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OA/ID Number: 90024
Folder ID Number: 90024-034

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Report	Re: Small Group Discussion Paper: New Sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro [FOIA restrictions redacted] (12 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
02a. Summary	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
02b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	1/5/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
02c. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	1/5/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
02d. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	1/5/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
02e. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	1/5/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
02f. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
02g. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993, 4:00 - 5:00 pm (1 pp.)	1/5/93	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

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Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Pinksheet Number: cap1726

OA/ID Number: 90024-034

Date Closed: 3/23/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02h. Agenda	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(1)	S
02i. Paper	Re: Discussion Paper: Funding Sanctions Enforcement Assistance (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02k. Tab	Re: Tab 1 - Budget Estimates: Sanctions Assistance (1 pp.)	1/1-6/3/93	(b)(1)	
02l. Tab	Re: Tab 2 - Preliminary Technical Assistance Requests (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02m. Memo	Jane E. Holl to Jonathan T. Howe Re: DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993 (2 pp.)	1/4/93	(b)(1)	C
03a. Summary	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion for 6 January DC Meeting on The Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03c. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion for 6 January DC Meeting on The Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03d. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion for 6 January DC Meeting on The Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

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03e. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion for 6 January DC Meeting on The Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03f. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion, Deputies Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993 (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03g. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting (2 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(1)	S
04a. Summary	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
04b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Info for Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
04c. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Additional Information to DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
04d. Report	Re: Small Group Discussion Paper: New Sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro [FOIA restrictions redacted] (12 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
05a. Memo	Jane E. Holl to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Today's DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(1)	S

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05b. Memo	Jane E. Holl to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Today's DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(1)	S

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320030
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 93 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 93
SOURCE REF: 9300126

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

YUGOSLAVIA
SANCTIONS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA / POSSIBLE
NEW SANCTIONS ON SERVIA / MONTENEGRO

ACTION: OBE PER HOLL

DUE DATE: 11 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9221247 9320021

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC423

CODES:

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FOR INFO
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9320030

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HOLL
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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 93010711 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 93010808 OBE PER HOLL

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320030
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 93 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 93
SOURCE REF: 9300126

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
DC

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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NEW SANCTION ON SERBIA / MONTENEGRO

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 11 JAN 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


January 5, 1993

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(DECL:OADR)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Possible New Sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro

Attached is a discussion paper on possible new sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro for circulation to the Deputies Committee in advance of the Wednesday meeting.


W. Robert Pearson
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By cap NARA, Date 3/23/10


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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 12/12/2022

Date Closed: 3/23/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2012-1199-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/12/2016

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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

SMALL GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER:
NEW SANCTIONS ON SERBIA/MONTENEGRO



I. ISSUE

In a December 20 joint statement, President Bush and Prime Minister Major announced that they would be ready, absent a rapid and radical change in Serbia's policy, to impose new sanctions which could "initially include cutting postal and telecommunications links and could lead to closing the borders and complete diplomatic isolation for years to come." Diplomatic isolation was understood to cover the possible severing of diplomatic relations, as well as expulsion from international organizations.

The following paper analyzes these potential additional sanctions from the perspective of: a) steps needed to implement them; b) the likelihood of their international acceptance and effective implementation; and c) their likely strategic and practical implications.

Effective implementation of each measure would require UNSC approval. While we may have some differences with the French and the U.K., our ability to secure Russian and Chinese agreement not to block Council action will be key to our ability to move forward. In the past, Russia has resisted many of our proposals for tough action and Yeltsin is under pressure from nationalists to help Serbia and to stop its cooperation with the West on pressuring Serbia. Our past experience suggests that it will be easier to bring Russia on board if the Perm-3 agree on the objectives and then consult closely with Russia before initiating resolutions.

We should consult with Vance and Owen on the potential impact of new sanctions on their efforts. Moreover, we need to consider whether additional new sanctions will have any impact on Milosevic's policies; if not, we need to consider the purpose of these measures. Finally, we would need to consider the strategy of approaching Security Council members on any issue. For example, should new sanctions initiatives be pursued in parallel with a no-fly enforcement resolution, and is this likely to invite trade-offs.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Cutting off Postal and Telecommunications Links with Serbia

A complete ban on postal and telecommunication links with Serbia would cut off normal communications with the outside world. It would underscore Serbia's isolation, inhibit economic activity, particularly banking and services, and

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2012-1199-MR

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complicate Belgrade's task of meeting local social and economic demands. The imposition of such a ban, however, would impose significant costs on neighboring states and may prove exceedingly difficult to achieve.

For the purposes of this discussion, telecommunications are defined as telephone, facsimile, telex, and telegraphic services, television program relay (e.g., electronic newsgathering) and include all transmissions by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems.

Implementation

A total or partial ban on postal and telecommunications services with Serbia would require a new UNSC Chapter VII resolution. Article 41 of the UN Charter specifically refers to the interruption of postal and telecommunications links as one of the measures the Council may order under Chapter VII. The resolution would require the issuance of implementing regulations by member states and would take precedence over any pre-existing obligations under multilateral and bilateral postal and telecommunications agreements. This step has never been invoked against any country.

We anticipate opposition to such a measure from Russia and other Balkan states which would be affected. Opponents may also argue that such a ban would entail considerable hardship for neighboring countries and disproportionately affect the population at large, public diplomacy and journalism. Some will argue that it could even strengthen Milosevic by providing him a captive audience.

UNSCR 757 now restricts import and export of goods and the provision of financial or other economic resources to Serbia-Montenegro. This has been interpreted by many states, including the U.S., as requiring a limitation on certain postal services and telecommunications transactions. The U.S. implements this resolution through U.S. Executive Order 12810. Exceptions are made under Treasury licenses for certain telecommunications transactions, letters of up to 12 oz and no commercial value, and diplomatic mails. While, if the UNSC issued a resolution so requiring, the U.S. could implement a general ban under the UN Participation Act, there could be litigation challenging the constitutionality of such a ban.

A less than total ban might be practically, as well as diplomatically, more acceptable. Exceptions could be made to

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allow for the continuation of diplomatic mail/electronic communications, journalistic and news and information services, and activities of Government broadcast services, including the VOA. A humanitarian exception (i.e. in the event of a natural disaster) could also be included. However, if telecommunications links were cut off by technical, rather than through regulatory means, it would be virtually impossible to make distinctions among types of information. We would need to consult with the private sector to ascertain whether specific services (e.g., private business/banking networks) exist which could be targeted from abroad by technical means. Broadcasting services originating outside of Serbia would not be impacted by the embargo, unless Serbia engaged in retaliatory jamming.

International Compliance and Likely Impact

Principal communication land lines (e.g., phone cables) linking Serbia and Montenegro to the outside world run through Bulgaria and Greece. There has also been a growing reliance by Serbia on the use of INTELSAT. Serbia-Montenegro shares space on INTELSAT transponders with other countries and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to cut them off without seriously impeding satellite services to other areas of the former Yugoslavia and neighboring countries. INTELSAT member governments would have to convene an extraordinary meeting to consider options for implementing such a resolution. Serbia-Montenegro is also a transit country for satellite, cable and microwave communications to neighboring countries.

Neighboring countries would be seriously affected by a comprehensive cut-off. Bulgaria would be hard hit by a cut off, as 45% of its international communications (phone, fax, etc) pass through Serbia. Greece would also be affected, as its lines to northern Europe pass through Serbia. Most of Macedonia's international communications links are through Serbia and a cutoff could have serious consequences including further political isolation and instability.

The success of a telecommunications ban would depend on a maximum number of member countries effectively requiring compliance by telecommunications service providers within their jurisdictions. If even a neighboring country refused to participate in the cut off, telecommunication links could be routed through that country to Serbia-Montenegro and the bulk of the services could be continued. However, any measure generally applied by most states would have a significant impact on Serbia's ability to establish routing external communications. The UN's ability to enforce such sanctions would also, in practice, be limited.

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Past U.S. programs of limited telecommunications controls against embargoed countries, such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Cuba, have not been very effective. These have been easily circumvented by individuals and companies sending telephone calls and other types of communications through third countries.

B. Closing Serbia's Borders

Closing Serbia's borders completely to trade of any kind, including all transshipments of food, medicine and other humanitarian items, would require a new Security Council resolution. The prospects of obtaining Council approval of such a broad extension of the Serbia embargo are marginal. There would be a serious impact of such sanctions on neighboring countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia. These states depend on traffic moving through Serbia to link them with the rest of Europe, and on the provision of certain exempted trade, e.g., food.

We have imposed a comprehensive set of sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro. Enforcement of these sanctions is far more complex than in the Iraq situation and has involved considerably greater resources. We have had to rely on the neighboring states to implement sanctions and have provided limited assistance to them. Their implementation of sanctions has improved significantly over the past month. Principal river, road and rail links between Serbia and neighboring countries are now being monitored by Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs).

Expanded Enforcement Measures

The closing of Serbia's borders to stop the provision of all goods and services would require significantly increased enforcement resources, including a major infusion of additional civilian or military personnel. The enforcement efforts of the states neighboring Serbia/Montenegro are now stretched to their limit. We cannot rely on them to further expand their enforcement efforts without the infusion of considerable technical assistance and personnel, and without compensation for the economic costs expanded sanctions will impose on them.

The existing SAM effort would have to be expanded from about 40 to up to 300 members to permit 24 hour coverage at all principal and secondary river, road and rail border crossings. These civilian monitors also could accompany the few remaining trains, ships and vehicles transiting Serbia

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under authorization from the Sanctions Committee. Monitors would be necessary in Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.

Our current efforts to expand the SAMs to a more modest 60 members indicate that the international pool of available customs officers for this purpose is quite limited. A 300 member SAMS force would cost an estimated \$3 million per month in personnel support costs alone. The U.S. contribution would likely require a new budget appropriation. The SAMs do not function directly under UN auspices, but rely on the direct participation of EC and CSCE states.

As a practical matter, international civilian monitors, including customs officers and other SAM participants, cannot be expected to use force against third country ships, trucks or trains suspected of violating sanctions. This would require host government enforcement action or their authorization to permit foreign military/police enforcement efforts within their territory.

If invited to do so by the host governments, the UN could establish an international military or customs force with armed guards in order to closely patrol Serbia's borders and interdict cross border traffic. Since closing the Danube would not be accepted by riparian states, armed naval vessels might be needed to escort commercial and other legitimate shipping through the Serbian portion of the Danube. These forces would be in addition to UNPROFOR, whose mandate is humanitarian and peacekeeping in nature.

The closing of borders by military force would require a new resolution and the consent of neighboring states.

- The Perm 5 would need to engage in extensive consultations; it is unlikely that China and Russia would agree to a resolution establishing an international force.
- The costs and personnel support requirements of an international military enforcement operation would be enormous. Under UN Peacekeeping provisions, the U.S. would be assessed 30.5% of the cost. Alternatively, we would have to seek voluntary contributions which, in view of the many other current requirements (Somalia, Iraq, etc.), would be extremely difficult to obtain.

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Expanding Sanctions Coverage

At Tab A, we have attached a possible menu of measures that would expand sanctions coverage without initiating a complete embargo.

C. Exclusion from International Organizations

The FRY has been excluded from normal participation in the work of the UNGA, most UN technical and specialized agencies, and most other international organizations, through resolutions or other measures under the procedures of these bodies. However, the FRY maintains its Mission in New York and could in theory continue to participate in other UN subsidiary bodies and technical and specialized agencies. Since the sanctions effectively deny the FRY direct economic benefits from these international organizations, exclusion would primarily be a symbolic and diplomatic gesture.

The United States has taken the position that Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and that the FRY is not entitled to Yugoslavia's membership in the UN. The General Assembly implemented the recommendation in Security Council Resolution 777 that the "General Assembly decide that the FRY should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly." While our original proposal in the Security Council would have denied FRY membership in all UN bodies under the theory that the FRY is not the "continuity" of Yugoslavia, we accepted this more limited formulation in order to obtain Russian, French, and British support for the resolution. The UN Legal Counsel's interpretation is that the resolution does not suspend or terminate Yugoslavia's UN membership and that its mission to the UN may continue to function. This interpretation implies that, in the absence of a new Security Council and General Assembly resolution, ECOSOC and its many subsidiary bodies have no authority to exclude the FRY. While the USG construes the resolutions differently, we have not attempted to challenge the UN Legal interpretation.

We have successfully pursued the adoption of resolutions in WIPO, ICAO, and the IAEA to exclude "FRY" participation in meetings of these organizations. Other international organizations, including GATT, INTELSAT, IFAD, and the CSCE have taken action to deny the FRY membership or participation.

Subsequently, we assured Russia that we would not take the lead to move to deny the FRY rights in other organizations, and that we would decide on a case by case basis whether to support such efforts by other countries. As a result, we have merely

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followed the EC in making a statement in some organizations to the effect that we believe the FRY should not be entitled to assume Yugoslavia's membership in the organization.

Implementation

To exclude the FRY from the entire UN system, a new UNSC resolution, implemented through a resolution in the UNGA, would be needed. The UN resolution should explicitly state that the FRY is not the continuation of the former Yugoslavia; consequently it is not a member of the UN and cannot participate in the United Nations until it has been granted membership in its own right. Independent of UN action, the USG could pursue resolutions in international organizations outside the UN system to exclude FRY participation. The rules and procedures would vary for different organizations.

International Acceptance and Likely Impact

We sought for nearly six months to obtain the initial UNSC and UNGA resolutions on this subject. There is no reason to believe that new resolutions would be any easier to obtain. The principal difficulty we would face in pursuing further formal exclusion of the FRY in the UN system would be in securing Russian concurrence or abstention. Moreover, EC countries also were not very supportive of our efforts during the earlier process. Provided that international acceptance can be secured, these measures can be implemented relatively easily.

Since the FRY is no longer participating normally in the work and meetings of most UN organizations, further measures would be primarily symbolic in nature. However, they would be important in achieving further diplomatic isolation of the FRY. One of our main concerns would be preserving FRY's financial and other obligations. This can be achieved through appropriate drafting. (For example, Serbia-Montenegro's share of Yugoslavia's \$2.0 billion debt to the World Bank is \$1.1 billion.)

D. Severing Diplomatic Ties

Isolating Serbia diplomatically could be accomplished by: closing Serbia's diplomatic missions abroad and foreign missions in Belgrade and severing relations; closing those missions without formally severing diplomatic relations; or further reducing the size of those missions.

It is not clear whether further diplomatic isolation of Serbia would weaken Milosevic or reinforce the Serbian electorate's garrison mentality, which was somewhat evident in

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the December 20 elections. Substantial reductions of active Embassy staff would have a negative effect on Western countries' ability to collect intelligence and, in particular, to maintain links to Kosovo, Sandzak, Montenegro and, to a lesser extent, Macedonia. To a very limited extent, these functions could be performed by international observers.

Implementation

Isolating Serbia diplomatically could be accomplished internationally by:

- (1) seeking a Security Council resolution calling on all member states to break diplomatic relations or, at a minimum, further to reduce the size of Serbia's diplomatic presence in their countries as was recently done with respect to Libya; or
- (2) seeking a consensus with key EC members for a coordinated move to reduce or sever diplomatic links with Serbia and pressing other countries bilaterally to follow suit; or
- (3) ending ties unilaterally.

While we could lead by example and then try to influence others to follow, this would reduce or eliminate our presence and the benefits that derive therefrom, without necessarily accomplishing Serbia's broader diplomatic isolation. To increase Serbia's isolation without formally breaking diplomatic relations we could simply close their embassy in Washington and our embassy in Belgrade. Finally, we could seek to reduce still further the size of the Serbian embassy here and our embassy in Belgrade. A first step could be to call on the Serbs to remove all their dependents and for us to do the same from Belgrade. A second could be to impose an even tighter limit on the numbers of official personnel.

- Although we do not have full diplomatic relations with Serbia, we have maintained our embassy in Belgrade and permitted a limited number of personnel from the embassy of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to remain in Washington. We have made clear that we do not consider this to constitute formal recognition of Serbia.
- We have, however, substantially downgraded our presence in Serbia-Montenegro. We reduced embassy personnel in Belgrade by two-thirds and did not

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replace our ambassador. We also closed all "Yugoslav" consulates in the U.S., sent home several military attaches and informed the "Yugoslav" embassy that we would not allow them to replace their ambassador.

International Acceptance and Likely Impact

As long as the strategy for the resolution of problems in the former Yugoslavia continues to be based on diplomacy rather than military intervention, the severing of diplomatic ties is likely to be seen by many countries as counterproductive. It is unlikely that the U.S. would find broad support for a resolution calling for Serbia's complete diplomatic isolation through embassy closures. Many countries, including Russia and China would be cautious about such a resolution. To date, most countries have withdrawn their Ambassadors, but no country, as far as we are aware, has followed the U.S. example and down-sized its embassy and/or closed "FRY" consulates. While most countries with a direct interest in the conflict are not likely for practical reasons to sever diplomatic ties with Serbia, they may be prepared to withdraw dependents, and substantially reduce staff. Under this approach, countries would reduce their vulnerability in case of increased hostilities, while preserving communication.

Milosevic has managed to play upon Serbian xenophobia to maintain his support by effectively exploiting many Western moves. Symbolic measures have thus proven somewhat self-defeating in the short term, particularly when coupled with Milosevic's ability to maintain the appearance of some economic normality through, for example, continued availability of gasoline and certain luxury goods.


Maintaining a presence in Belgrade would preserve our primary ability to monitor what is happening in Serbia (including Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina), Montenegro and Macedonia. Embassy officials maintain contacts with political and ethnic leaders, UN officials in these areas as well as with local governments. The Embassy in Belgrade is also helping to cover Bosnia-Herzegovina until we can set up a mission in Sarajevo.

1.4(b); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

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- 10 -

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)



TAB A

EXPANDING SANCTIONS COVERAGE

The following measures could be sought in a new UN resolution:

- Uniform freezing of Serbian government and government-controlled and private financial assets, including assets owned by their foreign subsidiaries. Serbia is successfully using ostensibly private resources to finance its efforts to circumvent the embargo. Depriving Serbia access to such financial sources will significantly decrease circumvention activity. National enforcement authority over financial assets differ considerably and agreement on any uniform approach to such financial sanctions will be quite difficult to achieve.
- Seizure and forfeiture of violative shipments and conveyances. The UN Security Council could direct border states and other members to seize and forfeit unauthorized imports and exports as well as the vessels or vehicles used to transport them. This would be a potent disincentive to sanctions-busters.
- Detention of Serbian/Montenegrin-controlled ships. Ships registered to Serbia or Montenegro, or beneficially owned by Serbian and Montenegrin interests, could be subject to detention and/or seizure if they enter any port. Their cargoes could be subject to detention and/or seizure and sale. Although we and some other countries (e.g., France) interpret existing resolutions as requiring such detention, other countries do not agree with our interpretation and a new resolution would be useful to settle the question.
- Clearly banning provision of services. Most countries do not interpret Resolution 757 as banning the import and export of services.
- Ban transshipments. We could move for a more comprehensive ban on transshipments through Serbia. This should include requiring that all such shipments be adequately protected from diversion to Serbia before sanctions committee approval. Special

provision could be made to exempt certain Danube river traffic where there is no intention to enter or land cargoes in Serbian ports. (Other states in the region, including Greece will strenuously oppose such a ban).

- Ban travel and related transactions. While the UNSC is not likely to approve a total travel ban, they might agree to clarify that travel-related transactions, at least for business travel, are prohibited under existing UN sanctions.
- Prosecution of sanctions violators. This would be largely a hortatory measure calling on states to provide penalties for and prosecute sanctions violators.

Measures limiting humanitarian assistance (which would be much more difficult to build support for) might also include:

- Narrowing the "humanitarian" definition. A more careful definition could be crafted of what constitutes "humanitarian goods". This would include a ban on pharmaceutical precursors which are largely used for exports and could include a list of items such as alcohol and cigarettes.
- Termination of the humanitarian exemption. We would encounter considerable resistance to the idea of cutting off all shipments of food, medicine and essential humanitarian goods; thus we would probably be forced to keep this exception. Suggesting the cut-off of these goods would go far beyond any previous UN sanctions regime.
- Termination of humanitarian remittances. At present most countries consider pension remittances as falling within the scope of the humanitarian exemption in UNSCR 757. Pensions and worker remittances are a significant source of hard currency for Serbia/Montenegro. (Our past efforts to cut off pension payments have met with little or no support). This would also mean halting the U.S. social security and federal benefit payments to 3,000 recipients (mostly elderly U.S. citizens) who our embassy reports would otherwise be destitute.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9221247
RECEIVED: 28 DEC 92 19

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
YUGOSLAVIA
AGENDA

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR DC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ON 6 JAN

ACTION: HILL SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 31 DEC 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9320021 9320028

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC423

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02a. Summary	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	3/23/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-034
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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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RESTRICTION CODES

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9221247

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HOLL
002 HOWE
002
003
004 HOWE
004

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 92122819 APPROPRIATE ACTION
Z 93010416 FOR DECISION
X 93010508 HOWE APPROVED RECOM
X 93010508 HILL SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
Z 93010612 FOR INFORMATION
X 93010910 NOTED BY HOWE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 930105 JACKSON, K
003 930105 PEARSON, W
003 930105 HOWARD, R
003 930105 CONNELL, M
003 930105 DOWNING, R
003 930105 SHERFIELD, M

003 930105 (b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

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Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Jon Howe	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>D.</u>
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>Tab I</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>JDA 1/5</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N/N</u>
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4 JAN 93 7:11

Jan 6 DC mts former Yugoslavia

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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02b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	1/5/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

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Office: National Security Council

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Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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MESSAGE NO. 0008 CLASSIFICATION**SECRET**PAGES 8FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN ^{DA}_{QV}

(NAME)

(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON 6 JAN.

NSC LOG# 21247

TO (AGENCY)

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PHONE NUMBER

STATE

W. ROBERT PEARSON

TREASURY

R. BLAIR DOWNING

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	3/23/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
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MESSAGE NO. 0008 CLASSIFICATION~~SECRET~~PAGES 8FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN ^{OPA}_{QY}

(NAME)

(PHONE NUMBER)

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NSC LOG# 21247

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	W. ROBERT PEARSON		
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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

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Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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(PHONE NUMBER)

(ROOM NO.)

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NSC LOG# 21247

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 8

FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN ^{QPA}_{QY}
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON 6 JAN.

NSC LOG# 21247

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	W. ROBERT PEARSON		
TREASURY	R. BLAIR DOWNING		
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]		
DOD	MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
JCS	H.L. SHEFFIELD		

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02g. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993, 4:00 - 5:00 pm (1 pp.)	1/5/93	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 3/23/2010

OA/ID Number: 90024-034

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

DATE: January 6, 1993
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00-5:00pm

AGENDA

- I. Opening Remarks.....Admiral Howe
- II. Policy Discussion.....All Participants
 - a. Humanitarian Assistance
 - b. Sanctions
 - c. U.S. Participation in CSCE Monitoring in Kosovo
- III. Summary.....Admiral Howe

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2012-1199-MR
MM 4/30/2015

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DISCUSSION PAPER: FUNDING SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE

The Deputies Committee, at its November 26 meeting, determined that the United States should provide technical assistance to reinforce enforcement of sanctions. Such assistance should be part of a combined, multilateral effort. This paper discusses technical assistance needs and possible funding sources.

Preliminary Technical Assistance Requests

At the CSCE Sanctions Liaison Group meeting in Vienna on December 4, the participating states invited the host states (Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Macedonia) to indicate the equipment and support they needed. Cited as most important has been continuation and expansion of the SAMS (Sanctions Assistance Monitors) effort, as well as boats for use on the Danube. The host states have also asked for training in the operation and maintenance of these boats, as well as on river patrol and control techniques, and various equipment (details at Tab 2).

The United States has said that it will provide Romania and Bulgaria up to three boats each, appropriately equipped, for enforcement on the Danube. These are to be obtained from Customs and the Coast Guard. However, the boats are "if available, as is, where is" and we will need funding to refurbish, equip, and move the boats to a U.S. port.

Macedonia, which has the most primitive customs capability and is now the greatest likely source of sanctions violations, will require the most assistance. The Macedonians have minimal customs capabilities at this time, but wish to improve. A major effort is required to avoid increasing leakage through their border with Serbia.

Budget Estimates for Assistance

Based on information concerning technical assistance requirements, and SAM reporting, State has prepared the attached budget estimates for sanctions assistance over the next six months (see Tab 1). This budget includes \$0.95 million for estimated costs associated with our participation in the SAMS effort (including the addition of four Coast Guard officers and a USG official for the proposed sanctions coordinator's office), and \$0.85 million in technical assistance (including equipment and training) for the countries bordering Serbia.

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-2-

In addition to our own efforts, the other (currently 10) countries that furnish SAMs pay for their participation. The EC also provides a communications facility in Brussels (SAMCOMM) and provides staff to that office. The EC countries are working to provide further equipment for the SAMs, and additional countries are pledging contributions to SAMs. The current, and anticipated future, U.S. contribution to SAMs is about 30 percent of the total.

As to technical assistance, State is seeking to minimize U.S. expenditures through cost-sharing, consistent with U.S. efforts and interests in maintaining and enhancing sanctions enforcement. State feels a 30 percent contribution to technical assistance is reasonable. It is expected that the \$0.85 million contribution being proposed will achieve about that outcome, though it is not unlikely that it will result in a higher percentage.

There is no special USG funding to support such overseas sanctions enforcement activities. So far, assistance efforts have been funded from the basic operating budgets of Treasury and State (see Tab 1). Success of this mission is dependent on firm funding and in-kind commitments for the duration from all participating agencies -- Treasury, State, Transportation (Coast Guard) -- as well as resources from any other agencies traditionally positioned to support such activities (such as Defense).

Funding Sources and Authorities

Presidential Authorities. Appropriate technical assistance and associated equipment could be provided by the agencies conducting operations -- i.e., Customs, Transportation (Coast Guard), and Defense. For agencies without specific legal authority to provide such services and equipment, the President could direct the drawdown of commodities and services (up to \$25 million in any fiscal year) from the inventory and resources of any U.S. agency, under authority of section 552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). In addition, section 506(a)(1) of the FAA provides for drawdown of up to \$75 million per year of defense articles and services for a foreign country or international organization in the event of an unforeseen emergency requiring military assistance. A Presidential Determination would be required to use either authority.

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-3-

State Department Authorities. State may use funds authorized by the SEED (Support for Eastern European Democracy) Act and appropriated in FY 1993 Foreign Operations legislation. These funds may be used for economic assistance to Eastern Europe, notwithstanding any other provision of law. Alternatively, under section 451 of the FAA, the Secretary of State could use Economic Support Funds (ESF) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to meet unanticipated contingencies. Approximately \$24 million remains under this authority. Any ESF, FMF, or SEED funding used for this purpose would have to be identified and reprogrammed from activities for which it was originally allocated. Use of FMF is also problematic, because only Hungary, of the countries concerned, has a Presidential Determination authorizing purchase of defense articles and services.

Defense Department Authorities. Sec. 166a of Title 10, U.S. Code (the CINC Initiative Fund), provides for broad contingency spending authority, up to \$25 million yearly. There is a specific limit in the FY 1993 Defense Appropriation Act on "emergencies and extraordinary expenses" of \$16.56 million, and there are limits on the amount that may be used for military training. Not less than \$50 million is available for global disaster relief activities of DOD (Title II, FY 1993 Defense Appropriation Act). Section 1342 of the Defense Authorization Act allows the Secretary of Defense to provide up to \$300 million in assistance for international peacekeeping activities under specified conditions. Finally, countries for which a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program has been justified to the Congress in a particular year are eligible to receive excess defense articles (EDA) from Defense. (Section 519 of the FAA permits transfer of non-lethal EDA to modernize the defense capabilities of eligible countries.) Of the countries requiring technical assistance for sanctions enforcement, only Hungary is eligible.

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Tab 1

Budget Estimates: Sanctions Assistance

January 1 - June 30, 1993

I. SAMS

Item	Allocated to Date	Estimated Added Cost to June 30
1. Personnel (TDY and Travel)		
a. Continuation of Customs Officer Programs (Treasury Funds)	\$500,000	\$400,000
b. Addition of 4 Coast Guard Officers	0	\$150,000
c. Addition of 1 U.S. Official for Coordinator's Office	0	\$60,000
2. Equipment (e.g., vehicles, communications)	0	\$200,000
3. Communications Operating Expenses (State)	\$150,000	\$140,000
Total	\$650,000	\$950,000

II. Technical Assistance

A. Bulgaria		
1. Required Equipment (See Tab 2)	0	\$100,000
2. Coast Guard Training for Local Personnel	0	\$50,000
B. Hungary		
1. Required Equipment (See Tab 2)	0	\$50,000
2. Training for Local Personnel	0	0
C. Macedonia		
1. Required Equipment (See Tab 2)	0	\$200,000
2. Customs Training for Local Personnel	0	\$300,000
D. Romania		
1. Required Equipment (See Tab 2)	0	\$100,000
2. Coast Guard Training for Local Personnel	0	\$50,000
Total	0	\$850,000
Total for all Programs	\$650,000	\$1,800,000

Note: Treasury has allocated \$500,000 for SAMS personnel and equipment costs, which will cover expenses through the end of February only. An additional \$400,000 (\$100,000 per month) will be needed to cover personnel costs of participation of 9 Customs officers through June 30. Any additional U.S. personnel will increase estimated expenses at the rate of \$10,000 per month per person.

TAB 2

PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REQUESTS*

A. Bulgaria - Equipment Requests

- speedboat-related costs - \$60,000*
- 5 radio locators - \$20,000
- 4 simplex and duplex line FM radios - \$2,000
- 2 MW and SW radios with SSB - \$2,000
- 1 computer - \$3,000
- 8 telephone units - \$1,000
- 15 heat and water resistant outfits - \$2,000
- 2 telex machines - \$2,000

B. Hungary - Equipment Requests

- 50 VHF transmitter-receivers hand and mobile 75-88 MHZ - \$25,000
- 20 radio telephones - \$4,000
- 1 mobile transmitter relay station- \$4,000
- 1 VHF or INMPSAT (INMARSAT) satellite transmitter and receiver - \$8,000
- 1 plantable antenna and transmitter, guided round transmitter - \$3,000
- sampling tools, for sampling of cargoes - \$10,000
- portable X-ray machines, both van and man-portable - \$4,000
- 7 four-wheel drive vehicles - \$140,000

C. Macedonia - Equipment Requests

- 4 Computers - \$12,000
- 9 printers - \$9,000
- 5 tape units - \$2,500
- 96 work stations - \$75,000
- 5 notebook computers - \$15,000
- 50 matrix printers - \$25,000
- Software - \$5,000
- 4 telephone switchboards - \$20,000
- 4 vehicle radio stations - \$2,000
- 10 radios - \$2,000
- 34 faxes - \$20,000
- Customs lab equipment - \$20,000
- 8 buses - \$300,000
- 6 jeeps - \$150,000
- 6 cars - \$120,000
- 3 vans - \$75,000
- 3 vehicles with R-scan equipment - \$90,000
- 20 sets inspection equipment (tools, scales, mirrors, lights, metal and other detectors) - \$10,000
- protective equipment, weapons - \$6,000

* NOTE: the items listed are the major categories of equipment requested to date, and best estimates of their cost. The amounts reflected on TAB 1 include provision for additional costs over the six month period.

D. Romania - Equipment Requests

- 15 speedboats with equipment*
- speedboat-related costs - \$60,000*
- 18 complete navigation radio stations - \$5,000
- 38 naval radio telephones - \$8,000
- 38 electro megaphones - \$5,000
- 1 central radio station - \$2,000
- 12 computers - \$20,000
- copiers - \$10,000
- fax machines - \$10,000
- cargo handling and inspection devices - \$20,000

*Speedboats

- o We hope to provide 6 speedboats, 3 each to Romania and Bulgaria, for enforcement on the Danube.
 - Customs and Coast Guard are continuing their efforts to find available speedboats.
 - Customs has been able to locate 1 boat.
 - Coast Guard is continuing to look for available boats, but advises that any found would probably be very old and in bad shape. Extensive repairs are typically required. Spare parts are often difficult to obtain as the boats are so old.
- o Cost: Boats themselves are free. However, there will be expenses for shipping costs and spare parts, accessories and maintenance packages.
 - We will need to arrange shipping to a US port for pick-up by Romanian/Bulgarian freighters. (The one boat located by Customs so far is in Arizona).
- o Estimated Cost for shipping/accessories/maintenance is \$120,000 for 6 boats.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21247

January 4, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE
THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT
FROM: JANE E. HOLX
SUBJECT: DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to agencies for the subject meeting. This meeting will focus on humanitarian assistance and sanctions. OSD is prepared to update us on humanitarian issues and suggest some possible courses of action to pursue.

On sanctions, State is prepared to brief (very much as OSD did on the humanitarian situation) and discuss what 'headroom' we have if we were to pursue a full embargo against Serbia.

You may also want to cover briefly several other issues:

- No-Fly negotiations in New York. This issue stalled in the UN over the New Year's holiday. With the President's discussions in Moscow and Paris, the way may now be clear to adopt a resolution by the end of the week. We should nail down where we continue to have differences with our allies and outline a strategy for moving ahead.
- Status of increased CSCE monitors for Kosovo. In the wake of the CSCE ministerial decision, State was to begin the process by which a sizeable U.S. contingent would participate. OSD was to evaluate the possible use of military assets.
- High-level negotiator for Kosovo. The French agree that renewed emphasis on negotiations is necessary to help keep tensions between the Kosovars and Serbs in check. Following the recent Serbian elections, how can we energize this initiative?

State has also asked that we circulate the paper they prepared on funding for sanctions operations (Tab B) as the issue of "who pays" may require Deputies' intervention to resolve.

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2

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Agencies

Tab A Agenda

Tab B Discussion Paper: Funding Sanctions Enforcement Assistance

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320028
RECEIVED: 06 JAN 93 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
DC

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 09 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9221247 9320021

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC423

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	3/23/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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RECORD ID: 9320028

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	HOWE	Z	93010713 FOR DECISION
001		X	93011109 HOWE APPROVED RECOM
002		X	93011109 SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	930111	JACKSON, K	
002	930111	PEARSON, W	
002	930111	DOWNING, R	
002	930111	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930111	HOWARD, R	
002	930111	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	
002	930111	CONNELL, M	

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<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>JK</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Jon Howe	<u>3</u>	<u>JA</u>	<u>D</u>
Sittmann Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>JA</u>	<u>Tab I</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>MM 1/11</u>	<u>SD</u>
NSC Secretariat			

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cc: VP Skinner Other _____

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Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

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File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 3/23/2010

OA/ID Number: 90024-034

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Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

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Disposition Date:

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MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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1993 JAN 11 AM 9:50

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0040 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 3

FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA # 20028

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON	EXEC SEC	
TREASURY	MR. R. BLAIR DOWNING	EXEC SEC	
DOD	COL MICHAEL SHERFIELD	EXEC SEC	
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	EXEC SEC	
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD	SECRETARY	

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0040 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 3
FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA # 20028

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON	EXEC SEC	
TREASURY	MR. R. BLAIR DOWNING	EXEC SEC	
DOD	COL MICHAEL SHERFIELD	EXEC SEC	
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	EXEC SEC	
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD	SECRETARY	

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

3/23/10 CAP

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion for 6 January DC Meeting on The Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 3/23/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 JAN 11 AM 9:50

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

JAN 11 10 21 AM '93

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY ☒
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Sherry

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0040 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 3

FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA # 20028

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON	EXEC SEC	
TREASURY	MR. R. BLAIR DOWNING	EXEC SEC	
DOD	COL MICHAEL SHERFIELD	EXEC SEC	
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	EXEC SEC	
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD	SECRETARY	

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP 3/23/10

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion for 6 January DC Meeting on The Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 3/23/2010

OA/ID Number: 90024-034

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1993 JAN 11 AM 9:50

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY ☒
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Sherry

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0040 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 3

FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA # 20028

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON	EXEC SEC	
TREASURY	MR. R. BLAIR DOWNING	EXEC SEC	
DOD	COL MICHAEL SHERFIELD	EXEC SEC	
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	EXEC SEC	
JCS	CAPT. H.L. SHEFFIELD	SECRETARY	

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/23/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320028
DATE 11 JAN 93

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 6 JAN DC MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

JACKSON, K
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

COPY: 1

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
ROOM 238 OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

COPY: 1

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
ROOM 822, USIA BUILDING
301 4TH STREET, SW
WASHINGTON, DC 20547

COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Summary of Conclusion, Deputies Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993 (1 pp.)	1/11/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	3/23/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20028

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 11, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. R. BLAIR DOWNING
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]


Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting
on the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993 (C)

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the Deputies
Committee Meeting on the former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993. (C)


William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 3/23/10

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03g. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting (2 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	3/23/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20028

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 6, 1993

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: JANE E. HOLLY

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee on
the Former Yugoslavia, January 6, 1993

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies
Committee Meeting held on January 6, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 3/23/06

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320021
RECEIVED: 06 JAN 93 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 06 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ADDL DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: HILL SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 09 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9221247 9320028

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC423

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CICIO
EXECSEC
HOLL
HOWE
NSC CHRON
TANNER
WRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAE NARA, Date 3/23/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Summary	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 3/23/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9320021

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SITTMANN
002

Z 93010609 FOR SIGNATURE
X 93010609 HILL SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	930106	JACKSON, K	
002	930106	PEARSON, W	
002	930106	HOWARD, R	
002	930106	CONNELL, M	
002	930106	DOWNING, R	
002	930106	SHERFIELD, M	
002	930106	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	
002	930106		

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 3/23/10

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

20021

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # ~~20021~~ _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS WSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG JDA A/O _____

fid

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

1

K

A

Bill Sittmann

2

-

Jon Howe

3

✓

I

Brent Scowcroft

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

4
5

JDA #1/6

~~S~~
U/R

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

cc:

VP

Skinner

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

6 JAN 93 9:11

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9320021
DATE 06 JAN 93

SUBJECT: ADDL INFO TO DC MTG ON 6 JAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
JACKSON, K OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS ROOM 238 OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY ROOM 822, USIA BUILDING 301 4TH STREET, SW WASHINGTON, DC 20547	_____	_____	_____ COPY: <u>1</u>

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Info for Meeting on 6 January (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	3/23/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION **CONFIDENTIAL** PAGES 13

FROM MR. WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION INFO FOR MTG ON 6 JAN

NSC LOG # 20021

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	W. ROBERT PEARSON		
TREASURY	R. BLAIR DOWNING		
DOD	COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD		
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]		
JCS	CAPT. H. L. SHEFFIELD		

REMARKS:

URGENT!!!!PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES UPON RECEIPT!!!

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/23/10

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Additional Information to DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 3/23/2010 **OA/ID Number:** 90024-034

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20021

January 6, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. R. BLAIR DOWNING
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H.L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Additional Information to DC Meeting on the Former
Yugoslavia *let*

Attached is additional information for today's DC meeting. *let*

Kenneth J. Diez
William F. Sittmann
for Executive Secretary

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 3/23/10

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Declassify on: OADR

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Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Report	Re: Small Group Discussion Paper: New Sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro [FOIA restrictions redacted] (12 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 423 - January 05, 1993 - NSC/DC Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 12/12/2022

Date Closed: 3/23/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-034
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2012-1199-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/12/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

SMALL GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER:
NEW SANCTIONS ON SERBIA/MONTENEGRO



I. ISSUE

In a December 20 joint statement, President Bush and Prime Minister Major announced that they would be ready, absent a rapid and radical change in Serbia's policy, to impose new sanctions which could "initially include cutting postal and telecommunications links and could lead to closing the borders and complete diplomatic isolation for years to come." Diplomatic isolation was understood to cover the possible severing of diplomatic relations, as well as expulsion from international organizations.

The following paper analyzes these potential additional sanctions from the perspective of: a) steps needed to implement them; b) the likelihood of their international acceptance and effective implementation; and c) their likely strategic and practical implications.

Effective implementation of each measure would require UNSC approval. While we may have some differences with the French and the U.K., our ability to secure Russian and Chinese agreement not to block Council action will be key to our ability to move forward. In the past, Russia has resisted many of our proposals for tough action and Yeltsin is under pressure from nationalists to help Serbia and to stop its cooperation with the West on pressuring Serbia. Our past experience suggests that it will be easier to bring Russia on board if the Perm-3 agree on the objectives and then consult closely with Russia before initiating resolutions.

We should consult with Vance and Owen on the potential impact of new sanctions on their efforts. Moreover, we need to consider whether additional new sanctions will have any impact on Milosevic's policies; if not, we need to consider the purpose of these measures. Finally, we would need to consider the strategy of approaching Security Council members on any issue. For example, should new sanctions initiatives be pursued in parallel with a no-fly enforcement resolution, and is this likely to invite trade-offs.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Cutting off Postal and Telecommunications Links with Serbia

A complete ban on postal and telecommunication links with Serbia would cut off normal communications with the outside world. It would underscore Serbia's isolation, inhibit economic activity, particularly banking and services, and

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2012-1199-MR

MM 2/12/2016

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complicate Belgrade's task of meeting local social and economic demands. The imposition of such a ban, however, would impose significant costs on neighboring states and may prove exceedingly difficult to achieve.

For the purposes of this discussion, telecommunications are defined as telephone, facsimile, telex, and telegraphic services, television program relay (e.g., electronic newsgathering) and include all transmissions by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems.

Implementation

A total or partial ban on postal and telecommunications services with Serbia would require a new UNSC Chapter VII resolution. Article 41 of the UN Charter specifically refers to the interruption of postal and telecommunications links as one of the measures the Council may order under Chapter VII. The resolution would require the issuance of implementing regulations by member states and would take precedence over any pre-existing obligations under multilateral and bilateral postal and telecommunications agreements. This step has never been invoked against any country.

We anticipate opposition to such a measure from Russia and other Balkan states which would be affected. Opponents may also argue that such a ban would entail considerable hardship for neighboring countries and disproportionately affect the population at large, public diplomacy and journalism. Some will argue that it could even strengthen Milosevic by providing him a captive audience.

UNSCR 757 now restricts import and export of goods and the provision of financial or other economic resources to Serbia-Montenegro. This has been interpreted by many states, including the U.S., as requiring a limitation on certain postal services and telecommunications transactions. The U.S. implements this resolution through U.S. Executive Order 12810. Exceptions are made under Treasury licenses for certain telecommunications transactions, letters of up to 12 oz and no commercial value, and diplomatic mails. While, if the UNSC issued a resolution so requiring, the U.S. could implement a general ban under the UN Participation Act, there could be litigation challenging the constitutionality of such a ban.

A less than total ban might be practically, as well as diplomatically, more acceptable. Exceptions could be made to

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allow for the continuation of diplomatic mail/electronic communications, journalistic and news and information services, and activities of Government broadcast services, including the VOA. A humanitarian exception (i.e. in the event of a natural disaster) could also be included. However, if telecommunications links were cut off by technical, rather than through regulatory means, it would be virtually impossible to make distinctions among types of information. We would need to consult with the private sector to ascertain whether specific services (e.g., private business/banking networks) exist which could be targeted from abroad by technical means. Broadcasting services originating outside of Serbia would not be impacted by the embargo, unless Serbia engaged in retaliatory jamming.

International Compliance and Likely Impact

Principal communication land lines (e.g., phone cables) linking Serbia and Montenegro to the outside world run through Bulgaria and Greece. There has also been a growing reliance by Serbia on the use of INTELSAT. Serbia-Montenegro shares space on INTELSAT transponders with other countries and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to cut them off without seriously impeding satellite services to other areas of the former Yugoslavia and neighboring countries. INTELSAT member governments would have to convene an extraordinary meeting to consider options for implementing such a resolution. Serbia-Montenegro is also a transit country for satellite, cable and microwave communications to neighboring countries.

Neighboring countries would be seriously affected by a comprehensive cut-off. Bulgaria would be hard hit by a cut off, as 45% of its international communications (phone, fax, etc) pass through Serbia. Greece would also be affected, as its lines to northern Europe pass through Serbia. Most of Macedonia's international communications links are through Serbia and a cutoff could have serious consequences including further political isolation and instability.

The success of a telecommunications ban would depend on a maximum number of member countries effectively requiring compliance by telecommunications service providers within their jurisdictions. If even a neighboring country refused to participate in the cut off, telecommunication links could be routed through that country to Serbia-Montenegro and the bulk of the services could be continued. However, any measure generally applied by most states would have a significant impact on Serbia's ability to establish routine external communications. The UN's ability to enforce such sanctions would also, in practice, be limited.

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Past U.S. programs of limited telecommunications controls against embargoed countries, such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Cuba, have not been very effective. These have been easily circumvented by individuals and companies sending telephone calls and other types of communications through third countries.

B. Closing Serbia's Borders

Closing Serbia's borders completely to trade of any kind, including all transshipments of food, medicine and other humanitarian items, would require a new Security Council resolution. The prospects of obtaining Council approval of such a broad extension of the Serbia embargo are marginal. There would be a serious impact of such sanctions on neighboring countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia. These states depend on traffic moving through Serbia to link them with the rest of Europe, and on the provision of certain exempted trade, e.g., food.

We have imposed a comprehensive set of sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro. Enforcement of these sanctions is far more complex than in the Iraq situation and has involved considerably greater resources. We have had to rely on the neighboring states to implement sanctions and have provided limited assistance to them. Their implementation of sanctions has improved significantly over the past month. Principal river, road and rail links between Serbia and neighboring countries are now being monitored by Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs).

Expanded Enforcement Measures

The closing of Serbia's borders to stop the provision of all goods and services would require significantly increased enforcement resources, including a major infusion of additional civilian or military personnel. The enforcement efforts of the states neighboring Serbia/Montenegro are now stretched to their limit. We cannot rely on them to further expand their enforcement efforts without the infusion of considerable technical assistance and personnel, and without compensation for the economic costs expanded sanctions will impose on them.

The existing SAM effort would have to be expanded from about 40 to up to 300 members to permit 24 hour coverage at all principal and secondary river, road and rail border crossings. These civilian monitors also could accompany the few remaining trains, ships and vehicles transiting Serbia

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under authorization from the Sanctions Committee. Monitors would be necessary in Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.

Our current efforts to expand the SAMs to a more modest 60 members indicate that the international pool of available customs officers for this purpose is quite limited. A 300 member SAMS force would cost an estimated \$3 million per month in personnel support costs alone. The U.S. contribution would likely require a new budget appropriation. The SAMs do not function directly under UN auspices, but rely on the direct participation of EC and CSCE states.

As a practical matter, international civilian monitors, including customs officers and other SAM participants, cannot be expected to use force against third country ships, trucks or trains suspected of violating sanctions. This would require host government enforcement action or their authorization to permit foreign military/police enforcement efforts within their territory.

If invited to do so by the host governments, the UN could establish an international military or customs force with armed guards in order to closely patrol Serbia's borders and interdict cross border traffic. Since closing the Danube would not be accepted by riparian states, armed naval vessels might be needed to escort commercial and other legitimate shipping through the Serbian portion of the Danube. These forces would be in addition to UNPROFOR, whose mandate is humanitarian and peacekeeping in nature.

The closing of borders by military force would require a new resolution and the consent of neighboring states.

- The Perm 5 would need to engage in extensive consultations; it is unlikely that China and Russia would agree to a resolution establishing an international force.
- The costs and personnel support requirements of an international military enforcement operation would be enormous. Under UN Peacekeeping provisions, the U.S. would be assessed 30.5% of the cost. Alternatively, we would have to seek voluntary contributions which, in view of the many other current requirements (Somalia, Iraq, etc.), would be extremely difficult to obtain.

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Expanding Sanctions Coverage

At Tab A, we have attached a possible menu of measures that would expand sanctions coverage without initiating a complete embargo.

C. Exclusion from International Organizations

The FRY has been excluded from normal participation in the work of the UNGA, most UN technical and specialized agencies, and most other international organizations, through resolutions or other measures under the procedures of these bodies. However, the FRY maintains its Mission in New York and could in theory continue to participate in other UN subsidiary bodies and technical and specialized agencies. Since the sanctions effectively deny the FRY direct economic benefits from these international organizations, exclusion would primarily be a symbolic and diplomatic gesture.

The United States has taken the position that Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and that the FRY is not entitled to Yugoslavia's membership in the UN. The General Assembly implemented the recommendation in Security Council Resolution 777 that the "General Assembly decide that the FRY should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly." While our original proposal in the Security Council would have denied FRY membership in all UN bodies under the theory that the FRY is not the "continuity" of Yugoslavia, we accepted this more limited formulation in order to obtain Russian, French, and British support for the resolution. The UN Legal Counsel's interpretation is that the resolution does not suspend or terminate Yugoslavia's UN membership and that its mission to the UN may continue to function. This interpretation implies that, in the absence of a new Security Council and General Assembly resolution, ECOSOC and its many subsidiary bodies have no authority to exclude the FRY. While the USG construes the resolutions differently, we have not attempted to challenge the UN Legal interpretation.

We have successfully pursued the adoption of resolutions in WIPO, ICAO, and the IAEA to exclude "FRY" participation in meetings of these organizations. Other international organizations, including GATT, INTELSAT, IFAD, and the CSCE have taken action to deny the FRY membership or participation.

Subsequently, we assured Russia that we would not take the lead to move to deny the FRY rights in other organizations, and that we would decide on a case by case basis whether to support such efforts by other countries. As a result, we have merely

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followed the EC in making a statement in some organizations to the effect that we believe the FRY should not be entitled to assume Yugoslavia's membership in the organization.

Implementation

To exclude the FRY from the entire UN system, a new UNSC resolution, implemented through a resolution in the UNGA, would be needed. The UN resolution should explicitly state that the FRY is not the continuation of the former Yugoslavia; consequently it is not a member of the UN and cannot participate in the United Nations until it has been granted membership in its own right. Independent of UN action, the USG could pursue resolutions in international organizations outside the UN system to exclude FRY participation. The rules and procedures would vary for different organizations.

International Acceptance and Likely Impact

We sought for nearly six months to obtain the initial UNSC and UNGA resolutions on this subject. There is no reason to believe that new resolutions would be any easier to obtain. The principal difficulty we would face in pursuing further formal exclusion of the FRY in the UN system would be in securing Russian concurrence or abstention. Moreover, EC countries also were not very supportive of our efforts during the earlier process. Provided that international acceptance can be secured, these measures can be implemented relatively easily.

Since the FRY is no longer participating normally in the work and meetings of most UN organizations, further measures would be primarily symbolic in nature. However, they would be important in achieving further diplomatic isolation of the FRY. One of our main concerns would be preserving FRY's financial and other obligations. This can be achieved through appropriate drafting. (For example, Serbia-Montenegro's share of Yugoslavia's \$2.0 billion debt to the World Bank is \$1.1 billion.)

D. Severing Diplomatic Ties

Isolating Serbia diplomatically could be accomplished by: closing Serbia's diplomatic missions abroad and foreign missions in Belgrade and severing relations; closing those missions without formally severing diplomatic relations; or further reducing the size of those missions.

It is not clear whether further diplomatic isolation of Serbia would weaken Milosevic or reinforce the Serbian electorate's garrison mentality, which was somewhat evident in

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the December 20 elections. Substantial reductions of active Embassy staff would have a negative effect on Western countries' ability to collect intelligence and, in particular, to maintain links to Kosovo, Sandzak, Montenegro and, to a lesser extent, Macedonia. To a very limited extent, these functions could be performed by international observers.

Implementation

Isolating Serbia diplomatically could be accomplished internationally by:

- (1) seeking a Security Council resolution calling on all member states to break diplomatic relations or, at a minimum, further to reduce the size of Serbia's diplomatic presence in their countries as was recently done with respect to Libya; or
- (2) seeking a consensus with key EC members for a coordinated move to reduce or sever diplomatic links with Serbia and pressing other countries bilaterally to follow suit; or
- (3) ending ties unilaterally.

While we could lead by example and then try to influence others to follow, this would reduce or eliminate our presence and the benefits that derive therefrom, without necessarily accomplishing Serbia's broader diplomatic isolation. To increase Serbia's isolation without formally breaking diplomatic relations we could simply close their embassy in Washington and our embassy in Belgrade. Finally, we could seek to reduce still further the size of the Serbian embassy here and our embassy in Belgrade. A first step could be to call on the Serbs to remove all their dependents and for us to do the same from Belgrade. A second could be to impose an even tighter limit on the numbers of official personnel.

- Although we do not have full diplomatic relations with Serbia, we have maintained our embassy in Belgrade and permitted a limited number of personnel from the embassy of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to remain in Washington. We have made clear that we do not consider this to constitute formal recognition of Serbia.
- We have, however, substantially downgraded our presence in Serbia-Montenegro. We reduced embassy personnel in Belgrade by two-thirds and did not

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replace our ambassador. We also closed all "Yugoslav" consulates in the U.S., sent home several military attaches and informed the "Yugoslav" embassy that we would not allow them to replace their ambassador.

International Acceptance and Likely Impact

As long as the strategy for the resolution of problems in the former Yugoslavia continues to be based on diplomacy rather than military intervention, the severing of diplomatic ties is likely to be seen by many countries as counterproductive. It is unlikely that the U.S. would find broad support for a resolution calling for Serbia's complete diplomatic isolation through embassy closures. Many countries, including Russia and China would be cautious about such a resolution. To date, most countries have withdrawn their Ambassadors, but no country, as far as we are aware, has followed the U.S. example and down-sized its embassy and/or closed "FRY" consulates. While most countries with a direct interest in the conflict are not likely for practical reasons to sever diplomatic ties with Serbia, they may be prepared to withdraw dependents, and substantially reduce staff. Under this approach, countries would reduce their vulnerability in case of increased hostilities, while preserving communication.

Milosevic has managed to play upon Serbian xenophobia to maintain his support by effectively exploiting many Western moves. Symbolic measures have thus proven somewhat self-defeating in the short term, particularly when coupled with Milosevic's ability to maintain the appearance of some economic normality through, for example, continued availability of gasoline and certain luxury goods.


Maintaining a presence in Belgrade would preserve our primary ability to monitor what is happening in Serbia (including Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina), Montenegro and Macedonia. Embassy officials maintain contacts with political and ethnic leaders, UN officials in these areas as well as with local governments. The Embassy in Belgrade is also helping to cover Bosnia-Herzegovina until we can set up a mission in Sarajevo.

1.4(b); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

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- 10 -

14(c), 14(d), (b)(3)



TAB A

EXPANDING SANCTIONS COVERAGE

The following measures could be sought in a new UN resolution:

- Uniform freezing of Serbian government and government-controlled and private financial assets, including assets owned by their foreign subsidiaries. Serbia is successfully using ostensibly private resources to finance its efforts to circumvent the embargo. Depriving Serbia access to such financial sources will significantly decrease circumvention activity. National enforcement authority over financial assets differ considerably and agreement on any uniform approach to such financial sanctions will be quite difficult to achieve.
- Seizure and forfeiture of violative shipments and conveyances. The UN Security Council could direct border states and other members to seize and forfeit unauthorized imports and exports as well as the vessels or vehicles used to transport them. This would be a potent disincentive to sanctions-busters.
- Detention of Serbian/Montenegrin-controlled ships. Ships registered to Serbia or Montenegro, or beneficially owned by Serbian and Montenegro interests, could be subject to detention and/or seizure if they enter any port. Their cargoes could be subject to detention and/or seizure and sale. Although we and some other countries (e.g., France) interpret existing resolutions as requiring such detention, other countries do not agree with our interpretation and a new resolution would be useful to settle the question.
- Clearly banning provision of services. Most countries do not interpret Resolution 757 as banning the import and export of services.
- Ban transshipments. We could move for a more comprehensive ban on transshipments through Serbia. This should include requiring that all such shipments be adequately protected from diversion to Serbia before sanctions committee approval. Special

provision could be made to exempt certain Danube river traffic where there is no intention to enter or land cargoes in Serbian ports. (Other states in the region, including Greece will strenuously oppose such a ban).

- Ban travel and related transactions. While the UNSC is not likely to approve a total travel ban, they might agree to clarify that travel-related transactions, at least for business travel, are prohibited under existing UN sanctions.
- Prosecution of sanctions violators. This would be largely a hortatory measure calling on states to provide penalties for and prosecute sanctions violators.

Measures limiting humanitarian assistance (which would be much more difficult to build support for) might also include:

- Narrowing the "humanitarian" definition. A more careful definition could be crafted of what constitutes "humanitarian goods". This would include a ban on pharmaceutical precursors which are largely used for exports and could include a list of items such as alcohol and cigarettes.
- Termination of the humanitarian exemption. We would encounter considerable resistance to the idea of cutting off all shipments of food, medicine and essential humanitarian goods; thus we would probably be forced to keep this exception. Suggesting the cut-off of these goods would go far beyond any previous UN sanctions regime.
- Termination of humanitarian remittances. At present most countries consider pension remittances as falling within the scope of the humanitarian exemption in UNSCR 757. Pensions and worker remittances are a significant source of hard currency for Serbia/Montenegro. (Our past efforts to cut off pension payments have met with little or no support). This would also mean halting the U.S. social security and federal benefit payments to 3,000 recipients (mostly elderly U.S. citizens) who our embassy reports would otherwise be destitute.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20021

January 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: JANE E. HOEL

SUBJECT: Additional Information to the DC Meeting on the
Former Yugoslavia

Attached is additional information that should be circulated to
the agencies before today's DC meeting at 4:00p.m.

Attachment

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 3/23/10

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9221247
RECEIVED: 28 DEC 92 19

TO: HOWE

FROM: HOLL
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 06 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SERBIA
YUGOSLAVIA
AGENDA

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 6 JAN DC MTG ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: NOTED BY HOWE

DUE DATE: 31 DEC 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9320021 9320028

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC423

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HOLL
NSC CHRON

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/23/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJSL

DOC 4 OF 4

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~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9221247

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HOLL	Z 92122819 APPROPRIATE ACTION
002 HOWE	Z 93010416 FOR DECISION
002	X 93010508 HOWE APPROVED RECOM
003	X 93010508 HILL SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
004 HOWE	Z 93010612 FOR INFORMATION
004	X 93010910 NOTED BY HOWE

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003	930105	JACKSON, K
003	930105	PEARSON, W
003	930105	HOWARD, R
003	930105	CONNELL, M
003	930105	DOWNING, R
003	930105	SHERFIELD, M
003	930105	OLIVER, J
003	930105	SHEFFIELD, H

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAF

3/23/10

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WTA LOG # 21247 ADD ON
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WTA A/O 1

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>Cops</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		<u>—</u>
Jon Howe	<u>3</u>	<u>JA</u>	
Brent Scowcroft		<u>[Signature]</u>	
Situation Room			<u>[Signature]</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>12/19</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____ VP _____ Skinner _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

Today DC - Yugoslav

6 JAN 93 3:17

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21247 Add on

January 6, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE
THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT
FROM: JANE E. HOLL
SUBJECT: Today's DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia

Today's meeting will have a large group basically considering two broad issues: humanitarian assistance and sanctions. We recommend that in order to keep the Deputies focused you direct discussion toward closure on certain aspects of each issue.

Humanitarian Assistance

- Supply. Deputies should agree to keep stock levels high. Irrespective of whatever the ratio of shelter to food requirements may be, we should take steps to ensure that the pipeline does not dry up -- even if it means stockpiling materials in the three main nodes into Bosnia: Zagreb, Split/Ploce, and Belgrade.
- Distribution. Deputies should agree that the USG make a practice of approaching UNHCR to ascertain truck/maintenance requirements so that if supplies are not getting in, it is not due to a lack of wheels. Deputies should agree that we should offer to conduct air drops for the most desperate cities -- i.e. Zepa.
- Security. Deputies should agree to make public the plight of reported inaccessible cities, to keep the pressure on all the parties to let convoys through, and to encourage other countries and Vance/Owen to do the same.

Sanctions

- Deputies should agree on what target level of effectiveness (i.e. 80%, 65%, 100%) we seek from the sanctions regime.
- Deputies should agree on those additional measures we would propose to reach that target level and task State to develop a strategy for ensuring their adoption.

Concurrence by: Nancy Dyke

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

201-2459-MR
Eg 2/18/14

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21247

January 6, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: JANE E. HODG

SUBJECT: Today's DC Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia

Today's meeting will have a large group basically considering two broad issues: humanitarian assistance and sanctions. We recommend that in order to keep the Deputies focused you direct discussion toward closure on certain aspects of each issue.

Humanitarian Assistance

- Supply. Deputies should agree to keep stock levels high. Irrespective of whatever the ratio of shelter to food requirements may be, we should take steps to ensure that the pipeline does not dry up -- even if it means stockpiling materials in the three main nodes into Bosnia: Zagreb, Split/Ploce, and Belgrade.
- Distribution. Deputies should agree that the USG make a practice of approaching UNHCR to ascertain truck/maintenance requirements so that if supplies are not getting in, it is not due to a lack of wheels. Deputies should agree that we should offer to conduct air drops for the most desperate cities -- i.e. Zepa.
- Security. Deputies should agree to make public the plight of reported inaccessible cities, to keep the pressure on all the parties to let convoys through, and to encourage other countries and Vance/Owen to do the same.

Sanctions

- Deputies should agree on what target level of effectiveness (i.e. 80%, 65%, 100%) we seek from the sanctions regime.
- Deputies should agree on those additional measures we would propose to reach that target level and task State to develop a strategy for ensuring their adoption.

Concurrence by: Nancy Dyke

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