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2005-1003-F; 2009-0857-F; S

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC Meetings Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 90000  
**Folder ID Number:** 90000-009

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**Folder Title:**  
NSC0008a - April 04, 1989 - U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe

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## Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Minutes	National Security Council Meeting Re: U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe (10 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	TS
02. Handwritten Note	Philip [G. Philip Hughes] to Bob (1 pp.)	4/3	(b)(1)	
03. Note	James W. Cicconi to POTUS Re: Attached is an updated briefing paper... (1 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	
04. Outline	From Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with the National Security Council (3 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S
05. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points -- Meeting with the National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with The National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07. Agenda	National Security Council Meeting Re: Western Europe/Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Outline	From Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with the National Security Council (3 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC0008a - April 04, 1989 - U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1381

**OA/ID Number:** 90000-009

**Date Closed:** 9/17/2009

**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2005-1003-F

**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

**Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet**  
**(George Bush Library)**

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with the National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10. Agenda	National Security Council Meeting Re: Western Europe/Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	Robert Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: National Security Council Meeting on Western Europe and Eastern Europe (8 pp.)	4/3/89	(b)(1)	S
12. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Distribution List Re: NSC Meeting (1 pp.)	4/1/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Agenda	National Security Council Meeting Re: Western Europe/Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	S
14. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Proposed Agenda for NSC Meeting on Western Europe and Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	3/31/89	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

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**Re-review Case #:**

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RECORD ID: 8920266  
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TO: HUGHES

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 11 APR 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST  
NSR

EUROPE EAST  
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR NSC MTG ON 4 APR RE WESTERN & EASTERN EUROPE

ACTION: HUGHES APPROVED RECOM	DUE DATE: 08 MAY 90	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS	LOGREF:	
FILES: IFM O	NSCP: NS0008A DC016	NSR0012 CODES:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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 004 PRESIDENT  
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 005 HUGHES  
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Z 89033110 FOR DECISION  
 X 89033014 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES  
 Z 89040313 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION  
 X 89040314 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM  
 Z 89040317 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION  
 Z 89040317 FOR INFORMATION  
 X 89040418 NOTED BY PRES  
 Z 89041110 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION  
 X 89041214 HUGHES APPROVED RECOM

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
**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: EA LOG # 20266  
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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG: EA AIO 02

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Bob Perito	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>LMS 5/7</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____

**A = Action**    **I = Information**    **D = Dispatch**    **R = Retain**    **N = No further Action**  
 cc: VP    Sununu    Other

**COMMENTS**                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20266 add-on

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Minutes for NSC Meeting on US Relations with  
Western Europe and Eastern Europe, April 4, 1989

Enclosed at Tab I are the minutes for the above-referenced meeting.

Recommendation

That you file the minutes for the NSC meeting on US relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe attached at Tab I for the record.

Attachment:

Tab I Minutes

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 9/17/09

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TAB I

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20266 add-on

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National Security Council Meeting

April 4, 1989, 2:55 p.m. - 4:20 p.m., Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

State:

Secretary Baker  
Robert Kimmitt

White House:

Brent Scowcroft  
John Sununu  
Marlin Fitzwater  
Robert Gates  
Robert Blackwill

Treasury:

Secretary Brady

OSD:

Secretary Cheney  
Paul Wolfowitz

CIA:

Director Webster  
Richard Kerr

JCS:

Robert T. Herres  
Jonathan Howe

Commerce:

Secretary Mosbacher

OMB:

Director Darman

USTR:

Representative Hills

ACDA:

George Murphy

USIA:

Marvin Stone

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Minutes

The President opened the meeting by indicating he saw the impending discussion as essentially an overview of our relations with Western and Eastern Europe and not as a decision meeting. He then asked General Scowcroft to open the discussion. (S)

General Scowcroft asked Judge Webster to begin with a quick intelligence review but, first, he noted that US policies in Europe had been successful and Europe is changing in big ways. In Western Europe, there is more unity in attitudes, common planning, assertiveness, and a strong impulse for better East-West relations. In Eastern Europe, there is an obvious loosening in Soviet control over the region. Eastern Europe clearly wants closer ties with the West and Western Europe, especially the FRG, wishes to become much more involved in Eastern Europe. (S)

Judge Webster said that political developments in Eastern Europe are outpacing economic reforms. The push for pluralism is coming from below in Hungary and Poland. In those countries in the next three to five years there should be more freedom of speech and a freer press. All these changes, of course, carry the risk of upheaval. Gorbachev's interpretation of the Brezhnev Doctrine is now uncertain. Hungary has a debt of \$18 billion and Poland one of \$39 billion. Both countries badly want Western aid. Although there is a possibility in the near future of more cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe concerning terrorism and drugs, this is not likely to be the case with respect to technology theft. (S)

The threat perception of the Soviet Union has receded in Western Europe and publics there are putting ever greater pressure on governments for more arms control. There is less and less public support for defense spending and diminishing concern about the dangers posed by Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Chancellor Kohl is politically weak and his public wants better relations with the East. As the 1990 elections in the Federal Republic approach, Kohl will want to take no chances. That will lead to something like a policy paralysis in Bonn. As for 1992, the biggest danger is that the EC will become a fortress Europe. That is unlikely if the world economy remains strong, but could become a more serious problem if there is a recession. (S)

General Scowcroft stressed that Judge Webster's presentation had underscored the rapid changes which are occurring in Europe. NATO is increasingly moving into uncharted territory. Western

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Europe is unifying. Eastern Europe is turbulent. (S)

General Scowcroft said that he wished to group the issues for NSC discussion into three baskets: NATO, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. He would assume familiarity with the papers responding to NSRs 4 and 5. Continuing, General Scowcroft noted that the NSR 5 paper assumed continuation of a massive Soviet military threat and recommended that the US should affirm a long-term military presence in Europe. The paper assumed that it is essential for the U.S. to maintain a land-based nuclear missile force in Europe. The paper called for a more creative U.S. approach to burdensharing and proposed interagency studies on future NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force levels in Europe, and on potential new CSBMs. (S)

On 1992, the NSR 5 paper noted that this step by the EC will do far more than set regulations; it is a major move toward the political and economic unification of Western Europe. The paper argued that broad trade disputes between the U.S. and the EC should not undermine the fundamental solidarity of the Alliance. There was a discussion of the benefits of a broader European role in the world, but some disagreements emerged at the DC-level. Some thought that we should consult with the Europeans on regional issues primarily through NATO, while others believed that we should intensify our dialogue with the EC on these subjects. Finally, the DC had wondered whether the USG is ideally organized to deal with 1992 and whether U.S. policies toward 1992 should be administered through the EPC, the NSC, or another group. (S)

Returning to Eastern Europe, General Scowcroft noted the emphasis in the NSR 4 paper on U.S. encouragement for further liberalization, economic assistance, and autonomy in that region. Events in Poland could provide a framework for arriving at a USG broad policy toward Eastern Europe. In addition, the paper recommended a shift in US policy on differentiation and argued that our approach to the area should be based on U.S. interests and not on the relationship between these countries and Moscow. In particular, differentiation should be based not only on domestic liberalization but also on policies toward terrorism, drugs, and technology theft. (S)

The paper cautioned against a US-Soviet effort to coordinate mutual policies toward Eastern Europe. This would raise a host of problems, including fears in Europe of a U.S.-Soviet condominium and the danger that West Germany would open its own

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channel to Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe. (S)

General Scowcroft, in summary, said that the papers responding to NSRs 4 and 5 were very cautious papers which basically recommended a steady as you go policy. This is what one would expect from the permanent government. But there was precious little in the papers to indicate that we are in new waters. In particular the papers made no attempt to anticipate or analyze the major changes in Europe that could easily happen before the end of the century. (S)

One such change could be in who governs Germany. If the SPD insisted on denuclearization, would we leave U.S. troops in Europe with no nuclear weapons, especially given increasing problems with the German public on low level flying, maneuvers, exercises, etc.? (TS)

Tough questions needed to be addressed. For example, with regard to the follow on to LANCE, why do we need one? Why were such weapons deployed in Europe in the first place? If we got rid of one class of weapons, INF missiles, why not another? What are the minimum requirements of extended deterrence? Could we defend Europe with nuclear weapons deployed at sea or in Omaha? What is our long term goal in the CFE negotiations? What sort of NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional balance would we like to see? (TS)

Turning to Western Europe, General Scowcroft asked if a unified Europe becoming a superpower in most respects was in the U.S. interest? If so, why? If not, why not? If the EC before and after 1992 assumed an anti-American orientation, how would that affect the U.S.? (S)

What does it mean that Gorbachev is more popular than the President in Western Europe? Are we doing something terribly wrong, or is this only a temporary phenomenon? What do we think about German reunification? If our attitude is negative, what can or should we do about it? Will 1992 embed Germany more firmly in the West or make the EC increasingly an instrument of Germany's eastern ambitions? (S)

Can we go through years of DOD austerity without touching U.S. force structure in Europe? If not, how can we try to insure that we get something from the Soviets in return for U.S. troop withdrawals from the continent? (S)

With respect to Eastern Europe, this is where the wars come from,

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General Scowcroft said. But what are our goals in the region? Is it to bring Eastern Europe westward toward the EC, is it Finlandization? How are we going to handle instability in Eastern Europe if it occurs in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary? Should we look at Eastern Europe as something of a Soviet sphere of influence? How would the U.S. react to a Soviet proposal to withdraw all of its forces from Eastern Europe if the U.S. withdrew its troops from Western Europe? (S)

General Scowcroft concluded his presentation by noting that the papers do make useful suggestions. But in some way the administration had to come to grips with these fundamental questions about U.S. policy towards Western and Eastern Europe, questions relating to what elements of traditional U.S. policy toward Europe in the postwar period should remain, and what changes, if any, should be made. (S)

In response, the President said that General Scowcroft had listed a set of penetrating questions and asked where we stand in getting the US Government to answer these questions in a reasonable time. Gorbachev was about to make an announcement in Havana. Gorbachev can move whenever he wishes given the system in which he operates. The President said that he hoped everyone at the table was thinking anew on these issues. We need creativity. We have to get the high ground. It is not necessary, the President continued, to match Gorbachev headline for headline. But we do have to worry about the effect of the Soviet peace offensive on the Alliance and on political stability in Europe. (S)

The President noted that we had constraints on the DOD budget. Even so, we have to be careful not to worry so much about Gorbachev that we lose the opportunities he may represent. We may be thinking too much about the downside of events in the Soviet Union and too little about the upside. For instance, maybe we can do with fewer troops in Europe if circumstances change. How will we know if that is the case? And how do we address General Scowcroft's questions without reading about them the next day in the newspapers? (TS)

General Scowcroft said that the European studies, NSRs 4 and 5, should be regarded as the bedrock on which we decide specific policy issues. But in deciding those particular issues of US-European relations, we would need to be sure that assumptions were challenged and alternatives examined. Otherwise, there would be no new thinking in the Administration. (S)

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Secretary Baker stressed that the worst thing would be to say publicly that we are going to have more studies; rather, we should indicate that the studies had been completed and that we are looking at them. Continuing, the Secretary emphasized that it was crucial to decide where the Administration was going during the next 50 days before the NATO Summit. He underlined to the President that the NATO Summit must be a successful example of the President's leadership of the West. New ideas had to be examined, but they would probably have to be worked through the bureaucracy from the top down. We certainly would need new initiatives in order to maintain aggressive US leadership in the Alliance, and we would need them in the next 50 days. We have been fiddling for two months on the SNF issue, and the Germans have been unwilling to engage. It was now time for the United States to get going. As for General Scowcroft's list of questions, we needed to move on two parallel fronts: an urgent effort to develop initiatives for the NATO summit and a parallel exercise to look at the longer-term issues. (S)

Secretary Brady said that he disagreed with Secretary Baker in one respect. Russia is flat broke and out of gas. We need an analysis of whether Moscow is out of money or not. If the Soviet Union is essentially bankrupt, it would have far-reaching effects on US diplomacy. Do the Soviets have the resources to both feed their people and buy weapons? (S)

Mr. Kerr observed that the USSR is not quite broke, but its economy, especially the consumer goods sector, is getting worse. The Soviet Union is going into the red. (S)

Secretary Cheney, referring back to the NSR papers, said he thought they were good. They do represent a status quo approach, but there is a good reason for that. The question is whether we should change the status quo after 40 years of success in which NATO successfully deterred the Soviet threat. How much has that threat really changed? We need, stressed Secretary Cheney, a set of standards through which we could precisely define what would constitute a significant reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe. (S)

General Scowcroft replied that we would be looking into just that question in the context of NSR 12. (S)

Governor Sununu said he agreed with Secretary Cheney about the papers, but said he was concerned about the negative effect on

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innovation of worries about leaks to the press. To combat this problem we need a small group to prepare high quality material for the President which would not immediately get into the newspapers. (S)

The President asked Governor Sununu if he had in mind a new mechanism. (S)

Governor Sununu replied that such a group could draw on existing people, but there would be no holds barred on ideas. This group would have to be small because, if too many people were involved, there would be leaks. (S)

General Scowcroft said such a group already exists. It is called the Deputies Committee. (S)

Governor Sununu said that they had to be given this charge. (S)

General Scowcroft responded that it could be done. (S)

The President emphasized that the time has come to develop the most innovative ideas possible that make sense. The situation is changing rapidly in Europe, and Gorbachev does have political appeal there. This appeal has to do with his style, his bold ideas, and his attractiveness to Western publics. He is a real challenge for us, and we have to meet that challenge. It won't be easy. The Soviets may be broke, but we are not exactly rolling in dough ourselves. The President stressed that we can handle the Gorbachev challenge. We must. (S)

Mr. Stone observed that USIA had been polling in Europe for two decades and that Europeans continued to be largely pro-American. (S)

Turning to 1992, Secretary Baker said that we will have major differences with the EC just as we did when Spain and Portugal went into the Community and the EC took it out of our hide. We will have to be ready for some tough days ahead in negotiating with the Community as it heads for 1992. (S)

Representative Hills said that she had heard two themes in the discussion: we need to get the DC to look for ideas and themes in the next 50 days in order to electrify NATO and shine the light on Gorbachev's empty promises, and we need to look at the longer-term issues raised by General Scowcroft. People are always pushing for innovation. Nevertheless, there is great

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strength in the status quo. Therefore, to try to reach decisions on General Scowcroft's questions in the next 50 days would be highly precipitous. (S)

Secretary Mosbacher observed that if the security relationship with the Soviet Union becomes manageable, we will have a growing economic agenda with Moscow. Trade with the Soviets seems to have a higher profile in other countries than in ours. As for 1992, we have to make sure that the EC market is kept open. And with regard to Eastern Europe, we have much more to offer there than does the Soviet Union. We should build on that enduring fact. (S)

Director Darman thought that we should not base our long-term strategy on Mr. Gorbachev who at present is a short-term phenomenon. It is premature to conclude that Gorbachev represents a long-term and fundamental shift in the attitudes of the Soviet leadership. In the short term, we have to figure out how to recapture the lead with public opinion. There is something fundamentally wrong in the management of our communications on this score since we so obviously have the merits on our side. We need a more inspiring vision of market-oriented democracies that ordinary people can understand. We have an opportunity to do a better job of selling our vision, and we need to begin doing it. We are going to have to take cuts in the defense budget. We should time those reductions so that we can get diplomatic benefits, and so we do not seem to be caving to domestic political pressure. The President needs to get some credit for what otherwise would be unilateral concessions. Finally, perhaps it would be best if Eastern Europe would remain a sphere of Soviet interest, for now, while the United States concentrates on more important parts of the world. (TS)

The President wondered how Darman's last point squared with political realities in Europe. Should we leave the field in Eastern Europe entirely to Moscow? If we did, what would be the effect on Germany? The President stressed that seeing Poland subjected to the Brezhnev Doctrine makes him want to give the Poles encouragement to get rid of the Soviet yoke. (TS)

General Scowcroft observed that there is a relationship between what we do for the Poles economically and the LDC debt problem. (S)

Director Darman said he would rather fix Mexico and Brazil than Eastern Europe. (TS)

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Turning to SNF, Mr. Murphy said we could significantly reduce US nuclear artillery rounds on the continent. (S)

Secretary Baker said that might be part of NATO's decision, but it would not help on the follow-on to Lance question. (S)

Director Darman called for a visionary set of Presidential speeches that reframe the ideological debate. We need to stress that we are for prosperity with a purpose. The West is best at the material side of life. It is also best at quality of life. We need to stress to our publics that our prosperity should move beyond the material. (S)

Secretary Brady thought that, if our objective was to be bold and visionary, it would be enormously helpful to review our postwar strategy, including the need for a strategic triad. (TS)

Secretary Cheney emphasized that we had to be cautious, that the Soviet Union was the only nation in the world that could destroy us. A period of turmoil and rapid change is the worst time for the United States to be bold and creative. If we are not careful, we could repeat the Reykjavik syndrome and scare the hell out of our Allies. We need consistency of purpose more than anything else and to remember that successful postwar US policies have worked, have got us where we are. (S)

The President agreed with Secretary Cheney but cautioned that we cannot be complacent. We have to be bold and visionary to make sure Germany does not become unstable, does not go socialist. (TS)

Secretary Baker stressed that we do not wish to be bold and creative at the risk of mistake. We do not wish to repeat Reykjavik. But we must have a successful NATO Summit. This President must demonstrate leadership in this Alliance, in part to help a good German government. (S)

The President summarized by saying that he had heard the Cheney/Hills/Darman theory: do nothing, but say it well. But one has to ask whether that approach staves off leftist trends in Germany and the rest of Europe. If so, the President said, he would relax. Concluding, the President stressed that he was seriously concerned about fragmentation within the West because of the Gorbachev phenomenon. The President told the group that he wanted the Administration to generate specific ideas for the

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NATO Summit, including on arms control. (TS)

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 03 APR 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST  
NSR

EUROPE EAST  
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MTG TALKER FOR NSC MTG ON 4 APR RE EASTERN & WESTERN EUROPE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 08 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: NS0008A DC016 NSR0012 CODES:

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002	X 89033014 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003 SCOWCROFT	Z 89040313 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION
003	X 89040314 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
004 SCOWCROFT	Z 89040317 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
004 PRESIDENT	Z 89040317 FOR INFORMATION
004	X 89040418 NOTED BY PRES
005 HUGHES	Z 89041110 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION
005	X 89041214 HUGHES APPROVED RECOM

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LOG # 20266  
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<del>Bob Perito</del>	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>IPZ</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>Je 4/3</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>MS 5/7</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
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89 APR 3 9:50

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

NSC - Mtg Memo 4/4 2:45 (Date/Time)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/3

Bob  
One thing troubles me about this paper

and that is injecting into the middle of an

MSC meeting, as the paper for the President

(reverts)  
docs, the issue of whether the MISE or the EPR

should take the lead on Europe 1992. This

may look like a "bureaucratic" issue compared to

the other policy questions on the table.

Philip

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Note	James W. Cicconi to POTUS Re: Attached is an updated briefing paper... (1 pp.)	4/4/89	(b)(1)	

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC0008a - April 04, 1989 - U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe

<b>Date Closed:</b> 9/17/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90000-009
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2005-1003-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

20266 Add-on

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extreme mold and water damage

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: April 4, 1989  
LOCATION: The Cabinet Room  
TIME: 2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT (B)

I. PURPOSE

Following our overview meeting last Friday, we are now ready to address the specific policy issues raised in our National Security Reviews on Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

II. BACKGROUND

The agenda for the meeting is at Tab B. We have identified 12 points for NSC consideration; they proceed from four major policy issues.

The first issue is maintaining the Alliance security consensus in changing circumstances. This entails projecting a vital U.S. and Allied vision of Europe's future, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, assessing the continuing role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and better defining our long-term conventional arms control goals.

Agencies agree on the need for a public U.S. and Allied statement that responds to and transcends Gorbachev's notion of a "common European home." Our vision, based on commonality of values rather than geography, should also include (a) preserving American ground and air forces in Europe to safeguard European security into the next century, (b) strongly supporting European integration, including security cooperation, (c) striving to overcome the division of Europe, with Western economic assistance to encourage hopeful changes in Eastern Europe, and (d) welcoming reforms in the USSR if they contribute to a less repressive and confrontational Soviet Union.

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2011-0786-MR  
SCS 10/31/12

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Declassify on: OADR

No agency has contested the need for the continuation of a land-based missile deterrent in Europe. Because achievement of this goal will require a considerable investment of U.S. resources and attention, I believe you should have the opportunity to make a deliberate decision to ratify this requirement. Reaffirmation of the American nuclear guarantee would reassure those Europeans who worry about an American nuclear disengagement from Europe.

The second issue concerns our approach to growing West European economic and political integration. The Deputies Committee urged adoption of a set of principles that should guide U.S. policy toward the European Community as it moves to create a unified single market in 1992 and, beyond that, to achieve closer economic and political unity. These principles should proceed from the conviction that there is no inherent contradiction between vigorous defense of specific U.S. interests and support for the goal of increased European unity.

The third issue is reassessing the U.S. and Allied approaches toward Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland, at a time of major change in the region. Economic assistance may be the West's most powerful lever in trying to encourage further liberalization and autonomy in the region. American financial resources are limited, but our economic and political engagement is needed both to seize what may be an historic opportunity in Eastern Europe and to insure a coordinated Allied approach to the region. As you know, we are considering a response to Poland, should Solidarity and the regime reach agreement. Our response will be taken as a signal throughout Eastern Europe and with our Allies of a new U.S. approach toward the region.

Currently, the U.S. differentiates among East European countries on the basis of domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence from Moscow. There is interagency consensus that we should judge East European foreign policies on the basis on U.S. interests rather than primarily with reference to Moscow.

The Deputies Committee was united in the view that seeking an arrangement with Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe is fraught with unacceptable dangers, including domestic political ones. We should not enter into any Yalta-like agreement or understanding with Moscow, nor should the U.S.

be seen as imposing limits on the East European peoples' right of self-determination.

The fourth issue concerns the role of the NATO summit and your visits to Rome, Bonn, and London. Your trip to Europe will be a major opportunity for you to project a U.S. vision for Europe and lead the Alliance toward a summit declaration that embraces a shared view of Europe's future.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You will open the meeting, perhaps using the suggested talking points at Tab A, ask Bill Webster for our intelligence assessment, and then turn to me to review the issues.

Attachments

Tab A      Suggested Talking Points  
Tab B      Agenda  
Tab C      List of Participants

Prepared by:  
Robert L. Hutchings

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points -- Meeting with the National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC0008a - April 04, 1989 - U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe

<b>Date Closed:</b> 9/17/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90000-009
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2005-1003-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

<p>Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]</p> <p>P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]            P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]            P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]            P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]            P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]            P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]</p> <p>C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.</p> <p>PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.</p>	<p>Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]</p> <p>(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]            (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]            (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]            (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]            (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]            (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]            (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]            (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information</p>
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with The National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC0008a - April 04, 1989 - U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe

<b>Date Closed:</b> 9/17/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90000-009
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2005-1003-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

<p><b>Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]</b></p> <p>P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]</p> <p>C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.</p> <p>PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.</p>	<p><b>Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]</b></p> <p>(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information</p>
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Tuesday, April 4, 1989

Cabinet Room

2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

WESTERN EUROPE/EASTERN EUROPE

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....The President
- II. Assessment of the Situation.....William H. Webster
- III. Issues for NSC Consideration.....Brent Scowcroft
- IV. Discussion.....All Participants
- V. Summary.....Brent Scowcroft

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-1569-MA  
7/8/2013 MA

Participants

The President  
The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
Chief of Staff to the President  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
United States Trade Representative  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Director, United States Information Agency

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 3, 1989


20266 Add-on

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: April 4, 1989

LOCATION: The Cabinet Room

TIME: 2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

Following our overview meeting last Friday, we are now ready to address the specific policy issues raised in our National Security Reviews on Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

II. BACKGROUND

The agenda for the meeting is at Tab B. We have identified 12 points for NSC consideration; they proceed from four major policy issues.

✓ The first issue is maintaining the Alliance security consensus in changing circumstances. This entails projecting a vital U.S. and Allied vision of Europe's future, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, assessing the continuing role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and better defining our long-term conventional arms control goals.

✓ Agencies agree on the need for a public U.S. and Allied statement that responds to and transcends Gorbachev's notion of a "common European home." Our vision, based on commonality of values rather than geography, should also include (a) preserving American ground and air forces in Europe to safeguard European security into the next century, (b) strongly supporting European integration, including security cooperation, (c) striving to overcome the division of Europe, with Western economic assistance to encourage hopeful changes in Eastern Europe, and (d) welcoming reforms in the USSR if they contribute to a less repressive and confrontational Soviet Union.

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2012-0719-MR  
2/18/2014 MM

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extreme mold and water damage

No agency has contested the need for the continuation of a land-based missile deterrent in Europe. Because achievement of this goal will require a considerable investment of U.S. resources and attention, I believe you should have the opportunity to make a deliberate decision to ratify this requirement. Reaffirmation of the American nuclear guarantee would reassure those Europeans who worry about an American nuclear disengagement from Europe. At the same time, the NSC should move now to commission new USG studies on the U.S. and Allied positions on conventional arms reductions, confidence- and security-building measures, and burdensharing.

✓ The second issue concerns our approach to growing West European economic and political integration. The Deputies Committee urged adoption of a set of principles that should guide U.S. policy toward the European Community as it moves to create a unified single market in 1992 and, beyond that, to achieve closer economic and political unity. These principles should proceed from the conviction that there is no inherent contradiction between vigorous defense of specific U.S. interests and support for the goal of increased European unity.

The NSC also needs to discuss the Administration's internal approach to "1992" -- particularly to define the competencies of the Economic Policy Council and the NSC and to establish mechanisms for improved coordination between them. Existing mechanisms work well in dealing with the trade and investment aspects of the 1992 program, but we need to focus greater high-level attention and better coordinate our economic, political, and security interests as European integration proceeds.

✓ The third issue is reassessing the U.S. and Allied approaches toward Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland, at a time of major change in the region. Economic assistance may be the West's most powerful lever in trying to encourage further liberalization and autonomy in the region. American financial resources are limited, but our economic and political engagement is needed both to seize what may be an historic opportunity in Eastern Europe and to insure a coordinated Allied approach to the region. As you know, we are considering a response to Poland, should Solidarity and the regime reach agreement. Our response will be taken as a signal throughout Eastern Europe and with our Allies of a new U.S. approach toward the region.

signal throughout Eastern Europe and with our Allies of a new U.S. approach toward the region.

Currently, the U.S. differentiates among East European countries on the basis of domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence from Moscow. There is interagency consensus that we should judge East European foreign policies on the basis on U.S. interests rather than primarily with reference to Moscow.

The Deputies Committee was united in the view that seeking an arrangement with Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe is fraught with unacceptable dangers, including domestic political ones. We should not enter into any Yalta-like agreement or understanding with Moscow, nor should the U.S. be seen as imposing limits on the East European peoples' right of self-determination.

The fourth issue concerns the role of the NATO summit and your visits to Rome, Bonn, and London. Your trip to Europe will be a major opportunity for you to project a U.S. vision for Europe and lead the Alliance toward a summit declaration that embraces a shared view of Europe's future.

I suggest you give a strong push at the meeting for agencies to work hard on developing new initiatives for the NATO Summit.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You will open the meeting, perhaps using the suggested talking points at Tab A, and will then turn to me to review the agenda.

Attachments

- Tab A Suggested Talking Points
- Tab B Agenda
- Tab C List of Participants

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with the National Security Council (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC0008a - April 04, 1989 - U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe

<b>Date Closed:</b> 9/17/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90000-009
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2005-1003-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
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<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Tuesday, April 4, 1989

Cabinet Room

2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

WESTERN EUROPE/EASTERN EUROPE

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....The President
- II. Assessment of the Situation.....William H. Webster
- III. Issues for NSC Consideration.....Brent Scowcroft
- IV. Discussion.....All Participants
- V. Summary.....Brent Scowcroft

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-1569-MR  
7/8/2013 JAM

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Participants

The President  
The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
Chief of Staff to the President  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
United States Trade Representative  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Director, United States Information Agency

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

20266 Add-on

ACTION

April 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*  
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RH*  
SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting on Western  
Europe and Eastern Europe, April 4,  
2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m., Cabinet Room

Setting

This NSC meeting is to consider the policy issues arising from the National Security Reviews on Western Europe (NSR 5) and Eastern Europe (NSR 4).

The President will open the meeting with some introductory remarks. Your briefing memorandum to the President is attached at Tab I, with proposed talking points attached at Tab A. The agenda for the meeting is at Tab B. After the President's opening statement, Judge Webster will present a five-minute assessment of trends affecting U.S. interests in Europe. We believe he will describe strains in the Alliance security consensus, movement toward greater West European coordination and integration, and the major changes underway in Eastern Europe. He will also describe Gorbachev's impact, though a discussion of our relations with the Soviet Union will be reserved for subsequent discussion by the NSC. The President may then ask you to guide the discussion. You could recapitulate the issues in this memorandum and then open them, one by one, for discussion and decision.

Discussion

We are in a period of major change in every dimension of our postwar European policy -- trans-Atlantic security relations, U.S.-West European economic relations, and relations with Eastern Europe -- as well as our relations with the Soviet Union, which will be discussed later by the NSC. We have proposed twelve issues calling for discussion, which will be a real chore in the allotted 90 minutes. (The first issue, intended as a scene setter, summarizes some of the points made in our earlier memorandum on East-West relations. The remaining 11 are new.)

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Declassify on: OADR

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2011-0786-MR  
SCS 10/31/12

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2

(1) Maintaining Alliance cohesion in changing circumstances.

New developments in Europe, led by the prospect of a diminished Soviet military threat and a new drive toward West European economic and political integration, vindicate goals which the U.S., and NATO, have pursued since the early postwar period. The overarching problem now is to adapt those goals and keep them relevant as these changes undermine some of the assumptions on which our postwar trans-Atlantic policies were founded.

Public opinion polls in Western Europe show continued strong support for NATO and the U.S. defense commitment, but they also show declining support for long-standing Alliance positions on NATO defense spending, arms control issues, and the importance of retaining a U.S. nuclear deterrent based in Europe. In a new Europe that is no longer bound together, in the West, by a clearly perceived Soviet military threat or perhaps, in the East, by the danger of Soviet military intervention, long-dormant rivalries and continental conflicts may reemerge. Gorbachev's actions have led many Europeans (and some Americans) to question the U.S. leadership role in Europe. We think this US role has been indispensable to the unprecedented stability of the international order in Europe since the war. If European leaders perceive that the U.S. is looking for an opportunity to withdraw from Europe, they may begin a fundamental reorientation of their foreign and security policies, with unforeseeable and potentially dangerous consequences.

(2) Defining the elements of the U.S. and Allied visions for Europe's future.

The DC on the Political and Security Aspects of U.S.-West European Relations (NSR 5) urged that a public U.S. and Allied statement be prepared that outlines such a vision. This vision could include:

- the common values, culture, and heritage, amounting to a "Western experience," shared by the United States and Europe, including Eastern Europe, but not by the Soviet Union;
- U.S. support for greater West European economic and political integration; and
- U.S. encouragement of greater West European security cooperation and assumption of more global responsibilities, through the Western European Union and other fora.

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3

- preserving American ground and air forces in Europe to safeguard European security into the next century;
- striving to overcome the division of Europe, with Western assistance to support movement toward political and economic institutional change in Eastern Europe; and
- welcoming reforms in the USSR if they contribute to less repression at home and less confrontational policies abroad.

A strong reaffirmation that the U.S. military presence is in Europe for the long term can let our allies know that we are not looking for Soviet force cuts as a way to release us from an unwelcome commitment.

(3) Assessing the continuing role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, especially land-based missiles.

We believe, as you know, that there will be an enduring need for substantial U.S. forces and U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on the continent, though the numbers might be reduced.

No agency has contested the need for the continuation of a land-based missile deterrent in Europe. We raise the issue because achievement of this goal will require a considerable investment of U.S. resources and high-level attention in the 1990s. We believe the NSC should have the opportunity to make a deliberate decision to ratify this requirement. More broadly, a reaffirmation of the presence in Europe of American nuclear land-based missiles would reassure those Europeans who feared that Reykjavik and the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty portended an eventual U.S. military disengagement from Europe. In so doing, it would serve to strengthen U.S. leadership in the transatlantic partnership.

(4) Commissioning USG studies on preferred outcomes in NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels and new CSBM initiatives.

The DC agreed that the USG should move now, in the context of the review of U.S. national security strategy (NSR 12), to study preferred outcomes in NATO and Warsaw Pact levels beyond the cuts envisioned in NATO's current CFE proposal. Although OSD and JCS may prefer a slower pace, we believe there is a pressing need better to define our long-term conventional arms control goals, especially since Shevardnadze has already offered a competing vision of where the Soviets think the CFE negotiations should eventually lead. The study could lay the groundwork for a subsequent NATO effort to identify our future conventional arms control objectives by the end of this year. Announcing the commencement of such a NATO study, with the goal of advancing a

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subsequent NATO effort to identify our future conventional arms control objectives by the end of this year. Announcing the commencement of such a NATO study, with the goal of advancing a less militarized future for Europe, could be part of the outcome of the NATO summit.

The DC also proposed that the USG make a major effort to develop new initiatives in CSBMs beyond those contained in NATO's current proposals. We believe the NSC should endorse that view and commission a thorough reevaluation of CSBM ideas, both new and old, to determine their merit in the different political climate this Administration must face. These two studies have been commissioned in NSR 12, but it would be useful if you were to give them a boost in the meeting.

(5) Examining more creative approaches to the burdensharing issue.

The DC endorsed the idea. This would entail redoubling efforts outlined in last year's NATO Executive Working Group report, working within the NATO framework to look at the relative defense roles, risks, and contributions of individual allies. As you know, we think that a new initiative in armaments standardization could also help, especially if it involved a high-visibility program like Main Battle Tank development. Such an initiative has been considered before, and encountered formidable resistance from national defense industries (including those in the U.S.) as well as from advocates of fully independent national production capabilities in key weapons systems. We believe, though, that the advantages for our burdensharing effort, and the potential cost savings, warrant the NSC commissioning such a burdensharing study.

(6) Encouraging a greater West European global role and deciding whether to seek to consult more intensely with the European Community on regional issues.

The DC agreed that the U.S. should encourage a greater West European role on global problems and initiate direct consultations between the U.S. and Western Europe on selected regional issues. There was disagreement, however, on whether these consultations should occur in the EC framework or in NATO.

We believe the NSC should agree to encourage greater European assertiveness and attempt to channel it into constructive cooperation. The USG could start regular political consultations with the EC on regional problems where we think the Europeans can make a real contribution. Some may wish to keep these detailed regional discussions entirely in NATO. As European states take on greater global responsibilities we can expect disagreements

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about policy direction, greater pressure for consultation on subjects where we do not think Europeans can be helpful, and challenges to U.S. leadership in setting the West's global agenda. However, European interest in a wider international role may be unstoppable. US acceptance of this trend and active engagement of the EC -- and, for that matter, the WEU -- could build a more durable base for a stronger out-of-area contribution by our allies and a better sense of common interests and joint responsibilities.

(7) Defining a set of principles and general U.S. approach in dealing with West European economic and political integration.

The DC on the Economic Aspects of U.S.-West European Relations (NSR 5) agreed that the USG needs a set of basic principles to guide U.S. policy toward the European Community as it moves toward a unified single market by 1992. The DC agreed that "1992" is more than a target date or set of regulations; it is part of a broader process of economic and political integration. The DC commissioned a separate PCC paper on "European Unity and the 1992 Program," which proposed such a set of principles.

We believe the NSC should consider these principles for adoption as the core of U.S. attitudes and approaches:

- There is no inconsistency between vigorous defense of specific U.S. interests and support for increased European unity and the trans-Atlantic partnership.
- We must pursue a cohesive policy including: support of our allies' political and economic growth, aggressive safeguarding of our trade and investment interests, maximum influence on European regional and transnational policy, and long-term preservation of the special U.S.-West European partnership and NATO.
- The inevitable trade disputes, in which we must pursue our interests vigorously, must not be permitted to erode the essential trans-Atlantic foundation of our global security, political and economic interests.
- All OECD countries have a special obligation to ensure liberal, non-discriminatory trade and investment policies based on national treatment and right-of-establishment, and not on sectoral reciprocity.

(8) Deciding on the appropriate USG mechanisms for dealing with the European Community as it moves to implement the 1992 program.

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The DC also agreed that while existing mechanisms do a good job of tracking the trade and investment aspects of 1992, the USG needs to focus greater high-level attention on "1992" and better integrate our economic, political, and security interests. The DC tasked the PCC paper to look into these organizational questions as well. The paper proposed, first, that U.S.-EC trade and investment issues continue to be coordinated within the framework of the Economic Policy Council and, second, that a working group be established under the Europe PCC to keep under review the security implications of European economic integration.

Economic agencies, as well as State's Economic Bureau, strongly resisted any expansion of the NSC's role at the expense of the EPC. Thus, the PCC paper's third recommendation says only that "some believe that an organizational framework may be necessary to bring together the EPC and the NSC on issues of concern to both...; the President might thus create a special cabinet level group."

At some point, the President will need to reach a decision on organizing the USG approach to 1992 -- particularly to define the competencies of the EPC and the NSC and to establish mechanisms for improved coordination. We believe "1992" and the broader process of European integration go well beyond trade and investment issues; they are eminently a matter of national security.

- (9) Reassessing the U.S. and Allied approach toward Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland, at a time of major change in the region.

The strategic importance of central Europe is clear. It is, as Bill Pfaff wrote in the New Yorker recently, "where the wars come from." Moreover, instability and repression in Eastern Europe would have dire consequences for East-West relations and, arguably, for the course of reform in the Soviet Union itself. A constructive and forward-looking U.S. approach to a changing Eastern Europe is crucial to the credibility of U.S. policy there and to our leadership role in Europe. If we fail to act, our Allies will do so in any case -- but in an uncoordinated way, without the political and economic conditions on which we base our East European policy.

That the stakes in Eastern Europe are very high is not controversial; the policy implications of that conclusion are. Arguments about a consistent global debt policy expose a view that there are other regions of equal importance, for instance Latin America, and that Eastern Europe does not deserve special

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treatment. Current U.S. policy assigns greater weight to economic criteria than political ones in questions of debt relief, in U.S. sponsorship of countries for membership in international economic organizations and in extensions of credits.

NSDD 54 states, "The U.S. extends debt relief only when necessary as a financial measure to ensure repayment and when the debtor country embarks on a program of economic and financial stabilization." The President will need to decide formally if that should remain the case. The NSC should consider whether the measures we are now developing for Poland give us a framework for implementing a new U.S. approach toward Eastern Europe as a whole.

(10) Revising the policy of "differentiation" in our relations with East European countries.

In considering NSR 4, the DC supported revision of the terms of differentiation laid out in NSDD 54. Currently, the U.S. differentiates among East European countries on the basis of domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence from Moscow. There is interagency consensus that we should judge East European foreign policies on the basis of U.S. interests rather than solely with reference to Moscow. This would mean making East European technology theft, support for terrorism, and/or intelligence activities factors in our differentiation decisions.

(11) Considering whether to seek an arrangement with Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe.

Despite Jim Baker's public comments on the subject, the DC was united in the view that seeking an arrangement with Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe is fraught with danger. This would betray 44 years of consistent U.S. policy on Eastern Europe. No Soviet commitment not to intervene in Eastern Europe would mean anything in the event of a real crisis there. Events in Poland and Hungary are moving so fast that Moscow cannot control them anyway, and we should not be seen as the ones imposing limits on Eastern Europe's evolution.

Moreover, our Alliance relations would be damaged. The French would be especially suspicious of U.S.-Soviet condominium, and the West Germans might seize the opportunity to open their own dialogue with Moscow on the future of Eastern Europe. The European press is filled every day with articles on the "Kissinger plan" -- almost all of them entirely negative. Finally, seeking such a dialogue, as you could tell from your meeting last Friday with the Polish Americans, would be domestic political dynamite. The President should lay this one to rest.

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(12) Specifying the roles of the NATO summit, new U.S. initiatives, and the President's visits to Rome, Bonn, and London in our policies toward Western and Eastern Europe.

The DC (on Western Europe; Political and Security Aspects) agreed that NATO should try to formulate a broad vision for Europe's future to be embodied in a summit declaration. It also agreed that the USG should develop new policy initiatives for the President to use in connection with the summit.

The NATO summit and the President's visits to Rome, Bonn, and London are major opportunities for the President, and other Allied leaders, to offer a positive political agenda for the future of Europe to compete with, and go beyond, Gorbachev's "common European home." The PCC paper responding to NSR 5 reflects interagency agreement on the need to develop a statement for the NATO summit, but gives no specific ideas.

The NSC should give a strong impulse to work hard for developing ideas for a NATO summit declaration, particularly for identifying substantive initiatives which the President, or Allied leaders, could announce in connection with the summit and the President's other visits. An interagency effort to elicit new ideas will need a strong push from the top, and you need to decide whether this effort should be run by the NSC Staff or by the State Department (Bob Kimmitt would be best there). In either case, we need to get going on the preparations. Whatever you decide in this case will set a strong precedent for organizing interagency work to support all future Presidential trips abroad.

*RH for* Condoleezza Rice, *AK* Arnie Kanter, and *RH for* Tim Deal concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Suggested Talking Points
- Tab B Agenda
- Tab C List of Participants

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Participants

The President  
The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
Chief of Staff to the President  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Director, United States Information Agency



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RECORD ID: 8920266  
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: HUGHES

DOC DATE: 01 APR 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST  
NSR

EUROPE EAST  
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF NSC MTG ON 4 APR RE WESTERN & EASTERN EUROPE

ACTION: HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 08 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM 0 NSCP: NS0008A DC016 NSR0012 CODES:

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By CAF NARA, Date 9/17/09

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DOC 2 OF 5

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT	Z 89033110 FOR DECISION
002	X 89033014 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003 SCOWCROFT	Z 89040313 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION
003	X 89040314 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
004 SCOWCROFT	Z 89040317 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
004 PRESIDENT	Z 89040317 FOR INFORMATION
004	X 89040418 NOTED BY PRES
005 HUGHES	Z 89041110 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION
005	X 89041214 HUGHES APPROVED RECOM

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National Security Council  
 The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>me 4/1</u>	<u>D/W</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>LMS 5/1/00</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
NDM - NSC on April 4    (Date/Time)



# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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Subject: NSC MTG.

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THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F				
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 451 7th Street SW, Room 10000				
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181				

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By CAF NARA, Date 9/17/09

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: WEST WING DESK, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 18th & E. Street N.W., Room 6151				
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20266

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April 1, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

CAPTAIN ANTHONY MANESS  
Executive Assistant to the  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. EMILY L. WALKER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN  
Acting Executive Secretary  
U.S. Information Agency

COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense


MS. ROBERTA RIFKIN  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency

MR. CRAIG R. HELSING  
Chief of Staff  
Department of Commerce

MR. FRANK HODSOLL  
Executive Associate Director  
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Western Europe/Eastern Europe,  
Tuesday, April 4, 2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.,  
Cabinet Room (8).

A meeting of the National Security Council will be held to discuss European issues on Tuesday, April 4, at 2:45 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. The meeting will address the specific policy issues raised by NSR 4 (Eastern Europe) and NSR 5 (Western Europe). Attendance should be principals plus one. (8)

  
G. Philip Hughes  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Agenda

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By MM NARA, Date 4/23/2014

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Tuesday, April 4, 1989

Cabinet Room

2:45 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

WESTERN EUROPE/EASTERN EUROPE

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....The President
- II. Assessment of the Situation.....William H. Webster
- III. Issues for NSC Consideration.....Brent Scowcroft
- IV. Discussion.....All Participants
- V. Summary.....Brent Scowcroft

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

March 31, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for NSC Meeting on Western Europe  
and Eastern Europe, April 4, 2:45 p.m.,  
Cabinet Room

This meeting will present the President and other top officials with a set of specific policy issues raised by NSR 4 (U.S.-East European Relations) and NSR 5 (U.S.-West European Relations). As the list of issues is long and the subject matter diverse, the meeting will need to drive toward decisions and choices among options if we are to have the material for Presidential decision documents and thus codified US policies.

We propose holding the assessment segment of the meeting to a minimum and focusing on 12 decision areas, listed on the proposed agenda (Tab A), that have emerged from the three DCs on these subjects.

Attached at Tab I is a notice for dissemination by Philip Hughes to the agencies, informing them of the NSC meeting and outlining the agenda.

*ME*  
Tim Deal and Arnold Kanter concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting notice (Tab I) from Philip Hughes to agencies notifying them of the NSC meeting on Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies  
Tab A Agenda

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By MA NARA, Date 4/23/2014

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8920229  
RECEIVED: 24 MAR 89 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HAGIN, J

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST  
NSC

EUROPE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRES ACTIVITY RE NSC MTG 4 APR

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 06 MAR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 8920266

FILES: IFM 0

NSCP: NS0008A

CODES:

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Brent Scowcroft  
FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN  
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

EVENT: NSC Meeting

DATE: April 4, 1989

TIME: 3:15pm

DURATION: 60 Minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

ATTIRE: Business Suit

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking Points

MEDIA COVERAGE: Closed

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

CONTACT: \_\_\_\_\_  
TELEPHONE OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ HOME \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

Ed Rogers  
James Cicconi  
Fred McClure  
Susan Porter Rose  
Patty Presock  
Speechwriting Office  
Laurie Firestone  
Robert Guttman

Marlin Fitzwater  
David Demarest  
Jean Lamb  
Steve Studdert  
John Keller  
Tim McBride  
J. Bonnie Newman  
Tony Lopez

David Bates  
David Valdez  
USSS - PPD  
Gary Walters  
WHCA Audio/Visual  
WHCA Operations  
Mary Jane Smith  
C. Boyden Gray

**TO: PROJECT OFFICERS**  
**FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II**  
**SUBJECT: CHECKLIST FOR PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS**

### General Responsibilities

- \_\_\_\_\_ The Presidential Advance Office has responsibility for all logistical arrangements for any event involving press coverage. Please coordinate with them from the time your event is approved in order to avoid the need for last-minute modification.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Notify and clear all participants. (Full name, social security number, date of birth and place of birth).
- \_\_\_\_\_ Prepare and submit briefing paper to Jim Cicconi's Office by 3:00pm of the preceding day (14 copies)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with Tim McBride on Presidential involvement.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with Press Office and Media Relations regarding Press Coverage. Provide Media Relations with hometowns of participants. No organization's photographers will be admitted to any event unless the press is present. Clearance of such photographers should be coordinated through Media Relations.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If remarks are required, coordinate with the Speechwriters Office well in advance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ For outdoor events at the White House, in case of inclement weather, clear and reserve the backup location indicated.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If participant plans to bring a gift, contact the White House Gift Unit, in advance, for review and proper procedure for handling.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If any foreign visitor or dignitary is to be involved, please coordinate with the NSC (x2224).
- \_\_\_\_\_ If any Department of Defense or Military personnel are to be involved, please coordinate in advance with the White House Military Office (x2150).
- \_\_\_\_\_ If press coverage is expected, please provide all pertinent information concerning this event (guests, scenario, backdrop, etc.,) to the Presidential Advance Office at least 72 hours prior to the event.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Within five (5) days after the event, submit a complete, confirmed list of staff and attendees, identified by title, and the actual starting and completion times of the event, to the President's Diarist, Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If tent name cards are needed, send a list of names to the Social Secretary's office (x7064) at least 48 hours in advance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ For West Wing Meetings all room arrangements (chairs, notepads, pencils, etc.) should be made through Carl Jones or Susie Peake.

### Residence Events

- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with the Social Secretary's office (x7064) for all arrangements.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Send guest list to Social Secretary's office, preferably three weeks prior to the event.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The President's attendance at this event should not be announced until official notification is given by the White House Press Office and any public announcement must be coordinated with that office. Also, prior to the distribution of any printed material, particularly details of the invitation, contact must be made with the White House Social Secretary, Laurie Firestone, at (x7064).

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**REVISED**

Bush Library Preservation Photocopy:  
Original destroyed 4/16/07 due to  
extreme mold and water damage

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brent Scowcroft  
FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN  
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

EVENT: NSC Meeting

DATE: April 4, 1989

TIME: ~~3:15pm~~ 2:45 p.m.

DURATION: ~~60 Minutes~~ 90 Minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

ATTIRE: Business Suit

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking Points

MEDIA COVERAGE: Closed

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

CONTACT: \_\_\_\_\_

TELEPHONE OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ HOME \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

Ed Rogers	Marlin Fitzwater	David Bates
James Cicconi	David Demarest	David Valdez
Fred McClure	Jean Lamb	USSS - PPD
Susan Porter Rose	Steve Studdert	Gary Walters
Patty Presock	John Keller	WHCA Audio/Visual
Speechwriting Office	Tim McBride	WHCA Operations
Baurie Firestone	J. Bonnie Newman	Mary Jane Smith
Robert Guttman	Tony Lopez	C. Boyden Gray

**TO: PROJECT OFFICERS**  
**FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II**  
**SUBJECT: CHECKLIST FOR PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS**

### General Responsibilities

- \_\_\_\_\_ The Presidential Advance Office has responsibility for all logistical arrangements for any event involving press coverage. Please coordinate with them from the time your event is approved in order to avoid the need for last-minute modification.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Notify and clear all participants. (Full name, social security number, date of birth and place of birth).
- \_\_\_\_\_ Prepare and submit briefing paper to Jim Cicconi's Office by 3:00pm of the preceding day (14 copies)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with Tim McBride on Presidential involvement.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with Press Office and Media Relations regarding Press Coverage. Provide Media Relations with hometowns of participants. No organization's photographers will be admitted to any event unless the press is present. Clearance of such photographers should be coordinated through Media Relations.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If remarks are required, coordinate with the Speechwriters Office well in advance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ For outdoor events at the White House, in case of inclement weather, clear and reserve the backup location indicated.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If participant plans to bring a gift, contact the White House Gift Unit, in advance, for review and proper procedure for handling.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If any foreign visitor or dignitary is to be involved, please coordinate with the NSC (x2224).
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