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in the seventeenth century. Naturalistic figures and theatrical compositions were introduced awkwardly and eclectically from Western models; older icons vanished beneath metal casings and layers of dark varnish; and serpentine rococo frames agitated the icon screen and seemed to constrict the holy figures they surrounded. The traditional *chin* of Muscovy had been replaced by the *chinovnik* ("petty bureaucrat") of Petersburg; and icon painting as a sacred tradition, by icon production as a state concession. The icon is only "good for covering pots," proclaimed Vissarion Belinsky in the 1840's,⁷⁸ pointing the way to the new artistic iconoclasm of the Russian revolutionary tradition.

Yet the spell of the icon was never completely broken. Nothing else quite took its place, and Russians remained reluctant to conceive of painting as men did in the West. Russians remained more interested in the ideal represented by a painting than in its artistic texture. To Dostoevsky, Holbein's "Christ in the Tomb" suggested a denial of Christian faith; Claude Lorraine's "Acis and Galatea," a secular utopia. The print of Raphael's Sistine Madonna over his writing desk was the personal icon of his own effort to reconcile faith and creative power.⁷⁹ The revolutionaries themselves looked with the eyes of icon veneratorators on the heroic naturalism of much nineteenth-century Russian secular painting. Many found a call to revolutionary defiance in the proud expression of an unbowed boy in Repin's famous "Haulers on the Volga." Just as the Christian warriors of an earlier age had made vows before icons in church on the eve of battle, so Russian Revolutionaries—in the words of Lenin's personal secretary—"swore vows in the Tret'iakov Gallery on seeing such pictures."⁸⁰

Large-scale cleaning and restoration in the early twentieth century helped Russians rediscover at long last the purely artistic glories of the older icons. Just as the hymns and chants of the church had provided new themes and inspiration for early Russian iconographers, so their rediscovered paintings gave fresh inspiration back to poets and musicians as well as painters in late imperial Russia. Under the former seminarian Stalin, however, the icon lived on not as the inspiration for creative art but as a model for mass indoctrination. The older icons, like the newer experimental paintings, were for the most part locked up in the reserve collections of museums. Pictures of Lenin in the "red corner" of factories and public places replaced icons of Christ and the Virgin. Photographs of Lenin's successors deployed in a prescribed order on either side of Stalin replaced the old "prayer row," in which saints were deployed in fixed order on either side of Christ enthroned. Just as the iconostasis of a cathedral was generally built directly over the grave of a local saint and specially revered with processions on a religious festival, so these new Soviet saints appeared in ritual form over the

mausoleum of the mummified Lenin on the feast days of Bolshevism to review endless processions through Red Square.

In the context of Russian culture this attempt to capitalize politically on the popular reverence for icons represents only an extension of an established tradition of debasement. The Polish pretender Dmitry, the Swedish warrior Gustavus Adolphus, most of the Romanovs, and many of their generals had themselves painted in semi-iconographic style for the Russian populace.⁸¹ An émigré Old Believer—for whom all modern history represents a foredoomed divergence from the true ways of Old Russia—looked with indifference and even joy upon the transfer of the icon of Our Lady of Kazan from a cathedral to a museum early in the Soviet era:

The Queen of Heaven, divesting herself of her regal robes, issued forth from her Church to preach Christianity in the streets.⁸²

Stalin added an element of the grotesque to the tradition of politically debasing spiritual things. He introduced new icons and relics in the name of science, then proceeded to retouch and desecrate them, before his own image and remains were posthumously defiled. The lesser figures on the Soviet iconostasis had removed the central icon of Stalin enthroned, and largely destroyed the new myth of salvation. But in the uncertain age that followed, lithographs of Lenin and giant cranes continued to hover over prefabricated concrete huts piled on one another much as the icon and the axe had over the wooden huts of a more primitive era

Bell and Cannon

IF THE ICON AND THE AXE in the peasant hut became abiding symbols for Russian culture, so too did the bell and cannon of the walled city. These were the first large metal objects to be manufactured indigenously in the wooden world of Muscovy: objects that distinguished the city from the surrounding countryside and fortified it against alien invaders.

Just as the icon and the axe were closely linked with one another, so were the bell and cannon. The axe had fashioned and could destroy the wooden board on which the painting was made. Likewise, the primitive foundry which forged the first cannon also made the first bells; and these were always in peril of being melted back into metal for artillery in time of war. The bell, like the icon, was taken from Byzantium to provide aesthetic elaboration for the "right praising" of God; and both media came to be

used with even greater intensity and imagination than in Constantinople. The development of the elaborate and many-tiered Russian bell tower—with its profusion of bells and onion-shaped gables—parallels in many ways that of the iconostasis. The rich “mauve” ringing of bells so that “people cannot hear one another in conversation”⁸³ became the inevitable accompaniment of icon-bearing processions on special feast days. There were almost as many bells and ways to ring them as icons and ways to display them. By the early fifteenth century, Russia had evolved distinctive models that differed from the bells of Byzantium, Western Europe, or the Orient. The Russian emphasis on massive, immovable metal bells sounded by metal gongs and clappers led to a greater sonority and resonance than the generally smaller, frequently swinging, and often wooden bells of the contemporary West. Although Russia never produced carillons comparable to those of the Low Countries, it did develop its own methods and traditions of ringing different-sized bells in series. By the sixteenth century, it has been estimated that there were more than five thousand bells in the four hundred churches of Moscow alone.⁸⁴

Just as the icon was but one element in a pictorial culture that included the fresco, the illuminated holy text, and the illustrated chronicle, so the bell was only part of a torrent of sound provided by interminable chanted church services, popular hymns and ballads, and the secular improvisations of wandering folk singers armed with a variety of stringed instruments. Sights and sounds pointed the way to God, not philosophic speculation or literary subtlety. Services were committed to memory without benefit of missal or prayer book; and the “obedient listeners” in monasteries were subjected to oral instruction. Not only were the saints said to be “very like” the holy forms on the icons, but the very word for education suggested “becoming like the forms” (*obrazovanie*).

The interaction between sight and sound is also remarkable. If the iconography of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Russia drew special inspiration from holy singing, and the Russian icon came to be a kind of “abstract musical arabesque . . . purified, like music, of all but its direct appeals to the spirit,”⁸⁵ so the new method of musical notation that was simultaneously coming into being in Muscovy had a kind of hieroglyphic quality. The authority of the classical Byzantine chant appears to have waned after the fourteenth century—without giving way to any other method of clearly defining the intervals and correlations of tones. In its place appeared the “signed chant”: a new tradition of vocal ornamentation in which “melody not only flowed out of words, but served as the mold on which words were set in bold relief.”⁸⁶ When written down, the embellished red and black hooked notes offered only a shorthand guide to the direction

of melody rather than a precise indication of pitch; but the vivid pictorial impression created by the signs gave rise to descriptive names such as “the great spider,” “the thunderbolt,” “two in a boat,” and so on.⁸⁷

Though even less is known about secular music in this early period, there were apparently patterns of beauty in it, based on repetition with variation by different voices. The exalted “rejoicing” (*blagovestie*) of the bells used an overlapping series of sounds similar to that which was used in the “many-voiced” church chant—producing an effect that was at the same time cacophonous and hypnotic.

Russians felt the same mixture of joyful religious exultation and animistic superstition in the ringing of the bells as in the veneration of icons. Just as icons were paraded to ward off the evil spirits of plague, drought, and fire, so were bells rung to summon up the power of God against these forces. Just as icons were paraded around the boundaries to sanctify a land claim, so bells were rung to lend solemnity to official gatherings. In both cases, spiritual sanctification was more valued than legal precision. As with the icon, so with the bell, men valued them for their anagogical power to lift men up to God:

The weak sounds of wood and metal remind us of the unclear, mysterious words of the prophets, but the loud and vigorous play of bells is like the rejoicing of the Gospel, radiating out to all the corners of the universe and lifting one's thoughts to the angelic trumpets of the last day.⁸⁸

The forging and ringing of bells, like the painting and veneration of icons, was a sacramental act in Muscovy: a means of bringing the word of God into the presence of men. This “word” was the *logos* of St. John's gospel: the word which was in the beginning, was revealed perfectly in Christ, and was to be praised and magnified until His Second Coming. There was no need to speculate about this unmerited gift, but only to preserve intact the inherited forms of giving thanks and praise. There was no reason to write discursively about the imperfect world of here and now when one could see—however darkly—through the beauty of sights and sounds a transfigured world beyond.

The importance of bells in lending color and solemnity to church proceedings was heightened by the general prohibition on the use of musical instruments in Orthodox services. Only the human voice and bells were permitted (with an occasional use of trumpet or drum in such rituals as the furnace show or a welcoming procession). The absence from early Muscovy of polyphony or even a systematic scale made the rough but many-shaded harmonies sounded upon the bells seem like the ultimate in earthly music. Just as Muscovy resisted the contemporary Western tendency to introduce

perspective and naturalism into religious painting, so it resisted the concurrent Western tendency to use bells to provide orderly musical intervals or to accompany (with fixed tonal values and often in conjunction with an organ) the singing of sacred offices.⁸⁹

The bell played an important part in material as well as spiritual culture through its technological tie-in with the manufacture of cannon. Already by the late fourteenth century—only a few years after the first appearance of cannon in the West—Russians had begun to manufacture cannon along with bells; and, by the sixteenth century, they had produced the largest of each item to be found anywhere in the world. So important were these twin metal products to Muscovy that the largest example of each was given the title "Tsar": the bell, "Tsar Kolokol," weighing nearly half a million pounds; the cannon, "Tsar Pushka," with a barrel nearly a yard wide.

They represent the first example of "overtaking and surpassing" a superior technology. But they illustrate as well the artificiality of the accomplishment. For the bell was too large to hang, the cannon too broad to fire. Technological accomplishments in both fields were, moreover, in good measure the work of foreigners from the time in the early fourteenth century when a certain "Boris the Roman" first came to cast bells for Moscow and Novgorod.⁹⁰

If the bell predated the cannon as an object of technological interest, the cannon soon replaced it as the main object of state concern. Many bells in provincial cities and monasteries were systematically melted down to provide cannon for the swelling Russian armies of the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century; but innumerable bells remained in Moscow, the skyline of which was dominated by the soaring 270-foot Bell Tower of Ivan the Great, which Boris Godunov had erected on a hill inside the Kremlin at the very beginning of this period. This tower was intended (like another massive bell tower built by Patriarch Nikon just outside Moscow in the latter part of the century) to be the crowning glory of a "New Jerusalem" on Russian soil: a center of civilization built in partial imitation of the old Jerusalem, and with enough embellishment to suggest the New. The tower in the Kremlin provided the shelter from which the fundamentalist Old Believers later hurled stones at official church processions.⁹¹ These defenders of the old order resisted the cannon fire of government troops for eight years in their northern monastic redoubt at Solovetsk. After this last, storied bastion fell, they spread out to the provinces to watch for the approach of the Tsar's "legions of Antichrist" from the bell towers of wooden churches, whence they sounded the signal to set fire to the church and the true believers within.⁹²

The later Romanov tsars revealed both uneasy consciences and bad

taste by filling the ancient monasteries with votive baroque bell towers. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the older bell towers had been largely displaced, restrictions placed on the excessive ringing of bells, and their special position in worship services challenged by the intrusion of organs and other instruments into Russian liturgical music.

Yet the echo of bells lingered on. They ring again majestically at the end of the coronation scene in Musorgsky's *Boris Godunov*; and the theological hint of redemption offered by their "ringing through" (*perezvon*) on the eve of festive days is recaptured by the little barking dog of that name that leads Alyosha's youthful comrades to reconciliation at the end of Dostoevsky's *Brothers Karamazov*.

In the world of politics, too, the bell called up memories. Bells had been used in some of the proud, Westward-looking cities of medieval Russia to summon the popular assembly (*veche*). The final silencing of the assembly bell of Novgorod in 1478 ended the tradition of relative freedom from imperial authority and partial popular rule which until then Novgorod had shared with many commercial cities of the West. The ideal of non-despotic, representative government impelled the early-nineteenth-century reformer to

take myself in imagination back to Novgorod. I hear the ringing bell of the popular assembly . . . I throw the chains off my feet, and to the "Who goes there?" of the guard, I proudly reply: "a free citizen of Novgorod!"⁹³

and the romantic poet to

sound forth like the bell in the assembly tower in the days of the people's celebrations and misfortunes.⁹⁴

When, a few years later, lyricism turned to anguish, Gogol gave a new, more mysterious quality to the image in one of the most famous passages in all Russian literature. Likening Russia to a speeding troika (carriage with three horses) near the end of *Dead Souls*, he asks its destination. But "there was no answer save the bell pouring forth marvellous sound."

A prophetic answer came a few years later in the prefatory poem to the first issue of Russia's first illegal revolutionary journal—appropriately called *Kolokol* (*The Bell*). The long-silent social conscience of Russia will henceforth—promised the editor, Alexander Herzen—sound out like a bell

swinging back and forth with a tone which shall not cease to reverberate until . . . a joyful, orderly, and quietly heroic bell begins to ring in every man.⁹⁵

But Herzen's summoning bell was soon drowned out by the shrill sounds of the *Nabat*: the special alarm bell traditionally used in times of fire or attack and the name of the first Russian periodical urging the formation of a Jacobin recolonization elite.⁹⁶ Tkachev, the editor of *Nabat*, was vindicated by the eventual victory of Lenin's professional revolutionaries. But under Bolshevism, all bells fell silent—their function to some extent taken up by the hypnotic sounding of machines, which announced the coming of an earthly rather than a heavenly paradise.

The enduring Russian fascination with cannon was evidenced in Ivan IV's storied storming of Kazan in 1552; the shooting out of the cannon by a Moscow mob in 1606 of the remains of the False Dmitry, the only foreigner ever to reign in the Kremlin; the determination of Chaikovsky to score real cannon fire into his overture commemorating the defeat of Napoleon in 1812; and in the later tsars' use of a hundred cannon to announce their anointment during a coronation.⁹⁷ Stalin was neurotically preoccupied with massed artillery formations throughout the Second World War; and his military pronouncements conferred only on the artillery the adjective *grozny* ("terrible" or "dread") traditionally applied to Ivan IV.⁹⁸ Subsequent Soviet success with rockets can be seen as an extension of this long-time interest. There seems a kind of historic justice to the interdependence in the late 1950's between the dazzling effects of cosmic cannoneering and the renewed promises of a classless millennium.

The Communist world that had come into being by then corresponded less to the prophecies of Karl Marx than to those of an almost unknown Russian contemporary, Nicholas Il'in.⁹⁹ While the former spent his life as an uprooted intellectual in Berlin, Paris, and London, the latter spent his as a patriotic artillery officer in Russian central Asia. Whereas the former looked to the rational emergence of a new, basically Western European proletariat under German leadership, the latter looked to the messianic arrival of a new Eurasian religious civilization under Russian tutelage. At the very time Marx was writing his *Communist Manifesto* for German revolutionaries refuged in France and Belgium, Il'in was proclaiming his *Tidings of Zion* to Russian sectarians in Siberia. Il'in's strange teachings reflect the childlike love of cannon, the primitive ethical dualism, and the suppressed fear of Europe, which were all present in Russian thinking. His followers marched to such hymns as "The Bomb of the Divine Artillery"; divided the world into men of Jehovah and of Satan (*Iegovisty i Satanisty*), those sitting at the right and left hand of God (*desnye i oshuinye*); and taught that a new empire of complete brotherhood and untold wealth would be formed by the followers of Jehovah along a vast railroad stretching from the Middle East through Russia to south China.

In a similar, but even more visionary vein, Nicholas Fedorov, an ascetic and self-effacing librarian in late nineteenth-century Moscow, prophesied that a new fusion of science and faith would lead even to the physical resuscitation of dead ancestors. Russia was to give birth in concert with China to a new Eurasian civilization, which was to use artillery to regulate totally the climate and surrounding atmosphere of this world, and thrust its citizens into the stratosphere to colonize others. His vision of cosmic revolution fascinated both Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, and influenced a number of Promethean dreamers in the earliest Soviet planning agencies.¹⁰⁰ His most inspired followers fled, however, from Bolshevik Russia to Harbin, Manchuria, to form a quasi-religious commune, which was in turn engulfed when the wave of Leninist, political revolution spread from their native to their adopted land.

Russian history is full of such prophetic anticipations, just as it is of reappearing symbols and fixations. That which has fallen before axe or cannon has often buried itself into the consciousness, if not the conscience, of the executioner. That which is purged from the memory lives on in the subconscious; that which is expunged from written records survives in oral folklore. Indeed, one finds in modern Russian history much of the same recurrence of basic themes that one finds in the unrefined early traditions of bell ringing and popular singing.

It may be, of course, that these echoes from childhood no longer reverberate in the adult Russia of today. Even if real, these sounds may be as enigmatic as the ringing of Gogol's troika; or perhaps only a dying echo: the *perezvon* that remains misleadingly audible after the bell has already fallen silent. To determine how much of Old Russian culture may have survived, one must leave aside these recurring symbols from the remote past and turn to the historical record, which begins in the fourteenth century to provide a rich if bewildering flow of accomplishment that extends without interruption to the present. Having looked at the heritage, environment, and early artifacts of Russian culture, one must now turn to the rise of Muscovy and its dramatic confrontation with a Western world in the throes of the Renaissance and Reformation.

ESSAY | William Safire

Bush's 'New Path'

Emboldened by the success of his scheme to subvert NATO with a Russo-German Entente, Mr. Gorbachev has just issued an ultimatum: Unless the Western alliance drops its intention to modernize the short-range missile that helps Europe offset Soviet military superiority, the Soviet Union will violate the intermediate-range treaty it signed with such fanfare only last year.

How's that for blustering arrogance? Unless he gets his way — unless we give up our right secured in previous treaties to maintain a credible local nuclear deterrent — then forget about Mr. Reagan's I.N.F. deal. This "new thinking" is revealed to be the same old duplicity: while the U.S. considers treaties to carry the force of law, Mr. Gorbachev has just vividly demonstrated he does not consider his nation bound by treaty any more than did his predecessors.

Does he expect to get away with threatening unilateral abrogation? Yes. He counts on his apologists in the West's disarmament lobby: West Germany's devious Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who sees a Fourth Reich rising from NATO's ashes to dominate Europe's economy; the grand old American negotiator Paul Nitze, whose ill-advised "walk in the woods" would have given the Soviets what they later had to trade real missiles for in the now-threatened I.N.F. treaty; the brilliant Nitze biographer and disciple, Strobe Talbott of Time magazine; Democratic Senators Sam Nunn and Joseph Biden, grabbing any device to whack at executive power; and assorted old mutual-assured-destructionaries.

Adding to the weight of the Gorbachev intimidation, and contributing to the systematic snookering of Secretary of State Baker in his foreign travels, is support for the Soviet no-nuke position from the ambush of deep background by Ronald Reagan. The former President, irritated at the contrast in style ostentatiously shown by his hands-on, in-touch successor, has let it be known that Mr. Bush is failing to capitalize on the momentum of détente established in the Gorbachev-Reagan embraces.

Thus does the Long-trusting Left combine with the Newly-entranced Right to squeeze the Sensibly-cautious Center. Resisting the stampede to denude our defenses, President Bush last week brought forth the fruit of his four-month strategic review in an important speech at Texas A & M.

"Containment worked," he said, crediting the recent Soviet reforms to internal contradictions and Western resolve rather than any Kremlin change of heart. After dutifully touch-

ing the bases of hope ("we are approaching the conclusion of an historic postwar struggle") he proposed that we move "beyond containment" to a "new path" — one that will respond to realistic change in Soviet behavior where it most endangers freedom. "Promises are never enough," he warned, and listed the means to earn trust: reduce the overwhelming Soviet forces, free Eastern Europe, stop supporting terror in the Middle East and subversion in Latin America, and "achieve a lasting political pluralism and respect for human rights."

This unsentimental better-safe-than-sorry approach was not what Mr. Gorbachev or the world's *détenteniks* wanted to hear. They wanted a "bold new initiative" — specifically, a pre-

Not what *détenteniks* wanted.

emptive concession to strip our forces of nuclear arms and make it possible for Mr. Gorbachev to maintain military superiority on the cheap.

But the Bush Administration's prudent strategy does not throw away containment's gains. To his meat-and-potatoes approach, he felt the need to add an "open skies" sauce, which will be useful in verifying conventional arms cuts; the central thrust, however, is to press for what is in the free world's interest: free the captive nations and peoples, permit market forces to introduce prosperity and stop causing trouble around the world.

The no-nonsense strategy, previewed in Mr. Bush's recent speech about Poland, drew on the thoughtful historical analysis made public April 1 by Robert Gates, deputy national security adviser, who reminded us "for 70 years we repeatedly have seen a system in crisis proclaim reform and turn to the West for help while the essential features of that system at the end of the day remained unchanged."

I remember writing hail-détente speeches for President Nixon; this time around, I'm for Mr. Bush's "new path," requiring the steady earning of trust.

Mr. Gorbachev has already succeeded in fraying the free world at its German edge, and Mr. Genscher is in effect sending the Americans home. Good luck, Europe, on your next treaty with the East: the Soviet dictator has just reserved the right in advance to abrogate it at will. □

If Winston Churchill had not already called Russia a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, many Soviets might be tempted today to use the phrase to describe their view of the United States. In any event, they are striving mightily to penetrate this veil of mystery to learn how America works. This is a remarkable turn-around from the days when Soviet officials claimed to know exactly how we operated -- the ruling circles and the military-industrial complex squeezed profits out of the hapless worker and that was that. Like a dead mackerel in the moonlight, they said, capitalism shines and stinks.

While these canards are probably still quacking lustily over some parts of the Soviet Union, I did not hear them from a wide and diverse group of Soviet government and party officials, intellectuals and cultural figures that I met with on my recent trip. In fact, I heard the opposite.

First, that America "works." It works in the economic sense -- the standard of living is high, the stores are filled with goods, there are no orchards in Central Park but somehow the millions of people who live and work in Manhattan get orange juice every morning. America also works in the political and social sense. One Soviet put it this way:

There are things in America which you take for granted which are burning issues for us. You have lobbyists and powerful interest groups in your country and yet the voice of the people can always be heard. How do you do that? You have a constitution that has lasted more than two centuries with just a handful of amendments. We're working on our fourth constitution in 72 years. How do you do that?

Second, although Soviets may always have had an abundance of facts and figures about us at their fingertips, they have not understood what makes it all hang together; they have not seen the soul in the American body politic.

I have been impressed in my meetings, official and unofficial, here and in Moscow and in Tbilisi, with Soviet willingness, even eagerness, to do business with the United States. Whether the field is educational exchange, agriculture, the working of parliamentary commissions or the nuances of constitutional law -- almost no American proposal is rejected out of hand. Soviets are ready to talk, to discuss and very often to act in surprisingly open ways.

Two threads run through all of the conversations and requests -- one is the need for information, the other is the need for "know-how." Like people after a drought, Soviets thirst for facts, data, figures -- for information -- about what is going on in the world around them. Soviets want to know how we do what we do. They ask for pamphlets, books, speakers, seminars, exhibits, satellite television programs, radio programs -- every possible means of communication -- to explain the basic mechanisms and values of American society and politics. Many of the most urgent calls are for assistance with "gut" issues -- food, housing, medicine. The Soviet Union has the same basic resources we do -- they have arable land, they have timber for houses, they have concrete factories without end, they have physicians and scientists the equal of any. But Soviets look at the end product and see in America a much higher standard of living -- better housing, a better and more varied diet, better and more sophisticated health care. Clearly, something different is going on. It is this "something different" that Soviets want to learn.

These trends -- openness to discussion, desire for information, eagerness to learn -- are certainly positive. The sheer volume of such requests, the eloquence with which they are stated and the historical implications for Soviet society should not, however, deafen us to several troubling notes that sound throughout this dialogue.

First, of course, is that we have no interest in helping Soviet authorities to merely modernize or streamline their control. Our interest is and can only be in honest, permanent, systemic change toward freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Second, the danger continues of equating information with understanding. The new, more accurate information ushered in by glasnost still does not guarantee understanding or respect for the American system, nor the variety of news and independence of thought that identifies a healthy society.

I believe that many Soviets think that "how-to" information will somehow magically make their troubles go away. As we Americans know all too well, there is no magic wand. Americans have not had it "easy," and American history is not a smooth, uninterrupted procession of a nation from one triumph to another and to ever higher levels of prosperity for all. It is not enough for the people of the USSR to have the tools, they must also understand the spirit that animates the craftsman and the artist.

Without asking or expecting the Soviets to abandon their values or traditions -- we must, nonetheless, ask and expect them to

begin to foster and appreciate the values of individuality, freedom and entrepreneurship. In short -- the spirit of America is what they must grasp.

We don't plan to sell them the legendary rope with which they will hang us and we have no magic wand to wave over their troubles and so dispel them -- what we can and are offering now is our hand.

BLOCK

Jennings: Felix Block, the U.S. diplomat suspected of spying for the Soviets, wants to find out what the State Department has on him. The Department is trying to fire him. Block has now demanded the government turn over to him all the information it has gathered as a result of electronic surveillance. (ABC-4)

XV-15 AIRPLANE

Jennings reports that the makers of the XV-15, a cross between a plane and a helicopter, staged a giant photo opportunity in a bid to drum up support for its successor, the V-22 Osprey. (ABC-7)

PRESIDENT'S EYES

Rather: President Bush tried to make light of his eye problem today as he headed off to the hospital to get a second opinion on the recent diagnosis that he has the disease called glaucoma in his left eye. Bush has been taking daily medication for it. The two glaucoma experts who saw Bush today decided to take him off medication, at least for now.

[TV COVERAGE of President Bush on the South Lawn, straining his eyes at the camera, then smiling.]

White House officials say Bush's vision is not impaired and that the President was not having side effects from the drugs. (CBS-6)

AIDS HOME TEST

Jennings: It soon may be possible to be tested for the AIDS virus in the privacy of your home. The FDA today reversed its longstanding idea of home test kits for AIDS and will now consider approving them.

ABC's George Strait reports that the test costs about \$15 and is easy to perform. First a person pricks a finger then presses it on specially coated filter paper. The sample is then sent to a laboratory and identified only by a code number, no names. That's a crucial issue for millions who have been reluctant to get tested. It's because the FDA would like to see more people get early testing that it changed its mind and will consider approving these kits. The biggest issue now is counseling. A person would be told test results and counseled over the phone. AIDS activists oppose home tests because they believe a person needs face-to-face counseling to fully understand the risks associated with AIDS. Last month the FDA was sued because it had refused for more than a year to even consider approving AIDS home test kits. The agency denies that the suit had anything to do with its about-face, which has opened the door to a billion-dollar market for AIDS home testing. (ABC-5)

Andrews continues:

(**Rep. Cox:** "Only if Gorbachev wants to follow in Stalin's footsteps does he have any right to be in Lithuania.")

The President was in no mood today to defend himself against the attempted history lesson.

(**President Bush** in the Roosevelt Room: "I don't need any defense. The policy stance I've taken has had strong support from the American people, and that's who I work for.")

Bush, in fact, sees Gorbachev as the opposite of Stalin or Hitler, which is why his Administration today repeated it will not fight for Lithuania if that risks the changes Gorbachev has allowed in Eastern Europe.

(**Secretary Baker:** "It's in our interests and in the interests of the free world that the Soviet Union is leading Eastern Europe. We don't want to do anything that might adversely affect that process.")

The White House says it is pushing the Soviets to negotiate with Lithuania, but Soviet officials today grew tougher, not more lenient, in their preconditions for holding talks. Landsbergis is saying that after Bush decided not to move against Moscow history could have predicted that. (CBS-5)

TRADE AGREEMENT

(**Jennings:** Another trade agreement with Japan. This one covers U.S. wood products. The Japanese will change their laws, lower their tariffs on imported wood, which could increase U.S. sales there by at least \$1 billion a year. The move makes it unlikely the Bush Administration will now cite Japan as an unfair trading partner. (ABC-9)

(**CBS's Deborah Potter** reports that Administration officials say there's a new spirit of compromise in Tokyo, but on Capitol Hill the reaction is skeptical.

(**Sen. Bentsen:** "The problem is with all these agreements that in the past we've had the agreements and there's been no results. We thought we came home with a so-called silver bullet agreement and finally found out we were firing blanks.")

Even if today's agreement does hold up there are more complaints about Japanese discrimination against other U.S. products, from semiconductors to auto parts and recorded music. Some in Congress want the Bush Administration to keep Japan on the trade hit list. But indications are that won't happen.

(**U.S. Trade Representative Hills:** "I think Japan has moved further this year than perhaps any other country.")

Administration officials fear that making new accusations of unfair trading practices by Japan might undo all the recent progress. But Japan still accounts for almost half the U.S. trade deficit, and many in Congress believe this is no time to let up the pressure. (CBS-7)

LAFONTAINE

(**Jennings:** One of West Germany's leading socialist politicians has been stabbed and seriously hurt. Oscar Lafontaine was stabbed in the neck at a political rally. He's a candidate to be chancellor of West Germany, running against Chancellor Kohl. The woman who stabbed him was arrested by police who say they do not know her motive. (ABC-3, NBC-9, CBS-3)

Bush Tells Fears On Baltic States

President Bush raised the image of the bloody Soviet crackdown in Hungary three decades ago as he told leaders of Baltic-American ethnic groups Wednesday that he cannot do more to back independence movements in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

As if to underscore Bush's fears, Soviet President Gorbachev warned in broadcast remarks Wednesday that secession movements within the Soviet Union could lead to "such bloody carnage that we won't be able to crawl out of it."...

Any move to redraw boundaries "would pit all peoples and all nations against each other and bring about a situation in this society the likes of which has never been witnessed by our country or by the world," Gorbachev said.

(David Lauter, Los Angeles Times, A1)

SOVIET RADICALS ASSAIL PARTY CONSERVATIVES

MOSCOW -- Radical reformers within the Communist Party responded angrily to efforts by the party leadership to oust them, and some appealed to other members to join them in an immediate break and the formation of a new party....

"We call upon all Communists to leave the party, to stop paying dues and to join the new party of the Democratic Platform," Igor Chubais, a leading member of the group, said, urging radicals to pre-empt the planned party action against them....

Chubais contended that [an open letter from the Central Committee attacking the Democratic Platform as opposing socialism] showed that there had been "a conservative coup" led by Yegor Ligachev.... This meant in turn that "democrats should pull out before they are purged," he said.

(L.A. Times, Washington Post, A38)

GORBACHEV SAYS RADICAL COMMUNISTS WANT CAPITALISM

MOSCOW -- Soviet President gorbachev has denounced a major bloc of Communist Party radicals, accusing them of wanting to restore capitalism....

Gorbachev, in comments made to a Communist youth organization meeting Tuesday and shown on television Wednesday, said radicals in the Democratic Platform were essentially looking for a way to further their careers.

"If you listen to these politicians who defend this platform, one can realize they want to defend their political ambitions," he said.

"They are calling us to a different social system, to capitalism," Gorbachev said. "One should see that."

(Jonathan Lyons, Reuter)

Thursday, April 12, 1990 -- A-4

GORBACHEV WANTS 'RADICAL REFORMS'

MOSCOW -- Thirty-eight of the participants in the World Media Conference met with Soviet President Gorbachev Wednesday and heard him promise that "radical reforms" will soon produce "real deeds."

...According to two participants, Gorbachev seemed surprised by the passion and tone of the remarks, and replied that he agreed that serious mistakes had been made.

The Soviet Union had fought for a Soviet revolution, but it was not achieved, Gorbachev said. The only way for the Soviet Union to go now was to a mixed economy, freedom of the press, the rule of law and freedom of religion, [he said].

(AP, Washington Times, A1)

SOVIET GENERALS BLAMED FOR ARMS SHIFT

Restive Soviet generals, angered by concessions made in Moscow and smarting over a range of domestic issues, pressured their government into recanting two agreements in arms control talks last week, a top Administration official says.

"We hear there was a fairly explosive military reaction," the official said, referring to understandings reached during Secretary Baker's February talks in the Kremlin where the active duty military was not present.

But, the official said, last week there was a never-before-seen general from the Soviet General Staff in meetings in Washington. At those sessions, the Soviets reversed ground on positions taken in Moscow on air-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles.

(William Beecher, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Washington Times, A5)

KISSINGER SAYS U.S. NOT WELL PREPARED FOR EVENTS IN SOVIET UNION, EUROPE

PITTSBURGH -- Former Secretary of State Kissinger Wednesday said the U.S. was not well prepared for recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe because it was practicing old-time diplomacy.

"If you compare what American leaders said in 1950 American objectives were and what has happened, it is a spectacular success," Kissinger said. "We have achieved practically everything we set out to do. Maybe not for the reasons we set out to do it, but we've achieved it.

"Now we are in a curious position, which is that the things we did in the '50s fitted in very well with traditional American expectations of how foreign policy should be conducted," said Kissinger. "As a result of our success, we now face a world for which we are not particularly well-prepared." ...

Kissinger...said he is not against how the Bush Administration is handling the situation between the Soviet Union and Lithuania. "I don't disagree with the Administration's approach," Kissinger said. "I might not make every single statement they made, but that's another tactical issue."

(Chuck Moody, UPI)

-more-

Essay

Charles Krauthammer

Don't Cash the Peace Dividend

The country, the Congress and the media are demanding a peace dividend. Papa Bush sternly refuses to give it to them. For that he is assailed as being out of sync, out of touch, overprudent, weird even.

Papa Bush is right.

There is nothing wrong with a gradual reduction of American forces in response to the Soviet eclipse. There may even be some merit to skipping one generation of weapons and investing instead in research and development of the next generation (as suggested by former Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle). Both of these approaches, however, rest on the premise that the U.S. must maintain a large, technologically advanced, worldwide military force. The logic of the peace dividend is the opposite: now that the cold war is won, it is time to demobilize.

Postwar demobilization is a very American idea. We have a penchant for demobilizing the day after the war is won. After World War I, we rapidly demobilized and disengaged from Europe. With no countervailing American force to contain the rise of the monstrous totalitarianisms of the '30s, the way was cleared for World War II.

Which we also won. And after which we demobilized again: 9 million men in the first year after the Japanese surrender. Stalin was slower to embrace the pleasures of civilian life. He kept 3 million men under arms, the U.S. half that number. Stalin kept a massive occupation force in Europe. The U.S. decided this time that leaving Europe entirely would be a mistake, so, having radically demobilized, we chose to stay on the cheap—with nuclear weapons, an expediency that kept the world on the nuclear precipice for 40 years.

We are now, once again but without realizing it, in an immediate postwar period. The cold war was world war in every respect but one. It was a great struggle between two massive alliances conducted on every continent and at every level of struggle—economic, political and military—save one: the existence of nuclear weapons outlawed direct military engagement between the great powers. Which is why the cold war is not recognized for what it was—World War III. And in 1989 it ended just like the first two: we won.

Seeing the cold war as World War III is not just a metaphor. It helps to explain the current rush to demobilize. We are again in the grip of a postwar euphoria, and our instinct is to do what we have always done: demobilize first, ask questions later.

It is in the American soul. Contrary to the fantasies of the recent left about an imperial Amerika, it is hard to think of a great power with less taste for empire than the United States. Empire? The most universal response to the hegemony that our Asian and European alliances brought us is the chorus of Washington voices demanding allied "burden sharing." For Americans, empire is a pain.

Empire? Even when we do invade, whether it is Normandy or Panama, the first question to arise is always, When do we get out? Luigi Barzini once observed that for America interventionism is often just an expression of "impatient isolationism," wanting to get the job over with and back to, "in the words of Theodore Roosevelt (who deplored it vigorously), 'the soft and easy enjoyment of material comforts.'"

Americans like to think—they thought so in 1919, in 1945 and now again in 1990—that having conquered the great evil of the day, they have conquered evil, that having defeated today's mortal threat, they have banished threat.

"Who's the enemy?" a reporter pointedly asked President Bush at a recent press conference.

The implication being, "If you can't name the enemy, there is none. And if there is no enemy, why \$300 billion for defense?"

It is true that no one can give a precise answer as to where the next threat will come from. That does not mean—as the peace dividenders of today loudly pretend—that there is none.

To assume that there is no threat is to assume, first, that the Soviet threat is completely dead, that even a disintegrating Soviet empire, home to 25,000 nuclear warheads, will not disturb the peace. History does not support the proposition that collapsing empires go quietly.

It is to assume, second, that the Soviet threat cannot be succeeded by a Russian threat. A Russia shorn of empire and taken over by embittered nationalists could easily revert to the kind of dangerous revanchism that seized other defeated powers in this century, notably interwar Germany.

It is to assume, finally, that threat, even if banished from the East, will not come from elsewhere. We simply have no idea where Germany, China, Japan are headed. We don't know how the Balkans will evolve. We do know that with the Soviet decline other forces will occupy the vacuum, among them long-dormant nationalisms and newly awakened Islamic fundamentalism, neither of which is necessarily friendly to American interests or values. We also know that in a high-tech world, dozens of regimes are acquiring weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) and the means to deliver them to almost any place on earth.

It is naive and highly dangerous, therefore, to pretend that with the end of this latest war, war is abolished. Yet that is what we want to believe. In 1943 Secretary of State Cordell Hull returned from the Moscow Conference that set the foundation for a United Nations and told a joint session of Congress that as the provisions of the conference were carried out, "there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

Sound familiar?





ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY MARC ROSENTHAL



Illustrations by Janusz Kapusta

Albany's Deficit

is not that states sud-
ver multi-hundred-mil-
lions but that the defi-
cits have been modest rela-
tive of their budgets: less
than even in celebrated
states that to Federal defi-
cits in the mid-1980's, were 25 to
30 percent of the total budget.

State deficits are excep-
tional to cope with. In many
states, financing of public serv-
ices has increased as Federal aid has
decreased and local property
taxes are limited by the voters.

Charge

an
ould

spending cutbacks are
more than ever.
Levels of government, the
more than a decade has been
cut. In the 60's and 70's, states
cut taxes or increased the
taxes in the face of spend-
ing and economic difficul-
ties, no matter how activist
the government has been exempt from
the "blat" of the past decade.
Governors or legislatures
cannot cut recent tax cuts as
feasible, or even hono-
rarily with deficits.

way out? Yes. State gov-
ernments — changes in com-
merce, gyrations in securities
and federal tax legislation,

whatever — can and will occasionally
result in serious shortfalls.
They should not assume that even the
best revenue forecasters will predict
these events or their revenue
impact.

The implication is that the state tax
system can't be enacted in Year 1 and
frozen for the rest of eternity — or for
a governor's hoped-for three terms
(which may be the eternity that
counts). A state tax system with give,
that can be adjusted in increments
without political battles fought as if
Western civilization were at stake, is
necessary in a volatile world.

Within the adult memories of some
people still alive today (that is, way
back in the benighted 1950's), it was
common for states like New York
that levied a personal income tax to
set rates that were considered perma-
nent. Each year, however, they
enacted small percentage reductions
or surcharges to assure a balanced
budget. People expected that these
adjustments would be temporary,
even though the reduction or sur-
charge did not change each and every
year.

How would this work today in, for
example, New York State? The state
confronts a budget gap that may be
more than \$1.5 billion in the next fis-
cal year. A 10 percent surcharge on
individual and corporate income
taxes (your liability under the tax
rate structure, which includes a
scheduled reduction, plus 10 percent)
effective at the beginning of the fiscal
year would raise about that amount.

If the economy recovers swiftly
and revenue forecasts turn out to be
pessimistic, the surcharge could be
reduced later in the year, or in the
next fiscal year — or turned into a
percentage reduction, from the regu-
lar rate schedule, for the next year.
The point is that the basic tax struc-
ture has some permanence, while the
inevitable marginal variations in eco-
nomic conditions are accommodated.

Hardly a bizarre idea, but one that
ordinary people can understand, and
live with. □

ESSAY | William Safire

Baltics to Baghdad

WASHINGTON

From the Baltics to Baghdad, the
umbrellas of appeasement are
unfurling.

"Lasting change can come to the
Soviet Union," said a powerful Voice
of America commentary on Feb. 15,
"when citizens no longer need to fear
massive surveillance — and worse —
from the K.G.B. Secret police are also
entrenched in other countries, such as
China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Libya, Cuba and Albania.

"The rulers of these countries hold
power by force and fear," was the ac-
curate message beamed by V.O.A.,
"not by the consent of the governed.
But as East Europeans demonstrated
so dramatically in 1989, the tide of
history is against such rulers. The
1990's should belong not to the dicta-
tors and secret police, but to the peo-
ple."

These words were labeled a "call to
revolution" by Saddam Hussein,
dictator of Iraq. He conveyed his dis-
pleasure through four cables from
our Ambassador in Baghdad to John
Kelly, the diplomat who had run the
Poindexter "back-channel" arms
bribery of Iran, now elevated by
President Bush to run the State De-
partment's Near Eastern bureau.

Mr. Kelly joined the King of Saudi
Arabia in supporting Saddam's pro-
test and denounced the V.O.A.'s truth-
ful words at a morning meeting on
Feb. 17 chaired by Secretary of State
Baker. Our pragmatic Secretary told
the U.S.I.A. representative at the
meeting to bring the V.O.A. editorial-
ists to heel.

The hangman of Baghdad had rea-
son to be edgy. His nuclear missile
program was set back by a huge ex-
plosion last Aug. 17 that sources tell
me may have killed hundreds of tech-
nicians at Al Hillah, south of Bagh-
dad. He also may have suspected that
his efforts to smuggle nuclear detona-
tors out of the U.S. were imperiled by
U.S. Customs agents in California;
their trap was sprung this week.

The State Department, which could
not have been ignorant of Iraq's at-
tempt to steal our nuclear secrets,
has long sought to appease Saddam.
Accordingly, the dictator was as-
sured that no more such broadcasts
would trouble him, and U.S.I.A. was
instructed to clear all editorials — in
writing — with State Department
censors.

The close supervision was extended
to another area: the Baltics. "We
were told by U.S.I.A. that State
wanted no editorials at all on Lithua-
nia," a Voice employee tells me.
(Richard Carlson, the Voice director,
loyally insists no new pressure was
applied.)

Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker have evi-

dently decided that "peace for our
time" would best be achieved by
hearing only promises of no use of
force from Moscow and by ignoring
the pleas for support of a small nation
struggling for freedom.

The newly empowered superczar,
Mr. Gorbachev, ordered the Red
Army to arrest "deserters." We must
refuse to accept Moscow's descrip-
tion of these brave young Lithuanians
as deserters; on the contrary, they
are patriots resisting impressment
by a foreign power, in the face of
likely beatings, torture and worse.

Mr. Bush, supported by Jimmy
Carter and unopposed by Congres-
sional leaders, refuses to assert even
moral support of the nonviolent Lith-
uanians.

Russian tanks and helicopters are
roaring through a nation that wants

Silence is also a gamble.

only to be let alone; Moscow is order-
ing out foreign observers, to prevent
pictures of any crackdown. Young
Lithuanians are being dragged away
by the occupying army — with thou-
sands more to be forcibly conscripted
into hated foreign uniforms in coming
weeks — and the U.S. Government is
worried that any expression of sup-
port for the oppressed nation would
"inflare the situation."

Spare us the apologia that nice-guy
Mr. Gorbachev is being forced to use
force by his mean army leaders and
his unruly Baltic subjects. One man,
has assumed the power to rule by de-
cree, and he has decreed that the
Soviet empire will not give up its
Stalinist conquests.

We cannot liberate the captive na-
tions by force of arms, but we can
take a stand on the principle of self-
determination. Would it harm Mr.
Bush's quiet diplomacy — his "mas-
terly inactivity" — for him to publicly
praise the nonviolent stand of Presi-
dent Landsbergis? Would it really in-
flame the Kremlin for the American
President to use the word "independ-
ence" in speaking about the goal of
negotiations?

To Moscow and to Vilnius as well as
to Baghdad, we should rebroadcast
the V.O.A.'s forbidden message:
"The 1990's should not belong to the
dictators and the secret police, but to
the people." □

DIPLOMACY**THE WILSON QUARTERLY**

NEW YEAR'S 1989

Pg. 39

Soviets and Americans

Visiting the Wilson Center, Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov recently warned that back home Mikhail Gorbachev was amassing personal power, seeking "democratic change through undemocratic means." The eventual outcome, Sakharov added, was "anybody's guess." Many Westerners have been more optimistic about Gorbachev's reforms and their impact on East-West tensions and arms control; Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sees an end to the Cold War. Some American analysts are less sanguine, noting that the Kremlin still seems bent on dividing the West even as it promises troop cuts, and withdraws from Afghanistan. Here our contributors look at the Soviet-American relationship, past, present, and future, after four long decades.

IS THE COLD WAR OVER?*by Peter W. Rodman*

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, there have been extensive changes in the practice and theory of Soviet foreign policy.

Two recent developments stand out. First is the INF Treaty (signed at the Washington Summit in December 1987), in which the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed not only to the unprecedented destruction of an entire class of nuclear missiles but also to an equally unprecedented system of highly intrusive on-site inspection. Second is the Soviet pledge to withdraw from Afghanistan, and to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 troops by 1991.

But these are only the most dramatic aspects of an expanding pattern of cooperative endeavors and seemingly more con-

ciliatory Soviet policies. In arms control, East and West are negotiating, or are about to negotiate, a comprehensive agenda ranging from banning chemical weapons, to stabilizing the conventional military balance in Europe, to controlling the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. We see the Soviets not only committing to a withdrawal from Afghanistan, but also encouraging diplomatic compromises in Angola and Cambodia, and engaging in a regular dialogue with us on other Third World conflicts. We see them establishing relations or improving relations with countries that used to be off-limits (the Republic of Korea, Israel, the Gulf Arabs); we see their foreign minister visiting parts of the world (Latin America, Southeast Asia) where no prede-

COLD WAR...CONTINUED

cessor had trod. Moreover, the Soviets now are showing more support for international institutions they once mistrusted. In the United Nations, they are not only paying their overdue bills but also praising the UN peacekeeping functions they once tried to block; they are even seeking to join the GATT and the IMF, and have established official ties to the European Community.

Soviet pronouncements on foreign policy speak of fundamental change. We read explicit renunciations of "class struggle" as the dominant Soviet theory of international relations, now deemed inadequate in a world of increasing interdependence and nuclear danger. We read their own blunt critiques of past errors, including Third World adventures and the military buildup of the 1970s, which provoked the sharp Western response of the 1980s. The Soviets talk, remarkably, about ensuring accountability by such means as legislative oversight and a lessening of secrecy. Their diplomats, the younger generation, mostly, but also some veterans, have a new style; they are more sophisticated and easier to talk to, no longer tied up in the formulaic strait-jackets of the past.

We in the West owe it to ourselves to take advantage of the new opportunities thus provided to settle some outstanding issues and scale back the military danger. Yet we must also ask ourselves how this all came about.

The Soviets' own analyses give us the clues. Embarked as they are on an ambitious program of internal reform, it is natural, as they have said, to seek a period of calm, a "breathing space" in the international environment. And, just as their internal reform is prompted by the failure of the economic and political system, so a good part of the Soviets' "new thinking" on world affairs is prompted by an explicit recognition of the failure of Moscow's previous policies. Despite our big arms buildup, the Soviets are saying, it seems the arms race cannot be won. Our deployment of SS-20s only provoked a Western reaction. Our own and our allies' attempts to win in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia were frustrated. The world's capitalist economy is too strong to defeat or ignore; we must link up with it and seek to benefit from it.

Last October, a senior foreign ministry official, Andrey V. Kozyrev, lamented Moscow's aid commitments and other burdens in the Third World: "[T]he aid itself is only the tip of the iceberg," he wrote. "Our direct and indirect involvement in regional conflicts led to colossal losses, by increasing general international tension, justifying the arms race, and hindering the establishment of mutually advantageous ties with the West." Kozyrev questioned the wisdom, for the Soviet Union, of using military instruments in support of "regimes which declare themselves to be progressive but which far from always possess an adequate democratic base in the country."

It is never easy for any government to abandon unsuccessful policies. The new Soviet leaders deserve credit, at the very least, for their decisiveness in acting on a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of some of Moscow's earlier efforts.

The Soviets seem to have concluded during the 1970s that what they call the "correlation of forces" was shifting in their favor. It was a time of American self-absorption in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate. French statesman Maurice Couve de Murville, on the floor of the National Assembly on May 6, 1976, warned that this American abdication was destabilizing the international system. Soviet power was growing, he said, but this was not new; the more striking new factor was "the American crisis": the domestic loss of confidence and the executive-legislative stalemate, which resulted in a paralysis of power. In addition, the West was reeling from increased oil prices—the "energy shock."

In response, the Soviets and their allies overreached. A Cuban expeditionary force transported and advised by the Soviets tipped the scales in the Angolan civil war in 1975 (after the U.S. Congress cut off aid to two non-Communist liberation movements). Cuban and Soviet forces later intervened in Ethiopia. Starting in 1977, the Soviet Union deployed the triple-warhead SS-20 missiles targeted at both Europe and Asia. A Communist coup in Afghanistan served as prelude to Soviet intervention. Hanoi's troops invaded Cambodia in 1978. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, who came to power in 1979 as leaders of a broad coalition against the dictator Somoza, began to

□ **THE SHOVEL GAP:** "The Soviet Union has a nationwide, long-standing, well-organized and funded civil defense program under military control . . ." begins a 1988 pamphlet issued by the U.S. Office of Civil Defense. That must be news to the Armenians, whose post-earthquake agony has been prolonged by a botched relief effort. For years hard-liners in the United States have posited the existence of a massive Soviet civil defense effort, citing it as yet more proof that the Soviets were both pre-

pared and willing to withstand a nuclear exchange. The corollary to their argument, of course, is that we should beef up our own civil defense effort or, better yet, our own retaliatory forces. Maybe, maybe not. But the chaos in Armenia makes the slick reports like the Department of Defense's *Soviet Military Power*—which devotes three pages to descriptions and fanciful sketches of Soviet underground railways and shelters—that much harder to swallow.

COLD WAR . . . CONTINUED

squeeze out all non-Communist rivals, in classic Leninist fashion reminiscent of Eastern Europe in the late 1940s.

Such a trend was bound to provoke a reaction. America rearmed. NATO began to deploy its own INF missiles in 1983, while offering to negotiate their elimination on an equal basis. In the various Third World conflicts, indigenous resistance, with outside help, prevented the consolidation of initial gains. The free-world economy recovered from the oil crisis and found itself on the threshold of a new industrial revolution—the information revolution of supercomputers and telecommunications—which threatened to doom the Soviet Union forever to minor-league status.

By the late 1980s, then, balance had been restored to the international system. On both sides, leaders had the wisdom to draw the right conclusions. It became a propitious time for diplomacy.

What of the future?

A Western analyst cannot help but notice the continuities that remain in Soviet policy, and the persistence of East-West competition in areas that have not been blessed with diplomatic solutions. Foremost among them is Europe. In Europe, Gorbachev—like his predecessors—continues political warfare against NATO cohesion and NATO strategies, while rejecting a Western call to tear down the Berlin Wall and otherwise end the artificial division of the Continent.

(The drive for self-determination in Eastern Europe promises to be a crucial test of Gorbachev's New Model foreign policy.) In Nicaragua, where the U.S. Congress has now disarmed the resistance, the Soviets continue a substantial flow of arms to the Sandinista military, now preponderant in Central America. The quest for unilateral advantage has not disappeared entirely from Soviet practice, whatever the theory.

Yet, the "agonizing reappraisal" that Soviet foreign policy has undergone in the face of compelling realities should remind us that we helped shape those realities. The economic vigor, military strength, and geopolitical resistance of the West have, beyond any doubt, helped bring us to this point. Perhaps we now see the beginning of the vindication of "containment," as foreshadowed by George Kennan in 1947—the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.

But have the Soviet Union's basic long-term aims truly changed? Fortunately, we do not have to answer that ultimate question today. If they have not changed, then a policy of continued Western firmness is surely the right prescription. If, on the other hand, the Soviets are indeed at a historic crossroads in rethinking their strategic interests, then it behooves us to help along this reappraisal by calmly sustaining the conditions that have produced it, offering the Soviets no temptations.

This is our opportunity, and our responsibility.

Peter W. Rodman, 45, has served as director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and as a deputy assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the Reagan administration. He was a special assistant to Henry Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, he received a B.A. (1964) from Harvard College, a J.D. (1969) from Harvard Law School, and an M.A. (1970) from Oxford University. The views expressed here are his own and not necessarily those of the U. S. government.

In the last few years, freedom for the arts has been expanded in the Soviet Union. Some poems, books, music, and works in other fields that were once banned have been made available to the public; and some of those artists who produced them have been recognized. Two weeks ago, because of the work of the Writers Union, the first step was taken to make the Pasternak home at Peredelkino into a museum. In the meantime, some artists in exile—the stage director Yuri Lubimov, for example—have been permitted to return and to work, and artists who are here have been allowed a greater range.

We in the United States applaud the new thaw in the arts. We hope to see it go further. We hope to see Mikhail Baryshnikov and Slava Rostropovich, artists Mrs. Reagan and I have seen perform in Washington, perform again in Moscow. We hope to see the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn published in the land he loves. And we hope to see a permanent end to restrictions on the creativity of all artists and writers. We want this not just for your sake but for our own. We believe that the greater the freedoms in other countries the more secure both our own freedoms and peace. And we believe that when the arts in any country are free to blossom the lives of all people are richer.

William Faulkner said of poets—although he could have been speaking of any of the arts—it is the poet's privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honor and hope and pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of our past. The poet's voice need not merely be the record of man. It can be one of the props, the pillars, to help him endure and prevail.

Thank you for having me here today and for sharing your thoughts with me, and God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 1:44 p.m. in the dining room at the A. Fadeyev Central House of Men of Letters. He was introduced by Vladimir Vasilievich Karpov, first secretary of the board of the U.S.S.R. Writer's Union. A tape was not available for verification of the content of these remarks.

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the Students and Faculty at Moscow State University

May 31, 1988

The President. Thank you, Rector Logunov, and I want to thank all of you very much for a very warm welcome. It's a great pleasure to be here at Moscow State University, and I want to thank you all for turning out. I know you must be very busy this week, studying and taking your final examinations. So, let me just say *zhelayu vam uspekha* [I wish you success]. Nancy couldn't make it today because she's visiting Leningrad, which she tells me is a very beautiful city, but she, too, says hello and wishes you all good luck.

Let me say it's also a great pleasure to once again have this opportunity to speak directly to the people of the Soviet Union. Before I left Washington, I received many heartfelt letters and telegrams asking me to carry here a simple message, perhaps, but also some of the most important business of this summit: It is a message of peace and good will and hope for a growing friendship and closeness between our two peoples.

As you know, I've come to Moscow to meet with one of your most distinguished graduates. In this, our fourth summit, General Secretary Gorbachev and I have spent many hours together, and I feel that we're getting to know each other well. Our discussions, of course, have been focused primarily on many of the important issues of the day, issues I want to touch on with you in a few moments. But first I want to take a little time to talk to you much as I would to any group of university students in the United States. I want to talk not just of the realities of today but of the possibilities of tomorrow.

—Standing here before a mural of your revolution, I want to talk about a very different revolution that is taking place right now, quietly sweeping the globe without bloodshed or conflict. Its effects are peaceful, but they will fundamentally alter our world, shatter old assumptions, and reshape our lives. It's easy to underestimate because it's not accompanied by banners or fanfare. It's been called the technological or information revolution, and as its emblem, one

might take the tiny silicon chip, no bigger than a fingerprint. One of these chips has more computing power than a roomful of old-style computers.

As part of an exchange program, we now have an exhibition touring your country that shows how information technology is transforming our lives—replacing manual labor with robots, forecasting weather for farmers, or mapping the genetic code of DNA for medical researchers. These microcomputers today aid the design of everything from houses to cars to spacecraft; they even design better and faster computers. They can translate English into Russian or enable the blind to read or help Michael Jackson produce on one synthesizer the sounds of a whole orchestra. Linked by a network of satellites and fiber-optic cables, one individual with a desktop computer and a telephone commands resources unavailable to the largest governments just a few years ago.

Like a chrysalis, we're emerging from the economy of the Industrial Revolution—an economy confined to and limited by the Earth's physical resources—into, as one economist titled his book, "The Economy in Mind," in which there are no bounds on human imagination and the freedom to create is the most precious natural resource. Think of that little computer chip. Its value isn't in the sand from which it is made but in the microscopic architecture designed into it by ingenious human minds. Or take the example of the satellite relaying this broadcast around the world, which replaces thousands of tons of copper mined from the Earth and molded into wire. In the new economy, human invention increasingly makes physical resources obsolete. We're breaking through the material conditions of existence to a world where man creates his own destiny. Even as we explore the most advanced reaches of science, we're returning to the age-old wisdom of our culture, a wisdom contained in the book of Genesis in the Bible: In the beginning was the spirit, and it was from this spirit that the material abundance of creation issued forth.

But progress is not foreordained. The key is freedom—freedom of thought, freedom of information, freedom of communication. The renowned scientist, scholar, and founding father of this university, Mikhail Lo-

monosov, knew that. "It is common knowledge," he said, "that the achievements of science are considerable and rapid, particularly once the yoke of slavery is cast off and replaced by the freedom of philosophy." You know, one of the first contacts between your country and mine took place between Russian and American explorers. The Americans were members of Cook's last voyage on an expedition searching for an Arctic passage; on the island of Unalaska, they came upon the Russians, who took them in, and together, with the native inhabitants, held a prayer service on the ice.

The explorers of the modern era are the entrepreneurs, men with vision, with the courage to take risks and faith enough to brave the unknown. These entrepreneurs and their small enterprises are responsible for almost all the economic growth in the United States. They are the prime movers of the technological revolution. In fact, one of the largest personal computer firms in the United States was started by two college students, no older than you, in the garage behind their home. Some people, even in my own country, look at the riot of experiment that is the free market and see only waste. What of all the entrepreneurs that fail? Well, many do, particularly the successful ones; often several times. And if you ask them the secret of their success, they'll tell you it's all that they learned in their struggles along the way; yes, it's what they learned from failing. Like an athlete in competition or a scholar in pursuit of the truth, experience is the greatest teacher.

And that's why it's so hard for government planners, no matter how sophisticated, to ever substitute for millions of individuals working night and day to make their dreams come true. The fact is, bureaucracies are a problem around the world. There's an old story about a town—it could be anywhere—with a bureaucrat who is known to be a good-for-nothing, but he somehow had always hung on to power. So one day, in a town meeting, an old woman got up and said to him: "There is a folk legend here where I come from that when a baby is born, an angel comes down from heaven and kisses it on one part of its body. If the angel kisses him on his hand, he becomes a handyman. If he kisses him on his

forehead, he becomes bright and clever. And I've been trying to figure out where the angel kissed you so that you should sit there for so long and do nothing." [Laughter]

We are seeing the power of economic freedom spreading around the world. Places such as the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan have vaulted into the technological era, barely pausing in the industrial age along the way. Low-tax agricultural policies in the sub-continent mean that in some years India is now a net exporter of food. Perhaps most exciting are the winds of change that are blowing over the People's Republic of China, where one-quarter of the world's population is now getting its first taste of economic freedom. At the same time, the growth of democracy has become one of the most powerful political movements of our age. In Latin America in the 1970's, only a third of the population lived under democratic government; today over 90 percent does. In the Philippines, in the Republic of Korea, free, contested, democratic elections are the order of the day. Throughout the world, free markets are the model for growth. Democracy is the standard by which governments are measured.

We Americans make no secret of our belief in freedom. In fact, it's something of a national pastime. Every 4 years the American people choose a new President, and 1988 is one of those years. At one point there were 13 major candidates running in the two major parties, not to mention all the others, including the Socialist and Libertarian candidates—all trying to get my job. About 1,000 local television stations, 8,500 radio stations, and 1,700 daily newspapers—each one an independent, private enterprise, fiercely independent of the government—report on the candidates, grill them in interviews, and bring them together for debates. In the end, the people vote; they decide who will be the next President.

But freedom doesn't begin or end with elections. Go to any American town, to take just an example, and you'll see dozens of churches, representing many different beliefs—in many places, synagogues and mosques—and you'll see families of every conceivable nationality worshipping together. Go into any school room, and there you

will see children being taught the Declaration of Independence, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights—among them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—that no government can justly deny; the guarantees in their Constitution for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion.

Go into any courtroom, and there will preside an independent judge, beholden to no government power. There every defendant has the right to a trial by a jury of his peers, usually 12 men and women—common citizens; they are the ones, the only ones, who weigh the evidence and decide on guilt or innocence. In that court, the accused is innocent until proven guilty, and the word of a policeman or any official has no greater legal standing than the word of the accused.

Go to any university campus, and there you'll find an open, sometimes heated discussion of the problems in American society and what can be done to correct them. Turn on the television, and you'll see the legislature conducting the business of government right there before the camera, debating and voting on the legislation that will become the law of the land. March in any demonstration, and there are many of them; the people's right of assembly is guaranteed in the Constitution and protected by the police. Go into any union hall, where the members know their right to strike is protected by law. As a matter of fact, one of the many jobs I had before this one was being president of a union, the Screen Actors Guild. I led my union out on strike, and I'm proud to say we won.

But freedom is more even than this. Freedom is the right to question and change the established way of doing things. It is the continuing revolution of the marketplace. It is the understanding that allows us to recognize shortcomings and seek solutions. It is the right to put forth an idea, scoffed at by the experts, and watch it catch fire among the people. It is the right to dream—to follow your dream or stick to your conscience, even if you're the only one in a sea of doubters. Freedom is the recognition that no single person, no single authority or government has a monopoly on

the truth, but that every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of us put on this world has been put there for a reason and has something to offer.

America is a nation made up of hundreds of nationalities. Our ties to you are more than ones of good feeling; they're ties of kinship. In America, you'll find Russians, Armenians, Ukrainians, peoples from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They come from every part of this vast continent, from every continent, to live in harmony, seeking a place where each cultural heritage is respected, each is valued for its diverse strengths and beauties and the richness it brings to our lives. Recently, a few individuals and families have been allowed to visit relatives in the West. We can only hope that it won't be long before all are allowed to do so and Ukrainian-Americans, Baltic-Americans, Armenian-Americans can freely visit their homelands, just as this Irish-American visits his.

Freedom, it has been said, makes people selfish and materialistic, but Americans are one of the most religious peoples on Earth. Because they know that liberty, just as life itself, is not earned but a gift from God, they seek to share that gift with the world. "Reason and experience," said George Washington in his farewell address, "both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle. And it is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government." Democracy is less a system of government than it is a system to keep government limited, unintrusive; a system of constraints on power to keep politics and government secondary to the important things in life, the true sources of value found only in family and faith.

But I hope you know I go on about these things not simply to extol the virtues of my own country but to speak to the true greatness of the heart and soul of your land. Who, after all, needs to tell the land of Dostoevski about the quest for truth, the home of Kandinski and Scriabin about imagination, the rich and noble culture of the Uzbek man of letters Alisher Navoi about beauty and heart? The great culture of your diverse land speaks with a glowing passion to all humanity. Let me cite one of the most eloquent contemporary passages

on human freedom. It comes, not from the literature of America, but from this country, from one of the greatest writers of the 20th century, Boris Pasternak, in the novel "Dr. Zhivago." He writes: "I think that if the beast who sleeps in man could be held down by threats—any kind of threat, whether of jail or of retribution after death—then the highest emblem of humanity would be the lion tamer in the circus with his whip, not the prophet who sacrificed himself. But this is just the point—what has for centuries raised man above the beast is not the cudgel, but an inward music—the irresistible power of unarmed truth."

The irresistible power of unarmed truth. Today the world looks expectantly to signs of change, steps toward greater freedom in the Soviet Union. We watch and we hope as we see positive changes taking place. There are some, I know, in your society who fear that change will bring only disruption and discontinuity, who fear to embrace the hope of the future. Sometimes it takes faith. It's like that scene in the cowboy movie "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid," which some here in Moscow recently had a chance to see. The posse is closing in on the two outlaws, Butch and Sundance, who find themselves trapped on the edge of a cliff, with a sheer drop of hundreds of feet to the raging rapids below. Butch turns to Sundance and says their only hope is to jump into the river below, but Sundance refuses. He says he'd rather fight it out with the posse, even though they're hopelessly outnumbered. Butch says that's suicide and urges him to jump, but Sundance still refuses and finally admits, "I can't swim." Butch breaks up laughing and says, "You crazy fool, the fall will probably kill you." And, by the way, both Butch and Sundance made it, in case you didn't see the movie. I think what I've just been talking about is *perestroika* and what its goals are.

But change would not mean rejection of the past. Like a tree growing strong through the seasons, rooted in the Earth and drawing life from the Sun, so, too, positive change must be rooted in traditional values—in the land, in culture, in family and community—and it must take its life from the eternal things, from the source of

all life, which is faith. Such change will lead to new understandings, new opportunities, to a broader future in which the tradition is not supplanted but finds its full flowering. That is the future beckoning to your generation.

At the same time, we should remember that reform that is not institutionalized will always be insecure. Such freedom will always be looking over its shoulder. A bird on a tether, no matter how long the rope, can always be pulled back. And that is why, in my conversation with General Secretary Gorbachev, I have spoken of how important it is to institutionalize change—to put guarantees on reform. And we've been talking together about one sad reminder of a divided world: the Berlin Wall. It's time to remove the barriers that keep people apart.

I'm proposing an increased exchange program of high school students between our countries. General Secretary Gorbachev mentioned on Sunday a wonderful phrase you have in Russian for this: "Better to see something once than to hear about it a hundred times." Mr. Gorbachev and I first began working on this in 1985. In our discussion today, we agreed on working up to several thousand exchanges a year from each country in the near future. But not everyone can travel across the continents and oceans. Words travel lighter, and that's why we'd like to make available to this country more of our 11,000 magazines and periodicals and our television and radio shows that can be beamed off a satellite in seconds. Nothing would please us more than for the Soviet people to get to know us better and to understand our way of life.

Just a few years ago, few would have imagined the progress our two nations have made together. The INF treaty, which General Secretary Gorbachev and I signed last December in Washington and whose instruments of ratification we will exchange tomorrow—the first true nuclear arms reduction treaty in history, calling for the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles. And just 16 days ago, we saw the beginning of your withdrawal from Afghanistan, which gives us hope that soon the fighting may end and the healing may begin and that that suffering country may find self-determination, unity, and peace at long last.

It's my fervent hope that our constructive cooperation on these issues will be carried on to address the continuing destruction of conflicts in many regions of the globe and that the serious discussions that led to the Geneva accords on Afghanistan will help lead to solutions in southern Africa, Ethiopia, Cambodia, the Persian Gulf, and Central America.

I have often said: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. If this globe is to live in peace and prosper, if it is to embrace all the possibilities of the technological revolution, then nations must renounce, once and for all, the right to an expansionist foreign policy. Peace between nations must be an enduring goal, not a tactical stage in a continuing conflict.

I've been told that there's a popular song in your country—perhaps you know it—whose evocative refrain asks the question, "Do the Russians want a war?" In answer it says: "Go ask that silence lingering in the air, above the birch and poplar there; beneath those trees the soldiers lie. Go ask my mother, ask my wife; then you will have to ask no more, 'Do the Russians want a war?'" But what of your one-time allies? What of those who embraced you on the Elbe? What if we were to ask the watery graves of the Pacific or the European battlefields where America's fallen were buried far from home? What if we were to ask their mothers, sisters, and sons, do Americans want war? Ask us, too, and you'll find the same answer, the same longing in every heart. People do not make wars; governments do. And no mother would ever willingly sacrifice her sons for territorial gain, for economic advantage, for ideology. A people free to choose will always choose peace.

Americans seek always to make friends of old antagonists. After a colonial revolution with Britain, we have cemented for all ages the ties of kinship between our nations. After a terrible civil war between North and South, we healed our wounds and found true unity as a nation. We fought two world wars in my lifetime against Germany and one with Japan, but now the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan are two of our closest allies and friends.

Some people point to the trade disputes between us as a sign of strain, but they're the frictions of all families, and the family of free nations is a big and vital and sometimes boisterous one. I can tell you that nothing would please my heart more than in my lifetime to see American and Soviet diplomats grappling with the problem of trade disputes between America and a growing, exuberant, exporting Soviet Union that had opened up to economic freedom and growth. And as important as these official people-to-people exchanges are, nothing would please me more than for them to become unnecessary, to see travel between East and West become so routine that university students in the Soviet Union could take a month off in the summer and, just like students in the West do now, put packs on their backs and travel from country to country in Europe with barely a passport check in between. Nothing would please me more than to see the day that a concert promoter in, say, England could call up a Soviet rock group, without going through any government agency, and have them playing in Liverpool the next night. Is this just a dream? Perhaps. But it is a dream that is our responsibility to have come true.

Your generation is living in one of the most exciting, hopeful times in Soviet history. It is a time when the first breath of freedom stirs the air and the heart beats to the accelerated rhythm of hope, when the accumulated spiritual energies of a long silence yearn to break free. I am reminded of the famous passage near the end of Gogol's "Dead Souls." Comparing his nation to a speeding troika, Gogol asks what will be its destination. But he writes, "There was no answer save the bell pouring forth marvelous sound."

We do not know what the conclusion will be of this journey, but we're hopeful that the promise of reform will be fulfilled. In this Moscow spring, this May 1988, we may be allowed that hope: that freedom, like the fresh green sapling planted over Tolstoi's grave, will blossom forth at last in the rich fertile soil of your people and culture. We may be allowed to hope that the marvelous sound of a new openness will keep rising through, ringing through, leading to a new world of reconciliation, friendship, and peace.

Thank you all very much, and *da blagoslovit vas gospod'*—God bless you.

Mr. Logunov. Dear friends, Mr. President has kindly agreed to answer your questions. But since he doesn't have too much time, only 15 minutes—so, those who have questions, please ask them.

Strategic Arms Reductions

Q. And this is a student from the history faculty, and he says that he's happy to welcome you on behalf of the students of the university. And the first question is that the improvement in the relations between the two countries has come about during your tenure as President, and in this regard he would like to ask the following question. It is very important to get a handle on the question of arms control and, specifically, the limitation of strategic arms. Do you think that it will be possible for you and the General Secretary to get a treaty on the limitation of strategic arms during the time that you are still President?

The President. Well, the arms treaty that is being negotiated now is the so-called START treaty, and it is based on taking the intercontinental ballistic missiles and reducing them by half, down to parity between our two countries. Now, this is a much more complicated treaty than the INF treaty, the intermediate-range treaty, which we have signed and which our two governments have ratified and is now in effect. So, there are many things still to be settled. You and we have had negotiators in Geneva for months working on various points of this treaty. Once we had hoped that maybe, like the INF treaty, we would have been able to sign it here at this summit meeting. It is not completed; there are still some points that are being debated. We are both hopeful that it can be finished before I leave office, which is in the coming January, but I assure you that if it isn't—I assure you that I will have impressed on my successor that we must carry on until it is signed. My dream has always been that once we've started down this road, we can look forward to a day, you can look forward to a day, when there will be no more nuclear weapons in the world at all.

Young People

Q. The question is: The universities influence public opinion, and the student wonders how the youths have changed since the days when you were a student up until now?

The President. Well, wait a minute. How you have changed since the era of my own youth?

Q. How just students have changed, the youth have changed. You were a student. [Laughter] At your time there were one type. How they have changed?

The President. Well, I know there was a period in our country when there was a very great change for the worst. When I was Governor of California, I could start a riot just by going to a campus. But that has all changed, and I could be looking out at an American student body as well as I'm looking out here and would not be able to tell the difference between you.

I think that back in our day—I did happen to go to school, get my college education in a unique time; it was the time of the Great Depression, when, in a country like our own, there was 25-percent unemployment and the bottom seemed to have fallen out of everything. But we had—I think what maybe I should be telling you from my point here, because I graduated in 1932, that I should tell you that when you get to be my age, you're going to be surprised how much you recall the feelings you had in these days here and that how easy it is to understand the young people because of your own having been young once. You know an awful lot more about being young than you do about being old. [Laughter]

And I think there is a seriousness, I think there is a sense of responsibility that young people have, and I think that there is an awareness on the part of most of you about what you want your adulthood to be and what the country you live in—you want it to be. And I have a great deal of faith. I said the other day to 76 students—they were half American and half Russian. They had held a conference here and in Finland and then in the United States, and I faced them just the other day, and I had to say—I couldn't tell the difference looking at them, which were which, but I said one line to them. I said I believe that if all the young people of the world today could get to

know each other, there would never be another war. And I think that of you. I think that of the other students that I've addressed in other places.

And of course, I know also that you're young and, therefore, there are certain things that at times take precedence. I'll illustrate one myself. Twenty-five years after I graduated, my alma mater brought me back to the school and gave me an honorary degree. And I had to tell them they compounded a sense of guilt I had nursed for 25 years because I always felt the first degree they gave me was honorary. [Laughter] You're great. Carry on.

Regional Conflicts

Q. Mr. President, you have just mentioned that you welcome the efforts—settlement of the Afghanistan question and the difference of other regional conflicts. What conflicts do you mean? Central America conflicts, South East Asian, or South African?

The President. Well, for example, in South Africa, where Namibia has been promised its independence as a nation—another new African nation. But it is impossible because of a civil war going on in another country there, and that civil war is being fought on one side by some 30,000 to 40,000 Cuban troops who have gone from the Americas over there and are fighting on one side with one kind of authoritative government. When that country was freed from being a colony and given its independence, one faction seized power and made itself the government of that nation. And leaders of another—seeming the majority of the people had wanted simply the people to have the right to choose the government that they wanted, and that is the civil war that is going on. But what we believe is that those foreign soldiers should get out and let them settle it, let the citizens of that nation settle their problems.

And the same is true in Nicaragua. Nicaragua has been—Nicaragua made a promise. They had a dictator. There was a revolution, there was an organization that—and was aided by others in the revolution, and they appealed to the Organization of American States for help in getting the dictator to step down and stop the killing. And he

did. But the Organization of American States had asked, what are the goals of the revolution? And they were given in writing, and they were the goals of pluralistic society, of the right of unions and freedom of speech and press and so forth and free elections—a pluralistic society. And then the one group that was the best organized among the revolutionaries seized power, exiled many of the other leaders, and has its own government, which violated every one of the promises that had been made. And here again, we want—we're trying to encourage the getting back those—or making those promises come true and letting the people of that particular country decide their fate.

Soviet MIA's in Afghanistan

Q. Esteemed Mr. President, I'm very much anxious and concerned about the destiny of 310 Soviet soldiers being missing in Afghanistan. Are you willing to help in their search and their return to the motherland?

The President. Very much so. We would like nothing better than that.

American Constitution

Q. The reservation of the inalienable rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution faces certain problems; for example, the right of people to have arms, or for example, the problem appears, an evil appears whether spread of pornography or narcotics is compatible with these rights. Do you believe that these problems are just unavoidable problems connected with democracy, or they could be avoided?

The President. Well, if I understand you correctly, this is a question about the inalienable rights of the people—does that include the right to do criminal acts—for example, in the use of drugs and so forth? No. [Applause] No, we have a set of laws. I think what is significant and different about our system is that every country has a constitution; and most constitutions or practically all of the constitutions in the world are documents in which the government tells the people what the people can do. Our Constitution is different, and the difference is in three words; it almost escapes everyone. The three words are, "We the people." Our Constitution is a document in which we the people tell the government what its

powers are. And it can have no powers other than those listed in that document. But very carefully, at the same time, the people give the government the power with regard to those things which they think would be destructive to society, to the family, to the individual and so forth—infringements on their rights. And thus, the government can enforce the laws. But that has all been dictated by the people.

The President's Retirement Plans

Q. Mr. President, from history I know that people who have been connected with great power, with big posts, say goodbye, leave these posts with great difficulty. Since your term of office is coming to an end, what sentiments do you experience and whether you feel like, if, hypothetically, you can just stay for another term? [Laughter]

The President. Well, I'll tell you something. I think it was a kind of revenge against Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who was elected four times—the only President. There had kind of grown a tradition in our country about two terms. That tradition was started by Washington, our first President, only because there was great talk at the formation of our country that we might become a monarchy, and we had just freed ourselves from a monarchy. So, when the second term was over, George Washington stepped down and said he would do it—stepping down—so that there would not get to be the kind of idea of an inherited aristocracy. Well, succeeding Presidents—many of them didn't get a chance at second term; they did one term and were gone. But that tradition kind of remained. But it was just a tradition. And then Roosevelt ran the four times—died very early in his fourth term. And suddenly, in the atmosphere at that time, they added an amendment to the Constitution that Presidents could only serve two terms.

When I get out of office—I can't do this while I'm in office, because it will look as I'm selfishly doing it for myself—when I get out of office, I'm going to travel around, what I call the mashed-potato circuit—that is the afterdinner speaking and the speaking to luncheon groups and so forth—I'm going to travel around and try to convince the people of our country that they should

wipe out that amendment to the Constitution because it was an interference with the democratic rights of the people. The people should be allowed to vote for who they wanted to vote for, for as many times as they want to vote for him; and that it is they who are being denied a right. But you see, I will no longer be President then, so I can do that and talk for that.

There are a few other things I'm going to try to convince the people to impress upon our Congress, the things that should be done. I've always described it that if—in Hollywood, when I was there, if you didn't sing or dance, you wound up as an after-dinner speaker. And I didn't sing or dance. [Laughter] So, I have a hunch that I will be out on the speaking circuit, telling about a few things that I didn't get done in government, but urging the people to tell the Congress they wanted them done.

American Indians

Q. Mr. President, I've heard that a group of American Indians have come here because they couldn't meet you in the United States of America. If you fail to meet them here, will you be able to correct it and to meet them back in the United States?

The President. I didn't know that they had asked to see me. If they've come here or whether to see them there—[laughter]—I'd be very happy to see them.

Let me tell you just a little something about the American Indian in our land. We have provided millions of acres of land for what are called reservations—or reservations, I should say. They, from the beginning, announced that they wanted to maintain their way of life, as they had always lived there in the desert and the plains and so forth. And we set up these reservations so they could, and have a Bureau of Indian Affairs to help take care of them. At the same time, we provide education for them—schools on the reservations. And they're free also to leave the reservations and be American citizens among the rest of us, and many do. Some still prefer, however, that way—that early way of life. And we've done everything we can to meet their demands as to how they want to live. Maybe we made a mistake. Maybe we should not have humored them in that wanting to stay in that kind of primitive

lifestyle. Maybe we should have said, no, come join us; be citizens along with the rest of us. As I say, many have; many have been very successful.

And I'm very pleased to meet with them, talk with them at any time and see what their grievances are or what they feel they might be. And you'd be surprised: Some of them became very wealthy because some of those reservations were overlaying great pools of oil, and you can get very rich pumping oil. And so, I don't know what their complaint might be.

Q. Mr. President, I'm very much tantalized since yesterday evening by the question, why did you receive yesterday—did you receive and when you invite yesterday—refuseniks or dissidents? And for the second part of the question is, just what are your impressions from Soviet people? And among these dissidents, you have invited a former collaborator with a Fascist, who was a policeman serving for Fascist.

The President. Well, that's one I don't know about, or maybe the information hasn't been all given out on that. But you have to understand that Americans come from every corner of the world. I received a letter from a man that called something to my attention recently. He said, you can go to live in France, but you cannot become a Frenchman; you can go to live in Germany, you cannot become a German—or a Turk, or a Greek, or whatever. But he said anyone, from any corner of the world, can come to live in America and become an American.

You have to realize that we are a people that are made up of every strain, nationality, and race of the world. And the result is that when people in our country think someone is being mistreated or treated unjustly in another country, these are people who still feel that kinship to that country because that is their heritage. In America, whenever you meet someone new and become friends, one of the first things you tell each other is what your bloodline is. For example, when I'm asked, I have to say Irish, English, and Scotch—English and Scotch on my mother's side, Irish on my father's side. But all of them have that.

Well, when you take on to yourself a wife, you do not stop loving your mother.

May 31 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1988

So, Americans all feel a kind of a kinship to that country that their parents or their grandparents or even some great-grandparents came from; you don't lose that contact. So, what I have come and what I have brought to the General Secretary—and I must say he has been very cooperative about it—I have brought lists of names that have been brought to me from people that are relatives or friends that know that or that believe that this individual is being mistreated here in this country, and they want him to be allowed to emigrate to our country. Some are separated families.

One that I met in this, the other day, was born the same time I was. He was born of Russian parents who had moved to America, oh, way back in the early 1900's, and he was born in 1911. And then sometime later, the family moved back to Russia. Now he's grown, has a son. He's an American citizen. But they wanted to go back to America and being denied on the grounds that, well, they can go back to America, but his son married a Russian young lady, and they want to keep her from going back. Well, the whole family said, no, we're not going to leave her alone here. She's a member of the family now. Well, that kind of a case is brought to me personally, so I bring it to the General Secretary. And as I say, I must say, he has been most helpful and most agreeable about correcting these things.

Now, I'm not blaming you; I'm blaming bureaucracy. We have the same type of thing happen in our own country. And every once in a while, somebody has to get the bureaucracy by the neck and shake it loose and say, Stop doing what you're doing. And this is the type of thing and the names that we have brought. And it is a list of names, all of which have been brought to me personally by either relatives or close friends and associates. [Applause] Thank you very much. You're all very kind. I thank you very much. And I hope I answered the questions correctly. Nobody asked me what it was going to feel like to not be President anymore. I have some understanding, because after I'd been Governor for 8 years and then stepped down, I want to tell you what it's like. We'd only been home a few days, and someone invited us out to dinner. Nancy and I both went out, got in the back seat of the car, and

waited for somebody to get in front and drive us. [Laughter]

[At this point, Rector Logunov presented the President with a gift.]

That is beautiful. Thank you very much.

Note: The President spoke at 4:10 p.m. in the Lecture Hall at Moscow State University. Anatoliy Alekseyevich Logunov was rector of the university.

Toasts at a Dinner Hosted by the President at Spaso House in Moscow May 31, 1988

The President. Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gorbachev, distinguished guests and friends, it's a pleasure to host all of you tonight and to reciprocate, in a small way, the hospitality you lavished upon us yesterday evening. While the General Secretary and I had already held three meetings before this one began here in Moscow, each of those earlier encounters took place in the autumn. The days were growing short, the weather ever grayer and colder. It makes for a bracing, delightful change to have this meeting take place at the high point of spring, a time of long, light-filled days.

I know that Nancy found her springtime visit to Leningrad earlier today both magnificent and moving. The play of light upon the rivers and canals added the special splendor of the season to a city splendid in any season. And everywhere, Nancy has told me, there was a sense of history, especially of Leningrad's immense courage and sacrifice during the Second World War, surely one of the most stirring epics in the whole human story.

Here in Moscow, I've been reminded a number of times during this springtime visit of a passage in a book about your country by Laurens Van der Post. Especially struck by the city's churches, Van der Post wrote that when he caught his first sight of the Moscow skyline he saw "the light of an unusually pure evening upon it. That light was alchemical, and it transformed Moscow into a city of gold. The tops of the spires and pinnacles drawing the rigid forms of the

A Single Bullet

By MARK HELPRIN

Most leaders who decide upon war do so amid what they report to have been the ineluctable compulsion of events with a life of their own. And when things get out of hand, it is usually after a period of euphoria has masked the small signals of danger that in later sobriety stand out with such melancholy force.

The lamps of Europe are burning brilliantly but out of control. Far too much rides upon Mikhail Gorbachev, for real power in the Soviet Bloc is still centralized in him, and he alone holds back the perfectly intact mechanisms of repression. The facts suggest a major Soviet *revanche* with unpredictable consequences in and among the blocs. Not since Sarajevo or Munich has so grave a peril been so unappreciated by so many.

Though the press, intelligence agencies and shallow think tanks proffer triumphalist analyses, this is only because institutional needs take precedence over the blaze of individual genius and the simple light of the truth. Institutional analysis tells us that the shah rules the Iran that conquered the Iraq that invaded the Saudi Arabia that owns the America that, in the depression before the nuclear war, ran out of resources just as President Dukakis visited Argentina, victor of the Falklands. And it tells us that Europe is safe.

Consider nonetheless a short list of fundamentals: the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, the centrifugality of the Soviet republics, and the demise of the Soviet economy.

A Red Line

Vadim Medvedev, the Soviet Communist Party's chief of ideology, believes that divisiveness in Soviet society and secessionist trends in the republics are enough in themselves to cause "the end of *perestroika*" and "our new role in the international community." This is obviously a red line, and yet the country continues to break apart not merely in protest of the forced unity of natural differences but because opportunity generates its own momentum.

The Soviets are attempting to restructure a failed centralized economy by means of a centralized design—a strategy that needs no further comment—and they have no room for mistakes, no political or economic elasticity save their legendary ability to suffer. If Western economies stumble in the near future, the privations of economic transition in the East will be impossible to bear, in that the model for which the East has undertaken to suffer will appear, justifiably or not, to have been an illusion. Keep in mind that in the Soviet economy full employment comes first, and that the national unemployment rate is (unofficially) 17%. Mr. Gorbachev can overcome all difficulties if he can deliver the economy, but he cannot deliver the economy.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact is more acutely damaging to Mr. Gorbachev's chances of survival than even the worsening consumer ice age over which he presides. He was not helped when West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, on a trip ostensibly to reassure the Poles, refused to accept the immutability of the Polish-German border: Fundamental Soviet interests guarantee that the rise of Germany will force a reassessment of the disintegration of the pact and the loss of buffer states, and with reassessment may come a change of personnel.

Nonetheless, conventional wisdom in

the West—"now that Soviet threat no longer exists..."—accepts Mr. Gorbachev's probity and permanence. American intelligence appears to believe that he has replaced hostile elements of the armed forces, but the word on the street in Moscow is the opposite, and a noted Soviet parliamentarian told this newspaper in September that "all the officers who support *perestroika* have been discharged." In this autumn of Eastern Europe, the Red Army continued to speak its ancient language, detaining American military observers and bayoneting tires, as if to signal that it is not to be dismissed as an independent actor, and it is not. The KGB and the party, bent out of shape by Mr. Gorbachev, can snap back.

The Soviet president will not magically rid the military, the KGB and the party of institutional memory, because his infall-

The Stalinists whom Mr. Gorbachev has stuffed into deep and unpleasant buckets may burst from them as if shot from a cannon.

bility is a wishful creation of the Western press: Though Mr. Gorbachev originally called for the dissolution of the blocs, he reversed himself when he saw what he had wrought. Still, he says with baseless assurance that "the 1990s promise to become the most fruitful period in the history of civilization," and I say that one must always question the probity and permanence of anyone whose stability depends upon increasing his velocity.

The Stalinists whom Mr. Gorbachev has stuffed into deep and unpleasant buckets may burst from them as if shot from a cannon. The smallest part of recent events in East Europe would have been, a short time ago, *casus belli* for the Soviet Union, justifying a full-scale invasion. Moreover, the Soviets do not and cannot view German reunification with America's careless indifference.

Though the Franco-Prussian War and two world wars were the result of heartfelt German ideals, silphshod European statesmanship, and unintended consequences, the Germans still believe that purity of intention can remake the world. The concert of Europe that they wish to inspire is not impossible, but it is improbable, and efforts to achieve it more often than not put disruptive strain upon the international system. This does not and will not matter to them, for their ethos is not to understand that the perfect is the enemy of the good, but, rather, to pursue an ideal so tensely that it shatters.

They are at it again, having virtually unified, as daily reportage attests. The Schengen talks on European Community open borders serve to query Bonn about reunification; and in refusing to control the inter-German border, Bonn has stated its position unequivocally. If the counter-revolution falls in the Soviet Union, either from lack of boldness or too much of it, the counter-counter-revolutionaries may be obsessed with German ascendancy and take the plunge to reclaim strategic depth. The Brezhnev Doctrine did not die with Brezhnev, just as it was not invented by him. Should a Soviet *revanche* include the re-

many locked in de facto unification with the Federal Republic, hell could break loose as the NATO Germans suddenly discover something for which they will lay down their lives.

America faces these dangers with slogans. Though "the end of history" and "the peace dividend" make no more sense than "tennis balls cause cancer" and "the Arabian resuscitation," they are the intellectual foundation for habitual capitulationists who resent having to receive concessions, because they are happy only when they are making them.

With no inkling of why Mr. Gorbachev may fall, they refuse to look closely at his crumbling economy, affronted military, slighted party and disintegrating empire, and seem to believe that the U.S., prostrate before the South Bronx, can pull these chestnuts from the fire with some beltocentric puffery. Are these not the same people who call the U.S. an impotent giant, who shrink at the thunder of Daniel Ortega, and dare not set foot in Beirut? El Salvador is too big a bite and should be left to the locals, but the U.S.S.R. you do in the afternoon.

Vision is the word used by those who do not comprehend what it is they do not have to offer. Critics of President Bush's instinctive caution, citing vision, have forced him to compromise with negligence. One of the "Wise Men" validating with his resume America's insatiable desire to throw off its burdens is Robert McNamara, once a burden himself. Despite nearly undiminished Soviet military capacity, he wants to cut the U.S. defense budget in half. His recklessness is allowed the front page, as perhaps it should be, for as one of the chief architects of both our gratuitous involvement in and unnecessary defeat by Vietnam, Mr. McNamara should be closely watched so that the public may safely seek the opposite of what he recommends.

Gradually and Steadily

Reduction of forces should be conveyed to take some strain off the Soviet economy while neither imperiling Western defense (which a 50% cut obviously would) nor requiring a change in the political structures it serves, for the preservation of NATO is essential not so much to meet contingencies as to deter them. The dissolution of empire in the East, the re-integration of Central with Western Europe, the diminution of orders of battle, and the shifting of alignments must occur gradually and steadily if they are to last and not turn shockingly bitter.

If *perestroika* succeeds too well, a classic power rivalry will come into play, and if it fails, ideological confrontation will return. What appears to some to be the concert of Europe is merely a moment of relief within a moment of hesitation. Because half the continent is in thrall, the other half should seek gravity, stability and continuity. This means, among other things, rejection of the premise and spur driving Mikhail Gorbachev, who, to continue, must accelerate. It means awakening to the fallacies of hope. It means that the policy of great nations and the fate of the West must not be allowed to depend on the fortunes of one man alone, no matter how positive his effect, for if the fate of the West rests upon one man, it rests upon a single bullet.

Mr. Helprin is a novelist and political commentator. This is the latest of four articles that began in 1988 with "War in Europe: Thinking the Unthinkable."

Q Any independent information on Afghanistan about what is going on there?

MR. FITZWATER: We don't have any information there that can verify what's happening.

Q Has the President, since we talked about this yesterday, read Gephardt's speech? Do you have any reanalysis or reappraisal of that point? (Laughter.)

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I don't know. That Gephardt. It's hard to figure out what he's up to. I mean, the Soviet Union has indicated that they don't want direct support. They have not made economic reforms that would be able to use that kind of support. Bill Bradley and other democrats, themselves, have said it would be pouring money down a rathole. So, he's hard to believe. I mean, it's like he's the Maxwell Smart of politics. (Laughter.) I mean, can you believe he wants to raise taxes on the American people to give money to the Soviet Union? I don't know what he's up to.

Q Oh, Marlin. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

11:03 A.M. EST

#165/03-07

OBERLIN

January 10, 1989


Ms. Peggy Dooley
Old Executive Office Building, Room 111
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Dooley:

This is the paper on Communications Technologies by S. Frederick Starr which you requested. As I mentioned it is included as a chapter in a book on Soviet Science and Technology soon to be published by the Harvard University Press in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Mr. Starr suggested that I might also include two of his more recent articles.

If I can be of any further help, please do not hesitate to ask.

Sincerely,



Betsy Young
Assistant to the President

Feeling low at the Higher School.

POOPED PARTY

By S. Frederick Starr

The Higher Party School in Moscow is to the Communist Party what the Pontifical Institute in Rome is to the Catholic Church. Since Lenin's day it has been codifying the Communist faith and passing it on to new generations of leaders. So when the scholars of the Higher Party School assembled on September 5 to debate "The Party and Perestroika," it was an event worth noting. The meeting was confidential, but a stenographer was there to record the proceedings. Several participants were stunned by what they heard and slipped a typescript to interested persons. The text reveals that in the course of a few brief hours the Higher Party School all but declared bankruptcy.

The professors gathered amid profound gloom. An economist estimated that it will take the U.S.S.R. 300 years to catch up with the United States in manufacturing and 600 years in agriculture. Professor Kuleshov, a department chairman, spoke of maternity hospitals without showers and toilets, clinics without medicine, and shops without goods. "I believe a worker [who sees all this] will not want to play around with definitions of 'capitalism' and 'socialism,'" he declared. "He wants to live in a society where people live well, regardless of what it calls itself. [He wants] a high standard of living, a degree of social justice, democracy, and humane social relations. I doubt there is even one person in this hall who would be so bold as to claim these exist in our country."

The mood of crisis was general, but it focused particularly on the Communist Party itself. One scholar spoke of "ritualized elections," another railed against the Party's "totalitarian structure," and still another denounced Soviet communism as "a social mutant with many absurd and illogical structures." Secretive in its operations and closed to public scrutiny, the Party "is not, strictly speaking, a political organization at all," announced the school's rector, V. N. Shostakovsky. Speaker after speaker zeroed in on the Party's administrative apparatus. Rigid and inflexible, this vast bureaucracy serves not the people but itself; any ties with society are purely one-directional, from the top down.

Perhaps, it was suggested, this isn't surprising, given what the Party has to work with. The rector observed, "If one speaks of the type of [person who becomes a] Communist, about the typical member of our organization, then one must acknowledge that . . . most are conformists . . . ill-disposed to independence or non-conformity, disinclined to criticize the leadership, lack-

ing in initiative, etc." Such people, he said, are incapable of participating in a democracy.

The chairman of the "Department of Scientific Communism" added a devastating historical dimension. Down to the 1917 revolution, he argued, the Bolsheviks were an illegal conspiratorial group with no notion at all of true democracy. Lenin's task after 1917 was to transform this band of professional revolutionaries into a democratic party. But as this early *perestroika* failed, Lenin turned not to democracy but to the Chekha, the notorious secret police. How can this anti-democratic failed reformer continue in his traditional role as national icon?

Looming over this grim party was the memory of untold numbers of monstrous crimes, the full extent of which are only now becoming known to the Soviet public. Who bears responsibility for this barbarism? The professors at the Higher Party School heard their rector draw a comparison between the U.S.S.R. and Hitler's Germany. He went on to quote Karl Jaspers in defense of the proposition that only by assuming full "metaphysical responsibility" for Stalin's crimes can today's Party hope to take responsibility also for the fate of *perestroika*.

These are hardly the views one would expect from a senior official of a political party facing possible humiliation at the polls in a few weeks. But the savage candor continued, with a young docent arguing that "if the people refuse to trust us, we have obviously earned it." Lest there be any doubt that disaster lies just around the corner, the vice rector, N. M. Blinov, brought forward a recent survey showing that no more than five percent of voters would support candidates backed by the Party bureaucracy (as opposed to party reformers), and that Communists stand to be thrown out of office in two-thirds of the large cities of the U.S.S.R.

But what about Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, which guarantees the Communist Party's "leading role" in Soviet society, come what may? The rector assured his audience that today no mere law can guarantee a role for the Party. A professor of industrial organization noted: "The experience of other socialist countries shows that if the Communist Party tries to preserve [its privileges] it will lose its leading role entirely."

Speaker after speaker took the podium to lay out a path by which the Party could draw back from the brink. All called for an overhaul of the system, so that it might actually reflect the views of workers. In planning this overhaul, the professors seemed to be guided not by Marx and Lenin, but by Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, all of whom they cited by name. The rector himself clinched an argument in favor of diversity of opinion by invoking the authority of "the American founding fathers."

In defending their proposals, several speakers conjured up likely scenarios. V. I. Mitrokhin, secretary of the Institute's Party Committee, saw five possibilities: the breakup of the Soviet Union into several dozen fully independent states; a federal system granting each republic much control over its own fate; a humane form of

socialism that "out of political considerations" would not call itself either communist or socialist; capitalism; or some combination of the above. Others posed the choice between driving the "radical" followers of Andrei Sakharov and Boris Yeltsin out of the Party or expelling the Party's traditionalist staff, the infamous "apparatus." No speaker accepted the radicals' seemingly unqualified embrace of individual interests as opposed to communal interests. Yet virtually all of them, including several who submitted their statements in writing after the meeting, embraced the rest of the radical program, including a multiparty system.

But what about the middle ground, where Gorbachev himself stands? As L. M. Ovrutsky, identified only as a "publicist," put it: "The field of maneuver between the conservative apparatus and the radicalizing masses of Party members is shrinking." In other words, the U.S.S.R. may soon have to choose between radicals and conservatives.

Many speakers called for full democratization, which led them to try to define just what that would mean. On many points, there was a surprising amount of agreement. "Bottom up" democracy requires protection of minority rights; after all, the rector reasoned, minority views are often "the most constructive and bold." All wanted to throw the apparatus out of the Party. (Even though, as Ovrutsky acknowledged, this could give rise to a separate party of neo-Stalinists and anti-Semites. The platform for such a party "already exists," he warned without elaborating.) Once emancipated from its own bureaucracy, the Communist Party will then be free to pull back from day-to-day supervision of the government and of the economy. The speakers argued that it is the failure of the economy above all that is driving workers away from communism, and this failure can be traced directly to oafish meddling by Party bureaucrats, who have killed competition and destroyed the market mechanism.

The importance and inevitability of political pluralism was virtually taken for granted. Gorbachev has struggled to confine the emerging pluralism to the Communist Party, but, as several speakers agreed, this is no longer possible. Other parties already exist, de facto if not de jure. A department head named I. A. Malmygin lamely proposed that the Communist Party divide itself into three new parties, red, orange, and green, and then close up shop. Not one speaker held out hope that the U.S.S.R. could remain a one-party system.

This is precisely the point at which these solid members of the *nomenklatura* revealed their sympathy for the radicalism of Yeltsin and Sakharov. As Shostakovsky put it, one-party rule condemns the monopolist party to stagnation; the only way the Communist Party can now revitalize itself is through the stimulation that comes from competition.

Virtually every speaker understood that the U.S.S.R. is groping toward becoming a "civil society" even though, as the rector acknowledged, the very idea of civil society remains terra incognita for many Russians. The tempo of change is rising, however. The sole future

for the Communist Party, he asserted, is to become "one of the bridges between civil society and the state." So much for Lenin's heritage.

What bearing does this feast of iconoclasm have on Gorbachev's reforms? Many speakers professed their support for *perestroika* and Gorbachev. At the least, they are willing to back him against the Party's own bureaucrats. However, the clear thrust of the entire exchange at the Higher Party School was criticism of Gorbachev on grounds that he lags behind the sentiments and needs of an increasingly democratic society.

One speaker petulantly criticized Western writers for speaking of "Gorbachev's new thinking," when in fact nearly all his ideas have been borrowed from others, and reluctantly at that. Dr. I. M. Kliamkin, a guest from a related institute, ripped into Gorbachev on more fundamental grounds. Citing chapter and verse from Gorbachev's speeches, he attacked the leader's unwillingness to disengage the Party fully from the economy; if full disengagement is a "false thesis," as Gorbachev claims, then "all talk of democratization is empty words." Kliamkin also criticized Gorbachev's contention that private property is "unacceptable" in the U.S.S.R.; if so, the country will never have efficient light industries or a functioning service sector. Above all, Kliamkin took aim at Gorbachev's opposition to a multiparty system, claiming that the president's position on this was more appropriate to the 20th (i.e., Stalin's) century than to the 21st.

It is hard to convey in a few lines the mood of desperation that emanates from the stenographic report of this discussion. The rector set the tone at the beginning when he noted that "we fear terms like 'political pluralism,' 'private property,' and 'confederation,' but for some reason we don't fear the collapse of the economy, crime waves, and moral erosion; nor do we fear the fact that everyone lives badly in our society except speculators and thieves." From this point it was downhill all the way. N. I. Travkin, a deputy to the new congress, warned that "we are talking about the preservation in this country of a Communist Party as such. Will it justify itself or not?"

Toward the end of this solemn conclave of professors, an elderly doorkeeper named Claudia Timofeeva asked for the floor. She explained that she is a simple worker, far from the world of learning. But she is loyal to the Party, which she joined in 1942. She had listened with interest to all the talk of how the Party should evolve. But the plain truth, she asserted, is that "the Party today has lost its authority. You hear this on every street corner."

Presumably, the purpose of the meeting at the Higher Party School was to reverse the erosion she described, to help the Party regain its authority. As news gets out on what was actually said, though, Party loyalists in Donetsk, Minsk, or Novosibirsk must surely feel abandoned. But by then maybe no one will care.

S. FREDERICK STARR is the president of Oberlin College.

Gorbachev's Slipping Grip

By S. FREDERICK STARR

One week ago Mikhail Gorbachev beat back a move in the Congress of Peoples Deputies to consider the abolition of Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, the clause which protects the Communist Party's monopoly in politics. Among the supporters of the motion was Andrei Sakharov, who died three days later, while drafting a further speech on the same issue. Mr. Gorbachev's victory, his Soviet and Western backers claim, frees him to sort out the country's economic mess. Reformist experts and technocrats will now be able to work their wondrous without the messy intrusion of democratic politics.

Such a view is wishful thinking. Mr. Gorbachev had to make crucial concessions. On many occasions before now he has declared that the Communist Party's monopoly of power is non-negotiable. The Soviet Union can have all the pluralism it needs, he has argued, merely by permitting greater diversity within the communists' vast organization. Mr. Gorbachev has now had to permit the decriminalization of alternative parties at least to be discussed, if only "at some later date." His ideological chief, Vadim Medvedev, has also acknowledged that the subject of political pluralism is no longer "taboo."

Only Three Votes

Had it not been for the large bloc of ex-officio members of party organizations in the Congress, Mr. Gorbachev would have lost outright. A similar motion last month in the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet legislature's upper house, failed by only three votes. And that slim electoral margin appears doomed: Elections to local councils are impending. Article VI has become the great test issue everywhere. Numerous polls, including one reported to the party's own Higher Party School, predict cataclysmic defeat for old-line party candidates. Should this happen at the local level, it will be impossible to hold the line in Moscow.

Only a few days ago Mr. Medvedev boasted smugly that Kremlin leaders "don't have to act under the pressure of emotional public gatherings." Strange words. When the Lithuanian parliament voted last week to remove Article VI from the constitution of that republic, the vote was preceded and followed by large and emotional public gatherings. While Mr. Gorbachev was meeting President Bush at Malta, huge demonstrations against Article VI took place in the Armenian capital of Erevan. The Armenian parliament seized the opportunity to drop both "Soviet" and "Socialist" from the name of the Armenian Republic. Not to be outdone, the Azerbaijanis also demonstrated for the legalization of their Popular Front as a political party, as did supporters of the fastest-growing political organization in the Ukraine, "Rukh." Most of the public meetings and vigils associated with these moves have been peaceful. But not all of them. When a large crowd of young Moldavians demonstrated outside party and militia headquarters in Kishinev, they could

barely be restrained.

Nor is the movement to disestablish the Communist Party confined to the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union. The coal miners who went on strike last summer may have been hungry but their first demand was not for consumer goods but a multi-party system. A few weeks ago a new "Russian People's Front" was launched in the ancient Russian city of Yaroslavl, where representatives of eighty local popular fronts gathered to decry the communists' opposition to pluralism. On Nov. 20 a new "USSR All-Union Student Forum" issued a similar call for political pluralism, as well as true self-determination for all the peoples of the Soviet Union and the unrestricted right to travel abroad. In the same spirit, the Russian head of Komosomol, the party's feeder organization for youth, has pleaded for the abolition of his group's monopoly status, to slow the mass resignations now occurring.

At one level, the entire debate over the constitutional protection of the commu-

absolutely clear their intention of moving toward full sovereignty. Armenia, too, has moved fast in this direction. The Azerbaijan Popular Front has also raised the banner of sovereignty, as have several groups within the republics of Georgia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan and the western part of the Ukraine. This unsettles Russian settlers in these regions. Many Russian and other Slavic immigrants to Moslem Central Asia have begun moving back home, and up to a third of the Russians living in the Baltic republics are expected to repatriate themselves in the next few years.

Far from seeing the efforts of the non-Russian peoples as part of a worldwide movement towards self-determination and popular sovereignty, many of Mr. Gorbachev's admirers in the West view them as an irksome threat to the orderly process of change being fostered from the Kremlin. If only the hotheads in the non-Russian republics would understand Mr. Gorbachev's intentions, it is argued, they would moderate their demands. But these movements

As long as independent political movements were a cheering section for his faction in the party, Mr. Gorbachev egged them on. But he no longer trusts the public.

nists' monopoly of power is beside the point. *De facto*, other parties already exist in every major city and republic of the Soviet Union. Some are devoted to environmental issues, others focus on economic, cultural or religious goals. Sociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaya and other members of Mr. Sakharov's "Inter-regional Group" in the Congress of Peoples Deputies still claim: it is premature to move toward establishing a separate party. Nonetheless, they are establishing newspapers, building a funding base and setting up support organizations, indistinguishable from those of an independent political party.

Given the surging numbers and growing power of unsanctioned political groups in the Soviet Union, why is Mr. Gorbachev trying to hold back the tide? The answer is that he no longer trusts the public. As long as independent political movements were simply a cheering section for his faction within the party, Mr. Gorbachev gladly egged them on. Now that they have moved beyond him, he is trying to rein them in. Mr. Gorbachev champions change in order to save the Communist Party and its system, not to destroy it.

For several years Mr. Gorbachev worried mainly about the Stalinist opposition within the Party. Sensing an alternative power base in the elective organs, he flirted for a year with the Congress of Peoples' Deputies and the newly elected Supreme Soviet. Then, as he lost the political initiative to an ever more radicalized public, he cooled to popular sovereignty.

To make matters worse, Mr. Gorbachev must bear Russia's fatal heritage of empire. All three Baltic republics have made

are not led by ethnic zealots—they are led, quite often, by communist reformers and honest democrats who seek nothing more than their own room in Mr. Gorbachev's "common European home."

It is worth noting that the Lithuanian parliament that denied the party its "leading force" role a week ago Thursday is still dominated by its Communist Party members. Their opposition to Article VI is eminently reasonable: If the Party insists on retaining its legal monopoly of power in their republic it will lose everything. Only by agreeing to play on a level field with other parties can the communists hope to survive. Mr. Gorbachev offers no adequate response to this argument from his fellow communists and reformers.

Still less does he have a response to those communists in the non-Russian republics who want to separate their parties from that of Moscow, for similar reasons of self-preservation. The Latvian communists have pointed out that communist parties are more likely than any alternative party to retain links with Moscow, but that these non-Russian communists have no chance of winning at the polls unless they are both independent from Moscow's direct control and freed from the taint of monopoly created by Article VI.

Since Lenin's day, the Soviet Union has nominally been a federation, but one ruled by a monopolistic Communist Party. As a former regional party chief, Mr. Gorbachev despises the Moscow-based ministries, whose mismanagement of the economy he believes has brought the country to ruin. So bitterly does he dislike the central ministries that he has assented to the sweeping program for economic decentral-

ization worked out in Estonia and now being applied to several other republics.

But what is acceptable for the economy is not yet deemed appropriate for the political system. In his simultaneous defense of economic decentralization and continued political centralization Mr. Gorbachev apparently hopes to distinguish the political "superstructure" from the economic base. It is highly unlikely that this astonishingly un-Marxist ploy will succeed. The decision this week to create for the first time a separate Communist Party organization for the Russian Republic indicates that the same breezes are blowing in politics as in economics, and among Russians as non-Russians. The result, whatever Mr. Gorbachev may wish, will likely be either a looser federation or a confederation of fully independent states.

Tradition of Federation

Is this an impossible dream? Not really, for despite the Russian chauvinism that first appeared in the late nineteenth century, Russia has far more of a tradition of decentralization and even federalism than many suspect. For more than a century the czars permitted the entire Baltic area virtual autonomy in legal and economic affairs. Many Russian thinkers have also been drawn toward true federalism as an alternative to their unitary empire. Russia's first revolutionaries, the so-called "Decembrists" of 1825, wanted to break up the empire into thirteen states, modeled after the new American federation. So popular was the idea of decentralized federalism, at the time of the Bolshevik revolution that Lenin had no choice but to adopt the term into his program, even as he subverted its meaning.

Today, groupings of loosely confederated states are being planned in many parts of the world, notably Western Europe. Most are built on the principle that only those things which cannot readily be accomplished by the local powers should be assigned to the center. Totalitarian centralism is dying everywhere, but at the same time modern communications and trade are breaking down the idea that any country can be an economic or political island unto itself. Why should the Soviet Union be immune to these developments?

The Soviet radicals are right: the only way the Communist Party can preserve a significant role for itself is to compete openly and actively with other legally constituted parties. Once this happens, the path will be open for whatever balance between autonomy and integration is desired by the various peoples who now comprise the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev—and the West as well—has more to lose if he attempts to thwart this natural development than if he permits it to take place. As Marju Lauristin of the Estonian Popular Front said on Tuesday, Article VI is "obsolete." Its deletion from the Soviet constitution is the *sine qua non* to the success of the social and economic emancipation underway in the Soviet Union today.

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NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE USSR

S. Frederick Starr

I. The Problem.

Few aspects of Soviet life today are untouched by change. Social organization, administrative structures, basic principles governing the economy, cultural values, and media of expression are all in the midst of apparently fundamental transformations. The rapid pace at which all this is occurring, combined with the participatory nature of the process, suggests that the very nature of change in Soviet life is changing.¹

Communications stand prominently among those areas undergoing transformation in the USSR. Taking both the complex and simple technologies into account, it is evident that in communications in general the USSR lags far behind other advanced industrial societies, especially in computerization but also, to a lesser extent, in telecommunications.² It is undeniable that this lag holds great importance for the future. Yet to concentrate on it to the neglect of other developments in communications, let alone of the inevitability of eventual computerization in the USSR, is to severely undervalue the changes that have occurred. Telephone, radio, television, photocopiers, print journalism, audio and video cassette recordings, automobile transport, international travel, and trans-border transmissions of various sorts are among the many areas of Soviet communications in which rapid development has occurred. The purpose of this essay is to identify those changes and determine their likely impact on the political system.

A rich body of theoretical literature can be brought to bear on this topic. As early as 1957 Karl W. Deutsch studied the process by which communications stimulate the integration of societies.³ Lucien W. Pye subsequently presented a body of theoretical writings on Communications and Political Development⁴, Marshall McLuhan stimulated thought on the media as such through "The Medium is the Massage,"⁵ and literally hundreds of writers have pondered the question, posed by Oswald H. and Gladys Gantey, of whether the tendency of the new media is To Inform or To Control?⁶

Nearly all of these writers tend toward deterministic views on the impact of communications on politics. However, few bother to analyze closely the question of just how deterministic communications technologies might actually be.⁷ Daniel Lerner offered an important caution on this point in his essay "Toward a Communications Theory":

The mass media, as a distinctive index of the participant society, flourish only where the mass has sufficient skill in literacy, sufficient motivation to share "borrowed experience," sufficient cash to consume the mediated product . . ."⁸

Many forces besides communications are fostering political change in the USSR. Indeed, the capacity of that country to assimilate and exploit new conduits of information is arguably as much the effect as the cause of change in other areas of the society. Undeniably, communications and overall social change are closely bound up with one another. At the least, developments in communications are a good index of social transformations.

We will therefore ask a range of questions, by no means all of which can be answered conclusively. Is the Soviet communications system made up of multiple simple systems, or is it moving toward fewer, more complex and integrated systems? How interactive are Soviet communications? Are the new technologies more readily controlled by the state than the old? Do they protect or erode Soviet notions of national sovereignty? Above all, does the evolution of communications foster vertical or horizontal human networks in the USSR?

This last question, posed by Deutsch a generation ago, provides the backbone of the following analysis.⁹ It presupposes that autocratic and authoritarian regimes one-sidedly develop vertical communication links ("transmission belts," in Lenin's phrase), while democratic societies require elaborated horizontal networks, as well as vertical ones. These requirements are not absolute, since all societies need multiple links in both directions, and since both types of linkage are more fully developed in complex societies than in simple ones. Our objective, then, must be to determine whether vertical or horizontal integration is proceeding more rapidly in the USSR.

The evolution of communications in Western Europe and the United States provide an inevitable context for such a study. Yet the level of development in such countries is so far in advance of the USSR that comparisons minimize the importance of incremental change on the Soviet side. To avoid this problem, developments in the Soviet Union today will be presented in the context of the earlier history of communications in Russia itself. The initial section of this paper briefly characterizes that development over several centuries. The proposed periodization lays great stress on the exceptional character of the specifically Soviet phase of that process as it has existed until recently. Against this background, it will be proposed that in communications, as perhaps in other areas, current developments in the USSR contribute principally to the strengthening of horizontal communication, and hence foster the development of a civil society in that country.

II. The Vertical Tradition of Tsarist Communications

Beginning in the eleventh century, written chronicles recorded and standardized the deeds of Russia's church and state leaders. Because they were maintained for centuries, chronicles systematized history over time; since copies were made and preserved in various towns, the chronicles imparted regularity to important data over geographical space as well. At the most local level, village church bells provided a simple signal system, while in the ancient Russian city of Novgorod birch bark "papyri" were employed to document commercial transactions. The latter are particularly important as an early example of non-governmental horizontal communication in society. The fact that channels for such communication did not significantly expand until the advent of modern technologies attests to the extent to which vertical communication dominated in both Kievan Rus and Muscovy.

Movable type printing and hand-carved wood block broadsides (lubki), both of which appeared in Russia in the sixteenth century, present an interesting contrast of vertical and horizontal linkages. In Western Europe, as Marshall McLuhan reminds us, moveable type printing fostered for pluralism, individuation, and autonomy.¹⁰ The Muscovite state's exclusive patronage of Ivan Fedorov, Russia's first printer, and its subsequent suppression of all publishing outside of the central Printing Court (pechatnyi dvor) indicates the very different function the same technology fulfilled in Russia. It is revealing that one of the first uses to which moveable type printing was put in Russia was not to publish locally edited Bibles for a literate public, as occurred in Germany, but to issue authorized service books in great number so that priests in the isolated parishes across the newly-conquered Tatar areas of the upper Volga basin would not fall into heresy.¹¹ Notwithstanding this effort, freshly edited scriptural texts issued in the seventeenth century by a handful of independent presses in the Ukraine gave rise to a major schism in the Orthodox church. However, by the end of Peter I's reign these presses, too, were muzzled and print technology limited to the dissemination of acts of state, official documents, scientific treatises, and Orthodox Christian liturgical books in forms approved by the state-church.

Contrasting to the state's domination of the "high technology" of moveable type printing, independent firms in Moscow and elsewhere dominated the "low" technology of wood block printing. Technologically primitive, lubki by the late seventeenth century were nonetheless established as an important conduit of horizontal communication in Russian society, disseminating the first printed satires, alphabet books, folk stories, popular religious tales, and pornography.¹² Thanks to its technological simplicity and portability, lubok technology was virtually uncontrollable and came eventually to flourish in the very shadow of the Kremlin, at the Lubianka.

Postal service was established in the late-seventeenth century with the help of Swedish and German experts. While postal messengers were able to transmit letters between Moscow and Kiev or Arkhangelsk in something over a week, their services were used exclusively by the court and bureaucracy.¹³ By contrast, the development of roads and canals facilitated autonomous economic and social intercourse. Following the French pattern, the Russian government established a state engineering school to prepare

specialists in bridge, road, and canal construction.¹⁴ The canal system begun by Peter I linked the major European Russian waterways and was designed according to the needs of commerce at the time. Roads, by contrast, were designed first to meet the state's military needs, and only secondarily to enhance private communications.¹⁵ Typically, the first macadamized road in Russia was built in 1816 by Count Arakcheev as a purely military venture.

Military considerations also figured large in Nicholas I's decision to engage American engineers to build the first railroad link between St. Petersburg and Moscow.¹⁶ The objective in this case was to move troops quickly between the two capitals should further crises like the 1825 Decembrist revolt occur. To be sure, the first Russian railroad between St. Petersburg and the Summer Palace had been privately constructed and the St. Petersburg-Moscow line itself was built by foreign concessionaires. Nonetheless, the state's deep suspicion of this new channel of communication - both Baron Toll, supervisor of the Directorate of Communication, and Count Kankrin, the Minister of Finances, opposed railroads as "democratic"¹⁷ -- assured that railroads would remain firmly under state control, if not ownership. Military considerations figure large in the design of the rail grid, even if the decision to use the broader American gauge was made to facilitate speed rather than security, as is often claimed.¹⁸ The slow development of steamboat transport in Russia -- there were only 97 steam-propelled crafts in 1850¹⁹ -- can probably be traced to the disinterest of the military in this technology and to the slow development of internal commerce.

No substantial and autonomous medium of communication developed in Russia before the mid-nineteenth century. Pressed by a depleted treasury, Catherine II had opened the door to private publishing in the 1760s.²⁰ But even the nominally independent entrepreneur who responded to her call used mainly state-owned presses and was subjected to heavy censorship. Further progress was slow. When private printing began to expand in the early nineteenth century, censorship laws were extended in order to regulate it. Moreover, publishing devoted to lateral communication, e.g. private printing, remained technologically backward. Whereas in Great Britain the first steam press had been introduced by the Times of London, it fell to the tsar's Ministry of Internal Affairs to introduce that technology to Russia.²¹

Thus, down to the mid-nineteenth century the Russian state provided the main locus for technological innovation in communications. Naturally, its aim was primarily to provide systems that met its own military and administrative needs, and only secondarily to develop society locally or to link its components horizontally. Suffice it to say that the Provincial News (provintsiialnye vedomosti) published by the government in each administrative district were conduits mainly for official information, much to the chagrin of local society.²² Only when urban society itself began to develop in the late-nineteenth century did pluralism and horizontality in communications begin to flourish.

largest circulation in Russia between 1900 and 1917.²⁹ The kinds of mass entertainment literature that had earlier been produced only on broadsides now spewed forth from presses in the form of penny newspapers and fugitive journals, with little or no effective state control.³⁰ Only when local self-governing councils (zemstva) tried to link horizontally their separate printing activities did the government intervene harshly by imposing strict censorship.³¹ In much the same way "societal organizations" today frequently enjoy extensive freedom to publish but have only recently gained limited rights to disseminate their magazines and journals beyond the immediate district in which they are licensed.

The telegraph and telephone are among the nineteenth century's most sophisticated new communication technologies and Russians played a prominent role in the development of both.³² P.L. Schilling, a German from Russia's Baltic provinces, invented electric telegraphy before Morse; B.S. Jacobi in 1839 invented the "writing telegraph"; E.Ia. Slonimskii was the first to send two telegraphic messages over the same line, in 1858; S.M. Berdichevskii-Apostolovyi invented the first automatic telephone switch in 1895; and Alexander Pavlov constructed a working radio telegraph in 1895. Russians had also established the longest optical telegraph line in the world in the 1840s and the longest telegraph line in the world, in 1871.³³

Notwithstanding these achievements in research, the practical development of both telegraphy and telephones was retarded in Russia. Governmental offices in Moscow and St. Petersburg could not communicate with one another by telegraph at the time of the Crimean War, and in 1863 there were fewer than three hundred telegraph stations in the entire empire.³⁴ As late as 1900 the Russian telegraph system was only half as long as Germany's and a third that of England.³⁵ Again, the cause was a shortage of capital, which also accounts for the decision to grant private telegraph concessions to the public. Seeking to maintain control over what it did not actually own, the government passed a telegraphic charter which imposed strict punishments against those transmitting anything deemed threatening to life and health, and the death sentence for telegraph agents who willfully violated the code. The Directorate of Communications also hosted an international convention in 1875 which endorsed punishments against those transmitting across national borders telegraphic messages "hostile to the interests of states, against the laws, the social order, and morality."³⁶ By such means the state tried its best to regulate strictly the individuating aspects of telegraphy, even when it did not own the systems.

A similar process occurred with the telephone, but in the decades after 1880 in which that technology developed the state was willing to allow concessionary firms to dominate the field.³⁷ It was widely held that privatization sped the development and lowered the cost of telephone services. Such arguments no doubt served to justify the fact that the entire local systems in Odessa and other cities were privately owned.³⁸

Railroads, telegraphy, and telephones developed in chronological sequence. Comparing them, one notes the nationalization of railroads before 1913, the steady but not increasing role of the state in telegraphy, and the prominent role of private and concessionary ownership in telephones. Besides

the growing privatization of their ownership, all three technologies increasingly served horizontal communication in society. Usage soared when semi-constitutional rule was instituted after the Revolution of 1905. Between 1903 and 1913 the number of telegraph stations grew by almost as much as it had in the entire forty years previous, while the number of telegrams transmitted increased by an even greater figure.³⁹ Between 1900 and 1910 the number of inter-city telephone lines quintupled, with still larger growth in the following half-decade.⁴⁰ The new technologies assumed a role in the new politics. The reactionary politician Konstantin Pobedonotsev listed his phone number in the St. Petersburg directory by 1900 as did the newly-formed political parties a few years later; during the revolutions of both 1905 and 1917 the public at large used telegrams to communicate its demands to the government.⁴¹ Private publishing also grew phenomenally in these years, the number of titles nearly quadrupling between 1907 and 1913 alone.⁴²

A Yiddish proverb reminds us that "An example is not a proof." Nonetheless, such instances, multiplied by hundreds, suggest the way in which Russia's developing society seized upon new technologies to enhance both horizontal communication among its members and vertical communication upward from society to the state. The evidence does not permit us to ascribe the rise of constitutional rule in Russia to a prior growth in horizontal communications, nor does it prove the reverse. What is clear is that they arose together before 1917 and that each fostered the other.

The result of these various policies was to restrict severely all areas of horizontal communication. It is worth noting that this process was well advanced even before Stalin's Cultural Revolution completed the task. The growth of urbanization required an absolute expansion of communication facilities in the 1930s, but the USSR ended that decade relatively even further behind the West than ten years before. During the post-War era the decline became absolute as well as relative. The number of both letters and packages sent by Soviet citizens in 1950 was less than in 1940, while the slight increase in inter-city telephone calls can be traced to official rather than private use. By contrast, since the content of books and newspapers could readily be controlled, their production was allowed to increase.

Along with controlling existing technologies of communication, the Soviet regime tried to exploit new technologies to enhance vertical top-down communication. Loudspeakers, introduced in the late-1920s, were well-suited to this purpose and were produced in quantity. Lenin had a keen appreciation for the potential of film, but insisted that this technology, too, be closely controlled from above. Private filmmaking collapsed during the Civil War,⁵³ to be replaced by the State Film Agency (Goskino later Sovkino).

The Bolshevik government also seized on radio technology. Introduced first by the Imperial Navy to improve communications during the Russo-Japanese War, radio remained a military monopoly down to the revolution, by which time there were twenty stations in Russia, all under the navy's control. By the end of the 1920s there were nearly sixty stations broadcasting in the USSR and plans were afoot to build millions of receivers.⁵⁴

Authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century are said to lay special importance on controlling and developing communications technology. This certainly occurred in Hitler's Germany and in Mussolini's Italy.⁵⁵ Russia's centralizing leaders, too, were determined to place the various new technologies of communication in the service of their cause. Lenin and a host of practitioners in various media developed an impressively detailed body of theoretical writings to undergird their hopes. State control of existing communications developed rapidly and steadily throughout the 1920s. New technologies like radio, film, and loudspeakers were exploited to strengthen the regime's ability to transmit messages downward to the populace. Such potentially individuating technologies as private automobiles, international telephones, and sound recordings were suppressed or limited. The result was a thoroughly authoritarian and even totalitarian system of communications, in which the state controlled both the conduits of information and the messages carried by those conduits.

Acknowledging this, one cannot help but be struck by the relatively primitive fashion in which the Soviet state developed and exploited communications technologies. For all their monopoly in film, the regime's filmmakers achieved far lower levels of public saturation than were achieved by Hollywood or the leading studios of the major western nations. Not surprisingly, Goskino was chronically under-funded and had to rely on receipts from popular foreign films for its revenue. Moreover, there existed only 900 projectors in the entire country in 1925, half of these being broken and hence idle.⁵⁶ Only in the 1930s did the production and distribution of Soviet films

begin to meet public demand, and then only imperfectly.

Having gained a monopolistic position in radio, the regime again failed to exploit its new position. Notwithstanding a 1932 plan to build fourteen million receivers, only 3.5 million were in operation in 1937, or a mere twenty-five receivers per thousand population.⁵⁷ A key retardant of radio communications was the USSR's inability to produce vacuum tubes in the quantities needed. As a result, production of popularly-priced models like the EChS-4 (1934) and SUD-9 (1939) fell far short of targets.⁵⁸ This,

along with the desire to restrict access to the open airways, led to the extraordinary development of cable ("wired") radios with fixed tuning to the two official stations. As late as 1952 two out of three radio receivers in the USSR were of this type, with fewer than six million wave radio receivers available for the entire Soviet population.⁵⁹

Only in the technologically less innovative areas of book and newspaper publishing did the regime achieve distinctively high levels of production. Hence, Professor Peter Kenez did not exaggerate when he concluded that "Soviet leaders had much to learn from Westerners in the field of mass communications and almost nothing to teach them."⁶⁰

It is clear that state-dominated "top-down" communications were vastly strengthened under Soviet rule, and at the expense of horizontal communication in society. However, this was achieved as much through the vigorous suppression of the latter as through the intensive development of the former. It is striking that in the years between the Bolshevik Revolution and the death of Stalin in 1953 Soviet citizens achieved no breakthroughs in communication technology comparable to the earlier achievements of Jacobi, Schilling, or Popov. Lacking them, a regime that placed great theoretical emphasis upon communication became a consumer of other nations' technologies rather than an innovator itself. This stands as clear evidence of the relatively conservative record of the Soviet government in the field of communications, its claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

It goes without saying that the content of messages transmitted over the vertical media strongly supported the regime. However, two qualifications must be introduced. First, a cursory review of the Soviet press and of Soviet films of the 1930s and '40s suggests that while virtually nothing anti-Soviet in character was transmitted, only a part of the production focused directly on regime goals. Far from the relentless bombardment of propaganda anticipated in Brave New World, much of the content was comprised of ideologically bland and even unassimilable data. Second, at least as much attention was devoted to what was not communicated as to what was. Stated differently, Soviet communications policy under Stalin emphasized more the suppression of data judged harmful than the effective dissemination of positive messages. As in the communications system as a whole, far more concern seems to have been devoted to the elimination of autonomous horizontal channels than to the full exploitation of vertical channels. Closer comparisons with fascist Germany would be instructive on this point.

For all the force Stalin devoted to suppressing horizontal communications, he never managed to destroy the ideal of a more pluralistic communications culture like that which had begun to appear on the eve of the revolution. As soon as the harshest controls began to be relaxed in the 1950s, horizontal channels of communication, both official and unofficial, came once more to the fore.

V. Toward a Horizontal Information Culture

The post-Stalin era has been the victim of hyperbole. Dubbed "The Thaw" after the title of a novel written before any thaw had occurred, the early years of dramatic change are said to have given way to torpor and "stagnation," to use Mr. Gorbachev's self-serving term. In terms of social change, however, the evolution was both more steady and more basic than either supporters or critics admit. Collective farmers constituted almost half of the population on the eve of World War II but had shrunk to a fifth by 1971, a smaller percentage than that constituted by members of the white collar intelligentsia.⁶¹ The number of post-secondary students soared, from 6.2 million in 1957-58 to 25 million in 1964-65.⁶² Corresponding changes occurred in the rates of literacy and urbanization as the population grew younger and geographically more concentrated. Such shifts, accompanied by the USSR's steadily improving technological capacity, prepared the way for a fundamental change in social communications. The fact that the law governing communications was extensively revised as early as 1954 suggests that leaders themselves understood change to be impending.⁶³

As will be seen, changes in communications occurred both through the addition of new technologies and the expansion and alteration of older technologies so as to make them capable of fulfilling new functions. Together, these shifts brought about a transformation far more extensive than is evident by examining only the separate parts. On the one hand, they extended and strengthened vertical channels of communication in Soviet society. However, they also rendered those channels more interactive than formerly and gave them a stronger role in horizontal communications. More important, they vastly expanded the ability of individuals and groups to communicate directly with one another, unmediated by the state. All of these changes presupposed a reduction, albeit partial, of the Stalinist controls on horizontal communications. As soon as these controls were cut back somewhat in the 1950s, Soviet society showed itself eager to exploit existing and new technologies of communication, as indeed it has ever since.

We will consider the implications of these changes for the Soviet polity in the concluding section of this essay. For now, let us review the elements contributing to the new horizontality of Soviet communications.

A. The Expansion and Alteration of Old Technologies

The Soviet postal system provides a good example of the impact of social change on communications. Between 1940 and 1974 the number of letters grew from three to nine million per annum.⁶⁴ The number of packages quadrupled in the same period. Most of this expansion was concentrated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, coinciding with a phase of rapid urbanization, increased literacy, and greater openness.⁶⁵ Increased efficiency also stimulated public use of the mails. Today, when sixty percent of Soviet mail is shipped by air, the volume of letters has grown so rapidly as to cause a shortage of postmen and an increase in postal theft.⁶⁶

Communication by telephone has also soared. Twice the number of new phones were installed between 1965 and 1974 as between 1940 and 1965, with the number of urban telephones trebling in the period.⁶⁷ Nearly all the new urban phones were automatic and thus increased privacy. Today there are 24 million telephones in the USSR, half the total being in urban apartments. By contrast, only two million private rural residences have phones.⁶⁸ The nearly two billion intercity calls made annually today and the seven-fold increase of international calls in the decades before 1974 attest to rapidly changing public access to this medium.⁶⁹

As the USSR became less of an "information poor" society, the content of communications grew less readily controllable. The sheer growth in the number of phone calls makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the state to monitor their contents, just as the quantity of private mail has rendered it impossible for the KGB to maintain former levels of surveillance over that medium. It is no surprise that persons in many fields as early as the 1970s came to regularly use both domestic and international telephone lines for unofficial and purely personal purposes. Among such users were those with agendas different from the state's. As one student of the subject put it,

The international telephone, despite continued control that amounts to persecution, has given Russia's dissidents the means for immediate direct contact with the outside world, something quite unthinkable not much more than twenty years ago.⁷⁰

The growth of mail and telephone usage facilitated horizontal communication. The rapid growth of publishing and the press, by contrast, benefitted both vertical and horizontal linkages. The number of periodicals nearly doubled between 1958 and 1965,⁷¹ with Pravda going from a four-page format to six pages in 1970. The central press grew with particular speed, with nearly all major Moscow newspapers being printed simultaneously in thirty-five cities by 1966.⁷²

If such changes served uniformity and "top-down" communication, other changes in traditional print media enhanced interaction. The much-heralded rise of "letters to the editor" columns indicate that Soviet newspapers were becoming vehicles for interactive communication from bottom to top, providing feedback to the government in the process. Moreover, the appearance of job ads, lonely hearts announcements, and other forms of personal notices in various local newspapers reflect the public's growing interest in exploiting traditional print technology to enhance horizontal linkages among individuals.

Radio, too, gradually became more interactive. Rare is the student of Soviet affairs who cannot regale friends with a few "Radio Armenia" jokes. Few pause to realize these have their origin in programs begun in the 1960s in which listeners were invited to call in their questions. Such programs, aired on most Soviet domestic stations, constituted the first sign of "bottom-up" use of the vertical medium of radio, and provide the same kind of feedback to the regime as letters columns in newspapers.

So much has been written about the USSR's failures in the mass dissemination of personal computers that it is easy to forget the dramatic

increases that have been registered in many other electronic media of communication, particularly in the 1960s. Nowhere is this more striking than in radio.⁷³ For all the emphasis on top-down communications in the Stalin era, there were only 17.5 million radios in the entire USSR in the year before Stalin's death.⁷⁴ By 1968 this number had risen to 89.5 million.⁷⁵ While the ratio of cable to wave radio in 1952 had been approximately 2:1, by 1968 the ratio slightly favored wave sets.

The proliferation of wave radios in the population at large during the 1960s made it all but inevitable that the public should become interested in receiving international as well as domestic broadcasts. Short wave transmissions had greatly multiplied since the early 1950s, with stations in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Iran beaming broadcasts to the USSR. Receivers capable of tuning in such broadcasts were constructed in large numbers by amateurs, while others were imported unofficially through diplomatic channels. Transistors enabled such equipment to be miniaturized during the 1970s and made it readily importable through informal channels. By the end of the 1960s Radio Liberty could claim that 27 million radios in the USSR were capable of receiving its broadcast.⁷⁶ Even if this figure is exaggerated, as seems likely, the number was great enough for the Soviet government to decide that it should itself manufacture such equipment so at least to co-opt what it could not control. Selective jamming limited access to certain foreign transmissions, but the manufacture of short wave radios indicates the government's acceptance of trans-border broadcasts as an unavoidable feature of modern communications.

B. The USSR's Mixed Record in New Major Technologies of Communication

No less important than the expansion and transformation of existing channels of communication are the major new media introduced in the past twenty years. Among these, television is the most prominent. Developed by a government confident in its ability to control the social impact of the medium, Soviet television burgeoned quickly, expanding from 2.5 million sets in 1958 to 30 million sets a decade later.⁷⁷ By the end of the 1970s television was all but universal in Soviet households. During the decade ending in 1974 the number of transmitters trebled.⁷⁸ Cable television, by contrast, has made very slow progress in the USSR, partly because it requires such great investments but doubtless also because it introduces a greater element of choice than the government is yet prepared to reckon with.⁷⁹ That the latter consideration is significant is suggested by the fact that the USSR did not shirk from the large investment required to transmit its few channels by satellite, which it has done since 1967.⁸⁰

In contrast to the Soviets' wholehearted acceptance of television, their attitude towards the private automobile has been more ambiguous. On the one hand, production grew from 64,000 cars in 1965 to over 1.3 million in 1982, and would have grown still more had the Kama River Truck Works not gobbled up more than half the rubles designated for the motor vehicle industry in the late 1970s.⁸¹ On the other hand, retail prices were set extra-ordinarily high, and were only reduced in 1985.⁸² Frequent articles in the press have

warned of the negative social impact of private automobiles, leading to charges that more than simple inefficiency lies behind the refusal of ministries to provide the necessary infrastructure for private automobile owners. Only in 1984 did the government announce plans to increase the number of gas stations for private cars from 1200 to 3000.⁸³ However, this more positive attitude has since spread rapidly, extending to the expansion of partial credit programs for car-buyers,⁸⁴ reductions in the prices of certain models,⁸⁵ and even to discussions of possible sports cars for Soviet citizens.⁸⁶

Since the retarded growth of computerization in the USSR has been widely discussed in the western press, it is not necessary to repeat the story here. Suffice it to say that while microchip technologies have made substantial progress in the military sphere and in certain areas of industrial planning, they have made little headway at the crucial level of desktop personal computers. With no modems, few printers, and inferior floppy disks, this situation in the USSR will not change rapidly.⁸⁷ Networking of all sorts is proceeding slowly at best,⁸⁸ even though a system linking institutes of the Academy of Sciences in three cities is now in place.

The introduction of a single "gateway" for all computerized data entering the USSR reflects the government's concern to control information transmitted for use by this new medium -- eighty percent of all data bases, after all, originated in the US.⁸⁹ Resistance to demand-based systems stems from a similar concern to maintain at least some central control. However, the adherence of the USSR to international architectural standards in computing, the rapidly declining costs of transmitting data within the USSR,⁹⁰ along with the great and positive publicity given to the interactive nature of the Academy of Sciences' new network, suggests that an environment more hospitable to the computer revolution is beginning to emerge, albeit slowly. Even the ideal of a single "gateway" in Moscow for computerized data from abroad may prove so clumsy or so difficult to enforce that it will eventually have to be abandoned.

The record of the USSR in adopting the major communications technologies of private automobile, television, and computing is mixed. Television, the most vertical and hence controllable technology, has progressed most rapidly, while the private automobile and personal computer have made only slow advances, development of the former having been retarded by more than half a century and the latter by at least a decade. Yet this is not to say that the advance even of these technologies will be permanently thwarted. The Soviet government has officially committed itself to rapid advances in both automobile and computer production, which will have the effect of stimulating public demand. In the concluding section of this paper it will be argued that such demand is becoming increasingly difficult to resist.

C. The Inexorable Advance of New "Small" Technologies

No journalistic account of Soviet life today seems complete without tales of VCRs, home movies, and black market audio and video tapes. Rarely, though, do such accounts go beyond the level of anecdotes. Yet the "small

technologies" of the past generation are uniquely suited to foster horizontal communications, just as film, radio, and loudspeakers represented new means of facilitating vertical communications in the 1920s and 1930s. The history of such "small technologies" dramatically highlights the fundamental changes occurring in Soviet communications over the past decades.

The rise of such minor technologies as home photography, cassette recording, ham radio, and video cassettes share certain common features. All benefitted greatly from public demand, which in turn was stimulated by the public's knowledge of how the given medium was being exploited abroad. All gave rise to simple networks of officianados, and all became the object of official efforts at co-optation. Eventually, all gained legitimate places in Soviet society as a whole. To see these patterns in action, let us review more closely the copying and transmission of static visual images; reproduction of sound; and the replication of movie images.

Various stencil, xerography, and ditto systems existed in the USSR prior to the 1960s. All were considered printing presses in law, however, and hence could not be owned privately. In practice, access to stencils was widespread, and materials as diverse as music and architectural drawings were being unofficially reproduced for select private audiences as early as the mid-1950s. As is well known, the USSR maintains strict controls over all xerox machines, including the cumbersome domestically-produced models. However, in the 1960s and 1970s a number of samizdat publishers in various fields gained access to such machines, and used them extensively. The example of the Voronezh engineer Iurii Vermenich is typical, in that he succeeded in reproducing translations of several dozen books on jazz on primitive machines owned by his institute.⁹¹

Many voluntary (obshchestvennye) organizations beginning in the late 1960s gained official permission to issue informal newsletters and magazines for local distribution; most of these publications, such as the Leningrad quarterly Kvadrat, were reproduced on photocopying machines. The independent Ukrainian journal Ukrainsky visnik and the religious journal Vybor are both reproduced in the same semi-legal fashion today.

Attempts to control access to xerox machines have failed to repress the demand for horizontal print communication. Private photography was always available to fill the gap. An article in the autonomous journal Svobodnaia mysl in 1971 presented detailed instructions on how inexpensive and widely available photographic equipment could be used as a surrogate printing press.⁹² Such techniques were made readily accessible by the excellent and inexpensive single-lense reflex cameras manufactured in the USSR with equipment taken from the Zeiss factories in Jena, the Zenit-E being the model of choice for unofficial printing on account of its high close-up resolution. Negatives were easily transmitted by mail and could be read with the help of a lense for viewing filmstrips available in children's stores for 35 kopeks. Countless manuscripts, reports, poems, lyrics and other documents were independently transmitted throughout the USSR by this means.

The spread of radio stimulated interest in recording. Wire recorders were manufactured in the USSR in the 1940s but were rarely available to

private citizens. Instead, amateurs constructed simple machines capable of recording sound or the emulsion of discarded x-ray plates. Such recordings were of poor quality and had a short life expectancy but had the double advantage of being inexpensive and readily transmittable through the mails. By the early 1950s this "Roentgenizdat" was widely exploited for recording both music and voice, leading eventually to a 1958 law making it illegal "to produce home-made records of the criminal trend."⁹³ Meanwhile, Soviet-made open reel tape recorders appeared in the 1950s with the large El Fa-6 model, which was followed before 1960 by the lumbering Dnepr-3 and Spalis models. More compact foreign-made cassette machines entering the country in great numbers in the early 1960s forced the authorities to choose between losing all control over the technology or attempting to co-opt it by producing a home-grown portable product. They chose the latter course. Sales of Yauza series tape recorders reached half a million by 1965 and over one million by 1970.⁹⁴ The social impact was enormous. The late Anatolii Kuznetsov described the situation:

Soviet ideological organs, busy in the field of radio production . . . completely failed to pay attention to such a seemingly innocent technical branch as the production of tape recorders. A demand existed and it was satisfied, and when at last ideological firemen discovered the catastrophic breakthrough, it was too late. Now it is a rare home without a tape recorder, and an evening party or get-together without one is unthinkable.⁹⁵

Cassette tape recordings, shipped through the domestic and international mails, provided a channel of horizontal communication that was at once inexpensive, legal, and virtually beyond control. Ham radio operators seized upon another means of sound transmission that was equally efficient, equally inexpensive, and nearly as difficult to control.⁹⁶ It is estimated that there were up to twenty thousand licensed radio amateurs in the USSR in the late 1960s. According to Gayle Hollander, the number of illegal operators increased dramatically in the 1960s, when a do-it-yourself handbook for amateur radio operators was published. While details of this medium are lacking, it is known that ham radio operators in the Ukraine warned of the Soviet troop build-up on the eve of the Czech invasion of 1967, that hams in the Ukraine spread lurid reports at the time of the Chernobyl disaster and helped force the government to release authoritative information, that a ham operator in Vilnius was given three years incarceration in the early 1970s, and that more than a thousand hams in the Donetsk region were detained in 1974.⁹⁷

Photography, tape recording, and ham radio were all exploited by Soviet citizens to create more adequate horizontal conduits for information than official media could provide. Much the same process is going forward today with video cassette recorders. Great quantities of these inexpensive and compact instruments were being unofficially imported into the Soviet Union by the late 1970s. Crew members of a Soviet cruise ship that made frequent stops in New Orleans were known to purchase several hundred VCRs at a time from dealers in that city, to be resold on the Odessa and Leningrad black markets. Dubbing machines, essential if the medium is to respond to market demands, were bringing 1000 rubles at Riga commission stores visited by the author in

September, 1986.

What Izvestia terms the "currently fashionable passion for videotapes" led police in Riga to confiscate 415 imported and domestically-produced videos depicting "cruelty, violence, mysticism, and superstition" that were being shown by independent operators to paying audiences of local students. The operators of this library were charged under an article of the Latvian civil code that banned the distribution of videotapes "harmful to the state or to public order, health, or morals . . ." ⁹⁸ The analogous law in the Russian Republic was invoked to punish a Moscow piano teacher caught trading in video tapes and equipment. ⁹⁹

VCRs by 1986 had spread so far that it would have been impossible to reign them in completely. Instead, the government limited its intervention to co-opting the medium and policing its most objectionable excesses. ¹⁰⁰ The worst danger lay in the seemingly uncontrolled nature of trans-border communications. Dish receivers have until recently been all but nonexistent, and any that might find their way into private hands could easily be controlled. Video tapes, by contrast, are as disrespectful of national borders as audio cassette tapes. Because they are so readily imported, reproduced, and disseminated, they effectively destroy the state's autarkic control over both television and film production. ¹⁰¹ Whether or not Soviet citizens produce their own original videos, the exercise of independent choice over what is imported and disseminated creates a kind of video samizdat. It is for this reason that the Soviet government began producing its own "Elektronika VM-12" VCR. Reportedly costing from twelve to fourteen hundred rubles, the Soviet machines may be less expensive than imports but have the overriding disadvantage of being unable to play standard western tapes without modification. It is doubtful that more than 10,000 Elektronika VM-12 units had been manufactured before the end of 1986. ¹⁰²

A second attempt to preempt the video import boom was the decision in 1985 to produce large numbers of video cassettes in the USSR. Manufactured at the same Elektronika plant in Voronezh which produced the VM-12, the Soviet video cassette library consists mainly of mainstream popular music (Pugacheva, Vysotskii, etc.) and old films, mainly Soviet. By the end of 1985 the library included 450 titles which were distributed mainly at electronic stores in such ports of entry as Riga, Moscow, Odessa, and Tallinn, where the black market in foreign tapes was most active. Production remained low, however, because the only source of tape was the Soviet film industry (Soiuzkinofond), which jealously hoarded all videotape to meet its own needs. ¹⁰³ Moreover, the Soviet press candidly admitted that many customers were buying the local product solely to re-record imported films and programs for their own use. ¹⁰⁴ No wonder that private video traders have concluded, as the official press acknowledges, "that, for the time being, there is no threat of competition." ¹⁰⁵

With the exception of audio tape recording, all of the "small technologies" of communication that have appeared in the USSR remain by western standards, fairly limited in their reach. Yet together the VCRs, ham radio stations, audio cassettes, photographic labs, and xerographic machines touch the lives of tens of millions of Soviet citizens. Responding to market

demand, these media have expanded rapidly in recent years and will doubtless continue to do so. Inevitably, this produced a strong reaction in the form of efforts to co-opt and control. None of these attempts have met with success, however, for the "small" technologies are too decentralized for their use to be more than marginally shaped from above.

D. Toward an Information Revolution in the USSR

The USSR's stagnant economy, coupled with its stumbling approach to personal computers, have caused observers there and in the West to conclude that in the 1970s and 1980s it missed out on the information revolution. The foregoing overview of the expansion and transformation of old technologies, the emergence of major new large-scale conduits of information, and the rise of small technologies suggests this generalization is overstated. However stagnant the Soviet economy as a whole, the realm of communications has been steadily, radically, and irreversibly changed those otherwise stagnant decades.

To be sure, different groups and regions of the USSR have sharply different levels of access to the transformed or new media. As has been noted, urban families are three times more likely to have telephones than rural families,¹⁰⁶ while major cities and international points of entry have far greater access to new communications than secondary and interior cities. Overall access to public media correlates closely with the differing level of economic development among the republics.

Whatever their unevenness, the changes are profound and show every sign of continuing. Repeated statements by Gorbachev from his arrival in office heralded his hope of increasing investment in telecommunications and computing. Moreover, there is ample evidence of a suppressed demand for communications so great that it can scarcely be avoided. Twelve million citizens were waiting for telephones to be installed in their homes in 1985, with a quarter million more waiting to receive long distance service.¹⁰⁷ The total of twenty-five million civilian phones in the Soviet Union compares with 170 million for the less populous United States, suggesting that even the addition of twelve million more phones may eventually not be enough.¹⁰⁸ With only thirty-two automobiles for every thousand Soviets, as compared with 471 for Americans and nearly the same ratio for West Germans, there is a clear likelihood that demand in that area, too, will continue to rise.¹⁰⁹ Only in computing has the Soviet state escaped market demand, and this is bound to change as a core of civilian computer buffs is formed.

Together, these many changes are beginning to create a horizontal information culture in the Soviet Union, supplementing but not replacing the vertical structure inherited from the Stalin era. At the same time, that vertical structure itself is being revived and altered as more messages flow both downward and upward through it and as the number of interactive or feedback elements increase. Indeed, one of the most important innovations that can be traced directly to Mikhail Gorbachev is the infusion of new vitality into the heretofore moribund sphere of vertical communications, both downward and upward.

Needless to say, strengthening of horizontal communications has evoked concern in some quarters. Mr. Chebrikov of the KGB denounced the exploitation of Soviet citizens by foreign media conspirators,¹¹⁰ while he and other Soviet commentators have singled out as evidence of such manipulation the nationalist demonstrations held in the Baltic republics in June, 1987, as well as the larger protests in Armenia and the Baltic states in the first half of 1988.¹¹¹ To check such untoward occurrences, Stalinist traditionalists mounted efforts to influence the drafting of new laws so as to limit the right of assembly and suppress independent publications as well.¹¹²

Compared with the extraordinary tenacity and initiative shown by Soviet citizens seeking greater access to modern communications, however, such accusations and measures seem quite tame, mild rearguard actions rather than a serious campaign of suppression. The failure of efforts to maintain the old controls raises the question of whether horizontal communications could actually have been suppressed in the late 1980s? Of course they could, but as we will see, only at a very high price. For now, it is worth noting that the Gorbachev government through 1988 took no drastic measures against any medium deemed subversive, even though it moved against single publications in several instances. Until the government makes such a counter-threat and until it succeeds, it is reasonable to conclude, first, that a kind of communications revolution is under way in the USSR; second, that that revolution is modifying the received communication culture by stressing horizontality and interaction among and across levels where "top-down" verticality once reigned unchallenged; and, third, that the new communications order in the USSR benefits from the government's acquiescence, if not approval.

VI. TECHNOTRONIC GLASNOST' AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE USSR

The Soviet newspaper Literary Gazette in 1987 carried a long article on "The American and the Computer," in which the author charged that Americans want nothing better than for the USSR to wallow in the same "technotronic openness" (glasnost') that exists in the United States.¹¹³ Information, he admitted, is power. For the USSR to suspend all controls on information would be to weaken the country for no better purpose than to satisfy the demands of Americans. In spite of such grumbling, a kind of "technotronic glasnost'" already exists in the Soviet Union and will have profound implications for the political culture of that country.

We have characterized this new information culture in terms of the rise of horizontal links and systems. While acknowledging that vertical conduits not only continue to exist but have been strengthened by new technologies and the new leadership, we have stressed the relatively greater impact in the USSR of the new horizontal communications in recent years. In many ways this recalls the situation in late nineteenth century Russia, when fresh technologies also stimulated horizontal communication within society. Today's developments in horizontal communication outstrip those of the past both in the diversity of new channels and in the number of people affected. It is therefore important to evaluate the impact of these developments on political life. This impact can be detected in at least six areas.

A. Privatized Information Stimulates the Formation of Public Opinion.

Far more information is available to the Soviet public than ever before. The public's capacity to acquire, preserve, and transmit information has grown sufficiently to enable one to speak of at least partial privatization in this area. Stated differently, improved horizontal communications and advances in education have almost certainly increased the percentage of all Soviet information that is now generated outside the Party and state and circulating freely in society.

This means that the regime must reckon with more numerous and more diverse sources of inputs than formerly. At the least, this more pluralistic situation places greater burdens on "the attention-giving, information processing, and decision-making capabilities of administrators, political elites, [and] legislatures."¹¹⁴ No wonder that in 1988 the Gorbachev government moved to establish two new institutes for the systematic study of Soviet public opinion.

B. Information in the Soviet Union is Increasingly Internationalized.

Both high and "small" technologies foster communication across the borders of the USSR. This is true of both unofficial and official channels. At the level of popular culture, contraband songs by the emigrés V. Tokarev and A. Rozenbaum gained great popularity even during the late Brezhnev era through tapes widely distributed at sanatoriums and vacation spas.¹¹⁵

Similarly, nearly forty percent of all films showing in the provinces are foreign-made, while the percentage of VCR films from abroad is even higher.¹¹⁶ Telephone calls, letters, and trans-border radio all attest to this internationalization of information.

A century-and-a-half ago, the notorious French traveller, the Marquis de Custine, wrote that "the political system of Russia could not survive twenty years' free communication with the west of Europe."¹¹⁷ Clearly, de Custine's observation overstates the case today. But if the regime has survived greater trans-border communication, it has increasingly to respond to information from abroad, the importation of which it can no longer control. No longer willing to pay the price necessary fully to control international conduits, the state attempts merely to minimize the negative impact of the information they convey. Implicitly, it acknowledges that the internationalization of information is inevitable.

C. Communications Technology Induces Individuation and Turns Subjects into Citizens.

Much has been written about the way cassette recorders, VCRs, photography, and other "small" technologies not only privatize communications but individuate the communicators. Such individuation is one of the strongest currents in Soviet society today, and helps explain phenomena as diverse as the rising prestige of careers in writing and the burgeoning fashion industry.

Existing "small technologies" in the USSR foster individuation because they enable people to exercise choice of the oral and visual sources from which they draw information. Desk top personal computers have the same impact, since they enable people to choose and, if necessary, generate data pertinent to their personal interests.

Individuation extends even to such "top-down" media as television. Viewing a movie in a theater places limits on one's response. Viewing the same movie at home frees the individual to react actively and independently. While it is true that all three Soviet television stations still air the news program Vremia (Time) at the same time, this practice has been attacked publicly in the Soviet press on the grounds that it suppresses choice.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the state controls nearly all newspapers and periodicals, but their sheer proliferation enables readers to seek out what interests them, again expanding the realm of choice.

The exercise of choice over information emancipates the individual from his surroundings. A cassette tape of a foreign pop tune that finds its way into the hands of some provincial teenager may conjure up the existence of an alternative life, of some "other" world where freedom and eros are untrammelled. Suddenly, his immediate environment becomes nothing more than the drab setting from which the taped tune emancipates him.

Choosing among the welter of information carried over new technologies, a subject is transformed into a citizen, eager to exercise broader choice over all life decisions. Eventually, the political system must accommodate that citizen and the individuated personality which is his essence.

D. New Conduits Foster the Growth of Networks and Groups.

Amateur builders of outlandish home-made aircraft held a convention at an airport outside Moscow in September, 1987. Convened at the urging of scientists in the capital, these inventors and their craft attested to the existence of a nation-wide network of Soviet Rube Goldbergs, most of them known to one another and communicating through the mails, telephones, and personal travel.

Such networks exist in hundreds of fields in the USSR. Those interested in unusual sports, various forms of collecting, and virtually every marginal field of culture have organized themselves into informal lateral networks with little or no support from the state and often wholly independent of it. Hundreds of groups are chartered as societal (obshchestvennye) organizations. Others thrive without official recognition. While less institutionalized than the major formal organizations, they have the advantage of being sustained by the members' genuine enthusiasm. The proliferation of such organizations owes much to social and educational change, but it could not have occurred without vastly improved conduits of horizontal communication.¹¹⁹

This mode of self-organization is ideally suited to those promoting special interests. When Moscow's city planners Posokhin proposed to cut the new Kutuzovskii Prospekt through the historic core of the city, opponents organized the now-notorious Memory (Pamiat) group. Over the fifteen years of its existence, Memory has gained branches in Leningrad and Novosibirsk and maintained informal communication on issues pertaining to historic preservation through inter-city telephones and open mails.¹²⁰

Similar groupings in the ecological field have existed for years, only the best-known of which deal with the problems of Lake Baikal. In a typical effort at co-optation, the Leningrad Komsomol organized the association BER, which quickly aligned itself with a coalition of unofficial youth groups publishing a samizdat journal and advocating, among other projects, a monument to the victims of Stalin. The Moscow Perestroika Club made similar demands, and in August, 1987, had the opportunity to express them at a convention of similar self-initiated organizations held in the capital under the patronage of the Moscow branch of the Community Party.¹²¹

Unlike the 19th-century zemstva, whose efforts to federate nationally were easily thwarted, the new groupings can proliferate and federate easily, albeit informally, simply by using the networking potential of the new communications media. In their informality, their horizontality, their openness to all supporters of a given cause, and in their participatory character made possible by the telephone, such groups contrast sharply with both the Communist Party and the organs of state. As such, they pose a fundamental problem to the Soviet leadership. In the autumn of 1987 V.M. Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB, delivered an astonishing and measured assessment of these organizations:

A characteristic feature of our time is the marked increase in the Soviet people's social activeness, clearly manifested, in particular,

in the creation of independent associations whose participants seek to contribute to the development of this or that aspect of public life. The CPSU regards the activity of such associations as a concrete manifestation of socialist democratism.¹²²

The KGB chief then went on to decry the fact that "extremist elements" have penetrated the leadership of certain of these associations, "taken to the streets to make unwarranted protests in public, advanced provocative demands, and fulminated against those who disagree." Yet while he charged that these extremists were under the sway of "foreign subversive centers," the KGB head, like the Leningrad Komsomol, seems to have accepted the inevitability of autonomous organizations. Indeed, by mid-1988 Communist officials advocating Gorbachev's reforms were themselves proposing the establishment of mass organizations independent of the Party as a means of strengthening their cause. Such entities were actually created in Latvia and elsewhere and represent the Communist Party's acknowledgment of the existence of change in the nation's political culture.

E. Proliferating Communications Technologies Thwart Surveillance.

Governmental surveillance of private communications was simple in a society in which potentially significant communications were limited to a few educated people using a limited number of public technologies. Now the numbers of communicators has soared, and numerous private technologies serve their individual and group needs.

Even before Chernobyl there was ample evidence that an autonomous and internationally-linked communication culture had grown up among the Soviet people. To be sure, this culture has not broken through a number of barriers which in Poland were penetrated early by the Solidarity movement. It has not, for example, created its autonomous radio beyond the level of ham operators; it has not launched publishing efforts on the scale of Poland's NOWA enterprise; it has not exploited videotape and film to the extent done by Video NOWA; and it has not managed to establish an independent newspaper on the scale of Poland's Robotnik, with a national circulation of 20,000.¹²³ Nonetheless, the autonomous communications culture of the USSR has shown sufficient strength for officials to deem it unwise to attempt to destroy it.

For such an effort to succeed, it would have to cut back much of the officially-sanctioned communications system as well. Since jamming cannot blot out all international broadcasts, legally acquired short-wave receivers would have to be banned. The use of inter-city telephones and mails would have to be severely restricted, and inter-city travel sharply reduced so as to thwart the transmission of independently reproduced sound, video, and print data. All this could be done, but it would require vast expenditures in money and manpower to reach anything like the former level of surveillance. The economic cost of this would be staggering, while the price the regime would pay in terms of public support would be greater still, particularly if it resorted to force, as would probably be necessary.

f. New Communications Have Undermined the Party's Role as Culture-Maker.

Such considerations suggest that the new communications culture is largely irreversible, even if the Soviet regime would wish to abolish it. And who would staff a Party or government that would undertake such an effort? The same process of individuation and pluralization that has affected society at large has been felt among those running official media. When the volunteer civil defense organization DOSAAF recently ecried the erosion of Communist values, it attacked not the independent "small" technology media but the entire television, film, and radio industries of the Soviet state.¹²⁴ In effect, it acknowledged that the masters of these official conduits had come to share the same individuated and pluralistic values that permeated the broader culture. This being the case, there would appear to be too few Bolshevik traditionalists -- "Stalinists," in the reformers' terminology -- to staff the input end of Lenin's conveyor belts today.

No careful reader of the Soviet press in recent years would be surprised by this assertion. As early as 1982 Soviet cultural leaders were publicly debating "mass culture." It is clear, declared the staunchly Leninist head of the Moscow Union of Writers, that mass culture is unrelated and even hostile to Socialist culture and the Socialist way of life -- "it is it's polar opposite."¹²⁵ Yet in the course of the 1982 debate it became clear that mass culture was already a reality in the Soviet Union, and that this more independent and market-related phenomenon represented a loss of the Party's cultural leadership.¹²⁶ By no means everyone did considered this bad. One writer saw the freer operation of market mechanisms in publishing as likely to benefit good literature as much as bad, since they provided an alternative to the moribund bureaucracy in publishing.¹²⁷

Through such debates, Soviet commentators struggled toward accepting the new reality of public opinion. Their conclusion can be easily summarized: that "mass culture" is not controllable "from above"; that many, if not most Soviet citizens are drawn to it; and that such attraction is the obverse of the public's alienation from those cultural values promoted by the Communist Party.¹²⁹

This 1982 debate came increasingly to focus on the new technological media as such. In the process, the position of the old intelligentsia came very close to that of conservative Party leaders, for both feared the way their status as shapers of public values was being eroded by television and film. Both understood that the vanguard role which the Russian revolutionary movement had assigned variously to the intelligentsia and the Party was being eroded by the new technologies. Writer Andrei Bitov's fulminations against mass culture thus paralleled those of Party apologists, although they began from radically different premises. Both look to the age of democratization with deep skepticism.¹³⁰ This is not to deny that intellectuals, especially those of the generation that reached maturity in the late 1950s, have played a central role in Gorbachev's reform movement. But the very nature of the changes they advocate will eventually broaden the degree of public participation in political life and hence weaken their own role, as has in

fact occurred in the younger generations in the USSR. This helps explain the frequent attacks on the young by reformist intellectuals who realize that popular culture is incompatible with their own role as an independent source of values.

That the realm of culture and values has gradually gained independence from Communist Party edicts in the Soviet Union is evident from recent developments in virtually every field of expression. What remains to be seen is the extent to which the Party will accept this reality by reducing its expectations of control.

What if it fails to do so? It can attempt to reimpose Stalinist controls on horizontal communication, which we have acknowledged to be possible but only at an exceedingly high price. Alternatively, it can simply adapt received institutions to deal with it. This, too, seems unlikely, for such a policy, carried to its logical limit, would deeply undermine the position of the Communist Party in Soviet society. Admittedly, this is the effect of various proposals put forward by Gorbachev at the June, 1988 Party conference, but he balanced them by calling for the strengthening of the central executive power. Finally, it can choose to move neither backward or forward, in which case state and society will remain at loggerheads, as was the case prior to Gorbachev.

Given both the need for change and the strong opposition to it in some quarters, some combination of the first two variants seems most likely, with a strong movement towards accepting the new realities limited by the Party's commitment to maintaining as much initiative and power as the changed circumstances allow.

VII. CONCLUSION

This overview of communications in Russian history suggests several conclusions. At the least, it demonstrates the close relationship in Russia between political development and the state of communications technology. In most eras the two have been closely connected, with progress in one inseparable from progress in the other. Many anomalies in Russian social development -- the slow appearance of an urban elite in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the isolation of the peasantry from politics in the nineteenth century; and the diminished role of the bourgeoisie from 1917 down through the 1950s -- are reflected in, and amplified by, the communications system. This history suggests an answer to the question of whether the Soviet Union's large new technical and managerial class will develop communications technologies capable of serving its own needs, as distinct from those of the Communist Party. Against the background of earlier history, the burden of proof would lie on the side of anyone claiming it would not.

Our overview of Russian and Soviet history from the standpoint of communications technologies suggests the need to revise accepted notions of several important eras in this century.

First, the march of communications technologies in the late imperial era contrasts sharply with historians' arguments about the internal decay of the social structure that supported semi-constitutional government in Russia. There is no evidence that the emerging communications system of the period 1900-1917 was collapsing from within and ample evidence that it was burgeoning. The present era appears as the lineal descendant of the late imperial phase, after two missing generations.

Second, it is hard to view the era of the New Economic Policy as representing something wholly separate from the Stalin era in the sphere of communications, as is often claimed in the area of political philosophy. The abolition of private printing, film, and record production, the cessation of private automobile production and the thwarting of telecommunications at both the inter-city and international levels all went forward as rapidly as the Party could promote it, the process beginning under Lenin himself. The pace at which the Party severed horizontal communications was defined less not by philosophical or legal limits than by raw power. While a careful review of Lenin's writings may reveal differences between his and Stalin's approach to communications technologies, their actions differ more in degree than kind.

Third, the reconstruction of horizontal communications and development of feedback systems and interactive media after 1953 proceeded steadily throughout the Brezhnev era. Whatever stagnation might have occurred in the broader economy, modern horizontal communications continued to develop rapidly down to Brezhnev's death. Indeed, the pronounced breakdown of vertical communications in the late Brezhnev era actually stimulated the development of horizontal links within society and hastened the creation of the situation existing today. What is taking place today can thus be seen as the fulfillment of changes begun in the 1960s and 1970s, rather than their refutation.

What, finally, is the essence of this fulfillment? The expansion of communications technologies in the USSR has fostered both horizontal and vertical links. In terms of social impact, however, the horizontal have predominated, and are reinforced by the increasingly interactive nature of the old vertical ties. This has created a kind of information pluralism in the Soviet Union quite unlike anything existing since 1917. Old monistic models of Soviet politics seem less and less appropriate as new patterns of communication deepen. Each network and group arising from the new pluralism boasts its own body of information and each is therefore capable of providing an independent input to the political process. Together, these changes are creating what is recognizably a "civil society" in the USSR.

As has been noted, this "technotronic glasnost'" still lags far behind what exists in Poland, which in turn remains far removed from the style of communications prevailing in the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Nonetheless, it is far closer to these prototypes than to anything existing in Russia since 1917 and may eventually lead to a very different type of political order than has heretofore existed. Gorbachev acknowledges as much when he speaks of democratization not as a goal but as a fact. He also affirmed it when in the spring of 1988 he appealed to the public to support his reforms in the face of opposition of many in the Party and state. Under such a new order, society may remain partially controlled, but it in turn exercises control of its own, thanks to the existence of autonomous channels of communication. Such circumstances impose absolute limits on absolute power. They limit the government's ability to shape society and introduce the possibility of society shaping government.

This situation exists today only in embryo. However, even in its present form it exhibits many characteristics commonly associated with the notion of "civil society," e.g. the free flow of information within society; the ability of individual groups to articulate their demands; a government subject to control by the governed; and the existence of rights against the state as well as duties to it. "Technotronic glasnost'" does not itself create these conditions, but it provides fertile soil in which they can grow, and therefore represents a profoundly significant source of change in Soviet politics in the waning twentieth century.

FOOTNOTES

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³Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, 1957, p. 54.

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⁷Among exceptions are C.F. Margorie Ferguson, ed., New Communications Technologies and the Public Interest, Beverly Hills and London, 1986, p. 53. Cf. also Daniel Bell, "The Social Framework of the Information Society," The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year View, M.L. Dertouzos and J. Moses, eds., Cambridge, 1979.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 31, 1989

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

10:02 A.M. EST

Dec. GORB.
MTG.

THE PRESIDENT: I have a statement and then be glad to take a few questions.

President Gorbachev and I will meet December 2nd and December 3rd aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels on alternate days in the Mediterrean. Our discussions will cover the current international situation and developments in U.S.-Soviet relations. And in view of the full-scale U.S.-Soviet summit to be held in the United States during the late spring or early summer of 1990, President Gorbachev and I have agreed that an interim informal meeting at this time would be appropriate.

Our talks will be informal in character, designed to allow us to become better acquainted with one another and to deepen our respective understanding of each other's views. Neither President Gorbachev nor I anticipate that substantial decisions or agreements will emerge from this December meeting.

Q Mr. President, what do you hope to accomplish with this? I mean, is the economy going to be one of the main parts of the agenda or do you have -- arms control? What do you think is really going to be -- you're going to talk about?

THE PRESIDENT: I think there'll be talk of a wide array of subjects without a specific agenda, and this is what I proposed to Mr. Gorbachev several months ago after I returned from the Paris economic summit. We've been working on this all that time, and --

Q It sounds like you were stampeded into this because it wasn't in the works and you had projected --

THE PRESIDENT: You mean -- since July it's been in the works.

Q Has it?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you just haven't been told.

Q You're right.

THE PRESIDENT: Since July, and I made the proposal to Mr. Gorbachev. And I'll say this. They immediately and enthusiastically -- he did -- thought this was a good idea.

Q And did you also?

THE PRESIDENT: I made the proposal.

Q Mr. President, there's been some speculation that a meeting of this type might be intended for ideas to revamp the Soviet economy. Are you trying to get some ideas together to go to this meeting with some type of proposal like that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm sure that now that the meeting

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is announced, there will be an awful many suggestions as to the subjects we should discuss, but there's not going to be an agenda or a meeting to be seen to fail or succeed on whether we make agreements of this nature. That's not what this meeting is about. And so President Gorbachev will have been in Italy and it seemed like a very convenient way to do this, but there's not going to be -- there's nothing off the table and nothing on it. It's not going to be an arms control meeting. Clearly the summit will drive the arms control agenda.

Q Let me ask you, how do you assess Mr. Gorbachev's reforms? Do you think he is in trouble?

THE PRESIDENT: I want to talk to him about their economy, our economy -- a wide array of subjects. And we've -- I've said over and over again, we want to see perestroika succeed. And they know this. There hasn't been a disconnect. As I answered Helen, we've been talking about this meeting since July.

Q How come we didn't know about it?

THE PRESIDENT: Because I'm trying to do something so -- to give everybody a little room so you can negotiate without getting it all up here in a lot of turmoil.

Q Now that it's out, sir, could you tell us a little bit about the steps that led to this -- your proposal, how and when it was made, and so forth?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I did say that I made the proposal -- I believe it was in July -- in writing to the President. And then got a very prompt response and then we've been going back and forth at that level. And then it's been discussed by the Secretary of State and Mr. Shevardnadze -- the details worked out.

Q When was it agreed upon?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, a month ago, I'd say.

Q Mr. President, since July, several of your very top officials have said publicly, that they didn't see any value in having a summit if it couldn't be carefully prepared, absolute guarantee of success, with some kind of a serious outcome. You're saying that's off. This is just to discuss --

THE PRESIDENT: No. The summit is on.

Q Well, but what if they said no meeting unless --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I -- who said that?

Q I don't want to point a finger, but he's standing over here to the side. (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, they weren't speaking for the President. I've told you what I think. You know there was one time when I felt that such a meeting wouldn't be productive. And I think it is going to be productive. But it's not going to be an agenda. We first set an agenda meeting -- we first set the summit. That will drive the arms control agenda. That's out there with a date on it -- rough time frame on it. And so and the other is rapid change going on. I now have a much clearer view of how our allies feel on East-West relations. We've got problems in this hemisphere that I want to discuss. And so the two are not inconsistent, Lesley.

Q Mr. President, the last time there was a summit like this was in Reykjavik, and it evolved into a rather free-wheeling arms control negotiation that caused consternation in Europe, because at one point we were talking about eliminating all nuclear weapons, which Europeans felt would give --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MORE

Q -- the Soviets an advantage because of their preponderance of conventional superiority. What guarantees are there that that won't happen at this meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, because neither side thinks it's going to happen. And we have a summit -- an arms control summit -- a summit which will be dominated by arms control issues already established -- separate and apart. And the Soviet leader and I both understand the kind of meeting we want to have. So I don't think there's any conflict there at all.

Q Mr. President, is one of your purposes in having this meeting to give Gorbachev a political boost at home?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I hadn't particularly thought about that. If it does, fine. I mean, there -- as I said, we want to see perestroika succeed.

Q Even though you say you don't have an agenda for this meeting, can you tell us what do you think are the most pressing issues that you want to raise with Mr. Gorbachev? What are the things that are most important in your mind that you feel need to be raised and discussed at this early date?

THE PRESIDENT: A wide array of regional issues of this hemisphere, Eastern Europe -- be sure I understand from him as clearly as possible his aspirations for perestroika. There's all kinds of subjects that we'll be discussing. I don't see a limit, but it's -- again, I come back -- there isn't a set agenda in my mind.

Q Mr. President, to what extent have the events in Eastern Europe caused you perhaps to want to accelerate this, or will that be major factor in your discussions?

THE PRESIDENT: I expect there will be a lot of discussion of that. But as I indicated, the genesis of this was in July when there were certainly change -- we'd just come back, as you recall, from Poland and Hungary. And there's been a lot of dramatic change since then -- Germany, some movements in Czechoslovakia. So things have moved. But I can't say that the meeting was predicated on the change in Eastern Europe solely.

Q Well, if not predicated, has it been a factor in the discussions in arranging to have this meeting? Has there been something that has been discussed that East Europe --

THE PRESIDENT: No, there's no arrangement. There's no subjects. I want to be very clear on that. And any exchange I've had with Mr. Gorbachev -- and I believe in Baker-Shevardnadze discussions -- there hadn't been any discussion of agenda items, or something we're going to take up.

Q You say this pre-summit summit is not meant to bail out Mr. Gorbachev politically. How about yourself? You've been criticized by the Democrats as being too timid toward Eastern Europe and toward Gorbachev, helping him with perestroika. Do you think it will help you?

THE PRESIDENT: That's not why we're doing it, but if that should be the fallout, so be it. We've known what we're doing. We've been on this track for some time. I've elected to remain very quiet in the face of a good deal of sentiment that we were missing an opportunity. And that hasn't perturbed me because we've got good people that know what we're doing in terms of the Soviet Union. And if people see that a little more clearly now, so be it; that's a plus.

Q It seems as though you're going there without any initiatives. We're trying to read between the lines here -- if that's the case, aren't you going to be accused once again of being timid?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I'm sure somebody would politically accuse me of anything. But that's not the point. I can tell you one thing: Our allies will be delighted about this. They've just been informed this morning. And I guarantee you there will be enthusiasm through much of the free world and a lot of the rest of the world.

But look -- I don't expect to have everybody that's been firing away at me up there jump up with joy. But we've just briefed the congressional leaders and they seem to be quite enthusiastic about this. They had not known about it. And I'll let them speak for themselves, but some who have not been overly supportive in the last few days seem to feel this is a very good thing to be doing.

Q Mr. President, you said a few weeks ago you thought there was a good chance to complete a START agreement by the time the real summit in the spring or summer comes around. Are you still holding to that feeling, are things on track? And will this meeting, though it's not an arms control meeting, push that process along?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think this meeting will push that process along, but I'm still holding to that feeling.

Q Mr. President, you've said repeatedly that you'd like to see perestroika succeed.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q What plans, if any, does the administration have to make sure that happens in terms of any kind of economic assistance or anything of the sort?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we haven't been asked for any economic assistance, and maybe this is one of the items that we will be discussing.

What I want to make clear to Mr. Gorbachev -- and I have done that -- and I don't think there's been a disconnect with the Soviets -- is that we do want to see it succeed. But we'll be discussing that.

Q Let me ask you -- are you also concerned that the reforms in the Soviet Union may be moving too quickly and it could result in a government crackdown a la China?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, some have suggested that I am -- they use a different word for it -- but a little too much on the cautious side. I think there is reason to be cautious. And I've said that over and over again. Substitute the word "prudent" if you want. But I think at this meeting -- after this meeting, I'll be better able to answer your questions. I know Mr. Gorbachev to be a very frank individual just from the contacts that I've had with him, which have been not as many as some, but more than most. And I think that I'll be able to give you a better answer to that because that's one of the things I want to -- I don't want to have two gigantic ships pass in the night because of failed communication.

Q Mr. President, right before and right after the Wyoming meetings, the guidance from your closest advisors here was that there was not going to be a pre-summit summit. And they were specifically ruling out a meeting of this sort anytime this year. Now, were we being deliberately misled? And assuming that we weren't, what changed?

THE PRESIDENT: That's one of the dangers of not telling what you know to everybody. There could be some disconnect in that. But one of the benefits is that the Soviets see we're dealing in good faith.

Q Was there a feeling on your part, Mr. President, that perhaps waiting for spring and summer was a little bit too long, too tenuous, since no date has been set for spring or summer?

THE PRESIDENT: No, because I think they're two separate kinds of meetings. One of them, announced as it is, will drive the arms control agenda, and the other one is the kind of meeting I talked about. So I don't -- it's not a question, Saul, of thinking if we didn't have this meeting, too long would go. I remember in 1984, people kept saying, well, Ronald Reagan hasn't even sat down with the Soviet leaders. They were admittedly changing pretty fast in those days. But he said that and people were -- the critics were on him about it. I don't feel that that had anything to do with it -- well, we've got to do it sooner because we won't see each other until the summer -- spring or summer, if that was your question.

Q Mr. President, but then what changed your mind? Because this is exactly the kind of meeting that you and your aides have been saying for months you did not want. And it seems exactly the kind of meeting that Gorbachev, given his domestic troubles, needs very, very much. What changed your mind, and why were you the one to propose it?

THE PRESIDENT: I'll tell you what changed my mind on it, was consultation with our allies. The rapidity of change in Eastern Europe, the emergence of democracies in this hemisphere and this concept that I just didn't want to, in this time of dynamic change, miss something -- something that I might get better firsthand from Mr. Gorbachev.

Q Mr. President, what made you decide to meet on the ships? Pull your ship beside his ship and --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we can do it without too much fanfare. We can do it without -- where there is a relatively few number of people, not a lot of crush of bodies out there, and a chance to put our feet up and talk in the kind of meeting that I've just described for you. And it will -- I think it's easy logistically for both sides.

Q How much time do you think you'll spend face-to-face? In your mind, what do you think it will take to get this feeling?

THE PRESIDENT: A lot. A lot. And I can't tell you in hours, but we're going to have small numbers of participants on both sides. Maybe I'm getting a little ahead of the power curve there, but I know that's my intention and I think the Soviet side has agreed to that. And it will -- by doing it in this manner, we can have, I would say, more time without the press of social activities or mandatory joint appearances -- things of that nature -- for public consumption.

Q Between hemispheric summits and drug summits and Gorbachev summits and economic summits, you're doing a lot of mountaineering. Let me ask you this --

THE PRESIDENT: This one isn't a summit, so scratch this one off your list of things to worry about.

Q Base camp.

THE PRESIDENT: I've got to make that point over and over again. Summits take on a definition -- an expectation of grand design and grand agreements. And that's not what this is.

Q Let me ask you about this expectation then. About six months ago, you proposed your conventional force reductions for Europe. If something came through on your six-month deadline, presumably you'd want a summit with Mr. Gorbachev to sign it. Are we going to have a third Gorbachev summit in 1990 or the next couple of months?

THE PRESIDENT: No anticipation of it, but, look, we'll meet as often or as little as we need to.

Q Well, how is that going? How is the conventional forces thing going?

THE PRESIDENT: Reasonably well. We still have to keep driving for the best we can, our Alliance, to be sure we keep moving forward to meet a rather ambitious time frame.

Q Mr. President, one of the criticisms that has been made is -- by the Democrats particularly -- is that this is a really unique time for you; that after 40 years of calling for free markets and an open society that you have a chance to perhaps cement some of these changes in the Eastern bloc, in Europe, and in the Soviet Union. Do you have some kind of plan or vision for getting that accomplished? Is this part of it?

THE PRESIDENT: We're seeing it move, aren't we? We're seeing dynamic change and I want to handle it properly. I want to do whatever the U.S. can do to facilitate these kinds of changes. You heard what I had to say yesterday -- some of you all did -- in terms of Poland and the group we're sending over there to help solidify the changes that are taking place. And I've got a good group of people working with me in this administration knowledgeable about Europe that assures me that we can move this whole process forward properly. Some things have to -- the United States can't wave a wand and say how fast change is going to come to Czechoslovakia or to the GDR.

Q Mr. President, you say there will be no agreements at this meeting. Is it possible, however, that you might firm up the dates for the meeting next year for the official summit?

THE PRESIDENT: Could be, could be. And I don't want to say -- I guess, maybe, I ought to retreat a little and say -- not saying there will be no agreements. The meeting is not being set up to achieve agreements. I would hope we'd see eye to eye on certain things when we get through and maybe more narrowly -- more precisely define what differences we have.

Q Are we to believe that the leader of the United States and the leader of the Soviet Union will get together and there will be no discussion of arms control? Or what role in this meeting will that play?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, but there's not an arms control meeting.

Q You keep talking about the rapid change in Eastern Europe. If Mr. Gorbachev would suggest that the United States be more generous in aid to Hungary, to Poland, perhaps even to East Germany, how receptive would you be to that idea?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we've got an aid package and program and I'd welcome his ideas. But I don't think we would respond to his charge on that. I think we'd have to do what we felt was the right way to do it -- and exactly what I have been doing.

Q Mr. President, over the past several months, you've had exchanges of letters with Mr. Gorbachev. Could you tell us if there's been a change in your evaluation of him as a person or how you're feeling about him?

THE PRESIDENT: No change. As I've indicated, I have a positive view of him to begin with. But I haven't felt any changes there. I will say that when I made this proposal, there was a very prompt response. And the only reason it's taking time between the July initiative on my part and his very prompt response that I think was fired back in August has been just working out where and how to do this. So I've not had occasion to change my view.

But as you look at the different meetings and if you look at the way this relation is developing, there are a lot of positive signs. We all go back in one capacity or another to times when the

rhetoric was much tougher, where you had a lot of -- well, you had a very different approach to openness in the Soviet Union than you do now. So I think the relationship is moving in the right direction. But I still -- when I say cautious or prudent -- I think that's the way we ought to do it. And I will have an opportunity to explain that when I see Mr. Gorbachev.

Q You believe the motivation is what he says it is?

THE PRESIDENT: You mean, do I question his word?

Q Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think he's committed to reform. Absolutely.

Q Mr. President, Secretary of State Baker has mentioned the possibility of technical assistance and advice on the state of the Soviet economy. How far would you be willing to go with that kind of thing?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, again, I don't know how far they want to go. And this is one of the subjects we'll be discussing.

Q Mr. President, there's been a lot of talk around town about the survivability of Gorbachev, especially going into the winter months and the prospect of strikes in the Soviet Union and so forth. When you say you would like to see perestroika succeed in the Soviet Union, do you equate that with the success of Gorbachev personally?

THE PRESIDENT: I think it's tied up in that right now. yes.

Q And do you think if there is anything that you could do to help strengthen his position in the Soviet Union that you would do it?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we've got to know what "it" is. But this is the kind of discussion we can have. I will say this: I don't think you base the foreign policy of a great power like the United States on one personality; I don't think you do that. I don't think that is a prudent way to approach it.

Q Mr. President, how about a domestic summit on some domestic problem, like health care -- the high cost of home health care?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm getting criticized for having too many summits as it is.

Q No, you need one on domestic issues. We've spent a long time here talking about things when we have a vital, crucial situation out there. Catastrophic illness is nothing. It would not take care of the situation. We had a press conference here all day yesterday where the Canadian government officials got up and said, in the United States you only have health care for the rich, not for the poor. Why can't we have a good system like that, and why can't we have a summit on health care?

THE PRESIDENT: I think what we've got to do is educate the Canadians if they feel that way, because that's not true. That is not true. And to suggest that it's true that our health care system is only -- that simply shows -- I don't know who those officials were, but it was never raised with me by the Prime Minister.

Q Well, the Health Minister of Canada --

THE PRESIDENT: We've got a lot of problems. We've got a lot of problems.

Q -- over and over again that you only have health care in this country for the rich and not for the poor.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that's a point I'd argue.

Q Mr. President, turning to Nicaragua for a minute, today or yesterday President Ortega now suggests that Reverend Jackson be used as an intermediary to talk about redirecting the U.S. humanitarian aid so it can be used to demobilize the Contras. What would be your thoughts on having Reverend Jackson involved between us and Nicaragua? And are you in any way thinking of refocusing the aid?

THE PRESIDENT: That suggestion has limited appeal to me.
(Laughter.)

Q Mr. President, I wonder if you might hope to enlist Secretary Gorbachev's support in encouraging reforms in some of the more reticent Eastern European states, like East Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: Want to discuss it with him. Again, I'm not suggesting, given his public statements, that he is going to be the one that controls what happens in every detail in Czechoslovakia or East Germany. But it is a subject that we should discuss, just as I'm sure he'll want to discuss changes in this hemisphere here -- others. So I think that will come up.

Q Would you expect him to look favorably upon your request for a little help, a little pressure, maybe?

THE PRESIDENT: A little pressure on what?

Q A little pressure on the leaders of East Germany, perhaps, to lighten up on people who want to leave?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we'll have a chance to discuss all those things. And that's one of the good things about it. There will not be a certain agenda on it. We'll simply sit down, and I'll give him my views on the changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe and certainly I'm most interested in getting his.

Q Mr. President, a two-part question. First of all, after you meet Gorbachev, will you take the opportunity since you'll be in the region to then meet with and brief allied leaders and solicit their comments? And secondly, why did you hold this deliberation so tightly? You said you wanted to show the Soviet Union's good faith, but why not involve the bureaucracy? Your administration, as you know, has been criticized --

THE PRESIDENT: Because I knew exactly what I wanted to do. And I knew how I wanted to go about doing it. And that's why I didn't need the advice of others in this particular subject matter. I knew how I wanted to do it; I knew that I wanted to get the arms control summit set. And I also knew that I wanted to, after the discussions I told you about, to go forward with this. And I wanted to deal in good faith with the Soviets because, until it was firmly locked, I should not be in the mode of committing them to this kind of a meeting.

And I think all that worked. And I hope what we've done is to develop a certain confidence in the Soviets as a result of these negotiations. Confidence is important. If you're going to have frank exchanges, then you have to have a certain degree of confidentiality. But on this one, I told you who was involved in it. I was getting good, sound advice. How they got the information upon which to advise me, why, that's their business. But I felt no deprivation of being deprived from information at all.

Q How about the first part, though, sir? Meeting with the allies afterward?

THE PRESIDENT: No plans to do that. This is going to be

MORE

done, if you look at the calendar, like over a weekend. And, of course, we'll be in full contact with them after that, but I don't plan to jump from country to country after the meeting.

Q Mr. President, one of the summits -- capital "S" -- on your agenda is the economic summit. Have you made a decision? And are next week's elections in Houston in any way a factor in why you haven't announced it so far?

THE PRESIDENT: No, those elections have no relevance to the decision. And no, the decision has not been made.

Q Mr. President, you say you have confidence in the Soviets. What assurances do you have that you won't be surprised by something Mr. Gorbachev might bring to the table? It's widely believed that President Reagan was somewhat sandbagged in Reykjavik.

THE PRESIDENT: He's free to bring anything he wants; there's no agenda. But the idea that arms control, we might be surprised on arms control, I don't worry about that because we've got an understanding that the already-announced summit meeting will handle those items.

Q Do you have any indication he has anything in particular he wants to bring?

THE PRESIDENT: I think he's anxious to do what I'm anxious to do right now.

Q Would you handle any arms control issue he might raise by simply trying to defer it right at the spot?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm just referring to what we've decided is going to be the matrix of the meeting.

Q Well, basically you were trying to put it off until --

THE PRESIDENT: I don't expect, other than in a very broad way, these questions to arise because we have a summit set to address ourselves to those.

Q Daniel Ortega was supposed to decide today whether to end the cease-fire. If he does, in fact, end the cease-fire, are you prepared with some sort of response?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I said down there, I'm not going to go into that hypothetical situation at this time, but I tell you, I've never seen a meeting where all the participants were so united against the outrages of one. And we're still getting messages in about the outrageous performance of Daniel Ortega -- reached a new embarrassing proportions to stepping on it.

Q Is renewed military aid to the Contras, though, still a viable option now? Is that something you could consider if needed?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I indicated down there, I would reevaluate the situation in a minute if this cease-fire is broken.

Q Mr. President, were you upset at all by Secretary of State Baker squelching the resident Sovietologist, Mr. Gates, telling him not to give a hard --

THE PRESIDENT: I've discussed this matter with Mr. Baker, Mr. Gates, Mr. Scowcroft -- even discussed it with Marlin Fitzwater and -- (laughter) -- don't say I don't reach out. (Laughter.) And John and these stories -- who's up, who's down, who's winning, who's not, who's going to be a hard line -- we've got a good strong team coping with these problems. And the degree to which Bob Gates and the Secretary of State are together and Brent and John Sununu, why, it's -- we've been very lucky. And so I don't get

all exercised about that kind of thing. I know everybody else does around here, but I don't.

Q He did acknowledge that he stopped Gates from giving a hard-line speech.

THE PRESIDENT: It wasn't a hard-line speech and he didn't say that. And maybe now we'll understand a little more of what is happening out there as a result of what I'm talking to you today about.

Q On a related question, Vice President Quayle has taken a very hard-line position. Is he out of sync?

THE PRESIDENT: No, he's totally in sync. And I had a chance to discuss this with one of the outstanding reporters for The New York Times the other day who had a feeling he was out of sync. And he isn't. And I just -- everybody's looking for nuances, and that's fine, that's your business. But I think we've been blessed in this administration by this: The President can sit in there and get conflicting ideas and then we don't have to go out and sound like there's disarray. So when some see one statement that may sound a little different, then I can understand running with that ball because I know how this place works.

But that's -- the main thing is, I feel that we are together on these issues. And that goes for the Vice President and the Secretary of State and my very able national security team. So I don't sense this -- one being tugged one way or tugged another.

Q Where are you going to put the press?

THE PRESIDENT: Helen, you've already had three questions. Get out of there.

Q In the middle of the Mediterranean? (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: I hadn't thought about that.

Q Where are you going to stay?

Q Mr. President, on the environment --

THE PRESIDENT: That will come up with Mr. Gorbachev.

Q So I thought.

THE PRESIDENT: I think.

Q You have some people going to the Netherlands next week who, some say, are appearing to go without an agenda. It looks like the United States is not going to play a leadership role in global warming, though you promised that during your campaign.

THE PRESIDENT: We will play a leadership role in global warming, and it will be based on the finest, most up-to-date science possible. And we will fulfill that role. And I think most countries, in spite of where they are on some conference, look to the United States for that kind of leadership in science. And we will fulfill it. And you see both our Science Advisor and the head of the EPA in sync going over there -- I think that's good.

Saul.

Q Hey.

THE PRESIDENT: Did he have one before? I derecognize him. (Laughter.)

Okay, back here.

Q -- conflict with Congress on capital gains. What

are you prepared to do about that? And will you accept a full year of sequestration in lieu of that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we've indicated that that's the law and we will live by the law. And we're going forward with that mandate because of the way the Congress has moved on this. I don't think I need to repeat my view on capital gains as something that is good for growth, something that is good for investment, something that is good for jobs. And we hear some shrill comments to the contrary, but in my view, that matter was debated fully, my position was made clear, and I plan to continue to fight for my position.

Q On minimum wage, is your original proposal still your first and final offer or would you be willing even to link it with something like capital gains, which you --

THE PRESIDENT: We're not in the posture of trying to tell the Congress how they ought to resolve these difficulties. We sent up clear proposals on the anticrime package, on the minimum wage, on the capital gains. And it has gotten so confusing up there that they ought to move now. But I'm not going to suggest. Why do we need to do that? We've told them what we want. And I wish they'd get some action going on the proposals that I have put forward. I think the American people are entitled to that. I think the American people see that it is this Congress that is frustrating getting the deficit down. And so they ought to move and move promptly. But I can't sit there and fine-tune for them, well, if you'll only throw this one issue in with that one, why, you can do your business. I mean, we've tried.

Q So you're saying package deals are out?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not saying in or out; I'm saying let's get going. We know what the administration position is. I've said it. Send it down the way I said it and we've got harmony and light. Send it down differently and I'll take a look at it. Send it down with some things in it that I can't take and I'll send it right back to you. And I don't know how more frank I can be with the Congress.

Q Mr. President, as recently as this summer some of your senior advisors -- dare I say some in this room -- were expressing doubts that Gorbachev would survive all of his internal political difficulties. Did you ever share those views? And has anything happened -- what has happened to turn you around?

THE PRESIDENT: Look, we are looking at everything we can regarding the rapid changes that are taking place, not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet Union. And we've got very thoughtful people outside the government that give me their opinions. And I don't think anybody has a corner on all the wisdom, but I can't speculate on that question.

What I can say is we're not basing the foreign policy of the United States on any individual. We've got to look at broad changes, we've got to look at commitment from all elements of leadership in the Soviet Union, where they come down -- fascinating meeting the other day with Mr. Primakov here -- and assess all of this and spell out as clearly as you can what's in the interest of the United States and the Alliance. And this meeting will help in that regard. But it's not predicated, our whole arms control agenda, on Mr. Gorbachev. Similarly, I don't think they do that on a U.S. president at the time.

Q But, sir, you wouldn't be meeting them, of course, if you thought he was a goner. (Laughter.) Did you at any time have any doubts in that regard?

THE PRESIDENT: A goner? No, I don't -- (laughter) -- that word never entered my mind. (Laughter.) You hear a lot of cross-currents about how successful perestroika's going to be. But one thing you get from all the Soviet leaders is, look, the clock

isn't going to be set back and we -- "we" -- are going to go forward with perestroika. Whether it's Mr. Yeltsin when he was here or Mr. Gorbachev's statements and visits with Shevardnadze, visits with Mr. Primakov and then others meet with other layers of the Soviet bureaucracy. And you get the distinct feeling that the clock is not going to be set back to square one. And then you go forward. Well, here's how this will interact with U.S. policy.

But I'm looking forward to this meeting. I think it's the right thing to be doing. As I say, there was a time when I wasn't sure that it was, but with this rapidity of change, I don't want to miss something. And the way we've got it set so there will be no firm agenda, where we can do it in a setting without a lot of public pressure from other governments, I think it's going to be a productive meeting. And I was very pleased with the reception that it got from the congressional leaders.

As I say, I expect we'll get a strong, positive response. I know I will from the allied leaders. And I really can't think of any country that is going to see objection to this because the fate of a lot of countries are wrapped up in how the United States and the Soviet Union get along and how the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are managed.

And when I come back from this meeting, I and my top advisors -- and we are going to keep our traveling squad down, I say -- will be able to have a much clearer perception of motivations behind Mr. Gorbachev's pronouncements. I think it's worthwhile.

Thank you all very much.

END

10:40 A.M. EST

From *Glasnost* to *Metanoia*: The Moscow Summits Challenge

Ambassador Edward L. Rowny

I WISH TO SPEAK today about the challenge of moving from what is called *glasnost* toward *metanoia*. You all know what *glasnost* is — it is the breeze that is blowing in the Soviet Union, bringing along some freshness and some so-called new thinking, some of which is really new. As to *metanoia*, it is a biblical Greek concept, the word for a change of heart or a conversion. The question is, "Is there really a move today in the Soviet Union toward conversion?" We hope there is, although it is early, maybe too early to tell. But as with the man who went to the moon, the first step must be taken before one can contemplate going further.

Of one thing I am certain, though, and that is that the renewal of U.S. strength and self-confidence has had an impact on Soviet official behavior. In 1981, the year President Reagan came to office, he found a country that was very deficient in its military posture. The Soviets knew it, and we knew it. Following more than a decade of neglect, we were in no position to deal with the Soviets, because the Soviets, as I have learned from some fifteen years of negotiating with them, deal only from strength. They don't share our ethics, they don't have our value system, they don't look for good example. As a matter of fact, they disdain any show of example. One of my most difficult times as a negotiator was when I worked for President Carter. My Soviet colleagues denigrated the President for not understanding them. They said he tried to deal with them from what they called "decadent Christian values."

President Reagan rebuilt U.S. strength at a time when it was very unpopular to do so. I

remember sitting in a back seat at Cabinet meetings early in the President's first term and hearing Cabinet members say, "Mr. President, you cannot spend all this money on defense. You have double-digit inflation, you have high unemployment." And so the arguments went.

"Look," the President replied, "providing for defense is the best thing I can do for this country. It is the most important of our social programs, for it ensures our freedom and the right to hold our heads high in the world without fear of encroaching communism."

The President also began early to formulate the intellectual underpinnings for his new policy for dealing with the Soviets. He first unveiled it in the 1981 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame. In it the President moved beyond the theory of George Kennan who believed that containment alone would lead to better international relations and greater U.S. security. "The West will not contain communism," the President said, "it will transcend communism."

The President's first-term priority of rebuilding our defenses, including the historic Strategic Defense Initiative announced in 1983, was resoundingly approved by the voters in 1984. This factor — our strength — is without doubt why the Soviets returned to the Geneva bargaining table in 1985. With the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev — a new kind of Soviet leader, with whom it was possible, in Margaret Thatcher's words, "to do business" — the stage was set for renewed U.S.-Soviet summit meetings.

Before the 1985 Geneva summit, the President announced that U.S. Soviet relations no longer would be centered primarily on arms control. Instead, the relationship would be

built on a foundation of four pillars: (1) resolution of regional conflicts, (2) advancement of human rights, (3) improvement of bilateral ties such as trade and cultural exchanges, and (4) a pursuit of stabilizing, effectively verifiable arms reductions.

When the Geneva summit was scheduled, President Reagan said it would follow the broad, "four-pillar" agenda. The Soviets did not agree, but said each side would be free to bring up items of importance to it. During the time planned for discussion of human rights, President Reagan spoke about human rights. Gorbachev listened, but then proceeded to speak about arms control. When the President raised the matter of regional conflicts, Gorbachev again responded with words about arms control. And so it went, too, when the President sought to discuss bilateral matters. Finally, when the meeting reached the time planned for discussion of arms control, both men talked about arms control and nothing but arms control. In the end, the Geneva summit was covered in the media as an arms control summit, the Soviet agenda.

A year later in Reykjavik, the President sought again to draw the Soviets out on regional issues. This time they obliged somewhat. They were adamant, though, against engaging on human rights. "This is an internal affair," they said. "You are interfering with our political and social structure."

Reykjavik proved to be another arms control summit, albeit a dramatic and productive one. The catalyst for Soviet movement was Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, chief of the Soviet general staff. To our surprise he appeared in our arms control discussions as the head of the Soviet team. Akhromeyev has great presence. He can speak with complete candor when he wants to, and he demonstrated that he has Gorbachev's confidence and an ability to overrule all others.

It was interesting that night that Akhromeyev was the only one on the Soviet side who spoke no English, and I, the only one on our side who spoke Russian. During one of our breaks I found he has a sense of humor. I said to him "Marshal, you must be one of the

last Soviet leaders to have served in the Second World War."

"No," he said. "You are wrong. It was the Great Patriotic War." "All right," I said, "have it your way. You were in the Great Patriotic War."

"Da," he said, "*ya poslednyy iz mogikan* (I am the last of the Mohicans)."

"Where did you get that?" I asked.

"It's an old Russian expression," he said with a wry smile.

With Akhromeyev willing and authorized to do business, we worked all night. We made two breakthroughs. One was to agree in principle to the plan President Reagan put forward in his Eureka College speech in 1982 — fifty percent cuts in strategic offensive arms. The Soviets accepted much of our formula, for instance, counting the things that really matter — warheads instead of launchers. The second breakthrough was to agree to go to zero INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) in Europe and to agree, at least in principle, to some on-site inspection.

The INF Treaty was ready for signing at the third summit in Washington, in December 1987. It provides for global elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, and as such is a tribute to allied solidarity not only in Europe but also in Asia. We agreed on effective verification measures, including on-site inspections and monitoring that many believed unthinkable just a few years ago.

Verification is the key. As the President said, we should "trust but verify." The American people understand this. They want arms reductions with the Soviet Union, but they don't trust the Soviets. They know the Soviet record of violating such agreements — the chemical/biological warfare convention, SALT I, and now the ABM Treaty. The American people insist on very strict, effective verification.

Beyond the achievement in arms reduction, the Washington summit marked new progress for the President's broad agenda. On that occasion, the Soviets talked in some depth about regional conflicts such as Afghanistan. They were apparently coming to the decision that

they should withdraw their Red Army invasion force from that country. There were signs, too, of possible movement on Angola.

The Soviets became somewhat engaged on human rights, too. They decided it was something they could talk about, after all — although their side of the discussion still left much to be desired. They feel they always have to have a riposte. When President Reagan, for instance, faced Gorbachev and asked, "Why don't you tear down the Berlin Wall," Gorbachev replied he would be willing to do so if we opened up our borders with Mexico to unlimited immigration. It's a nonsensical comparison, of course, trying to draw a parallel between their refusal to let people leave their country and our unwillingness to let unlimited numbers of immigrants enter our country. Still, it seems the Soviets feel inadequate unless they have a counterpart to everything we say. When we criticize them for keeping innocent people in Gulags and in psychiatric wards, they whip back at us that we permit capital punishment of minors and practice racial discrimination.

Several weeks ago, we had round four — the Moscow summit. In our talks on human rights we made some progress, although most of it was procedural. A large number of divided spouses and families were reunited. But there is still a long way to go. More people are allowed to leave the Soviet Union now than at any time in seven years. Still, a statistician calculated that at the rate they are leaving, it would take a hundred years for everyone who wants to depart to do so.

At the Moscow summit there were extensive talks on regional conflicts — about Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Angola. And last, but not least, Central America.

In Afghanistan, the Soviets are getting out, but not as fast as we would like. They are blaming it on the Pakistanis. "Your clients, your friends," they say, "are interfering with our leaving."

There has been major diplomatic movement on Angola now, and, significantly, the Soviets have invited my colleague, (Assistant Secretary for African Affairs) Chester Crocker, to the Soviet Union to meet with his counter-

part Anatoly Adamishin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. The Soviets say they have the same goals as we have in that part of the world. They say they want to help right the situation. We want to see if they are sincere about this. We are trying to get United Nations resolution 435 on Angola finally implemented by September 29, its tenth anniversary date. What we are waiting for are signs that the Soviets are truly serious about moving their client state, Cuba, to get its 45,000 troops out of Angola.

On Cambodia, the Soviets ask us why we don't back their client state Vietnam's proposal to withdraw fifty percent of its troops. We reply we want a one-hundred percent reduction. In Ethiopia, the scandal continues that the Soviet-backed regime there is allowing millions of persons to be threatened with starvation. Humanitarian gifts of food from the Free World are allowed to rot without reaching the people who need it. On issues in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, there was some talk at the summit but not much movement.

With regard to Central America, the Soviets would not budge. They want an unfair, uneven deal. They say they are willing to stop sending arms to the Sandinistas — but not small arms. And this they would be willing to do only if we stopped all of our aid — military and humanitarian — throughout Central America. Thanks to our Congress, it is pretty clear the Soviets do not have an incentive to pull back from their promotion of war and communism in Central America.

On arms control we pushed the ball forward somewhat in Moscow, largely by our initiative on air-launched cruise missiles and land-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. There was no progress on the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles, however, where the verification problems are almost insurmountable. Nor was there movement on questions about the Strategic Defense Initiative and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Here our purpose is to move forward with SDI and in no event let the Soviets succeed in their diplomatic campaign to cripple our efforts to find defenses against ballistic missile attack.

In any case, the SLCM and SDI questions must not be singled out as obstacles to completing a START Treaty. The START talks will necessarily continue to move slowly because of many inherent difficulties in reaching an equitable, effectively verifiable treaty.

Both leaders said at the end that they wanted to keep the arms control process moving forward through the remainder of President Reagan's term of office. This is encouraging. We will try to move it ahead. The ball is largely in the Soviets' court. If they bring Akhromeyev back again — and they did bring him to the negotiations two weeks ago, which is why we made some progress — we will be dealing with a man of authority and may be able to move farther ahead.

How shall I draw together my reflections on the progress over four summits from Geneva to Moscow? Much credit has been given to Mikhail Gorbachev as a new kind of Soviet leader, with whom it is, to be sure, easier to deal. As I already have acknowledged, there's some truth in this. Meanwhile, though, President Reagan often has not been given enough credit for being a new kind of U.S. leader in approaching the problems of communism and Soviet power.

There's a tendency in some of our political journalism to patronize the President on the matter of our improving relations with the Soviet Union. Some see the improving relations as evidence that Ronald Reagan has undergone a philosophical transformation — their patronizing term is that he has "grown," that is, become soft on communism.

I submit that Ronald Reagan's philosophical approach to Soviet communism has remained consistent since the beginning of his presidency. I mentioned earlier his first major foreign policy address as President, at the University of Notre Dame commencement in 1981, where he said: "The years ahead are great ones for this country, for the cause of freedom and the spread of civilization. The

West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism...."

I don't believe it has been adequately recognized how consistent this is with the President's thinking throughout his tenure. Consider, for instance, his speech reporting on the December 1987 Washington Summit. On that occasion he said: "... we are saying that the postwar policy of containment is no longer enough; that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom...."

Later, in Moscow, Ronald Reagan directly showed Soviet citizens what "transcending communism" means. He demonstrated this in his historic meetings with church leaders at the Danilov Monastery, with refuseniks and human rights activists at the American ambassador's residence, and with students at Moscow State University.

President Reagan said in Moscow that the Soviet leaders must go beyond *glasnost* and *perestroika* to *metanota*. We acknowledge that there is ferment and flexibility in Gorbachev's leadership. We even acknowledge that there is some "new thinking." But as yet we have not discerned the *profound* new thinking that is needed. Thinking about profound change is required if there is to be a true human rights revolution. We need to see comparable openness and honesty in defense matters so that there can be a good START agreement. Beyond this the Soviets need to drop their hypocrisy on strategic defense so that we both can move forward toward a safer balance of offenses and defenses.

We are not without hope. But we must exercise patience to learn whether the Soviet leaders have truly begun to free themselves and their people from their ideological confines. Prudence directs that we take our time in discerning whether the Soviets are indeed changing their old habits of repression at home and aggression abroad.

Celebrate the Differences

At the 40th anniversary of NATO we should pause to celebrate the fact that there are strong, free democratic societies in Western Europe that have very independent voices. It is healthy for free countries to have open honest debate. No one should mistake honest open debate on surface matters for a difference in the basic principles of freedom. No force in the world will be stronger than when someone tries to subjugate people that have tasted freedom and the benefits of a free society. All the surface differences will rapidly disappear and be replaced by a united will to preserve peace with freedom.

Reflect for a moment back to the late 1940's. The hope of the American people was that the Western Europe could partake of the broad based freedom and economic fruits of free people for which the United States was blessed. The hope of the American people was to make Western Europe self sufficient. The hope of the American people was that eventually all people would be free and at peace.

With vision and purpose we set out to help the Western European societies rebuild themselves. Though their hard work, U.S. aid and encouragement, in less than a generation Western Europe was rebuilt-it is at Peace and the people are free.

The goals and dreams of the American people have been fulfilled many times over. The Western Europe countries are strong and now reflect the sovereign wishes of their people. As we come closer and closer to the ultimate dream of peace and freedom for all people (witness the recent events in China) - there will probably be even more surface difference-Instead of being frustrated - we should celebrate the differences. The differences of opinion over nuclear matters reflect the different perspective of sovereign people and their elected representation. Ringing the toll bells over NATO is without foundation. On the real issues there is unity.

Contrast this growth and stability of free people with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact - they are third world powers in all but military might.