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Folder Title:
NSC/DC 079 - December 06, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on El Salvador via SVTS, Keywords: El Salvador

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Profile Sheet	Re: Notification of DC Meeting (1 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	TS
01b. Summary Report	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
01c. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Distribution List Re: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	S
01d. Paper	Re: Policy Coordinating Committee El Salvador Options Paper (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01e. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Paper on El Salvador for the Deputies Committee (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on El Salvador, December 6, 1989 (2 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	TS
02b. Paper	Re: Policy Coordinating Committee El Salvador Options Paper (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Outline	Re: Ongoing Activities... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Page 1 of 1

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 079 - December 06, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on El Salvador vis SVTS, Keywords: El Salvador

Pinksheet Number: cap1460

OA/ID Number: 90012-016

Date Closed: 10/28/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921476
RECEIVED: 06 DEC 89 14

TO: HUGHES

FROM: PACELLI
PRYCE

DOC DATE: 06 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR
DC

NSC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF DC MTG ON 6 DEC RE EL SALVADOR / AGENDA

ACTION: DUE DATE: 02 APR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF: 8921477

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC079

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8921476

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001 PACELLI
002 HUGHES
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

X 89120612 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
Z 89120614 FOR SIGNATURE
X 89120614 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
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National Security Council The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>X</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>APB</u>	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>12/6 AL</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>LMS 3/29</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

89 DEC 6 AG: 54

A = Action
 I = Information
 D = Dispatch
 R = Retain
 N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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COMMENTS

Paragraph classification Table
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LOG # 21476

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>J. STAPLETON ROY</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>H. LAWRENCE SANDALL</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.</u>	<u>EXEC ASSISTANT TO CHAIRMAN</u>	_____
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REMARKS

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CAP 10/28/09

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TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ROBERT S. ROSS / CHIEF OF STAFF / JUSTICE

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

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CIA	H. LAWRENCE SANDALL	EXEC SEC	
JCS	RGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.	EXEC ASSISTANT TO CHAIRMAN	

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CIA	H. LAWRENCE SANDALL	EXEC SEC	
JCS	BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.	EXEC ASSISTANT TO CHAIRMAN	

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EXEC SEC

CIA

H. LAWRENCE SANDALL

EXEC SEC

JCS

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.

EXEC ASSISTANT
TO CHAIRMAN

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21476

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


ROBERT S. ROSS
Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BG THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Notice of NSC Deputies Committee Meeting (U)

There will be an NSC Deputies Committee meeting to discuss policy options on El Salvador on Wednesday, December 6, 1989, at 2:15 - 2:45 pm by teleconference. Attached is an agenda (Tab A) and a policy options paper (Tab B) which has been approved by the NSC Policy Coordinating Committee on Latin America. (S)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Agenda
Tab B El Salvador Policy Options Paper

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MM 3/29/2016

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 6, 1989
LOCATION: Teleconference
TIME: 2:15 - 2:45 pm

EL SALVADOR

Agenda

- I. IntroductionRobert Gates
- II. Intelligence AssessmentCIA/Defense
- III. Policy OptionsState
- IV. DiscussionAll participants
- V. SummaryRobert Gates

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By SAP NARA, Date 10/28/09

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Policy Coordinating Committee

El Salvador Options Paper

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SITUATION

There have been some instances and increased threats of renewed fighting in San Salvador and elsewhere in the country. The FMLN can now introduce SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to the conflict. President Cristiani has requested a U.S. military demonstration of support. There are possibilities of the introduction of Nicaraguan "volunteers" into El Salvador and of a Nicaraguan incursion into Honduras in the vicinity of the Las Vegas salient. The Honduran Government also has sought demonstrations of U.S. support.

The Sandinistas crossed an important threshold with SA-7 shipments. Their decision on crossing further thresholds will be affected critically by their perceptions of reactions and costs from the SA-7 incident. We are at a critical point in the decisionmaking process. The U.S. Government became aware of the presence of SAMs in El Salvador ten days ago, and we have yet to respond directly other than in diplomatic channels with the Soviets, the Europeans and the Latin Americans. We are losing valuable time if a U.S. military reaction/signal is to be viewed credibly by Salvadorans and Sandinistas. In the meantime, the FMLN enjoys the illusion of victory in the international press despite its significant losses in a failed offensive. The recent departure of American citizens has contributed to this perception in El Salvador and internationally.

The U.S. Government has made a long-term commitment to help El Salvador preserve its democracy. We must decide, however, how far we are willing to go militarily and politically now to demonstrate the depth of our support to President Cristiani's government and our firmness in the face of increased Sandinista and Cuban aggressiveness. The PCC recognizes that our ability to sustain our help to El Salvador will depend significantly on the degree to which the GOES pursues the investigation/prosecution of those responsible for the Jesuit killings and that another, similar atrocity would cause a dramatic deterioration in U.S. assistance.

SUPPORTIVE ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN

A number of technical steps, principally military, have been taken to increase U.S. intelligence collection and improve the Salvadoran ability to analyze rapidly the information which they are receiving. A USSOUTHCOM team has been in country to identify Salvadoran requirements for quick modifications to improve aircraft survivability against a SAM threat. The JCS is assessing Salvadoran/Honduran requirements for ground radar coverage to improve the interdiction of FMLN supply lines. No decision has been made. The ESAF's lack of an interdiction doctrine and system to respond to the information which the radars would generate complicates how this important step must be taken. A detailed list of ongoing support activities is provided at the attachment.

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-2-

GEN Thurman visited the ESAF General Staff on Dec 1 to assure them that we are moving quickly to address their additional needs, encourage them to regain the initiative by going back on the offensive, and underscore how seriously the U.S. Government views the ongoing investigation of the Jesuit killings.

ADDITIONAL DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL MEASURES

Most of the world now is convinced that the Sandinista Government has played a role in providing military supplies to the FMLN. Recognizing this, the PCC believes that linkage should be established and exploited between foreign economic assistance and the GON's support of the FMLN. It is important for the Sandinistas to know, for example, that they would be unable to receive increased European and Japanese economic assistance, which they need so badly, as long as they continue to provide military support to the FMLN. A Presidential letter to key Prime Ministers would be critical to our ability to get European and the Japanese Governments to warn the GON about the consequences of its actions for future assistance.

While President Bush has affirmed his support for the Cristiani Government and the White House and State Department also have pledged U.S. support, a strong and carefully crafted Presidential statement of support for the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras in the face of external threats and aggression could send an important signal of support to our friends. The PCC supports the careful drafting of such a statement by the Department of State.

The PCC agreed that the Department of State will encourage the U.N. to modify ONUCA's implementation plan in order to concentrate on Sandinista support of the FMLN and that Defense and other agencies will prepare the ESAF and HOAF to share sanitized intelligence with ONUCA to bring pressure on FMLN support operations inside Nicaragua.

ONUCA's headquarters currently is being established in Tegucigalpa. While this observer group is ill-suited for interdiction, provision of intelligence regarding FMLN support operations in Nicaragua can have a deterrent effect on this activity and perhaps result in the shutdown of the more visible manifestations of support, such as Radio Venceremos. Moreover, ONUCA's verification of cross-border violations can help move the Soviets to work against Cuban and Nicaraguan support activities.

The PCC also agreed that the U.S. Government will work with the governments of Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica to improve their respective border-search operations and offer additional U.S. technical assistance. Some assistance already is being provided. This is an important dimension because if air and sea deliveries come under pressure, our increased efforts against overland shipments may hamper a switch to this means.

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-3-

ADDITIONAL MILITARY IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OPTIONS

The PCC's analysis of options has focused on three areas where the greatest immediate impact could be achieved. These include enhancing the intelligence available to the ESAF and their ability to use it, the targeting of FMLN logistical resupply coming from outside El Salvador, and demonstrating visibly U.S. support while avoiding sterile shows of military force. In the PCC's view the most credible military response that can be executed now is the re-establishment of a U.S. naval presence off the coast of El Salvador.

This commitment, which is envisioned to be a small surface action task force of at least three ships, accomplishes four objectives. In addition to providing a visible symbol of U.S. support for the Cristiani Government while the ESAF stabilizes the internal military situation, the naval presence augments the existing intelligence coverage of FMLN sea and air logistic traffic and FMLN electronic communications. Thirdly, we will share the logistic information, in particular, with not only the ESAF but also ONUCA, to guide verification operations inside Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union to increase its pressure on Cuba and Nicaragua by confirming allegations of their involvement. We seek through this presence, finally, to deter sea and air movement of military weapons, ammunition and supplies into El Salvador. It will take at least four days to deploy a naval task force to the Salvadoran coast. State believes the naval presence should not be withdrawn precipitously and might continue until the Nicaraguan election of February 25. The next two and a half months are a critical period not only for El Salvador but also Honduras. The deterrent, intelligence and symbolic dimensions of this task force may have a significant influence on events in the region.

The PCC assessed the potential impact of re-establishing a naval presence off the coast of El Salvador on the upcoming Nicaraguan election and concluded that we must carefully shape our public posture to avoid giving the Sandinistas a credible pretext to cancel the elections. We would likely announce the deployment and explain its mission. We would stress that the task force supports the Cristiani government at his request, that its focus is primarily intelligence collection against FMLN sea and air logistic traffic into El Salvador, that assisting the Salvador Navy with its logistics interdiction efforts has been a long-standing mission, and that these ships will take offensive action only if they are threatened.

The PCC discussed the possibility of deploying a carrier battle group to the area. This action would be a show of significant force which would require time to execute but could not kept on station for a lengthy period. It also would be more expensive. The PCC eliminated this alternative. The deployment of two or more airborne

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surveillance platforms to Honduras was evaluated. This option, which was tried unsuccessfully in the 1983/84 timeframe, did not address seaborne logistics operations, would become expensive when maintaining 24-hour coverage, and could be affected by weather conditions at the supporting airbase. The PCC also eliminated this alternative.

Over time the effectiveness of the naval presence, particularly as a deterrent force, will lose credibility unless there is an accompanying increase in the interdiction of sea and air shipments. Working within current political constraints on U.S. presence, the U.S. Government must assist the ESAF to make substantive improvements in its ability to interdict sea and air logistic traffic and to do so quickly. The only other timely alternative is for the U.S. military to assume this responsibility at the request of the GOES. The naval task force has a SAM capability and can easily intercept suspicious vessels. The PCC decided not to pursue the U.S. course of action at this time.

U.S. CONTINGENCY RESPONSE OPTIONS

The U.S. Government must be prepared to respond to scenarios involving follow-on Sandinista logistical support of the FMLN, the employment of SAMs against Salvadoran or U.S. aircraft, and the possibility of hostile, terrorist acts against U.S. citizens and property in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America. The PCC directed that a list of response options, formulated by a PCC working group and recommended for planning purposes, be developed in greater detail. The PCC gave the following guidance:

-- The U.S. response in these scenarios should be balanced, employing a mix of diplomatic/political and military measures, to counter the specific hostile action undertaken by the FMLN or the Sandinistas. In employing any of the options, we will want to weigh carefully the impact they would likely have on the Nicaraguan elections.

-- The political downside in our country of U.S. military force projection in Central America should be carefully factored in as well. Military options involving a direct U.S. role would trigger War Powers considerations and a major congressional and public debate. In brief, we would want to be clear that more severe U.S. military options could lead to escalation and, ultimately, entail the fullest commitment on our part to neutralize the FMLN and its Nicaraguan ally.

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-5-

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Department of State prepare a Presidential letter to selected European prime ministers and the Japanese prime minister in which their governments are encouraged to warn the GON that they will not provide additional economic assistance if Nicaragua continues to give military support to the FMLN.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That the Department of State prepare a statement for President Bush supporting the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That the JCS re-establish a naval presence as quickly as possible off the coast of El Salvador to increase intelligence collection in support of the Cristiani government and deter FMLN sea and air logistic resupply.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment: This document, which is classified Top Secret/Codeword, has been distributed separately.

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21476

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 6, 1989



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*
FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*
SUBJECT: Notification of NSC Deputies Committee Meeting
on El Salvador, December 6, 1989, 2:15 - 2:45 pm

A National Security Council Deputies Committee meeting will be held on Wednesday, December 6, 1989, at 2:15 - 2:45 pm by teleconference. The meeting will discuss policy options for El Salvador. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to your counterparts notifying their agencies of this meeting. Bob Gates has approved the scheduling of the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to your counterparts at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Agenda
Tab B El Salvador Options Paper

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 10/28/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

89 DEC 6 A 9: 00

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 21476 add-on

ACTION OFFICER: PACELLI

DUE: 6 DEC

☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates

☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi

☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

☐ Prepare Memo

to

URGENT

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3860

FYI

☐ Basora
☐ Beers
☐ Blackwill
☐ Briggs
☐ Brooks
☐ Charles
☐ Coulson
☐ Deal
☐ Donley
☐ Dyke
☐ Ebner
☐ Grant
☐ Haass
☐ Hoffmann
☐ Hutchings
☐ Jackson
☐ LaMagna
☐ Kanter

FYI

☐ Lampley
☐ Leach
☐ Levin
☐ Lewis
☐ Mahley
☐ Mandel
☐ McCue
☐ Melby
☐ Menan
☐ Miller
☐ Miskel
☐ Needels
☐ Paal
☐ Pacelli
☐ Passage
☐ Popadiuk
☐ Porter
☐ Pryce

FYI

☐ Rademaker
☐ Reiss
☐ Rice
☐ Rodman
☐ Rostow
☐ Salvetti
☐ Snider
☐ Tilley
☐ Tobey
☐ Welch
☐ Whitley
☐ Working
☐ Zelikow
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By SAF NARA, Date 10/20/09

INFORMATION

☒ Hughes

☒ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Gates (advance)

☒ Secretariat

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

☒ Sittman

COMMENTS

The TOP SECRET/Codeword attachment is not included in this package.

Logged By

AC

~~TOP SECRET~~

Return to Secretariat

TOP SECRET

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URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-00 BY 100000-100000

TOP SECRET



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

21476

~~SECRET~~ with
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Paper on El Salvador for the Deputies Committee

The attached paper has been prepared by the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on El Salvador for consideration at the Deputies Committee meeting planned for December 6, 1989.

Elizabeth McKame for

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment

~~SECRET~~ with
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD attachment
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2046-mr
MM 3/29/2016

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

NOV 4 1989

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

1989

The attached copy of the report of the
Investigative Committee on the activities of the
United States Committee for the Defense of the
Soviet Union, dated December 1, 1989.

Report of the
Investigative Committee

SITUATION ROOM

09 NOV 4 PM 11:03

89 DEC 6 A 8:59

WHITE HOUSE

Drafted: ARA: Col J^{HA}Cope; 74212
12/5/89 SEARACEN 6698

Cleared: ARA/CEN: JSullivanJS
ARA: BAronsonBA
P: SWesche for KB.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921477
RECEIVED: 06 DEC 89 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PACELLI
PRYCE

DOC DATE: 06 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EL SALVADOR
PCC

DC
AGENDA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PCC PAPER & AGENDA OF DC MTG 6 DEC RE EL SALVADOR

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 02 APR 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF: 8921476-

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC079

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PACELLI
PRYCE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 10/28/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: AC

CLOSED BY: B

DOC 1 OF 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8921477

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 89120614 FOR INFORMATION
X 89120620 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 10/28/09

~~TOP SECRET~~

National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21477

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓

SYSTEM PRS 20 NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 20 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>pm</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>LMS 3/69</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

09 DEC 69 12:50

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

- 21477
- ① make chur
 - ② pull suspense
 - ③ print profile
 - ④ update IIF
 - ⑤ send comeback up
- Jorge
- Thurs

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21477

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/C _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W.</u>	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>APB</u>	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Inequal Upstairs
12/6 - 12:50*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	David A. Pacelli to Brent Scowcroft Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on El Salvador, December 6, 1989 (2 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 079 - December 06, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on El Salvador vis SVTS, Keywords: El Salvador

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 2/5/2014

Date Closed:	10/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	90012-016
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1999-0467-F/2(85)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	10/17/2002	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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(w/~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment)

21477

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 6, 1989

INFORMATION

Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*


FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI *DAP*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on El Salvador,
December 6, 1989


The reason for this meeting is to discuss the Policy Coordinating Committee's recommendation that we reestablish a naval presence off the Salvadoran coast; the last recommendation of the options paper (Tab B). Neither of the other recommendations -- a Presidential letter to European governments urging them to cut aid to Nicaragua and a Presidential letter to Cristiani and Azcona supporting their governments -- would have needed DC approval and the letters have not yet been drafted.

Although the PCC recommends

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



We recommend you explore our ground-based efforts during the meeting to ensure that we are doing everything possible in that area.

Tab C describes intelligence and operational support now being supplied to El Salvador and Honduras. The PCC is not yet ready to answer your question of what we should do if Nicaragua doesn't stop shipping arms to the FMLN or if the FMLN employs the SA-7s.

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(w/~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment)
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958

1999-0467-F/2
10/17/2002 MM

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(w/TOP SECRET attachment)

Note that there already have been several reported instances of SAM use against Salvadoran Air Force aircraft.

General Thurman and Ambassador Walker delivered a good hard message on the need for faster progress in the investigation of the Jesuit killings. The government has not yet identified the military units in the area at the time of the shooting.

Attachments

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	PCC Approved Paper on El Salvador
Tab C	U.S. Support for El Salvador and Honduras

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 6, 1989
LOCATION: Teleconference
TIME: 2:15 - 2:45 pm

EL SALVADOR

Agenda

- I. Introduction Robert Gates
- II. Intelligence Assessment CIA/Defense
- III. Policy Options State
- IV. Discussion All participants
- V. Summary Robert Gates

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 10/28/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2046-MR
MM 6/8/2016

Policy Coordinating Committee

El Salvador Options Paper

SITUATION

There have been some instances and increased threats of renewed fighting in San Salvador and elsewhere in the country. The FMLN can now introduce SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to the conflict. President Cristiani has requested a U.S. military demonstration of support. There are possibilities of the introduction of Nicaraguan "volunteers" into El Salvador and of a Nicaraguan incursion into Honduras in the vicinity of the Las Vegas salient. The Honduran Government also has sought demonstrations of U.S. support.

The Sandinistas crossed an important threshold with SA-7 shipments. Their decision on crossing further thresholds will be affected critically by their perceptions of reactions and costs from the SA-7 incident. We are at a critical point in the decisionmaking process. The U.S. Government became aware of the presence of SAMs in El Salvador ten days ago, and we have yet to respond directly other than in diplomatic channels with the Soviets, the Europeans and the Latin Americans. We are losing valuable time if a U.S. military reaction/signal is to be viewed credibly by Salvadorans and Sandinistas. In the meantime, the FMLN enjoys the illusion of victory in the international press despite its significant losses in a failed offensive. The recent departure of American citizens has contributed to this perception in El Salvador and internationally.

The U.S. Government has made a long-term commitment to help El Salvador preserve its democracy. We must decide, however, how far we are willing to go militarily and politically now to demonstrate the depth of our support to President Cristiani's government and our firmness in the face of increased Sandinista and Cuban aggressiveness. The PCC recognizes that our ability to sustain our help to El Salvador will depend significantly on the degree to which the GOES pursues the investigation/prosecution of those responsible for the Jesuit killings and that another, similar atrocity would cause a dramatic deterioration in U.S. assistance.

SUPPORTIVE ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN

A number of technical steps, principally military, have been taken to increase U.S. intelligence collection and improve the Salvadoran ability to analyze rapidly the information which they are receiving. A USSOUTHCOM team has been in country to identify Salvadoran requirements for quick modifications to improve aircraft survivability against a SAM threat. The JCS is assessing Salvadoran/Honduran requirements for ground radar coverage to improve the interdiction of FMLN supply lines. No decision has been made. The ESAF's lack of an interdiction doctrine and system to respond to the information which the radars would generate complicates how this important step must be taken. A detailed list of ongoing support activities is provided at the attachment.

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-2-

GEN Thurman visited the ESAF General Staff on Dec 1 to assure them that we are moving quickly to address their additional needs, encourage them to regain the initiative by going back on the offensive, and underscore how seriously the U.S. Government views the ongoing investigation of the Jesuit killings.

ADDITIONAL DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL MEASURES

Most of the world now is convinced that the Sandinista Government has played a role in providing military supplies to the FMLN. Recognizing this, the PCC believes that linkage should be established and exploited between foreign economic assistance and the GON's support of the FMLN. It is important for the Sandinistas to know, for example, that they would be unable to receive increased European and Japanese economic assistance, which they need so badly, as long as they continue to provide military support to the FMLN. A Presidential letter to key Prime Ministers would be critical to our ability to get European and the Japanese Governments to warn the GON about the consequences of its actions for future assistance.

While President Bush has affirmed his support for the Cristiani Government and the White House and State Department also have pledged U.S. support, a strong and carefully crafted Presidential statement of support for the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras in the face of external threats and aggression could send an important signal of support to our friends. The PCC supports the careful drafting of such a statement by the Department of State.

The PCC agreed that the Department of State will encourage the U.N. to modify ONUCA's implementation plan in order to concentrate on Sandinista support of the FMLN and that Defense and other agencies will prepare the ESAF and HOAF to share sanitized intelligence with ONUCA to bring pressure on FMLN support operations inside Nicaragua.

ONUCA's headquarters currently is being established in Tegucigalpa. While this observer group is ill-suited for interdiction, provision of intelligence regarding FMLN support operations in Nicaragua can have a deterrent effect on this activity and perhaps result in the shutdown of the more visible manifestations of support, such as Radio Venceremos. Moreover, ONUCA's verification of cross-border violations can help move the Soviets to work against Cuban and Nicaraguan support activities.

The PCC also agreed that the U.S. Government will work with the governments of Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica to improve their respective border-search operations and offer additional U.S. technical assistance. Some assistance already is being provided. This is an important dimension because if air and sea deliveries come under pressure, our increased efforts against overland shipments may hamper a switch to this means.

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ADDITIONAL MILITARY IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OPTIONS

The PCC's analysis of options has focused on three areas where the greatest immediate impact could be achieved. These include enhancing the intelligence available to the ESAF and their ability to use it, the targeting of FMLN logistical resupply coming from outside El Salvador, and demonstrating visibly U.S. support while avoiding sterile shows of military force. In the PCC's view the most credible military response that can be executed now is the re-establishment of a U.S. naval presence off the coast of El Salvador.

This commitment, which is envisioned to be a small surface action task force of at least three ships, accomplishes four objectives. In addition to providing a visible symbol of U.S. support for the Cristiani Government while the ESAF stabilizes the internal military situation, the naval presence augments the existing intelligence coverage of FMLN sea and air logistic traffic and FMLN electronic communications. Thirdly, we will share the logistic information, in particular, with not only the ESAF but also ONUCA, to guide verification operations inside Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union to increase its pressure on Cuba and Nicaragua by confirming allegations of their involvement. We seek through this presence, finally, to deter sea and air movement of military weapons, ammunition and supplies into El Salvador. It will take at least four days to deploy a naval task force to the Salvadoran coast. State believes the naval presence should not be withdrawn precipitously and might continue until the Nicaraguan election of February 25. The next two and a half months are a critical period not only for El Salvador but also Honduras. The deterrent, intelligence and symbolic dimensions of this task force may have a significant influence on events in the region.

The PCC assessed the potential impact of re-establishing a naval presence off the coast of El Salvador on the upcoming Nicaraguan election and concluded that we must carefully shape our public posture to avoid giving the Sandinistas a credible pretext to cancel the elections. We would likely announce the deployment and explain its mission. We would stress that the task force supports the Cristiani government at his request, that its focus is primarily intelligence collection against FMLN sea and air logistic traffic into El Salvador, that assisting the Salvador Navy with its logistics interdiction efforts has been a long-standing mission, and that these ships will take offensive action only if they are threatened.

The PCC discussed the possibility of deploying a carrier battle group to the area. This action would be a show of significant force which would require time to execute but could not kept on station for a lengthy period. It also would be more expensive. The PCC eliminated this alternative. The deployment of two or more airborne

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-4-

surveillance platforms to Honduras was evaluated. This option, which was tried unsuccessfully in the 1983/84 timeframe, did not address seaborne logistics operations, would become expensive when maintaining 24-hour coverage, and could be affected by weather conditions at the supporting airbase. The PCC also eliminated this alternative.

Over time the effectiveness of the naval presence, particularly as a deterrent force, will lose credibility unless there is an accompanying increase in the interdiction of sea and air shipments. Working within current political constraints on U.S. presence, the U.S. Government must assist the ESAF to make substantive improvements in its ability to interdict sea and air logistic traffic and to do so quickly. The only other timely alternative is for the U.S. military to assume this responsibility at the request of the GOES. The naval task force has a SAM capability and can easily intercept suspicious vessels. The PCC decided not to pursue the U.S. course of action at this time.

U.S. CONTINGENCY RESPONSE OPTIONS

The U.S. Government must be prepared to respond to scenarios involving follow-on Sandinista logistical support of the FMLN, the employment of SAMs against Salvadoran or U.S. aircraft, and the possibility of hostile, terrorist acts against U.S. citizens and property in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America. The PCC directed that a list of response options, formulated by a PCC working group and recommended for planning purposes, be developed in greater detail. The PCC gave the following guidance:

-- The U.S. response in these scenarios should be balanced, employing a mix of diplomatic/political and military measures, to counter the specific hostile action undertaken by the FMLN or the Sandinistas. In employing any of the options, we will want to weigh carefully the impact they would likely have on the Nicaraguan elections.

-- The political downside in our country of U.S. military force projection in Central America should be carefully factored in as well. Military options involving a direct U.S. role would trigger War Powers considerations and a major congressional and public debate. In brief, we would want to be clear that more severe U.S. military options could lead to escalation and, ultimately, entail the fullest commitment on our part to neutralize the FMLN and its Nicaraguan ally.

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-5-

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Department of State prepare a Presidential letter to selected European prime ministers and the Japanese prime minister in which ~~their~~ governments are encouraged to warn the GON that they will not provide additional economic assistance if Nicaragua continues to give military support to the FMLN.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That the Department of State prepare a statement for President Bush supporting the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That the JCS re-establish a naval presence as quickly as possible off the coast of El Salvador to increase intelligence collection in support of the Cristiani government and deter FMLN sea and air logistic resupply.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment: This document, which is classified Top Secret/Codeword, has been distributed separately.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Outline	Re: Ongoing Activities... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 079 - December 06, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on El Salvador vis SVTS, Keywords: El Salvador

Date Closed:	10/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	90012-016
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information