

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
S; 2005-0569-S

FOIA Number:
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Administrative Files
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OA/ID Number: 13907
Folder ID Number: 13907-014

Folder Title:
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01. Cable	281606Z Apr 89 (8 pp.)	4/28/89	(b)(1)	S

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Office: Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries: Alpha File, 1989-1993
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Classified Materials from Speechwriters Office [2]

Pinksheet Number: RML15570
OA/ID Number: 13907-014
Date Closed: 6/14/2023
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-0569-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: MARLIN FITZWATER *Mal*

SUBJECT: Public Appearances by the President on
Foreign Policy

The month of May promises to be a high visibility time for foreign policy. Expectations for the foreign policy review are extraordinarily high. We must be able to publicly demonstrate that a coherent "world view" has emerged from this process.

We propose three Presidential addresses as follows:

- Peter Rodman*
- 1) May 12 -- Commencement Address at Texas A&M. The President would deliver a "world view" address outlining the broad results of his policy review process. The speech could center on such concepts as the rise of democracy, the failures of Communism, and the growing rise of free enterprise in national economies. This speech should wrap up the entire "review."
 - 2) May 21 -- Boston University Commencement Address. The President's address would focus on US-Soviet relations including such points as an assessment of those relations, where he expects that relationship to go and how he expects to guide that relationship.
 - 3) May 24 -- Coast Guard Commencement Address. This event is scheduled two days prior to departure for the NATO Summit. As a result, the President would focus on NATO, our strong European ties, and the mutual US-European commitment to defense and international affairs.

In addition to the above three scheduled events, we propose that the President return directly to Washington, D.C. on June 2 in order to deliver an Oval Office address to the nation. The address would summarize his European trip and outline his successes. We understand this may necessitate a scheduling change for the President but we believe it is something that should be considered. This is an important trip and it would be wise to demonstrate Presidential leadership from the Oval Office. It would give the President an opportunity to report on the success of the policy review as demonstrated in the NATO meeting.

I would also like to call to your attention some of the logistical problems the Press Office encounters on our foreign trips. I understand that we will be scheduling a number of arrival and departure statements by the President. It is also necessary to schedule time for either on-the-record or background readouts of these statements and of various Presidential meetings by either Secretary Baker or General Scowcroft. It is incumbent, therefore, that any scheduling leave either of these individuals free time to address the traveling press corps in the filing center. Both Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft should be available for readouts on meetings towards the end of the President's working schedule. The availability of the Secretary or General is particularly crucial during the first day of the NATO Summit.

Attachment

cc: Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen Studdert
David F. Demarest, Jr.

by DAVID R. GERGEN
Editor at Large

A GLOBAL COMPACT

A rare moment in history is at hand. The old order is breaking up, and a new one is emerging at breathtaking speed. Western Europe is moving rapidly toward economic and political integration. Japan, having achieved enormous economic muscle, is groping toward new global responsibilities. And as the massive student demonstrations in Beijing last week illustrated yet again, people in Communist nations are defiantly turning away from the failures of Marx and Lenin.

For the United States, this should be a moment of triumph as well as opportunity. After all, it was a generous America that helped Europe and Japan recover and a stout America that contained Communism's outward reach until it began crumbling from within. Fortunately, George Bush recognizes that if the U.S. and its allies work wisely and in concert, they have a chance in the 1990s to build a much more stable and democratic world.

While the West has only limited influence behind the iron curtain, it can be modestly helpful, as Bush showed recently with his economic proposal to assist Poland. Private citizens can also serve as a human bridge. Prof. Richard Gardner of Columbia University points out that no one has ever written a book on how to convert a Communist economy to a free market, but Moscow is now quietly turning to some American economists for advice. The West must not blow this possibility of ridding the world of Communism, the worst idea of the 20th century.

Ironically, at a time of enormous potential, the Western democracies have problems of their own that demand attention. A White House aide put it this way recently: "I would like to go in and tell him, 'Mr. President, we have the best chance in 40 years to undo Yalta. There's only one catch: We can't afford it.'" Precisely. The United States is now in the ludicrous position of proposing generous bailouts for debtor nations while it runs up the biggest debts in its own history. America and its partners have allowed trade and other imbalances to build up for so many years that the international economic system is badly out of kilter. Unless the imbalances are corrected, they could cause a


financial crisis in the early 1990s that could wreck the world economy.

A conference of Americans, Japanese and Europeans, sponsored in mid-April by the American Assembly in New York, concluded that the economic imbalances "are rooted in mistaken and often self-indulgent domestic policies of the industrialized democracies. Responsibility for ensuring a healthy international economy now rests primarily upon domestic policy changes in the United States, Japan and Western Europe." To break the current gridlock, the assembly said it was urgent that at the economic summit this summer, the key governments sign a "global compact." The U.S. would pledge to wipe out its budget deficit and become more export-oriented. The Japanese would take swifter steps to open their markets and triple economic assistance to poorer countries. And Europe would lower its current trade barriers and accelerate its economic growth.

The idea of a global compact is sound, but it would not be easy to engineer. The resignation announcement of Japan's Prime Minister and the panic that swept over the West German government last week starkly revealed

that the industrial democracies are entering the 1990s with major weaknesses at the top. Charges of corruption and cover-up in Japan are toppling not only Noboru Takeshita but at least a generation of other men in the line of succession; it will take a long while for that government to recover. In West Germany, centrist politics of the past are giving way to a polarization that threatens the government of Helmut Kohl. To ward off potential ouster, Kohl last week was pushing nuclear ideas that reeked of capitulation to the left and could splinter NATO. Even that magnificent leader Margaret Thatcher is in trouble from spiraling interest rates.

As he enters his second hundred days, here then is a mission for President Bush: To recognize not only the opportunities but the dangers of the 1990s and to rally the industrial democracies to meet them. The United States may no longer tower over other nations, but it remains *primus inter pares*. President Bush, more than anyone else, must lead the West into the next decade. ■



Organization for Planning the President's Trips to Europe

Coordinating Group for the President's European Trips and Policy Statements

General Scowcroft (chair)
STATE (Deputy Secretary Eagleburger)
DEFENSE (Deputy Secretary Atwood)
JCS (Vice Admiral Howe)
USIA (Deputy Director Stone)
White House Staff (Mr. Card, Mr. Fitzwater, Mr. Studdert)
NSC Staff

Steering Group for the President's European Trips and Policy Statements

Ambassador Blackwill (chair)
STATE (Assistant Secretary Ridgway)
DEFENSE (Assistant Secretary Lehman)
JCS (Vice Admiral Howe)
USIA (Associate Director Schneider)
White House Staff (Office of the Chief of Staff, Advance Office, and Press Office)
NSC Staff (Executive Secretary Hughes, Mr. Zelikow)

Working Groups:

One - The President's Trips to Europe and Related Policy Themes for the Next 90 Days (Mr. Zelikow chair)

Two - Security Initiatives (Col. Mahley chair)

Three - The President's Schedule and Logistical Support (Executive Secretary Hughes chair)

Four - Public Diplomacy (Mrs. Dyke chair)

Work Program (tentative, Working Group schedule and number of meetings may vary depending on Group involved and work requirements):

Monday, May 1: Steering Group meets, sets organization and work program

Tuesday, May 2: Working Groups (WGs) meet, work papers for Steering Group consideration

Thursday, May 4: WGs meet, finalize papers

Friday afternoon, May 5: Steering Group meets, reviews next steps

Saturday, May 6: Coordinating Group meets to review status of work

Monday, May 8: WGs meet to discuss how and where to utilize policy initiatives, coordination strategy with Allies, other implementation issues

Tuesday, May 9: Steering Group meets, finalizes above-described implementation strategy

Friday, May 12: WGs meet to review progress; draft briefing books for May trip due from State

Monday, May 14: Steering Group meets

Tuesday, May 15: Coordinating Group meets

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Chris
classified*

May 1, 1989

TO: David Demarest

FROM: STEPHEN M. STUDDERT

SMS

- FYI
- Appropriate Action
- Let's Discuss
- Per Our Conversation
- Per Your Request
- Please Return

COMMENTS:

Scene Setter for Rome, Italy visit
by the President

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
lt 06/14/23

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AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

Chriss -
2 speeches by Gates on the
USSR. October speech was quite
"controversial" on subject of Gorbachev's
task, etc. For what they're worth.
P.S. I have given M. Davis copies. Dan

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Center for Strategic & International Studies Conference
The 1990s: Critical Change
1 April 1989

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Gorbachev and Critical Change in the Soviet Union:
Implications for the West

It is an honor to speak to this distinguished audience examining critical change in the 1990s. I can think of no more appropriate or timely topic, for we are in a truly extraordinary period. Europe is moving steadily toward greater economic and political integration in 1992. Authoritarian governments from the Philippines and the Republic of Korea in the East to Latin America in the West are giving way to democracy. China is in the midst of a momentous reform program, and, in the Soviet Union, a revolution from above has been launched, albeit with no assurance it will succeed. Capitalism and democracy are ascendant; economic statism and political despotism are in retreat.

There has been a remarkable change in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union over the past two years, including the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. The Soviets have announced a first and important step toward reducing their overwhelming conventional force advantage in Europe. Conventional force reduction negotiations opened last month and negotiations on strategic force reductions will resume in the near future. A Sino-Soviet Summit is scheduled for mid-May. The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the Vietnamese may be leaving Cambodia, and a settlement getting the Cubans and South Africans out of Angola has been negotiated. Exhausted, Iraq and Iran have agreed to and are, in the main, observing a ceasefire. Structural change is reshaping international economic relationships in dramatic ways.

Accordingly, critical change in the 1990s is a most appropriate subject. It certainly is a subject with which the Bush Administration has been preoccupied for the last two months. Resisting the siren song of the quick fix and the big headline, we actually are trying to think about the 1990s -- to absorb and understand the many

changes that have taken place in recent years, those that are still underway, and those that are only just above the horizon of the future. Our task, then, is to devise policies that look to the end of the century and beyond. We are working to develop economic, political, military and arms control strategies that are grounded in reality and yet build upon opportunities for constructive, stabilizing change. We see opportunities to expand freedom, to strengthen both peace and security at lower levels of military forces, to enhance economic growth and extend it, and to promote international cooperation on such common problems as terrorism, drugs, the environment, and the spread of chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them.

Seizing such opportunities requires preparation and planning. Too often the energies and time of senior officials are consumed day in and day out by the crisis of the moment -- a diplomatic demarche, a newspaper story, a Congressional hearing, a bureaucratic dispute or a multitude of other short-term preoccupations. We in government, as a rule, spend too little time thinking about and planning for the future. We spend too little time reflecting on history and experience; we neglect strategy for tactics.

The Bush Administration is trying to resist this. Accordingly, our reviews of the international setting and our policies are focused on the development of long range strategy. Failure to take stock, to understand, to look ahead, and to plan would ensure failure to seize the opportunities we see now and discern in the future.

This brings me to the Soviet Union. On this subject, more than on any other, there has been speculation about the views of the new administration and directions the President will take. We have heard such nuanced and sophisticated questions as "Should we help Gorbachev" -- and we have resisted the temptation of monosyllabic answers. I expect our Soviet review to be complete very soon. This afternoon, rather than focus prematurely on possible outcomes or specific policies, I want to share with you the framework within which we approach the Soviet-American relationship.

We do live in a time of dramatic change -- change that now has spread to the Soviet Union. The failure of a system of government -- economic, political, social and moral failure -- is a powerful inducement to dramatic departures from the past, to

unprecedented distancing from many of the precepts that have guided the system for so long. It is the self-evident failure of the Soviet system, and the absolute imperative to change it, that form Gorbachev's mandate, are his primary sources of political support, shape his radicalism, and cause us all to wonder if the wheel of history is at last about to turn for that vast empire. Regardless of the substantial odds against him, we take seriously Gorbachev's determination to modernize the Soviet economy. We applaud the measures he has taken to increase openness in the press, to ease restrictions on religion, to take the first faltering steps toward democratization, and to contribute constructively to settling certain international disputes. We welcome his commitment to reduce Soviet conventional forces and to pursue a further relaxation of tensions and arms control. These are all positive steps, and they have led to widespread hope and optimism. We, too, are hopeful.

At the same time, long term policy must not be based on hopes, but on past experience, present realities and future probabilities -- as well as possibilities. Just as I believe we must try to look well into to the future in developing foreign policy, I also advocate looking to the past -- examining the historical record for

insights pertinent to the future. This is especially true with respect to the Soviet Union, where Western views too often are shaped by the latest leadership change, pronouncement or enticing proposal.

Looking back over one's shoulder with respect to the USSR is not for the faint hearted. What we see, above all, is a system of rule that over a seventy year period has brought to the peoples of the old Russian empire suffering on a scale previously unknown in human history. Mentioning this often elicits a reaction similar to a display of bad manners at a dinner party or a dismissive gesture suggesting the irrelevance of this past to our future. Commonly, the horrors of Soviet history are blamed on Stalin, both within and outside of the Soviet Union. Yet, I believe it essential for us today to understand that this record is not confined to the Stalin era alone, was not the doing of a single demented leader, but covers the entirety of Soviet history, and is the product of the very nature of the system itself.

Soviet history did not begin in the Spring of 1985. A brief reminder of the record and of the cycles in that record are useful, even for an audience as well informed as this one.

-- Under Lenin, 10 million people were killed in the civil war from 1918 to 1920, and another 5 million died in the War Communism famine of 1921-22. In 1921, in the midst of catastrophe, Lenin set a precedent for his successors by retreating, falling back to tried and true methods of economic growth -- private markets, small private business, denationalization, and legalization of private trade. By 1923, 83 percent of retail trade had been privatized. Whether the New Economic Policy and associated measures would have endured had Lenin lived is one of those finally unanswerable questions. Regardless, Lenin himself admitted, "We showed quite clearly that we cannot run the economy." Truer and more prophetic words were never spoken. While economic policy might have turned out rather differently, I believe Lenin contemplated no such flexibility in terms of politics -- the controlling monopoly of the Communist party.

Meanwhile, in another precedent important for the future, as early as 1920-21, facing disastrous internal problems, Lenin turned to the West for help, signing trade treaties with Britain,

Norway, Italy and Sweden and obtaining a major loan from France. By 1921, the American Relief Administration was feeding nearly 10 million Soviet citizens.

-- Under Stalin, another 14 million people died from 1928 to 1937 -- the war against the peasants. Countless more were killed in the Great Terror, as Stalin first purged the Party and then the military to eliminate opposition, both real and imagined. By the late 1930s, some 12 million people were in forced labor camps. Constant terror and periodic purges were characteristic of the Soviet regime to the very end of Stalin's life in 1953.

At the same time, Stalin eagerly and successfully sought foreign assistance for the Soviet regime from the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and France. The majority of the largest Soviet power plants before the war were built by the British firm Metropolitan-Vickers; western companies designed, built and equipped the industrial complexes at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk as well as the Urals Machine Works, and many more. The great Dnepr dam was built by the firm of Colonel Hugh

Cooper, an American hydraulic engineer. And, yet, during the period before the war the Soviet Union intervened in the Spanish Civil War, invaded Finland, and with Hitler's blessing seized the Baltic States and carved up Poland. I need hardly mention Soviet expansionism in Europe, Southwest Asia and East Asia in the immediate post-war period.

-- Khrushchev, as described by the emigre historians Heller and Nekrich, demonstrated that the system could forego mass terror without altering the Stalinist socialist state. This more selective terror stopped at the doors of the Central Committee as Khrushchev released millions from Stalin's camps but soon began refilling them. The means of intimidation became more sophisticated with the use of psychiatric incarcerations and other punishments.

Domestic reform again became the order of the day as Khrushchev moved to decentralize and modernize the economy, made management more flexible and eased pressures on the rural population. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet authorities declared their intention to increase

production of consumer goods and food. They again turned to private plots in agriculture and espoused the need for material relief of the people. He launched an anti-corruption campaign, sought to have senior party officials elected by secret ballot to limited terms of office, and tried to limit the privileges of senior officials. And in 1962, the Liberman economic reforms were begun with the central theme that profitability would be the main criterion for gauging the economic performance of enterprises.

Remember the "Thaw" of the 1950s -- the first and last time to this day that a work of Alexander Solzenitsyn has been published in the USSR? A new openness emerged as the central newspapers published thousands of complaints about the arbitrariness of local leaders and demands for legality. And, of course, Khrushchev exposed many of the crimes of the Stalin period.

Meanwhile the new Soviet leaders moved immediately to normalize relations -- to establish a detente -- with the United States and the West. The Korean Armistice was signed in July

1953, a cease fire was quickly agreed in Indochina and in 1955, Soviet forces left Austria. Eisenhower and Khrushchev met in Geneva and the Soviet leader visited the United States. Khrushchev unilaterally reduced conventional military forces by 1.8 million men between 1955 and 1957. There was much talk of the end of the cold war. Yet, during this period the Soviets crushed revolts in East Germany and Hungary, built and deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles for the first time, sent some of those missiles to Cuba, precipitated several dangerous crises in Berlin and built the Berlin Wall.

-- The popular impression of the Brezhnev period, reinforced by Gorbachev, is one of doddering old men presiding ineffectively and incompetently over a stagnating economy while pursuing detente and arms control with the West. This is Western historical amnesia and Soviet selectivity, if not disinformation.

In 1965, the Soviet leaders already knew their economy was in serious difficulty. They ratified many of Khrushchev's economic reforms, with the Liberman concepts at the core. The leadership turned again to the law of supply and demand,

material incentives and broad autonomy. Premier Kosygin tried to implement significant reforms, but plainly Brezhnev and the rest of the Politburo had little interest in paying any political, economic or social price to pursue reform. Then, as now, they tried to reconcile the irreconcilable: to enlarge the rights of individual enterprises and also restore the power of the central economic ministries.

By the late sixties, twin crises enveloped the USSR -- a political crisis reflecting the nationalities problem, and an economic crisis as growth decreased sharply. Brezhnev needed a breathing spell and, as so often in Soviet history, outside assistance. The West was happy to oblige.

Relationships with Europe and the United States blossomed. Tensions relaxed, warmer relationships were cultivated with European countries, the Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin was concluded, the first SALT Treaty and many narrower technical agreements were signed with the US, and Western trade, credits and technology flowed.

Yet, consider what Brezhnev was up to elsewhere during this

same period. His was the regime that invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 and crushed the Prague Spring. The Western reaction? President Johnson said, "We hope -- and we shall strive -- to make this setback a temporary one." The then French Foreign Minister said it was "an unpleasant incident along the road." The next year, the Soviets attacked China along the Ussuri River and dropped heavy hints, including in Washington, that a nuclear attack against China was under consideration. Recklessly or intentionally, the Soviets helped provoke the 1967 Middle East War. In the mid-1970s, they supported Cuban surrogate forces in Angola and Ethiopia. The same leaders toasted in the West provided the wherewithal for North Vietnam's final conquest of the South, underwrote the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, and sold \$12 billion worth of weapons to Libya. In 1979, Brezhnev ordered the invasion of Afghanistan. In 1980-81, this leadership forced the imposition of martial law in Poland and the suppression of Solidarity. And, all of this took place against the backdrop of the greatest peacetime military buildup in history.

We also have too easily forgotten the wave of internal

repression inside the Soviet Union during this period. In 1965, there were mass arrests of those involved in nationalist movements in the Ukraine, Lithuania and the Transcaucasus. The first show trials since Stalin convicted Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966 for slandering the Soviet state. Political trials all over the USSR followed -- in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov, Gorky, Riga, Tashkent and Omsk. Remember Aleksandr Ginzburg, Pavel Litvinov, Yuri Galanskov and all the others? By the late 1970s, the KGB had destroyed the dissident and human rights movements.

-- Finally, Andropov, as head of the KGB architect of the suppression of dissent. His contribution as General Secretary to solving the Soviet crisis? Tighter discipline, a call to arms against "consumer instincts," squeezing the fat out of the economy -- but not a single substantial reform. During his fifteen months in the top job, we saw wide scale arrests of dissidents, Baptists, Jews and many others.

I offer this thumbnail sketch of Soviet history to underscore that our view of the Soviet Union cannot be based on the

personality of one or another leader, but must be based on the nature of the Soviet system itself. We face a deeply entrenched philosophy and system of government that to date has depended upon repression at home and promoted aggression beyond its borders. It is the Soviet system itself, and the 70 year continuity we see from leader to leader, from Lenin to Chernenko, and even Gorbachev, that shapes our view of the USSR. Gorbachev is challenging some aspects of this system but even he acknowledges he has not yet significantly changed it. We cannot ignore Soviet history or the apparent strength and durability of the system that produced it. Nor can we ignore the cyclical turn to reform, "detente" and foreign assistance each time the system has hovered on the brink of catastrophe or fallen into it.

Le Monde has said, "One cannot minimize the scope of this reform. By every available measure, it is without doubt of the first importance.... It will have major consequences if it runs its course. Gradually, the entire Soviet system of planning will be overturned." Regrettably, those words were published in December 1964.

In important respects, Gorbachev has made quite clear he has

no intention of dismantling fundamental features of the system. There will be no political party but the Communist Party, as demonstrated by the prompt crushing of the Democratic Union. The economy is, and will remain, governed by political decisions. Rights are granted by the Party to the people. Glasnost is a grant, possibly temporary, from Gorbachev to the Soviet people suited to his own political needs and purposes. Indeed, it seems clear that Gorbachev turned to political reform only because he concluded that it had become necessary to achieve his economic objectives.

Moreover, we cannot make long-term decisions and devise strategies affecting freedom and the future that depend on the continued political (or even physical) survival of one man. Indeed, not a leader in the West goes to bed unaware that he or she could wake up to a new Soviet counterpart. Unlike any Western or other modern state, politics at the highest level in the Kremlin today are as hidden from public view as in generations past. Much has changed, but more that is fundamental remains the same.

In sum, we proceed with care and prudence because we are dealing with a system where the roots of oppression, aggression,

and secrecy are deep, because for seventy years we repeatedly have seen a system in crisis proclaim reform and turn to the West for help while the essential features of that system at the end of the day remained unchanged.

Prudence, however, is not synonymous with inaction. Nor is wariness to be equated with pessimism and cynicism. It would be the worst sort of myopia not to recognize that profound changes are underway in the Soviet Union. There is a degree of openness and vigor of political debate in the USSR unknown since the days of the first (or February) revolution in 1917. Indeed, we need only reflect on the openness of debate at the Party Conference last summer or the elections this last week. (Who could not be amazed at the defeat of the Leningrad Party Chief, who ran unopposed, or the demonstration of support for Boris Yeltsin?) In a number of areas -- Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, conventional force reductions, various aspects of arms control, China -- we are seeing the Soviets change their policies, abandon old positions, and remove themselves from longstanding dead-ends. We do see "new thinking" in some areas, although in others -- as in Central America and the Middle East -- the old ways of thinking and behavior remain.

We are generally encouraged by what we see. Maybe this time things will be different. The changes plainly offer opportunities -- opportunities for further reducing tensions, for enhancing strategic stability, for promoting human rights and democracy, for arms control, and for cooperation on transnational issues such as the environment, narcotics trafficking, and stopping the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Ironically, given Gorbachev's priorities, the pace of some aspects of political change is far outstripping economic modernization and performance. Indeed, what Gorbachev has set in motion represents a political earthquake. He is pulling all of the levers of change in a society and culture that historically has resisted change -- and where change usually has been violent and wrenching. He is a figure of enormous historical importance. The forces he has unleashed are powerful but so are the people and institutions he has antagonized -- thus setting in motion a tremendous power struggle and purge no less dramatic for the absence of show trials and terror. The outcome is by no means clear, and prolonged turbulence seems certain.

Gorbachev seeks a system in which some -- though certainly not all -- elements of the Stalinist economic structure and bureaucracy are eliminated thus opening the way to greater flexibility and innovation and thereby to modernization and improved performance. However, elections notwithstanding, Gorbachev's Leninism still means the continued political monopoly of the Communist Party. Gorbachev's dictatorship of the Communist Party remains untouched and untouchable. He seeks still a system based on the same Leninist political principles that guided his predecessors. As he said in 1987, "We will not retreat an inch from the path of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism."

Westerners for centuries have hoped repeatedly that Russian economic modernization and political reform -- even revolution -- signaled an end to despotism. Repeatedly since 1917, the West has hoped that domestic changes in the USSR would lead to changes in Communist coercive rule at home and aggressiveness abroad. These hopes, dashed time and again, have been revived by Gorbachev's radical domestic agenda, innovative foreign policy and personal style.

Enduring characteristics of Soviet governance at home and policy abroad make it clear that -- while the changes underway offer opportunities for a relaxation of tensions and for cooperation in many areas -- Gorbachev intends improved Soviet economic performance, greater political vitality at home, and more dynamic diplomacy to make the USSR a more competitive and stronger adversary in the years ahead.

What we seek is a Soviet Union that is pluralistic internally, non-interventionist externally, observes basic human rights, contributes to international stability and tranquility, and a Soviet Union where these changes are more than an edict from the top and are independent of the views, power and durability of a single individual. We can hope for such change but all of Russian and Soviet history tells us to be skeptical and cautious.

We cannot -- and should not -- close our eyes to momentous developments in the USSR. But we should not make concessions based on hope and popular enthusiasms in the West or attractive personalities in the USSR. We should, however, take advantage of

opportunities where the terms are favorable to us, where we can solve problems to mutual advantage, or where we can bring about desirable changes in Soviet policies -- whether to promote human rights, freer emigration, solutions to Soviet generated problems such as Afghanistan, reduce the military threat or even to expand business ties (if there is no transfer of sensitive technology). Above all, we must establish realistic criteria by which we can judge in the coming months and years whether political or economic change in the Soviet Union genuinely is reshaping the foundations of the system -- or whether the historically oppressive structure of the Soviet Union, including the instruments of central control and repression, endures discreetly in the shadows, available at the beckon of Gorbachev's successor, or even for Gorbachev.

Gorbachev has spoken of a European home, from the Atlantic to the Urals. But "Europe" and "the West" are not just geographic terms. They represent a community and continuity of values, a common historical experience reflected in this year's bicentennial celebration of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the inauguration of our First President under the Constitution. The principles set forth in these two documents compared to the central

tenets of Leninism still held dear by Gorbachev mark the distance that remains between us.

For all the changes underway, the Soviet Union philosophically and politically still embodies the primacy of the State over the individual. Because of this unbridgeable difference in values and beliefs, whether Gorbachev succeeds, fails, or just survives, a still long competition and struggle with the Soviet Union lie before us. Preserving the peace and fostering an enduring relaxation of tensions even as the competition continues depends upon seeing this reality clearly. Keeping this long range perspective -- with keen awareness of perhaps unprecedented opportunities as well as the dangers -- will be an extraordinary challenge for the United States and the Western democracies.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
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INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44 MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED, RETIRED, DEMOTED AND PROMOTED WITH NO DISSENT OR EVEN DISCUSSION AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE THE SESSION WAS TESTIMONY TO GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT ALSO WAS A MARK OF HIS VULNERABILITY AND HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS, BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN THE PARTY TO HIS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION.

THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ASIDE THE DISCUSSION OF PERSONALITIES AND RECENT PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPORTANT BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE WEST -- WHAT CHANGES ACTUALLY ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW GORBACHEV IS DOING IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM.

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WAS AFFECTING THEIR MILITARY POWER AND POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.

THESE TRENDS, AT A TIME OF WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, REMARKABLE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND DRAMATIC ECONOMIC GROWTH, FORCED THE POLITBURO TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS. THEY COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.

STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION

THERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO SINCE 1985 FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY, FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE.

AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING TWO WEEKS AGO, GORBACHEV SHOWED REAL POLITICAL MUSCLE IN ADVANCING SEVERAL PROTEGES AND SUPPORTERS WHILE REMOVING MOST OF THE REMAINING BREZHNEV HOLDOVERS. BUT EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CLASSIC POLITICAL STROKE IN THE KREMLIN, THE LIMITS TO GORBACHEV'S POWER -- OR AT LEAST THE DEGREE OF RISK HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT -- ARE APPARENT. TWO SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PURPORTEDLY HAVE

BEEN MAJOR OBSTACLES TO FAR-REACHING CHANGE — SECOND SECRETARY YEGOR LIGACHEV AND FORMER KGB CHIEF VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV — REMAIN ON THE POLITBURO AND IN POWERFUL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH WITH DIMINISHED CLOUT. MEANWHILE, GORBACHEV STILL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO PROMOTE ONE OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT PROTEGES, PARTY SECRETARY GEORGY RAZUMOVSKIY. GORBACHEV PROBABLY CAN COUNT ON ONLY 3 OR 4 OUT OF 12 POLITBURO MEMBERS AS BEING TOTALLY HIS MEN, CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTIVE ACROSS THE BOARD. SO, WHILE THIS SET GOES TO GORBACHEV, THE MATCH IS FAR FROM OVER. IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR THE LONG TERM THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING INTENSE STRUGGLE OVER THE PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND OVER POLITICAL POWER.

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE THERE ARE POWERFUL CONSTITUENCIES OUTSIDE THE POLITBURO THAT ARE RESISTANT TO CHANGE — ESPECIALLY THE FAR-REACHING CHANGE HE SEEKS. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED — JUSTIFIABLY IT WOULD SEEM — ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN

EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE HAVE COUNTED SOME 600 POPULAR DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM RELATING TO ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE LAST JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND GO. THEY ARE DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT -- A WEAK REED IN THE SOVIET UNION.

IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND PARTICULARLY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV, AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF IS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT OPPOSITION, AND HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT POSITION HIMSELF, AND TO TRY TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY.

IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920S AND 1930S. A MAJOR DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE CAN SO RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN SOVIET LIFE, WHETHER HE CAN DO SO WITHOUT CREATING CHAOS, AND WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE WEAKENED AND EVEN DISMANTLED. AND NO MATTER HOW MANY PERSONNEL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES GORBACHEV MAKES, IF HE CANNOT MAKE HIS POLICIES WORK, IF HE CANNOT TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY, TODAY'S SUPPORTERS WILL AT SOME POINT BECOME TOMORROW'S ADVERSARIES.

MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

GORBACHEV NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE.

TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE. NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE

REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL PLANNING. THE POLITBURO SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO LET GO OF THE REINS GOVERNING THE ECONOMY. BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 1991 AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY, AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:

- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO LESS THAN 1% IN 1987, DOWN FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986. GNP GROWTH WILL BE ABOUT 2-3% THIS YEAR. GORBACHEV WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH PER YEAR IN 1989 AND 1990 TO MEET THE FIVE YEAR PLAN TARGETS, A TARGET THAT IS FAR BEYOND REACH.
- IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM CAUSED MAJOR DISRUPTIONS IN PRODUCTION LAST YEAR, FORCING THE REGIME TO BACK OFF ITS ENFORCEMENT.
- NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS, AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE IN OTHERS.

- DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DONE SO FAR HAS NOT GREATLY CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE.

- TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT. THE RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL -- HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD WAS SET IN 1954, AND MEAT PRICES IN 1962. STATE SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN.

- UNDER GORBACHEV, THE DEFICIT IN THE SOVIET STATE BUDGET HAS SOARED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS NOW EQUAL TO ABOUT 7% OF GNP, ABOUT 66 BILLION RUBLES. BY WAY OF COMPARISON, THE COMBINED DEFICITS OF THE US STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS REACHED A HIGH OF 3 1/2% OF GNP TWO YEARS AGO.

FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN EMPTY SHELVES, LONG LINES IN STATE STORES, AND RISING PRICES IN RETAIL MARKETS. INDEED, STAGNATION ON THE CONSUMER SCENE AND RECOGNITION THAT PERESTROIKA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT WORKER SUPPORT HAS PROMPTED THE LEADERSHIP TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF NEW POLICY INITIATIVES. TARGETS HAVE BEEN RAISED FOR SPENDING ON HOUSING, EDUCATION, HEALTH, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND INVESTMENT IN THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES. EVEN SO, THE POPULATION WON'T SEE MUCH CHANGE IN ITS LIVING STANDARDS IN THE SHORT TERM BECAUSE THESE INVESTMENTS WILL TAKE TIME TO SHOW RESULTS AND THE SHORTAGES OF HOUSING AND DECENT HEALTH CARE ARE SO LARGE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SHIFT TOWARD GREATER PRIORITY FOR THE CONSUMER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION OF WHICH IS THE CRITICAL ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.

THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE, THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT THIS POINT IS BEING LOST. AFTER THREE YEARS OF REFORM, RESTRUCTURING AND TURMOIL, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE, IF ANY, SLOWING IN THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THE GAP BETWEEN PRONOUNCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING. IT IS THIS REALITY THAT

LED TO THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE AND THE DRAMATIC PERSONNEL CHANGES TWO WEEKS AGO.

POLITICAL REFORM

AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF GORBACHEV'S VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY COULD SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT SEEKS:

- THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM. HIS VERBAL CONTORTIONS IN EXPLAINING HOW GIVING PEASANTS A 50 YEAR FARM LEASE DOES NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM SOCIALISM HAVE BEEN, AT THE LEAST, IMAGINATIVE.

-- THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THE PARTY CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION. MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO HIS AGENDA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS HE DEMONSTRATED TWO WEEKS AGO, THE OLD METHODS REMAIN AVAILABLE WHEN MORE DEMOCRATIC MEANS SEEM UNLIKELY TO YIELD THE DESIRED RESULTS.

-- THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL-EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF

WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.

GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.

IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.

IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.

FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER AT HOME.

TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT "OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS WE ARE SEEING IN ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, ESTONIA, LATVIA AND EVEN IN MOSCOW.

IN SUM, WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. AS ONE RUSSIAN RECENTLY SAID, "THERE HAVE BEEN MANY BOOKS WRITTEN ON THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM BUT NOT ONE ON THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM." BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL

AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS GROWING AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY. AS USUAL IN THE USSR, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.

IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS DOUBTFUL -- THAT GORBACHEV CAN IN THE END REJUVENATE THE SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER AND POSITION AND THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM ITSELF IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT REALLY IS. AND EVEN HE NOW ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST FOR DECADES.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY

THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT, FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT

AND TRADE, AND, ABOVE ALL, AVOID LARGE INCREASES IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED.

SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR-FIGHTING. AS THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.

THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS CONTINUED PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS PROVIDED NEARLY A BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN 1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR -- TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SAY A GREAT DEAL ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET UNION PLAINLY WOULD LIKE TO EASE THIS BURDEN AND IS INTERESTED IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE THIRD WORLD ISSUES THAT HAVE LED TO ADVERSE REACTIONS IN THE WEST AND IN ASIA. THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE. FACED WITH AN UNWINNABLE WAR, THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP REASSESSED THE COSTS AND BENEFITS AND CONCLUDED THAT SOVIET INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD WERE BETTER SERVED BY LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SIMILAR CALCULATIONS ALSO EXPLAIN THE APPARENTLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA AND CAMBODIA. THIS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IN MY VIEW REFLECTS INCREASING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE KREMLIN. EVEN SO, SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE THIRD WORLD -- AS DEMONSTRATED IN GORBACHEV'S RECENT PROPOSAL TO TRADE CAM RANH BAY FOR OUR BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES -- REMAIN ADVERSARIAL AND SEEK TO DIMINISH US GLOBAL INFLUENCE AND REACH.

THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH CHINA THAT LIKELY WILL LEAD TO A SUMMIT IN A MATTER OF MONTHS; OVERTURES TO JAPAN ALSO SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- MOST OF THEM AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE -- AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO COMPLETE AND KEEP A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).

FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE

PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET AND THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.

THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE EVIDENT. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.

ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP

CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START OBVIOUSLY WOULD ALSO LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM-LINE POSITIONS WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.

ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE.

CONCLUSIONS

WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN SMALL AND FREQUENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. HE IS

A FIGURE OF ENORMOUS HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.

THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE. HOWEVER, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM STILL MEANS THE CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY -- ALBEIT A REJUVENATED ONE, ITS ROLE AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.

WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION -- SIGNALLED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO

CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.

ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.

WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC INTERNALLY, NON-INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND TRANQUILLITY, AND A SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE

VIEWS, POWER AND DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.

WE CANNOT -- AND SHOULD NOT -- CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME SOVIET-WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS, FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN EXPANDED BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.

THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS APPARENT: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS, FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. PRESERVING THE PEACE AND FOSTERING AN ENDURING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DEPEND UPON SEEING THIS REALITY CLEARLY. KEEPING THIS LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE -- WITH KEEN AWARENESS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.

Miss

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW CARD
DAVID DEMAREST ✓
MARLIN FITZWATER
SUSAN PORTER ROSE
BRENT SCOWCROFT

JOE HAGIN
JOHN KELLER
TIMOTHY MCBRIDE
PATTY PRESOCK

FROM: STEPHEN M. STUDDERT *SW58*
SUBJECT: BOSTON UNIVERSITY

I have expressed our concurrence to Boston University of the attached schedule proposal.

Boston University
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISE
Sunday, May 21, 1989

- 10:30 a.m. Academic Procession begins. (Graduates, Faculty, Deans, and Vice Presidents will file onto field. It will take approximately 25 minutes for everyone to be seated.)
- 11:00 a.m. Presidents Bush and Mitterrand, Mrs. Bush and President Silber will be escorted to the platform on Nickerson Field.
- 11:05 a.m. Dr. Metcalf, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Boston University, will open the Commencement Exercise. The national anthems will be played. Professor Elie Wiesel will deliver the invocation. Thereafter, President Silber will preside over the ceremonies.
- 11:10 a.m. Dr. Silber will introduce the Senior Student Speaker whose address will last not more than three minutes.
- 11:13 a.m. Dr. Silber will introduce the faculty winners of the Metcalf Cup and Prize for Excellence in Teaching. Two prizes will be given and two citations read.
- 11:23 a.m. Mrs. Barbara Bush will be escorted to the podium. Her citation will be read and she will be hooded. She does not speak.
- 11:28 a.m. President Mitterrand will be escorted to the podium, citation will be read and he will be hooded. President Mitterrand will deliver address which will be about ten minutes add an additional 10 minutes for translation.
- 11:53 a.m. President Bush will be escorted to podium, citation will be read and he will be hooded. President Bush will deliver address which is expected to last ten minutes.
- 12:08 p.m. President Bush's address ends and he returns to his seat.
- 12:09 p.m. Dr. Silber will present candidates for degrees. (*en masse*). Each dean will announce from the microphone his or her candidates (*en masse*).
- 12:29 p.m. President Silber will then recognize the Class of 1939, will make brief remarks to parents, thank Alumni Concert Band and staff.
- 12:34 p.m. Mrs. Nancy Joaquim will sing Clarissima, school song.
- 12:36 p.m. Bernard Cardinal Law, Archbishop of Boston, will deliver the benediction.
- 12:40 p.m. Presidents Bush and Mitterrand, Mrs. Bush and President Silber will depart the platform to the Case Center.

Note: We should allow an additional 10 minutes for movement back and forth by platform party, applause and cheers from audience. I have not added that to the schedule.



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Office of Public Policy

April 28, 1989

David F. DeMarest, Jr.
Assistant to the President
for Communications
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. DeMarest:

Thank you for sending we President Bush's speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Association in your memorandum to opinion leaders. I appreciate being kept informed of the President's messages and the Administration's initiatives. I look forward to receiving further communications from your office.

Sincerely,

Daniel P. Bourque
Corporate Senior Vice President

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