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2004-0722-F; 2005-0992-F

FOIA Number:
2004-0722-F; 2005-0992-F

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90012
Folder ID Number: 90012-031

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	4	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Form	Fax cover sheet, Re: DC [Deputies Committee] Meeting 5 Jan 89; redactions. [50 USC §403(g) Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949] [50 USC §402 Note Sec. 6, P.L. 86-36] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
01b. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, et al., Re: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee [meeting] on Cuba. (1 pp.)	12/28/89	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Robert M. Gates, Re: Options Paper on TV Marti. (1 pp.)	12/19/89	(b)(1)	S
01d. Paper	Re: TV Marti. (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01e. Memo	Arthur E. Green to G. Philip Hughes, Re: NSC Memorandum of December 9, 1989. (5 pp.)	12/12/89	(b)(1)	S
01f. Paper	Re: TV Marti. (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01g. Paper	Re: Comments on Draft National Security Council Television Marti Paper for the President. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01h. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, et al., Re: Paper on Cuba for the NSC Deputies Committee. (1 pp.)	12/09/89	(b)(1)	S
01i. Paper	Re: TV Marti. (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Pinksheet Number: RML4534

OA/ID Number: 90012-031

Date Closed: 3/10/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2004-0722-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01j. Memo	George P. Cole, Jr. to Executive Secretary, NSC, Re: TV Marti Paper for the NSC Deputies Committee. (1 pp.)	12/12/89	(b)(1)	C
01k. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, et al., Re: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee [meeting] on Cuba. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01l. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, et al., Re: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee [meeting] on Cuba. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01m. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, et al., Re: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee [meeting] on Cuba. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, et al., Re: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee [meeting] on Cuba. (1 pp.)	12/28/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Paper	Re: TV Marti. (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Form	Fax cover sheet, Re: SOC [Summary of Conclusions] for DC [Deputies Committee] Meeting on Panama; redaction. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
03b. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, Re: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Panama; redaction. (1 pp.)	01/05/90	(b)(3)	
03c. Memo	Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Panama. (2 pp.)	01/05/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 3

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03d. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, Re: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Panama; redaction. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
04a. Memo	William T. Pryce to Robert M. Gates, Re: Deputies Committee, Friday, January 5 at 2:00 p.m. on Panama--Possible Subjects for Discussion. [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	01/05/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Cable	U.S. Embassy, Panama to Secretary of State, Re: Future Structure of the Panamanian Public Force. (2 pp.)	01/02/90	(b)(1)	S
05. Form	NSC Time Planning Sheet, Re: Panama; names and Social Security number redacted. (1 pp.)	01/05/90	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

Page 3 of 3

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921141
RECEIVED: 16 SEP 89 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: HUGHES

DOC DATE: 28 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CUBA
DC

BROADCASTING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF DC MTG ON 5 JAN RE TV MARTI

ACTION: HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 17 APR 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI LOGREF: 8921065 8921130
FILES: IFM C NSCP: DC093 CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *Jan* NARA, Date *3/10/09*

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 3 OF 4

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RECORD ID: 8921141

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES	Z	89091610 FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
001 PACELLI	Z	89100420 FOR FURTHER ACTION
001 GATES	Z	89101218 FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
001 PRYCE	Z	89102310 FOR FURTHER ACTION
001 GATES	Z	89102707 FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
001 GATES	Z	89121919 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION
001	X	89122208 NO ACTION REQUIRED PER HUGHES
001	X	89122818 GATES APPROVED RECOM
001	X	89122818 GRIMES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
001	Z	90010510 HUGHES SGD MEMO
003	X	89122812 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES


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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By SPM NARA, Date 3/10/09

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Deputies
Mtg
Fri
1/5
@ 3 PM.


Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 21141 ADDITION

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>✓</u>	<u>APK</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>CM 12/28</u>	<u>CM 1/10</u>
NSC Secretariat			

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 89 DEC 19 PM 17

A = Action
 = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Exec Sec office has diskette
 Options Paper on TV Marti

RECEIVED
NSC SECRETARIAT

89 DEC 19 P 7:13

89 DEC 19 P 7:13

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A

15 10

10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 21141 A/0
Date DEC 28, 1989

Subject: DC MTG 5 JAN 90

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	#CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed for By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT	1	12/29/89	0936	<i>[Signature]</i>
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec Sec/Room 7241	1	12/28/89	2228	<i>R. Cellis</i>
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION % ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION % ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, VA				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB	1	12/29/89	943	<i>[Signature]</i>
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg.				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W., Room 800	1	12/29/89	10:00	<i>[Signature]</i>
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 18th & E Street N.W., Room 6151				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th S.W., Room 200A				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St. NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 1500 C Street, Room 828				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F				
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 451 7th Street SW, Room 10000				
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: WEST WING DESK, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

Page 1 of ____ Pages

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Form	Fax cover sheet, Re: DC [Deputies Committee] Meeting 5 Jan 89; redactions. [50 USC §403(g) Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949] [50 USC §402 Note Sec. 6, P.L. 86-36] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Date Closed:	3/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	90012-031
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0722-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 6

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG 5 JAN 89

LOG # 21141 A/O

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	Stapleton Roy	EXEC SEC	
DDI	George Cole	"	
Commerce	Craig HELSING	"	
CIA	[REDACTED]	"	
JCS	Thomas White	EXEC ASST	
NSA	[REDACTED]	Chief of Staff	

(b)(3) [50 USC §402
Note Sec 6, P.L. 86-36]

REMARKS _____

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REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

Rev 3/10/09

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IMMEDIATE

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SECURE FAX # _____

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES

6

DTG

RELEASER

FROM/LOCATION

1. G. Philip Hughes / THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Robert Ross / DOJ

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

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1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

21141 A/D - DC MTG ON CuBA 5 JAN 90.

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(W/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT)

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21141 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 28, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT S. ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

MR. JOHN P. DEVINE
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency


MR. EDWARD J. MINKEL
Managing Director
Federal Communications
Commission

MR. ROBERT T. COONROD
Chairman
TV Marti Task Force
Voice of America

SUBJECT: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee on Cuba (U)

A National Security Council Deputies Committee meeting has been scheduled for Friday, January 5, 1990 at 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the attached options paper on TV Marti which has been approved by the NSC Policy Coordinating Committee on Latin America. (U)

The meeting is restricted to principals and one other person. Recipients should notify the Executive Secretariat at 456-6534 of attendance at the meeting (including date of birth). (U)


G. Philip Hughes
for Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC/PCC Paper on TV Marti

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(W/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT)
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-MR
mm 3/29/2016

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21141 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*

SUBJECT: Options Paper on TV Marti

SIGNED

The options paper on TV Marti at Tab B incorporates the views of all relevant agencies (State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, OMB, CIA, JCS, USIA, NSA, and VOA). Written comments on the draft paper (system log 21487) are at Tabs II- VI.

We were able to incorporate nearly all of the suggestions made by USIA, State, and OMB. The NSA submission (Tab IV), expressing concern that TV Marti in no way interfere with NSA operations, is largely a statement for the record. Nothing is currently planned that would endanger the NSA mission.

We believe the paper is ready for a Deputies Committee meeting, and recommend that you call one. Even though there already is consensus on the paper, the meeting can productively address a number of issues, including what "negotiations" might look like, the need for interagency approval of any VHF testing, discussion of ways to keep the Cuban-American community on board, and identification of what ideas from the "menu" in Option 1 ought to have priority. We will provide a separate meeting memorandum which deals with these topics.

Concurrence by: Nancy Bearg Dyke *NBD*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Philip Hughes to sign the memorandum at Tab I to the Executive Secretaries.

Approve 8

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Draft Hughes Memorandum to the Executive Secretaries
Tab A Agenda for Deputies Committee Meeting
Tab B Options Paper on TV Marti
Tab II USIA Comments
Tab III State Department Comments
Tab IV NSA Comments
Tab V OMB Comments
Tab VI DOD Comments

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: JANUARY 5, 1989
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:00-4:00 p.m.

TV MARTI

Agenda

- | | | |
|------|--|------------------|
| I. | Introduction | Robert M. Gates |
| II. | Update on TV Marti Development | USIA |
| III. | Policy Options | State |
| IV. | Discussion | All participants |
| V. | Summary and Conclusions | Robert M. Gates |

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *PLM* NARA, Date *3/10/09*

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21141 Add-on

SUBJECT: TV Marti

Purpose

To decide how to proceed on TV Marti in view of technical and legal impediments to continuing the project as originally conceived.

Background

The TV Marti Interagency Task Force set up by the NSC in 1988 has made substantial progress in developing a system for broadcasts to Cuba. Plans have been made to broadcast on Channel 13, the only frequency available to us which would not interfere with US stations and would minimize interference with Cuban stations. A special antenna is nearing completion and operational tests are scheduled to begin early next year from a tethered balloon VHF transmitter located at Cudjoe Key Air Force Station in Florida. Pending legislation would require a presidential determination of feasibility at the conclusion of the tests.

The Cuban government preempted us last June by broadcasting on Channel 13 in Havana and announcing that it would utilize all available VHF frequencies. Although recent monitoring cannot confirm the continued presence of a Channel 13 transmitter in Havana, use of the frequency would block reception of TV Marti. Moreover, interference to Cuban transmissions caused by our TV Marti broadcasts would violate our commitments to avoid harmful technical interference under international agreements. For Cuba to prevent reception of TV Marti is technically a much simpler and less expensive procedure than the cost and effort associated with attempted USG broadcasts of TV Marti. Our antenna could be redirected to reach areas slightly to the west of Havana, but the maximum transmitting range from Cudjoe Key is only 120 miles, and we assume Castro would simply start broadcasts on whatever frequency we chose. Even Cuban broadcasts of a test pattern are enough to defeat our signal and to give Castro grounds for a legal complaint if we broadcast on the same frequency.

High-power tests of TV Marti on Channel 13 are scheduled for early February. The Cuban government says that if we go forward it will retaliate by jamming Radio Marti and it could do so, thereby jeopardizing a very successful program. Castro could also retaliate by increasing AM band counterbroadcasting to the United States, and he has the ability to jam US civilian and military communications systems. To protest the beginning of Radio Marti in 1985, Cuba suspended the bilateral immigration agreement, caused some interference with US AM broadcasting, and also jammed Radio Marti for some time. In short, there is a real risk of retaliation although no certainty it will take place.

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The NSC Deputies Committee has concluded that there is no fully satisfactory course of action to ensure the success of the TV Marti project as originally conceived (i.e., uninterrupted broadcasts of government-produced programming on Cuba and world affairs to a mass audience). The Deputies recommend that we not proceed with tests of the VHF transmitter as originally planned since the Cuban intention and ability to broadcast on all available VHF frequencies makes the project technically and legally infeasible. On the other hand, the Deputies Committee believes that we should not simply abandon the TV Marti project. Under these circumstances, we see three options:

Option 1: Continue Work on TV Marti, while Broadening the Possibilities. Under this option, we would acknowledge that Castro has the demonstrated ability to block our intended primary course of action but we would remain committed to the principle of providing television programs to Cuba. We would develop a fully operational VHF system, but not deploy it for the proposed 90-day broadcast test. Meanwhile, we would take advantage of other presently limited opportunities for broadcasting which over time could potentially develop a considerable TV audience in Cuba. In essence, this approach stays broadly within the legal limits placed upon us by Congress and international agreements. But it also signals our determination not to be deterred by Cuban actions; our continuing commitment to the Cuban-American community to pursue such programming; and our determination to broaden the range of information reaching Cuba.

This option would involve a number of different techniques which might be used at various times and in various ways to get our message across. This would involve spending money on options which may or may not work and which almost certainly will not have much of an audience for some years. The agencies are not enthusiastic about this course of action and find reasons why few of the options have any real potential. Of all the possibilities for broadening TV Marti, satellite broadcasting is the only one that can be implemented without further development. The techniques are:

- Broadcast via Satellite: This option would avoid the technical and legal impediments of VHF transmissions. Cuba would be unlikely to have legal grounds for retaliation since Cuba publicizes its satellite transmissions to the US. The TV Marti signal can be delivered easily and cheaply via satellite to the entire island of Cuba. We could thus demonstrate to TV Marti supporters that we have complied with our commitment to break Castro's monopoly on television. The Cuban audience would be extremely limited because there are few if any satellite dishes owned by private citizens. Nevertheless, a limited market for homemade receivers might develop, as it has in Eastern Europe. Advances in technology may eventually make it possible to pick up the signal using antennas that would not be so visible to Cuban authorities as a dish.

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- A Multifrequency VHF Transmitter: This could switch from channel to channel depending on which one the Cubans are not broadcasting on. The antenna now being developed for use at Cudjoe Key does not have this capability and a multi-frequency transmitter test appears practical only from an aircraft. It is possible that one frequency might interfere with another, however, and this procedure increases the possibility of interference with US broadcasts.
- Distribution of Videotapes in Cuba: The production of videotapes and programming content would be relatively simple, but distribution could be complicated. Unless the Cubans permit the free flow of videotapes, we would need to explore the possibility of a covert program. Moreover, if we go this route, we would need to make an exception for VCRs in our embargo policy.
- Changing the Direction of the VHF Antenna: We could change the direction of the antenna each day to try and hit a different part of Cuba, but the 120-mile range from Cudjoe Key limits this option to an area slightly west of Havana.
- Using an Antenna Within an Airplane: We are investigating using an airplane as a backup when the weather or balloon repairs ground the aerostat. We are presently in the system design phase and it is too early to assess feasibility. The plane is limited to flying over our territory, which imposes a constraint, and this option is extremely costly.
- UHF Broadcasts: The feasibility of UHF broadcasts should be further investigated, since the Cubans do not broadcast on those frequencies. Presently, very few television sets can receive UHF and there are probably only a small number of video recorders, which have UHF capability. Nevertheless, VHF to UHF converters for televisions could be added at relatively low cost.

Option 2: Explore a Program Agreement with Cuba. Under this option, the US government would hold in abeyance further development and expenditures on TV Marti while discussing mutual programming. Cuba has combined warnings about the dire consequences for us if we proceed with TV Marti with repeated offers to negotiate a program exchange agreement. The Cubans have not been specific about what they have in mind, variously mentioning a government to government exchange (similar to USIA's "TV Bridges" with the Soviet Union), scheduling regular broadcasts and news from a service like Cable News Network, or Cuban acceptance of other US Spanish language news broadcasts like PBS. It is unclear what the Cubans want in return, but they imply they would settle for a reciprocal agreement allowing them the opportunity to broadcast on certain US stations.

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This approach probably would not result in an agreement for US government-produced programming, as TV Marti is currently conceived, but it could serve our purpose of breaking Castro's monopoly on information more easily and directly than the first option. To have US network news in Cuba would be a significant breakthrough. There are, however, some potential disadvantages: Cuba could string out the talks or refuse to permit a genuine opening, while pointing to the "improved climate" in Cuban-US relations. We would have to be careful to ensure that exploration of this subject not be turned into formal or high-level negotiations. One way to guard against this would be to address TV Marti in the context of ongoing technical-level talks on radio interference, which were agreed to in 1987 but have not been pursued during the past nine months.

Option 3: Continued Work on TV Marti and Talks with Cuba. By combining the first two approaches, we can provide a stimulus for the Cubans to make a serious offer for program exchanges. We should not proceed with the 90-day test of the VHF transmitter, which would destroy the potential for talks. The Cubans should be told that testing is being held in abeyance while we explore their commitment to some form of agreement. Again, we would not engage in formal or high-level negotiations.

All interested agencies -- State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, OMB, CIA, JCS, USIA, NSA, and VOA -- recommend Option 3 as the best way for the Administration to deliver on its firm commitment to the Cuban-American community to proceed with TV Marti. It would be a mistake to allow Castro to intimidate us into inaction in an effort such as this. Even if he blocks us entirely, we can use Radio Marti to highlight the lengths to which he has gone to avoid having free information reach the Cuban people.

Bob Gates has met twice with Jorge Mas, and the Cuban-American community remains determined to see TV Marti implemented as originally planned. At the same time, Mas understands Castro's capabilities and the technical inhibitions to the kind of effort we had originally conceived. Privately, Mas has said that a program exchange arrangement with Cuba could be an acceptable alternative, but he will not say this publicly. As long as we are proceeding with the program and do not back down, I believe the Cuban-American community will be satisfied that we are fulfilling the Administration's commitment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option 3, including exploration of program agreement with Cuba and prompt determination of the feasibility of the above-mentioned other opportunities for bringing free television to Cuba.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

9 SEP 14 A 9: 33

SECRET

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

21510

ACTION OFFICER:

Pacelli

DUE:

Dec 15☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi☐ Prepare Memo _____☒ Appropriate Action☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext.

X 3860

FYI

☐ ☐ Basora☐ ☐ Beers☐ ☐ Blackwill☐ ☐ Briggs☐ ☐ Brooks☐ ☐ Charles☐ ☐ Coulson☐ ☐ Deal☐ ☐ Donley☐ ☐ Dyke☐ ☐ Ebner☐ ☐ Grant☐ ☐ Haass☐ ☐ Hoffmann☐ ☐ Hutchings☐ ☐ Jackson☐ ☐ LaMagna☐ ☐ Kanter

FYI

☐ ☐ Lampley☐ ☐ Leach☐ ☐ Levin☐ ☐ Lewis☐ ☐ Mahley☐ ☐ Mandel☐ ☐ McCue☐ ☐ Melby☐ ☐ Menan☐ ☐ Miller☐ ☐ Miskel☐ ☐ Needels☐ ☐ Paal☐ ☐ Pacelli☐ ☐ Passage☐ ☐ Popadiuk☐ ☐ Porter☐ ☐ Pryce

FYI

☐ ☐ Rademaker☐ ☐ Reiss☐ ☐ Rice☐ ☐ Rodman☐ ☐ Rostow☐ ☐ Salvetti☐ ☐ Snider☐ ☐ Tilley☐ ☐ Tobey☐ ☐ Welch☐ ☐ Whitley☐ ☐ Working☐ ☐ Zelikow☐ ☐ _____☐ ☐ _____☐ ☐ _____☐ ☐ _____☐ ☐ _____

INFORMATION

☒ Hughes☐ Scowcroft (advance)☐ Gates (advance)☒ Secretariat☐ Exec. Sec. Desk☒ Sithmann

COMMENTS

USIA/VOA comments- Notation of which ones were accepted

Logged By

MC**SECRET**

Return to Secretariat

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By PAC NARA, Date 3/19/09



SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1496-142
ES 5/11/13

December 12, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

FROM: Arthur E. Green *RTJ:ME*
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Paper on Cuba for the NSC Deputies Committee

REFERENCE: NSC Memorandum of December 9, 1989

USIA endorses the recommended option and the draft memorandum to the President on TV Marti with minimal modifications.

While holding the 90-day operational test in abeyance, it is important to conduct a limited-duration, full-power technical test of the aerostat-based VHF TV broadcast system:

1. to establish the feasibility of reaching the target area with a viewable TV signal; and,
2. to ascertain that no interference to U.S. stations is generated.

This can be accomplished by broadcasting an appropriate test signal at a time when Cuban television is not on the air.

Of the programming alternatives listed in the draft, it appears that broadcast via satellite and videotape distribution would be cost effective, as they have proven to be in Eastern Europe.

If the recommendation is approved appropriate Members of Congress should be briefed, explaining this revised approach and the rationale for it.

A number of ~~comments~~ on the draft text follow:

Draft, page 1, para 2, line 8:

Your approval is necessary for high-power tests to proceed.

Comment: Legislation does not require Presidential approval to proceed with a test.

Classified by: Robert T. Coonrod
Symbol: VOA
Declassify/Downgrade: OADR

SECRET

Struck this but did not substitute this

Indicates accepted suggested change

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Draft, page 1, para 3, line 1:

Unfortunately, the Cuban government preempted us by beginning broadcasts to Havana last June on Channel 13. The Cuban government now utilizes all available VHF frequencies, effectively blocking reception of TV Marti in Havana.

*accepted but
(modified
slightly)* ✓ Comment:

The Cuban government has announced that transmissions have been started on Channel 13 in Havana and that it intends to utilize all available VHF frequencies. However, recent monitoring can not confirm the presence of a Channel 13 transmitter in Havana.

Draft, page 1, para 3, line 4:

Moreover, TV Marti broadcasts would cause interference to Cuban radio transmissions...

struck

Comment: The TV Marti signal will not interfere with radio broadcasts.

Draft, page 1, para 3, line 8:

We could aim our antenna at other Cuban cities...

*modified
slightly* ✓ Comment:

The antenna could be redirected to reach areas slightly to the west of Havana (10-15 miles). The maximum transmitting range of the VHF system from Cudjoe Key is 120 miles.

Draft, page 1, para 4, line 1:

High-power tests of TV Marti on Channel 13 are scheduled for late January.

✓ Comment: Test now scheduled for early February.

Draft, page 1, para 4, line 2:

The Cuban government says that if we go forward it will retaliate by jamming Radio Marti and it could do so, easily thereby jeopardizing a fairly successful program.

struck

Comment: ~~Jamming~~ of the Radio Marti signal would require a substantial effort.

Draft, page 1, para 4, line 7:

After Radio Marti went on the air in 1985, Cuba...caused some interference with US AM broadcasting and also jammed Radio Marti for sometime.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

✓ Comment:

Cuba caused some interference to American commercial radio stations before Radio Marti went on the air. There was some low-level interference on the Radio Marti frequency even before it went on the air.

Draft, page 2, para 1, line 5:

The Deputies recommend that we not proceed with high-power tests of the VHF transmitter since the Cuban decision to broadcast on all available frequencies makes the project technically and legally infeasible.

✓ Comment:

Suggest the Deputies recommend that "we not proceed with tests as originally planned."

Draft, page 2, para 2, line 2:

Under this option, we would acknowledge that Castro has already taken steps.....

✓ Comment:

Castro has the demonstrated ability to take steps to block our intended primary course of action and ~~has announced his intention to do so.~~

Draft, page 2, para 2, line 5:

We would not conduct high-power tests of VHF.....

✓ Comment:

We would develop a fully operational VHF system but not deploy it for the proposed 90-day broadcast test. We would take advantage of presently limited opportunities for.....

modified original
Draft, page 2, para 3, line 5:

The Agencies are not enthusiastic about this course of action.....real potential.

didn't use this formula
Comment:

This course of action has limited short term potential and there is no consensus on all of the options.

Draft, page 2, para 3, line 7:

Of all the possibilities for broadcasting TV Marti, satellite broadcasting is the only one we know is feasible.

✓ Comment:

Satellite broadcasting is the only one that can be implemented without further development.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

Draft, page 2, para 4, line 6:
The TV Marti signalfrom Cudjoe Key.

✓ Comment: Delete "from Cudjoe Key".

Draft, page 3, para 1, line 3:
The antenna now being developed for Cudjoe Bay....

✓ Comment: Replace "Bay" with "Key".

Draft, page 3, para 1, line 7:
We could explore the possibility of launching several balloons
each with a separate antenna. We are told,..... radar balloon.

✓ Comment: Delete both sentences. A multi-frequency transmitter test appears
practical only from an aircraft.

Draft, page 3, para 3, line 1:
We could change the direction of the antenna each day to try to
hit a different part of Cuba.

✓ Comment: Replace with "try to hit an area slightly west of Havana."

Draft, page 3, para 3, line 3:
Just because Castro is using Channel 13 in Havana area does not
rule out its availability elsewhere on the island. Because the
antenna has to be repositioned by hand, it would have to be done
each day when it is brought down.

✓ Comment: Delete. As noted above, the maximum range of the system is 120
miles from Cudjoe Key.

Draft, page 3, para 4, line 1:
We are investigating.....repairs ground the other antenna.

✓ Comment: Replace "other antenna" with "aerostat".

Draft, page 3, para 4, line 3:
We have looked into this and so far.....broadcasters.

✓ Comment: We are presently in the system design phase, but it is too early to
assess feasibility.

~~SECRET~~

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-5-

Draft, page 3, para 5; (section headed UHF Broadcasts):

- ✓ Comment: Add as final two sentences: "Generally, VCRs have UHF capability. Also, VHF to UHF converters can be added to TV sets at relatively low cost."

Draft, page 4, para 3, line 3:

We should not proceed with high-power testing.....potential for talks.

- ✓ Comment: Replace "high-power" with "the 90-day test".

Draft, page 4, para 5, line 3:

At the same time, Mas understands what Castro has done...conceived.

- ✓ Comment: At the same time, Mas understands Castro's capability.....conceived.

~~SECRET~~



10126
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


December 15, 1989

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: TV Marti

We have reproduced as an attachment the proposed text of a Decision Memorandum to the President on TV Marti. Proposed changes in language are shown in parentheses. Deletions are marked with a single asterisk, additions with a double asterisk.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Proposed text.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By FW NARA, Date 3/10/09

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-MR

MM 6/8/2016

SUBJECT: TV Marti

Purpose

To decide how to proceed on TV Marti in view of technical and legal impediments to continuing the project as originally conceived.

Background

The TV Marti Interagency Task Force set up by the NSC in 1988 has made substantial progress in developing a system for broadcasts to Cuba. Plans (were*) (have been**) made to broadcast on Channel 13, the only frequency (originally*) available to us which would not interfere with US (stations**) (or*) (and would minimize interference with**) Cuban stations. A special antenna is nearing completion and operational tests are scheduled to begin early next year from a tethered balloon VHF transmitter located at Cudjoe Key Air Force Station in Florida. Your approval is necessary for (high power-tests*) (high-power tests**) to proceed. Pending legislation would require a presidential determination of feasibility at the conclusion of the tests.

Unfortunately, the Cuban government preempted us by beginning broadcasts (to*) (in**) Havana last June on Channel 13. The Cuban government now utilizes all available VHF frequencies, effectively blocking reception of TV Marti in Havana. Moreover, TV Marti broadcasts would cause interference to Cuban (radio*) transmissions, thus violating our commitments to avoid (radio*) (harmful technical**) interference under international (conventions*) (agreements**), and generating a storm of international protest. We could aim our antenna at other Cuban cities within 120 miles of Havana, but we assume Castro would simply start broadcasts on whatever frequency we chose. For Cuba to prevent reception of TV Marti is technically a much simpler and less expensive procedure than the cost and effort associated with attempted USG broadcasts of TV Marti. Even Cuban broadcasts of a test pattern are enough to defeat our signal and to give Castro grounds for a legal complaint.

High-power tests of TV Marti on Channel 13 are scheduled for late January. The Cuban government says that if we go forward it will retaliate by jamming Radio Marti and it could do so (,*) easily(,**) thereby jeopardizing a fairly successful program. Castro could also retaliate by increasing AM band counterbroadcasting to the United States, and he has the ability to jam US civilian and military communications systems. After Radio Marti went on the air in 1985, Cuba suspended the bilateral immigration agreement, caused some interference with US AM broadcasting, and also jammed Radio Marti for some time. In short, there is a real risk of retaliation although no certainty it will take place.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

The NSC Deputies Committee has concluded that there is no fully satisfactory course of action to ensure the success of the TV Marti project as originally conceived (i.e., uninterrupted broadcasts of government-produced programming on Cuba and world affairs to a mass audience). The Deputies recommend that we not proceed with high-power tests of the VHF transmitter since the Cuban decision to broadcast on all available VHF frequencies makes the project technically and legally infeasible. On the other hand, the Deputies Committee believes that we should not simply abandon the TV Marti project. Under these circumstances, we see three options:

Option 1: Continue Work on TV Marti, while Broadening the Possibilities. Under this option, we would acknowledge that Castro has already taken steps to block our intended primary course of action but we would remain committed to the principle of providing television programs to Cuba. We would not conduct high-power tests of VHF, but we would take advantage of presently limited opportunities for broadcasting which over time could potentially develop a considerable TV audience in Cuba. In essence, this approach stays broadly within the legal limits placed upon us by Congress and international (conventions*) (agreements**). But it also signals our determination not to be deterred by Cuban actions; our continuing commitment to the Cuban-American community to pursue such programming; and our determination to broaden the range of information reaching Cuba.

This option would involve a number of different techniques which might be used at various times and in various ways to get our message across. This would involve spending money on options which may or may not work and which almost certainly will not have much of an audience for some years. The agencies are not enthusiastic about this course of action and find reasons why virtually none of the options has any real potential. Of all the possibilities for broadening TV Marti, satellite broadcasting is the only one we know is feasible. The techniques are:

- Broadcast via Satellite: This option would avoid the technical or legal impediments of VHF transmissions, and Cuba would (have no*) (be unlikely to have**) legal grounds for retaliation.(**) (since*) (Currently,**) Cuba publicizes its (own*) satellite transmissions to the US. The TV Marti signal (easily and cheaply can be delivered*) (can be delivered easily and cheaply**) via satellite to the entire island of Cuba (from Cudjoe Key*). We could thus demonstrate to TV Marti supporters that we have complied with our commitment to break Castro's monopoly on television. The Cuban audience would be extremely limited because there are few satellite

dishes owned by private citizens. Nevertheless, a limited market for homemade receivers might develop, as it has in Eastern Europe. Advances in technology may eventually make it possible to pick up the signal using antennas that would not be so visible to Cuban authorities as a dish.

- A Multifrequency VHF Transmitter: This could switch from channel to channel depending on which one the Cubans are not broadcasting on. The antenna now being developed (for use**) at Cudjoe Bay does not have this capability since the balloon is not large enough for equipment for more than one frequency. It is also possible that one frequency might interfere with another. We would explore the possibility of launching several balloons each with a separate antenna(s*). We are told, however, that there is insufficient room at Cudjoe Key as well as some concern that cable for the balloons could foul the radar balloon there. Moreover, this procedure increases the possibility of interference with US broadcasts.
- Distribution of Videotapes in Cuba: The production of videotapes and programming content would be relatively simple, but distribution could be complicated. Unless the Cubans permit the free flow of videotapes, we would need to explore the possibility of a covert program. Moreover, if we go this route, we would need to make an exception for VCRs (, most of which are made in Japan,**) in our embargo policy.
- Changing the Direction of the VHF Antenna: We would change the direction of the antenna each day to try and hit a different part of Cuba. Just because Castro is using Channel 13 in the Havana area does not rule out its availability elsewhere on the island. Because the antenna has to be repositioned by hand, it would have to be done each day when it is brought down.
- Using an Antenna Within an Airplane: We are investigating the feasibility of an airplane as a backup when the weather or balloon repairs ground the other antenna. We have looked into this and so far none of the options meet our requirement of not interfering with US domestic broadcasters. Moreover, because the plane is limited to flying over our territory, this imposes a constraint -- not to mention a high cost.
- UHF Broadcasts: The feasibility of UHF broadcasts should be further investigated, since the Cubans do not broadcast on those frequencies. Presently, very few television sets can receive UHF and there are only a small number of video recorders.

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Option 2: Explore a Program Agreement with Cuba. Under this option, the US government would hold in abeyance further development and expenditures on TV Marti while discussing mutual programming. Cuba has combined warnings about the dire consequences for us if we proceed with TV Marti with repeated offers to negotiate a program exchange agreement. The Cubans have not been specific about what they have in mind, variously mentioning a government to government exchange (similar to USIA's "TV Bridges" with the Soviet Union), scheduling regular broadcasts and news from a service like Cable News Network, or Cuban acceptance of other US Spanish language news broadcasts like PBS. It is unclear what the Cubans want in return, but they imply they would settle for a reciprocal agreement allowing them the opportunity to broadcast on certain US stations.

This approach probably would not result in an agreement for US government-produced programming, as TV Marti is currently conceived, but it could serve our purpose of breaking Castro's monopoly on information more easily and directly than the first option. To have US network news in Cuba would be a significant breakthrough. There are, however, some potential disadvantages: Cuba could string out the talks or refuse to permit a genuine opening, while pointing to the "improved climate" in Cuban-US relations. We would have to be careful to ensure that exploration of this subject not be turned into formal of high-level negotiations. ((One means to guard against this would be to address TV Marti in the context of ongoing technical-level talks on radio interference, which were agreed to in 1987 but have not been pursued during the past nine months.))**)

Option 3: Continued Work on TV Marti and Talks with Cuba. By combining the first two approaches, we can provide a stimulus for the Cubans to make a serious offer for program exchanges. We should not proceed with high-power testing of the VHF transmitter, which would destroy the potential for talks. The Cubans should be told that testing is being held in abeyance while we explore their commitment to some form of agreement.

I recommend Option 3 as the best way for the Administration to deliver on its firm commitment to the Cuban-American community to proceed with TV Marti. I believe it would be a mistake to allow Castro to intimidate us into inaction in an effort such as this. Even if he blocks us entirely, we can use Radio Marti to highlight the lengths to which he has gone as a means of avoiding having free information reach the Cuban people.

Bob Gates has met twice with Jorge Mas, and the Cuban-American community remains determined to see TV Marti implemented as originally planned. At the same time, Mas understands what

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

Castro had done and the technical inhibitions to the kind of effort we had originally conceived. Privately, Mas has said that a program exchange arrangement with Cuba could be an acceptable alternative. As long as we are proceeding with the program and do not back down, I believe the Cuban-American community will be content that we are fulfilling the Administration's commitment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option 3, including exploration of program agreement with Cuba, immediate implementation of an effort for broadcasting via satellite, and prompt determination of the feasibility of the above-mentioned other opportunities for bringing free television to Cuba.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01g. Paper	Re: Comments on Draft National Security Council Television Marti Paper for the President. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Date Closed: 3/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 90012-031
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0722-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(w/SECRET ATTACHMENT)

~~SECRET~~

21487

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 9, 1989

*OMB
Staff comments
12/12/89*

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

MR. CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

MR. FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BG THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Acting Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency


MR. JOHN P. DEVINE
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency

MR. ROBERT T. COONROD
Chairman
TV Marit Task Force
Voice of America

SUBJECT: Paper on Cuba for the NSC Deputies Committee (U)

Attached at Tab A is a draft memorandum to the President on TV
Marti. (e)

Recipient agencies are requested to distribute it on a restricted
basis and to forward comments to the NSC staff by COB, Tuesday,
December 12, 1989. Comments will be incorporated into a revised
paper which will be distributed for a Deputies Committee meeting.
(e)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretaries

Attachments
Tab A NSC Paper on TV Marti

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(w/SECRET attachment)
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 2/5/2014

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21487

SUBJECT: TV Marti

Purpose

To decide how to proceed on TV Marti in view of technical and legal impediments to continuing the project as originally conceived.

Background

The TV Marti Interagency Task Force set up by the NSC in 1988 has made substantial progress in developing a system for broadcasts to Cuba. Plans were made to broadcast on Channel 13, the only frequency originally available to us which would not interfere with US or Cuban stations. A special antenna is nearing completion and operational tests are scheduled to begin early next year from a tethered balloon VHF transmitter located at Cudjoe Key Air Force Station in Florida. Your approval is necessary for high power-tests to proceed. Pending legislation would require a presidential determination of feasibility at the conclusion of the tests.

Unfortunately, the Cuban government preempted us by beginning broadcasts to Havana last June on Channel 13. The Cuban government now utilizes all available VHF frequencies, effectively blocking reception of TV Marti in Havana. Moreover, TV Marti broadcasts would cause interference to Cuban radio transmissions, thus violating our commitments to avoid radio interference under international conventions, and generating a storm of international protest. We could aim our antenna at other Cuban cities within 120 miles of Havana, but we assume Castro would simply start broadcasts on whatever frequency we chose. For Cuba to prevent reception of TV Marti is technically a much simpler and less expensive procedure than the cost and effort associated with attempted USG broadcasts of TV Marti. Even Cuban broadcasts of a test pattern are enough to defeat our signal and to give Castro grounds for a legal complaint. *Radio* X

High-power tests of TV Marti on Channel 13 are scheduled for late January. The Cuban government says that if we go forward it will retaliate by jamming Radio Marti and it could do so, easily thereby jeopardizing a fairly successful program. Castro could also retaliate by increasing AM band counterbroadcasting to the United States, and he has the ability to jam US civilian and military communications systems. After Radio Marti went on the air in 1985, Cuba suspended the bilateral immigration agreement, caused some interference with US AM broadcasting, and also jammed Radio Marti for some time. In short, there is a real risk of retaliation although no certainty it will take place.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-UR
MM 6/8/2016

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The NSC Deputies Committee has concluded that there is no fully satisfactory course of action to ensure the success of the TV Marti project as originally conceived (i.e., uninterrupted broadcasts of government-produced programming on Cuba and world affairs to a mass audience). The Deputies recommend that we not proceed with high-power tests of the VHF transmitter since the Cuban decision to broadcast on all available VHF frequencies makes the project technically and legally infeasible. On the other hand, the Deputies Committee believes that we should not simply abandon the TV Marti project. Under these circumstances, we see three options:

Option 1: Continue Work on TV Marti, while Broadening the Possibilities. Under this option, we would acknowledge that Castro has already taken steps to block our intended primary course of action but we would remain committed to the principle of providing television programs to Cuba. We would not conduct high-power tests of VHF, but we would take advantage of presently limited opportunities for broadcasting which over time could potentially develop a considerable TV audience in Cuba. In essence, this approach stays broadly within the legal limits placed upon us by Congress and international conventions. But it also signals our determination not to be deterred by Cuban actions; our continuing commitment to the Cuban-American community to pursue such programming; and our determination to broaden the range of information reaching Cuba.

This option would involve a number of different techniques which might be used at various times and in various ways to get our message across. This would involve spending money on options which may or may not work and which almost certainly will not have much of an audience for some years. The agencies are not enthusiastic about this course of action and find reasons why virtually none of the options has any real potential. Of all the possibilities for broadening TV Marti, satellite broadcasting is the only one we know is feasible. The techniques are:

- Broadcast via Satellite: This option would avoid the technical or legal impediments of VHF transmissions, and Cuba would have no legal grounds for retaliation since Cuba publicizes its own satellite transmissions to the US. The TV Marti signal easily and cheaply can be delivered via satellite to the entire island of Cuba from Cudjoe Key. We could thus demonstrate to TV Marti supporters that we have complied with our commitment to break Castro's monopoly on television. The Cuban audience would be extremely limited because there are few satellite dishes owned by private citizens. Nevertheless, a limited market for homemade receivers might develop, as it has in Eastern Europe. Advances in technology may eventually make it possible to pick up the signal using antennas that would not be so visible to Cuban authorities as a dish.

(Mostly high government officials)

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- A Multifrequency VHF Transmitter: This could switch from channel to channel depending on which one the Cubans are not broadcasting on. The antenna now being developed at Cudjoe Bay does not have this capability since the balloon is not large enough for equipment for more than one frequency. It is also possible that one frequency might interfere with another. We could explore the possibility of launching several balloons each with a separate antennas. We are told, however, that there is insufficient room at Cudjoe Key as well as some concern that cable for the balloons could foul the radar balloon there. Moreover, this procedure increases the possibility of interference with US broadcasts. *In addition, the option would be very costly.*
- Distribution of Videotapes in Cuba: The production of videotapes and programming content would be relatively simple, but distribution could be complicated. Unless the Cubans permit the free flow of videotapes, we would need to explore the possibility of a covert program. Moreover, if we go this route, we would need to make an exception for VCRs in our embargo policy.
- Changing the Direction of the VHF Antenna: We could change the direction of the antenna each day to try and hit a different part of Cuba. Just because Castro is using Channel 13 in the Havana area does not rule out its availability elsewhere on the island. Because the antenna has to be repositioned by hand, it would have to be done each day when it is brought down.
- Using an Antenna Within an Airplane: We are investigating the feasibility of an airplane as a backup when the weather or balloon repairs ground the other antenna. We have looked into this and so far none of the options meet our requirement of not interfering with US domestic broadcasters. Moreover, because the plane is limited to flying over our territory, this imposes a constraint -- not to mention a high cost. *An extremely*
- UHF Broadcasts: The feasibility of UHF broadcasts should be further investigated, since the Cubans do not broadcast on those frequencies. Presently, very few television sets can receive UHF and there are only a small number of video recorders.

Option 2: Explore a Program Agreement with Cuba. Under this option, the US government would hold in abeyance further development and expenditures on TV Marti while discussing mutual programming. Cuba has combined warnings about the dire consequences for us if we proceed with TV Marti with repeated offers to negotiate a program exchange agreement. The Cubans have not been specific about what they have in mind, variously mentioning a government to government exchange (similar to USIA's

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"TV Bridges" with the Soviet Union), scheduling regular broadcasts and news from a service like Cable News Network, or Cuban acceptance of other US Spanish language news broadcasts like PBS. It is unclear what the Cubans want in return, but they imply they would settle for a reciprocal agreement allowing them the opportunity to broadcast on certain US stations.

This approach probably would not result in an agreement for US government-produced programming, as TV Marti is currently conceived, but it could serve our purpose of breaking Castro's monopoly on information more easily and directly than the first option. To have US network news in Cuba would be a significant breakthrough. There are, however, some potential disadvantages: Cuba could string out the talks or refuse to permit a genuine opening, while pointing to the "improved climate" in Cuban-US relations. We would have to be careful to ensure that exploration of this subject not be turned into formal or high-level negotiations.

What type of thing would US continue to work on and at what cost?

Option 3: Continued Work on TV Marti and Talks with Cuba. By combining the first two approaches, we can provide a stimulus for the Cubans to make a serious offer for program exchanges. We should not proceed with high-power testing of the VHF transmitter, which would destroy the potential for talks. The Cubans should be told that testing is being held in abeyance while we explore their commitment to some form of agreement.

I recommend Option 3 as the best way for the Administration to deliver on its firm commitment to the Cuban-American community to proceed with TV Marti. I believe it would be a mistake to allow Castro to intimidate us into inaction in an effort such as this. Even if he blocks us entirely, we can use Radio Marti to highlight the lengths to which he has gone as a means of avoiding having free information reach the Cuban people.

Bob Gates has met twice with Jorge Mas, and the Cuban-American community remains determined to see TV Marti implemented as originally planned. At the same time, Mas understands what Castro has done and the technical inhibitions to the kind of effort we had originally conceived. Privately, Mas has said that a program exchange arrangement with Cuba could be an acceptable alternative. As long as we are proceeding with the program and do not back down, I believe the Cuban-American community will be content that we are fulfilling the Administration's commitment.

RECOMMENDATION

study effort

That you approve Option 3, including exploration of program agreement with Cuba, immediate implementation of an ~~effort~~ for broadcasting via satellite, and prompt determination of the feasibility of the above-mentioned other opportunities for bringing free television to Cuba.

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21510

12 December 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: TV Marti Paper for the NSC Deputies Committee (U)

Reference: Your memorandum to me dated 9 December 1989, subject: Paper on Cuba for the NSC Deputies Committee (U).

(C) The draft memorandum to the President on TV Marti has been reviewed and we concur in the paper as written.

George P. Cole Jr.
Colonel USAF
Executive Secretary

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-MR
mm 6/8/2016

Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on OADR

Sec Def Cont Nr.

X51973

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~(W/SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~

21141 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice
President
for National Security
Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

^{EAT S.}
MR. ROBERT A. ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

MR. JOHN P. DEVINE
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency

MR. ROBERT T. COONROD
Chairman
TV Marti Task Force
Voice of America

SUBJECT: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee on Cuba (U)

A National Security Council Deputies Committee meeting has been scheduled for _____ on _____ in the White House Situation Room. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the attached options paper on TV Marti which has been approved by the NSC Policy Coordinating Committee on Latin America. (C)

The meeting is restricted to principals and one other person. Recipients should notify the Executive Secretariat of attendance at the meeting (including social security number and date of birth). (C)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC/PCC Paper on TV Marti

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~~(W/SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-MR
MM 3/29/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~(W/SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~

~~SECRET~~

21141 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT S. ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

MR. JOHN P. DEVINE
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency

MR. ROBERT T. COONROD
Chairman
TV Marti Task Force
Voice of America

SUBJECT: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee on Cuba (U)

A National Security Council Deputies Committee meeting has been scheduled for Friday, January 5, 1990 at 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the attached options paper on TV Marti which has been approved by the NSC Policy Coordinating Committee on Latin America. (U)

The meeting is restricted to principals and one other person. Recipients should notify the Executive Secretariat at 456-6534 of attendance at the meeting (including date of birth). (U)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC/PCC Paper on TV Marti

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~~(W/SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-MR
MM 3/29/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(W/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT)

~~SECRET~~

21141 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT S. ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

MR. JOHN P. DEVINE
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency

MR. ROBERT T. COONROD
Chairman
TV Marti Task Force
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G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC/PCC Paper on TV Marti

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(W/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT)
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~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-MR
MM 3/29/2016

~~SECRET~~

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE:
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME:

TV MARTI

Agenda

- | | | |
|------|--|------------------|
| I. | Introduction | Robert M. Gates |
| II. | Update on TV Marti Development | USIA |
| III. | Policy Options | State |
| IV. | Discussion | All participants |
| V. | Summary and Conclusions | Robert M. Gates |

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921141
RECEIVED: 16 SEP 89 10

TO: GATES

FROM: PRYCE
PACELLI

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CUBA
DC

BROADCASTING

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OPTIONS PAPER FOR DC MTG ON 5 JAN RE CUBA

ACTION: DUE DATE: 17 APR 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI LOGREF: 8921065 8921130
FILES: IFM C NSCP: DC093 CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *PM* NARA, Date *3/14/09*

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: LF

CLOSED BY: AC

DOC 2 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

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RECORD ID: 8921141

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES	Z 89091610 FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
001 PACELLI	Z 89100420 FOR FURTHER ACTION
001 GATES	Z 89101218 FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
001 PRYCE	Z 89102310 FOR FURTHER ACTION
001 GATES	Z 89102707 FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
001 GATES	Z 89121919 ADD-ON / FOR DECISION
001	X 89122208 NO ACTION REQUIRED PER HUGHES
001	X 89122818 GATES APPROVED RECOM
001	X 89122818 GRIMES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
001	Z 90010510 HUGHES SGD MEMO
003	X 89122812 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By PAK NARA, Date 3/10/09

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21141

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>1/3 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>LMS 2/10</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

RECEIVED

90 JAN 3 A 9: 32

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS Brian, Add to File
Retransmitted to JCS. First
copy was unreadable.
AC
1/3

21141
A/O

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 6

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NSC DC MTG ON 5 JAN

LOG # 21141

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>JCS</u>	<u>BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.</u>	<u>EXEC ASSISTANT</u> <u>TO CHAIRMAN</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS DELIVER ASAP TO ADDRESSEE. **URGENT**

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

Rev 3/10/09

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~~(W/SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~

~~SECRET~~

21141 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

December 28, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT S. ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

MR. JOHN P. DEVINE
Chief of Staff
National Security Agency


MR. EDWARD J. MINKEL
Managing Director
Federal Communications
Commission

MR. ROBERT T. COONROD
Chairman
TV Marti Task Force
Voice of America

SUBJECT: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee on Cuba (U)

A National Security Council Deputies Committee meeting has been scheduled for Friday, January 5, 1990 at 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the attached options paper on TV Marti which has been approved by the NSC Policy Coordinating Committee on Latin America. (U)

The meeting is restricted to principals and one other person. Recipients should notify the Executive Secretariat at 456-6534 of attendance at the meeting (including date of birth). (U)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC/PCC Paper on TV Marti

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~~(W/SECRET ATTACHMENT)~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-UR
mm 3/29/2016

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: JANUARY 5, 1989
LOCATION: SITUATION ROOM
TIME: 3:00-4:00 p.m.

TV MARTI

Agenda

- I. Introduction Robert M. Gates
- II. Update on TV Marti Development USIA
- III. Policy Options State
- IV. Discussion All participants
- V. Summary and Conclusions Robert M. Gates

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By PLM NARA, Date 3/10/09

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21141 Add-on

SUBJECT: TV Marti

Purpose

To decide how to proceed on TV Marti in view of technical and legal impediments to continuing the project as originally conceived.

Background

The TV Marti Interagency Task Force set up by the NSC in 1988 has made substantial progress in developing a system for broadcasts to Cuba. Plans have been made to broadcast on Channel 13, the only frequency available to us which would not interfere with US stations and would minimize interference with Cuban stations. A special antenna is nearing completion and operational tests are scheduled to begin early next year from a tethered balloon VHF transmitter located at Cudjoe Key Air Force Station in Florida. Pending legislation would require a presidential determination of feasibility at the conclusion of the tests.

The Cuban government preempted us last June by broadcasting on Channel 13 in Havana and announcing that it would utilize all available VHF frequencies. Although recent monitoring cannot confirm the continued presence of a Channel 13 transmitter in Havana, use of the frequency would block reception of TV Marti. Moreover, interference to Cuban transmissions caused by our TV Marti broadcasts would violate our commitments to avoid harmful technical interference under international agreements. For Cuba to prevent reception of TV Marti is technically a much simpler and less expensive procedure than the cost and effort associated with attempted USG broadcasts of TV Marti. Our antenna could be redirected to reach areas slightly to the west of Havana, but the maximum transmitting range from Cudjoe Key is only 120 miles, and we assume Castro would simply start broadcasts on whatever frequency we chose. Even Cuban broadcasts of a test pattern are enough to defeat our signal and to give Castro grounds for a legal complaint if we broadcast on the same frequency.

High-power tests of TV Marti on Channel 13 are scheduled for early February. The Cuban government says that if we go forward it will retaliate by jamming Radio Marti and it could do so, thereby jeopardizing a very successful program. Castro could also retaliate by increasing AM band counterbroadcasting to the United States, and he has the ability to jam US civilian and military communications systems. To protest the beginning of Radio Marti in 1985, Cuba suspended the bilateral immigration agreement, caused some interference with US AM broadcasting, and also jammed Radio Marti for some time. In short, there is a real risk of retaliation although no certainty it will take place.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2059-MR
MM 6/8/2016

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The NSC Deputies Committee has concluded that there is no fully satisfactory course of action to ensure the success of the TV Marti project as originally conceived (i.e., uninterrupted broadcasts of government-produced programming on Cuba and world affairs to a mass audience). The Deputies recommend that we not proceed with tests of the VHF transmitter as originally planned since the Cuban intention and ability to broadcast on all available VHF frequencies makes the project technically and legally infeasible. On the other hand, the Deputies Committee believes that we should not simply abandon the TV Marti project. Under these circumstances, we see three options:

Option 1: Continue Work on TV Marti, while Broadening the Possibilities. Under this option, we would acknowledge that Castro has the demonstrated ability to block our intended primary course of action but we would remain committed to the principle of providing television programs to Cuba. We would develop a fully operational VHF system, but not deploy it for the proposed 90-day broadcast test. Meanwhile, we would take advantage of other presently limited opportunities for broadcasting which over time could potentially develop a considerable TV audience in Cuba. In essence, this approach stays broadly within the legal limits placed upon us by Congress and international agreements. But it also signals our determination not to be deterred by Cuban actions; our continuing commitment to the Cuban-American community to pursue such programming; and our determination to broaden the range of information reaching Cuba.

This option would involve a number of different techniques which might be used at various times and in various ways to get our message across. This would involve spending money on options which may or may not work and which almost certainly will not have much of an audience for some years. The agencies are not enthusiastic about this course of action and find reasons why few of the options have any real potential. Of all the possibilities for broadening TV Marti, satellite broadcasting is the only one that can be implemented without further development. The techniques are:

- Broadcast via Satellite: This option would avoid the technical and legal impediments of VHF transmissions. Cuba would be unlikely to have legal grounds for retaliation since Cuba publicizes its satellite transmissions to the US. The TV Marti signal can be delivered easily and cheaply via satellite to the entire island of Cuba. We could thus demonstrate to TV Marti supporters that we have complied with our commitment to break Castro's monopoly on television. The Cuban audience would be extremely limited because there are few if any satellite dishes owned by private citizens. Nevertheless, a limited market for homemade receivers might develop, as it has in Eastern Europe. Advances in technology may eventually make it possible to pick up the signal using antennas that would not be so visible to Cuban authorities as a dish.

- A Multifrequency VHF Transmitter: This could switch from channel to channel depending on which one the Cubans are not broadcasting on. The antenna now being developed for use at Cudjoe Key does not have this capability and a multi-frequency transmitter test appears practical only from an aircraft. It is possible that one frequency might interfere with another, however, and this procedure increases the possibility of interference with US broadcasts.
- Distribution of Videotapes in Cuba: The production of videotapes and programming content would be relatively simple, but distribution could be complicated. Unless the Cubans permit the free flow of videotapes, we would need to explore the possibility of a covert program. Moreover, if we go this route, we would need to make an exception for VCRs in our embargo policy.
- Changing the Direction of the VHF Antenna: We could change the direction of the antenna each day to try and hit a different part of Cuba, but the 120-mile range from Cudjoe Key limits this option to an area slightly west of Havana.
- Using an Antenna Within an Airplane: We are investigating using an airplane as a backup when the weather or balloon repairs ground the aerostat. We are presently in the system design phase and it is too early to assess feasibility. The plane is limited to flying over our territory, which imposes a constraint, and this option is extremely costly.
- UHF Broadcasts: The feasibility of UHF broadcasts should be further investigated, since the Cubans do not broadcast on those frequencies. Presently, very few television sets can receive UHF and there are probably only a small number of video recorders, which have UHF capability. Nevertheless, VHF to UHF converters for televisions could be added at relatively low cost.

Option 2: Explore a Program Agreement with Cuba. Under this option, the US government would hold in abeyance further development and expenditures on TV Marti while discussing mutual programming. Cuba has combined warnings about the dire consequences for us if we proceed with TV Marti with repeated offers to negotiate a program exchange agreement. The Cubans have not been specific about what they have in mind, variously mentioning a government to government exchange (similar to USIA's "TV Bridges" with the Soviet Union), scheduling regular broadcasts and news from a service like Cable News Network, or Cuban acceptance of other US Spanish language news broadcasts like PBS. It is unclear what the Cubans want in return, but they imply they would settle for a reciprocal agreement allowing them the opportunity to broadcast on certain US stations.

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

This approach probably would not result in an agreement for US government-produced programming, as TV Marti is currently conceived, but it could serve our purpose of breaking Castro's monopoly on information more easily and directly than the first option. To have US network news in Cuba would be a significant breakthrough. There are, however, some potential disadvantages: Cuba could string out the talks or refuse to permit a genuine opening, while pointing to the "improved climate" in Cuban-US relations. We would have to be careful to ensure that exploration of this subject not be turned into formal or high-level negotiations. One way to guard against this would be to address TV Marti in the context of ongoing technical-level talks on radio interference, which were agreed to in 1987 but have not been pursued during the past nine months.

Option 3: Continued Work on TV Marti and Talks with Cuba. By combining the first two approaches, we can provide a stimulus for the Cubans to make a serious offer for program exchanges. We should not proceed with the 90-day test of the VHF transmitter, which would destroy the potential for talks. The Cubans should be told that testing is being held in abeyance while we explore their commitment to some form of agreement. Again, we would not engage in formal or high-level negotiations.

All interested agencies -- State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, OMB, CIA, JCS, USIA, NSA, and VOA -- recommend Option 3 as the best way for the Administration to deliver on its firm commitment to the Cuban-American community to proceed with TV Marti. It would be a mistake to allow Castro to intimidate us into inaction in an effort such as this. Even if he blocks us entirely, we can use Radio Marti to highlight the lengths to which he has gone to avoid having free information reach the Cuban people.

Bob Gates has met twice with Jorge Mas, and the Cuban-American community remains determined to see TV Marti implemented as originally planned. At the same time, Mas understands Castro's capabilities and the technical inhibitions to the kind of effort we had originally conceived. Privately, Mas has said that a program exchange arrangement with Cuba could be an acceptable alternative, but he will not say this publicly. As long as we are proceeding with the program and do not back down, I believe the Cuban-American community will be satisfied that we are fulfilling the Administration's commitment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option 3, including exploration of program agreement with Cuba and prompt determination of the feasibility of the above-mentioned other opportunities for bringing free television to Cuba.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020025
RECEIVED: 05 JAN 90 19

TO: HUGHES

FROM: PRYCE
HUGHES

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PANAMA
DC

SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 5 JAN DC MTG ON PANAMA

ACTION: HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 14 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRYCE

LOGREF: 9020022

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC093

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
PRYCE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Rue NARA, Date 3/19/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: B

CLOSED BY: MC

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9020025

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HUGHES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90010519 FOR SIGNATURE
X 90010520 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By TCM NARA, Date 3/10/09

~~SECRET~~

- ① Send cys to
VP & ~~DFS~~ Treasury
note
- ② update doc-log
- ③ process
normally &
update computer
file

BB

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Philip -

2000
1/5-

Bill Pryce feels this
should be LOX'd out
tonight if possible.

Thank you
Weng

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: Ben
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 20025
 SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 DOCLOG Ben AO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>8</u>	_____	<u>8</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>APB</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>2A</u>	<u>Ben</u>	<u>CDX</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>mc 1/5</u>	<u>2AX/T</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>X</u>
<u>WWD</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>mc 1/5</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

SOC: AC - Panama
 (Exec Sec office has diskette)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 20025
Date Jan. 5, '80

Subject: DC Summary

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

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	HCYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed for By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT	<u>1</u>	<u>8 Jan</u>	<u>0630</u>	<u>Ray H. Brown</u>
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec Sec Room 7261	<u>1</u>	<u>1-6-80</u>	<u>2130</u>	<u>M. J. Sullivan</u>
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THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th S.W., Room 200A				
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DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F				
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
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Page 1 of 1 Pages

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Form	Fax cover sheet, Re: SOC [Summary of Conclusions] for DC [Deputies Committee] Meeting on Panama; redaction. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Date Closed:	3/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	90012-031
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0722-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 03

FROM G PHILIP HUGHES *B7m* NSC
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SOC FOR DC MTG ON PANAMA

#20025

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SECRETARIAT	
DEFENSE	COL GEORGE COLE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	
TREASURY	EMILY WALKER	EXEC SECRETARIAT	
CIA		EXEC SECRETARIAT	
JCS	BG THOMAS WHITE	OFC OF CHAIRMAN	

(b)(3)
[50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]

REMARKS CLOSE HOLD; EYES ONLY TO ADDRESSEES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

PA 3/10/09

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, Re: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Panama; redaction. (1 pp.)	01/05/90	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Date Closed:	3/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	90012-031
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0722-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20025

January 5, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. EMILY L. WALKER
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

ROBERT S. ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Rm NARA, Date 3/19/09


(b)(3)
[50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]

[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BG THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee
Meeting on Panama (S)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions for the National
Security Council Deputies Committee Meeting on Panama held on
Friday, January 5, 1990, for your agency's use and information.
(S)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20025

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1320-MR
MM 9/8/2015

Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: January 5, 1990
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:00 - 3:00 p.m., EST

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee
Meeting on Panama (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office
Carnes Lord

JCS
Michael Carns
David Mead

State
Robert Kimmitt
Bernard Aronson

CIA
Richard Kerr
Richard Stolz

OSD
Henry Rowan
Richard Brown

White House
Andy Card
Robert Gates

Justice
Robert Ross
Robert Mueller

NSC
William T. Pryce

Treasury
John Robson
George Folsom

Summary of Conclusions

The Chairman informed the meeting that the President would like to have an NSC meeting on Panama during the latter part of the next week to discuss future directions for U.S. policy. The following topics were agreed upon as items for the agenda:

1. Economic recovery. (S)
2. The nature of U.S. presence in Panama. (S)
3. The restructuring of the Panama Defense Force. (S)
4. Fostering political support for the new Endara government. (S)
5. Law enforcement related issues. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

6. The drawdown of U.S. military forces from Panama. (S)
7. Advice on proper U.S. Government actions concerning the Noriega case. (S)

It was agreed that:

- The Deputies would look to the Eagleburger/Robson team to provide the basic paper on the first topic listed above. (S)
- The Panama PCC would do the preparatory work and make suggestions on topics 2-6. (S)
- The Attorney General would make the presentation on topic 7. (S)
- Ambassador Hinton should be invited to attend the NSC Meeting, and the Deputies Meeting preceding it. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20025

January 5, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM:

William T. Pryce *WTP*

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies
Committee Meeting on Panama

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to your counterparts circulating the Summary of Conclusions of the NSC Deputies Committee meeting on Panama held on January 5, 1990, at 2:00 p.m.

Bob Gates has approved this in draft.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the Summary of Conclusions to your counterparts.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Hughes Memo to Counterparts

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *PMC* NARA, Date *3/10/09*

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03d. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Carnes Lord, Re: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Panama; redaction. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR CARNES LORD

Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. EMILY L. WALKER
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

ROBERT S. ROSS
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Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *PLM* NARA, Date *3/10/09*

(b)(3)
[50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]


Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BG THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee
Meeting on Panama (S)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions for the National
Security Council Deputies Committee Meeting on Panama held on
Friday, January 5, 1990, for your agency's use and information.
(S)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020022
RECEIVED: 05 JAN 90 14

TO: GATES

FROM: PRYCE

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PANAMA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION FOR DC MTG ON 5 JAN RE PANAMA

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 14 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRYCE

LOGREF: 9020025

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC093

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
PRYCE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By RM NARA, Date 3/10/05

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: LF

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9020022

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DOC ACTION OFFICER

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001 GATES
001

Z 90010514 FOR INFORMATION
X 90051014 NOTED BY GATES

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By RA NARA, Date 3/10/09

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National Security Council The White House

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LOG # 20022

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>✓</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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☒ A = Action ☐ I = Information ☐ D = Dispatch ☐ R = Retain ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

For
2:00 Meeting

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Memo	William T. Pryce to Robert M. Gates, Re: Deputies Committee, Friday, January 5 at 2:00 p.m. on Panama-- Possible Subjects for Discussion. [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	01/05/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SS on 1/25/23

Date Closed: 3/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 90012-031
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0722-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0391-MR(613)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/26/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 5, 1990

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee, Friday, January 5 at 2:00 p.m.
on Panama -- Possible Subjects for Discussion

1. Restructuring of the PDF

I think there is general agreement, both in Panama and here, that we need a restructured PDF which concentrates on police functions, is under as much civilian control as can be contrived, is stripped of its ancillary functions such as ports, railroads, immigration, and of its commercial enterprises, and has some limited defense function.

Panama agencies worry that Arias Calderon does not want to separate the functions of the former PDF out as definitively as is desirable. Their views are contained in the telegram at Tab I. Arias Calderon told Larry Eagleburger, Bernie Aronson, and me that he does want to prevent the re-creation of the old PDF and he is working toward that. He believes that there must be some sort of defense role and is talking about one or two public order companies which would be mobile.

Arias Calderon has to take into consideration the political realities of how far he can go in restructuring the PDF without completely alienating officers upon whom he must depend. He told us that he appreciates all the help he has been getting from various U.S. military ^{3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)} advisors, but felt he was getting conflicting signals at times. ^{3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)}

Arias Calderon made known that he did not want to even consider questions of U.S. defense of the Canal after 2000 at this time.

You may want to emphasize the need to let the GOP take the lead in deciding how to deal with its problem of restructuring the PDF.

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0391-MR

MR 4/26/2016

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2. Economic Reconstruction

You may want to ask John Robson to discuss this. The team was very impressed with the attitude and quality of Panama's economic team. They are private enterprise and anti-narcotics oriented. They did qualify remarks on money laundering by saying they hope to protect bank secrecy as much as possible. A principal problem is how to give the Panamanians relief on their \$540 million debt to the IFIs. Another policy question is how quickly to move forward on Presidential waivers for CBI, GSP and the sugar quota. I think we need to move as quickly as possible. I think Larry agrees.

You may want to discuss Ross Perot. Larry and Brent have talked about his going to Panama and I understand we are now encouraging him.

3. Withdrawal of U.S. Forces

You may want to probe JCS thinking on this. Max Thurman has plans for 12-man teams of rangers to be assigned to various rural garrisons for training ^{3.3(5)(1)} purposes. These could cause problems down the road.

4. Treatment of Third Country Embassies

There continue to be problems. The latest was our picking up a Cuban diplomat with a diplomatic passport saying he had been born in Panama. You may want to re-emphasize the need for better control to avoid incidents.

Attachment

Tab I Telegram

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PANAMA 00020 00 OF 03 022220Z 0765 SS02312

INFO X-01 ~~TF1-01~~ SS-01 ARA-01 JSR-01 /005 A4 PDJ
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FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, HARR, PH
SUBJECT: FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE PANAMANIAN
PUBLIC FORCE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: OUR EFFORTS TO PROD THE GOP TOWARDS DECISION ON RESTRUCTURING THE PUBLIC FORCES ARE BEARING FRUIT. THEY HAVE MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE DIRECTION OF SEPARATING OUT INTO VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED BY THE PDF, CREATING A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. WHILE THE DEGREE AND NATURE OF COMBAT CAPABILITY REMAINS IN DEBATE, THE RANGE OF VIEWS HAS NARROWED TO RELATIVELY MODEST LEVELS OF COMBAT FORCES. WE ARE BRINGING THIS DECISION PROCESS TO CLOSURE SO WE CAN GET ON WITH COORDINATED IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES. END SUMMARY.
3. AS WE MOVE FORWARD IN OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING IN PANAMA, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BEAR IN MIND THE SORT OF STRUCTURE WE WOULD HOPE TO SEE DEVELOPED IN PANAMA OVER THE MEDIUM TO LONG TERM. WE MUST NOT ALLOW SHORT-TERM EXPEDIENCY TO RECREATE THE SORT OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES THAT PERMITTED THE RISE OF THE MORIEGA REGIME. ALREADY SOME PANAMANIAN ARE BEGINNING TO ASK THE QUESTION: "IS THE U.S. IN FACT INTENT ON PUTTING BACK TOGETHER THE STRUCTURE THAT WE JUST SPENT 25 AMERICAN LIVES AND OVER 300 PANAMANIAN LIVES FORCIBLY TO DISMANTLE?"
4. ALL HERE ON BOTH THE U.S. AND GOP SIDES BELIEVE THAT WE MUST ACT NOW TO DEFINE WHERE WE ARE HEADED, AND THEN CALIBRATE OUR IMPLEMENTING STEPS TO THAT ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. SUCH DIFFERENCES AS DO EXIST ARE OVER MATTERS OF DEGREE AND OF SHORT-TERM PRACTICALITY. BUT UNLESS WE DEFINE CLEARLY AND PROMPTLY WHERE WE ARE HEADED, THE VARIOUS US AGENCIES WHICH MUST RELATE TO THE NEW PUBLIC FORCES MAY INADVERTENTLY TAKE MEASURES TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR OWN MISSIONS THAT WILL DRIVE THE GOP IN DIRECTIONS WE MAY NOT FAVOR.
5. CERTAIN BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE FULLY SHARED BY ALL USG AND GOP ELEMENTS, INCLUDING THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEW PUBLIC FORCES. FIRST, ALL AGREE THAT A NUMBER OF THE FUNCTIONS ASSUMED BY THE FORMER PDF SHOULD BE BROKEN OUT INTO SEPARATE INSTITUTIONS

PAGE 01 PANAMA 00020 00 OF 03 022220Z 0765 SS02312

UNDER THE CONTROL OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO CREATE A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. THE PUBLIC FORCES THEMSELVES INITIALLY DETERMINED TO SEPARATE THE INVESTIGATIVE POLICE, IMMIGRATION AND PRISONS FROM THE PUBLIC FORCES. UNDER THIS SCHEME, HOWEVER, EVEN SOME OF THESE SEPARATED FUNCTIONS WOULD FALL UNDER THE MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE. VICE PRESIDENT AND MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE RICARDO ARIAS CALDERON PROFFESSES TO WANT A GREATER DEGREE OF SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS BUT CLAIMS HE CANNOT PRESS THIS AT THIS POINT WITHOUT UPSETTING THE PUBLIC FORCES. ENDARA AND FORD, AS WELL AS ARIAS CALDERON'S OWN PARTY LEADERSHIP, APPEAR EXTREMELY CONCERNED BY THIS TREND, VIEWING THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS A RECREATION OF THE OLD PDF. INDEED, SENIOR PDC OFFICIALS COMMENTED THAT THEY ASSUMED ARIAS CALDERON WAS DOING THIS ON THE ORDERS OF THE U.S. TO THE EXTENT THAT ARIAS CALDERON ACTUALLY WANTS A GREATER SEPARATION OF POWER, HIS INABILITY TO STAND UP TO THE NEW PUBLIC FORCES LEADERSHIP WITH FULL U.S. BACKING DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR HIS ABILITY TO DO SO ONCE U.S. FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN.

6. MAX THURMAN AND I, WITH THE FULL CONCURRENCE OF BUSHNELL AND KOZAK, BELIEVE THAT A FAR MORE AMBITIOUS SEPARATION OF POWER IS NECESSARY AND ACHIEVABLE. THE SOUTHCOM STAFF HAS IN FULL COORDINATION WITH US DEVELOPED AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCHEME NOT ONLY TO SEPARATE THE POLICE, NATIONAL INVESTIGATORS, CUSTOMS, PRISONS, AIR SUPPORT, COAST GUARD, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY, TRAFFIC REGISTRATION, TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT, FORREST SERVICES, PARK RANGERS, CONSTRUCTION GROUPS, COUNTERNARCOTICS, ANTI-TERRORISM, ETC., INTO SEPARATE INSTITUTIONS, BUT ALSO TO DISBURSE THESE NEW INSTITUTIONS AMONG A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT CIVILIAN MINISTRIES. THIS PLAN HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ENDARA, ARIAS, AND FORD, AND PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. ARIAS NOW AGREES THAT THE INVESTIGATIVE POLICE (THE OLD DENI) SHOULD BE A SEPARATE INSTITUTION UNDER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. CONSENSUS ALSO APPEARS TO EXIST THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD SHOULD BE SEPARATE AND UNDER THE MINISTRY OF THE PRESIDENCY. WE HAVE MADE A SMALL DENT ON REDEFINING THE NAVY INTO A SEPARATE COAST GUARD AND HAVE MET STRONG RESISTANCE FROM ARIAS CALDERON ON SEPARATING THE AIR FORCE FROM THE PUBLIC FORCES. EVEN WHERE THERE IS AGREEMENT ON SEPARATING OUT A SERVICE, HOWEVER, MUCH JOCKEYING IS OCCURRING OVER THE ISSUE OF WHICH CIVILIAN MINISTER WILL HAVE CONTROL.

7. THE DEGREE AND CHARACTER OF THE SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION AMONG VARIOUS MINISTRIES IS ULTIMATELY A GOP DECISION. IT WILL REQUIRE A NEW LAW WITH INEVITABLE POLITICAL JOCKEYING. WE SHOULD NOT BECOME HUNG UP ON THESE PRECISE ASPECTS. WHAT WE ARE SEEKING IS THAT THE GOP BRING TO CLOSURE ITS EFFORTS TO BREAK UP THE PDF STRUCTURE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE INTO A NUMBER OF SMALL INSTITUTIONS ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS MINISTRIES. ONLY IF BOTH WE, THE GOP AND THE NEW PUBLIC FORCES KNOW THE GOAL CAN WE COHERENTLY BEGIN THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH IT. HOPEFULLY THE EAGLEBURGER VISIT WILL HELP STIMULATE THE GOP TO FINALIZE AND ANNOUNCE ITS PLANS IN THIS RESPECT.

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PER E.O. 13526
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PAGE 02 OF 02 PANAMA 00028 00 OF 03 022202 0765

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PAGE 01 PANAMA 00028 00 OF 03 022202 0765

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8. THE SECOND ISSUE OF KEY CONCERN IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE NEW GOP WILL MAINTAIN A MILITARY COMPONENT. ALL AGREE THAT AT A MINIMUM THE NEW PUBLIC FORCES MUST HAVE PUBLIC ORDER COMPANIES WHICH WOULD BE TRAINED FOR CROWD CONTROL AND MAINTAIN A MINIMAL LEVEL OF COMBAT CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH THREATS WHICH CANNOT BE HANDLED BY LIGHTLY ARMED POLICE. THE SEPARATE ANTI-TERRORIST UNIT WOULD ALSO HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH SMALL-SCALE THREATS FROM WELL-EQUIPPED TERRORISTS.

9. THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER PANAMA WILL NEED AND CAN AFFORD THE RISK OF RECREATING FAIRLY LARGE-SCALE COMBAT UNITS. THE ARGUMENT THAT THESE WILL BE NEEDED FOR CANAL DEFENSE -- OR ARE SOMEHOW REQUIRED BY THE CANAL TREATIES -- IS NOT SHARED HERE. THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OUTLINED BY TORRIJOS DURING THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS -- AND EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED BY THE US -- REMAINS SOUND. HIS POINT WAS THAT THE CANAL CANNOT BE DEFENDED AGAINST LOCAL THREATS BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES STATIONED IN PANAMA: "THE ONLY DEFENSE FOR THE CANAL IS A FRIENDLY PEOPLE AND GOOD INTELLIGENCE." UNDER THE TORRIJOS DOCTRINE, EXTERNAL CONVENTIONAL THREATS TO THE CANAL WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY FORCES STATIONED IN THE U.S. -- NOT THOSE STATIONED IN PANAMA. CERTAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THIS RECORD, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE TREATY NEGOTIATORS ENVISIONED THE CREATION OF A LARGE PANAMANIAN MILITARY TO REPLACE U.S. FORCES NOW PRESENT IN PANAMA. THE DECISION TO DO SO WAS NORIEGA'S, AND HIS PURPOSES RELATED LESS TO ANY SOUND MILITARY RATIONALE REGARDING CANAL DEFENSE AND MORE TO HIS OWN QUEST FOR POWER.

10. A MORE SERIOUS QUESTION IS WHETHER WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE THE GROWTH OF AN INSURGENCY THAT WOULD THREATEN THE GOP AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. IN SHORT, WILL THE CUBANS MAKE AN EFFECTIVE EFFORT TO RECOUP WHAT THEY HAVE LOST HERE DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS, AND HOW FERTILE WILL THE TERRAIN BE FOR SUCH AN EFFORT? THIS IS CERTAINLY A DEBATABLE QUESTION, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN EFFORT CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THE REAL ISSUE IS WHETHER WE SHOULD RUN THE RISK OF LEAVING PANAMA EXPOSED TO AN AS YET UNMANIFEST GUERRILLA THREAT THAT THE PUBLIC FORCES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO HANDLE ALONE ABSENT A SIGNIFICANT COMBAT CAPABILITY OR RUN THE

MORE PREDICTABLE RISK THAT THE CREATION OF SUCH A CAPABILITY COULD ITSELF BE THE INSTRUMENT FOR DESTABILIZING THE GOVERNMENT IT IS OSTENSIBLY DESIGNED TO PROTECT. ARIAS CALDERON EXPRESSES HEARTFELT FEAR OVER THE PROSPECT OF RECREATING COMBAT UNITS, BUT NEVERTHELESS SEEMS TO BE LEANING IN FAVOR OF A MODEST COMBAT CAPABILITY, CITING BOTH THE POSSIBILITY OF A GUERRILLA THREAT AND THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING THE PUBLIC FORCES TO ACCEPT A PURELY POLICE ROLE. ENDARA AND FORD SEEM TO BE LEANING THE OTHER DIRECTION. ARIAS CALDERON IS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM HIS PARTY TO STOP THE BUILDUP EVEN OF POLICE FORCES.

11. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE RISK OF CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL COMBAT CAPABILITY IS NOT WORTH RUNNING, AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS WHILE THE U.S. PRESENCE IS DOMINANT. THE CREATION OF SIGNIFICANT COMBAT CAPABILITY WOULD GIVE THOSE UNITS A DOMINANCE IN PRESTIGE AND FIRE POWER OVER

ALL OF THE OTHER INSTITUTIONS WE WOULD CREATE TO ESTABLISH CHECKS AND BALANCES. MOREOVER, IT WOULD ALSO INEVITABLY LEAD TO THE SORT OF CONSOLIDATION OF ALL ARMED ELEMENTS INTO A SINGLE ENTITY AS OCCURRED IN THE PDF. IF THE PUBLIC FORCE IS TO HAVE A COUNTER INSURGENCY/CIVIL DEFENSE MISSION, IT BECOMES HARD TO ARGUE THAT ALL ARMED ELEMENTS IN PANAMA SHOULD NOT RECEIVE SUCH TRAINING AND FALL UNDER A UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE SO AS TO REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A LARGER STANDING ARMY IN ADDITION TO THE POLICE, COAST GUARD, ETC.

12. ACCORDINGLY, MAX THURMAN AND I, WITH BUSHNELL AND KOZAK IN FULL AGREEMENT, FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO COME DOWN HARD AGAINST THE RECREATION OF COMBAT UNITS. THE PROBLEM OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE EXISTING COMBAT TROOPS IS IN OUR JUDGMENT MANAGEABLE. SOME CAN BE INCORPORATED INTO THE POLICE AND OTHER NEW INSTITUTIONS. A LARGE NUMBER MIGHT BE EMPLOYED IN A PUBLIC WORKS/CIVIL ACTION MISSION UNDER THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS, BUT IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY. THE ONLY CARRYOVER FROM THEIR MILITARY DAYS WOULD BE THEIR RETIREMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS. OVER TIME, THESE CIVIL ACTION UNITS COULD BE PHASED OUT.

13. WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT BY STIMULATING DEBATE OVER THESE ISSUES ON THE GOP SIDE WE HAVE AT LEAST ARRESTED A DISTURBING TREND TO RECREATE THE PDF UNDER ANOTHER NAME. FEELING THE HEAT FROM HIS COLLEAGUES, ARIAS CALDERON HAS PRESSED THE PUBLIC FORCES TO GIVE UP ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND TO ACCEPT CIVILIAN CONTROL OF PUBLIC FORCES FINANCES. WE NOW MUST BRING THE PROCESS TO CLOSURE IN ORDER THAT WE CAN GET ON WITH THE TASK OF IMPLEMENTING IN PRACTICE THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PDF THAT WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING CONCEPTUALLY.

14. USCINCSO CONCURS.
DAVIS

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↖
Barbara:
Robert Ross would
like to be cleared
in w/ his name &
DOB. Apparently there
is another Robert Ross.

Thanks,
Siane

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Form	NSC Time Planning Sheet, Re: Panama; names and Social Security number redacted. (1 pp.)	01/05/90	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 093 - January 05, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Panama, Keywords: Panama

Date Closed: 3/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 90012-031
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0722-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

SUBJECT: Parame

Participants	Invited	Agency Rep.	Date of Birth	Social Security Number	Confir
VP	✓	Charles Ford			
STATE	✓	K. M. Smith	✓		
TREASURY	✓	George Brown	✓		
BAKER (PERSONAL)		George Brown	1/2/55		
DOD	✓	Henry Rogers	10/11/25		
JUSTICE	✓	Robert Ross	3/27/44		
MEESE (PERSONAL)		Robert Mueller	8/7/44	(b)(6)	
JCS	✓	Michael Corns	6/23/37		
CIA	✓	Ward Mead	8/21/40		
OMB			27 Nov 25		
USUN		(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]			
WALTERS (PERSONAL)					
ACDA	✓	Card			
USIA	✓	Bois			
H. BAKER		Bois			

COMMENTS:

☐ Principals☒ Principals Plus 1