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2005-0954-MR;2005-1003-F; 2009-0857-F; S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90000
Folder ID Number: 90000-010

Folder Title:
NSC0009 - April 05, 1989 - Review of National Security Review 3 Regarding U.S. and USSR Relations

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Minutes	Meeting Minutes (and Participant List) for NSC Meeting re U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union (8 pp.)	4/5/89	(b)(1)	TS
01b. Talking Points	Talking Points for Meeting to Review NSR 3 (4 pp.)	4/5/89	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	To Hughes from Blackwill re Minutes for NSC Meeting [name redacted] (2 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(3)	
01d. Memo	For Brent Scowcroft from Condoleezza Rice re April 5 Meeting to Review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet Relations (8 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(1)	S
01e. Talking Points	Points to be Made for Meeting with the National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01f. Memo	For POTUS from Brent Scowcroft re Meeting with the National Security Council (3 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S
01g. Talking Points	Points to be Made for Meeting with the National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01h. Memo	For Brent Scowcroft from Condoleezza Rice re April 5 Meeting to Review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet Relations (8 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(1)	S
01i. Report	U.S.-Soviet Relations - NSR 3 (31 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

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Subseries: NSC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC0009 - April 05, 1989 - Review of National Security Review 3 Regarding U.S. and USSR Relations

Pinksheet Number: bc148

OA/ID Number: 90000-010

Date Closed: 3/24/2008

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-0954-MR

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01j. Report	NSR 3: Recommended Policies (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01k. Report	NSR 3 Near-Term Initiatives (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01l. Note	Handwritten Note from Philip to Bob re NSC Meeting (1 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(1)	
01m. Memo	From G. Philip Hughes for Carnes Lord et al re NSC Meeting on the Soviet Union [name redacted] (1 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(3)	
01n. Memo	For Brent Scowcroft from Condoleezza Rice re Proposed Agenda for NSC Meeting on the Soviet Union (2 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8920272
RECEIVED: 03 APR 89 16

TO: HUGHES

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 17 APR 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
NSR

AGENDA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR NSC MTG ON 5 APR RE NSR 3 / US & USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES	DUE DATE: 23 MAR 90	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: RICE	LOGREF: 8920230	
FILES: IFM 0	NSCP: NS0009	NSR0003
	CODES:	

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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COMMENTS

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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001
002 HUGHES
003 SCOWCROFT
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004 SCOWCROFT
004 PRESIDENT
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005 SCOWCROFT
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006 HUGHES
006

Z 89040316 FOR DECISION
X 89040317 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
X 89040320 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
Z 89040410 ADD-ON / FOR SIGNATURE
X 89040410 SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO
Z 89040410 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
Z 89040411 FOR INFORMATION
X 89040412 NOTED BY PRES
Z 89040416 ADD-ON #2 / FOR INFORMATION
X 89040517 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
Z 89041818 ADD-ON # 3 / FOR DECISION
X 89050110 NOTED BY HUGHES

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>LMS 5/18/90</u>	<u>R</u>
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

NSC Minutes



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~

w/~~TOP SECRET~~ Attachment

20272 add-on

April 17, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Minutes for NSC Meeting on US Relations with the
Soviet Union, April 5, 1989.

Enclosed at Tab I are the minutes for the above-referenced
meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you file the minutes for the NSC meeting on US Relations
with the Soviet Union, attached at Tab I, for the record.

Attachment: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I Minutes

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *b/c* NAFA, Date *3/13/08*

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Minutes	Meeting Minutes (and Participant List) for NSC Meeting re U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union (8 pp.)	4/5/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC0009 - April 05, 1989 - Review of National Security Review 3 Regarding U.S. and USSR Relations

Date Closed: 3/24/2008	OA/ID Number: 90000-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-0954-MR	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8920272
RECEIVED: 03 APR 89 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICE
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 04 APR 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
NSR

AGENDA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR NSC MTG ON 5 APR RE NSR 3 / US & USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 23 MAR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF: 8920230

FILES: IFM 0 NSCP: NS0009 NSR0003 CODES:

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001	X	89040317	SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
002 HUGHES	X	89040320	HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003 SCOWCROFT	Z	89040410	ADD-ON / FOR SIGNATURE
004	X	89040410	SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO
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004	X	89040412	NOTED BY PRES
005 SCOWCROFT	Z	89040416	ADD-ON #2 / FOR INFORMATION
005	X	89040517	NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
006 HUGHES	Z	89041818	ADD-ON # 3 / FOR DECISION
006	X	89050110	NOTED BY HUGHES

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20272 AO/2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 4, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen



MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for NSC Meeting to Review NSR 3:
U.S.-Soviet Relations

Talking points for the meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations are appended at Tab I. They follow closely the outline of the briefing memorandum provided earlier.

Attachment:

Tab I Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *dlc* NARA, Date *3/13/08*

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TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING TO REVIEW NSR 3
APRIL 5, 1989
3:15 p.m.

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Introductory Remarks

- The purpose of this meeting is to review NSR 3 on U.S.-Soviet relations.
- First let me turn to Bill Webster who will give us a brief assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union.

Issue I: Overall Approach

- I recommend that we take a look first at the broad question of our overall approach to the Soviet Union.
- If we accept that this is a period of military retrenchment for the Soviet Union and that they will be seeking a non-confrontational atmosphere over the next three to five years, we have to ask ourselves, "How can we best use this period of time to reach our objectives?"
- There are arguments out there that we should bring maximum pressure on the Soviets in this period.
- Others argue that we should take a joint problem solving approach.
- I'd like to here the views around the table.

Issue II: Leverage

- This raises the question of our leverage to affect Soviet behavior.
- We do make clear to Moscow that actions in one area can affect the overall relationship.

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2005-0954-MR
SCS 2/28/13

- Explicit linkage of issues in the way that we linked the grain embargo to Afghanistan is another matter.
- We're pretty far down the road in telling the Soviets that we are linking their behavior in Central America to the overall relationship.
- What are we going to do if they don't accept our appeals for cut off of aid to Nicaragua?
- It's sometimes difficult to carry through on linkage.

Issue III: In what regions and on what global issues does cooperation with the Soviet Union make sense?

- If Moscow is retrenching militarily, we should think about where their cooperation might be useful and where there are problems.
- I have reservations about getting the Soviets too deeply involved in counterterrorism talks.
- We'd have to be awfully careful not to compromise our sources, methods and operational procedures---not to mention our allies.

Issue IV: Can we influence the course of democratization in the Soviet Union? How large a role should democratization, including human rights, play in our policy?

- Of course we want to promote Western values and ideas through expanding contacts with the Soviet people.
- There are some risks to making democratization of the Soviet Union an objective of American policy.

- I wonder how long it will be before there is a backlash from some of the Russian nationalists if we press this too hard and too publicly.
- Human rights has been a very high-profile part of our agenda with the Soviet Union. Does everyone agree that we want to continue that approach?

Issue V: What should be our approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union?

- There are many people in Congress and in the business community that are looking for a signal from us.
- What stance do you think the USG ought to take toward trade with the Soviet Union? We could take a laissez-faire approach or be more assertive.
- There are some, including Vanik himself, who are pushing for a temporary waiver of Jackson-Vanik.
- We're going to have to face up to this issue soon if the Soviets continue at their present emigration rates.
- Some of our allies are pressing us to streamline COCOM.
- It might make enforcement easier if you had a smaller, really important list but streamlining the list could also send the wrong signal.

Issue VI: Regaining the Initiative

- I'm really concerned because now that this review is over the public, our allies and the Soviets are going to expect us to show results.

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- Are there a few initiatives that we might take very soon?
- The Defense Strategy and Arms Control Reviews are looking at some ideas in that area.
- How about an initiative for cooperation in space now that our own program is back on track?
- We could propose an expanded program of management training for Soviet executives---a sort of Peace Corps/free enterprise initiative.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Memo	To Hughes from Blackwill re Minutes for NSC Meeting [name redacted] (2 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
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TO: HUGHES

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 17 APR 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
NSR

AGENDA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR NSC MTG ON 5 APR RE NSR 3 / US & USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES DUE DATE: 23 MAR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE LOGREF: 8920230

FILES: IFM 0 NSCP: NS0009 NSR0003 CODES:

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DOC 6 OF 6

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005	X 89040517 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
006 HUGHES	Z 89041818 ADD-ON # 3 / FOR DECISION.
006	X 89050110 NOTED BY HUGHES

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002	890403	LORD, C	
002	890403	LEVITSKY, M	
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002	890403	COLE, G	
002	890403	HELSING, C	
002	890403	HODSOLL, F	
[REDACTED] (b)(3)			
002	890403	MANESS, A	
002	890403	RIFKIN, R	
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
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2005-0954-MR
MM 7/17/2015

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 3, 1989

Brent --

Following our conversation
last night, we have
tried to frame these issues
in a way that produces clear
policy alternatives for the NSC
to discuss.

Bob Blackwill

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: April 5 Meeting to Review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet
Relations

This memorandum lays out our suggestions for conducting the NSC meeting to review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet relations. The memorandum from you to the President at Tab I prepares him for the meeting and apprises him of the results of NSR 3. The awful recommendations paper that was commissioned by the DC is at Tab II. The response to NSR 3 is at Tab II.

The meeting should begin with an assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union by Judge Webster. You may then want to guide the participants through the 6 issues that emerged from NSR 3. It may be possible to move briskly through issues 1-4, reserving time to discuss the more specific policy choices raised by the last two issues.

Issue One: What strategy should we pursue during this period of Soviet military retrenchment? Should the U.S cooperate, concentrating on joint problem solving? Or should we pressure the Soviet Union, seeking to extend American advantages relative to the Soviet Union?

Discussion

The key intelligence judgment in NSR 3 is that Soviet internal problems are so severe that the leadership will concentrate in the next 3-5 years and perhaps longer on trying to "arrest the internal decline of the Soviet Union." As a result of their preoccupation with internal problems, the Soviet leadership will seek a non-confrontational relationship with the United States and the Western alliance for at least that period of time. This does not preclude an active Soviet foreign policy but does imply that Soviet military power will be less in evidence and that Moscow will be more cooperative on the international front. The West will have a period of time, three-five years, maybe longer, to pursue significant reductions in Soviet military power and to reduce the Soviet Union's presence in the Third World. We must decide how best to use this period.

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NSR 3 takes a cooperative approach to the Soviet Union, concentrating on joint problem solving to ameliorate regional conflicts and to address global problems (narcotics, terrorism, etc.). Though not explicitly stated, an underlying assumption of NSR 3 is that the Gorbachev reforms have the potential to transform Soviet foreign policy for the long term. Though the "new foreign policy" is not irreversible, it will become harder for the Soviet Union to return to its aggressive course if democratization proceeds, giving, for instance, real powers in foreign and defense policy to a revamped legislature. In this scenario, the Soviet Union would emerge from perestroika as a competitor but one that relies more on diplomacy and less on military power.

There is a def perspective:

The defense agencies believed that NSR 3 was too optimistic about future Soviet behavior. They emphasized that the real motivation of economic perestroika ultimately is to make the Soviet Union more competitive. Thus, whatever the opportunities for U.S. policy in this period, they argue that it is important not to lose sight of the long term picture and the possibility that the Soviet Union will reemerge as a more competitive and efficient military power. This is the tone taken in the analytic section (Part I) of NSR 12: Defense Strategy Review. It is a view with which we agree.

The bottom line for policy is not fundamentally different in the two reviews; both recommend a cautious approach that seeks changes in Soviet capabilities that are reversible only at high cost. But as you know, Bill Odom and others argue that now is precisely the time to squeeze the Soviets. These differing approaches might be worth discussing at the NSC.

alt: cooperate or squeeze

Issue Two: What leverage do we have over Soviet external behavior and what role should explicit linkage play in our policy?

Discussion

NSR 3 argues that Gorbachev's new approach gives us sources of leverage that we have not had in the past because of Moscow's desire for international legitimacy and positive relations. The agencies are agreed that implicit linkage, making clear to Moscow that actions in one area can affect the overall relationship, is useful. The disagreements arise over the value of explicit cross-issue linkages (like the grain embargo as a sanction for Afghanistan). It might be useful for the principals to discuss the utility of linkage, particularly since we have gone pretty far down this road in linking Soviet behavior in Central America to the general state of our relations. In particular, one wonders exactly what we will do if Moscow does not meet our desiderata in Central America.

Issue: What is our view of linkage?

Issue Three: In what regions and on what global issues does cooperation with the Soviet Union make sense?

*Previews when started
What strategy linkage & then
at least end it.*

Discussion

The paper notes that the Soviet desire for a non-confrontational relationship with us and Moscow's retrenchment in the Third World will produce opportunities for amelioration of a number of regional conflicts and then presents a fairly standard list of regional problems:

- There may be opportunities to promote greater autonomy in Eastern Europe as Moscow's grip loosens.
- We should press the Soviets on Bloc arms supplies to Nicaragua.
- In Asia, any significant lessening of the Soviet military threat poses challenges to our relationship with Japan which remains the pillar of our Asian policy.
- We should resist Soviet pressure for a Helsinki-like process in Asia.
- The Soviet call for an international conference in the Middle East is a ploy to gain entrance into the peace process. We should press the Soviets to demand that their clients adopt more benign policies that can lead to fruitful and direct talks among the parties.
- We will want to challenge Moscow to translate its rhetorical support for efforts to address global problems (terrorism, narcotics control, the environment and disaster relief) into concrete action.

We recommend that the participants discuss the judgment that Moscow's retrenchment will allow for greater cooperation and examine some of the generic problems of a more cooperative Soviet Union in these regions. There are some areas where cooperation with the Soviet Union makes sense and is relatively cost free (i.e. narcotics control) and others where Soviet help might come at a price that we are unwilling to pay (e.g. in the Middle East). The State Department is anxious to have bilateral expert talks on counter-terrorism. The intelligence agencies are worried that talks on operational issues will compromise U.S. and allied sources, methods and procedures. The NSC should start to distinguish between those areas that are ripe for cooperation and those that are problematic. The DC commissioned a paper to disaggregate "global issues," and discuss the costs and benefits of engaging the Soviet Union on different problems. We have not yet received that paper but will forward it to you when it arrives.

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Issue Four: Can we influence the course of democratization in the Soviet Union? How large a role should democratization, including human rights, play in our policy?

Discussion

NSR 3 endorses continued pressure on the Soviet Union to improve human rights, using our participation in the Moscow Human Rights Conference as leverage. It also recommends the promotion of Western values and ideas through expanding people-to-people, cultural and scientific exchanges.

Though not discussed in this paper, the U.S. embassy Moscow has recently sent a cable suggesting that we expand bilateral discussions, presumably beginning with Baker's May visit, with the Soviet Union to include domestic developments. We think that this is a terrible idea because it gives the impression of moral equivalence in the two systems. We do not need to give the Soviets a forum in which to raise American Indian rights every time we bring up their nationalities problem.

The concept of "democratization" of the Soviet Union as an American objective is not cost free and should be discussed before we go further down this road. It is easy to overstate the degree to which Moscow's interest in and tolerance for Western ideas will last. There are many countervailing pressures, including a prideful great Russian segment of the intelligentsia that may react against too overt an American "democratization" effort. Most importantly, should this Administration continue to say publicly, as did the last, that human rights are our number one priority in relations with the Soviet Union?

Issue Five: What should be our approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union?

Discussion

The key question is whether the USG ^{should} needs to liberalize its approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union. Though NSR 3 notes that the volume of U.S.-Soviet trade is not likely to increase dramatically in the next 3-5 years, the Western allies and business communities are looking for signals from the Administration on several issues. No agency is willing to argue for broad and rapid liberalization of our approach; a view held by some in Congress and in the U.S. business community. But Commerce and State believe that the time is approaching when we should take specific decisions in that direction. Defense hopes to hold the line and is even suspicious of expanding non-strategic trade. There is, however, surface consensus on this issue that is hard to crack. We recommend that the NSC discuss the following:

Should the U.S. do more to encourage non-strategic trade with the U.S.S.R. (e.g., endorsing joint ventures in principle)?

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Issue: Are democratization & Human Rights priority issues?

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- ✓ -- What should be our approach on: (a) Western export credits to the USSR; and (b) Soviet membership in international bodies such as the GATT and IMF?
- ✓ -- When and under what conditions should the Administration seek waivers for the USSR under Jackson-Vanik and repeal of the Stevenson amendment? Though the agencies argue that the Administration should wait for signals from the American Jewish Community and the Congress on a Jackson-Vanik waiver, many there are waiting for leadership from the Executive Branch. We are in something of a tangle on this issue which should be addressed at the NSC level.
- ✓ -- Should the U.S. ease existing constraints on high technology trade with the USSR (e.g. faster streamlining of COCOM control lists, no exceptions)?

Issue Six: What steps should we take in the near term to regain the initiative and challenge Gorbachev? Is there a role for unilateral U.S. initiatives?

Discussion

The DC felt that NSR 3 failed adequately to address this question and commissioned a PCC paper on near term policy recommendations. The product is very disappointing. So as Bob Gates asked, we have come up with in a very preliminary way the following sets of initiatives that you might raise for discussion with the NSC:

Arms Control

Though military issues will not be discussed at this meeting you may want to mention that NSR 12's tasks examination of the following initiatives:

- 2 ✓ -- Modifying the existing negotiating organizational structure and the existing U.S. position on the linkage between conclusion of a START treaty and resolution of existing Defense and Space Treaty issues.
- ✓ -- Opening negotiations on restricting anti-satellite weapons.
- ✓ -- Offering a ban on MIRVd mobile ICBMs in START, while allowing single-RV mobile ICBMs.
- ✓ -- Offering specific limits on nuclear SLCMs.

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- Examining options for reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe which exceed those in the initial Western proposal in the CFE negotiations.
- Preparing options for additional confidence building measures which might be proposed in the East-West context.

Additional initiatives examined beyond these could include:

- An interim agreement among the 23 members of the two alliances to reduce their chemical weapons stocks to residual, lower, declared and equal ceilings, with strict verification both of destruction of the declared stocks and inspection of residual stockpiles.
- Open skies. The United States and the Soviet Union could permit reconnaissance aircraft to fly routine aerial overflights over their respective territories. Opening the U.S. to such inspections would be a big step and would have to be carefully considered by all agencies, especially CIA and JCS. But as Andy Goodpaster put it to Eisenhower, on balance, a closed society always has more to lose from openness than we do. The President may have reservations on this one.
- Regular meetings of the Secretary of Defense-Minister of Defense to discuss long term defense plans. The Ministers could discuss the scope, pace and direction of their defense policies and programs. This would diminish some of the pressure for worst case analysis and, perhaps, give us insight into the impact of perestroika on the Soviet defense effort.

Cooperation in Space

Now that the U.S. space program is back on track, the President could announce a broad "cooperation in space" initiative. He could direct the Space Council to oversee an effort by a blue ribbon team to design a sensible program for cooperation with the Soviets.

We are told that the Soviets are now advanced enough in some limited areas that we could benefit from joint efforts in space. Three potentially useful areas are:

- Life Sciences. Exploring the impact of zero gravity on physiological processes. Exploring the impact of extended space travel on the human body. We have superior medical technology to ensure design of useful experiments and they have valuable data gathered through the extended stays of astronauts above the Mir space station.

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- Research on ecological and environmental problems on earth using space as the laboratory. Because the Soviets have so many cheap, small satellites (low-earth orbit) and are able to launch them quickly, a marriage between that capability and our applied earth sciences knowledge would be a good one.
- Robotic research toward an expedition to Mars. The United States is scheduled to launch an unmanned probe toward Mars next year. The Soviets have recently lost both their Phobos experiments but might have useful information to share.

Work has been going on at NASA and there are already low-level bilateral efforts in space cooperation. The problem is that NASA doesn't have the right people to design the experiments to take account of national security/technology transfer concerns. The Space Council, backed by a Presidential initiative, could bring Défense and NASA together to resolve some of these issues.

Economic Relations

The U.S. could propose an expanded program of management training for Soviet executives, a sort of Peace Corps/free enterprise initiative. As the Soviets loosen centralized controls on their economy, they will need more competent managers who understand market principles.

Media Initiative

The United States and the Soviet Union could agree to give the other side one or two hours of programming per month for direct television broadcast. This could be for cultural programming or public affairs/public interest documentaries. Obviously, this would take considerable negotiation on our side with either PBS or the networks but it would extend the concept of the exchange of Presidential messages on New Year's Day begun in the Reagan Administration.

Baker's Trip to Moscow

At some point, we will have to settle how preparation for Baker's 10-11 May Ministerials in Moscow will be managed within the Administration but this is not the meeting in which to do so.

A. Kanter and T. Deal concur.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Suggested Talking Points
- Tab B Agenda
- Tab C List of Participants
- Tab II Response to NSR 3
- Tab III Recommendations Paper

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8920272
RECEIVED: 03 APR 89 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 04 APR 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
NSR

AGENDA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MTG TALKER FOR NSC MTG ON 5 APR RE NSR 3 / US & USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 23 MAR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF: 8920230

FILES: IFM 0

NSCP: NS0009

NSR0003

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY: _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: CM

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC. 4 OF 6

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ATTACHMENTS

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT	Z	89040316	FOR DECISION
001	X	89040317	SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
002 HUGHES	X	89040320	HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003 SCOWCROFT	Z	89040410	ADD-ON / FOR SIGNATURE
004	X	89040410	SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO
004 SCOWCROFT	Z	89040410	FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
004 PRESIDENT	Z	89040411	FOR INFORMATION
004	X	89040412	NOTED BY PRES
005 SCOWCROFT	Z	89040416	ADD-ON #2 / FOR INFORMATION
005	X	89040517	NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
006 HUGHES	Z	89041818	ADD-ON # 3 / FOR DECISION
006	X	89050110	NOTED BY HUGHES

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- The purpose of this NSC meeting is to consider our policy toward the Soviet Union. Our agenda is to examine five issues raised by National Security Review 3.
- We might also spend a few minutes discussing how to seize and keep the initiative in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- The issues before us are:
- How can we best use the next four years to advance our objectives and those of our allies?
- What leverage do we have over Moscow's external behavior?
- In what regions and on what issues does it make sense to cooperate with Moscow?

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- Do we have new opportunities to promote Western values and ideas as the Soviet Union undergoes reform?
- What should be our approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union?
- We cannot compete with Gorbachev headline for headline but now that our review is complete we need to seize the initiative. How can we do that?
- This is an exciting time when carefully crafted policies may allow us to achieve goals that we have pursued since the end of World War II. Our postwar policies have been vindicated by the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and in Europe and are in large measure responsible for the historic juncture at which we find ourselves.

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- But it is time to go forward. As we move from the principles established in this review to specific policy decisions over the next few months, we should keep the key judgements of this review in mind.
- With that background, let me turn to Bill Webster.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 4, 1989

2005-0954-MR


SCS 2/28/13

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: April 5, 1989

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 3:15 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

The NSC will meet to consider the issues raised in National Security Review 3: U.S.-Soviet Relations.

II. BACKGROUND

The review of U.S.-Soviet relations affirms the validity of the approach of the Western alliance since the end of World War II. The pressures of a failing system at home and frustrated policies abroad have caused the Soviet leadership, at least for now, to experiment with new political and economic approaches domestically, and to make important concessions abroad. These circumstances are likely to continue during your Administration and offer the opportunity to make progress toward the resolution of a number of international problems.

NSR 3 concludes that Soviet internal problems are so severe that the leadership will concentrate in the next 3-5 years and perhaps longer on trying to "arrest the internal decline of the Soviet Union." As a result, Moscow is likely to seek a non-confrontational relationship with the United States and the Western alliance.

We have identified five major issues for discussion by the NSC. The agenda of the meeting is at Tab B.

Issue One: Should our strategy be to cooperate with or to pressure the Soviet Union in this period?

The first issue is how to pursue our objectives during this period of Soviet military retrenchment. There is agreement that we should take a cautious approach that seeks changes in Soviet behavior and in Soviet capabilities that Moscow can reverse only at high cost. This consensus disguises two quite different approaches. One would emphasize cooperation and joint efforts to solve international problems during the next 3-5 years. Alternatively, the United States could use this period of Soviet weakness to press its advantages, technologically and economically, seeking to emerge in an even stronger position relative to the Soviet Union at the end of the century.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Issue Two: How much leverage do we have to influence Soviet external behavior?

The review states that Gorbachev's new approach gives us sources of leverage that we have not had in the past because of Moscow's desire for international legitimacy and positive relations. While all agree that we should make clear to Moscow that actions in one area can affect the overall relationship, there may be disagreement over the value of explicit linkage between various elements of our relationship with the Soviets. This is worth discussing because we have already gone pretty far down this road in linking Soviet behavior in Central America to the general state of relations with Moscow.

Issue Three: Regional Disputes: What regions and on what issues does cooperation with the Soviet Union make sense?

The probable Soviet desire for a less confrontational international environment may produce opportunities to settle a number of regional conflicts. But the Soviets will need to make significant changes in their policies in the Middle East and Central America before cooperative efforts are likely to bear fruit.

As you know, the U.S.-Soviet agenda has been expanded to include global or transnational issues and we will challenge the Soviet Union to join us in fighting the narcotics trade and environmental problems. Some issues, like discussions on terrorism require careful planning so that we do not inadvertently reveal the intelligence sources, methods and operational procedures of the United States or our allies.

Issue Four: How large a dimension should democratization, including human rights, of the Soviet internal system be in our policy?

NSR 3 endorses continued pressure on the Soviet Union to improve human rights. It also recommends the promotion of Western values and ideas through expanding people-to-people, cultural and scientific exchanges. Our ability to affect the course of Soviet internal reform is limited. But to the degree that the Soviet people and even elements of the leadership are ready to look to the West for ideas about free enterprise or democracy we should stand ready to make our experience available to them.

Issue Five: What should be our approach to U.S.-Soviet economic relations?

Though the volume of U.S.-Soviet trade is not expected to expand dramatically in the next 3-5 years, there are public and commercial pressures to liberalize our approach toward

economic relations with the Soviet Union. We need to address the following issues:

- ✓ -- Should the U.S. further encourage non-strategic trade with the U.S.S.R. (e.g. endorsing joint ventures in principle).
- ✓ -- What should be our approach on: (a) Western export credits to the U.S.S.R., and (b) Soviet membership in international bodies such as the GATT and IMF?
- ✓ -- When and under what conditions should the Administration seek waivers for the U.S.S.R. under Jackson-Vanik and repeal of the Stevenson amendment?
- ✓ -- Should the U.S. ease existing constraints on high technology trade with the U.S.S.R. (e.g. faster streamlining of COCOM control lists, revocation of the no exceptions sanction)?

limits credits to low number

III. PARTICIPANTS


List of participants is at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You will open the meeting, perhaps using the suggested talking points at Tab A, and will then turn to Bill Webster for an intelligence assessment, then to me to review the agenda.



no exceptions

Attachments

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Agenda
- Tab C List of Participants



Prepared by:
Condoleezza Rice

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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- We might also spend a few minutes discussing how to seize and keep the initiative in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- The issues before us are:
- How can we best use the next four years to advance our objectives and those of our allies?
- What leverage do we have over Moscow's external behavior?
- In what regions and on what issues does it make sense to cooperate with Moscow?
- Do we have new opportunities to promote Western values and ideas as the Soviet Union undergoes reform?
- What should be our approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union?

We cannot compete with Gorbachev headline for headline but now that our review is complete we need to seize the initiative. How can we do that?

This is an exciting time when carefully crafted policies may allow us to achieve goals that we have pursued since

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the end of World War II. Our postwar policies have been vindicated by the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and in Europe and are in large measure responsible for the historic juncture at which we find ourselves.

-- But it is time to go forward. As we move from the principles established in this review to specific policy decisions over the next few months, we should keep the key judgements of this review in mind.

-- With that background, let me turn to Bill Webster.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, April 5, 1989

Cabinet Room

3:15 p.m.

SOVIET UNION

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....The President
- II. Assessment of the SituationJudge Webster
in the Soviet Union
- III. Issues for NSC Consideration.....Brent Scowcroft
- IV. Discussion.....All participants
- V. Summary.....Brent Scowcroft

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By bic NARA, Date 3/13/08

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Wednesday, April 5, 1989
Cabinet Room
3:15 p.m.

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By hlc NARA, Date 3/13/08

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Participants

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
Chief of Staff to the President
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
United States Trade Representative
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4/4/89

0930

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April 3, 1989

Brent --

Following our conversation
last night, we have ~~discussed~~
tried to frame these issues
in a way that produces clear
policy alternatives for the NSC
to discuss.

Bob Blackwill

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: April 5 Meeting to Review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet
Relations

This memorandum lays out our suggestions for conducting the NSC meeting to review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet relations. The memorandum from you to the President at Tab I prepares him for the meeting and apprises him of the results of NSR 3. The awful recommendations paper that was commissioned by the DC is at Tab II. The response to NSR 3 is at Tab II.

The meeting should begin with an assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union by Judge Webster. You may then want to guide the participants through the 6 issues that emerged from NSR 3. It may be possible to move briskly through issues 1-4, reserving time to discuss the more specific policy choices raised by the last two issues.

Issue One: What strategy should we pursue during this period of Soviet military retrenchment? Should the U.S cooperate, concentrating on joint problem solving? Or should we pressure the Soviet Union, seeking to extend American advantages relative to the Soviet Union?

Discussion

The key intelligence judgment in NSR 3 is that Soviet internal problems are so severe that the leadership will concentrate in the next 3-5 years and perhaps longer on trying to "arrest the internal decline of the Soviet Union." As a result of their preoccupation with internal problems, the Soviet leadership will seek a non-confrontational relationship with the United States and the Western alliance for at least that period of time. This does not preclude an active Soviet foreign policy but does imply that Soviet military power will be less in evidence and that Moscow will be more cooperative on the international front. The West will have a period of time, three-five years, maybe longer, to pursue significant reductions in Soviet military power and to reduce the Soviet Union's presence in the Third World. We must decide how best to use this period.

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NSR 3 takes a cooperative approach to the Soviet Union, concentrating on joint problem solving to ameliorate regional conflicts and to address global problems (narcotics, terrorism, etc.). Though not explicitly stated, an underlying assumption of NSR 3 is that the Gorbachev reforms have the potential to transform Soviet foreign policy for the long term. Though the "new foreign policy" is not irreversible, it will become harder for the Soviet Union to return to its aggressive course if democratization proceeds, giving, for instance, real powers in foreign and defense policy to a revamped legislature. In this scenario, the Soviet Union would emerge from perestroika as a competitor but one that relies more on diplomacy and less on military power.

The defense agencies believed that NSR 3 was too optimistic about future Soviet behavior. They emphasized that the real motivation of economic perestroika ultimately is to make the Soviet Union more competitive. Thus, whatever the opportunities for U.S. policy in this period, they argue that it is important not to lose sight of the long term picture and the possibility that the Soviet Union will reemerge as a more competitive and efficient military power. This is the tone taken in the analytic section (Part I) of NSR 12: Defense Strategy Review. It is a view with which we agree.

The bottom line for policy is not fundamentally different in the two reviews; both recommend a cautious approach that seeks changes in Soviet capabilities that are reversible only at high cost. But as you know, Bill Odom and others argue that now is precisely the time to squeeze the Soviets. These differing approaches might be worth discussing at the NSC.

Issue Two: What leverage do we have over Soviet external behavior and what role should explicit linkage play in our policy?

Discussion

NSR 3 argues that Gorbachev's new approach gives us sources of leverage that we have not had in the past because of Moscow's desire for international legitimacy and positive relations. The agencies are agreed that implicit linkage, making clear to Moscow that actions in one area can affect the overall relationship, is useful. The disagreements arise over the value of explicit cross-issue linkages (like the grain embargo as a sanction for Afghanistan). It might be useful for the principals to discuss the utility of linkage, particularly since we have gone pretty far down this road in linking Soviet behavior in Central America to the general state of our relations. In particular, one wonders exactly what we will do if Moscow does not meet our desiderata in Central America.

Issue Three: In what regions and on what global issues does cooperation with the Soviet Union make sense?

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Discussion

The paper notes that the Soviet desire for a non-confrontational relationship with us and Moscow's retrenchment in the Third World will produce opportunities for amelioration of a number of regional conflicts and then presents a fairly standard list of regional problems:

- There may be opportunities to promote greater autonomy in Eastern Europe as Moscow's grip loosens.
- We should press the Soviets on Bloc arms supplies to Nicaragua.
- In Asia, any significant lessening of the Soviet military threat poses challenges to our relationship with Japan which remains the pillar of our Asian policy.
- We should resist Soviet pressure for a Helsinki-like process in Asia.
- The Soviet call for an international conference in the Middle East is a ploy to gain entrance into the peace process. We should press the Soviets to demand that their clients adopt more benign policies that can lead to fruitful and direct talks among the parties.
- We will want to challenge Moscow to translate its rhetorical support for efforts to address global problems (terrorism, narcotics control, the environment and disaster relief) into concrete action.

We recommend that the participants discuss the judgment that Moscow's retrenchment will allow for greater cooperation and examine some of the generic problems of a more cooperative Soviet Union in these regions. There are some areas where cooperation with the Soviet Union makes sense and is relatively cost free (i.e. narcotics control) and others where Soviet help might come at a price that we are unwilling to pay (e.g. in the Middle East). The State Department is anxious to have bilateral expert talks on counter-terrorism. The intelligence agencies are worried that talks on operational issues will compromise U.S. and allied sources, methods and procedures. The NSC should start to distinguish between those areas that are ripe for cooperation and those that are problematic. The DC commissioned a paper to disaggregate "global issues," and discuss the costs and benefits of engaging the Soviet Union on different problems. We have not yet received that paper but will forward it to you when it arrives.

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Issue Four: Can we influence the course of democratization in the Soviet Union? How large a role should democratization, including human rights, play in our policy?

Discussion

NSR 3 endorses continued pressure on the Soviet Union to improve human rights, using our participation in the Moscow Human Rights Conference as leverage. It also recommends the promotion of Western values and ideas through expanding people-to-people, cultural and scientific exchanges.

Though not discussed in this paper, the U.S. embassy Moscow has recently sent a cable suggesting that we expand bilateral discussions, presumably beginning with Baker's May visit, with the Soviet Union to include domestic developments. We think that this is a terrible idea because it gives the impression of moral equivalence in the two systems. We do not need to give the Soviets a forum in which to raise American Indian rights every time we bring up their nationalities problem.

The concept of "democratization" of the Soviet Union as an American objective is not cost free and should be discussed before we go further down this road. It is easy to overstate the degree to which Moscow's interest in and tolerance for Western ideas will last. There are many countervailing pressures, including a prideful great Russian segment of the intelligentsia that may react against too overt an American "democratization" effort. Most importantly, should this Administration continue to say publicly, as did the last, that human rights are our number one priority in relations with the Soviet Union?

Issue Five: What should be our approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union?

Discussion

The key question is whether the USG needs to liberalize its approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union. Though NSR 3 notes that the volume of U.S.-Soviet trade is not likely to increase dramatically in the next 3-5 years, the Western allies and business communities are looking for signals from the Administration on several issues. No agency is willing to argue for broad and rapid liberalization of our approach; a view held by some in Congress and in the U.S. business community. But Commerce and State believe that the time is approaching when we should take specific decisions in that direction. Defense hopes to hold the line and is even suspicious of expanding non-strategic trade. There is, however, surface consensus on this issue that is hard to crack. We recommend that the NSC discuss the following:

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- What should be our approach on: (a) Western export credits to the USSR, and (b) Soviet membership in international bodies such as the GATT and IMF?
- When and under what conditions should the Administration seek waivers for the USSR under Jackson-Vanik and repeal of the Stevenson amendment? Though the agencies argue that the Administration should wait for signals from the American Jewish Community and the Congress on a Jackson-Vanik waiver, many there are waiting for leadership from the Executive Branch. We are in something of a tangle on this issue which should be addressed at the NSC level.
- Should the U.S. ease existing constraints on high technology trade with the USSR (e.g. faster streamlining of COCOM control lists, no exceptions)?

Issue Six: What steps should we take in the near term to regain the initiative and challenge Gorbachev? Is there a role for unilateral U.S. initiatives?

Discussion

The DC felt that NSR 3 failed adequately to address this question and commissioned a PCC paper on near term policy recommendations. The product is very disappointing. So as Bob Gates asked, we have come up with in a very preliminary way the following sets of initiatives that you might raise for discussion with the NSC:

Arms Control

Though military issues will not be discussed at this meeting you may want to mention that NSR 12's tasks examination of the following initiatives:

- Modifying the existing negotiating organizational structure and the existing U.S. position on the linkage between conclusion of a START treaty and resolution of existing Defense and Space Treaty issues.
- Opening negotiations on restricting anti-satellite weapons.
- Offering a ban on MIRVd mobile ICBMs in START, while allowing single-RV mobile ICBMs.
- Offering specific limits on nuclear SLCMs.

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- Examining options for reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe which exceed those in the initial Western proposal in the CFE negotiations.
- Preparing options for additional confidence building measures which might be proposed in the East-West context.

Additional initiatives examined beyond these could include:

- An interim agreement among the 23 members of the two alliances to reduce their chemical weapons stocks to residual, lower, declared and equal ceilings, with strict verification both of destruction of the declared stocks and inspection of residual stockpiles.
- Open skies. The United States and the Soviet Union could permit reconnaissance aircraft to fly routine aerial overflights over their respective territories. Opening the U.S. to such inspections would be a big step and would have to be carefully considered by all agencies, especially CIA and JCS. But as Andy Goodpaster put it to Eisenhower, on balance, a closed society always has more to lose from openness than we do. The President may have reservations on this one.
- Regular meetings of the Secretary of Defense-Minister of Defense to discuss long term defense plans. The Ministers could discuss the scope, pace and direction of their defense policies and programs. This would diminish some of the pressure for worst case analysis and, perhaps, give us insight into the impact of perestroika on the Soviet defense effort.

Cooperation in Space

Now that the U.S. space program is back on track, the President could announce a broad "cooperation in space" initiative. He could direct the Space Council to oversee an effort by a blue ribbon team to design a sensible program for cooperation with the Soviets.

We are told that the Soviets are now advanced enough in some limited areas that we could benefit from joint efforts in space. Three potentially useful areas are:

- Life Sciences. Exploring the impact of zero gravity on physiological processes. Exploring the impact of extended space travel on the human body. We have superior medical technology to ensure design of useful experiments and they have valuable data gathered through the extended stays of astronauts above the Mir space station.

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- Research on ecological and environmental problems on earth using space as the laboratory. Because the Soviets have so many cheap, small satellites (low-earth orbit) and are able to launch them quickly, a marriage between that capability and our applied earth sciences knowledge would be a good one.
- Robotic research toward an expedition to Mars. The United States is scheduled to launch an unmanned probe toward Mars next year. The Soviets have recently lost both their Phobos experiments but might have useful information to share.

Work has been going on at NASA and there are already low-level bilateral efforts in space cooperation. The problem is that NASA doesn't have the right people to design the experiments to take account of national security/technology transfer concerns. The Space Council, backed by a Presidential initiative, could bring Defense and NASA together to resolve some of these issues.

Economic Relations

The U.S. could propose an expanded program of management training for Soviet executives, a sort of Peace Corps/free enterprise initiative. As the Soviets loosen centralized controls on their economy, they will need more competent managers who understand market principles.

Media Initiative

The United States and the Soviet Union could agree to give the other side one or two hours of programming per month for direct television broadcast. This could be for cultural programming or public affairs/public interest documentaries. Obviously, this would take considerable negotiation on our side with either PBS or the networks but it would extend the concept of the exchange of Presidential messages on New Year's Day begun in the Reagan Administration.

Baker's Trip to Moscow

At some point, we will have to settle how preparation for Baker's 10-11 May Ministerials in Moscow will be managed within the Administration but this is not the meeting in which to do so.

A. Kanter and T. Deal concur.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Suggested Talking Points
- Tab B Agenda
- Tab C List of Participants
- Tab II Response to NSR 3
- Tab III Recommendations Paper



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Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC0009 - April 05, 1989 - Review of National Security Review 3 Regarding U.S. and USSR Relations

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NSR 3: Recommended Policies

NSR 3 affirms the strategy and policies the United States has broadly pursued vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the post-war years, both for ourselves and our Allies. Implementation of this affirmed long-term policy approach involves several facets: our long- and short-term objectives, our strategy for achieving them, and the immediate task of implementing our approach. All are critical if we are to build a policy that is comprehensive, stable and sustainable with our Allies and at home.

Long-Term Objectives

Over the next ten years, we should pursue three broad sets of objectives in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Our basic strategic-military objective is to maintain strong modern defenses, strengthen deterrence and enhance the security of the U.S., our Allies and friends. To this end, we should seek ways to transform new Soviet defense concepts, such as a restructuring of the military toward lower force levels and a truly defensive posture, into reality.

In the political-diplomatic area, we should seek to preserve strong ties with our Allies and friends in Europe and Asia, while encouraging Soviet retrenchment in the Third World and greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. We should challenge Moscow to subordinate client relationships to the objective of finding peaceful solutions to regional conflicts and, over the longer term, seek to remove the competitive East-West dynamic from such conflicts. We also want to take advantage of opportunities that arise to expand cooperation in dealing with global issues like terrorism and the environment.

And finally we should seek democratization, that is, genuine reform -- including greater respect for human rights and domestic liberalization institutionalized by law -- within the USSR. We want a Soviet Union that increasingly casts its values and priorities in terms of the quality of life of its people, rather than expansion abroad, and where there are internal political constraints on the power of the Soviet leadership and party. In the long term, we seek to make cultural, economic and social contacts with the Soviet people flow through private channels, similar to those we have with other countries.

The Overall Strategy

The strategy to achieve these objectives must be multi-faceted: it must be fully consistent with broader U.S. national security objectives; it must be sustainable with our Allies and at home; and it must effectively challenge the

Soviets to move in the directions we seek. Given these requirements, our strategy specifically should:

- Be comprehensive, taking advantage of opportunities to push forward on all elements of the relationship. We should not permit the Soviets to dictate a selective approach, e.g. one limited to arms control and regional conflicts of interest to Moscow. Indeed, the primary weakness of the détente process in the 1970s was that it held out a promise of improved relations without addressing many of the sources of real tension between the U.S. and USSR. Today, with the plurality of views and interests in America concerning the Soviet Union, it is even more important to take a comprehensive approach to relations with Moscow.
- Be grounded in the consistent pursuit of our fundamental interests. The opportunities now facing us are largely the result of U.S. policies of the last forty years and particularly the last eight (e.g. our efforts to modernize our military, restore our economy's vitality, strengthen alliances, and foster democracy and economic growth in the Third World). They will continue to be key components of a successful strategy for dealing with Moscow.
- Be sensitive to Alliance concerns. A coordinated Western approach significantly increases the chances of reaching our goals -- and Allied disunity significantly increases the risk of failure. Pursuing a forward-looking policy toward the Soviet Union with well-defined goals is an essential element of U.S. international leadership.
- Be steady and consistent with a long-term perspective. Soviet reform will take many years to play out; progress in our relationship will be gradual and uneven, as the relationship remains largely adversarial and susceptible to crisis. We must be able to handle "bad" as well as "good" Soviet behavior, avoiding overreaction to either that could undermine our long-term aims.
- Instill confidence in our leadership. We must articulate our objectives and vision of future relations, even as we stress a current agenda of our creation that focuses on the real issues and hard work necessary to turn that vision into reality. This means establishing an agenda rooted in solid objectives which we pursue in a consistent manner. This will be essential if we are to keep public expectations realistic.

The five-part agenda (human rights, arms control, regional dialogue and bilateral issues supplemented by global issues) is designed to give specific content to these broad principles and to provide an overall framework for pursuing our strategic-military, political-diplomatic and democratization goals over an extended length of time. Much of Soviet "new thinking" is

still only words. We should continually challenge Gorbachev to back those words with concrete and specific actions that meet U.S. interests. Clear challenges will not only signal to Moscow what actions we want them to undertake, but will also lay down clear milestones by which our publics can judge Soviet behavior. Such challenges are also meant to ensure that we continue to define the agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Short-Term Objectives

In the next 3-4 years, we seek to make significant strides toward the long-term objectives outlined above. Specifically, we should challenge the Soviets on all key elements of our relationship and press ahead in those areas where opportunities to further U.S. interests present themselves. Only in this manner will we be able to "get out front" of Soviet policies. The particular fascination that the world has for Gorbachev because of his perceived bold gambles is an arena in which we should not attempt to compete.

The five-part agenda should guide our policies: it is concrete, it is of our creation, and experience shows that it is an approach that works. It also provides a yardstick by which to judge the success of our policies and the Soviet response to our challenges: by the specifics of the accords that we negotiate; the degree to which the competitive East-West dynamic is removed from regional conflicts and replaced by cooperation; the steps that the Soviet leadership are willing to take to meet our concerns on human rights; and the extent to which measures are implemented that increase transparency in the USSR and contribute to the irreversibility of domestic reform.

The key to asserting U.S. leadership in this area will be the demonstration in both word and deed that we have a sound and realistic policy: one that is forward-looking and does not shrink from the future, but one that also focuses on the concrete steps needed to get us there. Two immediate steps can be taken to this end: U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union should be presented in its totality; and we should reengage with the Soviets on the basis of our agenda as quickly as is appropriate.

Thus, we would recommend the following in the near-term:

- Complete the review and, in consultation with our Allies, build a consensus in support of our objectives.
- Project its findings, specifically our objectives and overall agenda. A Presidential speech could get the ball rolling.
- Reengage the Soviets and challenge them across the spectrum of issues with specific initiatives that fit our overall agenda and serve U.S. interests.

NSR 3 Near-Term Initiatives

The paper identifies specific possible initiatives that might serve U.S. policy objectives. Agencies disagree on the utility of certain candidates; all would require further work before they could be fleshed out into concrete initiatives. The following simply lists the possibilities; the more detailed discussion is contained in NSR 3.

Strategic-Military (pages 16-19)

- Reengage as soon as appropriate on the full range of issues on the arms control agenda.
- Consider possible new strategic confidence-building measures (CBMs).
- A new chemical weapons (CW) initiative.
- Supplement existing military-to-military contacts by having new "national security" discussions.

Political-Diplomatic (pages 19-24)

- Reengage on the regional conflict dialogue, including a regular cycle of regional experts meetings on such issues as Central America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
- Build Allied agreement to a revamped and forward-looking new stress on NATO as a political alliance devoted to ending the division of Europe through systemic changes in the East.
- Work with our Asian allies to challenge the Soviets by opening the Soviet Far East to international trade and communication.
- Challenge the Soviets to work in practical ways to curb terrorist activities.
- Establish a working relationship with narcotics authorities and implement our bilateral Memorandum of Understanding.
- Challenge the Soviets on such global issues as the environment.

Democratization (pages 24-31)

- Active use of bilateral and high-level dialogue to press the Soviets on human rights, including individual cases.

- Press the Soviets at the Paris human rights conference for follow-through on commitments made regarding Soviet human rights performance.
- Increase the role of inter-parliamentary bodies and non-governmental organizations on human rights: inter-parliamentary contacts; Congressional/CSCE Commission channel; "Rule of Law symposia.
- Promote Western ideas within the USSR: an "Enterprise Initiative" to encourage the development of market institutions in the USSR; promote labor contacts between the two countries; press for reciprocal cultural centers.
- Foster expansion of non-strategic trade, including joint ventures, on strictly commercial terms.
- Work with Allies to seek greater transparency in lending to the East.
- Consider "no exceptions" COCOM policy; work with Allies on streamlining and strengthening export controls.

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Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>see note</u>	
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4/3

Bob

DoE has asked if they can attend this NSC. (May not be a bad idea in view of importance of energy sector for Soviets' economic future and the past policy effort we've invested on constraining/channelling Soviet energy development.)

How about Agriculture, in view of their role in US-Soviet trade?

Whatever you think about these two ideas, do you want this to be principal plus one as proposed? (It will be huge!)

Philip

Please send copy
of 20272 (agenda)
to Mr William Vitale
Executive Secretary
DESE OF ENERGY
ASAP
June 4/4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01m. Memo	From G. Philip Hughes for Carnes Lord et al re NSC Meeting on the Soviet Union [name redacted] (1 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC0009 - April 05, 1989 - Review of National Security Review 3 Regarding U.S. and USSR Relations

Date Closed: 3/24/2008	OA/ID Number: 90000-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-0954-MR	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

~~_____~~ (b)(3)
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

CAPTAIN ANTHONY MANESS
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. EMILY L. WALKER
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

MS. ROBERTA RIFKIN
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Acting Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency


MR. CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

MR. FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Soviet Union, Wednesday,
April 5, 3:15 p.m., Cabinet Room (S)

A meeting of the National Security Council will be held to discuss the Soviet Union on Wednesday, April 5, at 3:15 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. The meeting will address the specific policy issues raised by NSR 3 (U.S.-Soviet Relations). Attendance should be principals plus one. (S)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary



Agenda
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3 4 (B) September 11, 2006
By b/c NARA, Date 3/3/08

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20272

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, April 5, 1989
Cabinet Room
3:15 p.m.

SOVIET UNION

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....The President
- II. Assessment of the SituationJudge Webster
in the Soviet Union
- III. Issues for NSC Consideration.....Brent Scowcroft
- IV. Discussion.....All participants
- V. Summary.....General Scowcroft

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines


E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2001

By b1c NARA, Date 3/13/08

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~SECRET~~



April 3, 1989

20272

Brent - I think the agenda + announcement are OK but we should talk about the meeting jump plan. By.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *NB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for NSC meeting on the Soviet Union, April 5, 3:15 p.m., Cabinet Room

This meeting will present the President and other top officials with a set of policy issues raised by NSR 3 (U.S.-Soviet Relations). We recommend that the meeting begin with a very brief assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union by Judge Webster. The NSC could then turn to consideration of 6 issues raised in NSR 3:

- What are the implications for U.S. policy of the intelligence community's finding that the Soviet Union, preoccupied with internal reform for the next 5-10 years, will seek a non-confrontational relationship with the United States and our allies?
- What should be our strategy for U.S.-Soviet relations during this period of Soviet military retrenchment? Should the U.S. emphasize accomodation or take a more competitive approach that tries to exploit and extend American advantages?

What if they're wrong?

What leverage is available to us to influence Soviet external behavior and what is the role of explicit linkage in our policy?

How can we advance our specific policy objectives in the following areas: strategic-military policy; political-diplomatic policy? What initial steps should we take? Can we influence the course of democratization in the Soviet Union?

What should be our approach toward economic relations with the Soviet Union?

Should the U.S. further encourage non-strategic trade with the USSR (e.g. endorsement of joint ventures)?

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PER E.O. 13526

2005-0954-MR
MM 7/17/2015

- What should be our approach on: (a) Western export credits to the USSR, and (b) Soviet membership in international bodies such as the GATT and IMF?
- When and under what conditions should the Administration seek waivers for the USSR under Jackson-Vanik and repeal of the Stevenson amendment?
- Should the U.S. ease existing constraints on high tech trade with the USSR (e.g. faster streamlining of COCOM control lists, no exceptions)?
- What steps should take in the near term to regain the initiative and challenge Gorbachev? Is there a role for unilateral initiatives?

If you agree that these questions provide an appropriate framework for reviewing NSR 3, we have attached at Tab I a notice which Philip Hughes would send out to the agencies, informing them of the NSC meeting.

TD
Tim Deal and Arnie Kanter *Don Smiley for* concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the meeting notice (Tab I) from Philip Hughes to the appropriate agencies notifying them of the NSC meeting on the Soviet Union.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
- Tab A Agenda

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8920230
RECEIVED: 24 MAR 89 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HAGIN, J

DOC DATE: 23 FEB 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR

NSC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRES ACTIVITY RE NSC MTG 5 APR

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 11 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 8920272

FILES: IFM 0

NSCP: NS0009 NSR0003

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

DATE

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: LF

CLOSED BY: LF

DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8920230

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 89032414 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20230

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Brent Scowcroft

FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

EVENT: NSC Meeting

DATE: April 5, 1989

TIME: 3:15pm

DURATION: 60 Minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

ATTIRE: Business Suit

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking Points

MEDIA COVERAGE: Closed

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

CONTACT: _____

TELEPHONE: OFFICE _____ HOME _____

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

Ed Rogers	Marlin Fitzwater	David Bates
James Cicconi	David Demarest	David Valdez
Fred McClure	Jean Lamb	USSS - PPD
Susan Porter Rose	Steve Studdert	Gary Walters
Patty Presock	John Keller	WHCA Audio/Visual
Speechwriting Office	Tim McBride	WHCA Operations
Laurie Firestone	J. Bonnie Newman	Mary Jane Smith
Robert Guttman	Tony Lopez	C. Boyden Gray

TO: PROJECT OFFICERS
FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II
SUBJECT: CHECKLIST FOR PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS

General Responsibilities

- _____ The Presidential Advance Office has responsibility for all logistical arrangements for any event involving press coverage. Please coordinate with them from the time your event is approved in order to avoid the need for last-minute modification.
 - _____ Notify and clear all participants. (Full name, social security number, date of birth and place of birth).
 - _____ Prepare and submit briefing paper to Jim Cicconi's Office by 3:00pm of the preceding day (14 copies)
 - _____ Coordinate with Tim McBride on Presidential involvement.
 - _____ Coordinate with Press Office and Media Relations regarding Press Coverage. Provide Media Relations with hometowns of participants. No organization's photographers will be admitted to any event unless the press is present. Clearance of such photographers should be coordinated through Media Relations.
 - _____ If remarks are required, coordinate with the Speechwriters Office well in advance.
 - _____ For outdoor events at the White House, in case of inclement weather, clear and reserve the backup location indicated.
 - _____ If participant plans to bring a gift, contact the White House Gift Unit, in advance, for review and proper procedure for handling.
 - _____ If any foreign visitor or dignitary is to be involved, please coordinate with the NSC (x2224).
 - _____ If any Department of Defense or Military personnel are to be involved, please coordinate in advance with the White House Military Office (x2150).
 - _____ If press coverage is expected, please provide all pertinent information concerning this event (guests, scenario, backdrop, etc.) to the Presidential Advance Office at least 72 hours prior to the event.
 - _____ Within five (5) days after the event, submit a complete, confirmed list of staff and attendees, identified by title, and the actual starting and completion times of the event, to the President's Diarist, Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling.
 - _____ If tent name cards are needed, send a list of names to the Social Secretary's office (x7064) at least 48 hours in advance.
- For West Wing Meetings all room arrangements (chairs, notepads, pencils, etc.) should be made through Carl Jones or Susie Peake.

its

Coordinate with the Social Secretary's office (x7064) for all arrangements.

• List to Social Secretary's office, preferably three weeks prior to the event.

President's attendance at this event should not be announced until official confirmation is given by the White House Press Office and any public announcement be coordinated with that office. Also, prior to the distribution of any printed material, particularly details of the invitation, contact must be made with the White Social Secretary, Laurie Firestone, at (x7064).