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REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO COMMONWEALTH CLUB

San Francisco Hilton Hotel
San Francisco, California

12:35 P.M. PST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr.Fink. Modesty may not be his long suit, but I like the introduction. (Laughter.) And very candidly, I like the pride he takes in his institution, and he gave me a good lecture up here as to how I should be supportive of these smaller and independent colleges. And it struck home to me, I'll tell you. (Applause.)

Governor Deukmeijian, I'm glad to be with you, sir -- (applause) -- and our Commonwealth Club President, Joseph Perrelli, thank you for your hospitality. And let me just single out our former Secretary of State, George Shultz. I'm honored to see him here and be with him. (Applause.)

I'm going to get in real trouble here, but another San Franciscan who has served his country at a very high level is now giving of his time to work with me on the prestigious Science Advisory Committee -- and I'm talking about your own and my friend, David Packard. I'm delighted he's here. (Applause.)

And just two more. I'm pleased to see the Mayor of San Francisco here -- Mayor Agnos -- delighted to see him. (Applause.) And, of course, another who I read in the paper had re-retired, or was about to re-retire, and I'm talking to the former head of the World Bank, Tom Clausen, an old friend, who I'm delighted to see him here. (Applause.)

So I feel encompassed by friends and delighted to be back for I think it is my sevent -- Joe, seventh? -- seventh appearance before this prestigious group. A few minutes ago, I asked a 49er fan what he thought was the turning point in the Super Bowl. (Laughter.) He said, "The National Anthem." (Laughter and applause.)

Of course, not all the recent memories -- as Art knows -- in the Bay area have been pleasant ones. I'm sure you remember the last time I was here, after this city suffered tragedy. And I'm talking about a clutter of car wrecks that -- and a flattened freeway and a terrible black cloud rising from the Marina district. And I know that some damage remains, and certainly some heartache and some hardship. But today I've sensed and felt something else -- renewal. The people of the Bay area have stood up and dusted themselves off and are rebuilding, because you came together -- (applause) -- and San Francisco will be as beautiful and vital as ever. So I think it's fair to say, from having been here for about 45 minutes, San Francisco is back. And we can understand that. (Laughter.)

But I've come here today to California for another reason, to give you a no-nonsense -- you hard-nosed businessmen and women that you are, a straightforward and hopeful message about the national security of our country. Yesterday at Fort Irwin, I also thanked our men and women in uniform -- not just because they keep America safe and free. But I came to thank them because they help to make possible the wonderful changes that are sweeping the world.

I wish every man and woman here could have been with me as I talked to the young troops out there in the desert. It's very clear why every one of our Joint Chiefs keep telling me our services all have the finest, most dedicated young men and women to ever serve in the uniform of the United States. (Applause.)

And as the threats to our security change, so, too, must our defense strategy. In 1986, defense expenditures consumed 6.3 percent of our Gross National Product. As you know, I just submitted my 1991 budget to Congress, which holds down defense spending for the fifth year in a row -- down to just above five percent of Gross National Product. I'm submitting this budget at a time when the postwar world that we have known -- the world that began in 1945 -- is changing before our very eyes. So to understand then where we're going, let me first review where we've been and where I think we are today.

The Free World's first generation of postwar leaders had the cautionary example of their predecessors. They remembered that the great war -- the war to end all wars -- was followed by chaos and conflict. They remembered that visionary statesmen, after the First World War, had tried to limit large navies -- even outlawed war itself. But soon these great hopes faded in the face of unchecked aggression. And no pact could prevent World War Two.

So by 1945 our leaders had acquired a realism -- a realism born of bloody experience; a pragmatism born of a sober appraisal of the world as it was. And from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan, our strength -- our strength -- became the world's shield; our ideals of freedom and democracy, the world's hope. We paid dearly for the defense of liberty -- with our national wealth, and with many of our youngest and bravest.

And so, over the past 40 years, our leaders continued to provide for war even as they sought peace. It was during the Truman administration, in this very city, that men and women of great vision and high ideals came from around the world to create an assembly of nations. And so it was in San Francisco, 45 years ago, that the United Nations was born.

Then, as now, the United States strove to balance its role as peace-keeper with that of peacemaker. We helped create the United Nations and NATO. And we encouraged Soviet change even as we thwarted Soviet expansion.

Those who crafted this new policy had a name for it. They called it containment and predicted that if we blocked the easy path of expansion, the Soviet Union would one day have to confront the contradictions of its inhumane, illogical system. The purpose of containment was not to defeat or humiliate the Soviets. The purpose was to preserve and extend liberty. The hope was someday to see, as George Kennan put it in 1947, "the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." It took nearly a half a century to vindicate this strategy, but we can now see the results: today the Cold War is in retreat.

That is good news, for no sane man or woman is nostalgic for the Cold War. We're inspired by this revolution of 1989 -- heartened, for example, to see a man of letters and conscience in Prague move from prison to the presidential palace. We are heartened to see the Berlin Wall fall, setting off a shockwave that upended a tyrant in Romania.

And we're grateful for something more. Now, because of our strength and that of our allies, now thanks to the march of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe -- and even in the Soviet Union itself -- now the prospects for an enduring peace are greater than ever before. We can now envision a new destiny for the nations of the continent -- that of a Europe truly whole and free.

We are taking the first steps across a bridge begun by others long ago. And it's a bridge that can lead us from seemingly endless conflict to the promise of a lasting peace. But no matter

how great the promise, we must be certain that the bridge is secure.

As President, every morning, I receive an intelligence briefing. And I receive the best information available to any world leader today. Yet the morning news is often overtaken by the news that very same evening. And the world is moving too fast to forecast with absolute certainty what will happen next. Our challenge is to manage this period of transition from the world of today to the world of tomorrow and safeguard the security of America in the process. When it comes to the security of this country, I would rather be called cautious than I would be called reckless. (Applause.)

Our pursuit of this promising future must start with an understanding of today's realities.

Take, for example, our most recent proposal warmly received by our allies and President Gorbachev. I proposed reducing the troop levels on both sides in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 troops. That balance, that balance encourages the less threatening future we envision, and it holds great promise. But right now, right now, the Soviets still have more than 560,000 men under arms in Central Europe.

On the issue of strategic weapons, we've made progress in the START negotiations. And again, I'd like to salute George Schultz for his very important part in this. (Applause.) And we now hope to slash dramatically the number of strategic weapons on both sides. It is these important reductions that Secretary Baker is seeking this very day in Moscow. That's the future we envision, and it, too, holds great promise.

But let us not forget that right now the Soviets still have more than 10,000 strategic weapons. They are modernizing them: they have developed two new mobile ICBMs, and their spending on strategic defense is comparable to their spending on strategic offensive forces.

The President of the United States is the Commander-In-Chief, bound by the Constitution to defend and protect the United States of America. Now, some would have me predicate the defense of our people on promising -- but as yet unfulfilled -- hopes for the future. I will not do that. I am determined to seek with the Soviets the collateral to implement a new peace. In international terms, collateral means soldiers discharged, tanks dismantled, nuclear missiles demolished, and chemical weapons banned from the face of the Earth.

Some see our measured approach as endangering the process of change. I see our approach as essential to change, essential to the security of this nation and as the only way to a lasting peace. We have shown that American resolve can help further Soviet reform. And we've shown that American strength is the catalyst for arms control. And we've shown that the idea called America can inspire change. And now we must not let impatience, born of euphoria, jeopardize all that we hope to achieve in the future. (Applause.)

First, as Americans have always believed, our foremost goal is to prevent another world war. To do so, we will still need to remain fully engaged. European security, stability and freedom -- so tied to our own -- requires an American presence. Western Europeans all want us to stay there -- every single country -- want us to avoid pulling back into an uninvolved isolation. I have the feeling that when the dust settles, the new democracies of Eastern Europe will feel exactly the same way. We must remain in Europe as long as we are needed and wanted. And the prospect of global peace, therefore, depends on an American forward presence.

Second, we will, of course, continue to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. And that's why I will vigorously pursue the START talks with the Soviet Union. But arms control and strategic modernization are not competing strategies. Rather, they can work together to make the world a safer place.

Just this morning, I went out and visited Lawrence Livermore Labs and met those visionary men and women who strive to make a nuclear strike on our country -- whether from a nuclear superpower, or some renegade nation, or terrorist group -- even more unlikely than it is today. And if the technology I have seen today proves feasible -- and it looks very promising -- no aggressor could be confident of the success of a ballistic missile attack. And that's what deterrence is all about.

And let's be clear: This purely defensive concept doesn't threaten a single person anywhere in the world -- the life of a single person anywhere in the world. God forbid, if it ever had to be used, it would be used against missiles, not against people.

When some complain of the cost of developing such technologies, they should first consider the cost of not doing all we can to deter conflict and protect the cities and the citizens of America. And that's why I will seek to persuade the Soviets, through our defense-in-space talks, that, in fact, greater reliance on strategic defenses will contribute to a safer world. (Applause.)

Now let me now tell you something about the strategy behind our 1991 defense budget:

First, new threats are emerging beyond the traditional East-West antagonism of the last 45 years. These contingencies must loom larger in our defense planning. Remember the threats of Libyan and Iranian terrorism. And remember the liberation of Grenada and Panama. And remember the dedication of our American servicemen on duty in the Persian Gulf two years ago, safeguarding -- not only the flow of oil -- but safeguarding the flow of oil to the industrial democracies -- but an action also welcomed by many small nations over there who were afraid that the Iran-Iraq War would adversely affect their own freedom.

And remember, too, that there are more than 15 countries in the world that will have developed ballistic missiles by the end of the decade -- 15 countries -- many with chemical and biological capabilities. Nuclear weapons capabilities are proliferating -- much to my regret and the regret of everybody here. And inevitably high-tech weapons will fall into the hands of those whose hatred of America and contempt for civilized norms is well-known. We will continue to work hard to prevent this dangerous proliferation. But one thing is certain: We must be ready for its consequences. And we will be ready.

Then there are the narco-gangsters that concern us all, already a threat to our national health and spirit. Now they are taking on the pretensions of a geopolitical force -- whole new force to effect change -- and they must be dealt with as such by our military: in the air, on the land and on the seas.

Clearly, in the future, we will need to be able to thwart aggression, repel a missile, or protect a sealane or stop a drug lord. We will need forces adaptable to conditions everywhere. And we will need agility, readiness, sustainability. We will need speed and stealth. And we will need leadership.

In short, we must continue to deter both a global war and limited conflicts in new conditions. And for this reason, we doubly need to continue the modernization of our forces. I pray that it will not be my sad duty to commit American fighting men again into combat. But if I do, on my watch, the lives of American fighting men will no be short-changed. (Applause.)

As I mentioned, just yesterday I visited the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, near Barstow, where our fighting forces prepare for action. It was at this very base that we trained many of our troops who fought with such distinction in Panama. And they were courageous. But being prepared is also the best way to ensure that wars are prevented. And after seeing our men and women

again and talking with them, they are indeed up to the challenges of the future.

You know, I once read that Khrushchev once spoke to the Commonwealth Club for three hours. (Laughter.) Perhaps he began this speech with these words: "Let me make just a few brief observations before taking your questions." (Laughter.)

So I will get to my final concern: how all this change in our defense budget affects us at home. Many speak of the peace dividend. Few discuss the short-term cost of peace. There will be costs as we cross the bridge to a better future -- for dislocated industries and workers, for communities -- painful personal adjustments to be made.

But America has always been willing to pay the price of peace. I know that some of the bases that have been proposed for cutbacks are in this area, just as many of them are in my home state of Texas, but let me state right here and now: there have been no politics in these proposals. Some talk about bases in Democratic districts here. Well, they're also in the same state as a great Republican Governor over here. I ask Congress to join me in a spirit of fairness. Longstanding critics of defense spending should not turn around and block the closing of a base in their home district. (Applause.) There's something just a little bit ironic about certain members of Congress whose philosophy seems to be make deep cuts, but be sure to cut in somebody else's state or somebody else's district. And we can't have that anymore. This is too important.

I can't accept that. The taxpayers deserves better, and so do those affected by our decisions. So let me assure you: If a base closes, it doesn't close federal concern and commitment.

You know civilians who are laid off will receive top priority for placement in other DOD positions. The Homeowner's Assistance Program will protect military and civilian personnel from falling real estate prices. And the Office of Economic Adjustment will work with communities to develop powerful new economic assets, new ways to use old bases. The Bible speaks of beating swords into plowshares. We're transforming military runways into municipal airports, and military bases into industrial parks and community colleges, and missile hangars into factories.

I know -- I don't know how the pruning hook business is going out there, but we may go back into that too -- cast them into pruning hooks. You know, I know the American people will support these measures for a continued strong defense. My travels around this country tell me that. But to have the means to negotiate reductions and ensure peace, I will need the support, the cooperation and consultation of Congress.

We can now envision a time when the world is more secure than ever; when all the competitive instincts of modern man will be diverted to commerce -- even to football.

You know, I started joking about the 49ers winning the Super Bowl during the National Anthem. But it's not how many passes Joe Montana completed, it's that he knew better than to rest on his laurels at the beginning of the fourth quarter. So, so should we. I will work with Congress to build a bridge to a more secure world. And if we work together, then peace itself will be the greatest dividend of all.

Thank you for inviting me to San Francisco. And God bless you all. (Applause.)

END 12:59 P.M. PST

By Bill Stetson

DATE = MARCH 24, 1989
TYPE = EDITORIAL
NUMBER = 0-03536
TITLE = STRATEGIC DEFENSE IS "MORALLY IMPERATIVE"
CONTENT = THIS IS THE ONLY EDITORIAL BEING RELEASED FOR BROADCAST MARCH 24, 1989.

Anncr:

Next, an editorial reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

"Strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary and morally imperative," Vice President Dan Quayle declared Thursday. Speaking on the sixth anniversary of the 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or S-D-I, Mr. Quayle said that nothing has happened since then that should change United States thinking about strategic defense. "In fact," he said, "when it comes to deployed military hardware -- the only tangible criterion by which to measure our adversaries' purpose and intent -- the only changes I have seen have reinforced the case for strategic defense."

The announcement of S-D-I on March 23rd, 1983, by the Reagan-Bush administration had profound implications for the future of America and the world. S-D-I challenged the doctrine known as "mutual assured destruction," under which nuclear attack could be deterred only by the threat of instant nuclear retaliation. The purpose of S-D-I was to explore the possibility of developing a system to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles before they could reach the soil of the U.S. or its allies. Such a system would strengthen deterrence by threatening to destroy missiles, instead of people.

A new look at defense and deterrence was especially crucial in view of the Soviet Union's massive offensive nuclear weapons buildup and its heavy investment in anti-missile defense technology. Despite some encouraging changes within the Soviet Union in the last few years, the Soviets' offensive modernization program continues. Other nations also are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them -- posing new threats and making S-D-I all the more imperative.

The U.S. and its allies must develop the means to defend against the weapons that threaten us, and that is what S-D-I is all about. Not only would S-D-I defend against actual aggression; it also would reduce the incentives for aggression by making the outcome of an attack more uncertain. For these reasons, President George Bush is committed to the development and deployment of a viable strategic defense system. As Mr. Bush has said many times, we must not be left defenseless against ballistic missiles.

Fortunately, said Vice President Quayle, U.S. research on S-D-I is showing promising results. At first, there were many skeptics, who said that S-D-I could never work or would be too expensive. But now it is increasingly obvious that S-D-I is both workable and cost-effective. **[OPT** One promising line of research is the "Brilliant Pebbles" program -- a system of small interceptors suitable for ground- or space-basing that would use non-nuclear kinetic energy to destroy enemy ballistic missiles. Kinetic energy relies on the force of impact, not an explosion, to destroy its targets. **END OPT]**

Upon assuming office, President Bush ordered a review of all aspects of U.S. national security policy. Commitments will not be made to program details until the review is complete. But Vice President

Quayle made it clear that the U.S. will continue S-D-I research and "begin deployment of a missile defense system as soon as it's ready."

Anncr:

That was an editorial reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

The Heritage Foundation

Backgrounder UPDATE

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9/18/89 | Number 109

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL: THE NEED FOR A VETO STRATEGY

(Updating *Executive Memorandum* No. 243, "Congress's SDI Cuts Deserve A Bush Veto," July 19, 1989.)

Later this month, a House-Senate conference committee will meet to hammer out the final version of the fiscal 1990 Defense Authorization Bill. House members will bring to the table a bill that cripples such important programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the B-2 bomber, and the MX missile, while restoring funding to such marginal programs as the F-14D jet fighter, which the Administration sought to cancel. By contrast the Senate members bring to the table a bill that includes more funds for the SDI program, protects the MX missile and B-2 bomber programs, and cancels the F-14D fighter program. The Bush Administration can help the Republican and Democratic members of the Senate team of the conference by threatening to veto a bill that does not reflect closely the Senate priorities. The White House should work with conferees from the Senate, notably Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat, to protect the SDI, B-2, and MX programs.

The House Defense Authorization Bill, which passed July 27, undermines United States security in several areas. It slashes the SDI budget to $3.1 billion, down from the Administration's request of $4.9 billion; eliminates from the MX missile program $174 million for research and development, $164 million for components such as railcars and communications equipment, $59 million for spare parts, and $105 million for construction of buildings and facilities; cuts $1 billion from the B-2 "Stealth" bomber program and eliminates future procurement funds for the program if its size and cost are not reduced. The purpose of these House actions appears to be to restrict SDI to research, bar MX deployment on railcars, and declare the B-2 program unaffordable. The House backing of the F-14D jet fighter program, meanwhile, is opposed by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, who argues that it is prudent to invest in more advanced fighters such as the F/A-18 *Hornet* and the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA). The House bill essentially would leave the Bush defense policy in tatters and ultimately undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence.

Far Preferable Bill. The Senate bill, by contrast, funds the SDI program at $4.5 billion, fully funds the MX missile and B-2 bomber programs, and cancels the F-14D program. This makes its bill far preferable to the House bill. The SDI program will end the near complete U.S. vulnerability to a nuclear missile attack. The proposal to deploy the MX missile on railcars will ensure the survivability of at least a portion of the U.S. land-based missile force against a Soviet first strike. The B-2 bomber is essential to maintaining a U.S. strategic bomber force capable of penetrating Soviet airspace into the next century. The F-14D, while a capable aircraft for meeting today's needs, will not provide tactical air superiority for the Navy as well as will the F/A-18 *Hornet* and the proposed Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA).

Defense spending levels were set earlier this year at $305 billion in the now famous Administration-Congress budget accord. Therefore, there is no dispute over how much the U.S. is spending on defense, but over the specific programs to be funded. The Congress is often tempted to micromanage the defense budget. The House bill typifies the sort of congressional micromanagement of the defense budget that ultimately undermines the national security. The congressional temptation to micromanage is greatest when parochial interests are at stake. The F-14D program was preserved, in large measure, because of such interests.

The White House can influence the decision of the House-Senate conference committee. To do this, George Bush first must threaten to veto a defense bill unless it meets minimum standards that include:

- ♦♦ $4.2 billion for SDI;
- ♦♦ the Senate position on the B-2 bomber, which, unlike the House bill, will not require a reduction in the overall size and budget of the program;
- ♦♦ $328 million in procurement funds to deploy the MX missile on railcars;
- ♦♦ cancellation of the F-14D.

Test of Leadership. Bush too must work with responsible Democratic members of the conference from the Senate, particularly Georgia's Nunn, so that they will argue the Administration's case during the conference deliberations. Vice President Dan Quayle met with Nunn on July 27 to discuss the actions taken by the House on the defense bill. Bush should keep open this channel of communication with Nunn and request that the Senate insist on its position where there is serious disagreement with the House.

Defense Secretary Cheney hinted that a veto of the Defense Authorization Bill is possible in his August 23 speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Bush should now come forward and publicly back the Cheney statements.

Bush's ability to sustain his defense policies in the upcoming congressional conference tests his leadership. He can salvage his defense program in conference if he shows that he is prepared to fight for what he wants. For this he must be prepared to veto the defense bill if it fails to meet his minimum requirements to protect the nation.

Baker Spring
Policy Analyst

456-6218

IMPACT OF AN $8.1 BILLION OUTLAY SEQUESTER ON DOD

- The deficit, as calculated in the baseline budget, is $116.2 billion. Therefore in the absence of FY 1990 appropriations or congressional action to increase revenues, a $116.2 billion deficit would exceed the G-R-H target of $100 billion by $16.2 billion and trigger a sequester.

- Since the outlay reductions to meet the deficit target must be shared equally between Defense and nondefense functions, outlays in Function 050 would have to be reduced by $8.1 billion (half of $16.2 billion).

  - Since the President has tentatively decided not to exempt the military personnel appropriations from sequestration, an $8.1 billion outlay sequester would require reductions in budget authority in DoD accounts of $13.3 billion in new budget authority and $1.7 billion in unobligated balances. This amounts to a uniform reduction of 4.3 percent and would change the 1.2 percent negative real growth in the President's budget to 5.7 percent negative growth.

- An automatic sequester in FY 1990 would seriously disrupt the Defense program. Reductions would fall heavily on the O&M accounts while research and development and the quality-of-life areas of military family housing and military construction will be hard hit as well.

- Undoubtedly, a defense budget base already weakened by 4 years of negative real growth will be severely impacted, and national defense goals eroded, by the impact of another $15 billion reduction driven by the mechanical requirements of the G-R-H sequester.

- A sequester of $3.4 billion in Military Personnel would cause active forces to be reduced by nearly 200,000; reduce PCS rotations by 20 percent; reduce full-time active duty reserve strength by 6,000 to 7,000 (nearly 10 percent) and reduce over 125,000 drilling reservists (nearly 12 percent); and reduce reserve school and special training over 30 percent.

- A sequester of $3.8 billion in operations would either reduce readiness sharply or severely disrupt support programs, depending on how implemented.

  - If flying hours, steaming hours, ground operating tempo and unit training are protected to avoid immediate readiness degradation, disproportionately larger reduction would have to be taken in equipment and facility maintenance, logistic support, base operations and individual training programs. Repair backlogs would grow sharply, essential support to the operating forces would

be curtailed, civilian manpower would be cut and ongoing programs would be severely disrupted.

- Similarly, many largely uncontrollable costs in the operating accounts, such as medical care, unemployment compensation, disability compensation and property damage claims cannot be reduced, thereby increasing the size of the reductions that must be made in the discretionary areas mentioned above.

- A sequester of $3.6 billion in Procurement would leave Defense with an inefficient procurement acquisition program. Cost reductions to be gained in FY 1990 through planned economic production rates would be lost, program costs would increase, delivery schedules would slip and quantities would be reduced. In addition, FY 1990 increments of prior year multiyear procurement contracts may incur quantity reductions resulting in cost penalties and reduced savings.

- A sequester of $1.7 billion in RDT&E would force contract renegotiation with attendant cost increases and schedule slippage in a number of programs including C-17, ATA, ATF, LRAACA and JSTARS. A reduction in the B-2 test and development would delay the introduction of this improved strategic bomber capability. Similarly, a reduction in the SSN-21 would necessitate a slip in the production plan.

- A sequester of $500 million in Military Construction and Family Housing would require approximately 150 separate military construction projects to be eliminated, including operational and training, maintenance, barracks, warehouses, guard and reserve centers, child care centers, dependent schools, chapels, gymnasiums, and other community facilities. Family housing construction and improvements to existing older units would be severely curtailed.

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October 12, 1989

The following is text of remarks by
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
On the Strategic Defense Initiative as delivered
To National Security Industrial Association
Washington, D.C.
Thursday, October 12, 1989

One area in particular, which I want to focus on for a few minutes now, has to do with the Strategic Defense Initiative. I think often times in the past there has been a bit of a tendency to give short shrift, if you will, to SDI. It has been somewhat controversial in terms of its consideration by the Congress, but I think it's extremely important. I know the President believes it's very important, and I wanted to share with you today a few thoughts, if I might, about the progress that we've been making with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative and why I think it's vital that we continue our efforts in this area.

I recently had the opportunity to visit the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California, just one of many facilities that are doing remarkable work with respect to the technologies that are involved in the development of SDI, and I want to make clear how important the entire defense program from a strategic standpoint is to the President and how seriously we take the proposed cuts that some in Congress are now suggesting.

Let me begin with a point that's going to surprise some people. Despite the heated debate surrounding strategic defense, in fact, we have a greater consensus today than ever before on the essence of the program, I believe. Very few people any longer question the technical feasibility of the program. Today the issue is largely political. That's right. Today technology, in my opinion, is not a bar to deploying strategic defenses.

How many times have you heard people say in recent years defenses would be nice but they're just not feasible. Well, our tests have proven that defenses that enhance deterrence and provide protection are, indeed, possible. The question now is clear-cut -- will we have the resources to deploy SDI. The critics, of course, haven't given up. They still want to argue that we can never have a 100 percent foolproof population protection and, therefore, SDI would be a waste of money unless we've got this absolute total shield that can guarantee that no missile would ever get through.

This is the most popular red herring of our time, I think. The issue has never been a perfect defense but, rather, deterrence and population protection through the phased deployment of space and ground-based defenses in which each phase increases deterrence and adds to protection. Technology does not stand in the way of this realistic and attainable goal. It is no longer visionary to

MORE

think that a successful strategic defense could render our fears about a first strike obsolete. So I call on the critics to cease their attempts to make perfection the enemy of the good, and let's get down to the real debate about how defenses fit into our strategy for nuclear stability, deterrence, and arms reductions.

As I mentioned earlier, I had the chance to tour the Livermore Lab earlier this month and speak to the scientists there about SDI research, and especially the space-based defense system, so-called "Brilliant Pebbles." It's just one of many options we're looking at, but we're giving it a very aggressive going-over this year because of its promise. And I must say I am very encouraged by the potential contribution that Brilliant Pebbles can make to strategic defenses.

It's clear to me from the visit that I had at Livermore that Brilliant Pebbles' concept is sound, that we can build it -- in short, that it may well be a winner. This is a relatively new system, so let me explain briefly what it is. A Brilliant Pebble, of course, is a space-based missile killer that in one small vehicle contains a host of systems. Small rockets would be used to detect, track and destroy a ballistic missile early in its flight simply by hitting it. There is no need for explosives of any kind. At one time, we thought these different functions would have to be performed by several different satellites -- some of them very large and very complex. But now we know that one small pebble, in effect, can probably do all of these jobs.

By taking essential defense systems like sensors to see the target, tracking technology to follow the missiles, communications to take commands from the ground and computer processors to bring all of these functions together, by taking all of these tasks and putting them on one rather small vehicle, we can save enormous sums of money and still get reliable defenses. Moreover, to do this, we are using mostly, mostly off-the-shelf technology. No scientific breakthroughs have been necessary to create Brilliant Pebbles. We are basically using what we have. But we are making it lighter, smaller and cheaper.

One of the most exciting aspects of the program is the extent to which we have been able to build on our strength and our capacity to continue to miniaturize key components. I brought along two pieces of equipment today just to give you some idea of what's happened. This is a camera that's in effect, one of the eyes, if you will, of Brilliant Pebbles. It's an infrared camera that can detect and track a ballistic missile during its flight from thousands of miles away. There is nothing really revolutionary about the camera, except its size and weight. This camera that I have got in my hand now was the camera that we had a year ago. This one, in my other hand, which weighs one-tenth the amount this does performs exactly the same functions. It's 10 times lighter than the infrared camera we had one year ago and, it gives you some idea of, going from five pounds in weight to half a pound in weight, our success at being able to innovate solutions to the problems that are involved with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

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In effect, what we had is a 90-percent reduction in weight in just one year and that's the kind of progress we're seeing in the Brilliant Pebbles program as well as many other areas of SDI research.

We haven't yet settled on a final design for the Brilliant Pebbles program, but the work is going well, and most important, we see no major scientific roadblocks to the program. Similar stories can be told about other facets of of the technology that we are looking at with respect to SDI. In fact, I think our technological progress is really one of the major scientific success stories of the decade. We've made amazing discoveries in laser beam technology, in rail guns and ground-based interceptor systems. And each of the successes tells me that strategic defenses are, in fact, possible. But if possible, we've also got to convince people that it's necessary.

The most basic reason that we need SDI is because, of course, the contribution it would make to bolstering deterrence. Today, the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons stands as our sole means of deterring a nuclear attack. But with space and ground-based interceptors as part of a strategic defense system, deterrence would take on a new face. If a Soviet war planner were to consider an attack against the United States, he would have to be sure that a certain number of his missiles destroyed their targets, or face the devastation of retaliation. Even a partial defense, the kind we would deploy in a first phase, could deny war planners any confidence that what they had aimed at would actually be hit. A defense would so disrupt a coordinated attack that our adversary would lose any hope that such a strike could achieve its aim.

As the latest edition of Soviet Military Power makes clear, Moscow has enhanced its strategic nuclear force since Mr. Gorbachev came to power. And even with a START agreement, the Soviets would still have sufficient warheads deployed on their huge land-based ICBM force to place our most important strategic assets at risk. The modernization of these weapons, especially the newest version of the SS-18, convinces me that the Kremlin continues to rely on a first-strike force posture.

By discounting the value of these weapons, a reliable first phase of SDI would complement our arms control, as well as our strategic modernization program. And this would certainly contribute to strategic stability. Of equal importance is SDI's effectiveness against mobile missiles. Within the next several years, some 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM force may well be mobile. These systems pose no special problem for strategic defenses. That is really a great advantage of space-based defenses. They can take on all comers, no matter whether they originate from a fixed silo or a mobile facility. Because it would disrupt a first strike, strategic defense would also give us important insurance against Soviet cheating on arms control agreements. This is especially a concern with respect to mobile missiles, which may well prove to be difficult to verify.

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Now, I hardly need to remind this audience that the spread of high technology weapons to the Third World poses increasing problems. The U.S. and Soviet Union may be able to decrease the number of our ballistic missiles, but we expect an increase in the number of nations capable of building and using these weapons in the near future. Of course, other deadly weapons besides nuclear bombs can be delivered by missiles. Chemical and biological weapons are increasingly avaiable to the Third World. Second-class powers can become first-class threats without having to join the nuclear club. In a little over a decade, 15 developing nations will probably have ballistic missile launch capability. In addition to deterring a Soviet first-strike, SDI then would be effective against this threat, as well. In fact, we believe that even the first phase of SDI could provide effective population defense against limited missile launches. Who among us is willing to remain naked to missile launches from nations that are so often torn by civil war and instability?

There are many compelling reasons why we need SDI, and there are no technical reasons why we could not have it. Nevertheless, Congress has put our hopes for deployment in serious doubt. The levels of funding which Congress is now considering for SDI in both the Defense authorization and appropriations bills are widely conflicting.

The House suggested a radical cut to under $3 billion; the Senate has suggested just over $4 billion for fiscal year '90. Our budget request was $4.6 billion, and that was already a billion less than the Reagan budget which we inherited.

The research program has matured to the point where the main system elements are moving beyond laboratory research into field experiments. Such experiments cost more than lab research, but they are absolutely necesssry if we're going to be successful with the program.

The really deep congressional budget cuts in SDI recommended by the House would force the elimination of some SDI technology options; would force the termination of contracts; scaling back research; reductions in the scientific workforce and, of course, send a signal that our commitment to the program has somehow declined. Should the Congress produce legislation with inadequate funding levels for SDI, I will recommend to the President that he veto the bill.

If the nation is ever going to be able to realize the potential for strategic defense, SDI must be adequately defended. An effective strategic defense could be the single most important military bequest this generation could make to the future.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END

NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301
PLEASE NOTE DATE

REMARKS AS DELIVERED BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY
TO NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1989 - 12:05 P.M.

Thank you very much, Harvey. I appreciate those kind remarks and introduction today. I also want to thank the organization for being flexible enough to allow me to speak before lunch and then depart the hall, because I do have another commitment elsewhere.

I know the National Security Industrial Association has played a very important part in our national security debates over the years. I am well aware that it was first established by my predecessor, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. I have his portrait behind me in my office in the Pentagon, primarily because of its historical significance. I hope I come to a different end than he did. But it is a rare occasion to have the opportunity to spend a little time here this afternoon because I know the great work you've done over the years to help and shape the nation's security.

Like Mr. Forrestal, I know the Association appreciates the fundamental role of scientific innovation in our defense. What I would like to do today, if I might, is spend a few minutes talking about the current state of our legislative business with respect to the ongoing debate and dialogue on Capitol Hill over the Defense Department budget and authorization for the coming fiscal year; then I want to zero in and focus on one specific program in particular because I don't think it's received as much attention this year as it merits, and that's specifically the Strategic Defense Initiative.

As a Member of Congress, I was I think what everyone would describe as a Hawk, someone who voted for absolutely every single defense program that I ever saw as a Member of Congress. I never saw a defense program I didn't like. I voted for every one of them in ten years. My problem now, though, is having inherited the tight budget situation, is to figure out how to cram all those programs into fewer dollars. Is isn't easy.

If you just go through what has transpired this year with respect to our budget we had, first of all, in May the requirement to cut some $10 billion to reach the agreed-upon level between the President and the Congress for defense spending -- $10 billion below what had been recommended in January. We had an inflation adjustment of about $4 billion, money out to finance drug programs, money out to finance various and sundry other activities. There are proposals now to take money out to fund the aid to Poland program, disagreement between OMB and CBO on Capitol Hill over outlay rates which cost about another $4 billion. And of course now, next week, if Congress is unable to pass the budget agreement for fiscal year '90, we'll find ourselves in a

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position where we have to take a sequester, which will be an across-the-board cut of better than four percent. It works out to some $8 billion in outlays for fiscal year '90. Certainly we hope that sequester will be replaced by a rational budget, and I'm reasonably optimistic that will happen.

But the message is that instead of the kind of real growth that we had in the early '80s with respect to defense spending, we're now in about our fifth year, 1990 will be about our fifth year of real declines in defense spending. Whereas Mr. Gorbachev has promised a 14 percent cut in the Soviet defense budget, we've already taken a cut of approximately that size in our defense budget, it's already been implemented.

What that required was a very careful scrub of the budget and effort on our part to make some hard choices and to make some clean, clear cut choices. In doing that, we had several priorities we were interested in. I won't dwell on them all today, but I think there are two sort of general categories of concern that we're faced with as we complete our negotiations on the bills on the Hill.

The first has to do with strategic modernization. If you look at what's transpired in the Soviet Union, while clearly Mr. Gorbachev appears to be inclined to want to restructure the Soviet military in terms of trying to take some resources away from there and allocate them to the civilian side of the house, to the extent that we see any changes at all by way of force reductions, it's strictly in the conventional area--his commitment to reduce by some 500,000 manpower including withdrawing some forces from Eastern Europe, etcetera. But even there, in restructuring those forces, they're not taking out new tanks, they're obviously taking out old tanks. You can argue that when they get through the units that are left may be slightly fewer than were there before, but they're probably more capable than the ones that were there before.

But the really significant area where we see no change, other than continued improvement, is with respect to strategic systems. When you look at the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union, those systems that are targeted on the United States, they are clearly more robust today than they were when Mr. Gorbachev came to power some four years ago. SS-24's and 25's had not been deployed in 1985. Today both are deployed with a total combined number of over 200 missiles now in those two systems. A brand new generation of the SS-18, their most capable land-based ICBM. A new Typhoon submarine this year and a new Delta-4 ballistic missile boat. So if anything, their capabilities in this area are more robust than they've been in the past.

Based on that, the President decided that when we went forward with our budget amendments this spring, we wanted to emphasize the need to continue our strategic modernization programs, specifically the B-2, the mobile missiles, the Trident D-5, and specifically, SDI, but I'll have more to say about that in a minute.

But having made those choices it obviously, was necessary also to make some cuts, to eliminate some systems, a very painful process for us to go through. The traditional way of doing business in this period of fiscal austerity in the past has been that we keep everything in the budget, keep all the production lines open, keep all the contracts going, keep all the

production lines open, keep all the contracts going, keep all the bases open, but run everything in an inefficient rate, and that was proposed. The ideas that were brought forward from within the department when we had to make the adjustments included such things as slowing down production lines, but that raises the unit cost of everything you buy. So, we decided instead that we would in fact cancel some programs, and that's what we recommended to the Congress.

Congress, unfortunately, finds itself in a position where they don't want to accept the reality that if you're going to have less money you've got to cut something. I had the experience a couple of weeks ago, of being asked to meet on Capitol Hill with some of my former colleagues -- I didn't say former friends -- former colleagues in the Congress, and the Senator who called this meeting, this was a bipartisan meeting, I don't mean to point the finger of blame at either party, or either house -- there were members of both houses there as well. The Senator who called the meeting led the charge to cut the defense budget to fund various and sundry things he likes to fund, all of which are outside the realm of the Defense Department, but the purpose for the meeting was for him and his colleagues to plead with me to open up that package of 86 bases that we finally got approval to close or realign. He wanted me to exempt the base in his state from the proposed cuts because of course, it is a major national security interest and the survival of the republic is at stake if we don't leave that base in operation.

You simply cannot do business that way. If we are going to be faced with a period of fiscal austerity, we have to establish some priorities, we have to make some choices, and that's what we tried to do in the budget this year.

One area in particular, which I want to focus on for a few minutes now, has to do with the Strategic Defense Initiative. I think often times in the past there has been a bit of a tendency to give short shrift, if you will, to SDI. It has been somewhat controversial in terms of its consideration by the Congress, but I think it's extremely important. I know the President believes it's very important, and I wanted to share with you today a few thoughts, if I might, about the progress that we've been making with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative and why I think it's vital that we continue our efforts in this area.

I recently had the opportunity to visit the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California, just one of many facilities that are doing remarkable work with respect to the technologies that are involved in the development of SDI, and I want to make clear how important the entire defense program from a strategic standpoint is to the President and how seriously we take the proposed cuts that some in Congress are now suggesting.

Let me begin with a point that's going to surprise some people. Despite the heated debate surrounding strategic defense, in fact, we have a greater consensus today than ever before on the essence of the program, I believe. Very few people any longer question the technical feasibility of the program. Today the issue is largely political. That's right. Today technology, in my opinion, is not a bar to deploying strategic defenses.

How many times have you heard people say in recent years defenses would be nice but they're just not feasible. Well, our tests have proven that defenses that enhance deterrence and provide protection are, indeed, possible. The question now is clear-cut -- will we have the resources to deploy SDI. The critics, of course, haven't given up. They still want to argue that we can never have a 100 percent foolproof population protection and, therefore, SDI would be a waste of money unless we've got this absolute total shield that can guarantee that no missile would ever get through.

This is the most popular red herring of our time, I think. The issue has never been a perfect defense but, rather, deterrence and population protection through the phased deployment of space and ground-based defenses in which each phase increases deterrence and adds to protection. Technology does not stand in the way of this realistic and attainable goal. It is no longer visionary to think that a successful strategic defense could render our fears about a first strike obsolete. So I call on the critics to cease their attempts to make perfection the enemy of the good, and let's get down to the real debate about how defenses fit into our strategy for nuclear stability, deterrence, and arms reductions.

As I mentioned earlier, I had the chance to tour the Livermore Lab earlier this month and speak to the scientists there about SDI research, and especially the space-based defense system, so-called "Brilliant Pebbles." It's just one of many options we're looking at, but we're giving it a very aggressive going-over this year because of its promise. And I must say I am very encouraged by the potential contribution that Brilliant Pebbles can make to strategic defenses.

It's clear to me from the visit that I had at Livermore that Brilliant Pebbles' concept is sound, that we can build it -- in short, that it may well be a winner. This is a relatively new system, so let me explain briefly what it is. A Brilliant Pebble, of course, is a space-based missile killer that in one small vehicle contains a host of systems. Small rockets would be used to detect, track and destroy a ballistic missile early in its flight simply by hitting it. There is no need for explosives of any kind. At one time, we thought these different functions would have to be performed by several different satellites -- some of them very large and very complex. But now we know that one small pebble, in effect, can probably do all of these jobs.

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camera that can detect and track a ballistic missile during its flight from thousands of miles away. There is nothing really revolutionary about the camera, except its size and weight. This camera that I have got in my hand now was the camera that we had a year ago. This one, in my other hand, which weighs one-tenth the amount this does performs exactly the same functions. It's 10 times lighter than the infrared camera we had one year ago and, it gives you some idea of, going from five pounds in weight to half a pound in weight, our success at being able to innovate solutions to the problems that are involved with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

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By discounting the value of these weapons, a reliable first phase of SDI would complement our arms control, as well as our strategic modernization program. And this would certainly contribute to strategic stability. Of equal importance is SDI's effectiveness against mobile missiles. Within the next several years, some 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM force may well be mobile. These systems pose no special problem for strategic defenses. That is really a great advantage of space-based defenses. They can take on all comers, no matter whether they originate from a fixed silo or a mobile facility. Because it would disrupt a first strike, strategic defense would also give us important insurance against Soviet cheating on arms control agreements. This is especially a concern with respect to mobile missiles, which may well prove

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Thank you very much. (Applause.)

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OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. · 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 2:05 P.M. EDT
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REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE DICK CHENEY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS
NATIONAL CONVENTION
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1989

CHENEY

Last month the House of Representatives voted for a drastic cut in the funds we need to modernize America's strategic armed forces. My former colleagues voted as they did not because they had a better idea about how to deter the Soviet threat, but because many of them seemed to think there is no real threat any more. They have seen some changes and apparently believe everything now is just fine. It is as if they had decided to give away their overcoats on the first sunny day in January.

If the House really thinks everything is fine -- if it thinks the threat is reduced and we do not need to modernize -- then the House ought to say so directly and return the unspent money to you. But that is not what happened. Instead, the House diverted your tax money away from critically important strategic programs and voted to spend it instead to protect jobs in selected home districts.

The chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees probably had the best descriptions for what happened. House chairman Les Aspin said that the House "passed a Michael Dukakis defense budget." As Aspin then went on to say, the House said no to the small road-mobile ICBM or Midgetman, no to rail garrison for the large, multi-warhead Peacekeeper, and made big cuts in the Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI and the B-2" ("Stealth") bomber. Senate chairman Sam Nunn was even more direct. He called the House decisions "irrational."

They were both right. And let me tell you something you probably know already. The senior members of this Administration can still remember the 1988 election. In November, the voters decided, by a landslide, that they did not want the Dukakis defense budget. If the House-Senate conference produces a bill like the House bill, you can be sure it will be veto bait.

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You have all heard the warm reassurances coming from Soviet leaders. I wish them well. But I also want to give you what Paul Harvey would call "the rest of the story."

It would be wonderful if the premise underlying the House's decisions were true. I wish I could stand before you and say that the Soviet strategic threat has been reduced over the past five years. But it has not. If anything, the United States is facing a more formidable, offensive strategic arsenal today than before Mr. Gorbachev took power. That's right: I said more formidable, not less.

In fact, although there has been talk of a 14 percent cut in its defense budget, since 1985 Soviet defense expenditures have actually increased by an average of 3 percent per year in real terms. At the same time our defense spending has declined in real terms by over 11 percent.

For the past year or so, Soviet leaders have said and done a number of things to suggest that their military postures and doctrines have undergone a fundamental change. In certain limited areas -- like the INF agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces -- the changes have, in fact, produced positive results. We are continuing to work hard in other negotiations -- like the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) -- to see if we can reach further agreements that will increase stability and reduce the Soviet threat.

But we are not at that point now. Moreover, the changes we have actually seen are not ones that automatically translate into a more secure strategic environment. Virtually all of the changes and promises so far have had to do with conventional forces, or with short to intermediate range nuclear weapons. The strategic picture is radically different.

The Soviet Union has been making major improvements to every leg of its strategic arsenal. In systems ranging from intercontinental missiles and bombers to submarines and strategic defense, the Soviet Union is getting stronger, while our Congress debates and our country treads water.

Let's look at ICBMs as an example. The Soviet Union has been modernizing all of the elements in its intercontinental missile force. In 1985, it began deploying the road-mobile SS-25, a single warhead ICBM more or less like our proposed small ICBM or Midgetman. The Soviet Union already has about 170 of these road-mobile missiles and is rapidly continuing to deploy more. We have none. Even if the President's budget prevails, we won't have any for another eight years.

The Soviet Union also has deployed 58 large SS-24 missiles, each of which carries ten independently targetable warheads. Eighteen of these SS-24s are rail-mobile, and the other 40 are in silos.

But the Soviet Union is not satisfied with modernizing its mobile missiles. It is also spending huge sums of money to modernize stationary missiles that they have no intention of ever making mobile. To be specific, the Soviet Union has been converting silos to accommodate the fifth modification of the huge SS-18 missile. These missiles can carry at least ten warheads each, and the Soviets have more than 300 of them of varying vintages in fixed silos.

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In other words, the Soviets are continuing to build and modernize very powerful multi-warhead missiles that they plan to leave in vulnerable fixed silos. This decision has crucial implications. It means that the widely publicized Soviet shift to a defensive doctrine seems to have no serious application to the strategic world. However friendly Mr. Gorbachev may sound, however friendly he may in some respects wish to be, he cannot explain deployment of the beefed up SS-18 as a friendly act. This is a highly capable missile that would seem by its basic design to be a use-it-or-lose-it weapon -- one that would make sense only for a preemptive first strike. It would be irresponsible not to modernize our own systems to defend against it. deter...

All of this adds up. The Soviet buildup shows that we must continue to take it very seriously as a potential adversary. We need to modernize our own strategic forces because Soviet strategic capabilities are becoming more dangerous under Mr. Gorbachev, despite the popular impression to the contrary. Despite some cuts, they may well be producing a leaner and meaner military force and not just a smaller one.

This was the kind of information that led President Bush to recommend a budget that placed a high priority on strategic modernization. The President took the position that nothing is as important as assuring our continued survival against the one adversary that can seriously threaten us. The Senate agreed with this thinking. But the House decided it was more important to use the defense budget as a local job protection program.

Declining defense budgets mean that we've made hard choices between competing weapons systems and programs. Indeed, for years the Congress told the Administration that it wanted to see budgets that made tough choices and actually eliminated weapons systems.

Of course, that's exactly what our budget does. But the response is curious indeed. The House simply restored the programs we wanted to cut, and paid for them by gutting the rest of the defense plan. The House's decision derived not from any defense requirements -- or budget requirements for that matter -- but from consideration of the political impact on jobs back home.

But they simply cannot have it both ways. They want to reap the political benefits of calls for defense cuts without suffering the political costs of what that reduced spending might mean to their district.

A good example is our attempt to eliminate the Navy's new F-14D production program. Everyone agrees it's a terrific aircraft. Everyone agrees it should be modernized. Well, there are two ways to do that -- you can build new ones, or you can refurbish the older ones. Building new ones gives you F-14s with a flyaway cost of over 50 million dollars per airplane, while refurbishing costs half as much.

We want to cancel the production program and modernize the older aircraft. The political problems comes from the fact the Grumman Corporation that makes the F-14 is in Long Island. What the House did was keep open the new production lines in Long Island at the taxpayers expense and the military capability of the fleet. By postponing the start up of the remanufacturing process, and keeping open new production lines, the House would add considerably to the cost of the program or get us fewer aircraft or both. This is a perfect example of using the defense budget as a jobs program.

Of course, I cannot ask you or any other American taxpayer to give us a blank check. We must explain not just our reasons for modernization in general, but our reasons for specific systems and programs -- especially the mobile ICBMs, the B-2 Stealth bomber, and the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.

All of these systems and programs point to a similar objective. We have managed to preserve the peace successfully, for decades, because the Soviet Union has understood that the United States could retaliate credibly, flexibly and with determined certainty against a strategic attack, no matter how large the attack, and no matter how much of a surprise it might be. That is the underlying idea behind the strategic Triad -- the three-legged deterrent consisting of land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and manned bombers. No matter what the Soviets might do, they could not knock out all three legs of this retaliatory Triad at once.

The idea behind the Triad remains sound. However, the weapons that could do the job twenty years ago are not adequate to provide anything like the same, comfortable level of deterrence today. Old Minuteman missiles in fixed silos and an aging bomber fleet do not inspire the same confidence they once did. The Soviets are moving forward. It would be irresponsible for the United States to try to get by with aging systems.

Although the case for mobile ICBMs should be self-evident, the House of Representatives voted against both road-mobile and rail-mobile ICBMs. I am convinced that most members understand the importance of missile mobility. They were probably rebelling against two different mobile systems. For those people, I want to emphasize how crucial it is for us to stop arguing about which is the best system. If we keep arguing, nothing will ever get done.

The Peacekeeper has already been built and deployed. It can be made mobile quickly. We should do it now to remove the specter of vulnerability from the land-based missile leg of the Triad.

The road-mobile, small ICBM has real advantages, but it cannot be ready for years. So we recommend putting the 50 already built Peacekeepers on rail, and then spending more on the small ICBM as the Peacekeeper spending winds down.

Let me turn now to the B-2 and SDI. I am convinced the American people should support these two programs. Unfortunately, our case has not yet taken hold. What we have said about the B-2 has been distorted and misunderstood. What we have said about SDI has not been heard. We need to correct both of those problems. This is a good place to start.

The first thing you hear about the B-2 is its cost. I am not denying that the B-2 will be expensive, but the cry of "sticker shock" is a phony argument. The opponents of the B-2 do not plan to return the unspent money to the taxpayers. They plan to spend it on other projects. So the real issue is not cost, but whether the B-2 is worth more than pork barrel.

The B-2 decision is really a decision about the future of the penetrating manned bomber. Our B-52 bombers are older than the pilots who fly them. By the turn of the century the youngest B-52 will be forty years old. Today we have some 250 penetrating bombers, but without the B-2, that

MORE

number will dwindle to under 200 by the mid 1990s, and to just 97 B-1 bombers at the end of the century.

So the question is a simple one: do we need a penetrating bomber? To answer that question, you should think about how bombers operate. A significant portion of our strategic air force is kept on alert at all times. These planes can be airborne in minutes.

That means they would have to be attacked by missiles with very short flight times -- submarine missiles, not ICBMs. Because the timing requirements for taking out bombers and ICBMs are so different, it would be virtually impossible for a Soviet first strike to destroy both systems at the same time. Whichever were hit first, there would be time for the other to take off.

In other words, airplanes -- like submarines -- help make the Triad invulnerable. In addition to invulnerability, however, the bombers add safety. An airplane can take off to make sure it would survive a first strike.

However -- unlike a missile -- an airplane can be recalled after takeoff. Because human beings are in control, no other system provides so many safeguards against human error.

That element of safety can be crucial to a President in the midst of a crisis. Imagine a situation in which the radar screen suddenly lights up, during peacetime. It looks as if the United States may be under attack, but we are not fully certain. By putting bombers in the air, a President can afford to wait until he is certain before making what could be the most important and most lethal decision any leader in history has ever been forced to confront.

That brings me to the remarkably misleading congressional debates over the B-2's mission or targets. The main strategic, deterrent value of bombers is not that they would go after different targets than missiles. They can go after different targets, of course, and they would. Bombers are by far the most flexible systems in the strategic arsenal.

But the major deterrent value of bombers is that they can also go after the most important and most difficult strategic targets -- some of the same targets that might redundantly be given to a Peacekeeper. That redundancy assures the prime targets would be at risk no matter what happens to our land-based and sea-launched missiles. It is why bombers would give the United States safer options to consider in a moment of crisis.

There is one final argument for the B-2: strategic stability. Bombers are simply too slow to be used as first strike weapons, but they would be extremely effective in rendering the other side's first strike suicidal. That is why both sides have tentatively agreed in START to use counting rules that would increase the importance of bombers, and decrease the reliance on missiles.

Under this counting rule, a missile carrying say ten warheads would count a full ten against any agreed upon limit. But each B-2, would count as only one against that limit In short, the B-2 is an integral part of our arms reduction strategy -- a strategy that was ignored by the House.

MORE

Under START, fully one-fifth of all of our nuclear warheads are to be carried by the B-2. So by gutting the B-2 program, the House is also gutting our arms reduction strategy. More importantly, a world without the B-2 would be less safe -- with or without a START agreement.

The concern about safety brings me around to my last subject. I want to talk for a few minutes about SDI. An effective strategic defense could be the single most important military bequest this generation could make to the future.

There has been a lot of nonsense spoken about SDI. Some people seem to think that if you cannot assure a defensive system that would protect against all incoming missiles, there might as well not be a defensive system at all. That odd form of reverse utopianism fails to understand how even a moderately effective defense could help make a first strike unthinkable.

Put yourself in the shoes of a Soviet military planner. Suppose you knew that a significant percentage of your missiles would be knocked out by space-based kinetic energy interceptors shortly after liftoff. Kinetic energy interceptors would destroy their targets by colliding with them at great speed. Suppose you also knew that many of the missiles that got past the space-based interceptors would be destroyed by a second layer of ground-based interceptors. You would have no way of knowing in advance which of your warheads would get through. In that situation, how could you even begin to plan a preemptive first strike?

Enhancing deterrence by confounding first strike planning is exactly the objective of the first phase of SDI. Later phases would involve directed energy, or lasers, as well as kinetic energy interceptors. These would be expected to hit an even higher percentage of missiles and reentry vehicles.

When SDI was proposed by President Reagan, some critics thought it was hopelessly idealistic. Now we have a great deal of serious research behind us, with successful tests, miniaturization of component technologies and vastly reduced unit costs. We have good reason to believe we are talking about something that is not only realistic, but that is operationally feasible within the relatively foreseeable future.

I cannot yet assure you that a Phase I system with both space and ground based sensors and interceptors will definitely work. But I can say to you that our research and development work is very promising. Our budget request, which the Senate came close to following, would allow the President to make a deployment decision within four years, without destroying the research into even more advanced technology that has already begun. In contrast, the House budget figures would gut the program.

The point of this program, however, is not just to preserve an option for the President. The President and I want to pursue SDI research not because we are starry eyed, and not because we are looking for bargaining chips. We want to pursue SDI because we think a successful SDI program would be immensely valuable. It no longer is visionary to think that a successful strategic defense could render our fears about a preemptive first strike obsolete. That is why President Bush committed himself to deploying SDI when it proves feasible.

MORE

We are serious about pursuing weapons and technologies that can enhance deterrence, increase stability and assure the security of the United States and its allies. That is why we are serious about SDI, the B-2 and mobile missiles. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union goes about building weapons that would appear to be useful only in a preemptive first strike. We cannot let the Soviet modernization program go unanswered. And yet, we feel morally impelled to seek responses that do not put the world on a hair trigger.

The House of Representatives put short-term concerns ahead of these strategic and moral imperatives. I urge the House-Senate conferees to follow the Senate and restore the President's priorities. We must not sit passively by, knowing that our children will have to live with the consequences.

END

Dan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Legislative Encroachment on Executive Power

In case you missed it, attached is a description of an especially delicious recent example of Congressional micromanagement of the Executive Branch -- namely, a provision prohibiting the Executive Branch from keeping records of Congressional micromanagement.

cc: Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1989

What Is Congress Trying to Hide?

By Mark B. Liedl

When Congress adjourned for its summer vacation it left behind a bombshell that could explode into a scandal. Buried in the 119-page appropriations bill funding the Interior Department is a clause that effectively prohibits department employees from making any record of their contacts with Capitol Hill. The clause is a perfect illustration of congressional micromanagement of executive branch operations, and it raises a serious question: What does Congress have to hide?

In an effort to curb congressional micromanagement of the executive branch, White House staffers and others recently proposed that executive branch employees be required to report all contacts with members of Congress and their staffs. The reason: to gauge the extent of congressional demands on the executive branch, to determine which demands result in better-managed federal programs and which impede effective execution of the law and encourage wasteful spending. Such a requirement would be consistent with current laws requiring agency officials to include in the public record any ex parte contacts that arise during the agency adjudication and rulemaking process.

Orwellian Tactics

There is one glitch, however: Congress doesn't like the idea. Tucked into the massive appropriations bill providing fiscal 1990 funding for the Interior Department is Section 117, which reads: "None of the funds available under this [bill] may be used to prepare reports on contacts between employees of the Department of the Interior and Members and Committees of Congress and their staff."

This means that department employees will be forbidden by Congress from telling their boss, the secretary of the interior, who on Capitol Hill is calling them, how often, and for what reasons. The section makes it illegal for staffers to communicate—either orally or in writing—such information to the secretary. Such Orwellian tactics might make Mikhail Gorbachev shudder, but they are becoming business as usual in a Washington increasingly divided by a constitutional power struggle between the executive and legislative branches of government.

Riders to appropriations bills are one of Congress's preferred vehicles for micromanaging the executive branch. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher, for example, recently complained that Congress was forcing him to spend money on pork-barrel projects ineligible for funding under established federal guidelines. Five public-works projects proposed for the Economic Development Administration totaling $11.4 million were rejected this year by Mr. Mosbacher as being legally ineligible under EDA guidelines. Mr. Mosbacher was overridden, however, by congressmen seeking the projects for their home states. The secretary was directed in the department's appropriations bill to earmark funding for the five projects, as well as six others that the inspector general of the department determined were "inordinate," "inappropriate" and "flawed with respect to long-existing EDA policies."

Attorney General Richard Thornburgh has experienced similar problems. Earlier this year Mr. Thornburgh sought to merge the FBI regional office in Butte, Mont., into the regional office in Salt Lake City. The FBI had requested the change, confident it could perform its mission while saving $1.9 million by shutting down the Butte office. Montana Sen. Max Baucus, who is facing re-election in 1990, disagreed.

Determined to keep the office open, the Montana Democrat inserted in the Justice Department's supplemental appropriations bill the following clause: "None of the funds provided by this appropriation bill shall be available to relocate, reorganize, or consolidate any office, agency, function, facility, station, activity or other entity falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice." Rep. Neal Smith (D., Iowa), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Justice Department, clearly expressed the congressional intent behind the appropriations bill rider. In a June 13 Scripps Howard news service story, he remarked: "Legally, they [Justice] can do it once. But the next year they'll have no flexibility at all on closing. We'll write it into the law that they can't change anything."

The congressional micromanagement story also can be told in numbers. Example: A Sept. 27, 1988, study by the Congressional Research Service found that 74 House and Senate committees and subcommittees exercise jurisdiction over the Office of National Drug Control Policy. (Ironically, that number does not include the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.) Such mind-numbing oversight means that virtually every member of Congress sits on a committee with jurisdiction over the federal drug office, enabling hundreds to assert to constituents that they personally are overseeing the federal drug effort.

The Defense Department is another victim of oversight overkill. In a report submitted June 12 to the president, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, himself a former congressman, decried congressional micromanagement of the Defense Department.

During the HUD scandal years, 84 congressional committees and subcommittees had jurisdiction over HUD. Obviously, the oversight was ineffective.

Mr. Cheney reported that 107 congressional committees and subcommittees oversee his department. But that's not all. Every working day, the Defense Department receives an estimated 450 written inquiries and more than 2,500 telephone inquiries from Capitol Hill. Each day, according to the report, the department is required to submit to Congress nearly three separate written reports—each averaging more than 1,000 man-hours and costing about $50,000 to prepare. Senior Defense Department officials, meanwhile, spend 40 hours preparing for the average 14 hours of congressional testimony they provide each day that Congress is in session. None of this "oversight," however, prevented such wasteful spending as the massive Defense Department procurement fraud uncovered in 1988 by the FBI.

In the wake of the mismanagement of millions of dollars at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, many members of Congress are calling for increased oversight of HUD. Yet Congress is and has been exercising considerable jurisdiction over the department. During the HUD scandal years, 84 congressional committees and subcommittees had jurisdiction over HUD. Obviously, the oversight was ineffective.

The measure of proper and effective congressional oversight, therefore, is not the quantity of oversight but the quality of it. And improving the quality requires addressing this question: Is congressional oversight being used to improve federal programs and spend federal tax dollars wisely, or is it being used to strong-arm executive branch agencies into delivering political benefits to re-election-minded congressmen?

What is missing from the congressional hearings on the HUD scandal, for example, are details about the role congressmen played as lobbyists encouraging the mismanagement of funds. How often did congressmen call or write HUD officials pressing them to grant housing contracts to their own friends and supporters? As the Washington Post, the New York Times, and others have reported, several congressmen—even some who have expressed outrage over the scandal—worked hand-in-hand with professional influence peddlers to direct HUD contracts to campaign contributors and influential constituents. Yet, there is no official record of this congressional lobbying.

'Sunshine Laws'

Perhaps this explains why Congress would want to prevent Interior Department employees from reporting contacts with congressional offices. A record of contacts, after all, would help to expose congressional "politicking" masquerading as oversight. It would define the difference between effective oversight and politically motivated arm-twisting, and it would identify those members of Congress who use the oversight process simply to feather their own political nests. Congress in the 1970s passed "sunshine laws" to open the government process to public scrutiny. Now Congress, it seems, is closing the windows, pulling the shades, and barring the door, lest the public see the light.

Sometime, somewhere, the president needs to draw the line. A constitutional challenge to congressional micromanagement is in order, and Section 117 of the fiscal 1990 Interior Department Appropriations bill is an appropriate place to make a stand. It is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers, motivated by Congress's desire to evade public accountability. President Bush should say "let the sun shine in."

Mr. Liedl is director of the U.S. Congress Assessment Project at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. A related editorial appears today.

BALTIMORE SUN Feb. 16, 1990 Pg. 15

The Army Goes to War with the Marines

By Jeffrey Record

Washington.

THE PRESENT bureaucratic guerrilla war being waged by the Army and Marine Corps against one another over which of the two is more relevant to counter future challenges to American security — and therefore which should be favored in the present era of U.S. military retrenchment — is not a new phenomenon.

Not since the late 1940s have the U.S. armed services faced so bleak a future. Now, as then, a combination of sharply declining defense expenditure and an absence of a clear and immediate Soviet military danger to American security interests abroad has prompted calls for a far smaller military establishment than was created in World War II or subsequently re-established in the wake of the Korean War.

Periods of defense budgetary austerity, especially when accompanied by an apparent retreat of external threats, have inevitably excited a mad scramble among the services for scarce dollars as well as for new missions to replace questionable or discredited old ones. In such times, real or perceived inter-service duplication of missions and force become prime targets of congressional and other budgetary ax men.

During the military demobilization of the late 1940s the need for two separate, large ground forces — the Army and the Marine Corps — was challenged not only by the usual liberal congressional suspects but also by President Harry Truman and such uniformed icons as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower.

The argument against a large Marine Corps, though somewhat premature and fueled by service prejudice, was not altogether unsound. It was claimed that large-scale, Iwo Jima-style amphibious operations were an anachronism; and that there was no reason why the Army, which after all had undertaken all of the great amphibious landings in the European theater during World War II, could not perform the mission as well as the Marine Corps. Truman, Bradley and Eisenhower would have returned the Corps to its pre-war status as a small organization of ships' police and shore parties.

It was then, however, that the Korean War intervened. MacArthur's spectacular 1950 amphibious descent on Inchon seemingly reaffirmed the wisdom of continued preparedness for amphibious warfare.

Effective Marine Corps lobbying of a sympathetic Congress, still the Corps' most powerful political constituency, succeeded in establishing the Corps as we know it today: a large force, with its own aviation, empowered by statute with exclusive responsibility for amphibious missions and of "such other duties as the President may direct" — a catch-all that has encouraged the effective employment of Marines in a host of non-amphibious contingencies.

No nation in history has maintained so large a "naval infantry" either in absolute terms or in relation to the size of its regular army. Today's Marine Corps nonetheless has reasons to worry about it future. Unlike the Army, whose institutional existence has never been questioned, the Corps remembers what almost happened to it 40 years ago. Moreover, Marines have not been called upon to mount a significant amphibious assault since Inchon.

As long ago as 1975 then Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger questioned the "need for an amphibious assault force which has not seen anything more demanding than essentially unopposed landings for over 20 years." And in 1986 Richard Halloran, the respected military correspondent of the *New York Times* proposed abolishing the Corps and transferring its functions to the Army.

If the Marine Corps is uneasy about its future, so too is the Army, although not for the same reasons. No other service has staked its size and much of its force structure on countering the reducing Soviet military threat to Europe. And the Army, more than the other services, is more dependent on the other services to get to the battlefield and to prevail there once it arrives.

The Marines are the least NATO-oriented of the services; indeed, their traditional forte has been intervention in logistically remote Third World regions — precisely those contingencies that are drawing the increasing attention of every service in the unfolding post-Cold War era. Moreover, the Marines have their own air force and, in the form of specially configured warships supplied courtesy of the Navy, their own means of strategic mobility. In contrast, the Army must apply to the Air Force or Navy for transport overseas, and again to the Air Force for close air support on the battlefield.

Additionally, by virtue of its ability to operate from the sea and its powerful forcible entry (amphibious assault) capabilities, the Marine Corps can operate in areas of the world that are denied to the Army, which, notwithstanding its capacity for airborne assault (a very risky instrument of warfare requiring a host of rarely fulfilled operational and tactical preconditions), is for the most part dependent on the political goodwill of other countries to get ashore and stay there. (The invasion of Panama was largely an Army show, but most of its success rested on a substantial preinvasion U.S. ground force presence.)

On the other hand, the Marine Corps' predominantly expeditionary character has been achieved at considerable cost in firepower, logistical stamina, and capacity to sustain major combat questions more than 50-100 miles beyond the beach. Moreover, airlifted Army forces for the most part can arrive on disputed ground (assuming, of course, the availability of requisite overflight rights and friendly terminal airfields) well ahead of seaborne Marines.

RECORD...Pg. 16

Jeffrey Record, a senior research fellow at the Hudson Institute, comments on military affairs for The Sun.

NEW YORK TIMES Feb. 16, 1990 Pg. 35

Mr. Bush's Geography Lesson

By Richard H. Ullman

PRINCETON, N.J.

At a moment when the post-war political framework is shifting, labels do not afford much help. George Bush was right to duck the question at his Monday press conference, "Who's the enemy?"

While the political landscape may be moving, the geographical landscape is not. That is why President Bush was right to insist that the U.S. retain 30,000 more troops in Western Europe than the Soviets keep in Eastern Europe.

Moscow's acquiescence on this point is welcome. But not because it confirms that our troops are invited guests, while theirs are occupiers, but because geography is against us. The President put it succinctly: "We've got a big ocean between us and Western Europe."

By accepting the U.S. proposal, the Soviet Union gave up the right to station forces in Bulgaria and Romania. But Moscow has had no troops in either country for years, nor any reason for wanting them there; militarily, the countries are a path to nowhere. Soviet forces, instead, have been stationed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, along the invasion route to the West.

Those forces are to be cut to 195,000 troops from 560,000. The U.S. will reduce the 250,000 troops it now has on the other side of the line dividing the so-called central zone — in West Germany and Benelux — to the same number. The 30,000 "extra" Americans will be in Italy, Greece, Turkey and (more than half of them) Britain.

If ever the day came when American forces had to surge back to Europe, these troops would help make a return possible. The Soviets would need no similar assistance, as their forces would return by road and rail, not by aircraft and ships.

Scenarios of this sort are admittedly far-fetched. It is extraordinarily unlikely that the reformed Soviet state and the West will have interests that conflict so much as to lead to war. Within a few years, indeed, there may well be far fewer than 195,000 American or Soviet troops stationed astride the old fault lines.

Meanwhile, the task of statesmanship is twofold. First is to make it easy for Soviet forces to depart from Eastern Europe, where the memory of their intimidating presence is all too real. Second is to insure that the U.S. will continue to be able to honor its commitment to Europe's security.

Citing moral grounds rather than the neutral facts of geography to justify the extra 30,000 Americans only confuses the issue. It also makes it more difficult for the Soviet military establishment — and no doubt many citizens as well — to swallow the profound changes that Mikhail Gorbachev's policies have set in motion. □

Richard H. Ullman is professor of international affairs at Princeton University.

WASHINGTON POST Feb. 16, 1990 Pg. 1

Bush, Latins Vow To Press Anti-Drug Fight

Communique Acknowledges Needs of South Americans

By Eugene Robinson and David Hoffman
Washington Post Foreign Service

CARTAGENA, Colombia, Feb. 15—President Bush and the leaders of the world's three leading cocaine-producing nations agreed today on a plan for fighting drug trafficking that put new emphasis on economic assistance but skirted controversial issues such as the extradition of suspects and increased U.S. military involvement.

In a one-day "drug summit" held amid tight security in this resort city on the Caribbean coast, Presidents Bush, Virgilio Barco of Colombia, Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia and Alan Garcia of Peru agreed on a strategy committing their countries to a long-term anti-drug approach that recognizes the economic aspects of the problem.

The four leaders billed the meeting as a major step forward in seeking a multilateral solution to the problem, as well as an advance toward mending hemispheric relations, which were strained by the U.S. invasion of Panama last December.

Speaking to reporters this evening as he prepared to leave the nearby coastal city of Barranquilla for Washington, Bush said that he and the other leaders had created an "anti-drug cartel" at the meeting, which he described as "ice-breaking."

Bush said the dicussions were held in "total candor" and were "very frank," with the other leaders making demands of him. He said he detailed for them the U.S. anti-drug strategy.

Garcia, a freqent vocal critic of Bush administration policy toward Latin America, said the meeting marks a change by the Bush administration to an "economic and social" approach to fighting drugs in the source countries and to solving the hemisphere's problems through multilateral initiatives. Paz Zamora said the summit signaled "a kind of perestroika" in U.S. policy.

A 12-page joint declaration issued after the summit acknowledged that "profits from coca production and trade and from illicit drug trafficking contribute, in varying degrees, to the generation of employment and income."

Colombia produces around 75 percent of the world's cocaine, and Peru and Bolivia grow virtually all of the coca, the plant from which cocaine is processed. The Andean governments have said in the past that the drug trade generates a total of up to $4 billion annually for the three economies.

The United States pledged in the declaration to "provide balance of payments support to help meet foreign exchange needs" of the three governments, which depend heavily on the dollars that the cocaine trade earns. Bush also pledged to "consider funding for emergency social programs" that might be needed.

The immediate social needs are greatest in Peru and Bolivia, where coca-growing peasants have no other source of income. The Colombian government has been more concerned with having the United States support its legitimate exports, like coffee and cut flowers, more actively, and in the declaration Bush pledged to facilitate "access to the United States market."

But it is unclear just how extensive any new U.S. aid will be. The joint declaration does not set any dollar figures or create any specific new aid programs. Bush agreed that the United States will work harder to crack down on money laundering and to control exports of weapons and the chemicals used to process cocaine.

The four countries agreed to step up their police efforts to interdict drug traffic, but again there were few specifics. U.S. officials have expressed a desire to use naval forces in the Caribbean to intercept Colombian drug shipments, for example, but there was no mention of this effort in the communique. Barco said in a press conference after the summit that Colombia will patrol its own waters without U.S. assistance.

The communique did not mention the extradition of drug suspects to face trial in the United States—a major issue in Colombia, where drug traffickers essentially have offered to put an end to their violence against society in exchange for assurances that they will not be extradited.

U.S. negotiators had hoped to secure a flat commitment from the three Andean nations to use their military forces, not just the police, in the drug fight, which would open the door to increased U.S. direction of the South American anti-drug campaigns through military assistance programs. But the communique only states that the Andean nations "may" use their military forces against drugs. Particularly in Peru, the army has resisted involvement in the anti-drug fight.

The United States has long sought to wipe out cocaine at its source by eradicating the cocaine fields in Peru and Bolivia. The communique is hazy on the issue, saying eradication "can play an essential part" but putting the emphasis on voluntary programs.

Afterwards, the South American leaders said they were pleased at the new economic and social focus.

"For the first time we have recognized that drug trafficking is an economic issue and that to fight it we must be compensated for the . . . disruptions our economies suffer," Garcia said. "We are committed to fight on the economic plane as well as the police level."

Bush said "we did not go into" the cost of replacing the lucrative coca crops. He reiterated his earlier statements that coca growing is "immoral and wrong," but he did not offer specific remedies. Bush said he learned from the other leaders that their economies "are hurting." He also said that Washington does not envision a job-for-job replacement of the coca growing business, although he promised to make "every effort" to ease the economic troubles of the Latin nations.

The president said he did not raise the controversial idea of using a U.S. aircraft carrier to establish a radar screen along Colombia's coast to track planes involved in drug trafficking. The proposal was shelved recently when its disclosure provoked an outcry in Colombia. Bush said news reports about the idea were "distorted" and he felt there was "so much misunderstanding" about it that it was "not timely" to raise it today.

"I felt it was better to talk in general terms," he said, promising not to force something on the Colombians.

As expected, the U.S. and Latin leaders met under heavy guard. United States counter-assault teams were on the scene, and Bush was flown to Cartagena in special helicopters that can deter missiles. Hundreds of U.S. military and civillian support workers were based on ships stationed offshore, and contingency plans were made for different scenarios if trouble arose. Apparently out of concerns for his safety, Bush did not deliver an arrival statement, but aides distributed a written version of what he would have said.

Bush did not meet with either of two coca producers who were brought to the talks by Garcia. Officials said the producers were staying at Garcia's hotel but did not actually come to the talks.

WASHINGTON POST
Feb. 16, 1990 Pg. C-2

Lear Siegler received a $103.3 million Air Force contract for support of the Royal Saudi Air Force F-5 aircraft fleet.

RECORD...

from Pg. 15

All of this suggests that the present bureaucratic cat fight between the two services, while predictable, is deplorable. It poorly serves civilian authorities charged with determining the future size and roles of both services. Rather than harping on each other's deficiencies, the two services should be advertising their respective unique contributions to American military power.

If, in fact, the Army and Marine Corps were simply mirror images of one another, with more or less identifiable capabilities, then there would be no case for maintaining more than one land force. But, clearly, they are not. The capabilities and force structure of the Army and Marine Corps are largely complimentary, and their combined deterrent and fighting power exceeds the simple sum of the two services.

Now and for the foreseeable future, the United States will need a sizable Army and Marine Corps.

Prodded by Quayle and Cheney, Bush Becomes Fervent Supporter of Strategic Defense Initiative

By GERALD F. SEIB
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — To many who have watched him over the years, it's an unlikely development: George Bush is positioning himself as a champion of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And for that turn of events, SDI supporters owe particular thanks to Vice President Dan Quayle and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. Mr. Quayle has been the key behind-the-scenes player in the evolution of the Bush administration's surprisingly robust advocacy of SDI, and has helped fuel Mr. Cheney's recent gung-ho support of the program as well.

Dan Quayle

SDI supporters have long been skeptical of Mr. Bush. They strongly suspect he is only lukewarm in his support of the space-based missile defense program, and maintain he wavered in his defense of it in his presidential campaign.

But now Mr. Bush wants an increase of roughly $1 billion, or some 25%, in SDI funding—at a time when the perception of a Soviet threat is fading fast and other Pentagon programs are being cut back. He made a well-publicized visit to the nation's top SDI lab. And he delivered a major defense speech in which he declared that the program is needed more than ever.

Indeed, Mr. Bush's administration has begun talking of beginning deployment of SDI by the late 1990s—a timetable as ambitious as any discussed under President Reagan, who created SDI.

Skeptics still doubt that Mr. Bush really is deeply committed to SDI. They suspect he is mostly posturing, in an effort to ensure that conservatives who champion SDI won't blame him when Congress slices up the program's budget later this year.

"I don't think he's been converted," says Frank Gaffney, head of the Center for Security Policy. "I think what he's trying to do is avoid responsibility for the free-fall the defense budget is going to take in the next few months."

Indeed, congressional Republicans warn the White House that it will take an even more vigorous defense of SDI than Mr. Bush is mounting to prevent the program from being slashed in the attack that will certainly be mounted on Capitol Hill.

Predictably, though, White House aides insist that Mr. Bush genuinely believes his recent assertion that "in the 1990s, strategic defense makes much more sense than ever before." And whatever his true feelings, Mr. Bush has begun making a public case that the end of the Cold War will produce an international environment in which the importance of SDI grows rather than declines.

Mr. Bush maintains that SDI is needed in part because the threat of surprise missile attacks by Third World nations and terrorists is increasing as more nations acquire ballistic missiles. And his aides assert that strategic defense makes more sense as the size of the offensive U.S. nuclear deterrent declines under U.S.-Soviet arms deals.

That public posture has emerged from a series of private twists and turns that have fostered Mr. Bush's current thinking on SDI, officials say. The evolution began, they say, with a National Security Council meeting back when Mr. Bush was vice president. The process was pushed along by Mr. Quayle's persistent lobbying for the latest SDI concept, and it was galvanized by a little-noticed September trip by Mr. Cheney to the laboratory conducting the most important SDI research.

Dick Cheney

Privately, Mr. Bush's advisers acknowledge that he never fully embraced Mr. Reagan's original, costly concept of SDI as an impenetrable "Astrodome" shield in which a combination of space-based sensors and lasers would insulate the U.S. from even an all-out Soviet nuclear assault.

But Mr. Bush began getting more enthused one day in 1988, when physicist Edward Teller walked into an NSC meeting carrying a model illustrating a new approach called "Brilliant Pebbles." Brilliant Pebbles is a cheaper SDI plan in which thousands of small rockets built with existing technology would constantly orbit the earth.

Upon detection of an enemy attack, they would be dispatched to crash into incoming missiles. (As technology advances allow the rockets to be shrunk in size, scientists recently have begun referring to the concept as "Smart Bullets" rather than Brilliant Pebbles.) Advocates assert that Brilliant Pebbles would cut the cost of SDI to $55 billion from $69 billion.

Brilliant Pebbles began turning SDI into a program Mr. Bush could more fully support, aides say. That inclination was reinforced when Mr. Bush picked Mr. Quayle, an unabashed SDI and Brilliant Pebbles backer, to be his vice president.

Mr. Quayle lobbied hard to insert a statement supporting SDI into Mr. Bush's first address to Congress a year ago this month, administration aides say. Because he had long warned of the danger of ballistic missile proliferation, Mr. Quayle also helped introduce the argument that SDI would be needed to guard against attacks from the Third World as well as from the Soviets.

Then, after Mr. Cheney became defense secretary, the vice president began what officials describe as a persistent personal campaign to increase the new defense chief's enthusiasm for SDI. Mr. Cheney always was an SDI advocate. But administration officials say his advocacy for the program turned up a notch when, partly as a result of the peppering he was receiving from Mr. Quayle, he flew to California Sept. 21 to visit for the first time the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, site of much of the cutting-edge research on SDI technology.

Mr. Cheney seemed to return from the trip with deeper enthusiasm for SDI and the Brilliant Pebbles approach, administration officials say. He began openly lobbying members of Congress to make the same trip, telling lawmakers at one recent hearing that "phenomenal progress" has been made in SDI research.

Still, SDI spending was chopped by Congress in last year's budget deliberations. So last November Mr. Quayle convened a meeting of about 20 sympathetic lawmakers in the vice president's office in the Executive Office Building to develop more effective arguments for SDI spending. As a result, House Republican leader Robert Michel and Republican Whip Newt Gingrich sent the president a letter urging him to mention SDI in his State of the Union address. And the idea of having Mr. Bush himself travel to Livermore began to circulate around the White House.

By December, the administration was still wavering on how much money to request for SDI this year. Mr. Quayle pushed hard internally for robust funding, opposing some officials who argued that such a big request wasn't wise because Congress would never approve it anyway. In the end, the Bush budget called for a big $1 billion SDI spending boost, and the president plugged SDI in his State of the Union speech.

Earlier this month, Mr. Bush himself stood before television cameras at the Livermore Laboratory. "Even as we work to reduce arsenals and reduce tensions, we understand the continuing crucial role of strategic defense," he declared.

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REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE DICK CHENEY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MARCH 16, 1990

I'm grateful for the opportunity to talk about doing things prudently and about realizing your place in the world. There's been quite a bit of talk about both of these ideas the past few months in Washington, as we debate the defense budget.

It reminds me of the story about Arthur Brisbane, the columnist who worked for William Randolph Hearst. Brisbane's work was so popular and so successful that Hearst offered him a six-month vacation with full pay. But Brisbane refused, and Hearst asked why in the world he would turn down such a generous offer.

Brisbane replied, "The first reason is that if I quit writing for six months, it might damage the circulation of your newspaper." He paused and then said, "The second reason is that it might not." Brisbane was being prudent and he knew his place in the world.

I hope in the coming months of the debate over the defense budget that Congress will be prudent and will realize the place of the United States in the world. I hope that President Bush and Congress will be able to work out an agreement on our defense budget this year that provides for our national security. But today I'm not going to talk about the details of that budget.

I want to take a different look at the budget debate this morning because part of that debate is <u>not</u> the usual pulling and hauling between and the Executive and Congress. The more I look at this debate, the more it appears to be a debate -- not about one program or another -- but about what kind of country we want to be.

When serious people propose cutting the defense budget by half over the next ten years -- leaving us, for example, with a mere six aircraft carriers at sea -- they are not talking just about simple budget shifts. What they are suggesting is a radical change in our global status. They would give us the defense budget for a second-class power, the budget of an America in decline.

MORE

In Congress, we face the possibility of radical cuts based on nothing save grand compromises over what parochial interests need to be satisfied. This willy-nilly approach to defense makes tatters of our national strategy. The results would be unavoidable: An America that is a declining superpower. Now there's no question that changes in the world do justify some long-term budgetary savings. But there's a point below which we cannot go if we want to remain a superpower.

I think what drives this notion that we can easily get by with a fundamentally different kind of military structure is the idea that American is already in decline. According to this argument, this slippage from great power status is virtually inevitable owing to a host of forces beyond our control.

We are told that there are external and internal causes for this decline.

Externally, the argument goes, America is losing economic power relative to the rest of the world, especially Japan and Europe. After the Second World War, our global market share was about 50 percent. It's now dropped to just over 20 percent.

With a united Germany just around the corner, an economically unified Europe, an Eastern Europe with its economic engine ready to kick in, a growing market dominance by Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and other Asian nations -- taking into account just these factors -- some think that we've lost the battle for world markets.

This is now a common theme: we are suffering from imperial overstretch like Britain in the early 20th century. Overburdened by defense spending and far flung commitments, we've sapped our national strength. We are on the slippery slope to second-class status and there is really very little we can do about it.

We are told that domestically, we have such an array of diseases that curing them compels us to turn away from the world to concentrate on the decay. They point to the very real problems of drugs, inadequate education, an eroding infrastructure and poverty, and jump to the conclusion that healing our domestic life means turning away from our global responsibilities.

There's also a part of this argument that has to do with our national goals. With the end of the Cold War, we are told, America has now accomplished the one transcendent goal which gave both unity and purpose to an entire generation. Without a communist threat, we are told, America won't be looked to as a protector, and we won't be looked to for our special values, because those values will have become -- or very soon will become -- universal.

Now I'm not suggesting that any one individual would stand behind all these arguments, or that they capture every nuance of this kind of thinking. But it's clear that a general worry exists about our future role in the world and there are many voices--among them my good friend Jeanne Kirkpatrick--that

will tell us America had better get used to being just another power -- not a superpower.

Quite frankly, I think the notion of America's inevitable decline is both wrong and dangerous. No question, we could chose to recede into second-class status. Foolish policy is all around us ready to be picked up. But there is no irresistible force of decline acting outside and independent of our own choices. We can remain an influence in the world with a robust economy and global military reach, or we can withdraw into some self-centered shell; power gone, spirit drained, will sapped.

In fact, this "America in decline" idea has no validity.

Let's look at the so-called external causes of our decline first. So far as our global economic condition is concerned, there's no question we've declined relative to Europe and Japan and some other rapidly growing nations.

But as columnist Charles Krauthammer pointed out recently, the measure of that relative decline is the very abnormal period, just after World War Two, when Europe and Japan were in utter collapse and we were in the midst of a post-war economic boom. After recovery, the world market got back to normal and we've held a steady share of the global market since 1960. Our friends are doing well, and so are we. And are we really a declining economic force in the world? Consider the following:

- Our federal budget -- just our budget -- is about the size of the entire West German economy.

- A lot of people think our economy is smaller than Japan's. Our economy is almost double theirs. Our gross national product is now 40 percent larger than Japan's.

- Many people think we are no longer much of a player in international economics. In fact, we remain the biggest market for foreign goods and we're the biggest investor overseas. In Europe alone, we spent 15 billion dollars buying companies last year.

If this is decline, show me success.

The next part of this story says that over the last forty years we've taken on a crushing defense burden and excessive commitments overseas. The fallacy here is quite clear. As a percent of GNP, defense spending is down from 8 percent in the 1960s, to 5 percent today. Indeed, defense represents just 24 percent of the federal budget today, whereas President Kennedy's defense budget was over 40 percent. And if we follow President Bush's long-term defense plan, we'll find defense spending in 1995 at the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor, both as a percent of GNP, and as a percent of the federal budget.

As far as these "so-called" excessive overseas commitments are concerned, the fact is that the security brought about by our alliances has paid enormous economic and political dividends for us and for the world.

By creating a rock-solid security system in the West and in Asia, we've made possible economic growth and encouraged private enterprise. The peace

we enjoy and the freedom we've fought for, have given individuals the confidence to make the kind of long-term commitment of time, money, and energy to advance science and technology, as well as the arts and education. Business will invest, expand, and take risks if they believe their future is secure. Signs of that confidence are everywhere. Since World War Two, total world trade volume has increased tenfold.

The benefits of such confidence are the direct result of our continued willingness to be involved around the world, to support our allies and to deploy significant military power. That truth isn't lost on our allies. If I've gotten one message from my trips abroad, it's that our friends do not want to see an American military withdrawal.

Our involvement around the world has had other benefits as well. Not alone a sense of our own security, but a sense of genuine global progress -- progress shaped by our own efforts to insure that free peoples, and those seeking freedom, would have hope.

Shortly after the Second World War, we learned that our dream of preserving the peace through a grand international organization would not be realized. We also learned that as important as our alliances were, nothing was as effective for keeping the peace as military force wielded by the United States in the name of freedom, democracy and self-determination.

The second cause of our decline is suppose to be overpowering domestic problems that will force us to look inward. Now I am not in the domestic policy business. I leave those discussions to the President, Jack Kemp and Dick Darman. But it does seem clear to me that there is no problem today so much more complex than those we've confronted in the past that we can't summon the wisdom to meet it.

In any case, I've yet to see real reasons for despair. There's no question, we have serious, in some cases critical, domestic problems. Are they going to force us to abandon our commitments to the world, and drive us to leave the international stage? I don't think so.

We've also got to remember that comparing our problems to those of other countries often distorts what we really aim for in our domestic politics. We have one of the most culturally diverse nations in the world, and yet we seek to educate everyone to a generally common, and high, standard. Given that task, it's not surprising that some of our schools don't always measure up.

There is another point to make here. One of our greatest continuing strengths is the fact that we're still the place to go when you can't go home again. Last year alone, over 600,000 people immigrated to the United States; more in the 1980s than in any other decade since World War One. These people certainly haven't lost confidence in America. They bring with them talent and creativity. They remind us of what it means to be an American. They also remind us what being an American does not mean. It does not mean turning your back on the rest of the world.

The final argument I want to touch on says that because the Cold War is over, we'll lose our overarching purpose. With the decline in the Soviet threat, goes our real purpose for international involvement. To me, this is the strangest argument of all.

The first point is critical: threats to our security have not evaporated, and it is too soon to say that the Soviet Union will never again pose a threat to ourselves or our allies. Simple common sense tells us we should not abandon defense on the weight of one year's good news. The Kremlin retains enormous military power -- last year alone they produced 140 new intercontinental ballistic missiles. We produced 12.

We are encouraged by President Gorbachev's reforms and we support them. But we will not base our security on today's headlines, no matter how hopeful. We have got to look to the future, to a future that can hold -- as we learned in 1989 -- great surprises indeed.

Our critics keep saying that our administration isn't taking advantage of changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and that we are looking at threats of the past not the future. In fact, President Bush is the one that is looking to the future. It was almost a year ago, long before today's critics had discovered Eastern Europe, that the President launched a comprehensive and forward-looking strategy for active American engagement. He's considering not only what's happening today, but what might happen tomorrow. That's strategic planning.

My sincere belief is that far from becoming less of a force in the world, America is going to be taking on greater global responsibilities in years ahead. If the Soviet Union moves toward true democratic reform, and concentrates on internal economic revival, we will certainly face a dramatically different security environment. It's one I look forward to. But it's going to be one in which our influence and engagement are of greater importance than ever. The fact is, the only superpower in decline is the Soviet Union.

No other nation will be capable of our kind of global reach. The idea of a security threat was not invented by the communist party. It will remain long after the party is gone. As a result, the world will still be a dangerous place, a place that will continue to benefit from -- indeed require -- the stabilizing influence of the America military.

We had best be ready for that kind of world. We will certainly be called upon to help our friends and allies, and to protect our own economic and political interests worldwide. If we do not create the forces to meet future threats, that does not mean those threats won't be there. It only means we'll be poorly prepared to meet them. And what that means is we would either shrink from protecting our own interests or we would send out American troops ill-prepared and ill-equipped to do the job. The first option is unwise, the second is morally repugnant.

It is certainly a paradox that during one of the most successful periods in our history, we find an undercurrent of unease and malaise. America has never really been comfortable with great power responsibilities, so in the present climate of change, maybe we should expect traditional hopes of isolationism to surface. In any case, dramatic events force us to reflect on our role in the world and what kind of nation we think we should be.

We often talk about how events in Eastern Europe have changed the political landscape of these nations, and how democratic ideas have made

there way into the deepest reaches of the communist world. But we seldom consider how these events have changed us.

Americans so often take freedom and equality for granted, that we tend to think it's something that's easy to come by and requires no sacrifice. East Germans, Czechoslovakians, Romanians, Hungarians, Poles, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Panamanians -- in 1989 these people taught us the price of freedom.

When Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel spoke to Congress recently they mentioned the influence our founding fathers and Abraham Lincoln had on their struggle against oppression. As I thought back on their speeches, I had the uneasy feeling that in some ways, they understood these men better than we did. They showed us the founders' ideas as if they were brand new. In fact, Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln have been given another life. Not only outside America, but inside as well.

How have events in Eastern Europe changed us? They've reminded us of where our real strength lies. It's not in military or economic power, though these are certainly important. It's not in our cultural reach either, though blue jeans and Michael Jackson fit as well in Moscow as they do in Milwaukee.

Our real strength lies in our ideas. When President Haval spoke to Congress, he mentioned in particular Jefferson and Lincoln. One helped create the union on the principle of liberty and equality, the other helped to keep it together under those principles.

This is a good city to see the symbols of those ideas. If you travel over to the Jefferson Memorial you'll notice that the third President stands in the center of his rotunda looking directly across the Tidal Basin to the south front of the White House; keeping a knowing eye on the current occupant. Surrounding Jefferson are the words he spoke and wrote, the words that have guided us and so many other people around the world. I would think that if President Havel or Lech Walesa had the chance to visit this monument, one sentence among the many others might catch their eye. "Nothing is so clearly written in the book of fate," said Jefferson, " than that these people shall be free."

Thank you all very much.

-END-

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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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This is my first appearance before the National Press Club as Secretary of Defense. It comes one year and five days after I took office. It has been a momentous year.

We are on the verge of a new era in American military history. With democratic ideas finding their way into the farthest reaches of the Communist world, with our most potent adversary facing internal crisis and with the threat of sudden attack on the central front of Europe lower than at any time in some forty years, we're looking at what could well be the end of the cold war.

More to the point, these developments are signs of a victory in the cold war.

Victories are occasions for confidence and pride, and we have a right to both.

But along with pride, we also feel some uncertainty. What President Bush called the "Revolution of 1989" swept away so much that was ugly in our world, that we have good reason to wonder about what might come next. And as the revolution swept away the ugly, it brought us much that is good. "America stands at the center of a widening circle of freedom," the President said. It's a circle we must be sure keeps growing.

I don't think I've made a speech since taking this job a year ago without recognizing these changes and discussing in detail exactly what the implications are for our military. And yet, some of my former colleagues in Congress can't give a speech without claiming that our defense budget hasn't been responsive to dramatic events in the Kremlin and Eastern Europe.

Some of my friends on Capitol Hill work overtime, crafting ever cuter nuggets to drive home their claim that the Administration is too slow to react to global change. Since "reacting to change" translates for some in Congress to mean, "cutting the defense budget," let me begin by reminding everyone exactly what we have already cut.

- Since I became Secretary, I've cut 231 billion dollars out of the five year defense plan.
- For 1990 and 91 alone, I've recommended that we terminate 20 weapons programs.
- We're in the process of closing 86 military bases and we are looking at closing another 47 including overseas bases.
- We've cut 60,000 military personnel.
- If we follow the President's five year defense plan -- the plan some in Congress say doesn't cut fast enough--defense spending, as a share of GNP and the federal budget, will fall to the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor.

Does Congress really believe it's safe to move below that level?

The fact is, we've heard a lot of bold talk about cutting the overall defense budget. But every time I actually try to cut something, I have a fight on my hands.

Some of the members who are the biggest advocates of deep cuts yell the loudest when it comes time to cut something in their districts.

For example, we want to take account of the changing threat in Eastern Europe by ending our production of the weapons system most appropriate for that theater -- our main battle tank.

We already have 7900 ABRAMS tanks -- we are reducing the number of divisions in the Army -- we are getting ready to withdraw some forces from Europe -- We don't need any more ABRAMS tanks. But doing that might cost jobs in a Congressman's district or a Senator's state. So the result is a major roadblock as we try to restructure our forces for the future.

My friend, Les Aspin, is the most critical this year, claiming we are not moving fast enough on our cuts. But if you look at performance -- if you look at real cuts -- his committee has the worst track record in terms of actually supporting Administration reductions. Last year, the committee tried to put back in the budget everything I cut out.

In fairness to Les, he supported my efforts to cancel or terminate programs. But unfortunately, the majority of his committee did not support him.

What Congress gives me is complaints instead of solutions; politics instead of strategy.

If our critics would actually look at what we are doing in the Department to restructure our forces for the future, they would see a complete rethinking of missions and strategy.

We have major program reviews under way for the Advanced Tactical Fighter, Advanced Tactical Aircraft, the C-17 transport, the B-2 bomber. We're also looking at the experimental light helicopter and SDI. These studies will all be finished within the next few weeks.

In our long-term program reviews, we are doing a thorough going analysis of each service's budget, force structure, and procurement plans.

In general, we are reevaluating our force structure and long-term national requirements. Two day ago the President forwarded to the Congress his National Security Strategy Report. Two weeks ago Congress received the Joint Military Net Assessement. Both reports -- one public and one top secret -- spell out in some detail the Administration's views with respect to the future and our military requirements.

Now for a moment let's look at those requirements. For the sake of argument, let's grant the optimists all of their assumptions. Let me sketch out a scenario for the future -- in which things continue to go well, and then contemplate what the enduring elements of our military will be.

For the purposes of this discussion set aside doubts about the future of Mr. Gorbachev and his reform efforts inside the Soviet Union. Don't concern yourself with questions about instability in Eastern Europe, or nationality conflicts, or economic collapse, or leadership changes.

Rather, let's assume the following, as we think about what the requirements will be for military forces and commitments for the rest of the decade.

- Assume that Mr. Gorbachev is still in power;
- That his domestic policies have been at least partially successful;
- That his foreign policy remains far less hostile to the West than were those of his predecessors;
- That the U.S. and the Soviets have implemented successful arms control agreements affecting conventional and strategic forces -- and that we're negotiating further agreements;
- That all Soviet forces have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and that the Warsaw Pact is nothing more than a relic of history;
- And that Eastern Europe is governed by democratically elected, non-communist regimes.

Now, I would call that a rosy scenario.

Furthermore, those assumptions are precisely the ones we've used in designing our budget from now through 1995.

I have directed the military services to plan for the mid-90's on exactly these assumptions.

The question we've put to ourselves is: what if the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat continues to erode? What kind of continuing requirements would exist for U.S. military power, if we assume a vast reduction in the threat which has dictated our national strategy for the past 40 years?

I believe there are six requirements that must be the foundation of national defense, for now and for five years from now.

The first point that must be understood is that even under an optimistic scenario, a self-absorbed, changing Soviet Union is going to maintain its strategic nuclear arsenal.

If the Kremlin were to abandon its strategic nuclear forces, it would let go of the last real vestige of its global power. The Soviets may reshape this force to fit a START agreement. But they will probably continue their modernization -- a modernization which is now moving at a remarkable pace for a nation in the midst of an economic crisis.

Furthermore, we're going to have to be prepared for the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, and the means to deliver them.

The idea of a strategic offensive triad with weapons on land, sea, and in the air -- must expand, to include the concept of a well balanced mixture of offensive and defensive deterrence. Based on our advantages in high technology, this new force will help us deter war by raising the uncertainty of a first strike, and will protect people -- elements we'll need to avoid nuclear blackmail.

Second, we are going to want strong alliances and the coalition defense they give us.

At the core of our national strategy, and at the core of our success over the last 40 years, are the alliance relationships in Europe and Asia.

In the future, those alliances may well play different roles. The responsibilities of the partners will probably shift. But what should not change is our fundamental commitment to coalition unity and strength. This is the message I took to Asia last month -- a message that has been echoed by every one of our allies.

Our allies recognize -- and believe strongly -- that our military presence serves a variety of ends. It dampens traditional regional tensions. And it creates a general air of security, in which economies grow and democracy has the chance to thrive.

We must recognize that regional security is not always connected to the level of the Soviet threat. As that threat recedes, regional calm and global economic progress will still depend on our willingness to be trusted allies.

Of course, if our commitment were backed up only by words, it would be hollow. So the third enduring element is forward deployment.

The difference between words of support and actions of conviction, is that we're willing to put U.S. troops on the ground. The message, to friends and enemies alike, is that Americans are willing to risk their lives to insure the security of our friends and allies. Nothing can substitute for the stability and deterrence provided by forward deployment.

It is certainly true that we will be adjusting the levels of our deployments, especially in Europe after a CFE agreement. And we've initiated discussions with Japan and Korea that will result in a 10 percent reductions in U.S. forces in Asia over the next three years.

If we manage that transition well, and take advantage of our superior technology and the increasing strength of our allies, those deployments will be just as effective as they are today.

Fourth, no matter how politics among nations might change, geography will not. We are the leading maritime power in the world and we'll need to control the seas, regardless of what happens in Moscow.

As circumstances change, we will adjust the kinds of Naval forces we need. We are now looking at a smaller Navy than we were in the early 1980s.

As our economy becomes even more interwoven with those of our trading partners overseas, it's going to become more important that we maintain maritime superiority.

The fifth enduring military requirement is one we have been called upon to use recently. It's the capability to project power quickly and effectively. If we are going to defend our interests and protect American lives, we must have the military capability to use force in ways appropriate to the level of combat.

Overwhelming nuclear superiority was of little use on the streets of Panama. We needed a well trained, highly professional, properly equipped fighting force.

We had the forces when we needed them. Our troops performed extraordinarily well, and we are going to maintain that capability, and even enhance it.

But the ability to project power is not just a question of combat. Instead of using force, the goal is to prevent the escalation of low-intensity conflicts, using security assistance and the peacetime engagement of our military -- in training, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other contributions.

The sixth and final enduring element I want to discuss today is the foundation of all the rest. As we begin the fundamental restructuring of our forces, we are going to rely, as never before, on our ability to generate the best high technology weapons in the world. We can do that only if we pay greater attention to our eroding industrial base.

If we lose our capacity to produce first class, high quality weapons, we will not just have a smaller force come 1995, we'll have a dangerously weaker one, too.

The Soviets' inability to compete with our advanced technology is one of the primary reasons they've chosen to try to repair their abysmal economy. If we do not maintain that lead, we will have taken away a major reason for Gorbachev's reforms.

We must not, by our own foolish actions, grant a military advantage to the Soviets that they seem to have wisely concluded is unattainable by their own efforts.

So, the military requirements we must maintain, no matter what the future holds, are:

- Offensive and defensive nuclear forces;
- alliances;
- forward deployed forces;
- maritime superiority;
- flexible contingency forces and a
- strong industrial base.

Central to each of these requirements is our quality military force. Each time I get the chance to visit with our troops -- as I've done in Europe, Asia, Panama and at home -- I become more convinced that the quality of our people in uniform is the basis for our success. They are the ones who put their lives on the line, and the American people expect that we will take care of them.

The quality of our personnel isn't something that just happens. It's the result of years of effort making certain they are paid what they deserve, ensuring their families are taken care of, and guaranteeing that if they must fight, they have the equipment and training to do the job. All of this costs money. It is worth every penny.

As we reduce defense spending and build down our forces, we must do so with a strategy and with common sense as our guide.

The slogan, "bring the boys home," is one of our most unenlightened sentiments, and probably one of our most dangerous.

We should not engage in the kind of radical reductions that followed World War Two, Korea, and Vietnam. Each reduction left us weaker. Each reduction had to be reversed at great cost. We are now on a prudent path to lower defense spending, one guided by a strategy and an understanding of our enduring military requirements.

At the end of this period of reductions we want to be able to look back and see that we have preserved -- and even enhanced -- these basic elements of our power.

For all the mistakes we have made in the last forty years or so, our power and influence have been a positive force in the world. Defending democracy, self-determination, and justice -- these are the only reasons why the American people will ever support the exercise of our military power.

President Bush said it best in his State of the Union address: America is more than a nation, it's an idea. Our Army, our Navy, our Air Force our Marines -- give us military power.

Strength is essential. Without strength our purposes will always be hostage to less benign wishes.

But strength alone doesn't define our role in the world. When Lech Walesa spoke to Congress last year, with the voice of liberty he had fought so hard for, military power was not his concern. Instead, he reminded us of our real force in the world. He said: "The people of Poland link the name of the United States with freedom and democracy, with generosity and highmindedness, with human friendship and friendly humanity."

These ideas are part of what it means for us to be a superpower. But the cost of maintaining the ideas that gave hope to Walesa, and Vaclav Havel, and millions of others, will always be more than good words and fine intentions.

In the speech he would never deliver at the Trade Mart in Dallas, President Kennedy captured this idea. Had he lived, the President would have said:

> "Above all, words alone are not enough. The United States is a peaceful nation. And where our strength and determination are clear, our words need merely to convey conviction, not belligerence. If we are strong, our strength will speak for itself. If we are weak, words will be of no help."

Thank you all very much.

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I'm grateful for the opportunity to talk about doing things prudently and about realizing your place in the world. There's been quite a bit of talk about both of these ideas the past few months in Washington, as we debate the defense budget.

It reminds me of the story about Arthur Brisbane, the columnist who worked for William Randolph Hearst. Brisbane's work was so popular and so successful that Hearst offered him a six-month vacation with full pay. But Brisbane refused, and Hearst asked why in the world he would turn down such a generous offer.

Brisbane replied, "The first reason is that if I quit writing for six months, it might damage the circulation of your newspaper." He paused and then said, "The second reason is that it might not." Brisbane was being prudent and he knew his place in the world.

I hope in the coming months of the debate over the defense budget that Congress will be prudent and will realize the place of the United States in the world. I hope that President Bush and Congress will be able to work out an agreement on our defense budget this year that provides for our national security. But today I'm not going to talk about the details of that budget.

I want to take a different look at the budget debate this morning because part of that debate is <u>not</u> the usual pulling and hauling between and the Executive and Congress. The more I look at this debate, the more it appears to be a debate -- not about one program or another -- but about what kind of country we want to be.

When serious people propose cutting the defense budget by half over the next ten years -- leaving us, for example, with a mere six aircraft carriers at sea -- they are not talking just about simple budget shifts. What they are suggesting is a radical change in our global status. They would give us the defense budget for a second-class power, the budget of an America in decline.

MORE

In Congress, we face the possibility of radical cuts based on nothing save grand compromises over what parochial interests need to be satisfied. This willy-nilly approach to defense makes tatters of our national strategy. The results would be unavoidable: An America that is a declining superpower. Now there's no question that changes in the world do justify some long-term budgetary savings. But there's a point below which we cannot go if we want to remain a superpower.

I think what drives this notion that we can easily get by with a fundamentally different kind of military structure is the idea that American is already in decline. According to this argument, this slippage from great power status is virtually inevitable owing to a host of forces beyond our control.

We are told that there are external and internal causes for this decline.

Externally, the argument goes, America is losing economic power relative to the rest of the world, especially Japan and Europe. After the Second World War, our global market share was about 50 percent. It's now dropped to just over 20 percent.

With a united Germany just around the corner, an economically unified Europe, an Eastern Europe with its economic engine ready to kick in, a growing market dominance by Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and other Asian nations -- taking into account just these factors -- some think that we've lost the battle for world markets.

This is now a common theme: we are suffering from imperial overstretch like Britain in the early 20th century. Overburdened by defense spending and far flung commitments, we've sapped our national strength. We are on the slippery slope to second-class status and there is really very little we can do about it.

We are told that domestically, we have such an array of diseases that curing them compels us to turn away from the world to concentrate on the decay. They point to the very real problems of drugs, inadequate education, an eroding infrastructure and poverty, and jump to the conclusion that healing our domestic life means turning away from our global responsibilities.

There's also a part of this argument that has to do with our national goals. With the end of the Cold War, we are told, America has now accomplished the one transcendent goal which gave both unity and purpose to an entire generation. Without a communist threat, we are told, America won't be looked to as a protector, and we won't be looked to for our special values, because those values will have become -- or very soon will become -- universal.

Now I'm not suggesting that any one individual would stand behind all these arguments, or that they capture every nuance of this kind of thinking. But it's clear that a general worry exists about our future role in the world and there are many voices--among them my good friend Jeanne Kirkpatrick--that

will tell us America had better get used to being just another power -- not a superpower.

Quite frankly, I think the notion of America's inevitable decline is both wrong and dangerous. No question, we could chose to recede into second-class status. Foolish policy is all around us ready to be picked up. But there is no irresistible force of decline acting outside and independent of our own choices. We can remain an influence in the world with a robust economy and global military reach, or we can withdraw into some self-centered shell; power gone, spirit drained, will sapped.

In fact, this "America in decline" idea has no validity.

Let's look at the so-called external causes of our decline first. So far as our global economic condition is concerned, there's no question we've declined relative to Europe and Japan and some other rapidly growing nations.

But as columnist Charles Krauthammer pointed out recently, the measure of that relative decline is the very abnormal period, just after World War Two, when Europe and Japan were in utter collapse and we were in the midst of a post-war economic boom. After recovery, the world market got back to normal and we've held a steady share of the global market since 1960. Our friends are doing well, and so are we. And are we really a declining economic force in the world? Consider the following:

- Our federal budget -- just our budget -- is about the size of the entire West German economy.

- A lot of people think our economy is smaller than Japan's. Our economy is almost double theirs. Our gross national product is now 40 percent larger than Japan's.

- Many people think we are no longer much of a player in international economics. In fact, we remain the biggest market for foreign goods and we're the biggest investor overseas. In Europe alone, we spent 15 billion dollars buying companies last year.

If this is decline, show me success.

The next part of this story says that over the last forty years we've taken on a crushing defense burden and excessive commitments overseas. The fallacy here is quite clear. As a percent of GNP, defense spending is down from 8 percent in the 1960s, to 5 percent today. Indeed, defense represents just 24 percent of the federal budget today, whereas President Kennedy's defense budget was over 40 percent. And if we follow President Bush's long-term defense plan, we'll find defense spending in 1995 at the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor, both as a percent of GNP, and as a percent of the federal budget.

As far as these "so-called" excessive overseas commitments are concerned, the fact is that the security brought about by our alliances has paid enormous economic and political dividends for us and for the world.

By creating a rock-solid security system in the West and in Asia, we've made possible economic growth and encouraged private enterprise. The peace

we enjoy and the freedom we've fought for, have given individuals the confidence to make the kind of long-term commitment of time, money, and energy to advance science and technology, as well as the arts and education. Business will invest, expand, and take risks if they believe their future is secure. Signs of that confidence are everywhere. Since World War Two, total world trade volume has increased tenfold.

The benefits of such confidence are the direct result of our continued willingness to be involved around the world, to support our allies and to deploy significant military power. That truth isn't lost on our allies. If I've gotten one message from my trips abroad, it's that our friends do not want to see an American military withdrawal.

Our involvement around the world has had other benefits as well. Not alone a sense of our own security, but a sense of genuine global progress -- progress shaped by our own efforts to insure that free peoples, and those seeking freedom, would have hope.

Shortly after the Second World War, we learned that our dream of preserving the peace through a grand international organization would not be realized. We also learned that as important as our alliances were, nothing was as effective for keeping the peace as military force wielded by the United States in the name of freedom, democracy and self-determination.

The second cause of our decline is suppose to be overpowering domestic problems that will force us to look inward. Now I am not in the domestic policy business. I leave those discussions to the President, Jack Kemp and Dick Darman. But it does seem clear to me that there is no problem today so much more complex than those we've confronted in the past that we can't summon the wisdom to meet it.

In any case, I've yet to see real reasons for despair. There's no question, we have serious, in some cases critical, domestic problems. Are they going to force us to abandon our commitments to the world, and drive us to leave the international stage? I don't think so.

We've also got to remember that comparing our problems to those of other countries often distorts what we really aim for in our domestic politics. We have one of the most culturally diverse nations in the world, and yet we seek to educate everyone to a generally common, and high, standard. Given that task, it's not surprising that some of our schools don't always measure up.

There is another point to make here. One of our greatest continuing strengths is the fact that we're still the place to go when you can't go home again. Last year alone, over 600,000 people immigrated to the United States; more in the 1980s than in any other decade since World War One. These people certainly haven't lost confidence in America. They bring with them talent and creativity. They remind us of what it means to be an American. They also remind us what being an American does not mean. It does not mean turning your back on the rest of the world.

The final argument I want to touch on says that because the Cold War is over, we'll lose our overarching purpose. With the decline in the Soviet threat, goes our real purpose for international involvement. To me, this is the strangest argument of all.

The first point is critical: threats to our security have not evaporated, and it is too soon to say that the Soviet Union will never again pose a threat to ourselves or our allies. Simple common sense tells us we should not abandon defense on the weight of one year's good news. The Kremlin retains enormous military power -- last year alone they produced 140 new intercontinental ballistic missiles. We produced 12.

We are encouraged by President Gorbachev's reforms and we support them. But we will not base our security on today's headlines, no matter how hopeful. We have got to look to the future, to a future that can hold -- as we learned in 1989 -- great surprises indeed.

Our critics keep saying that our administration isn't taking advantage of changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and that we are looking at threats of the past not the future. In fact, President Bush is the one that is looking to the future. It was almost a year ago, long before today's critics had discovered Eastern Europe, that the President launched a comprehensive and forward-looking strategy for active American engagement. He's considering not only what's happening today, but what might happen tomorrow. That's strategic planning.

My sincere belief is that far from becoming less of a force in the world, America is going to be taking on greater global responsibilities in years ahead. If the Soviet Union moves toward true democratic reform, and concentrates on internal economic revival, we will certainly face a dramatically different security environment. It's one I look forward to. But it's going to be one in which our influence and engagement are of greater importance than ever. The fact is, the only superpower in decline is the Soviet Union.

No other nation will be capable of our kind of global reach. The idea of a security threat was not invented by the communist party. It will remain long after the party is gone. As a result, the world will still be a dangerous place, a place that will continue to benefit from -- indeed require -- the stabilizing influence of the America military.

We had best be ready for that kind of world. We will certainly be called upon to help our friends and allies, and to protect our own economic and political interests worldwide. If we do not create the forces to meet future threats, that does not mean those threats won't be there. It only means we'll be poorly prepared to meet them. And what that means is we would either shrink from protecting our own interests or we would send out American troops ill-prepared and ill-equipped to do the job. The first option is unwise, the second is morally repugnant.

It is certainly a paradox that during one of the most successful periods in our history, we find an undercurrent of unease and malaise. America has never really been comfortable with great power responsibilities, so in the present climate of change, maybe we should expect traditional hopes of isolationism to surface. In any case, dramatic events force us to reflect on our role in the world and what kind of nation we think we should be.

We often talk about how events in Eastern Europe have changed the political landscape of these nations, and how democratic ideas have made

there way into the deepest reaches of the communist world. But we seldom consider how these events have changed us.

Americans so often take freedom and equality for granted, that we tend to think it's something that's easy to come by and requires no sacrifice. East Germans, Czechoslovakians, Romanians, Hungarians, Poles, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Panamanians -- in 1989 these people taught us the price of freedom.

When Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel spoke to Congress recently they mentioned the influence our founding fathers and Abraham Lincoln had on their struggle against oppression. As I thought back on their speeches, I had the uneasy feeling that in some ways, they understood these men better than we did. They showed us the founders' ideas as if they were brand new. In fact, Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln have been given another life. Not only outside America, but inside as well.

How have events in Eastern Europe changed us? They've reminded us of where our real strength lies. It's not in military or economic power, though these are certainly important. It's not in our cultural reach either, though blue jeans and Michael Jackson fit as well in Moscow as they do in Milwaukee.

Our real strength lies in our ideas. When President Haval spoke to Congress, he mentioned in particular Jefferson and Lincoln. One helped create the union on the principle of liberty and equality, the other helped to keep it together under those principles.

This is a good city to see the symbols of those ideas. If you travel over to the Jefferson Memorial you'll notice that the third President stands in the center of his rotunda looking directly across the Tidal Basin to the south front of the White House; keeping a knowing eye on the current occupant. Surrounding Jefferson are the words he spoke and wrote, the words that have guided us and so many other people around the world. I would think that if President Havel or Lech Walesa had the chance to visit this monument, one sentence among the many others might catch their eye. "Nothing is so clearly written in the book of fate," said Jefferson, " than that these people shall be free."

Thank you all very much.

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REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE DICK CHENEY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1990

This is my first appearance before the National Press Club as Secretary of Defense. It comes one year and five days after I took office. It has been a momentous year.

We are on the verge of a new era in American military history. With democratic ideas finding their way into the farthest reaches of the Communist world, with our most potent adversary facing internal crisis and with the threat of sudden attack on the central front of Europe lower than at any time in some forty years, we're looking at what could well be the end of the cold war.

More to the point, these developments are signs of a victory in the cold war.

Victories are occasions for confidence and pride, and we have a right to both.

But along with pride, we also feel some uncertainty. What President Bush called the "Revolution of 1989" swept away so much that was ugly in our world, that we have good reason to wonder about what might come next. And as the revolution swept away the ugly, it brought us much that is good. "America stands at the center of a widening circle of freedom," the President said. It's a circle we must be sure keeps growing.

I don't think I've made a speech since taking this job a year ago without recognizing these changes and discussing in detail exactly what the implications are for our military. And yet, some of my former colleagues in Congress can't give a speech without claiming that our defense budget hasn't been responsive to dramatic events in the Kremlin and Eastern Europe.

Some of my friends on Capitol Hill work overtime, crafting ever cuter nuggets to drive home their claim that the Administration is too slow to react to global change. Since "reacting to change" translates for some in Congress to mean, "cutting the defense budget," let me begin by reminding everyone exactly what we have already cut.

- Since I became Secretary, I've cut 231 billion dollars out of the five year defense plan.
- For 1990 and 91 alone, I've recommended that we terminate 20 weapons programs.
- We're in the process of closing 86 military bases and we are looking at closing another 47 including overseas bases.
- We've cut 60,000 military personnel.
- If we follow the President's five year defense plan -- the plan some in Congress say doesn't cut fast enough--defense spending, as a share of GNP and the federal budget, will fall to the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor.

Does Congress really believe it's safe to move below that level?

The fact is, we've heard a lot of bold talk about cutting the overall defense budget. But every time I actually try to cut something, I have a fight on my hands.

Some of the members who are the biggest advocates of deep cuts yell the loudest when it comes time to cut something in their districts.

For example, we want to take account of the changing threat in Eastern Europe by ending our production of the weapons system most appropriate for that theater -- our main battle tank.

We already have 7900 ABRAMS tanks -- we are reducing the number of divisions in the Army -- we are getting ready to withdraw some forces from Europe -- We don't need any more ABRAMS tanks. But doing that might cost jobs in a Congressman's district or a Senator's state. So the result is a major roadblock as we try to restructure our forces for the future.

My friend, Les Aspin, is the most critical this year, claiming we are not moving fast enough on our cuts. But if you look at performance -- if you look at real cuts -- his committee has the worst track record in terms of actually supporting Administration reductions. Last year, the committee tried to put back in the budget everything I cut out.

In fairness to Les, he supported my efforts to cancel or terminate programs. But unfortunately, the majority of his committee did not support him.

What Congress gives me is complaints instead of solutions; politics instead of strategy.

If our critics would actually look at what we are doing in the Department to restructure our forces for the future, they would see a complete rethinking of missions and strategy.

We have major program reviews under way for the Advanced Tactical Fighter, Advanced Tactical Aircraft, the C-17 transport, the B-2 bomber. We're also looking at the experimental light helicopter and SDI. These studies will all be finished within the next few weeks.

In our long-term program reviews, we are doing a thorough going analysis of each service's budget, force structure, and procurement plans.

In general, we are reevaluating our force structure and long-term national requirements. Two day ago the President forwarded to the Congress his National Security Strategy Report. Two weeks ago Congress received the Joint Military Net Assessement. Both reports -- one public and one top secret -- spell out in some detail the Administration's views with respect to the future and our military requirements.

Now for a moment let's look at those requirements. For the sake of argument, let's grant the optimists all of their assumptions. Let me sketch out a scenario for the future -- in which things continue to go well, and then contemplate what the enduring elements of our military will be.

For the purposes of this discussion set aside doubts about the future of Mr. Gorbachev and his reform efforts inside the Soviet Union. Don't concern yourself with questions about instability in Eastern Europe, or nationality conflicts, or economic collapse, or leadership changes.

Rather, let's assume the following, as we think about what the requirements will be for military forces and commitments for the rest of the decade.

- Assume that Mr. Gorbachev is still in power;
- That his domestic policies have been at least partially successful;
- That his foreign policy remains far less hostile to the West than were those of his predecessors;
- That the U.S. and the Soviets have implemented successful arms control agreements affecting conventional and strategic forces -- and that we're negotiating further agreements;
- That all Soviet forces have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and that the Warsaw Pact is nothing more than a relic of history;
- And that Eastern Europe is governed by democratically elected, non-communist regimes.

Now, I would call that a rosy scenario.

Furthermore, those assumptions are precisely the ones we've used in designing our budget from now through 1995.

I have directed the military services to plan for the mid-90's on exactly these assumptions.

The question we've put to ourselves is: what if the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat continues to erode? What kind of continuing requirements would exist for U.S. military power, if we assume a vast reduction in the threat which has dictated our national strategy for the past 40 years?

I believe there are six requirements that must be the foundation of national defense, for now and for five years from now.

The first point that must be understood is that even under an optimistic scenario, a self-absorbed, changing Soviet Union is going to maintain its strategic nuclear arsenal.

If the Kremlin were to abandon its strategic nuclear forces, it would let go of the last real vestige of its global power. The Soviets may reshape this force to fit a START agreement. But they will probably continue their modernization -- a modernization which is now moving at a remarkable pace for a nation in the midst of an economic crisis.

Furthermore, we're going to have to be prepared for the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, and the means to deliver them.

The idea of a strategic offensive triad with weapons on land, sea, and in the air -- must expand, to include the concept of a well balanced mixture of offensive and defensive deterrence. Based on our advantages in high technology, this new force will help us deter war by raising the uncertainty of a first strike, and will protect people -- elements we'll need to avoid nuclear blackmail.

Second, we are going to want strong alliances and the coalition defense they give us.

At the core of our national strategy, and at the core of our success over the last 40 years, are the alliance relationships in Europe and Asia.

In the future, those alliances may well play different roles. The responsibilities of the partners will probably shift. But what should not change is our fundamental commitment to coalition unity and strength. This is the message I took to Asia last month -- a message that has been echoed by every one of our allies.

Our allies recognize -- and believe strongly -- that our military presence serves a variety of ends. It dampens traditional regional tensions. And it creates a general air of security, in which economies grow and democracy has the chance to thrive.

We must recognize that regional security is not always connected to the level of the Soviet threat. As that threat recedes, regional calm and global economic progress will still depend on our willingness to be trusted allies.

Of course, if our commitment were backed up only by words, it would be hollow. So the third enduring element is forward deployment.

The difference between words of support and actions of conviction, is that we're willing to put U.S. troops on the ground. The message, to friends and enemies alike, is that Americans are willing to risk their lives to insure the security of our friends and allies. Nothing can substitute for the stability and deterrence provided by forward deployment.

It is certainly true that we will be adjusting the levels of our deployments, especially in Europe after a CFE agreement. And we've initiated discussions with Japan and Korea that will result in a 10 percent reductions in U.S. forces in Asia over the next three years.

If we manage that transition well, and take advantage of our superior technology and the increasing strength of our allies, those deployments will be just as effective as they are today.

Fourth, no matter how politics among nations might change, geography will not. We are the leading maritime power in the world and we'll need to control the seas, regardless of what happens in Moscow.

As circumstances change, we will adjust the kinds of Naval forces we need. We are now looking at a smaller Navy than we were in the early 1980s.

As our economy becomes even more interwoven with those of our trading partners overseas, it's going to become more important that we maintain maritime superiority.

The fifth enduring military requirement is one we have been called upon to use recently. It's the capability to project power quickly and effectively. If we are going to defend our interests and protect American lives, we must have the military capability to use force in ways appropriate to the level of combat.

Overwhelming nuclear superiority was of little use on the streets of Panama. We needed a well trained, highly professional, properly equipped fighting force.

We had the forces when we needed them. Our troops performed extraordinarily well, and we are going to maintain that capability, and even enhance it.

But the ability to project power is not just a question of combat. Instead of using force, the goal is to prevent the escalation of low-intensity conflicts, using security assistance and the peacetime engagement of our military -- in training, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other contributions.

The sixth and final enduring element I want to discuss today is the foundation of all the rest. As we begin the fundamental restructuring of our forces, we are going to rely, as never before, on our ability to generate the best high technology weapons in the world. We can do that only if we pay greater attention to our eroding industrial base.

If we lose our capacity to produce first class, high quality weapons, we will not just have a smaller force come 1995, we'll have a dangerously weaker one, too.

The Soviets' inability to compete with our advanced technology is one of the primary reasons they've chosen to try to repair their abysmal economy. If we do not maintain that lead, we will have taken away a major reason for Gorbachev's reforms.

We must not, by our own foolish actions, grant a military advantage to the Soviets that they seem to have wisely concluded is unattainable by their own efforts.

So, the military requirements we must maintain, no matter what the future holds, are:

- Offensive and defensive nuclear forces;
- alliances;
- forward deployed forces;
- maritime superiority;
- flexible contingency forces and a
- strong industrial base.

Central to each of these requirements is our quality military force. Each time I get the chance to visit with our troops -- as I've done in Europe, Asia, Panama and at home -- I become more convinced that the quality of our people in uniform is the basis for our success. They are the ones who put their lives on the line, and the American people expect that we will take care of them.

The quality of our personnel isn't something that just happens. It's the result of years of effort making certain they are paid what they deserve, ensuring their families are taken care of, and guaranteeing that if they must fight, they have the equipment and training to do the job. All of this costs money. It is worth every penny.

As we reduce defense spending and build down our forces, we must do so with a strategy and with common sense as our guide.

The slogan, "bring the boys home," is one of our most unenlightened sentiments, and probably one of our most dangerous.

We should not engage in the kind of radical reductions that followed World War Two, Korea, and Vietnam. Each reduction left us weaker. Each reduction had to be reversed at great cost. We are now on a prudent path to lower defense spending, one guided by a strategy and an understanding of our enduring military requirements.

At the end of this period of reductions we want to be able to look back and see that we have preserved -- and even enhanced -- these basic elements of our power.

For all the mistakes we have made in the last forty years or so, our power and influence have been a positive force in the world. Defending democracy, self-determination, and justice -- these are the only reasons why the American people will ever support the exercise of our military power.

President Bush said it best in his State of the Union address: America is more than a nation, it's an idea. Our Army, our Navy, our Air Force our Marines -- give us military power.

Strength is essential. Without strength our purposes will always be hostage to less benign wishes.

But strength alone doesn't define our role in the world. When Lech Walesa spoke to Congress last year, with the voice of liberty he had fought so hard for, military power was not his concern. Instead, he reminded us of our real force in the world. He said: "The people of Poland link the name of the United States with freedom and democracy, with generosity and highmindedness, with human friendship and friendly humanity."

These ideas are part of what it means for us to be a superpower. But the cost of maintaining the ideas that gave hope to Walesa, and Vaclav Havel, and millions of others, will always be more than good words and fine intentions.

In the speech he would never deliver at the Trade Mart in Dallas, President Kennedy captured this idea. Had he lived, the President would have said:

> "Above all, words alone are not enough. The United States is a peaceful nation. And where our strength and determination are clear, our words need merely to convey conviction, not belligerence. If we are strong, our strength will speak for itself. If we are weak, words will be of no help."

Thank you all very much.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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MR. HOLMES: Thank you very much, Senator.

We do have a few questions here. I'd like to begin with one. Senator Mitchell of Maine this morning announced his opposition to your nomination. The Majority Leader's vote carries a great deal of weight. Can your nomination make it in light of it?

SEN. TOWER: I believe that the Majority Leader also said that individual Senators should make up their own minds, or words to that effect. So, I don't believe that he's trying to put the hammer on anyone -- or I would not guess that he is, based on statement that individual Senators should come to their own conclusions.

MR. HOLMES: Senator Hollings this morning said you had made pledges to abstain from alcohol before and broken them. Can we believe the latest one?

SEN. TOWER: I don't what Senator Hollings is referring to. I don't recall any such. But the fact is this is not a pledge, it is an oath that I have taken -- have taken for, to, and before the American people. And I regard such oaths as sacred. And I can assure you I will abide by it. (Applause)

MR. HOLMES: You said Sunday you've never broken a pledge in your life. Does this include wedding vows? (Reaction of general audience disapproval)

SEN. TOWER: As a matter of fact, I have broken wedding vows. I think I am probably not alone in that connection. (Scattered laughter)

MR. HOLMES: Senator, have you considered waiving the privacy provisions of the FBI report so that portions of it could be

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released to the public?

SEN. TOWER: It's not up to me to waive the privacy provisions.

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The privacy provisions, I think, apply essentially to the people who were interviewed, and I don't think it's within the purview of my power to waive anything. I have not seen the FBI report, I don't know what's in it and I can't comment on -- really on -- or express any attitude on what should be done with the report in terms of revealing sections of it or all of it or a redacted version of it. I simply have no way of making a judgment.

MR. HOLMES: As head of the Tower Commission investigating the Iran-contra affair, you gave George Bush a clean bill of health. Some say your nomination is a pay-off for that and that's why he is sticking with you in the face of strong opposition. Your comment?

SEN. TOWER: I think that when you consider the fact that the Commission was made up of three people, Brent Scowcroft and Ed Muskie in addition to myself, that that would be sort of impugning the integrity of Brent Scowcroft and Ed Muskie. I don't know whether the questioner intended to impugn them because I had an equal voice with them on this report. We found nothing to implicate the Vice President. I might add that the joint congressional committee found nothing to implicate the Vice President. I wonder what kind of pay-off they're going to get.

MR. HOLMES: One Washington columnist, Jack Germond, this morning on the Today program said you were not a cuddly or very well-liked member of the Senate when you were there. Do you think that the lack of affection of your former colleagues is playing an inordinate role in your current crisis?

SEN. TOWER: Well, that would only be guesswork on my part. As a matter of fact, I have heard various commentators say that some of my old colleagues had some scores to settle with me and were prepared to settle those scores. I don't believe that's true. I believe it might be true that I'm not universally popular with all of them, but I don't think that would be considered a motivation for their vote for or against me because I have some very good friends that hold me in deep affection and have told me so that are not going to vote for my confirmation. I know of some in the Senate who have said that they have very little affection for me who are going to vote for me. So, I would have to discount that as a factor.

MR. HOLMES: Do you believe, as some apparently do, that the opposition to you is mostly partisan? And please explain what you think the Democrats would gain by opposing your nomination.

SEN. TOWER: I think it remains to be seen whether or not the opposition turns out to be totally partisan.

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JOHN TOWER
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I hope that some of my Democrat friends who've expressed privately to me that they feel I'm highly qualified and that they see nothing that has come to light to date to disqualify me, will vote for me.

But I want to make an additional comment. I think if it turns out that way, that it's a significant development in American politics. I think it raises the question: Is character assassination a legitimate and acceptable means of the exercise of political power? If that question is answered in the affirmative, we have ushered in a new and rather ugly phase in American politics. (Applause.)

MR. HOLMES: Do you believe the Senate's decision then on your confirmation will be essentially a political one -- President Bush versus Senator Nunn?

SEN. TOWER: Again, I think we have to see this thing play out and make our judgments subsequent to the way the debate develops and the outcome of the vote. So I think it's perhaps a little bit early to comment on that.

MR. HOLMES: Senator, what has angered you most about the way your nomination is being considered?

SEN. TOWER: When so many of my colleagues have said that I was publicly qualified -- or publicly said that I was qualified, and some Democrats who voted against me on the Senate indicated that, early on, they had intended to vote for me, and had complimented me on my expertise, my background and experience, and my record of leadership, that I suppose one thing that I think engenders some resentment is the fact that there was no clearly defined standard against which I should be judged. The standard seemed to be developed and seemed to evolve to fit the situation. Now, several Senators have said that the Secretary of State (sic) must adhere to a higher standard than members of the United States Senate. I accept that. I accept that the Secretary of Defense must adhere to a higher standard than members of the United States Senate. But my question is, how much lower an acceptable standard is there for members of the Senate? (Scattered laughter.) Is it an acceptable standard for senators late in the evening who've had a few drinks in the hideaways

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and offices of the Capitol, a few steps away from the Senate chamber, to come onto the floor late in the evening and vote on vital issues of nuclear deterrence? Is it an acceptable standard for senators to accept honoraria, PAC contributions, and paid vacations from special interests who have a vested interest in the legislative process? I think, in the course of formulating a standard for the Secretary of Defense or indeed for any other Cabinet officer, that it is time that the Congress articulated what its own standards are. (Applause.)

MR. HOLMES: Would it be advantageous to your nomination for the Senate to delay its vote?

SEN. TOWER: Well, that's a judgment that I can't make. There are some who say that an early vote might be to my advantage, others that say that if it plays out for a little while longer maybe the situation would change. I can't make that assessment now. I am not a prophet. And I've found that sometimes prophesying is a dangerous business, so I will not engage in it now.

MR. HOLMES: Senator, you've taken a beating in the press. Embarrassing stories have been written about your personal life. What are your feelings about this?

SEN. TOWER: Well, I can't say -- well, I guess I should say I feel a little bit like the fellow that was -- had been immersed in tar and feathers and was being ridden out of town on a rail. And, he said, "Really, gentlemen, if it weren't for the honor, I'd rather hitchhike." (Laughter.) Obviously, it has not been comfortable.

I think that there has been too much of an eagerness on the part of some aspects of the media to rush into print or on the airwaves with unsustained allegations. And, there's an old saying, of course, that the answer never catches up with the charge. The charge might be a four-column head above the fold on the front page, and the answer, when it comes, refuting the charge or rebutting it or disproving it might come back on page 23, somewhere in the patent medicine ads. So, it's not a comfortable situation. And, I think my own impression is that I wish there could be more balance.

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If I had to look at any single medium and say that that's an example of balance, I would have to recant some earlier things that I have said about that organization and say that I think that really the standard for balance and fairness has been exhibited by the Washington Post.

MR. HOLMES: Under what set of circumstances would you withdraw your name for consideration by the Senate?

SEN. TOWER: William Barret Travis, who was the commandant of the Alamo -- (laughter) -- incidentally, tomorrow is Texas Independence Day -- (laughter) -- and I will be glad to read Travis' last letter from the Alamo to anyone who would like to assemble with me tomorrow and listen to it. But Travis, in that last letter from the Alamo, said, "I shall never surrender or retreat." (Applause.)

Wait a minute. I'm -- (laughter) -- I'm a little sorry I brought up the Alamo analogy because -- (laughter) -- because it just occurred to me what happened at the Alamo -- (laughter) -- just 10 days after Travis wrote that letter. (Laughter.) But the ultimate outcome was a happy one, because Sam Houston was able to withdraw his army to the side to sort of there pounce upon the superior army of Santa Ana and defeat it in one of the great decisive battles of the world. (Laughter, applause.)

MR. HOLMES: If and when confirmed, how long will it be before the Department of Defense is staffed and program decisions made? One, two, three months?

SEN. TOWER: Program decisions are already being made. Many of those have to await the outcome of the strategic review. Already people are being recruited to staff the Department. I'm not at liberty to announce some of those who have tentatively been selected, because that is the President's prerogative. But the President has given me, as he has other Cabinet appointees, the power to do my own recruiting, to carefully screen and vet the people that are suggested for positions in the Defense Department. The ultimate sign-off, of course, is the President himself.

But I believe that we are in the process of assembling a very good team, and I think that within three months time, depending on the outcome of the confirmation process, and of course a number of these appointments would've been stacked up -- the FBI has been too busy investigating me over the past three months to turn their attention to a lot of other people. But in fact, if the confirmation process can be expedited, I would say within two months, we'll have a full team on board, and even earlier than that, we will have made substantial progress on our principal projects

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at the moment, and that is the management review and the strategic review.

MR. HOLMES: There has been some confusion on your stand toward the Strategic Defense Initiative. To what extent do you support an aggressive program to demonstrate and develop space-based weapons for a first phase of SDI?

SEN. TOWER: I would not like to try to prescribe the precise direction we will take in SDI and the character of what our earliest deployment would be. That is a policy decision that will be made through the collective decisionmaking process. I am, of course, a major participant in that process. But ultimately, that determination will have to be made. I do know that the President is dedicated to continuing the Strategic Defense Initiative, and he has embraced the idea of a deployment as early as is feasible. My belief is that SDI is an extremely important, indeed, essential part of our strategic modernization program. And, of course, it is our desire to move, to the extent possible, from a purely offensive strategy, in terms of the weapons systems and the character of the weapons systems, to a defensive strategy, and that means bringing in a ballistic missile defense system. So I think that the strategic modernization programs, the modernization of the three elements of the triad, must go hand-in-hand with the development of a ballistic missile defense system. I don't see us shrinking from that, but I can't prescribe the details as of this moment.

MR. HOLMES: In view of the upcoming reviews, how would you make the trade-offs between force size and force readiness?

SEN. TOWER: That's a very difficult question to answer and I think that you have to study this matter very carefully. I don't believe that we should return to the so-called hollow army situation of the late '70s. I think that the forces that we have available must be highly ready. I would not sacrifice readiness purely for size. I think we have to examine many ways to try to do this, including lodging some functions in our various reserve components. But I wouldn't want to try to make any prescription on that right now. Certainly, we have to be ready and if we have a large force that can't perform the roles and missions necessary to meet our commitments, it doesn't do us a lot of good.

MR. HOLMES: What specific reforms would you institute in the Department's procurement process? And what parallel reforms would you urge on Congress to improve the way in which the House and Senate debate review and eventually get out a Pentagon budget?

SEN. TOWER: I have already outlined some of the terms of reference for our internal management reforms.

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Rather than try to go into detail with you because that's currently under development, I think I should simply say that we look forward to full implementation of the Packard Commission report -- the Packard Commission recommendations, doing all that we can administratively, and then at the point where we have done all that we can administratively, go to Congress and ask for congressional help and whatever statutory relief -- statutory changes -- that are required to reduce the overlayered bureaucracy in the micro-management that now exists and the maze of statutes and regulations that are often in conflict with themselves. I think what is indicated probably is a recodification of all of our procurement statutes.

MR. HOLMES: Would you comment on the state of the current relationship between the Department and the defense supply industry. Should it be improved? And how would you do that, especially in view of your own personal perceived conflict of interest by some?

SEN. TOWER: Well, in terms of my own case, that's a perception of an appearence. There is none because I have no continuing financial arrangement with any defense contractor. I severed all my relationships with them as of the 1st of December of last year, three months ago. And so, I have no continuing financial interests. I have no particular loyalty to any particular contractor. I think contractors must be held accountable for what they are responsible for. And I believe that we should insist on value for the dollar that we spend with them. And I think we should insist that they be honest in their dealings with the Defense Department. And I believe that it's high time that they undertook a substantial policing of their own industry and embarked on a self-improvement program. And I think if that is not successful, then we have to impose certain disciplines on the contractors ourselves.

MR. HOLMES: What is your view of proposals to use certain elements of the armed forces in the program to interdict drug shipments into this country?

SEN. TOWER: I believe that we should use them as effectively as possible. I think that unfortunately there are a lot of misconceptions about how effectively military assets can be used in interdicting the drug traffic. Some have gone so far as to suggest that we take the entire force of the United States army that is currently based in the United States and deployed along the border. I don't think that would be an effective means of the use of the military.

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I think we have to continually seek to find better ways to effectively utilize the military. We should not be engaged in the business of perhaps sometimes degrading our military roles and missions in an ineffective interdiction job of drugs. I can't claim any expertise in that area now. It's a matter that I will have to get into and get into in some depth once I'm confirmed.

MR. HOLMES: There's been some suggestion that the accusations against you have been fueled by the Pentagon itself because of its fear and concern about the reforms you would make. Any comments?

SEN. TOWER: If that's true, I would consider that to be a very, very strong recommendation for my confirmation. (Laughter)

MR. HOLMES: Several hundred men and women are ousted each year from the Armed Services because they are homosexuals. How would you -- would you favor the creation of a panel to study whether the military's ban should be ended?

SEN. TOWER: Well my visceral reaction is that it should not be, but it's a matter on which I haven't done -- quite frankly, have not done much thinking nor paid close attention to. I'm sure it is a matter that will come to my early attention and that I will have to deal with it. I am not prepared to do so right now.

MR. HOLMES: If confirmed, what effect will all the debate leading up to the vote have on your ability to function as Secretary of Defense?

SEN. TOWER: I have been assured by my potential subordinates that it would have no adverse effect on them in terms of following my direction and my authority. I think when people suggest that I would be incapable or crippled or in some way debilitated in the performance of my duty, to explain how they think I would be. I think once you're given that authority, backed up by the President of the United States, and you're engaged in the active cooperation of Congress, that my effectiveness would not be diminished.

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And two, there is a very clear perception in the military community that I am be very, very unfairly treated and my confirmation would be considered vindication. And I think to survive the kind of campaign that I have been through actually indicates strength and not weakness.

MR. HOLMES: Senator, could you tell us what specific defense or national security programs are being delayed pending your confirmation?

SEN. TOWER: I don't know of any that are being delayed. We're in the process now of trying to come up with the revised budget based on the budgetary constraints of a zero budget for fiscal year 1990. And that's ongoing right now and the numbers crunchers are hard at work.

MR. HOLMES: It appears that the

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Soviets must reduce their huge military expenditures if Gorbachev's perestroika is to succeed. In that event, is this any time for the United States and NATO to make unilateral reductions in defense expenditures?

SEN. TOWER: I think unilateral reductions would be dangerous in the extreme. We must not. We must continue to modernize and improve our forces. We cannot engage in a euphemistic orgy of neglect of our defense establishments throughout NATO and the United States.

The fact is, if perestroika succeeds, what will emerge will be a much stronger Soviet Union. That omens well for the future if it is a more benign Soviet Union, one that is not so bent on self-aggrandizement; a Soviet Union that is prepared to live in peace and harmony with its neighbors. That will be, of course, a very happy outcome. And then, perhaps, we can begin the business of beating swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks.

But it is altogether possible that what could emerge from a successful reform effort that strengthens the Soviet economy would be a further emboldened Soviet Union, ever more threatening and ever more ominous. We must be prepared for either outcome.

MR. HOLMES: In the event that you do not win confirmation, will you return to consulting for defense contractors?

SEN. TOWER: I have no intention of ever returning to defense consulting again in any circumstance. Following my career in government service, should it extend over a period of a few years from now, or should it extend over a much shorter period of time, it is my expectation that my involvement in national security matters will be in the academic world primarily, my involvement in defense matters.

In all probability, if -- once I -- well, I won't say in probability, I'd say it's a virtual certainty that once I complete my public service -- I've spent virtually all of my adult life in public service, only two, a little over two years, two and a half years in the private sector and that's all, the rest of it has been given over to public service. I've accumulated very little in this world, being a school teacher by background -- or by trade, and a clergyman's son by background.

And I remember what John Nance Garner once said when he left the Vice Presidency after having served as Speaker of the House, Vice President of the United States, a distinguished career, he said he was going to cross that Potomac heading west and never return again. (Light laughter.) He never came back, and he lived to be 95 years old. (Laughter.)
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However, I will not make that kind of flat commitment. It is my plan to load up my 1972 Dodge Charger 400 Magnum with all my possessions, mattress strapped to the roof, and all that sort of thing, and head back to Texas to --(as my permanent residence. But, I might be back from time to time in one capacity or another. Incidentally, in that my grandparents lived into their 90s, my enemies can take small comfort that I will depart this world anytime soon. (Laughter.)

MR. HOLMES: Representative Aspin's plan to fund all strategic programs at $31 billion over a 10-year period has been proposed. Is this the type of proposal that ought to be coming from a Secretary of Defense?

SEN. TOWER: I'd rather not comment on any proposals emanating from Congress right now. (Laughter.) It reminds me of the story about Paddy O'Leary who was on his deathbed, very ill, in extremis, and a priest was summoned to his side. And the priest leaned over him and said "Paddy, do you renounce the devil and all his works?" And Paddy looked up at the priest and said, "Father, I'm in no condition now to make any enemies." (Laughter, applause.)

MR. HOLMES: A recent ABC poll indicated that the American people believe that you should not have been nominated, but, since you have been, that President Bush's choice should be supported. Does the Senate run a risk if it votes against your -- votes against public opinion?

SEN. TOWER: I have never been one -- I would be hypocritical if I said otherwise. I've never been one that believes that the Congress should simply follow polling results because it is incumbent on members of Congress to lead and to help shape public opinion, not simply blindly follow a popular whim of the moment. So, I think senators should make up their mind based on their own personal convictions, their own knowledge and understanding of the issues at hand.

MR. HOLMES: Senator, before asking my last question, I'd like to present you with a certificate of appreciation from the National Press Club, and I'd also like to present you with a Press Club paperweight.

The -- my last question -- and I must say that you've taken the wind out of my sails a little bit. I know that upon retirement you had said before that you'd like to be a linebacker coach for Tom Landry. (Laughter.) Now what? (Laughter.)

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SEN. TOWER: Well, just like I thought the Alamo analogy was unfortunate, I think the Landry analogy is unfortunate as well. (Laughter.) I didn't say defensive line coach for Landry, I simply said for the -- I really said for the SMU Mustangs. They haven't had a football team for the last two years because of some rather shortsighted and unfair judgments rendered by the NCAA. (Laughter.) But, I don't think I could do that on a professional level. I might apply at Southern Methodist University for that job, which I understand is open now. (Applause.)

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END

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Background and Action Plan for Defeating
The Dukakis-Akhromeyev Defense Bill of 1989

July 1988: Reagan a lame duck. Bush trailed Dukakis in the polls by double digits. SecDef Carlucci, Sens. Warner and Thurmond urged Reagan to sign the bill, arguing it was the best they could achieve and a veto would result in an even worse bill. Junior Republican senators led by Quayle (this was a month before the Republican convention) urged Reagan to veto the bill. Bush's decision to urge a veto was pivotal in persuading Reagan to carry out the veto. The strategy had its risks as far as the defense programs themselves were concerned, but Bush was so far down he had little to lose from boldness. During the August recess, Administration spokesmen and the Bush campaign carried the Reagan-Bush defense message across the country, building support for the veto strategy and the President's priorities. The veto strategy worked. The bill was vastly improved. Meanwhile the veto focussed public attention on defense issues. The stark contrast exposed between Dukakis and Bush on defense policy was a key factor in the collapse of Dukakis's popular support and the switch in favor of Bush.

July 1989: Bush is overwhelmingly popular, hailed as a superb diplomat, a national security policy expert more engaged in details than Reagan and thus well equipped to implement the popular defense programs Reagan launched. Quayle, the young Senate defense expert of last summer, is Vice President. Defense policy is the best area for him to show the depth and gravitas the media says he lacks. Bush has a comprehensive program for strategic modernization, which, he insists in this era of SDI, must include defenses as well as offenses. In contrast to the policy paralysis caused by the Shultz-Weinberger feud, Bush has a harmonious team with Baker, Cheney and Scowcroft.

Bush offered an "outstretched hand" to Congress with his proposed Defense budget, making deep cuts from the Reagan request in such key programs as SDI. But while Bush was carrying off his diplomatic and public relations triumphs in Europe, Congress put together a Michael Dukakis Defense Bill. The rhetoric of the Markeys and Schroeders and Dellumses as they gut the defense bill is clearly that of persons "viscerally opposed to defense." The House SDI and B-2 cuts would make Bush a sort of lame duck Commander in Chief, throwing our START positions "out the window" (as Quayle put it) and negating Bush's ability to fulfill his campaign promise to make the SDI deployment decision in his first term.

ACTION REQUIRED: It's time for another veto and another Read-My-Lips speech. Bush needs to put some of his hoard of political capital to work to protect the national interest. Dukakisism is coming out of its hole and must be beaten back. Much time has been lost, but Bush still has a surprise factor in his favor if he chooses a veto strategy. A good public relations campaign can take the message through local newspapers and broadcasting to the home districts of swing votes in Congress. August 1989 can be as crucial and successful a month as August 1988 in educating the public and reversing a seemingly large but actually shallow liberal political advantage.

VP Quayle
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: OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Embargoed until delivered--approx. 10:45 a.m. March 23, 1989

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT
TO THE NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEA-AIR-SPACE EXPOSITION
SHERATON WASHINGTON HOTEL
WASHINGTON, DC

I am delighted to be here this morning, and to address this distinguished gathering. Since its founding back in 1902, the Navy League of the United States has enjoyed the support of some of our nation's most influential strategists, officers and political leaders. You have earned this support, because you have always stood for a strong Navy, a strong national defense, and a strong America. And you have always recognized that for America to remain strong, it must adopt a strategic approach to its defense needs -- that is, an approach that focuses not on yesterday's challenges, and not only on today's challenges, but on tomorrow's likely challenges, as well. Planning for the future means preparing for the future. In our plans and preparations we must never yeild in our determination to have a strong national defense.

I am here this morning to tell you that President Bush shares this same strategic approach to our nation's defense needs. As he said only a few days ago, "My agenda is...to confront the emerging problems of the future today. A complacent society is a society doomed to comfortable decline...But world events are moving too swiftly for us to relax in set ways and to cling to smug assumptions."

One area where events are moving especially swiftly, and which I'd like to discuss with you this morning, is space. Nowhere else are our scientific, technical, commercial, defense and foreign policy goals more closely intertwined. Nowhere else is the excitement of scientific discovery or the inspiration and motivation of our children more compelling than in our national space program. Space is vital to our international competitiveness, to our continued economic growth, and, indeed, to our very survival as a nation.

As today's Exposition demonstrates, the Navy has long recognized both the challenge and the opportunity posed by space. In fact, the Navy has relied on space for support operations that are critical to its mission since well before one of its officers became the first American to go into space over a quarter-century ago. Today, some of America's finest scientific and technological achievements are embodied in our military spacecraft, and the Navy now relies on these assets for global C3, for instant meteorological data, for ever more precise positioning and navigation, and for constant reconnaissance over distant as well as nearby areas of operation. In short, the Navy understands that today, as we stand on the threshold of a new century, the Navy League's motto -- "Control of the seas is essential to the life of the nation" -- refers not only to the waters that surround us, but to the great sea of space that envelops us.

Today, of course, is a particularly appropriate day for us to talk about space and the future -- and in particular,

strategic defense. For on this day, six years ago, the Reagan-Bush Administration launched the Strategic Defense Initiative -- an initiative with profound implications for the future both of America and the world. SDI called for a fundamental reappraisal of our reliance on only offensive weapons for deterrence. It recognized several evolving strategic realities that, by 1983, had become apparent:

First of all, it recognized that technologies long under development had matured to the point that previously impossible applications could now be seriously examined. Many of these technologies, such as sensors, command and control, and interceptor components, grew out of our earlier research and development of such defense systems as the Stinger missile. Others involved new power and propulsion sources, advanced data processing techniques, and breakthroughs in guidance algorithms. Taken together, these technologies offered the hope of discovering new approaches to strategic deterrence -- approaches which would strengthen America's defenses against the possibility of ballistic missile attack.

Second, the strategic defense initiative recognized that the notion of strategic stability embodied in the concept of "mutual assured destruction," or MAD, was flawed. For one thing, this notion was not shared by our Soviet adversary. For strategic stability means two things according to advocates of MAD. First, it means that the territories and societies of <u>both</u> sides would be left vulnerable. And second, it means that <u>both</u> sides' retaliatory forces would be kept survivable.

Soviet behavior showed that they saw things rather differently. Their acceptance of the rules of MAD was, let us say, highly selective at best. They seemed only to agree with those parts involving our vulnerability and their survivability. No matter how hard our negotiators pressed, the logic of mutual societal vulnerability, and mutual force survivability, continued to elude them.

Furthermore, a Soviet build-up of previously unimagined proportions had brought U.S. force survivability into question. As a result, our efforts to maintain deterrence could no longer rely exclusively on traditional means.

And finally, the Strategic Defense Initiative recognized that extensive efforts to retard or prevent these developments through arms control had failed. Indeed, quite apart from serious compliance problems, it had become obvious by 1983 that the basic objective of arms control -- strategic stability -- had been seriously eroded by the size and character of the Soviet build-up.

So that was the strategic situation we faced six years ago, when SDI was first unveiled. And, despite some encouraging changes within the Soviet Union, I know of nothing that has occurred since 1983 that should change our thinking about strategic defense. In fact, when it comes to deployed military hardware -- the only tangible criterion by which to measure our adversaries' purpose and intent -- the only changes I have seen have reinforced the case for strategic defense.

Thus, the Soviets' offensive modernization program continues, with emphasis on precisely those weapons that we have always regarded as destabilizing. Thus, too, others are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them -- posing new threats to our safety and security.

Fortunately, we have embarked on a program of strategic defense. As all of you know, because many of you have helped make it happen, the Strategic Defense Initiative program that has emerged over the last six years has produced a degree of technological progress that few expected in such a short time.

For example, we seldom hear the claim any more that we must reject strategic defenses because they are technically impossible. This kind of "Luddite mentality" has proved to be as shortsighted as the forecasts of an earlier generation that said ICBMs wouldn't work.

And we are hearing less and less about how the cost of strategic defense renders it unworkable. New technologies, new applications of existing technologies, new architectures, lighter payloads, and imaginative deployment strategies are being developed at a rapid pace. We have already decreased both overall costs and cost per target dramatically, and further improvements in these areas are forthcoming.

One of the most promising lines of research is the "Brilliant Pebbles" program. Currently under development by the SDI Organization, Brilliant Pebbles is a class of kinetic-kill vehicles suitable for ground or space basing with several

important implications for the future potential of strategic defense:

First, its small size -- less than 100 pounds fully fueled, barely a meter in length -- adapts it to low-cost launch capability, and simplifies the survivability problem.

Second, at a deployed cost on the order of a half-million dollars per interceptor, it would bring the price of a boost phase system into a much more affordable realm. As SDIO Director Lt. General George Monahan noted on Tuesday, Brilliant Pebbles has "excellent potential" to significantly reduce costs.

And third, its use of available, largely demonstrated technologies would facilitate its development significantly.

In short, if tests of the "Brilliant Pebbles" concept show the promise that is expected, it could revolutionize much of our thinking about strategic defense.

These are the kinds of imaginative, "get the job done" approaches to national security that we will require in an era when the threat continues but when resources are constrained. Navy programs that envision future reliance on light satellites, unmanned aircraft systems, and existing launch platforms for novel launch requirements fall into the same category of new thinking. And it's precisely this kind of new thinking that has reinforced the President's confidence in and commitment to the future of strategic defense.

Will the opposition to SDI be quelled by these developments in cost control and the technological efficacy of the program? Alas, probably not. Opposition to a more defense reliant

deterrence force has never been so rational. Some who decry strategic defense would oppose it if it worked perfectly and cost nothing. Perhaps that is why many of SDI's detractors never want to see it truly tested. Perhaps that is why we hear so often that it should be abandoned quickly in an era of scarce resources.

It is odd that "defense" would generate such unhesitant opposition among some. Are we so wedded to the notion of a purely offensive deterrence that we can no longer embrace the strategic imperatives associated with defending ourselves? The MAD enthusiast frequently repeats the claim that the capability to defend ourselves will only make it more likely for us to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. This is a red herring. The most fundamental rationale underpinning strategic defense is that it will give a President an alternative to the employment of offensive weapons. That is why President Bush has said he "would not leave America defenseless against ballistic missiles."

So we need to move ahead. We need to develop the means to defend against weapons that threaten us. That is what SDI is all about. SDI would not only defend against actual aggression, but by making the outcome of an attack more dubious, it would lessen the incentives for aggression -- and thus enhance deterrence. That is why I believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary and morally imperative.

For these reasons, the Bush Administration remains committed to the development and deployment of a viable strategic defense system. As you know, the President has directed an honest review of all aspects of our national security policies. That review is well underway and, until it is completed, there cannot be commitments to programmatic particulars. But as the President has said many times, we intend to continue our research, and to begin deployment of a missile defense system as soon as it's ready. We are determined not to leave America undefended against ballistic missiles. Defending America is the first responsibility of any Administration. Moving toward deploying SDI is defending America.

Since SDI has come under so much criticism in recent years -- nearly all of it unfounded, in my opinion -- I thought I'd conclude my remarks with a quotation from one of the Navy League's earliest and greatest supporters, President Theodore Roosevelt. "It is not the critic who counts," President Roosevelt said. "The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred with sweat and dust and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself on a worthy cause; who, if he wins, knows the triumph of high achievement; and who, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat."

The words of Teddy Roosevelt apply to everyone here today. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to salute all of you for daring to enter the arena, and for the "great enthusiasm" and "great devotion" you have shown in "a truly worthy cause" -- defending the United States. Military services are often accused of invariably preparing for the last war, never the next one. But the Navy is demonstrating, once again, how unfounded these charges are. Whether the threat comes from the Gulf of Sidra today, or from "Gunsights in Space" tomorrow, the Navy is there, ready for action. And that's why your place will never be with "those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat." Your place will be, as it has always been, with the bravest and the best.

Thank you and God bless you.

Joe de Sutter

for the abandonment of the Soviet offensive strategy on the continent.

We must never forget that arms reduction is not enough. Armaments are only the symptom, not the cause, of a much deeper division between free societies and the unfree. That division is at its heart a moral division. Perhaps it is best symbolized by the Berlin Wall and the horrible barrier that cuts down the center of Europe, dividing nations, peoples, families. The question must be asked, When can we ever hope to achieve a real and lasting peace with a regime that is so fearful of its own people that it must imprison them behind barbed wire? That's why, when I visited the Berlin Wall last year, I issued a challenge to Mr. Gorbachev: If you really want *glasnost*, if you really want openness, tear down that wall.

So, let me conclude by saying, I found this week in Brussels what the Atlantic alliance has demonstrated now for 40 years: that a peace built on strength can and will endure. And I am convinced, after our meeting, that the alliance of free nations has never been stronger.

Until next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 12:06 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House.

Remarks at the Annual Washington Conference of the Veterans of Foreign Wars

March 7, 1988

Thank you, Commander Earl Stock, and it's good to see here Ladies Auxiliary President Joan Katkus.

I've always said it's a pleasure and an honor to speak before a meeting of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. You are the men who, from the Marne to the Bulge, from Okinawa to Omaha Beach, from the Chosin Reservoir to Hamburger Hill, have defended America's heritage and fought for the freedom not only of our nation but peoples all over the world.

Today as veterans you're still defending freedom. Whether it's supporting adequate defense budgets or aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua or teaching America's young people the meaning of our precious rights through your Voice of Democracy program, the members of the VFW are still on the front lines, still leading the charge, and still showing what true patriotism really means. That's why when you sound the bugle this is one old rider in the horse cavalry who snaps to attention.

As you may know, I returned last Thursday from a 2-day visit to Europe, where I met with the leaders of the other Western allies, and I'll talk about that meeting in a moment. At another time, I might have liked to take a few more days over there, see some sights, and maybe buy Nancy a few presents. But I had a meeting here in Washington I couldn't miss. I've told you this before, and it's true as ever. I'd travel halfway around the world to meet with the VFW.

Let me say here something that I regard as an obvious truth, but one that seems to need repeating. America owes a great debt to its fighting men. And it's a debt that our nation will carry as long as it lives, for without our fighting men, our nation would not live. That's why I don't understand those who would so easily forget. I'm speaking about those who would turn their backs on the men missing in action in Southeast Asia. We have a moral bond as sacred as any a free people can make with one of their own to close no books, write no last chapters, reach no final conclusions until we have the fullest possible accounting of every soldier, airman, aviator, marine, and civilian lost in Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam.

To you who came home, the Emergency Veterans' Job Training Act I signed at your convention in New Orleans 5 years ago and the new GI bill I signed last June are the least we can do to show America's gratitude. And as you know, I believe we also should create a Cabinet-level Department of Veterans' Affairs.

I've always found that Americans are deeply grateful to our veterans—even those Americans who aren't too good at showing it. This is my way of sliding into a story. While it doesn't concern an American veteran, it's about a great allied fighting man.

It was during World War II, and British Field Marshal Montgomery had come to America to help spur the war effort. A dinner was held in his honor in Hollywood. Sam Goldwyn, one of the founders of MGM, was to toast Field Marshal Montgomery. And when the time came, Sam, who has a reputation for misspeaking, got up, waited for silence, then after a few words said, "I propose a toast to Marshall Field Montgomery." [*Laughter*] Well, Jack Warner was sitting next to Sam and tried to help. And he said, "Montgomery Ward, you mean." [*Laughter*]

Well, as I said a moment ago, I've just returned from meeting with the leaders of our North Atlantic allies. And next year, the alliance marks its 40th anniversary. Its achievement has been simple and historic: 40 years of freedom and democracy in Western Europe—and without armies clashing anywhere on the continent. Since the fall of Rome more than 1,500 years ago, Europe has known few longer periods of total peace. Americans, including some of you, have helped keep that peace and preserve that freedom. As President Kennedy told our troops in Germany 25 years ago: "Millions sleep peacefully at night, because you stand in this field." You know when I hear about peace marchers in Europe or here I think of our young men and women in uniform. They're the real peace marchers.

At the meeting last week, the Atlantic alliance celebrated one of the great achievements of its history. More than a decade ago, without warning, without provocation, the Soviet Union challenged the strategic balance in Europe and stationed an entirely new level of weapon, one for which NATO had no fully effective deterrent: the intermediate-range SS–20 nuclear missile. To keep the balance that keeps the peace, NATO had to meet this challenge, and meet it NATO did. In 1979 it voted to deploy U.S. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. It also voted to press for a U.S. negotiation with the Soviets on this issue.

Shortly after I came into office, I proposed that our negotiators should work for what we called the zero option—remove all U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles. You may recall that some of our critics said I couldn't be serious, that this was just a ploy to ambush arms control and put it out of commission for the duration. The Soviets said they would walk out of negotiations if we went ahead with deployment. Well, we did, and they did.

But NATO stuck to its guns. In the face of heavy political fire, the leaders of NATO moved forward. Many faced demonstrations at home, and some of those demonstrations turned to violence. But eventually, after the missiles went in place, the Soviets returned to the bargaining table, and today we have the agreement our critics said was impossible: the zero option. Now, I can't think of any better demonstration of what you and I've been saying for years: that the road to peace is through American and free world strength.

And no one should ever forget that you helped America stand its ground against the political assault here at home and finally to take the hill in arms talks. Yes, once again you defended our nation's security, peace, and freedom. And now your support is needed on another front. I hope that you, the members of the VFW, will vigorously support ratification of the INF treaty.

And by the way, let me just tell you, I wouldn't have signed that or any other agreement with the Soviets if I didn't believe we could effectively verify it. The networks have been having fun in the last few months playing clips of my statement just after I came to office that the Soviets reserved to themselves the right to lie and cheat for their own ends. They say I've changed. I've got news for them. [*Laughter*] If I trusted the Soviets, I wouldn't have insisted on the strict verification provisions that we have in this treaty—the toughest that have ever been adopted. Now, maybe they call that trust. Well, if so, it must be the kind of trust a sage meant when he said, "Trust everybody, but cut the cards." [*Laughter*]

But something amazing has happened since Mr. Gorbachev and I signed the INF agreement in Washington in December. In Europe and here at home, some of the very same people who told us not to deploy the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, who said we were being provocative and that our defense buildup in general was a step back in the safety of the world—

these same people are now taking credit for the INF agreement. They say that the agreement is a victory for what they've been calling for: cuts in defense, eliminating or scaling back vital weapons systems. Well, as a great general said once at the Battle of the Bulge, "Nuts!" [*Laughter*]

The truth is just the opposite. This is not the time to drop our guard. It's time to look forward and ask what we must do to keep the peace not only in Europe but around the world. And the answer is the same as it's always been: Keep America and its allies strong. In Europe this means continuing to modernize our remaining nuclear forces and modernizing our conventional forces as well, giving them what is called smart weapons that help even the odds against the much larger armies of the Warsaw Pact. It's just this simple: If we're going to put young Americans in harm's way, we owe them the best weapons money can buy.

Keeping America strategically strong means going forward, as well, with our research, development, and testing on a strategic defense against ballistic missiles. SDI is America's best guarantee that the Soviets will stick to their agreements in arms reductions. It's also protection against an accidental missile launch and against some madman who might take over a country that can get ballistic missiles. In short, as I've said before, it's an insurance policy, and we're not the first ones the agent has visited.

The Soviets have been spending far more money developing strategic defenses than we have and have been doing it longer. In the last decade, they've poured roughly $200 billion into their programs. In 2 weeks, we mark the fifth anniversary of our Strategic Defense Initiative, and in that time, we've spent only $13 billion—less than 7 percent what the Soviets spent in the decade. To give you an idea of the magnitude of the Soviet efforts, they've assigned 10,000 of their top scientists and engineers to their military laser program alone. It would be foolhardy not to pursue SDI, and that's why America must research, develop, and test SDI. And when it's ready, we must deploy it.

Now that we have the INF treaty, our negotiating priorities are a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms; a conventional arms balance in Europe; and an effective, verifiable, and truly global ban on all chemical weapons. We'll need to keep up our strength if we're to succeed, and that's why the Congress must not further reduce the defense budget.

Not long ago I saw a letter from your commander to Members of Congress. He sent it following his recent visit to Central America, and I think he summed things up as well as anyone ever has when he said that, in his words: "The real issue before the Congress and the country is not the *contras*, it is communism in Central America."

You know, recently the Government of El Salvador found documents on the body of a Communist courier. The papers included a review of the situation in Central America, and in those papers it said: "The defeat of the *contras* would be a grave strategic defeat for the United States, especially if we take into account the geopolitical position of Central America."

Well, the VFW understands this. The Communists in Central America understand this. The Soviets understand this. It's time that Congress understood it, too. A Soviet base on the American mainland is a pistol pointed at the heart of the Americas.

During the first round of debate on aid to the freedom fighters a few weeks ago, one of the congressional leaders opposing aid said that we shouldn't keep money flowing to the *contras*, because for every dollar we gave them, the Soviets would give the Sandinistas five. Well, he ought to remember something Pericles, the great leader of ancient Athens, said: "The secret of liberty is courage."

Too many of the opponents of aid to the freedom fighters claim to be the heirs of Franklin Roosevelt, who told us when the odds are stacked against us that America had a rendezvous with destiny and then led us to the fight, and of Harry Truman, who helped Greece and Turkey stand up to communism and led us into NATO.

You know, when I listen to the critics and their claims to be what F.D.R. and Truman would be today, it reminds me of a time I was on the set of a movie that happened to involve Irving Berlin. As a matter of fact, it was called "This is the Army." I was already

in the Army, but some of us on active duty were sent back temporarily to be in that film, which as you all know, all the proceeds went to Army emergency relief.

Well, Irving Berlin, who had written that and who had written the first one in World War I, "Yip Yip Yaphank," was on the set. And Irving asked if he couldn't play one part there, because there was a flashback to World War I, and Irving wanted to sing his song "Oh, How I Hate to Get Up in the Morning." [*Laughter*] Now, he's a great writer of songs, not particularly a great singer of songs. [*Laughter*] And as we were filming that scene and he, in his World War I uniform, was singing, one of the crew leaned over to me and whispered, "If the fellow that wrote that song could hear this guy sing it, he'd roll over in his grave." [*Laughter*]

Courage hasn't exactly been the watchword of some opponents of *contra* aid. Harry Truman said: "The buck stops here." But last week, aid opponents tried to pass the buck of responsibility for abandoning in the field the young men and women of the democratic resistance. And that ploy failed, as it should have. Now it's time for Congress to show that it knows you can't have real peace negotiations when one side has helicopter gunships and the other has bandages. Recently, Daniel Ortega has said he's going to crush the freedom fighters, and he has thrown out the peace mediator, Cardinal Obando y Bravo. You know where Ortega stands. Isn't it time for Congress to have the courage to show where it stands?

You better than anyone know that Americans have never lacked for courage. On the eve of the Second World War, an observer from another country said: "Most people think Americans love luxury and that their culture is shallow and meaningless. It's a mistake. I can tell you that Americans are full of the spirit of justice, fight, and adventure." Those were the words of Japan's senior admiral in the war, Admiral Yamamoto, who added: "Japan cannot beat America."

In thousands of foxholes and trenches, cockpits and decks, around the world, the American spirit of justice and the just fight, our love of freedom and devotion to the dignity of man have been the hope of millions for liberty and a better life. You more than anyone else know what courage it has taken. It was courage like that of Sergeant Howard Collette, whose bomber was hit over the Celebes, and as it plunged toward the Pacific, he was heard over the radio reading aloud from his pocket Bible to his wounded comrades, calming them, comforting them, as he and they fell to their final rest. On every continent and ocean in this century, Americans have left such stories. Courage is our mark, freedom and democracy our gift to mankind. And you, who know this so well, help us keep it that way forever.

Thank you, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 10:34 a.m. in the Sheraton Ballroom at the Sheraton Washington Hotel.

Remarks to Media Executives During a White House Briefing on Drug Abuse
March 7, 1988

I'm delighted all of you could come by today. The question before us is a simple one: What value do we place on human dignity and on human worth? I realize that's rather bluntly put. But you know, one of the things I've been intrigued by while I've held this job is an attitude in government that says every approach to public policy issues must be complicated and indirect. Now, come to think of it—and I know this will come as a surprise—it kind of reminds me of an anecdote from back in the days when I was also in the media business, in radio.

And most of you will remember for those radio dramas the sound effects man and all of the things that he devised, from coconut shells that he would pound on his chest to be a horse galloping and so forth. This one particular time at WHO-Des Moines, rehearsing for a play there, and there was a sound effect that called for water falling on a board. And the sound effect man went to work. He tried sand on a drum, and he tried rice on cardboard and peas on something else. And he was going on, and he couldn't get anything that sounded, through the microphone, like water on a board. And

REMARKS ON THE U.S.S. AMERICA
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1989

THANK YOU. IT'S GREAT TO BE HERE ON ONE OF THE GREATEST SHIPS IN THE WORLD, WITH A CREW THAT KNOWS THE MEANING OF THE WORDS "MY SHIP, MY COUNTRY" -- THE CREW OF THE U.S.S. AMERICA.

YOU KNOW, AS AN OLD CARRIER PILOT, TODAY IS A SPECIAL DAY FOR ME. I CAN'T HELP THINKING OF THE CARRIER I ONCE SAILED ON. THEY WEREN'T AS BIG IN THOSE DAYS. [IN FACT,

I THINK MY SHIP COULD HAVE FLOATED IN THE STEW KETTLES DOWN IN YOUR MESS.]

BUT WE KNEW, JUST AS YOU, HOW MUCH WE OWED TO THE MEN AND WOMEN AT THE SHIPYARDS. AND FROM THE DAY OF REVOLUTIONARY ERA SLOOPS TO THE MOST MODERN SUPERCARRIERS, NO SHIPYARD HAS WRITTEN A PROUDER CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY THAN THE NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD. ALL OVER THE WORLD, THOSE WHO LOVE THE SEA AND THE SHIPS THAT SAIL ON IT KNOW THAT NORFOLK STANDS FOR EXCELLENCE.

NORFOLK IS A NATIONAL TREASURE -- AND WE'RE GOING TO KEEP IT THAT WAY.

MY VISIT TODAY IS THE FINAL STOP ON WHAT YOU MIGHT CALL AN INAUGURAL TRIP. FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS I HAVE BEEN VISITING WITH THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE MY COLLEAGUES IN SERVICE TO OUR NATION -- FROM SENIOR APPOINTEES IN MY ADMINISTRATION TO RANK AND FILE CIVIL SERVANTS. MOST ARE OUTSTANDING. MOST DO A SUPERB JOB. BUT STILL YOU MIGHT SAY, WITH NO DISRESPECT FOR THE OTHERS, THAT I'VE SAVED FOR LAST THOSE WHOSE SERVICE DEMANDS THE MOST -- AND I

MEAN YOU, THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO KEEP OUR SHIPS AND GUARD OUR SHORES, THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO SERVE WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

IN THE MONTHS AHEAD I WILL BE TALKING A GREAT DEAL ABOUT SERVICE -- NOT SERVICE THAT IS COMPELLED, BUT SERVICE THAT IS GIVEN FREELY AND OPENLY, THE SERVICE OF THE STRONG HEART AND THE QUESTING SOUL.

I WILL SPEAK ABOUT THOSE WHO GIVE THEIR TIME AND LOVE TO THEIR COMMUNITIES, TO HELP THOSE WHO CANNOT FULLY HELP THEMSELVES.

LONG AGO IT WAS WRITTEN THAT THE QUALITY OF MERCY IS NOT STRAINED; AND I WILL SPEAK OF THOSE WHO DEDICATE A PORTION OF THEIR LIVES TO MERCY FOR HUMANITY.

AND I WILL SPEAK ABOUT YOU, FOR IN A WAY THAT EVERY AMERICAN KNOWS, AND EVERY MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD IN OUR LAND SALUTES, YOU WHO STAND HERE TODAY SET OUR NATION'S STANDARD FOR SERVICE. AND LET ME START RIGHT NOW BY RECOGNIZING ONE OF YOUR OWN -- YOUR "SAILOR OF THE YEAR" -- AVIATION ORDINANCEMAN 1ST CLASS JOSEPH ROBINSON. JOSEPH WAS AWARDED THIS HONOR FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST FOR HIS

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RUNNING OF THIS SHIP. BUT JOSEPH HAS ALSO BEEN RECOGNIZED FOR HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO HIS COMMUNITY WHERE HE HELPED ESTABLISH A NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM AND DEVOTED OVER 100 HOURS TO ITS SUCCESS. JOSEPH, IF YOU'LL COME UP HERE, I'D BE PROUD TO SHAKE YOUR HAND AND PRESENT YOU WITH THIS LETTER OF COMMENDATION.

ALL OF YOU KEEP THE PEACE ON THE FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM AROUND THE WORLD. AND IN EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE, MILLIONS RECOGNIZE YOU AND THE FLAG YOU CARRY AS THEIR SYMBOL OF HOPE. YES, WHEREVER YOU GO, YOU TAKE AMERICA

AND ALL IT REPRESENTS WITH YOU, AND YOU DO IT WITH A PRIDE AND DEDICATION THAT FEW HAVE EVER MATCHED.

I KNOW SOME SAY THAT IT'S JUST A JOB. BUT WHEN A SAILOR MUST PUT TO SEA FOR 6 MONTHS OR MORE AT A TIME, AND COME HOME TO FIND THAT THE CHILD WHO COULD BARELY CRAWL, CAN WALK AND SAY A FEW WORDS, THAT'S MORE THAN A JOB -- THAT IS SERVICE AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, SACRIFICE.

WHEN A SOLDIER SPENDS LONG HOURS ON COLD NIGHT'S SENTRY DUTY AT THE D.M.Z. IN KOREA OR AT CHECKPOINT

CHARLIE IN BERLIN, HE IS NOT JUST FILLING A JOB BUT IS ANSWERING THE CALL OF SERVICE.

AND THE MECHANIC WHO INSPECTS THE PLANE'S ENGINE OR SHIP'S POWER PLANT ONE LAST TIME AND MAKES DOUBLE AND TRIPLE SURE THAT EVERY SCREW, EVERY HOSE, EVERY WELD IS AS IT SHOULD BE -- THAT MECHANIC IS DEDICATING HIMSELF OR HERSELF NOT SIMPLY TO A JOB BUT TO A CONCEPT OF SERVICE TO COUNTRY THAT IS THE HIGHEST IN THE WORLD.

AROUND THE WORLD, OTHERS HAVE SEEN AND KNOW WHAT YOUR DEDICATION TO SERVICE MEANS.

YOU MAY REMEMBER THAT LAST YEAR, THE SOVIET UNION'S TOP MILITARY MAN AT THE TIME, MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, VISITED THE UNITED STATES. HE SPENT A DAY ON A CARRIER NOT UNLIKE YOURS, AS IT WENT THROUGH EXERCISES IN THESE WATERS, AND HE VISITED INSTALLATIONS ACROSS OUR NATION. HE SAW MUCH OF THE AMAZING WEAPONRY AND MACHINERY IN OUR ARSENAL, AND WHEN HE FINALLY CAME TO VISIT THE WHITE HOUSE, HE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED. AND WHAT MOST IMPRESSED HIM WAS NOT OUR MIRACULOUS TECHNOLOGY OR INCREDIBLE FIREPOWER, BUT THE ENLISTED MEN AND WOMEN THAT HE MET ON

HIS TOURS. HE COULDN'T BELIEVE THAT WE GAVE OUR ENLISTED MEN AND WOMEN JOBS THAT ONLY OFFICERS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO HANDLE IN HIS OWN MILITARY. HE COULDN'T BELIEVE THE OBVIOUS DEDICATION OF AMERICA'S ENLISTED MEN AND WOMEN TO THEIR JOBS, THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MACHINERY THEY HANDLED, AND THEIR READINESS AND ABILITY TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. IN SHORT, HE COULDN'T BELIEVE YOUR DEDICATION TO SERVICE.

I KNOW YOU'VE HEARD IT FROM YOUR PARENTS. THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE MARRIED HAVE HEARD IT FROM YOUR HUSBANDS OR WIVES AND FROM YOUR CHILDREN. BUT IT GOES FOR EVERYONE

ACROSS THE COUNTRY, LET ME SAY WE'RE ALL VERY, VERY PROUD OF YOU AND OF THE JOB YOU'RE DOING.

IN THE YEARS AHEAD, I WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT THOSE WHO BUILD OUR SHIPS, PLANES, AND WEAPONS LIVE UP TO THE STANDARDS OF SERVICE, DEDICATION, AND DUTY THAT THIS CREW AND THIS SHIPYARD SET.

I'VE BEEN INSIDE A SUBMERGED SUBMARINE WHILE DEPTH CHARGES WERE GOING OFF ALL AROUND IT. I KNOW WHAT IT'S LIKE TO HEAR THE VESSEL STRAIN AND SHAKE AND TO PRAY TO

GOD THAT THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF BUYING AND BUILDING CARED AS MUCH ABOUT THE VESSEL AS YOU DO.

I BELIEVE THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PROCUREMENT OFFICERS AND DEFENSE CONTRACTORS DO CARE THAT MUCH. I AM DETERMINED TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERY SINGLE ONE OF THEM DOES.

MY MESSAGE TO THEM WILL BE JUST THIS SIMPLE: DON'T THINK IT'S JUST ANYONE OUT THERE. THINK IT'S YOUR SON OR DAUGHTER -- AND REMEMBER THAT THEIR LIVES DEPEND ON THE THINGS YOU MAKE. AND IF YOU'RE NOT READY TO CARE THAT

MUCH AND WORK THAT HARD, YOU'RE NOT READY TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

LET ME GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE -- COST OVERRUNS. OVERRUNS DIDN'T START YESTERDAY. THE FIRST DRY DOCK EVER BUILT FOR OUR NAVY IS STILL OPERATING NOT FAR FROM HERE IN THIS SHIPYARD. IT WAS FINISHED MORE THAN A CENTURY AND A HALF AGO. THE ACTUAL FINAL COST WAS THREE TIMES THE ORIGINAL ESTIMATE.

BUT EVEN IF OVERRUNS ARE NOT NEW, THEY ARE STILL WRONG -- AND HURT THE NATIONAL SECURITY, PARTICULARLY WHEN

BUDGETS ARE TIGHT. WE <u>WANT</u> TIGHTER CONTROLS AND HIGHER STANDARDS IN WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, AND WE <u>WILL GET</u> TIGHTER CONTROLS AND HIGHER STANDARDS IN WEAPONS PROCUREMENT. YOU DESERVE THE VERY BEST EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS. YOU ARE GETTING THEM MOST OF THE TIME NOW. WE ARE DETERMINED THAT YOU WILL GET THEM ALL OF THE TIME.

ONE OTHER THING. I AM DETERMINED TO EXPAND THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS THAT IS NECESSARY FOR PROPER SUPPORT FOR OUR NATION'S DEFENSES. I WILL DO THIS BECAUSE THE FIRST BULWARK OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE IS OUR NATIONAL

WILL. IF OUR WILL IS RUPTURED, OUR SHIP OF STATE CANNOT SAIL -- OR AT LEAST SAIL SAFELY. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE VITAL FIRST STEP TO BROADENING OUR NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON DEFENSE IS TO WRING THE LAST DROP OF WASTE AND MISMANAGEMENT OUT OF THE WAY WE BUY OUR WEAPONS. AND THAT'S WHAT WE INTEND TO DO.

IT'S WHAT YOU MIGHT CALL MY BOND TO YOU. WHEN A FAMILY SENDS A SON OR HUSBAND TO SEA OR TO BOOT CAMP OR TO FLIGHT SCHOOL TO DEFEND OUR NATION, THEY ARE MAKING A SACRIFICE -- AND IT IS A GREAT AND NOBLE SACRIFICE. THINK

OF ALL THE GOOD ALL THOSE SACRIFICES ADDED UP TOGETHER HAVE MEANT AROUND THE WORLD IN THE LAST FEW YEARS.

WHEN THE RECORD OF OUR TIME IS FINALLY WRITTEN, I HOPE IT WILL BE THE STORY OF THE FINAL TRIUMPH OF PEACE AND FREEDOM THROUGHOUT THE GLOBE -- THE STORY OF THE SUNRISE IN THE DAY OF MANKIND'S AGE OLD ASPIRATIONS. AND ON THAT DAY, WHO WERE THE HEROES, GENERATIONS TO COME WILL ASK? WHO DROVE THE CHARIOTS OF FIRE ACROSS THE SKY? WHO BROUGHT THAT DAY TO THE EARTH? AND THE ANSWER WILL BE YOU. DURING THE NEXT FOUR YEARS I WILL BE NOT JUST YOUR

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BUT YOUR FRIEND. AND TOGETHER WE WILL WORK TO SPIN THE GOSSAMER THREAD OF HUMAN DREAMS INTO A STURDY FABRIC OF PEACE THAT WILL LAST FOR GENERATIONS TO COME.

THANK YOU, GOD BLESS YOU, AND GOD BLESS AMERICA.

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