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Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90024
Folder ID Number: 90024-013

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 403A - December 03, 1992 - Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Small Group [Somalia] [FOIA exemptions redacted] (11 pp.)	12/3/92	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 403A - December 03, 1992 - Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Pinksheet Number: cap1708

OA/ID Number: 90024-013

Date Closed: 3/17/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320043
RECEIVED: 11 JAN 93 09

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ORDWAY
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
MINUTES

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR DC MTG ON 3 DEC RE SOMALIA

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 14 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

DC ~~397~~ 403A

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CLARKE
NSC CHRON
ORDWAY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/16/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9320043

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SITTMANN
001

Z 93011117 FOR DECISION
X 93011213 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/16/10

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National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20043

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AB A/O _____

W

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Jon Howe			
Brent Scowcroft			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>File</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

cc:

VP

Skinner

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

11 JAN 93 5:12

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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20043

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 11, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY

SUBJECT: Minutes for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting,
December 3, 1992

Attached are the Minutes for the subject Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and file the attached Minutes for the record.

Approve JA Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Minutes

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 3/16/10

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 403A - December 03, 1992 - Small Group Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SLG on 10/9/14

Date Closed: 3/17/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2382-MR (500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/6/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20043



Meeting of the NSC Deputies Small Group

DATE: December 3, 1992

LOCATION: SVTS Room

TIME: 5:32 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Minutes for the Deputies Small Group Meeting on Somalia
(S)

PARTICIPANTS:

OVP:

Karl Jackson

State:

Frank Wisner

Robert Gallucci

Hank Cohen

Brandon Grove

DOD:

Carl Ford

James Locher

James Woods

CIA:

William Studeman

(b)(1); (b)(3)

JCS:

David Jeremiah

Frank Bowman

AID:

Andrew Natsios

White House:

Jonathan Howe

NSC:

Richard Clarke

Nick Rostow

John Ordway

Michael Sheehan

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2006-0851-MR

SCS 6/6/13

Minutes

Admiral Howe: The train is moving. The Congressional briefing will be tomorrow. Probably the most central issue is who is with us for peacemaking and peacekeeping. We are trying to nail down the statement. I understand the President has talked to eleven heads of state and there have been lots of other contacts. (S)

The President wants to know tomorrow morning who is signed up, who's a good possibility, and who has given a formal commitment. (S)

There are other issues we need, too. The President will not make a formal decision until there is a resolution and he consults with Congress. If everything is positive there will be a Presidential statement which will be the go signal. (S)

Admiral Studeman:

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

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Declassify on: OADR

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(b)(1); (b)(3)

They have rains today in Mogadishu. There is lots of flooding.
(U)

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Mr. Wisner: The Security Council went into session at 5:30. The resolution which is based on Boutros-Ghali's approach resolved the command issue. It appears that the Security Council will vote this evening, and it looks like it will be unanimous. (U)

Admiral Howe: How is the command relationship? (U)

Mr. Wisner: There is a formula which has been worked out. (U)

Admiral Bowman: This links paragraph 8 with command paragraph 11 by having paragraph 8 "welcome the offer by a member state" Paragraph 11 says that state and the Secretary General should make the necessary arrangements which reflect that offer. (U)

Mr. Wisner: I have a number of issues to bring up later. You have seen Perkins explanation of vote. (U)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

I would like to go through, since the President wants it on his desk, who we have got. I would like to go through it country by country. Dick Clarke's sheet has been passed on. It needs to be completely recognized that it very early. I have asked Dick Clarke to keep interagency book on this. Once we have the basic diplomatic work done by the President and the State Department, it's over to you, Dave Jeremiah, how to orchestrate it. Let's run down the countries in order. Let's start with (b)(1). My assumption is that we have heard from the (b)(1). (U)

Mr. Wisner: I know nothing about (b)(1). (U)

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Mr. Clarke: This is part of the original peacekeeping commitment. (C)

Admiral Howe: We will put them in peacekeeping. Next is (b)(1). I know from the Presidential discussion with (b)(1) that (b)(1) is supportive for peacekeeping, and his guys will be there in a few days, but he wanted to consult and get back to the President this weekend. My assumption is this will be a go. We can count them in the peacekeeping column. (C)

Admiral Jeremiah: The (b)(1) said they were on for peacemaking and peacekeeping. (C)

Admiral Howe: Is 750 right? (C)

Admiral Jeremiah: They are talking about the original contingent for peacemaking and then staying on for peacekeeping. (C)

Admiral Howe: So can they be there the 5th or 6th? (C)

Mr. Wisner: Under peacemaking, each nation will have to cover its own costs. What is the financing aspect? (C)

Admiral Howe: We didn't discuss that. The general condition is that each country pays its own way, and needs to find its own sponsors. (C)

Mr. Wisner: Funding needs to be front and center. Maybe we should have a funding column. (C)

Admiral Howe: Good idea. I would suggest another thing is a cable out for ambassadors to give them the essence of the conversation and so they can follow up. It is really important that it get out tonight. We certainly want the ambassador to be informed. (C)

Mr. Wisner: We are equipped to get cables out and will ask the (b)(1) about the fund. (C)

Admiral Howe: (b)(1) (C)

Mr. Clarke: The State Department said (b)(1) reported they were interested. (C)

Admiral Howe: We are interested in knowing whether it is for coalition or peacekeeping. (C)

Mr. Wisner: A question for Admiral Jeremiah. Do you want anyone, any size? Should there be minimum force levels, certain units? What guidance do you have? (C)

Admiral Jeremiah: From the military perspective, we don't need anybody. It is a political and logistical call. For the peacemaking phase we are inclined toward company size or larger, and not many. We want four to five western style battalions that can be deployed quickly. The (b)(1) who

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are a little light. I don't know about (b)(1), that would set you up in the front end. It's enough flags. From that point on you need a coalition of forces. Before the (b)(1) and the (b)(1). We want a coalition of forces between company and battalion size that are self-sustaining. Mostly countries that would give large numbers. The emphasis will be on relatively light units and engineering units. (S)

Mr. Wisner: You prefer a battalion, can go for a company, are interested in light forces or engineers. The Secretary General wants Africans and Muslims. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: (b)(1) is good but they are stretched to the limit. We'll have to pay. (S)

Admiral Howe: (b)(1) (S)

Nailing one will be important. (b)(1) may not be the right one. We will come back to that. We want, even if they are only medical or something, we need black Africans and Muslims. (S)

On (b)(1), my vibes were good on (b)(1). They would like to be part of the coalition and peacekeeping. The (b)(1) Prime Minister said he would have to consult politically and will get back to us on peacemaking. I think that will come out positive. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: That tracks precisely. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Nothing on (b)(1). (S)

Admiral Howe: On (b)(1) was the same: in for peacekeeping, needs to check politically for the coalition. I had a fairly positive sign (b)(1). (S)

Mr. Wisner: Boutros-Ghali was assured by (b)(1) he would be there for the coalition. (S)

Admiral Howe: (b)(1) was positive about both aspects. He wants to confirm. My sense is (b)(1) troops. My impression is that they would go fairly soon. We can count on them in the coalition. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: They intend to get (b)(1) in with the MARG. (S)

Admiral Howe: I think we can count on (b)(1). An ambassadorial follow up would be useful. (S)

(b)(1) we have not contacted. I assume this is a previous peacekeeping contingent. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I have nothing (b)(1). (S)

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Admiral Howe: [redacted] (b)(1) is the same situation. [redacted] (b)(1) we have talked about. The [redacted] (b)(1) were forward leaning. We have to nail it down. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: The attache was over here with charts and everything. (S)

Admiral Howe: We can count [redacted] (b)(1) in unless Frank Wisner is [redacted] (b)(1). (S)

We have not yet sent a message to the [redacted] (b)(1). We are trying to decide whether to make a request or not. I understand that you, Frank, recommend that we make that request. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Correct. (U)

Admiral Howe: [redacted] (b)(1) is an old commitment. [redacted] (b)(1) is an old commitment. With the [redacted] (b)(1) we got a very positive response. They are interested in increasing their forces, and being part of the coalition. Frank? (S)

Mr. Wisner: We have been assured the [redacted] (b)(1) will be there with additional forces. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: I am amazed by the degree this is contrary to our warmups. (S)

Admiral Howe: It is useful when the President talks to the Head of State. But the bureaucrats can try to turn it in a different direction. (S)

[redacted] (b)(1) we have discussed. [redacted] (b)(1). The President asked several times and the only answer was support in the UN. He did not get a positive affirmation. (S)

With regard to [redacted] (b)(1) was positive and he is in for both peacemaking and peacekeeping. He had a generally supportive statement. We will have to follow up. (S)

All heads of state were grateful for what the U.S. is doing. The [redacted] (b)(1) was positive on the request for troops but not specific. I think we can count on [redacted] (b)(1) participation. (S)

Mr. Wisner: This is more positive than I had anticipated and is very welcome news. (S)

Admiral Howe: He said to make contacts through his ambassador at the UN. I assume military follow up occurs through the attache. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I assume that should be through [redacted] (b)(1). (S)

Admiral Howe: On [redacted] (b)(1) the President asked and got no response. My guess is that [redacted] (b)(1) won't take this on. (S)

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Mr. Wisner: Boutros-Ghali said they made an offer to him, an offer for the coalition. We will need to follow through. (S)

Admiral Howe: On (b)(1). (S)

Mr. Wisner: They have offered troops. Boutros-Ghali would like them in as a nation that had suffered from aggression. (S)

Admiral Howe: Symbolically that is a very useful thing. There may be others. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Boutros-Ghali informed me he had an offer from (b)(1). He's pleased and hopes we will work on that. My impression is a "maybe" on peacekeeping. We need to follow up in (b)(1). (S)

Admiral Howe: After this meeting we will give a list of those potentially in for coalition, and those in for peacekeeping. It might be useful for you to call the ambassadors and see. So tomorrow morning we can have a good update for the President at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow. (S)

Mr. Wisner: We will organize to send cables tonight. (S)

From (b)(1) we have a hint of interest. Also (b)(1). (S)

Admiral Howe: (b)(1) might be part of the coalition. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I don't know other than "interested." I understand (b)(1) will consider money. (S)

Admiral Howe: (b)(1) are not interested in sending troops. (S)

Mr. Ford: How about (b)(1)? (S)

Admiral Howe: We have not made a call yet for other reasons. I anticipate that probably tomorrow afternoon or Saturday the President will talk to (b)(1), and this will be one issue. (S)

Mr. Wisner: The only thing is that I've have been in touch with the charge and asked his assessment. He is skeptical that they would be prepared to send troops. We are light on (b)(1)

(b)(1) (S)

Admiral Howe: We are depending on an all-points message. We are not pushing from the Presidential level. I am sure the President would be willing to follow up, though. (S)

Mr. Wisner: An update on (b)(1). (S)

Mr. Gallucci: I understand that (b)(1) had said yes to troops, but couldn't pay for them. (S)

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(b)(1)

Mr. Wisner: If we got \$10 million out of the Saudis that is only the opener. We have to decide where to put that money. (C)

Admiral Howe: On (b)(1), he is not through, but he says he is overloaded. That is not likely. The Prime Minister is positive but has lots on the plate. (b)(1) funding was based on peacekeeping. We need to be sure (b)(1) will foot the bill for the coalition effort. (C)

We will try to square away these. Maybe, Frank, on the B list we could target and get messages out. We want a solid base for peacekeeping. Maybe we would work with Boutros-Ghali on that. (C)

Mr. Wisner: I will call him tonight, and make sure he is comfortable with the list. We will get to the ambassadors tonight. We don't have the UN resolution, and we don't have a Presidential decision, and it is remarkable we have this much. (C)

Admiral Howe: Out of the meeting today there is a desire to nail down as much as possible at this juncture. There are a couple of problems. The issue of diplomatic clearances was raised today for military access for throughput. Dave Jeremiah, as I understand (b)(1) are the key clearances you want to work hard. The President had a good call with (b)(1) who was extremely supportive and in a general way offered facilities. The President mentioned a port visit. The initial ground was broken and now needs to be nailed down. (C)

Admiral Jeremiah: The access list has come in from CINCCENT and State followed up with a message. I can't tell you the responses. (C)

Mr. Gallucci: We have made telephone calls but no messages. (C)

Admiral Howe: On (b)(1) will we get a positive response on supporting an airhead? (C)

Mr. Cohen: There is a message saying they would do what is necessary to support the U.S. effort. (C)

Admiral Howe: Bob Oakley's early entry into Mogadishu before the force to talk to the clans brings up the need for talking points. JCS and State need to work this. We would like to see them. (C)

Mr. Wisner: I am not yet in a position to table a paper. We will work on it. I have a draft of Oakley's basic instructions. We are asking him to go to Mogadishu as chief U.S. representative, responsible for all U.S. activities not under the military commander and to be an advisor to the commander, liaison to Kittani, and the main contact on relief work with the DART. Oakley will be joined by a small team from OFDA, Embassy Nairobi,

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administrative support and secretarial support. A former DCM in Mogadishu is coming along. Phyllis says he is packing. (S)

Admiral Howe: I assume he will check in with General Johnston. We will have a day or two to work this, but we will need to nail down what he will do with the clans. On the legal aspects, the Attorney General will send a statement on why this is legal. We will need a war powers notification statement. This has not been decided by the President, but is likely to be needed within 48 hours after the troops go in. (S)

Mr. Rostow: The war powers lawyers are meeting tomorrow at 10:00. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I had a good session with Boutros-Ghali. There are a number of outstanding issues, including the need to prepare for a Presidential statement to Boutros-Ghali as a commitment of the U.S. to accomplish this mission. It would give us a chance to describe the mission in our own way. We have sent around a draft. [Note: no one had received it.] (S)

I agreed with Boutros-Ghali that we would draft a reply, including a commitment that he have a peacekeeping force on the ground. I want these letters approved as drafts so Perkins can negotiate the Boutros reply. (S)

Admiral Howe: We will work closely. Get comments to Dick Clarke. Is this in response to the resolution? (S)

Mr. Wisner: The sooner the better. I would urge JCS to get someone to New York for intelligence, liaison, and to brief our UN people on the concept of operations. (S)

We got a bleat on Hargeisa and the Kenyan border. We have USIA working on information support. A USIA team will be in New York tomorrow morning to work the UN radio propaganda, and our own radio propaganda effort. We will also have the press affairs strategy that you have requested. (S)

Admiral Howe: Presumably if there is a Presidential statement tomorrow, and a backgrounder at DOD, State will have lots of good grist. (S)

Mr. Natsios: Jim Kunder is with Oakley in Addis. He talked to (b)(1). There is lots of useful information and lots of useful stuff for the military, too. (S)

Admiral Howe: It is important to get information around and to coordinate what you are saying. State is leading the coordination but we need to make sure we are talking from the same line. (S)

Mr. Natsios: (b)(1) in all the villages, without exception, there is enthusiasm for the U.S. initiative. We are hearing no complaints. People are relieved to hear that someone is coming to restore order. (U)

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Admiral Howe: That is useful. (U)

Mr. Wisner: It also will be very nervous in the next few days. Deployment will be a time of maximum danger. There is a feeling that the warlords are moving technicals out to the hinterland to prey on NGOs. We want to evacuate only in extreme cases. (S)

What is the Congressional guidance? (U)

Admiral Howe: The President will have a meeting tomorrow with the Congressional leadership about 11:00 a.m. Once that is done my thought is that you would be free to contact your own committees, and say that you expect the President to make an announcement soon. Let's stay in touch tomorrow. I am reluctant to unleash everybody tomorrow. Let's check. Maybe you could contact your Congressmen tomorrow as the meeting breaks. (S)

Mr. Wisner: It would probably be in the afternoon after the President's speech. (S)

Admiral Howe: That's safest. If you have a problem with committee people, that's okay. If the speech is the benchmark that's best. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I suggest close coordination with the three public affairs offices. (S)

Admiral Howe: That is critical and I will remind Walter Kansteiner and company. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: If we believe the 100-day program, there is no reason to believe there is any humanitarian disaster in the north. I understand from Skip [Bowman] that Boutros-Ghali is keen for us to go to the north for disarming and de-mining operations. That's scary. If there's a reason to go to Hargeisa, that is okay but we need to have it defined. (S)

Mr. Wisner: In my last conversation with Boutros-Ghali, the weight of the conversation was on human suffering. The UN and Kittani were subject to hostility there. We have to be sensitive to the north. I think we have to get up after the President's announcement and make a presentation to Boutros-Ghali with maps and so forth. We need to have our concept all spelled out. (S)

Admiral Howe: It is fine to brief the UN, but Dave Jeremiah is right not to take on more than our target area. Check the facts, and if there is chaos and starvation because of security it would fit in, but we don't want to expand to all of Somalia if we can avoid it. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: On the (b)(1) and their comments.

(b)(1)

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Parallel to the public affairs piece if the psyops piece. OSD has that well in hand. (S)

Mr. Locher: You are right. We have worked the psyops piece, and Joint Staff has been involved. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Is it coordinated with USIA? (S)

Mr. Locher: Yes. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: The news that technicals are leaving Mogadishu is great news. It simplifies urban warfare. (S)

Admiral Howe: On the issue of the north area, I think the intelligence community has to help separate fact from fiction, and political agendas from need. We need to know if there are areas of famine where anarchy or gangs interrupt relief. I am sure there will be an on-going dialogue with the Secretary General. (S)

We are not taking on a political process, not solving Somalia's problems for all time. We are accomplishing a humanitarian mission of relief. We hope it will be complementary to long-term solutions. The mission is to get relief into areas of greatest starvation and to pave the way for security forces after the coalition. (S)

Admiral Studeman: I think one problem is that you cannot ignore the north. We will have to look at what activities are logical up there. (S)

Mr. Cohen: The (b)(1) says there is little suffering. The north wants to secede. If we go there, they will say America is for secession. (S)

Mr. Clarke: Once the president makes his speech, we should send out an ALDAC. (S)

Admiral Howe: We will want ambassadorial follow up. The thing we need to nail down tonight is further refining of this list. Who can we count on for sure as the President consults with Congress. We need to know who is there for peacemaking and peacekeeping to follow in behind us. (S)

Mr. Wisner: And who has got money. (S)

Admiral Howe: The main thing is who is committing forces. (S)

Mr. Rostow: How much time between the President's decision and troops going in? (S)

Admiral Howe: Enough time to draft a war powers report. (S)

Mr. Rostow: Do we need to work all weekend, since we have 48 hours from the first penetration. (S)

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Admiral Howe: I don't think it will begin this weekend. (C)

Mr. Wisner: I just got news that the resolution passed 15-0.
(U)

-- End of Meeting --

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