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2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

FOIA Number:
2005-1002-F

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90011
Folder ID Number: 90011-006

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	3	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions (3 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Note	John Gordon to Robert Gates Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	9/13/89	(b)(1)	S
01c. Note	Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Coversheet	NSC Profile Sheet Re: Background Material (1 pp.)	09/08/89	(b)(1)	
02b. Memo	John Gordon to Robert Gates Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Nuclear Testing Tuesday, September 12, 1989 at 4:00 p.m. (6 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Paper	Issue Paper: Nuclear Testing Talks [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (9 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	S
02d. Report	Re: Issue (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02e. Report	Trigger Levels [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02f. Report	Re: Two Tests (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02g. Report	Re: Positions (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Pinksheet Number: cap1444

OA/ID Number: 90011-006

Date Closed: 10/22/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02h. Report	Re: Proposal (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02i. Report	JCS Position on OSI at Existing Test Sites for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02j. Report	JSC Position for CORRTEx of Tests Below the Trigger Level [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02k. Memo	Memorandum for the Chairman of the Arms Control PCC Re: ACDA Position (2 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	S
02l. Memo	Memorandum for Arnold L. Kanter Re: DOE Position (2 pp.)	9/7/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Coversheet	NSC Profile Sheet (1 pp.)	09/08/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Distribution Record	Re: DC Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(3)	
03c. Distribution Record	Re: DC Meeting [redaction] (1 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(3)	
03d. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	S
03e. Paper	Issue Paper: Nuclear Testing Talks [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (9 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	S

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03h. Report	Re: Two Tests (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03i. Report	Re: Positions (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03j. Report	Re: Position (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03k. Report	JCS Position on OSI at Existing Test Sites for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03l. Report	JCS Position for CORRTX of Tests Below the Trigger Level [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03m. Memo	Memorandum for the Chairman of the Arms Control PCC Re: ACDA Position (2 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	S
03n. Memo	Memorandum for Arnold L. Kanter Re: DOE Position (2 pp.)	9/7/89	(b)(1)	S
03o. Draft Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04a. Covresheet	NSC Profile Sheet (1 pp.)	09/11/89	(b)(1)	S

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Memo	Don Mahley to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies' Committee Meeting on September 12 (2 pp.)	9/11/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 4 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC-053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Pinksheet Number: cap1444

OA/ID Number: 90011-006

Date Closed: 10/22/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921115
RECEIVED: 13 SEP 89 17

TO: GATES

FROM: KANTER
GORDON

DOC DATE: 12 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR TESTING
DC

VERIFICATION
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONSLUSIONS OF 12 SEP RE NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: GATES APPROVED

DUE DATE: 06 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF: 8921090 8921107

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC053

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GORDON

KANTER

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 10/22/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: GD

CLOSED BY: LF

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 8921115

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 89091317 FOR DECISION
X 89091514 GATES APPROVED

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAE NARA, Date 10/22/07

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National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21115

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG GA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>SPB</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>9/14 RC</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>LMS 7/13</u>	<u>R</u>
<u>Gordon</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>FPA</u>

89 SEP 13 P4: 09

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DC Mtg Conclusions

Info made

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21115

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 12, 1989

ACTION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting,
September 12, 1989

Attached (Tab I) is the summary of conclusions for the Deputies Committee meeting held September 12, 1989 on nuclear testing.

RECOMMENDATION

That you accept for the record the attached summary of conclusions.

Attachments

Tab I Summary of Conclusions

See files 2 p 2

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 10/22/09

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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01a. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions (3 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Date Closed:	10/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

COPY OF NOTE ATTACHED TO NUCLEAR
TESTING DECISION PACKAGE (#21119)
DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 1989

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 13, 1989

Mr. Gates,

Following the Deputies Committee meeting on nuclear testing, State Department withdrew its reservations regarding the minimum number of CORRTX measurements required if the Soviets do not test above the trigger level. Accordingly, I have deleted that entire section from the decision memorandum and changed the summary of conclusions from the DC meeting.

Instructions to the Delegation will reflect the current U.S. position for a minimum of two tests per year.

~~/S/~~
John Gordon

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2014-MR
MM 12/2/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

"trigger level" for CORTEX, seismic and OSI; and what should be the minimum number of CORTEX measurements the U.S. requires in the absence of Soviet tests above the trigger level. A future decision will be required on how to deal with tests in non-standard geometries. (S)

There was general consensus that the U.S. needed to agree to negotiations on a seismic component. Some were concerned with the next steps we would have to consider, but agreed that, on balance, it was necessary to now say "yes" to this proposal. (S)

There was considerable discussion on whether on-site inspection should be an element of our proposal. In the end, all but OSD believed OSI should be included as an element of the U.S. position. Turning to trigger levels, there was a discussion of the relative merits of 50, 75, and 100 kt for CORTEX/seismic levels. After discussion, OSD and ACDA supported 50 kt; all other agencies supported 75 kt. All who support OSI believe its trigger level should be between 35-50 kt. (S)

except for State
After discussion of the minimum number of CORTEX measurements the U.S. needs in the event the Soviets do not test above the trigger level, the DC rejected the PCC proposed change (x tests over a y year time period) and agreed to keep the original formulation of two per year. (S)

See Attached Note.
Ambassador Bartholomew also reviewed ongoing work on CFE and CW. No decisions were made on CFE. With respect to CW, all agencies concurred that we can reveal the aggregate of U.S. chemical agent stockpile in negotiations with the Soviets, making clear that the U.S. cannot confirm and does not endorse the stockpile data the Soviets would provide in exchange. The DC also agreed that before tabling this number with the Soviets, that the U.S. define the additional steps we must take to reduce our uncertainty in the Soviet stockpile. (S)

to recommend
It was agreed that:

- Seismic ~~will~~ be included as an element of a U.S. nuclear testing counterproposal. (S)
- White House decisions are needed on trigger level and OSI. (S)
- The U.S. ~~will~~ retain its current position calling for a minimum of two CORTEX measurements per year if the Soviets do not test above the trigger level. (S)
- OSD reserves on whether they will request an NSC meeting to make the necessary decisions. (S)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921090
RECEIVED: 08 SEP 89 15

TO: GATES

FROM: GORDON
KANTER

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR TESTING
USSR

ARMS CONTROL
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR DC MTG ON 12 SEP RE NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF: 8921107 8921115

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC053

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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~~White House Guidelines~~
~~E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006~~
~~By CAP NARA, Date 10/22/09~~

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: MC

CLOSED BY: AC

DOC 3 OF 4

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2014-MR
MM 6/21/2016

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8921090

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HUGHES
002
003 GATES
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 89090815 FOR SIGNATURE
X 89090909 SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
Z 89090810 ADD-ON / FOR INFORMATION
X 89091310 NOTED BY GATES

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 10/22/09

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 21090

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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DOCLOG R A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>✓</u>	<u>APB</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Philip Hughes	<u>5</u>		<u>I</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>LMB 7/12</u>	<u>R</u>

89 SEP 11 A 8:30

A = Action	<u>I = Information</u>	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DC Mtg Nuclear Testing
9/12, 4:00 pm

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Memo	John Gordon to Robert Gates Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Nuclear Testing Tuesday, September 12, 1989 at 4:00 p.m. (6 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	S

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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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02c. Paper	Issue Paper: Nuclear Testing Talks [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (9 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	S

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**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 3/18/2016

Date Closed: 10/22/2009	OA/ID Number: 90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2014-MR(501.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/21/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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September 8, 1989

Issue Paper

Nuclear Testing Talks

The Soviets have indicated their strong desire to complete the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). At the last round of Nuclear Testing Talks, they offered to accept, in principle, the central element of the US position -- the right to conduct CORTEX measurements on all Soviet nuclear tests above an agreed trigger level -- if we would also agree to include seismic and on-site inspection provisions as parallel rights.

The US has also stated a desire to complete the protocols, and has used the fact of this negotiation to good advantage with the Congress and in international fora. That said, we believe that as soon as the protocols are complete, the Soviets will renew their call for a comprehensive test ban. Moreover, once these treaties are ratified we will come under increasing pressure to take further steps to limit nuclear testing. Although the US is proceeding with these negotiations within the framework of the step-by-step approach, no further testing limitations that are in our national security interests have yet been identified.

If the Soviets will in fact agree to the types of measurements we require for effective verification in exchange for conditions of their own which are at least no more intrusive than those we demand, there is considerable potential for US embarrassment -- and associated domestic and international political costs -- if we refuse to negotiate on those reciprocal terms.

Whatever the decision on the Soviet proposal, there will still be considerable work to do before the protocols are completed. Thus we should not place ourselves in the position of working against a negotiating deadline.

Background

The US and the USSR have concluded four rounds of negotiations seeking effective verification procedures for the TTBT and the PNET. These treaties were signed in 1974 and 1976, but were never ratified. They call for verification by national technical means which, for underground nuclear explosions, translates to long-range seismic measurements.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Unacceptably large uncertainties in seismic measurements and the possibility of reducing the magnitude of the signals so that they would imply a lower yield, led to the US position that seismic is an inadequate method to verify compliance of the 150 kt yield limit of the TTBT. ^{1.4(e); 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(4)}

The US has developed a more accurate means to measure directly the yield of a nuclear explosion, called CORRTX. This process involves an electrical cable buried near the nuclear device. As the shock wave from an underground nuclear explosion propagates through the earth, the cable is crushed, shortening its apparent length. This length change is measured electronically as a function of time and results in a determination of the yield, in a standard testing configuration, to an accuracy of 1.3 or better.

The US entered negotiations on the basis that effective verification requires this type of direct yield measurement on every test with a declared yield above a specified threshold or trigger level. Both sides have agreed to CORRTX in the PNET for all explosions predicted to be greater than 50 kt. Until this past round, the Soviets have refused to agree to routine use of CORRTX on weapons tests (limited by the TTBT), but would have allowed two CORRTX measurements annually on tests over 100 kt to calibrate seismic stations.

During round four, the Soviets offered a "package," signaling that they will agree to the right for routine CORRTX measurements for all tests above an agreed trigger level (the US position is 50 kt; the Soviets indicate they prefer 75 kt) if we will agree to the right to in-country seismic measurements along with a provision for on-site inspection for tests above that same trigger level. (A number of important issues remain to be agreed on the configuration and test procedures for CORRTX.)

The US has rejected inclusion of seismic methods in the protocol. Our consistent position has been that seismic methods do not provide a sufficiently accurate yield measurement for verification, and, as an element of national technical means, are not appropriate for inclusion in the protocol. However, we have told the Soviets that if they agree to the US use of CORRTX on all tests above 50 kt, we would agree to any other method that is no more intrusive than CORRTX.

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The Soviets have taken the position that seismic is adequate for Soviet determination of US treaty compliance but have made no arguments which would demonstrate that seismic measurements provide sufficient accuracy. They have emphasized that regardless of US views on the value of seismic yield measurement, it remains the preferred Soviet verification method.

With respect to on-site inspection, there is no agreement among US agencies on whether it should be an element of the US verification position.

We must decide whether and how to deal with nuclear testing at the upcoming Ministerial and the next negotiating round. If we decide to make a counterproposal at the Ministerial, there remain numerous issues to be resolved in the negotiations themselves. The key issues and possible elements of a US counterproposal are:

- Should we agree to the right to conduct seismic measurements in the country of the testing party, provided we retain the right to conduct CORRTEx measurements on all tests above an agreed trigger level and provided acceptable, relevant procedures can be agreed for both CORRTEx and seismic?
- Should we seek OSI as an adjunct to our own verification concept, and if so, at what trigger level? Should we accept the Soviet proposal for inclusion of OSI if the verifying party does not conduct CORRTEx measurements?
- What should be the "trigger" level at which either CORRTEx or in-country seismic measurements are permitted?
- Should the US continue to insist on the right to conduct a minimum number of CORRTEx measurements even if the testing party declares no tests above the trigger level?

An additional decision will be needed on how to deal with tests above the trigger level in "non-standard" geometries, i.e. test configurations which may require special procedures for CORRTEx. A separate paper on this issue will follow.

Seismic

The Soviets can detect US nuclear explosions from seismic stations in Europe and Asia. The Soviets attempt to justify their seismic proposal with a claim to need to measure one of the seismic waves that does not propagate across oceans. However, this detailed seismic data is available to them (and to the US) through an international network of seismic stations, including

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stations in the US. Thus they already have access to the data they would measure for themselves under their proposal. Although the Soviets have stated that their verification methods require this information, some believe that in seeking the right to conduct in-country seismic measurements, the Soviets are laying the groundwork for verification of reduced yield thresholds and a comprehensive test ban. Some are concerned that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would appear to legitimize seismic yield determination as an acceptable verification technique for underground testing.

Some agencies believe that we should offer a counterproposal that accepts the Soviet use of seismic, provided we retain an unambiguous right to conduct CORRTEx measurements. They argue that since the Soviets would obtain no new data, this is a small price to pay for achieving our principal objective of effective verification of the TTBT. They also believe that the domestic and international pressures would be severe if we fail to accept seismic as an element of the protocol if our own requirements for effective verification are also satisfied.

Other agencies oppose including seismic as a verification technique in the TTBT, believing that the acceptance of seismic in the TTBT protocol gives credibility to a technique that is not sufficiently accurate for effective verification and is already available to both sides without the protocol. They point out that the Soviets have not yet agreed to essential implementation procedures for CORRTEx.

Decision:

Option 1. Offer a counterproposal to the Soviets stating that we will accept, in principle, the right to seismic measurements for yields above an agreed trigger level, provided the US retains the right to CORRTEx measurements of all tests above the trigger, and contingent upon agreement on effective CORRTEx implementation procedures. If this approach is selected we need decisions now on the trigger level, on-site inspection, and a minimum number of CORRTEx measurements to flesh out the counterproposal.
(Supported by JCS, State, DOE and ACDA.)

Option 2. Reserve on the Soviet proposal; offer a working group in the negotiations for the Soviets to explain why this is an effective and sufficiently accurate means to verify the treaty limits. (Supported by _____.)

Option 3. Reject the Soviet proposal; reaffirm our position that seismic is not a means to effectively verify the TTBT.
(Supported by _____.)

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Trigger Level and On-Site Inspection

We need to decide whether to adjust our trigger level for CORRTEx (and seismic if option 1 above is selected) in the TTBT to 75 or 100 kt or to keep it at 50 kt. We need also to decide whether to include on-site inspection at the test sites when CORRTEx is not used on a test, and if so, the OSI trigger level.

Trigger level. For determining compliance with the 150 kt limit of the TTBT, it is not necessary to make CORRTEx measurements of every test -- only those with relatively high yields which might appear through seismic monitoring to exceed 150 kt.

Early in the negotiations, the US set the trigger level at 75 kt in the TTBT and also sought a complementary right to choose any geographical area within a test site and to measure the two highest yield tests in that area annually. This was to protect against evasion by testing in areas of reduced energy coupling.

3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(4)

The US later dropped its position on the right to choose geographic areas, judging it too be too intrusive on the US program. At the same time, the US lowered the TTBT trigger level to 50 kt to help guard against potential decoupling scenarios, to avoid the need for more intrusive CORRTEx measurements in geographical areas of special concern, and to be consistent with the PNET. (One agency believes that if we raise the trigger level to above 50 kt we will need to revisit our position on the complementary right to test in specific geographical areas.) In PNET, the sides have agreed to the 50 kt trigger level and to OSI above a 35 kt trigger level. For the TTBT, the Soviets originally proposed a trigger level for CORRTEx of 100 kt and offered to lower it to 75 kt in their "package." They apparently have not rejected the US-proposed 50 kt level, and there are indications of flexibility.

On-site inspections. We do not have a US position on on-site inspection. All agree that, by itself, OSI would not provide for effective verification since OSI does not measure yield. Some agencies believe that we need OSI as an element of a complete verification regime to help deter cheating and to provide information to improve seismic yield estimates. Others oppose OSI because they do not believe it contributes to effective verification (in that there is no clear way to use data from OSI to improve seismic yield estimates) and it could undermine internal US support for the implementation of CORRTEx.

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The Soviets have now proposed OSI be used in conjunction with seismic measurements as part of their package. There are some indications that this may not be an essential part of their proposal (in one mid-round discussion, one Soviet delegate said they were willing to take OSI off the table; however in subsequent discussions, OSI was presented as an integral part of their package).

Those who believe on-site inspection should be an element of the US position point out that OSI is part of what is done on the test site for CORRTEx. Approximately 15 personnel would be on site for about two weeks to confirm geological information that the testing party provided with its notification of the planned test, obtain geological samples and confirm the absence (or presence) of cavities or large voids.

The Soviets would apparently use OSI in a similar manner for tests which they choose only to measure with remote seismic sensors. Thus the Soviets would have identical trigger levels for CORRTEx, seismic, and OSI.

Some of those in the US who support OSI prefer it at a lower level (35-50 kt) than for CORRTEx. Some also draw a relationship between OSI and the CORRTEx/seismic trigger level, believing we can achieve effective verification with a 75 kt trigger level or, in the case of one agency, a 100 kt trigger level if we have OSI, but must insist on 50 kt if we do not have OSI. There is a concern within agencies that support OSI that the Soviets could exceed the 150 kt yield limit by testing in unusual geometries or geologies in which the energy of the nuclear explosion would not efficiently "couple" into the earth so that remote seismic sensors would indicate a lower yield. They believe that at existing test sites OSI would help deter and limit Soviet opportunity to cheat and also help improve our seismic yield estimates.

Others who support OSI are concerned that the US will not always choose to exercise its right to conduct CORRTEx measurements on all tests over the trigger level because of the expense and energy involved. (The cost to CORRTEx a Soviet test is estimated at \$8.5-10 million.) They argue that OSI of these tests will ensure the Soviets do not change test conditions after the US decides not to instrument a particular test. Proponents of OSI believe that it is not credible to reject OSI at US test sites for those tests at which the Soviets choose to conduct seismic measurements and not CORRTEx -- it is far preferable to have a limited Soviet presence on-site before the test than an extended Soviet presence conducting electronic measurements during the test.

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1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1)

Opponents of OSI believe that there is little to be gained by OSI and much to be lost. They argue that at the current test sites there is little opportunity for the large decoupling scenarios advanced by OSI proponents. They cite USGS reports that decoupling appears to be infeasible at Semipalatinsk test sites because of the local geology, high water table and containment requirements. Thus Soviet evasion scenarios would likely be limited to the Novaya Zemlya test area. Here the decoupling would be at most a factor of two to three for tests up to 100 kt and somewhat less for higher yields. OSI opponents note that for high yield tests, covert long-term mining and spoil removal would be difficult, expensive, and be easily detectable through NTM and thus such activity would likely be discovered even without OSI. They believe that CORRTEx measurements with a trigger level of 50 kt provide for effective verification and a factor of three in the uncertainty and decoupling.

Opponents of OSI also argue that the added presence of Soviets at our Nevada test site exposes us to more intelligence activities for little or no gain. Establishing an OSI trigger level below that of CORRTEx (i.e. 35 kt) provides the Soviets with additional opportunities to gather data concerning the 35-50 kt spectrum of the US test program. Further, establishing an OSI alternative to CORRTEx (trigger level the same for OSI and CORRTEx) provides the Soviets with a right to be present at our test site, a right they would not have under the current US position if they opt not to CORRTEx a particular test. In this regard, they believe the absence of a right to OSI would be a benefit to our test program by allowing the US to change test conditions after the Soviets decide not to instrument a particular test. Opponents believe OSI does not reduce seismic uncertainties and point out that we have consistently argued that seismic is not accurate enough for effective verification. They also argue that there is no accepted way to use OSI information obtained about voids or unusual geologies to correct seismic NTM yield estimates. Thus we would have the same unacceptable uncertainties we now have with seismic NTM.

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Decision:

Option 1. On-site inspection trigger level at 35-50 kt; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at **50 kt.** (Supported by ACDA.)

Option 1a. On-site inspection trigger level at 35-50 kt; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at **75 kt.** (Supported by State; (ACDA's second alternative.)

Option 1b. On-site inspection trigger level at 35 kt; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at **100 kt.** (Supported by DOE.)

Option 2. No right to OSI; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at 50 kt. (Supported by JCS; OSD supports retention of the 50 kt trigger level and opposes OSI, but reserves on the issue of seismic.)

Option 3. CORRTEX trigger level at 50 kt; no seismic component; no OSI component. (Select this if Option 3 in the seismic section is chosen.)

CORRTEX at tests below the trigger level

There are some indications both in the intelligence and in statements by the Soviets at the negotiations that they may restrict their testing to the agreed trigger level (or at least to reduce significantly the number of tests above the trigger) in order to limit US presence at their test sites.

Our position in the negotiations has been that in the event the testing party did not declare tests above the trigger level, the verifying party would have the right to conduct CORRTEX measurements of the two highest yield tests during the year. This provision was designed to provide a degree of access and reciprocity for the US since we clearly plan to test up to 150 kt and to characterize the Soviet test site further, especially if concerns arise about areas of the test site which may naturally decouple the shock wave from the test explosion.

Some agencies believe that this is an unnecessary provision. They believe it has nothing to do with verification and that CORRTEX with an appropriate trigger level along with OSI will effectively verify the yield limit of the treaty. Moreover, if the Soviets restrict their testing to the trigger level in order to minimize US presence on their test site, we are the beneficiaries.

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Other agencies believe the US would derive no verification benefits from the TTBT/PNET verification improvements unless the US conducts at least some CORRTEx measurements at Soviet test sites. If the bias is less than the US now assumes (a circumstance certainly known to the Soviets) the Soviets could test above 150 kt with impunity. Therefore, not only would important yield uncertainties persist, but the importance of verifying compliance with the trigger level would very significantly increase, to the point where we might need to treat the trigger level as a test limit for compliance purposes.

Those who support the need for a minimum number of CORRTEx measurements believe we can and should change the US position from a minimum of two measurements per year -- which implies an open-ended commitment -- to a more limited right for a minimum number of measurements over a specified time period. The number of tests and the time period have not yet been determined by the Arms Control PCC, but the specific numbers need not influence the decision. (An example of this approach is "The US requires the right to conduct a minimum of five CORRTEx measurements on tests in the Soviet Union during the first four years of the treaty.") Such a formulation would provide the data proponents of this approach require (and at higher yields where the data would be most useful) and may be more acceptable to the Soviets by limiting this right to a fixed time-period.

Since the Soviets have offered two calibration shots per year and we have asked for CORRTEx on two shots if the trigger level is not exceeded, there may be potential for agreement.

Decision:

Option 1. Change the US position and not seek the right to conduct CORRTEx measurements if the testing party does not declare tests above the trigger level. (Supported by JCS and State.)

Option 2. Change the US position to seek the added right to conduct a minimum of x CORRTEx measurements in a y year period if the testing party does not declare at least x tests above the trigger level. (Supported by ACDA, DCI and OSD.)

Attachments

Agency Position Papers

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SEISMIC ISSUE

State supports Option One. State believes that acceptance of the Soviet package is the necessary step for securing the fundamental US goal throughout these negotiations -- effective verification of Soviet compliance through the right to CORRTEX all Soviet weapons tests above an agreed trigger. State agrees with other agencies that seismic measurement alone does not provide effective verification. However, continued rejection of the inclusion of seismic elements, based on this US view, ignores two central facts of the current decision. First, NOTHING in this proposal would obligate the US to rely upon or even conduct seismic measurements provided for in the Protocol. The Verifying Party and only the Verifying Party would have the right to choose hydro measurement, seismic and, should it be included in the Protocol, OSI. Second, whatever the US view on the effectiveness of seismic verification, the Soviets have continued to maintain that THEIR preferred verification method is seismic. The fact that the Soviets would receive no information that they do not obtain now from other sources is an important consideration in assessing the potential cost of seismic for the US. However, there seems little value in arguing against direct Soviet collection of this same information. The US is convinced that only data collected by US personnel using US equipment is validated and suitable for verification. It appears that the Soviets are seeking the same validation of their primary verification data.

In view of these considerations, STATE believes Option Two and Option Three offer no solution to the problem. Option Two would have the US conduct yet another discussion of the shortcomings of seismic methods. Past US explanations of this view, repeated by USDEL members at every opportunity, have not persuaded the Soviets to abandon their commitment to seismic. Equally sustained Soviet efforts have not shifted the US from its commitment to CORRTEX. There is no reason to believe that further discussions would have any more effect on Soviet views or even, at this point in the negotiations, that the Soviets would agree to such an inherently inconclusive discussion.

Option Three would reverse the US position on verification methods, namely that either side should have the right to employ any verification method provided it is no more intrusive than satellite hole CORRTEX. No agency opposed to seismic has argued that it would be so intrusive. More importantly, given the Soviets explicit linkage of hydro and seismic acceptance, Option Three is a prescription for US failure to secure its primary objective in these negotiations.

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Report	Trigger Levels [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Document Partially Declassified
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 By MM on 3/18/2016

Date Closed: 10/22/2009	OA/ID Number: 90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/21/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



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TRIGGER LEVELS

STATE supports Option One A. The US is negotiating a protocol intended to endure as long as our reliance upon nuclear weapons for our national security requires testing. STATE believes it is essential that the protocol include all the elements necessary to protect US interests now and in the foreseeable future. Belated recognition that necessary features were omitted will be of no help if future problems arise. STATE believes that those problems could be of two types: resource constraints and Soviet cheating.

It is impossible to be certain that, during the lengthy period of this treaty, the time will never come when the demands of our own continuing test program or some other resource constraints make it impossible for the US to CORRTX one or more eligible Soviet tests. In such a circumstance without OSI, the US would be deprived of any opportunity for on-site collection of information. Instead, the US would be forced to rely solely upon the very seismic methods which we have repeatedly and rightly termed insufficient for effective verification. Opponents of OSI would thus appear to argue that, should the US be unable to CORRTX a Soviet test, it is preferable for the US to have no directly collected, validated information than for the US to have some validated data. STATE believes instead that the US should have the choice of conducting OSI as an alternative - a choice the US and the US alone would make.

All agencies appear to agree that, at least in theory, the possibility of Soviet cheating through decoupling exists. They disagree over whether such cheating is constrained by geology and/or readily detectable by other, existing verification methods. Both sides' arguments rest on assumptions about Soviet geology and test practices. If the US already had a body of validated data on Soviet test sites, these issues could be resolved now. ^{1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1)}

The question is thus whether, in the absence of validated data, the US does not require a safeguard against the possibility that increased direct US experience at the Soviet test sites will prove that the theoretical problem of decoupling is, in fact, a real one. If we reject OSI now and then discover that decoupling possibilities exist, there is no reason to assume the Soviets would accomodate our newfound concerns by reopening the Protocol. STATE believes it is simple prudence to protect ourselves now against the possibility of decoupling.

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STATE supports 35 kt as the trigger level for on-site inspection activities. This will protect against significant Soviet cheating through decoupling in either cavities or geological "sweet spots" up to a factor of five. The trigger level for on-site activities would then be identical in the PNET and TTBT. Having the right to come on site at a lower trigger level than for undertaking CORRTEX measurements effectively protects against misuse of the CORRTEX trigger level by the Soviets, since the requirement to notify the US of all tests of 35 kt or higher would result in there being little probability of seeing a 70 kt or higher seismic yield for which there was no prior notification. If there are overriding concerns regarding Soviet presence at the test site, we could accept a higher trigger for OSI.

STATE supports a 75 kt trigger for CORRTEX and seismic. The original US position, communicated to the Soviets at the start of the talks, was the right to CORRTEX all explosions at declared test sites exceeding 75 kt. This trigger level was lowered to 50 kt in order to deal with the possibility of geological "sweet spots". With OSI assuring that the Soviets cannot take advantage of such geological conditions to exceed the 150 kt level, there is no longer a requirement to CORRTEX tests below 75 kt. The 75 kt level also reduces the potential Soviet presence at the Nevada Test Site.

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TWO TESTS BELOW THE CORRTEX TRIGGER

STATE supports Option One. STATE believes that our primary verification goal is achieved by the right to CORRTEX all Soviet weapons tests above an agreed trigger in combination with the right to conduct an effective OSI. The requirement to CORRTEX Soviet shots below the trigger level could impose an unnecessary burden on US CORRTEX resources. Any potential political problem, resulting from some perceived asymmetry in the number of tests measured on-site, would only occur if the Soviets unilaterally decide to abandon testing above the trigger level. STATE believes that should the Soviets so restrict their testing, an assumption that remains to be proven, the benefits to the US of a Soviet decision to forgo the research necessary for new, high yield nuclear weapons far outweigh the potential costs posed by any perceived asymmetry in the number of tests each side directly measures in a given year.

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OSD POSITIONS ON NTT ISSUES

TRIGGER LEVEL

(X) OSD supports maintaining the CORRTEx trigger at 50 kt. OSD opposes OSI and, therefore, does not take a position on an OSI trigger level. The OSD position on seismic is under active consideration; thus, OSD reserves on the question of a seismic trigger level.

(X) The decision to set the 50-kt trigger level for CORRTEx measurements reflected numerous systematic uncertainties regarding the relationship between the yields of Soviet tests and teleseismic signals (e.g., the "bias" factor), the potential for Soviet decoupling of high-yield tests, and the desire for consistency with the PNET. The 50-kt trigger makes it highly unlikely that the Soviets could opt not to notify the U.S. of a planned high-yield test, violate the 150-kt limit and still credibly argue that they had not exceeded the 50-kt notification requirement. The 50-kt trigger also minimizes the risk that the Soviets could declare a new test site (the issue of whether new test sites will be permitted has not been agreed with the Soviets), and exploit opportunities to test in low-coupling media for the purpose of violating the 150-kt limit.

(X) A case has not been made for returning to a 75-kt trigger. Rather, it has been incorrectly asserted that a U.S. decision to raise the CORRTEx trigger from 50 kt to 75 kt simply would be a return to our pre-NTT position. In fact, the pre-NTT position included an additional requirement for the right for the Verifying Party to specify a location at the other's test site where the Verifying Party could CORRTEx the two largest tests below 75 kt. If we were to move back to 75 kt as the trigger, we would need to consider returning to this requirement. The U.S. decision in 1988 to lower the TTBT trigger level from 75 kt to 50 kt reflected, in part, DoD and DoE desires to remove the intrusiveness associated with that additional right.

(X) Finally, since there is no agreement within the USG on whether the data collected through OSI could reduce the unacceptable uncertainties of teleseismic methods, there is no strong technical basis for asserting that a 35-kt OSI trigger somehow could remove all our uncertainties about seismic estimates for Soviet tests declared to be in the 35-75 kt range. In particular, OSI would give no information on the seismic bias. Such assertions would have to be proven before the U.S. could consider raising the CORRTEx trigger to 75 kt.

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OSI

(X) OSD strongly opposes including any OSI component in the TTBT protocol. The U.S. should reject any OSI separate from CORRETEX. OSI would represent, in fact, a second teleseismic component in the TTBT. There is interagency agreement that OSI does not provide the effective verification achieved through CORRETEX. Enshrining OSI in the TTBT as a credible alternative to CORRETEX could make it very difficult to obtain resources necessary to implement CORRETEX and, especially if the OSI trigger is set below CORRETEX, would give the Soviets greater access to our test site. The Soviets clearly indicated during the last round that they were prepared to take OSI "off the table" if the U.S. isn't interested.

(X) A detailed summary of the problems and inadequacies of OSI are found in the background and Tabs F (OSD position) and H of the interagency decision paper on OSI of June 20, 1989.

CORRETEX MEASUREMENTS BELOW THE 50-kt TRIGGER

(X) OSD supports retaining the U.S. position, which provides for the right to two CORRETEX tests per year if the testing party does not declare any tests above the trigger level of 50 kt.

(X) There are strong reasons for retaining the current U.S. position. We clearly have a requirement to continue testing up to the 150-kt limit. As a result, we can expect that the Soviets will be present at our test site after TTBT ratification. If the U.S. were to drop this provision, the Soviets could deny us access to their test site by simply not declaring any tests above 50 kt. (This does not mean, of course, that the Soviets necessarily would restrict their tests to below 50 kt, as some agencies incorrectly have suggested.) It would be politically difficult for the Administration to defend a TTBT protocol before the Senate if its verification provisions arguably would affect only the U.S.

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JCS POSITION ON SOVIET SEISMIC PROPOSAL

JCS Support Option 1 (with suggested modifications underlined): During the Ministerial, offer a counterproposal to the Soviets that we will accept the right to seismic measurements in the country of the testing party for yields above an agreed trigger level, provided the US retains the right to CORRTEx yield measurements of all tests above an agreed trigger; stipulate that the US would be willing to discuss the specifics of such an agreement during NTT Round V.

(NOTE: If this option is selected, we need decisions on the other elements of the US counterproposal including the trigger level, on-site inspection, minimum number of CORRTEx measurements and tests in non-standard geometries. We would also need to agree with the Soviets on a number of outstanding CORRTEx configuration issues.)

Existing US position concerning what verification method(s) the Soviets can use to verify US compliance with the TTBT is that "the Soviets can use any method that we (US) determine is no more intrusive than CORRTEx in a satellite hole." In light of this policy, it would be politically difficult to outright reject the Soviet seismic proposal. However, as do the Soviets, the US should demand technical justification for each component of the Soviet seismic proposal. The JCS believe the US should accept in principle a minimal seismic component for the TTBT provided the Soviets accept our existing CORRTEx requirements (including the 50kt trigger) and the necessary implementing provisions; the latter must include hydrodynamic measurement for non-standard tests, as well.

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02i. Report	JCS Position on OSI at Existing Test Sites for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

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By MM on 3/18/2016

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Date Closed:	10/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2014-MR(501.08)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/21/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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
JCS POSITION ON OSI AT EXISTING TEST SITES
FOR THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

JCS Support Option 4: CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at 50 kt. No right to OSI.

OSI beginning at the 35 kt level is unacceptable in the TTBT context because of the adverse impact on the US test program. While the number of tests in the 35 to 50 kt range has historically been small, that number is likely to increase, as is the sensitivity of the types of tests (i.e., effects and SDI).

Additionally, the proponents of OSI have failed to present a credible evasion scenario that an OSI provision could preclude. Further, if geologic formations exist or could be created clandestinely which might offer the opportunity to decouple a 150 kt test at factors above 2, and if the Soviets were willing to attempt such a test, there would be no impetus for the Soviets to announce that the test would breach the OSI threshold; the US would simply not be invited to be present on the test site.

3.3(b)(1), 1.4(c)



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2010-2014-MR
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02j. Report	JSC Position for CORRTEX of Tests Below the Trigger Level [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 3/18/2016

Date Closed:	10/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2014-MR(501.09)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/21/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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JCS POSITION FOR CORRTEX OF TESTS
BELOW THE TRIGGER LEVEL

JCS Support Option 1: Do not press for the right to conduct CORRTEX measurements if the testing party does not plan to test above the trigger level.

The decision to use 50kt as the trigger for implementing CORRTEX was based upon the belief that technically this level would ensure the Soviets could not violate the treaty simply by not notifying the US of a test. NTM would provide sufficient information to alert decisionmakers to a violation of the 50kt trigger. Providing the Verifying Party the right to measure the yields of "two nuclear weapon tests whose yields are the highest declared by the Testing Party that year" has nothing to do with verifying the 150kt threshold of the TTBT. ^{1.4(c)}

^{1.4(c)} the purpose of this protocol is to ensure Soviet compliance of the 150kt provision of the TTBT.

^{1.4(c)}

Further, such a provision will be ineffective in calibrating the seismic network for the entire test site over the range of yields of concern. Statements to the contrary, that the "two below" provision will calibrate the seismic network, could result in further claims that the United States has the seismic capability to verify reduced thresholds and thereby support calls for an intermediate nuclear testing limitation and possibly a CTB.

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02k. Memo	Memorandum for the Chairman of the Arms Control PCC Re: ACDA Position (2 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Date Closed:	10/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

MEMORANDUM FOR Arnold L. Kanter

7 September 1989

Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

SUBJECT: DOE Position on Nuclear Testing

I. The CORRTEx/Seismic "Package"

The Department of Energy supports Option 1: that the U.S. agree in principle to a package containing the rights to routine use of CORRTEx, on-site inspection and in-country seismic yield measurements. U.S. acceptance should be conditional upon U.S.-Soviet agreement on implementation procedures, including those procedures necessary to verify tests in non-standard geometries.

We have told the Soviets that, if they meet our CORRTEx requirement, we will agree to any other verification method that is no more intrusive than CORRTEx. DOE believes that seismic and on-site inspection components can meet our criterion.

There are no inherent technical or security reasons to oppose a seismic component. Further, the argument that acceptance of seismic puts the U.S. on a "slippery slope" toward a low threshold test ban treaty verifiable by seismic means misses the mark. It is not necessary to dilute the verification of the TTBT in order to resist further constraints on nuclear testing. We should resist further testing constraints on the strong grounds of national security. Failure to separate peripheral arguments from central ones could result in a significant loss of credibility.

DOE notes that even with a "package agreement," we are not at the end of what has already been a prolonged negotiating process. Complex and important technical details remain to be worked out. A decision now to develop a U.S. package will help define the scope of the remaining work on the TTBT verification protocol, thereby allowing negotiators to focus their energy on technical details at what may well be a critical time. This will enable us better to complete the negotiations in a methodical, technically competent, and timely manner.

II. Trigger Levels and On-Site Inspection

The Department of Energy recommends a 100kt trigger level for CORRTEx/seismic, with rights to conduct a US-defined OSI on all shots notified to exceed 35kt. DOE recognizes that a 100kt trigger level for CORRTEx/seismic is not currently among the options listed in the Issue Paper, but believes that such an option represents a reasonable balance between verification requirements and national security concerns.

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- o It provides effective verification of the 150kt limit under both routine testing practices and credible evasion scenarios, including those involving "sweetspots."
- o A 100kt trigger for hydrodynamic measurement would reduce intrusive Soviet access to sensitive U.S. tests in the 50 to 100kt range. At the same time, a 35kt OSI trigger would afford U.S. access to Soviet sites to which we might otherwise be denied access.
- o It reduces the cost of verification but not its effectiveness, and increases the operational flexibility of the U.S. test program.

III. CORRTEx on Tests Below CORRTEx Trigger Level

The Department of Energy takes a neutral position on the provision for the right to CORRTEx some number of shots below the trigger level in the event that fewer than two are announced above the trigger level. This position is contingent upon the designation of NTS as a single test site.

The Department notes that the provision is not required for effective verification, and that implementation of the provision as now written can be manipulated by the notification policy of the tester.

IV. TESTS IN NON-STANDARD GEOMETRIES

The Department of Energy judges a veto over tests in non-standard geometries to be an unacceptable restriction on the U.S. nuclear test program for the following reasons:

- o Occasional non-standard tests with yields subject to hydrodynamic measurement may be critical to future weapon system development and survivability.
- o A Soviet veto over any tests below the 150kt threshold would impose a restriction on the U.S. testing program not intended by the TTBT.
- o An operationally acceptable alternative to the veto provision (the normalization approach) is available that provides effective verification for tests in non-standard geometries.

Victor E. Alessi

Victor E. Alessi
Director
Office of Arms Control
Defense Programs

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921090
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TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 09 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR TESTING
USSR

ARMS CONTROL
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF DC MTG ON 12 SEP RE NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 09 FEB 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

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Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
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03b. Distribution Record	Re: DC Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(3)	

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File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

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03c. Distribution Record	Re: DC Meeting [redaction] (1 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Date Closed:	10/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR:

September 9, 1989

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Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security
Affairs

DR. ALAN BROMLEY
Director
Office of Science and
Technology Policy

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR EDWARD ROWNEY
Special Advisor to the
President and Secretary of
State on Arms Control
Matters
Department of State

MR. WILLIAM V. VITALE
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

MR. FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and Budget

AMBASSADOR PAUL ROBINSON
Chief Negotiator,
Nuclear Testing Talks
Arms Control and Disarmament
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
MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN ANTHONY MANESS
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Tuesday,
September 12, 1989, 4:00 PM - 5:00 PM (S)

There will be a meeting of the Deputies Committee on Tuesday,
September 12, 1989, 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM, in the Situation Room to
discuss nuclear testing. An interagency-prepared paper that
reviews needed decisions is attached. (S)

Attendance is limited to principal plus one. In addition, the
U.S. Nuclear Testing Negotiator is invited to attend. (U)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Nuclear Testing Issue Paper (S)

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 1/23/2014

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03e. Paper	Issue Paper: Nuclear Testing Talks [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (9 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

**Document Partially Declassified
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By MM on 3/18/2016

Date Closed: 10/22/2009	OA/ID Number: 90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2014-MR(501.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/21/2014

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September 8, 1989

Issue Paper

Nuclear Testing Talks

The Soviets have indicated their strong desire to complete the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). At the last round of Nuclear Testing Talks, they offered to accept, in principle, the central element of the US position -- the right to conduct CORTEX measurements on all Soviet nuclear tests above an agreed trigger level -- if we would also agree to include seismic and on-site inspection provisions as parallel rights.

The US has also stated a desire to complete the protocols, and has used the fact of this negotiation to good advantage with the Congress and in international fora. That said, we believe that as soon as the protocols are complete, the Soviets will renew their call for a comprehensive test ban. Moreover, once these treaties are ratified we will come under increasing pressure to take further steps to limit nuclear testing. Although the US is proceeding with these negotiations within the framework of the step-by-step approach, no further testing limitations that are in our national security interests have yet been identified.

If the Soviets will in fact agree to the types of measurements we require for effective verification in exchange for conditions of their own which are at least no more intrusive than those we demand, there is considerable potential for US embarrassment -- and associated domestic and international political costs -- if we refuse to negotiate on those reciprocal terms.

Whatever the decision on the Soviet proposal, there will still be considerable work to do before the protocols are completed. Thus we should not place ourselves in the position of working against a negotiating deadline.


Background

The US and the USSR have concluded four rounds of negotiations seeking effective verification procedures for the TTBT and the PNET. These treaties were signed in 1974 and 1976, but were never ratified. They call for verification by national technical means which, for underground nuclear explosions, translates to long-range seismic measurements.

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Unacceptably large uncertainties in seismic measurements and the possibility of reducing the magnitude of the signals so that they would imply a lower yield, led to the US position that seismic is an inadequate method to verify compliance of the 150 kt yield limit of the TTBT. ^{1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(4)}



The US has developed a more accurate means to measure directly the yield of a nuclear explosion, called CORRTX. This process involves an electrical cable buried near the nuclear device. As the shock wave from an underground nuclear explosion propagates through the earth, the cable is crushed, shortening its apparent length. This length change is measured electronically as a function of time and results in a determination of the yield, in a standard testing configuration, to an accuracy of 1.3 or better.

The US entered negotiations on the basis that effective verification requires this type of direct yield measurement on every test with a declared yield above a specified threshold or trigger level. Both sides have agreed to CORRTX in the PNET for all explosions predicted to be greater than 50 kt. Until this past round, the Soviets have refused to agree to routine use of CORRTX on weapons tests (limited by the TTBT), but would have allowed two CORRTX measurements annually on tests over 100 kt to calibrate seismic stations.

During round four, the Soviets offered a "package," signaling that they will agree to the right for routine CORRTX measurements for all tests above an agreed trigger level (the US position is 50 kt; the Soviets indicate they prefer 75 kt) if we will agree to the right to in-country seismic measurements along with a provision for on-site inspection for tests above that same trigger level. (A number of important issues remain to be agreed on the configuration and test procedures for CORRTX.)

The US has rejected inclusion of seismic methods in the protocol. Our consistent position has been that seismic methods do not provide a sufficiently accurate yield measurement for verification, and, as an element of national technical means, are not appropriate for inclusion in the protocol. However, we have told the Soviets that if they agree to the US use of CORRTX on all tests above 50 kt, we would agree to any other method that is no more intrusive than CORRTX.

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The Soviets have taken the position that seismic is adequate for Soviet determination of US treaty compliance but have made no arguments which would demonstrate that seismic measurements provide sufficient accuracy. They have emphasized that regardless of US views on the value of seismic yield measurement, it remains the preferred Soviet verification method.

With respect to on-site inspection, there is no agreement among US agencies on whether it should be an element of the US verification position.

We must decide whether and how to deal with nuclear testing at the upcoming Ministerial and the next negotiating round. If we decide to make a counterproposal at the Ministerial, there remain numerous issues to be resolved in the negotiations themselves. The key issues and possible elements of a US counterproposal are:

- Should we agree to the right to conduct seismic measurements in the country of the testing party, provided we retain the right to conduct CORRTEx measurements on all tests above an agreed trigger level and provided acceptable, relevant procedures can be agreed for both CORRTEx and seismic?
- Should we seek OSI as an adjunct to our own verification concept, and if so, at what trigger level? Should we accept the Soviet proposal for inclusion of OSI if the verifying party does not conduct CORRTEx measurements?
- What should be the "trigger" level at which either CORRTEx or in-country seismic measurements are permitted?
- Should the US continue to insist on the right to conduct a minimum number of CORRTEx measurements even if the testing party declares no tests above the trigger level?

An additional decision will be needed on how to deal with tests above the trigger level in "non-standard" geometries, i.e. test configurations which may require special procedures for CORRTEx. A separate paper on this issue will follow.

Seismic

The Soviets can detect US nuclear explosions from seismic stations in Europe and Asia. The Soviets attempt to justify their seismic proposal with a claim to need to measure one of the seismic waves that does not propagate across oceans. However, this detailed seismic data is available to them (and to the US) through an international network of seismic stations, including

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stations in the US. Thus they already have access to the data they would measure for themselves under their proposal. Although the Soviets have stated that their verification methods require this information, some believe that in seeking the right to conduct in-country seismic measurements, the Soviets are laying the groundwork for verification of reduced yield thresholds and a comprehensive test ban. Some are concerned that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would appear to legitimize seismic yield determination as an acceptable verification technique for underground testing.

Some agencies believe that we should offer a counterproposal that accepts the Soviet use of seismic, provided we retain an unambiguous right to conduct CORRTEx measurements. They argue that since the Soviets would obtain no new data, this is a small price to pay for achieving our principal objective of effective verification of the TTBT. They also believe that the domestic and international pressures would be severe if we fail to accept seismic as an element of the protocol if our own requirements for effective verification are also satisfied.

Other agencies oppose including seismic as a verification technique in the TTBT, believing that the acceptance of seismic in the TTBT protocol gives credibility to a technique that is not sufficiently accurate for effective verification and is already available to both sides without the protocol. They point out that the Soviets have not yet agreed to essential implementation procedures for CORRTEx.

Decision:

Option 1. Offer a counterproposal to the Soviets stating that we will accept, in principle, the right to seismic measurements for yields above an agreed trigger level, provided the US retains the right to CORRTEx measurements of all tests above the trigger, and contingent upon agreement on effective CORRTEx implementation procedures. If this approach is selected we need decisions now on the trigger level, on-site inspection, and a minimum number of CORRTEx measurements to flesh out the counterproposal.
(Supported by JCS, State, DOE and ACDA.)

Option 2. Reserve on the Soviet proposal; offer a working group in the negotiations for the Soviets to explain why this is an effective and sufficiently accurate means to verify the treaty limits. (Supported by _____.)

Option 3. Reject the Soviet proposal; reaffirm our position that seismic is not a means to effectively verify the TTBT.
(Supported by _____.)

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Trigger Level and On-Site Inspection

We need to decide whether to adjust our trigger level for CORRTEx (and seismic if option 1 above is selected) in the TTBT to 75 or 100 kt or to keep it at 50 kt. We need also to decide whether to include on-site inspection at the test sites when CORRTEx is not used on a test, and if so, the OSI trigger level.

Trigger level. For determining compliance with the 150 kt limit of the TTBT, it is not necessary to make CORRTEx measurements of every test -- only those with relatively high yields which might appear through seismic monitoring to exceed 150 kt.

Early in the negotiations, the US set the trigger level at 75 kt in the TTBT and also sought a complementary right to choose any geographical area within a test site and to measure the two highest yield tests in that area annually. This was to protect against evasion by testing in areas of reduced energy coupling.

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(4)

The US later dropped its position on the right to choose geographic areas, judging it too be too intrusive on the US program. At the same time, the US lowered the TTBT trigger level to 50 kt to help guard against potential decoupling scenarios, to avoid the need for more intrusive CORRTEx measurements in geographical areas of special concern, and to be consistent with the PNET. (One agency believes that if we raise the trigger level to above 50 kt we will need to revisit our position on the complementary right to test in specific geographical areas.) In PNET, the sides have agreed to the 50 kt trigger level and to OSI above a 35 kt trigger level. For the TTBT, the Soviets originally proposed a trigger level for CORRTEx of 100 kt and offered to lower it to 75 kt in their "package." They apparently have not rejected the US-proposed 50 kt level, and there are indications of flexibility.

On-site inspections. We do not have a US position on on-site inspection. All agree that, by itself, OSI would not provide for effective verification since OSI does not measure yield. Some agencies believe that we need OSI as an element of a complete verification regime to help deter cheating and to provide information to improve seismic yield estimates. Others oppose OSI because they do not believe it contributes to effective verification (in that there is no clear way to use data from OSI to improve seismic yield estimates) and it could undermine internal US support for the implementation of CORRTEx.

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The Soviets have now proposed OSI be used in conjunction with seismic measurements as part of their package. There are some indications that this may not be an essential part of their proposal (in one mid-round discussion, one Soviet delegate said they were willing to take OSI off the table; however in subsequent discussions, OSI was presented as an integral part of their package).

Those who believe on-site inspection should be an element of the US position point out that OSI is part of what is done on the test site for CORRTEX. Approximately 15 personnel would be on site for about two weeks to confirm geological information that the testing party provided with its notification of the planned test, obtain geological samples and confirm the absence (or presence) of cavities or large voids.

The Soviets would apparently use OSI in a similar manner for tests which they choose only to measure with remote seismic sensors. Thus the Soviets would have identical trigger levels for CORRTEX, seismic, and OSI.


Some of those in the US who support OSI prefer it at a lower level (35-50 kt) than for CORRTEX. Some also draw a relationship between OSI and the CORRTEX/seismic trigger level, believing we can achieve effective verification with a 75 kt trigger level or, in the case of one agency, a 100 kt trigger level if we have OSI, but must insist on 50 kt if we do not have OSI. There is a concern within agencies that support OSI that the Soviets could exceed the 150 kt yield limit by testing in unusual geometries or geologies in which the energy of the nuclear explosion would not efficiently "couple" into the earth so that remote seismic sensors would indicate a lower yield. They believe that at existing test sites OSI would help deter and limit Soviet opportunity to cheat and also help improve our seismic yield estimates.

Others who support OSI are concerned that the US will not always choose to exercise its right to conduct CORRTEX measurements on all tests over the trigger level because of the expense and energy involved. (The cost to CORRTEX a Soviet test is estimated at \$8.5-10 million.) They argue that OSI of these tests will ensure the Soviets do not change test conditions after the US decides not to instrument a particular test. Proponents of OSI believe that it is not credible to reject OSI at US test sites for those tests at which the Soviets choose to conduct seismic measurements and not CORRTEX -- it is far preferable to have a limited Soviet presence on-site before the test than an extended Soviet presence conducting electronic measurements during the test.

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14(c); 33(6)(1)



Opponents of OSI believe that there is little to be gained by OSI and much to be lost. They argue that at the current test sites there is little opportunity for the large decoupling scenarios advanced by OSI proponents. They cite USGS reports that decoupling appears to be infeasible at Semipalatinsk test sites because of the local geology, high water table and containment requirements. Thus Soviet evasion scenarios would likely be limited to the Novaya Zemlya test area. Here the decoupling would be at most a factor of two to three for tests up to 100 kt and somewhat less for higher yields. OSI opponents note that for high yield tests, covert long-term mining and spoil removal would be difficult, expensive, and be easily detectable through NTM and thus such activity would likely be discovered even without OSI. They believe that CORRTX measurements with a trigger level of 50 kt provide for effective verification and a factor of three in the uncertainty and decoupling.

Opponents of OSI also argue that the added presence of Soviets at our Nevada test site exposes us to more intelligence activities for little or no gain. Establishing an OSI trigger level below that of CORRTX (i.e. 35 kt) provides the Soviets with additional opportunities to gather data concerning the 35-50 kt spectrum of the US test program. Further, establishing an OSI alternative to CORRTX (trigger level the same for OSI and CORRTX) provides the Soviets with a right to be present at our test site, a right they would not have under the current US position if they opt not to CORRTX a particular test. In this regard, they believe the absence of a right to OSI would be a benefit to our test program by allowing the US to change test conditions after the Soviets decide not to instrument a particular test. Opponents believe OSI does not reduce seismic uncertainties and point out that we have consistently argued that seismic is not accurate enough for effective verification. They also argue that there is no accepted way to use OSI information obtained about voids or unusual geologies to correct seismic NTM yield estimates. Thus we would have the same unacceptable uncertainties we now have with seismic NTM.

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Decision:

Option 1. On-site inspection trigger level at 35-50 kt; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at **50 kt.** (Supported by ACDA.)

Option 1a. On-site inspection trigger level at 35-50 kt; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at **75 kt.** (Supported by State; [ACDA's second alternative.]

Option 1b. On-site inspection trigger level at 35 kt; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at **100 kt.** (Supported by DOE.)

Option 2. No right to OSI; CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at 50 kt. (Supported by JCS; OSD supports retention of the 50 kt trigger level and opposes OSI, but reserves on the issue of seismic.)

Option 3. CORRTEX trigger level at 50 kt; no seismic component; no OSI component. (Select this if Option 3 in the seismic section is chosen.)

CORRTEX at tests below the trigger level

There are some indications both in the intelligence and in statements by the Soviets at the negotiations that they may restrict their testing to the agreed trigger level (or at least to reduce significantly the number of tests above the trigger) in order to limit US presence at their test sites.

Our position in the negotiations has been that in the event the testing party did not declare tests above the trigger level, the verifying party would have the right to conduct CORRTEX measurements of the two highest yield tests during the year. This provision was designed to provide a degree of access and reciprocity for the US since we clearly plan to test up to 150 kt and to characterize the Soviet test site further, especially if concerns arise about areas of the test site which may naturally decouple the shock wave from the test explosion.

Some agencies believe that this is an unnecessary provision. They believe it has nothing to do with verification and that CORRTEX with an appropriate trigger level along with OSI will effectively verify the yield limit of the treaty. Moreover, if the Soviets restrict their testing to the trigger level in order to minimize US presence on their test site, we are the beneficiaries.

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Other agencies believe the US would derive no verification benefits from the TTBT/PNET verification improvements unless the US conducts at least some CORRTEX measurements at Soviet test sites. If the bias is less than the US now assumes (a circumstance certainly known to the Soviets) the Soviets could test above 150 kt with impunity. Therefore, not only would important yield uncertainties persist, but the importance of verifying compliance with the trigger level would very significantly increase, to the point where we might need to treat the trigger level as a test limit for compliance purposes.

Those who support the need for a minimum number of CORRTEX measurements believe we can and should change the US position from a minimum of two measurements per year -- which implies an open-ended commitment -- to a more limited right for a minimum number of measurements over a specified time period. The number of tests and the time period have not yet been determined by the Arms Control PCC, but the specific numbers need not influence the decision. (An example of this approach is "The US requires the right to conduct a minimum of five CORRTEX measurements on tests in the Soviet Union during the first four years of the treaty.") Such a formulation would provide the data proponents of this approach require (and at higher yields where the data would be most useful) and may be more acceptable to the Soviets by limiting this right to a fixed time-period.

Since the Soviets have offered two calibration shots per year and we have asked for CORRTEX on two shots if the trigger level is not exceeded, there may be potential for agreement.

Decision:

Option 1. Change the US position and not seek the right to conduct CORRTEX measurements if the testing party does not declare tests above the trigger level. (Supported by JCS and State.)

Option 2. Change the US position to seek the added right to conduct a minimum of x CORRTEX measurements in a y year period if the testing party does not declare at least x tests above the trigger level. (Supported by ACDA, DCI and OSD.)

Attachments

Agency Position Papers

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SEISMIC ISSUE

State supports Option One. State believes that acceptance of the Soviet package is the necessary step for securing the fundamental US goal throughout these negotiations -- effective verification of Soviet compliance through the right to CORRTEx all Soviet weapons tests above an agreed trigger. State agrees with other agencies that seismic measurement alone does not provide effective verification. However, continued rejection of the inclusion of seismic elements, based on this US view, ignores two central facts of the current decision. First, NOTHING in this proposal would obligate the US to rely upon or even conduct seismic measurements provided for in the Protocol. The Verifying Party and only the Verifying Party would have the right to choose hydro measurement, seismic and, should it be included in the Protocol, OSI. Second, whatever the US view on the effectiveness of seismic verification, the Soviets have continued to maintain that THEIR preferred verification method is seismic. The fact that the Soviets would receive no information that they do not obtain now from other sources is an important consideration in assessing the potential cost of seismic for the US. However, there seems little value in arguing against direct Soviet collection of this same information. The US is convinced that only data collected by US personnel using US equipment is validated and suitable for verification. It appears that the Soviets are seeking the same validation of their primary verification data.

In view of these considerations, STATE believes Option Two and Option Three offer no solution to the problem. Option Two would have the US conduct yet another discussion of the shortcomings of seismic methods. Past US explanations of this view, repeated by USDEL members at every opportunity, have not persuaded the Soviets to abandon their commitment to seismic. Equally sustained Soviet efforts have not shifted the US from its commitment to CORRTEx. There is no reason to believe that further discussions would have any more effect on Soviet views or even, at this point in the negotiations, that the Soviets would agree to such an inherently inconclusive discussion.

Option Three would reverse the US position on verification methods, namely that either side should have the right to employ any verification method provided it is no more intrusive than satellite hole CORRTEx. No agency opposed to seismic has argued that it would be so intrusive. More importantly, given the Soviets explicit linkage of hydro and seismic acceptance, Option Three is a prescription for US failure to secure its primary objective in these negotiations.

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03g. Report	Trigger Levels [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

Document Partially Declassified
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 By MM on 3/18/2016

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Date Closed: 10/22/2009	OA/ID Number: 90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2014-MR(501.04)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/21/2014

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
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



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TRIGGER LEVELS

STATE supports Option One A. The US is negotiating a protocol intended to endure as long as our reliance upon nuclear weapons for our national security requires testing. STATE believes it is essential that the protocol include all the elements necessary to protect US interests now and in the foreseeable future. Belated recognition that necessary features were omitted will be of no help if future problems arise. STATE believes that those problems could be of two types: resource constraints and Soviet cheating.

It is impossible to be certain that, during the lengthy period of this treaty, the time will never come when the demands of our own continuing test program or some other resource constraints make it impossible for the US to CORRTX one or more eligible Soviet tests. In such a circumstance without OSI, the US would be deprived of any opportunity for on-site collection of information. Instead, the US would be forced to rely solely upon the very seismic methods which we have repeatedly and rightly termed insufficient for effective verification. Opponents of OSI would thus appear to argue that, should the US be unable to CORRTX a Soviet test, it is preferable for the US to have no directly collected, validated information than for the US to have some validated data. STATE believes instead that the US should have the choice of conducting OSI as an alternative - a choice the US and the US alone would make.

All agencies appear to agree that, at least in theory, the possibility of Soviet cheating through decoupling exists. They disagree over whether such cheating is constrained by geology and/or readily detectable by other, existing verification methods. Both sides' arguments rest on assumptions about Soviet geology and test practices. If the US already had a body of validated data on Soviet test sites, these issues could be resolved now. (c) 3.3(b)(1)

The question is thus whether, in the absence of validated data, the US does not require a safeguard against the possibility that increased direct US experience at the Soviet test sites will prove that the theoretical problem of decoupling is, in fact, a real one. If we reject OSI now and then discover that decoupling possibilities exist, there is no reason to assume the Soviets would accommodate our newfound concerns by reopening the Protocol. STATE believes it is simple prudence to protect ourselves now against the possibility of decoupling.

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STATE supports 35 kt as the trigger level for on-site inspection activities. This will protect against significant Soviet cheating through decoupling in either cavities or geological "sweet spots" up to a factor of five. The trigger level for on-site activities would then be identical in the PNET and TTBT. Having the right to come on site at a lower trigger level than for undertaking CORRTEx measurements effectively protects against misuse of the CORRTEx trigger level by the Soviets, since the requirement to notify the US of all tests of 35 kt or higher would result in there being little probability of seeing a 70 kt or higher seismic yield for which there was no prior notification. If there are overriding concerns regarding Soviet presence at the test site, we could accept a higher trigger for OSI.

STATE supports a 75 kt trigger for CORRTEx and seismic. The original US position, communicated to the Soviets at the start of the talks, was the right to CORRTEx all explosions at declared test sites exceeding 75 kt. This trigger level was lowered to 50 kt in order to deal with the possibility of geological "sweet spots". With OSI assuring that the Soviets cannot take advantage of such geological conditions to exceed the 150 kt level, there is no longer a requirement to CORRTEx tests below 75 kt. The 75 kt level also reduces the potential Soviet presence at the Nevada Test Site.

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TWO TESTS BELOW THE CORRTEX TRIGGER

STATE supports Option One. STATE believes that our primary verification goal is achieved by the right to CORRTEX all Soviet weapons tests above an agreed trigger in combination with the right to conduct an effective OSI. The requirement to CORRTEX Soviet shots below the trigger level could impose an unnecessary burden on US CORRTEX resources. Any potential political problem, resulting from some perceived asymmetry in the number of tests measured on-site, would only occur if the Soviets unilaterally decide to abandon testing above the trigger level. STATE believes that should the Soviets so restrict their testing, an assumption that remains to be proven, the benefits to the US of a Soviet decision to forgo the research necessary for new, high yield nuclear weapons far outweigh the potential costs posed by any perceived asymmetry in the number of tests each side directly measures in a given year.

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OSD POSITIONS ON NTT ISSUES

TRIGGER LEVEL

(S) OSD supports maintaining the CORRTEx trigger at 50 kt. OSD opposes OSI and, therefore, does not take a position on an OSI trigger level. The OSD position on seismic is under active consideration; thus, OSD reserves on the question of a seismic trigger level.

(S) The decision to set the 50-kt trigger level for CORRTEx measurements reflected numerous systematic uncertainties regarding the relationship between the yields of Soviet tests and teleseismic signals (e.g., the "bias" factor), the potential for Soviet decoupling of high-yield tests, and the desire for consistency with the PNET. The 50-kt trigger makes it highly unlikely that the Soviets could opt not to notify the U.S. of a planned high-yield test, violate the 150-kt limit and still credibly argue that they had not exceeded the 50-kt notification requirement. The 50-kt trigger also minimizes the risk that the Soviets could declare a new test site (the issue of whether new tests sites will be permitted has not been agreed with the Soviets), and exploit opportunities to test in low-coupling media for the purpose of violating the 150-kt limit.

(S) A case has not been made for returning to a 75-kt trigger. Rather, it has been incorrectly asserted that a U.S. decision to raise the CORRTEx trigger from 50 kt to 75 kt simply would be a return to our pre-NTT position. In fact, the pre-NTT position included an additional requirement for the right for the Verifying Party to specify a location at the other's test site where the Verifying Party could CORRTEx the two largest tests below 75 kt. If we were to move back to 75 kt as the trigger, we would need to consider returning to this requirement. The U.S. decision in 1988 to lower the TTBT trigger level from 75 kt to 50 kt reflected, in part, DoD and DoE desires to remove the intrusiveness associated with that additional right.

(S) Finally, since there is no agreement within the USG on whether the data collected through OSI could reduce the unacceptable uncertainties of teleseismic methods, there is no strong technical basis for asserting that a 35-kt OSI trigger somehow could remove all our uncertainties about seismic estimates for Soviet tests declared to be in the 35-75 kt range. In particular, OSI would give no information on the seismic bias. Such assertions would have to be proven before the U.S. could consider raising the CORRTEx trigger to 75 kt.

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OSI

(X) OSD strongly opposes including any OSI component in the TTBT protocol. The U.S. should reject any OSI separate from CORRTEX. OSI would represent, in fact, a second teleseismic component in the TTBT. There is interagency agreement that OSI does not provide the effective verification achieved through CORRTEX. Enshrining OSI in the TTBT as a credible alternative to CORRTEX could make it very difficult to obtain resources necessary to implement CORRTEX and, especially if the OSI trigger is set below CORRTEX, would give the Soviets greater access to our test site. The Soviets clearly indicated during the last round that they were prepared to take OSI "off the table" if the U.S. isn't interested.

(X) A detailed summary of the problems and inadequacies of OSI are found in the background and Tabs F (OSD position) and H of the interagency decision paper on OSI of June 20, 1989.

CORRTEX MEASUREMENTS BELOW THE 50-kt TRIGGER

(X) OSD supports retaining the U.S. position, which provides for the right to two CORRTEX tests per year if the testing party does not declare any tests above the trigger level of 50 kt.

(X) There are strong reasons for retaining the current U.S. position. We clearly have a requirement to continue testing up to the 150-kt limit. As a result, we can expect that the Soviets will be present at our test site after TTBT ratification. If the U.S. were to drop this provision, the Soviets could deny us access to their test site by simply not declaring any tests above 50 kt. (This does not mean, of course, that the Soviets necessarily would restrict their tests to below 50 kt, as some agencies incorrectly have suggested.) It would be politically difficult for the Administration to defend a TTBT protocol before the Senate if its verification provisions arguably would affect only the U.S.

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JCS POSITION ON SOVIET SEISMIC PROPOSAL

JCS Support Option 1 (with suggested modifications underlined): During the Ministerial, offer a counterproposal to the Soviets that we will accept the right to seismic measurements in the country of the testing party for yields above an agreed trigger level, provided the US retains the right to CORRTEx yield measurements of all tests above an agreed trigger; stipulate that the US would be willing to discuss the specifics of such an agreement during NTT Round V.

(NOTE: If this option is selected, we need decisions on the other elements of the US counterproposal including the trigger level, on-site inspection, minimum number of CORRTEx measurements and tests in non-standard geometries. We would also need to agree with the Soviets on a number of outstanding CORRTEx configuration issues.)

Existing US position concerning what verification method(s) the Soviets can use to verify US compliance with the TTBT is that "the Soviets can use any method that we (US) determine is no more intrusive than CORRTEx in a satellite hole." In light of this policy, it would be politically difficult to outright reject the Soviet seismic proposal. However, as do the Soviets, the US should demand technical justification for each component of the Soviet seismic proposal. The JCS believe the US should accept in principle a minimal seismic component for the TTBT provided the Soviets accept our existing CORRTEx requirements (including the 50kt trigger) and the necessary implementing provisions; the latter must include hydrodynamic measurement for non-standard tests, as well.

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03k. Report	JCS Position on OSI at Existing Test Sites for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

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By MM on 3/18/2016

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2014-MR(501.08)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/21/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

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
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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JCS POSITION ON OSI AT EXISTING TEST SITES
FOR THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

JCS Support Option 4: CORRTEX and seismic trigger level at 50 kt. No right to OSI.

OSI beginning at the 35 kt level is unacceptable in the TTBT context because of the adverse impact on the US test program. While the number of tests in the 35 to 50 kt range has historically been small, that number is likely to increase, as is the sensitivity of the types of tests (i.e., effects and SDI).

Additionally, the proponents of OSI have failed to present a credible evasion scenario that an OSI provision could preclude. Further, if geologic formations exist or could be created clandestinely which might offer the opportunity to decouple a 150 kt test at factors above 2, and if the Soviets were willing to attempt such a test, there would be no impetus for the Soviets to announce that the test would breach the OSI threshold; the US would simply not be invited to be present on the test site.

3.3(b)(1)



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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2014-MR

4/21/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
031. Report	JCS Position for CORRTEx of Tests Below the Trigger Level [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 3/18/2016

Date Closed:	10/22/2009	OA/ID Number:	90011-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2014-MR(501.09)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/21/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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JCS POSITION FOR CORRTEX OF TESTS
BELOW THE TRIGGER LEVEL

JCS Support Option 1: Do not press for the right to conduct CORRTEX measurements if the testing party does not plan to test above the trigger level.

The decision to use 50kt as the trigger for implementing CORRTEX was based upon the belief that technically this level would ensure the Soviets could not violate the treaty simply by not notifying the US of a test. NTM would provide sufficient information to alert decisionmakers to a violation of the 50kt trigger. Providing the Verifying Party the right to measure the yields of "two nuclear weapon tests whose yields are the highest declared by the Testing Party that year" has nothing to do with verifying the 150kt threshold of the TTBT. ^{1.4(c)}

the purpose of this protocol is to ensure Soviet compliance of the 150kt provision of the TTBT.

^{1.4(c)}
Further, such a provision will be ineffective in calibrating the seismic network for the entire test site over the range of yields of concern. Statements to the contrary, that the "two below" provision will calibrate the seismic network, could result in further claims that the United States has the seismic capability to verify reduced thresholds and thereby support calls for an intermediate nuclear testing limitation and possibly a CTB.

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2010-2014-MR
4/21/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03m. Memo	Memorandum for the Chairman of the Arms Control PCC Re: ACDA Position (2 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 053 - September 12, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

Date Closed: 10/22/2009

OA/ID Number: 90011-006

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

MEMORANDUM FOR Arnold L. Kanter

7 September 1989

Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

SUBJECT: DOE Position on Nuclear Testing

I. The CORRTEX/Seismic "Package"

The Department of Energy supports Option 1: that the U.S. agree in principle to a package containing the rights to routine use of CORRTEX, on-site inspection and in-country seismic yield measurements. U.S. acceptance should be conditional upon U.S.-Soviet agreement on implementation procedures, including those procedures necessary to verify tests in non-standard geometries.

We have told the Soviets that, if they meet our CORRTEX requirement, we will agree to any other verification method that is no more intrusive than CORRTEX. DOE believes that seismic and on-site inspection components can meet our criterion.

There are no inherent technical or security reasons to oppose a seismic component. Further, the argument that acceptance of seismic puts the U.S. on a "slippery slope" toward a low threshold test ban treaty verifiable by seismic means misses the mark. It is not necessary to dilute the verification of the TTBT in order to resist further constraints on nuclear testing. We should resist further testing constraints on the strong grounds of national security. Failure to separate peripheral arguments from central ones could result in a significant loss of credibility.

DOE notes that even with a "package agreement," we are not at the end of what has already been a prolonged negotiating process. Complex and important technical details remain to be worked out. A decision now to develop a U.S. package will help define the scope of the remaining work on the TTBT verification protocol, thereby allowing negotiators to focus their energy on technical details at what may well be a critical time. This will enable us better to complete the negotiations in a methodical, technically competent, and timely manner.

II. Trigger Levels and On-Site Inspection

The Department of Energy recommends a 100kt trigger level for CORRTEX/seismic, with rights to conduct a US-defined OSI on all shots notified to exceed 35kt. DOE recognizes that a 100kt trigger level for CORRTEX/seismic is not currently among the options listed in the Issue Paper, but believes that such an option represents a reasonable balance between verification requirements and national security concerns.

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2010-2014-MR
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- o It provides effective verification of the 150kt limit under both routine testing practices and credible evasion scenarios, including those involving "sweetspots."
- o A 100kt trigger for hydrodynamic measurement would reduce intrusive Soviet access to sensitive U.S. tests in the 50 to 100kt range. At the same time, a 35kt OSI trigger would afford U.S. access to Soviet sites to which we might otherwise be denied access.
- o It reduces the cost of verification but not its effectiveness, and increases the operational flexibility of the U.S. test program.

III. CORRTEX on Tests Below CORRTEX Trigger Level

The Department of Energy takes a neutral position on the provision for the right to CORRTEX some number of shots below the trigger level in the event that fewer than two are announced above the trigger level. This position is contingent upon the designation of NTS as a single test site.

The Department notes that the provision is not required for effective verification, and that implementation of the provision as now written can be manipulated by the notification policy of the tester.

IV. TESTS IN NON-STANDARD GEOMETRIES

The Department of Energy judges a veto over tests in non-standard geometries to be an unacceptable restriction on the U.S. nuclear test program for the following reasons:

- o Occasional non-standard tests with yields subject to hydrodynamic measurement may be critical to future weapon system development and survivability.
- o A Soviet veto over any tests below the 150kt threshold would impose a restriction on the U.S. testing program not intended by the TTBT.
- o An operationally acceptable alternative to the veto provision (the normalization approach) is available that provides effective verification for tests in non-standard geometries.

Victor E. Alessi
Victor E. Alessi
Director
Office of Arms Control
Defense Programs

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21090

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1989



ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Nuclear Testing,
September 12, 1989

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Tuesday, September 12, 1989, 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM in the Situation Room to discuss nuclear testing. A memorandum to your counterparts and an interagency prepared issue paper are attached (Tab I).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A Issue Paper

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 10/22/09

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21090

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security
Affairs

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. WILLIAM V. VITALE
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

MR. FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and Budget ^{indent}

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

DR. ALAN BROMLEY
Director
Office of Science and
Technology Policy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

AMBASSADOR EDWARD ROWNEY
Special Advisor to the
President and Secretary of
State on Arms Control
Matters
Department of State

AMBASSADOR PAUL ROBINSON
Chief Negotiator
Nuclear Testing Talks
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

+JCS

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Nuclear Testing, Tuesday,
September 12, 1989, 4:00 PM - 5:00 PM (S)

There will be a meeting of the Deputies Committee on Tuesday,
September 12, 1989, 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM, in the Situation Room to
discuss nuclear testing. An interagency-prepared paper that
reviews needed decisions is attached. (S)

Attendance is limited to principal plus one. In addition, the
U.S. Nuclear Testing Negotiator is invited to attend. (U)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Nuclear Testing Issue Paper (S)

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 1/23/2014

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921107
RECEIVED: 11 SEP 89 20

TO: GATES

FROM: MAHLEY
KANTER
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 11 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
STOCKPILES
VERIFICATION

DC
CHEMICAL WARFARE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR DC MTG ON 12 SEP RE CHEMICAL WARFARE

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 19 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MAHLEY

LOGREF: 8921090 8921115

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC053

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
KANTER
MAHLEY

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~~White House Guidelines~~
~~E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006~~
~~By CAP NARA, Date 10/22/09~~

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: CM

CLOSED BY: AC

DOC 1 OF 1

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MCH 6/21/2016

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RECORD ID: 8921107

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES

Z 89091120 FOR INFORMATION

001

X 89091307 NOTED BY GATES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 10/22/07

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National Security Council
The White House



PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 21107

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>LMS 7/12</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

89 SEP 11 P8:12

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

CW at Deputies mtg

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21107

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 11, 1989

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/^{me}ROBERT BLACKWILL^{RJB}

FROM: DON MAHLEY^M

SUBJECT: CW at Deputies' Committee Meeting on September 12

Undersecretary Bartholomew may raise CW at the Deputies' Committee meeting September 12. Reggie's concern is to ensure that the USG is in a position to "play our best hand" toward getting a bilateral US-USSR MOU on CW data exchange and verification experiments signed during the Baker-Shevardnadze ministerial next week.

The two unresolved data issues that are most important are:

- (1) Declaration of aggregate quantity (tons) of US CW stocks, and
- (2) Disaggregation of US stocks to the degree that the quantity or percentage of US stocks in the FRG would be identifiable.

One drawback to agreeing to exchange aggregate stockpile totals is that by accepting the Soviet aggregate figure we give it credibility, when in truth we have no confidence we have a reliable estimate of total Soviet stocks. Consequently, we need to ensure that we include in our counterproposal a continuing mechanism for getting a better fix on the real Soviet CW inventory.

NSC staff would therefore recommend that the US take the following approach at the Ministerial:

- (a) Try to get Soviet agreement with only currently declared data. (e.g. declaring a percentage of our total stocks to be at a location in CONUS, and saying that our total inventory is "less than x," but not providing overall tonnage figures.)
- (b) Offer to provide specific figures for those sites that would be subject to inspection as part of the joint verification experiments. (This would allow calculation of overall US stocks, when combined with our previous percentage-at-site declarations).

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AS AMENDED
2008-0674-MR
12/2/2009 MM

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-2-

- (c) Offer to provide overall aggregate data, but not broken down to identify directly the amount in non-US overseas storage, even though that amount could be calculated by the Soviets.

The issue of protecting the FRG on the matter of stocks located there is moot. The FRG responded to our inquiry of last Friday by saying that they were not concerned about the Soviets knowing the overall amount of CW stored in the FRG. The FRG is still very sensitive about revealing the precise location of the stocks within the FRG, but none of the options above would reveal that location to the Soviets.

We believe if Undersecretary Bartholomew raises this issue, most Deputies may be relatively uninformed about the technical details of the issues. If, nonetheless, consensus around the step-by-step approach outlined above to Issue (1) can be forged, it would be useful.

Concurrence by: Philip ^{PZ} Zelikow

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