good," she says.

In summer, Aland is a nice place for a
bike ride and picnic. Now, the only attrac-
tion is the museum, which boasts a stuffed
reindeer and a complete collection of
Aland stamps; An autonomous territory,
Aland issues its own postage, good only for
mail on the island.

Many day-trippers end up at the police
station. "We find them sleeping under
bushes," says officer Lars Holmberg.
"Then we have to take them to the hos-

"We are definitely on the path to con-
frontation," says Mr. Chanturia, who has
been jailed twice in the past seven years.
"The only way out [for Mr. Gorbachev] is
repression. But this will be just the begin-
ning. Our people are not afraid to fight."

Elguje Tsiklauri is already prepared for
battle. He is a bearded 37-year-old sports
instructor who resigned from the Commu-
nist Party after last April's killings and set
up a paramilitary organization known as
the Legion. He sits on a park bench near
the center of town, dressed in camouflage
fatigues, and talks about his troops. "We
love our people, our religion, our culture,"
Mr. Tsiklauri says. "We are prepared to
die for them."

He says several thousand people
throughout the republic belong to the
Legion, which he describes as "a volunteer
patriotic-military sports club." He dodges
the question of whether they are armed. A
dozen teen-age recruits, all in uniform,
stand or squat around him, listening with
rapt attention. Others wander around town
in their fatigues, maiming information
stalls or raising money.

Such activities alarm some of the radi-
cals, who fear that Moscow will use the ex-
istence of a paramilitary force as a pretext
to march in. But Georgian passions are
understandable, given the region's long and
proud history. Until it was annexed by
Russia in 1801, it was a centuries-old king-
dom that extended throughout the Cau-
casus. Between 1918 and 1921 it was an
independent state run by social democrats
who held out against the imposition of Bol-
shevik rule. But the Bolsheviks won out,
and Georgia was incorporated into the
Soviet Union.

How to Pull Out

The best way to pull out of the U.S.S.R.
is now a point of contention among the 100
or so political parties committed to inde-
pendence that have sprung up in the re-
public. Some believe that Georgia should
make use of Mr. Gorbachev's "democ-
racy" campaign to be elected to local gov-
ernment. But militant groups, who seem to
have the upper hand, say they don't want
anything to do with Soviet institutions.
Some of them want to elect a new Geo-
rgian Congress that would proclaim inde-
pendence and organize strikes and civil
disobedience to press its demands.

The Monarchy Party is the only group
pressing for restoration of the Georgian
throne. Though it takes as its ideal the
12th-century rule of King David the Re-
builder, the party wants a constitutional
monarchy at the head of a democracy, and
not an absolute monarchy. It has been in
contact with the nominal heir to the
throne, a prince who lives in Spain.

LUI Is Seeking
To Aid Embattled
Insurance Units

By CRAIG FORMAN

STAFF REPORTER OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
LONDON—London United Investments
PLC is trying to assemble an increase in
financial reserves for its insurance units,
some of which may be technically insol-
vent due to U.S. liability claims.

LUI, a London-based insurance and in-
vestment company, suspended trading of
its shares on London's Stock Exchange
Monday after announcing that "additional
reserves may need to be made" for possi-
ble insurance claims largely stemming
from its U.S. liability policies. The suspen-
sion followed a review requested by Brit-
ain's Department of Trade and Industry,
which the government agency said ex-
posed "financial uncertainties" at the
units. The British government then or-
dered the units to suspend new underwrit-
ing at the request of the company.

LUI said its best-known insurance unit,
London-based Walbrook Insurance Co.,
has stopped accepting new premiums, though
it continues to pay claims. Six smaller LUI
reinsurance units, some of which advisers
described yesterday as "technically insol-

ULTIMATE EASTER EGG

The London jewelers Kutchinsky said
they had crafted a 2-foot-high Easter egg
made from 37 pounds of gold and studded
with 20,000 pink diamonds; it will sell for
\$11.3 million. "So far as we know, it is
the biggest decorative egg of its kind in
the world and contains the largest single
collection of rare pink diamonds in any
one piece," said designer Paul Kut-
chinsky. The egg opens to reveal a minia-
ture library with cabinets and books. A
carousel then revolves to display a tiny
portrait gallery where the eventual
owners could feature their family.

TOYOTA IN TURKEY

Japan's Toyota Motor Corp. has ap-
plied to the Turkish government for ap-
proval of a plan to start passenger-car
production in that country together with
two other companies. Toyota officials
said the Turkish government is now con-
sidering the plan submitted jointly with
Toyota's partner in Turkey, Ihacl Omer
Sabanel Holding AS, and Mitsui & Co., a
giant Japanese trading house. The com-
pany, to be tentatively capitalized at \$150
million, would be owned 40% by Toyota,
50% by Sabanel and 10% by Mitsui.

FRENCH RACISM

A French government commission

U.S. Pleas
Sinking In

of the U.S. deficit with Japan.
us are coming to a head as
are supposed to produce an
rt by the middle of next
re now preparing for a cru-
in Washington next week.
alks began in September, the
ately argued that its posi-
streamlining Japan's com-
sion system, toughening Ja-
enforcement and lowering
would benefit Japanese con-
as U.S. exporters.
was first greeted with much
it has since been followed
n the Japanese press about
n standard of living in Ja-
growing rhetoric from politi-
ans should make changes to
sumers.

Legislators Balk

HE WALL STREET JOURNAL
apanese legislators, meeting
this Tuesday, balked at U.S.
they enact broad economic
p shrink the U.S. deficit in
pan.

members of the Japan-U.S.
ans League told U.S. Ambas-
in Michael Armacost and
bassy officials that reform
d-use policies and its retail
stem would be difficult to
y, lawmakers attending the
ting said.

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	Percent change
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28	9.6
36	23.9
%	
90	79.2
%	
38	66.4
%	
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5%	

The Washington Times

The notion of locking up old forests from all management and harvesting is anathema to Swedish conservationists, and 75 percent of Swedish forests are still in private hands. Mr. Remrod said, while the Greens have influenced Swedish forestry somewhat, "At heart, the forester is a cultivator. Forestry workers are creative people, and after a harvest, they want to see something new grow again."

Not only has that approach led to a 30 percent rise in annual Swedish timber

growth (not to mention thriving paper, pulp and lumber industries), but it is far better for the world's environmental "carbon budget" (carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere).

A major new study by the Goddard Space Institute and Columbia University shows forests may actually "sink" (consume) more carbon than the ocean. But that is only true of growing forests. Researchers found that mature forests give off as much carbon dioxide as they consume, and dead trees are carbon emitters.

NASA's James Hansen told a National Academy of Sciences workshop in January that, because of our growing forest volume, the United States may actually now be "sinking as much carbon as we emit." Yet all that growing wood volume is under private ownership!

Sadly, the socialist Greenies are among the environment's worst, if well-meaning, enemies. Consider the outrage of journalist Phyllis Austin in the Boston Globe on March 26 over the purchase of the Great Northern Nekoosa forest by Georgia Pacific—a sale between two forest products companies:

"For much of the 1980s, concerned men and women stood around hands in pockets while big landowners sold and greedy subdividers carved up some of the northern lands' cherished but unprotected natural gems. But much remains within our grasp to save."

For the forests' sake, we hope not too much.

## and keep

All the media seem to be celebrating Earth Day, which is fine with me. I am all for the current homage to the earth that is happily sweeping the planet. But in giving the earth a priority, it would be self-defeating if we failed to complete the triad of necessary human orientations. For being earth-oriented must be linked with being human-oriented and God-oriented.

Herewith some reflections on the triad. They were first evoked when Lothar de Maiziere, prime minister of the new East German regime, ex-

Max Lerner is a nationally syndicated columnist.

ernment. It came from the right nation, too. Consider that East Germany carries the burden of a double outrage against humanity. First it was a participant in Hitler's Reich, then — unlike West Germany — in Stalin's. For a ruling class to have been so closely linked with two successive imperial monsters might well need some forgiving.

Long before Hitler, toward the end of the Age of Reason in the late 18th Century, Immanuel Kant gave us the right frame for judging the irrationalisms of the 20th Century. He put the now-historic question, "Was ist der Mensch?" What is man? Or putting it differently, what does it mean to be human?

It contains within it the enigma of

see LERNER, page F4

## ARNOLD BEICHMAN

# Ultimate arsenal

MOSCOW

Mikhail Gorbachev is doing what he can with threats and with tanks and soldiers on the streets of Vilnius to persuade the Lithuanian people to back off from independence demands. The Soviet president is trying persuasion, pressure, an arrest here and there — iron-fist-velvet-glove.

His tactics and warnings will not work. Lithuanians will not listen to him, or if they do it will not be for

long. Estonians and Latvians won't listen to him, either, nor will the Moslems of Central Asia. And eventually the Ukrainians. They will not listen to Mr. Gorbachev—unless...

Unless he reintroduces Stalinism, the Soviet empire will fly apart. The explosive "Stalinism" not only refers to the totalitarian dictatorship of the Stalinist era but also refers to a particular method of rule.

The question of "Stalinism" has a great bearing on the future of Mr.



Gorbachev, the Soviet peoples, the proposed economic and political restructuring of the Soviet Union and in particular the future of national subdivisions such as the three Baltic countries.

The particular method of rule that Lenin introduced and that Stalin as Lenin's brilliant disciple systematized was terror. However, it was a particular kind of terror utterly different from the anti-human actions of other modern tyrants, like those of Mussolini, Generalissimo Franco of Spain, Antonio Salazar of Portu-

gal, the Greek colonels, Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and other Latin American dictators.

Stalin's contemporaries practiced torture and imposed horrible prison conditions against their opponents. Whatever one can say about these evil men, they did not practice genocide as Stalin did.

Horrifying and genocidal as Hitler's terror was, it still was different from Stalin's because it was predictable. If you were a Jew, a gypsy, a Roman Catholic, your life in Nazi Germany was in danger. Under Stalin all lives were in danger regardless of race, creed or national origin.

see BEICHMAN, page F4

Arnold Beichman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a columnist for The Washington Times.

## BEICHMAN

From page F1

Stalin's secret police chiefs were themselves executed seriatim. Thousands of Red Army officers were executed regardless of rank or service.

What made Stalin's terror unique in history was that it was indiscriminate, unpredictable and deliberately so. "Does any man tremble as I speak?" thundered Robespierre as he addressed the Constituent Assembly during the French Revolution. "Then I say he is guilty." Like Robespierre, who pioneered revolutionary terror, for Stalin everybody was guilty; everyone was an enemy, women and children included.

The victims of Stalin's terror, many of them his close associates, could not predict their fates. Nikita Khrushchev described in his memoirs how when a call came from Stalin for a midnight conference at the Kremlin, you kissed your family goodbye because you didn't know if you would come back.

The innocent and the so-called guilty were equally at risk during the Stalin terror. And that was why

Stalin's terror "worked." Today's GPU executioner could tomorrow a GPU victim be, and the day after his entire family. Today someone could be sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp for a non-existing crime and tomorrow someone else could be tortured and executed for the same non-existing crime.

Indiscriminate, unpredictable and, above all, ideological—that was the key to the "success" of Stalin's terror; how one man could so cow millions of people including his close associate, V.M. Molotov, who paid no heed to the imprisonment at Stalin's order of Mrs. Molotov. A Russian historian, Dmitri Volkov,

recently described how on Dec. 12, 1937, Stalin and Molotov, the then-Prime Minister, sanctioned the executions of 3,167 people and then they went off to the movies in the evening. A story current in the black days of Stalinism recounts how a Moscow concierge went around pounding on people's doors in the middle of the night and reassuring the trembling tenants, "Don't worry, comrades, it's only the building on fire."

Purges, executions, assassinations, torture, slave labor, a world of concentration camps went on for almost a quarter of a century in the Soviet Union. Stalin never had any organized opposition in his lifetime. The old dictator died—in bed—in March 1953 while he was planning what would have been another purge of his party associates and Russian Jewry.

In other words, Stalin's power was credible and his use of terror was credible. Nobody was safe because Stalin completed the work Lenin had begun—the destruction of civil society. Everybody was turning everybody else in, including best friends and relatives, in the vain hope of self-exculpation. It was life in a state of nature, the war of all against all.

Mr. Gorbachev has not used terror to impose and extend his rule. In fact, there has been nothing like Stalin's reign of terror since 1953, not under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov or Chernenko. Mr. Gorbachev has introduced a simulacrum of a rule of law that, of course, precludes a reign of terror. Without indiscriminate, unpredictable use of terror, people, hitherto cowed by the state, will risk punishment, at worst imprisonment, sure in the knowledge that there will be no execution, no torture, no long jail terms, and above all no reprisals against families.

Herein lie the seeds of Mr. Gorbachev's imminent failure. Without Stalinism, the Soviet Union as we have known it since Stalin's death is doomed. And that raises the question:

Will Gorbachev or his successors in an act of desperation born out of a hysterical apprehension try to resurrect Stalinism? Even if he or his successors wanted to, could they—or have things gone too far for a perestroika'd Stalinism? I don't know nor at the moment, in my opinion, does Mr. Gorbachev himself know as he improvises from day to day.

But soon he'll have to make up his mind what it's to be.

feared provoking a war with the Soviet Union. Gen. Clay prevailed, arguing, "I believe the future of democracy demands that we stay put."

On July 8, the Berlin airlift was officially proclaimed. Joined by the French and British, the airlift made 200,000 flights to Berlin and brought nearly 2 million tons of food, industrial goods and coal to the city.

As West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has written, "Above and beyond these figures, the airlift was an important political demonstration." It showed the Soviets we meant business about democracy and were willing, as John Kennedy would later say, "to pay any price, bear any burden, support any friend, oppose any foe" in its pursuit for others as well as its preservation for ourselves.

Such resolve has always worked with the Soviets. Under Ronald Reagan, it produced the current wave of freedom now sweeping most of Eastern Europe.

President Bush is in a delicate position over Lithuania. He wants next month's summit to come off without a hitch in order to maintain the momentum that has brought Eastern Europe so far, so fast. But there is a greater question involved. Is the price of freedom for the rest of Europe worth the refusal of support necessary for Lithuania to be free?

If Lithuania's leaders were to plead for Western help to survive a Soviet blockade, surely the United States would be guilty of gross immorality if it turned its back.

What if Lithuania's president were to make a speech similar to the one delivered on Sept. 9, 1948, by Berlin's mayor, Ernst Reuter:


"People of the world, people of America, England, France, Italy! Look at this city and admit that you may not and cannot betray this city or its citizens! . . . We have done our duty and we will continue to do our duty. People of the world, do yours! Help us in the time ahead—not just with the rumble of your aircraft engines, not just with the means of transportation which you send, but also by standing as firmly, as indomitably for those common ideals which alone can guarantee our future and yours! People of the world, look to Berlin! And people of Berlin, you can be certain, we want to win this battle and we will win!"

President Bush could not ignore a similar call from Lithuania's leadership and maintain much credibility

as a defender of democracy.

Administration officials have declined to speculate or hypothesize about what they might do in the face of a blockade, but they had better have a workable contingency plan, as Gen. Clay did nearly 42 years ago. Where there are those who remain the reluctant captives of the hammer and sickle, the least they should expect is support from the United States and its allies when they put their lives on the line for freedom. At a minimum this should include food and raw materials essential for daily living.

No summit is worth trading away a nation so leaders can smile at one another. Neville Chamberlain tried appeasing Hitler by giving him Czechoslovakia. It didn't work. Neither will Mr. Gorbachev be pacified if the United States "gives" him Lithuania. The U.S. policy should be freedom for all until all are free. If an airlift or sealfit is necessary, then Berlin offers the model. All that remains is for the Bush administration to exercise the courage.



any way against him, he will wipe out half of Israel with his military technology. This includes lethal chemical and biological weapons, and can desolate a population, even without the atom bomb that Saddam Hussein is trying to assemble. There was some protest in the West, but it was lost amid the onrush of other events.

I take threats from armed psychopaths seriously. I go back, in memory, to Hitler's 1938 speech at one of the big Nazi rallies, after a young Jew in Paris had shot a German diplomat. With a glacial coldness, amid his fiery oration, he said he would hold the "parasite" Jewry to account, and promised to wipe out Europe's Jews. He all but did.

Radical evil is an enigma because its perpetrators, whether Nazis or communists or world terrorists, have usually acted out of a belief that they were the agents for building a better world. Secure in that belief, they recognized no limits on their actions. The case of Saddam Hus-

sein is like that of other state and sectarian terrorists in the Middle East. They accept no limits because of their certitude that they are acting as agents of God. What they forget is that to strip yourself of your humanity is to betray the very godhead to which you are oriented.

This applies, in a somewhat different fashion, to the pollution and desolation of the earth. Like Eden, the earth was given to humans "to dress and to keep." It is a striking fact that the Marxist elites, who had denounced God but were certain of their dream society, were as ruthless with the desecration of the earth as with the massacre at Katyn Forest or the liquidation of the kulaks in the Soviet Union. The earth pollutions uncovered in Eastern Europe today go beyond anything that the West German Greens railed against.

What does it mean to be human? It means awe for the limits that God imposes on our arrogance, reverence for the earth out of which we come, and the understanding that as humans we are part of each other.

## FIELDS

From page F1

everyone is sexy, and everyone is powerful."

And that's why these women will never find a party to be as "sexually charged" as they want it to be. Love and desire require difference, not equality. Sexual attraction relies on perceived power, which is very different from actual power. John Gilbert, the man, was not more powerful than Greta Garbo, the woman. It was the differences between male and female that gave them their on-screen electricity, compelling electron to pursue electron. Off-screen, she rejected him.

In the sexual equation, the woman is the more powerful, holding the power to say yes or no. In fact, it is just this power that the rapist wants to destroy. It was the power of the female that made Adam reach for the fruit proffered by Eve, even though he knew it would deprive him

*In the sexual equation, the woman is the more powerful, holding the power to say yes or no. It is just this power that the rapist wants to destroy.*

of the pleasures of the Garden of Eden forever.

Simone de Beauvoir, mother of modern feminism, enjoyed intellectual equality with Jean Paul Satre, but she paid a price. She had to suffer his bringing his mistresses home to meet her.

When she met Chicago novelist Nelson Algren, who didn't give a hoot about her feminism, she revealed in what she describes as "a beautiful, corny love story," a love that

founded only when she chose to make it prosaic in her semiautobiographical novel, "The Mandarins." Nelson Algren knew something that Simone de Beauvoir never learned, that such a love affair requires mystery. He reviewed her book, bitterly.

Today, Hollywood strains to incorporate feminism into scripts by giving women ideologically correct roles to play, which often lead to emotions deeply felt but ideologically incorrect. In "Impulse," for example, a movie directed by a woman, a female cop is stalked by a serial killer. Although she's as tough as nails on her beat, she goes all squishy inside when she's with her boyfriend, an assistant district attorney. She cries hysterically that she's more afraid of losing the boyfriend than being found by the killer.

Garbo is more convincing as woman, as in her role as Anna Christie, a woman tough and proud, who understands what it takes to be female: "Gimme a whisky with chinchale on the side—and don't be stingy, baby!"

# The New York Times

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## Letters

## Capital

To the Editor

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### Photo Copy Preservation

## Help Who?

*We are prepared to provide technical assistance in certain areas of Soviet economic reform. . . . We want perestroika to succeed. . . .*

Such words would have been unutterable in official Washington even a few months ago. Such thoughts would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. To Ronald Reagan, the Soviet Union was the evil empire. To Americans generally, the U.S.S.R. remained the implacable enemy.

That Secretary of State James Baker can now say these words, out of American self-interest, signals a welcome, monumental moment in the history of the cold war and of the Bush Administration.

Probably not since World War II, when U.S. cargo ships carried lend-lease aid to Murmansk and Stalin was still old "Uncle Joe," have American officials spoken so openly in support of a Soviet leader. And at no time since taking office has this Administration so clearly acknowledged the significance of Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to transform his economy and society.

In marked contrast to the dangers perceived by others in the Administration, Mr. Baker looks upon perestroika as a "historic opportunity." He offers few specifics but his tone is reassuringly right.

The Administration's hesitancy till now has inspired puzzlement, even alarm. The White House seemed unable to comprehend the vast transformation in the Soviet Union, even conveying the impression that it wanted Mr. Gorbachev to fail. First the Administration spokesmen said Mr. Gorbachev wasn't serious; then that he wouldn't last; finally that his reforms posed risks to the U.S.

President Bush set the earlier tone in four speeches this spring. Instead of welcoming the changes in Moscow and reciprocating, he adopted a

"show-me" stance. Saying it was time to move "beyond containment" to "integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations," Mr. Bush insisted the new relationship had to be "earned."

The deputy national security adviser, Robert Gates, wondered whether the Soviet changes were fundamental and irreversible. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney predicted Mr. Gorbachev would fall. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger warned of "the danger that change in the East will prove too destabilizing to be sustained" and disparaged calls for "measures to insure the success of Gorbachev's reforms."

Now, in one strong speech, Mr. Baker has moved to reassure the Soviets that the Administration recognizes its own interest in their reforms and to enlist Americans to act on that recognition.

Mr. Baker's offer of technical assistance is modest, yet to be spelled out. Even so, there's nothing presumptuous about this help. The U.S. may not have an answer to the Communists' problem, how to move from a command economy to a demand economy. But it can share its abundant experience with markets.

Soviet and U.S. economists already exchange ideas, as the Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan, did in Moscow last week. Economics departments and business schools are welcoming Soviet students and managers. Perhaps Washington can help with a new version of Fulbright (why not call them Kennan?) grants. The Jackson-Vanik amendment awaits repeal, to open trade.

But before the Administration finally starts doing the right thing, it's worth applauding Mr. Baker's willingness, finally, to say the right thing:

*We want perestroika to succeed.*

Innecessary or Worse, for Airlines

5/11  
5/12  
7/17  
7/16

Your editorial, ("Help Who?" October 18, 1989), based on a speech earlier this month by Secretary of State James Baker, claims to see a shift in U.S.-Soviet policy where there is none. This results from the heavy emphasis placed by the Times' editorial writers on Secretary Baker's statement that "We want perestroika to succeed."

Mr. Baker's views on perestroika are right on the money. What readers of the Times editorial wouldn't know is that Mr. Baker's views are also the President's. Despite the fact the Times' claims Mr. Baker's statement on the the success of perestroika to "have been unutterable...even a few months ago," those words were uttered all spring -- and on two continents -- by none other than George Bush.

While speeches don't carry footnotes, interested readers can find the phrase "I want to see perestroika succeed" in President Bush's statements of May 1, May 24, June 8, July 6, July 17, <sup>July 27</sup> August ~~28~~ and September 18.

28

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3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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November 24, 1989, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: EDITORIAL; PAGE A23

LENGTH: 920 words

HEADLINE: Looking Back on the Eighties--And the revival and triumph of the West.

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

Rarely does history respect the calendar, but this time events have conspired to demarcate precisely the 1980s. Christmas, 1979, the day of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, marks the apogee of the Soviet empire. November of 1989, with the communist crackup in Eastern Europe, marks its nadir. What happened in the interval defines the '80s. They will be remembered -- long after the avarice, the corruption and the other delightful excesses of the time are forgotten -- as the decade of the revival and triumph of the West.

Nineteen-seventy-nine was the annus mirabilis of the Soviet imperium. In that one year, Iran turned fanatically anti-American, and the Soviets or their clients seized Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia and, just to rub it in, Grenada. It was also the West's postwar low, as oil shocks, inflation and the hostage crisis completed America's post-Vietnam demoralization.

Then, the great turn, which came not with Reagan's inaugural but, in the interest of historical neatness, in 1980, the last year of the Carter administration. It was a post-Afghanistan Jimmy Carter who reasserted a foreign policy hard line (arming the mujaheddin, embargoing Soviet grain, cutting off aid to the Sandinistas). It was then too that Carter's Federal Reserve chairman, Paul Volcker, began squeezing the economy to break inflation.

Reagan finished the job with a vengeance. He let Volcker's cruel but inflation-breaking recession proceed through the 1982 election year. He challenged the Soviets to an all-out arms race with which they could not keep up. He brandished SDI, which the Soviets read as a sign that the United States was prepared to use its technological superiority to trump Soviet military power, their one claim to superpower status.

NATO then held together for the most overlooked geopolitical victory of the '80s: the successful deployment of the intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) in Europe, thus facing down both Soviet threats and the West's peace movement. The final straw was the Reagan Doctrine, which put American arms and money behind a worldwide anticommunist guerrilla campaign that gave the Soviets "bleeding wounds" on three continents.

And just when they thought they had America down, the combination of INF, SDI, the Reagan Doctrine and the huge defense buildup made it clear to the Soviets that they were facing a future that they could only lose. American resilience in this decade came as a shock to the Soviets. Their new foreign policy is the residue of that shock.

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After all, the Soviets had achieved something astonishing: for 40 years they had singlehandedly taken on the most formidable alliance of great powers in history -- the United States, Britain, France, Japan, two-thirds of Germany and a host of other highly industrialized countries -- and held it to a draw. At the end of the '80s, it became clear to Gorbachev that this could not continue. In July of 1988, Eduard Shevardnadze before his own Foreign Ministry workers scornfully rejected "the idea, which gained a firm hold in the minds and deeds of certain strategists, that the Soviet Union could be as strong as any possible coalition of states opposing it." Their only hope was to abandon a losing contest. They sued for peace.

Who killed communism? There is a lot of credit to go around. But certainly none goes to those who since 1972 have urged, "Come home, America." Who opposed the defense buildup. Who inflamed the nuclear hysteria of the early '80s and joined its panicked, now merely quaint, call for a nuclear freeze. Who called for a moratorium on INF, i.e., a surrender to the street. Who denounced the Reagan Doctrine on the grounds that it was the road to Vietnam, when, in fact, it turned Brezhnev's empire into a Soviet Vietnam.

Wrong on every count. Now foreign policy liberals are reduced to arguing that the monumental collapse of the Soviet empire is the work of one man whose rise is some complicated accident of Russian history. The Gorbachev reversal is no accident. It was the premise and the goal of the entire policy of containment, as outlined by George Kennan in 1947. "It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could ... bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia," he wrote. "But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate ... and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." The '80s represent the final fulfillment of that policy.

Which is why with the waning of the decade the conservatives' time might soon be up. Voters are not sentimental. They don't give points for past achievement. They turned out Winston Churchill less than three months after V-E Day.

The rule is: What have you done for me lately? After the Democratic Party built the magnificent structure of the New Deal, it ran out of ideas, and the voters threw the rascals out. Conservatives have done what they were asked to do in 1980: break inflation and restore Western power. Their job is done.

The voters sense it. The Republicans took a whipping in the 1989 elections. Their social agenda (most prominently, abortion) proved unenactable. And that was the fallback for a party whose economic and foreign policy agenda has already been enacted.

There is another turn ahead. Democrats will do everything in their power to blow it, but one new idea and the '90s belongs to them.

GRAPHIC: ILLUSTRATION, WELLS FOR THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE

TYPE: OPINION EDITORIAL

ENHANCEMENT: NINETEEN-EIGHTIES

5TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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November 17, 1989, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: EDITORIAL; PAGE A23

LENGTH: 859 words

HEADLINE: Dangers of Liberation

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

There was some mindless complaining last week that President Bush had shown insufficient enthusiasm for the fall of the Berlin Wall. What was he supposed to do? Get up and sing "Deutschland Ueber Alles?" Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine) suggested that Bush hasten to Berlin. And say what? You don't visit the site of a revolution in order to emote. You go to give definition to the revolution, to enunciate a new policy, to offer a vision of (forgive the phrase) a new order. Mitchell had no suggestion as to what the new order might be.

Or you can go to gloat. There is little the United States can do to help the liberation of Eastern Europe. But there is one thing it can do to hinder. That is to shove a thumb in Mikhail Gorbachev's eye by crowing about the obvious, namely that communism is finished, and its empire dissolving. Proclaiming our manifest victory would serve only to energize Gorbachev's internal enemies and further demoralize his allies.

Which is why Bush's semi-comatose response to the opening of the Wall, whether calculated or not, was exactly right. Not because we are unmoved. This is the fulfillment of a 40-year twilight struggle. If we don't make any radical errors, we win. Eastern Europe will be normalized. Stalin's empire will be liquidated. The Soviet Union itself might see its fate and future tied to ours.

A couple of days of dancing in the streets to mark the beginning of the end are perfectly appropriate. But that was Nov. 9. Time is now up. After the party, sober reflection on the dangers of liberation.

Those who insist on raising cautions as the Wall falls are said to be either nostalgic for the Cold War or pathologically obsessed with the German threat. Let's be clear: there is nothing about the Cold War to warrant nostalgia. It was a worthy struggle, as any Pole or Berliner will tell you, but like all war it was nasty and wearing. The only thing to recommend it was its simplicity. Simplicity, however, is not a reason for nostalgia. World War II was simple, too, and no one pines for Pearl Harbor or, for that matter, Hiroshima.

Larry Eagleburger was jumped on as a Cold War nostalgic for saying the obvious: that the bipolarity of the Cold War made for intellectual simplicity and political stability. The multipolar world that is dawning will, at least at the beginning, be less simple and less stable. As the game goes from ping-pong to billiards it gets harder. The more interactions, the more possibilities for error and tragedy.

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The billiard balls that have been set in motion are precisely those Central European nationalisms -- Serbian, Hungarian, German, etc. -- that earlier in this century collided and combusted into two world wars. You don't have to have Hitlerian nightmares or believe in the mechanical repetition of history to temper your enthusiasm for a sudden end to Europe's cruel but tranquilizing postwar division.

History has not ended. It has merely moved east. Central Europe, frozen for half a century by totalitarianism, is rejoining history. In many ways that means picking up where it left off. It is yet another cosmic joke that the great questions rising to meet Europe at the end of the 20th century are precisely those it faced at the beginning -- and mistakenly assumed to have been buried by two world wars.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain is collapsing. And behind it, nationalisms long suppressed are astirring. They're back: the Balkan, Hapsburg and now, the German question.

The names may change. Now we ask: Can Yugoslavia survive? What kind of independence is possible for the successor states of Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia)? But the underlying issue -- Central European nationalism -- endures. Can Europe contain the dynamism of a reunified German giant? Will that giant forever renounce its lost territories and forever forswear nuclear weapons?

The German question, though the largest, is just one of many. Albanians and Serbs, Bulgarians and Turks, Hungarians and Romanians are remembering antagonisms that the 20th century was thought to have rendered obsolete. When Hungary held its intensely moving reburial of Imre Nagy last spring, Romania denounced the act as not only anti-socialist but "anti-Romania." In Budapest, the kiosks already carry maps of "Greater Hungary" that include territory now belonging to Yugoslavia. When Chancellor Kohl visited Poland last weekend, he was greeted in the lost German province of Silesia by signs saying "Helmut, you're our chancellor, too." Ein Volk ...

Irredentism did not die in 1945. It was merely suppressed by the superpowers. The West may have transcended its murderous nationalisms during the last half century by developing such a high degree of economic integration, cultural symbiosis and political coordination that territorial complaints (of the Basques, for example) look positively quaint. But Eastern Europe, which has lost half a century of economic and social development, may need that much time to work out its long-suppressed ancient animosities.

Three cheers for liberation. Now comes the hard part.

TYPE: OPINION EDITORIAL

SUBJECT: U.S. PRESIDENT; UNITED STATES; EAST GERMANY/GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC;  
EASTERN EUROPE / SOVIET BLOC; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ORGANIZATION: COLD WAR

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October 27, 1989, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: EDITORIAL; PAGE A19

LENGTH: 876 words

HEADLINE: Baker on Perestroika's Promise . . .

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

Is Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviet Union's Jimmy Carter? His conduct, which has post-Afghanistan syndrome written all over it, is strikingly reminiscent of American conduct at a similar malaise-ridden juncture in our history. Consider: Gorbachev repudiates his country's role in a losing foreign adventure, denouncing the invasion of Afghanistan as immoral and illegal. He openly admits to a whole host of national sins, the latest being the brazen Soviet violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He pledges absolute independence and hands off for countries previously under Soviet domination. He at least suspends the Brezhnev Doctrine and lets Eastern Europe go its own way (much as Carter did for our back yard, Latin America -- backing off Nicaragua, decolonizing the Panama Canal and generally retiring the Monroe Doctrine for the rest of the hemisphere). He repeatedly renounces hegemony and embraces interdependence, which recalls Sestanovich's Law (named for the noted Sovietologist) that countries that talk about interdependence -- the United States in the '70s, the Soviets today -- are invariably in decline. His domestic economy is failing, with inflation surging and living standards falling. For his labors, he is earning points abroad, while steadily losing support at home.

The reason that this should be a cautionary analogy is that while the Carter years were good for the U.S.S.R., which acquired an impressive Third World empire during that time. Those years were immediately followed by the Reagan reaction, which was bad for the Soviet Union. It is thus quite possible that the Gorbachev years will be followed by the Ligachev reaction -- though the betting is that if there is a Soviet counterrevolution, Gorbachev will lead it -- that will not be good for us.

The corollary is that for now Gorbachev is good for us. Secretary of State James Baker's loud and official declaration to that effect is a welcome development. We do have a large stake in the success of Gorbachev's program. True, the chances of that success are small and receding. Gorbachev's attempt to reform the Soviet economy incrementally has been likened to a country trying to switch, gradually, from driving on the left-hand side of the road to the right.

Nonetheless, even if perestroika ultimately fails, we have an interest in its mere continuation. The longer it goes on, the harder it becomes to reverse its effects. And these effects are dramatic: the rapid de-communization of Hungary and Poland, with East Germany and Czechoslovakia to follow; the arousal of nationalist feelings within the Soviet republics; and, most important, the rise of civil society as a challenge to the state throughout the Soviet Empire, a challenge that heretofore totalitarianism had specialized in crushing.

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China shows that these expressions of popular sentiment are not irreversible. They can be put down. But the longer they go on and the more organized they become, the higher the cost of putting them down and, thus, the less the likelihood of massive repression if Moscow suffers a change of regime or Gorbachev a change of heart.

Baker is less convincing when he says that because Gorbachev may not be there forever, all the more reason for us to hurry and conclude arms control agreements with him while we can. His point is that if these agreements impose structural constraints on the Soviets -- troop withdrawals, reductions in military personnel, destruction of weapons -- even a new regime in the Kremlin could not easily reverse these changes.

True, but it could still reverse them far more easily than any American government could. (Arms agreements would impose structural changes on the United States too.) When it comes to rearmament, the White House is far more politically constrained than the Kremlin. In a soured international environment, which country would be more likely to rebuild the military, reactivate the assembly lines and return troops to Central Europe?

This is not to argue against concluding arms treaties with Gorbachev. It is only to argue against rushing into them. They have to be framed in such a way that if post-Gorbachev they are broken, as the Soviets now admit they broke the ABM Treaty, Western deterrence will not have been fatally compromised.

Those who issue such cautions are usually derided as hard-liners, closed to the marvelous new possibilities of the Gorbachevian universe. As I recall, however, not too long ago those who insisted that the Soviets unconditionally tear down their radar station at Krasnoyarsk were also denounced as hard-liners -- seeking, by stressing Soviet violations, to undermine the entire arms control enterprise. It was a group of congressional soft-liners who traveled to Krasnoyarsk, looked at the radar, and said, with wonderful sophistry, that while it might be illegal it wasn't. Why? Because "it is clearly not deployed. Thus we judge it not to be a violation of the ABM Treaty at this time."

Soft-liners are now in retreat. Indeed, they have suffered the ultimate humiliation: they are being refuted, not by Cap Weinberger but by Eduard Shevardnadze. It is Gorbachev who is telling us that the hard-liners were right all along. His authority is good enough for me.

TYPE: OPINION EDITORIAL

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES; U.S.S.R.; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NAMED-PERSONS: MIKHAIL GORBACHEV; JAMES BAKER III

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HEADLINE: WHAT IS FUKUYAMA SAYING? AND TO WHOM IS HE SAYING IT?

BYLINE: By James Atlas; James Atlas is an editor of this magazine.

BODY:

THE YEAR 2000 FAST APPROACHES, and millennial doom is in the air. Global warming, nuclear proliferation, chaos in Eastern Europe. Even the notion of post is over. Post-modernism, post-history, post-culture (to borrow the critic George Steiner's term) - we're beyond that now. 'The sun is about to set on the post-industrial era,' declares the economist Lester C. Thurow in The New York Times.

What follows post? Samuel P. Huntington, Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard, has a name for the latest eschatological craze: 'endism.' The critic Arthur C. Danto theorizes on 'the end of art.' Bill McKibben, a former staff writer for The New Yorker, issues a dire report on 'The End of Nature.' Clearly, it's late in the day.

On the face of it, the lead article in the summer issue of The National Interest, a neoconservative journal published in Washington, seemed like more bad news. 'The End of History?' it asked. The author, Francis Fukuyama, a State Department official, was unknown to the public, but his article was accompanied by 'responses' from Irving Kristol, Allan Bloom, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and others notable for their gloomy prognostications.

The magazine's readers were in for a surprise. What was Fukuyama saying? That the end of history is good news. What is happening in the world, claimed his eloquent essay, is nothing less than 'the triumph of the West.' How else to explain the free elections in Poland and Hungary? The reform movement in China? The East German exodus?

In Fukuyama's interpretation, borrowed (and heavily adapted) from the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, history is a protracted struggle to realize the idea of freedom latent in human consciousness. In the 20th century, the forces of totalitarianism have been decisively conquered by the United States and its allies, which represent the final embodiment of this idea - 'that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy.' In other words, we win.

Within weeks, 'The End of History?' had become the hottest topic around, this year's answer to Paul Kennedy's phenomenal best seller, 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.' George F. Will was among the first to weigh in, with a Newsweek column in August; two weeks later, Fukuyama's photograph appeared in Time. The French quarterly Commentaire announced that it was devoting a special issue to 'The End of History?' The BBC sent a television crew. Translations of the piece were scheduled to appear in Dutch, Japanese, Italian and Icelandic.

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Ten Downing Street requested a copy. In Washington, a newsdealer on Connecticut Avenue reported, the summer issue of The National Interest was 'outselling everything, even the pornography.'

'Controversial' didn't begin to cover the case. Unlike that other recent philosophical cause celebre, Allan Bloom's 'The Closing of the American Mind,' Fukuyama's essay was the work of a representative from what is often referred to in academic circles as the real world. This was no professor, according to the contributor's note that ran in the magazine, but the 'deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff.'

It wasn't just the message, then; it was the source. Maybe there was an agenda here. . . . By mid-September, Peter Tarnoff, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, could speculate on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times that 'The End of History?' was 'laying the foundation for a Bush doctrine.' Not bad for a 16-page article in a foreign-policy journal with a circulation of 6,000.

YOU HAVE TO PASS THROUGH A METAL detector to get to Francis Fukuyama's office in the State Department, and the silver plaques beside the doors - INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTER - confirm that this isn't a philosophy department. But the elegant private dining room on the 8th floor, overlooking the Potomac, could easily be mistaken for an Ivy League faculty club. Plush carpets, chandeliers, a sideboard out of Sturbridge Village, oil portraits of 19th-century dignitaries on the walls - an environment conducive to shoptalk about Hegel.

It's mid-September, and the arrival of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze for meetings with Fukuyama's boss, James A. Baker 3d, is less than a week away. 'It's a busy time,' says Fukuyama, apologetically. Apart from assisting in the preparation of 'talking points' for the Secretary of State, he's been besieged with telephone calls from book editors and agents eager to cash in on his famous article.

How does he account for the commotion? 'I don't understand it myself,' Fukuyama says quietly, sipping a Coke. 'I didn't write the article with any relevance to policy. It was just something I'd been thinking about.'

He does seem an unlikely celebrity. (But so was Paul Kennedy. So was Allan Bloom.) His khaki suit has an off-the-rack look about it, and he speaks in a tentative, measured voice, more intent on making himself clear than on making an impression. A youthful 36, he emanates a professorial air - an assistant professorial air.

Fukuyama doesn't quite fit the neo-conservative stereotype. Whatever ideological direction he has gone in lately, he's still a child of the 60's. He belongs to the Sierra Club; he's nostalgic for California, where he worked for the Rand Corporation; he worries about pesticides in the backyard of the small red-brick bungalow in the Virginia suburbs where he lives with his wife and infant daughter.

'The last thing I want to be interpreted as saying is that our society is a utopia, or that there are no more problems,' he stresses. 'I simply don't see any competitors to modern democracy.' In short, he's a liberal neo-conservative.

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Fukuyama grew up in Manhattan's Stuyvesant Town, a middle-class housing development on the Lower East Side. His father was a Congregational minister who later became a professor of religion, and Fukuyama's own direction in the beginning was toward an academic career. As a freshman at Cornell in 1970, he was a resident of Telluride House, a sort of commune for philosophy students; Allan Bloom was the resident Socrates. They shared meals and talked philosophy until all hours, living the good life Bloom would later evoke in 'The Closing of the American Mind,' the professor and his disciples sitting around the cafeteria discussing the Great Books.

Fukuyama majored in classics, then did graduate work in comparative literature at Yale, where he studied with the deconstructionist Paul de Man (who would achieve posthumous notoriety when it was discovered that he'd published pro-Nazi articles in the Belgian press at the height of World War II). 'It was kind of an intellectual side journey,' Fukuyama says.

After Yale, he spent six months in Paris, sitting in on classes with Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, whose abstruse and fashionable discourses would become required reading for a generation of American graduate students. Fukuyama was less than impressed. 'I was turned off by their nihilistic idea of what literature was all about,' he recalls. 'It had nothing to do with the world. I developed such an aversion to that whole over-intellectual approach that I turned to nuclear weapons instead.' He enrolled in Harvard's government department, where he studied Middle Eastern and Soviet politics. Three years later he got a Ph.D. in political science, writing his thesis on Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East.

Fukuyama's first job out of the academic world was at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Then, in 1981, Paul D. Wolfowitz, director of policy planning in the Reagan Administration (and also a former student of Bloom's), invited him to join his staff. Fukuyama worked in Washington for two years, then returned to Rand.

For the next six years, he wrote papers for Rand on Soviet foreign policy, speculating on such weighty matters as 'Pakistan Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan' and 'Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission.' In 'Gorbachev and the Third World' (published in the spring 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs), Fukuyama claimed that Soviet foreign policy was still expansionist, and that despite efforts to economize at home and act conciliatory abroad, Gorbachev was quietly 'trying to stake out a more combative position' in client nations like Angola and Afghanistan, Libya and Nicaragua. The message of these heavily footnoted articles was clear: The cold war is still on.

Last February, shortly before he returned to Washington to become deputy to Dennis Ross, the new director of policy planning, Fukuyama gave a lecture at the University of Chicago in which he surveyed the international political scene. It was sponsored by his former professor, Allan Bloom. 'My whole life has been spent in organizations that prize technical expertise,' says Fukuyama. 'I was anxious to deal with larger and more important issues' - what Bloom calls 'the big questions.'

As it happened, Owen Harries, co-editor of The National Interest, was looking around for a think piece on the current situation - a piece, as Harries explains it, that would 'link history with the great traditions of political thought.' Harries got hold of Fukuyama's lecture and instantly recognized that it was

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'a provocative, stimulating essay, just what the times needed.'

HARRIES, A DONNISH, PIPE-SMOKING Welshman whose desk is piled high with books - he was educated at Oxford and was for many years a professor of politics - belongs to a type that exists only in Washington. Leon Wieseltier, literary editor of The New Republic, calls them 'policy intellectuals.' In New York, people talk about the latest issue of Vanity Fair; in Washington, they talk about the latest issue of Foreign Policy.

Some of these policy intellectuals are in government; Carnes Lord, the author of a highly regarded translation of Aristotle's 'Politics,' is national security adviser to Vice President Quayle. Others are 'fellows' or 'scholars' at the Heritage Foundation or the Brookings Institution. Often, they have grand titles; Michael Novak, for instance, is the George Frederick Jewett Scholar in Religion and Public Policy at the American Enterprise Institute. Many are fugitives from academic life. 'A lot of people around the office came up to me after the article appeared,' Fukuyama says. 'Hegelians who hadn't gotten tenure.'

The political orientation is well to the right. 'We hold to a traditional view of foreign policy,' says Owen Harries. And what does he mean by 'traditional'? 'The belief that power politics is still in business. A belief in the efficacy of force.'

The National Interest is clearly a well-heeled outfit. It's funded by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, a prominent neo-conservative organization; the John M. Olin Foundation, established by a wealthy manufacturer who made his fortune largely in munitions, and the Smith Richardson Foundation -which, says Harries, 'supports a number of good causes around the place.'

The magazine's quarters, in a modern office building on 16th Street in Washington, are a far cry from the grubby cubicles one associates with political journals on the left (if there still are any). The floors are carpeted and the phones ring with a muted chirp. The elevator has piped-in Mozart instead of Muzak. Directly across the street, behind a high wrought-iron fence, is the Russian Embassy.

The National Interest, now four years old, is the creation of Irving Kristol - listed on the masthead as its publisher. His desk at the magazine is sort of in the lobby area; but then, he occupies many desks. Apart from his two magazines (he's also publisher of The Public Interest), Kristol is a distinguished fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Last year, he gave up his professorship at New York University and moved to Washington. New York was no longer the nation's intellectual center, he wrote in The New Republic a few months later, explaining his decision. The intellectuals had disappeared into the universities. The culture of Washington was just as 'nasty and brutish,' in Kristol's Hobbesian view, as anywhere else. 'But there is one area in which Washington is an intellectual center, and that is public policy: economic policy, social policy, foreign policy, today even educational policy.'

Living in Washington doesn't make Kristol any less a New Yorker. The cigarette, the rumpled seersucker jacket, the shrewdly self-deprecating wit are more congenial to a seminar room at the City University of New York's graduate center on 42d Street than to a Washington think tank. Why did 'The End of History?' make news? 'I'd like to think it's because my coming to Washington

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from New York has raised the level of discussion,' Kristol says with a laugh. And Fukuyama's thesis? 'I don't believe a word of it.'

Neither did a lot of other prominent opinion-makers around town. 'At last, self-congratulation raised to the status of philosophy!' sneered Christopher Hitchens, a Washington-based Englishman who writes a column for The Nation. 'The Bush years have found their Burke, or their Pangloss.' For Strobe Talbott, editor at large for Time magazine, 'The End of History?' was 'The Beginning of Nonsense.'

If it wasn't nonsense, Fukuyama's basic thesis wasn't exactly news, either. For months, conservatives had been gloating over the demise of Communism. 'The perennial question that has preoccupied every political philosopher since Plato - what is the best form of governance? - has been answered,' wrote Charles Krauthammer in The Washington Post last March, before anyone had ever heard of Francis Fukuyama. 'After a few millennia of trying every form of political system, we close this millennium with the sure knowledge that in liberal, pluralist, capitalist democracy we have found what we have been looking for.' Essentially, that was Fukuyama's message, but it didn't draw swarms of reporters to Krauthammer's door.

So how did 'The End of History?' become such a big event? It was the Hegel spin that did it. Not only is America winning, Fukuyama claimed, but the flourishing of democracy around the world is the fulfillment of a grand historical scheme. The end of the cold war and the disarray of the Soviet Union reflected a larger process - the realization of the Idea. History, Hegel believed (or Fukuyama says he believed), 'culminated in an absolute moment - a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious.' And that moment, it just so happens, is now.

A weird thesis, utterly speculative and impossible to prove. But 'The End of History?' was a stylish performance, erudite and written with a rhetorical flair rare in the somber prose of Washington policy journals; it possessed intellectual authority.

Fukuyama's respondents greeted the piece with open arms. 'I am delighted to welcome G.W.F. Hegel to Washington,' declared Kristol. Senator Moynihan, himself a Harvard government professor before he discovered politics, confessed that his grasp of Hegel was shaky; but he dusted off his European history, tossing in a few references to Marx and Rousseau. 'It is not often that one has the opportunity to argue about Hegel in The National Interest (or anywhere else, for that matter),' noted the historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, who is the wife of Irving Kristol. Soon after the article appeared, there was a conference held to discuss it at something called the United States Institute of Peace. Kristol, Himmelfarb and Krauthammer were in attendance, along with the Sovietologist Richard Pipes. The rest is . . . history?

IT'S NOT HARD TO SEE why Fukuyama's essay won favor among this community. It's not only the high-flown references to Kant and Hegel, not only the message that Western democracy beat out the competition. 'The End of History?' has a polemical edge familiar to readers of 'The Closing of the American Mind.'

Like Bloom, Fukuyama doesn't have much patience for non-Western cultures. ('For our purposes,' he writes, 'it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso.') And like Bloom, Fukuyama's no

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booster. The West isn't so hot either. At the heart of his critique is a veiled contempt for the very culture whose triumphs in the political sphere it purports to celebrate.

What distinguishes Fukuyama from the crowd of conservative pundits elated by Gorbachev's troubles is his curled-lip attitude toward the victorious party. Say the West has won, that fascism and Communism are dead, that no significant ideological challenges are on the horizon - then what? There's an 'emptiness at the core of liberalism,' Fukuyama maintains. What does America have to offer? 'Liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic.' The society Hegel envisioned at the end of history, a universal state in which the arts flourish and virtue reigns, is nowhere to be found. Instead we're stuck with a 'consumerist culture' purveying rock music and boutiques around the world.

So the end of history may not be such a good thing after all. In fact, Fukuyama concludes, it will be 'a very sad time.' Why? Because the meaning of life lies in the causes that we fight for, and in the future there won't be any. 'The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.' Put plainly, we're heading for a time of 'boredom.'

As a Washington cab driver said when I tried to explain why I was in town, 'Give me a break!' Does Fukuyama really believe all this? 'I guess I prefer not to answer that,' he said one afternoon, talking in his State Department office. 'Leave it ambiguous. All I can say is, if people can't take a joke. . .'

That he meant to be provocative is obvious; but it's clear from his rational, erudite prose that he wasn't fooling around. As a political theorist, Fukuyama is more in the tradition of Bentham or Locke than of pop futurists like Alvin Toffler. 'All I meant by that last paragraph,' he says, 'was that there's a tension in liberalism that won't go away. There are all kinds of reasons for being a liberal: the security and the material wealth it provides, the opportunity for spiritual and intellectual development. But it fails to address some fundamental questions. You know, what are the higher ends of man? Should we just be content with having secured the conditions for a good life, or should we be thinking about what the content of that good life is?'

IF LIBERALISM STILL has a few kinks to work out, Communism is finished, although 'there may be some isolated true believers left in places like Managua, Pyongyang or Cambridge, Massachusetts,' writes Fukuyama with characteristic acerbity.

In Cambridge, the contempt is mutual. Even in that citadel of 1960's subversion, there aren't too many Communists left, but there is an inordinately dense concentration of people around Harvard Square who know their Hegel, and the summer issue of *The National Interest* sold out there virtually overnight. By and large, the Cambridge intelligentsia is dubious about 'The End of History?' The distinguished Harvard government professor Judith N. Shklar didn't even have to read Fukuyama's piece in order to dismiss it as 'publicity.' Her colleague Daniel Bell, who did, pronounced it 'Hegel at third remove . . . and wrong.'

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(Bell's classic book, 'The End of Ideology,' anticipated Fukuyama 30 years ago.) The historian Simon Schama, author of 'Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution,' is more tolerant. Himself an idiosyncratic practitioner of the genre, he found the piece 'spirited and lively,' but wonders how Fukuyama could have failed to address the revival of religious fundamentalism or the conflicts that could arise out of nationalism. 'It's more of a theological document, don't you think, a work of prophecy,' he says. 'I mean, nobody really believes in the end of history.'

It's not too hard to think of scenarios that would spoil Fukuyama's end of history. Who's to say what would happen in the Soviet Union if glasnost and perestroika collapse? What new dangers might a reunified Germany pose? Or a newly industrialized China? And what about the nuclear threat? That would put an end to things, the political scientist Pierre Hassner observed, 'in a more radical sense than he envisages.'

Gertrude Himmelfarb's response in The National Interest was perhaps the most damaging refutation of all. To begin with, Hegel never said that history would end in a literal sense; it's a continuous process in which 'the synthesis of the preceding stage is the thesis of the present, thus setting in motion an endless dialectical cycle - and thus preserving the drama of history.' And what about black poverty, the poverty of the underclass? asked Himmelfarb. In southeast Washington, where young blacks are dying nightly in the front lines of the drug war, history doesn't seem over; it seems to be just beginning. As Irving Kristol tartly put it, 'We may have won the cold war, which is nice - it's more than nice, it's wonderful. But this means that now the enemy is us, not them.'

Liberals complained that Fukuyama ignored the third world. Conservatives weren't too enthusiastic about his dour assessment of the winning team. Where is it written that government should provide for the spiritual needs of its citizens? Michael Novak wondered in Commentary. Democracy promises freedom from tyranny; it doesn't promise to make us happy. 'The construction of a social order that achieves these is not designed to fill the soul, or to teach a philosophy, or to give instruction in how to live,' Novak wrote. Democracy isn't a required course; it's an elective.

ANUMBER OF COMMENTATORS have compared 'The End of History?' to the famous article published by George F. Kennan in Foreign Affairs in July 1947 and signed with an anonymous 'X.' Kennan's essay warned of Moscow's expansionist tendencies and called for a policy of 'firm and vigilant containment,' thus supplying the term that would come to characterize America's foreign policy in the postwar era.

In an article in Policy Review last summer, 'Waiting for Mr. X,' Burton Yale Pines, the magazine's associate publisher, called for an update. The cold war was over, Pines agreed; only what was the United States doing about it? How to deal with the turmoil Gorbachev's reforms have provoked? What should be our policy toward Eastern Europe? 'Needed, in essence, is another 'X' article,' wrote Pines - an article that would encourage the United States to seize the initiative. Given this hunger for a sequel, it's not surprising that Fukuyama is being touted as our 'X.'

But is he? It's tempting to dismiss the whole thing as a media phenomenon. 'Each year needs a new sensation,' says Daniel Bell. 'It encapsulates a

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mood that people feel and gives it a vocabulary.'

The practical consequences have been more difficult to measure. In the wake of Shevardnadze's visit, interpreters of foreign policy were busy scrutinizing speeches for evidence of endism. Did Fukuyama's article reflect President Bush's thinking? Was it a high-level policy paper in disguise? Senator Moynihan, for one, is skeptical. 'The minute you announce that the cold war has ended and history is over,' he notes, 'a lot of people are going to say, 'Hey, wait a minute, we're out of a job.' 'If only for bureaucratic purposes, then, history is still a going concern. As for the article's actual influence, 'there's no connection between this piece and what the Government does,' Kristol says flatly. 'No one in the Administration has read it.'

Everyone else has. Whether or not we've reached the end of history, we haven't reached the end of 'The End of History?' The fall issue of The National Interest featured more 'responses,' and you still can't pick up a magazine or a newspaper without stumbling across some reference to Fukuyama. 'I don't see much of a future for liberal democracy here in Peru's Shining Path country, but people would be pretty excited about VCRs if they only had electricity,' the journalist Tina Rosenberg reported with laconic irony in The New Republic, writing from Baja Collana, Peru. 'But that's just one of those technological problems Francis Fukuyama says we'll have to spend our time grappling with now that there are no more ideological conflicts to keep us busy.'

In a way, though, the question mark in Fukuyama's title has pre-empted criticism. History, after all, is only a way of making sense of things. Human beings depend on narrative to create an illusion of order, the literary critic Frank Kermode has argued in his profound book, 'The Sense of an Ending.' 'To make sense of their span they need fictive concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems.'

'The End of History?' is a poem. (No wonder no one in the Administration has read it.) Even if we have come to the end of history, that may not be the end of it. As the historian Jerry Z. Muller observed, writing in Commentary last December, 'After late capitalism comes more capitalism.' And after the end of history comes more history.

#### THOUGHTS FROM 'THE END'

The passing of Marxism-Leninism, first from China and then from the Soviet Union, will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance. For while there may be some isolated true believers left in places like Managua, Pyongyang, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, the fact that there is not a single large state in which it is a going concern undermines completely its pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history. And the death of this ideology means the growing 'Common Marketization' of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.

This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se. For the world at that point would be divided between a part that was historical and a part that was post-historical. Conflict between states still in history, and between those states and those at the end of history, would still be possible. There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even

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in parts of the post-historical world. Palestinians and Kurds, Sikhs and Tamils, Irish Catholics and Walloons, Armenians and Azeris, will continue to have their unresolved grievances. This implies that terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda. But large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its North Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.

(From "The End of History?" By Francis Fukuyama, The National Interest, No. 16, Summer 1989.)

GRAPHIC: Francis Fukuyama wrote "The End of History?" (Dan Borris/Outline) (pg. 38); Irving Kristol (Bruce Hoertel/Gamma-Liaison) (pg. 42)

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; COMMUNISM (THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY)

NAME: FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS

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HEADLINE: Holding On To Brezhnev's Empire

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

The Soviet Empire is collapsing in the most paradoxical way: the inner empire is rapidly falling apart, while the external empire is managing to hold together. That's not the way things are supposed to happen. That certainly is not the way it had been predicted, say, a year ago when it seemed that the Soviets were being pushed out of their newer colonies of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and Ethiopia.

The collapse of the East European inner empire is proceeding at an astonishing pace. Poland is actively decommunizing under Solidarity. (Though Solidarity may have rushed history a bit by agreeing to act as bill collector for 40 years of Communist misrule.) And Hungary's Communists have molted into what they say is a traditional, albeit left-wing, social democratic party.

East Germany, however, presents the Soviets with the most insoluble imperial dilemma. Hungary or Poland can exist without communism. East Germany cannot. It is not a country but a creation. It exists solely so that one group of Germans may experience the joys of a workers' state. Take that away, and the state ceases to have a reason for existence. Which is why reform in East Germany is almost a contradiction of terms. Perestroika will not solve East Germany's problems. It will make them terminal.

We are speaking here, of course, just of Warsaw Pact allies. Gorbachev has to worry even more about the centrifugal forces at work in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, the Ukraine and the Soviet Moslem republics.

Which makes for the oddity: while the Soviet inner empire, the crown jewel of its postwar conquests, spins out of control, the external Third World empire remains intact:

Afghanistan. The puppet government of Najibullah (like Cher and Charlemagne, he goes by one name) has survived far longer than anyone thought possible when Soviet soldiers pulled out in February.

Cambodia. As Vietnam withdraws, its puppet (Hun Sen) is gathering grudging support, even in the West, as perhaps the only realistic alternative to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.

Angola. Jonas Savimbi, trying to topple the Soviet client regime, is on the defensive and having increasing difficulty getting supplies.

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Nicaragua. The contras get ready to test Miami's housing market. The Sandinista regime is as secure as at any time in its 10-year history.

Ethiopia. This may be the exception. Mengistu's regime is retreating in the face of advances by Tigray and Eritrean secessionists. But even this would not be quite the loss it seems, because both the Tigrayans and the Eritreans are led by Communists.

What is going on? It is not an accident, comrade, that Gorbachev is holding on to these colonies. Contrary to expectations, he did not write them off when he began withdrawing Soviet (and proxy Cuban and Vietnamese) troops and calling for negotiation rather than confrontation. He is instead trying to do what Nixon tried to do in South Vietnam: sustain, with huge amounts of aid, a client regime after the metropolitan support troops have gone home. The U.S. Congress cut short that experiment in proxy power in 1975. The Soviet parliament is unlikely to follow suit.

The size of Gorbachev's continued investment in the colonies is breathtaking. Afghanistan is getting a quarter of a billion dollars a month in military supplies from a Soviet economy that is self-advertised as bankrupt. Cambodian aid has apparently doubled in the last year to about half a billion dollars a year. Aid to Angola holds steady at a cool \$ 1 billion a year. And the Sandinistas are getting their usual half a billion, albeit, now in the age of perestroika, laundered through Eastern Europe and Cuba.

Which raises the question: Why, at a time when soap, salt and sugar are rationed even in Moscow, is Gorbachev investing at least \$ 5 billion a year to maintain Brezhnev's empire?

Because empires, even those cobbled together absent-mindedly, do not voluntarily dissolve themselves. As they shed their ideology, the Soviets are reverting to the natural condition of a great power: trying to maintain power where they have it and extend it where they don't. To assume otherwise is to assume that they have not only overthrown Communist ideology but reversed human nature. Great powers do not voluntarily abjure power. Small countries, like Canada or Finland, living in the protective shadow of great powers, sometimes do. But great powers, unless utterly defeated in war, like Germany and Japan, do not.

About Eastern Europe, Gorbachev can do little. The growth of civil society has reached the point at which its challenge to the Soviet-imposed state cannot be resisted. Gorbachev has few tools to arrest the dissolution of the inner empire. Accordingly, his strategy is to finesse the crisis by trying to Finlandize states that he can no longer control.

In the external empire, on the other hand, the anticolonial battle is more primitive: tanks and guns can still decide the issue. And tanks and guns are a Soviet specialty. Gorbachev will use them to try to hang on to what he can.

Gorbachev is not a decolonizer. He is a realist. He will decolonize only where he must. The external empire can still be held together militarily. The internal empire cannot. Where he still retains the means to resist, he shows every willingness of doing so.

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BYLINE: MEG GREENFIELD

## HIGHLIGHT:

We can no longer put our minds on automatic in thinking about these things. It's a damned outrage.

## BODY:

These days when I open my paper I am put in mind of that old man in the cartoons who walks around with a sign saying, "Repent, the end is nigh." For the end, we are told, of practically everything is nigh: history, liberalism, ideology, the cold war. I suspect that all these entities actually have a little more life in them and that what's happening is something different. What we are confronting is the destruction of many of our premises and expectations about all of the above. ~~Our pal arguments don't work anymore. We can no longer put our minds on automatic.~~ It is, of course, a damned outrage, as this means we all have to start thinking again.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in our internal conflicts over foreign policy. For years it seemed enough to many people to take their foreign-policy compass reading from what the other side in the domestic argument said; whatever it was, they took the opposite stand and were confirmed in their judgment by the looniness of the forces rallied against them.

Thus, a lot of conservatives did not much credit either complexity or constructive change in communist countries. Evidence of either was dismissed as a trick or a fantasy of the liberal goo-goos, and they could continue to pursue 1951-type approaches to 1980s-style governments in Eastern Europe. This was enough for their liberal counterparts, who found in these absurd rigidities of the right-wingers justification for their own brand of non-sense -- namely, the notion that it was benighted to look upon those governments as oppressive ("mindless anticommunism" was their phrase); they habitually put the word "threat" in quotes when it followed the word "communist."

These were two groups of people so busily and happily fighting each other here at home that for a while they seemed almost not to notice when the objects of their argument abroad managed to mortally undermine both their positions. For only the most paranoid and dimwitted of right-wing observers would any longer deny the reality of enormous change for the better in large parts of the communist world. And only the lunatic left could refuse to see in the reforms and uprisings and remarkable confessions, exposes and commentary coming from the East evidence that the repression has been much more onerous and diabolical than liberal discourse often implied.

If only the changes in the Soviet-bloc world had been clean, clear and totally transforming it would have been easy, but they have not been. We are

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faced with an uneven, uncertain and only partially changed situation, one that could, at least in some measure, revert to the old status quo. Therefore across the whole American political spectrum those who would participate in the policy response have been forced to think, to weigh, to choose.

What do we want, anyway, from and for the communist countries? What was and is the nature of their threat to us? Does the definition of our interest begin and end with protecting ourselves against aggression? Or does it also include attempting to preserve and actually extended democratic values? Do we give a hoot what kind of domestic political lives other countries laid? If Third World disputes were not overlaid with East-West meaning, would we care how they came out? Would we be concerned only as our economic interests were affected? Outside the cold-war context, does any of the currently burgeoning ethnic mayhem around the world matter to us, warfare between peoples with exotic names who have been trying to annihilate each other for centuries and whom most of us probably never even heard of until the 6 o'clock news tonight?

Many questions: All of these questions are being wrangled in the current political debate over what to do about Eastern Europe. There are ironies and oversimplifying. The self-evident truth that the Soviet military is exceedingly strong and still being stoked by the Gorbachev leadership is invoked as a way of answering more questions than it actually does. To point to their military might and continuing military ambitions answers the question as to whether this country needs to maintain its own military strength, but it does not tell you how to capitalize on the genuine political changes that are occurring in the Soviet Union. To say that Poland and Hungary, now at the cutting edge of democratic reform, could yet revert to the old dispensation does not tell you what steps we should take to try to encourage them the other way. And to say simply "more money, more money" for the countries struggling to shed their repressive systems does not really address the tougher issues of whether their reforms are solid enough to justify the investment and whether a huge injection of money might not in effect harm reform by enabling the recipients to avoid the painful steps they must take to restructure their economies. These, in other words, are no yes-no, black-white, am too-are not questions. They are questions of proportion and degree and as such require through, calculation, trade-off.

But there is an even more taxing order of questions that have arisen in the wake of the change in Eastern Europe than those concerned with policy and program responses to what is going on. These are the big, blowzy but critical questions of our basic purpose. They have always lurked, unresolved, in our acrimonious debates about human rights, authoritarians versus totalitarians, whose dictators -- those of the left or the right -- are worse, and what if any our interest may be in the various places in which we intervene around the world. Some on the same side of the debate over intervention were always arguing from different values -- American strategic interest, for instance, and American missionary democracy. Are we out there to do good or merely to do in anyone who threatens our well-being?

Charles Krauthammer has wisely written about the way these arguments are playing out within the American conservative complex. The conservatives aren't the only ones affected. The cold war may or may not be over. What is clearly over is the intellectually easy cold-war period in which there seemed to be only two sides in the world and only two ways of thinking about their relationship here at home.