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VOLUME 14

Heart to India

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA

INTERNATIONAL EDITION

COMPLETE IN THIRTY VOLUMES

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1829

GROLIER INCORPORATED

International Headquarters: Danbury, Connecticut 06816



BOB AND IRA SPRING

HELSINKI, Finland's capital and largest city, is also a major seaport with an excellent harbor. To the left can be seen the president's palace, while the spire of Uspenski Cathedral rises at center.

HELSINKI, hel'sing-kē, the capital and largest city of Finland, is located in the far south of the country on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. In addition to its political function, the city plays a leading role in the cultural, commercial, and industrial life of Finland. Being situated in a district whose rural inhabitants are largely of Swedish extraction, Helsinki has a bilingual character; about one fifth of its population speaks Swedish. The Swedish name for the city is *Helsingfors.*

Helsinki is characterized by stately public buildings, broad avenues, and tree-lined esplanades. It is often called the "White City of the North," because it is built largely of the local light-colored granite. At the center of the older part of the city is Senate Square. It contains the cathedral, university, and state council building, all designed in neoclassical style by the German architect Karl Ludwig Engel in the early 19th century. Other notable buildings include the National Museum (1911) and the railway station (1914), both designed by Eliel Saarinen, the parliament building (1931), and the national pension building (1956), designed by Alvar Aalto. The tower of the Olympic stadium (1938) affords a fine panoramic view of the city and its surroundings.

Economy. Industrially, Helsinki is diversified. Metalworking and machinery manufacture rank as the most important branches in terms of employment. Included in this category are shipyards, foundries, machine shops, and factories producing electrical equipment and railway rolling stock. Other major industries include textiles, clothing, and food processing. Helsinki has the largest porcelain factory in Scandinavia.

Three eighths of Finland's domestic commerce is carried on in Helsinki. Consumers' cooperative societies account for a considerable proportion of total sales, and nearly one fourth of the city's inhabitants are members of Elanto, the largest and most influential cooperative.

In foreign commerce, Helsinki ranks as the country's largest import and second-largest export port. Its peninsula site gives it access to the sea through five harbors, the oldest and most important of which is the so-called "South Harbor." Although Helsinki is icebound from January to May, it handles about 10 million tons of shipping a year. Almost half of the tonnage of Finland's merchant fleet is registered in Helsinki. Helsinki's airport, located at Malmi, 7 miles (11 km) to the northeast, is the country's busiest; it handles both domestic and international flights.

History. Helsinki was founded in 1550 by decree of Gustav I Vasa, King of Sweden. The original site was at the mouth of the Vantaa River, some 3 miles (4.8 km) north of the present city center. Hoping to establish a port that could effectively meet the competition of Reval (modern Tallinn) on the south shore of the Gulf of Finland, Gustav commanded the inhabitants of all the other towns in southern Finland (except Turku and Viipuri) to move to Helsinki; they were allowed to return home only when Helsinki was firmly established. The town was granted its first charter in 1569 by King John III, but the difficulty of reaching it from the open sea impeded its commercial growth. Finally, in 1640, the town was rebuilt on the Vironniemi peninsula, closer to the gulf.

Despite easier access from the sea, Helsinki remained a small unimportant town. It was periodically devastated by fire, plague, and enemy attack. But when the southeastern part of Finland was lost to the Russians in 1743, the Swedes were prompted to fortify the approaches to Helsinki, and the completion of the Suomenlinna (Swedish, Sveaborg) fortress in 1748 gave the city new importance as a defensive outpost. However, when the Russians invaded Finland in 1808, Sveaborg capitulated with scarcely a fight. In the same year Helsinki was burnt to the ground.

After the cession of Finland to the Russians in 1809, the country's new political masters decided to rebuild Helsinki, and a grandiose 30-year plan was drawn up. In 1812, Czar Alexander I decreed that the seat of the Finnish government should be transferred to Helsinki from Turku, where it had been located since the beginning of Swedish rule. In 1828 the national university was moved from Turku to the capital. Within a decade, Helsinki overtook Turku as the most populous city in Finland, and in the following century it steadily lengthened its lead. Population: (1976) 491,516; of the metropolitan area, 825,407.

VINCENT H. MALMSTROM, *Middlebury College*

VOLUME 11

Falstaff to Francke

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FINLAND

FINNISH TOURIST ASSOCIATION

LAKE SAIMAA, in southeast Finland, presents a landscape typical of much of Finland, with dense forests reaching to the shoreline and numerous small islands.

Coat of Arms of Finland

CONTENTS

FINLAND, fin'lənd, is a republic in northern Europe. In area it is the fifth-largest state in Europe, but by population it is one of Europe's smaller countries. About one third of Finland lies above the Arctic Circle, and with Iceland it is the world's northernmost independent state.

Finland is a land of vast, dark, coniferous forests, with a multitude of lakes and islands, and long, indented coastlines. The basis of Finland's economy is its forests of pine, spruce, and birch, which cover about 70% of the land area. There are more than 55,000 lakes and innumerable ponds. Finland has thousands of miles of seacoast, characterized by red and gray granite rocks, and lined with clusters of islands. Most of the land is low, though not flat, and abounds in small cliffs, hills, and ridges.

Finland connects the Scandinavian peninsula to the great land mass of eastern Europe, and this geographical location has deeply affected its development. Since earliest times Finland has received waves of immigrants from Scandinavia to the west and the European mainland to the east. The present linguistic and ethnic composition of Finland's population reflects this two-fold origin. There are two major language groups in Finland: the Finnish-speakers, or Finns, and the Swedish-speakers, also referred to as Swede-Finns.

The ancestors of the present-day Finnish-speakers emigrated gradually in small groups to Finland from Estonia across the Gulf of Finland. Traditionally the emigration is supposed to have taken place during the first eight centuries A.D.

INFORMATION HIGHLIGHTS

Official Name: The Republic of Finland (Finnish, Suomen Tasavalta; Swedish, Republiken Finland).
Head of State: President.
Head of Government: President and Prime minister.
Legislature: Eduskunta (Swedish, Riksdag).
Area: 130,165 square miles (337,127 sq km).
Highest Point: Haltiotunturi (4,344 feet, or 1,324 meters).
Population: 4,598,336 (1970 census); 4,764,422 (1979 est.).
Capital: Helsinki (Swedish, Helsingsfors).
Major Languages: Finnish and Swedish (both official).
Major Religious Groups: Lutherans; Greek Orthodox.
Monetary Unit: 1 Finnish mark (markka) = 100 pennies (penni).
Weights and Measures: Metric system.
Flag: A blue cross on a white field. See FLAG.
National Anthem: *Maamme* (Swedish, *Vårt Land; Our Country*).



P. MOLINARD, FROM RAPHO GUILLUMETTE

A LAPLANDER, wearing shoes and trousers of reindeer skin, whittles wood to repair his summer cabin.

However, archaeological finds suggest that the movement into Finland may have started earlier. The first settlements of any size appear to have been in southwestern Finland. From there they spread along the river routes inland to the southern part of the lake district in central Finland.

Most of the Swedish-speaking people of Finland are probably descendants of Swedes who migrated to Finland from the 11th through the 13th century, when Finland became gradually dominated by Sweden. The Swedish immigrants settled mainly along the unoccupied or underpopulated southern and western seacoasts. The newcomers helped to bring Finland under the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Finland remained under Swedish rule for about 600 years, from the 13th to the early 19th century. During this period its political, social, legal, and educational institutions developed along the Scandinavian pattern.

From time to time during the centuries of Swedish domination, Finland was a battlefield in the many wars that were fought between Sweden and Russia. Finally, in 1809, Finland was annexed to the czarist empire as an autonomous grand duchy. The century of Russian rule left few outward traces on Finland, but it marked the rise of Finnish nationalism. The Russians did not become directly involved in the administration of the country until the turn of the century, when a period of russification began, referred to by the Finns as the "years of oppression."

The beginnings of independent Finland were tragic. The declaration of independence in December 1917 was followed by a war that was at the same time a civil war and a war of national liberation from Russia. The country had only two decades of peace to prove its viability as an independent republic before it was invaded by Russia in 1939, at the outbreak of the "Winter War." With the exception of a short interval in 1940–1941, the war with Russia continued until the armistice in 1944. Since World War II Finland has cultivated close relations with both the Soviet Union and its Scandinavian neighbors in an attempt to pursue a policy of neutrality.

1. The People

Of Finland's population of 4,764,422 (1970 est.), over 92% are Finnish-speaking, while Swedish is the mother tongue for about 7%. The influence of the Swedish-speaking minority, once politically and socially dominant, has been gradually shrinking as has its proportion of the total population. Even the absolute number of Swedish-speakers has been decreasing, owing to a combination of increasing intermarriage, a low birthrate, and emigration. The Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking groups differ little in appearance. Both generally have a light complexion, gray or blue eyes, and fair or light-brown hair.

Finland also has a tiny minority of Lapps, numbering about 1,500, some of whom make their living by tending reindeer. There is a colorful gypsy population of about 4,000 people, a Jewish community of about 1,500, and a small Turkish minority of nearly 1,000.

Linguistic and Ethnic Characteristics. The two official national languages, Finnish and Swedish, are in no way related and differ from each other more than English and Russian, for example. Unlike most other languages spoken in Europe, Finnish is not an Indo-European tongue. Together with Estonian, Hungarian, and a number of languages spoken by small groups in the Soviet Union, it belongs to the Finno-Ugric family. The Finnish language has a wealth of vowels, but it also uses double consonants. It does not use the letters *b*, *c*, *f*, *w*, *x*, or *z*, and it has neither gender nor articles. Prepositions are replaced by suffixes, making the words quite long. Words are spelled phonetically, and in pronunciation the stress is invariably on the first syllable. See also section 8. *Language*.

The earliest origins of the Finno-Ugric people are a mystery, although recent comparative research on blood types seems to offer a possibility of further discoveries. Both Finns and Estonians apparently share certain blood types with the Mongolic peoples. These blood types are rarely found in other Europeans. Nevertheless, this discovery does not substantiate an earlier 19th century theory that connected the Finns with the Mongols. It was based on linguistic theories since discarded and on erroneous ideas about the appearance of Finns.

Way of Life. Outwardly there is a noticeable difference between life in town and life in the country. A majority of the urban residents live in apartment buildings. The average living space available per person in apartments in Finland falls below that in the Scandinavian countries and the rest of western Europe. However, many Finns own the apartments in which they live, and residents in a building often form a company in which each owns shares in proportion to the size of his apartment. The rural population, especially the farmers, frequently live on small, isolated homesteads. The dense farming

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FINLAND'S highest mountains are found near Lake Kilpisjärvi, in the extreme northwestern corner, well beyond the Arctic Circle.

FINNISH TOURIST ASSOCIATION



KEMIJÄRVI, in Lapland, is one of many small towns that were built by Finnish settlers as they moved north along the river valleys.

FINNISH TRAVEL ASSOCIATION

villages of central and eastern Europe are not characteristic of Finland.

Except for differences in types of dwellings, however, life in town and life in the country are quite similar. There are no major variations in food, drink, or dress. Rapid improvement in communications and the spread of cars, radios, and television have helped to standardize customs and tastes, reducing distinctions between various provinces and regions as well as between town and country. This same process has also tended to weaken efforts led by the youth societies to activate rural life by putting on plays and reviving interest in folk dances and old customs.

In some forms, however, folk culture has been well preserved in Finland. The Finnish folklore archives are probably the largest collection in the world. National costumes are occasionally worn on festive days. Wood carvings and various types of woven goods, such as *ryijy* rugs, are the main handicraft products.

A national interest in outdoor life and sports makes the lives of most Finns fairly similar both in winter and summer. In the winter practically all the people, from three-year-olds to grandparents, ski cross-country through the woods. The older Finnish children are active fans of ice hockey and ski jumping. In the summer the exodus from town to country is repeated, as hundreds of thousands of Finns flock to the lakes and coast to the summer cottages and saunas, the Finnish steam baths. There are some 500,000 saunas to satisfy the national passion for dry-heat bathing.

Social Structure. The social structure of Finland has changed considerably since World War II, and the 1960's were a period of especially rapid transformation. During its half century of independence, Finland made the transition from an agrarian country to a modern industrial and commercial society. Agriculture and forestry together provided work and a livelihood for most Finns before 1940, but by 1966 the percentage had fallen to less than one third. Within the same period, 1940 to 1966, the percentage of the work force employed in industry doubled and that in commerce and the service occupations—the fastest growing fields of employment—increased more than four times.

These changes, combined with the general availability of higher education, have brought about greater social mobility in Finland. At the turn of the century class distinctions were sharp and difficult to overcome, and some attitudes of an earlier period survive even today, such as the strong concern for occupational, professional, and academic titles.

The middle class has continued to grow—from an estimated 11% of the population in 1940 to about 30% in 1960. At the same time, the working class diminished from 62% to 51% of the population and the farmers from 24% to 16%.

Women form an important part of the Finn-

PHOTO TRENDS

Helsinki, the national capital, is Finland's largest city as well as its commercial center and busiest port.

ish work force. Over one third of the industrial workers and civil servants in Finland are women, although they generally receive lower salaries than men who have corresponding positions and training. Women are also strongly represented in some of the professions, such as dentistry.

Finland's high standard of living makes it one of the more prosperous countries in the world, although it has areas of poverty in the north and in the east. In the national income per capita it ranks 15th in the world and 11th in Europe. The growth rate of its national income has been among the highest in Europe, averaging about 5% a year.

The major social problems of Finland are related to regional discrepancies in the distribution of wealth. The northern and eastern parts of the country are economically depressed and seem continually to fall behind the rest of Finland. These regions have the highest birthrate in the country, but, faced with unemployment at home, the young people emigrate in search of a better life.

Population Changes. After World War II there was a baby boom in Finland, but more recently the birthrate has been falling, to 16.5 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1967. The death rate has been dramatically reduced during the 20th century and the rate of infant mortality is the fourth smallest in the world. Life expectancy in Finland has reached 65.4 years for men and 72.6 years for women. Finland's population density is 39.4 per square mile, but its distribution has been undergoing considerable change since World War II.

Movement to the urban centers is one of the two basic population trends in Finland. Urbanization has been rapid, and almost half the population now lives in urban communities, as opposed to 26.8% in 1940 and only 12% in 1900. The second basic trend is the increasing concentration of population in the southernmost corner of Finland, where the population density per square mile is sometimes 50 times greater than in the northland.

Large-scale resettlement had to be started immediately after World War II, when Finland had to find new homes for 425,000 refugees, or about 12% of its population, who had fled from the Karelian region lost to the Soviet Union. The largest number of refugees resettled in the southern areas of Finland, which have continued to attract people from other parts of the country.

Finland has not been able to provide adequate employment for its whole population, and this, combined with the high standard of living in neighboring Sweden and the freedom of movement, has encouraged considerable emigration. An estimated 200,000 Finns have moved to Sweden since World War II, and there has also been some emigration to Canada and Australia. Before World War I, Finnish emigration reached a peak of 159,000 in the first decade of the 20th century. During this period the greatest number of Finns resettled in the United States.

Religion. The Evangelical Lutheran Church, to which 92% of the population belongs, is by far the largest church in Finland. The Greek Orthodox Church is second in size, with a membership of 1.4% of the total population. There is freedom of worship in Finland, but in practice the Evangelical Lutheran Church enjoys a privileged position as the former state church. It is now often called the People's Church and still retains close ties to the state, with the president of Finland as its supreme head.

Traditionally, the Lutheran Church has been a conservative element in Finland. The working class and the socialist movement, especially in the past, have viewed it with some resentment and suspicion. Such attitudes, however, have had little effect on church membership. An overwhelming majority of marriages are celebrated in the church, and christenings and confirmations

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are universally accepted by the membership. But attendance at church services and an active participation in church affairs are not common. Furthermore, the church's influence as a social force has weakened, particularly in the cities.

2. The Land and Natural Resources

Most of Finland is low lying, with elevations averaging between 200 and 400 feet (60–120 meters). The hills generally increase in size toward the northeast, but the highest elevations are found in the extreme northwest of Finland. Many hollows in the surface soil have filled with water to form a myriad of interconnected shallow lakes, which create the long, complex waterways characteristic of Finland.

Finland is a land of ancient granite bedrock, mostly covered by glacial debris and postglacial marine deposits. Retreating glaciers left morainic ridges, eskers, hills, and mounds of boulder clay. The long, pine-covered morainic ridges of Salpausselkä, in the southern part of Finland, are the most notable example of this debris.

Geographical Regions. Finland can be divided into four basic regions: the coastal lowlands of the south and west; the lake-studded central plateau, or lake district, of the interior; the uplands of the north and east; and the archipelago, or belts of coastal islands, which are broadest in the southwest. These regions differ quite clearly in their dominant physical characteristics and natural conditions, though they do not coincide with historical or political divisions.

Coastal Lowlands. The coastal lowlands include some of the most fertile areas of the country and have a more settled look than the other regions. There are more fields and plains and fewer forests than elsewhere, and the hills and lakes are small. The southwestern corner of Finland is well cultivated, and its climate is the mildest in the country. It was the first area to be permanently settled, and Turku (Swedish, Åbo), the earliest town, was founded there.

Turku was the capital of Finland during the centuries of Swedish rule, and though devastated by fire several times, it still contains monuments that show its ancient origin. A medieval castle overlooks the harbor, and a 13th century cathedral, on the tree-lined shores of the Aura River, stands at the center of the city. Finland's first university was established in Turku in 1640. The city continues to be a center of learning, with both a private Finnish and a private Swedish university. With its population of over 150,000, Turku competes with Tampere for the title of second-largest city in Finland.

Helsinki (Swedish, Helsingfors), the capital city of Finland, is situated on a peninsula roughly in the middle of the southern coast. With a population of over 530,000, it is Finland's largest city. It is also Finland's main business and cultural center and busiest port, and the region around the capital is the fastest-growing district in the country. Helsinki has never been a heavily industrialized city, though it is now the hub of Finnish manufacturing. The city developed in the 19th century as an administrative center, and its neoclassical buildings give a pleasing unity to the historical heart of the city.

While small hills and valleys are characteristic of the southern coastal lowlands, the coastal plains of Ostrobothnia in western Finland are relatively flat. The two largest towns in Ostrobothnia are Vaasa (Swedish, Vasa) and Oulu, where the northernmost university in the world is situated.

Central Plateau. The lake district of central Finland, the second geographical region, is a labyrinth of waterways. Tens of thousands of lakes, with thousands of little islands, are connected in numerous water systems, some hundreds of miles long. Lakes cover about 9% of the total territory of Finland, but in the lake district they occupy 20% to 50% of the area.

EDITORIAL PHOTOCOLOR ARCHIVES

SAVONLINNA CASTLE, a 15th century stronghold, stands on an island in Lake Saimaa, the largest of Finland's many lakes.

BOB AND IRA SPRING

Most farms in Finland consist of small, isolated homesteads, such as this one at Imatra, near the Soviet border.

Lakes and forests dominate the landscape. Most of the arable land in the lake district lies to the southwest, the location of the earliest settlement in the area.

Rivers flowing from the lakes generate much of Finland's electric power. Some of the rapids in the lake district were the sites of early industrial centers, such as Tampere. An industrial town situated between two lakes, Tampere is also a cultural center, with a university and well-known theaters.

Lahti, situated on the southern edge of the lake district, is a rapidly growing modern town. It is a center for winter sports, especially skiing. The city of Lappeenranta, on the shores of Saimaa, Finland's largest lake, is the gateway to the Saimaa Canal connecting the rivers of the eastern part of the lake district with the Gulf of Finland. Savonlinna, a center of lake traffic in the Saimaa area, is the site of a handsome 15th century castle. Kuopio, the largest town in eastern Finland and the seat of the archbishop of the Finnish Orthodox Church, is on the northern edge of the lake region.

Uplands. The third district, the uplands of the north and east, covers about 40% of Finland's territory but does not play a role in the nation's economy commensurate with its size. The climate is harsher, the soils poorer, and the vegetation sparser than in the other areas. To the north the forests and hills become interspersed with large swamps, bogs, and marshlands. Stunted pines still grow here and there but gradually give way to small Arctic birches, willows, and finally the tundra, a treeless plain.

The largest rivers of Finland traverse this area, and meager farming settlements spread northward along the river valleys. The rivers are not easily navigable, but their energy is harnessed by power stations. The mineral potential of the region has not been exactly determined, but the Outokumpu copper mines in eastern Finland are the most important known source of mineral wealth. The forests in the northern and eastern uplands region are not so valuable as those of the lake district, since they replace themselves more slowly and are less accessible.

Archipelago. The islands along the coasts make up the fourth geographical region. They are barren in comparison with the rest of the country. Although some of the larger islands have rich flora, their stern granite base is visible almost everywhere, and the smallest islands are only bald cliffs. Except as summer retreats and bases for a dwindling number of fishermen, the islands have little economic importance. Åland (Finnish, Ahvenanmaa) in the extreme southwest is the largest single island and a shipping center.

Climate. The climate of Finland is more hospitable than the climates of Alaska and Greenland, which are located at the same latitudes. Finland's average temperature in January is similar to that of the Great Lakes region in North America. However, snow covers the land about five months of the year in the south, and seven months in Lapland, the northernmost district.

The climate is mildest in the southwestern part of the country, which is the most densely populated and most prosperous region.

3. The Economy

Finland's economy since the 1920's has shown substantial progress and growth, although economic development slowed during the depression of the early 1930's. World War II brought a period of absolute decline in production, and Finnish recovery during the period of reconstruction was slower than from the depression. With the armistice that ended the fighting, Finland lost roughly one tenth of its productive capacity and resources and had to pay war reparations to the Soviet Union from its diminished national output. Since 1957 the economy has displayed an accelerated rate of growth. By 1965, Finland's domestic product was four times larger than in 1926.

World War II accelerated significant changes in the structure of the Finnish economy. Before the war Finland still had a predominantly agricultural economy. Agriculture and forestry accounted for about 34% and manufacturing for only 25% of the domestic product, but the relative share of agriculture-forestry was already

declining. During the period of postwar reconstruction, manufacturing and construction developed rapidly. The metal and shipbuilding industries expanded to meet the reparations demands. Since 1957 service sectors have become the most rapidly growing part of the economy. Manufacturing and construction have held on to their relative shares of the domestic product, while agriculture and forestry have continued to decline, amounting to about 15% of the national output in 1968. A still higher degree of industrialization is probably the key to increasing Finland's economic well being.

The Finnish economy is based mainly on private enterprise. The public sector accounts for about 25% of the domestic product and has been expanding. The state has a monopoly on railroad, radio, mail, and telegraph services, and on the sale of alcoholic beverages. It also dominates television.

The Finnish government is involved in many industries, frequently sharing the ownership of companies with private individuals. Often the government's involvement has been necessary because of the scarcity of capital in the country, which caused the government to intervene in the power, communications, and mining industries.

Agriculture. Finland comes close to being self-sufficient in agriculture. It now produces almost all the bread grain it consumes. The country has long been self-sufficient in dairy products, eggs, and meat, and also exports these foods. The climate and soils of Finland and the small family farms with their ample labor supply favor dairy and livestock production, which amounts to about 80% of the value of the agricultural output. Wheat and rye are the main grain crops in southwestern Finland. The growing season there is 210 to 220 days, while in northern Finland it is reduced to 120 to 150 days. Spring and fall frosts may sharply influence crop yields.

Small family farms dominate Finnish agriculture. The average farm has only 22 acres (9 hectares) of arable land, and 79% of the farms have fewer than 24 acres (10 hectares) and 53% fewer than 12 acres (5 hectares) of arable land. The average size of farms has diminished since the prewar years because of the need to distribute land to Karelian refugee farmers, who fled from the Soviet-occupied areas in the east.

Mechanization of farming was rapid, especially during the 1950's, and the number of tractors well surpasses the number of horses. Mechanization and increased use of fertilizers have contributed to a rise in productivity, with the largest increases in yields per acre occurring in grain and fodder production.

Though agricultural productivity has been improving, output per worker has increasingly lagged behind that in other segments of the economy. This has necessitated heavy subsidization of agriculture to prevent the standard of living of the farming population from falling drastically behind. Future improvements in the farmers' standard of living will probably depend on increased efficiency, which would necessitate increasing the size of the average farm while reducing the total number of farms.

In the 1950's new farms were set up and land reclaimed at a considerable rate, and by 1958 enough new arable land had been cleared to compensate for the loss of farm acreage to the Soviet Union. Much of the new land was cleared in northern Finland, where farming has not proven successful, and problems of overproduction have led to the practice of soil banking (leaving land uncultivated) and reforestation of recently cleared land.

Forestry. Forests are Finland s most important source of natural wealth and are still the base for its national economy. Pine constitutes 46% of the growing stock, spruce 36%, and birch 16%. Over 60% of the forests are privately owned, mainly by farmers who receive a large share of their cash income from selling timber and from working as loggers in the winter. The state owns almost one third of the forest land, but its share of the total annual growth amounts to only 16%, largely because the state-owned forests are mainly in northern Finland, where the growing season is short. Forest holdings of corporations are small, and their acquisitions are limited by law. Generally speaking, the share of privately owned forests has increased during the decades of independence and especially since World War II, when many new farms for refugees were established on public land.

Forestry has counterbalanced seasonal fluctuations of employment and income in agriculture, but increasing mechanization and rationalization have been reducing the demand for human labor in forestry. This has brought hardship to the small lumber farmers who have been accustomed to earning extra income by working in the forests. The number of people exclusively dependent on forestry for a living is very small.

Industry. Finland's manufacturing industries have produced mainly for domestic markets, but

LUMBER, Finland's most important natural resource, is being pulled in large floats to a mill near Tampere.

FRITZ HENLE, FROM PHOTO RESEARCHERS



are increasingly exporting their products. By 1967 manufacturing amounted to 30% of the gross national product, and construction to 10%. Woodworking, paper, and pulp industries traditionally have dominated the Finnish industrial economy, but their share of the industrial working force has been decreasing. However, they still have the largest share of the country's exports and accounted for 27.3% of the gross value of industrial output in 1967. Within the forest-based industries, the manufacturing of paper and pulp has since the 1920's exceeded the other sectors in value. The plants and mills of the forest industry are located along water routes, since much of their raw materials is floated to them.

Metal and engineering industries are the most rapidly expanding industries in Finland. They accounted for 21.9% of the gross value of industrial production in 1967 and have become the largest source of industrial employment. The demands of wartime and of reparations to the Soviet Union encouraged the growth of the metal industry, though its sources of raw materials are rather poor. Mining plays an insignificant part in the national economy. Its main product is copper, which is also exported.

Wood and hydroelectric power are the main sources of energy. Finland lost one third of its electric power capacity to the Soviet Union, but the harnessing of rivers and rapids in northern Finland has compensated for the losses. There are no deposits of coal, oil, or natural gas in Finland, and these fuels must be imported in increasing amounts to meet the demands for power. An atomic energy plant is to be built as an additional source of power.

Labor. In 1967 two sectors of the Finnish economy, manufacturing and agriculture-forestry, each employed 25% of the labor force, with farm owners making up about 90% of the number employed in agriculture. Trade, banking, insurance, and other services employed 28% of the labor force, construction 10%, communications 7%, and public administration and defense 5%.

Finnish labor unions grew rapidly in membership and strength after World War II, but political disagreements between the Social Democrats, Left Socialists, and Communists have weakened their unity. In 1960 the SAK (Central League of Finnish Trade Unions) split into two rival organizations.

Collective bargaining between unions and employers' organizations came into general practice during World War II and now cover almost all labor. Disputes and interpretations of agreements have been handled by official mediators since 1925 or by a labor court, set up in 1947. The frequency of strikes and the number of people involved in them have been somewhat higher in Finland than in the Scandinavian countries. The purchasing power of both blue- and white-collar Finnish workers has increased from the prewar period.

Transportation. In net value of operations, road transport is the leading form of transportation in Finland, followed in order by maritime shipping, railroads, and air services. The road network expanded rapidly and was much improved during the 1960's. Major roads now have a hard-top covering, which has reduced the adverse effects of the climate on them.

About 90% of the country's foreign trade and passenger traffic abroad goes by sea. Icebreakers keep the harbors of the southwestern coast open in winter. The inland waterways are of little importance in transportation.

The gauge of the Finnish railroads is the same as that of the Soviet Union but different from that of the rest of Europe, and this has reduced the importance of railroads for foreign trade. Railroad transport has been declining, but there are plans to develop an electric system in Finland.

Finland has been served by international airlines since 1924, but domestic routes were not started until the late 1930's. Both services have expanded rapidly since the 1950's.

Trade. Both wholesale and retail trade are divided between private enterprises and cooperatives, although private enterprises have the largest share. Cooperatives handle about one third of the retail trade.

Like other small European countries, Finland is very dependent on foreign trade. Paper, pulp, and wood products account for about two thirds of Finnish exports. Machinery, ships, and other highly processed goods have become increasingly important export items. In 1967 industrial goods accounted for 94% of the total value of exports. Finland's international trade position has been enhanced by an influx of foreign tourists. As of 1968 the country's income from foreign visitors exceeded the expenditures of Finnish tourists abroad. Raw materials and fuels are the most important items imported by the Finns.

Most of Finland's foreign trade is conducted with other European countries. In 1961, Finland became an associate member of EFTA (European Free Trade Association), which is the regional economic bloc most important to its trade. Finnish trade with EEC (European Economic Community) countries surpasses its exchanges with COMECON (Eastern bloc) countries. Britain traditionally absorbs the largest single share of Finland's trade, and West Germany, the Soviet Union, and Sweden are its other principal markets. Trade between Finland and the Soviet Union has greatly increased since the prewar period. Today Russia is a major market for Finland's metal products, while the Western countries absorb the traditional paper and wood products.

4. Government

A republican constitution was adopted in Finland in 1919. The parliament and the president exercise legislative power, while executive power is vested in the president and in the council of state (cabinet), which must enjoy the confidence of the parliament. The president's term of office is six years, and he is elected indirectly through an electoral college of 300 members chosen by popular vote. The president has extensive powers. He can temporarily veto bills passed by parliament and may also dissolve it and call for new elections. The president makes all appointments to higher offices in the state, including the cabinet. He conducts foreign policy and is the commander in chief of the armed forces.

The president's powers clearly exceed those of the prime minister, but the prime minister has an important role in the formation of a cabinet and its general program, and he acts as its spokesman. His defeat or resignation results in the dissolution of the cabinet.

The parliament, whose term is normally four years, consists of a single chamber of 200 members. Finland's system of proportional representation favors a multiparty system. Since independence no party has received an absolute majority in the parliament; therefore the cabinets have been either coalition or minority governments.

There are eight political parties in the parliament. Most of them tend to represent the economic interests of particular groups. The Social Democratic party has generally been the largest. It is predominantly a left-center party and attracts mainly the votes of workers and the lower-middle class. In the past it has been averse to cooperation with the Communists, but this policy changed after the elections of 1966. The Center party (before October 1965, the Agrarian party) traditionally has been the key force in Finnish politics, due to its position at the center of the political spectrum and to its size. Since independence, it has been the largest non-socialist party. It represents the farmers' interests, but as the size of the agricultural population has declined, it has tried to continue as a major political force by also appealing to other groups. The Communist-dominated People's Democratic League, which grew up after World War II, is now the third-largest party in Finland. Its support comes from workers and small farmers who are seasonal laborers.

The National Coalition party is closely associated with business and receives support from middle- and upper-middle-class professional groups. The Liberal party also appeals to these economic and social groups. The Swedish People's party is a middle-of-the-road party that does not appeal to any particular social or economic group alone, but represents the cultural interests of Finland's Swedish-speaking minority. The Social Democratic Union of Workers and Small Farmers is a small splinter group of the Social Democratic party, while the Small Farmers' party is a splinter group of the Center party.

The cabinet members, the ministries and the central boards that are subordinate to them are responsible for general administration. For purposes of local administration, Finland is divided into provinces and communes. The state administers the provinces, but the communes govern themselves.

The Finnish constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary from the other branches of the government. By a unanimous decision a jury can overrule the judge. The supreme court and the supreme administrative court are the highest judicial authorities.

The largest amount of government funds is spent on welfare and health, followed in order by education and cultural activities, public debt, transportation and communications, and agriculture. National expenditures for social welfare in Finland have continually increased. Through social welfare legislation, an elaborate structure that attempts to provide security for families and individuals of all ages has been set up. Provision is made for old age and disability insurance, and health, accident, and unemployment insurance. Various family allowance acts give child and maternity benefits. The government maintains most hospitals, and patients are expected to pay only 13% of their expenses.

The share of Finland's national income spent for defense is one of the lowest in Europe. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 limits the strength of the Finnish armed forces to 41,900 men. Military service is compulsory for all able men. The period of initial service varies from 270 to 330 days, depending on the branch of the armed forces and the level of training.

Radio broadcasting is a state monopoly, but Finland has both a state-owned and a commercial television station. Radio and television broadcasts are in both Finnish and Swedish.

Most of the Finnish newspapers are associated with, or support, a political party. *Helsingin Sanomat*, an independent newspaper, has the largest circulation. Other leading papers are the conservative *Uusi Suomi* and the Swedish-language *Hufvudstadsbladet*.

5. Education

The Finns have a long tradition of literacy. As early as the 17th century they had to prove their reading ability before they were allowed to marry. The basic outline of the present educational system was developed in the 1860's, though primary school attendance did not become compulsory until 1921. Primary education is publicly financed, and every child must attend school for at least eight years. There are no fees; pupils receive textbooks, one hot meal a day, and medical and dental care free of charge, as well as clothing if needed.

Following four years in primary school, the majority of students enter secondary school after taking competitive entrance examinations. The number going on to secondary school is steadily increasing, whereas previously only a small percentage of children had this opportunity. Secondary education is provided by private, communal, or state schools. All students receive state subsidies, which cover most of their expenses, but they also have small tuition fees, which are highest in the private schools.

Finnish secondary schools are divided into two sections—the 5-grade middle school and the 3-grade upper-secondary school. Emphasis is placed on the academic subjects, particularly in the three upper grades. Although the students have a choice of concentrating either on mathematical subjects and natural sciences or on languages and humanities, the basic curriculum is inflexible and the same for all. During their last spring in secondary school, students take nationally administered graduation examinations. Those who pass may apply for admission to universities or other similar institutions.

The Finnish school system is undergoing radical changes. A new type of school is being created that combines the curriculum and functions of the present primary and middle schools. The aim of the new system is to provide a similar basic education for all Finnish children irrespective of economic situation or geographical location.

Finland has seven universities and many other specialized institutions of higher education. The oldest and largest of them is the University of Helsinki, which has over 20,000 students. It was founded in Turku in 1640 and transferred to Helsinki in 1828. Renamed the Imperial University of Alexander, it received its present name after independence. It is a state institution, and instruction is given in both Finnish and Swedish. Tuition fees are small or nonexistent in Finnish institutions of higher education, even the private ones.

Children who do not transfer from primary schools to secondary schools, or who do not continue in the upper-secondary schools, may enter various kinds of vocational schools and colleges. Finland also provides public adult education in many forms, including people's and workers' colleges, institutes, and study circles, which offer instruction in a wide variety of subjects. Together their enrollment exceeds by far the combined enrollment of the academic institutions of higher learning.

6. History

The first known homeland of the Finns was probably in the area between the middle Volga region and the Ural mountains. The ancestors of the Finns migrated from there to the northwest, reaching the eastern coast of the Baltic about 3,500 years ago. Eventually, they settled in southwestern Finland and gradually spread eastward, reaching Karelia about 800 A. D. Karelia also received settlers from the southeast. The new arrivals gradually pushed the small population of Lapps then living in the area northward, to their current home in Lapland.

The early Finns were divided into three loosely organized tribes. In the southwest, or Finland proper, lived the Suomalaiset, who gave their name to Finland (Finnish, Suomi). Inland, around the southwestern part of the lake district, was Häme, the heartland of the Hämäläiset (Tavastians). Farthest east lived the Karjalaiset (Karelians). Large areas of wilderness separated these three regions, and only a few scattered Lapp hunters occupied the vast forests to the north. The new Finnish settlers introduced agriculture as they spread inland, but hunting, trapping, and fishing were very important in their economy. Furs were perhaps their major export and exchange item.

The Finnish tribal groups lacked any national political organization and were frequently hostile toward one another. They were slower to organize themselves in political groups than their western and eastern neighbors, the Swedes and the Russians, who by the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries were striving to extend their influence over Finland. Territorial aspirations of these neighbors were mixed with religious motives. The Swedes tried to convert the Finns to the Roman Catholic Church, while the Russians attempted to bring them into the Eastern Orthodox Church. This rivalry between east and west foreshadowed Finland's destiny for many centuries.

Swedish Domination. Most Finns eventually became Roman Catholics and fell under Swedish domination. Individual Roman Catholic missionaries worked in southwestern Finland as early as the 11th century. About 1155, King Eric of Sweden made the first crusade to Finland to strengthen the hold of the new faith. The second Swedish crusade (1238 or 1249) consolidated the new order in Häme. By the end of the 13th century the Swedes had extended their power into Karelia by building the castle of Vyborg (Finnish, Viipuri) in 1293. However, in Karelia the Swedes were entering territory that the Russian state of Novgorod considered its own. This resulted in intermittent fighting until a peace treaty was concluded in 1323, dividing Karelia between Sweden and Russia and formally establishing the eastern boundary of Finland for the first time.

It had taken little over a century and a half for Finland to become part of the kingdom of Sweden. This development brought a wave of Swedish settlers to Finland, where they concentrated along the southern and western coasts. For the first time the tribal groups of Finland, with the exception of many Karelians, were united under the same administrative authority. In 1362 the Finns gained the right to participate in the election of Swedish kings, and this concession signified that Finland had become the equal of the other provinces of Sweden and was considered an integral part of the realm.

Until the end of the Middle Ages, Finland was in a sense under dual authority. There was first the Swedish crown and its highest representatives, the lords of the castles. Then there were also the bishops of Turku (Swedish, Åbo), who headed the Finnish Church and were frequently the most influential men in the country. Most of the medieval Finnish bishops were cultured men who had studied abroad, usually at the Sorbonne in Paris, and two of them even served as rectors there. One bishop of Turku, Mikael Agricola (1510–1557), made Finnish a literary language and encouraged the Lutheran reformation in Finland.

The Swedish King Gustav I Vasa (reigned 1523–1560), a contemporary of Agricola, ended Danish supremacy over the Swedish realm, including Finland. Gustav also broke off relations with the Roman Catholic Church. He encouraged the Finnish settlement of Finland toward the north and east, which led to further conflicts and lengthy warfare with the Russians. The latter half of the 16th century was a restless period both for Sweden and Finland, when the sons and grandson of Gustav Vasa struggled for the throne. Finland's internal troubles culminated in a widespread rebellion in 1596–1597, known as the War of Clubs, against the rule of Klaus Fleming, a Finnish nobleman who had been the country's actual master.

During the 17th century Sweden became a great power, development that had significant consequences for Finland. The early part of the century was a period of renewed warfare with Russia, until the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus (reigned 1611–1632) concluded the Peace of Stolbova in 1617. This treaty moved the eastern boundary of the Swedish realm farther east to include much of the shore of Lake Ladoga and the province of Ingria, where St. Petersburg was to be built a century later. After his successful campaigns in the east, Gustavus Adolphus became involved in the Thirty Years' War and Continental politics. Participation in the war was costly in men and treasure, and Finland suffered its share of the losses.

Other characteristics of the age were increased administrative centralization, the rapidly growing wealth and power of the nobility, and religious zeal and bigotry. Centralization of the administration tied Finland more closely to the rest of the Swedish kingdom and weakened its distinct identity. The nobles benefited from the prolonged warfare, gaining land grants and tax concessions from the Swedish crown as rewards for their services. This development tended to impoverish and weaken the position of the peasants. However, during the latter part of the 17th century there was a reclaiming of lands granted earlier to the nobles, which prevented the development of feudalism in Finland.

Religious bigotry brought about efforts to convert by force the Greek Orthodox Karelians in the territories that had been won from Russia. This led to large-scale emigration of the Orthodox population into Russian territory, and Lutheran settlers in Karelia replaced them. Some aspects of Lutheran sternness were valuable, however, since the church saw to it that the peasants learned to read.

There was a severe famine in Finland in 1695–1697, during the reign of Charles XI of Sweden. The rule of Charles XII (reigned 1697–1718) began with the Great Northern War of 1700 to 1721. This war, in which the Swedes fought all of their neighbors, cost Sweden its eastern possessions, including Ingria and southeastern Finland, as well as its position as a great power. During the war Russia occupied Finland for eight years (1713–1721) and devastated the country thoroughly, a period known to the Finns as the Great Wrath. In the next war with Russia (1741–1743) the Russian Empress Elizabeth tried to turn the Finns against Sweden by suggesting the creation of an autonomous Finland under Russian protection. However, nothing came of the plan, and Russia annexed another slice of Finland.

The experiences of these two wars and the growing power of Russia caused the Finns to doubt Sweden's ability to protect them from the hardships of war in the future. This pessimism caused some Finnish officers, during a new war with Russia (1788–1790), to conspire to create an autonomous Finnish state that was to be under Russian protection. The conspiracy failed, but it was an indication of the growing feeling among Finns that Finland had an identity apart from Sweden. The new mood was exemplified in the studies and activities of Henrik Gabriel Porthan (1739–1804), a professor at the University of Turku, who encouraged his students to study the past and the potential of their homeland.

Russian Domination and the Rise of Finnish Nationalism. In 1808 a war broke out between Sweden and Russia. While the war was still in progress, Alexander I of Russia (reigned 1801–1825) assembled a Finnish Diet in the town of Borgå (Finnish, Porvoo) in 1809 and promised to respect the existing constitution, laws, and institutions of Finland. When a defeated Sweden ceded Finland to Russia in 1809, the Czar allowed Finland extensive autonomy instead of integrating it into the rest of the Russian Empire. Furthermore, Alexander agreed in 1812 to return to Finland the Karelian territories that had been annexed to Russia during the 18th century wars.

Russian rule changed little in Finland except the person of the ruler, with Alexander becoming Grand Duke of Finland in place of the king of Sweden. The Grand Duchy of Finland remained an entity apart from Russia. A governor-general acted as the czar's personal representative and as the highest administrative official in Finland. The first to hold this office was Göran Magnus Sprengtporten (1740–1819), a former Finnish officer who had plotted for Finnish independence decades earlier and had left Swedish for Russian service. After him the governors-general were Russians, but the rest of the administration remained in Finnish hands.

The period of Russian suzerainty started under favorable auspices for Finland. The country had grown in size, and had developed from being an integral part of the Swedish kingdom into an autonomous state. These conditions, combined with the new ideas of romanticism and nationalism sweeping Europe, encouraged the development of a national identity in Finland. The first clear signs of a distinct Finnish nationalism appeared about 1820 at the University of Turku, when Adolf Ivan Arwidsson, a young teacher, suggested improvements in the position of the Finnish language. Over the centuries Swedish had become the sole language in Finland's administration, law, and schools, as well as in most of its cultural life. Of the educated people only the clergy were still proficient in Finnish.

There were no immediate changes in the position of Finnish. However, after the publication of *Kalevala* (1835), an impressive collection of folklore gathered by Elias Lönnrot, interest in the language grew. Indirectly, this trend was encouraged by the work of Johan Ludvig Runeberg, who wrote in Swedish but whose patriotic poetry idealized the common Finnish worker and soldier. Johan Vilhelm Snellman, a publicist, philosopher, and statesman, demanded that the educated class adopt Finnish as it language and that Finnish be used in administration and schools.

When the Finnish Diet started meeting regularly again in 1863, after being moribund for over 50 years, political parties gradually developed along language lines. Their feuding and rivalry were characteristics of the late 19th century. Only gradually did Finnish gain ground in schools, cultural life, and government, finally reaching official equality with Swedish in 1902.

Reaction Against Russia. By the turn of the century both language groups were confronted by the new threat of Russian nationalism, which

EDITORIAL PHOTOCOLOR ARCHIVES

Turku's cathedral was the seat of Finland's first bishop.

aimed at the integration of Finland into the empire. Russian decrees revealing this goal turned the Finns' loyalty to the czar into hatred.

In trying to decide on proper tactics to meet Russian pressures, the Finns divided into three basic groups. The Compliers argued that Finland should go along with Russian demands to some extent in order to maintain a certain influence over the course of events, gain time, and reduce the number of appointments of Russian officials. The Constitutionalists wanted to resist Russian violations of the Finnish constitution by refusing to obey such decress. The kind of passive resistance advocated by the Constitutionalists required complete national unity to be effective, and the Compliers' views made this impossible. But passive resistance had some success, and young Finnish men failed to appear for the Russian military draft. However, passive resistance in the long run did not work, and this caused the growth of the Activist movement, which made preparations for armed resistance and rebellion.

Political Reform. The Russo-Japanese War and the abortive Russian revolutionary movement of 1905 brought a temporary end to russification policies in Finland and opened the way for an important political reform. In 1906 the traditional Finnish Diet of four estates voted to abolish itself in favor of a new unicameral parliament to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. In the elections of 1907 the Socialists captured 40% of the seats, becoming the largest single party. Their success reflected the magnitude of Finland's unsolved social problems and the existence of a large rural proletariat.

However, the new parliament could do little to solve these problems, since the czarist regime again took control of Finland. Russification was renewed with fresh vigor in 1908 and by the start of World War I the idea of an armed revolt was gaining ground, especially in university circles. Young Finns had had no military training after disbandment of the Finnish Army (1901–1905), and failure of the Russian military draft. To overcome this handicap, students and other young men started to slip into Germany for military training.

Before any Finnish revolt materialized, the March Revolution of 1917 occurred in Russia, and a new period in Finnish-Russian relations began. The Russian provisional government restored Finnish autonomy, but this no longer satisfied the Finns. In July 1917 the Socialist-dominated Finnish parliament assumed supreme power in the country, except in foreign and military affairs, which were left to Russia. This situation was unacceptable to the Russian government and it dissolved the parliament. New elections in the fall of 1917 put the embittered Socialists in the minority.

Besides these political events, Finland was also troubled by rapidly increasing unemployment, food shortages, and unsolved social problems. The Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd in November 1917 was followed by a general strike in Finland, and radicalism and a revolutionary mood quickly gained ground among the Finnish Socialists. The internal situation was becoming chaotic, and the presence of undisciplined Russian military forces added to the confusion.

Independence and Civil War. The parliament proclaimed Finland independent from Russia on Dec. 6, 1917, but the declaration did not at once solve matters. In spite of the Bolsheviks' recognition of Finnish independence, Russian troops remained in the country. Furthermore, the gulf separating non-Socialist Finns from the radical Socialists, who wanted a social revolution, continued to widen.

Both groups wanted complete independence from Russia but, suspicious of one another, had been setting up separate armed units, which became known as the Red and White Guards. In January 1918 the government of Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, who was a former leader of the passive resistance movement, ordered the White Guards commanded by Carl Gustaf Mannerheim to expel the Russian troops from the country and restore public order. The Whites started operations against the Russian garrisons in western Finland. However, the Finnish Reds seized power in the south and the war of national liberation turned into a civil war as well.

The Germans and the Jägers, those young Finns who had gone to Germany for military training, aided the Whites, while the Russians helped the Reds. The Whites were finally victorious in the war, which ended in May 1918. After the war, Svinhufvud and Mannerheim acted as regents of Finland until a republic was

WIDE WORLD



WINTER WAR OF 1939 displayed Finland's remarkable military strength against the invading forces from the USSR.



PHOTO TRENDS

Architect Alvar Aalto's skillful use of materials is evidenced in this Institute of Technology building at Otaniemi.

proclaimed in 1919. Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, who stood for reconciliation between the Reds and the Whites, was elected the first president.

Interwar Period. Independent Finland faced vexing problems in both its foreign and internal affairs. Relations with Sweden and Russia were tense. Sweden was claiming possession of the Åland Islands, off the Finnish coast, and had the support of the local Swedish-speaking population. After prolonged disputes the League of Nations awarded the islands to Finland in 1921.

Problems with Russia centered around Eastern Karelia, a border area largely inhabited by Finnish-related peoples but which was now included in Russia. Many Finns wanted either to annex Eastern Karelia to Finland or help the area gain independence. Expeditions to end uprisings in Eastern Karelia against Bolshevik rule failed to achieve either aim. In 1919, however, a Finnish volunteer force helped the Estonians gain independence from Russia. Peace with Russia was concluded in 1920, but relations remained strained throughout the interwar period, in spite of the signing of a nonaggression treaty in 1932.

In domestic affairs the rise of an anti-Communist movement and a running feud between Finnish-language enthusiasts and Swedish-speaking Finns disturbed the tranquillity of the republic. For a short interval in the early 1930's hatred created by the civil war, Communist activity, and economic depression contributed to the rise of the Lapua movement. This anti-Communist, but eventually also antiparliamentary, Fascist-style movement developed into a powerful pressure group. The Lapua movement caused the outlawing of Communist organizations; but it lost its popularity after an attempted coup d'etat in 1932. Its successor IKL (People's Patriotic Movement), which organized itself as a political party, never gained a mass following.

The constitution had in principle placed the Swedish language on a level equal with Finnish, a provision that many Finnish-speaking people disliked. Their resentment was aroused by the view held by some Swedish speakers that the Swedish-speaking population should be allowed a great degree of self-government. The Finnish-speakers were also displeased by lingering frustrations and traces of past Swedish dominance, particularly in cultural and business life. The language strife continued through the 1930's but quieted when, as international tensions increased, Finland sought closer relations with traditionally neutral Scandinavia.

Although the politics of the country had at times been stormy, Finland's overall economic advance had been impressive during the two decades of independence. An important land reform had taken place, which leveled class distinctions by allowing tenant farmers to become landowers. Thus, when the Soviet Union demanded islands and a naval base in the Gulf of Finland and part of the Karelian isthmus from Finland in the fall of 1939, it confronted a unified nation. The Social Democrats and Agrarians dominated the coalition government, which refused to comply with Soviet demands and invited other parties to join it.

The Winter War and World War II. On Nov. 30, 1939 Russian troops invaded Finland, thus beginning the Winter War. Shortly afterward Soviet authorities set up a Finnish puppet government composed of men who had fled from Finland to Russia after the civil war in 1918. The Russians and the puppet government signed a treaty that joined most of eastern Karelia to Finland. However, the Russians encountered unexpectedly strong Finnish resistance, based on the Finn's wide use of highly mobile ski troops. This, and the possibility that Britain and France would aid the Finns, persuaded the Soviets to abandon the puppet regime and come to terms with Finland. In the peace concluded on March 12, 1940, Finland lost southern Karelia and Viipuri (Vyborg), the second-largest Karelian city. The area ceded to the Soviet Union included 12% of Finland's total population. In addition, the Finns had to leave Hangö (Finnish, Hanko) peninsula to the Russians as a naval base.

SVEN SAMELIUS

THE OLYMPIC STADIUM in Helsinki, with its statue of Paavo Nurmi, the Finnish long-distance runner, reflects the national interest in sports.

Following the Winter War, Finland turned toward Germany for protection in the face of Russia's continued pressure, its refusal to accept a Swedish-Finnish alliance, and its incorporation of the three small Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) into the Soviet Union in 1940. When Germany invaded Russia on June 22, 1941, Finland declared itself neutral in the conflict. However, there were German troops in Lapland, and the Russians bombed Finland. The Finnish troops, commanded by Mannerheim, crossed the Russian frontier, recaptured lost territories, and occupied Eastern Karelia. After that, the front remained stable until 1944.

In the summer of 1944 the Russians tried to break Finnish resistance completely, but their advance was stopped near Vyborg in some of the bloodiest battles on the Finnish front. An armistice with Russia was signed on Sept. 19, 1944. It was followed by fighting against the Germans, who refused to leave northern Finland peacefully and systematically levelled the area in their retreat. Throughout the war the democratic form of government was maintained in Finland, and no measures were taken against the Jews, who were treated like all other Finnish citizens.

The wars were costly. Nearly 100,000 Finns died, and 50,000 were permanently disabled. These were almost exclusively battlefield casualties. Although there were foreign troops in some parts of Finland, the country escaped foreign occupation. Again, Finland lost southern Karelia and other territories along its eastern border, including its corridor to the Arctic Ocean. It also had to lease a military base to the Soviets at Porkkala, less than 20 miles (32 km) from Helsinki. The inhabitants of the lost territories, over 420,000, were allowed to move to Finland, where they received compensation for their property losses and were resettled. Finland also had to pay war reparations amounting to about $445 million.

The Postwar Era. The postwar era started with a popular-front style government of the leftist parties—the Social Democrats, the Agrarians (since 1965, the Center Party), and the Communists. Communist party efforts to dominate the government failed, in spite of their temporary control of the premiership and of the ministry of the interior. After 1948 the Communists were kept out of the government until 1966.

Mannerheim, who as president since 1944 had led the country out of war, resigned in 1946 and was succeeded by Juho Kusti Paasikivi. Paasikivi was the creator of Finland's postwar foreign policy of neutrality. In order to gain security, Finland cultivated close relations with both the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries. A treaty signed with the Soviet Union in 1948 stated that if Finland were attacked or threatened by a third party, the two countries would negotiate about appropriate cooperation. In 1955 the Soviet Union returned its military base in Porkkala in exchange for a 20-year renewal of the 1948 treaty.

Finnish internal politics during most of the 1950's were dominated by the Agrarians and the Social Democrats. In 1956 the Agrarian leader Urho K. Kekkonen, by a narrow electoral vote of 151 to 149, succeeded the retiring Paasikivi as president of the republic.

While attempting to pursue a policy of neutrality in international relations, Finland was subjected to recurring Soviet pressure. In 1958 the Soviet Union succeeded in causing the dissolution of a Social Democrat-led coalition government by cutting off trade and recalling its ambassador. This pressure induced the Agrarian members of the coalition to withdraw their support from the government, and as a result it fell. For the next eight years the Agrarians kept their distance from the Social Democrats, who were excluded from the government on the grounds that they supposedly were unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

The next notable example of Soviet interference came during the presidential election campaign in 1961. The Soviet government claimed that it feared a possible German attack and proposed military consultations with Fin-

land on the basis of their Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Apparently the Soviet leadership was disturbed also by the possibility of a change in leadership in Finland. Satisfied with the way Kekkonen implemented his policy of neutrality coupled with friendship with the Soviet Union, the Soviets openly backed his candidacy. The Social Democrat candidate, Olavi Honka, withdrew from the race, Kekkonen was reelected in 1962, and the call for a military consultation was forgotten.

The Social Democrats won a clear victory in the parliamentary elections of 1966, and a coalition government with members from several parties, including the Communists, was formed under their leadership. In the years that followed, Finland generally was ruled by coalitions of the left and center.

On Oct. 27, 1981, Kekkonen resigned the presidency, which he had held for over 25 years, because of poor health. He was succeeded by the Social Democrat premier, Mauno Koivisto, who won a clear majority of the electoral vote on Jan. 26, 1982. Koivisto, whose candidacy had been neither opposed nor endorsed by the Soviets, was Finland's first president to be drawn from the left of the political spectrum.

7. Culture

The existence of two major languages in Finland is reflected in its cultural traditions. Though Finnish had been a literary language since the 16th century, it was little cultivated in written form during the era of Swedish domination. Apart from folk traditions, Finland's cultural development was intimately connected with the general development of Swedish culture. There were intellectuals particularly interested in Finnish culture, and some, like Henrik Gabriel Porthan, made notable studies of the language, geography, history, and economy of Finland.

Finnish cultural life in the 19th century acquired a more distinct character. Folklore collections and publications revealed the wealth of ancient Finnish traditions, enriched the literary language, and inspired the development of the arts. One of the most important 19th century Finnish writers was the poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg, who wrote in Swedish. He won wide renown in Scandinavia and gained the stature of a national poet through his patriotic works on the 1808–1809 war with Russia. Another prominent 19th century writer was Aleksis Kivi, author of popular plays and of the classic epic *Seven Brothers*. Minna Canth, who protested against social injustices and championed women's rights, was another important playwright. In one of his major works, *Juha*, Juhani Aho, a remarkable stylist, depicted the tensions between the western and eastern elements in the Finnish people.

Eino Leino, who is considered the greatest poet to write in Finnish in the 20th century, was strongly influenced by native folklore. But it remained for the Swedish-speaking poets Edith Södergran and Elmer Diktonius to introduce modernism to Finland. The Nobel Prize-winner Frans Eemil Sillanpää, a 20th century Finnish author, became internationally known for his lyrical descriptions of the Finnish countryside and its people. Toivo Pekkanen wrote about working-class life and the effects of industrialization. Mika Waltari's historical novels became international best sellers, and Väinö Linna produced powerful novels about war and rural life in Finland.

The Finns are great theater enthusiasts. There are more than 35 publicly supported professional theaters in Finland, four of which perform in Swedish. Towns with populations of about 20,000 have professional theaters, and there are many amateur groups.

In music the figure of Jean Sibelius (1865–1957) towers above all others. Sibelius wrote symphonic poems based on the Finnish epic *Kelevala*. Many of his other works, such as the famous *Finlandia*, were inspired by the landscape of his country.

Eliel Saarinen and Alvar Aalto are probably Finland's leading 20th century architects. One of Saarinen's most famous works is the Helsinki railroad station. He went to the United States in 1923, where his ideas greatly influenced the development of designs for skyscrapers. The versatile Alvar Aalto, who introduced functionalism to Finland, is well known for his building and furniture designs and for his skillful use of natural materials.

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8. Language

With Karelian, Estonian, and several other languages, Finnish (or Suomi) forms the westernmost, or "Baltic," subbranch of the Finno-Ugrian branch of the Uralic family of languages (see FINNO-UGRIAN LANGUAGES). It is spoken by about 4.6 million people in Finland proper and in adjacent counties, as well as overseas. Finland is divided into two main dialect areas, East and West, but the literary language used in Finnish schools is known throughout the country. This dates from the 16th century and especially from the writings of Mikael Agricola, the Finnish Lutheran bishop and reformer.

In the course of their history, speakers of Finnish have come in contact with groups of people speaking older forms of Baltic (Latvian-Lithuanian), of Germanic, and of Slavic. Finnish has borrowed vocabulary items from all of these—for example, *hammas* ("tooth"), from Baltic; *kuningas* ("king"), from Germanic; *risti* ("cross"), from Slavic. In addition, it has taken a few items from still older sources—such as *sata* ("100"), from an Indo-Iranian language—and many from more recent sources, including Swedish, Old Scandinavian, Low German, and others. Finnish is constantly being enriched by neologisms in all fields of modern life, from government to psychiatry to rocket physics. Some of these terms are international, but many are composed of Finnish roots: for example, *Yhdysvallat* ("United States"), derived from *yhty-* ("to be united with")—itself from *yksi* ("one")—and *valta* ("power"), with the plural suffix *-t*.

The syntax of modern spoken Finnish resembles that of modern spoken Swedish. In the formal written style can be found complexities reminiscent of German syntax. Archaic features can be encountered in folklore; the youth of Helsinki favors racy words, often derived from English.

Finnish has 8 vowels—*i, e, y* (as *ü* in German), *ö, ä* (as *a* in English *cat*), *u, o,* and *a*—and 12 consonants—*m, n, ng, p, t, k, s, r, l, j, v,* and *h*. It is a quantitative language; all vowels and consonants may be either short or long, excepting *j, v,* and *h*, which are always short.

THE OLYMPIC STADIUM Helsinki, with its statue Paavo Nurmi, the Finnish l distance runner, reflect national interest in sport

Letters written double represent long sounds, which are pronounced about twice as long or twice as slowly as the corresponding shorts. There are no consonant clusters (such as *pr, str, nt*) at the beginnings or ends of native words; thus *koulu* ("school") has lost the *s*, which began the word from which it was derived. Due to this avoidance of consonant clusters and to the relatively small repertory of basic sounds, the stems of Finnish nouns and verbs tend to be relatively long (generally bisyllabic); examples are *isä* ("father"), *käsi* ("hand"), *pilvi* ("cloud"), *jalka* ("foot," "leg"), *talo* ("house"), and *navetta* ("cowshed"). The stress in Finnish always falls on the first vowel of the word.

A typical feature of the phonology of Finnish is the phenomenon known as vowel harmony, according to which no front vowel (*ä, ö, y*) may stand in the same word with any back vowel (*a, o, u*); thus *halu* ("desire," "eagerness") and *halussa* ("in the desire") contrast with *hälу* ("clamor," "tumult") and *hälyssä* ("in the clamor"); note *-ssa* as opposed to *-ssä*.

Another typical feature is gradation, examples of which include *vati* ("basin") as opposed to *vadissa* ("in the basin") and *kukka* ("flower") as opposed to *kukassa* ("in the flower"). Gradation at times involves complex phenomena, as in *laki* ("law") and *laissa* ("in the law"), or *hylje* ("seal") and *hylkeessä* ("in the seal"). Both of these features are conditioned by the distribution of vowel and consonant sounds in Finnish words.

Nouns and Verbs. Finnish nouns have 16 cases, of which 12 are fully productive; 4 others are only found sporadically. Examples include the genitive, indicated by the suffix *-n;* the inessive, indicated by *-ssa/-ssä* ("in . . ."); and the essive, indicated by *-na/-nä* ("as . . ."). Each case indicates the relation of the noun to the other members of a phrase or sentence; for example, *isä-n talo-ssa,* using the genitive and inessive, means "in father's house." Nouns can also be modified by possessive suffixes: *talo-ni* ("my house"), *talo-mme* ("our house"), *talo-ssa-ni* ("in my house"), *talo-i-ssa-ni* ("in my houses"; here the suffix *-i-* is the plural marker of the stem, corresponding to the suffix *-s of houses*). There are five possessive suffixes, meaning "my," "thy," "our," "your," and "his/her/its/their."

Finnish verbs have three persons in the singular—as in *anna-n* ("I give"), *anna-t* ("thou givest"), and *anta-a* ("he gives")—and three in the plural. They have two tenses—present and past—four moods, and a special device for indicating an impersonal agent, comparable to *man* in German or *on* in French; thus *annetaan* ("one gives"), *annettakoon* ("may one give!"). There is also a negative verb, very much like *don't* in English, which is conjugated for person: *minä en anna* ("I do not give"), *sinä et anna* ("thou dost not give"), *hän ei anna* ("he/she does not give"). Finnish abounds in infinitives and participles—for example, *antaa* ("to give"), *antanut* and *annettu* ("given"), *antava* ("giving"), *annettava* ("which is to be given"), *antaen* ("while giving"), *antaessa* ("in the act of giving"), *antama* ("which has been given"), and *antaminen* ("the activity of giving"). Most of these can be inflected, like any noun, for case and for person.

Finnish has many derivational suffixes that serve to enrich its vocabulary. Words exemplifying this phenomenon include *anta-utu-* ("to give oneself up"), *ant-el-ias* ("generous"), *ant-o* ("allocation," "credit"), *ann-os* ("a portion"), *ant-ime-* ("a gift"), *ann-iskele-* ("to retail," "to serve on the premises"), and *ant-ee-ksi* ("forgiveness," "pardon"), all of which are derived from the verbal root *anta-* ("to give").

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FINLAND, Gulf of, an arm of the Baltic Sea, extending about 250 miles (400 km) from west to east between Finland (north) and the Estonian republic of the USSR (south) to Leningrad. Its breadth at the widest part is about 80 miles (128 km). The gulf is relatively shallow and freezes over for three or more months during the winter. It receives the Neva River at Leningrad, the Saimaa Canal at Vyborg, USSR, and the Narva River at the eastern border of Estonia. It is also connected by canal, via lakes Ladoga and Onega, with the White Sea. It contains many islands, including Kotlin, site of the Soviet naval base of Kronshtadt. Helsinki, capital of Finland, and Tallin, capital of the Estonian republic, are on its shores.

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The Baltic:

Arena of Powe

By PRIIT J. VESILIND NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SENIOR WRITER

Photographs by COTTON COULSON

A stiff breeze buffets a Soviet sailor on a submarine in Leningrad, Russia's window on the Baltic. For the seven nations of this northern sea, the winds of change are blowing.



IN LENINGRAD I met a defector from America.

He was wearing sunglasses, sitting alone on a small towel beside the Neva River, by the walls of the Peter and Paul Fortress where Leningrad insiders swim and play volleyball on weekends. He had lived in the Soviet Union for 28 years.

A Russian friend pointed him out: "He is from San Francisco. Perhaps he will want to talk with you."

The defector was a bland man, with a face that betrayed no content. "What did you do in the States?" I asked him.

"National Security Agency."

I told him I was born just a few hundred miles down the coast, in Estonia, and fled west during World War II with my parents.

"We went opposite ways," he said, smiling. "I guess all cultures have their defects."

In Leningrad I met a lady.

She was sitting at the hard-currency bar of the Hotel Moscow, sipping gin. She liked to read John Steinbeck, she said, and she was a cardiologist by profession. But the lady was also a prostitute. In one night she could easily make $250, the average monthly salary of a physician in the Soviet Union.

"You are looking at me," she said abruptly, "and saying, 'Poor doctor!' Well, this is what our system does. And now, now we can say it." Her words spat across the table.

In Leningrad I met an admiral.

He was commander of the Leningrad naval base. In a VIP boat we followed his launch down the Neva to celebrate Navy Day, past four destroyers and three submarines lined up for inspection, each with its brass band, each with its sailors stiff in dress formation.

"How is it, comrades?" the admiral shouted through a bullhorn at each ship.

"Rah, rah, rah!" the sailors shouted back in unison.

That evening we photographed the fireworks over the Neva from the roof of the admiralty building, a top-secret facility. Thousands lined the riverbank. Strings of lights outlined the warships below, and the bronze statues atop the Winter Palace of the tsars stood black against the rockets' red glare.

"What's going on around here?" the admiral had demanded. "We haven't let even our *own* photographers on this building, and now we have American journalists? Up there? . . . Well, why not?"

THESE ARE HEADY, risky days on the eastern Baltic, front lines of the Soviet experiments in openness *(glasnost)* and restructuring *(perestroika)*. What was closed is open; what was secret lies revealed. Palms sweat among those who have held power by fear or graft. Officials throw up their hands, unsure of the new rules. Soviet society has never been on such display. Leningrad, Russia's traditional window on the West, finds the world peering back in fascination.

In the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three of the Soviet Union's fifteen constituent republics, last year's most dangerous fantasies have been sanctioned by the government itself. From Moscow has come the admission that, yes, after all, the Soviet Union occupied these nations by force in 1940, against the will of the people. Estonia has declared itself a sovereign state and is drafting ambitious plans for economic autonomy. The old national flag, stripes of blue, black, and white, a one-way ticket to Siberia only last May, waves over farmhouses.

Emotions fly between euphoria and cynicism in Estonia. Many fear a short spring, the rumble of tanks. Others sense the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a colonial power.

A consensus prevails that there is no alternative to radical change. Like Peter the Great, the Russian tsar who imported Western architects to build Leningrad on the marshes of the Neva, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev must reach out. He needs Western technology and expertise to prop up his foundering

giant before it sinks into Third World status.

Six industrial nations—Finland, Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, East Germany, and Poland—share this shallow, brackish Baltic Sea with the Soviet Union. Now the careful equations that have governed business, diplomacy, and military balance among them have been altered in three short years, and in one bold summer.

The Baltic has been a buffer zone and a battleground between East and West since the days of the Vikings, with seafaring tribes sacking each other in a cycle of cruelty and revenge. Only for a brief two centuries in the Middle Ages did a Baltic community coalesce, under the Hanseatic League of prosperous cities that valued trade over plunder. Since then, East and West have pursued their violence with the usual zest, culminating with Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin dividing people and nations between them as if they were cattle.

The Baltic remains on military alert, grouped into three forces: NATO, with Denmark and West Germany; the Warsaw Pact, with East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union; and two skittish neutrals, Finland and Sweden, gamely in the wings. The sea has become a chessboard for their maneuvers, patrols, provocative flight patterns, and electronic surveillance, with each side monitoring the other into a kind of half-cordial, grudging stalemate that wastes millions of dollars and thrives more on momentum than on crisis.

Deep suspicions remain between nations, and generals still talk like generals, but the thaw in the East has offered new hope; the Soviets have declared that the Cold War is over. And now a common enemy—pollution—promises to press the littoral nations of the Baltic into common cause. Environmental scientists already talk like citizens of a community. What I began last spring as a story of confrontation has turned into a story of optimism.

My journey starts on the blank page of the frozen Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and Finland, about a hundred miles south of the Arctic Circle. On this foggy morning we fly by helicopter from the Finnish town of Oulu over farmhouses and birch forests, droning out to sea over an open *(Continued on page 613)*

A friendly nyet wards off more pictures of Adm. Vladimir Samoilov, at right, commander of the Leningrad naval base. In the spirit of glasnost (openness) the admiral allowed the Western press full access to Leningrad's Navy Day celebrations in July 1988. The Soviet Baltic has emerged as the cutting edge of the nation's social, economic, and political experiments. East and West still eye each other warily across the sea, but the Cold War has begun to melt.


DENMARK
AREA: 43,069 sq km
(16,629 sq mi)
POPULATION: 5,126,000
SWEDEN
AREA: 449,964 sq km
(173,732 sq mi)
POPULATION: 8,393,000
FINLAND
AREA: 337,032 sq km
(130,129 sq mi)
POPULATION: 4,950,000
ARCTIC CIRCLE
AIR AND NAVAL BASES
Warsaw Pact country
Neutral country
NATO country
AVERAGE ICE EXTENT
Land
Jan. 1
Feb. 1
Feb. 21
Open water
Ferry route
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
DENMARK
Oslo
Göteborg
Frederikshavn
Aarhus
Karup
Esbjerg
Varberg
Kattegat
Skagerrak
North Sea
Helsingør
Helsingborg
Copenhagen
Malmö
Ystad
Flensburg
Kiel
Heiligendamm
Warnemünde
Travemünde
Priwall
Lübeck
Hamburg
KIEL CANAL
NETH.
Rostock
Stralsund
Sassnitz
Rønne
Darss Peninsula
Rügen
Mecklenburg
Pomerania
Świnoujście
Szczecin
Kołobrzeg
Puck
Gdynia
Sopot
Gdańsk
WOLIN NATIONAL PARK
WEST GERMANY (FRG)
EAST GERMANY (GDR)
POLAND
Berlin
Oder
Vistula
Warsaw
Oregrund
Mariehamn
Uppsala
Mälaren
Stockholm
Sandhamn
Aland
Turku
Helsinki
Gulf of Finland
Tallinn
Hiiumaa
Saaremaa
Gulf of Riga
Türi
ESTONIAN S.S.R.
Pärnu
LATVIAN S.S.R.
Ventspils
Jürmala
Sloka
Rīga
Daugava
Lielupe
Liepāja
River
Klaipėda
LITHUANIAN S.S.R.
Neringa
Kaliningrad
R.S.F.S.R.
Kaunas
Vilnius
U.S.S.R.
Vänern
Vättern
Norrköping
GÖTA KANAL SHIP ROUTE
Visby
Gotland
Oland
Kalmar
Karlskrona
Oskarshamn
Härnösand
Sundsvall
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Umeå
Luleå
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0 100 km
0 100 mi
LAMBERT CONFORMAL CONIC PROJECTION
WEST GERMANY
AREA: 248,630 sq km
(95,997 sq mi)
POPULATION: 60,980,000
EAST GERMANY
AREA: 108,178 sq km
(41,768 sq mi)
POPULATION: 16,597,000
POLAND
AREA: 312,677 sq km
(120,725 sq mi)
POPULATION: 37,958,000

The Baltic

Civilization has washed its hands too long in this shallow, brackish, lakelike sea, which is surrounded by one of the most industrialized areas of the world. Excesses of toxic waste, farm fertilizer runoff, oil spills, and the sewage of 70 million people pour into its waters, whose saltwater circulation is so weak that stagnation occurs naturally. In response, all seven nations of the Baltic community signed the Helsinki Convention of 1974, the world's first pact to protect an entire sea against pollution from all sources. Since then, oil spills have been dramatically reduced, toxic chemicals curtailed, and endangered species such as seals given new hope for survival.

Despite the fact that ice blocks its harbors in heavy winters, the Baltic has become one of the world's most active seas. Icebreakers cut channels for year-round commerce, and dozens of ferries link the seven nations. The sea also teems with navies: those of Denmark and West Germany of NATO; Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet Union of the Warsaw Pact; neutral Finland and Sweden.



U.S.S.R.
AREA: 22,274,900 sq km
(8,600,387 sq mi)
POPULATION: 286,435,000

The Baltic States, independent nations before their forced annexation in 1940, make up most of the Soviet Baltic. Many Western nations do not officially recognize the annexation. In 1988 each republic regained the unofficial use of its former national flag (below). Kaliningrad is part of the Russian Republic.

LITHUANIA LATVIA ESTONIA

From an island in the Stockholm archipelago, a member of the Swedish Home Guard scans for infiltrators. For the past nine years Swedes have been frustrated by foreign submarines probing their coastal waters. The video camera sits ready to record incidents.

channel bobbing with ice curds. At noon we intercept one of the world's most modern icebreakers, the six-story, 30,000-horsepower *Otso,* owned by the Finnish government, from whose immaculate decks I would have eaten scrambled eggs.

The *Otso* crushes rather than cuts the ice, bellying up on the sheet with enormous mass. The ice crumbles off in shards, the smaller ones churning in the wake and flashing shades of green as the seawater soaks through their layer of snow. Cracks rip off into the horizon, zigzagging as if they were chased.

In our wake is the Polish freighter *Eugenie Cotton,* fast for Kemi for a load of paper pulp. In hard winters national flags and borders have little meaning to traffic on the Baltic. Under a pragmatic agreement among the seven nations, their combined 34 icebreakers are shifted around from an office in Helsinki just by a few phone calls: "Say, Ivan, we need your boys over in Sweden."

At night we sit high on the bridge, hypnotized by the pale lights of the computer and radar screens and the deep, steady rumble. The moon and Venus hang like ornaments in the cold. Sibelius is on the tape deck. It seems as if we have left earth altogether and are headed for the galaxies, warm, powerful, in charge.

Even in normal winters, thick ice grips the



sea as far south as the Swedish island of Gotland. "If we stop for a day," says First Officer Christian Wennerstrand, "we have chaos."

Finland, the world's only nation with no ice-free ports, builds more than half the world's icebreakers, many for the Soviet Union. Finns regard perestroika with caution. Already faced with shrinking orders in a bleak era for European shipbuilding, they must now deal with the economic instability of one of their biggest customers. Says Pekka Laine, president of Wärtsilä Marine Industries, Finland's largest ship maker, "There is no longer just one market in the U.S.S.R., but many. In Murmansk, for example, the decisions to buy are made on site, rather than in Moscow."

Finland signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in 1948. In exchange for her freedom Finland will allow no invasion of the Soviet Union through her territory. Finlandization has become a generic term for one nation's accommodations with a neighboring superpower and is sometimes used to suggest a kind of national castration. Said Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri when he visited Washington, D. C., last summer, "From the depths of my heart, I hate that term."

Culturally and economically Finland is a Western nation. But would the Finns fight if the Soviets tried to use Finnish territory as a springboard to attack NATO?

"We would damn sure defend ourselves," Finnish Vice Adm. Jan Klenberg says succinctly at General Headquarters in Helsinki. "We have to make it clear that it is not possible to *use* Finnish territory.

"We know we wouldn't win another war—but we are prepared to fight." An acid mix of pride and frustration rises in his throat. "They test us from both sides—both NATO and Warsaw Pact. Almost every day we send up interceptors. If some skidoo has come across a land border by even two meters, we respond."

Ripping a gash in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Finnish icebreaker Otso leads a timber-laden Soviet freighter from the port of Kokkola, Finland. A multinational fleet of 34 icebreakers, most built in Finland's Wärtsilä shipyards, operates in the Baltic.

With its Leningrad architecture Helsinki retains trappings of the days when Finland was a grand duchy of the Russian Empire—samovars and borscht, the dark brocade of old restaurants. For many years Finland even had serious Communists. But I see in the newspaper, while sitting at McDonald's on Mannerheim Street, that Arvo Aalto, head of the Finnish Communist Party, plans to resign next week because the party suffered heavy financial losses in the stock market.

FROM HELSINKI's South Harbor, the Baltic's elegant car-and-passenger ferries put forth to Leningrad, Gdańsk, Travemünde, and my own destination, Stockholm via the Åland Islands, an overnight cruise that threads an island world of pine forest and granite.

The ferries make money. Slot machines occupy the idle. Duty-free shops push cognac and silk scarves. A ten-piece band pumps waltzes over a smorgasbord rich in herring. On the deck gentlemen Swedes in gray suits stroll like storks, with their hands folded behind their backs, saying, "Yaw, yaw."

In the Åland Islands, the autonomous archipelago between Finland and Sweden, 23,000 Ålanders fly their own flag and lick their own Åland Islands postage stamps. They speak Swedish but belong to Finland, which is responsible for their defense. Formerly a Swedish province, the islands petitioned to be returned to Sweden as the Russian Empire disintegrated in 1917, but the League of Nations honored the Finnish claim and confirmed

the islands' status as a military-free zone.

Their history bristles with sea captains and merchant sailing fleets, and today Ålanders own many of the ferry lines—Viking, Birka, Eckerö—that haul more than eight million passengers each year in the Baltic. Through the tax-free sales they have prospered.

"We are a privileged people," an Ålands gas station owner tells me. "There's no poverty here, no racism, because there are no 'guest workers.' There's almost no serious crime, few drugs. I wouldn't go anywhere else."

And what can be sweeter than early summer in the Ålands? The spangle of sun on water, the sharp smell of mown grass, apple blossoms, and lilacs. Queen Anne's lace that billows beside country roads like snowdrifts. And shocks of dandelions growing brazenly in the long daylight, their thick, hollow stems wet as rhubarb.

STOCKHOLM ARRIVES in the early morning, through mist and a maze of small islands, with a skyline of church spires and sailboat masts, their sharpness always reaching toward heaven. The city rests on 14 islands, clinging by tentacles of bridges and causeways to the rocks. Half the city lies

Questions of power and purpose hang heavy on Poland's independent trade union, Solidarity, outlawed in 1981 but recently invited back into the national dialogue. At a strategy session in Gdańsk, founder Lech Wałęsa, at right, and local president Alojzy Szablewski, middle, hear from a member. At Gdańsk's Lenin Shipyard (below), Solidarity's birthplace, sandblasters restore a Soviet ship. The yard may soon close. Politics, says Solidarity.



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beside Lake Mälaren, half beside the Baltic.

Swedes are a confident people. Sweden has not warred for 175 years. With no pain to endure, no heroes to worship, no warriors to bury, they have a human advantage: They carry no self-hate and so are not apt to hate others. They seem indifferent to defense. Says air force Lt. Col. Gösta Edwards, "Society looks at us as if we don't belong."

But bad things happen to nice people. The Swedes are deeply troubled by the assassination of their charismatic prime minister Olof Palme three years ago. And for the past nine years they have been plagued by foreign submarines, arrogantly, systematically, probing their coastal waters.

No one knows why. Training? Espionage? One Danish naval officer theorized that the Soviet Union is getting navigational fixes on the Swedish coast so it can hide nuclear submarines in case of war and push the buttons from there. "They know now that the Swedes can't find them," he told me.

Since 1981, when a Soviet Whiskey-class sub ran aground near the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona, no physical evidence has been found, no foreigners confronted. With photographs of bottom-crawling mini-sub tracks



creeping within a few miles of Stockholm, and night sightings of frogmen, the hunt has taken on the comic overtones of the Loch Ness monster. The Swedish Navy has lost face.

With the loss has come a new toughness. "I'm in charge of military readiness," Swedish Army Brig. Gen. Bertel Österdahl tells me at the garrison in Stockholm, "a job that gives me trouble from time to time. There's quite a lot of activity in this area, and we have to act too, just to show that we are present."

"But what happens," I ask, "if you actually destroy a submarine and have Russian or Polish bodies floating in Stockholm Harbor?"

"In our territorial waters we'll shoot without warning," he replies.

To see the complexity of the submarine chase, you must sail an archipelago of 25,000 islands, past thousands of granite skerries flush with blueberries, past summer hideaways and small boys fishing on piers, through waters thick with sonar-foiling thermal layers, inconsistent salinity, and erratic bottoms, and extending hundreds of miles on a coastline as long as from Long Island to Key West in North America.

"The Baltic is good for submarine warfare," says Comdr. Carl-Gustaf Dybeck of the



Medieval-style houses haunt the heart of Gdańsk, Poland's main seaport, reminders of past glories. Once known as Danzig, it was a Germanic pillar of the Hanseatic League of merchant cities that dominated northern Europe.

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Swedish Navy. "In some parts of the year it's almost impossible to hunt submarines except with other subs."

From Muskö Naval Base, south of Stockholm, we sail out one morning on H.M.S. *Umeä,* a Swedish sub hunter powered by Rolls-Royce aircraft engines and carrying a payload of eight Swedish RBS-15 missiles and six torpedoes. The *Umeä* is part of a ten-ship joint exercise. It is the fastest conventional ship in the Baltic, like a greyhound at 38 knots in rough seas, streaking through narrow passages, spilling our wake on the rocks.

Comdr. Anders Stävberg, head of the squadron, joins me on deck as I grip the railing: "Only a helicopter can follow us along. In two hours we can reach Soviet waters with missiles; it's only five hours south for action against Poland and East Germany."

"But what about these subs?" I ask. The commander winces. "It's a little irritating that

we can't do it better. In 1972 we had the forces to hunt submarines, but then parliament figured there were better things to spend money on. By 1992 we'll have four more corvettes, and we'll start to hunt with effectiveness."

In the wardroom of the *Umeä* we feast on roast pork, lingonberries, and steamed potatoes. Says the ship's skipper, Lt. Comdr. C. A. Klingspor, "Frankly this sub crisis has put such a strain on the navy, no one has had time to take care of wife and family. Two weeks out, a weekend in. Living on a small craft. They've been holding seminars to help families stay together."

THE BALTIC is not a lonely sea. Joining the military parade are thousands of fishing boats, yachts and freighters, crisscrossing ferries, tankers, scows, research vessels, reefer ships, and transatlantic merchant vessels flying Liberian flags. From West Germany, daily "butter ships" selling groceries carry *Hausfrauen* back and forth to Denmark at nominal charge, so they can save some money on tax-free food and get a good chat in too. Robinson Crusoe would have been picked up and been back home by Friday.

As traffic swirls around it, the Kingdom of Denmark guards the Baltic like a sentinel. Its most easterly outpost is the island of Bornholm, an early-warning platform for NATO intelligence. When a Soviet cruiser eases out of Kaliningrad Harbor, on the Baltic's southeastern coast, it announces itself to the entire Western world. On Bornholm, Comdr. Ole Bretting picks up an echo from the cruiser's hull on his radar and sets the process of snoop-versus-snoop in motion.

"We'll shadow along and identify her," Bretting says. "A Danish patrol craft will hand her over to a West German boat that will follow her through the Danish straits. A helicopter will go out to take pictures. Finally she'll be handed over to the Norwegians. This is daily life. The Red Navy has grown to disproportionate size. It's their lake. But we can pinpoint all the ships to see if there is an incoming or outgoing trend. If there's an outgoing trend, something is going on in the world."

War and confusion suit Bornholm badly. In the village of Årsdale on the east coast, set in hollyhocks and lace curtains, red-tile roofs and half-timber cottages, I walk down the street and hear only the piping of swallows, the hush of waves against the harbor wall, and smell the alder smoke from herring being cured.

Like many parts of the Baltic, Bornholm was occupied first by Germany, then by the Soviet Union in the shifting fronts of World War II. Old fisherman Svend Clausen remembers: "One man hung his best suit of clothes on the apple tree outside. 'If they bomb the house,' he said, 'at least I'll have my suit.' "

Mr. Clausen deals rather briskly with German tourists: "They ask me where to go. 'You must know,' I tell them. 'You didn't ask directions in 1940.' "

The West German tourist fights the past all over Europe. And even the best beaches of the old German shore are now in East Germany and Poland, not prime travel destinations.

Once the German Baltic coast was the playground of the *Wandervögel,* youth groups of the early 1900s whose physical-culture movement was preempted by the Hitler Youth and muddled with their notions of Aryan supremacy. After the war West Germans had to rediscover their culture, and restoration of beach life at Travemünde, north of the old

Standing short for law and order, a statue playfully honors an imaginary market policeman in the Finnish port of Oulu. Before powerful icebreakers, Oulu celebrated FOW Day, for First Open Water of spring, when ships could get through with fresh goods.

Ten miles offshore, an ice fisherman checks a net by his portable hut (facing page). A branch marks his fishing hole. Hundreds of such Baltic fishermen work through the winters, ice or no.

city of Lübeck, was one of the first steps.

Since then, the Ostsee, or East Sea—as the Germans call the Baltic—has become a sort of German New Jersey shore, a frugal choice for the holidays. The region is suffering a mild depression, despite the 70,000 ships that annually use the Kiel Canal to bypass the Danish straits for Baltic ports. Lübeck alone has lost 12,000 laboring jobs in the past 15 years, many in the shipbuilding industry.

North of Kiel I wander along a beach where the shoreline is hacked off by the sea and the prevailing west winds as if by a butcher knife, leaving half a barley field, half a cow pasture. Offshore oil derricks sit like docked aircraft carriers in the haze.

On a sunny weekend some 50,000 come to fill the wicker *Strandkörbe*—beach baskets—of Travemünde, cocoons against the brisk wind. Thousands camp on the hook of land called Priwall, by the border with East Germany, the northern tip of what used to be the Iron Curtain. Behind an ordinary pipe fence painted red and white is an empty shore of Eden-like beauty, fragrant with new blooms of wild roses and flowering shrubs. The East German guard tower stands in the distance.

I walk down the fence, along the shoreline of a tidepool. Behind me a West German border guard leads his attack dog. He stops to smoke and throw a stick into the water, which the beast chases with foolish enthusiasm.

WHEN HERMANN AXEN, a leader of the Communist party in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), came to Washington last spring, he said quite bluntly: "You cannot mix socialism and capitalism, as you cannot mix fire and water."

To be a German is burden enough. To be a German Communist carries a double stigma that has toughened the leaders of the GDR, the little nation that could. Because East Germany has made communism work better than anyone else, they remain cold to the pressure for glasnost and perestroika and deny the failure such radical restructuring implies.



Says Dieter Noll, director of the port of Rostock, "There are many people who have two opinions—one private and one official. I'm not rich enough to have two opinions; official ones have served me well."

Noll, an impatient, broad-shouldered man, has no time for doubt; more than 3,800 ships a year pass in and out of his harbor, bearing the commerce of a nation: pulp and paper from Finland, chemicals from Latvia; trucks to Vietnam, rolls of steel plate to the Third World, urea and rock salt to the United States. Nearly 44 percent of all cargo involves the Soviet Union; 10 percent is transit goods for the landlocked European interior—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria.

"At the end of the 1950s," Noll says with pride, "there was only a small harbor here. Hamburg and Lübeck were already world renowned. We built this from scratch into one of the largest seaports on the Baltic."

Noll scoffs at the prospect of independent trade unions like Solidarity in Poland. "Bargaining?" he asks. "The word 'bargaining' is a foreign one; we do not use this word. If the trade unions in our harbor want anything improved, they simply apply to the management. I've never heard a discussion—like in Poland—that they would demand more."

Dieter Kuntze, 38, lives in a four-room flat with his wife and two sons, within sight of the crane he operates for the harbor. He has been selected by the collective for this interview, but he is his own man. "We sometimes make a show—as if everything is great," he begins. "This is not right, huh?"

They could use a better stereo system, says Dieter, and the furniture is a bit old, but living standards exceed those of some Western

"They're still clean," says Danish fisherman Per Jørgensen of the codfish he nets off the tiny island of Christiansø near Bornholm, a yet unpolluted area of the southern Baltic. A rubber-roller winch helps pull in the catch. Jørgensen eases his one-man boat through November breakers into Christiansø Harbor (far left), later relaxing at tea with daughter Sara and wife Vita. Although pollution has reduced the number of its species, the Baltic is not yet overfished, thanks in part to a 1976 zone system that sets national boundaries but irritates fishermen accustomed to complete freedom.



An ill surf washes most Baltic beaches. In Estonia slaughterhouse waste from nearby collectives shut down Pärnu Beach, where a sign warns: "Seawater does not meet standards. Swimming is not advised." Experts say such pollution has plagued the water for years; only now have most governments given warning.

At the headquarters of a chemical company in Helsinki (above), a Greenpeace activist chains himself to a door to publicize ulcerous fish caught near the titanium dioxide plant in Pori.

nations such as Greece or Portugal. Even the long years of defensive isolationism seem numbered. In 1988 East Germans were permitted seven million trips to the West. Such travel is on the hostage system, of course; a family member must stay behind. Still, defections were quite high to West Germany.

"Those who have left have to prove to me that they have it better on the outside," Mrs. Kuntze says defiantly. "I have my job, and it's good wages. There's something on the table every day. If there is some lack, someone has not done the people's work."

"Well," says Dieter, "in our society those who don't work well get paid as much as those who do, and that's a big problem. People are lazy. But when you have competition, you have to get up early in the morning."

Mrs. Kuntze seems alarmed at her husband's drift. "There will be a time when capitalism will disappear," she says. "Social science will grow and grow. Of course, it will take 200 or 300 years."

THE PLAINS of Mecklenburg around the medieval Hanseatic town of Rostock always grew their cabbages, potatoes, and stubborn Junkers, landowners who resisted change and kept north Germany too long in military feudalism.

The roads are lined with trees, like soldiers planted at attention. Fields are bemedaled with scarlet poppies. In the evening, fog rises from the land, and families of wild boar snort along the forest edge. Not a billboard desecrates the open road. There is a sad nostalgia in the landscape, like a faded picture book that shows the innocence of better times.

My eyes sting from the soft coal burned for heating and industry and from the exhaust of inefficient two-stroke East German auto engines. I ask the head of the famous health spa

at Heiligendamm, famous for asthma cures, how he and other doctors can pressure the government to clean up the air.

He sniffs the sea breeze and says simply, "My air here is very good." But this is the summer to press the point, and finally he answers in impeccable social-speak, "In the frame of the possible, we are as angry as we can afford to be and remain progressive."

The plains sweep north along the fragile coastline, buttressed there by wooden pilings driven in the sand against the thieving surf. In a claustrophobic nation the seashore is the chance to breathe free. Thousands elbow into health spas, campgrounds, and beaches. Holidays are organized and monitored by trade unions; many have their own low-cost resort dormitories on the coast. Government-organized nudist beaches and camps rival "textile beaches" in number. Vacations on the Baltic are highly prized but available to the average worker only once in three years or so.

Much of life in the GDR seems drawn on graph paper, a life of straight lines and right angles, each worker in his little square, a unit in the grand design of state. So it is a pleasure to find a little silliness in Warnemünde, a resort town north of Rostock, where the Baltic Sea Festival features races between goofy boats built of plywood and inner tubes.

One boat is manned by "workers" in construction helmets; another is powered by "bureaucrats" in coats and ties, typing at a floating desk. King Neptune comes upriver with his entourage—a cassocked priest, a crew of frogs, and maidens dressed in seaweed.

The crowd gathered by the riverbank is tentative—not quite knowing when to clap and when to cheer. They haven't had any practice laughing at themselves. But they have had their bread; now they have their circus. So far, so good, says the government. Stick around.

Stereos and microwaves are on the way. But we're going to do it on our own—from scratch if possible, without that perestroika.

FROM THE SANDSPITS of the GDR the road rolls into the Polish People's Republic, a wounded nation just plain uninterested in communism, now or in 300 years. "In the GDR," says journalist Rafał Jesswein in the port city of Świnoujście, "they haven't noticed that Stalin is dead."

By the Bay of Szczecin, in Wolin National Park, a white-tailed eagle named Kuba sits brooding in a small aviary. Kuba is not well, for a national symbol. First of all, he has been without his royal crown since 1945. Second, his breed is dying in the Baltic, because the fish the eagles feed on are contaminated. Only five nests survive in the park.

The Baltic is burdened by 70 million people and their massive industrial output. The sea is sluggish and virtually tideless, much like a lake. Its salinity is replenished largely by storms that force North Sea water through the Danish straits. Such a flush is vital to marine life in the Baltic, but the sea has remained stagnant now for a record ten years. Its deeper layers have spent their oxygen, and some areas are completely devoid of life.

Man has compounded the Baltic's own limitations by overloading the sea with pesticides, toxic industrial wastes, and excessive nutrients in the form of nitrogen and phosphorus from municipal sewage and agricultural fertilizers. Some species of wildlife, such as Baltic seals, have been brought to the edge of extinction. Last summer, for the first time, most of the beaches on the Baltic were closed.

Yet the Baltic is not the most polluted sea in the world. Says Estonian environmentalist Harald Velner, "It is merely the most examined." In 1988 Professor Velner was executive secretary of the main group of examiners, the Helsinki Commission, the permanent committee established to implement the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area—an extraordinary working agreement signed in 1974 by all seven Baltic nations. The commission is chaired in turn by professionals from each nation and meets annually.

After a decade there is progress: a decrease in DDT and PCB levels, a reduction in mercury concentration in fish, the control of discharges and oil spills from ships. At their meeting in March 1988 the states agreed to cut by 50 percent their input of nutrients, heavy metals, and organic toxins by 1995.

Among Baltic polluters Poland has been a heavy contributor and faces a stiff challenge with the new guidelines. Practically the entire nation—the coal mines of Silesia, the cities of Warsaw and Kraków—feeds the Baltic. Its population of 37 million is more than twice that of Finland, Sweden, and Denmark combined. But now Warsaw has a new sewage-treatment plant, and 25 others are being built on the coast. Most are due on line by 1992.

Says Anna Trzosinska of the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management in Gdynia, "Sixty percent of our nutrient input comes from agriculture. In heavy rains it's just drainage off the land. We will never reach this 50 percent removal. . . . All the countries will have trouble making it. When we signed, we signed the text that the countries will be *trying*—a goodwill act."

THE POLISH COAST rests on two urban-industrial pillars—the Szczecin/Świnoujście complex on the west and Gdańsk on the east. Between them hangs the potato kingdom, Pomerania, with its fields of white potato blossoms, tufts of dense forest, and seaside lagoons inhabited by wild swans.

For centuries Pomerania was trampled by some form of Germans on their way east—Teutonic Knights, the armies of Brandenburg, Prussia, and the Third Reich. Gdańsk was the free Germanic city of Danzig. Slavic Poland was largely impotent, often blocked from the Baltic coast, carved up among successive powers. Today Pomerania is finally rid of its Germans but occupied still; until midnight Soviet fighters thunder in and out of their training base east of Kołobrzeg, keeping the tourists restless.

The Poles are well dressed, handsome, and somehow on a larger scale than their surroundings, as if they have grown since the war and Poland itself has not. They walk about their shabby, construction-site cities like cavaliers, with the hint of the Tatar in them, kissing the hands of women in greeting. In Leningrad it was just the opposite: The people seemed too small for the buildings.

Across rural Poland, through villages and goose farms, past manure piles and storks' nests, rose gardens, and shrines guarding

crossroads, I reach the resort of Sopot, once known as the Pearl of the Baltic. Here too the beach is closed. Sopot was once the playground for the people of Gdańsk, whose own bay has sunk into squalor. Now there is nowhere to swim within 100 miles. But some still venture into algae-rich water the consistency of broccoli soup. I see one man bobbing his infant son up and down in the water.

"I *paid* for my vacation," he tells me, "and I should enjoy it. If it's so dangerous, people should have been warned about it earlier. Hey, they say if you don't get sick in three days, then you're all right. The water's warm. It's a shame to waste it."

Gdańsk, a city of aged and spiraling ironwork and guild houses left from Hanseatic days, has made its modern mark as the home of Solidarity, Poland's independent trade union and unofficial popular front. Solidarity grew from the Lenin Shipyard here and threatened a Polish spring before martial law was imposed in 1981. Now Lech Wałęsa is negotiating with authorities again, and the union has found new legitimacy as Poland grapples with its economic demons. But the shipyard itself may soon be closed; lack of orders, the government says. Here, as elsewhere in Poland today, workers are looking for a way out. Thousands have left Poland for good.

"It is a very big shame," says ship worker Benedykt Bruski when I visit the yard. He waves his hand to dismiss all dissent. "If I have a wife and children, I should support them and not send them to the neighbors for food and clothing; it's a matter of pride. That's what our government has done. They should have been a better father. But still, I'm also ashamed of all the Poles who stay abroad. They're deserting a sinking ship."

Polish women seek desperately for any warm body of a Swede or West German to marry. University professors wash dishes abroad and return to buy villas. And there are thousands like Zbigniew Potrzuski of Szczecin. He has contracted to work for a year as a chemical engineer in a developing country, where he will be paid in hard currency.

"Libya is my perestroika," he says. "One of our leading Communists has said that every man is responsible for his own wealth."

"That's a very capitalistic idea," I offer.

"It's a very human idea," he says.

NEW IDEAS, seductive and bordering on the seditious, have spread epidemically in the Baltic States of the Soviet Union. "Popular fronts" in support of perestroika have materialized almost overnight in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to test the limits of possibility. The bottom of orthodox communism has collapsed, revealing a stagnant center. Hard-line Stalinists have been ousted. The truth about the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic States, crated and buried in revisionist history for two generations, has been resurrected and paraded in public like a hero. Speech has become the new intoxicant. Once forbidden words, sentences, emotions, tumble over one another, leaving the population light-headed in disbelief.

Gentler waters rinse a family at an East German nudist camp on the Darss peninsula, where bare beaches outstretch "textile beaches" five to one. "Everyone here is equal, no trouble," said one camper. "It's different in textile areas. Maybe when you take off your clothes, you take off your aggressions too."

Until last year the people of the Baltic States felt like American Indians—left with their dances and songs and language. They had watched an immigration of Russian and other Slavic workers tip the population balance until Latvians lost the majority in their own nation and Estonians composed only 60 percent of theirs. Only Lithuania successfully kept its ethnic population, at 80 percent. Now Russification is open to criticism. Many speak of a national rebirth.

All this has been a calculated gamble, roughly choreographed by the Kremlin. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were independent parliamentary democracies for 22 years. They are the Soviet Union's link to the West, the only people with a living memory of free-market economics, and thus the prime candidates for experimental change. Their success would legitimize perestroika and quicken more sluggish parts of the Soviet Union.

Politically the Baltic experiment plays with a deep-smoldering fire. So far the Communist Party has been a participant in the movements, hoping to control more radical elements, but the Baltic people also remember with vividness and hostility the deportation of thousands of farmers, teachers, merchants, and intellectuals to Siberian labor camps in 1940 and the brutal humiliation that followed. For many, support for perestroika is only the first step toward the national dream, to rid the nation of its Vandals and Visigoths. Moscow may have underestimated the impact of offering such people free speech.

PHOTOGRAPHER Cotton Coulson and I were the first Americans in decades to visit Neringa, on the delicate pine-scented sandbar that links the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda to Kaliningrad, a closed and secretive oblast of the Russian Republic wedged between Lithuania and Poland.

Even in this vacation hideaway conversation quickly turns, unsolicited, to politics. "I think about these problems every day—every night," a man from Vilnius tells me on the street. "People are at a boiling point. For many years we have been in chains and handcuffs. Now the Russians are looking to us for success. They need Lithuanians to begin these things. But we are only a drop in the sea."

Lithuania looks prosperous. The earth is a dark chocolate, and farmhouses are smothered in flowers and fruit trees. Silos and haystacks, iron red cattle, and fields of clover rush by the windshield of our microbus. Buildings are better painted, brickwork tidier, shops a bit brighter than in Poland. In Klaipėda we marinate in a traffic jam worthy of Rome. Along a peaceful canal in the rebuilt city one evening I chat with two worm fishermen, Anatoli and his son, Kostya, age seven.

"I grew up under Stalin," says Anatoli, "but he turned out to be the enemy. Hah! I've seen lots of leaders come and go, but Gorbachev is the best yet."

Anatoli knows all about American politics too; he quizzes me on Jesse Jackson. I ask if he would like to travel to America. The idea seems suddenly less preposterous to him. "But I'd have to save for three years," he says, smiling. "Oh, I'd go someday."

"If Mama lets you," says Kostya wisely, biting into a green apple.

The Baltic States are among the smallest of the Soviet republics, but the most urban and literate. From one state to another, culture changes sharply. Lithuanians are Roman Catholics with historic ties to the Poles. Latvians are Lutherans and speak a different Indo-European tongue. Estonians are Lutherans, linguistically among the Finno-Ugric stock, which includes Finns and Hungarians.

For years the republics have shrewdly used environmental issues as safe but vital battlegrounds to resist the central control of Moscow. In Estonia dangerous and unwanted plans by central ministries to strip-mine more phosphate near the Baltic coast, to build an oil terminal near Tallinn, and to construct more shale-oil-burning electric power plants have been thwarted by popular resistance. In Latvia a grass-roots group called VAK has taken the initiative, leading a protest march of 15,000 people to temporarily halt the construction of a subway under the capital city of Rīga.

"A subway would require the importation of workers from Russia," says a young man from Rīga. "And besides, Russian construction is so bad that we don't trust them blasting and tunneling under the old city."

The closing, for at least five years, of Rīga's Jūrmala Beach was a heavy blow. At the acerbic local newspaper, *Jūrmala,* editor Aivars Baumanis is indignant: "We can't swim in the sea—it's the first summer. . . . It's absurd!"

Jūrmala is soiled mostly by the ancient Sloka pulp-and-paper plant, only 15 miles upstream, that spews its poisons into the Lielupe

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River and the Gulf of Riga, now one of the dirtiest bodies of water on the Baltic.

"Our factories have been controlled by all-union ministries in Moscow," says Baumanis. "Such ministers don't care about the ecology of the republics. Five years ago we couldn't say anything. It was taboo to discuss dirty water. It was *top secret!*"

Baumanis laughs heartily and lights another cigarette. "But now it's changed. Now we talk openly about it. Glasnost! Now they have the commitment. . . . The Sloka factory will be closed by March 31. We can clean up our water. We have to overcome barriers—lots of fools are still in the way. But we can do it."

BETWEEN LATVIA and Estonia we pick up a Russian woman and her daughter, hitchhiking to catch a Moscow train. They had been camping on a Latvian beach. "I've had a lot of arguments with people here," she tells us. "We Russians want to make all nationalities happy, but these Estonians and Latvians. . . . It's a shame. They say that only *their* country is their motherland. It's like Californians saying that their state is their only country. I don't understand."

In Estonia there have been no burning tires and tear gas in the streets; intellectual force and restraint have been the weapons of rebellion. And Moscow has given Estonians remarkably free rein. Hundreds of thousands, including new Communist Party leader Vaino Väljas, have gathered in Tallinn to sing full-throated and righteous patriotic songs. Flag-waving demonstrators gather daily in Tallinn. Since last June, police have watched from a benign distance.

On August 26 I join a protest to mark the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, whose secret protocol divided Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union and led to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. At a rally in Hirve Park, Hitler



A short history of Latvia, one of the Soviet Union's three Baltic republics, plays out on the streets of Rīga, the capital, as Latvian girls dressed in ethnic costumes for a folk dance share the sidewalk with Soviet police. The Baltic nations, now asserting themselves, were forcibly occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940.

and Stalin are called "colleagues," and Russians are rudely invited to "go loaf around in their own country." The old Estonian Hymn is sung, haltingly but reverently. In a bizarre touch, a police car leads the mass march down the avenue to the harbor to the chant, "Russians go home! Russians go home!"

Says Endel Lippmaa, a scientist and veteran of Kremlin corridor battles over the environment, "Gorbachev is using Estonia to demonstrate that he is a man of goodwill. In order to make perestroika credible, he must use some bait—it suits global politics. I hope that he is sincere. But, at any rate, we must use this situation to put our house into better order."

Few feel the Baltic States can con their way into full independence. The Kremlin has already squelched hyperventilated calls for a separate Estonian currency, diplomatic corps, and membership in the United Nations and the Olympic committee. The Kremlin needs Estonia to perform; it wants to see black ink, not rebellion, in return for the risk.

PRIIT J. VESILIND

Bitter memories fuel Estonians in the capital city of Tallinn, demonstrating on the anniversary of the 1939 pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. that paved the way for annexation of the Baltic States. "A free Estonia," reads one banner. On a Tallinn street (opposite) a sign demands: "KGB under control of the people!" So far, Moscow has been tolerant.

But Estonians feel that economic success must be predicated on full autonomy. "Look at it this way," says the erudite secretary of the Estonian Writers Union, Lennart Meri, "the most peaceful and effective border of the Soviet Union is with Finland, not with the satellite countries like Poland . . . because Finnish-Soviet trade is extensive and beneficial. This border could extend to the Baltic States. Ten years . . . give us ten years to begin to offer the same economic advantages to the Soviet Union as Finland does. It would work."

Estonia, with less than one percent of the Soviet population, already has more than half the nation's joint-venture enterprises with the West. Private cooperatives such as coffee shops and grilled-meat stands have sprung up by the roadsides. A group of young wits from the resort town of Pärnu sells cans of seawater as gag gifts; on the labels they list the high pollution levels and give medical instructions.

In Pärnu the beach is closed, but the Neptun cooperative still runs its beachfront shop, renting surfboards and beach chairs. The crowds have been thin. "But it's not just the pollution," says the young manager. "The Russians are just as afraid of our blue-black-and-white as they are of our water. In Moscow they tell each other that Estonia is dangerous now—like we were going to kill them or something!"

In other parts of the Soviet Union such raw enterprise is still controversial. Not so in Estonia. "We've earned everything honestly," says Andrus Sukles, one of the founders of Neptun. "The only trade-off has been our nerves, our stress.

"But you know what I really like about today? They tell us, 'If you're a man, do it!' That's what I like."

WE DRIVE ALONG the southwestern shore of Estonia in a storm. The beach is scrubbed by gray waves that foam through the reeds. The rain sweeps in, fresh from the west, as we stop at a campground where families from the village of Türi have come for their holidays. Above their tents flies an immense old



The Iron Curtain just dribbles into the sea at Priwall in West Germany, where visitors come to gaze quietly across the border with the German Democratic Republic. In a time of hope the Baltic may be moving toward a true community of nations.

Estonian flag, resurrected from someone's attic, where it had been hidden since 1940. They embrace me like a lost son, offering champagne, talking all at once, eager to tell about their remarkable summer.

"In our village we're digging out the monument to the Estonian War of Freedom from under the asphalt," says Theo Aasa, one of the leaders. "People remembered where it was buried by the Russians. This is a mass movement. It's everywhere! You can't stop it!" His face brightens. "And no one is trying."

So far. So far. We take pictures of their beautiful old flag. "The old people are



weeping," says Aasa. "This was unexpected in their lives."

We leave them gathered around the flagpole, these people from Türi, and walk back toward our microbus. Suddenly I hear applause behind us, warm and steady. They are clapping for us, for themselves, for the truth that electrifies the Baltic air, that men should be free. I try to wave good-bye from the window as we pull out, but my eyes well over, and I bury my head on the back of the seat in front of me.

My mother has always told me that the Baltic Sea is shaped rather like a woman kneeling in prayer—her cowled head bowed between Finland and Sweden, her robe trailing off into Denmark and the Germanys, her knees pressing down on Poland. But her arms—they are embracing Estonia.

My journey ends with a full heart. Men of goodwill are about, and there is hope. The warships of seven nations still glare at one another. Pulp mills and chemical works still disgorge their poisons. But now we know that we all live on the same sea. Surely we can solve the ancient riddles that divide us. As the admiral said in the confused but expectant city of Leningrad, "Well . . . why not?" □

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

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FINLAND'S CAPITAL HAS ITS HEART IN THE COUNTRY

Helsinki

By PRIIT J. VESILIND

Photographs by JODI COBB

BOTH NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC STAFF

THE SUN STARTS TO NIBBLE through the arctic winds in early spring. Daylight lingers into dinner hour, and there is an irresistible tug at the Helsinki soul to welcome the passing of winter.

On weekends solitary fishermen sit like toads on the still-frozen sea, their giant hole-drilling augers curling beside them. On the ice the people come and go, cross-country skiers and strollers, and young kickers of melting chunks of winter (following pages). They walk in pairs, arm in arm, or alone, just strolling in the healing sun, yet silently and almost magnetically apart, as if guided by a surrealist choreographer.

"Being on the ice," Helsinkians call the Sunday ritual, a celebration, really. But in this city of dignity and reserve, only a brief smile, a relaxed shoulder, and an occasional balloon hint at the holiday intent of it all.

The capital of Finland lies on the latitude of Anchorage, Alaska, and clings to a windswept outcropping of granite hillocks like a hand stretching into the Gulf of Finland. Half the metropolitan area's 737 square kilometers (284 square miles) are undisturbed shores, lakes, and forests. A broad swath of woods, Central Park, bisects the city north of the railroad station.

"Sometimes after work," a young draftsman told me, "I just strap on my skis at the door of my apartment house, and before me are ten kilometers of wooded trails."

Of the world's capitals, only Iceland's Reykjavík lies farther north, and in winter the elements press in on Helsinki as if reclaiming stolen property. By February the fingers of the peninsula are cemented into sea ice so thick that cars race on it. Deep snow muffles the streets, and on some still, foggy mornings, huge elk wander in from the surrounding forest.

You can easily walk to the walls of Suomenlinna, an 18th-century Swedish sea fortress built on four islands,

*To defy and enjoy the rigors of an interminable winter is the challenge of life in Helsinki (**facing page**). Summer is but a brief, sweet interlude with long sunny days and strawberries at the market (**above**).*



and look back into South Harbor. The skyline of Helsinki is a layer of white, pastel, and ocher stone, 19th century in its scale and proportion. From here the old city fans orderly into the peninsula with blocks of six-story, gray-stone buildings shaped like boxcars, their spines dissecting the pale winter sunlight into a clean geometry of angles and planes Darkness comes soon enough, at three in the afternoon, and gathers in thick layers. And people, as the poet and novelist Bo Carpelan notes, "hurry past like shadows. . . . nothing but a feeling of disintegration and uncertainty, veering winds and a pale hope of spring."

The Daughter of the Baltic grew artificially on this somber landscape, by edict and decree, and thus slowly and grudgingly. In the 12th century, when Sweden colonized the Finnish hinterland in the name of Christianity and empire, there were no cities—only settlements and farmsteads of rough-hewn and stubborn free men. But Swedish King Gustav Vasa was determined to compete with the Hanseatic League port of Tallinn, Estonia.* In 1550 he simply ordered the burghers of four small Finnish towns to the sodden estuary of the Vantaa River. The misplaced settlement languished for 90 years before it was forcibly removed by another edict, six kilometers south to the edge of the sea itself.

Ruled by Swedish nobility for some 250 years and by the tsars as part of a grand duchy of the Russian Empire for 100 more, Helsinki was essentially built by foreigners who considered the Finnish people rustics and hired hands.

Finland declared its independence during the Russian Revolution in 1917. Helsinki spread boldly along the coast and flared north like the bell of a trumpet.

TODAY SWEDISH is spoken by a 10 percent minority in the city, but the nation remains officially bilingual and subtly stamped by the past.

"Swedes are a civilized people," one young Finn told me. "That's what accounts for some of our inferiority feelings."

The core of true urbanites remains resolutely, though not snobbishly, Swedish. But many Finns, too, love the city for its brisk blend of architecture, fine arts, and fresh air. I found it a sensible, always honest, well-organized city, perhaps even chaste among the shopworn capitals of Europe—homogeneous in population, free of slums, and unencumbered by untidy pockets of corruption and sexual exploitation.

Still, Helsinki remains a city of people who would rather be somewhere else. Many of them live here as if Gustav Vasa still insisted on it. In their minds a city isn't home; home is the countryside of villages and farms to the north, the expanse of birch and

*See the author's April 1980 GEOGRAPHIC account of his return to Estonia, the land of his birth.

By royal decree *in 1550, when Finland was a part of Sweden, the burghers of four small Finnish towns were uprooted and ordered to establish the seaport called Helsinki (**map**). Ruled by the Swedes and later by the Russian tsars, the town became the capital of independent Finland in 1917. Today's prosperous city of 484,000 remains a fulcrum between Scandinavia and the Soviet Union, fostering Finland's strong economic ties to both the West and the Eastern-bloc nations.*

Grateful for their free society, Helsinkians have learned to treasure the simple beauties of life, such as this rose among potatoes at market.



pine and chill water. Just 40 percent of the city's inhabitants were actually born here.

Says my friend Oke Jokinen, who has lived in Helsinki for 32 years, "Everyone here has a silent wish: When I get my pension, by God, I'm going back home."

Helsinkians suffer from the natural shyness of people only lately accustomed to the closeness of urban life, a trait visitors often mistake for a lack of hospitality. They are a silent people—"silent in two languages"—as Bertolt Brecht once wrote. From the demands of a bitter climate they know innately that warmth is a luxury and must always be used sparingly.

When they talk, they're apt to be blunt, with a contempt for artifice, and slow to show emotion, but immensely patriotic, with an overriding respect for the privacy of others and an inner strength they call *sisu*.

Sometimes hospitality must be earned. Said Helsinki's mayor, Raimo Ilaskivi, a twinkle in his eyes, "We have had some trouble with tourists who disregard our traffic and parking laws, but some of our more conscientious citizens simply let the air out of their Mercedes-Benzes. That's a better kind of traffic ticket."

When large numbers of Finns migrated to Helsinki between 1950 and 1970, the city suffered a crisis of the spirit. More than 16,000 people a year, many of them rural poor displaced by mechanization of logging and farming, came southward to Helsinki. The population almost doubled. Slablike apartment houses rose carelessly in the suburbs. Traffic fatalities soared.

By 1970 the growth had run its course, and city planners were actually caught short of people. They estimated that Helsinki's population would be 700,000 by 1980, but it plummeted instead—from 510,000 in 1970 to today's 484,000.

When I arrived last March, intelligent solutions had caught up with some elusive problems. "I want people to move back into the center of Helsinki," Mayor Ilaskivi told me. "They've been going to nearby cities like Vantaa and Espoo, and businesses have taken over their apartments. The central city has been turning into just an employment zone, and we can't let that happen."

CLOSE TO 900,000 people live in the ten-region metropolitan area of Helsinki, almost 20 percent of Finland's population. On coastal islands like Vartio, the wealthy live in resortlike splendor within the city limits. In the morning you can see businessmen in three-piece suits rowing to work. To the northeast, some government-subsidized suburban developments, like Jakomäki, are notable as crime areas.

The city owns 60 percent of the land and has a monopoly on building plans. In this highly structured society, all goes according to the master plan or not at all. The pragmatic master planners are fond of high-density

solutions—apartments and town houses, and snugly fit gems of suburbia like Olari and the internationally acclaimed garden city of Tapiola. But it is no secret that the dream of nearly every Finn is a private, detached home of his own. Only 8 percent in Helsinki have fulfilled that dream, a level nevertheless high by European standards.

Lars Hedman, chief of city planning, plays the wet blanket in this drama. "It's just not practical," he said wistfully. He showed me what is practical—a master plan calling for a network of mini-cities to be built 16 to 24 kilometers out, intended to keep jobs and traffic out of the overloaded city center.

Since the middle 1970s, the exodus from the city center has been reversed. Special bus and tram lanes and electrification of trains into the city have turned traffic manageable, and the first branch of a subway should rumble in Helsinki next year.

HELSINKI'S most familiar sounds are the groan of winches, the creak of tightening hawsers, the cry of searching sea gulls. As envisioned by the kings of Sweden, Helsinki has become the center of trade in the eastern Baltic. By value more than half of Finland's imports—including oil, wheat, chemicals—funnel through the city's five harbors.

From the passenger terminal in South Harbor, the *Finnjet,* a 213-meter ferry operated by Finnlines, powers tourists and their cars from Travemünde, near Hamburg, in 22 hours on engines similar to those designed for jet aircraft. The Estonian liner *Georg Ots* delivers "vodka tourists" to Tallinn almost daily; other liners specialize in quickie tours of Leningrad. Said Finnlines official Matti Poijärvi dryly, "Some consider Leningrad the high point of their trip to Helsinki."

One cold March afternoon I took a cruise on the *Teuvo,* the city-owned icebreaker that keeps the harbors free of ice, at times as thick as two feet, thus permitting year-round commerce. Without it, and the fleet of nine oceangoing icebreakers, Helsinki would be virtually isolated in winter, for land routes to the west follow a frozen 1,770-kilometer loop around the Gulf of Bothnia.

Twenty vessels were stranded in the gulf that day, for Finland's Seamen's Union had gone on strike, shutting down the bulk of the nation's shipping. It was getting dark, and a southeast wind was pressing ice against the coast. Even powerful ships were in trouble.

We made a cursory pass at the *Finnjet,* then rammed toward Suomenlinna fortress with a satisfying feeling of sanctioned destruction, like cracking and shattering an endless plane of mirrors.

"Will the strikers get their demands?" I asked *Teuvo* captain Iikka Stenberg.

"Sure!" he answered. "In these conditions they have the ice on their side."

With or without the elements, the workingman of Helsinki is no underdog, for the nation's labor force is one of the most highly organized in the world, almost 90 percent. Many Finns believe that SAK (Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions) and the employers' association run the country; parliament only listens.

The largest nongovernmental payroll, 3,600, belongs to Oy Wärtsilä Ab, which has built more than half the world's icebreakers.

"We can't compete with low-cost-labor nations like Singapore or Korea for ordinary ships," said Wärtsilä's Göran Damström. "We have to concentrate on building ships that take high technology and expertise."

Mr. Damström showed me the dry-dock operation on the huge luxury liner *Nordic Prince,* which had just been lengthened by a new middle portion to add 44 percent more capacity. "It was like severing a body at the trunk," a technician said, "and connecting bones, veins, and nerve endings."

Helsinki's shipbuilding—one of the cornerstones of Finland's remarkably healthy economy—got its impetus from the reparations demands of the Soviet Union after World War II. It claimed hundreds of existing Finnish vessels, and asked for more. Much of the burden, or opportunity, fell to Wärtsilä. Last year the Russians contracted with Wärtsilä for six arctic ice-breaking freighters, a contract worth more than 1.2 billion marks (278 million dollars). In return comes a dependable flow of crude oil at a rate of 50 million barrels a year.

In postwar years, trade with the Russians has taken on the characteristics of a mother country (Finland) sending finished products to the colony (the Soviet Union), which sends back raw materials. Still, Finland's trade with the Russians is less than many

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Westerners assume—20 percent of its exports and the same percentage of its imports.

The border with the Soviet Union, only 161 kilometers from Helsinki, is omnipresent; the harsh climate is limiting. Laws are rigid; rebellion is rare. Finns expect clearly defined boundaries.

Within these bounds, and perhaps because of them, the people have concentrated on improving the quality and the details of everyday life. A law requires all workers to have window light; traffic tickets are based on income level of the offender. Shoddiness and cheapness are not tolerated. Things—vending machines, toilets, telephones—work. Chinaware from the Arabia company, Fiskars scissors, woodenware from Aarikka, textiles by Marimekko are not only export products of elegant and functional design, but also aspects of a national consensus of taste, style, and mood. Motifs are rooted in the textures of the sea, the sculpture of ice, and the solidity of granite.

Wrote Swedish artist Tyra Lundgren: "The Finns possess . . . a primitive artistic instinct with which their creations are charged. It is a mysterious mixture of magic and the melancholy of the wilderness, of brilliant colors and drab greyness, heathenism, a yearning for beauty and tenacious strength."

FOR TOO MANY Helsinkians the melancholy of isolation and darkness has produced what some call "bad sisu," the intemperate use of alcohol.

"It's not really a problem of alcoholism," said Dr. Klaus Mäkelä of the Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies, "but a problem of disruptive drinking. The attitude of Finns toward alcohol is similar to the attitude of people in some countries toward taking drugs. The goal is to get intoxicated."

One Friday night I joined Senior Constable Bengt Lindholm and Sgt. Bjarne Eriksson for some practical experience, answering emergency calls in their Helsinki police cruiser. At 8:35 we got our first, a man named Suominen, 51, drunk and bleeding from the head in Harjutori Park.

"Ah, Suominen," said the young orderly at the emergency room, "where have you been? We haven't seen you for a while."

By nine o'clock we had been summoned back to the same park to take away another offender, this time to the city drunk tank, where 10 television monitors keep a 24-hour vigil over 45 separate rooms.

"In the wintertime," said the sergeant, "some of them like to come here. It's warm, it's cozy to sleep. The police are watching over you. One homeless man will call up and say, 'There's a gentleman asleep on the park bench, and I can't wake him up.' Then he'll go lie on the bench and wait for us."

Through the hectic night almost every call had something to do with liquor. Take away demon drink, was the impression, and the yearly crime of Helsinki might fit inconspicuously into a bad week in a large American city. Handguns are rare. The city has only 10 to 12 homicides a year. And a list of all the stolen cars in Finland (about 30) is taped to the dashboard of the patrol car.

Helsinki has worked hard toward solving its drinking problems. One step was the opening of Kyläsaari Clinic in 1979, an asylum for homeless alcoholics (page 253).

Others find solace in the Siiloan Church, whose revival tent attracts 500 a night to hear the word of fundamental Christianity.

"I was a drug addict," witnessed one baby-faced young man. "My wife left me, and I was contemplating suicide. Now I'm a new man in Jesus."

A revival meeting in Finland is a little like flat beer—the substance is there, but the sparkle is missing. Yet the nasal monotone of the Siiloan preacher seemed to hypnotize the gathering. People nodded in the heat that smelled of canvas and closeness; some wept. Behind the preacher a row of earnest young guitarists made music for lost souls.

Not far from the tent a lone woman with gray hair and a gash of lipstick across her deeply lined face stood defiantly, thrusting literature at passersby. In her right hand a red flag bore the likeness of another prophet.

"Lenin is the light of the world," she said to an audience of one.

Among Helsinki's young, the old Marxist revolutionary has big competition from the late American actor James Dean, whose astonishingly large following of teenagers, called the *diinarit,* emulate what they think was the American tough guy of the 1950s. Many youths on the streets appear to be rebels without a cause—torn denim jacket,

sewn-on Confederate flag, hair in a wavy *torttupää,* or cake head (page 249), pants pegged, menacing swagger. Trouble . . . except that the feeling persists that under each ducktail haircut lurks a streak of incurable Finnish wholesomeness.

In Helsinki the cure for any ill, the balm for any evil, is the sauna. It's hard to exaggerate the Finnish obsession with this ritualized heat bath, and the constant proselyting of its virtues to foreign visitors.

Why is it that a Helsinkian would rather sit naked in a sauna beside a total stranger than say hello to him on the street? At the Sauna Seura (society) of Helsinki, President Dr. Harald Teir tried to explain. He told me of the idealism with which the sauna is taken, the tranquillity it generates; then he thrust me into an oven where half a dozen grinning retirees were beating themselves with birch branches in heat higher than 200°F.

"I had a friend here from Chicago," one of them recalled, "and after we sat up here in the top tier for five minutes, he looked at me and said, 'Seppo, if this is your pleasure, what is your punishment?' "

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After a few minutes the gentlemen, still grinning, filed naked out the door, and lowered themselves into a 20-foot-wide hole in the frozen Gulf of Finland. I followed, cursing all rituals. But later we had salted herring and boiled potatoes with dill, a cold bottle of Karjala beer, and, as always, that sense of light-headed well-being.

The sauna mystique is endemic. Finnish President Urho Kekkonen often uses the sauna for international diplomacy, heated or otherwise, and much big business is conducted in this restful ambience.

"That's a problem for me," said Hilkka Tuominen, a bank officer. "I used to miss a lot of meetings. Next time, I'm going to demand they let me in!"

Hilkka, divorced and the mother of two small children, typifies several of the problems of Helsinki's workingwomen. Sixty-eight percent are in the work force, one of the world's highest percentages, but few of them reach prominent positions. The divorce rate is high, and women outnumber men by 55,000. In the short days of winter, life can be severely depressing.

***Brighter and brighter** shine the city lights, here glistening in an autumn rain (**left**). Larger and larger grow the conference and tourist crowds. Wetter and wetter get the light of heart at the annual Herring Festival at South Harbor (**above**), as they dance on a wooden platform under the Helsinki flag.*



The heroes of youth *range from Olympic champion runner Lasse Viren* ***(top)*** *to the late American actor James Dean, whose disciples, the diinarit, amuse themselves at the expense of a city policeman* ***(facing page)****. A counter cult is the punkkarit—punks—* ***(above)****, whose tastes run to bizarre haircuts and rock music played on a chain saw.*

"What I hate," said Hilkka, "is going to work in the dark and coming home in the dark. Sometimes I just go dancing."

These "tea dances" are innocent affairs between working hours and evening. There is no disco music here, but a schmaltzy stage band squeezing out waltzes, tangos, and polka-like *humppas*. And on Thursdays at the Vanha-Maestro dance hall, the worm turns; it's ladies' choice night. The lines outside are prodigious.

HELSINKI remains basic and bourgeois compared to Stockholm and Copenhagen, but a certain cosmopolitanism is creeping in.

"Now we have everything," remarked Vuokko Tarpila, a young editor. "People are traveling more, and they have seen Paris and the café life of the Mediterranean. And we can get food items from Stockmann's [Helsinki's largest department store] that were not available before—like ginger from Malaysia and lobster from Canada."

With the extras of life has come a welcome rush of foreign tourists, 1,500,000 in 1979 compared to 500,000 in 1960.

"The character of Helsinki has changed very much in the past ten years," said former Mayor Teuvo Aura, the man credited for much of Helsinki's recent prosperity. "You see, heavy industry couldn't find enough places to build in Helsinki, so they moved out of the city. And we had to find some other way to get revenue. Now, especially in summer, Helsinki is an international town."

In the past decade Finland's strict political neutrality has brought both prestige and profit to the city. The spirit of Helsinki, a promise of more intellectual freedom for Eastern Europe, stems from the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1973-75. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States also began in Helsinki. More and more, the city is perceived as the Geneva of the North.

Such sobriquets delight city fathers, whose budgets count heavily on attracting international gatherings to Helsinki's growing conference facilities. Three patently international high-rise hotels, the Hesperia, the Inter-Continental, and the Presidentti, have been built near Finlandia Hall to meet

the demand for more space. Additional hotels are planned.

Visitors to Helsinki who expect to find a Soviet satellite are often chagrined to discover very little Soviet presence. There are only monuments from the days of the grand duchy, a few Russian restaurants, and the daily train from Moscow that caters mostly to Western diplomats on shopping sprees to Stockmann's or trips to the dentist. The only obvious Soviet connection is trade.

"I do business with Russians," said one Helsinki businessman, "despite my personal feelings about their system. We are here and can't do anything about it. We can't put Helsinki into the Caribbean or into Africa. And let's face it. We couldn't have the same high living standard without the Russians."

Yet the Communist Party of Finland is a part of Helsinki's everyday life instead of an outcast, because with the Social Democrats it controls the labor unions. Of 200 members of the Finnish Parliament, 35 are members of the Communist Party, which is split into moderate and radical-Stalinist factions. For now, the moderates work in surprising harmony with the multiparty system; the Stalinists say they refuse to work in a government whose capitalist system they are trying to overthrow.

"We are not gathering arms to attack," scoffed Anna-Liisa Hyvönen, a moderate Communist and former parliamentarian who is now Helsinki's deputy mayor for health service. "We are only trying to convince a majority that our line is correct."

Many Helsinkians are less troubled by Communists than by the term "Finlandization," coined to describe the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union. In 1948 the two nations struck the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. It is not a military alliance.

"It hurts us," said Eero Asp, the director of Finnish Export Credit Ltd., "that people don't appreciate the fact that of all the countries to have achieved independence just after World War I, only Finland has remained a western democracy."

The prize of independence was hard won and bitterly defended in the Winter War of 1939-40, when Finnish troops fought the Soviet army to a standstill.

There are free speech and free elections and a free press. Finnish television is seen and cherished in most of northern Estonia, now a republic of the U.S.S.R., and commentators do not hesitate to report on such volatile affairs as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But they are presented in a carefully objective fashion. As Finnish historian Max Jakobson writes, "The Finns deny themselves the luxury of making emotionally satisfying gestures."

"If we bow West," one Helsinki pundit added, "we present our backsides to the East. We just can't afford to do that."

International books, newspapers, and magazines catering to every conceivable specialty and political persuasion choke the bookstores and newsstands; Helsinkians are among the best read people in the world.

They are among the most conservative of

"Our drinking habits are heavy," *one recovered alcoholic told the author, "and rooted deep in our melancholy history. We drink not so often, but we drink to get drunk." The city fights that bane—55,000 arrests a year—with posters* ***(above)*** *and such asylums as Kyläsaari Clinic* ***(right)****, where one of Helsinki's homeless men rests in an 85-bed dormitory.*

audiences also, but knowledgeable and appreciative. Radio music often alternates between takes from, say, Isaac Stern and Bo Diddley, with each artist given the same humorless analytical introduction. Sports crowds clap politely rather than throw beer cans, but follow the subtleties of a track-and-field meet with attentive sophistication. Raucous chauvinism emerges only during the annual meet against Sweden, or an ice-hockey game against the Soviets.

On Midsummer Eve—celebrated the last Friday in June—on Seura Island a 60-foot-high bonfire announces the official beginning of summer in the city. There are folk dances in the amphitheater, gypsy fortune-tellers, and the sweet smell of birch fires and roasting *makkara*—sausage.

Then, from June through August, the city virtually changes hands—tourists move in, residents move out to homes and cottages in the country. Commerce and businesses are staffed by grass widowers, those whose families have left. Life is a string of Sundays; streets lie calm and warm.

I asked my friend Jaakko Tahkolahti whether that yearly migration causes animosity between the city and country people.

"Oh, sometimes country people complain that their hospitality is being abused," he said, "but that's because the city dweller still feels that it is his *right* to come back."

In mid-June the sun rises at 3 a.m., and by 5 the outdoor market at South Harbor shimmers with vitality under a swirl of sea gulls and arctic terns. Blond schoolgirls with braids and mocking eyes offer spring flowers, strawberries, cucumbers, cabbages,

eavy," one author, "and oly history. We rink to get bane—55,000 s (above) and Clinic (right), neless men y.

and tiny new potatoes. In August four-inch-long crayfish, eaten with bread, butter, and dill, and frequent shots of Koskenkorva vodka are a specialty.

One sunny morning I took a bicycle ride along the shoreline of tall sea grass and piers with hundreds of small boats. In Sibelius Park, Japanese tourists crowded around Eila Hiltunen's sculpture of metal pipes that honors Finland's most famous composer, poking their heads inside the cylinders and tapping them (as all tourists must) to test the resonance.

Sails salted the horizon and a kayak stroked past, chased by a playful duck quacking with friendship. Sounds of laughing children floated on the breeze like the spangle of sunlight on the water, and from a seaside café came the whiff of fresh coffee.

If Helsinki could just stay itself—not too big, not too small; sophisticated but not jaded; livable; free . . . but with the years, the city presses in ever more. Diesel fumes and jackhammers and the alarming *hew-haw* of sirens dull the senses. The homeless suffer and abandon their dignity on park benches. At Carroll's Cheeseburgers on Mannerheim Street, the followers of James Dean order French fries. And trams, with their hard, painted shells and bristling antennas, rush by like angry, noisy beetles.

So the city Finn goes home to the soil, to the forests and chill waters that nourish him. Even if it's just for a weekend.

ON THE PORCH of the log cabin by the water's edge, Matti Kohva and I sat in the afterglow of a sauna. We had sailed on the lake in the brisk wind, and sunset ringed the western horizon of fragrant pine forests. But in the east, dark thunderclouds loomed.

Matti's wife, Irma, was cleaning fresh fish in the kitchen of the cabin, a hideaway many miles and many moods from their apartment in Helsinki.

"Looks as if we're in for some rain," I mused, worried that the weekend would be spoiled. Irma looked out of the open window, and a warm breeze blew back a stray wisp of blond hair.

"Yes," she said with the tough optimism that will be forever Finnish, "but it's not snowing." □

***A layered look** in street fashions **(above)** or in suburban apartments **(facing page)** speaks for a comfortable conformity of good taste and design. Helsinki is among the most homogeneous of Europe's capitals, with no significant minority groups or guest workers to complicate, or enrich, the society of Finns. Most land is city owned, a boon for urban planners whose talents have produced suburban models that are internationally emulated.*



2. *Sun kukoistukses kuoreston*
Kerrankin puhkeaa!
Viel' lempemme saa nousemaan
Sun toivos, riemus loistossaan,
Ja kerran laulus, synnyinmaa,
Korkeemman kaiun saa!

2. The flowers in their buds that grope
Shall burst their sheaths with spring;
So from our love to bloom shall ope
Thy gleam, thy glow, thy joy, thy hope,
And higher yet some day shall ring
The patriot song we sing!

FINLAND

Maamme Laulu

(Our Land)

English
PERCY Words by
of seco JOHAN LUDVIG RUNEBERG (1804-1877)
MARY Translation by
CHARLES WHARTON STORK

Music by
FREDRIK PACIUS (1809-1891)



*Shelley
Written
Adopte

This anthem was written by Finland's National Poet in 1846.
Sung for the first time at a students' gathering, 13 May, 1848.


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
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FORSSAN KIRJAPAINO OY

YEARBOOK OF FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY 1990

The Changing Global Agenda

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A number of deep changes which may considerably reshape international relations are taking place in the international system. Events in our immediate environment are naturally highlighted from Finland's viewpoint. The future of the Soviet Union's policy of reform is an important factor. Regional developments in Europe are also significant. A third zone of foreign policy extends beyond our close neighbours and the regional level. Changes in this zone also have an influence on Finland.

In analyzing this change, it is worthwhile focusing on two processes currently under way at the level of the international system. The first concerns relative positions between states in the system. Owing to a reallocation of power resources, the positions of the great powers are judged to be weakening, while other states' positions appear to be growing stronger. Furthermore, changes are taking place in the way states interact.

The purpose of this article is provide a tentative evaluation of how these processes of change will influence the global political agenda. The term agenda refers here to the issues which key states consider important and which are assumed to affect a large part of the world's states. The closer questions are to the top of the agenda, the greater their significance for international relations.

Talking about global politics and the global agenda does not necessarily signify a change in the basic nature of international relations. Despite the existence of issues which are commonly deemed important, no world community is in sight, for instance. The content of the global agenda still depends on the issues which sovereign states consider significant. Although these issues have far-reaching effects, states appear to define their attitude towards them primarily on the basis of their own points of departure. On the other hand, the possibility of deeper changes cannot entirely be excluded.

The issue cycle

This evaluation of change in the global agenda is based on John A. Vasquez and Richard W. Mansbach's idea of the issue cycle in global politics.[1] They assume that in the current international system there cannot be an official, formal global agenda determined by a central authority; instead each state has its own foreign-policy agenda. The global agenda consists of those issues which a large number of states or the most influential states consider to be most significant. The global issues jointly emphasized by the leading actors at any moment are thus decisive in formulating the agenda.

The issues on the agenda differ in terms of importance. The content of international relations depends largely on the "critical issue" at the top of the agenda. This critical issue also determines what type of conflict configuration will characterize international dealings. Although the leading actors tend to agree on the relative importance of different questions, they seldom agree on how to resolve them. Smaller states may consider other issues more important, but they cannot avoid the effects of the global agenda determined by the leading actors.

It is assumed here that the global agenda changes as the critical issue goes through three key stages: genesis, ritualization and removal from the agenda. During the genesis stage the old agenda is replaced by a new one as the previous critical issue loses its position at the top of the agenda. This phase is initially characterized by competition between several issues for dominance of the agenda. The content of international relations changes once the new critical issue has established its position. Friends and opponents are also selected on this basis.

The genesis stage is linked to a crisis situation which is characterized by four things. First of all decision makers are convinced that the new question must be resolved if disaster is to be avoided. Secondly the rise of the critical issue produces uncertainty in international relations. Thirdly the replacement of the previous critical issue with a new one may coincide with changes in the position of key states in the international system. Fourthly the values on which dealings are based may be at issue. Habitual forms of interaction and previously accepted rules no longer seem to work.

Gradually the states learn to operate in the way required by the new agenda, and a ritualization stages follows in the cycle. Casual dealings receive more permanent forms. Principles, norms, expectations and rules are created to guide international relations. In other words, international regimes are established.

The farther normalization proceeds, the closer we come to the third stage, i.e. the removal of the issue from the agenda. This stage is preceded by a period of dormancy, when the issue is relegated to the periphery. A typical feature of this stage is the way in which states avoid risks, exercise self-control and strive to achieve compromises. Fi-

nally the critical issue is removed from the agenda when the states agree on its solution. The end of the issue cycle does not always take place peacefully. An issue can also be removed from the agenda by war and the elimination of the opponent.

The current agenda

The Cold War has undoubtedly been the critical issue of the post-war global agenda. It has emphasized the significance of questions related to military security and divided not only Europe, but also a large part of the rest of the world into two opposing camps.

In addition to the Cold War, issues regarding the international economy – especially the elimination of trade barriers – have had a salient position on the global agenda.

Referring to the issue cycle described above, the Cold War long ago passed the crisis stage and began to be ritualized. After having been falling into a deeper and deeper state of dormancy, it now appears to be removed from the top of the global agenda.

Rather than examples of confrontation, in the past few years the focus has been on factors pointing to a cessation of the Cold War. The "rules of the game"[2] between the superpowers appear to be one sign of the ritualization of the Cold War and its shift to dormancy. The self-control typical of dormancy is illustrated by how conscientiously the other side's spheres of interest are respected. The chance to expand one's own sphere of influence has, however, been utilized in areas where the division into spheres of influence has remained unclear, as in Berlin before 1948 and in Korea before 1950, or where the opponent's determination to maintain his position has appeared to be shaky, for example after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. But it has already been nearly three decades since the events in Cuba. The 1962 missile crisis is generally regarded as a turning point in the history of the Cold War towards better relations between the great powers.

The Soviet Union and the United States have also avoided risks regarding their relations by taking care not to engage in open military conflict with each other. The increased willingness of the superpowers to compromise can be seen in their changing attitude towards nuclear weapons, among other things. The United States and the Soviet Union are said to have "learned" to live with nuclear weapons.[3]

The improvement in the relations between the great powers which began in the mid 1980s has increased speculation that the Cold War may be about to lose its place at the top of the global agenda. Periods of détente have of course previously interrupted the high tension of the Cold War, but the current détente may be longer lasting than its predecessors.[4]

In this regard attention should be drawn to the reallocation of power resources. In a world led by the two great powers, a security dilemma tends to grow sharper. Any step taken by the other party is easily interpreted as a threat to one's own security. At the same time the need to underscore determination to defend vital interests weakens the border between key and less important issues. Now the unequivocal leading position of the United States and the Soviet Union has been called to question at least in the economic field. Developments tend to alleviate the security dilemma which has characterized the Cold War, since in a multipolar world the structural pressure leading to confrontation between the two leading powers will be weakened. When the great powers see others threatening their interests, they will probably pay less attention to each other's activities. It is also possible that they will begin to note common interests in defending their positions.

The lessening of the significance of ideology in superpower relations may also strengthen current détente. The Soviet Union's internal development is important in this regard. The farther perestroika and glasnost proceed, the less the Soviet Union will appear to be the "evil empire" the containment of which has been the basis of the USA's post-war security policy. The United States' threat perception is in other words losing its foundation.

The events of the past few years have caused Cold War experts to speculate on the resolution of the entire issue.[5] It is nevertheless too soon to say that the Cold War is being removed from the global agenda. Current détente can run aground for many reasons. The continuity of the Soviet Union's policy of reform is one of the most important factors when it comes to evaluating the future of superpower relations. Developments in Eastern/Central Europe and perhaps the German question also have their own significance.

Signs of a change in the global agenda are nevertheless visible. New issues are moving towards the top of the agenda although they are still nowhere near the position of the critical issue.

What changes the global agenda? In order to answer this question, we will now examine two processes of change at the system level. This examination will help us to estimate what issues are moving towards the top of the global agenda alongside the military-political and economic issues which have dominated the present agenda.

Towards a multipolar system

Structural change is first of all important. This refers to the reallocation of power resources among states.[6] The general interpretation of the current structural change is that it will lead to a multipolar international system. The leading position enjoyed by the United States and the Soviet Union since the Second World War is breaking down as other states grow stronger.

A large degree of agreement exists that the United States is no longer

as strong as it was during the two decades following the Second World War. The Soviet Union has achieved an equal position in terms of military strength. The United States' share of the world economy has fallen from half to around a quarter. Washington likewise is finding it more difficult to influence world events. Differences of opinion mainly regard what the weakening of the United States' position says about its future place in the world.

Some researchers see the change in the position of the United States as a symptom of a power cycle which has been repeated in history. Others see it merely as the correction of an abnormal situation which has existed since the war. In their view the United States is only now finding its proper place in the power hierarchy of the international system. Consequently the United States' future position will not be determined by some historical law, but by its ability to renew itself internally.[7]

In order to understand the change which has taken place in the United States' position, a distinction should be made between economic relations and other aspects of international relations. Some states have questioned the economic power of the United States, but not – at least so far – its military position.

The same division also applies to the Soviet Union. Its problem is above all the weakening of its economic position, not its military might. The Soviet Union's future status in the international system will depend decisively on the success of its internal reform policy.

What states are rising to challenge the United States and the Soviet Union? Generally three actors are expected to grow in strength – Japan, Western Europe and China. The rise of Japan and Western Europe is based on their economies.[8] On the other hand, Japan is still relatively weak militarily, and it has to import the bulk of its oil, many raw materials and grain.[9] It may also lack the ideological attraction needed to gain hegemony.[10] Western Europe meanwhile lacks the political unity required for a strong political and military position.[11] China and some newly industrialized countries in the Third World have weaker chances to rise to the top of the international system than Japan and Western Europe.

The idea of a multipolar international system therefore refers mainly to a weakening of the superpowers' economic position.

How will this restructuring affect the content of the global agenda? We mentioned earlier that the loosening of bipolarity is apparently easing the security dilemma between the United States and the Soviet Union. This should help to place the Cold War in an even deeper state of dormancy and give other issues a better chance to rise to the top of the agenda. As a result of the structural change, recognizing issues on the agenda now requires that attention be paid to the foreign-policy agendas of at least five actors – the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, the EC and China – instead of two.

Growing interdependence

In addition to the reallocation of power resources, a process change is under way in the international system.[12] While restructuring alters states' relative positions in the power hierarchy, process change shapes interaction between states. Process change refers first of all to non-structural factors influencing states' behaviour. Secondly process change affects states' ability to communicate and cooperate with each other. From the viewpoint of the global agenda, factors influencing behaviour are important. They affect the way states define national interests. In changing the issues on a state's foreign-policy agenda and the ranking of these issues, they directly shape the global agenda as well.

The growth of interdependence is no doubt the most important aspect of process change. Dependence is defined as a state's susceptibility to outside influences. Interdependence refers to mutual dependence. The greater influence external events have on individual actors, the higher the level of interdependence in the system. As interdependence increases, bilateral issues become regional and can even be extended to the entire international system.

This type of process has been clearly visible in the economic field. Economic interdependence has considerably influenced international relations during the post-war era. The issues raised by this will also remain on the global agenda during the coming decades.

In addition to economic mechanisms, technological development and the horizontal spread of new technology increase interdependence between states. The need for international dealings in order to reap the benefits of technological development and reduce its adverse effects appears to be constantly growing. Consequently new issues which are not directly linked to the Cold War and its conflict configuration or to traditional international economic dealings are moving toward the top of the global agenda.[13]

The future agenda

An idea of issues which are on the rise can be obtained by seeing what types of issues the most important states accentuate in their own agendas. The following summary is based on three foreign-policy statements: a declaration issued by the Paris summit of the group of seven leading Western nations in July 1989,[14] a declaration issued by the Brussels conference of the leaders of the NATO countries in May 1989,[15] and a speech delivered by Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev to the UN General Assembly in December 1988.[16]

What is striking in these stands is the emphasis on four new types of issues. *Regional conflicts* constitute one category. This is naturally not the first time the great powers have devoted attention to this issue. The horizontal spread of modern weapons technology is, however, giving it new significance. Another

issue concerns *environmental degradation.* Pollution in general and climate change in particular are more and more clearly moving towards the top of the great powers' agenda. *Problems in the developing countries* form the third issue receiving broad attention. This is not a new item on the agenda either, but the salience of environmental questions appears to be changing the content of the development problem and increasing its importance in the great powers' eyes. These three issues regard problems. The fourth is linked to their solution. Each statement mentions the *need to strengthen the position of the UN.*

The raising of these issues is nothing unusual. However, their salience on the foreign-policy agendas of the key actors is quite a new phenomenon.

Interdependence and the existence of global problems have become part of the Soviet Union's foreign-policy language along with the policy of reform which was initiated in the 80s. They were actually brought to the international stage in Gorbachev's UN speech. The NATO summit of May 1989 was the first where the Western alliance included a section on "global challenges" in its declaration.

The environment is a fresh topic in international relations. Although international environmental issues have been addressed in previous decades, they finally assumed a position on states' foreign-policy agendas as a result of the environment conference which was arranged by the UN in Stockholm in 1972. During the 80s environmental diplomacy focused especially on limiting international atmospheric pollution – acid rain and ozone depletion. Global warming, i.e. the intensification of the so-called greenhouse effect, is likely to become the most important international environmental issue in the coming decades.

The new content and importance of the development problem was clearly manifested in the report entitled "Our Common Future" which was published two years ago by the World Commission on Environment and Development.[17] In this report the creation and solution of environmental problems were closely linked to economic growth and its absence.

Regional conflicts and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are likewise part of the current global agenda. In addition the spread of modern weapons technology today involves missile technology and chemical weapons.

Improved relations between the great powers and consciousness of the existence of global problems have no doubt caused the great powers to consider developing the UN's role in solving problems. Especially with regard to international environmental problems, the need for international cooperation and multilateral decision making is obvious.

The same four issues are also emphasized in global political agendas drawn up by researchers. It is, however, surprising that neither the Brussels and Paris declarations nor Gorbachev's UN speech mention *population growth* as one of the most important issues on the future global agenda.

As a matter of fact international environmental problems, population growth and the development question form a whole whose parts are hard to discuss separately.[18] The issue of regional conflicts and the spread of new weapons technology is also linked to this problem category. The continuation of poverty, the aggravation of environmental problems and rapid population growth in the Third World may create growing pressures within states, resulting in rivalries and international conflicts.

The division between North and South?

The rise of the above-mentioned issues on the global agenda may divide states in a different way than before. The issues which dominated the Cold War agenda were characterized by East-West confrontation. Similar conflicts are of course possible in other issues, but environmental questions, the development problem, population growth and regional conflicts appear to divide the world into North and South as well.

The "population explosion" no longer properly describes the main problem in the population issue, since the world is divided into countries with slow and fast growth. In many industrialized countries population growth has in fact stopped or is stopping. The populations of the developing countries, on the other hand, continue to grow at a fast rate. It is estimated that 90% of the world's future increase in population will take place in the Third World.

Differences in prosperity clearly divide the international system into the rich North and the poor South. For this reason the industrialized nations are in a better position than the developing countries to adapt to the consequences of the greenhouse effect. Furthermore, in order to limit climate change, the industrialized nations must not only reduce their own emissions but must also see that the economic growth which is the goal of the developing countries does not increase the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The difference between North and South is also clear in the case of regional conflicts. Most wars are already conducted in the Third World. The spread of new weapons technology to the developing countries will make future wars even more destructive.

If the direction of the global change outlined in this article is correct, international relations will become more complex in terms of both content and conflict configurations. In all likelihood this will also be reflected in Finland's foreign policy.

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Finland's international environmental policy: Principles, Goals and Results

Minister of the Environment Kaj Bärlund

Finland's goal with regard to international environmental cooperation is the solution of global environmental problems, since the pollution of our common environment and the depletion of global resources have a direct or indirect influence on the state of our own environment. At the same time we are cooperating with our neighbours to prevent or repair environmental damage.

We are actively working to achieve the long-term goal of economic and social development which is just and sustainable. The plundering of natural resources and short-sighted polluting industry can only be eliminated if something is done about the basic causes, i.e. poverty and the inequitable use of natural resources. The Finnish government is striving domestically and in all its international activities to promote the implementation of the recommendations made by the World Commission on Environment and Development.

Environmental policy alone is not sufficient to place social and economic development on a sustainable basis with regard to the use of natural resources. The principle of our national and international activities is in fact that environmental protection should be taken into consideration in all economic and social activity. With regard to the use of natural resources, it is of the utmost importance what type of trade, economic, tax, energy, agricultural and transport policy is implemented in Finland and around the world.

Environmental policy has become an important part of domestic policy. It is also becoming an increasingly central aspect of foreign policy. When our government programme was revised in spring 1989, international environmental cooperation received a visible place in the government's foreign policy programme. In Finland's international cooperation, development cooperation is highly significant from the viewpoint of environmental protection. Although the Ministry of the Environment and the development cooperation department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs conduct a regular dialogue, we should adopt a new active approach to the promotion of environmental protection through development cooperation. In my opinion global problems regarding environmental protection call for us to give them attention in development cooperation as well. In this way we could have a considerable influence on global environmental problems.

As in past years, about 60% of the FIM 3,659 million appropriated for development aid in Finland's 1990 state budget or around FIM 2,000 million can be classified as bilateral development cooperation. If, say, 30% of this amount or FIM 600 million were directed to projects aimed at developing environmental protection, including forestation and the production of environmental-friendly energy, this would be a substantial investment in international environmental protection. I believe the preconditions for this type of reorientation are good as a result of the recent significant increase in our development cooperation appropriations.

In addition to the above principles, a key goal is the prevention of damage. Repairing environmental damage in Finland and elsewhere is much more expensive than preventing it in the first place. This conclusion has been reached by distinguished scientists who estimated the costs of ozone-depleting substances and the costs of shifting to substances which are less dangerous to the environment. In some cases there is no way to repair pollution, regardless of how much money can be spent. Nor can the damage to people's health or lost human lives be measured in terms of money.

International development of environmental cooperation

The roots of environmental protection do not extend very deep in the history of international politics. Discussion of environmental issues in the UN and other organizations picked up in the 1970s. The European Year of Environmental Protection in 1970 and the UN Conference on the Human Environment which was held in Stockholm two years later created the basis for an international and national environmental policy. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established. Initiative and activity have been a key principle in Finland's international environmental policy. Finland took part both in preparing the Stockholm conference and in establishing UNEP.

The Stockholm conference led to a new approach, reevaluating growth and the means to achieve them. The declaration adopted by the Stockholm conference developed in the direction desired by Finland. In addition to the deterioration of the environment and pollution, hunger and shortages were also viewed as environmental prob-

lems. Finland furthermore played an active role in seeing that people's working and living environments were considered important factors influencing the quality of life. The concept of environmental protection was thus given broader scope than the protection of nature. The basic ideas of the World Commission on Environment and Development were thus presaged nearly twenty years ago. Today it is easier for us to understand the nature of environmental problems. Solving these problems requires active international efforts since the state of the environment and the preconditions for building society – in Finland and around the world – depend on international economic development and its environmental effects.

Accordingly Finland actively supports efforts to achieve broad, long-term evaluations of the global environment and its future. In addition to the report submitted by the World Commission on Environment and Development, the United Nations Environment Programme has prepared a report and action plan up to the year 2000. The Economic Commission for Europe has prepared a similar programme covering Europe and North America. Studies like these are indispensable, and Finland will strive to make full use of them in formulating its social and environmental policy. Environmental and development problems play a key role in futurology.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Atmospheric changes the most serious threat

It has been said that, apart from nuclear war, environmental problems related to detrimental changes in the atmosphere are the most serious threat currently facing our planet. Such changes include global warming, the depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain. These are also the most obvious examples of how global environmental problems influence our own well-being. We may not be the worst offenders, but for our own future's sake we must be in the forefront when it comes to solving these problems.

Global warming would also have detrimental effects in Finland, where it takes a hundred years for forests to grow. Greater still, however, would be the indirect effects caused by changes in the balance of nature, the international economy, security and social conditions. Large areas of the world would become barren, desertification would increase and the rising sea level would leave extensive areas which are now inhabited under water.

Finland has participated in the work of an international panel on climate change in order to investigate these development prospects and ways to prevent them.

Ozone-depleting substances also have a warming effect on the globe. We played a central role in the effort to slow down global warming and protect the ozone layer when the first conferences between the parties of the Vienna agreement on the protection of the ozone layer and the Montreal protocol were held in Helsinki in April-May 1989. These conferences are of decisive importance for future cooperation. In Helsinki the representatives of 81 states and the EC made a political commitment to stop the production and consumption of CFCs by the year 2000 and to end the consumption of other ozone-depleting substances as soon as possible. The intermediate goals agreed on in the Montreal protocol should also be tightened. The deadline for reducing CFCs by 50% should be brought up from 1998 to 1993.

We have also considered it to be of prime importance that the developing countries participate broadly in this cooperation. Finland earmarked over FIM 1 million of its development cooperation funds for assisting the developing countries' representatives to participate in the Helsinki conferences. At the conference Finland also stated that it would provide over FIM 10 million to help develop substances which are not harmful to the ozone layer for use in the developing countries. Finland is also at the head of a working party which was established in Helsinki to prepare a proposal regarding ways to finance the developing countries' shift to the production and consumption of safe substances.

Intensifying UN activities

Finland is also participating in the solution of other global environmental problems. In spring 1989 the United Nations Development Programme decided to make its work more effective by concentrating on preventing climate change, protecting the world's seas and coastal areas, ensuring the availability of fresh water, protecting soil and preventing desertification, protecting our natural heritage and regulating the international transport of hazardous chemicals and problem waste. Another area of emphasis is improving the living and working environment of the poorest population.

In all of these areas we have taken initiatives and worked to achieve international arrangements. Finland has actively participated in preparing the UN's long-term housing strategy, supported the UN's desertification programme and taken part in implementing regional water-protection programmes particularly in southern Africa. Finland also took the initiative in setting up talks on the international transport of hazardous waste.

A programme on the protection of the marine environment which was approved by the Nordic ministers in early 1989 is a significant political document in this area. Protecting the Baltic has had and continues to have a special significance in our environmental policy. Finland's initiative in 1971 led to environmental discussion and fruitful work between the seven nations around the Baltic at a time when the relations between the great powers generally hampered dealings be-

tween East and West. Baltic cooperation has proved to be a successful regional solution and has served as a model for the preparation and implementation of UNEP's regional sea programme. Intensifying objectives with regard to protecting the Baltic ultimately depends on the environmental-policy possibilities of each of the states in question. The declaration which was approved by the Helsinki ministerial conference in 1988 requires a drastic cut in the most dangerous pollutants over the coming years. Political monitoring should be intensified. Decisions should also be made binding.

Finland has supported the intensification of activities within the UN framework in environmental matters. While structural changes are being studied, every possible step should be taken to make existing organizations more effective. The Finnish government has therefore urged the concentration of UNEP's work and the doubling of its funds by 1992.

FINLAND AND EUROPE

The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has become an important agent of environmental protection in Europe and North America. Long-distance atmospheric pollution has been viewed as such a serious threat that it has united East and West European countries in true efforts. A convention on the prevention of long-distance atmospheric pollution was achieved as far back as 1979. It took six years, however, before the first precise reduction programme (the "sulphur protocol") was signed in Helsinki in 1985, with 21 countries agreeing to reduce their sulphur dioxide emissions 30% from the 1980 level by the year 1993.

In accordance with a protocol which was signed in autumn 1988, 27 countries have agreed to freeze nitrogen compound emissions at the 1987 level by 1994 and subsequently to reduce emissions so as not to exceed the so-called critical load on nature.

The programmes to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen compouds were the first important steps towards preventing acid rain. There is still a broad consensus in Europe that this work should be continued by setting reduction goals for all emissions according to critical loads.

Finland has given top priority to air-protection cooperation within the ECE. We have also actively participated in developing and implementing common goals in the fields of water protection, environmental-friendly technology and nature conservation. We have moreover given political support to the ECE.

European integration

European integration extends broadly to different areas of society. The creation of an integrated economic area and the elimination of trade barriers will have a direct influence on environmental-protection possibilities. We will face problems in air protection, for example, if cars imported to Finland do not meet the standards we set. Regulations regarding chemicals, fertilizers and the noise level of machinery and equipment are further examples of the challenges for environmental protection which are presented by an integrating Europe.

Environment ministers have anticipated this development and in autumn 1988 held their first meeting for representatives of the EFTA and EC countries and the European Commission in the Netherlands. The EFTA countries enjoy a key position in this discussion, since our environmental-protection regulations are generally tighter than the corresponding EC decisions. The position of the EFTA countries in discussion regarding future development should be strengthened to ensure there is no backsliding on environmental-protection regulations when the creation of a European Economic Space is negotiated.

The OECD and the Council of Europe are also important channels of European cooperation and supplement the other organizations' work. A division of labour has been made between these organizations. The best place to negotiate agreements is those bodies in which every European state can participate on an equal footing. Consequently these are entrusted to the ECE. On the other hand, the scientific and technical cooperation which is conducted by the OECD in the field of environmental protection is highly significant in investigating and solving environmental problems faced by countries having a similar level of development and the same economic system. This research has often supported broader solutions and has been utilized in the ECE and UNEP.

The work of the Council of Europe meanwhile supplements the activities of the European Economic Community. Whereas with the latter we concentrate primarily on economic activities and environmental-protection matters, in the Council of Europe we participate in nature conservation cooperation.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Environmental cooperation with the other countries in our immediate region is especially important for the success of our environmental policy. Consequently Nordic and bilateral cooperation has decisive significance with regard to improving our own environment. This cooperation has also helped to speed up major international initiatives such as the agreement on long-term atmospheric pollution and the convention on the protection of the ozone layer, as well as related protocol negotiations. Bilateral negotiations have also been used to obtain broad support or overcome disagreements in international connections.

Nordic cooperation

Environmental questions have been highly visible in the Nordic Council. The first extraordinary session in

the council's history was convened in 1989 to deal with environmental matters. This session dealt with the Nordic environmental-protection programme and a separate programme to protect the marine environment, which were approved by the Council of Ministers in early 1989.

The air-protection programme and marine-protection programme are currently being revised. These long-term programmes will have a strategic significance as we decide on our national and international activities. We are actively involved in the work of the Nordic Council of Ministers as well as the official-level committee which prepares matters for the council and its 43 permanent or ad hoc working parties.

Concrete results with the Soviet Union

Environmental cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union goes back for over twenty years. This cooperation received a clearly more concrete content in 1985, however, with the signing of a bilateral environmental-protection agreement. Annual ministerial meetings have been able to deal openly with all types of problems.

A programme to reduce emissions near the Finnish-Soviet border is globally speaking an extremely significant and even unique advance. This bilateral programme approves considerably farther-reaching reduction goals than have been agreed multilaterally in the ECE. The programme covers emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen compounds and heavy metals. In the first stage sulphur-dioxide emissions will be cut 50% by 1995. The first-stage target for nitrogen compounds corresponds to the ECE's international goals, with emissions being frozen at the 1987 level by 1994. Heavy-metal emissions will be reduced through the application of the best economically feasible technology.

In the second stage all the above-mentioned emissions will be reduced below the critical load. This level will be defined by 1992, and the necessary reduction programme will be applied in 1993. According to scientists' estimates, this will require 70-80% cuts in sulphur-dioxide emissions, for example.

The air-protection programme involves strict monitoring. Implementation is reported yearly at chairman and joint-commission meetings. Any infringements must be reported to the other party immediately. Measuring pollution is an important part of monitoring work.

Finland is also ready to participate in the modernization of facilities in the Kola Peninsula, particularly the nickel plant in Pechenga. Sulphur-dioxide emissions could in this way be reduced by over 90%. This would have a decisive influence on preventing acidification in Lapland, since the plant produces nearly as high an amount of emissions as the whole of Finland.

Fast and flexible information is necessary in both parties' view in accidents which can have international effects. Mutual assistance and the prevention of accidents are also extremely important. It is only natural that bilateral cooperation is broadest with our nextdoor neighbour, the Soviet Union. Finland is also engaged in agreement-based cooperation with Poland, France, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary. Joint meetings on the political and expert level have also been held with Great Britain, all the EFTA countries, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States.

Special measures required by the Arctic environment

An environmental initiative influencing our immediate environment concerns the protection of the Arctic region. At the invitation of the Finnish government, representatives of eight nations met in Rovaniemi on 20-26 September 1989. The participants in this conference, representing the Nordic countries, the Soviet Union and the United States, voiced their common concern over the pollution of the Arctic region and the depletion of natural resources for the purpose of increased economic activity. Part of the nature in the Arctic region is already badly damaged. Cooperation in this region should be intensified.

Although sevral international agreements cover the use of natural resources or environmental protection in the Arctic region, these agreements are not sufficient to protect this extremely delicate environment. A separate action plan is required for environmental protection in the Arctic region.

Our initiative for cooperation in the Arctic region, practical activities with our neighbouring countries, the protection of the Baltic, the handling of environmental matters in the CSCE, our initiatives to prepare several international agreements and to intensify the activities of the entire UN system are examples our determined efforts to meet concrete challenges during more than two decades. Our international environmental policy has from the start been based on the understanding that direct and indirect threats to our own environment can only be eliminated through concerted action together with other nations.

International cooperation in environmental matters is nothing new. What is new is that in the past two years cooperation has taken a great leap forward and expanded to cover more and more areas of environmental policy. Finland has so far been quite successful in making its own contribution to this cooperation and has achieved a strong and established position in various cooperation projects. In the coming years we will have to work hard to preserve this position and in the setting of our own priorities so that we can help to reduce the environmental problems facing Finland and the world as effectively as possible.

Finland on the Path of Sustainable Development

Report of the Finnish Commission on Environment and Development

Esko Liukkonen, student of political science

In December 1987 the Finnish Ministry of the Environment established a national commission with the task of preparing a report on the significance of the proposals and recommendations made by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) from Finland's viewpoint. In addition it was charged with following discussion of the WCED's report in other countries and making proposals regarding arrangements to monitor the implementation of recommendations.[1]

In April 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development which had been established by the UN General Assembly published its final report after four years of intensive international negotiations and conferences. The task of the WCED was to devise a long-term environmental strategy, develop environmental cooperation between the industrialized and developing countries, consider forms of international environmental cooperation and assist in defining common goals for all the nations of the world.[2]

Despite the fact that the report was something of a compromise between differing viewpoints, it can be regarded as a new landmark of environmental and development policy.[3] The report for the first time brought environmental and development problems to the arena of "high politics", which has traditionally been shaded by military issues. Another progressive feature of the report was to link the environment, natural resources, economic development and military crises to one another. Thirdly the report legitimized its recommendations by appealing to several different spheres of interest; the creators of the report were mainly politicians rather then economic or scientific experts.

In view of achieving "sustainable development", the report acknowledged the necessity of economic growth and emphasized the significance of grassroots organizations in decision making. Furthermore, the WCED took a clearly negative stance on nuclear power.[4]

Sustainable development was defined by the WCED as a process of development which guarantees humanity's current basic needs without endangering the living conditions of future generations. Sustainable development requires that the world increase production capacity where it is lowest and at the same time ensure equal opportunities for everyone.[5]

Concern over pollution, the widening gap between the rich and poor countries, the consequences of uncontrolled population growth, the depletion of natural resources and the escalation of environmental problems into military conflicts formed a key problem field in the WCED's work.

The Finnish Commission on Environment and Development, which was chaired by Minister of the Environment Kaj Bärlund, filed its report in summer 1989. In addition to representatives of the state administration, the national commission included members representing the Confederation of Finnish Industries and the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions as well as various research institutions and interest groups.

The Finnish commission's report first of all summarizes key international organizations and agreements influencing its work.[6] The commission considered the most important documents to be an OECD study of Finland's environmental policy and a government report on environmental policy which was submitted to Parliament on 31 May 1988.

Sustainable development and Finland

Owing to the wide scope of the WCED's work, the Finnish commission concentrated on key issues in its report. The commission considered the greenhouse effect, depletion of the ozone layer, acidification and chemical pollution of the environment, marine pollution, the depletion of natural resources (particularly forests) and growing inequality between people and nations to be the most serious threats from Finland's viewpoint.[7]

The WCED defined new goals in the area of environmental and development policy which are required for sustainable development as follows:[8]

1. growth must be revived
2. the nature of growth must be changed
3. it must be possible to satisfy basic needs
4. population growth must be reduced to a sustainable level
5. natural resources must be pro-

tected and developed
6. the trend of technological development must be changed
7. environmental and economic policy must be interlinked in decision making.

(1) The Finnish commission considers the structure and growth possibilities of our economy, which is largely based on renewable resource, to be acceptable from the viewpoint of sustainable development.

(2) Although Finland consumes only a small part of the world's natural resources, consumption per inhabitant is large. For this reason Finland must also devote special attention to the conservation of energy and natural resources and the development of environmental-friendly industry, according to the Finnish commission.

(3) In Finland basic needs have been ensured with the help of an advanced social policy. The commission nevertheless regards the continuation of economic growth as a precondition for positive development.

(4) Although Finland's population growth is not an immediate threat to the achievement of sustainable development, the consumption of natural resources and energy per inhabitant is many times greater than in the case of the developing countries.

(5) Finland's forest are our most important renewable resource. The commission draws special attention to the effects of acid rain and the global warming on forestry as well as the need to ensure wood production in the future. Finland is and will remain dependent on imported energy, however, so complete self-sufficiency cannot be achieved in any sector of the economy.

(6) The Finnish commission regards the recommendations on technology to be practicable for Finland. Developing conservation-oriented technology should in its opinion be given increased attention both domestically and in development cooperation projects.

(7) The commission notes that Finnish social policy has given little weight to the WCED's principle that environmental and economic policy should be interlinked. However, this is due largely to the relatively good state of our environment compared with the worst polluted countries. In the commission's opinion the closer integration of environmental and economic policy is indispensable. As an example the report mentions the evaluation of environmental impacts in long-term economic planning.[9]

The Finnish commission's recommendations

The Finnish commission's recommendations based of the WCED's report can be divided into proposals and recommendations with **direct** and **indirect** effects from the viewpoint of sustainable development. The former category includes proposals regarding the use, production and consumption of natural resources as well as the reduction of the environmental damage caused by traffic. The latter category consists of proposals aimed at increasing environmental awareness, education and training and the development of administration and international cooperation.

Greater use of natural gas, less pollution

The Finnish commission proposes that the use of renewable and non-renewable resources in Finland should be readjusted to the level required by the requirements of sustainable development. It recommends the intensification of recycling and the expansion of raw materials markets. With regard to renewable resources, the constant worsening of the state of the nations forests and waters should be stopped and steps should urgently be taken to eliminate the effects of acidification and atmospheric pollution.[10]

The commission would also like to see more attention given to energy conservation. The principles of sustainable development should be taken into consideration in the planning of energy policy, and the environmental impact of different forms of energy production should be taken into account in choosing between alternatives.[11] The commission recommends that the use of natural gas be increased by expanding the natural gas network and shifting heat and energy production to this source of energy, particularly in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.

The Finnish commission's stance on nuclear power is more "neutral" than that taken by the WCED or the Nordic Council of Ministers' environmental committee in their final reports.[12] The Finnish commission somewhat enigmatically addresses the question of ranking different energy alternatives by noting: "If all costs – including indirect expenses – are taken into account, cost-effectiveness comparisons for different forms of energy can produce quite surprising results."[13]

In order to reduce the environmental damage caused by traffic, the Finnish commission recommends that rail transport be developed so as to make it a competitive alternative to road and air transport. The shift to less-polluting vehicles should also be speeded up with the help of tax-policy measures so as to reduce emissions. The commission also proposes the study of electricity and natural gas as energy alternatives in the transport sector.[14]

Attention to the environment in decision making

In accordance with the WCED's report, the Finnish commission stresses the significance of research and information in the handling of environmental problems. Finland should in its opinion actively participate in international bodies such as the Nordic environmental programme and the European Community's environmental research programme and should develop the educational system's curriculum to include the principles of sustainable development.[15]

The commission notes that environmental impacts should be given greater attention by the municipalities and the state in planning and decision making. The report recommends that the parliamentary Financial Committee and the Council of State include the evaluation of environmental impacts in their presentation documents.[16] In addition the economic steering of environmental protection should be intensified.

The principle of making the polluter pay should be applied more consistently than at present. This principle should not, however, lead to a state of affairs in which pollution is permitted for a fee.[17] The Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Justice should reform environmental legislation and criminal law so as to make investments in environmental-friendly technology more economical than polluting.[18]

Towards a new internationalism

According to the WCED's report, environmental, economic and development issues are closely intertwined. In addition to shared content, these issues also link different states to one another. Problems which have traditionally been regarded as local or national are becoming global in scope, ignoring geographical borders. According to the report, no individual country can develop completely on its own, and the goal of sustainable development thus requires a new type of internationalism.[19]

The Finnish commission's report notes that advancing the principles of sustainable development will have a conflict-reducing and security-increasing effect internationally. The promotion of sustainable development is thus in harmony with Finland's foreign policy.[20] The commission recommends that Finland actively promote the inclusion of sustainable development in international cooperation. Through its development cooperation Finland should strive to bolster the developing countries' self-sufficiency and thus reduce international inequality.

In this connection the Finnish commission cites the report of a working party which was established in 1983 to consider the environmental impact of development cooperation. According to this document Finland should take heed of environmental impacts in the planning and implementation of development cooperation projects, help build the developing countries' own environmental administration and increase projects which directly improve the developing countries' environment.[21] In addition to these principles the Finnish commission recommends that support be channeled mainly to the poorest countries. The export of environmental-friendly technology to the developing countries should also be expanded, and research and educational cooperation between Finland and target countries should be promoted.[22]

Changing the structure of international trade in order to improve the economic position of the developing countries is one of the central principles advanced by the WCED. The Finnish commission stresses the possibilities of multilateral bodies (particularly GATT) to strive towards this end. In addition it recommends the reshaping of the General Systems of Preferences to take the poorest developing countries into account better than at present. Finland should also pay closer attention to the developing countries' own economic aspirations and support their goals of raising the level of processing and diversifying production. Furthermore Finland should investigate possibilities to increase imports of products from the developing countries, since exports of Finland's industrial products are four times larger than imports from the developing countries.[23]

In the Finnish commission's opinion, Finland should in every possible way promote the goals in the WCED's report to develop international cooperation and cooperation organizations in order to achieve sustainable development. Finland should support the operational and administrative arrangements of the UN secretary general so that the organization can act more effectively to achieve the principles of sustainable development.

In particular Finland should promote the position of the United Nations Development Programme (UNEP) and its activities as a developer of environmental information and justice. Likewise Finland should support the efforts of the Economic Commission for Europe to implement the principles of sustainable development in its work.[24]

In other organizations outside the UN framework, Finland should also promote the observance of the principles of sustainable development.

In addition to intensifying international cooperation, the state and municipal sector should likewise devote attention to promoting sustainable development.

The Finnish commission on several occasions acknowledges the wide scope of the task field. The WCED's principle that development and environmental issues should be closely linked in decision making is also reflected in the extension of the problem field to various sectors of society in the Finnish commission's report. The purpose of the report is to serve as a basis for discussion and activity regarding sustainable development.

The fate of sustainable development depends primarily on the success of international cooperation, however. International organizations will play a central role in promoting sustainable development.

As the Finnish commission notes in its report, the promotion of sustainable development is a field of activity in which Finland can play an active part in the international arena and thus promote efforts for a more secure international system.

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Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio

Finland's international environment policy in the 1990s

Advisory Board for UN Affairs Seminar February 6, 1990

The past year has strengthened my belief that the solution of our ever-growing environmental problems will be the crucial issue of international cooperation in the '90s. I am more convinced than over that in the long term the future of the world is just as threatened by pollution of the environment, shortsighted exploitation of natural resources and impoverishment of the developing nations as it is by armed conflict, including the threat of nuclear war – indeed, as things look at the moment, possibly even more so. Ultimately, what is at stake is the whole future of mankind.

Though the overall picture is depressing, there are some encouraging signs of a new awareness, of new attitudes. People are waking up. Governments are becoming conscious of their responsibilities. The first major agreements have been signed on reducing pollution and environmental issues feature high on the international affairs agenda. Last autumn's session of the UN General Assembly bore witness to this. My colleagues and I took part in the open debate at the session, and for the first time in the history of the UN, practically all the various delegation leaders clearly viewed the solution of environmental problems as an urgent challenge for international cooperation.

Finland has been a front line country in international environmental cooperation. It is well in line with our foreign policy activity for us to continue along this course. Our own environment and economic development are vitally affected by what happens elsewhere in the world. I am convinced that it is well worth investing in international environmental cooperation. This will ultimately pay for itself, not only in a healthy environment and nation, but also through growing markets, stable economic development and greater international security.

We are preparing ourselves for the challenges of the '90s. This is not easy, because we need action which is at one and the same time global and comprehensive, and practical and close to home. It is obvious that the primary focus of Finland's international environment policy lies in areas nearby, whose pollution has a direct effect on the health of our environment and whose conditions we can actually do something about. At the same time we must also have the wisdom to see beyond the problems close at hand.

The environment and development as a whole are intimately bound up with one another. Expansion of the world economy, trade problems, raw material prices and the indebtedness of the developing nations have a crucial impact on the state of the environment and on sensible use of natural resources. If we act jointly with other governments we can help find the kind of multilateral solutions which will support economic growth based on rational use of natural resources. We are aware of the proposals of the Brundtland Commission. It is indisputable that the poverty spiral of the Third World is leading increasingly to shortsighted destruction of resources and the use of pollutive production technology.

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In the 1990s the UN will be playing an even more important role in international environmental cooperation. At the beginning of the decade one of the biggest challenges faced by the whole UN organization will be the Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. This conference is supposed to approve an actionstrategy for the '90s designed to solve what are considered to be the nine most urgent problems. Of these nine areas, detrimental changes in the atmosphere are the most difficult. Others include protection of the oceans and seas, preventing desertification and the destruction of tropical forests and ensuring the continuing diversity of organisms and species.

The most important political result of the conference is expected to be a convention on the prevention of climatic change. The effects of global warming show clearly the worldwide dependence of environment problems on decisions taken in other countries.

We know that greater emissions of carbon dioxide are the main element in global warming. As over a third of the world's coal resources are in China, that country's energy policies in the '90s will in the long term obviously affect the condition of the Finnish forests, the foundation of our economy, more than anything we ourselves can do. We also know that developments in our immediate neighbourhood – let us say, pollution from the Kola Peninsula and Poland – is felt here more rapidly and directly.

We cannot start behaving like imperialists under the pretext of environmental risk. As the industrialized countries have caused most of the present problems, they cannot dictate conditions to the rest of the world in the name of the common

good. We must carry our own responsibility for finding solutions and developing the necessary technology and forms of financing. We cannot prevent any country from using its natural resources unless we have viable and environmentally useful solutions to offer in their stead. We must therefore help to create an international energy programme, for instance, and also develop solutions which may not necessarily be feasible in Finland itself.

As well as working out its nine action strategies, the important political issues faced by the UN Conference on Development and Environment will be technological cooperation with the developing nations, extra funding for these same nations, and the future development of UN operations. The UN's present cooperation programmes, disposable resources and organization reflect the scale of need measured when the first UN environment conference was held in Stockholm, twenty years ago. The seriousness of the problems today forces us to take a completely new look at the UN's organization and resources. On a Finnish initiative, the UN General Assembly decided last autumn to ask the Secretary General for a proposal on how the UN organization should be developed to allow it to respond more effectively to the enormous challenges ahead.

There have been several proposals for developing the UN's Environment Programmes. The foundation of new bodies such as an environment council has been suggested, or the transfer of environmental matters to bodies whose work is coming to an end, or then rationalization of the workings of present bodies. It has also been suggested that the authority of the Security Council on these matters should be increased. What decisions are finally taken remains to be seen.

The permanent members of the Security Council are unlikely to give their support to decisions calling for changes in the UN Charter. In any case, it is important to strengthen UNEP, the UN Environment Programme, and to give it more financial backing. Finland has already done this. Finland last autumn prepared and coordinated the Environment Programme in the General Assembly, together with a resolution on the operations of the whole UN organization. This year Finland's contribution to UNEP will increase over 50%. I am also ready to propose a substantial increase in next year's budget.

Secondly, the status of the General Assembly should be reinforced. Possibly a body representing all the member countries should be set up to coordinate environmental issues, with extensive supranational powers.

Though the current authority of the Security Council allows it to interfere in acute, unexpected environmental problem which may lead to disputes between nations, it seems poorly suited to the handling of broad environmental issues of slow impact, even if the threat they pose to international security is much greater by far than some incidental catastrophe.

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In financing cooperation we face issues of quite a different magnitude. We need some completely new approaches if we are to solve them. Protection of the ozone layer is the first field in which calculutions have been made about the amounts of money needed. The assumption has been that the industrial countries will pay for themselves the cost of changing over to materials that are environmentally safe. The developing countries, on the other hand, have neither the necessary technology nor the money. They have quite rightly demanded that, because it is primarily the industrial nations that are causing ozone depletion, it is their job to help the Third World to change over to acceptable substitutes.

Present estimates about the backing needed by the developing antions range between 800 million and 2 billion Finnish marks a year, for about 10 years. The annual budget of the entire UN Environment Programme is only about one tenth of the lowest estimate. I do not believe that any nation is ready to raise its contribution ten-fold over the next few years.

An alternative that deserves serious consideration is a product-specific charge determined on the basis of present consumption. For instance, this would add 4–10 Finnish marks to the price of a new refrigerator. I doubt that any Finnish consumer would fail to buy a fridge because of this surcharge. If this kind of charge could be put into effect, it would produce the funds needed for international action. We understand, however, how difficult this would be to implement worldwide, when even Finland has not managed to implement environment charges for protection purposes. This matter is being discussed, however, under Finland's lead. If no solution in principle is found by next summer, the ban on substances which destroy the ozone layer, already decided on last spring in Helsinki at the political level, will not be implemented. Decision-makers must also continue to face up to their responsibilities, now that the Helsinki ozone conference is over.

The resources needed for protection of the ozone layer are relatively small, however, compared with those needed to prevent climatic changes. This calls for a completely new energy, agricultural and forestry policy.

No such transfers of funds can be made out of the development cooperation budget. Yet development cooperation is extremely important, if faster progress is to be made in the right direction. The content of our development cooperation must be adjusted to make it serve sustainable development vis a vis natural resources more effectively. I have proposed that our development cooperation contribution should be raised to 1 % of GNP, and 0.3 % of this devoted to international environmental cooperation in neighbouring areas and the Third World.

Whether we must go even farther than this can be pondered when this

first goal has been reached. The decision-makers must also be brought to understand that it is not possible, indeed hardly honest, to support protection of the environment internationally yet deny it funds.

Whatever financing models are eventually adopted, environmental protection will demand really substantial economic sacrifices from us in the future. A clean environment is so precious to the Finns that I believe they will be ready to make these sacrifices. However, people will want to be certain that the money they provide is really used on the environment. This certainty they must be given.

* * *

Our immediate neighbours, the source of most of the air-borne impurities reaching Finland, will be the focus of Finnish environment policy in the near future. We must be able to protect our most precious natural resource, our forests.

This primarily means cooperating with the Soviet Union, Poland and the German Democratic Republic. An open exchange of views and collaboration have already been launched with these countries. The first agreements have also been signed. Initially, we need effective agreements to reduce emissions. Next, we must reach agreement of financing systems and programmes related to the transfer of technology. The 'polluter pays' principle can probably be used with the rich OECD countries, but strict observance of it with countries in Eastern Europe struggling with other economic problems, not to mention the developing nations, does not seem realistic at present.

We must join the other Western industrial nations in contributing to the reconstruction of Eastern Europe, for instance through the new reconstruction bank. Because the restructuring of production in the countries of Eastern Europe will take time, greater economic acticity may initially result in heavy emissions of pollution. Environmental protection must therefore be at the forefront right from the start of reconstruction programmes. Special action is needed both bilaterally and on broader basis. The idea of setting up a European environment fund should be worked on further.

In bilateral cooperation we have started to work out a cooperation strategy with the emphasis on training and environmental protection. Negotiations with Poland on collaboration in environmental protection and energy saving have already been concluded and the first collaboration projects are being worked out. Measures affecting air pollution control take priority. Over 50 million Finnish marks have been allocated in this year's budget for this purpose.

There is also extensive cooperation with the Soviet Union. During President Gorbachev's visit to Finland three new conventions on environmental protection were signed. The most important concerns the reduction of air-borne pollutants from areas close to our common border. This bilateral programme has laid down much stricter measures to cut emissions than have been agreed on anywhere else in Europe. We are currently negotiating on economic cooperation to limit emissions. The Finnish company Outokumpu is ready to modernize to world's biggest nickel production plants, on the Kola Peninsula, thus reducing their emissions by over 95 %. For this purpose, the Government has granted a loan guarantee and interest subsidy more favourable than the support provided for air protection investments in Finland itself. Progress has been made in the negotiations and I believe that agreement will be reached at the next session of the Economic Commission.

The Baltic must be protected. Some important initiatives have been made on closer cooperation in the Baltic area. Finland is ready to participate at a high political level in the meeting of Baltic countries being held next autumn to deal with the protection of the Baltic environment and other cooperation. The time is ripe for more effective cooperation affecting the whole environment in the Baltic area, and not just the protection of the sea itself. The various initiatives put forward for further collaboration in the Baltic should be integrated into a coordinated action programme.

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I have now touched on the most important aspects of environmental cooperation in the '90s. I would crystallize our line of action in the near future as follows:

1) The Government considers that environmental questions will become an increasingly important issue of international cooperation and attaches great importance to environmental cooperation in its foreign policy.

2) We will join actively with other countries in developing international economic relations which promote the sensible use of natural resources.

3) We will take the initiative in the UN, its special agencies, other international organizations and financial institutions to ensure sustainable development vis a vis natural resources and the consideration of environmental aspects in all development.

4) We will work particularly actively in preparations for the UN Conference on Environment and Development and strive to achieve binding action programmes to solve the world's main environmental problems, particularly to prevent climatic changes.

5) We will work ectively to develop the UN organization so that it can deal more effectively with environmental problems.

6) We will develop technological cooperation and financing systems to allow the developing nations to acquire clean production technology and products that do not endanger the environment at reasonable cost.

7) Our future development cooperation will take environmental considerations into account in every aspect. Our development coopera-

tion budget will be raised to 1 % of GNP, and 0.3 % of this will be used on environment projects in neighbouring areas and the Third Word, in addition to the regular development cooperation appropriations.

8) The focus of our immediate action is neighbouring areas. Cooperation in the European area will be developed in line with the recommendations of the CSCE environment conference and a stricter line will be adopted on programme to reduce the long-distance transportation of air-borne impurities. We will work further on our initiative to protect the susceptible wildlife of Arctic areas.

9) There will be greater urgency with the preparation and implementation of an environment-oriented actionstrategy for cooperation with Eastern Europe. We will play on active part in protection of and cooperation in the Baltic area.

10) Cooperation with the Soviet Union will be intensified, particularly that with neighbouring areas in the field of air and water pollution control. Cooperation affecting the Kola Peninsula is especially important.

The new dimensions and challenges of cooperation also call for an increase in national resources. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is currently negotiating with the Ministry of the Environment on intensifying cooperation and increasing resources. An office for international environmental cooperation is to be set up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I am very happy that Prime Minister Holkeri has proposed the holding of a special high-level discussion forum in the autumn involving politicians, representatives of business and industry, and high government officials to ponder our environment policy. I believe that international trends and prospects in environment policy will then be strongly to the fore.

The Significance of the CSCE Yesterday and Now

Markku Reimaa, Doctor of Political Science, Ambassador

What is expected of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe today, in a changing Europe? Can the 35 original states that took part in the Conference use the agreed mechanisms to help shape a safer and more cooperative continent through today's process? What role should or could be played by the CSCE in, for instance, current handling of the German question? These are all questions that will put the survival of the 15-year-old CSCE process to the test.

Positive answers can be found to all of them. However, the first question is whether the 35 countries themselves believe that the CSCE process can play a constructive role in a changing Europe. The answer to this question, too, would seem to be an undeniable 'Yes'. This applies primarily to the expectations expressed by both Germanies with regard to the current and future role of the CSCE process. Under President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union is also showing a new readiness to utilize the full potential of the CSCE. I shall be returning later to the experiences gained during the Vienna follow-up meeting. New weightings can also be detected in the USA's basic attitude to the CSCE, and these are not merely cosmetic. Ever since President Ronald Reagan's speech at Finlandia Hall in 1988, and with recent developments provoking more widespread debate about the new role of the military alliances, Washington, too, seems to judge that the CSCE has more operative viability.

The situation in the small, ex-Socialist countries of Europe is also interesting. Their former governments responded very positively to the opportunities the CSCE offered for an enhancement of their distinctive national character. Their new governments now seem even more closely tuned to the essence of the CSCE: a prominent member of Charta 77 currently sits in Hradcany Castle. As recently as the follow-up conference in Belgrade in 1977–78 this subject provoked extremely passionate ideological and fire-and-brimstone debate.

In the early '80s the CSCE already offered Poland's Solidarity movement a goal which it viewed as effectively realizing some of its own European ideals. The present government of the German Democratic Republic operates from the specific assumption that handling of the German question should proceed "in a broader pan-European context". In connection with the Vienna talks on military security, the present Hungarian government has striven to distinguish most emphatically between the new applications of its national defence doctrine and what went before.

All these examples would seem to indicate that, though the various countries' individual aims may differ in detail, the basic trend is the same: confirmation of new national identity and legitimacy through the CSCE.

Accordingly, one could even state that the history of the CSCE could be written under the heading 'From Prague to Prague'. 1968 marked a stalemate in European cooperation; it was vital to devise some new mechanisms. The CSCE process had its origins in spring 1969. Now that the effects of European change are again being assessed in Prague, there are completely new expectations of the CSCE.

How does the CSCE reflect reality?

The Helsinki summit conference in 1975 underlined the news value and political topicality of the CSCE – for the general public, perhaps excessively so. Events thereafter have given more of an impression 'time frozen' and endless negotiations than concrete results. The Stockholm conference and the conventional arms reduction talks now going on in Vienna are perhaps exceptions to the rule.

Selling the progress so gradually made and results which are inevitably a compromise is altogether another story. Thus juicy causes of dispute have always had more appeal for newsmen than any decisions reached by dint of plodding, however important.

The CSCE Final Act of 1975 was the most comprehensive document in the post-war period, a programme for cooperation which all the states responsible for European security, including the USA and Canada, had helped to shape. Albania was the only country that did not accept the Finnish government's invitation.

As well as the ten basic Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, certain areas were mapped out for future cooperation – primarily economic relations, cooperation in various fields of human endeavour, including the promotion of transboundary contacts, more exchange of information, and cooperation in culture and education. The basic assumption was that it was not the aim of the CSCE to interfere in the security system prevailing at the time. As the emphasis was on cooperation and ways of furthering it, there is no valid reason for claiming that the process aimed at preserving the status quo. Quite the reverse. Each follow-up conference from Belgrade to Madrid and Vienna has been based on the assumption that attainment of the agreed goals must be implemented with ever greater effectiveness and that new joint decisions must be made to carry the programme onwards.

Throughout the CSCE process, Finland has been one of the countries stressing the importance of the changes achieved through the CSCE. In every country, the new obligations naturally prompt a close analysis of how far the existing procedures and practice accord with the new situation. In this respect, the resolutions passed by the Vienna follow-up conference (1986–1989) are of significance throughout. The importance of the new commitments agreed to in Vienna took on even greater importance; several delegations were thereby seeking guarantees that the process of political reform and the direction already taken should be confirmed as effectively as possible. The Vienna negotiations represented pressure for change in other ways, too. The alliances were no longer as cohesive as before; certain East European Socialist countries, in particular, engaged in an open campaign advertising the advantage of doing business with them in fixing bold targets.

In the Western camp, these new winds from the East were initially met with some bewilderment. No-one was sure whether the new readiness being shown by the Soviet Union concerned only tactical objectives or whether it might lead to results with completely new implications. In order that this increasing heterogeneity of the Eastern camp should not be reflected in the West, there was a tightening of Western discipline; the role of NATO was not restricted solely to the military coordination of security questions. It was important for NATO to display unshaken solidarity towards values and goals over an even broader front.

In practice, the Vienna conference was the first follow-up at which internal negotiations between the alliances and the shaping of common positions and stands took up the lion's share of the time.

Today's test of the German question

The CSCE was the first international multilateral conference forum attended by both German states on an equal footing. The opening of the Helsinki consultations at Dipoli on November 22, 1972 marked a new modus vivendi between the two countries.

Throughout the process the German delegations have striven to keep their internal disputes out of the CSCE. They have pursued this aim with great determination. Over the years, contact between the delegations has actually ipcreased steadily. There was always good cause for the other side to be aware in advance of any future plans. The CSCE also created the basis for better relations between the two Germanies. The Final Act does not mention the German question as such. The key disputes in the final phase of the Geneva negotiations concerned the manner in which (West) Berlin could be involved in implementation of the CSCE resolutions. As the wording "throughout Europe" was then adopted, this issue, too, which was then felt to be a problem, was eliminated.

The CSCE's longest-serving foreign ministers Fischer and Genscher have been working together for nearly fifteen years. It has certainly been beneficial for both Germanies and for Europe that their delegations have throughout shown a genuine and living interest in ways of utilizing the CSCE process. It is therefore only natural that the countries concerned now view the handling of the German question in its new phase within the CSCE both important and valuable. However this question is ultimately settled, it is clear that the German question today is no longer just a matter for a select few. It is an issue that affects the whole of Europe, so everyone should be involved in ensuring that it is settled peacefully.

New lines for cooperation

The exceptional preconditions for the Vienna follow-up meeting were shaped earlier, in Stockholm; it was there, in September 1986, that a new breakthrough was made reflecting military confidence. The right of all signatory participating States to challenge inspections was agreed to side by side with more effective notification thresholds for military exercises and their supervision. It was clear that this historic outcome, in an area of military security that had always been considered delicate, could not be allowed to remain an isolated case. More concrete proofs of the new thinking were expected from Vienna. The outcome of the Vienna meeting showed such results in all three main areas: principles of human rights, military security and economic cooperation.

Human rights in the CSCE

At the time, the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 was only 'sold' in the US because of the 'Helsinki human rights accords'. This was largely also the American approach to the combined efforts of the CSCE prior to the Vienna conference. Despite the demand for inner balance in the CSCE Final Act, human rights took on a 'more equal' status than the other baskets.

It was not, therefore, a complete surprise in November 1986 when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze distinctly stressed in his opening address the new potential attached to human rights. Moscow's proposal for a broadly-based human rights conference in Moscow gained pride of place.

At Vienna, it was asked how far joint resolutions could credibly advance as a practical test of Soviet reform policy. How could the Soviet Union convince its Western partners that the impressive plans for human rights already launched could really be implemented at the practical level? The gap (not to say conflict) between words and deeds was now the object of special scrutiny.

It may possibly not be long before we obtain the first detailed accounts of the internal workings of the Warsaw Pact during the Vienna conference. It was, after all, an acknowledged fact that throughout the follow-up the Warsaw Pact countries were divided into two camps, or two

progressive trios, especially on human rights, adopting a totally new approach even within the CSCE. The Soviet Union, Hungary and Poland fought a pioneering battle in the front line of reform to convince Western diehards that new thinking was also called for from the West. Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Bulgaria represented a more cautious approach: as internal reforms had not really got under way there, they found it more difficult to allow themselves to be carried away by the new external criteria.

The meeting of experts on human contacts held in Bern in April-May 1986 had already shown that the CSCE was taking on a new kind of validity. As CSCE negotiations never take place in a vacuum, that meeting, too, showed that the distrust felt about Soviet reform policies, particularly, still reflected conventional attitudes in the USA.

Some completely new commitments were now written into the concluding document signed in Vienna: one was that the participating States would fully respect the right of everyone "to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." It was agreed that the time for processing the necessary documents, particularly in contacts between members of the same family, should be shortened drastically; 'urgent' cases and applications would, for instance, be settled within three working days. It was considered that the time necessary for arranging meetings would normally be one month. If the issue concerned the reunification of families, the agreed normal practice would be three months.

All CSCE decisions are reached by concensus and are politically binding. The CSCE has often been criticized for this, in an attempt to show that its 'lack of legality' would be one of its basic weaknesses.

A new dimension is added to the monitoring of human rights and human contacts in the Vienna concluding document. While it is possible to make a thorough study of the implementation of decisions at roughly three year intervals, when the regular follow-up conferences are normally held, it was now agreed that this would be done annually.

A separate section of the concluding document dealing with the human dimension agrees that a new kind of conference will be used for this purpose. The first such conference was held in Paris in May-June 1989, and the second in Copenhagen in June 1990; the third is to be in Moscow in September-October 1991. It is the task of these conferences to exchange information on questions related to the human dimension, to hold bilateral meetings on the matter if necessary, and to bring any causes for concern to the attention of the other participating States. These conferences also deal with proposals for new measures aimed at promoting the implementation of CSCE commitments concerning the human dimension and increasing the effectiveness of the agreed procedures.

The work of the Paris conference showed that the CSCE had already embarked on a new kind of dialogue. It is a dialogue of much greater subtlety than before. It is also more practically oriented. Political debate and argument with an ideological orientation are taking a back seat. At the same time, the goals aimed at are much more ambitious. As early as the Paris conference, proposals were made across the old bloc limits (France–Soviet Union), aimed at achieving a set of common European norms – in other words, not just the implementation of joint political commitments but the achievement of a uniform set of legal norms on human rights.

On these issues the work of the Vienna follow-up meeting and the Paris conference was marked by the national reservations expressed by Rumania. Rumania has recently announced unilaterally that it retracts those reservations and is thus also ready to observe in full the resolutions adopted in Vienna. As well as the Rumanian problem, the discussion at the Vienna meeting also showed that closer dialogue between the blocs does not necessarily mean the elimination of all problems. There are various tensions connected with human rights and national minorities within the alliances.

It can be assumed that the role of various citizens' organizations will gain in importance in future monitoring of these matters. While in Vienna the representatives of Western organizations still played the leading role in this unofficial work, it is only to be expected that a whole number of new participants from the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will take part in the second conference on the human dimension in Copenhagen.

Military security

Ever since the early days of the CSCE negotiations, the official position taken by the military alliances has been that disarmament talks proper do not fall within the sphere of the CSCE. Negotiations on European arms reductions in fact began in Vienna side by side with the CSCE process in 1972. It was not long before this parallel operation became rather academic. There were insurmountable differences of opinion about the actual figures for armed forces. After nearly sixteen years, the negotiators in the arms reduction talks recognized that their original goals were out of date. When the Vienna follow-up conference reached final agreement in January 1989, the negotiators issued a brief public bulletin stating that the process begun in autumn 1972 had come to an end. In their more concrete form, the task and the new potential for it were transferred to the CSCE.

After the Vienna follow-up, two series of parallel negotiations were launched in March 1989, as agreed: further talks between the 35 CSCE countries on confidence and security building measures (CSBM) and negotiations between the 23 member countries of the two military alliances on cutting conventional forces in Europe (CFE). The mandate was not now restricted to the Continent of Europe, but covered the entire territory of the 23 countries concerned, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The events connected with military security in Europe subsequent to the breakthroughs in the summer and autumn of 1986 (Stockholm and the Reykjavik summit) have led to a rapid reshuffle of negotiating and debating positions. Now that exactly one year of the dual negotiations in Vienna has passed, they are made subject to a completely new sense of urgency. Despite their ambitious mandate, the 23-country CFE talks are under extreme pressure to achieve results. And not only because the first results should be ready in good time before the 35 CSCE nation summit planned for this year.

Even greater pressure, perhaps, is experienced by the negotiating parties because military coordinates, especially on the Continent, are being changed almost as effectively and rapidly unilaterally and bilaterally as through multilateral negotiation. Unilateral action announced by the Soviet Union and the United States is included in the first CFE agreements. Yet at the moment no-one can guarantee just how long the agreed positions will remain 'the last word'. Pressures in internal government to continue to make arms cuts are also likely to continue after the first CFE agreement is signed.

The positions have changed dramatically in this sector, too. Western suspicions of the Soviet Union's readiness and ability to begin radical cuts in its armed forces are fading. At the 'Open Skies' conference of 23 countries' foreign ministers in Ottawa in February 1990 provisional agreement was reached between the American and Soviet delegates that both would accept a ceiling of 195,000 men for central Europe. In the case of the Americans, this means a major change in their original stance, which expressed a readiness for cuts of only some 10 per cent. The figure is now probably closer to thirty than ten.

In the Soviet Union, the most recent step forward is likely to mean cuts of over fifty per cent. In addition, the Soviet Union agrees that, at this stage at least, the cuts do not have to affect troops other than American and Soviet.

Only the future will tell how the US Congress and the political leadership of NATO prove able to handle the military supremacy with which the Western alliance is so unexpectedly endowed. Another matter altogether is the detailed consideration that will probably have to be given in various connections in the next few months to how the territory of the German Democratic Republic fits to this new equation.

The CFE agreement makes substantial cuts in tanks, aircraft, helicopters and personnel carriers. The inspection and monitoring mechanisms used for implementation are also likely to be unique in the history of multilateral agreements. The 'Open Skies' scenarios of the Ottawa meeting show that a transition has been made from the old era of cover-up to a time of magnificent openness – perhaps irreversibly. The contest is becoming more even.

As a result of the Vienna talks, the CFE negotiations were also linked into the CSCE. It was agreed that the Helsinki follow-up meeting in 1992 would be the first occasion on which there would be an overall assessment of these negotiations, including their possible integration.

Here, too, it may well be that the changes and rapid developments going on in Europe bring the discussions forward. Naturally, there will be discussion at the CSCE summit now under preparation of all the main CSCE dimensions, the situation at the moment, and the main lines to be followed in the future. We can assume that the steps to be taken following the first CFE agreement will feature prominently on the agenda: People are asking what the next phase of European disarmament will be. Is the old CFE process, tied as it is to a scenario of military alliances, really the natural and proper path to follow today? It is extremely likely that the line advocated by France, that the two negotiation processes should be combined straight after the summit, will win increasing support, and not only from the neutral and non-aligned nations.

Within the CSBM process, the fast changes going on in Europe have naturally been welcomed, but are also felt to be something of a problem. Is it possible to make credible progress in the traditional manner, on the basis of the mandate agreed on in Madrid in 1983, in a situation in which military significance is being tested using completely new methods through multilateral negotiations? It can also be asked where the "stable and secure balance at lower levels, the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action" of the new objectives can be seen most effectively. The cuts in troops and tanks are doubtless such steps. But alongside, debate is going on about the opportunities offered in this situation by unilateral cuts – specifically in conventional forms. Side by side with the concrete reductions, there is a fundamental doctrinal reassessment in progress.

The seminar on the military doctrines of all 35 CSCE countries held in Vienna in January-February 1990 was clear proof of this. Openness was conspicuous, and the frank dialogue between highlevel military representatives convincing. Within, and partly because of, the CSCE, the military alliances have been given the chance to further new opportunities for cooperation, rather than confrontation.

In any case, on matters connected with military security, it is possible to say that the CSCE has proved able to adapt to new challenges. Over the years, an extremely modest core of confidence-building measures has developed into a network of dialogue, openness and measures to increase mutual confidence and security. The challenge inspections laid down in Stockholm have become almost a routine element in military cooperation. The observation programmes for military exercises are also a natural way for an ever growing network of experts to keep in touch. It has also become

clear that attaining the goals presupposes the posing of ever higher demands. A measure which becomes routine uses up the new political energy invested in it extremely rapidly.

From the point of view of principle and policy, it is of course important for all the CSCE participating States to be involved in the process. This is an achievement and a value in itself. Making it credible in future is a challenge to everyone concerned, especially those who are not the prime targets of the CFE talks and the reductions agreed on in them. Thus the role played by the neutral and non-aligned nations as component elements in stability and security may indirectly grow. The less change of a fundamental nature they have experienced during these years, the more effectively the neutral countries can contribute to the reinforcement of stability in years to come.

The more debate there is about the part played by military alliances in future, the more likely it is that the importance of the joint efforts of the 35 nations will grow. National security needs will have to be defined amid a new environment. The more diverse the negotiating process, the more flexible will be the means by which we can respond to new challenges. I believe that the neutral countries of Europe are ready for this.

Economic and environmental cooperation

The economic conference held in Bonn between March 19 and April 11, 1990 is the first of its kind in the CSCE. It is the second meeting of experts on the areas covered by 'basket II', following the Vienna meeting. A meeting of experts was held in Sofia on environmental protection in October-November 1989. This was unable to produce a unanimously approved final document. Though no such aim has even been set for the Bonn meeting, the assumption is that the achievement of a final document would be welcome in the present circumstances.

Economic cooperation has been of secondary importance ever since the beginning of the CSCE. As long as different ideological weightings coloured the debate on human rights, it proved insuperably difficult to bring about concrete and meaningful cooperation for pragmatic reasons. Though the UN's Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has in fact existed right from the start as a ready executive body, even this fact did not prove capable of revitalizing cooperation on economic matters.

An extensive and detailed set of recommendations connected with more effective environmental protection was drawn up as a result of the Vienna follow-up. A joint Nordic and Finnish initiative also led to the first CSCE meeting of experts on environmental matters. The workings of the Sofia meeting showed that the Nordic countries' ambitious objectives are both vital and viable. Concentrating on the prevention of industrial accidents, handling of potentially hazardous chemical substances, and on the protection of international and frontier waters showed that, in this area, national boundaries are history.

Recent events have made the Bonn conference even more timely. Questions of the general advancement and diversification of economic relations, simplifying contacts between business people and obtaining a comparable data base, improving the standing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), industrial cooperation and cooperation in specific areas such as energy-saving techniques, developing environmental protection equipment and border issues and financial policy are all priority issues.

In accordance with the agreed decisions, the Bonn conference will be an extremely prestigious joint meeting of representatives from the business world. The host country, the Federal Republic of Germany, hopes particularly that this event will make a concrete contribution to helping create business links. The FRG is therefore arranging some large-scale events outside the official conference programme so as to present the achievements and attainments of its business and industry.

Despite the fact that the joint decisions do not include any specific reference to having a final stage of the conference at a political, i.e. ministerial, level, it is already highly probable that this will be the case. It is one of the good aspects of the CSCE that its flexibility also allows for a more relaxed interpretation of a rigid agenda when called for. In the case of the compilation of a concluding document and representation at a political level, this timely challenge will now be put to the proper test.

During the Geneva stage of the CSCE in 1973-1975, Finland often stressed the importance of economic cooperation and the whole of basket II to this country. This was only natural, as in the early '70s we were in many ways pioneers because of our experience of trade policy solutions and East/West trade. This basic interest is sure to be expressed in the work of the Bonn conference, too. The challenge and current problems are very different from what they were twenty years ago. Nonetheless, it is right and proper to strive to find suitable solutions on the basis of earlier experience. It is extremely valuable that the Finnish national delegation includes prominent and distinguished representatives of Finnish business life. We can expect this expertise to ensure that Finnish experience and views about both past and future will win the attention they deserve.

The significance and value of the Bonn conference in the present situation is also enhanced by the fact that the economic conference is the first meeting of CSCE experts at which the Finnish delegation is chaired by a government minister.

Is there a need for CSCE institutions?

The not quite 20 years of CSCE experience so far shows that a joint

negotiation process between 35 participating States can succeed without any permanent organizations or institutions. This was a conscious choice when the Helsinki Final Act was negotiated: there was no desire for UN examples to influence the new enterprise in any way. Voting was eliminated from the procedures, and all the signatories, both large and small, have an equal 'right of veto' on all issues, since decisions call for consensus, that is, joint agreement. For the same reason, any attempt to distinguish between questions on the grounds of whether they concern matter or procedure was rejected. In any case, making this distinction would have proved impossible, if not immediately, then at some point along the way.

What, then, has replaced all that was lacking? A mechanism by which decisions reached are followed up. The CSCE follow-up process has proved an effective instrument of supervision. It takes the form both of comprehensive follow-up conferences and meetings of experts dealing with various individual matters. It is part of the character of these follow-up conferences that their brief is more important than the amount of time spent. Only when there has been a thorough exchange of views on the implementation situation and detailed negotiations have been held about further joint action do the preconditions exist for closing a follow-up conference. Of course, all the participants are always ready to proclaim that the follow-up conference should complete its work as soon as possible. In the same breath, however, they claim that a rapid conclusion is only secondary, compared with achieving meaningful results. That is why the Madrid and Vienna follow-up conferences stretched out over two years – indeed, in the case of Madrid, because of the longer breaks in negotiations, to exactly three years.

The follow-up programme agreed on in Vienna for the intermediate period between Vienna and the Helsinki follow-up conference in 1992 is also unique. In practice, it means that one negotiating link is constantly available between the 35 participating States. The vienna talks on military security are likely to continue for the time being at least, unless some new solutions are worked out as a result of the summit.

Otherwise, in each year (1989, 1990, 1991) three meetings of experts in different fields are also convening to deal with human rights, economic cooperation, cooperation in the Mediterranean and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is clear that a programme like this, with all the changes going on around, puts the resources of many nations to the test.

When there is talk of the possibility of institutionalizing the CSCE in a new way, this in fact means two different things. Firstly, the desire expressed for a summit this year shows that the CSCE still lacks a flexible mechanism for convening a meeting outside the agreed programme if one is generally felt to be necessary. As there is still uncertainty even about the host country for a summit, it has so far been difficult to start preparations.

The other, more common, question raised with regard to institutionalization is that some permanent unit, secretariat or the like should be set up for the CSCE. The current practice is that the host country for each CSCE event sets up a secretariat in turn. Naturally, well-tested CSCE professionals are available for these jobs in various places.

In connection with the CSCE tenth anniversary in 1985 Finland strove to increase the services available to all the signatory nations: we have supplied a set of microfiches of all the official CSCE documents so far to each participating state. This has proved particularly useful because otherwise the documents from the various meetings have not been compiled into a single volume.

Talk about institutionalizing the CSCE today takes place in a changing world. Developments in the last twenty years have shaped our picture of both Europe and the CSCE. Some dramatic advances have been made and with them the usefulness of the CSCE has been re-assessed. It is extremely important for expert and political circles, especially in the main Western capitals, to now see the CSCE as a useful tool – so useful, indeed, that they are ready to propose its institutionalization. The proposals made for a European institute of human rights, an ecological institute and a crisis management centre are all ideas that will certainly be given full consideration. The suggestion has also been made that a regular opportunity for meeting should be created for CSCE foreign ministers.

It is probable that the first steps taken along this road will be cautious ones and that advances will be made gradually. In the interests of careful preparation, it might be valuable to study the question thoroughly at the Helsinki follow-up conference, if not before.

At a given level, the unwritten rule that the follow-up conferences proper should always be held in a neutral country if possible is also a kind of non-institutionalism. The follow-up programme now agreed on in Vienna already offers some new pointers on this question: it was agreed that three follow-up events would be held in East European cities (Sofia, Cracow, Moscow).

When Helsinki announced to all the participating States that it was available as the host country for the next follow-up conference, it was in 1987, at the joint 750th anniversary celebrations of the city of Berlin. It was already suggested then in a distinguished quarter that Berlin should become one international meeting place of the new Europe. It is perfectly possible that some new decisions may be reached on issues like this at the Helsinki follow-up meeting.

In the light of all the above, it would seem – assuming that the course of European change remains roughly the same – that the Helsinki follow-up conference will be one of the most important European forums vis a vis the new operating structures of the 1990s.

Finnish Policy on Refugees Suffering from a Lack of Planning

Irene Rinne, master's thesis for the University of Tampere in spring 1989 dealing with Finnish refugee policy; State stands on the refugee question 1973–1987

Finnish refugee policy is said to be part of our foreign policy. The 1989 budget included FIM 131 million for this purpose, including both care of refugees in Finland and aid to refugees abroad. Economically speaking, this is not an important area of foreign policy. So it is interesting that such an economically marginal issue has attracted so much debate in recent years, primarily among the populace and in the press. The refugee question has not been brought up in Parliament or in the Government, despite the fact that the present Government programme makes special mention of it.

Finland has provided the UN refugee agencies with regular aid since 1960. However, it was not until 1986 that a breakthrough came in the Finnish response to the problem: State economic aid to refugees in developing countries nearly doubled and reception of refugees was for the first time regulated by what is called a 'quota decision'. Keen debate began on refugee policy, or rather, the subject widely discussed was, "How many refugees can Finland take?"

Finnish refugee policy can be examined on at least three levels. The first is the *legislative level.* In Finland's case, the key legal documents are the international convention[1] on refugees, which has been approved at statute level, and the act and statute on foreign nationals. The second level is *speeches and statements* made by Finland on the refugee question, by which it strives to influence the issue at either the national or the international level. The third level is *concrete action,* such as financial aid for refugees in developing countries and reception of refugees in Finland.

My degree paper on Finnish refugee policy[2] considered what kind of issue Finland has held the refugee question to be. For this purpose I studied Finland's official speeches and statements on the refugee issue between 1973 and 1987. My research material comprised mainly speeches made by Finnish representatives at the UN concerning the work of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). I also studied statements made by Finnish foreign ministers in various connections.

Varying attitude

In official Finnish statements connected with refugees in 1973-1987, attitudes to the refugee problem and the means proposed for solving it varied. In the '70s, the refugee problem was considered an issue connected with a low level of development. The refugee question was primarily a *humanitarian* issue, and to solve it Finland called on other UN member countries to increase their economic aid to refugees.

In the early '80s it was stressed that the refugee problem was the outcome either of pressures exercised within the country or of aggression from outside. If the refugee problem was to be tackled, the political causes behind it had to be dealt with. Hence the refugee problem was not just a humanitarian but also a *political* issue. The existence of millions of refugees was a serious threat not only economically and socially but also in terms of security policy. According to Finland, the international community bore the responsibility for the refugee problem; though this did not mean that the countries which had caused the problem were absolved of liability. The concrete measure supported by Finland as the means of alleviating the problem continued to be financial support for the UNHCR.

In the mid '80n Finland's official speeches went back to stressing the humanitarian nature of the refugee issue. Compared with the '70s, the difference now was that a stand was taken on UNHCR aid programmes and Finland strove to improve them, demonstrating the country's greater familiarity with the problems involved in aiding refugees. Though economic aid for refugees was still thought important, the reception of refugees became a new Finnish solution to easing the world's refugee problem.

Financial aid grown

There was very little financial aid to refugees in the '70s. The whole question of developing countries was at that point only just coming to the fore in Finland. From the early '80s on, however, encouraging trends in GNP also led to increases in appropriations for development aid, at the same time allowing better opportunities for financial aid to refugees. Since 1986, in particular, Finland has substantially augmented this aid.

Diagram 1. Growth in the value of Finnish aid to refugees from 1973 to 1987 (at 1980 prices).



Diagram 2. Targeting of Finnish refugee aid by country and in general assistance in 1973-1987 (at 1980 prices). General assistance comprises unspecified aid to the UNHCR.



Diagram 3. Trends in use of aid channels 1973-1987 (at 1980 prices).



Finnish refugee aid has gone mainly to the African countries and to Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, also taking the form of unspecified aid for general UNHCR programmes (diagram 2). UNHCR recommendations are largely followed in deciding the priorities for recipients of aid[3]. When the amount of aid is determined, the principle has been to make it proportionate to the number of refugees and the level of distress, though Africa tends to get a larger share.

The targeting of refugee aid is not decided solely by the International Development Agency. The political section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is also involved in the decisionmaking. This is one way in which refugee policy is part of Finnish foreign policy as a whole. In the distribution of refugee aid it means that the question of the recipient goes through a deliberation process[4] during which the following aspects are considered:

1. the present situation of the recipient/country concerned
2. the undisputed standing of the recipient/country internationally
3. how widely the other Nordic countries and the international community are involved in aid, and
4. the effects of Finnish involvement on Finland itself.

During the 1973-1987 period, official Ministry for Foreign Affairs material does not include any plans for the distribution of refugee aid appropriations. However, there is an advance plan for the distribution of the following year's 'refugee kitty' in the State budget. For instance, the 1987 budget reveals how much annual assistance was to be given to UN refugee agencies and to bilateral projects in Africa. The budget includes a plan for annual aid to UN refugee agencies, after which FIM 46 million remained in 'undistributed aid'.

This lack of advance planning is partly due to the fact that the funds for humanitarian aid exist precisely for unexpected disasters (e.g. various natural upheavals). However, refugee problems have remained unchanged for a long time now, so assistance on this kind of *ad hoc* basis is not necessary. In this respect, use of resources could be improved by basing it on a longer-term plan.

Finland has channelled its economic aid to refugees mainly through UN refugee agencies. In recent years a substantial amount of aid has also taken the form of bilateral aid to African countries - Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Of the international organizations, the Red Cross has mainly been responsible for getting the aid to its destination.

Reception of refugees not automatic

The decision to take a hundred Southeast Asian boat people following the initial reception of Chilean refugees was not automatic, despite the fact that during 1979 the press repeatedly depicted the boat people as in need of humanitarian aid. When assistance for Southeast Asian refugees was debated by the Finnish Government in June 1979, there was also discussion of the possibility of taking some refugees. The aid decision made only referred to economic aid, however. A few weeks later, this was extended to include the reception of a hundred refugees in Finland as, according to the Foreign Minister at the time, the situation in Indochina had become seriously aggravated.[5]

Finland's decision was announced to the rest of the world at an international conference arranged by the UN in July 1979, when a note was added to the effect that Finland's climate and other features of the living environment would inevitably cause special adjustment problems for people from Southeast Asia.[6]

Official statements made by Finland on the reception of refugees refer specifically to the reception of what are known as 'quotas'. People seeking asylum are a class in themselves. In 1973-87 such people were mentioned in Finnish speeches on refugees only as examples of the fact that certain (other) countries had tightened their approach to the handling of requests for asylum.

It appears that requests for asylum are dealt with separately from other refugee policies. In the case of requests for asylum, the refugee question seems to be primarily a political issue, especially one of security policy.

Unpondered quota question

The report of the committee on refugees in 1979 noted that Finnish involvement in international refugee work was needed, especially as Finnish aid lagged so far behind the other Nordic countries. According to the report, economic aid was not sufficient as Finland's contribution; we had to be ready to take in refugees. The refugee quota had to be reconsidered if the refugee situation in the world at large led to an increase in the number of refugees offered to Finland. However, no working group was set up to follow trends in the refugee situation or to ponder the refugee quota.

In a speech dealing with the refugee question in 1982, the then Foreign Minister stated that the refugee quota would be reconsidered if the situation so demanded.[7] In autumn 1985, when the number of refugees in the world had held steady at over ten million for several years, and after pondering the matter for six years, Finland decided on a hundred person refugee quota.[8]

The progress made during this six-year maturation cannot be followed using public Ministry for Foreign Affairs documents. Rather, there are signs of inaction on the quota decision, for it was May 1986 before a working group was set up at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health to plan the organization of refugee services.[9] At the beginning of 1987 the Foreign Ministry working group mentioned earlier started to investigate the potential the various local authorities had for receiving refugees. This was designed to create a basis on which

the refugee quota could be raised.

According to the Council of State decision, the refugee quota is reconsidered every year. It has been raised annually, but the decision on the quota for each year is not taken until the year concerned.

Delays over the 1989 quota decision, together with other problems with coordination and information flow within the bureaucracy, resulted in a three-month delay in the reception of 50 refugees. The labour costs and the rent on empty housing during this delay were paid by the State.

Part of policy on immigration and foreign nationals?

The refugee question has been handled by several ministries in Finland. One sees to this, another to that. There is often insufficient personnel to devote the proper care to matters. Decision-making is slow, not only because of the many parties involved, but also because it cannot be built on a clear refugee policy plan.

The advisory committee on immigration affairs[10] recently submitted a report, though this concerns only immigrants and foreign nationals. The committee proposed that the Government should issue a statement on Finland's immigration and foreign national policy. If the Government follows this course, it would be only rational to comment on the refugee question at the same time. Mere clarification of the present procedures so as to fully utilize the available resources calls for consideration by committee. This should establish the principles, targets and practical implementation of Finland s refugee policy.

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Credibility and Human Rights

Peter Stenlund, General Secretary of the Swedish People's Party, chairman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs consultative committee on international human rights issues.

By convention, the government programme states that Finland pursues a policy of neutrality aimed at maintaining friendly relations *with all nations.* At first sight, this statement seems to provide a good basis for a foreign policy that will promote world peace and good relations.

It is, however, easy to take the opposite view. What does the maintenance of good relations with China mean when its leadership sends in the military to shoot down students and workers demonstrating for democracy in Tiananmen Square? How proud should we be of our good relations with the Bulgarian government, which does not even recognize the existence of the country's Turkish minority and is forcing these people to leave the country in numbers that at worst reach hundreds of thousands?

Or how should we react to the country the Bulgarian Turks are fleeing to, Turkey itself, which treats its Kurds in the same way and has a grim human rights record in general? And how about our good relations with Rumania, where the government deprived the nation, and especially its minorities, of both political and economic, social and cultural rights? If anyone asks for my personal opinion, I may well find it easy to give a reply. But it is not so easy for the foreign policy leadership to provide an answer. It must strive to employ the same yardstick in its assessment of international events, whether they take place near or far, in East or West.

Foreign policy observers tend to get the idea that the Government has opted for silence when a reaction is called for to international events that run counter to our moral convictions, which we feel are part of our Western cultural heritage. It is best to say nothing, and then nothing has been said.

The question is, how far is this approach valid? We are regularly told that foreign policy and morals do not go together. Does this claim provide any help and guidance in a Europe in which the human dimension is acknowledged as playing an important role in cooperation between the continent's states? Surely foreign policy can have a moral value without necessarily being overly moralistic.

Is there any sense in viewing morals and *realpolitik* as opposites? Would it not be justifiable to study every international problem from both points of view and to combine what we find into a tenable foreign policy? It would seem particularly feasible for small countries to act in this way. After all, it is in their interests to watch over morals and human rights in international relations.

Bloc thinking still survives

At the CSCE conference on the human dimension which came to an end in Paris in late June, 1989, I was a member of the Finnish delegation, and as I was also chairman of the committee on international human rights issues set up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1988 I got a good picture of the problems the Ministry has to face in deciding Finland's stance on human rights affairs.

The deliberations of the CSCE process have always been marked by the existence of political blocs. When the participating States reached agreement about the final document of the Vienna follow-up at the beginning of 1989, it was remarked that the progress made on human rights issues had finally given them a real value of their own, and that they were no longer mere tools in the debate between the major powers. There is certainly something in this, largely because of the new stance adopted by the Soviet Union and the other 'progressive' Socialist states, Hungary and Poland. Even so, bloc thinking overshadowed the debate on human rights at the first session on the human dimension in the three-meeting sequence.

When acute and topical issues were debated, bloc thinking held the upper hand in both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact camps. Nearly all the delegations chose not to criticize human rights offences that had taken place within their own grouping. The exception was Hungary, which criticized Rumania's treatment of its Hungarian minority, often in principle, but occasionally with specific reference to Rumania. The Soviet delegation expressed its objections to the fence that Rumania had erected on the Hungarian border at the Paris press conference, but not in the official negotiations. The Soviet Union did not defend Rumania's policy, but it did oppose a resolution which would have led to that country's total isolation.

The Western nations concentrated on praising developments in Hungary and Poland and expressing their satisfaction at the important reforms going on in the Soviet Union, but remembered to emphasize that the latter still had a long way to go before true democracy would be reached. The GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria came in for harsh criticism substantiated with concrete examples. Rumania was a category entirely of its own, because it stated its refusal to recognize the mechanism giving CSCE countries the right to intervene in each others' human rights affairs without this being interpreted as interference in

the country's internal affairs.

It should be noted that the NATO countries without exception closed their eyes to Turkey's human rights abuses, which according to Amnesty International reports included the oppression of the Kurdish minority, torture and numerous other offences. The inevitable final impression gained was that this blind spot weakened the credibility of the criticism of Bulgaria's policy on minorities, and the Bulgarian delegation did not fail to exploit this. Unofficially, it was admitted that bloc solidarity had to prevail in situations like this, and that skeletons in the home cupboard have to be cleared away out of sight of observers.

Finland shows restraint and sends signals

How should Finland act in this climate? The CSCE spirit urges us to discuss human rights problems, wherever they occur. What concrete offences should Finland raise without being accused of pursuing the interests of one bloc or the other? Is Rumania enough? Or should we also comment on the situation in Turkey and Bulgaria? And why stop there? Should we examine, for instance, how Canada treats its Inuits and Indians, compared with the Nordic countries' policy on the Lapps?

Sweden and Finland adopted different procedures. In his opening address the leader of the Swedish delegation, Jan Romare, criticized the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria severely, and did not forget Turkey. In the closing address Turkey was not mentioned.

Finland did not mention any country by name. On the other hand, it stressed that the Vienna document concerns every country in every respect. Nobody could fail to realize that this message was aimed at Rumania.

The oppression of national minorities was the most heatedly debated issue at the conference.

In its special theme address, the Finnish delegation gave an account of the equal status of the country's Finnish and Swedish speaking populations, including a Swedish-speaking education system from primary school to university. Lapp questions were also mentioned. The address was certainly considered a valuable contribution to the debate on, for instance, Rumania's Hungarians, but also other oppressed minorities.

In his closing address, ambassador Timo Koponen referred to the situation of national minorities and especially to situations in which human rights are infringed on a wide scale. He said that Finland has always expressed its concern about these infringements and intends to press for debate about the matter for as long as it called for attention. All in all, the actions of the Finnish delegation constituted a 'signalling system' which allowed for criticism of the current situation without the delegation's having either to name offenders or fail to name them.

Humanity combines morals and realpolitik

On an occasion such as this CSCE meeting, the procedure is a viable one and can be defended from the point of view of both morals and *realpolitik*. The conference provided the time and the place for the creation of a subtle signalling system in which the recipients of the signals were present.

The situation is more difficult when we are faced by acute events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre. Then, a line must be found that can also be used in other connections.

There is rarely justification for employing the whole range of possible reactions immediately. The crisis may well prove long term, and then the initial reactions demand a follow-up. Finland with reason avoids making protests which mean cutting diplomatic relations. A trade embargo is only effective if it is internationally coordinated, preferably by the UN. Development aid can rarely be used as a means of bringing political pressure to bear.

There is reason for restraint in employment of these measures. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand why Finland felt it was unable to add its voice to the joint Nordic appeal to the Chinese government on behalf of the students condemned to death. The Nordic countries are our most important constituent group, and we have every reason to strive to coordinate our action against human rights infringements with the rest of Scandinavia. We should not endanger Finland's image by holding back.

Finally, I should like to return to where I began. Why could we not revise the wording of the present Government programme to the effect that Finland strives for good relations *with all nations and peoples?* In this way we could express our view that a combination of morals and *realpolitik* is needed to create a foreign policy which also has a human dimension.

SURVEY

The European Economic Space and Parliament:

Report to Parliament by the Council of State Concerning Finland's Attitude Towards the Western European Integration Process

Mervi Porevuo, Student of Political Science

Finland faces one of the greatest foreign-policy challenges in its entire history: European integration. What role will the Finnish Parliament play in the formation of the EES, the goal of which is to ensure the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons in a large economic area including both the EC and EFTA? At what level will debate on relations with the EC proceed on the basis of the report which was submitted to Parliament by the Council of State in November 1989? Where and by whom will decisions be made?

The EES

On 1 January 1984, customs duties and quantitative restriction on imports of industrial goods were eliminated in trade between the EC and the EFTA countries, in accordance with free-trade agreements which had been concluded in the 1970s. That same year also marked the beginning of a new phase in relations at the organizational level. On 9 April 1988, the EC and EFTA issued the Luxembourg Declaration, which laid down the joint goal of creating a dynamic European economic operating environment.[1]

At the Milan Summit in 1985, the EC adopted a White Paper calling for the creation of an "internal market" by the end of 1992. What the Member States had in mind was an intense process of European economic integration, and the EFTA countries were afraid of being left outside this process when the EC redefined its attitude towards EFTA in accordance with the principles approved at the Interlaken conference, which gave top priority to the EC's internal integration, stipulated the necessity of complete autonomy in EC decision making and required that dealings with the EFTA countries be based on reciprocity.[2]

In the light of the Interlaken principles, it became obvious that the Luxembourg Declaration alone did not offer an adequate basis for cooperation. The EC is not interested in arrangements which would guarantee selective participation in the integration process. In order to keep the EFTA countries from applying for full membership in the EC, President Jacques Delors in January 1989 offered the EFTA countries an opportunity to go farther than the EES by opting for a "third path". The EC and EFTA would form a two-pillared system with a a common legal procedure and decision-making process. If the EFTA countries could not agree on a unified negotiating approach, the alternative would be for each country to make its own adjustments individually.[3]

The prime ministers of the EFTA countries responded positively to President Delors' initiative at the Oslo summit meeting in March 1989. The statement issued by this conference noted that the EFTA countries were prepared "to explore together with the EC ways and means to achieve a more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions" and declared that they would "take the necessary steps to strengthen EFTA's decision-making process and collective negotiating capacity".[4] After the Oslo summit the EC and the EFTA countries began talks at the official level regarding the content of the EES agreement.

Finland's foreign-policy decision-making system

According to Article 33 of Finland's Form of Government Act: "The relations of Finland with foreign powers shall be decided by the President, but treaties with foreign powers must be approved by the Parliament insofar as they contain provisions which pertain to legislation or which according to the Constitution otherwise require the consent of Parliament. Regarding war and peace the President shall decide with the consent of Parliament."

The making of Finland's foreign policy has traditionally been President-centred. The balance of power has favoured executive organs at the expense of parliamentary bodies. After the Second World War, the task of managing Finland's sensitive and sometimes turbulent relations with the Soviet Union reinforced the President's personal position as director of the nation's foreign policy. During the first term of President Mauno Koivisto, a shift took place from the hands-on style characteristic of the Kekkonen era to more institutionalized forms of administration. The prime minister, the minister for foreign affairs and the Council of State saw their own

positions strengthened in the handling of routine foreign-policy matters, although the President remained in charge of national foreign policy.[5]

Parliament's role in the handling of foreign policy concerns formal basic solutions which have not been entrusted to the President or Council of State but require parliamentary approval in accordance with the Finnish Constitution, such as declaring war, making peace and signing international agreements that include stipulations in conflict with Finnish law or directly necessitate the appropriation of state funds. In such instances parliamentary approval can be obtained beforehand, in connection with negotiations or after the fact. Parliament thus has considerable weight in theory. In practice, however, it has seldom stood up against the Council of State in foreign-policy matters, but has legitimized Government proposals almost without exception.

Although Finland's decision-making system in the sphere of foreign policy gives the President such a central role and in this way diverges from the parliamentary model, foreign policy is not conducted in a vacuum. The roots of a successful foreign policy lie in the domestic-policy environment created by the nation's political parties, whose most important forum is Parliament.

Reports to Parliament

According to Section 36 of the Parliament Act, the Council of State can submit communiqués or formal reports to Parliament on matters involving national administration or relations with other countries. Such formal reports are treated by Parliament in the same manner as interpellations (motions of censure), Parliament being able to return to its normal agenda with what amounts to a vote of confidence or no-confidence in the Government. Since 1969 the Council of State has also been able to submit less-formal papers to Parliament for discussion, allowing MPs to exercise their right to review and oversee the handling of foreign affairs and to exchange opinions openly.

In November 1988, the Council of State submitted such a paper to Parliament on the subject of European integration. This was followed by a formal report in November 1989. The 1988 paper defines Finland's goals and strategy with regard to Western European economic integration, while the 1989 report describes EES cooperation in practice, dealing with questions on which the content of any future agreement will be built.[8]

The EC - Finland's strategy and goals

The 1988 paper for the first time defined Finland's official stance towards European integration at the political level. It noted that Finland's activities in the integration process are based on EFTA. The Finnish Government's goal is to strengthen EFTA organizationally and to support cooperation within the EFTA framework. In the Council of State's opinion, negotiating in concert with the other EFTA countries offers the best way to avoid discrimination as the EC completes its internal market and can ensure Finland the optimum negotiating position. If EFTA cooperation proves impossible, the Council of State will strive to protect national interests together with the other Nordic countries. Direct bilateral contacts with the EC Member States are another option.[9]

The paper summarized Finland's basic stance on the integration process as follows:[10]

1. Finland's goal is the continued development of general European cooperation in a broad range of dealings between states and individuals in accordance with our established foreign-policy line.

2. We will strive to ensure economic and commercial interests of vital importance to our nation's welfare and our social development and to improve our competitive position by taking advantage of developments in international trade and in the fields of science and technology.

3. We will strive to see that international organizations adopt solutions aimed at avoiding discrimination, fighting protectionism and preventing distortions both globally and in Europe.

4. In our view membership in the EC cannot be harmonized with our policy of neutrality, nor will we strive for membership in the EC.

5. We will strive for the closest possible cooperation with the EC in order to ensure our interests in the process of Western European integration.

6. We will act in accordance with the Luxembourg Declaration approved by EFTA and the EC to create a European economic area consisting of 18 countries.

7. We will strive to strengthen EFTA and to achieve joint positions by the EFTA countries in as many questions as possible.

8. In order to ensure our interests we will also work together with the other Nordic countries or use direct negotiation channels. We will ensure the progress gained within the sphere of Nordic cooperation and strive to further develop it.

9. We will further develop cooperation among officials, the business community, labour-market organizations and other interest groups.

10. We will intensify information activities regarding European integration.

11. We will strengthen monitoring and preparation within the sphere of state administration in the manner required by the situation.

The paper stated that Finland's goals in the integration process include promoting trade in industrial goods by means of eliminating existing trade barriers and preventing the creation of new ones, deepening and expanding scientific and technological cooperation, and resolving differences between EFTA and the EC in areas of trade involving environmental protection. In removing technical trade barriers, atten-

tion should be paid to the impact on consumer protection as well as health and safety at work. Finnish banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions should be allowed to keep operating on a similar footing as in the past. Promoting the free movement of persons is important. The goal is to develop the exchange of students and trainees and to promote the equivalence of diplomas.[11]

Parliament gave the 1988 paper good marks - with minor reservations. Negative comments concerned what was perceived to be an excessive orientation towards the needs of the nation's administration and business community and the fact that this was the first chance Parliament had been given to discuss the effects on integration on Finland.

The EES agreement - material content

Official discussion concerning the material content of the EES agreement has outlined the regulations required to eliminate existing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons and to intensify cooperation in areas related to these four freedoms. Further regulations are also necessary with regard to collective decision making and administration as well as the procedure for resolving disputes between the EC and the EFTA countries. Foreign and security policy would remain outside the scope of the agreement, as would such economic sectors as energy, economic, industrial, regional and social policy - in the sense that no attempt would be made to formulate joint policies in these areas.[12]

The 1989 report added that a shift to fully harmonized rules is not realistic in every sphere of domestic markets. This applies to agricultural and fishing policy, for instance, as well as the elimination of frontier checks between the EC and the EFTA countries. During the course of negotiations, exceptions and transition periods will have to be worked out.[13]

The 1989 report in Parliament

The 1989 report occupied four plenary sessions of Parliament (on 29–30 November and 4–5 December) and gave rise to a total of 312 speeches.

General discussion tended to wander, mainly dealing with specific areas and details of the EES agreement. The matter of how Finland would fare if the EES agreement fails was given little consideration.

Parliament put the report to a vote on 5 December 1989. The Speaker moved that Parliament, having received the report, should return to the order of the day. MPs sought to make 25 amendments to this motion, but all of these were defeated.[14]

Two natural fronts were observed in the parliamentary debate: the government parties and the opposition. Discussion was relatively bland and predictable, being tightly bound to party politics. The EES agreement is Finland's biggest foreign-policy challenge, but Parliament appeared unable to get any grip on the matter. Debate consequently remained on a superficial level.

Developments since the 1989 report

On 13 March 1990 the Council of State submitted another paper to Parliament on "Finland and the Western European Economic Area", as it had promised to do during discussion of the 1989 report. Parliament sent this new paper to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which was charged with informing the Government of Parliament's position on the instructions to be drawn up for Finland's EES negotiators. The Foreign Affairs Committee submitted its own report regarding Finland and Western European integration on 5 June 1990.

"Finland and the Western European Economic Area", 13 March 1990

The report which the Foreign Affairs Committee submitted to Parliament in March 1990 is broader and more detailed than previous accounts. It stated that Finland's goal is the creation of a European Economic Space which will:

- achieve the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons on the basis of jointly determined EC directives, with justified exceptions based on fundamental national interests as well as transition-period arrangements being subject to negotiation, and with equal competition conditions being ensured;
- strengthen and broaden cooperation within the framework of the EC's activities in other areas such as research and development, the environment, education, working conditions and social security, consumer protection, programmes for small and medium-size enterprises, and tourism; and
- reduce economic and social differences of a regional nature.

Open questions

The Foreign Affairs Committee noted a number of questions which had been left open by the March 1990 paper, the most important being decision-making procedure within the EES and participation in this procedure. The EC and its Member States strongly emphasize the principle of autonomy in the EC's own decision-making process. The EC has stated that it will ask the EFTA countries for their opinions, but it will still make its own decisions. The EFTA countries in turn stress the need for joint decisions when it comes to preparing new EES rules. This would require participation in the working parties which operate under the European Council. This poses a problem for all the EFTA countries.

Another open question is which EC regulations should be used as the basis for the EES agreement.

According to the Council of State, the best way to achieve the EFTA countries' objectives is to adopt existing EC regulations, together with their established interpretation, as the basis for EES arrangements. Negotiators will have to resolve the question of exceptions and transition periods, however.

Economics

Finland is a Nordic welfare state with a high level of social security and social services. The process of European integration has included pressures to privatize parts of the public sector. Increasing competition in the public sector and the proposed harmonization of taxes could weaken state revenues and services. In the opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Finland should negotiate on the basis that it intends to continue developing as a Nordic welfare state, so as not to jeopardize existing benefits.

In 1989 the EC accounted for 44% of the total value of Finland's foreign trade in goods. Wood processing in turn makes up 60% of Finland's exports to the EC. In trade with the EC, Finland enjoys a relative advantage in this capital- and resource-intensive field. The nation's export industry and industrial output are becoming more one-sided. The Foreign Affairs Committee considers it extremely important to give thorough study to the effects of EES arrangements on the structure of the Finnish economy. In order to avoid problems, the Government must implement effective policies in the fields of industry, business and technology.

The Foreign Affairs Committee also emphasized that Finland must retain the ability to decide its own financial and tax policies and prevent social conditions from becoming impaired.

Trade policy

The EES negotiations have rested on the assumption that the free movement of goods will be achieved by expanding and deepening free-trade arrangements. Another assumption is that frontier checks will still be necessary between the EC and the EFTA countries. Finland's goal is the simplification and development of origin rules so that goods produced in the EFTA countries will not be subject to discrimination in the EC because of their source. Border formalities will be simplified by shifting to so-called paperless customs clearance.

There is no intention to include a common agricultural policy in the EES arrangement. Free trade will not cover agricultural products in the same way as industrial goods. Instead, trade will be promoted through separate arrangements, which can apply to specific products and vary from country to country.

With regard to the elimination of non-tariff trade barriers, the green light has been given to the EC's three fundamental principles: harmonization of essential safety requirements, reciprocal approval of national regulations in other areas and reciprocal acceptance of test findings. The EC would also like the EFTA countries to approve old directives in this field. The Foreign Affairs Committee stressed that this is only possible if requirements match or exceed those already on the books in Finland.

The standardization of competition rules will be an important part of the EES system, ensuring equal competitive conditions for companies in the EC and the EFTA countries. Devising concrete norms in accordance with EC competition rules will require the creation of an effective joint monitoring body. The Government and the Foreign Affairs Committee see no obstacles to extending international competition to state and municipal procurements. It is in Finland's interest to give the principle of free competition the broadest possible scope in public procurements as well as other areas.

Key negotiation questions

In the matter of foreign ownership, foreign investments are generally looked on favourably. The attitude with regard to real estate is marked by reservations, however. Finns want to keep ownership of land, forests, natural resources and basic energy in their own hands. A cautious approach has also been taken in the case of foreign ownership of holiday properties. The Foreign Affairs Committee insists that Finland should retain the possibility to monitor and limit foreigners' right to purchase real estate in Finland.

The criteria applied by the EC in its regional-policy measures are poorly suited to Finland; it is unlikely that any part of Finland would be eligible for support under EC programmes. The attention which Finland and the other Nordic countries characteristically give to sparsely populated areas requires different solutions in the field of infrastructure than those adopted by the EC. Subsidies for businesses operating in designated regions, tax benefits for investments and regional transport subsidies are key forms of regional-policy support in Finland. The Foreign Affairs Committee insists that Finland should not give up the right to practice its own regional policy taking into account the nation's special circumstances, i.e. cold climate, low population density and long distances.

Turning to the free movement of workers, the Foreign Affairs Committee expects the Government to ensure the preservation of the Finnish social security system in all its main features.

Other important negotiation questions include adequate transition periods in such fields as banking, insurance and transport, ensuring the competitiveness of small and medium-size enterprises, consumer protection and the environment.

Conclusion

In its report the Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that Parliament approve the paper submitted by the Council of State, provided that the Government during the course of the EES negotiations:

1) work to achieve an EES solution which takes Finland's significant viewpoints into consideration in a broad and balanced manner;

2) strive for the implementation of the principle of sustainable development throughout the EES;

3) work for an EES decision-making and preparatory system which will ensure the interests of the EFTA countries;

4) strive to have limitations and reservations which are necessary to ensure basic national interests included in the EES agreement, particularly so that:

a) Finnish authorities will retain the opportunity to monitor and limit foreign ownership of Finnish corporations and production plants as well as real estate,

b) Finnish social security and labour protection will remain at least on their current level and the necessary preconditions will be created for their development,

c) Finland will be guaranteed the right to maintain and develop national environmental legislation which is stricter than EC regulations,

d) Finland will be able to practice its own regional policy, developing activities which are important from the point of view of the nation's special circumstances;

5) keep Parliament's special committees up to date on the progress and content of negotiations and ensure Parliament the proper say and role in different stages of negotiations.

The report of the Foreign Affairs Committee was approved by Parliament on 13 June 1990.

Stalin and the Winter War

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I. The debate Soviet policy in 1939

The immediate origins of the Winter War are to be sought in the Soviet-German Pact of 23 August 1939. The secret additional protocol stated that 'in the case of a territorial-political transformation in the area of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the northern frontier of Lithuania will form at the same time the boundary of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR...' It was this clause which enabled the Soviet government to demand mutual assistance pacts from the Baltic states with confidence that they must be accepted at the end of September and beginning of October. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania accepted agreements which included rights for Soviet naval and military facilities on their territories. Comparable demands were made to Finland at the beginning of October. Yet in spite of three visits to Moscow between 10 October and 13 November by the Finnish delegation led by J. K. Paasikivi, veteran of the Tartu negotiations of 1920, agreement was not reached. Paasikivi left Moscow on 13 November. On 30 November at 8.30 a.m. after a half-hour artillery bombardment, the Red Army crossed the frontier in force. This was followed on 1 December by the announcement of Kuusinen's government and its treaty with the Soviet Union.

For forty years Soviet historians have considered the secret additional protocol to the Soviet German pact a falsification. But even before the report of the commission of the Congress of People's Deputies on this matter, it is clear that this year it has been accepted in the Soviet Union at the highest level that even if the original cannot be found and only a microfilm copy survives, there was indeed agreement on spheres of influence in Poland and the Baltic in August 1939 which included Finland in the Soviet sphere. The historian, V. Sipols who has written extensively in the past rejecting the secret articles as falsifications, still in May 1989 reminded us that: 'At the level of the Soviet leadership it is considered impossible to recognise the validity of the copies of the protocol which are current in the west'. But in an article based for the first time on evidence of Soviet relations with Germany in 1939 from the archives of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Sipols shows that while the initiative for recognising their mutual interests 'from the Baltic to the Black Sea' came from the German side, it was Molotov on 17 August who insisted that these matters should be included in a secret additional protocol.[1]

The prominent historian A. O. Chubaryan goes further than Sipols rather grudging and laconic admissions. The Soviet-German Pact was 'a forced step'. There was an agreement on spheres of interest to 'set limits to the possible advance of German forces' and 'thus prevent the encroachment of the German armies into the western Ukraine, western Byelorussia, to the Baltic states and Bessarabia and limit the German penetration of Finland'. But Chubaryan sees in this not simply the desire to protect Soviet security but more far-reaching ambitions of the Stalinist leadership: on the Soviet-German agreement and 'in particular on its accompanying documents and the following development of events lies the imprint of that deviation from moral principles which was peculiar to Stalinism... Stalin felt there was a chance not only to draw the Soviet Union out of isolation, but also to seize the initiative and put the USSR in the ranks of powers, determining the fate of other countries and world policy as a whole'.[2]

In August, Politburo member A. N. Yakovlev, chairman of the investigating comission, gave a more official stamp to these views and stated that 'although the original of the protocol has not been discovered, of its existence in the light of the documents available, there can be no doubts'. According to Yakovlev there is no Soviet account of the discussions on 23 August between Stalin, Molotov and Ribbentrop. He tells us for the first time that only Stalin and Molotov knew of the protocol and it was never discussed in the Politburo nor in the Council of People's Comissars. It was, Yakovlev considers, 'a deal' by Stalin and Molotov. And 'the great-power claim for 'territorial political reorganisation' in the region, however you interpret it, is from a juridical point of view in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of a whole group of countries...' This is a more frank recognition than we have had so far from Soviet historians who tried to explain away the secret articles or absolve the Soviet leadership of responsibility.[3]

A first requirement in understanding Stalin's policy towards Finland at the end of 1939 is to understand why he made the agreement with Germany with its secret clauses in August. The western powers had not found an answer to Italian, German and Japanese aggression. Appeasement encouraged it. The failure to impose sanctions over Ethiopia, the acceptance of the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, of German and Italian intervention in Spain, of the annexation of Austria in March 1938 and finally the appeasement of Hitler over Czechoslovakia's German speaking Sudetenland in September-October 1938, all contributed to the Soviet view that the western powers preferred an agreement with Hitler

rather than with the Soviet Union and that 'collective security' could not be effective enough to deter Hitler. Stalin warned in early March 1939 before Hitler marched into Prague, that the Soviet Union would 'not take the chestnuts out of the fire' for other powers, as Hitler's pressure on Poland mounted. The British rejection of Soviet proposals in March and April 1939 for effective co-operation against Hitler and Chamberlain's separate British guarantee of Poland on 31 March contributed to further suspicion of British policy. As a recent study of Britain and Poland in 1939 has concluded, even the guarantee was 'a political bluff devoid of strategic consequence'.[4] The appointment of Molotov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs on 3 May 1939 in place of Litvinov the eloquent spokesman for collective security, was a clear sign that Soviet options were open.

The Soviet agreement with Germany did not just bring the Soviets a breathing space. It also brought them strategic and political benefits which were not on offer from the western powers. The political negotiations with Britain and France had come to a halt over the definition of 'indirect aggression'. The Baltic states and Finland had been unwilling to accept unilateral guarantees by the powers. The western powers were reluctant to accept the Soviet claim to a right of intervention in the event of any political changes in those states which might be construed as a threat to the Soviet Union. It was thus not simply British and French appeasement mentality which prevented agreement with the Soviet Union but concrete issues and the Soviet leaders' assessments of the merits of the choice of courses open to them after the British guarantee of Poland when both Germany and the western powers were seeking its support.

As for the discussion of the Winter War, views countering the official orthodoxy have emerged recently in the Soviet Union. In his dissident Marxist history of Stalinism, *Let History Judge* (1972) even Roy Medvedev does not refer to the secret articles of the pact with their references to Finland and the Baltic states, so the background to the war is not explored. He does however condemn Stalin's 'mistake' of the war with Finland tacitly accepting that it was the Soviet responsibility. And he has recently been able to publicly condemn it as 'the only aggressive war fought by the Soviet Union'. In a recent discussion in *Moskovskiye Novosti,* Valentin Falin, head of the international department of the Central Committee, continued to take a hard line. Referring to Soviet–Finnish relations in 1939–40 and the Winter War he said: 'It is well-known that official Helsinki in its contacts with Nazi Germany and militarist Japan conducted a line for the establishment of a Greater Finland, sought partners for unleashing war against the Soviet Union simultaneously in the Far East and Europe'. His colleague Mikhail Semiryaga however took a less defensive position and in striking contrast to previous Soviet statements on the matter, said: 'I think that we must all the same recognise that in spite of serious conflicts existing at that time between Moscow and Helsinki, nevertheless it cannot be excluded that there could have been a political method of solving the problem. But this course was not used. In my view it was also unwise for us to declare the so-called Democratic Finnish republic with Kuusinen at its head.

Recent discussion in the Soviet Union has focused on the origins of the world war and the significance of the Soviet–German Pact. Closer analysis of Soviet policy towards Finland and the Baltic states has not yet figured much in the discussion. As a correspondent in the June 1989 issue of *Voprosy Istorii* complained: 'even in recent publications on the history of Soviet–Finnish relations there can clearly be seen a tendency to simply up-date the old interpretation and adapt it to new conditions. It is not enough to accept that the establishment of the Terijoki government did not get support from the Finnish people, the question should rather be of a crude diplomatic step and a big foreign policy error by Stalin'.

II. Soviet Union and Finland in the 1920s

The Soviet Union attacked Finland in November 1939. But the attitudes and perceptions necessary for this to follow so shortly after the breakdown of negotiations had been shaped much earlier in connection with the emergence of the Nazi threat.[5] As early as June 1935 the Soviet minister, Erik Assmus had warned prime minister Kivimäki that if there were war between Germany and the Soviet Union, it would involve Finland; and the Red Army would not wait on the frontier at Rajajoki only 20 miles from Leningrad, but would occupy Finland within a week.[6] At the end of 1936, A. A. Zhdanov, in a speech at the eighth Congress of Soviets in Moscow on 29 November warned of the possibility of military conflict with Finland.[7]

The Soviet threats of 1935–36 were crude and aggressive on the part of a great power against a small one. But they should be seen in the context of the Soviet Union's international situation: the failure of non-intervention in Spain was seen as a serious threat, the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936 threatened the possibility of a two-front conflict. Relations with Finland specifically were at a low point. Litvinov in conversation with foreign ministry Holsti commented that Finland seemed to orientate itself towards Germany in international politics even after the emergance of Hitler to power, in spite of its declaration of a neutral Scandinavian stance.[8] Zhdanov's 1936 warning should not be seen as an irrevocable Soviet commitment to solve problems with Finland in future by war, nor as the only strain in Soviet foreign policy. But it was a reminder that Finland's foreign policy orientation was not a matter of indifference to the Soviet Union in the context of the virulently anti-

Soviet regime in Germany. One of the pre-requisites for the decision of 1939 was lack of conviction that the Finns would defend themselves against Germany or that they would be invulnerable to a pro-German coup. And there was a comparable apprehension that Britain and France might encourage Finland in an adventure against the Soviet Union.

III. The military option

Already in February 1937 Litvinov frankly admitted to Holsti that they were 'taking all measures of precaution on the Finnish frontier'. At the end of 1938 efforts were being made to improve the defences of Leningrad and specifically the communications from the Murmansk railway towards the Finnish fronter under the newly appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District, K. A. Meretskov. This, significantly perhaps, follows the failure of the Yartsev feelers in 1938.

But only after the failure of the Shtein mission in April 1939 was Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff and former commander of the Leningrad military district, ordered to prepare plans for the event of a military clash with Finland. He made wide-ranging proposals emphasising that significant exertions of the whole Red Army would be required in such a conflict. He considered that it was 'far from a simple matter and expected that it would, require not less than several months of intense and difficult war, even in the event that the great imperialist powers did not intervene directly in the conflict'.

To avoid this, speed was essential: 'the corresponding military action should be carried out and completed in a very short time' in order not to give the opportunity for intervention. This plan for a campaign against Finland alone, not apparently in the context of a war with the imperialist powers, but pre-empting possible action, was a result of the failure to reach agreement. It showed the strength of commitment of the Soviet leadership to improvement of their strategic position on the north-west frontier. This was preparation for a different kind of war from that which Stalin purported to fear in the autumn negotiations, that is one in which Finland would be used by Germany. At the end of June 1939 at a meeting of the Chief Military Council chaired by Voroshilov, Shaposhnikov's views and plans were rejected as they were said to underestimate the strength of the Red Army.[9]

Meretskov was ordered to prepare within 2 or 3 weeks plans for a 'counter attack' against Finland making use of the resources of the Leningrad Military District alone. These were approved at a further meeting of the Chief Military Council at the end of July. Meretskov was advised to complete the campaign in the shortest possible time. His objections, like those of Shaposhnikov, that 'a few weeks for an operation on such a scale were not enough' were brushed aside: the campaign was to last three weeks and he, like Shaposhnikov, was told 'it was necessary to take into consideration the strength of the Soviet Union as a whole'.[10] These were evidently only contingency plans in the summer of 1939, when the outcome of the negotiations with the western powers (and with Germany remained) uncertain and by no means only in the control of Soviet policymakers. But what is significant is that these plans needed to be made in the summer of 1939, rather than having been already prepared earlier when the Finnish official stance was more hostile to the Soviet Union. And it is noteworthy that these plans were pre-emptive, they envisaged action before any intervention of the 'imperialist' powers in Finland. And they evidently were plans (as Meretskov wrote 'on such a scale') not for a limited rebuff to a possible Finnish provocation, but for the conquest of Finland. So, while the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact seemed to create for the Soviet Union more favourable circumstances for successful negotiations with Finland, when they failed, serious thought and planning had already been given to an alternative in the form of a military campaign. The attraction of a military campaign against Finland was not only that it could solve a serious strategic problem, but also that the political leadership thought it would be easy.

Amongst the objectives of Soviet policy as Molotov replaced Litvinov was evidently the determination to settle matters with Finland if suitable circumstances and excuse should occur and, if necessary, to be prepared for the use of military force.

But even though a plan of campaign had already been ordered to be prepared many months before, and even though the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact allowed the Soviet Union to deal with Finland without fear of German reaction by the autumn, Stalin evidently preferred a peaceful solution if the major substance of his demands could be achieved. He was present at almost all the meetings with Paasikivi and his delegation and he personally intervened in the negotiations even after Molotov had announced on 3 November 'the matter will have to be handed over to the military'. Stalin made further concessions on the Soviet point of view in an attempt to reach a settlement. Paasikivi judged that it might have been possible to reach agreement if they could have offered Hästö-Busö (off the Hanko peninsula) and the former Ino fortifications opposite Kronstadt. But why did Stalin seek a peaceful settlement? If he had already decided that the military should be brought in if there was not a satisfactory solution and that the campaign would not be strenuous, then it was evident that the earlier this was done the better, as winter was on the way. And why if ideological conviction persuaded him that a 'Peoples government' in the train of the liberating Red Army was an unbeatable combination, why did he still hesitate when every day made a campaign more difficult?

A campaign against Finland was expected to be easy and some talked simply of a 'victory march', yet there

were also more sober judgements evidently. Stalin knew there had been argument about the difficulty of the campaign in the Military Council. Shaposhnikov, Meretskov and Voronov had all warned that the campaign should be taken seriously. It was evidently expected to be a campaign and not a walkover at the highest military level. The forces of the Leningrad Military District alone still made a formidable force on paper particularly further north. And the campaign, quick as it might be, was still expected to bring significant casualties. From the very beginning of the war the hospitals of Leningrad were cleared for casualties and in some provincial towns even schools were cleared in preparation. And the Leningrad blackout showed that somebody in authority took the possibility of significant opposition from Finland seriously.[11] While Mekhlis as head of the Red Army's Political Directorate undoubtedly encouraged the view that the war would be a walkover, his views should not be taken as simply as reflecting the outlook on the matter in November 1939 of Stalin and whichever other members of his entourage took part in the decision to go to war.

IV. The Kuusinen government

Stalin's distinctive ideological outlook and the prospect of creating a 'socialist encirclement' through 'liberation' determined the form which the war against Finland took. The Kuusinen government was a vitally important part of the equation. Stalin thought that having removed the counter weight of Germany in the eastern Baltic by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, it would be possible to cajole the Finns into agreement for a base and territorial concessions, if not a mutual assistance pact. Military action and the Kuusinen government option, for whatever reasons, do not seem to have been his preferred, or perhaps even expected choice in the situation he had helped to create from August. Though of course they did not suddenly spring from nowhere when the negotiations failed.

O.W. Kuusinen, one of the secretaries of the Comintern Executive, was already involved in Soviet policy discussions about Finland in July 1939 and Stalin had such confidence in him that he advised Meretskov to consult him about Finnish affairs. Some commentators have given Kuusinen an independent role in the formation of the People's Government, and claimed that its aim was only to mediate peace. This does not at all conform to our knowledge of Kuusinen's position and to the power relationships in the Soviet elite in 1939. Others have suggested that Kuusinen misled Stalin about the possibilities for revolution in Finland. Osmo Jussila has shown from Kuusinen's writings at the time that he had a fairly realistic picture of the internal political situation in Finland which hardly provided a basis for revolutionary hopes.

Nevertheless already no later than 13 November preparations were begun to make use of emigre Finnish communists and others to form an alternative government. The service records of soldiers in Kuusinen's 'army' show that most began their service already about 17th or 18th November, before the outbreak of war on 30 November.[12] The government would, it was presumably hoped, be attractive enough to discourage the Finns from seriously struggling against such implacable odds. But it was a fateful decision with which Soviet historians have not yet come to terms and which undermined the frequent assurances about Finnish independence.

The programme of the Kuusinen government shows that it was not (at least yet) intended to incorporate Finland in the Soviet Union. But it also reveals a distinctive Soviet view on the conception of 'independence'. Combined with the Soviet political leadership's conviction that 'bourgeois' Finland would not be able to put up much resistance and would collapse within a fortnight, the organisation of the Kuusinen government and its army convincingly show that the revolutionary-aggressive strain had come to dominate over the pragmatic – defensive in Soviet foreign policy in relation to its small neighbours.

Stalin had not dissociated himself from the revolutionary theme in Soviet foreign policy. Socialist revolutions were necessary in order to guarantee the security of the first revolution. As Osmo Jussila has shown the Kuusinen government arose from the revolutionary ideological outlook of Stalin and was taking up a tactic used on previous occasions in Poland in 1920, in the Transcaucasus and in Mongolia. In Max Jakobson's conception, it was a suit taken off-the-peg and not made to measure for Finland in 1939.[13]

But it would be wrong to make too simplistic a connection as if it was simply a reversion to a policy aim long held and which represented 'real' Stalinist foreign policy. That the revolutionary theme was revived at that particular time was a result not simply of Stalin's commitment to it as a solution to Soviet security problems, but of the outcome of the struggle for different emphases in Soviet foreign policy internally and, in particular, of the closing of other seemingly feasible avenues of action by developments beyond Soviet control. The persistence with which Stalin pursued the negotiations with Finland in 1939 showed that for long he preferred an alternative to the revolutionary theme, which would be the inevitable accompaniment of war. The views of influential figures in Finland, Mannerheim, Paasikivi and Tanner, in favour of a fuller acceptance of Soviet security claims, emphasized that in hoping for agreement Stalin was not unrealistic, nor was he attempting simply to create an opportunity for intervention in a revolutionary style. Once the decision to go to war had been made, however, the Kuusinen government flowed naturally from it. It was the task of the Red Army to liberate foreign nations from their oppressors and such liberation missions had a history in Russia's foreign

relations going back into the pre-revolutionary past.

How did the decision come to be taken? It has frequently been concluded that it was the result of the influence of A. A. Zhdanov, who had been Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet since 1936 and an active critic of Litvinov.

No definite evidence however links him exclusively with the Kuusinen government idea. Yakovlev tells us that only Stalin and Molotov were involved in the discussions about the secret articles of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. And it was Molotov who told the Finnish Charge d'Affaires in August 1939 to take note of the Czechoslovak case, the implication being that it was only Stalin's. Kuusinen was closer to Stalin than to Zhdanov. He hardly ever left Moscow and there was no special trust between him and Zhdanov. There had even been tension over the purging of Finnish Communist leaders in the Karelo-Finnish ASSR in 1937–38. Even if the detail of Aino Kuusinen's tale of December 1935 may be treated with caution, the central idea that communists would only come to power with the success of the Red Army coincided with Stalinist views. That Kuusinen had the special confidence of Stalin in discussion of Soviet policy towards Finland was shown by Stalin's consultation with him before the Military Council meeting in June 1939 and in particular by his advice to Meretskov to consult him directly on Finnish affairs, and not Zhdanov. Khrushchev's reminiscences also confirm Kuusinen's close involvement with Molotov and Stalin on the eve of the war.[14]

The letter from Kuusinen to Tuominen of 13 November and the subsequent preparations for the Peoples Army show that the decision for a military solution had already been made. Molotov was ready to inform the Finns already on 3 November that as the civilian authorities had not reached agreement, then 'the matter must be handed over to the military'. This suggests that the strategy of what to do if a satisfactory settlement could not be reached had already been agreed. They evidently did not intend to let the matter drop even though Erkko in Helsinki was inclined to think that they had. The fact that the Kuusinen government appeared publicly already on the second day of the war and was recognised already by the Soviet government, shows clearly that already by the time operations were initiated the Soviet leadership had committed itself to a total 'territorial-political transformation' in Finland. No room was left for the possibility that military pressure might persuade the Finnish government to be more conciliatory. The Soviet refusal to recognise any more the legitimate government of Finland, left no such alternative to the Finns. A limited military campaign followed by annexations of the territories demanded, was a theoretical alternative for the Soviets. Certainly this would only mean 'revolution' in part of the country. But this is what happened in Eastern Poland in 1939 and Bessarabia in 1940. It was not beyond the ingenuity of Soviet propagandists to provide a suitable justification for the relevant Finnish areas adjacent to the Soviet frontiers.

What distinguished the Finnish case was that the negotiations of the autumn had shown that Finland was a more stubborn opponent to Soviet demand than had been expected after the Soviet-German pacts; it would be dangerous therefore to be simply satisfied with the 'modest' frontier changes called for and yet leave an unreliable Finnish in place. In particular, the international situation was favourable for a bold settlement of the issue and the opportunity might not recur in the fast changing scene. Finally such a territorial solution would not include the Hango peninsula on which the Soviet negotiators and (apparently) the Soviet military and naval authorities had put so much emphasis.

We can be sure that the Mainila incident of 26 November was fabricated on the Soviet side and at the highest level. In Vihavainen's view an incident was necessary to justify denunciation of the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Pact and a first strike against Finland which would enable the Kuusinen government to establish itself within Finnish territory. The decision to prepare for the war and for the Kuusinen government had certainly been made by 13 November. But much remains obscure in the Soviet leadership's perception of the Finnish situation in this period. For this writer there remains some doubt as to whether some residual hope was not retained in the Soviet leadership after 13 November that they could bully the Finnish government into more substantial concessions even as their plans for more drastic action came to fruition. While there already had been a build up of military forces on the frontier during the period of negotiations, Meretskov complained that it was only after Mainila that they were given an inadquate four days to prepare. But certainly little time was given for a favourable reaction to emerge after Mainila and the events of 30 November–1 December showed that the road to a solution negotiated with the legitimate Finnish government was closed.[15]

Footnotes

1. *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn',* May 1988 128–41.
2. *Izvestiya,* 1 July 1989.
3. *Pravda,* 18 Aug. 1989, pp. 1–2.
4. Anita Prazmowska, *Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front,* (Chambridge, 1987), p. 105.
5. For fuller references on Soviet policy and the background to the Winter War see my article 'The Soviet Decision for War against Finland . . ', *Soviet Studies,* 38, 1986, pp. 207–226. Also see the comments by Timo Vihavainen in ibid., 39, 1987, pp. 314–7.
6. Kivimäki memoirs, as quoted in Keijo Korhonen, *Suomi neuvostodiplomatiassa Tartosta talvisotaan,* vol. 2, (Helsinki, 1971), p. 214.
7. *Pravda,* 1 December 1936. Korhonen comments: 'the Winter War began with Zhdanov's speech

of 29 November 1936. Korhonen, op. cit., II, pp. 135–6, 141.

8. *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR,* vol. 17, nos. 84, 265; vol. 18, nos. 371, 397, 412, 428,460; vol. 19, nos. 43, 60, 132, 300, 397.

9. A. M. Vasilievsky, *Delo vsei Zhizni,* (Moskow, 1973, pp. 100–2; K. A. Meretskov, *Na sluzhbe narodu: stranitsy vospominaniya,* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 177–82; P. N. Pospelov, *Velikaya otechestvennaya voina sovetskogo soyuza. Kratkaya istoriya,* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 46–7.

10. Meretskov, p. cit., pp. 177–8.

11. N. N. Voronov, *Na sluzhbe voennoi* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 114, 116–7, 125, 132–6; Meretskov, op.cit., pp. 181–2; A. F. Chew, *The White Death,* (Michigan, 1971), p. 256 quoting a captured report of Meretskov; V. Zenzinov, *Vstrecha s Rossiei,* (New York, 1945) pp. 128–9, 157.

12. Meretskov, op.cit., pp. 178–9; Markku Salomaa, 'Terijoen hallituksen mysteeri', *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja,* 1985, pp. 30–38 and Jussila reply ibid., pp. 120–7. Osmo Jussila, *Terijoen Hallitus,* pp. 55–8; Ohto Manninen, 'Kuusisen armeijasta', *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja,* 1985, pp. 121–2.

13. Stalin speech 'On the Social-Democratic deviation in our party', as quoted in R. C. Tucker, 'The emergence of Stalin's foreign policy', *Slavic Review,* vol. 36, 1977, p. 571; Jussila, *Terijoen Hallitus,* passim.

14. Aino Kuusinen, *Before and after Stalin,* (London, 1974), pp. 115–9; Meretskov, op. cit., pp. 178–9; E. Crankshaw (ed.), *Khrushchev Remembers,* (London, 1977), pp. 177–8.

15. Spring, op. cit., pp. 218–222; Vihavainen, op. cit, and Vihavainen, 'Neuvostolehdistö ja 'Suomen kriisi' talvella 1939–40', *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja,* 1984, no. 1, pp. 38–41.

Guilty or Innocent?

Approaches to the Winter War in research and memoirs

Martti Turtola, Doctor of Political Science

Despite its ostensible lack of complication, the Winter War has become a bone of contention in Finnish history, ideology and politics. This is aptly reflected in the fact that the war has failed to inspire any world class novels of consequence; the Winter War has no *Unknown Soldier,* and is unlikely to ever see one written. The war has, however, inspired one lyrical masterpiece: Yrjö Jylhä's epic poem enititled *Kiirastuli* (Purgatory).

The actual military configuration was decidedly simple: in the foreign press it was frequently compared to the biblical clash between David and Goliath and the seemingly hopeless opposition put up by the ancient Greeks in the Persian Wars. In the Western mentality the Winter War represented a struggle between 'good' an 'evil', with Finland the Western democracy up against Stalinist Russia, ally of Nazi Germany.

Conversely, the causes of the war, long-term political trends during the '30s and the territorial negotiations of autumn '39, have been given complex, conflicting readings over the decades. There are about as many interpretations as there are interpreters. To some extent, the same can be said of the armistice; whether Finland stood to gain from appealing for the aid of the Western Allies in March 1940 is unresolved.

The Terijoki puppet government is a complicated issue in itself. Was it really Stalin's last-minute improvisation, or was the whole thing a carefully orchestrated plot to sovietize Finland?

With few exceptions, war histories chiefly illustrate how attacks are bravely warded off by the defence forces. Critical approaches have therefore been lacking in war histories.

The causes of the Winter War

Not long after the war, Max Jakobson produced a brilliant work still held in high esteem today, as it is likely to be in the future. *Diplomaattien talvisota,* published in 1955, (English translation *The Diplomacy of the Winter War,* 1961) has become a classic. In spite of the fact that reference material was in scant supply at the time – original sources were naturally unavailable only fifteen years after the war – the work has retained its standing as a seminal analysis of the lead-up to the war and wartime diplomacy. The text is propped by Jakobson's impeccable style and thorough knowledge of international diplomacy.

Also in the 1950s, three prominent, albeit very dissimilar, works were published in the form of memoirs, with all three providing very different accounts of the outbreak of war and the armistice. Typified by a decidedly critical, analytic approach, a book of memoirs entitled *Vinterkriget ur min synvinkel* (My version of the Winter War) was published in 1949, based on the journals of General Harald Öhquist, commander of the second army corps during the Winter War. The book understandably focuses on military operations.

In 1950–51 two books of memoirs containing highly contrary interpretations were published: Väinö Tanner's *Olin ulkoministerinä talvisodan aikana* (I was foreign minister during the Winter War) and Juho Niukkanen's *Talvisodan puolustusministeri kertoo* (The Winter War as the minister of defence saw it). A year later the posthumous memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, *Minnen 1 and 2,* (English translation: *The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, 1953)* came to public notice under a cloud of controversy. The section dealing with the Second World War was written by one of Mannerheim's closest officers, infantry general Erik Heinrichs.

The most recent in this sequence of consequential war memoirs were published posthumously in 1958: J. K. Paasikivi's *Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–41* (My role in Moscow and Finland in 1939–41). Collectively, these works shaped the opinions the Finns came to hold about the Winter War. In terms of style, they represent the very best in Finnish political memoirs, as the subjective interpretations of four influential personae.

Academic analyses, theses and other essays on the causes of the Winter War were considerably longer in the making.

'Renaissance' of the Winter War

The late '70s and, even more so, the early '80, reawakened interest for research into the history of the Winter War.

It would not be unqualified to claim that almost all literature and research dealing with the causes of the Winter War ultimately boils down to the issue of whether Finland bears the burden of war guilt. A second issue frequently taken up for discussion is whether everything possible was done for Finland's defence before the outbreak of the war, and if not, who was responsible for this neglect?

Over the past 40 years a clear trend has become evident in how these issues are approached. Mannerheim's memoirs engendered the notion that the political leaders neg-

lected Finland's defence during the '30s, and are therefore to be held culpable for the resulting military losses.

This political burden has been onerous. It was not until the '80s that it began to diminish, and only now, spurred on by recent developments, can Finland discard it altogether. If Mannerheim anchored the burden of guilt on the unprepared politicians, Paasikivi did the same in his memoirs. His understanding of the Winter War as 'Erkko's war' is supported by Aaro Pakaslahti, head of the department of political affairs during the Winter War, in *Talvisodan poliittinen näytelmä. UM:n poliittisen osaston päällikön päiviä ja öitä,* 1970 (The political drama of the Winter War. The days and nights of the head of the Foreign Ministry's department of political affairs).

Paasikivi's criticisms, as to some extent Väinö Tanner's, are chiefly levelled at the decisions made by the leaders of foreign policy during the territorial negotiations of autumn '39. However, neither author denounces Finnish foreign policy on the whole during that decade. After all, both Tanner and Paasikivi played key roles in consolidating Finland's 'Nordic' foreign policy: Paasikivi based in Stockholm as a diplomat and Tanner based in Helsinki enjoying the support of his Nordic colleagues abroad.

Juhani Suomi added fuel to the fire by admonishing the leaders of foreign policy in his study, *Talvisodan tausta* (The background to the Winter War). In Suomi's opinion, Finland's political leaders failed to make use of the 'thaw' which had developed between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1937.

Suomi's study gained political tenability after receiving recognition from Urho Kekkonen, who used it as reference for his speech at the 25th anniversary celebration of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Fiendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in the spring of 1973.

The armistice debate

If the outbreak of the war has been a source of literary debate, then so has the armistice. The aforementioned polemic memoirs of Juho Niukkanen stimulated a protracted debate on the question of whether Finland should have stayed in the war with the support of the Western Allies in March 1940.

Väinö Tanner, the Foreign Minister during the Winter War, adopted a straightforward approach to this issue: laying down arms was Finland's paramount priority. In a biography of Mannerheim entitled *Mannerheimgestalten* (Finnish translation *Mannerheim Suomen kohtaloissa I ja II,* 1957–59, Mannerheim and the fate of Finland I and II) Erik Heinrichs also takes a strong stand on the issue.

In *Apu jota ei pyydetty. Liittoutuneet ja Suomen talvisota 1939–1940,* 1972 (English translation: *The appeal that was never made,* 1976) Jukka Nevakivi is critical in his assessment of whether the Western Allies could really have changed Finland's fate. Martti Häikiö does not attempt to refute Nevakivi in his thesis *Maaliskuusta maaliskuuhun. Suomi Englannin politiikassa 1939–40,* 1976 (From March to March. Finland in British foreign policy 1939–40).

There has also been contention around the issue of the Terijoki government. Applying comparative methodology, Osmo Jussila's *Terijoen hallitus 1939–40,* 1985 (The Terijoki Government 1939–40) proposes that puppet governments were a routine Bolshevik strategy and no spur-of-the-moment improvisation.

Other notable studies on the Winter War or related topics include Martti Julkunen's *Talvisodan kuva. Ulkomaisten sotakirjeenvaihtajien kuvaukset Suomessa 1939–40* (The Winter War in the media. Portrayals of Finland by foreign war correspondents 1939–40) published in 1975, Silvo Hietanen's social history *Siirtoväen pika-asutuslaki 1940,* 1982 (Legislation on the resettlement of evacuees 1940) and Ilkka Seppinen's *Suomen ulkomaankaupan ehdot* 1939–1944, 1983 (Restrictions on foreign trade in Finland 1939–1944).

Unanticipated boom

Autumn 1989 and winter 1990 marked a reawakening of keen interest in the Winter War on its 50th anniversary. There are many reasons for this, attributable to trends both inside and outside Finland. The single most tangible reason is Finland's new relationship with the Soviet Union. Open discussion about the Winter War and its causes would have been impossible were it not for *glasnost,* the new policy of openness instituted in the Soviet Union over the past few years. Given the astounding pace at which changes are taking place in the Soviet Union, and with the Baltic nations approaching a day of reckoning, Estonia being the prime case in point, the Finns have been motivated to reappraise their own situation.

Moreover, the socio-political climate in Finland and the changes witnessed over the past decade from 'Kekkonen to Koivisto' have accommodated unprecedented historical reappraisals. This is also attributable to the advantages of a long-term temporal perspective.

Added to the fact that many veterans of the Winter War are still alive today, the above factors have given rise to a sociopolitical climate that has inspired a new wave of discussion about the war. Moreover, public debate has tended to perpetuate itself. Discussion has been fuelled by Pekka Parikka's film version of Antti Tuuri's novel about the Winter War. The film is a poignant study of human endurance and the mindlessness of war. The film is also therapeutic as a tribute to the fallen and to those who survived the war.

Research papers and other books about the war published in autumn 1989 largely approach the same issues as earlier works, namely whether or not Finland bears the burden of war guilt and the degree to which Finland was or war not prepared for the war.

The 50th anniversary of the Win-

ter War in 1989 inspired a veritable boom in war literature. However, few research papers or comparable works worthy of serious attention were published.

New approaches

Kun kansa kokosi itsensä, Suomalaisten talvisota (When the nation drew together, the Finns' Winter War) by Lauri Haataja, is not an academic study in the orthodox sense. Unfettered by conventional codes of reference, Haataja has free hands to introduce bold and pioneering interpretations. He examines the Winter War as a collective experience; the real war as the Finns saw it.

Haataja reassesses the causes of the war and the question of war guilt. On this point he supports researchers who have sought to interpret the actions of Foreign Minister Erkko in 1938–39 in a new, sympathetic light. The beliefs engendered by President Paasikivi and Marshal Mannerheim are beginning to atrophy. Perhaps the Winter War was not 'Erkko's War' after all, and perhaps civil pressure for Finnish intransigence was more forceful than Erkko's policy ever was. Mannerheim's criticism of Finland's political leaders for neglecting the country's defence in the 1930s does not stand up to close scrutiny. Relative to its size, Finland spent more money than most on defence. The movement for disarmament never gained ground in Finland as it did elsewhere in Scandinavia. Furthermore, compulsory military service continued to be quite long in Finland.

Hasty revisionism

A book of essays entitled *Talvisota* (The Winter War) edited by Pertti Pesonen and Keijo Immonen exemplifies a case of hasty or, more aptly, belated revisionism. In particular the article by Soviet researcher Alexander Dongarov entitled *Tosiasioiden edessä* (Facing the facts) in particular represent the proto-*glasnost* approach prevalent about a year and a half ago. Dongarov's article advocates the 'shared guilt' approach. No longer is Finland alone held culpable, as during the years of 'stagnation'; it is now acknowledged that the Soviet Union also made mistakes. However, it simply cannot be overlooked that Finland pursued a dangerously aggressive, menacing foreign policy prior to the war. Thus it is all too easy to reach the neat conclusion that the Soviet Union's defensive actions were justified.

The outstanding academic achievement in the compilation is Ohto Manninen's article *Stalinin talvisota* (Stalin's Winter War). It is unmatched as a thorough, enlightening account of Soviet military preparations and war goals and the outcome of the war from the Soviet perspective. Right from its outbreak, the Winter War was more than just a localized military operation carried out by the Leningrad military; according to Manninen, troops were summoned from much further afield. Manninen's article proves that the Soviet leaders were prepared for military conflict in good time early in autumn.

Martti Häikiö proffers a compelling new interpretation of the commonly held notion that Finland was isolated during the war. Häikiö postulates that Finland's isolation was no more than a myth created through propaganda to serve Finland's goals both politically and in terms of mass psychology by encouraging the people to unite in the common cause, both prior to and after the war.

Between the wars

The *Kansakunta sodassa* (A people at war) titles have a long history. A three-part edition is about to be published as a synthesis of research projects. The first part, *Sodasta sotaan* (From war to war, editor-in-chef Silvo Hietanen) investigates the causes of the war and the war itself in two-thirds of its pages; the rest explores the 'interim peace' and the causes of the Continuation War.

Olli Vehviläinen's *Kansainvälisen järjestelmän kriisi* (The crisis of the international system) is one of the most coherent accounts of international developments prior to the war ever written by a Finnish historian. Timo Vihavainen's pithy, refreshing articles explore how the Soviet Union saw Finland prior to, during and after the war.

Anssi Vuorenmaa's articles show a healthily critical approach to decisions made by wartime leaders. Focusing specifically on the military aspect of the war, his articles show how the frequently uncritical of reports written by soldiers who saw action has been exchanged for a more discerning approach.

The unknown Winter War

A booklet entitled *Tuntematon talvisota, Suomi 1939–40* (The unknown Winter War, Finland 1939–40; editor-in-chief Jukka Nevakivi) has been published as a synopsis of a seminar organized by Jukka Nevakivi. In this ambitious work Nevakivi attempts to shed new light on the international causes of the Winter War by, for example, revealing how Russo-Japanese relations were strained to the point of a military clash.

Kalervo Hovi draws attention to a 'self-evidency' which is frequently overlooked when the fate of the Baltic nations in 1939–40 is discussed in Finland. The Baltic nations were not three marginal democracies, but three mini-dictatorships. This fundamental difference between Finland and the Baltic nations explains a great deal in terms of the fates they faced – the size differences alone do not explain everything, as is commonly assumed.

New interpretations

At its best, recent research into the Winter War has opened totally new perspectives. Even the academics

are gradually discarding historical burdens. The Winter War provides a stark example of how researchers who consider themselves objective are actually dependent on the climate of the times.

With innovative approaches being adopted in research and with the renouncement of conventional interpretations, the popular image of the Winter War is being revised. At last, the courage has been summoned to refute Mannerheim's, Paasikivi's, and even Tanner's memoirs, along with other official Finnish war histories. Specific topics taken up for reappraisal include Finland's defence burden and lack of readiness on the threshold of the war, Erkko's foreign policy and Finnish government policy in the autumn of 1939, as well as the supposed unanimity of the Finnish people about the Winter War. The Winter War has been brought to life; it is beginning to change. It is still a piece of living history.

More Homogeneous Image of the Soviet Union Among Finns

Pentti Raittila, research scholar, University of Tampere Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

Perestroika is making Finnish ideas about the Soviet Union more homogeneous. This is the key conclusion of a comparative Finnish-Soviet survey carried out by the University of Tampere, aimed at plotting Soviet and Finnish people's ideas about each other. The survey was a joint project of the University of Tampere Department of Journalism and Mass Communication and the institute of sociology of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. A thousand citizens of different ages were interviewed in both Finland and the Soviet Union during October-November 1988.

No threat under normal conditions

Behind the questions concerning the Soviet Union's foreign policy was the idea that Finland's official foreign policy line and parlance have not always been accepted unreservedly among society at large. There has been talk of dualism in the language of Finland's official foreign policy and that of ordinary citizens with regard to the Soviet Union.

About half of the respondents considered the Soviet Union a peaceloving country and did not believe it posed any threat to Finnish security. Nearly as many believed that the Soviet Union is neither peaceloving nor aggressive, and that it might only pose a threat to Finnish security in the case of some crisis. Only one per cent of respondents unreservedly considered the Soviet Union a threat to Finland (table 1).

The attitude of Centre Party and Social Democratic Party supporters to Soviet foreign policy was in line with the average for the population as a whole. On the other hand, there were distinct differences between Conservatives (National Coalition) and People's Democrats.

The youngest age groups were more reserved about the Soviet Union's desire for peace than people over 30. Over 50 year olds who had lived through the war considered the Soviet Union a peaceloving country much more frequently than the rest and did not consider it a threat to Finnish security. The reason for this somewhat surprising result may be the different points of view of the generations in respect of the Soviet Union.

"Finnish-Soviet Treaty a good thing"

71 per cent of respondents considered the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance a good thing, i.e. a finding roughly in line with earlier surveys. Women were slightly more positive than men about the Treaty, but there were no major differences between age groups. Both those interested in politics and those uninterested viewed the Treaty as a good thing equally often. Supporters of nearly all the political parties were more favourably disposed to the Treaty than the average. The exception was the Conservatives, only 60 per cent of whose supporters considered the Treaty a good thing. Support for the Treaty among students and people living in the metropolitan area was also lower than average.

The Finnish-Soviet Treaty has been a self-evident fact to the Finns for a long time and does not give rise to really strong feeling. It is easy and socially acceptable to support the first option offered by the interviewer – "It is a good thing". Obviously, very many people who feel indifferent about it chose this option. Conscious support for the Treaty is somewhat lower than the findings of questionnaires like this indicate.

It would seem justified to conclude that in the '80s Finns broadly accepted the country's present relations with the Soviet Union. Any dualism between official foreign policy and public opinion has largely disappeared. The change has taken place in all generations' and most clearly in the oldest age groups with experience of the war.

The interviews also asked for an assessment of Finland's responsibility for the last two wars with the Soviet Union (Winter War and Continuation War). The question was posed in exactly the same form as in an opinion poll made in 1964. Possibly the most surprising finding was that there had been almost no change at all in the breakdown of Finnish responses to this question in the previous quarter century. Over half of the respondents considered the Finns to some extent responsible for the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union (table 2).

TABLE 1. Finnish attitudes to Soviet foreign policy, possible threat and the Finnish-Soviet Treaty.

	whole sample (997)	women (514)	men (483)	Age groups: 15–19 (84)	20–29 (269)	30–39 (215)	40–49 (131)	50–59 (110)	60 (158)
A) What is your opinion of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and role in the world? I think the Soviet Union is ...									
– a peaceloving state	47	43	52	24	38	50	48	70	59
– an aggressive and threatening state	6	6	7	12	4	8	4	5	9
– not directly either	42	46	38	62	53	40	45	23	27
– don't know	4								
B) Do the Soviet Union and its army threaten Finnish security?									
– no	52	47	58	44	46	51	58	65	54
– not now, but could be a threat during a crisis	43	47	39	54	49	47	37	28	39
– don't know	3	4	2	0	4		2	6	6
– yes	1	1	1	2		1	2	0	1
C) What do you think about the Finnish-Soviet Treaty? I think it is ...									
– a good thing	71	73	69	73	69	73	71	75	69
– something we have to adjust to	24	23	27	23	26	25	25	19	25
– a bad thing; should be revoked	2	1	3	2	3	1	3	2	1
– don't know	2	3	2	2	2	1	1	5	5

TABLE 2. Finnish view of partial responsibility for the last wars.

"Let us take the wars that Finland found itself involved in during the Second World War. Were we Finns a great deal at fault, somewhat at fault or not at all at fault for the outbreak of these wars?"

	whole sample (997)	women (514)	men (483)	Age groups: 15-19 (84)	20-29 (269)	30-39 (215)	40-49 (131)	50-59 (110)	60 (158)
– don't know	14	17	10	18	13	9	16	14	16
– not at all	26	26	26	17	24	29	19	25	39
– somewhat	55	53	56	64	58	58	57	50	38
– a great deal	6	4	8	1	4	4	8	12	8

The over 65s group of those involved in the war included far less of those who also considered the Finns at fault for the outbreak of war. Predictably, assessment of responsibility correlated with the political stance of respondents: Socialist, Left-wing and Green supporters conceded that Finland was partly responsible much more often than the others. The replies of Conservative supporters did not differ greatly from the average for the whole sample, but Centre Party supporters and farmers thought Finland partly responsible much less frequently than the rest.

Familiar problems

In the interview the respondents were read some dozen aspects of the everyday life of Soviet citizens for which they could choose among five options illustrating how well these aspects were provided for in the Soviet Union (on the questionnaire form the aspects were in a different order to the way they are presented in diagram 1, which puts them in 'order of excellence').

Sports, cultural pursuits and educational opportunities were considered the Soviet Union's strong sides by Finns of all ages. The greatest dispersion of opinions and "I don't know's came with regards to questions concerning social security in the Soviet Union. Civil liberties, access to information and opportunities for financial betterment were considered worse. Opportunities for Soviet citizens to travel abroad were judged worst of all.

When the respondents were asked for their opinion about social problems in the Soviet Union, they stated that the most important were the poor quality of consumer goods, the lack of freedom of speech, pollution of the environment and the food shortage (diagram 2).

The respondents' attitude to Socialism and their party affiliation had some influence on their assessment of internal affairs in the Soviet Union, but the differences were surprisingly slight. Both Right and Left wingers picked out the same things as the good and bad sides of Soviet life; only the intensity of the criticism varied slightly. Finns from different backgrounds seemed to have a very similar view of Soviet life, especially of topical problems.

Attitudes to Russians and Estonians

A key feature of the hostile image of the Soviet Union nurtured during the early years of Finnish Independence was being Communist and being Russian were the same thing. Teaching the Finns to hate and despise Russian people was all part of their anti-Bolshevik political education. As Finland was also at war with the Soviet Union for nearly five years, it is only natural that the hostile image and negative stereotypes of Russian people lived on in the Finnish consciousness for a long time.

DIAGRAM 1. Finnish ideas about life in the Soviet Union.
"How well or badly do you feel the following matters are currently provided for in the Soviet Union?"



Before the respondents were asked anything about the Soviet Union, they were asked their opinion about having people of different nationalities move in as neighbours. Two thirds of the respondents would have accepted any of the proposed foreigners as a neighbour. The 'order of preference' for various nationalities was roughly the same as was found in an extensive survey of Finnish attitudes to foreigners made a year earlier.

It is interesting that attitudes to Estonians were more favourable than attitudes to Russians. The reasons for this are contradictory; for instance, the equally favourable attitude of Conservatives and Communists stems partly from very different reasons. In the national dimension, both conservatives and radicals may feel solidarity with this little kindred nation. In the ideological and political dimension, on the other hand, the reasons for the favourable attitude of Right and Left wingers may be totally different.

Perestroika taking effect

A distinct majority of respondents (58 %) considered *perestroika* a policy aimed at strengthening socialism. Over half said that their attitude to the Soviet Union had become more positive because of perestroika. The main reason for this change was the personality of General Secretary Gorbachev and Soviet initiatives on reducing nuclear arms, economic reform and allowing more openness in the media (table 3).

Young people believed more than others that perestroika means that the Soviet Union is moving towards capitalism. The revelation of current problems resulting from *glasnost* had played a major role in making their picture of the Soviet Union more favourable. Correspondingly, the oldest age group felt that the revelation of the injustices of the Stalinist era was of much more importance than the rest.

DIAGRAM 2. Finnish ideas about the Soviet Union's problems.

"How important a problem do you think the items in the following list are in the Soviet Union today?" (options 'not a major problem' and 'don't know' given in addition to those shown).



To end up with, the respondents could explain in their own words which direction they hoped the Soviet Union would take in the next few decades and how they thought it actually would develop. Very often, respondents hoped that the Soviet Union would move in a freer, more open and more democratic direction. Only about half of those who expressed this hope believed that the Soviet Union would actually move in this direction or in a better direction in general.

Soviet image of Finland

For the Finns, the Soviet Union is a crucial element dominating political and public life. Finland, on the other hand, is a small neighbour of rather little importance to the ordinary Soviet citizen. This difference in importance was reflected in the findings of the Soviet survey, in the large number of "don't know" answers.

Most Soviets did, however, have a distinct opinion about Finnish foreign policy and the Finnish-Soviet Treaty: four out of five considered Finland a peaceloving country and the Treaty a good thing (though it might be asked just how familiar respondents in Siberia were with the contents of the Treaty).

In questions asking for Soviet opinions on current Finnish problems and other internal affairs, "don't know" answers accounted for nearly half, on average. The most important problems were thought to be high taxes, drugs and environmental pollution (alternatives the same as in diagram 2).

Finnish and Soviet citizens assessed each other's opportunities for sport and culture and matters connected with social security very much the same. In contrast, assessments of political rights and liberties were completely opposite.

Perestroika and its effects were assessed in roughly the same way in Finland and the Soviet Union. The Soviets were asked to assess which aspects of perestroika had had a positive effect on the attitudes of Western countries to the Soviet Union. The Soviet respondents attached less importance than the Finns to Gorbachev's personality, economic reform and the revelation of current problems.

TABLE 3. Finnish attitudes to perestroika in the Soviet Union.

	whole sample (997)	women (514)	men (483)	Age groups: 15-19 (84)	20-29 (269)	30-39 (215)	40-49 (131)	50-59 (110)	60 (158)
A) Which of the following options does perestroika suggest to you?									
– the gradual abandonment of Socialism and the movement of the Soviet Union towards capitalism	29	27	28	38	35	27	35	25	20
– a strengthening of Socialism by correcting mistakes and distortions	58	59	61	42	55	63	52	65	66
– don't know	12	14	10	20	10	11	13	9	14
B) Has perestroika affected your own attitude to the Soviet Union?									
– no change	38	41	34	48	40	36	37	33	38
– my attitude is more favourable	56	52	61	46	56	61	57	59	52
– my attitude is more negative	1	1	1	2	1		2	3	0
– don't know	5	6	4	4	3	2	5	4	10

Effects of perestroika crucial

The survey did not attempt to analyse the image of the Soviet Union held by individual people, but rather to establish attitudes prevailing throughout society and trends and background elements in them.

The crucial conclusion was that the image of the Soviet Union held by most Finns was extremely homogeneous. There was a particularly unanimous view of the Soviet Union's social problems and the political rights and liberties of its citizens. There were rather few people with an uncritically favourable or totally unfavourable idea of their Eastern neighbour.

The general 'mainstream' image of the Soviet Union can be described as follows:

> The Soviet Union is not considered to be a state with aggressive intentions, and is not a threat to Finnish security in normal circumstances. The Finnish-Soviet Treaty is considered to be a good thing. Opportunities for sports and cultural pursuits are held to be good, social security reasonable, but political rights and civil liberties poor. Perestroika has made attitudes to the Soviet Union more favourable. Attitudes to Russian people are similar to feelings about other foreign natives.

It is probable that only a few decades ago the Finns' image of the Soviet Union was nowhere near as homogeneous as it is now. More blinkered reliance on certain mass media and various political and ideological background factors influenced ideas about the Soviet Union more than at present. The blurring of class distinctions in Finland in the last few decades, and in particular the lessening of support for the Communists, mean that less people think of the Soviet Union as 'a nation of the proletariat'. Old-style friendship for the Soviet Union stemming from Left wing thinking is now only marginal. Perestroika and its revelations about the past and the problems of the present have brought Left wing ideas about the Soviet Union closer to the mainstream.

The old, highly negative view of the Soviet Union held by the political Right has softened.

This is partly a result of the way trade with the Soviet Union has benefited the Finnish economy. Right wingers feel that perestroika has confirmed the validity of their earlier picture of the Soviet Union.

The Finns' image of the Soviet Union is changing as a result of perestroika and glasnost, and this survey suggested ways of estimating the course of this change. This assessment is then based on differences between the responses of young, better educated people in the metropolitan area and those of the rest of the population.

If glasnost continued to advance and the Soviet Union opens up to the outside world, Finland's image of its neighbour will become clearer and at the same time more detailed and closer to the truth. It is also likely to become even more homogeneous. This will also depend on the international climate and its effect on the Finnish media; a new heightening of tension and a return to the confrontation of the early '80s would certainly slow down this trend.

The change that has taken place in the Finns' image of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era has not, however, been as pronounced as in many other Western countries. Here, the Soviet Union was not viewed as a threat even in the Brezhnev era. Changes in our image of the Soviet Union will, however, depend crucially on the advance of perestroika.

So far, replacement of the glossy image with an open acknowledgement of the problems has had a favourable effect on the Finns. But if revelation of the problems does not lead to their correction in practice, perestroika may well have the opposite effect, or at least the present changes for the better in our image of the Soviet Union may come to a halt. Future developments in Estonia will also carry a lot of weight in Finnish ideas about the Soviet Union.

BOOK REVIEW

Compiled by Sari Okko

Enforcement of the Finnish Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

Ilkka Saraviita: YYA-sopimus. Tutkimus Suomen ja Sosialistisen Neuvostotasavaltain Liiton välillä ystävyydestä, yhteistyöstä ja keskinäisestä avunannosta 6.4.1948 allekirjoitetusta sopimuksesta Suomen oikeusjärjestyksessä. (The FCMA treaty in the judical system of Finland; a study on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Finland signed on April 6, 1948.) University of Lapland, Faculty of Law publications. Series A, no. 2, published by the Union of Finnish Lawyers. Helsinki 1989.

UN Ambassador Klaus Törnudd in issue 3/89 of the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs:

Ilkka Saraviita has come to public notice with a comprehensive judicial analysis of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. His essay examines how the treaty and the protocols for its continuation came into being, as well as the content of the treaty relative to Finnish legislation and other international agreements to which Finland is bound.

The topic is defined as follows: "Ultimately the exercise of authority by the President and Parliament, namely who makes decisions on measures called for by the treaty and in what order, in which circumstances and in what way Parliament participates in making these decisions, the level of enactment norms required by follow-up agreements made on the basis of the said treaty, how the treaty endorses the President's authority as the head of foreign policy and commander-in-chief and how the treaty complies with norms for national crises laid down in the Finnish Constitution and with assorted international agreements pertaining to its implementation."

The study thus concentrates exclusively on the Finnish judicial system; no comparisons are drawn between the FCMA treaty and defence treaties made between other nations.

The study emphasizes the President's central authority in executing the treaty. In his summary, the author draws the conslusion that the FCMA treaty has augmented the authority of both the President and Parliament.

Decision-making based on the FCMA treaty and the protocols for its continuance, added to the way the treaty is frequently given emphasis in official statements, can undoubtedly be taken to illustrate the exercise of authority by the President and Parliament in important matters of foreign policy. Indeed the FCMA is a good case in point, but might we not be prompted to ask whether the same would be true irrespective of the treaty?

I believe that the treaty, or how its implementation is conceived, actually reflect an overall trend. Finland has grown used to thinking of national security policy comprehensively, with politics and national security propping one another. Dualist leadership has no place in modern-day national security policy.

In various contexts Saraviita refers to communiqués approved for official State visits between Finland and the Soviet Union. Saraviita postulates that these communiqués have in fact been binding, albeit inferior in the hierarchy of national agreements. The significance of bilateral communiqués in Finnish foreign policy has diminished considerably over the past few years. Instead, multilateral consensus-based political agreements have become more important, both in the UN and the CSCE.

In his conclusion Saraviita claims that the basic structure of Finnish foreign policy is "defined with regular reference to the introductory clause of the FCMA treaty and articles pertaining to its implementation". Here Saraviita is mistaken: the FCMA treaty is not the cornerstone of Finnish neutrality, nor is the basic orientation of Finnish foreign policy regularly defined with reference to it.

Saraviita has a well-defined perspective and his study has filled a vacuum in writings on the FCMA treaty. However, on its own his study does not suffice to elucidate the overall significance of the treaty – nor does the author claim to do so.

Refugeeism in plain terms

Harto Hakovirta: Pakolaisuus – maailman ongelma, meidän ongelmamme. (Refugees – a worldwide problem, our problem.) Mänttä 1989.

Dr. Anne Koistinen in issue 3/89 of the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs:

Harto Hakovirta, Assistant Professor at Tampere University and docent in international politics at at the University of Helsinki has compiled the results of his research on refugees into a paperback. Between 1979 and 1984 Hakovirta analysed 33 international or domestic crises in the Third World which resulted in refugeeism between the mid '50s and the early '80s. The Finnish Society of Sciences published the report under the title Third World Conflicts and Refugeeism – Dimensions, Dynamics and Trends of the World Refugee Problem (Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium 32:1986).

Hakovirta approaches the refugee problem as something more than a humanitarian issue or a human tragedy. The report is insightful; it analyses concrete instances and investigates related aspects of international politics and sources of conflict.

Hakovirta defines refugees as persons living in exile due to political, religious, ethnic or other persecution, or in order to escape military conflict or threat of violence, and who furthermore require external aid to get by. Hakovirta has formulated a set of criteria for assessing how critical individual instances of refugeeism are. The number of refugees, how sudden the onset of the crisis is, its duration and resolution form these criteria. A 'minor crisis' affects 50 000–100 000 refugees, a 'major crisis' in turn involves over 750 000 refugees. A crisis lasting under 4 years is 'temporary', 4–8 years is 'prolonged' and over 8 years is 'chronic'. Models for resolving the refugee problem are categorized by goal: return to original homeland, resettlement in a neighbouring country, resettlement in an industrialized country or prolonged residence in a refugee camp. In assessing refugeeism in the '80s, Hakovirta concludes that there are no clear signs of improvement or deterioration.

In terms of the reader, the most interesting aspect of the report is Hakovirta's analysis of the causes of refugeeism. He attributes more signif-

icance to concrete circumstances than to individual motives. Warfare and repressive living conditions, either together or separately, are the immediate causes of refugeeism. However, Hakovirta sees the political instability of the Third World as its ultimate cause.

Hakovirta seeks to explain why the industrialized countries give aid to refugees in terms of humanitarian ideals, altruism and social solidarity. Countries are motivated to resolve the refugee problem out of a sense of moral responsibility and as their own national interests change.

Dissertation in military science

Pekka Visuri: Totaalisesta sodasta kriisienhallintaan: Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys läntisessä Keski-Euroopassa ja Suomessa vuosina 1945–1985. (From total warfare to crisis control: Trends in defence strategy in Western Europe and Finland in 1945–1985.) Otava, Helsinki, 1989.

Pekka Sivonen in issue 2/89 of the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs:

Lt. Col. Pekka Visuri's From total warfare to crisis control is the most recent dissertation on defence policy written by an active Finnish officer, and the fourth of its kind to be written since the war. It was examined as a dissertation on political history at the University of Helsinki in March 1989.

Visuri's dissertation is a systematic analysis of trends in postwar military defence policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Finland. In addition to a country-by-country analysis, the dissertation provides a thorough study of changes in the theory of national defence, and of coinciding developments in defence policy and international politics.

By 'defence strategy' the author is referring to the defence aspect of national security doctrines with an emphasis on military operations. Instead of using official military doctrines the dissertation examines trends in defence policy which have been applied in practice. Herein lies the principal dilemma of the work; this entails that the normal criteria of historical research cannot as such be applied in assessing the dissertation. Visuri has not been able to hinge his arguments on official or confidential material. He consequently attempts to reconstruct defence strategies by revising the image given to the public of analysis trends in organizations, military hardware and tactics. One of the methodological strengths of the work is the way in which Visuri attempts to reveal the truth behind the official reports produced for specific political purpose.

Visuri covers a broad range of material and quite successfully pulls together a synthesis to support his conslusions. Visuri's dissertation does not so much illustrate as investigate the changes that have taken place in defence strategy.

Seminal study or peep-hole?

Ahti Karjalainen, Jukka Tarkka: Presidentin ministeri. Ahti Karjalaisen ura Urho Kekkosen Suomessa. (The President's Minister. Ahti Karjalainen's career in Urho Kekkonen's Finland.) Otava, Keuruu, 1989.

Timo Soikkanen in issue 4/89 of the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs:

Ahti Karjalainen's memoirs have ignited political controversy and media debates which have released pent-up emotions and traumas suppressed during the Kekkonen era. The very same debate is nonetheless closely linked to present-day politics.

The reliability of memoirs as a source of reference is inevitably a problem in many respects. However, Karjalainen's memoirs draw on an exceptionally broad selection of first-hand source material. With Jukka Tarkka as ghostwriter, the book represent an interesting dilemma in terms of sources. This optimal set-up, namely first-hand source material and a skilful historian, prompts the reader to contemplate who ultimately chooses the details and topics that are dealt with, and with what motives. A paradox is clearly in evidence. Making compromises with Soviet representatives and taking Soviet interests into account in Finnish policy was normal procedure for Karjalainen; in fact, it was virtually imperative in terms of efficient politics and, in the long run, Finnish independence.

Tarkka has evidently approached the task more as a historian than a ghostwriter. He implies that unpatriotic, immoral plotting with foreign powers must be disclosed and expunged. The disparate motives of the protagonist and the author thus make for a highly engaging book. The book explores issues central to Finnish politics, including volatile topics. Tarkka has aimed to make his portrayal realistic; no more, no less.

Ecopolicy in international affairs

Tapani Vaahtoranta: Gone with the Wind: The Politics of International Air-Pollution Control (Dissertation presented to the faculty of Princeton University in candidacy for the degree of doctor of philosophy).

Tapani Vaahtoranta, Senior Research Fellow with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, has written a dissertation on international politics, the results of cooperative air pollution control and factors affecting foreign ecopolicy. The dissertation was examined at Princeton University on April 23, 1990.

Dr. Alpo Rusi in issue 2/90 of the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs:

The dissertation examines air pollution control as a political problem on a global scale. Solutions must be found through developing expansive cooperation. The author concludes that collective environmental protection is motivated more by national than international or global motives. This is an important consideration to be taken into account as we try to solve what to do about the greatest problem of our time.

The dissertation attempts to explain why some nations are active in international air pollution control and why some countries actually oppose it. Key agreements on air pollution control were made in the '80s. The dissertation thus chiefly traces developments which have taken place over the past decade.

Vaahtoranta investigates the opinions of ecorevolutionary researchers who posit that environmental problems cannot be solved in a system of individual state governments, and prescribe what they call the new world order. This new order is evidently conceived as a radical alternative.

Vaahtoranta's dissertation concentrates on the effects of acid rain, the deterioration of the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect. The dissertation assesses ecological interdependencies and the progressive permutation of a system which could inhibit air pollution. The author concludes that there is no international system on the horizon which could possibly serve to stop air pollution. Our only hope is to improve the efficiency of existing institutions.

The age of nuclear armament in Europe

Europe in transition: Politics and Nuclear Security. Edited by Vilho Harle and Pekka Sivonen. Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1989.

Special researcher Kari Möttölä reviewed the book in issue 1/90 of the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs as follows:

The book investigates a facet of European security which has been largely unaffected by changes in Europe but has nonetheless been a source of disquietude since before the 1989 revolution – namely the threat of nuclear warfare. This collection of articles edited by Harle and Sivonen was compiled after the Soviet Union and the United States reached an agreement on the removal of medium-range missiles. The work explores whether the INF agreement could be used as a springboard for further disarmament and for a new approach to European security.

Nuclear arms are, above all, NATO's problem, and this is the basic approach adopted in the essays. Eclipsed by recent political developments, both monitoring compliance with arms agreements and disarmament are losing out in terms of public interest.

NATO is being forced to face the fact that the changes taking place in Europe are undermining its very reasons for existence, namely flexible response, pre-emptive use of nuclear arms and the presence of US troops on the European continent.

Even after the withdrawal of all ground-based nuclear arms, Europe will not free of the threat of nuclear warfare. Sea-based and strategic missiles will sustain the threat of nuclear warfare between the great powers – with Europe in the crossfire. France and the UK would be unlikely to remove their nuclear arms for a long time to come.

EC membership and neutrality

Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), Suomen puolueettomuuden tulevaisuus. (The future of Finnish neutrality.) WSOY, Helsinki, 1990.

Dr. Martti Häikiö in issue 2/90 of the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs:

A collection of articles entitled The future of Finnish neutrality published in May 1990 marks a milestone in public exchange on Finnish foreign affairs. Only a year earlier, talk of EC membership was still tabu in Finland. The book reflects how today, spurred on by radical changes in Europe, EC membership has become a realistic proposition.

The book does not recommend Finland's joining the EC as such. Instead, it systematically investigates the political reasons related to Finnish neutrality which might conflict with EC membership. The most enlightening article in the book is by Jaakko Iloniemi, chairman of the Paasikivi Society, who writes a pragmatic review of how Finland's political position changed in winter 1989–90. Regarding the future of Finnish politics Iloniemi deftly concludes: "If European integration reaches a stage at which former military and ideological opponents find new models for cooperation, conflicts of interests would be unlikely to arise in Finland's pursuit of a policy of neutrality."

Of EC membership, Iloniemi writes with traditional Finnish wariness: "If the EC were to accept Finland as a full member, without infringing on her right to determine her foreign policy as regards the Soviet Union or her right to pursue a policy of neutrality, there would be nothing in terms of foreign policy to prevent Finland's membership. Membership could then be decided on the basis of internal affairs. It would be a question of whether we wanted to – not whether we could – join the EC."

On the whole, the book examines Finnish neutrality from a theoretical perspective, which is why foreign policy in practice is given secondary emphasis.

The book is thought-provoking – it suggests new alternatives. One is left with the impression that while neutrality is seen as an undeniable advantage, it is also considered a kind of a burden. In addition to Iloniemi's review, the book contains articles by Director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Paavo Lipponen, Professor Raimo Väyrynen, Professor Allan Rosas, Associate Professor Harto Hakovirta, Docent Esko Antola, Special Researcher Kari Möttölä and Dr. Paavo Väyrynen.

Dissertation on self-determination

Jyrki Iivonen: Independence or Incorporation? Poland's National Self-Determination and Independence within The Idea of the Russian and Soviet Socialism from the 1870s to the 1920s.

Jyrki Iivonen, Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of Foreign Affairs, had his dissertation approved on February 10, by the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Helsinki.

Iivonen's opponent was Dr. Margot Light of the London School of Economics and Political Science, the custodian was Professor Raimo Väyrynen.

The dissertation aims to elucidate how national self-determination, as an integral part of Soviet foreign policy and nationalities policy, has emerged and developed. Its origins lie more in Russian thinking than in Marxism. Marx and Engels treated the nationality issue as a concrete political problem; they assumed history would inevitably lead to the formation of ever larger political units.

To the Bolsheviks, and to Lenin in particular, national self-determination was both a pragmatic and strategic tactic designed to facilitate the socialist revolution. The models of self-determination adopted and their advantages ultimately rested on how they benefited the Revolution and the ensuing Soviet State.

Talks on Polish independence both prior to and after the October Revolution reveal that the model for Polish self-determination largely hinged on Poland's distant location. Within the territory of the former Russian Empire, various forms of federation and autonomy were viewed as the best solutions. Of the countries which were formerly annexed to the Russian Empire, Poland and Finland were in a special position, and were granted independent status.

Here Poland and Finland differed from the Baltic nations, which were granted independence, but only for two short decades.

It is interesting that the current nationality problem in the Soviet Union is raising many of the issues that prevailed at the turn of the century. We may consequently conclude that many of the fundamental causes of the Soviet Union's present-day problems are deep-rooted, tracing back to political decisions made in Soviet Russia after the October Revolution.

Facing the Change in Europe

Facing the Change in Europe, EFTA Countries' Integration Strategies, edited by Kari Möttölä and Heikki Patomäki. Published by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki 1989.

The EC programme to create a single market in 1992 has spurred the EFTA countries into action to avoid being discriminated against and safeguard their interests in the wider West European market.

European political cooperation has become another challenge for the EFTA countries, for whom it is essential to avoid marginalization in a changing Europe.

Facing the Change in Europe: EFTA Countries' Integration Strategies is a report on the choices made, and faced by, the six EFTA members: Austria, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland. It also outlines multilateral cooperation between EFTA and EC and the progress to date and prospects for European political cooperation.

The report sets forth the similarities and differences between EFTA countries' integration policies and opens a perspective on the future of EFTA and neutrality in Europe. It appraises the development of the "dynamic European Economic Space" and its implications for both EFTA and the EC and the great powers.

See also "Winter War in research and memoirs", pages 43–46.

DOCUMENTS

Compiled by Mikko Majander

Speech by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet at Finlandia Hall on Thursday, 26 October 1989

Mr. President,
Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades,

(- - -)

I wish now to turn to Soviet-Finnish relations – the main purpose of this visit.

They have a history that is varied and not simple. A lot has been experienced – good as well as bad. But the first considerably outweights the second. The decisive part in it belongs to the fact that both of our countries have drawn fundamental conclusions with due sense of responsibility from the tragedy of 1939-44.

Finland's outstanding political leaders, including Juho-Kusti Paasikivi, Urho Kekkonen and, of course, President Mauno Koivisto who enjoys full trust and sincere respect in the Soviet Union, have made a priceless contribution to good-neighbourly relations and friendship between our nations.

We in the Soviet Union are fully satisfied with the way our relations with Finland have been developing. They proved inestimable to us at the peak of the Cold War, when the Western world built a cordon of alienation around us. They withstood the onslaught of time-serving anti-Soviet tempests. Now that the post-war period is over, Soviet-Finnish relations will go down in history as a symbol of a sense of honesty in international affairs, respect for and commitment to one's word, as an example of how much reliable partnership and bilateral trust can accomplish in world politics. They are gaining new political and economic substance, obtain new dynamics also as an international factor.

We have learned to trust each other's peaceful intentions. There are no problems that would defy our effort to address them. We maintain frank exchanges on each other's concerns and preoccupations, and it is on this basis that we seek solutions to our difficulties.

We have over 150 treaties and agreements signed between us. A decades long partnership binds together the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Finland's political parties. There is a broad-based and varied network of ties linking the citizens of both nations, there is a whole mechanism that enables us to analyze and harmonize each other's interests. Surely, all this makes for an impressive contribution to developing a global policy of peace, a policy that would shape a future non-violent world resting on a balance of interests, on understanding of and respect for other nations and peoples living in other countries. Care for maintaining precisely such a relationship with Finland constitutes a firm and integral part of all our foreign-policy activities.

In that sense, the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance surely deserves a word of praise – an instrument that proved particularly effective and long-lasting in the entire history of diplomacy. The Treaty marked a radical breakthrough in Soviet-Finnish relations.

I share President Mauno Koivisto's view that we need not change a single word in that Treaty, as it is consonant with the realities of our time and allows for effective and equitable efforts to be made now and in the future in line with our own interests, those of Europe and the entire world. The Treaty has developed into an integral part of security in the North of Europe.

The 1948 Treaty and Finland's neutrality constitute, as you say in this country, the basis of national foreign policy, with both elements – the Treaty and neutrality – being non-conflicting and mutually supportive.

We may recall that past controversy surrounding the proper interpretation of Finnish neutrality on occasions continues to cause ripples to this day. It is not my intention to reiterate old stereotypes or revive groundless fears. True, Finland's neutrality, just as the neutrality of any other nation for that matter, has some distinguishing features. But what I wish to stress most firmly is that the Soviet Union unreservedly recognizes Finland's neutral status and shall continue to do so in the future.

Mr. President, as you have said on many occasions, Finland does not hold that its neutrality should imply either indifference to ongoing world developments or contempt for the obligations it has assumed as one of the members of the international community. Finland has effectively demonstrated that a relatively small state, guided by goowill, can play a major, dynamic role in world politics.

In our discussions with the President and Finland's other political leaders we have covered in detail the issue of further development of our bilateral relations. Without repeating what I said yesterday, I will make just one point – the President and I are fully convinced that notwithstanding their sweeping scope, there is a large untapped potential in Soviet-Finnish relations. Accordingly, we are in agreement that no effort should be spared as we proceed to making use of that potential.

In point of fact, what continues to make us somewhat worried is but one aspect of our relations – namely the state of our trade and economic exchanges. Although the latest difficulties seem to have been caused by objective developments, this is not to suggest that they are insurmountable. I am confident that the many contacts and discussions our representatives have had over the past few days and, of course, the documents we have just signed, will make easier their solution.

The President and I also have discussed some fresh ideas.

It is to be hoped that the introduction of both republican and regional self-financing in the Soviet Union will intensify contacts between Finland and its individual regions on one side and Russia's hinterland areas, Karelia, the Komi Republic, and the Soviet Baltic Republics on another side.

Mr. President, Gentlemen, Friends,

Each of our two nations has its own history, traditions, concerns and interests, each lives atuned, so to say, to its own time-frame.

At the same time, broader and improved relations between our two countries meet our own interests,

those of Europe and the entire world community. Jointly, we have accomplised already a great deal in building a "northern wall" and a "northern roof" in the common European home-peaceful project for the future – and, by setting an example of good-neighbourly relations, we have helped others gain faith in the validity of that project.

May I extend my sincere wishes of well-being and prosperity to friendly Finland and her people.

May I express my thanks to all the citizens of Finland for their welcome, hospitality and friendly feelings.

Speech by the President of the Republic Mauno Koivisto to the Paasikivi Society on 27.11.1989

Ladies and Gentlemen,

(- - -)

Since my last speech at the Paasikivi Society, I have had the opportunity to outline our views on security policy to senior representatives of both superpowers.

In these discussions, what I have tried to present as our view is that the Nordic region must not, under any circumstances, be deprived of a share of the fruits of a general relaxation of tension.

Here in Helsinki last October, President Mikhail Gorbachev told us how he sees Finland and the situation in northern Europe. His expression of recognition of Finnish neutrality can be considered a logical consequence of the new constructive attitude adopted in Soviet foreign policy. It is appreciated in Finland and I believe that it will evoke responses further afield as well.

President Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union's interest in developing co-operation with the Nordic region. He proposed for consideration the development of direct links between the Nordic region, on the other hand, and his own country's northern areas and Baltic republics, on the other. These proposals should be responded to and studied to see how they could be implemented in practice.

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When something very unexpected happens, one easily believes that many other unexpected events can be expected.

Yet - with all the reservations that a situation like this calls for – I am of the opinion that the general configuration that has prevailed in Europe for decades is not changing particularly rapidly. Major interests are vested in preventing too-radical changes from taking place, and there exist many checks that can be applied for this purpose.

Since Adenauer's time, the Federal Republic of Germany's integration into Western Europe has been very close. The GDR, for its part, has enjoyed a special relationship with the EEC owing to the fact that the Federal Republic has not considered it a foreign country; thus even within the present framework trade between the Germanies has been able to grow to an extensive volume.

Of the Eastern European countries, Hungary and Poland have shown interest in cooperation with EFTA. Also the Soviet Union has wanted to develop links to EFTA. Even before that, many approaches had come from Yugoslavia, although so far they have led to only limited cooperation.

Negotiations between EFTA and the EC now seems to have reached a stage in which discussion of economic cooperation within a broader European framework would not necessarily disturb them. However, EFTA cannot be an anteroom, nor a place of transit, nor a substitute for other forms of cooperation. We in Finland are prepared to commence negotiations about cooperation.

Especially Poland has turned to Western countries for economic aid. It appears that there is a considerable discrepancy between the needs announced and the aid on offer.

It is possible that the countries needing aid will not be able to cope with the fact that donors give only something out of their surpluses. Socialist countries have exploited resources with a heavy emphasis on benefit, and also heavily burdening nature. Aid should be so effective as to allow also old neglects to be redressed. Of cource, this will call for clear sacrifices on the part of the West.

In the development of European economic cooperation, the Federal Republic of Germany is obviously both capable and interested. It has played an active role in developing pan-European cooperation with neutral and nonaligned countries. This is understandable when one considers that it is probably the Germans that have been most at threat in the arms race. Prodigious power of destruction is located on their soil and aimed at targets on it.

Endeavours to mitigate the division of Europe and to lessen its adverse effects have also prompted activity on the part of the Federal Republic within the CSCE. I believe that will continue.

Talk of German reunification arouses unease in both East and West, and at least as much in the West as in the East. By contrast, practical measures with similar effects do not draw the same kind of opposition; by this I mean measures leading to a lessening of Europe's division, a strengthening of confidence-building measures and increasing economic interdependence on a Europe-wide scale.

Many a pressure rooted in question of nationality would ease if the significance of national boundaries as a factor dividing people were to dwindle. To quote freely from Urho Kekkonen's words at the opening of the CSCE conference in 1973, the way to increase security is not by raising border fences, but rather by abolishing obstacles to interaction between peoples.

Europe has given the world much that is good and much that is bad. Many wars into which other countries have been pulled have begun in Europe. The most recent example began 50 years ago.

That supporters of representative democracy lost to totalitarian forces in the struggle for power in Germany proved to have fateful consequences. Of cource, what representative democracy had taken charge of there after the First World War was the bankrupt estate of militarism. Its prospects for success were slender also because the victorious powers displayed great short-sightedness and because the world was plunged into a deep slump.

A lot has been learnt from those times, and it would be good to bear those lessons in mind, but seeking the quilty on grounds of nationality leads to false doctrines being embraced and spread, and distracts attention from where it ought to be focussed.

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Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio's speech in the Finnish Parliament, November 29, 1989

Mr Speaker,

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In implementing its European policy Finland holds fast to its established neutrality and strives to create even better conditions for it.

The Finnish Government is working from the assumption that the European Economic Space, or EES, aimed at by EFTA and the European Communities would, when realized, also create even better preconditions for the strengthening of economic cooperation throughout Europe.

In the negotiatons between EFTA and the EC, the Finnish Government has in principle continued to pursue the line it adopted on European integration back in the '50s. We wish to safeguard our vital economic and commercial interests and further our competitive position through solutions that harmonize with our foreign policy line.

The aim of the European Communities is to set up a political alliance. The EC is moving in this direction and political integration will be increasingly furthered. These developments must be noted. We must be able to pursue a credible neutrality policy in future, too, and we do not wish to become a member of the EC.

The present stage of integration faces us with some major new demands. Above all, we must view developments more comprehensively than before. Integration is also a dynamic process constantly taking on new form and content. It affects Finnish society over a broad front and goes much farther than a mere free trade system. Consequently, developments must be carefully monitored and the widest possible circles must be involved in the preparation and making of decisions.

In preparatory discussions to date, the EFTA countries have succeeded better than expected in establishing a common line. On the other hand, cooperation within EFTA needs to be closer if the best possible result is to be achieved in the actual negotiations with the EC.

Within the arrangement currently being worked out, the EFTA countries would be an equal part of the European Economic Space. They would be involved in the preparation, approval, application and supervision of regulations governing integration. It is the Government's aim to produce a model for decision-making in which decisions would not be binding on Finland against our will, and in which the status of our national bodies in the decision-making process can be adequately and reasonably safeguarded.

EFTA has performed an important role in developing European free trade. The question now posed concerns the role EFTA can play in a fast-changing Europe. Does it have a future? Can this be counted on?

I am convinced that, as the other pillar upholding the EES, EFTA will be at least as successful in the future as it has hitherto been in the past.

EFTA and the EES solution currently being devised seem to be of interest to a growing number of countries in Eastern Europe. Many would like closer relations with EFTA. The Finnish Government supports these ambitions. We hope that the EFTA countries can soon jointly offer these countries a positive response on closer cooperation.

The destruction caused by Second World War crushed the historical structures of interaction. The countries that have suffered most from this lie in a belt running down the middle of the continent from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean. A community of nations observing the principles of the CSCE is taking shape in Europe. But ensuring the right kind of development demands an open mind from us all. Marx once said, "Images of the past will haunt the younger generations like a nightmare." Could Marx possibly be wrong in this prophecy? Could it be that the new generations are emerging from the nightmare?

Finland intends to work to ensure that the many different opportunities for cooperation that have presented themselves on our continent are utilized to the full. For us, European integration represents a capacity and new potential for cooperation stemming from national differences. But as with a growing plant, so, without proper care of the roots, the growth of our continent will not yield the desired fruit.

Prime Minister Harri Holkeri's speech during the parliamentary debate on integration, December 4, 1989

Mr. Speaker,

The creation of a dynamic European Economic Space, or EES, will provide an opportunity to promote the expansion of economic relations, also outside the EES. In this sense, the EES is a key system. It will also create a foundation for furthering trade relations on a global scale.

Finland's basic position in the face of these developments is that its policy of neutrality must be retained as the crucial instrument of foreign policy.

We are not stepping forward into an integrated Europe furtively and fearfully, but as an independent European nation aware of its own goals and worth.

Similarly, we should not take offence from the debate currently going on in the outside world about the so-called 'Finnish model'. Rather, this debate seems to offer an opportunity for us to explain the basic principles of our foreign policy and show the world what modern Finland is made of.

We are a special case, and it is this that is our political strength. It also allows us to play a unique role on the world stage.

Finland's foreign policy choices, the unshakably democratic attitudes of the Finnish people and their intense desire not to depend on others are what preserved Finland's margin for independent manoeuvre during the Cold War.

But even in today's climate of vigorous détente, Finnish neutrality does not limit our potential for action. Neutrality is an instrument of foreign policy which has usefulness in situations other than those in which our security is at risk. In an integrated Europe, that neutrality is more, rather than less, important.

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As I see it, even in an integrated Europe the nation-states are unwilling to throw themselves on the mercies of a supranational authority. I assume that decisions will be made democartically even at the supranational centre of the new integration systems.

Finland has had to face major challenges before in managing its foreign relations or adjusting its economy overall. It has succeeded in its chosen course even when there has been public debate in Finland depreciating and, doubting 'little Finland's, negotiating capacities.

Finland is now integrating with the new economic order in Europe in its own interests. I t is not doing so to imitate others or because it would otherwise feel 'handicapped' as a European nation. Finland's values and cultural heritage are already European. We have always been part of Europe.

The EFTA and EC negotiators are experienced professionals and work from the assumption that each party will watch over its own interests-giving, taking and mediating. The aim is therefore a balance of benefits and responsibilities.

The high living standard in EFTA countries and the fine quality of their internal legislation, standards and way of life make for fairly easy adjustment to corresponding practices in the EC. In this respect, Finland, too, will have no great difficulty in adjusting to the fullest possible implementation of the four basic freedoms now proclaimed.

A dynamic EES will naturally have several dimensions, apart from economic aspects. It will offer Finnish citizens an equal opportunity for involvement in numerous forms of cooperation in integrated Europe. It will provide an opportunity to advance and enrich Finnish culture over a broader spectrum than ever before.

When speeking of the four freedoms, we can also speak of certain rights which are important to Finland.

The first of these rights is the preservation of our policy of neutrality. This also presupposes the right to retain our system of foreign and trade policy agreements.

We also have the right to watch over the needs of our own culture, while preserving its distinctive features. This does not mean setting up fences or erecting walls.

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So what does the European integration process signify for Finland's economic policy?

Even without integration in Europe, Finland has to cope with the challenges to its economic policy that now face us. Within the EES, a country's own economy must naturally be in good order. Without the EES, these challenges and the pressures they generate could well be much greater, however. The EES will, for instance, offer Finnish companies a splendid opportunity for a share in the European market on equal terms with their competitors.

In pondering the importance of the integration process it is good to keep in mind that Finland accounts for only one tenth of one per cent of the world population, a third of a per cent of world output and about one per cent of world trade. In this sense Finland is small. But it is also a country with a high income level, whose well-being depends crucially on how effectively we can exploit our own natural resources and know-how within a framework of international exchange.

Making full use of the benefits of integration presupposes broad legislative harmonization, and also abolition of the remaining regulations on import volumes and of other trade barriers and subsidies that distort competition.

Improving operating conditions on the market is not just necessary for the integration process, but also a way of making our own economy more efficient. This will lead to a faster rise in productivity and pricing that favours consumer.

The more open the market, the tougher the competition. For my own part, I take the view that Finland has a good chance of doing well in expanding international competition. We have a highly trained labour force, a dynamic industry ready to invest in the future, and a public sector that guarantees good basic services.

It is sometimes feared here that we will have to compromise on the standard of our public services because of integration. There is no justification for such fears. Public spending's share of GNP is below the European average. What is more, the government debt is lower than in any other country.

There is still good potential for raising our real competitive capacity. Industrial investment is brisk both in Finland and abroad, and productivity is rising quite rapidly. Furthering both basic research and research of direct value to industry is one of the present government's main focus areas.

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The Military Doctrine of Finland; Statement by the Chief of the the General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces, Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg; Seminar on Military Doctrine, Vienna, 17 January 1990

Introduction

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Finland is a neutral Nordic state. Neutrality is the method of Finland's foreign policy. We endeavour to stay outside the conflicts of interest between the great powers and military alliances. We maintain friendly relations with our neighbours as well as all other States, and contribute to the security of our continent.

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 prescribes certain military limitations on the quantity and quality of Finland's defence forces. These limitations do not, however, prevent an adequate development of our defence capabilities.

In the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, concluded with the Soviet Union in 1948, Finland provides guarantees that it will not allow its territory to be used for an attack against the Soviet Union.

We believe that no foreign powers have offensive interest in Finnish territory. A military threat to Finland could conceivably arise in connection with such a major European conflict which would entail a risk of involving our territory. Consequently, Finland's strategic significance depends on the extent to which, in the event of a conflict, Finnish territory could be used for military purposes. In order to deter any such use, Finland is prepared and intends to maintain a credible control of its territory and airspace by Finnish forces. It is crucial that our neighbours, as other countries, have confidence in our resolve and capability to control and defend our territory.

In our immediate security environment, the geostrategic focus has since the Second World War shifted from the Gulf of Finland to the southern part of the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, the High North of Europe has gained new strategic importance.

All parts of Finland will be defended. Southern Finland with its centres of population, Lapland and, of course, the country's airspace are particularly vital for our defence.

Interdependence and stability characterize the situation in the Nordic region. There are no sources of conflict among the five Nordic countries themselves, and they respect each other's security policy solutions. The absence of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries is an essential factor of stability in the entire region.

The Northwest ot the Soviet Union, bordering Finland and Norway, and the adjacent northern waters, are of major strategic significance. These areas play, therefore, an important role for the central nuclear balance as well as for the security of the whole region. For Finland, regional stability is of primary importance.

We believe that the defence forces of the neutral countries are recognized as a contribution to European stability. In this respect, the defence of Finland remains an important factor in the North of Europe.

The fundamental objective of Finnish security policy is to maintain freedom and independence and to prevent the country from being drawn into war. To achieve this and to prevent the exploitation of its territory for hostile purposes Finland maintains a defensive capability. In addition, the Defence Forces provide a flexible instrument of crisis management.

Objective of military defence

The objective of Finland's military defence is to make it prohibitively difficult for any potential aggressor to violate Finnish territory. The task of defence is to make an attack not worth the cost in terms of time, manpower and equipment lost by prolonged engagement in the Finnish direction.

In short, the ultimate goal is deterrence, not deterrence by punishment, but deterrence by denial of access. The military objective is, therefore, to raise the cost of attack higher than any conceivable benefit which the aggressor might hope to gain.

In order to make its military defence credible, a smaller neutral state must employ all the resources at its disposal.

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Doctrine: 1. Territorial defence

The military defence of Finland is based on the concept of territorial defence. In particular, it has been developed to benefit from the country's special geographic and climatic conditions.

The Finnish military doctrine is non-offensive. The defence of Finland begins at its borders.

The fully operational decentralized command and control system provideassurances against a surprised attack. At present, the peacetime command structure includes military areas divided into military districts. Military area commanders have full authority over preparations, readiness, mobilization and operations in their area. This system enables a rapid mobilization in every part of the country.

As Finland has no fully combat-ready standing forces, but mainly training units, mobilization is vital. All peacetime units have two main responsibilities. First, they carry out conscript and refresher training. Secondly, they also have certain readiness tasks. If needed, peacetime forces can be reinforced within hours by reservists to form various types of combat units. A fast deployment force of about 250 000 men, comprising the best-equipped Army brigades, the Frontier Guards, the Air Force and the Navy can be made combat-ready through acclerated mobilizing measures within a few days.

The fully mobilized wartime Defence Forces consist of approximately 530 000 men drawn from a pool of one million trained reservists. Time permitting, mobilization will be followed by a period of intense combat training. The bulk of these troops will be deployed within a week. Sparsely populated areas, such as Lapland, will receive reinforcements from central Finland.

Doctrine: 2. Territorial defence system

In the concept of territorial defence, the Army occupies a pivotal position. It carries the main burden for repelling an attack.

We have categorized our troops into local and general forces. The local forces are equipped mainly with light arms and mines. They form a network covering the whole country and defend sensitive limited targets and perform delaying action in their local surroundings. They are also prepared to carry out ranger- and guerilla-type operations.

The general forces of the Army will be concentrated to defend, hold and reoccupy key areas. While the main function of the local forces is to slow down and wear out the attack, the primary task of the general forces is to repel the aggressor. The system of territorial defence is a flexible one, using mobility, battle endurance and

exploitation of terrain to the fullest extent possible. Both types of forces provide support to each other in their respective primary tasks. In terms of numbers, in the fully mobilized Army there will be more than two hundred battalion- and company-sized local units, while the general forces will include two armoured and 25 infantry brigades.

The Navy and the Air Force play a particularly important role in safeguarding Finland's neutrality and territorial integrity. In defending the country against an invasion they have a role complementary to that of the Army.

Naval defence is mainly responsible for reconnaissance and the surveillance of territorial waters, repelling intrusions and delaying amphibious attacks. Its duties also include the control and protection of sea lines of communication. The principal areas of operation are, first, the large southwestern archipelago including the Åland Islands and, secondly, the inlet to the Gulf of Finland and the waters adjacent to the capital city of Helsinki.

Control of the airspace is for Finland – as for all countries – an especially demanding strategic and financial challenge.

The main responsibility of air defence is to prevent violations of Finnish airspace. Therefore, the principal tasks of our Air Force are surveillance, interception and reconnaissance. In times of crisis and war, the limited air defence capabilities will be devoted to protecting vital national assets and, thereafter, to give support to the Army and the Navy.

The Frontier and Coast Guard units, trained and equipped like regular military units, are subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. These units are of high professional military standard and can, if needed, be partly or wholly integrated into the Defence Forces.

In conclusion

Self-defence is the inherent right of all States, large or small. Every State has the right to defend its independence and to safeguard the lives and well-being of its citizens.

The Defence Forces are an integral part of the Finnish society, and they are firmly anchored in Finnish history. The Finnish people are today as determined to defend their country as they were fifty years ago.

Address by Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio at the preliminary budget debate in Parliament, September 19, 1989

Mr Speaker:

Amid a changing international situation the basic line of Finnish foreign policy meets our needs well. The changes going on involve challenges that should not be underestimated. We will succeed in answering the challenges if we hold on firmly to the foundations of our foreign policy. That means primarily good, trusting relations with our neighbours and our policy of neutrality.

With a dynamic process of change and reform going on in Europe and in our neighbour the Soviet Union, stability and persistence take on added importance in our relations with the Soviet Union.

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The rapid changes going on in Europe have led to emphasis on our neutral stance in debate about Finnish foreign policy. A wide variety of assessments have been made of the character of and developments in our neutrality policy. The debate has been stimulating, but from the Government's point of view has not brought out anything new that might call for a re-assessment of our chosen course.

Analysis of the implications of our neutrality policy is always necessary - and in the present situation, possibly more than ever before. The Government sees a policy of neutrality as a security policy choice by which we strive to keep out of disputes between the major powers.

There has been widespread discussion of our neutrality policy in connection with West European integration. Neutrality is not a concept known to trade policy. Yet trade policy cannot be pursued in a way that limits realization of our neutrality policy. From these points of departure it must be stated that Finland is not considering becoming a member of the European Communities. We can make other arrangements with the EC which are in our economic and other national interests.

International debate recently has tended to see Finland's standing abroad as a desirable model for the developments going on in certain East European countries. The response to this must be that the line of foreign policy that decides Finland's international standing is a specifically Finnish solution, born, bred and further developed specifically in Finland's social and historical circumstances. No country can import its foreign policy principles from elsewhere, and Finland does not wish to force its own solution on others. Every country must arrange its international relations for itself.

Each neutral country follows a line of neutrality adapted to its own particular circumstances. There are differences between them, which is only natural. Finland, too, decides for itself how to apply its own policy of neutrality and what that policy involves.

Foreign powers may, and indeed often do, have their own interests vis-à-vis the behaviour of a neutral nation. That is normal, and it is only wise to take it into account. A policy of neutrality is difficult to implement successfully unless others recognise it as such. However, the responsibility for putting it into practice lies with the neutral states themselves.

The status of the neutral countries has grown stronger as a result of developments in recent years. They can still work to achieve rapprochement between East and West, whether this means strengthening security or economic cooperation. It should be noted that the breakthrough in détente has only just taken place, and may still only be in its infancy. It includes some violent changes and uncertainties. The role of the neutral countries in European development is that of acting as reliable guides to cooperation. In Finland's view, the task of an active neutrality policy is far from being complete.

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Events in Finnish Foreign Policy, 1989

A. 1 General Developments, Parliament and Government

6.1. The five year plan for 1990-1994 by the Foreign Minister anticipated that the next CSCE follow-up meeting be held in Helsinki in 1992. Development aid will remain at 0.7 per cent of the gross national product. Finland is seeking full membership in European Space Agency ESA in 1992.

10.1. The Finnish Government proposed holding a conference on the protection of the environment in the Arctic areas soonest possible. Invitations would be sent to the Nordic countries as well as to the Soviet Union, Canada and the United States.

13.1. Foreign Minister Sorsa and Minister of the Environment Bärlund announced that the environmental conference of the Arctic countries would be held at ministerial level in Helsinki within the next two years. The purpose of the conference would be to conclude an agreement on the protection of the environment in the Arctic and set up an international body to monitor compliance.

24.1. Foreign Minister Sorsa tendered his resignation to President Koivisto. Sorsa wanted thus to give way to Social Democratic Party chairman Paasio in the cabinet.

26.1. SDP chairman Paasio was appointed as Foreign Minister.

1.2. Meeting of CE parliamentarians in Strasbourg, France recommended the acceptance of Finland as a member of the Council of Europe

1.1. The opening session of the parliament elected Kalevi Sorsa as the speaker.

1.2. A poll published by the Ministry of Labour examined the attitudes of Finns towards foreigners as well as alien policy. More than 30 per cent of those interviewed would like to accept more refugees than the official refugee quotas would indicate. Majority of Finns was prepared to grant aliens political rights after a few years stay in Finland.

10.2. A Government bill was submitted to the Parliament expanding the possibilities of aliens to have access to public posts.

14.-17.2. A meeting of the Baltic Commission was held in Helsinki. The meeting established a commission for the follow-up of earlier recommendations on reducing the pollutive waste by 1995. Greenpeace was accepted as an observer in the organization.

17.2. A poll was published on the views of Finns concerning security and foreign policies. 85 per cent of those interviewed regarded the Finnish foreign policy as successful and 74 per cent saw the Finnish Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) as a positive factor in view of Finland's international position.

24.2. The economic and working plan of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health for 1990-94 anticipated the expansion of refugee quotas annually by 100-150 refugees. At the end of the period the annual quota would be 1000 refugees.

3.3. The Parliament was submitted a Government bill proposing the adoption of the Council of Europe charter thus accepting the Finnish membership in the Council.

5.-7.3. A 124-country conference on the protection of the ozone layer was held in London. Minister of the Environment Bärlund suggested that the use of chemical substances depleting the ozone layer be abandoned by the year 2000.

7.3. According to an amendment in the law on associations, foreigners are permitted to join associations in Finland. Membership in political parties, however, is open only to citizens of the Nordic countries resident in Finland.

18.3. U.S. President George Bush appointed John Giffen Weinmann as new US ambassador to Helsinki.

18.4. The Parliament decided on Finnish membership in the Council of Europe. It also accepted a law on the Finnish delegation to the Council, consisting of five members and five substitutes.

24.4. The Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs Paavo Lipponen estimated that Finnish membership in the European Communities can come actual in the 1990s. The development will be largely dependent on the success in attempts to create a wider European Economic Space (EES) between EC and EFTA, as well as on general developments in Europe.

11.5. The Finnish action programme focusing on environment and development, based on the report of the so-called Brundtland commission, was completed. It suggested reductions in the consumption of energy, the development of agriculture and forestry according to more natural principles and reductions in traffic flows.

11.5. OECD presented its reports on the Finnish agricultural policy. According to the organization, excessive support for the agriculture has led to growing overproduction. The Finnish agricultural policy has too strong emphasis on self-reliance in times of crises instead of peace time self-reliance.

12.5. Finland will open a new embassy in Dublin, Ireland on August 1st 1989.

15.-20.5. Minister of the Environment Bärlund attended the 15. meeting of the UN Environmental Programme UNEP. The meeting outlined the focal areas for the international environmental cooperation in the 1990s.

19.5. The Finnish Meteorological Institute made public its estimates on the sulphur fallouts in Finland. According to those estimates, 40 per cent of them come from the Soviet Union, another 40 per cent from the Finnish industry and the remaining 20 per cent from the rest of Europe.

26.5. The Government set up a working group to make preparations for the financing of the environmental investments in the Eastern Europe.

31.5. The Government accepted a Ministry of Labour proposition regarding the opening the borders for foreign labour. This would be a means to moderate periodic shortages of labour. Finnish laws on social security and working conditions as well as collective labour agreements would be applied to foreign labour.

25.4. The delegation of Finland to the Council of Europe was confirmed by the Parliament. National Coalition MP Liisa Hilpelä was elected chairwoman. The delegation has nine other members.

26.4. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs distributed FIM 116.3 million to civic and missionary organizations to be used for development cooperation in 1989-91.

26.-28.4. An international follow-up meeting of the so-called Vienna convention on the protection of the ozone layer was held in Helsinki. The Finnish delegation was headed by Minister of the Environment Bärlund. Finland will examine possibilities to give monetary support to the developing countries in their attempts to solve their environmental problems.

2.-5.5. A ministerial meeting on environment was held in Helsinki, focusing on the strengthening of the Montreal agreement on the protection of the earth's ozone layer. There was a suggestion by President Koivisto that the use of chemical substances depleting the ozone layer be abandoned as soon as possible. He announced that Finland would increase by 50 per cent its support to the UN Environmental Programme UNEP. The meeting adopted a socalled Helsinki declaration, formulated by Finland, as an official appendix to the agenda. A separate working group was set up to look for ways which would enable the developing countries to switch over to technologies, less harmful for the ozone layer.

4.5. The refugee quota was expanded by the Government for the second time this year, increasing the quota from 400 to 500.

5.5. Finland became a member of the

Council of Europe.
5.6. Foreign Minister Paasio commented on the violent crushing of the Tiananmen demonstrations in Peking. It was stressed by the Foreign Minister that the developments that are transmitted to us are being followed with anxiety and shock in Finland.
9.6. The Government's Foreign Affairs Committee discussed the events in China on the basis of a report by Foreign Minister Paasio. In its public statement, the Government characterized the developments in China as worrisome. Finland would not, however, break its cooperation with China.
11.6. Foreign Minister Paasio argued that it would be justified to modernize the practice of public communiques in the context of visits of Heads of States between Finland and the Soviet Union.
13.6. In a written question, 41 members of Parliament demanded that the Government report on eventual sanctions against Chinese government as well as freeze for example trade relations and development aid to China.
19.6. A ministerial meeting on Eureka-programme was held in Vienna. The Finnish delegation was headed by Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen. Finland joined 8 of the 89 new projects.
1.7. Pasi Rutanen, deputy head of the Foreing Ministry's department for development cooperation, was appointed as Prime Minister's foreign policy advisor.
5.7. The Finnish UN battalion stationed in Namibia was informed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that holidays in South Africa by the UN soldiers were regarded as improper due to South African policy of apartheid.
16.7. In an article in newspaper Turun Sanomat docent Esko Antola from the University of Turku reviewed the prospects of neutrality in changing Europe. According to Antola, the European integration was changing the operational surroundings of the neutral countries to such an extent that the old concept of neutrality, born as a result of the second world war, was no longer applicable. New developments seem to set a demand for a new definition of neutrality. Neutral countries do not want to take part in military cooperation with in the EC, and are suggesting that it be excluded from the eventual membership. Secondly, the neutral countries should agree to accept the multinational decision making process, which membership in the EC entail. Acting on these they would be able to influence those EC decisions that in any case affect these countries.
21.7. Docent Antola elaborated on the concept of neutrality presented in his earlier article. He now laid a strong emphasis on re-evaluation of the concept of neutrality, he did not want to abandon the concept altogether. According to Antola, we might already in the next decade find ourselves in a situation where neutrality must be combined to multinational ties.
30.7.-2.8. Peace in the Nordic 2000 seminar was held in Kuhmo and Kostamus. Scholars from the Soviet Union and the United States attended the seminar which focused on peace research and environmental cooperation.
1.8. The amendments to the laws concerning the access of foreigners to public posts entered into force. The access was generally enlargened, but the highest posts remain open to Finnish citizens only.
11.8. It was announced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that a new office would be opened in Tallinn in the beginning of October. The new office would operate under the Leningrad consulate and deal primarily with visa applications.
16.8. Preparations for the conference for the environment protection in the Arctic areas will be launched at a subministerial level in Rovaniemi in 20th September 1989. Delegates from Nordic countries, the Soviet Union, Canada and the United States will attend.
31.8 Nordic members in the joint body for the European refugee organizations ECRE, reviewed the current status of refuees and the rise of racism in the Nordic countries. The meeting was held in Helsinki.
3.9. In his lecture in Paasikivi-Seura commemorating the late President Urho Kekkonen, the former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt estimated the political and economical situation in Europe. He reviewed the future prospects for the Soviet perestroika and modernization process in Eastern Europe as well as Western attitudes towards these developments.
19.9. Speaking in the Parliament, Foreign Minister Paasio announced that Finnish membership in EC is not being counsidered. Arrangements with the EC can be found which correspond to our economical and other national interests. These arrangements would have no impact on our policy of neutrality since neutrality cannot be considered a concept of trade policy.
20.-27.9 A preparatory meeting for the conference on environmental protection in the Arctic areas was held in Rovaniemi. A total of fifty delegates attended. All Nordic countries, the Soviet Union, Canada and the United States were represented. It was agreed in the meeting that further cooperation will focus on the definition of the pollutants threatening the area, agreeing on the follow-up of the state of the environment as well as finding ways for an enduring use of the natural resources in the area. A ministerial meeting on environment protection was to be held in Autumn 1990.
21.-29.9. The Finnish delegation to the Council of Europe attended to the autumn session of the Council. The session appointed secretary general in the Ministry of Justice Pekkanen as member in the CE court of human rights.
21.-24.9. National Coalition chairman Suominen and Prime Minister Holkeri took part in the Tokyo conference for International Democratic Union (IDU) leaders. The meeting focused on developments in China as well as Eastern Europe.
13.10. The Government decided that a report be submitted to the Parliament concerning Finland's positions towards the economic integration in Western Europe.
18.10. Minister of Education Taxell spoke on behalf of Finland in UNESCO general assembly in Paris. According to Taxell, the global structural change creates a need for abolition of illiteracy and also, need for efforts to tackle environmental problems by the means of education and science.
20.10. The Parliament was submitted a Goverment bill suggesting that foreigners be allowed to join political parties, associate freely and to make publications.
28.10. First meeting of Foreign Ministers of the four European neutral countries was held in Yverdomn, Switzerland. Foreign Minister Paasio attended the meeting, which suggested that the economic help to Poland and Hungary be channeled through OECD. It was decided that the ministerial meetings would continue.
22.11. The Government decided in principle that limitations on foreign ownership in Finland be moderated. Regardless of the branches of the economy, foreign ownership will be accepted in principle up to 100 per cent, if it is not in conflict with the national interests. As to the ownership of land and real estate, the current limitations will remain in force.
28.11. The Government informed the Parliament on its views on European integration. The Government regarded EFTA as the best instrument in the necessary arrangements in the integration process. Finland favours the creation of the EES (European Economic Space) consisting of 18 countries. The structure for decision-making has to be formulated to give the member countries really a say in future regulations within the area. Social security policy will continue to be arranged on a national basis. The opposition saw that the Parliament has too few possibilities to influence the integration process.
29.-30.11 The Parliament discussed the Government report on integration. According to the National Coalition, Finland should not hesitate in taking

part in the integration process. The Social Democrats wanted that environmental problems and social issues be kept in mind. The Centre thought that the government's goals in the negotiations on integration are not clear from the report. The SKDL estimated that the EC would play a predominant role in EES arrangements. The Greens saw participation in EES as a prelude to eventual full membership in the EC. The opposition demanded that the report be sent to relevant committees for further inquiry.

29.11. According to the Confederation of Finnish Industries the aim at creating a European Economic Space EES, which can be found in the Government's report, corresponds to the needs of the Finnish industry.

6.12. As expected, the Government got a clear victory in the vote ending the three-day discussion on integration. It was decided for example that Finland takes part in the negotiations on the European Economic Space EES.

11.12. A joint conference of the Finnish Government and OECD group of experts reviewed the impact of technology on social development. The conference was held in Helsinki.

11.12. The role of neutrality, and therefore the position of Finland have to be thought again due to the integration process, argued Rozanne Ridgeway, former U.S. ambassador to Helsinki on her visit to Finland.

13.12. In a meeting arranged by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Swedish scholar Bo Johansson argued that accepting the Finnish neutrality was an easy PR victory for Gorbachev. Johansson, whose doctoral thesis deals with Shoviet attitudes towards neutral countries also meant that "Finland is not as neutral as Sweden and Austria".

19.12. The Parliament's Constitutional Committee accepted the revision of the Constitution largely as drafted by the Government. In the new Constitution the election of the President would turn into an indirect, twostaged popular election and the Presidential incumbency would be limited to two consecutive terms.

20.12. In a statement by Foreign Minister Paasio on sending the American troops to Panama, it was emphasized that international disputes should be solved through negotiation without resorting to violence. Therefore it was most regrettable that the situation in Panama had developed into a military conflict.

22.12. The Finnish Government stated its hope that the developments in Rumania would take a peaceful course after the ousting of party leader Nicolae Ceausescu.

27.12. The Finnish Government discussed the situation of Rumania. In the meeting, a decision of aid package worth FIM 3 million was made. The money will be spent for purchases of medicine and hospital accessories in the Finnish Red Cross. Foreign Minister Paasio stressed that the new Rumanian leadership enjoyed full support of the Finnish Government.

28.12. The Finnish Government decided on FIM 3 million of additional aid to Rumania. A telegram sent by Prime Minister Holkeri to the Rumanian Salvation Front expressed Finnish solidarity.

A. 2 President

1.1. In his New Year's Speech President Koivisto noted that the improved superpower relations, progress in disarmament and settling of some regional conflicts must be seen as positive developments in the global situation. Becoming a member of the UN Security Council marks a great challenge to Finland. According to Koivisto, Finland has been somewhat hesitant to interfere in internal affairs of other countries, and this line will continue. International cooperation, he said, would be decisive in solving the environmental problems.

3.2. In his speech at the opening of the 1989 session of the Parliament President Koivisto found the draft revision of the Constitution, given to the Parliament by the Government, acceptable. He emphasized the importance of the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Central Europe as well as confidence-building measures in the northern seas.

20.2. Mr. and Mrs. President Koivisto attended the funeral of Emperor Hirohito in Tokyo. Koivisto also had meetings with the new Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Noburo Takeshita.

19.-21.4. Mr. and Mrs. President Koivisto visited Poland. The President met with the Head of State Wojciech Jaruselski and expressed Finnish support for the reforms in Poland. As to the development of cooperation in the field of environment, it was agreed that a joint working group be set up. Finland promised to supply Poland with know-how and technology.

26.5. An advisory committee was appointed by the President to prepare and analyze Finnish standpoints in connection with the negotiations on economic integration in Western Europe. Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen became chairman in a body consisting of 43 members.

16.6. In an interview published in the newspaper Savon Sanomat, President Koivisto noted that the events in China do not affect Sino-Finnish economic relations.

22.8. President Koivisto commented in Mikkeli the recent discussion on a claimed shift in Finnish foreign policy. In the background there was the exchange of views concerning integration policy as well as the so-called FCMA-pact with the Soviet Union. According to Koivisto, the Government had already made itself clear in these points. If there is to be a change in Finnish foreign policy, it will be announced, said the President.

11.9. In an interview published in West-German magazine der Spiegel, President Koivisto estimated that the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were developing to a more natural direction. Finnish neutrality is, he said, incompatible with the EC-membership.

24.9. In an interview in newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, President Koivisto rergarded Finnish EC-membership as impossible. However, the most important project in Finnish foreign and trade policy for the time being is the establishment of European Economic Space EES. Western integration cannot be seen as an obstacle to the development of trade and economic relations with Eastern Europe, said Koivisto. From the perspective of Finland and other EFTA countries, taking part in the integration process brings more advantages than staying outside, because it is through participation that we get the best possibilities to exert influence. Koivisto found it unnecessary to make any changes in the FCMA-pact.

1.-5.10. Mr and Mrs. President Koivisto made a state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. In the delegation were Foreign Minister Paasio, Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen as well as representatives of the Finnish industry. In the discussions with his host, President Richard von Weizsäcker President Koivisto presented the Finnish views to European integration. Koivisto estimated that problems in Eastern Europe would bring economical and environmental problems also to Western Europe. He said that Finland is a willing host for the highest political representatives of the CSCE countries, when the fourth follow-up meeting is held in Helsinki in 1992.

10.10. President Koivisto said that he has no knowledge of any plans concerning an international summit in Helsinki in autumn 1990. According to some news reports, this summit would have been suggested by the Soviet Union. As to the proposed customs union between EFTA and EC, the President noted that this is not the right way of arranging relations between the two organisations. He also regarded Finnish associate membership in EC as unthinkable. Koivisto estimated that EFTA will not adopt multinational decision-making procedures.

27.11. President Koivisto held a speech in the annual meeting of the Paasikivi society. According to Koivisto, the

overall pattern in Europe will not change very quickly, due to the strong interests blocking rapid changes. Finland is prepared for negotiations on cooperation between EFTA and some Eastern European countries.
30.11. President Koivisto reviewed his state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany to the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. He also spoke on the developments in the two Germanies from the perspective of our view on Europe and described his talks with the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

A. 3 Political Parties and Non-Governmental Organizations

24.1. Foréign Minister Sorsa attended a Stockholm meeting of Social Democratic Foreign Ministers of Finland, Sweden and Norway. Joint efforts to advance the Middle East peace process were discussed.
9.-10.3. Leaders of member parties in the Socialist International held a meeting in Vienna. From Finland the Social Democratic Party (SDP) chairman Paasio attended.
17.3. In their meeting, the international sections of the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) and the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) reviewed Finlands joining the Council of Europe. No obstacles were seen, although the membership may have some negative consequences.
14.-19.5. The Centre of Finland hosted a visit by the Soviet Communist Party delegation. The delegation was headed by Boris Bugo, member in the party central committee and chairman of the control committee. The delegation also had a meeting with President Koivisto.
11.-18.6. A SKDL delegation visited the Soviet Union. In its meeting with the Soviet Communist party representatives, the SKDL made initiatives on increased cooperation in the field of environment, improving information links, abolition of visa procedures and development of mutual trade on free currencies.
15.6. The working committee of the Swedish People's Party noted that it is not justified to severe trade links with China as a protest to the violent crushing of Peking demonstrations.
20.-22.6. The Congress of the Socialist International was held in Stockholm. The SDP delegation was led by Party chairman Paasio. SDP invited all leftist parties in Europe to a joint forum which would be held in Finland in autumn 1990. The central themes of the forum would be security issues, economic cooperation and environmental questions.
20.7. The Social Democratic Party marked the 90th anniversary of its foundation. The declaration given by the party on the occasion called for the protection of the environment, with effective national laws and binding international agreements.
14.8. The Swedish People's Party suggested that Finland accept Hungarian refugees from Rumania.
25.-27.8 The Sosial Democratic Party had its 90-year celebrations in Turku. Mr. and Mrs. President Koivisto attended the occasion.
24.-29.9. The SKP delegation on East-West trade made a visit to the Soviet Union. New challenges to the economic cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union were discussed, also increased cooperation between Soviet Karelia and Eastern Finland.
24.-26.9. The Christian League participated in the Tallinn seminar of the christian parties in the Baltic and Nordic countries. In their declaraton the parties demanded the cancellation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
25.-28.9. Delegation of the Finnish Centre, headed by its chairman Väyrynen, visited the Soviet Union. The visit was arranged to celebrate the 15 year old relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Finnish Centre.
11.-14.10. The annual meeting of the Liberal International was held in Paris. From Finland, the Finnish Centre, Swedish People's Party and Liberal People's Party were represented. The meeting adopted a resolution on disarmament, formulated by the Swedish People's Party and also, a resolution on environment formulated by the Finnish Centre.
28.30.11. A Swedish People's Party delegation visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet CSCE committee. The delegation was headed by party chairman Taxell.
16.-27.12. The Finnish Green League took part in the Brussels meeting of European green parties. The meeting called upon the Western Europe that it keep in mind its ecological and social responsibilities when cooperating with Eastern Europe. The meeting attracted groups from 23 countries. The chairwoman of the Finnish Green League Hautala was elected in the fivemember Secretariat of the European greens.

A. 4 Disarmanent

7.-11.1. The 149 country conference on chemical disarmament was held in Paris. Finland was represented by Foreing Minister Sorsa, who addressed the conference on 10.1. In his speech, Sorsa announced that Finland will take steps to instruct experts from the developing countries in the methods and equipment for controlling the ban on chemical weapons that is being negotiated.
16.3. Finland addressed the Geneva Disarmament Conference, stating its desire for full membership. Finland has acted as an observer since the foundation of the body and carried out research to advance negotiations on disarmament.
21.7. Finland announced in the Geneva disarmament Conference that it is able to instruct representatives of the developing counrtries in the verification of use and production of chemical weapons. The first course would start in the beginning of 1990.

A. 5 Defence

2.1. The Ministry of Defence published its financial and operational plan for 1990-94. It totalled FIM 15,8 billion, the increase in defence expenditures being 10,7 per cent. The Ministry suggested for example the modernization of the interceptor aircraft.
25.1. A draft law on state of defence was given to Minister of Defene Norrback by the Parliamentary Committee on the state of war. The new draft would replace the 1930 law on the state of war.
12.5. Head of the general staff, vice-admiral Jan Klenberg was appointed as Commanding General of the Defence Forces. He will take up his post on 1.3.1990.
21.7. Minister of Defence Norrback suggested that the system of conscription that is used by the Swiss defence forces, would be adopted in Finland. The actual military service lasts approximately four months, after which the conscripts are called to exercises of the reserve every year for ten years.
29.-30.7. The European Congress of Conscripts convened in Vantaa. Official delegations from seven countries attended, together with several observers. European threat perceptions and South-European conscripts were on the congress agenda.
25.9. Minister of Defence Norrback estimated that there may have to be an increase in the defence budget in order to finance the new interceptor aircraft. The Commanding general of the Defence Forces Valtanen however argued that the purchase of new aircraft needs not at any rate lead to a substantial increase in defence expenditures.
26.11. Vice-admiral Klenberg called for an increase in the level of the defence expenditures in the budget. The superpower relations are clearly becoming less dangerous, but the collapse of the established power structures in Europe involves also risks that have to be taken into account and preparations must be made for that.
14.12. The effectiveness of the security policy is increasingly important for

neutral countries like Finland, due to the changes in the security situation. This was the main theme elaborated by Tomas Ries, senior research fellow in the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, during his visit in Helsinki.

17.12. Prime Minister Holkeri estimated that the security issues relating to the northern seas have an increased actuality, due to the decrease in arms build-up in the Central Europe. The threat perceptions concerning Finland have, however, not changed.

19.12. The Commanding General of the Defence Forces Valtanen said in his order of the day that West European integration and rapid changes in the East Europe have hardly any effect on the basic goals and tasks of our security policy. The breaking up of old power structures in Europe has brought to the front pressures for changes that can break out in an unforeseeable way and cause security problems. Therefore the defence forces must continue to act anc be developed from known principles.

20.12. Foreign Minister Paasio noted that the Commanding General of the Defence Forces should not interfere in the conduct of foreign policy the way he did in his 19.12. order of the day. The conduct of foreign policy belongs to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and it is up to the President to decide who is entitled to make public speeches on it.

22.12. The Commanding General of the Defence Forces Valtanen denied having interfered in the counduct of foreign policy, as suggested by Foreign Minister Paasio.

B. 1 Finnish Relations with the Soviet Union and Nordic Countries

10.1. The meeting of Nordic Ministers of Environment was held in Helsinki. A new Nordic environmental programme for cooperation and an action plan to prevent pollution of the seas were signed.

31.1. In Copenhagen, Nordic Cooperation Ministers presented their report on Nordic cooperation in establishing links with the EC. EFTA was generally considered as the most important instrument in these efforts. In addition, there is an attempt at utilizing the Nordic cooperation whose ultimate aim was considered to be the establishment of common home and transport market. The report was titled "Nordic Countries in Europe II".

6.2. The meeting of the leaders of Nordic Conservative Parties accepted a resolution on European integration. The meeting also discussed the developments in Eastern Europe, environmental and energy issues as well as workings of the Nordic Council.

26.2. In their meeting in Stockholm, the Nordic Prime Ministers reviewed the EFTA-EC relationship in view of the forthcoming meeting of heads of governments of EFTA in Oslo.

27.2.-3.3. The Nordic Council held its 37th session in Stockholm.

3.3.-21.3. Nordic foreign minister meeting was held in Faroe Islands. According to the ministers, a peace conference should be organized to solve the problems in the Middle East. All parties of the dispute as well as permanent members in the United Nations Security Council should attend. The Nordic countries announced they would relax visa regulations for South African citizens.

19.4. The joint Gulf of Bothnia Committee of Finland and Sweden launched a research project studying the pollution of the Gulf of Bothnia and factors contributing to it. The results would be published in 1993.

12.-13.6. Prime Minister Holkeri hosted the summer meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers in Finland. The meeting discussed support to the Eastern Europe, relations with the EC as the violent actions of the Chinese government in crushing student demonstrations in Peking.

15.6. In Copenhagen, the Nordic Cooperation Ministers adopted a working programme for 1989-92 concerning the status of the Nordic countries in Europe.

20.6. A meeting of the Nordic ministers of cosumer issues was held in Copenhagen. The meeting was dedicated for making plans for common principles and methods of labeling products not harmful to the environment.

26.-27.6. Finnish Minister of the Environment Bärlund and his Swedish counterpart made an attempt at clearing the differences between the two countries on pollutive discharges and examined the plans for environment protection of the industrial plants seen as the worst polluters of the Gulf of Bothnia in both countries.

30.6.-2.7. Green and environmental movements from the Baltic region held their meeting in Kotka. The meeting critizised the workings of the Helsinki Commission, which is a joint environmental commission of the whole Baltic region. A communication network for citizens would be established for information exchange on environmental issues relating to the Baltic sea, and also an information center for the Baltic.

22.6. A 72-point joint working plan "Nordic Countries in Europe 1989–92" was published. The plan focused on strengthening the Nordic home market and its position within the European integration.

23.-28.7. A joint event "Nature and Peace 1989" was arranged in Kirkenäs, Norway and Murmansk, Soviet Union. The event was organized by activists from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Soviet Union and it focused on security and environmental issues pertaining to the Northernmost parts of the participating countries.

14.-15.8. The autumn meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers was held in Iceland. The meeting discussed the working programme of the next UN session of the UN General Assembly. The ministers reviewed the chances for improved contacts to the Baltic countries as well as for arranging a meeting for all littoral states of the Baltic to reduce the pollution of the sea.

14.-15.8. In the meeting of Nordic Cooperation Ministers, it was noted that the cooperation programme "Nordic Countries in Europe 1989–92" will become a central theme in Nordic cooperation, together with environmental issues. From Finland, Minister of Justice Louekoski attended.

29.8. In the environmental conference of the Council of Ministers of the Nordic Countries in Gothenburg, three programmes for environment protection were handled and the Nordic support investments for East-European environment protection were agreed upon in principle. The final decision will be taken by the Nordic Council in its March 1990 meeting.

29.8. During the "Air Protection Days" in Lappeenranta, a joint programme for air protection of all Nordic countries was presented. The programme aims at a considerable reduction of sulphur and nitric discharges. The protection programme would be submitted to the Ministers of the Environment.

28.9. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement noted that the Soviet Union puts a high value on what was termed as deliberative Finnish integration policy. A possible definition of Finnish neutrality in the joint declaration of the Gorbachev visit can be altered if necessary. Changes in the Finnish-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) were seen as unjustified, according to the statement it will form the basis of the relations of the two countries also in the next century.

16.-18.10. The conference on the protection of the seas initiated by the Nordic Council, was held in Copenhagen. Members of Parliament from Finland and 16 other countries attended. The joint declaration called for the establishment of an international fund to support the solution of environmental problems in Eastern Europe. It also demanded that the sea areas that are most threatened be listed and an action plan be made to improve their condition.

28.10. Elsi Hetemäki-Olander, chairwo-

man to the organization Pohjola-Norden, argued in the organization's meeting in Mikkeli, that the Nordic countries must, in the midst of European integration processes, stress their common values, common culture and social dimension.
2.11. The Nordic Parliamentary Commision on nuclear free zone in the Nordic area urged the governments to complete the work of the Commission by Nordic Foreign Minister meeting in March 1990 meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers.
13.-15.11. An extraordinary meeting of the Nordic Council was held in Maarianhamina. The meeting decided to send its General Secretary to Moscow to negotiate about cooperation between the Nordic Council and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Nordic Ministers of the Environment announced that a Nordic company of risk capital would be established to reduce the level of pollution of the air and the water in East-European countries. The Prime Ministers in their turn stressed that it is important that EFTA sticks to the schedule planned for the integration. Finance Ministers set a goal at abolishing the remaining obstacles for free capital movements by July 1990.
16.-17.12. In the meeting of the standing commission of the Finnish and Soviet central organizations for trade unions, it was suggested that from each country, target areas should be chosen, whose problems would then be discussed jointly between the two parties.

B. 3 Finland and the CSCE

3.1. Neutral and non-aligned countries submitted their draft final document for the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting be held in Helsinki 1992.
10.2. The Finnish delegation to forthcoming CSCE talks on disarmament was appointed. Ambassador Markku Reimaa became head of the delegation.
6.-8.3. A Foreign Minister meeting for 35 CSCE countries was held in Vienna. From Finland, Foreign Minister Paasio attended.
16.4.-13.5. An information forum connecting to the CSCE process was held in London, with delegations from all 35 countries. The forum focused on problems connecting to the access and distribution of information.
19.6. Finland addressed the CSCE conference on human rights in Paris. The speech emphasized the necessity of preserving the status of national minorities.

B. 4 Finland and the UN

1.1. Finland started its two-year term in the UN Security Council.
9.1. Finland addressed the Security Council after the shooting down of two Libyan air planes by the US armed forces in the Mediterranean. Finland expressed the hope that international regulations for marine and air force behaviour would be established.
11.1. The UN Security Council voted on a draft resolution on the air incident between the United States and Libya. Finland abstained from voting for what were described as imbalances in the text of the resolution.
17.2. The Security Council voted on a resolution condemning the Israeli actions in occupied Palestinian territories as violations to the human rights. Finland voted in favour of the resolution.
20.2. Total of 886 peacekeepers were put at the disposal of the United Nations in carrying out the Namibian peace plan.
9.4. First contingents of the Finnish UN Peacekeeping force left for their destination in Namibia.
10.6. In the UN Security Council, Finland called upon Israel to act in a more conciliatory way and asked for new moves to sort out the ongoing disturbances in the occupied Palestinian territories.
24.7. Finland received from the UN instructions it had requested on Namibian peacekeepers and their holidays in South Africa. The Organization did not forbid these holidays. Finnish Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, found these holidays inappropriate, since Finland does not approve of the South African policy of apartheid.
20.-29.9. Foreign Minister Paasio visited the U.S. and attended the UN General Assembly in New York. In his address on 26.9., he emphasized the importance of continued superpower dialogue as well as reductions on conventional armaments in Europe.
17.11. Finland abstained from voting when the UN General Assembly voted on the situation of Kamputshea. A total of 124 countries supported the resolution which stated the hope that the coalition led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk would lead the country.
21.12. In the UN Security Council Session devoted to Panama, Finland suggested that the Security Council demand an immediate ceasefire in Panama and the withdrawal of U.S. troops to their bases. A military intervention is an disproportionate response to events in Panama, although drug traffficking and other illegalities can not be accepted.

B. 5 Finland and Global Questions: LDCs

1.2. Finland signed, together with other Nordic countries, agreements with SADCC-countries on a Norsad fund promoting the flow of capital to SADCC countries. Agreements on cultural cooperation and the Taara railway in Tanzania were also signed.
15.6. An independent expert group reviewing the Finnish development aid found that the basic principles behind the Finnish aid were correct. The aid must not be too dispersed. Solving the problems of the third world reguires moderation of the rate the population increases, and finding a solution to environmental and debt problems. Foreign minister Paasio noted that it is necessary to have a new post in the Government – that of a Minister for Development Cooperation.
12.11. In the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, the director of the Institute for Development Studies Kiljunen reviewed the Finnish development aid and its appropriateness. The most problematic feature in the development aid is not its volume but its allocation within societies. In present forms, the aid only stregthens the well-off elites in the developing countries rather than improves the conditions of the poor.
21.12. Ministry for Foreign Affairs presented its plans for development cooperation for 1991-1994. There will be a decrease in the amount of aid fo countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Peru, Somalia and Burma due to their internal situations. According to the plan, in 1993 the aid would total FIM 1,2 billion. Finland is starting the preparatory work for longterm development aid for Namibia.

C. 1 Trade Policy: Western Europe

19.-20.1. The first meeting for trade union leaders from EFTA countries was held in Vienna. From Finland, the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) chairman Viinanen attended. In its declaration, the meeting considered EFTA as the appropriate instrument in talks with the EC.
14.-15.3. Prime Minister meeting of EFTA countries in Oslo focused on arranging the relations with the EC. From Finland, Prime Minister Holkeri attended. The meeting prepared a declaration for the joint ministerial meeting of EFTA and EC countries to be held on 20.3. A decision was made on closer communication within EFTA. EFTA fishing markets will be freed taking into account the reservations requested by Finland.
20.3. The joint ministerial meeting of EFTA and EC was held in Brussels. Finland was represented by Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen.
25.-26.5. A meeting of EFTA parliamentarians was held in Helsinki. The meeting supported the idea of establishing a joint fund to strengthen the protection of the environment in East-

ern Europe. The aim is to present an initiative to the EFTA governments in the beginning of 1990. The parliamentarians discussed finding a so-called third road in establishing relations with the EC.

13.-14.6. EFTA ministerial meeting was held in Kristiansand in Norway. From Finland, Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen attended. EFTA will be ready to enter formal negotiations with the EC in 1990 on opening the public procurements and works for free competition within the European Economic Space EES. The EFTA fishing markets will be freed in 1990 with the exception of the reservations granted to Switzerland.

4.7. The EFTA-EC follow-up commission reviewed the need for changes in the Finnish legislation in trying to adapt to the development of inner markets within the EC. According to the review, the necessary amendments are not essential, despite the differences in EC directives and certain Finnish laws.

19.7. Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen explained the integration talks carried out so far between EFTA and the EC, and characterized them as satisfactory. The idea of a possible customs union between the two organizations had not, according to him, been totally rejected.

25.7. A joint working group of EFTA and EC officials presented their raport on tree labour movements in 18 West European countries. Finland is prepared to accept free movements of labour together with other countries.

20.10. A joint working group of EC and EFTA officials agreed upon basic alternatives, that laid the basis for political talks on bringing the two organizations closer together.

27.10. Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen participated in an EFTA-meeting in Geneva which handled a suggestion by a working group of high-level officials on the creation of the European Economic Space EES. The meeting considered the paper submitted to it as a good starting point for further actions.

11.-12.12. EFTA ministerial meeting in Geneva prepared the time goals for the EES negotiations between the EC and EFTA. From Finland, Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen participated.

19.12. The EFTA and EC joint foreign ministerial meeting was held in Brussels with the participation of Foreign Minister Paasio and Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen. In the meeting, a joint declaration on formal negotiations between the organizations was signed. According to the declaration, the talks on the creation of a European Economic Space EES would start in 1990. The declaration also called for intensified cooperation in other fields.

C. 2 Trade Policy: The Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe

26.-28.4. The intergovernmental economic commission between Finland and the Soviet Union launched the preparations for the fiveyear trade agreement for 1991-1995. The Finnish party was chaired by Prime Minister Holkeri, the Soviet side by Vice Prime Minister Kamentsev. The agreement only defines quantities to be imported, without mentioning the values as had been done so far. Also, the total value of exports is no more stipulated beforehand.

9.5. Prime Minister Holkeri noted that the trade to the East had reached a good level, tanks to the new payment arrangements. Different projects and possibilities opened by the economic reforms contribute to the fact that imports can be expanded. Clearing trade will remain as the primary mode of trade also for the next five-year period.

19.8. The Soviet Union left bids for a contract to the Finnish national road administration concerning the construction of the Päijänne–Keitele channel. The work would be assumed in early 1990 and the waterway would be completed in 1993.

D. 1 Visits form Finland

8.-11.1. Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen visited Portugal. He had discussions with Portugal's Minister of Trade and Industry Joaquim Ferreira do Amiral on for example trade relations between the two countries.

7.2. Foreign Minister Paasio visited Sweden and met Foreign Minister Sten Andersson.

18.-23.3. Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen visited Pakistan, where he had a meeting with President Ghulam Ishaq Kahn.

27.-28.3. Foreign Minister Paasio visited the Soviet Union. Paasio had a meeting with Foreign Minister Edward Shewardnadze who announced that President Gorbachev will visit Finland in the autumn of 1989.

13.-16.4. Foreign Minister Paasio visited Hungary. Paasio suggested that a European Forum on disarmament be organized in the future. Paasio had a meeting with Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi.

19.-21.4. Minister of the Environment Bärlund paid a visit to Estonia, hosted by Minister of the Environment Tiit Nuudi. It was agreed that environmental cooperation between the two countries be enhanced.

11.-19.5. Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen visited China.

5.6. Minister of Social Affairs and Health Halonen visited Borås, Sweden. She proposed an additional agreement for the Nordic countries on social security and health services of emigrants and immigrants.

12.-16.6. An official parliamentary delegation visited Bulgaria.

13.-15.6. Minister of Social Affairs and Health Halonen attended an international meeting in Geneva on refugee situation in Southeast Asia.

26.-29.6. Prime Minister Holkeri visited Iceland where he had a meeting with Prime Minister Steingrimur Hermansson.

8.-9.8. Minister of labour Puhakka visited Sweden. He agreed with the Swedish Minister of Labour Ingela Thalen upon establishment of a working group to study labour union activities across the borders.

10.-11.8. Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen visited the Soviet Union to negotiate on the exchange of commodities and payments for 1991-95.

4.-8.9. Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen paid a visit to the United States where he met with Trade Minister Robert Mosbacher.

17.-27.9. A delegation of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee visited Botswana and Namibia to become acquainted with the Namibian independence process. In Botswana, the delegation had a meeting with Vice President Peter Mmusi, Foreign Minister Gaositwe Chiepe and SADCC General Secretary Simba Makon. In Namibia, the delegation met the Finnish UN troops, UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari as well as representatives of Swapo and South Africa in the country.

20.-29.9. Foreign Minister Paasio visited the United States. Among other people, he had meetings with Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and the Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shewardnadze.

19.10. Foreign Minister Paasio visited Sweden where he met Foreign Minister Sten Andersson.

31.10-3.11. Prime Minister Holkeri visited the Great Britain. He had discussions with Prime Minister Thatcher on environmental questions as well as integration in Western Europe.

7.-9.11. Foreign Minister Paasio attended a Washington conference organized to celebrate the 70 years of Finnish-American diplomatic relations.

8.-11.11. Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen in China. He had meetings with Prime Minister Li Peng and Foreign Trade Minister Zheng Tuob.

13.11. Foreign Minister Paasio visisted Denmark where he met Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen.

16.11. Foreign Minister Paasio attended a meeting for European Council Foreign Ministers in Strasbourg, France. The meeting expressed the desire to stregthen the role of the council to improve cooperation in the whole of Europe.

1.-3.12. National Coalition leader Suo-

minen visited the Federal Republic of Germany where he attended a conference on Finnish – German economic relations. Suominen also had a meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl.
10.12. SAK Chairman Viinanen visited Hungary to introduce for example the Finnish policies on wages and trade unions to his Hungarian hosts.
13.12. Foreign Minister Paasio attended a 24 country ministerial meeting in Brussels. Economic help for Hungary and Poland were on the agenda. Paasio also had a meeting with the U.S. Foreign Minister James Baker.

D. 2 Visits to Finland

9.-10.1. The Swedish Minister of the Environment Birgitta Dahl gave a lecture in Finland–Sweden Society on her country's environmental policy.
16.-17.1. Leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization PLO Jasser Arafat visited Finland. He had meetings with President Koivisto, Prime Minister Holkeri, Foreign Minister Sorsa and Parliament Speaker Ahde. The discussions dealt with the situation in the Middle East and ways of advancing the idea of a Middle East peace conference. Arafat said he hoped for a joint Nordic initiative on Middle East peace process.
2.-4.2. Unesco General Secretary Federico Mayor visited Finland. He met President Koivisto, Prime Minister Holkeri and Foreign Minister Paasio.
6.-10.2. The Soviet Finance Minister Boris I. Gostev. He met the chairman of the Economic Commission Sorsa as well as Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen.
20.-24.2. Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs from Syria visited Finland.
4.-5.4. The Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van der Broek visited Finland. He had meetings with President Koivisto, Foreign Minister Paasio and Parliament Speaker Sorsa.
9.-11.4. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gerhanu Bayih made an official visit to Finland.
23.-26.4. Italian Parliament Speaker Giovanni Spadolini visited Finland and had meetings with President Koivisto, Prime Minister Holkeri, Foreign Minister Paasio and Parliament Speaker Sorsa. Spadolini expressed his hope that Finland as a neutral country could get as a mediator within the Council of Europe when human rights issues are handled.
25.4. The Nordic representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sören Jessen-Petersen visited Finland. He hailed the growth of the Finnish refugee quota as a positive delvelopment as well as the improvements in the new legislation on refugees.
26.-28.4. The Foreign Minister of Cyprus Giorgios Iacovou visited Finland. He met President Koivisto and Foreign Minister Paasio. The discussions dealt with enhancing the economic cooperation between the two countries as well as the situation in Cyprus.
9.-10.5. The US Foreign Minister Baker paid a visit to Finland during which he had meetings with President Koivisto and Prime Minister Holkeri. The dicussions dealt with international economy and the perestroika policies in the Soviet Union.
17.-19.5. An East German parliamentary delegation headed by the speaker of the National Chamber Horst Sindermann visited Finland. He had meetings with President Koivisto, Parliament Speaker Sorsa and Foreign Minister Paasio.
18.-20.5. Swiss Foreign Minister Rene Felber visited Finland. He suggested that the four neutral countries of Europe start meeting regularly at foreign ministerial level like the Nordic countries do. Felber met President Koivisto, Foreign Minister Paasio and Parliament Speaker Sorsa.
4.-6.6. Pope John Paul II made a visit to Finland during which he had a meeting with President Koivisto.
9.-11.6. The chairman of the chiefs of staff of the US armed forces, admiral William J. Crown visited Finland. He had meetings with President Koivisto, Defence Minister Norrback and Commanding General Valtanen.
13.6. Foreign Minister of Egypt Abdel Meguid visited Finland. He met President Koivisto, Foreign Minister Paasio and Parliament Speaker Sorsa.
18.-19.6. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans visited Finland. In the discussions the East-West relations, events in China as well as developments in Kampuchea and South-Africa were handled. Evans appealed that Finland would work to advance the protection of the South Sea. He had meetings with President Koivisto, Foreign Minister Paasio and Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen.
20.-22.6. The General Director of European Space Agency ESA Reimar Lust negotiated in Finland about eventual Finnish full membersip in ESA.
21.6. Karel van Miert, EC Commission Member and responsible for traffic questions, reviewed the traffic arrangements between EC and Finland. Among those he met was Traffic Minister Vennamo.
27.-28.6. General Director Hiroshi Nakajima of World Health Organization WHO visited Finland.
3.-5.7. King of Spain Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia made a state visit to Finland. They had meetings with President Koivisto, Prime Minister Holkeri, Foreign Minister Paasio and Parliament Speaker Sorsa. The Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Ordonez and Foreign Minister Paasio discussed European Integration, Austrian relations and workings of the European Council.
19.-20.7. The French Minister for Agriculture and Forestry Henry Nallet visited Finland. He met with Minister for Agriculture and Forestry Pohjala and Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen. Ministers Nallet and Pohjala announced a plan to convene a European ministerial meeting which would deal with the protection of the forests of the continent.
28.-30.7. King of Sweden Carl XVI Gustaf and Queen Silvia visited Finland. They participated in the 350th anniversary celebrations of the town of Savonlinna and had a meeting with President and Mrs Koivisto.
31.7.-6.8. Estonian Prime Minister Indrek Toome visited Finland. He had meetings with Prime Minister Holkeri and Minister for Education Taxell.
16.-18.8. The Soviet defence minister Dmitri Jazov visited Finland. He had meetings with President Koivisto, Defence Minister Norrback and Commanding General Valtanen.
23.-25.8. French Foreign Trade Minister Jean-Marie Rausch visited Finland. He had discussions with Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen on European Integration, GATT-negotiations as well as trade between Finland and France.
27.-31.8. A parliamentary delegation from Iceland visited Finland headed by Speaker Gudrun Helgadottir. She met President Koivisto, Parliament Speaker Sorsa, Prime Minister Holkeri and Foreign Minister Paasio.
30.8. French minister for European affairs Edith Cresson visited Finland at the invitation of Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen. She also met President Koivisto and Foreign Minister Paasio.
3.-5.9. General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Labour party Karoly Grosz visited Finland. He had meetings with President Koivisto, Foreign Minister Paasio as well as Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen.
11.-14.9. The Soviet Marshal Sergei Ahromejev visited Finland at the invitation of the Finnish Commanding General Valtanen. He had meetings with President Koivisto and Defence Minister Norrback.
11.-15.9. The King of Nepal and Queen Aishwarya paid a visit to Finland. The King had discussions with President Koivisto and had a meeting with Parliament Speaker Sorsa. During the visit an agreement was reached on an electricity project worth FIM 50 million, which will be carried out as a part of the Finnish development aid programme.
21.-22.9. Frans Andriessen, member of the EC commission and responsible for its foreign relations, visited Finland. He met President Koivisto, Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen and Education Minister Taxell.
24.-28.9. Delegation from the Albanian parliament, headed by the Secre-

tary of the National Assembly Sihat Tozain, visited Finland. The delegation had discussions with Prime Minister Holkeri, Minister of Justice Louekoski and Parliament Speaker Sorsa on economic and cultural relations.
10.-12.10. The Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock visited Finland. He met President Koivisto, Prime Minister Holkeri, Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen and Foreign Minister Paasio.
15.-19.10. Delegation of the Polish Democratic party visited Finland. The head of the delegation Jerzy Jozwiak had a meeting with President Koivisto. The Delegation met Prime Minister Holkeri, Parliament Speaker Sorsa and Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen.
25.-27.10. Soviet President and Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev visited Finland. He had discussions with President Koivisto and Prime Minister Holkeri. The official declaration of the visit signed by both leaders recognized Finland's states as a neutral country.
5.-7.11. Minister without portfolio Imre Pozsgay of Hungary visited Finland. He had discussions with President Koivisto on Hungary's possible membership in EFTA and met Parliament Speaker Sorsa.

Agreements

A) Multilateral

8.2. Finland joined the international UN convention against illegal trade on drugs (Vienna).
9.10. The membercountries of the agreement on Antarctica accepted Finland as a member with full powers.

B) Bilateral

8.2. The Soviet Finance Minister Gostev and Finance Minister Liikanen signed an agreement on the protection of investments between Finland and the Soviet Union.
2.6. An agreement was signed between Finland and the Soviet Union on sulphur discharges in both countries as well as their effects in each other's territories.
18.5. Eight agreements on economic cooperation were signed between Finland and China.
26.10. Minister of the Trade and Industry Suominen and the Soviet Minister for External Economic Relations Katushev signed the five-year trade agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union for 1990–1995. The trade will continue to be based on clearing, but the systems of payment would be reformed. The import of energy will dominate the Finnish import. The mean value for Finnish exports will annually be approximately FIM 800 million.
26.10. An agreement on environment was signed between Finland and the Soviet Union. The agreement aims at reducing sulphur discharges to a half in the border areas in both countries by 1994 from the 1980 level. The discharges of nitric compounds should not in 1994 exceed those in 1987. Also there will be a reduction of discharges of heavy metals.
19.12. The protocol for the exchange of commodities for 1990 between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow by Minister of Trade and Industry Suominen and the Soviet Minister for External Economic Relations Katushev. The trade will remain at the 1989 level. The total value of Finnish imports is approximately FIM 13 billion and exports FIM 14–15 billion. The exports of machines and instruments will be expanded while the export in the fields of shipbuilding industry, construction work and consumer products will be diminished. The import of energy will continue to dominate the 1990 import. The direct trade of companies not included in the protocol will also grow.

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