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*paper prepared for the international seminar
on party building, Hungary September 1989*

The Lesson of the Polish Elections of June 1989

by Jacek Moskwa

The evolution of the Polish political system has gained momentum under the influence of the two strike waves which swept the country in 1988: one in the Spring and the other in the Autumn. These upsurges of labor unrest revealed that Solidarity continued to command authority among the people, functioning at the same time as a myth and a goal of action. This explains why the Communist rulers started to talk to Lech Wałęsa and eventually arrived at the idea of the 'round table.' In the resulting negotiations, the opposition approached the parliamentary elections as a price for the recognition of Solidarity, the widening of civic liberties, the promotion of genuine local government, the restriction of censorship, and pluralism in the mass media—rather than as a self-contained goal.

The same considerations induced the Solidarity representatives at the 'round table' to endorse a concept of 'nonconfrontational' elections which provided for a predetermined distribution of seats in parliament on the strength of a new electoral law, specially tailored for this occasion: 65% of the seats were reserved for the government coalition, comprising the Communists (PZPR, that is, Polish United Workers Party), the United Farmers Party (ZSL), the Democratic Party (SD), and the three minor Catholic groupings allied with the Communists. The coalition reallocated these seats among themselves, leaving the electorate a choice between two candidates from the same party. The remaining 35% of the seats (or 161 out of a total of 460) were to be freely contested by the non-affiliated. Candidates could be put up either by the Communists and their allies, or by at least 3,000 voters. As an additional safeguard, 35 seats of the 299 reserved for the ruling coalition were to be filled by the candidates from the 'national list,' who however were without rivals and hence would run only in the first ballot, where 50% of the valid votes were needed for winning the given seat. In the second ballot, held two weeks later, all the seats not filled in the first ballot were to be contested again, but now without the 50% hurdle: from each two candidates the one with the higher vote was to win, no matter how low the ballot was. But since there were no rivals on the 'national list,' the 35 candidates from this list would not run again in the second ballot. Excepting the 'national list,' all the candidates were grouped in constituencies of from 3 to 5 seats. In effect, in the first round of the elections, in any constituency, a voter could cast his ballot for one from each pair of candidates (either 3, or 4, or 5 pairs) and for any (or none) of the 35 national list candidates.

The 'round table' accord provided further for the election of a second chamber of parliament, the Senate with 100 seats. Here there was genuine freedom of choice because all the seats were freely contested, except that the distribution of seats was not proportional because each voivodship (province) got two seats, with the exception of the two most populated provinces: Warsaw and Katowice, which got three seats in the Senate.

This highly complicated voting procedure (for an alternative description see the appended material from *News About Poland*) had been devised in keeping with the maxim observed by Tomasi di Lampedusa's hero of *Leopardo*, Prince Tancredo: "A lot must be changed to allow nothing to change." The rulers' calculation was that even if they were to lose the struggle for all the Senate seats and for 35% of the *Sejm* (lower house) seats, they would still have a comfortable majority in the National Assembly (the *Sejm* and the Senate in joint session), which was to elect the President, and also in the lower house to put up a government under their control.

As we know, this calculation was demolished by the voters. But on April 5, when the 'round table' accord was being signed, nobody could envisage the election outcome. In a span of two months, the opposition could scarcely hope to set up the political apparatus needed to conduct an effective election campaign. The political groupings of the opposition were in an initial phase of organization and, unlike the Communists and their allies, were lacking the necessary institutional background. The Solidarity trade union was about to come out into the open, after many years of illegal activities (in the 'underground') and was not in a position to become involved in the election campaign. On the other hand, no other organization enjoyed as much prestige and had the potential to ensure that the freely contested 100 Senate seats and 161 *Sejm* seats are filled by truly independent people, rather than by proteges of the Communist party.

A major obstacle was the very limited access to the mass media, that is, television, radio, and mass-circulation newspapers. To be sure, the 'round table' included a subsection dealing with the mass media, but the approaching election campaign was not in the center of attention. There was only Janina Jankowska, a former radio journalist and winner of *Prix Italia*, who submitted a self-contained proposal for a thorough reform of Radio and Television, but the idea was rejected out of hand by the government side, on the understanding that, next to the armed forces and the police, these media were the pillars of their hold on power. So the 'round table' accord specified only that a certain amount of paper would be made available to the revived Solidarity weeklies and to a daily newspaper of the opposition. The latter (*Gazeta Wyborcza*) did not start appearing until four weeks before the elections and its circulation was initially only 170,000, rather than the agreed-upon half a million copies.

Even less had been won on the state-monopolized television: once a week Solidarity was allowed to have a program of 45 min. (and 60 min. on the radio). In addition, during the four weeks preceding the elections, on television the opposition was granted short spans (exactly 23%) within the half-hour 'election blocs,' which amounted to spans of 7 minutes: twice a day on the national TV network plus once a day locally. On the radio, which had seven (either half-hour or quarter-hour) election blocs during the day, the opposition had spans of from 3.5 to 7 minutes. Within these strictly circumscribed spans Solidarity produced self-contained programs marked by a special signal. In practice, numerous obstacles had to be overcome before the opposition journalists and technicians could make full use of this very limited access to radio and television (for more details, see the appended material from *News About Poland*).

Needless to say, the forces in control of radio and television did not miss the slightest opportunity to campaign for their candidates in practically every kind of program, especially on television. The matter is discussed in greater detail by my colleague, Wojciech Maziarski.

Such were the circumstances in which the forces of the opposition grouped around Lech Wałęsa as Solidarity chairman, resolved to take part in the parliamentary elections. A nation-wide list of candidates for the freely contested seats in both houses of parliament was drawn up the Solidarity Civic (or Citizens') Committee, a body originally set up in June 1987, when Lech Wałęsa summoned 60 prominent figures, among them the leaders of the banned trade unions and intellectuals who had become known as supporters of Solidarity, for their first national conference. The conference issued a declaration on vital issues of public interest, and there followed two more such declarations. In September 1988 the Civic Committee was widened by including the remaining members of the Solidarity National Executive (KKW), the leaders of Individual Farmers Solidarity, and the leaders of the massive strikes of Spring and Autumn 1988. Once the prospect of the 'round table' had acquired some reality (December 1988), the Committee was to function in an advisory and programming capacity and, for this purpose, regrouped into 14 subcommittees for the various spheres of public life. Eventually, nearly all Committee members took part in the 'round table' negotiations, which comprised numerous sections and subsections, precisely in such an advisory and programming capacity. Still, in view of the fact that the Civic Committee had been nominated by Lech Wałęsa, both its role and composition were being questioned right from the beginning, on the grounds that its members had not been elected by the various political groupings of the opposition (even though leading members of many of these groupings were involved on an individual basis).

Upon the conclusion of the 'round table,' the Solidarity National Executive recommended that the advisory body be renamed into the Solidarity Civic Committee and be entrusted with nominating the candidates for parliament and with conducting the election campaign. The Executive also called on the regional bodies of the trade union to set up parallel civic committees at voivodship (provincial) level.

This arbitrary decision provoked a stormy debate within the Civic Committee, whose members disagreed with having the trade union dictate them how to run the election campaign without paying attention to the new geography of oppositional groupings that has emerged in the past few years. The leader of the rightist-Catholic Young Poland Movement (RMP), Aleksander Hall (now appointed minister for political parties), proposed an alternative formula: the Alliance for Democracy affiliating the various opposition groups and parties which could nominate their candidates in a more democratic style. Among those supporting this idea was Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the present Prime Minister, who advised the trade union against becoming involved in the election campaign. But the view prevailed that such a procedure would unduly delay the campaign and reduce its effectiveness. The chief exponents of this view (Lech Wałęsa, Bronisław Geremek, and Jacek Kuroń) argued that Solidarity's legend, symbols, and political potential must be put to use. Eventually, the stance of the Solidarity National Executive was endorsed by the Civic Committee.

The controversy brought some unfortunate results, however. A number of leading Solidarity activists, among them Aleksander Hall, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Marcin Król (editor of the monthly *Res Publica* and a leading figure of the young conservatives) refused to run in the parliamentary elections. In addition, in those regions (provinces) where civic committees had been formed earlier by people associated with the clergy operating in working class neighborhoods and with the Catholic Intellectuals Clubs (KIK) an antagonism developed between these (old) committees and the new ones formed by local Solidarity chapters.

The first and foremost task of the central election staff was to alleviate these tensions. The ultimate argument was that Lech Wałęsa would support only the candidates selected jointly by the rival committees. Not everywhere have these antagonisms been removed. In some regions (Łódź, Radom, Bydgoszcz) the rival committees put up their own candidates. In those places the Solidarity candidates scored relatively low in the first round of the elections.

Despite these quarrels, in most voivodships the civic committees emerged as a broad, spontaneous, and pluralistic political movement relying chiefly on volunteers. In fact, they have largely continued as such to this day, even though there was a point at which the National Executive tried to put an end to their existence on the assumption that they would emerge as rivals of the local Solidarity bodies. Most recently, now that Tadeusz Mazowiecki has set up a Solidarity-dominated cabinet, the civic committees will become a convenient ground for promoting democratic local government and for supporting the budding reforms.

From the very beginning, the civic committees did not resemble a political party, except perhaps a party of the American type, that is, a broad coalition of diverse groups and trends on a historical and pragmatic rather than an ideological foundation. The core of the committees is made up of not only Solidarity and Farmers Solidarity activists but also members of the clergy serving in working class environments and members of the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs. The committees have released a tremendous potential of civic activities and it can be stated safely that Solidarity owes its electoral victory to them.

Initially, the provincial civic committees tended to submit complete lists of (local) candidates for parliament. On the other hand, the (national) Civic Committee had formed a central pool of candidates comprising members of the Committee and people proposed by the national leaderships of Farmers Solidarity, by the economic societies (associating private businessmen), by the Dziekania Political Club (linked with the Roman-Catholic hierarchy), and by the central council of attorneys. Those voivodships where Solidarity was relatively weak were happy to see candidates of well-known names "imported" into their provinces. For example, in Krosno where two deputies and two senators were to be elected, as many as three of the four candidates had their domicile in Warsaw. One was the famous actor Gustaw Holoubek, another was Andrzej Szczypiorski, a writer of international standing, and a third was Professor Jerzy Osiatyński, a leading economic expert of Solidarity, right now appointed as chairman of the Central Planning Bureau.

But Krosno was not a typical voivodship. In actual fact, only 16 of the 161 candidates for the *Sejm* and 25 of the 100 candidates for the Senate can be traced back to the center. A majority of the Solidarity candidates were recruited from among the local educated people: technicians, economists, teachers. A striking feature was the small number of laborers, which reflected the tendency of Solidarity leaders (Lech Wałęsa, Zbigniew Bujak, Władysław Frasyniuk) not to run for parliament.

In contrast, a very vocal group was that of activists of Farmers Solidarity who entered a kind of competition with the other groupings. Other conflicts arose from the divisions within Solidarity originating in the period of 'underground' activities. This is where the 'central' candidates fitted well as compromise solutions, next to 'neutral' Catholic activists. Relatively few of the Solidarity candidates represented the strictly political groupings. Aside of a member of the Dziekania Club, there was one candidate from the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) and three from the Christian Democrats, and these were chosen at local level.

The voivodship lists were endorsed by the local civic committees by secret ballot. Sent in to Warsaw, they were compiled into the national list to be backed by the (national) Civic Committee and Lech Wałęsa himself. Only a few of these candidates were finally omitted, the typical reason being their political stance under martial law and the period of Solidarity's illegal existence. The most notable case was that of Janusz Zabłocki, the chairman of the Christian-Democratic Club, to whom exception was taken because of his record as *Sejm* deputy and member of the Consultative Council set up by General Jaruzelski.

Some of the opposition politicians who had been omitted by the Solidarity Civic Committee decided to enter on their own the race for the seats (35%) available to the non-affiliated, in both the *Sejm* and the Senate. Such cases of competition with the Solidarity-backed candidates were recorded in several election districts. In Cracow, there was KPN leader Leszek Moczulski, in Katowice it was Kazimierz Świtoń (running against Adam Michnik), and in Warsaw it was attorney Władysław Siła-Nowicki (running against Jacek Kuron). The latter two represented the (still unofficial) Christian Democrats and were thus ideological rivals of the two prominent Solidarity activists with social-democratic leanings. As it turned out, none of these "independents" could seriously threaten the Solidarity-backed candidates, even though the two Christian Democrats were conspicuously backed by Józef Cardinal Glemp, the Primate of Poland.

On balance, the Roman-Catholic Church, including influential circles of the Episcopate, took a supportive stance. The priests would allow Solidarity election meetings to be held in their premises, without however engaging in open canvassing. There were some cases where the clergy opposed Solidarity candidates who were known to violate the Catholic rules of family life. But the most effective influence of the Church was of an indirect kind. A statistical analysis of the election results revealed that the highest voting turnouts and the most massive support for Solidarity were recorded in the South-East, where the local communities had preserved their social integrity largely thanks to the influence of the Church.

The way the Solidarity candidates were nominated attracted criticism from official quarters as well as from some minor oppositional groupings, under the motto "Lech Wałęsa's *nomenklatura*." In our election campaign we took up this challenge, presenting our candidates as "Lech Wałęsa's team," who were meant to enter Parliament not in order to represent the interests of any local communities or specific oppositional groupings but in order to accomplish sweeping political and economic reforms on a national scale. A brief programmatic statement of our goals was displayed on posters all over the country. Our slogan was that people of particular features and dispositions had been selected.

The entire election campaign proceeded in keeping with this assumption. By casting their votes for the Solidarity candidates, the voters had a choice between ... good and evil. "It's for the first time that you can choose—choose Solidarity" ran one of our popular slogans, displayed on posters. A veritable hit of our campaign was a poster saying "High Noon, June 4, 1989" and showing Gary Cooper with a voting paper in his hand.

Fortunately, Solidarity did not have to popularize a logo of its own. Since 1980 there has existed the visual symbol of the movement, firmly ingrained in people's minds despite the official ban by martial law: the inscription *SOLIDARNOSĆ* in tightly jammed red letters (symbolizing people leaning against each other) against a white background (white and red being the Polish national colors), with a tiny Polish flag protruding from the letter *N*, as if flying above the heads of a crowd. Practically all our posters, and there were millions of them, as well as countless leaflets, placards, and stickers were adorned with the logo.

Naturally, we did display the individual traits of our candidates, at numerous election meetings, often involving well-known actors and other personalities, and in our radio and TV programs. But invariably the emphasis rested on the community of objectives and the confidence vested in the candidates by Solidarity and Lech Wałęsa in person. Each of our candidates had a photo taken side by side with the Solidarity leader, except for one candidate to the *Sejm*, and precisely this one failed in the first round.

Our election strategy contrasted sharply with the line followed by our antagonists. The Communists and their allies strove to present the election as a rivalry between personalities rather than programs. While Solidarity was stressing the political image of our candidates, they sought to obliterate the political identity of theirs, hiding them among the others. In many cases the party affiliation of the Communist candidates was not even mentioned. Only the 35 candidates on the 'national list' carried the stamp of officialdom. In all the other cases the voter was confronted by names stripped of any identity. There was no way of finding out who of the candidates had been proposed by the party hierarchy and who had collected the required 3,000 signatures of support to register on his/her own. In addition, each voter was handed from 5 to 7 voting papers (slates): one for each *Sejm* seat (i.e., from 3 to 5), one with the Senate candidates, and the 'national list.' In some cases (e.g., Warsaw), the Senate list comprised as many as 34 names! And since the voting papers did not specify the affiliation of the candidates, the voters could not find their way without special guidelines.

Only Solidarity did consistently provide such guidelines, showing the names of our candidates in each electoral district. And since there was just one Solidarity candidate per seat, the electorate had an easy choice. They only had to mark off on the slates the names they found on a Solidarity leaflet (sort of 'horse'), widely distributed before voting day and, in many cases, freely accessible at stands put up in the vicinity of the polling stations.

In effect, the voting turned into a kind of plebiscite. Even though Solidarity as such had not given any explicit instructions, and Lech Wałęsa on the eve of the elections disclosed that he would vote also for some of the national-list candidates and other "reformers" from the government coalition, many semi-official representatives of Solidarity advised the voters to strike off all but the Solidarity-backed candidates. This strategy converged with the popular tendency to "take revenge" for the 45 years of moral degradation under a totalitarian and at the same time inefficient system. For the first time in the lifetime of more than one generation people were given an alternative. They could choose between the exponents of the old system and Solidarity. We only assisted them in their choice.

This strategy yielded results which surpassed our most optimistic expectations. All but one of our candidates to the *Sejm* won in the first round, mostly by a wide margin, scoring from 60 to 90% of the ballot. From among the 100 Solidarity candidates to the Senate, only eight had to stand in the second round (held two weeks later).

The success of Solidarity became even more visible against the background of the humiliating defeat suffered by the government coalition. Popular sentiments were so much against the latter that in the first round (with the 50% hurdle) only 5 of the 299 seats reserved for them were filled: two from the 'national list' and three more by candidates labelled either ZSL (two) or PZPR (one), but the three only because they had received the blessing of the local Solidarity civic committees.

All the Senate seats would have fallen to Solidarity were it not for a provincial entrepreneur who invested a sizeable portion of his fortune in the election campaign. He was the only non-Solidarity candidate to score more than the second-best Solidarity nominee already in the first round of the election. And since he was able to repeat this feat in the second round, the province of Pila in the North-West is the only one in Poland having one senator who is not affiliated to Solidarity and who forms a kind of one-man opposition in the upper house.

The biggest uproar was caused by the defeat of the 'national list' candidates. In fact, it provoked a miniature constitutional crisis since the electoral law did not specify what to do with the 33 (= 35 minus 2) vacant seats. Eventually, the government coalition named new candidates (this time, two per seat) for the second round.

The second round of the parliamentary election attracted much less attention. Only in those few provinces where the eight Solidarity candidates to the Senate were running, and in the district where one of the Solidarity candidates had missed the target, was the turnout anywhere in the vicinity of 60%. In all other districts and provinces it was around 25% or lower. Still, from among the 294 *Sejm* seats to be filled by the government coalition, an estimated 55 were won by people backed unofficially by Solidarity.

When publishing the election results, the Communists managed to suppress the data on turnout (attendance) and per cent of invalid votes for the particular electoral districts. The results of the second round were published in an even more scanty form: nothing about the turnout or per cent of invalid votes even nationwide, and only the absolute number of votes cast for the given candidate.

All in all, the parliamentary elections of June 4 and 18 brought the Communists a crushing defeat which could not fail to have far-reaching consequences. Today we have to cope with them.

4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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July 31, 1989, Monday

SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 18

LENGTH: 657 words

HEADLINE: The Fight Over Western Civilization

BYLINE: By Edward J. Lynch. Edward J. Lynch is an associate at The Madison Center in Washington, D.C.

BODY:

WESTERN civilization, Allan Bloom contends, "... is the majestic and triumphant march of two principles: freedom and equality." William Bennett has asserted that those two principles "now define no less than a universal standard of legitimacy." Charles Krauthammer even suggests, "The perennial question that has preoccupied every political philosopher since Plato - What is the best form of government? - has been answered. After a few millenia of trying every form of political system, we close this millennium with the sure knowledge that in liberal, pluralist, capitalist democracy we have found what we have been looking for."

Nevertheless, Western civilization is under attack. Most paradoxically, the hour of apparent triumph is precisely when many universities are abandoning the study of Western civilization to pursue ideas that might supplant liberal, pluralist, capitalist democracy. This points out two areas of great public concern.

First, though the West may have triumphed over other competitors for three millennia, many people are uncertain why. Are the ideas of freedom and equality superior to the alternatives? What are the alternatives? Is this a justified conquest, or an accident based on economic power, not ideas? What other principles were rejected for freedom and equality to win? In short, how well do we understand the principles that occasioned this apparent victory?

Second, Western civilization remains under attack, not merely by people who assaulted student protesters in Tiananmen Square, but by others within American society who believe that there is something better. "Hey, Hey, Ho, Ho/ Western culture's gotta go," might well be the chant of a nihilist, but it could also be the creed of someone who thinks he has a vision of a better way of life. Is there a new system to replace Western freedom as a guiding principle? Or are there alternatives that will surpass or enlighten Western principles, even in this moment of apparent success?

If there is to be a struggle for the world's future, a thorough understanding of Western civilization is a starting point. Those who would defend the apparent victory of liberal, capitalist, pluralist democracy should know what they are defending and why. The best way to understand the principles of Western institutions is to read the authors who developed them, often in the heat of long-forgotten struggles. Abandoning the study of these great minds in our universities is intellectual disarmament in the enduring war of ideas.

Those who would surpass western civilization can do little better than focus new attention on ideas and arguments that have been advanced against our way of life. To recognize the depth of Marx's criticism of liberal democracy, to understand the limits that Nietzsche saw to democratic life, or to comprehend reasons why critics as diverse as Moses, Socrates, Jesus, and Freud can hardly be understood as advocates of American democracy is to begin to explain exactly what they would cast aside from our current heritage, and what is better.

A serious understanding of the arguments the West has produced is necessary for future progress. Whether people wish to build upon or reject the currently triumphant idea, the future can improve upon the past only to the extent that people understand what might be gained, or lost, in altering or abolishing western forms of government. President Bush said in his inaugural address, "For the first time in this century - for the first time in perhaps all history - we don't have to talk late into the night about which form of government is better." But the events in Tiananmen Square and the effort to reshape the study of western civilization on American campuses both indicate that some are unconvinced.

If ideas rather than force, are to guide progress, no one can ignore the battles over books.

8TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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July 21, 1989, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: EDITORIAL; PAGE A21

LENGTH: 804 words

HEADLINE: Stealth: The Weapon For Going It Alone

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

Is a fleet of B-2 Stealth bombers worth \$ 70 billion? Seventy billion is real money, but it does not buy what it used to. At today's prices, it will buy you 16 months' worth of oil imports, or half an S&L bailout. Remember: The \$ 23 billion already spent on Stealth research and development is gone. Killing Stealth will not recover that money. The remaining \$ 50 billion -- about what America spends on beer in a year -- spread through the 1990s amounts to about 1 1/2 percent of the defense budget, almost precisely what the B-1 (1982-86) and the B-52 (1952-61) cost in their day.

What do we get for \$ 70 billion? The manned bomber of the next century. The only weapon that has the potential for finding and destroying mobile nuclear targets and for ascertaining what has been hit. A \$ 70 billion investment that immediately degrades the Soviets' \$ 350 billion air defense system.

Bombers are an essential third leg of the American nuclear deterrent. In one respect, they are the best leg: they are uniquely recallable. Once ballistic missiles are launched from land or sea, it's all over. Bombers give a president 10 hours to ponder the apocalypse.

Moreover, the B-2, like the B-52, will be able to carry out non-nuclear, non-apocalyptic missions: the 1986 Libya raid, for example. Congressional opponents argue that it is absurd to send a \$ 500 million airplane to destroy a \$ 5 million bridge. What about the F-111s that we sent to destroy Gadhafi's tent? Was it absurd to send a \$ 36 million plane to destroy something that costs less than a Buick?

The idea of matching the cost of a weapon to the cost of a target is an example of the silliness that passes for strategic thinking these days. It is not the cost of the target that matters, but the magnitude of the threat it poses. Chemical weapons factories, for example, are cheap. Are they therefore to be attacked only with small arms?

If you have a mission deemed essential to the national interest, you carry it out at least cost to yourself in men and machines. The cost of sending radar-vulnerable F-111s against Libya was, we tend to forget, one downed plane and two dead American flyers. The reason to have a very expensive but radar-evading plane like Stealth, which can fly 10,000 miles on a single refueling, is to be able to strike almost anywhere in the world with high confidence that the planes and the men will not be shot down. We either want that capability or we don't. If we do, we have to pay for it.

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We are soon going to need that capability more than ever. In this era of Soviet retrenchment, "new thinking" about the post-Cold War world is much in vogue. Notably missing from the Stealth debate is new thinking about the strategic environment that dawns as the Cold War wanes. In a post-Cold War world a major source of threats to American interests and American lives will be "crazy states," like Libya and Iran, states armed with unappeasable grievances, mobile missiles and chemical (possibly nuclear) weapons of massive destruction.

The other feature of a post-Cold War world will be the weakening of the alliance structure established in the '40s and '50s, which afforded the United States the luxury of bases and staging areas throughout the world. With the decline of communism, these anti-communist alliances will decline, leaving America increasingly on its own.

Given these two predictable developments, Stealth becomes a vital weapon. The promise of Stealth is that it can take off from the United States, go anywhere, strike undetected and return home without the need for foreign bases, support or sufferance. It is the perfect weapon for the multipolar international environment and the unilateralist American foreign policy of the future. Stealth is the go-it-alone weapon for a go-it-alone world.

Moreover, the current international tranquillity offers a unique window of opportunity for the United States, freed from the constraints imposed by crisis, to think big and take the technological leap represented by Stealth. True, money spent on Stealth is taken from readiness and from other weapons systems. But readiness for what? In 40 years we have never been on less of a war footing. Readiness -- money spent today for the contingency of war tomorrow -- is money lost if there is no war tomorrow. (It is like term life insurance: if you make it until tomorrow, you've lost today's premium.) The world will be decades catching up to Stealth. If there ever was a time to trade some readiness for immense technological advantage, this is it.

There is one more reason for building Stealth. It has nothing to do with strategy. It has to do with aesthetics. No machine that beautiful should be allowed to die. Expensive, yes. But, again: consider today's prices. Each Stealth goes for no more than nine Van Goghs.

TYPE: OPINION EDITORIAL

SUBJECT: BOMBERS

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July 3, 1989, U.S. Edition

SECTION: ESSAY; Pg. 74

LENGTH: 1001 words

HEADLINE: Disorders of Memory

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

Washington is in the grip of a memorial epidemic. The success of the Viet Nam Memorial has spawned demand for more. Memorials are in progress to Korean War vets, to black Revolutionary War patriots, to women in military service, to law-enforcement heroes, to women in Viet Nam, to Francis Scott Key, to Kahlil Gibran (!). The hunger for memory etched in stone is exactly what one would expect from a culture that, having just now transcended paper and entered the radically ephemeral world of video, finds itself living in an ever moving **pastless present.**

The first casualty is memory. Every **advance in writing**, from stone to clay to paper to electronic blips, is at the same time an **advance in erasing.** In the electronic age erasing has become literally effortless: it takes an act of commission -- you must command your computer to SAVE -- to retain information. Simple omission, or an electrical storm, turns computer thoughts to ether.

The ultimate instrument for forgetting is television. It is inherent in the medium. The flickering image is impossible to retain. Who remembers the once ubiquitous Mike Douglas? Frank Reynolds? Michael Dukakis? Pastlessness is inherent in video, with its fast cuts and dissolving shots and rerecord button, with its moving tape forever recording a **vanishing now.** For a television society, every day is Today, This Morning and Tonight. Television life is a **rolling present** relieved only by commercial breaks.

"To live in the present is like proposing to sit on a pin," wrote Chesterton. Science makes a more severe judgment. It calls living in the present psychotic. Not happy-go-lucky, devil-may-care living in the present, but the real thing. Some individuals by reason of accident or disease (generally alcoholism) suffer from what is called Korsakoff's psychosis: they have no memory. Not that they have forgotten their ancient childhood memories. They often retain these. But they have lost entirely the capacity to establish new memories. Everything they see, everything they hear, everything they think, they forget within seconds. Introduce yourself to a Korsakoffian, leave the room, and return a minute later. He will have no recollection of you.

Not surprisingly, the amnesic society behaves much like the amnesic individual. The Korsakoffian patient, for example, fills in his gaps with fiction. He makes up stories, often gigantic confabulations, to make historical ends meet. The video culture too fills in the gaps of real life with mountains of fiction. (The average American absorbs more make-believe drama in a year than his ancestors did in a lifetime.) And it ties **history's loose ends** with a form of fabrication it calls docudrama.

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The Korsakoffian, moreover, has trouble functioning. He is always getting things wrong. As modern industrial culture becomes more visual, its images more transient, it has a hard time learning. It too is constantly surprised. Take the shock with which news of the Chinese crackdown on the democracy movement was received. Given Communism's 70-year history, marked by repeated reigns of repressive terror, only a forgetting culture could have been so taken by surprise. The week after the Tiananmen massacre, Hungary, which has a harder time forgetting, staged a moving reburial of the men executed for leading the 1956 rebellion. The commemoration reminded us that **Western Communism in its 40th year produced precisely the same atrocity -- freedom crushed with tanks and terror -- that Eastern Communism is producing in this, its 40th year.**

But amnesia, the disorder of advanced electronic societies, is not the only possible derangement of national memory. There are cultures that remember nothing and cultures that forget nothing. Forgetting nothing might be worse. Remembering nothing produces a mere mindless, stumbling insouciance. Forgetting nothing produces paralysis and death.

Beirut's warring factions, for example, have a prodigious capacity for remembering injury. So too the Northern Irish, whose Protestants celebrate the Battle of the Boyne -- next year is the 300th anniversary -- as if it took place yesterday. The inability to forget, to let the slate be wiped clean, freezes societies in anachronism and turns blood feuds into endless civil war.

It is because the inability to relinquish the past can produce such horror that memory -- what place, what price, what power to give it -- is a central question in the great historical transition from dictatorship to democracy. All the new Latin democracies, for example, are emerging from periods of brutal dictatorship. What to do with this past? Uruguay chose, by referendum, a forgetting. It voted to let the brutalities of military rule be bygone. Argentina did the opposite. It prosecuted those who gave the orders for torture and execution. The Argentine experience, however, with its semiannual military revolts and its reversion to Peronism, seems an argument against too much remembering.

Too much remembering. In Funes, the Memorious, Jorge Luis Borges tells the story of a man who suddenly gains the ability to remember every iota of information he has ever apprehended. Every vein of every leaf of every tree, every formation of every cloud in every sky at every instant of his life he sees. An avalanche of knowing renders him inaccessible, mystical and finally defeated. Funes dies young. No mind can apprehend God's work, or man's, in all its detail and survive. Forgetting, for men as for nations, is a biological necessity, like sleep, a respite from consciousness.

We children of the electronic age, however, suffer differently. Forgetting is all we do. We so feel ourselves forgetting that we contrive **monuments of stone** -- to vets, to cops, to Kahlil Gibran, to whomever -- **to anchor ourselves in time**. That which is written in stone endures, we figure. If the Ten Commandments were given today, they would be flashed on the great Diamond Vision screen at Yankee Stadium, and by sunup not a soul would remember.

GRAPHIC: Picture, NO CAPTION descColor illustration., ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY PETER SIS

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June 23, 1989, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: EDITORIAL; PAGE A23

LENGTH: 926 words

HEADLINE: Communist Imperative

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

"Lord, if only I could have talked with Hitler, all this might have been avoided."

-- Idaho Senator William Borah, upon hearing of the Nazi invasion of Poland.

Last Tuesday, when Secretary of State James Baker went to Capitol Hill to announce new sanctions against China, he was scolded by unmollified senators, chief among them Gordon Humphrey, for his "pathetically weak" response to the crackdown in China. "We missed an important opportunity to at least temper the direction of the Chinese leadership," said Humphrey.

However injurious it is to American national pride, the fact remains that the direction of the Chinese leadership is not tempered by the righteous protest of foreigners. Certainly not by the righteous protest of Americans. Hours after the administration's appeal for clemency for demonstrators sentenced to death, the Chinese government responded with 10 bullets to the back of the head. An American writ that does not extend to Panama City will not extend to Beijing.

But the Chinese authorities would have been undeterred even by America at its zenith. When it comes to matters of state, most dictatorships are impervious to foreign protest. And for the Chinese Communists the democracy movement was the ultimate matter of state: a threat to the very existence of the regime.

This is made clear not only in Deng Xiaoping's June 9 speech now endlessly repeated on Chinese television and in factory "study groups," but in the pre-massacre speech of President Yang in which he told his military commanders that "retreat means the downfall of the People's Republic of China and the restoration of capitalism." Us or them. Communists always choose us.

If we cannot influence events, why then sanctions? As in the case of South Africa, it is important to have no illusions about sanctions. They will not materially help the people we want to help. Nor will they bring about our desired political outcome. The main purpose for sanctions, in China as in South Africa, is internal: to make us feel that we have expressed moral outrage in some more than rhetorical way. Sanctions are a means of national self-expression. It is entirely correct for a nation dedicated to a proposition to express itself on issues of international morality. But such actions are not to be confused with diplomacy.

They might also be insulated from politics. House Majority Leader Gephardt led a delegation of congressmen to the Chinese Embassy on Tuesday. Not surprisingly, he was told by the ambassador to mind his own business. "We made

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it very clear," Gephardt told the waiting cameras, "that all of the nations of the world today, including China, have subscribed to a set of rules and regulations governing human rights, the Helsinki Accords." Fine sentiment, unfortunate reference. The Chinese are not signatories to the Helsinki Accords. Waving parchment at Chinese Communists is a waste of time in the first place. Those who insist on doing so regardless should at least read the text.

But won't the denial of international loans and other such sanctions have some effect on the Chinese economy, the success of which is so highly prized by the current leadership? They will, but Deng has made it clear that politics takes precedence over economics. He knew full well what repression would cost in terms of economic development. For the sake of power, the ultimate Marxist-Leninist value, he decided to pay it.

These costs have been most clearly on display in Poland following the smashing of Solidarity in 1981. The resulting scenario is this: the regime retains power, but the population refuses to cooperate. A sullen work force, an alienated intellectual class, and a general suspicion produce economic stagnation. That is the real economic cost of repression. Western sanctions -- which, in any case, can confidently be predicted to be short-term, given the West's attention span -- add only marginally to the cost.

The East European model is worth keeping in mind because in much of the coverage of China the impression is given that the current repression is a peculiarly Chinese tragedy, another abortive attempt at modernization, another reactionary turn in 20th century Chinese history. In fact, the reign of terror is not uniquely Chinese but characteristically communist -- from the massive propaganda campaign, the show trials and the forced confessions, right down to the invocation endlessly repeated in the media to "Love the party."

Now that Soviet communism has adopted a human face, the baby boom generation has a hard time recalling what the Cold War was about. A popular revisionism holds that the Cold War, fed on a mutual paranoia, was a cherished project of the American right. In fact, China today has clarified the issue. It has dramatically recreated precisely the kind of forces America fought during 40 years of the great twilight struggle.

Which is what makes Tiananmen Square an important event not just in Chinese but in Western consciousness. It is the first time that this generation -- too young to remember Budapest 1956, too distracted to notice Prague 1968, too far removed to fully absorb the Vietnamese gulag and the Cambodian genocide of the '70s -- has finally been directly exposed to the meaning of Marxist-Leninism.

Because of Gorbachev, it is easy to think of Marxist-Leninism as a mere failure. But it is more than that. It is a crime. Every generation needs its demonstration of the barbarism at the core of communism. The martyrs of Tiananmen Square have given us our Budapest 1956.

TYPE: OPINION EDITORIAL

SUBJECT: CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC; COMMUNISM

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June 9, 1989, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: EDITORIAL; PAGE A27

LENGTH: 802 words

HEADLINE: When Kingdoms Reform

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

In this age of communist collapse it is an irony to be savored that Marxists, who pride themselves on having deciphered the laws of history, should have so impaled themselves on an iron law that dates back at least to 1789: kingdoms fall when they start to reform.

When revolutionaries rewrite history, they always portray the tyrant just overthrown as having grown increasingly overbearing and oppressive. But as de Tocqueville noted, looking back on the French Revolution, the time of maximum danger for despotism is precisely when it begins to relax its pressure: "The most critical moment for bad governments is the one which witnesses their first steps toward reform."

What was true for Louis XVI and, in our day, the shah, is most dramatically true of the Chinese communists. Today's revolution occurs 10 years into Deng Xiaoping's massive liberalization, which saw not only a radical freeing of the economy but a dramatic opening to the West through travel, tourism, modern communication and student exchanges (the means by which 62,700 Chinese have acquired an extended taste of American democracy).

The lesson for other communists, like comrade Gorbachev, is clear: reform at your peril. But the reason communism is now caught in such a vise is that, as Gorbachev has concluded, communism has no choice but reform. Why? Because this decade has revealed yet another iron law of history: in conditions of modernity, totalitarianism is unsustainable.

This is a remarkable reversal of expectations. Dictatorship had long been thought durable, democracy fragile. It was only six years ago that Jean Francois Revel published "How Democracies Perish." But not even the American Founders were sanguine about the chances of the long-term survival of democracy. "Democracy never lasts long," wrote John Adams to John Taylor. "There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide."

Yet democratic regimes have proved durable because of their extraordinary adaptability. In the last 25 years, for example, American democracy has absorbed the forces of civil rights, feminism, environmentalism, even rock culture, to the point that they are now part of the established American landscape.

Peruvian scholar Hernando De Soto, author of "The Other Path," has chronicled the myriad feedback mechanisms that Western democracies have built into the most mundane political processes, such as rule-making. By inviting criticism, hearings, debate and revisions by interested parties and ordinary citizens, even the bureaucracy produces rules that reflect reality and yield some social

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benefit. Dictatorships and quasifeudal mercantilist states such as Peru have nothing of the sort.

But democracies have always been flexible and dictatorships not. Why then now do dictatorships seem such unstable political vehicles? Because technological and social change has become so rapid. Where society, technology and culture are essentially static, dictatorship can survive for generations. But modernity, which is defined by its relentless exponential pace of change, makes the command society a prescription for instability.

What drives history is not class struggle but ever accelerating change. In such an environment, Darwinian laws of evolution apply. The adaptable "The adaptable organism survives. Totalitarianism is a dinosaur of adaptability." organism survives. Totalitarianism is a dinosaur of adaptability.

This is not to say that democracy and freedom are inevitable. The instability of totalitarian systems may or may not eventuate in freedom. China, for example, is faced with the prospect of civil war, or perhaps even a return to warlordism. The most likely outcome is some massively repressive form of military rule. The least likely outcome is victory for the democracy movement. When tanks contend, it is unlikely that students will rule.

While the contention of tanks does not guarantee democracy, it does prefigure the collapse of communism. Most advanced on that road is Poland, where the party, humiliated in its first half-free elections, is begging Solidarity to join the government to lend it the legitimacy it needs to govern. It is precisely in China and Poland (and, we might add, Hungary), i.e., where reform has been boldest, that collapse is most imminent. Reform communism may be communism's last stage.

It is poetic justice that Marxism, which has so smugly and brutally claimed the mantle of history, should now be subject to a series of historical contradictions that make its own decline as inevitable as the decline it had predicted for bourgeois democracy. History is the great god of the Marxist heresy. In Beijing and Warsaw, history is speaking. And for communism the verdict, to borrow the official government comment on the Polish elections, is "truly disadvantageous."

TYPE: OPINION EDITORIAL

SUBJECT: COMMUNISM; DEMONSTRATIONS; POLITICS

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Time

June 5, 1989, U.S. Edition

SECTION: ESSAY; Pg. 90

LENGTH: 969 words

HEADLINE: Reflections on the Revolution in China

BYLINE: Charles Krauthammer

BODY:

Living as we are through the greatest global democratic awakening in history, it is hard not to feel the thrill Wordsworth felt when contemplating the French Revolution ("Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive/ But to be young was very heaven!"). Of course Wordsworth lived to regret it. But there will be time for that later. Now is the time to thrill.

At the stunning uprising in China, of course. But it is only the latest event in the democratic demarche, which began with the **Philippines and Korea** and has now reached wondrous proportions.

-- In **Lithuania** the Soviet-installed, Communist-controlled, erstwhile puppet parliament votes for independence from the Soviet Union.

-- In **Hungary** the two wings of the Communist Party are fighting over whether upcoming multiparty elections mean the Communists will be voted out of power in six years (the hard-line position) or sooner (the moderate position).

-- **Argentina** is about to witness the first transition of power from one popularly elected President to another since 1922, though, by electing a Peronist, the Argentines have proved once again that democracy is a people's license to act stupidly.

-- In Chile a 15-year-old dictatorship holds a referendum on itself and loses, proving once again that democracy is a people's license to act enlightened.

-- Poland will not only hold free elections for the upper house of parliament this month but, in a little noted provision of its pact with Solidarity, will also have a popular election for President in six years.

With such goings-on, it's hard not to get gushy and to feel it a privilege to have lived to witness such a dawn.

I admit to feeling a gush or two of Wordsworthian euphoria. Though a drawing of Yuri Andropov graces my office wall (a warm reminder of the good old days when The Enemy looked the part), I am a cold warrior who does not mourn the passing of the great twilight struggle. The cold war made thinking simpler in a "four legs good, two legs bad" (the Animal Farm axiom) sort of way. But simpler doesn't mean better. There could be no happier outcome for the cold war than for us to win it and for old cold warriors to face the invigorating challenge of rethinking from the **ground up what America's role in the world**, if any, ought to be.

But some of the gushing is getting out of hand. The most common bit of mush, endlessly repeated, whether the reporting is from China or the Soviet Union or Lithuania, is that once the genie of freedom is out of the bottle it can never be put back in. This is rank sentimentalism. The idea that somehow, if people

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have tasted freedom, the taste cannot be wrung out of them is a fallacy so large it is embarrassing just to hear it. Think only of this century. Russia tasted freedom in February 1917 and by October had lost it for 70 years. Weimar Germany tasted democracy for 14 years; it took Hitler and his storm troopers a few months to eradicate it. (Had Hitler not started World War II, the taste might to this day not have returned.) Hungarians let the genie out in 1956; five days and 5,000 tanks later, Khrushchev had stuffed it back in. Twenty-one years ago, the Czechs tasted freedom for an afternoon. Tell the Czechs that today's "Moscow Spring" is irreversible. Nothing is irreversible.

I admit that the genie cannot be put back in the bottle forever. Oppression and extermination can repress the will to freedom for decades, sometimes generations, but inevitably it reappears. That is the lesson we learn from the earthquakes in China and the Soviet Union and Lithuania and Poland and Hungary.

The past decade has taught that the classical totalitarian theory of the '40s and '50s was wrong. That theory, based on Stalin and Hitler as models, made the then quite reasonable assumption that modern totalitarianism, harnessed to high technology and mechanized power (Stalin was once called Genghis Khan with a telephone), had the capacity not only to suppress freedom but also to eradicate it. Classical theory postulated the brainwashed mind, utterly enslaved through terror and manipulation. It supposed the shattered society, its mediating structures and competing allegiances (family, church, union) destroyed, leaving an atomized individual enslaved to the all powerful state.

Not so. We learn that totalitarianism can terrorize individuals and shatter civil society, but it cannot change human nature. The will to freedom can be suppressed, but inevitably it returns.

But to say that the will to freedom cannot be suppressed forever is not to say that it cannot be suppressed for a very long time. And from the point of view of the individual with a finite life-span that is the same as forever. There are many Soviets who have lived and died in this century and never known freedom of any sort. Yes, the suppression of the Prague Spring did not forever abolish the Czech hunger for freedom. But it did crush the life of an entire generation.

No one knows where the Chinese revolution is leading. But the notion that once a million people have marched in the streets, some carrying effigies of the Statue of Liberty, things cannot be undone is wishful thinking. History has provided a generous supply of Bonapartes and Lenins. Maos too. This is not China's first revolution. And even if this one does succeed, it will not be the last.

The will to freedom is, of course, a constant of human nature. But so is the will to power. And power is intolerant of freedom. The drama of today's revolution in China is the contest between the two. Neither will is absolute. All victories are temporary.

Hail freedom! But precisely now that it is ascendant, do not assume that it cannot be sent into long exile. Iran and Nicaragua and Cuba are now the exception. But only a minute ago they were the rule. They can be again.

GRAPHIC: Picture, NO CAPTION descColor illustration., ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY PETER SIS

Cluss et al
FYI

TALKING POINTS: TRI-MISSION GREETING, BRUSSELS 12/4/89

* Members of the Brussels family, Ambassador Glitman, Ambassador Taft, Ambassador Niles (Taft and Niles are new since your previous visit)

* It's nice to see some familiar faces. When I was in Brussels six months ago, you would have thought I'd at least wait a year before I put you through a Presidential visit again.

* But, you know, that is one of the nice things about our crew here in Brussels: you're ready for anything. You know the drill, and you're pros.

* Because in these exciting times we need people like you: unflappable, quick to respond, dedicated veterans of the foreign policy process.

* The other thing I like about the operation here in Brussels is your ability to work together. The Joint Administrative Service support group typifies that kind of effort. And believe me, I know what a visit like this demands of your admin offices. Where's Nick Basky? Nick, it's professionals like you that make these trips bearable. (Nick was also brought in to help out on the Costa Rica trip)

* It's an exciting time for America. And particularly for you here in Brussels. You've all seen the reports out of Malta, and our meeting here with our partners in the Alliance. We are standing on the threshold of a new era in our relationships with the East, and you here are on the cutting edge.

* (Here, you may want to give them a personal anecdote or reflection about President Gorbachev or your meeting)

* Thank you for your commitment and your dedication. God bless you and God bless the United States of America.

- * MEMBERS OF THE BRUSSELS FAMILY, AMBASSADOR GLITMAN, AMBASSADOR TAFT, AMBASSADOR NILES (TAFT AND NILES ARE NEW SINCE YOUR PREVIOUS VISIT)

- * IT'S NICE TO SEE SOME FAMILIAR FACES. WHEN I WAS IN BRUSSELS SIX MONTHS AGO, YOU WOULD HAVE THOUGHT I'D AT LEAST WAIT A YEAR BEFORE I PUT YOU THROUGH A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AGAIN.

- * BUT, YOU KNOW, THAT IS ONE OF THE NICE THINGS ABOUT OUR CREW HERE IN BRUSSELS: YOU'RE READY FOR ANYTHING. YOU KNOW THE DRILL, AND YOU'RE PROS.

- * BECAUSE IN THESE EXCITING TIMES WE NEED PEOPLE LIKE YOU: UNFLAPPABLE, QUICK TO RESPOND, DEDICATED VETERANS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS.

- * THE OTHER THING I LIKE ABOUT THE OPERATION HERE IN BRUSSELS IS YOUR ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER. THE JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP TYPIFIES THAT KIND OF EFFORT. AND BELIEVE ME, I KNOW WHAT A VISIT LIKE THIS DEMANDS OF YOUR ADMIN OFFICES. WHERE'S NICK BASKY? NICK, IT'S PROFESSIONALS LIKE YOU THAT MAKE THESE TRIPS BEARABLE. (NICK WAS ALSO BROUGHT IN TO HELP OUT ON THE COSTA RICA TRIP)

- * IT'S AN EXCITING TIME FOR AMERICA. AND PARTICULARLY FOR YOU HERE IN BRUSSELS. YOU'VE ALL SEEN THE REPORTS OUT OF MALTA, AND OUR MEETING HERE WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE. WE ARE STANDING ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EAST, AND YOU HERE ARE ON THE CUTTING EDGE.

- * (HERE, YOU MAY WANT TO GIVE THEM A PERSONAL ANECDOTE OR REFLECTION ABOUT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV OR YOUR MEETING)

* THANK YOU FOR YOUR COMMITMENT AND YOUR DEDICATION. GOD
BLESS YOU AND GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

International

WEST MEETS EAST

Drawn by pure democracy, consultants are reborn in Eastern Europe, by James David Barber

At the invitation of numerous emerging political parties in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, Campaigns & Elections exported its campaign training seminars to Eastern Europe for sessions March 6-16. One of the participants, James David Barber, was the designated scribe. This is his report.

We arrived as humble teachers. We left as activist allies, anxious to help make democracy—real democracy—happen in Eastern Europe.

Our conscience was off limits. We didn't come to preach at the democratic converts like some pontificating patriarch who drops in to straighten out his children. From the start, as our Canadian leader Gordon Robson put it, we were not in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to instruct them on how to imitate us. Our American leader, Campaigns & Elections publisher James Dwinell, echoed Robson's sentiments when he said, "We are not here to teach but to learn. We will show you our ways but as with a menu, you need to choose the tactics and strategies that are right for you and your political culture and teach us."

We came stressing cool tolerance and open mindedness, and listened for their special needs and concerns. As Florida-based consultant Lee Miller put it, "We offered you hammers and nails."

We whirled around, spending a few days in each country, working seminars which started out sparsely populated in Budapest, and ended in Warsaw with more than 350 political party officials attending. On the way, we changed. We fell off the teacher's stool and took up the flag of freedom. We planed back to America eager to help democracy grow from the revolution.

There were surprises that awakened our jaded band. For instance, is there anything more vital to a campaign than lists of voters? Last fall, Hungary did a major national referendum, a vote which decided to delay the choice of a president until the new parliament was elected. Surely anyone gearing up for a parliamentary election would want that referendum list specifying thousands of available voters. But to Hungarians, person-listing had been a weapon of the secret police for more than four decades. Tear them up and throw them away, they said.

We thought the rock-bottom challenge of political journalism is going to be how to write the story. But over there, the biggest challenge is getting paper to print the story on. In Poland, the Communists bill their own newspapers 800 zlotys (about 8 cents) for a section of paper. Solidarity, the democracy movement, is charged 5,000 zlotys, per section. In Eastern Europe, newspapers are powerful campaign tools, not forums for unbiased reporting.

And, we thought, if you're running for office, surely you'd like to get your spouse on television or in the newspaper. But to them, that implies nepotism—that if you win, your spouse will get a special job.

The political scene in Eastern Europe is different from that in Eastern New Jersey. As Wayne Johnson observed, "We argue about zoning. They're deciding whether or not to legalize private property."

The upcoming elections are not like our 1988 model. They are more like 1788, when our democracy was being constituted in its basic fundamentals. Tony Quinn may be right in suggesting that "maybe we should encourage them to think of [Vaclav] Havel and [Lech] Walesa as

playing the role of a Washington or DeGaulle as they get underway."

Argentinian pollster Felipe Noguera has it right when he says that "these countries are not just going through a change of administration, but of regime."

In Hungary we were scheduled to seminar in "Karl Marx University." By the time we got there, the name had been changed to "University of Economics of Budapest."

The big news from the three nations we visited is that democracy has stepped out onto the high wire, leaving behind the rigid communist platform, facing forward to a risky chance to establish freedom and justice for all. Now is the hour to guarantee non violence, citizenship for all, rational consent of the governed, genuine law to regulate the



Democracy comes to Wenceslas Square, Prague

economy and society, and secure, democratically controlled foreign relations.

But to make it happen, leadership is necessary. In Hungary there is a revulsion against coming out for some new political star. In Czechoslovakia, the opposite occurred. The love for Havel, the playwright-president, is almost universal.



Photo Copy Preservation

In Poland, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa has increasingly quiet respect, as if he were becoming yesterday's leader.

More importantly, what's needed is local leadership, from the village on up. In Poland, they need thousands of candidates for local and regional offices before the June election, an event unknown since World War II.

Political parties have been born, but they have yet to pass through their identity crisis. Solidarity started as a trade union and is now an umbrella for all sorts of parties. As a Solidarity M.P. put it, "What unifies us is the will to fight the communists." But with the communists on the way out, Solidarity must begin to organize national unity.

Hungary, on the other hand, lacks a national umbrella. The Czechs have a broad-based "Civic Forum" and the Slovaks the rapidly broadening "Public Against Violence." When our professional consultants talked about how to build

coalitions, eyes lit up. A new version of the Federalist Papers might make a hit.

Media politics is on a roll, but wobbling. Christine LaPaille says that "as democracy emerges in these countries, the press will emerge also." But virtually all the radio, television, and newspaper facilities are owned by the state. Harsh censors at the top have been replaced by permissive editors and producers. Reporters on the street are inventing their journalism day by day.



The Slovak organization "Public Against Violence" has become an umbrella for smaller Czech parties

Democracy rests on citizens, which is why *Campaigns & Elections*' seminars centered on the age-old questions of democracy. How do you activate voters? Where do you get money to buy the tools for campaign action?

As the long days went on, those of us who listened and looked began to experience a newness of life. When you have lunch with an aging fellow working hard in politics after being jailed for six years as a political prisoner; when you have

supper with a beautiful 17-year-old gypsy girl who is emerging as a vivid volunteer among many who think a gypsy is an animal; when you breakfast with a reporter whose weekly magazine was underground and now going public; or you walk the street with a woman translator about to have a third child, who says she never joined the communists because "you have to look your children in the eye;" those happenings turn your mind.

Randy Gilliland, president of Gilliland & Co., a fundraising firm, put it this way: "After spending many years in the American political arena, I had grown cynical. I had tired of petty political arguments and in many ways lost my sense of political vision and idealism. This trip invigorated me. It made me turn back to the dreams and idealistic views of my younger years."

Such renewed dreams are sparking realities: Gilliland and Wayne Johnson are raising funds for six East European political organizations, working to get U.S. newspapers to support papers in Poland, and trying to have equipment contributed to party offices.

Lee Miller, has taken on projects in two countries for "organizational and communications opportunities."

C&E'S EASTERN EUROPE FACULTY

- Chuck Adams**
Adams and Co., Salem, OR
- James David Barber**
Duke University, Durham, NC
- Robin Bell**
International Center for Development Policy, Washington, DC
- Scott Berkowitz**
C&E, Washington, DC
- Graham Bruce, M.L.A.**
Government of British Columbia, Duncan, BC
- James Dwinell**
C&E, Washington, DC
- Barry Fadem**
Bagatelos & Fadem, San Francisco, CA

- Andrew Frank**
C&E, Washington, DC
- George Gibault**
Public Affairs Bureau, Victoria, BC
- Randy Gilliland**
Gilliland & Company, Midlothian, VA
- Sal Guzzetta**
Political Publishing, Alexandria, VA
- Wayne Johnson**
Wayne C. Johnson & Assoc., Sacramento, CA
- Jennifer Kessler**
C&E, Washington, DC
- Kelly Kimball**
Kimball Petition Management West Los Angeles, CA

- Ginnie Kontnik**
Harriman Communications Center Washington, DC
- Jerry Lampert**
Principal Secretary to the Premier Victoria, BC
- Christine LaPaille**
Agenda Communications Chicago, IL
- Greg Lyle**
Principal Secretary to the Premier of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba
- Lindsay Mattison**
International Center for Development Policy, Washington, DC
- Lee Miller**
Miller Consulting Group, Ltd. Fort Lauderdale, FL

George Gibault, director of research for the Public Affairs Bureau in British Columbia, linked himself to numerous agricultural enterprises, whose technical aid he will enlist for urgent training needs.

A stunning conversion from preaching to participating happened when Ginnie Kontnik, director of Harriman Communications Center in Washington, and professional consultants Kelly Kimball, Trish Whitcomb, Barry Fadem, and Grey Lyle struggled all night with "Public Against Violence," the major organization working for democracy in the Slovakia part of Czechoslovakia.



Collecting political party volunteers in Wenceslas Square, Prague

Kontnik and the rest see themselves as "volunteers who were asked to help." And help they will. They have formed the nonprofit volunteers for democracy to get donations of high-tech equipment and a supply of detailed strategic advice. The group already has put together a set of four-minute television ads for Public Against Violence to be used

daily from April until the June election. The first one tells the Czech voter: "VPN took you to the revolution in Wenceslas Square. Vote on the ballot so we can finish the revolution!"

To finish the revolution is to found democracy. In the capitol of Poland, we visited the great hall of the national parliament. Up front, facing the elected representatives, is the symbol of Poland, a white eagle with outstretched wings. The communists left the eagle there in 1945, but smashed the crown off its head. When we were there, workers were putting on a new crown. Will the new crown of democracy hold firm on the head of the nation? The wonder and the uncertainty are still there. □

James David Barber is on the faculty of Duke University in North Carolina as a James B. Duke Professor of Political Science and Policy Studies.

Rev. James Noble

Decatur, GA

Phil Noble

The Palmetto Project, Charleston, SC

Felipe Noguera

Mora y Araujo Noguera, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Beth Provinse

Conotabs, Bethesda, MD

Tony Quinn

Braun and Company Sacramento, CA

Gianni Riotta

Corriere Della Sera, New York, NY

Gordon Robson

Robson and Assoc., Maple Ridge, BC

Mary Robson,

Robson and Assoc., Maple Ridge, BC

Cliff Scotton

New Democratic Party of Canada, Nanaimo, BC

Amanda Smith

Sex Equity Consultant, Durham, NC

Patricia Whitcomb

Bates & Associates, Indianapolis, IN

Robert White

International Center for Development Policy, Washington, DC

VOLUNTEERS FOR DEMOCRACY

Several participants in C&E's trip have formed a non-profit organization to provide support for VPN, the Slovak Democracy movement. If you would like to donate computers, faxes, copiers, your time, or anything else, please call (800) 237-7842.

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COMMENTARY

DON'T BLOCK GERMAN UNITY

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

AS it has been since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the future of Germany is once again at the core of the revolutionary changes rippling across Europe.

And the reaction of the Western democracies seems to prove George Bernard Shaw's aphorism that "there are two tragedies in life. One is not to get your heart's desire. The other is to get it."

Having deplored the division of Europe for nearly half a century, the Western democracies cannot decide how to relate the eruption of freedom in Eastern Europe to the traditional policies of Atlantic cohesion and European integration.

For years conventional wisdom denied the existence of any problem. The Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, and especially on the German Democratic Republic (GDR), seemed unshakable.

It was therefore expected that West European integration would move much more rapidly than German unification.

Events both unforeseen and unsettling now belie these assumptions.

Soviet power in Eastern Europe has collapsed. The Brezhnev Doctrine, which committed the Red Army's support to Communist regimes, has been abandoned.

These events have exposed a gap between the West's declaratory policy and its actions which, if not bridged, could wreck the achievements of four decades of Western statesmanship.

TO be sure, Western leaders continue to reaffirm their commitment to German self-determination.

But they all hedge their pronouncements with conditions that amount to turning the Atlantic Alliance and European integration into obstacles to German unification and, in the long term, barriers to the pro-Western orientation of the German state.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, for instance, has placed German unification at the end of a process of democratization of Eastern Europe that includes the Soviet Union and that by implication preserves the East German state as a separate sovereign entity for a period expected to last 10-15 years.

At a recent press conference, French President Francois Mitterrand declared that European integration should precede German unification, which should take the form of a special position of the GDR

within the European Community.

The American stand has been more complex. President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker have put forward four principles which seek to reconcile German national aspirations with historic European fears:

■ That the principle of self-determination be preserved without prejudice to its outcome.

■ That German unification take place within the framework of NATO and the European Community.

■ That unification be part of a step-by-step process.

■ That Germany reiterate its support for the principles of the Helsinki Act regarding its borders.

Statesmen forget at their peril that arcane language is not in itself reality.

The gradualism being preached is not tied to any specific program, nor has any Western leader defined German self-determination or a procedure for achieving it.

As a result, the Western democracies run a huge risk of turning into partners of the Soviet Union in de-


Catering to ancient fears risks making the West a partner of Moscow in defending the status quo

fending the status quo and in sharing in German eyes the opprobrium for the division of Germany heretofore borne solely by the Soviet Union.

For decades the West has suspected Moscow of having a German card up its sleeve. It would be ironic if the West now handed that card to the Soviets just as democracy is prevailing in Eastern Europe.

THE danger of making the Kremlin and the East German communists the key to German national aspirations results not only from Western pronouncements but also from Western actions.

Both Mitterrand and Baker recently visited East Germany and met with leaders with whom contact had been shunned for 40 years, who have been all but repudiated by the East German public and who even now are making it difficult for democratic parties to organize.



West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl responds to cheers last month as East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow (left) escorts him to Dresden's Palace of Culture for press conference.

And the four Allied commanders jumped at a Soviet proposal to hold for the first time since 1971 a meeting of the so-called Kommandatura, the four-power control commission for Berlin.

These gestures, by treating the East German state as the moral and political equivalent of the national states of Eastern Europe, imply a Western interest in the status quo in Germany. Over time this will generate a sense that German national aspirations are incompatible with the Western orientation of the Federal Republic.

Germany's democratic allies should think twice before they risk the Western connection of the Federal Republic by forcing German leaders to choose between their allies and their national goals.

They must not create a German problem in the name of avoiding it.

THE question of how to treat East Germany internationally brooks no delay.

In Eastern Europe democratic institutions are likely to enhance domestic stability. In the GDR, the opposite is certain to occur; free elections will generate pressures for unification.

No formula can alter the fact that the principal reason for the existence of the East German state has been as a communist outpost of the Soviet Union.

Of course, if the East German population desires a separate state, no country in the world would object — probably not even the Federal Republic. But the Western nations would be taking a fateful step if they were to incite such an evolution by their own policies.

Whatever the time scale for German unification or its nature, the direction of it must be established within the next year.

Once two German states — especially democratic ones — become fixtures of

the European equilibrium, German unification can be pursued only at the cost of an international crisis.

European politics will revert to the patterns of the 18th and 19th centuries. Outside powers — especially the Soviet Union — will be given an opportunity to manipulate inter-German rivalry.

For the 200 years prior to German unification, as many wars were sparked by Germany's division as by its subsequent unity.

In truth, the choice of the Western democracies is not so great as their public pronouncements suggest.

For any attempt to make progress toward German unification conditional on progress toward European integration will defeat both — this is the weakness of the American principles. It will sooner or later turn German nationalism against European integration and Atlantic unity.

The real choice before the Western allies is whether they fear German unity more than they prize European integration and Atlantic cohesion.

The way to avoid German preponderance is not to ascribe to it motives contrary to 40 years of responsible German policy, even less to divide that country.

Should Germany, against all present indications and common sense, seek the road of hegemony, Britain and France always have the option of increasing their cooperation within the framework of European and Atlantic institutions.

And the United States would surely use its influence to prevent an outcome that it opposed in two wars.

SEVERAL factors drive German unification.

The dissolution of Germany's internal frontiers will force the Federal Republic to move rapidly toward the equalization of living conditions in the two parts of Germany. Otherwise, a

mass exodus of East Germans is probable, exceeding the capacities of the Federal Republic to sustain.

Common economic policies are inevitable; a common currency cannot be far behind.

Another impetus will be supplied by the elections scheduled for the two parts of Germany this year: in the East in May, in the Federal Republic in December.

It is highly improbable that the policies of the political parties toward unification will — being essentially non-partisan — vary on either side of the dividing line.

Therefore the appeals of Germany's allies for gradualism are curiously irrele-

Any attempt to make progress toward unification conditional on progress toward European integration will defeat both

vant, and assurances to the Soviet Union that no effort will be made to accelerate the process could be dangerous.

As for the Soviet Union, it surely has the physical power to prevent German unification. But to do so by force would wreck the "Gorbachev fever" in the Federal Republic on which Moscow has staked so much and which it has worked hard to foster.

The Kremlin can also offer unification in return for Germany's loosening its Western ties. The least Ger-

many's allies can do is to avoid providing incentives to Germany for such a course.

The only realistic way to moderate the pace of events and to keep Germany in the Western community is to come to an agreement on the desired outcome and then to plan together the precise step to reach the goals.

LIKE many contemporaries who experienced the Hitler regime and World War II, I would have suffered no sense of deprivation had the issue of German unification remained in limbo for a while longer.

Now that it has arisen, we no longer have the option of deferring it to a more convenient moment.

A faster pace of European integration is highly desirable. But paradoxically it is most likely in the context of a Western plan on German unification.

This is the best way of ensuring that European integration and the Atlantic Alliance are not perceived in Germany as a subterfuge for delaying unification.

The confederation proposal of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl — greeted so lukewarmly by his allies — represents the minimum compatible with German aspirations and international necessities.

Overcoming their misgivings, the Allies should develop a long-range program in four stages:

■ First, the elaboration of a timetable for German confederation to be completed within a two-year period. The confederation should have a common foreign policy as its goal.

■ The implementation of another major step toward European political integration beyond what is envisaged for 1992 should be completed within a fixed time period after the establishment of the German confederation, including a specific program to enable the countries of Eastern Europe to enter into association with the European community.


■ Concurrent negotiation of a new European security system as a step toward full unification.

■ Development of a program to move from confederation to whatever form of German unity a process of self-determination generates.

The opportunity to build a truly new international system must not be lost in a maze of bureaucratic formulas masking old fears. It requires a clear vision of what lies ahead and above all an initiative equal to the challenge before us.

Henry A. Kissinger's analyses of world events appear monthly in *The Post*.

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Agence France-Press

President Nicolae Ceausescu made it clear yesterday that for as long as he is in charge Rumania will not follow other Eastern European countries along the path toward democracy or capitalism. With him at the Communist Party congress in Bucharest was his wife, Elena.

... powers back
Estonia, for exa
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Walesa in Venezuela

CARACAS, Venezuela, Nov. 20 (AP) — Lech Walesa, the founder of the Solidarity movement in Poland, arrived here today after a United States tour, pledging that Eastern Europe and Latin America would work together in improving their debt-ridden economies.

Reporter's Notebook

Hungarians, Maestros of Ambiguity, Confront a Whole New Political Process

By R. W. APPLE Jr.
Special to The New York Times

BUDAPEST, Nov. 20 — Put three Hungarians into a room, people say here, and they'll form seven clubs. So it is as political parties multiply in anticipation of next year's elections for Parliament.

A Hungarian walks into a revolving door behind you, people also say here, and comes out in front. So it is with the complex and devious tactics that the new parties are devising.

Next Sunday, the nation will either vote, or not, on whether it will hold a presidential election, or not. If more than 50 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots, and more than 50 percent of them vote no, the presidential election tentatively scheduled for Jan. 7 will be canceled. But if less than 50 percent vote, or if more than 50 percent vote and more than 50 percent of them vote yes, then the election will take place on schedule.

Clear? Certainly not, except to the boys in the back room who thought it up in the first place.

The purpose of the whole exercise is to deny the presidency to Imre Pozsgay, a popular former Communist, now a Socialist, who is probably

the best known of the dozen or so people who say they will seek the office — if the office is there to be sought.

Although he has his electoral problems, such as the presence of two other Communist-turned-Socialists in the field, Mr. Pozsgay is given a good chance of winning. Especially by the Free Democrats, a small party that does not much like him: So they cooked up the referendum and collected the 100,000 signatures needed to get the Government to authorize it.

The Free Democrats figure that the Socialists and their allies will do badly in the voting next spring, so they want the new Parliament, in which Pozsgay supporters would presumably be a minority, to choose a President next summer.

To some people sitting on the sidelines of this byzantine maneuvering, the main problem with it is that Mr. Pozsgay seems to have just the qualities needed in a President.

"You need someone whom the Russians can trust not to try to pull out of the Warsaw Pact, or something foolish like that," a Western Ambassador said. "You need someone whom the liberals in Parliament can trust not to go for dissolution every time they get

a little bit frisky. And it's hard to think of very many people other than Pozsgay who fill both of those bills."

Bittersweet Humor Stops

In the old days, Budapest was the fountainhead of political jokes.

Even as the evolution of Hungarian politics began early this year, the wisecracks continued. In May, this was a favorite: Communism is the long, hard road between capitalism and capitalism. By July it was: The difference between the United States and Hungary is that the United States has a Communist Party. Now, nothing.

Mikroszkop, a political cabaret, is still going, and so is Hocipo, a satirical newspaper. But there are no new one-liners circulating among the lawyers, the bartenders and the hotel concierges who used to retail them so avidly and so very malaciously.

Now people can say what they mean, without the code of humor "Who needs double entendre now?" asked Andres Sugar, a television reporter who used to delight in telling foreign visitors just slightly anti-Communist jokes. "Who needs to hide behind jokes in the day of free

speech? It's progress, I guess."

The Natives Return

Whatever else it is, it is a moment of high drama in the history of the Hungarians, a people whose origins in Central Asia live on in their splendidly polysyllabic language, in the high cheekbones of people on the streets, and in the sense of isolation from the neighboring Slavs.

To share that drama, many of those who were scattered around in the world — first in 1939, again in 1948, and once again in 1956 — are traveling back to Budapest.

Some are well known, like Paul Kovi, one of the proprietors of the Four Seasons restaurant in Manhattan, who comes here for fun and to help in the fight on behalf of ethnic Hungarians in northern Rumania.

But many are not well known. Victor and Iby Laslo are cases in point. She was born in Hungary, and so were his parents. Having retired from his practice as a patent lawyer, he and his wife split their time among Geneva, Vienna, Budapest and a house in the California wine country. Hungary's odyssey has become a consuming passion for them.

"We go all the time," Mrs. Laslo said. "I saw my grandmother's tears when they took our little piece of land. My grandfather hanged himself. To see this system crumbling, the Communists on the run all over the world, almost makes up for all that."

Newest Conquerors

One of the less savory elements of the changes that are transforming this little country is the feeling of neocolonialism experienced by long-term residents. A British woman commented that wherever she went here, she was treated like a member of the ruling class.

Hungary has been conquered, plundered and ruled by foreigners for many centuries — the Turks, the Austrians and the Russians, to name only the most recent overlords. Now we shall see, Hungarians are saying to one another, whether the Americans and the West Europeans behave the same way.

"It's inevitable," said Ronald S. Lauder, the cosmetics heir and former New York mayoral candidate, who is looking for investment opportunities here. "Two, three years, and there will be a backlash against this capitalist exploitation."

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Iron Curtain crumbling

'All bets are off' as predictability gives way to change and uncertainty

By Charles M. Madigan

One of the most important elements in Soviet-American relations during four decades of the Cold War was predictability. Now that has been lost in the vortex of change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Although no one could ever say exactly what would happen, everyone could safely assume, based on long experience, that the central players would remain true to their roles.

The world was carved into clearly de-

Charles M. Madigan is *The Tribune's* senior national correspondent.

defined areas of influence, with the Soviet Union in firm control of its satellites in Eastern Europe and the United States cementing its relationship with the rest of Europe through NATO.

If the behavior on the other side of the world was sometimes shocking, over time it was not surprising. Invasions were staged at the request for "fraternal assistance" from socialist neighbors. Dissent was crushed.

Over the years, the events formed a pattern of behavior so apparent that the best way to predict how the Soviets and their satellites would react to an event in the future was to review their behavior

during similar events in the past.

As for checking the health of Soviet or East bloc leadership, the process involved taking a look at the lineup on Lenin's tomb every Revolution Day, Nov. 7, or reviewing Pravda to see whose face was missing from the photos of the event.

It was a primitive, but generally dependable, analysis constructed completely on the assumption of predictability.

All of that has changed now. Uncertainty has arrived to fill the gap created by the death of predictability.

One Western diplomat in Moscow, solicited last week for his analysis of what

would happen next, simply smiled and said, "All bets are off" in the world of Soviet bloc prediction.

If a persistent memory of Soviet leadership is the image of a pathetic Leonid Brezhnev fumbling through a Revolution Day speech late in his life, the reality is a vibrant and unpredictable Mikhail Gorbachev doing a standup Q&A for Moscow TV right after last week's military parade, warning that an economic sword of Damocles was hanging over the nation.

If the memory of Eastern Europe is of a bloc of passive, firmly controlled and predictable countries, the reality is that


the Warsaw Pact relationship is crumbling, along with assumptions about the staying power of leaders in totalitarian states.

The longest-serving communist ruler, Bulgaria's Todor I. Zhivkov, Friday announced his resignation after 35 years of hard-line control. Democracy has already arrived in Hungary and Poland, and the demand for change is thundering across much of what had been the rest of the Soviet empire, too.

If the abiding Cold War symbol is the Berlin Wall, the reality is East Germany's decision only last Thursday, in

See Change, pg. 6

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New East Europe born with mix of pain, happiness

By Paula Butturini

WARSAW—It's Friday and the news comes on here at 5:15 p.m. and I'm hoping to see the first TV pictures in Poland of what has been happening in Berlin. People say it is a momentous thing for the Germans, but I think it is a momentous thing for anybody who grew up with the atom bomb.

I can remember as a child sneaking out of bed and sitting at the top of the staircase in our house, listening to my parents' talking to their friends on a Saturday night about the horrors and fears of war with the Soviets. I would go to bed scared to death but I couldn't say anything because I wasn't supposed to be up listening in the first place.

With the news from Berlin last night [Thursday night], it was the first time we have felt, well, my God, maybe there is a chance! It was something on the order of... I will always remember the day John F. Kennedy was killed and I will never forget this night.

Sometimes it seems the whole of Eastern Europe is in chaos, but when you strip away the visible action, the same thing is happening everywhere. Communism used fear to control populations for four decades. But now the fear is being replaced by anger at the political and social mess it left behind after so many years in power.

There are two apparent options for Eastern Europeans, push for reform, or head west. One involves



Chicago Tribune/DAVID JAHNTZ

There are two apparent options for Eastern Europeans, push for reform, or head west. One involves confronting a mammoth political challenge. And the other one sometimes just breaks your heart.

I have been shuttling across Eastern Europe from my base in Warsaw for the past two months, trying to keep up with changes that seem to be happening at the speed of light. Once a correspondent's job entailed measuring the snail's pace of state socialism as it inched its way toward the pure communism of the future. Suddenly it's the job of witnessing the passing of the old order.

There is a new Eastern Europe being born, and like the process of childbirth, it involves a mix of happiness and great pain. These days you see them both almost anywhere you go, and sometimes at the same time.

At Pomezani Nad Ohri, Czechoslovakia's northernmost border crossing point into West Germany, it was only

See Europe, pg. 7

Paula Butturini is The Tribune's East European correspondent.

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Bush, aides struggle to find the right way to respond

By Timothy J. McNulty

WASHINGTON—With a momentous transformation underway in Eastern Europe, President Bush and his foreign policy advisers are increasingly befuddled over finding a proper public response to the lightning changes.

White House officials have been unable to come up with a single initiative to capture the public's imagination or promote a greater role for the United States in the political rearrangement of Europe that now seems inevitable.

Their inability to settle on a strong presidential theme and to focus America's response was especially glaring in the last three days as Bush at first offered only tepid encouragement to East Germany for its startling liberalization of emigration policy.

That attitude was a reflection of the thinking of his closest aides, who are reluctant to embrace in public the changes for fear they may eventually backfire. Trying to explain Bush's performance, White House officials insisted the President did not want to "inflame the situation" or appear to be gloating.

But Bush may have overdone his "prudent" pose. Answering

Timothy J. McNulty is a Tribune White House correspondent.

questions in his reclining desk chair in the Oval Office Thursday, the President twirled a pencil in his fingers and looked hangdog and almost despondent, as if the Berlin Wall were going up instead of crumbling under the weight of a combined and hopeful German citizenry.

Friday morning the President tried to change that impression during a speech in Dallas. "I was moved, as you all were, by the pictures of Berliners from East and West, standing atop the Wall with chisels and hammers, celebrating the opening of the most vivid symbol of the Iron Curtain," an upbeat Bush said.

He also acknowledged he had not anticipated such rapid change. "To be honest with you, I doubted that this would happen in the very first year of this administration..." he said. "No one really accurately predicted the speed of the changes in Eastern Europe. Certainly I didn't."

If the administration's policy of a measured response is correct, the pitch of his message seemed disappointing and off-key. One glum White House aide recognized the confusion in the President's stance. "It looks like we're getting way behind the PR curve," he said.

Other presidential advisers argue that "it's all going our way," and they believe a high American profile might only en-

See Bush, pg. 6



Illustration by David Suter

Snapshots of life from 'a brand-new ball game'

There'll always be a hustler. Gyorgy Tabori, 34, working with a big British public relations firm, wants to become Eastern Europe's first big-time political PR manager. "It's a brand-new ball game and nobody has any experience how to handle it," Tabori says, launching into his sales pitch in the bustling lobby of the Hyatt Hotel in Budapest, Hungary. "People need to know how to get prepared for an election, how to communicate to voters. They need to know how to build a personal and party image. And they need to know how to run a local government. Nobody's ever done these things here."

Supporters of Czechoslovakia's best-known dissident, playwright Vaclav Havel, embarrassed the Communist Party daily Rude Pravo by tricking it into printing Havel's picture on his birthday. Instead of giving his real name, they used the name Ferdinand Vanek, a semiautobiographical character who appears in several of Havel's plays. During a big antigovernment demonstration in Prague on Oct. 28, protesters marched past the hospital where Havel was being treated for a respiratory ailment and chanted, "Long live Ferdinand Vanek!"

Poland's new government

Compiled from reports by Tribune correspondents and wires.

spokeswoman, Malgorzata Niezabitowska, was at a luncheon organized by Western journalists recently when a loud, insistent ring of the doorbell interrupted conversation. Niezabitowska, a former Solidarity journalist, looked a bit startled and then laughed. "Not very long ago," she said, "that bell might have been the police coming to detain us for having an illegal meeting—a Solidarity member talking with the Western press."

What could Fidel Castro be thinking of? In a factory visit last week, the Cuban leader lamented the "very sad things" happening elsewhere in the communist world but added, "Obviously, we respect everyone's right to solve their problems in the way they see fit." In two major speeches earlier this year, Castro adopted the motto "Socialism or Death."

Hungary's parliament is seeking bids on removing the giant 3,200-pound communist red star from atop the parliament building in Budapest. Two months ago the government ordered all red stars removed from public buildings, and lights on the big star were switched off last month. Church restorers had shown an interest in removing the star, but say they might need an army helicopter to do the job. It's to be replaced by a weather

See Snapshots, pg. 7

Change

Continued from page 1

response to nothing short of a popular uprising, to allow its citizens to pass freely to the West.

Those old images were all elements that played central roles in 40 years of scholarship aimed at interpreting and anticipating Soviet behavior.

Now Gorbachev's domestic political reforms have blotted out the meaning of much of that experience, *glasnost* has turned what was a trickle of information into a tidal wave, and the developments in East Germany, Hungary and Poland are forcing the world to find a new definition for what it means to be East European.

The contrast between historical events and the events of the last few months is stunning.

Twenty years ago, the developments in East Germany or Hungary would have seen everyone anticipating the arrival of Soviet tanks, or the push for change would have been crushed long before it reached any advanced stage.

These days, there is talk of taking the Kremlin at its word when it says it will not interfere in the developing turmoil of East European nations. That element of trust is brand new to a relationship that

was built on a foundation of mistrust. Four decades of skepticism doesn't melt away in a few months.

One of the problems of the new era is that the U.S. really doesn't know how to trust the Soviets yet.

As optimistic as the political developments in Eastern Europe appear to be, they come at the expense of stability and at the loss of the assurance that both sides knew very well the limits of behavior, however bad it might have seemed at the time.

What is being abandoned is that old, dependable formula that dictated where the U.S. and the Soviet Union stood in relation to one another, a theory embodied in the State Department's policy of "containment of communism," which dominated American foreign policy for most of 40 years.

Some historians have argued that, since the mid-1950s, the lines of authority and behavior were so clear that neither side made the mistake of stepping into the other's turf, with the sole and significant exception being the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Neither side wanted American soldiers fighting Russian soldiers.

One of the most noteworthy developments in the early Cold War, in the view of University of Michigan Soviet specialist William Zimmerman, was that the Soviets played no visible role at all in North

Korea's attack on South Korea.

"It is quite striking and important to remember that it was the North Koreans, not the Soviets," Zimmerman said. "One of the most telltale acts of Stalin's behavior was to pull Soviet troops out of North Korea to make sure the Americans didn't end up fighting the Soviets."

That fact provided one of the golden nuggets in early Soviet analysis: that the Kremlin was not eager to take big risks.

Predictability and awareness of interests also played a role in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and a bit of a role earlier than that in the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956.

"Lyndon Johnson went out of his way to let the Soviets know we weren't going to do anything in 1968," Zimmerman said. The Kremlin also knew that there would not be a military response from the West to the invasion of Hungary.

As valuable as that experience was in setting the terms of the superpower relationship, it has been rendered all but worthless by the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the last few years. It is part of old history.

No one appears to be acting in character anymore, a welcome change on one level, but a change that makes everything more complicated and less predictable on another.

Bush

Continued from page 1

danger the economic and political reforms in Poland, Hungary and now East Germany.

But on Capitol Hill and among foreign policy experts in Washington, the greater concern is that accelerated change in Eastern Europe has already exceeded the administration's ability to capitalize on events and project an image of bold leadership.

Bush was elected in part because of his experience and expertise in foreign policy, but his failure to be out in front on these developments could lead to serious problems in talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev only three weeks away.

From talk of German reunification to questions about European stability after 1992, American policymakers suddenly find themselves without the luxury of time.

No U.S. policy toward the newly diverse East bloc has changed yet, said one official, "but it may mean what we thought we didn't have to worry about for another five years, we have to worry about now."

Among the subjects for discussion

expected at Bush's seaborne summit with Gorbachev are the crippled economies in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. But Bush, feeling the pressure of the U.S. budget deficit and conservative disdain for bailing out Warsaw Pact nations, already has rejected suggestions that the U.S. could help with a new Marshall Plan.

At the rendezvous in the Mediterranean, each leader will be looking for assurance that what is happening in Eastern Europe will not threaten the other's overall interest.

"There are a number of areas where the two countries have parallel interests for very different reasons," said an official helping to plan the shipboard meetings. But he quickly added a caveat: "It's not going to be a Yalta meeting to decide the future of Eastern Europe."

Events have accelerated not only overnight but even over lunch. When a senior State Department official arrived at the Washington bureau of The Tribune last week, he was told East Germany's entire Cabinet had just resigned. "But I just left my office," he said, stunned by the news.

Bush himself has been spending more time on the phone, talking with West German Chancellor Hel-

mut Kohl in particular. He also intensified his preparations for the supposedly "non-summit summit."

The U.S. attitude is calculated, White House officials insist, to not get ahead of events. There is still a fear that rapid change could provoke a reaction not unlike what happened in June to the pro-democracy students in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.

Bush's foreign policy advisers fear Gorbachev could be forced into a similar reaction. "No one knows where the red lines are," said a National Security Council staffer. "But there are red lines somewhere that we must not cross."

Officials also worry that within each nation, especially in East Germany and Czechoslovakia but also in Poland, there are people eager to return to a more fascist regime, ignoring both communist and democratic ideology.

Some believe the greater danger lies in remaining tepid. "The Poles speak to us in the language of liberty and freedom and independence," former Vice President Walter Mondale said last week, expressing his frustration after returning from a trip to Warsaw. "We sort of come back with the language of a bookkeeper and bureaucrat."

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Europe

Continued from page 1

a week ago that I watched a muddy blue Trabant auto rattle into a parking area. The little car sounded just like a lawn mower, its two-stroke engine straining.

A middle-aged East German couple climbed out, followed by their son, his wife and a toddler in a pink parka. The grandparents carried two stuffed duffel bags as far as the border police would allow. Then they just stood back for a moment, looking at the trio getting ready to cross. They had no camera, but it seemed they were trying to chisel into memory a lasting image of three loved ones.

I watched their long, sad embrace. The young parents picked up their bags and took the baby by the hand. They walked down a slight hill and up a long, winding curve until they were out of sight.

For more than an hour, the grandparents stood on that little spot in Czechoslovakia, weeping and staring west toward the family they had lost. It was a sad moment that just might have a happy ending someday. Between then and now, the East Germans decided to open the border. Maybe the next picture they etch into their memories will be a happy one. You can always hope.

If that chapter of the impact of change persists from my visit to Czechoslovakia, the reality back on the streets of Warsaw is a lot less dramatic. Tremendous changes have occurred in Poland over the past few months, but you have to search to find them.

I am writing this in a nice house on the southern edge of town. There are fruit trees in the backyard that offer an umbrella of brilliant white flowers in the spring and a canopy of green during the summer. But in November, with its rains and its grayness, Warsaw looks just like death.

I have watched the retreat of communism in Poland for quite some time now, and there aren't many signs of that ideology in evidence. Solidarity has its posters and symbols all over the place, but they were there even before, when the organization was not legal.

This is a nation with a troubled history and constantly bubbling political rhetoric. It's what they talk about in the bars and restaurants

and on the streets. But in November, you have to look for more subtle signs.

Turn on the TV and you are likely to see someone in government making a statement. A few years ago, maybe he was in jail, or wanted for antisocial behavior. Pick up the newspapers and they are full of information, a far cry from the dull, official media that set the tone for so many years.

You have to search for change in much of the rest of Eastern Europe, too. Sometimes the least apparent things hold the most meaning—a visit to the West German Embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia, a few weeks ago, for example.

I have never seen anything like it. It was unbelievable—pure pandemonium. East Germans everywhere, camping on the lawn, resting on three-tier bunk beds in the ornate old reception room. The place smelled like coffee and sweat and baby food and damp socks.

Somebody said once that if given the chance, everyone would vote with their feet. It's a pretty simple formula. What you hate, you walk away from. And that was certainly true in this case. In an East Germany where no democracy existed, the exiles were voting with their feet, and the trail to freedom at that point carried them through the old embassy in Prague.

Like all refugees across time, people salvage just the important things they can carry. It strikes me that the possessions of these exiles were a good measure of what had been important to them. A couple of suitcases. Maybe a child's favorite stuffed toy. It is a meager collection, and that may be the one reason why they are heading west. If they had a tractor-trailer of belongings and a life they cherished, they wouldn't be leaving.

But once these refugees kissed their friends and families goodbye, there was nothing much else to leave behind but an ideology in collapse.

People all over Eastern Europe are making those kinds of choices now. And even though I know they happened, some of them are difficult to believe.

I was in Budapest when the Hungarian Communist Party made a very unusual decision. Everyone was angry about communism in Hungary. Their own revolution in 1956 had been brutally crushed by the Russians. But now the winds of change were blowing. So the party



Part of the exodus: East Germans walk and drive to freedom as they cross into West Germany from Czechoslovakia last week.

decided to go all the way. Instead of cleaning up the old act, it created an entirely new one. The Communist Party was abolished and, *voilà!* the Socialist Party was born.

The sense I got from the public was that this was all a lot of hokey. How were they supposed to believe that a party that had ruled for 40 years as the Communists could become the Socialists overnight?

The transformation has not gone well. I have been told there were 700,000 to 800,000 members of the Communist Party in the very recent old days, but the new Socialist Party has only 35,000 members.

People don't seem to be paying much attention to it.

One thing that hasn't changed about Budapest is the look. Budapest looks like a dirty Vienna, a Vienna that hasn't been cleaned in

45 years and is covered with soot. Its beautiful 19th Century buildings, massive buildings, are crumbling. It can't hold a candle to Prague, still unreformed but at least renovated in a bid to lure tourists.

The buildings in Prague are beautiful. Unfortunately, once you step inside, memories of the smell at the old West German Embassy with its pack of stranded East Germans are evoked. If reform must cut to the very foundation of a society, renovation should, too. Or at least it should try to do something about the smell in the hallways.

It's easy to make jokes about Eastern Europe or to feel no small amount of pride as an American over the political developments. But again, when you go searching for meaning, sometimes you find pain that has been buried for dec-

ades, a pain so great that its silence overwhelms even the happiest celebrations.

Truth does have a way of coming out eventually, and I am witnessing its sad reality now in Poland. Amid the cheers for reform, away from the cameras and personalities, sits Walbrzyska Street Cemetery in south Warsaw.

There is a 15-foot high wooden cross in the cemetery. A single orange paper burns at its foot. I'm told that almost every day, someone heaps fresh chrysanthemums near the cross, as though it marked the grave of someone beloved and very recently departed.

But the lost souls remembered at this site suffered and died long ago in Josef Stalin's push to consolidate his power at the end of World War II. There is not much left in the grave but some bones. Some of the bodies were wrapped in paper and lime to speed up the process of decomposition.

I am told that the people buried in this particular deep grave had been shot, hanged or tortured. Their nude remains were dumped at night. Remains from Mokotow Prison nearby indicate 700 bodies were dumped between 1945 and 1948. But I've heard estimates that climb into the thousands by the time the midnight burials stopped in 1956.

It's one of the saddest realities of what is happening right now in Eastern Europe. Pieces of dark history buried long ago are pushing their way back to the surface, like the bones of the dead, and all of the pain and fear that marked the decades of tight Soviet control are coming back with them.

Good memory is one of life's most powerful mysteries. What we

cherish we save, calling it back time after time to reflect on the events in our lives. That is what I am seeing in Eastern Europe now. It is reflecting on the events of its own life.

Some of them are public reflections, like the scene at the Warsaw cemetery. And some of them are private.

A miller in central Poland once told me that his mother had been imprisoned for baking bread for the Home Army, the underground resistance that fought first against the Nazis and later against the Communists. He was 6 when she was arrested. He never saw her again.

In Budapest, there is an old woman who says she was never able to determine what happened to her son after his disappearance in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Last June, she saw his name on a newspaper list. More than three decades after he disappeared, she learned her son had been killed, his remains dumped in the same weedy cemetery plot as Imre Nagy, the Hungarian leader executed for treason after the uprising.

In Czechoslovakia, a farmer showed me some of the tools in use at a collective farm. He recognized them because he and his father had used them years ago, before the state claimed their land. He can still point to the boundaries of his old farm, and he says he remembers that some of the tools belonged to a neighbor.

A few days before the East Germans opened the Berlin Wall, I chatted with a middle-aged man standing near the Pomez border crossing. In his own exhumation of history, he recalled that the state had refused him permission to attend his father's funeral in the West.

That was many years ago. His voice still shook with anger.

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Snapshots

Continued from page 1

...
In Poland, the dollar has gone into a free fall. Worth 12,000 zlotys on the black market only a couple of months ago, a dollar now buys only 4,800 zlotys. Poles with dollars—it's legal to have them—

ing of values inside and outside the times, will strip them of the smell of cheap sensation and myth, while contributing to an objective view on the rich and complex period of the '60s in our film."

...
Alexander Dubcek, the man who engineered the "Prague Spring," was a nonperson for years, effectively in exile as a provincial forestry official until he reappeared a week ago—on Soviet television.

Why Settle For A Medicare Supplement That Gives You

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into a tree fall, worth 12,000 zlotys on the black market only a couple of months ago, a dollar now buys only 4,800 zlotys. Poles with dollars—it's legal to have them—are thronging to hard-currency shops because it's suddenly cheaper to buy, say, a TV set for dollars there than to convert dollars to zlotys and buy one on the regular market (assuming one can be found). Other popular items: oranges, bananas and chocolate.

••• In Czechoslovakia, all films made in the 1960s and banned after Soviet tanks crushed the reforms of the "Prague Spring" in 1968 may now be shown. Cautious government cultural officials were quick to add, however, that the decision wasn't meant to paint that period in a benign new light. Said one: The decision "will make it possible for a better and more objective determin-

ingement of the Prague Spring was a nonperson for years, effectively in exile as a provincial forestry official until he reappeared a week ago—on Soviet television. The sympathetic treatment of Dubcek, in a documentary on the events of 1968, was taken as a clear sign that Moscow is reassessing the Soviet invasion.

••• Atty. Gen. Dick Thornburgh, fresh from a visit to the USSR, says it "would be foolish" to preclude the possibility of enlisting an unlikely ally in the fight against international terrorism and drug traffic. He was talking about the KGB—but he said he retains a "healthy skepticism" and there's a catch that has to be cleared up first: The Soviets have to renounce state-sponsored terrorism. "What their response will be," he said, "I don't know."



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Red Profs Get Pink Slips as Mandatory Marxism Courses End

By Marc Fisher
Washington Post Foreign Service

EAST BERLIN—In 90 days, Prof. Eckhard Lassow's profession will no longer exist.

Beginning in August, the Marxism-Leninism department at East Berlin's Humboldt University will be dissolved. No longer will every college student in the country be required to study four years of Communist ideology. No longer will students' career paths—no matter what fields they enter—depend on their performance in frustratingly vague political theory classes.

And no longer will Lassow and his colleagues have jobs.

In universities throughout Eastern Europe, the rigid, Soviet-inspired curriculum that made Marxism-Leninism and Russian-language courses mandatory for all students is being eliminated, to be replaced by the more flexible system that governs West European higher education.

The dramatic change in the structure of East European education seems quick to university instructors, but quite late to many students. East Germany will have adopted a Western currency, economy and political system before it gets around to scrapping a teaching system that was vastly unpopular long before citizens began demon-

strating against their Communist rulers.

The sole purpose of Marxism-Leninism courses, said Beatrix Schulz, a freshman language student at Humboldt, "was to put the ideology of the country in the people's heads."

From early childhood through college years, students were surrounded by banners and posters that read: "The study of Marx is all-powerful because it is the truth." Now, said first-year student Kirsten Lommatzsch, "the only place you might see that motto is maybe in a comedy show or a cabaret."

At Humboldt alone, about 80

professors and other instructors are expected to lose their jobs. Some are applying to teach in other departments. Some are trying to retrain themselves in other fields. And some expect to be out on the street, learning firsthand about one aspect of Western economies they often criticized in class—unemployment.

"The problem isn't only in the Marxism department," Lassow said. "It touches other departments as well, such as economics. Anyone who leaves the university now will have a difficult time finding another job."

Lassow is studying political science these days, hoping to find

work teaching the politics of Central and Eastern Europe. It won't be easy. When employers hear that an applicant taught Marxism-Leninism, "it sounds almost like you were in the Stasi," the now-dissolved secret police, Lassow said.

Marxism-Leninism courses at East German universities were a form of political control and a mechanism for recruiting and training the party elite. Every student, regardless of prospective profession, had to pay considerable attention to courses in socialist theory and the history of the workers' movement because scholarships and job placements were based in part on grades in those classes.

But even instructors said the material was most effective as a soporific. "This department had long ago ceased to be current," Lassow said. "We emphasized the good parts of East Germany but didn't say what was bad. We didn't talk about the fact that our economy didn't always work."

The content of courses was ordained by the Communist Party's policy-making Central Committee, according to George Turner, head of West Berlin's department of education. The primary task of East Germany's six universities was "to train qualified cadres in all sectors of society and to carry out

See UNIVERSITY, A43, Col. 1.

E. Germany Ends Mandatory Study Of Communism

UNIVERSITY From A41

research geared to the needs of society as defined by the Communists," Turner said. That deep difference in intent and structure has frustrated initial efforts to blend the East and West German university systems, he said. Eliminating the heavy emphasis on political indoctrination is only a preliminary step.

Unlike universities in other East European countries, where professors and students have helped fuel the drive for Westernization, Humboldt and other East German colleges are still dominated by people who strongly believe in socialism.

Although many students have welcomed the ending of the political requirements, many instructors and some students are trying to keep a communist presence in the curriculum.

"My conviction is that Marxism is the right view of the world," said Fred Broecker, 24, a first-year criminology student at Humboldt. "The mistake here was to study just Marxism. We were just fed the ideology, and we didn't deal with the problems in the society. They taught us that capitalism is bad. Now we see it isn't all bad."

But whatever their personal beliefs, academics must eat. Many have therefore put their theories in cold storage while they look for work.

Broecker said that to get a job as a criminologist, "it will be useful to be conservative." He plans to tell job interviewers that: "I still believe in Marxism but not in the form we had here."

"It's horrible how many people now say, 'We always thought differently,'" Lassow said.

Many of his colleagues now argue that they sang the praises of the Communists only to curry favor with the party officials who ran the university. In fact, he said, "Everyone knows they didn't think differently."

Lassow says he is convinced that the ideas of Marx and Lenin, material he spent decades studying in the Soviet Union and East Germany, will once again prove attractive.

Right now, he said confidently, "economically, it's been decided in favor of capitalism. But in the long run, this is a victory that could upset the victor's stomach."

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One answer to the German question

Everyone is better off with Germany inside NATO—including Moscow



Where did the cold war begin? In Germany. Why? Because of Germany. What was item No. 1 on the Washington summit agenda last week? Again, Germany.

That's new. Virtually all of the past summits, since Dwight Eisenhower first met with Nikita Khrushchev in 1959, revolved around classical superpower stuff: How many nukes for me, how many for you? Arms control dominated the agendas, and the endless shuffle over megatons, throw-weights and MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) determined the choreography of negotiation.

The Washington summit was a première because the cozy world of the cold war is no more. "Germany on my mind" was the theme song because postwar order came unstuck last November, when the Berlin Wall came down. And with it fell the entire architecture of partition that had lent almost immutable stability to the security affairs of Europe.

Cast in concrete, the wall also symbolized the very essence of the Forty Year War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which remained "cold" only because of the nuclear balance of terror. Germany was divided because neither power would let go of the greatest prize of World War II.

And so, now we find ourselves back at the beginning. Though the cold war is said to be over, the underlying conflict is not. The Great Question is still the same: What to do with Germany, the country in the middle; that by virtue of economic clout and geographic position is bound to become No. 1 on the continent. Nor have the answers changed. The West says a united Germany must be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And the Soviet Union says "Nyet." That, with all respect to Mikhail Gorbachev, is the wrong reply.

The linchpin. To begin with, the Soviet answer conceals a hidden agenda that is not hard to grasp. NATO minus Germany is no NATO at all. Remove Germany and you are left with Britain (an offshore island), France (outside of the unified NATO command), Spain (ditto) and Italy (isolated from the rest by neutral neighbors). Remove the German linchpin and you might just as well send the Americans packing. France kicked U.S. forces out in 1966 and shows no sign of remorse. Belgium and Holland? A bit crowded, just right for a platoon and a pontoon somewhere on one of those lovely canals.

To which Gorbachev would doubtless reply: "What's wrong with pulling the plug on NATO? Haven't I just done the same to my very own Warsaw Pact by letting its members go and withdrawing my troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia?"

In debate strategy, this is known as the "fallacy of false symmetry." NATO and the Warsaw Pact are not the same; the Western Alliance does not have to commit suicide just because the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe has self-destruct-

BY JOSEF JOFFE

ed. Indeed, the very demise of that empire is the most telling difference. The Warsaw Pact and communism were inflicted on the East; NATO and democracy embody the fondest wishes of the West. The East Europeans are happy to see the Soviets go; the West Europeans (even on the left) would be traumatized if the Americans shipped out. NATO serves the interest of its members; the Warsaw Pact was but a tool of Soviet expansionism, and thus it is only right and fitting that it should go.

This is not just a debating point. With the pact collapsing, NATO is the only security organization still left. It provides legitimacy for the American presence, a seasoned framework for cooperation and an indispensable insurance policy against perils lurking just beyond the Soviet climb-down from empire.

Who wants a loose cannon? What if Gorbachev falls? What if the Soviet empire descends into another *smuta*, a "time of troubles" engendered by a succession crisis and internal revolt? What if Yugoslavia explodes? What if the free market in Eastern Europe does not deliver, propelling *les misérables* westward and turning the Oder River between Poland and Germany into Western Europe's "Rio Grande"? Take any scenario and you will be glad to have NATO in place.

But there is a final argument that even the Soviets understand. Nobody, and that includes most Germans, wants a loose cannon

on the deck. By now, even the Poles have come out in favor of German membership in NATO on the simple *Realpolitik* premise that a greater Germany tied to the West is better than a giant completely unfettered. Now, and for many years to come, only NATO plus the U.S. can mute everybody else's fears of the German colossus unlimbering its muscles. And though the Soviets pretend otherwise, they know that Germany-in-NATO serves their security interests, too.

But that is not their position. They favor a "Pan-European security system" that would "transcend" the alliance. This is the European equivalent of a Wild West posse, with all the good citizens ganging up on whoever broke the peace. Yet we remember what happened to Gary Cooper in "High Noon." When the gunslingers came calling, the victim was on his own. So was Abyssinia in 1935, when Haile Selassie pleaded with the League of Nations to make good on its "collective security" guarantees against Fascist Italy. "Collective security"—one for all, all for one—did not work yesterday and it will not work tomorrow, because nations are loath to sacrifice their own interests on the altar of abstract justice. Such a system assumes security; it cannot create it.

Mikhail Gorbachev should know better. No one will welcome the U.S.S.R. into the "common European Home" as long as there are 385,000 Soviet troops squatting in East Germany. And Gorbachev surely knows that the U.S.S.R. is alone in wanting to separate Germany from NATO. ■



The fall of the wall. Border guards exchange hats

Bill Bradley

Photo Copy Preservation

We Can't Afford Not to Help East Europe

And we could do it for one percent of the defense budget.

The Bush administration's unfair attack on House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt's speech at the Center for National Policy was a blatant attempt to cover up a major inadequacy of the president's policy toward Eastern Europe. The \$380 million the president proposed to bolster economic growth and democracy in the region is barely enough to bail out a single major failed S&L, much less jumpstart national economies that have been dead for decades. Congress should seize the initiative and set aside an amount of up to one percent of the defense budget as a catalyst for East European reconstruction.

For almost half a century, the Soviet threat rested on troops stationed in the client regimes Stalin set up in Central Europe. Our security efforts focused on deterring Soviet assaults on Western Europe. Last year that defense cost about \$125 billion.

Now new democratic governments have begun to insist that Soviet forces go home. The political and economic success of these East European democracies would significantly enhance our own security. Instead of a band of hostile armies, we could face a line of healthy, prosperous economies anchored in the West.

Although Eastern Europe's movement toward reform seems irreversible, success is unfortunately far from guaranteed. Even those countries that have made the most progress—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia—face enormous problems because of the legacy of Stalinist controls imposed on them by the Soviet Union. Yet each has already faced up to the fact that success means submitting to the rigors of international competition and shedding rigid price controls. This is a revolutionary change.

The potential investment needs of Eastern Europe are enormous. According to a leading Western bank, Eastern Germany could absorb \$500 billion in the next 10 years, and Poland's needs are even greater. With such massive needs, the question is how best to get momentum quickly into the process of development.

After World War II, the genius of the Marshall Plan lay in its premises: self-help, free trade and European economic integration. The United States provided some material resources and an open market, while Europe provided domestic political leadership and private initiative. For the most part, the salvation of Eastern Europe likewise has to come from within. The member states understand that, which is why they have already embarked on radical economic and political reform. But they need our help to sustain their revolution.


This doesn't only mean more money. Training and know-how are also important. There's an enormous requirement for private sector initiatives in filling in these gaps, and efforts are already under way, especially by West Europeans. But the U.S. government can also make a major contribution, as Sen. Joe Biden's effort in the Foreign Relations Committee recognizes.

Aside from supporting East European

economic stabilization programs, our government should provide firm assurances that our markets will be open to the goods and services these countries produce. Unless people believe this, they simply won't invest anywhere near the sums required for real prosperity. This means granting Most Favored Nation status and extending membership in international economic and financial institutions as soon as these countries are ready.

We must also facilitate access to up-to-date technology and equipment. The U.S. government should take the lead in revamping strategic-trade controls so that East European nations can buy the robots, computers and other items they will need in a modern economy. This can be done without touching sensitive military issues.

In addition, the U.S. government should



BY BILL SNEAD — THE WASHINGTON POST

provide technical assistance to build the institutions critical to the pluralistic market-based economies: tax, banking and accounting systems, a judicial system to enforce contracts and protect private property, an educational system to instill new attitudes and skills that are indispensable in a democratic entrepreneurial society, viable political parties and an independent press. The U.S. government can mobilize Americans—especially those with East European roots and language skills—to help.

Our government can advise on converting military resources to meet pressing needs such as roads, telecommunications and pollution controls. We should also cooperate with Western Europe and Japan in providing seed capital to modernize production systems and promote competitive small businesses.

In Poland, we must take the lead in marshaling support for the new government's urgent request for a comprehensive reduction of its huge foreign debt and debt service. This debt—some \$40 billion, mostly owed to West Germany—is one of the world's highest and least payable debt burdens. It clouds prospects for desperately needed investment by Poles and foreigners alike. Without a solution, Poland has little

choice but to abandon hope of achieving the prosperity its people's sacrifice and courage have surely earned.

Ironically, Germany is the example of why debt relief is a strategic opportunity. At the end of World War I, the victors turned their backs on the need to lower the burden of Germany's debt and reparations—with disastrous results. After World War II, the allied powers avoided a repeat of their earlier mistake and granted Germany deep debt relief in the 1953 London Agreement on German Debt. Such enlightened self-interest should guide us in dealing with Poland in the 1990s.

These initiatives are not costly. We could do them all for less than one percent of the defense budget. But unless we contribute these resources, we will be missing the opportunity to collect a security dividend—both military and economic—of our own.

At the same time, we should recognize that the Soviet Union is in a different circumstance. We should stand ready to respond forthrightly to the transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economy. But as leading Soviet reformers themselves recognize, reconstruction aid and guaranteed investment would be a mistake, at least for now. Mikhail Gorbachev's impressive strides in liberalizing Soviet society have yet to extend to the economic front. A nation that has an economy larger than Japan's, that is burdened with a 60-year history of collectivism, that unlike Eastern Europe has yet to bite the bullet of price decontrol and other crucial reforms, that still spends huge sums on military forces it does not need and cannot get food from field to shelf without much of it rotting: such a country simply cannot use foreign aid efficiently enough now to justify asking American taxpayers to foot the bill for it. I'd rather spend that money at home.

Finally, we should remember that if Eastern Europe succeeds, the patterns of economic and political relations and the perceptions of mutual interest that evolve during the transition will endure long into the future. That's the lesson of the Marshall Plan: If we give help, we can forge lasting bonds based on common democratic values, cultural ties and economic interests. If we fail to provide sufficient support, we cannot realistically expect that Western Europe, Japan and the other nations we leave to pay the costs will look after our interests.

Nor should we be surprised if the future of Eastern Europe has a major impact on Western Europe's economic evolution. Americans are unlikely to be pleased with the outcome unless our contribution is commensurate with our interests. And our contribution will not be big enough unless our ambition for our values is bold enough. This is the time to seize the initiative for democracy. If President Bush fails to do so, Democrats in the Congress have an obligation to try now.

The writer is a Democratic senator from New Jersey.

Upheaval in the East: The Curtain Goes Up in Bonn

Poles Are Promised Role in Talks on German Unity

By SERGE SCHMEMANN
Special to The New York Times

BONN, March 14 — The two Germanys and the four World War II Allies held their first formal talks on German unity today and emerged with an agreement to include Poland in the discussions when they came to the question of Polish borders.

The meeting, under the "two plus four" formula, was to have dealt largely with procedural matters, awaiting the elections in East Germany to start substantive discussions.

But the fact that a decision was made on inviting Poland demonstrated the sensitivity and urgency the issue has attained in recent weeks, and it was a triumph for Poland's campaign to gain reassurance that a united Germany will not try to reclaim territories transferred to Poland after the war.

Emerging after the first daylong session of senior Foreign Ministry officials from the two Germanys, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, the chief West German delegate, Dieter Kastrup, said the participants "agreed Poland will be invited as soon as questions are discussed that especially affect its borders."

Poland Expresses Satisfaction

In Warsaw, the Government spokesman, Zbigniew Augustynowicz, was quoted as saying, "Any decision concordant with our demands is greeted here with satisfaction."

Mr. Kastrup said the talks otherwise comprised "an initial exchange of ideas on which topics are to be handled on the agenda of future sessions." He said that the discussions were held in a "businesslike manner," and that participants had agreed to keep the contents confidential.

No date was set for the next meeting, but a more formal inaugural session in East Berlin at the level of foreign ministers is expected soon after East Germany elects its new Parliament on Sunday and the Parliament installs a government.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, said: "The start of these talks is a moving experience for the Germans. It makes clear again how much the situation in Europe has changed."

The meetings of the Germanys and the Allies were agreed on in Ottawa a month ago as a forum for negotiating the formal conclusion of all occupation rights by the victorious powers, and their consent to the reunification of Germany. The arrangement agreed to at these talks will then be presented to the 35-nation security conference of Atlantic and European countries.

Bonn Prevails on Venues

West Germany reportedly won agreement for its proposal to alternate sessions thereafter between East Berlin and Bonn, an arrangement the Germans want to underscore their premise that they have primacy in the discussion of their future. That same

When the border is the issue, Warsaw will be invited.

premise is inherent in the talks being dubbed the "two plus four."

The other Allies had proposed rotating the talks among all their capitals, but there was no indication on how Bonn had prevailed.

While the official purpose of the talks is to prepare a formal end to the vestiges of military occupation, including Allied control over Berlin, the more important role of the negotiations is to insure that a united Germany will not become a source of instability in Europe.

Security issues loom as the most complex matter to be discussed, with

the Western powers and West Germany determined to keep a united Germany in NATO, and the Soviet Union wary of any such arrangement.

Poland's western border is among the questions left formally unresolved after the war. It was for this reason that when the "two plus four" talks were begun in Ottawa a month ago, Poland began its quest for formal reassurance that a united Germany will recognize the existing borders.

Kohl's Stand Provokes Furor

But Poland's initial request to take part in the talks when its borders were discussed was rejected by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In subsequent weeks, Mr. Kohl also repeatedly evaded Poland's demand for formal declarations by both Germanys of their intention to accept Poland's existing border along the Oder and Neisse rivers.

Mr. Kohl's clumsy handling of the issue churned up something of an international furor, raising questions about

Bonn's sensitivity to the concerns and apprehensions of its neighbors and allies. The Chancellor finally agreed last week to have both German Parliaments adopt matching pledges on the sanctity of the frontier, but Warsaw has continued demanding something even stronger.

Diplomats said the United States was anxious to show progress toward reassuring Poland before a visit to Washington next week by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. France has also sided strongly with the Poles, and both the Soviet Union and Britain have publicly called on Bonn to meet Warsaw's demands.

The combined pressure was evidently enough to overcome whatever reservations West Germany still had. Those reservations, in any case, would have been only from Mr. Kohl and his Christian Democrats, since Foreign Minister Genscher has publicly declared himself in favor of giving Poland the reassurance it needs.

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German Unification Talks Get Underway in Bonn

All Sides Agree on Limited Role for Poland

By Marc Fisher
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, March 14—The two Germans and the four victorious World War II powers today began the detailed and delicate task of recreating a single German state without jeopardizing peace in Europe.

The talks opened here while the most prominent West German politicians joined their neophyte colleagues in East Germany today, wooing voters in Sunday's election there with the promise of quick unity.

However, the diplomats who gathered for 7½ hours of talks at Bonn's Foreign Ministry are charged with devising a more measured reunification that takes into account the security concerns of Europeans and the four Allied powers.

The two German representatives, a democrat and a communist, sat side by side, confident of a common position that would have been unfathomable only a few months ago. With the Germans were the Soviet, British, French and American representatives, each with their own concerns about the form of the new Germany and its impact on the balance of power.

The initial sessions of the unification talks are to be devoted to

deciding which issues will be left to the Germans themselves and which will not. Although both East and West Germany are sovereign states, the Four Powers still have some legal and military authority over Germany and wield ultimate administrative control over Berlin.

The Two-plus-Four talks—the name was designed to assert German self-determination while acknowledging a role for the foreign powers—are expected to last months, perhaps well into the fall, U.S. and German diplomats said. Poland, Italy and other European nations, meanwhile, are pressing for a role in any decisions about the future of their continent.

One issue was resolved after the West Germans, continuing efforts to calm the fears of their neighbors, last night dropped their opposition to Polish participation in the talks. Dieter Kastrup, West Germany's leading negotiator, said all six participants agreed today that Poland should take part when the German-Polish border is discussed.

But other obstacles remain, and an American involved in planning the talks said, "The more you look at it, the more complicated it gets. Do Soviet troops stay in East Germany? Will there be a World War II

See GERMANY, A32, Col. 3

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THE WASHINGTON POST

German Reunification Talks Open in Bonn

GERMANY, From A29

peace treaty? Two-plus-Four will take months and months.

"But even that is not so simple. Events will rule. The real pressure is coming from 2,000 people a day leaving the East and crossing to West Germany. If that grows larger, or if the people take to the streets again, these talks have to go into hyperspeed."


The six nations have already gotten stuck on some procedural issues, including where to meet. The Germans want to alternate between Bonn and East Berlin; the French and Soviets want to include Paris and Moscow to emphasize that these are not exclusively German talks.

West Germany's Kastrup said the next round of talks would be held in East Berlin after Sunday's East German elections.

Once the meetings progress, the main obstacles are expected to be on military issues. The Soviets, who have 350,000 troops in East Germany, want the united Germany to be neutral. West Germany and the Western powers want the country to remain in NATO, which has 400,000 troops in West Germany. The Western powers have said they do not intend to station any troops in what is now East Germany.

Beyond the basic question of neutrality lie several issues that divide the Soviets from the others at the table. Moscow's representative, Anatoly Adamishin, a specialist on European affairs, wants to make sure that the new Germany cannot pose a threat to its neighbors.

West German and U.S. sources here said Adamishin's proposals include moves to remove all nuclear weapons from Germany, place strict limits on the size and powers of the German military, require Germany to pay for the stationing of Soviet and NATO troops in Germany during a transitional period, and withdraw all foreign



Representatives of the Germans, the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union gather in Bonn.

troops except a small contingent of Americans within five to 10 years.

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner said today that NATO is open to "allowing the Soviets to maintain a presence for a certain time in East Germany."

But none of the countries in the talks has yet developed a proposal spelling out a detailed image of a united Germany that belongs to NATO but has Soviet troops in its eastern section.

West Germany has told its allies that it is willing to accept limits on its military and to pay for the continued presence of Soviet troops in a united Germany, Western diplomats said.

U.S. diplomats said the Four Powers are agreed the easiest path to German unity would involve the least change in current security arrangements. Therefore, one diplomat involved in the talks said,

American and Soviet negotiators find themselves equally determined to set up a transitional period in which hundreds of thousands of NATO and Soviet troops remain on German soil.

The U.S. also wants a united Germany to begin paying reparations to Poles, Soviets and other Europeans who lost property or family to aggression in World War II.

The nationalities question, which surfaced last month during West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit with the Polish government over the status of the German-Polish border, threatens to divide Western powers. Although Kohl last week backed down and guaranteed the existing border, Poland, France has taken up the cause of the Poles, who say they deserve a place at the Two-plus-Four talks because of past German aggression against their country.

TEXT OF HAVEL'S SPEECH TO CONGRESS

Reuter

Dear Mr. President, dear senators and members of the House, ladies and gentlemen:

My advisers advised me to speak on this important occasion in Czech. I don't know why. Perhaps they wanted you to enjoy the sweet sounds of my mother tongue.

The last time they arrested me, on Oct. 27 of last year, I didn't know whether it was for two days or two years. Exactly one month later, when the rock musician Michael Kocáb told me that I would be probably proposed as a presidential candidate, I thought it was one of his usual jokes.

On the 10th of December, 1989, when my actor friend, Jiri Bartoska, in the name of the Civic Forum, nominated me as a candidate for the office of president of the republic, I thought it was out of the question that the parliament we have inherited from the previous regime would elect me.

Nineteen days later, when I was unanimously elected president of my country, I had no idea that, in two months, I would be speaking in front of this famous and powerful assembly and that what I say would be heard by millions of people who have never heard of me and that hundreds of politicians and political scientists would study every word that I say.

When they arrested me on Oct. 27, I was living in a country ruled by the most conservative communist government in Europe, and our society slumbered beneath the pall of a totalitarian system.

Today, less than four months later, I'm speaking to you as the representative of a country that has set out on the road to democracy, a country where there is complete freedom of speech, which is getting ready for free elections and which wants to create a prosperous market economy and its own foreign policy.

It is all very extraordinary. But I have not come here to speak of myself or my feelings, or merely to talk about my own country. I have used this small example of something I know well to illustrate something general and important.

We are living in very extraordinary times. The human face of the world is changing so rapidly that none of the familiar political speedometers are adequate.

We playwrights, who have to cram a whole human life or an entire historical era in a two-hour play, can scarcely understand this rapidity ourselves. And if it gives us trouble, think of the trouble it must give to political scientists who spend their whole life studying the realm of the probable and have less experience with the realm of the improbable than us, the playwrights.

The World in Bipolar Terms

Let me try to explain why I think the velocity of the changes in my country, in Central and Eastern Europe, and of course in the Soviet Union itself, has made such a significant impression on the face of the world today and why it concerns the fate of us all, including you Americans.

I would like to look at this first from the political point of view and then from a point of view that we might call philosophical.

Twice in the century, the world has been threatened by a catastrophe. Twice this catastrophe was born in Europe, and twice you Americans, along with others, were called upon to save Europe, the whole world and yourselves. The first rescue mission, among other things, provided significant help to us, Czechs and Slovaks.

Thanks to the great support of your President



BY JAMES K.W. AHERTON—THE WASHINGTON POST
Vice President Quayle listens as Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovak playwright turned president, addresses Congress members.

idly that, in the flood of work, we have literally no time even to be astonished.

Europe to 'Seek Its Own Identity'

What does all this mean for the world in the long run? Obviously, a number of things. This, I am firmly convinced, is a historically irreversible process and, as a result, Europe will begin again to seek its own identity without being compelled to be a divided army any longer. Perhaps this will create the hope that, sooner or later, your boys will no longer have to stand on guard for freedom in Europe or come to our rescue because Europe will at last be able to stand guard over itself.

But that is still not the most important thing. The main thing is, it seems to me, that these revolutionary changes will enable us to escape from the rather antiquated strait-jacket of this bipolar view of the world and to enter at last into an era of multipolarity, that is, into an era in which all of us, large and small, former slaves and former masters, will be able to create what your great President [Abraham] Lincoln called "the family of man."

Can you imagine what a relief this would be to that part of the world which for some reason is called the Third World, even though it is the largest?

One, as you certainly know, most of the big wars and other conflagrations over the centuries have traditionally begun and ended on the territory of modern Czechoslovakia, or else they were somehow related to that

Havel wishes to dissolve the Warsaw Pact tomorrow and NATO the day after that, as some eager journalists have written. Vaclav Havel merely thinks what he has already said here, that for another hundred years American soldiers shouldn't have to be separated from their mothers just because Europe is incapable of being a guarantor of world peace, which it ought to be in order to make some amends, at least, for having given the world two world wars.

Sooner or later, Europe must recover and come into its own and decide for itself how many of whose soldiers it needs so that its own security, and all the wider implications of that security, may radiate peace into the whole world.

Vaclav Havel cannot make decisions about things that are not proper for him to decide. He is merely putting in a good word for genuine peace and for achieving it quickly.

Proposed Goals for Helsinki Two

Four, Czechoslovakia thinks that the planned summit conference of countries participating in the Helsinki process should take place soon and that, in addition to what it wants to accomplish, it should aim to hold the so-called Helsinki Two conference earlier than 1992, as originally planned.

Above all, we feel it could be something far more specific than has so far seemed possible. We think that Helsinki Two should become something equivalent to the European peace conference, which has not yet been held, one that would finally put a formal end to the Second World War and all its unhappy consequences.

Such a conference would officially bring a future democratic Germany in the process of unifying itself into a new pan-European structure which could decide about its own security system. This system would naturally require some connection with that part of the globe we might label the Helsinki part, stretching westward from Vladivostok all the way to Alaska.

The borders of the European states, which, by the way, should gradually become less important, should finally be legally guaranteed by a common, regular treaty. It should be more than obvious that the basis for such a treaty would have to be general respect for human rights, genuine political pluralism and genuinely free elections.

Five, naturally we welcome the initiative of President Bush, which was essentially accepted by Mr. Gorbachev, according to which the number of American and Soviet troops in Europe should be radically reduced. It is a magnificent shot in the arm for the Vienna disarmament talks and creates favorable conditions not only for our own efforts to achieve the quickest possible departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia but indirectly as well for our own intention to make considerable cuts in the Czechoslovak army, which is disproportionately large in relation to our population.

If Czechoslovakia were forced to defend itself against anyone, which we hope will not happen, then it will be capable of doing so with a considerably smaller army, because this time its defense would be, not only after decades but after centuries, supported by the common and indivisible will of both its nations and its leadership. Our freedom, independence and our newborn democracy have been purchased at great cost, and we shall not surrender them.

For the sake of order, I should add that whatever steps we take are not intended to complicate the Vienna disarmament talks but, on the contrary, to facilitate them.

Sixth, Czechoslovakia is returning to Europe. In the general interest and in its own interests as well, it wants

proached democracy for a mere 20 years, between the two world wars, and now for the three and a half months since the 17th of November last year.

The advantage that you have over us is obvious at once.

The communist type of totalitarian system has left both our nations, Czechs and Slovaks, as it has all the nations of the Soviet Union and the other countries the Soviet Union subjugated in its time, a legacy of countless dead, an infinite spectrum of human suffering, profound economic decline and, above all, enormous human humiliation. It has brought us horrors that fortunately you have not known.

It has given us something positive, a special capacity to look from time to time somewhat further than someone who has not undergone this bitter experience. A person who cannot move and lead a somewhat normal life because he is pinned under a boulder has more time to think about his hopes than someone who is not trapped that way.

What I'm trying to say is this: We must all learn many things from you, from how to educate our offspring, how to elect our representatives, all the way to how to organize our economic life so that it will lead to prosperity and not to poverty. But it doesn't have to be merely assistance from the well-educated, powerful and wealthy to someone who has nothing and therefore has nothing to offer in return.

We, too, can offer something to you: our experience and the knowledge that has come from it.

This is a subject for books, many of which have already been written and many of which are yet to be written. I shall therefore limit myself to a single idea.

The specific experience I'm talking about has given me one great certainty: Consciousness precedes being, and not the other way around, as the Marxists claim.

For this reason, the salvation of this human world lies nowhere else than in the human heart, in the human power to reflect, in human meekness and in human responsibility.

Without a global revolution in the sphere of human consciousness, nothing will change for the better in the sphere of our being as humans, and the catastrophe toward which this world is headed—be it ecological, social, demographic or a general breakdown of civilization—will be unavoidable. If we are no longer threatened by world war or by the danger that the absurd mountains of accumulated nuclear weapons might blow up the world, this does not mean that we have definitively won. We are, in fact, far from the final victory.

We are still a long way from that "family of man." In fact, we seem to be receding from the ideal rather than growing closer to it. Interests of all kinds—personal, selfish, state, nation, group, and, if you like, company interests—still considerably outweigh genuinely common and global interests. We are still under the sway of the destructive and vain belief that man is the pinnacle of creation and not just a part of it and that therefore everything is permitted.

There are still many who say they are concerned not for themselves but for the cause, while they are demonstrably out for themselves and not for the cause at all. We are still destroying the planet that was entrusted to us and its environment. We still close our eyes to the growing social, ethnic and cultural conflicts in the world. From time to time, we say that the anonymous megamachinery we have created for ourselves no longer serves us but rather has enslaved us, yet we still fail to do anything about it.

In other words, we still don't know how to put morality ahead of politics, science and economics. We are still incapable of understanding that the only genuine backbone of all our actions, if they are to be moral, is

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Thanks to the great support of your President [Woodrow] Wilson, our first president, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, founded our modern independent state. He founded it, as you know, on the same principles on which the United States of America had been founded, as Masaryk's manuscripts held by the Library of Congress testify.

In the meantime, the United States made enormous strides. It became the most powerful nation on earth, and it understood the responsibility that flowed from this. Proof of this are the hundreds of thousands of your young citizens who gave their lives for the liberation of Europe and the graves of American airmen and soldiers on Czechoslovak soil.

But something else was happening as well. The Soviet Union appeared, grew and transformed the enormous sacrifices of its people suffering under totalitarian rule into a strength that, after World War II, made it the second most powerful nation in the world.

It was a country that rightly gave people nightmares, because no one knew what would occur to its rulers next and what country they would decide to conquer and drag into its sphere of influence, as it is called in political language.

All of this taught us to see the world in bipolar terms as two enormous forces—one a defender of freedom, the other a source of nightmares. Europe became the point of friction between these two powers, and thus it turned into a single enormous arsenal divided into two parts.

In this process, one half of the arsenal became part of that nightmarish power, while the other, the free part, bordering on the ocean and having no wish to be driven into it, was compelled, together with you, to build a complicated security system to which we probably owe the fact that we still exist.

So you may have contributed to the salvation of us Europeans, of the world and thus of yourselves for a third time. You have helped us to survive until today, without a hot war this time but merely a cold one.

The totalitarian system in the Soviet Union and in most of its satellites is breaking down, and our nations are looking for a way to democracy and independence.

The first act in this remarkable drama began when Mr. [Mikhail] Gorbachev and those around him faced the sad reality of their country, initiated a policy of *perestroika*. Obviously, they had no idea either of what they were setting in motion or how rapidly events would unfold. We knew a lot about the enormous number of growing problems that slumbered beneath the honeyed, unchanging mask of socialism.

But I don't think any of us knew how little it would take for these problems to manifest themselves in all their enormity and for the longings of these nations to emerge in all their strength. The mask fell away so rap-

idly begun and ended on the territory of modern Czechoslovakia, or else they were somehow related to that area. Let the Second World War stand as the most recent example.

This is understandable: Whether we like it or not, we are located in the very heart of Europe and, thanks to this, we have no view of the sea and no real navy. I mention this because political stability in our country has traditionally been important for the whole of Europe. This is still true today. Our government of national understanding, our present Federal Assembly, the other bodies of the state and I, myself, will personally guarantee this stability until we hold free elections, planned for June.

We understand the terribly complex reasons, domestic political reasons, above all, why the Soviet Union cannot withdraw its troops from our territory as quickly as they arrived in 1968. We understand that the arsenals built there over the past 20 years cannot be dismantled and removed overnight.

Nevertheless, in our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, we would like to have as many Soviet units as possible moved out of our country before the elections, in the interests of political stability. The more successful our negotiations, the more those who are elected in our places will be able to guarantee political stability in our country, even after the elections.

Helping Soviets on Road to Democracy

Two, I often hear the question: How can the United States of America help us today? My reply is as paradoxical as the whole of my life has been. You can help us most of all if you help the Soviet Union on its irreversible but immensely complicated road to democracy.

It is far more complicated than the road open to its former European satellites. You, yourself, know best how to support as rapidly as possible the nonviolent evolution of this enormous multinational body politic toward democracy and autonomy for all of its people. Therefore, it is not fitting for me to offer you any advice.

I can only say that the sooner, the more quickly, and the more peacefully the Soviet Union begins to move along the road toward genuine political pluralism, respect for the rights of the nations to their own integrity and to a working—that is, a market—economy, the better it will be not just for Czechs and Slovaks but for the whole world.

And the sooner you yourselves will be able to reduce the burden of the military budget borne by the American people.

To put it metaphorically, the millions you give to the East today will soon return to you in the form of billions in savings.

Three, it is not true that the Czech writer Vaclav

Sixth, Czechoslovakia is returning to Europe. In the general interest and in its own interests as well, it wants to coordinate its return, both politically and economically, with the other returnees, which means, above all, with its neighbors, the Poles and the Hungarians.

We are doing what we can to coordinate these returns. And at the same time, we are doing what we can so that Europe will be capable of re-accepting us, its wayward children. Which means that it may open itself to us and may begin to transform its structures, which are formally European but *de facto* Western European, in that direction but in such a way that it will not be to its detriment but rather to its advantage.

Seven, I have already said this in our parliament, and I would like to repeat it here in this Congress, which is architecturally far more attractive.

For many years, Czechoslovakia, as someone's meaningless satellite, has refused to face up honestly to its co-responsibility for the world. It has a lot to make up for. If I dwell on this and so many important things, it is only because I feel, along with my fellow citizens, a sense of culpability for our former reprehensible passivity and a rather ordinary sense of indebtedness.

Eight, we are, of course, delighted that your country is so readily lending its support to our fresh efforts to renew democracy. Both our peoples were deeply moved by the generous offers made a few days ago in Prague at Charles University, one of the oldest in Europe, by your secretary of state, Mr. James Baker. We are ready to sit down and talk about them.

A Long Way From 'Family of Man'

Ladies and gentlemen, I've only been president for two months, and I haven't attended any schools for presidents. My only school was life itself.

Therefore, I don't want to burden you any longer with my political thoughts, but instead I will move on to an area that is more familiar to me, to what I would call the philosophical aspect of these changes that still concern everyone, although they are taking place in our corner of the world.

As long as people are people, democracy, in the full sense of the word, will always be no more than an ideal. One may approach it as one would the horizon in ways that may be better or worse, but it can never be fully attained. In this sense, you, too, are merely approaching democracy. You have thousands of problems of all kinds, as other countries do. But you have one great advantage: You have been approaching democracy uninterruptedly for more than 200 years, and your journey toward the horizon has never been disrupted by a totalitarian system.

Czechs and Slovaks, despite their humanistic traditions that go back to the first millennium, have ap-

pravity ahead of politics, science and economics. We are still incapable of understanding that the only genuine backbone of all our actions, if they are to be moral, is responsibility.

Responsibility to something higher than my family, my country, my company, my success—responsibility to the order of being where all our actions are indelibly recorded and where and only where they will be properly judged.

The interpreter or mediator between us and this higher authority is what is traditionally referred to as human conscience.

If I subordinate my political behavior to this imperative, mediated to me by my conscience, I can't go far wrong. If, on the contrary, I were not guided by this voice, not even 10 presidential schools with 2,000 of the best political scientists in the world could help me.

This is why I ultimately decided, after resisting for a long time, to accept the burden of political responsibility.

I am not the first, nor will I be the last, intellectual to do this. On the contrary, my feeling is that there will be more and more of them all the time. If the hope of the world lies in human consciousness, then it is obvious that intellectuals cannot go on forever avoiding their share of responsibility for the world and hiding their distaste for politics under an alleged need to be independent.

It is easy to have independence in your program and then leave others to carry that program out. If everyone thought that way, pretty soon no one would be independent.

I think that you Americans should understand this way of thinking. Wasn't it the best minds of your country, people you could call intellectuals, who wrote your famous Declaration of Independence, your bill of human rights and your Constitution and who, above all, took upon themselves practical responsibility for putting them into practice? The worker from Branik in Prague that your president referred to in his State of the Union message this year is far from being the only person in Czechoslovakia, let alone in the world, to be inspired by those great documents. They inspire us all; they inspire us despite the fact that they are over 200 years old. They inspire us to be citizens.

[Speaking English]: When Thomas Jefferson wrote that "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," it was a simple and important act of the human spirit. What gave meaning to that act, however, was the fact that the author backed it up with his life. It was not just his words; it was his deeds as well.

I will end where I began: History has accelerated. I believe that once again it will be the human mind that will notice this acceleration, give it a name and transform those words into deeds. Thank you.

Havel Urges U.S. to Help Soviets on 'Irreversible ... Road to Democracy'

HAVEL, From A1

Today will soon return to you in the form of millions of savings." At this, the audience broke into a hearty round of applause, led by Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other service chiefs.

Havel's speech capped a two-day visit to improve relations and trade with the United States. He met for 2½ hours today with President Bush, who offered several important financial and trade deals, and returned to the White House today for an unscheduled 45-minute talk before leaving for New York.

Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said of the meeting, "They talked at some length about the future of Europe and

agreed to stay in close touch at this time of rapid change. Both expressed their support for [Soviet] President Gorbachev's reforms and his encouragement of peaceful change in Eastern Europe and both agreed that the presence of American troops is a factor for stability and security in Europe."

In his address, Havel wore half-lens glasses and spoke mostly in Czech with a monotone translation by his press secretary, Mikhail Zantovskiy.

Still, his speech, half political review and half philosophical discourse, was heartily applauded when, in accented English, Havel declared, "When Thomas Jefferson wrote that 'governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,' it was a simple

Havel called for "a global revolution in the sphere of human consciousness."

The audience even applauded Havel's observation—not often the subject of House floor debate—that "consciousness precedes being, and not the other way around, as the Marxists claim."

Havel's speech lacked some of the personal, emotional connection that surrounded Polish leader Lech Walesa's address last November. Walesa, surrounded by Polish-American members of Congress, was more openly emotional; the gravely voiced Havel had a more low-key delivery.

The only Czechoslovak member of Congress is Rep. Robert J. Mrazek (D-N.Y.). In the gallery, Czechoslovak tennis star Martina Navratilova wiped away tears as she

But the extraordinary rise of the once-banned playwright and his fellow actors and musicians to the top of the Czechoslovak government prompted warm laughter as Havel began his speech by saying, "The last time they arrested me, on Oct. 27 of last year, I didn't know whether it was for two days or two years."

Havel, responding to reported differences with the Bush administration over U.S. troops in Europe, said, "It is not true that the Czech writer Vaclav Havel [pronounced Vats-laf Hav-el] wishes to dissolve the Warsaw Pact tomorrow and NATO the day after that."

Havel said that "for another hundred years, American soldiers shouldn't have to be separated from their mothers just because

world peace." Europe, perhaps under a "new pan-European structure," would be able to "decide for itself how many of whose soldiers it needs so that its own security ... may radiate peace into the whole world."

"Czechoslovakia is returning to Europe," Havel said, and is no longer "someone's meaningless satellite." He said he will try for "the quickest possible departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia," and will make substantial cuts in the Czechoslovak army.

"A considerably smaller army" was all that would be needed, since the country would now be defended "by the common and indivisible will" of the citizenry. "Our freedom, independence and our new-born democracy have been purchased at great cost, and we will not surrender them," he said as

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Beyond the Wall


OF ALL places, it was in divided Berlin in divided Germany in divided Europe that the cold war erupted into an east-west street party. Cautiously in Poland and Hungary, now jubilantly in East Germany, people power has taken on communist power and pulled off some famous victories—not least, the breaching of that dreary symbol of Europe's division, the Berlin Wall. If Europe's 1989 revolution can continue on its peaceful path, it will change more than the rotting communist edifice of Eastern Europe. The entire structure of postwar Europe will be transformed as well.

So far, the changes sweeping Eastern Europe have not gone the way of the doomed revelries of Tiananmen Square. Whether this progress can continue towards democracy and prosperity depends upon a whole cascade of uncertainties. First of these is what happens in Germany, the place where the Warsaw pact holds together or unravels.

The really big victories for East Germany's fledgling opposition—free elections, an end to party control over government, unshackling the economy—have yet to be won. Its leader, Mr Egon Krenz, promises new elections, but with only the present (until now communist-dominated) parties allowed to compete. Without genuinely free elections to a parliament really independent of party control there can be no confidence that gestures made in a moment of near panic, including the new freedom to travel, will stick.

By opening the borders, Mr Krenz is gambling that he can release the pressure for more far-reaching change at home. The opposition is already worried that the mood of protest will be smothered in "West Berlin chocolate". That fear is probably exaggerated: the past three months' exodus to the West have shown that East German discontents are first about freedom, second about material comfort. And West Germany's chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, promises no more cash for East Germany unless it holds free elections. Even so, with an election of his own looming next year, and East Germany's economy badly weakened by the haemorrhage of skilled workers to the West, Mr Kohl may be tempted to be more generous than he should. The best way for West Germans to help the East is to stand back, hands in pockets, until Mr Krenz accepts a free-market democracy.

He will probably have to. So far each barrier he has thrown up to protect party rule has been rudely trampled down. Yet it would be wrong to assume that he will not fight back. East Germans may have lost their fear of the party, but the party has not yet lost its power of retaliation. For all the recent images of smiling soldiery, the army is still no less capa-



ble than China's of scattering protesting crowds in a hail of bullets. And if Mr Krenz cannot defend creaking communism in East Germany, it remains quite possible that a Russian—presumably not Mr Gorbachev—might be tempted to try.

For beyond Germany the fate of Eastern Europe remains closely bound to the fate of *perestroika* in Russia. And *perestroika* is not going well. So far Mr Gorbachev has watched the communist rout in Poland, Hungary and East Germany with apparent equanimity, if not encouragement. Yet he still has conditions he would like to hold to: the communist party must not be humiliated, meaning it should retain at least a share of power; and for the time being nobody should leave the Warsaw pact. The pace of change, however, and the degree of anti-Soviet feeling are such that Hungary is already in danger of pushing past him. If it did, Poland and East Germany would want to follow. At that point Mr Gorbachev, *perestroika* and the prospect of a freer Eastern Europe could conceivably end in military crackdown.

That is a prospect that the West must keep up its guard against, as it revels in the news from central Europe. But in a year when the most quixotic optimists have repeatedly been proved too cautious, the chances must be for a less cataclysmic outcome. Even that, indeed even a successfully democratising East Germany, will merely lead to the next imponderables for both Germany and Europe.

Gunboat diplomacy

Mr Gorbachev may raise one, and possibly two, of these when he meets Mr Bush for their Mediterranean summit next month. He has hinted that, for the time being at least, he would prefer to stick with two Germanies. Nothing too demanding in that, since for the time being it seems to be what many West Germans and East Germans want too. But in order to help fend off the charge at home that he is selling out the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, he may offer Mr Bush a deal: free elections in East Germany in return for the neutrality of both Germanies, together perhaps with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe by, say, 2000. Mr Gorbachev may then add a second uncomfortable offer: for the two separate Germanies some day to become one, but with the same two conditions attached.

Mr Bush need not clear his throat for long before he answers: a time when East Germans are struggling to win their freedom after 40 years of communist dictatorship is no time for East and West to start dictating their future to them. Neu-

Radio and the Freeing of Europe

By Dale Russakoff
Washington Post Staff Writer

High above Connecticut Avenue, amid the tangle of tongues that is the Washington bureau of Radio Free Europe, some of the clocks are set to local time, some to Moscow time, some to Munich time. And some are just wrong—but who has time to change them when you're rewriting history by the minute?

This week it is Nestor Ratesh, senior correspondent for Romania, who is dizzy with exhaustion. The Romanian service went round-the-clock soon after the massacre in Timisoara. And Ratesh, a passionately anti-communist emigre, went on alert with it.

Now, nursing a cold, he is trying to reorder a desk heaped with clippings and notes about yet another revolution no one anticipated, while assembling reports about U.S. aid to Romania and interviewing scholars on what it all means. A 1990 calendar lies wrapped in plastic on his windowsill. "I'm still in 1989," he explains, as if in a rapture.


Several weeks ago it was the Slovak commentator who was in a frenzy, and the Hungarian a few weeks before that. And a few months ago it was Jacek Kalabinski, the Pole, whose booming voice has been famous in his homeland since before martial law when he was a Polish National Radio correspondent.

The past year has been as extraordinary for Radio Free Europe as for Europe itself. The U.S.-funded radio network created in the Cold War to send news, culture and opinion through an Iron Curtain that sought to keep it out has been covering the realization of its own dream—even playing a role in it.

When officials of the U.S. agency that oversees the network recently went to Warsaw to arrange to open a bureau there—an unthinkable goal six months ago—they said they met

former Politburo member Jozef Czyrek, who greeted them wryly: "Well, I must say it's an honor to meet with an organization as powerful as Radio Free Europe."

The network's Washington bureau has a central newsroom staffed by American news reporters who pride themselves on being dispassionate and has private



BY PETER HOEY—THE WASHINGTON POST

offices filled with emigre commentators who are as passionate as they come. All of them will say, as does Kalabinski, whose office is adorned with a Solidarity poster, "I am a journalist, above all."

A target of the communist government who went underground and then emigrated during martial law, Kalabinski made his first trip home last October to cover the new coalition government. "It was a funny situation," he said. "My friends are now Cabinet members, members of Parliament."

Large and bearded, legendary for his energy, he burned up the airwaves with 36 stories in 14 days. During an interview on the exodus from East Germany, he said, a spokesman for the communist-controlled Interior Ministry, which houses the secret police, stopped in mid-sentence and said: "My God, if I'd been talking to you only six months ago, I'd have had to arrest myself."

Even now, he said, it is amazing to have in his wallet a permit

in the name of Radio Free Europe, the communist anathema, to cover the Polish Parliament. The permit expired Dec. 21, he said, "but I keep it as a souvenir."

When Solidarity leader Lech Walesa addressed Congress in November, Kalabinski was asked to be his translator and accepted without reservation. His was the gravelly and heartfelt English rendition of Walesa's opening words, "We the people," that brought down the house.

For Ratesh, the Romanian who emigrated in 1973, it is still hard to absorb the events of the last month. He tells of a traditional Romanian New Year's Eve party of exiles here, which normally is a night of drinking and dancing.

"But this year, everyone was so excited, more than drinking and dancing we talked about what had happened," he said. "For the very first time in the history of the Romanian people, they took their fate in their own hands. It wasn't the Soviet Union or America or some international treaty that decided their fate. It was themselves. And for all the bloodshed, you have to say it was a kind of cleansing, after so many decades of cowardice and collaboration."

"It suddenly gives you pride to be a Romanian—even an exiled Romanian. We were a little embarrassed that Romania was a country in which nothing happened. We had such a hard time trying to answer all those questions from Americans, from French. There were suggestions of cowardice and a lack of pride, and all of a sudden the Romanians become heroes. All over Eastern Europe it was kind of a picnic, but in Romania it was a real, popular, violent revolution. They invested blood. Thousands of people were killed fighting for liberty."

He appears on the verge of tears, but suddenly he sinks into his chair and calms himself. "It's very moving," he says, "but then you sit down in front of the microphone and you have to be cool and objective."

The Quadrille of Nations



States of mind precede states. In what matters most, consciousness, Germans are one people again.

Marx is confirmed, kind of, by the collapse of Marxist regimes: states are indeed withering away. East Germany, the fourth country to secede from communism in as many months, is becoming a bourgeois democracy (that is now an aspiration; until recently it was an epithet) and collapsing toward reunification with another, the Federal Republic. For 40 years East Germany has been a Potemkin state, a façade of legality. In the 1970s, recognizing the lethal threat of German national sentiment, the regime changed its description of itself from "a Socialist state of the German nation" to "a Socialist state of workers and farmers." It has had only one *raison d'être*, to be a Soviet salient in the Cold War. It is socialist or it is nothing. It is now nearly nothing because East Germans have been over into the present—Berlin's Kurfürstendamm—and it works.

East Germany's befuddled, apolitical intelligentsia, its thinking stunted by decades spent frozen like a fly in amber, talks vaporously about some "third way," some "humane socialism." But the masses want none of it. At a Leipzig rally a man identifying himself as a "plain craftsman" wins loud applause when he says socialism has failed and any "new socialism" will, too. "We are not," he says, "laboratory rabbits." Neither are they *East German*.

Diplomats, blinkered by their prejudice in favor of existing arrangements, whatever they are, are often the last to see what is happening. Today they are earnestly asking a question that history has already answered: Will Germany be reunified? It already is. Institutional details remain to be resolved but in what matters most, consciousness, Germans suddenly are one people again. The crucial steps in the making of the United States (1776, 1789) were made possible by the fact that people were thinking like Americans. States of mind precede states.

Gorbachev says reunification is for "history to decide." It did, long ago. The boldness of this generation of Germans is ratification of 20 generations of evolving nationhood. Politicians who think history can be tamed by legalisms are trying to lasso a locomotive with a cobweb lariat.

In Brussels—that preposterous pretender to the role of Rome in a new empire of homogenized Europe—President Bush said Germany's movement toward reunification "must" be gradual and "should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO, an increasingly integrated European Community, and with due regard to the legal role and responsibilities of the Allied

powers." That is the muffled voice of the State Department, speaking with its head in the ground. Today it is gradualism that is imprudent, given the collapse of the East German government. ("Who was Egon Krenz?" asked a sardonic banner at a protest rally while Krenz was the head of state.) What now is this NATO to which leaders say they are committed, world without end, amen? The world that made NATO necessary may have ended. Does "due regard" for Allied rights refer to the vestigial occupation rights? If so, the less said the better. As for "European integration," George Walden, a British M.P., writes: "One of the major incentives to postwar European integration was the threat from the East: it is not easy to see how its sudden diminution can be used to justify a stampede towards federalism."

President Mitterrand, meeting last week with Gorbachev, said his position had not changed, which of course meant that it had. Previously he had said, "I have no fear of German reunification." Now he says: but only if Germans accommodate "the interests of others." France is not famous for sacrificing its sovereignty on the altar of other people's interests, but its anxiety is understandable. It is axiomatic that France wants a Germany strong enough to keep the Soviet Union at bay but weak enough to be held in check by Luxembourg. De Gaulle hoped that a special Franco-Soviet relationship would preserve Europe's balance of power. But what if the special relationship is between a reunified Germany and the Soviet Union? There are precedents—Rapallo in 1922, the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939—for sudden reversals of German-Soviet relations. After the war a French officer in occupied Germany worried about the day when Germans might do that again: "We all know that every time they come to an agreement with the Russians they arrive in Paris."

Gray dream: Germany invaded France three times in 70 years (1870, 1914, 1940) but it is farfetched to worry about a fourth invasion. Still, it is natural that the French and others worry about the Fourth Reich bestriding Europe, with Berlin shoving aside Brussels as the center of gravity. Events are rekindling Bismarck's aspiration for Germany to be Europe's "honest broker," this time as a bridge between East and West. There is a history of German economic and cultural penetration in the East. As a Bundestag member says, "German history and culture are more tightly linked with our neighbors in Central Europe than with EC nations such as Portugal and Spain."

It is not yet 1990 and already "Europe 1992," the statist's gray dream of a "deepened" European integration inflicted by Eurocrats in Brussels, looks like an anachronism. Should Germany, with its quickened sense of self and of its capacity for collective action, now aspire to the role of Gulliver, bound down by a thousand threads of red tape spewed forth from Brussels?

Timothy Garton Ash says the puncturing of the Berlin wall did for Germany what the pope's 1979 visit did for Poland: it caused an epiphany (Ash writes of the "pentecostal quality" of the Berlin experience), a sudden comprehension by the people that they all felt and thought the same way. They quickly understood that they could be, collectively, a body politic, strong when acting in concert. The result in both cases was solidarity. In Poland a trade union midwifed the rebirth of a nation. In Germany the result soon will be reunification. So as we turn the corner on the last decade of the century we are heading back to the future, to the 19th-century quadrille of nations. Despite the castles being built in the air by the bland utopians of Brussels, those dreamers of European unification, the newly assertive nations are not about to wither away.

It's Too Early to Relax Technology Curbs for East Bloc

For the West Germans, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) is "outdated." For the Italians, the strategic export controls the West has enforced for the past 40 years, by virtue of lists drawn up at COCOM, need substantial revision. For many in the U.S., especially in the machine-tool industry, the COCOM controls have meant significant sacrifices, lost opportunities and reduced market share. A 1987 report by the League of Concerned Scientists estimates that high-technology export controls cost U.S. businesses as much as \$9 billion every year in lost sales.

In Mikhail Gorbachev's view, as expressed before the European Parliament in

Europe

By Kenneth R. Timmerman

Strasbourg on July 6, COCOM should be "dismantled" so West and East can join together into a common European home. West Europeans also lobbied heavily for changes in COCOM rules; in the weeks leading up to the Oct. 25-26 high-level meeting in Paris of the 17-member COCOM. West Germany's foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, told a radio audience in Bonn that Western nations "have to assist the reform-oriented countries via comprehensive cooperation" and "transfer of technology." That required a review of the lists of high-technology goods barred from export to communist countries.

Furthermore, Italian President Francesco Cossiga said in Washington on Oct. 12 that the West should "review and reconsider" the restrictions on high-tech sales to Poland, Hungary and other Soviet-bloc countries. Italy's foreign minister, Gianni De Michelis, added that Polish and Hungarian industries must have access to up-to-date machine tools and technology or be

relegated to "second-class" status. But while Mr. Genscher and the Italians were playing to the grandstands, another message was being quietly delivered by the back door.

It was that message the COCOM delegates heard when they met in Paris and agreed on measures to strengthen enforcement of controls. In the coming months, COCOM will set specific performance standards for strategic export controls to which all members are expected to adhere. The aim, COCOM delegates said, is to make "the fence outside of Europe stronger" by the end of 1992 when trade barriers inside Europe go down.

In the 1970s, when detente sparked a dramatic upsurge in high-technology transfer agreements with the U.S.S.R., Western manufacturers, selling to eminently "civilian" foreign-trade organizations such as V/O Technopromimport, fueled the most remarkable modernization of the Soviet military-industrial manufacturing base since World War II. Sophisticated Western and Japanese machine tools were sold to the Baltic Shipyards in Leningrad, which turned out a whole new generation of silent nuclear attack submarines. These contracts led by Toshiba in Japan, Kongsberg in Norway and Forest-Line in France will cost the U.S. taxpayer as much as \$30 billion, according to former Navy Secretary John Lehman if the U.S. is to maintain a credible deterrent. Thanks to Western technology, Soviet submarines can now approach to within 10 nautical miles of the U.S. coastline undetected, instead of 200 miles as before.

In early October, the State Department's senior representative for strategic trade, Ambassador Allan Wendt, and the newly appointed head of the Defense Technology Security Agency, William Rudman, toured European capitals to present dramatic new figures on illicit machine-tool deals with the Soviet bloc. Since 1983, they said, European COCOM nations and Japan

had delivered 6,000 COCOM-embargoed machine tools to the U.S.S.R., and nearly all of them were funneled directly to projects run by the Soviet Military Industrial Commission.

Half of the 6,000 machines were West German. Japan, Italy, Britain and France were also major violators. The most recent case (and this is how the "6,000 machine tools report" came to be identified to the public) concerned deliveries of sophisticated machine tools made by Olivetti in Italy to a Soviet aeronautics factory, where they were used to help build the Yak 41 fighter-bomber. On this basis, the U.S. told other COCOM members it was willing to agree to significant streamlining of the COCOM lists, "but only if everyone else agreed to better enforcement."

Furthermore, as the most recent edition of the Pentagon's annual estimate of Soviet Military Power revealed, Soviet military spending has continued to rise in real terms by 3% since 1985, when Mr. Gorbachev took over as general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. During this time, the Soviet military has completed the modernization of its entire ballistic-missile fleet, including two new categories of ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25. It has introduced new classes of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines, new fighters, new tactical missiles, and is working on a new generation of tanks. New Soviet weapons are regularly designed on Western computers, built with Western machine tools and driven by Western computer chips that have slipped through the COCOM net.

Warsaw Pact high-technology purchases in the West have primarily served the military, and not the consumer. Even today, when the Soviets are clamoring for more highly sophisticated computer-driven machine tools, bubble memories and gallium arsenide computer chips, 60% of the apartment fires in Moscow are caused by the explosion of Soviet-built television sets.

Maintaining the COCOM restrictions may require a certain economic sacrifice on the part of Western manufacturers, but dropping them would require an even greater sacrifice in terms of Western security.

COCOM seeks to determine "what needs to be controlled on strategic grounds, no more, no less," Mr. Wendt said in a July interview. "There is ample room for trade with the Warsaw Pact outside of COCOM-controlled goods." Take the case of Poland and Hungary. In recent discussions with the European Community, these nations have not been asking for strategic technologies at all. Instead, they have been asking for basic agricultural equipment—such as secondhand tractors!

Besides, COCOM nations have been able to apply licenses for many high-technology sales to Poland and Hungary all along. Since May, the U.S. has even lifted its "no exceptions" policy toward the U.S.S.R., in force since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Talk about dissolving COCOM, or doing away with COCOM scrutiny of high-tech sales to the communist bloc, simply misses the point. The reformers within the Warsaw Pact don't need the type of technology COCOM controls; only the Warsaw Pact military has such needs. Further relaxing strategic export controls, even toward countries such as Poland and Hungary, will send the wrong message. These controls exist because the Warsaw Pact exists as a military alliance, and because pact nations continue to divert some 60% of their industrial base to military production. Change these basic equations, and there will be plenty of time to reconsider COCOM controls. But to drop the controls beforehand would serve only to strengthen the military and discourage reform.

Mr. Timmerman, a Paris-based journalist, is author of a recent book on Soviet diversion of technology.

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Churchill et
al.
FYI

ARRIVAL STATEMENT IN BRUSSELS, 12/3/89

D1

Today, we met in Malta, Winston Churchill's "tiny rock of history and romance." Ancient stepping stone to Europe. Today, the crossroads of East and West.

And tonight we meet in Brussels. Tonight we stand at the crossroads of history, on our way to a Europe whole and free.

It is always a pleasure to return to Brussels. This city represents the finest that Europe has to offer in friendship and hospitality. It also represents the strength and vitality of European institutions, nourished and protected for more than 40 years by the security shield of NATO -- one of the great success stories of our century.

Brussels symbolizes a vibrant and growing trans-Atlantic partnership -- one that has helped foster the astounding changes we are seeing today.

The modern Atlantic Alliance was born at sea. It was on a battleship off the coast of Canada that Franklin Roosevelt met Winston Churchill during Europe's darkest hour, great leaders in a rendezvous at sea, a rendezvous with destiny.

The legacy of that meeting became known as the Atlantic Charter, significant not for its details, but for its vision.

It spoke of a day when all peoples, in all nations, would freely choose their form of government, and live lives rich with opportunity and hope. It spoke of a day when nations would

resolve their differences at the negotiating table, not on the field of battle.

Tonight, I have come to Brussels to share with our friends and allies the results of that vision -- results born of strength and solidarity, continuity and commitment.

It seems like the world is changing overnight. But the yearning for freedom lives within all of us, and always has. That simple truth is manifested in the thunderous events taking place a few hundred kilometers to the East. And that simple truth brought Mikhail Gorbachev and I together in a windswept harbor off Malta.

The seas were as turbulent as our times. But it was not an ill wind carrying us on our mission. No, it was the winds of change. Strong and constant. Profound.

And today, as the sun broke through the clouds, we could both see a new world taking shape -- a new world of freedom.

Here in Brussels, only six months ago, we pledged as Allies to work together to end the division of Europe. We now stand at the threshold of making that dream a reality.

My presence here, and that of my NATO colleagues, underscores the importance we attach to consultations within the Alliance. I look forward to my discussions with Prime Minister Martens, Secretary-General Woerner, and E.C. Commission President DeLors.

It is an exciting time for the Alliance, for Europe, and for America. I have come with good news. Thank you, God bless you, and good night.

Chung et al.
FYI

PRESIDENT'S AFTERNOON INTERVENTION
ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

- THIS MORNING I REVIEWED MY DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AT MALTA AND WE HEARD FROM PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI AND PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY ABOUT THEIR RECENT MEETINGS WITH HIM.

- I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY THIS AFTERNOON TO TALK ABOUT A SUBJECT OF EVEN BROADER SCOPE: THE FUTURE SHAPE OF THE NEW EUROPE AND THE NEW ATLANTICISM.

A TIME OF CHOICE

- WHEN WE LAST MET IN MAY, OUR SUMMIT DECLARATION DESCRIBED THE SETTING AS A "JUNCTURE OF UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITIES." IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, WE HAVE WITNESSED EVENTS THAT HAVE FINALLY BEGUN TO MATCH OUR HOPES THESE FORTY YEARS. OUR DREAMS FOR AN HISTORIC TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE FROM A DIVIDED CONTINENT INTO A CONTINENT WHOLE AND FREE ARE COMING TRUE.

- THE ALLIANCE WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1949 TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR PRECISELY THE EXTRAORDINARY EVOLUTION WHICH IS OCCURRING IN EASTERN EUROPE TODAY.

- THIS YEAR THE PEOPLE OF THE EAST MADE FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES ABOUT THEIR DESTINY, AND GOVERNMENTS THERE BEGAN TO HONOR THE CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE. WHAT THESE CHANGES AMOUNT TO IS NOTHING LESS THAN A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION.

- THE TASK BEFORE US IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE FRUITS OF THIS PEACEFUL REVOLUTION AND PROVIDE THE ARCHITECTURE FOR CONTINUED PEACEFUL CHANGE. GREAT CHOICES ARE BEING MADE, AND GREATER OPPORTUNITIES BECKON.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE: OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE THROUGH FREEDOM

- IN ANY TIME OF GREAT CHANGE, IT IS GOOD TO HAVE FIRM PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE OUR WAY. OUR GOVERNMENTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES AGAIN IN MAY TO SEEK AN END TO THE PAINFUL DIVISION OF EUROPE. WE HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED THIS DIVISION. THE PEOPLE OF EVERY NATION HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE IN FREEDOM.

- OF COURSE, WE HAVE ALL SUPPORTED GERMAN REUNIFICATION FOR FOUR DECADES. AND IN OUR VIEW, THIS GOAL OF GERMAN UNIFICATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES.

- FIRST, SELF-DETERMINATION MUST BE PURSUED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS OUTCOME. WE SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME ENDORSE NOR EXCLUDE ANY PARTICULAR VISION OF UNITY.

- SECOND, UNIFICATION SHOULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMANY'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO NATO AND AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE LEGAL ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIED POWERS.
- THIRD, IN THE INTERESTS OF GENERAL EUROPEAN STABILITY, MOVES TOWARD UNIFICATION MUST BE PEACEFUL, GRADUAL, AND PART OF A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.
- LASTLY, ON THE QUESTION OF BORDERS WE SHOULD REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
- AN END TO THE UNNATURAL DIVISION OF EUROPE, AND OF GERMANY, MUST PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND BE BASED UPON THE VALUES THAT ARE BECOMING UNIVERSAL IDEALS, AS ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE BECOME PART OF A COMMONWEALTH OF FREE NATIONS. I KNOW MY FRIEND HELMUT KOHL COMPLETELY SHARES THIS CONVICTION.

THE ROLE OF NATO

- THE POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR NATO THAT WE AGREED UPON LAST MAY MAKES THE PROMOTION OF GREATER FREEDOM IN THE EAST A BASIC ELEMENT OF ALLIANCE POLICY. ACCORDINGLY, NATO SHOULD PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND REFORM WITHIN EASTERN COUNTRIES AS THE BEST MEANS OF ENCOURAGING RECONCILIATION AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE.
- THIS EFFORT RECALLS THE ORIGIN OF NATO AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE OF NATIONS SHARING THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL VALUES, A FOUNDATION ON WHICH I EXPECT NATO WILL INCREASINGLY BUILD IN THIS NEW AGE OF EUROPE.
- ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR REFORM AND POSITIVE CHANGE IN THE EAST NEEDS TO BE BROAD, MULTIFACETED, AND FLEXIBLE. IT SHOULD NOT ONLY BE A QUESTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE -- AS IMPORTANT AS THAT MIGHT BE -- BUT OF STEPS TO SUPPORT GREATER POLITICAL PLURALISM, OPEN UP FLOWS OF INFORMATION, DEVELOP NEEDED TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND PROVIDE THROUGH OUR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN STATES, BOTH EAST AND WEST.
- THIS FITS THE CONCEPT OF "NEW MISSIONS FOR NATO" WHICH I PROPOSED WHEN I WAS HERE LAST MAY FOR OUR SUMMIT.
- BUT WE ALSO MUST REMAIN CONSTANT WITH NATO'S TRADITIONAL SECURITY MISSION. THE POTENTIAL FOR STRIFE IS INHERENT IN ANY PERIOD OF FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL TRANSITION. IN SEEKING AND PREPARING PEACEFUL CHANGE, THIS ALLIANCE ALSO MUST REMAIN A RELIABLE GUARANTOR OF PEACE IN EUROPE, AS IT HAS BEEN FOR FORTY YEARS. IT UNITES THE FREE STATES OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN SHARING RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO NURTURE AND GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW EUROPE.

- AS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND PARTNERSHIP OF DEMOCRACIES, NATO SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THREATENING BY THE EAST. RATHER, IT CAN HELP MANAGE PEACEFUL CHANGE IN EUROPE IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES SECURITY AND STABILITY FOR ALL STATES. A HEALTHY NATO WILL SUPPORT BOTH MOVES TOWARD GREATER UNITY WITHIN WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS THE DISSOLUTION OF BARRIERS WITH THE EAST.
- ALTHOUGH THIS IS A TIME OF GREAT HOPE, WE MUST NOT BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROMISING EXPECTATIONS AND PRESENT REALITIES.
- MY GOVERNMENT THEREFORE REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR, BASED ON A MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.
- I PLEDGE TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES DESIRE OUR PRESENCE AS PART OF A COMMON SECURITY EFFORT.
- AS I SAID AT NATO EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE U.S. WILL REMAIN A EUROPEAN POWER. THAT MEANS THE U.S. WILL STAY ENGAGED IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, AND IN OUR COMMON DEFENSE.
- THIS IS NOT OLD THINKING. IT IS GOOD THINKING. OF COURSE I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LESS MILITARIZED EUROPE. EVERYONE HERE KNOWS HOW STRONGLY I SUPPORT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TOWARD AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE EAST-WEST DIVIDE.
- THIS CFE AGREEMENT WOULD DRAMATICALLY CUT BACK WARSAW PACT, PARTICULARLY SOVIET, FORCE STRENGTH. THIS HAS GREAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS FOR THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE. AND IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED AND RESPONSIBLE SET OF ALLIED REDUCTIONS AS WELL.
- AS WE SEEK TO ADJUST OUR MILITARY POSTURE TO THE CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE, I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER MODEL THAN THE CFE PROCESS AS A WAY TO COORDINATE OUR RESPONSES TO THE NEW REQUIREMENTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. WE MUST STAND TOGETHER FOR NEGOTIATED, COORDINATED, STABILIZING REDUCTIONS AGAINST A RUSH TO THROW OFF DEFENSE BURDENS, AGAINST A RETURN TO THE NARROW PROTECTION OF SELF-INTEREST THAT COULD BE SO DANGEROUS AT A TIME WHEN EUROPEAN POLITICS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX RIVALED IN MY ADULT LIFE ONLY BY THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
- YET, THE CFE PROCESS HAS NOT REALIZED ITS FULL POTENTIAL. LAST MAY WE AGREED TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR. WE HAVE MADE GOOD PROGRESS SINCE THEN, BUT TOO LITTLE AND TOO SLOWLY TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US: THE CHANCE TO EASE THE SOVIET ARMY OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE AND SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND AGGRESSION.

- WE AS POLITICAL LEADERS NEED TO REMAIN FIXED ON THIS GOAL AND TO RE-ENERGIZE OUR BUREAUCRACIES AND NEGOTIATORS TO SEIZE THIS URGENT OPPORTUNITY. I HOPE YOU AGREE WITH ME ON THE NEED FOR ACTION NOW. IF WE IN THIS ALLIANCE ARE NOT EQUAL TO THE CHANGES THAT ARE GOING ON IN EUROPE AROUND US, THE CFE PROCESS COULD BE OVERRUN BY EVENTS. THAT COULD BE DANGEROUS AND WE MUST AVOID IT.
- SIMILARLY, WE NEED TO GIVE THOUGHT TO HOW THE ALLIANCE CAN BEST MAINTAIN, IN THE MIDST OF CHANGE, DETERRENCE AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES.
- FOR THAT REASON, I AM PREPARED TO LOOK WITH AN OPEN MIND AT WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN TOGETHER ACHIEVE EVEN LOWER LEVELS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE AS PART OF A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.

THE ROLE OF CSCE

- MANY OF THE VALUES THAT SHOULD GUIDE EUROPE'S FUTURE ARE DESCRIBED IN THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. THESE VALUES ENCOMPASS THE FREEDOM OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR DESTINY UNDER A RULE OF LAW WITH RULERS WHO ARE DEMOCRATICALLY ACCOUNTABLE.
- I THINK WE CAN LOOK TO THE CSCE TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE.
- EARLIER THIS YEAR, I SUGGESTED WE EXPAND THE CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS BASKET TO INCLUDE FREE ELECTIONS. GIVEN THE CALLS AND COMMITMENTS TO ELECTIONS IN MANY NATIONS TO THE EAST, THIS COULD BE AN EXCELLENT TIME FOR THE CSCE TO ASSUME THIS ADDITIONAL MANDATE.
- IN ADDITION, THE "ECONOMIC BASKET" OF THE CSCE HAS BEEN UNDERDEVELOPED. I SUGGESTED TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV THIS WEEKEND THAT WE COULD BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THIS ASPECT OF CSCE BY FOCUSING ON THE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSITION FROM STAGNANT PLANNED ECONOMIES TO FREE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS.
- IN SUM, THE THIRTY-FIVE NATIONS OF THE CSCE BRIDGE BOTH THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. IT IS A STRUCTURE THAT SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE.

THE ROLE OF THE EC

- I ALSO APPRECIATE THE VITAL ROLE THE EC MUST PLAY IN THE NEW EUROPE.
- BEFORE MY TRIP TO MALTA, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND CALLED TO SHARE WITH ME THE VIEWS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS EXPRESSED AT THE EC MEETING HE HAD CALLED. AND I KNOW THE COMMUNITY WILL BE RETURNING TO THESE TOPICS IN STRASBOURG LATER THIS WEEK.

- IT'S MY BELIEF THAT THE EVENTS OF OUR TIMES CALL BOTH FOR A CONTINUED, PERHAPS EVEN INTENSIFIED, EFFORT OF THE TWELVE TO INTEGRATE, AND A ROLE FOR THE EC AS A MAGNET THAT DRAWS THE FORCES OF REFORM FORWARD IN EASTERN EUROPE.
- THAT'S WHY I WAS EXCEPTIONALLY PLEASED THAT WE AGREED AT THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT ON A SPECIFIC ROLE FOR THE EC IN THE GROUP OF 24 EFFORT TO ASSIST POLAND AND HUNGARY. NOW THE G-24, CATALYZED BY EC EFFORTS, MUST DELIVER. ONE KEY STEP IS TO HELP POLAND ASSEMBLE THE \$1 BILLION STABILIZATION FUND IT HAS REQUESTED TO SUPPORT THE MAJOR MACROECONOMIC OVERHAUL PLAN IT INTENDS TO PUT IN PLACE WITHIN WEEKS.
- I RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THE EC CANNOT BEAR THIS BURDEN ALONE. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE AT THE COMMUNITY'S SIDE IN THIS NOBLE ENDEAVOR.
- I ALSO AM COMMITTED TO A CLOSE U.S. PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EC. WE ARE BOUND TOGETHER BY COMMON VALUES AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AS WELL AS BY SHARED INTERESTS. SO WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR TIES SO A NEW ATLANTICISM WILL PULL IN HARNESS WITH A NEW EUROPE.

CONCLUSION

- WE STAND ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA. WE KNOW THAT WE ARE CONTRIBUTING TO A PROCESS OF HISTORY DRIVEN BY PEOPLES DETERMINED TO BE FREE. THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE, ESPECIALLY THE BRAVE CITIZENS OF THE EAST, ARE ILLUMINATING THE FUTURE.
- YET THE OUTCOME IS NOT PREDESTINED. IT DEPENDS ON OUR CONTINUED STRENGTH AND SOLIDARITY AS AN ALLIANCE. IT DEPENDS VITALLY ON THE ACTIONS WE TAKE, AS GOVERNMENTS AND INDIVIDUALS, TO OFFER LEADERSHIP, PROTECTION, AND ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THIS PROCESS OF PEACEFUL TRANSFORMATION.
- EUROPE IS CHANGING, AND WE WILL BE EQUAL TO THE CHANGE. OUR TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP CAN CREATE THE ARCHITECTURE OF A NEW EUROPE, AND A NEW ATLANTICISM, WHERE SELF-DETERMINATION, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM EVERYWHERE REPLACE COERCION AND TYRANNY, WHERE ECONOMIC LIBERTY EVERYWHERE REPLACES ECONOMIC CONTROLS AND STAGNATION, AND WHERE LASTING PEACE IS REINFORCED EVERYWHERE BY COMMON RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

I AM LOOKING FOR COMMON GROUND — Bush on China

For the Record

From an article by Misha Glenny, Central Europe correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corp., in The Listener magazine (Nov. 30):

Many factors have contributed to the change in Czechoslovakia. The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev was of course a pre-condition. The tireless and often thankless work of Czechoslovakia's dissident community has played an enormous part. . . . But according to Jirina Siklova, a founder signatory of Charter 77, 21 August 1988, the 20th anniversary of the invasion, opened the last chapter of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia. "None of us, opposition or officials, believed that on that day. And when Naegele broadcast his piece that night on Voice of America people throughout the republic realized that something fundamental had changed."


For the past four years, the impact of Jolyn Naegele, the VOA's Eastern Europe correspondent, on Czechoslovak politics has been greater than most journalists can dream of in a lifetime. . . . Naegele has communicated the ironic nuances of Czechoslovak reality to people inside the country more effectively than anyone else before him.

Naegele's success was due partly to one of the cardinal sins committed by [Gustav] Husak and [Milos] Jakes. While publicly embracing glasnost, they insisted on feeding one of Europe's most educated populations with huge doses of indigestible verbal hogwash. It was this which ensured that the overwhelming majority of the population listened regularly to the VOA, the BBC and Radio Free Europe: The role of these radio stations will now change as the Czechoslovak journalists rediscover the heritage of Capek, Peroutka and Vaculik.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

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**Address of Lech Walesa
to the AFL-CIO Convention
Washington, D.C.
November 14, 1989**

Dear American friends, President Kirkland, Executive Council:

Dear Brothers and Sisters of the AFL-CIO:

This is a meeting that has been a long time in coming. The bond of friendship between Solidarity and the AFL-CIO is strong and enduring. It has been shaped over the years, both good and bad.

You have proven to be our most steadfast allies in the trade union struggle for human freedom.

I am honored, at long last, to accept on behalf of my trade union the George Meany Human Rights Award, which I had planned to pick up exactly eight years ago.

A vast movement for democracy and freedom is developing in my country. It is changing the political face of Poland and of the world. And that movement has been made possible only through the peaceful struggle of working people, of trade unionists like you and I.

Today the working people of Poland are struggling to rebuild their country, to create a stable, democratic society. We will need your help. And we know we can count on it. You have been unfailing and reliable allies, and we know you will not let us down.

Today I am here, in the United States, as a trade unionist. I am here also as a Pole. And I am proud that your trade union movement includes so many of my countrymen in its ranks and among its leaders.

For millions of my compatriots, the route across the Atlantic was the route of hope. It was long and exhausting. Millions of Poles travelled for weeks to finally find themselves in an unfamiliar country whose name they associated with freedom. When, in 1619, some of my countrymen--glass workers--staged the first strike in American history in the Jamestown colony, they lit a flame of freedom and human dignity that is burning to this day at home, in Poland, and here in the United States. Here they found the freedom they had so often missed in their own country.

My journey across the Atlantic was entirely different. Not only because it lasted a few hours--which made me realize how much the world had grown smaller. And not only because from the very moment I arrived here, I felt at home. The most important thing is that I travelled across the Atlantic just to tell you that hope has found its way to Poland too. For the first time in several dozen years, Poles can feel the breeze of freedom in their own country--the breeze many people once had to seek on this side of the ocean. We knew that the time would come, and we had been awaiting it full of faith in the power of human dreams. You encouraged us in this belief. You helped us survive the most difficult days, the moments of despair and hopelessness. The help provided by you and some other friends enabled us to continue our struggle for the right to set up legal free trade unions. Thanks to your support at international forums, efforts to isolate us from the world trade union movement failed, and we were not reduced to silence. Now the time has come to thank you; to thank you for your solidarity with Solidarity--with the cause so many people considered lost and which now, thanks to the stubbornness of Poles and the perseverance of our friends, has put us onto the road to victory.

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One easily finds friends when one is successful. But when you are in trouble, there is suddenly hardly anybody to be seen. But at least you can know for sure that those who stayed by you are the ones you can rely on. And this is the kind of friendship you value most even when you are again surrounded by new allies and sympathizers attracted by your new success.

Many people considered Solidarity a lost cause. Many analyzed the balance of power and concluded that we had nothing while our opponents had everything. We were presented as Don Quixotes pursuing unrealistic goals. We were advised to reconcile ourselves to so-called realities of life and were condemned when we refused to do so. For many politicians, we were either a troublesome partner or a burdensome obstacle in their diplomatic game. Opinions were voiced that our activities might threaten international stability, thus posing a threat to peace.

We could not agree to this kind of thinking. And not because we lacked realism. We decided to contribute to world peace in a different way--it was realism which told us one could not build enduring peace based on injustice and slavery. We learned this through our Polish experiences, but this is in fact a universal formula valid everywhere, in every geographical latitude and in every culture. This formula applies to all totalitarian and dictatorial systems, regardless of the ideology they profess or the catchphrase they hide behind. None of those systems has the right to pose as a defender of peace. Peace has to be the work of free people who speak for themselves.

To discern this fact and to understand it--this is realism. This same realism told us it was impossible to suppress the desire for freedom in Poland for any long stretch of time. This desire found its reflection in our movement. And this is why we kept repeating the words which became the motto of the last few months in Poland: There is no freedom without Solidarity.

It was realism that made us know that it is impossible to reform the country when peoples' mouths are gagged and their hands are bound, as it is they who must implement reforms. Our movement came into being as a movement of working people. For several dozen years much was done in our country to deprive people of the willingness to work and of faith in work's meaning. Solidarity came into being as a movement whose main task was to restore the value of work and its dignity. This task was our guiding principle in 1980, and later, until the imposition of martial law. We did not lose sight of this principle even as we worked underground and tried to persuade the authorities to choose the road of reforms. Today much more depends on us than ever before in the last 40 years.

Of course, eight years ago everything may have seemed easier. When in August 1980 I jumped over the wall surrounding the Gdansk Shipyard, I did not know what our protests would lead to, but I knew perfectly well what it was that we had to do. Today I often dream that I can find myself in such clear-cut situations as those in the past. Maybe today I would have slightly more difficulty jumping over that wall, but today I would not mind having only that one difficulty.

Of course, we have taken upon ourselves full responsibility for the country. There was no other choice. True enough, nobody with an ounce of common sense in him would be willing to take over a bankrupt enterprise in a hopeless condition, but what can one do if that enterprise happens to be one's own country? We could have said that we didn't ruin it and so we don't have to worry about its rebuilding. But it is we who have had to undertake this task, risking a lot in the process--an awful lot. We had to do it because we owe it to the people who trusted us and who cast their votes for us in the June elections. We were driven to it by our sense of responsibility for our country. We took over a country which was in a catastrophic state. The 40-year experiment with the communist political system caused a devastation which is almost impossible to clear up. For those 40 years, Poland was separated from the road to which she had once belonged. Even book-keeping in enterprises was changed to such a degree that a Polish accountant can hardly communicate with his Western opposite number.

Nobody has ever tried transforming a planned economy into a market-oriented one. There are no handbooks or seasoned experts in this field. Everything has to be

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performed for the first time, and not in a laboratory but in a country where people are exhausted by an economic crisis that has lasted 15 years--longer than anywhere else in the world. In addition to all this, we carry a heavy burden of debts incurred on our behalf in the '70s without anyone asking our permission or seeking our opinion on the matter. However, those who gave us money at that time were not bothered by this fact. They did not ask critical questions or express doubts. They did not follow the advice of independent economists who kept warning against investing money in projects aimed at satisfying the megalomania of the authorities rather than the country's economic needs. Today we are being told that the West has had a bad experience with extending loans to Poland and that they have to be careful.

We have nothing against being careful, on the contrary, we tried to encourage this attitude in the 70s. If the West had been more cautious at that time, we would have been in a different situation at present. We are not trying to talk anyone into carelessness. We are only trying to convince our partners that they should not wait too long. In Eastern Europe everything is in short supply, even, or rather first and foremost, time. No one knows how much time we have left to reform our economy, but we all realize it is not much. If we fail to convince people that although things are changing slowly they are nevertheless changing for the better, then this breeze of freedom I spoke of will soon disappear, leaving behind only a sense of bitterness accompanying unaccomplished dreams. It will result in a defeat for us, but not only for us.

Sometimes we feel as if we are swimming chained hand and foot, trying to summon all our energy just to make it safely to the shore. And on the shore there is a cheering crowd of people who offer us their admiration instead of simply throwing a life-belt. We want to make it to the shore, we want to join the community of democratic countries with efficient economies. And I think this would also be to the advantage of these countries. Putting money in dictatorships usually turns out to be a short-term business. Investing money in a democratic country is always profitable, even if it does not bring immediate results. And when a new partner joins the community of market-oriented economies it can only bring profit for everyone. I know that investing money in Poland requires a little bit of courageous thinking, or maybe a bit of imagination. But I also know that in America there are more imaginative and courageous people than anywhere else in the world, and these qualities are indispensable when exploring something new, something as yet unfathomed. I know that the pioneer spirit which made this country big and free is still around. I would like you to transplant this spirit to Poland. I would like Americans to smooth the way for big business with Poland. A friend of Poland should now go into business with her and should encourage others to follow suit. Our country needs your experience, your knowledge, your modern technologies. If you engage in any activity in our country, others will emulate your example. The world is awaiting your signal, it is watching you. Do not let the world and us wait any longer.

Such is the fate of a Polish trade unionist--he has to launch a publicity campaign for private entrepreneurship. I would not like anybody to think that I made an about-face. Nowadays in Poland the defense of workers is not based on demanding more money, which in our country has no real value and for which one cannot buy anything. At present defending workers means building a normally functioning economy that would allow increasing production and letting people earn more money. Such an economy can be only built together with the trade unions; it cannot be built against them.

That is why Solidarity is still indispensable for Poland as a movement of reforms to reshape our country into a European state. A year ago we were saying: "There is no freedom without Solidarity." Today we can say: "There are no reforms without Solidarity."

Within the last few months we have achieved more than we could have hoped for. We have a legally operating free trade union; we are strongly represented in Parliament and even in the government. All this has been achieved through our own efforts, but also thanks to an international solidarity with Poland. Today, when we are threatened by recession and inflation rather than police repressions, we need this international solidarity no less than in the past. Therefore I am addressing my appeal to you, our friends who have proved to be reliable in the most difficult of times: Help Poland make

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her way to the shore of freedom. Help realize this hope that finally has come to our country. Uphold your solidarity with Solidarity. Let the road of hope--embarked on by millions of Poles on their way to America--be a road of friendship of two free nations: the Polish and the American.

Dear Brothers and Sisters. Dear Brother Kirkland. Once again I wish to say how honored I am to be here, in the United States, as guest of your great trade union movement. I am delighted to see in this hall the many faces of the movement that has always assisted us in times of need.

I am happy to be able to greet you with the words of the famous American trade union anthem that links our two movements together:

"Solidarity forever"

-30-

Dan McS.



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TERRY E. BRANSTAD
GOVERNOR

CONDITION OF THE STATE MESSAGE

By

The Honorable Terry E. Branstad
Governor of Iowa

January 9, 1990
Des Moines, Iowa

Delivered Before a
Joint Convention
of the
73rd General Assembly

(FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 A.M.)

Madam President, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Chief Justice, Justices and Judges, State Officials, Senators and Representatives, Distinguished Guests and Friends.

Before I begin this morning, I would like to take a moment to welcome a very special family to these chambers - Tibi and Marilena Craici and their children, Dan and Anamaria.

The Craici's were born, married and had their two children in Romania. Tibi was an electrical engineer and Marilena a mechanical engineer there. They were more fortunate than many of their countrymen. Yet, Tibi told me last week, "We had everything...except freedom."

A few years ago, they fled their homeland as political refugees. Today, Tibi and Marilena Craici are realizing their dream of freedom here in Iowa. Iowa is now their home.

It was thus with horror that a month ago the Craici's watched thousands of their compatriots gunned down while marching for freedom. We can only imagine the joy in their hearts as they witnessed Romania throw off a 40-year yoke of brutal oppression. Finally, all Romanians are realizing their dream of freedom.

1989 was the year when the Cold War melted; the Iron Curtain parted; and the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. First it was Hungary, then Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and finally Romania. One by one, people in Eastern Europe threw off the mantle of oppression and demanded freedom and democracy.

Today, let us salute all the brave Romanians and other Eastern Europeans who risked their lives to bring freedom to their lands. Please join me in welcoming the Craici's to this special place they now call home, Iowa.

As we enter the 1990's, the prospects for peace in the world are greater than at any other time in the 20th Century and we Iowans should take at least a small measure of pride in knowing that we helped make that happen. Our state has always been a force for peace in the world.

Even though it was more than 30 years ago, we vividly recall Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Roswell Garst's farm near Coon Rapids. In the 70's, Iowans pushed for expanded trade with the Soviets and in the 80's, Iowa was the very first state to establish a sister-state relationship in the Soviet Union.

For Iowa, peace means prosperity. The next ten years offer extraordinary opportunity for our state. Yes, the 90's could well be Iowa's best decade.

Lest we forget, the 80's taught us some important lessons.

Ten years ago today, we had just come off a decade of great prosperity. Farmland values had yet to hit their peak; manufacturing jobs were at an all time high, and inflation-induced growth seemed never ending.

Yet, there were dark clouds on the horizon. Interest rates were beginning to soar; a grain embargo had just been imposed on the Soviets and the wheels of commerce were slowing down.

We were not prepared to deal with the result.

Those dark clouds rained distress on Iowans like no time since the 30's.

We watched in dismay as the floor fell out of the economy, land values plummeted, bankruptcies mounted, unemployment neared double digits, and many Iowans moved to other parts of the country in search of jobs.

Never again. Never again will we enter a decade so vulnerable to the shifts of economic trends. Never again will we become complacent and uncompetitive. Never again will we let our economy rest on a one-legged stool. Never, never again.

Yes, in the 1980's times were tough, but Iowans were tougher. We learned some lessons from the farm crisis and used them to help Iowa turn a new direction. We set out a plan and stuck to it: to strengthen and diversify Iowa's economy; to build on our strengths in agriculture and education; to improve our business climate; to promote and market Iowa.

Now the sun is shining on our horizon. Our strategy is paying dividends. Over the past three years, we have seen a dramatic comeback in the Iowa economy.

- * In 1989, record numbers of Iowans were working and unemployment in our state remained among the lowest in the nation.
- * Land values are up 45 percent since 1986.
- * 40 percent of Iowa firms have plans for expansion.
- * And in the first 10 months of 1989, exports are up 20 percent.

We can be proud of the economic comeback that together we helped start in the 80's; but the job is not completed. We must not rest until all Iowans share in our recovery. We can make the 90's the best decade in the Twentieth Century.

Like our ancestors, the Craici's have decided to call Iowa home. They like the quiet and comfortable life in our state and the freedom and security it provides. They understand that this is a special place to live, work and raise a family.

Former Iowans are coming back, realizing that only Iowa can be home. This is a special place where friendliness, honesty and kindness are a way of life.

New Iowans marvel at our attention to the environment, our quality of life and our unparalleled commitment to education. All of this we must develop. All of this we must nurture. All of this we must preserve.

Let us not permit partisan or personal differences to divert us from this task -- to make the 1990's Iowa's decade, a decade to come home to Iowa.

Come home to a state that is strong and safe; clean and compassionate.

Come home to a state with open arms for families like the Craici's seeking freedom and hope and opportunity.

Come home to a state where our children and our children's children can find jobs and family and community.

Come home to this special place -- Iowa -- a beacon of hope in the Heartland of the world.



FOR RELEASE: 6:01 a.m. LOCAL TIME
12:01 a.m. EST

"FROM REVOLUTION TO DEMOCRACY:
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
IN THE NEW EUROPE"

ADDRESS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
CHARLES UNIVERSITY
PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Wednesday, February 7, 1990

For further information contact:

On an autumn day in Washington, D.C., seventy-two years ago, a messenger brought an envelope to the White House. A clerk stamped the enclosed letter, "Received, October 18, 1918."

The letter was sent by an elderly former professor from Prague to his friend, a former professor from Princeton.

The letter was timely, for on that very day, October 18, the Princeton professor, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, was considering a recent proposal from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

That letter to the White House was the Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation. Thomas Masaryk had sent it.

As our twenty-eighth President read the document from the man who would be your first President, he must have been stirred by the words that recalled our own declaration of independence from an empire. He must have been moved by the closing passage:

"The forces of darkness have served the victory of light, -- the longed-for age of humanity is dawning. We believe in democracy, we believe in liberty, -- and liberty ever more."

That same day, October 18, Woodrow Wilson sent his reply to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a "government clothed with proper authority." And he insisted that Czechs and Slovaks, not an emperor in Vienna, should be the judges of their own destiny.

But the wisdom of Masaryk and Wilson, the rationality of democracy and self-determination, did not last.

The days of reason of 1918 yielded to the unreasoning darkness of 1938 and 1948. Czechoslovakia witnessed -- and endured -- frightening totalitarian power and the breakdown of the European order. The United States returned to Europe, and America's young men died, resisting Nazi and Fascist aggression. Then America stayed in Europe to contain Stalinist expansionism.

Now the revolutions of 1989 have revived an age of reason for Czechoslovakia and Eastern and Central Europe.

That is what brings us together in this special place. Twenty-two years ago, students just like you -- students like Jan Palach -- joined during a fateful Prague Spring to

restore the vibrant democratic society that once stood at the heart of Europe -- only to be crushed by the twisted normality of "normalization," by the unreason of the era of stagnation.

Now you -- the students of this great university -- have taken part, heroically and responsibly, in your velvet revolution.

So it is especially fitting for me to come here, to Czechoslovakia, to Prague, to this university, to talk with you about how we might promote, perpetuate, and protect Europe's democratic revolutions.

Never again should you -- or any other people -- have totalitarianism steal away your freedom.

Never again should you be just the objects of history, unable to effect, much less shape, your own destiny. Unable to do anything but cry out: "o nas, bez nas, proti nam" -- about us, without us, against us.

From Revolution to Lasting Democracy

In December in Berlin, I discussed four key features of the new European architecture: NATO, the EC, CSCE, and a continuing American role in Europe.

Here in Prague, I want to resume that discussion. I want to share my thoughts on how Czechoslovakia and its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe can move from revolutions to lasting democracies that draw strength from the new architecture.

The historic, democratic movements that we are witnessing across Europe -- here in Prague and in Bratislava, in Warsaw and Budapest, in Berlin, Sofia, Belgrade, and Bucharest -- hold great promise for all of us. They hold the promise that Europe can achieve what President Havel has called "the era of freedom." What President Bush has called a "Europe whole and free."

We must work to fulfill that promise and to protect it. Indeed, we all know that initial impulses for democracy may not be enough. If 1989 was the year of sweeping away, 1990 must become the year of building anew.

Four challenges confront the newly emerging democracies of this region.

1) The Economist

First, the spirit of revolution needs to move from the streets into the government. Transitional regimes need to give way to fair and free elections that establish open parliaments with a place for opposition. The new democratic political systems need to respect the rule of law and fundamental

individual rights and liberties -- including freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press. Majority rule must respect minority rights.

Second, the spirit of the New Europe needs to be reflected in security arrangements that remove the threat of military aggression or intimidation and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. Elections and new security treaties will be mutually reinforcing, for only freely-elected governments can legitimize the security arrangements the treaties will codify.

Third, the spirit of economic reform needs to move forward to allow free men and women to enjoy economic liberty -- including the rights to private ownership and to work alone or collectively in markets where prices are set by individual choices, not centralized diktat. The improved performance and freedom of market economies will be necessary to help sustain popular support for the new democracies.

Following from these three challenges, I suggest there may also be a fourth: Some of the new democracies of the region may determine that they can better support and sustain their common effort if they do so in concert, perhaps through some form of regional cooperation.

In each of these efforts, the evolving institutions of a New Europe -- NATO, the EC, CSCE -- will play important roles.

So will America. For as you make progress toward democratic ideals, so do we, for that is the essence of America. Both Wilson and Masaryk understood that.

None of us should underestimate the difficulty of the work ahead. But neither should we underestimate the great opportunity presented all of us by your courage.

As President Havel said on New Year's Day, "Let us teach both ourselves and others that politics does not have to be the art of the possible, especially if this means the art of speculating, calculating, intrigues, secret agreements and pragmatic maneuvering, but that it also can be the art of the impossible, that is the art of making both ourselves and the world better."

Free Elections -- The First Challenge

Two months ago in Berlin, I emphasized that governments based on the consent of the governed are the first requirement for an enduring peace in Europe. Americans value self-determination because we value the dignity and freedom of the individual. We value it, too, because the principle of self-determination is the only basis upon which legitimate governments can stand.

The steps you take are not just your own. They are also steps forward for all states that have a stake in a legitimate European order, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Only through the legitimacy of democracy will we achieve a resilient and lasting stability.

Governments accountable to their peoples, and more concerned with the livelihood of their citizens than with their apparatus, armies, or secret police, will secure a Europe whole and free in a way armies of tanks never could. Democratic governments are far more likely to promote the well-being of their citizens than to pursue expansionist, aggressive aims.

President Gorbachev also appears to have understood this opportunity. By word and deed, this new Soviet leadership seems to agree that legitimacy, not force, is the only way to ensure European stability. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said just last month, "We are emerging from a difficult past. We are emerging from it, having learned well its main lesson: Only an advanced democracy can give guarantees against the abuse of power and can secure a nation against repression and violence."

Since self-determination through a free and fair election is the right that secures all others, President Bush has called for adding free elections to CSCE nations' human rights obligations. This proposal would commit all 35 CSCE participating states to hold periodic and genuine elections, permit free party activity, and require that elections be open to foreign observers. Between now and the Copenhagen CSCE conference, the United States will propose new provisions to support, monitor, and carry out a free elections regime within the CSCE process.

Indeed, I propose that all CSCE member states join with the United States in sending observer delegations to ensure that the people power elections of 1990 genuinely represent the will of the people.

No proposal could be more timely. Last month, Romania said it would invite U.N. observers to its elections. Now I hope Romania will give our CSCE observer proposal greater impetus by being the first nation to invite CSCE observers.

1989 was the year the people took to the streets. 1990 should be the year the people move into their parliaments.

I would like to add one cautionary note. We are troubled by indications that some of the governments in the region have engaged in practices that will obstruct truly free and fair elections. Let me be clear: The peaceful transition to democracy now under way in Central and Eastern Europe will not tolerate rear guard maneuvers from any quarter. As we have seen in the GDR and Romania, such actions will only undercut

the legitimacy of this vital process. And any steps that undercut the creation of legitimate governments will increase, not decrease, instability. That is in no one's interest.

We will proceed on the basis of a new democratic differentiation: any backsliding in the movement to create legitimate governments will isolate a nation from the support we can provide.

Consolidating Changes in Europe's Security: The Second Challenge

The democratic imperative is the first and most basic challenge. But the second challenge is no less important. I want to state our objective as clearly as possible: We must leave behind not only the Cold War but also the conflicts that preceded it.

After 1918, you built a strong democracy and a vibrant economy, but 1938 and 1948 proved the necessity for enduring, effective security.

The lesson is clear: Military changes must keep pace with political ones. And CFE is a critical step toward an agreed and codified security system. Last week President Bush made a new proposal that should bring an effective CFE Treaty to a rapid conclusion.

The United States is confident that such an agreement will promote a stable strategic relationship in Europe. That relationship should minimize and deter the threat of any army of invasion and end the unjust presence of any army of occupation.

We also believe that enduring security necessitates a continued U.S. military role on the continent -- for as long as our allies desire it -- to reassure the nations of Europe, large and small, that we will stand by them to resist invasion, intimidation, or coercion.

We can make the European strategic situation more predictable and perhaps less threatening by encouraging greater openness and transparency in military affairs. Next week, for example, Canada will host the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa, where we hope to begin negotiations toward implementing President Bush's proposal to overcome the suspicions of secrecy through a system of overflights on short notice.

The negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures within CSCE offer a vehicle for ongoing efforts to reduce tensions on the continent. Yet our present proposals are oriented primarily toward the danger of Eastern offensive action against the West. We also need to develop measures that would impede an assertion of military might by any European nation against any other.

So today I propose that we start exploring the expansion of the confidence and security building measures agenda. For example, we should consider new proposals to promote greater military transparency between neighboring states, especially along border areas, and to open the military budgets of all 35 CSCE nations to public scrutiny.

NATO will continue to play an important role in ensuring strategic stability and predictability in Europe -- West and East -- but NATO must also evolve to assume new missions. As a political alliance, NATO offers a cohesive structure that can help address old and new European animosities and fears -- outside and inside NATO. As a security alliance among sixteen like-minded democracies, NATO should consider how it might facilitate collective action against non-traditional threats -- such as proliferation and regional conflicts. As a political and a security alliance, NATO can assist in the verification of arms control and security agreements to the benefit of all Europeans.

Economic Requirements for the New Democracies: The Third Challenge

Free elections and treaties on conventional forces and confidence building measures will help advance and consolidate your people power revolutions. But if steps are not taken to promote economic vitality, then the stability of Europe may be threatened again. This is one of the painful lessons of the inter-war years. The newly emancipated peoples of this region now face the long and trying labor of regenerating societies devastated by half a century of totalitarian rule.

A major part of this effort must clean up your rivers, lakes, forests, soil, and air -- damaged just as badly by central-planning as were your economies themselves.

Because the circumstances of each nation differ considerably, it would be a mistake to apply a mechanistic assistance formula. I believe, however, we can, identify stages of economic reform to which the United States, the EC, and the other nations of the Group of 24 should tailor support.

First, some nations will need short-term emergency aid to cope with severe shortages of necessities -- for example, food, medicine, and disaster relief. We will be there to break the fall. But we will seek to do so in a way that does not undercut the revitalization of homegrown solutions -- especially in agriculture.

The private sector can play a key role here. For instance, the American organization, AmeriCares, has sent over \$80 million in medical supplies since 1982 to aid the people of this region. And their supplies are donated primarily from American pharmaceutical companies -- over 800 of them.

Second, all the new democracies will need help in the transition from broken down Stalinist command economies to market systems driven by the engine of private enterprise. Your new Finance Minister, Vaclav Klaus, recently made a succinct statement at an international meeting that went to the heart of the problem: We don't need the old types of cooperation, he reminded an old thinking Eastern colleague, we need business!

Businesses need market prices and an opportunity to compete. It is up to you to provide a conducive legal environment, to turn over or sell factories to private owners, and to lift the heavy hand of excessive government intervention. It is up to us to help draw foreign investors, offering incentives where appropriate, and even at times to supply seed money for local private ventures. It is up to all of us to lend a hand -- especially through multilateral financial support -- to democratic economies struggling to manage such difficult transition problems as debt payments, stabilization of currency values, and currency convertibility.

That is exactly what we are doing for Poland and Hungary, where the United States alone has offered about \$1 billion in various assistance measures. And just last week, President Bush asked Congress for \$300 million for assistance to Eastern Europe. While some of our assistance will be available to all, the progress a government makes in meeting the challenges I have outlined will influence the availability of the full range of aid.

Third, we must integrate the new market democracies into the international economic system. You need access to IMF and World Bank resources. You need barriers to trade removed bilaterally and through GATT, so potential investors will know they can export to other markets. You need access to high technology. To meet this need, the United States is considering with its allies adjustments in the COCOM system that could enable you to have access to technology, provided you will protect it and forego industrial espionage.

We have been pleased the European Community has assumed a major role in coordinating economic assistance, because the availability of the EC market for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe is vital. We recognize, as well, that others -- including the United States, Japan, and the EFTA nations -- should also play significant roles so the new market democracies can assume their proper independent place within the whole of Europe and the larger international system.

Czechoslovakia and other nations of Eastern Europe warrant special recognition at this historic time. Therefore, I am pleased to announce that we will support the offer of the government of Czechoslovakia to locate the new European Development Bank for Reconstruction and Development here in Prague, in the center and heart of Europe.

I also look forward to the Bonn CSCE economic conference as an opportunity to establish European-wide adherence to market principles. If CSCE is to fulfill its potential, it needs a better developed economic component that will aid the transition to market economies and promote ongoing respect for economic liberty and open markets.

CSCE Summit

Free elections. CFE and security. Dynamic market economies.

Standing alone, each of these is important. But together they are mutually reinforcing. Together they offer an agenda for the United States and others that want to ensure that the revolutions of 1989 become the democracies of the 1990s. Together they can help build governments that answer to only one power: the people.

This agenda draws from and builds on the CSCE framework.

It should be the agenda of a CSCE Summit.

Therefore, the United States stands ready to participate in a 35-nation CSCE Summit this year if the Summit addresses three points.

One, we need to make substantial progress on the U.S. and U.K. proposal to establish a CSCE commitment to hold periodic and genuine elections. Free elections should be a human right and are the baseline requirement for establishing a new, legitimate European political order.

Two, we must complete the CFE Treaty -- so it can be signed at the Summit -- establishing new, legitimate security arrangements.

Three, we should clearly define the Summit agenda based on substantive progress and possible proposals in other areas as well, including economics. This way, it can prepare for, not replace, the 1992 Helsinki Review Meeting and demonstrate CSCE's potential for advancing reform in a New Europe. For example, we might consider how CSCE can gradually develop institutions to support its work in the three baskets, as the FRG has suggested.

U.S. Bilateral Programs for Czechoslovakia

Let me say a word about our bilateral assistance program for Czechoslovakia. Under the sure guidance of the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence, Czechs and Slovaks together have shown that no change is too rapid when it is peaceful, consolidates democratic gains, and leads to a legitimate government. Our assistance can help you continue your revolution.

In recognition of your country's dramatically changed human rights situation, I am pleased to announce that the President will notify the Congress that he is waiving the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. This waiver will open the way for Most Favored Nation status for Czechoslovakia after we negotiate a trade agreement. And when Czechoslovakia's parliament passes new, liberal legislation on free emigration, the United States will declare Czechoslovakia in full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, as we have done with Hungary, so that Czechoslovakia can enjoy MFN status without the requirement of an annual waiver.

The President will also request authority for the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation to operate in Czechoslovakia to encourage and offer financial support to private U.S. investors.

And we will support your recent request to rejoin the IMF.

The United States will also:

- Support you economically by making Czechoslovakia eligible for the export-credit guarantees of our Export-Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation; by seeking legislation to promote technical assistance; by negotiating a bilateral investment treaty; and by coordinating this assistance with the multilateral efforts of the Group of 24.
- Support you ecologically by proposing a joint U.S.-Czechoslovak study to determine the most cost effective way to deal with your serious air pollution problems; by encouraging you to participate in the Budapest Regional Environmental Center announced by President Bush last July; and by intensifying our dialogue on all transnational issues, including the environment, drug trafficking, and terrorism.
- Support closer ties between our peoples by increasing cultural and educational exchange programs; by beginning a Peace Corps English language program here; by establishing USIA cultural centers in Bratislava and in Prague; and above all, by reopening our consulate in Bratislava. These steps will go far toward reestablishing our historical ties with both the Slovak and Czech peoples.

I also have one more U.S. initiative to announce today, an idea specially suited to safeguarding your democracy and those of your neighbors. It starts from the assumption that just as you have won your own freedom, so too will well informed citizens protect freedom by setting wrong to right. As Thomas Jefferson wrote almost 200 years ago, "Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe."

These were and are wise words.

The United States proposes, therefore, the establishment of a Fund for Independent Broadcasting and a Free Press. Our goal

is to support cooperative development of commercial and non-profit radio and television broadcasting and free press in Czechoslovakia and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. The Fund would solicit participation and contributions from Western private corporations and institutions. This Fund's principal purpose would be to assist groups in the region that wish to start independent radio, television, and print enterprises. The Fund could provide seed money for start-up costs as well as technical assistance. It would also provide training in the United States and other Western countries in the use of equipment and development of professional broadcast and print standards.

New Associations in the Region and Europe: The Fourth Challenge

In a region that has suffered so greatly from the distortion of national interest and from international isolation, I am encouraged by the first signs of coordination and possible new association among newly democratic states. President Havel and others have opened the discussion. We recognize that the growth of legitimate multilateral organizations that reflect the economic political and security interests of this region will develop as they are needed, but permit me, if you will, to think out loud for a few moments.

The United States has supported voluntary associations of independent nations in every other region in the world. As in Western Europe after World War II, we believe that the process of political and economic reconstruction may be strengthened by new forms of cooperation.

We believe voluntary associations follow naturally from democracy and are, in a sense, a natural way for democracies to build international civil society and overcome old animosities. Indeed, association may also give you additional strength to build democratic institutions at home, because the lessons and success of one may assist another.

We welcome, for example, the recent discussions of mutually beneficial economic cooperation in the region by officials of the governments of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, including a possible free trade agreement, free flow of capital and labor, harmonized financial systems, and a convertible accounting unit. Economic integration can enhance efficiency and growth. Common infrastructure projects can assure compatible communications, transport, and energy networks.

The purpose of such closer ties should not be to isolate the countries in association from others. Indeed, your nations have every interest in overcoming the enforced associations of the past that actually discouraged your entry into the European and global economies. No longer should the circumstances of this continent subject you to characterization as "The Lands Between"; you can, instead, establish a region of recognition

and respect. Working together, you might strengthen your position and fashion a special relationship with the EC, the nations of EFTA, or the U.S.

If you do work together, we will respect your decision by providing our assistance in a way that supports your association. The choice of whether to associate and in what form is of course entirely yours to make.

A Commonwealth of Free Nations

Today in Prague and two months ago in Berlin, I have elaborated upon the President's vision of a Europe whole and free. I have described America's vital role in building that new Europe together with you. By respecting the principles of self-determination and democratic choice, we believe that the old divisions of Europe can be overcome. The legacy of 1938 and 1948 can be left behind, and the hopes of 1918 and 1968 can be fulfilled.

Before I came to speak to you this morning, I visited the place where, twenty-one years ago, Jan Palach set himself on fire to protest fear and terror. There is little that an American official can tell this audience about his sacrifice. But I know that among the students of his old university gathered here today, the student Palach would not be a lonely man.

For in affirming your dignity as individuals, you have reclaimed more than the future of your generation. In recovering your independence as Czechs and Slovaks, you have begun more than your country's historic return to Europe. You have shown that, in the words of your president, freedom is indivisible.

When the "freedom trains" bearing East German citizens pulled out of Prague last year, hundreds of your countrymen stood and cheered. But the freedom train of 1989 did not stop at the East German border or the Czechoslovak border or the Hungarian border, just as it did not stop at the border of Poland or Bulgaria or Romania or Yugoslavia.

It is the great promise of our historical moment that the return to freedom and the return to a whole Europe are bound together — and can only succeed together. And I believe the day will come when any European can stand in any European city — in Prague or Paris, in Berlin or Budapest — and see only countries of free individuals, a continent of free parliaments, a commonwealth of free nations. For as more and more people today understand in more and more places, freedom's journey is one that should never end.

President Havel was right. Politics can be the art of the impossible.

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Decades Past Still Loom Large in Everyday Life

WP 4/3/90

TIRANA, Albania
This isolated European nation is filled with images that reflect a country still very much rooted in the past.

The trucks and buses are straight out of the 1940s, mostly Chinese models dating from Albania's two-decade relationship with Beijing, which effectively ended on a sour note of Marxist rhetoric in 1978 following Chinese moves to improve ties with the West. Oil field equipment, complete with derricks, would not be out of place in Texas of the 1930s.

Teams of horses and oxen draw plows through the fields, where women with white head scarves sow wheat from wide baskets. Fashions seem stuck sometime in the late 1960s, with men's trousers favoring bell-bottoms and women's shoes given to square toes and thick heels and soles.

The brown smoke belching from factory smokestacks is still considered proof of industrial power rather than a cause for environmental

concern. The electrified frontier fence along Albania's borders with Greece and Yugoslavia is a throwback to the Cold War in these days of East-West detente, as are the passes required for travel outside one's locale.

But Albanians have long memories and innate suspicions of foreigners born of invasions dating back to the Romans and 500 years of Ottoman occupation. Three-quarters of the country remains off limits to foreign diplomats, who are forbidden contact with ordinary Albanians. Foreign tourists, welcome only in groups, are bussed around carefully selected itineraries by watchful minders.

ALONG ALBANIA's Ionian coast, Kim Philby, the Soviet mole inside British intelligence, caused an American-planned invasion force of anti-Communist exiles to come to grief in the 1950s by tipping off Moscow, which in turn informed Tirana.

High in the ramparts of the Venetian fortress at the town of Gjirokaster, Albanians proudly display an artifact from the cold war—an intact U.S. Air Force T-33 jet trainer they said they forced down while on a "spying mission" in 1957.

Those were the days when Western strategists were worried by the presence of Soviet submarines in the warm-water port of Vlore. That concern disappeared in 1961 when Albanian Communist leader Enver Hoxha broke with his Soviet counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, and closed the naval facilities.

But China stepped in, pumping in billions of dollars worth of aid in return for the right to use Albania as a base to propagandize Europe with denunciations of capitalism and Marxist revisionism, as practiced by the Kremlin and its Eastern European satellites.

For Hoxha, who ruled for four decades until his death in 1985, the only foreigner to be trusted was Stalin. All these decades later, Albania still boasts Stalin busts and

statues, Stalin photographs and streets galore, and the only city in the world still named after the late Soviet leader.

Even official Albanian paintings and sculpture are in the socialist-realist tradition favored by Stalin, as is the wide square in Tirana, where an enormous gilt statue of Hoxha keeps haughty watch. Even the privations and excesses associated with Stalin still seem to afflict Albania.

RELIGION WAS abolished when Albania became the world's first officially atheist country, and churches and mosques in this once predominantly Moslem country were turned into museums. Although making the sign of the cross in public is punishable by three years' imprisonment, Christians worship privately, fast for Lent and paint red Easter eggs in keeping with a tradition of the Greek Orthodox Church, to which their families once openly belonged.

More temporal concerns involve housing and perennial shortages of everything from toilet paper to milk and meat. With a birth rate rivaling that of a Third World country, Albania is hard-pressed to feed and house its population, which has trebled to 3.2 million since the end of World War II. A potentially rich country, three-quarters of it is mountainous.

Visitors were shown a two-room apartment shared by five members of the same family—that is well enough off to afford a refrigerator and a washing machine. They are kept in the outside hall for lack of space.

Another two-room flat comprising a kitchen and bedroom was occupied by its original tenants and a recently married couple.

Well-placed Albanians regularly rise at 4.30 a.m. to line up for milk, which less favored fellow citizens do without. Every month a family is entitled to a single chicken and a little more than two pounds of ground meat and another two pounds of whatever other meat is available, usually lamb or, unfortunately for the many Moslems, forbidden pork.

Often, no meat is available, although the 120,000 members of the Communist Party endure no such

privations and get priority access to food.

Party propagandists are quick to list Albania's blessings—no drugs, no AIDS, no alcoholism, no crime, no foreign debt, no income tax, no homosexuality and no automobile congestion. Private cars are banned.

Whatever the regime's accomplishments in transforming a once backward land, its defenders acknowledge greater progress elsewhere in once impoverished southern Europe. Greeks have four times the per capita income of Albanians, Yugoslavs twice as much and Turks a bit more.

Although Albanians privately compare their plight to that of the spied-upon, ill-fed and poorly heated Romanians under Nicolae Ceausescu, even critics of the government concede that Albanian leaders are not corrupt and lead comparatively discreet lives. The party elite lives in a carefully guarded small area of a few blocks near the university in Tirana and receives better food, limousines and special beach houses.

— Jonathan C. Rand

Albania Shows Signs of Easing Up as Last of Stalinist Strongholds

By JONATHAN C. RANDAL
THE WASHINGTON POST

TIRANA, Albania—The government of Albania, Europe's last Stalinist bastion, is under siege.

Economic necessity and fears of following other East European Communist governments into oblivion are forcing the country's reluctant leadership to open what may be the most closed of Marxist societies and undertake limited domestic reforms.

Rarely since the Communists seized power in 1944 has the government appeared more vulnerable to unpredictable domestic and foreign forces, in the view of diplomats and analysts who are speculating about when—not if—the government here will fall.

A five-day visit to Europe's most reclusive, repressive and impoverished country, a land of 3.2 million people on the mouth of the Adriatic Sea flanked by Yugoslavia and Greece, suggested that the Albanian government is becoming defensive about the hard-line, isolationist philosophy under which it has governed.

As a result, the Albanian leadership, which long ago distanced itself from other Communist powers and insists that it will not follow other East European countries down the road of reform, is trying to impose gradual change from above, out of fear of being swept out of power from below. As one diplomat put it, Albania is experimenting with *perestroika*—Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's name for his restructuring efforts—"without calling it *perestroika*."

But diplomats and other analysts say the changes being made by the country's leaders are likely to accelerate demands for change from a people said to be tired of the secret police repression, lack of basic freedoms and shortages of meat, milk, soap, toilet paper and consumer goods.

"This time something is brewing," said a foreign visitor with extensive knowledge of Albania. "People are ready to explode."

In December, students at Tirana University protested a lack of adequate heating as well as other living conditions, according to reports. Then, in mid-January, a student-led demonstration erupted in the northern city of Shkoder, according to reports accepted as accurate by foreign governments.

The crowd's attempts to tear down a statue of the late Soviet dictator Josef Stalin sparked speculation about a nascent democracy movement in this country, where dissidence in the past has been met with ruthless repression. As many as 400 arrests were made in Shkoder, according to specialists in the West who follow Albanian affairs, and about 100 people are believed still in custody.

LA Times
5/6/90

Some specialists speculate that pro-democracy sentiment here could be focused in Shkoder, with a long Roman Catholic record of anti-Communist resistance, and in the increasingly restive ethnic Greek community. Together, the Christian minorities make up about one-fifth of the population in the atheist state.

Traditionally, the ruling Communists have kept the population in line through a mixture of repression, nationalist pride and fear of foreign invasion.

But now, the government faces dangers for which the thousands of concrete bunkers scattered across the land serve no practical purpose. Ingredients for turmoil are at hand despite the reputation for effective repression of the Sigurimi, the pervasive and dreaded secret police.

For one thing, Albania is strapped for hard currency. Furthermore, insufficient rains this winter point to a third successive bad harvest, and the government recently announced cutbacks in hydroelectric power. Albania's ill-maintained and obsolete industrial plant is nearing exhaustion.

Because of the collectivization of farming and sizable food exports for hard currency, the government is barely able to feed Europe's poorest—per capita annual income is estimated at under \$900—and fastest-growing population, which increases by about 60,000 people

every year.

People's expectations also appear to be rising. Because of access to Greek, Italian and Yugoslav television, Albanians are aware of events abroad, and some indicated in conversations here that they are impatient for a consumer society. An English-speaking Albanian university student in Tirana spoke knowledgeably about CBS, NBC and American serials broadcast in English on Yugoslav television.

Meanwhile, party propaganda sounds increasingly defensive. "We could have been a second Switzerland," said a Communist Party tour guide, "but we preferred our independence and feel proud that we did not hold out our hands to anyone for aid."

In the past, such appeals to nationalist pride have struck a deep chord among Albanians for whom the last 45 years of Communist rule represent their longest unbroken period of independence. Albanian history has been marked by five centuries of Ottoman occupation, neighbors' efforts to partition the country after formal independence was declared in 1912 and an Italian invasion during World War II. It is not at all clear if such an appeal will have the same effect now.

Please see ALBANIA, A31

ALBANIA: Hard-Liners Are Under Siege

Continued from A30

So far, Communist leader Ramiz Alia has reacted cautiously to the growing pressures. In late January, the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, as the Communists call themselves, adopted potentially significant reforms. But they stopped well short of following Communist parties in other countries that abolished their guaranteed leading role in society and introduced multiparty democracy.

Key measures approved here included decentralizing political and economic decision-making, introducing production incentives, developing private home ownership and improving Albania's much criticized human rights record.

Under consideration is penal code reform, including a reduction in the long list of infractions punishable by death, and re-establishment of the Justice Ministry and the right of a defendant to have a lawyer, both of which were abolished in 1967. Such changes would eliminate the people's tribunals that human rights organizations abroad have criticized as allowing condemnations on the basis of little more than hearsay.

In the first, if indirect, response to charges of failing to provide official information about political prisoners, the government said in March that 83 of the country's 3,850 prison inmates were detained for seeking to overthrow it "by violence." Other sources said there may be 15,000 to 20,000 political prisoners. The last annual report of Amnesty International, the London-based human rights monitoring group, said, "It is impossible to estimate their numbers."

Overall, the reforms appear to reverse trends toward greater agricultural collectivization and centralized industrial planning. But so far, no enabling legislation has been adopted, despite repeated promises in recent weeks by high-placed Albanian officials that the rubber-stamp Parliament will act this year.

The delay has sparked speculation that Alia and his pragmatic allies are being stymied by old-guard Stalinists grouped around the widow of Enver Hoxha, the government's founder who ran Albania with an iron hand for four decades by liquidating rivals.

Five years after his death, Hoxha's influence is still felt, thanks to a personality cult featuring billboard exhortations from 69 published volumes of his writings, statues, photographs and an expensive memorial in Tirana.

Underlining Alia's inability to put his personal stamp on domestic affairs is the fact that the ruling People's Assembly has been unchanged for the last six years. He has, however, encountered less resistance in foreign affairs.

Even before what Alia recently called "the tragedy" of the fall of East European communism, Albania sought to improve long-spurned relations with foreign governments and international institutions as a way out of its economic and financial predicament and self-imposed diplomatic isolation.

Despite a constitutional clause outlawing foreign debt, the government has signed important deals with Western firms based on "buy back" provisions paying off foreign investment with products.

An Italian firm is interested in offshore gas and oil prospecting rights and provides agricultural machinery and a regular truck ferry service to Trieste. West German firms are renovating chrome and nickel plants, and France recently signed an important contract to supply hydroelectric turbines.

Business sources also have reported that Albania has streamlined its once cumbersome bureaucracy since the East European order collapsed in 1989.

This winter, the government also signaled a desire for accommodation with the United States and the Soviet Union. In what diplomats called a characteristically Albanian rewriting of history, Deputy Foreign Minister Sokrat Placa told the Associated Press in February that the lack of relations with Washington is "not our making" and that "the ball is in their court."

Perhaps even more surprising has been Albania's improved ties with its southern neighbor, Greece, which persuaded Tirana to join a foreign ministers conference with four other Balkan powers.

Only late last year, Greek Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras and the Greek Orthodox Church complained about human rights violations of the Greek minority, includ-

ing a case involving four brothers caught trying to escape across the border and allegedly tortured and dragged through their village behind tractors.

But early in April, Albania gave way in a landmark case involving a 28-year-old ethnic Greek who jumped over the Greek Embassy fence and sought asylum. The man, who had been imprisoned repeatedly for his religious beliefs, was issued a Greek passport and flown to Athens nine days later.

Albanian determination to improve long-spurned relations with the rest of the world now centers on a visit scheduled this month by U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. Although Perez de Cuellar is expected to raise human rights violations, his presence will help build Albania's self-image as a member of the world community.

The government has proved adroit in suggesting that it will tolerate greater liberalization than it in fact does. For example, direct dial telephone service initiated and paid for by the U.N. Development Fund opened with 54 countries recently, an advance in telecommunications that elsewhere could be construed as opening yet another major window on the outside world. But few telephones, public and private, exist in Albania, and those that do can be easily monitored.

Nonetheless, visitors said they note a relaxation of suspicion and a greater tolerance for once-taboo foreign influences.

Greek visitors, previously obliged to sleep in government-owned hotels where surveillance is assured, are now allowed to stay with Albanian relatives. Until last year, only Albanian emigres were allowed to enter on U.S. passports, but two American journalists were allowed to visit Albania with no more ado than an admonition to "write positive articles."

That is a far cry from the days when dollars sent by emigre Albanians were returned as tainted capitalist money.

And starting this spring, more Albanians are expected to be allowed to go abroad on group visits to Greece, Italy and Turkey. In the past, few Albanians were allowed to travel abroad—mostly party and government officials, university professors and other members of the Establishment.