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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90024
Folder ID Number: 90024-004

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords; Somalia

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	3	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [Somalia] [FOIA exemptions redacted] (10 pp.)	11/20/92	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
02a. Memo	W. Robert Pearson to Distribution List Re: Papers for Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/19/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
02b. Outline	Re: A Greater UN Role in Somalia (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Paper	Re: Improving US-UN Military-to Military Communications (1 pp.)	11/10/92	(b)(1)	C
02d. Paper	Re: Improving US-UN Military-to Military Communications [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(6)	
02e. Paper	Re: Somalia Discussion Paper (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02f. Memo	John M. Ordway to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia, November 20, 1992 (4 pp.)	11/19/92	(b)(1)	S
02g. Agenda	Re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting Somalia (1 pp.)	11/20/92	(b)(1)	C
02h. Paper	Somalia Discussion Paper (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Pinksheet Number: cap1699

OA/ID Number: 90024-004

Date Closed: 3/15/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02i. Paper	Re: State Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee The Need for Action in Somalia (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02j. Memo	Re: Somalia: The Threat to the UN's Pakistani Battalion in Mogadishu (4 pp.)	11/18/92	(b)(1)	S
02k. List	Re: Objectives (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02L. Report	Re: Can United Nations Forces Successfully Carry Out Their Mission in Somalia? (4 pp.)	11/10/92	(b)(1)	S
02m. Draft Paper	Re: Discussion on Somalia (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Summary	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Agenda & Discussion Paper for 17 November DC Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03c. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/13/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03d. Agenda	Re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting Somalia (1 pp.)	11/17/92	(b)(1)	C
03e. Paper	Re: Somalia Discussion Paper (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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03f. Draft Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
03g. Draft Paper	Re: [Somalia Discussion Paper] Pages 2 and 3 (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04a. Memo	W. Robert Pearson to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/19/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	
04b. Paper	Re: State Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee The Need for Action in Somalia (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

National Security Council
The White House

DC 395

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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DOCLOG KA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Jon Howe		<u>JA</u>	<u>N</u>
Brent Scowcroft			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>JS 1/19</u>	<u>File</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4/</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

cc:

VP

Skinner

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

11 JAN 93 4:29

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20044

January 11, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE *rfc*

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY *jo*

SUBJECT: Minutes for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting,
November 20, 1992

Attached are the Minutes for the subject Deputies Committee meeting on Somalia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and file the attached Minutes for the record.

Approve */* Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Minutes

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 3/15/10

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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01. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [Somalia] [FOIA exemptions redacted] (10 pp.)	11/20/92	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

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File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 10/10/2014

Date Closed: 3/15/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2006-0859-MR (500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/6/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20044



Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: November 20, 1992

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:05 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT: Minutes for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia
(S)

PARTICIPANTS:

OVP:

Karl Jackson

JCS:

Barry McCaffrey
James Hill

State:

Frank Wisner
Hank Cohen
Peter DeVos

AID:

Reginald Brown
Andrew Natsios

DOD:

Paul Wolfowitz
James Woods

USIA:

McKinney Russell
Bruce Koch

OMB:

Robert Howard

White House:

Jonathan Howe

CIA:

John Helgerson
(b)(1); (b)(3)

NSC:

Ted McNamara
John Ordway

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2006-0859-MR

SCS 6/6/13

Minutes

Admiral Howe: We waited a long time so we could get better organized. I think it has been worth it. (S)

We probably won't complete the agenda. The real question today is whether we are at a time of fundamental change with regard to humanitarian aid to Somalia, where we may have to look at the situation in a different way. (S)

Some of us are used to dealing with top secret, others are not. We have had too much lobbying from the outside, including the Les Gelb article and the [Fred] Cuny options. There is no reason the public shouldn't discuss and worry about this. But some of what we discuss today has to be closely held. It could endanger the (b)(1). As we discuss bolder options, until they are blessed by the President we want to preserve his right not to hear about it from the press. (S)

We have a letter from Interaction urging a different approach of the UN to providing security. That's an important fact. In

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Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

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
Bosnia, it took a long time for the agencies to ask for this. (S)

I would like to focus on the issues in the State paper, and whether we should be more aggressive in approaching the overall situation. (S)

John, what is your overall assessment? (S)

Mr. Helgeson: The papers describe what we are up against. The situation on the ground has gotten worse. The battles between Ali Mahdi and Aideed continue and the NGOs are interfered with. No improvement is foreseeable. (S)

Sahnoun's resignation was a setback and leads to an unravelling of agreements. Kittani is trying to re-do the agreements. The resignation fueled Aideed's suspicion of the UN. (S)



Tensions in the port have increased. A ship was warned off by artillery, in one case from Ali Mahdi's forces. (S)

On the airlift, they are getting in fourteen flights a day. Service to Baidoa, Oddur and Bardera has been interrupted sporadically. Road movement is risky, and a CARE convoy was ambushed at Baidoa. (S)

In the north things are better. The famine is less serious. Kittani was in Hergeisa Wednesday to re-do an agreement, which has come to naught. The north has warned that they do not want any Egyptians there. (S)

Admiral Howe: I remember the JCS chart, and I still think that is a good approach: humanitarian, security and political. Humanitarian is trying to progress, but security is not off the ground and the political is not going very fast either. We are making an effort, but it is going nowhere because of the security leg. The paper that the NSC circulated suggested the fundamental question should we make a push with the UN, change the UN's mind set. We have said before, and the President approved, that we would seek and "all necessary means" resolution. We backed off but is it time to push for that, and to have UN troops, who have a change in ROE and approach and deal with those who stand in the way of the mission. I was glad to see in the State paper that

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they were coming to grips with that issue. We need to look hard at that issue, too. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Do we need to do more? On the basis of the evidence, unambiguously yes. We have reflected for a moment on why. We would have hoped that the acceleration of airlift deliveries and 3500 men would have made a difference. But the number dying is increasing dramatically. It is increasing in the south, and we have to keep our eyes on what we need to come to grips with.

One reason for why this is our problem is because of what we have done. I am told that as much as 70 percent of the food is stolen. Food has become the economy. I would argue for a substantial departure. We have spelled out an approach to the UN, with a more robust stand. Larry Eagleburger is prepared to do this personally. We should do it despite the sniping from the press. The Interaction letter reflects the NGO view that they want force and are prepared to run the risks of additional force being deployed. (S)

It is an important question of mind set. In discussions with the UN, I have been struck that they see the need to do more. They do not see a force with just 3500 men engaged, but on the far side, a force up to 15,000-20,000, perhaps inserted without permission. I don't know where they will be. The forces were threatened by Aideed, (b)(1)

(b)(1) The UN is feeling a little up with the capability to deal with Aideed. They feel that if Aideed pushes the Paks out of Somalia, the consequences for other peacekeeping operations are very grave. (S)

What are they up against? They are short of money, troop lift, troops and logistics. (b)(1)

(b)(1) . It was clear to me that he would welcome the push we have proposed in our paper. There are many risks. Once in, how do you get out? There is no good answer to that. But we can't get a political environment without proper security. We will try to help restore infrastructure, get crops planed, police developed -- a UN receivership so there will be an end game with authority restored so we could leave. But I can't say when. It needs money and will. I think we are ready for this now, and I suggest we contact the UN and make plans. (S)

Admiral Howe: On pages 3 and 4 of your paper you have a five specific steps. I want to be clear what they are. (S)

An envoy (who would be Eagleburger). (S)

A much larger force, in a non-permissive environment, to provide security, and share our plan. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Yes. (S)

Admiral Howe: Working to put a coalition together, etc. (S)

We would not just be content with a fading volunteer force, but seek others as well. (S)

The U.S. would be prepared to provide logistic support -- we need to come back to that. (S)

If appropriate, we would deploy a MARG off the Somali coast to deter attacks on the UN humanitarian operation. (S)

You might want to elaborate on Boutros-Ghali's views on a backup force to help get UN forces. (S)

Mr. Wisner: There is no inconsistency. We could be less wedded to a MARG than a mandate to cover what would be necessary to accomplish a military mission. We put a MARG down as an example of what might be needed. (S)

Admiral Howe: Related to this, perhaps it was overkill to have the MARG the first time, but it gave some good military capability. It seems to me that one important area is if the UN gets in trouble and needs reinforcement, are we willing to do that, even at some risk to our people. It is an important step if the President takes it. (S)

Mr. Helgeson: Various Somali factions don't have the fear of the UN that they do of the U.S. If we can intimidate without being on the ground it might be worth exploring. If the UN expanded and the ROE changed it might be different, but the U.S. off the coast might send a message. (S)

Admiral Howe: You are saying that the U.S. provides logistic support and maybe a protective envelope. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: I am sympathetic, since it is not working now. I am worried that it is a band aid. The real issue is ROE. If we get involved with big resource implications, and there is "no U.S. role for ground forces," that might shift if it doesn't work. (S)

I was lobbied on this by Cuny and Mort Abramowitz. (S)

Mr. Natsios: Cuny has gone further than the PVOs have, and they are angry with him. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: The idea is to do what we did in Provide Comfort. We can only do that if we are willing to kill people. If the Secretary General is saying that he doesn't want the U.S. to be the world policeman because it scares us off, that's one thing. If it's ideology, that's another. To get the bad guys out and if

not use violence will suck up an enormous number of people. It will be costly and likely to suck us in on the ground. I have no idea what my boss thinks, but we need to look at a serious use of force if we are serious. (S)

Mr. Wisner: The UN's dilemma is as follows. The classic situation is to go in with the agreement of two sides and keep them apart. Here there is a new situation: go in and shoot for the objective. They are prepared to cross that line with Security Council support. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: They may be prepared to go across that line to shoot defensively, but the real issue is to create an environment. In Provide Comfort, we were able to clear the Iraqi army out by threat of force without the use of force. We then created an area beyond that with no Iraqi troops. And we created an environment where relief works with some degree of security outside there. It should be possible to create areas in Somalia, too. (S)

Mr. Wisner: The UN intends to move the (b)(1) down, and the (b)(1) to Kismayo, and move out from Kismayo. They know what the implications are. I did not sense reticence to use force for a mission supported by the Security Council. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: How about creating an area? (S)

Mr. Helgerson: I don't know what "forces" are. (S)

Admiral Bowman: That is our points-of-security plan. (S)

Admiral Howe: The technicals, according to Cuny, are the problem. There are a few hundred. They are the real intimidation. They are not organized by the clans, although they may control some. It doesn't sound like a force the UN cannot solve. He says to abandon Mogadishu. (S)

General McCaffrey: I'd hate to say it is just a couple of hundred technicals. There are 20,000 armed men in Mogadishu. (S)

Admiral Howe: His idea is focusing on where the severest need is. (S)

Mr. Natsios: (b)(1). You can't get the food in without using Mogadishu and Kismayo. (S)

On the motivation of people. The difference in Somalia is that this is a business undertaking. They steal, sell, and get money. There is no hatred for us. We are not a factor. I think if we put in sufficient force, the risks would be too high for a business proposition. (S)

Admiral Howe: One important thing that Cuny and others have said, and the UN is starting to conclude, is that the UN force should be concentrated in the area of need and ports to support the humanitarian flow. The ^{(b)(1)} up in the north doesn't make sense. I gather the UN is coming to that conclusion, as well. I suspect that one reason to go to the north is to get in without having to make a deal with Aideed. But that approach seems slow. (S)

General McCaffrey: It is 1000 miles from the action. (S)

Mr. Wisner: I have no quarrel with pushing the UN to put more forces closer to the need. (S)

Admiral Howe: Barry? (U)

General McCaffrey: I had instructions from my senior leadership. Paul Wolfowitz captured the tone. I couldn't agree more that if we assume the eventual outcome is delivering relief, it is through Mogadishu and Kismayo and ground convoys. It won't work without such a security system. (S)

There are two problems. A bigger force and new ROE won't work. You need to change the environment. You must be willing to destroy the forces that oppose food deliveries. I don't know if it is politically acceptable, but there needs to be a transfer to a coalition or U.S. force, and the ROE need to change. (S)

The number committed to UNOSOM is 3500 and fading. ^{(b)(1)} is out. ^{(b)(1)} You are probably talking 15,000, whack at it for three to four months, and then set up a police force that threatens to come back. There is no view by the uniformed forces on whether this is a good idea politically. But it is resolvable by U.S. forces, including combat troops. Analytically, it is a doable mission. We will do some prudent planning. (S)

Admiral Howe: Are you saying that as we look at these concepts, we work with the UN and stay in the background, and we lean forward with logistics and lift. The other approach is to take it on frontally, the U.S. taking the lead, sorting it out and then leaving a UN police force. Should that be in the paper for the President as a competing concept? (S)

General McCaffrey: There is real skepticism that the UN will come up with the numbers or the will to do the job. The ability to deliver military force is fading. (S)

Admiral Howe: Frank, your assessment? (S)

Mr. Wisner: I cannot answer that question today. I am proposing that we help answer that question. We should see who is there and push them. With Barry and others, I didn't hear them say that the funding constraint was reflected. Budget, costs, sustainment, and how to manage Mozambique, Angola and other missions will be a problem for the UN. (S)

General McCaffrey: I don't want to push this option. The UN has 30-40 people on its planning staff. They have 500 Pak hostages. There is a threat of delivering the (b)(1) battalion. They are talking about delivering a (b)(1) battalion 1000 miles from where people are dying 1000 miles away. This is not even an amateur effort. It is unlikely to produce policy results. The U.S. has the capability. Using it is an NSC policy decision. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: There are people with troops in (b)(1) and (b)(1) and if they are approached with money, this might be a valuable, spectacular political initiative. If you want to go to the President there needs to be a serious, workable option but you haven't done that. It seems to me that we should be clear that if we want to make it happen, if we are not taking over we need to give the UN a lot more advice. (S)

Mr. Brown: One problem at AID is that we are hit with a supplementary airlift indefinitely. We will run out of money. If we wait until there is provision of some security in the future, we have to think about what to do with the airlift. Even if we use all \$100 million here (which begs the question elsewhere) we are really hurting. (S)

Admiral Howe: That is a valuable point. We cannot deliver by air forever. I don't see any alternative, though. We have to find money. (S)

Mr. Wisner: Our money will go further if there is proper security. (S)

Mr. Howard: If we continue on business as usual, we have enough for the time being. We should scrounge for now. If we would decide to proceed with 20,000 troops, that is a very different story. (S)

Admiral Howe: We don't say 20,000 U.S. troops. (S)

Mr. Howard: We'd have to pay 30 percent of the UN's costs. (S)

Mr. Wisner: There is not enough for the current budget. (S)

Mr. Howard: Go into arrearage. (S)

Mr. Wisner: We need to find \$45 million to continue the airlift if necessary. We can take it out of the African disaster account. We have plenty of money in the wrong places. We need to switch from development assistance to disaster assistance. (S)

Mr. Brown: That hurts the development program. (S)

Mr. Wisner: We have plenty of money. The bigger problem is the peacekeeping budget. Where is the money to let the UN do its job? (S)

General McCaffrey: Your paper suggests voluntary forces. Given Yugoslavia, it is not clear that is a viable option. (S)

Mr. Wisner: We are trying to argue the need to join the UN in getting additional funds.

Mr. Howard: Does that stick us with more or less? (S)

Mr. Cohen: Less. (S)

Mr. Wisner: It depends on whose forces. (S)

Mr. Cohen: The Belgians are being financed by the EC. (S)

Admiral Howe:

(b)(1)
(b)(1)

Let's talk about what we can do now, and second what I sense is that we are out of kilter on the security effort and the political solution. We need to something with security to meet human needs. There are two options for the Cabinet-level and the President that need to be developed. One, push the UN forward with considerable muscle, money and leadership. Second, the other option is that the U.S. lead a coalition, blessed by the UN, with the UN involved. We have to develop, this talking among ourselves. Is it 20,000 or 50,000? What is the mission? How do we get out of it? What would be the goal of U.S. participation? Before we need a UN charge we need to start out with how far the President and his Cabinet advisors are willing to go. The third option is the current approach. (S)

First, more of the same with a little push. (S)

Second, the State proposal: a big push. (S)

Third, a coalition effort. (S)

Mr. Howard: Would option three be acceptable to the UN? (S)

Mr. Wisner: We didn't go to the UN with option three in mind. I think Boutros-Ghali's point was a wise commentary, but if we go to the UN and say we are open to looking at engineers, combat troops, air cover, I am not sure there would be a closed door. (S)

Admiral Howe: There is a difference between the State option, and a U.S. commitment as part of a coalition force. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: Leadership is the difference. (S)

Admiral Howe: On the first approach we push, on the second we lead. (S)

Mr. Howard: We got others to pay in Iraq. (S)

Mr. Helgerson: I would hope for a better mix than Provide Comfort. (S)

Admiral Howe: I agree that Paul Wolfowitz that we should look at (b)(1) and others. (S)

Mr. Helgerson: Someone would have to pay for them. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: Start with the (b)(1) and pay to have the (b)(1) troops that are there go to Somalia. (S)

Admiral Howe: Let's ask Dick Clarke to get a small group together to consider options. Even under the status quo we should go for an "all necessary means" resolution. (S)

Mr. Wisner: We haven't thought it through. I think an "all necessary means" resolution should be accompanied by means to make it happen. (S)

[Wolfowitz leaves]

Admiral Howe: I am willing to hold off. How about the 75 (b)(1) and their equipment? Can we agree to do that? (S)

Mr. Wisner: We have agreed. There is an issue. When we agreed to provide additional lift, our assumption was that it would come out of our assessment. Boutros-Ghali thought we would provide it for free. If the UN has to figure out means, they have other options. I told them that if it was a question of moving forces and the issue is between sea and air, to come back to us since urgency is always a factor. To see the (b)(1) go by boat because of budget is not good. (S)

General McCaffrey: The (b)(1) equipment is at sea. The 75-man contingent is irrelevant. The equipment is more suited for ship than plane. We could do it in 48 hours, but it won't make any difference. (S)

Admiral Howe: It could help them defend themselves. (S)

General McCaffrey: Aideed has neither the political will nor the military ability to do it. (S)

Mr. Helgerson: Someone's division needs to be in Mogadishu. (S)

General McCaffrey: Right. (S)

Admiral Howe: We have an immediate requirement. If they feel they need more, and the UN has asked, we should do it. It doesn't solve the problem, but we cannot afford to have them withdraw. (S)

Mr. Woods: From the files, I thought you had agreed to complete deployment of the initial contingent. We choked on 300+. There was no decision that it would be a freebie. (S)

Admiral Howe: Let's do it. (S)

Mr. Howard: We can argue about assessments later. (S)

Admiral Howe: I think this is part of the initial bunch. (S)

Other things? (S)

Mr. Natsios: About our people on the ground. If Somalis think we have made a decision to send in combat troops, it could be dangerous. We might try to do a resolution as close to deployment as possible. (S)

Admiral Howe: I agree. But you don't get a resolution quickly anyway. (S)

Dick [Clarke], if you would work with your group to develop options. We want a meeting with the President before Thanksgiving. (S)

General McCaffrey: What is the change day-by-day with the death rates? (S)

Mr. Wisner: Increasing. (S)

Mr. Natsios: In the last three weeks there has been an exponential increase in deaths. (S)

-- End of Meeting --

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9221098
RECEIVED: 20 NOV 92 07

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 19 NOV 92
SOURCE REF: 9223939

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
UN

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 20 NOV DC MTG ON SOMALIA

ACTION: OBE PER RECORDS MANAGEMENT

DUE DATE: 24 NOV 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF: 9220859 9221037

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC395

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9221098

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 ORDWAY
001

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X 93011117 OBE PER RECORDS MANAGEMENT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	W. Robert Pearson to Distribution List Re: Papers for Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/19/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed: 3/15/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



9223939

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

21098

November 19, 1992

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR.

MEMORANDUM TO:

MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Affairs Advisor
The White House

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
United States Information Agency

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


CPT H.L. SHEFFIELD, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Papers for Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia

Please transmit to members of the Deputies Committee the attached papers on the FY 93 A.I.D. and State Department Funding Estimates for Somalia; the OFDA Assessment on the Food Situation in Somalia; IO's concept on a "UN Limited Receivership for Somalia," and DoD's proposal on Improving US-UN Military-to-Military Communications.

The Policy Coordinating Committee on Africa decided these papers should be forwarded to the Deputies Committee for its November 20 meeting.


Robert Pearson
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By cap NARA, Date 3/15/10

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**FISCAL YEAR 1993 A.I.D. AND STATE DEPARTMENT
FUNDING ESTIMATES FOR SOMALIA**

Introduction

Over the course of fiscal year 1993, State and A.I.D. estimate that they will spend roughly \$221 million in Somalia. The Department of Defense FY93 costs for the airlift of food into Somalia and for airlifting additional UN security guards into the country are not included in this figure.

The A.I.D. and State contributions - which include both cash and food resources - will be used for relief and rehabilitation activities inside Somalia, for assistance to refugees in neighboring countries, and for U.S. contributions to a UN Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia. The resources would be provided by the following agencies: A.I.D. -- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Food for Peace, and Africa Bureau; and State Department -- Bureau for Refugee Programs and International Organizations Bureau. A description of these entities' activities and a budget summary is provided below.

The \$221 million projection includes \$159 million in disaster, food, and refugee assistance. This is a realistic reflection of what State and A.I.D. offices believe they will spend in Somalia this fiscal year given a) the assumptions outlined below and b) current availability of U.S. resources. The U.S. contributions will by no means meet the overall needs of the country. Significant contributions from other donors and the cooperation of Somali leaders will also be required if even the most basic needs of the Somali people are to be met.

Also critical will be the successful deployment of UN troops. The Bureau for International Organizations (IO) estimates that the U.S. share of the cost of U.N. peacekeeping is about \$62 million. The USG/other donor airlift cannot meet food needs inside the country and has not successfully reversed death rates. The USG will be unable to sustain via civilian airlift daily tonnage now moved by DOD throughout the course of the fiscal year. The cost would be prohibitive. A proposed USG civilian aircraft phase-out schedule is below.

Budget Assumptions

Each contributing State and A.I.D. office has made certain assumptions in calculating their budgets. They include:

- o The UN will move ahead expeditiously with its deployment of 3,500 troops.
- o The UN troop deployment will be partially successful. (Troops will allow for cheaper delivery of more food by road convoy but will not secure large areas of the country.)

- o Ongoing intra- and inter-clan conflict and general banditry will continue throughout the country but will be most significant in south/central Somalia. Relief needs will continue to be most acute there.
- o There will be moderate expansion of food relief activities but the overall level of international relief will not significantly increase due to insecurity.
- o Small-scale rehabilitation activities (e.g., water; seeds and tools distributions) will be possible in some locations but larger-scale reconstruction activity will not be feasible on any large scale basis.
- o Insecurity will continue to prevent large-scale repatriation of Somali refugees; refugee-hosting countries will continue to keep their borders open.

A.I.D. PROGRAMS

The focus of A.I.D. relief programs will continue to be free distribution of general food rations, supplemental and therapeutic feeding for malnourished children and adults, preventive and curative health care, water and sanitation programs and food monetization. In areas where it is possible, there will be additional rehabilitation and perhaps to a limited extent reconstruction activities.

The Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance will continue to concentrate its resources on life-saving efforts in areas of Somalia where the needs are most critical, (presently the south/central areas). It will also provide rehabilitation assistance, such as provision of seeds and tools, vaccination of livestock, and improvements in water systems. FHA's Office of Food for Peace will continue to provide food resources primarily through the ICRC and World Food Program.

AID's Africa Bureau will review options for reconstruction activities depending upon the security situation. Due to Somalia's arrears in repaying debt, the U.S. historically has been prohibited from providing development assistance funds to Somalia because of legislative sanctions under Section 518 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1992, also known as the Brooke Amendment. However, Section 6 of the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act permits the use of development assistance, including the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), for reconstruction activities that are implemented through PVOs and international organizations which have demonstrated effectiveness in working

with local NGOs and are committed to the promotion of local grassroots development and self reliance.

FHA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

AID/FHA/OFDA anticipates that it will spend approximately \$53.3 million in Somalia in FY93 for relief programs operated by the UN, ICRC and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and for airlifting of relief supplies. Of this amount, OFDA expects to draw at least \$25 million from a new Africa Disaster Assistance account in the FY93 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill which includes an earmark of funds for use in Somalia. OFDA's \$53.3 million projection is double the amount OFDA spent in Somalia last fiscal year.

The Nairobi-based FHA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) estimates that it will require some \$3.5 million to fund relief programs during the first quarter of this fiscal year. Extrapolating from their figure, FHA/OFDA estimates at least \$14-\$15 million in new program funding this fiscal year.

In addition, FHA/OFDA anticipates that some \$10 million will be generated in local currency from food aid monetization activities throughout the course of the fiscal year. These funds will be used by PVOs to implement labor-intensive rehabilitation activities. The actual amount of local currency generated will depend on the value of the mix of commodities ultimately monetized throughout the course of the year.

In mid-November FHA/OFDA will begin the funding of civilian aircraft to replace DOD aircraft. The DOD aircraft are scheduled to begin phase-down on November 15 and complete their withdrawal from the Somali relief effort on January 25. The total airlift capacity of DOD planes will be met during this period through FHA/OFDA contracting of five civilian aircraft. These five aircraft are additional to two aircraft FHA/OFDA is already funding, once each for the UN World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

FHA/OFDA plans to sharply decrease the number of civilian-funded aircraft one month after DOD's January 25 departure. Its phase-out scenario, as outlined below, shows airlift funding being cut back from seven airplanes to two on February 25 -- one for ICRC and one for WFP. This scenario relates explicitly to our assumption that roads will be open for truck convoys and implies that the UN will make the troop commitments necessary to make that happen. This scenario also reflects FHA/OFDA thinking that airlifts are a) NOT successfully reducing overall death rates and, therefore, large-scale airlifts should be phased out of our strategy and b) are too costly to maintain throughout the year, given alternative strategies and needs.

To maintain DOD airlifts throughout fiscal year 1993, FHA/OFDA would have to spend over \$70 million. In that scenario, FHA/OFDA's budget projection for Somalia would be \$98.2 million, (\$70 million for airlift; \$15 million for new relief programs and \$10 million in local currency for rehabilitation; and \$3.2 million to DOD). To meet that target, FHA/OFDA would have to dramatically reduce its funding for emergencies in other parts of the world, including critical emergencies like Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Angola and the Newly Independent States, or there would need to be an appeal to Congress for supplemental funding.

OFDA's proposed phase-out schedule is as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>USG Civilian Aircraft Replacing DOD</u>	<u>OTHER SAT planes</u>	<u>Total</u>
January 25:	5		
February 25:	0	2	7
March 25:	0	2	2
April 25	0	2	2
May 25	0	2	2
September 30	0	1	1
		0	0

Under this scenario, total cost for the civilian airlift operation will be approximately \$25.1 million. Contributions to WFP and ICRC from other donors for airlift plus a transition to road transportation will allow for a longer phase-out of AID funded aircraft than that outlined above. Unfortunately, as it stands now, total capacity of the airlift is expected to decrease at the end of 1992, as the French, Germans, and Canadians are reportedly planning to withdraw their planes at that time.

FHA/OFDA has also agreed to pay the Department of Defense the commercial rate for tonnage moved on its 4 remaining aircraft for the period December 15, 1992-January 25, 1993. Estimated cost is \$3.2 million. (4 aircraft x 14 MT per aircraft x \$1,368.6 per MT x 42 days).

Program funds: @\$25 million
 Civ. Airlift : @\$25.1 million
 DOD aircraft : @ \$ 3.2 million
 TOTAL: @\$53.3 million

FHA Office of Food for Peace

During the course of FY 1992 and 1993 the USG has made significant food aid contributions in support of the Somalia relief effort through FHA's Office of Food for Peace and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In FY 1992 and FY 1993, the USG has contributed a total of 292,000 MT valued at \$120 million. In FY

1993, A.I.D. is considering an additional P.L. 480 Title II allocation of \$10 million to support direct feeding programs and market intervention initiatives. Additional U.S.D.A. Section 416 (b) food aid is not expected to be available during the rest of FY 1993.

ICRC estimates that approximately 52,000 metric tons is required monthly to support a 4.5 million population or a 12 month requirement of 676,000 metric tons. In order to address these needs, the World Food Program (WFP) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plan of action for the period September through December 1992 envisaged joint delivery of 52,150 metric tons monthly by WFP and ICRC. Recent estimates suggest that the international relief effort is providing about 37,000 MT per month, about 70% of the ICRC-estimated total food aid requirement of Somalia. Over 75% of incoming food is being brought in by boat and overland.

The central themes in the USG's FY 1993 food aid strategy are continuation and expansion of supplemental feeding and direct distribution programs while simultaneously increasing national food supplies through the monetization program. The primary implementing partners for direct distribution programs are the ICRC and the WFP. Other private voluntary organizations, including Catholic Relief Services, CARE and Save the Children, are implementing or assisting with implementation of USG food programs.

Tonnage authorized to date for FY 1993:	173,919
Value of authorized contributions:	\$69.2 million
Additional contributions	
under consideration:	<u>\$10 million</u>
Total dollar value	\$79.2 million

Africa Bureau

The Africa Bureau will continue to monitor the security situation in Somalia. If the political situation stabilizes enough to allow reconstruction activities, the Africa Bureau will explore the possibility of using additional funds above the \$25 million earmark from the Sub-Saharan Africa Disaster Assistance Fund. Although development assistance can be used under the Horn of Africa Act, there is currently no DFA available for Somalia in FY93. Any programming of DFA for Somalia would require a reduction of funding for an existing development program in another country. Likewise, the Africa Bureau has no excess staff capacity for managing Somali reconstruction activities and would therefore have to rely on an arrangement like the DART team, coordinated out of the AID regional office in Nairobi.

STATE PROGRAMS

State Department Bureau for International Organization Affairs

The United Nations Advisory Committee on Administration and Budget Questions will meet the week of November 12 to discuss the cost of UN Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia. Current estimates are that the peacekeeping operations will cost the U.N. approximately \$205 million for 12 months. We expect the cost of the operation to be assessed in which case the U.S. would be committed to pay 30.387 percent of the total, or an estimated \$62.3 million in FY93. Because of large peacekeeping costs in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and the Middle East, IO does not foresee having sufficient funds in FY 1993 to pay the estimated \$62 million assessment for Somalia. The \$62 million would be added to U.S. arrears for U.N. peacekeeping.

Total Estimated Assessed Contribution for Peacekeeping Operations for FY 1993: \$62.3 million

State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs

In FY 1993 the Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) will continue to support U.N. and NGO activities for Somali refugees in the neighboring countries as well as the ICRC efforts inside Somalia itself. While the majority of the funds contributed from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account will be unearmarked, it is anticipated that at least \$25 million of RP's FY 1993 support could eventually be attributed to addressing the Somalia crisis.

Already in FY 1993, \$1.5 million of Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) funds have been used to contribute to the costs of DOD's food airlift. Additional funding could be available from this source under a Presidential Determination to address Somalia cross-border needs and/or requirements resulting from additional outflows of refugees.

In FY 1992 the Bureau for Refugee Programs provided earmarked contributions of \$17.1 million to U.N. organizations and NGOs assisting Somali refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. Unearmarked contributions for UNHCR's programs in Africa, including those in the Horn, amounted to \$44.3 million. An earmarked contribution of \$10 million was given to ICRC for its emergency relief program in Somalia. In addition, RP contributed \$28 million in unearmarked funds to ICRC for its Africa-wide emergency appeal; about half of the appeal was for the Somalia relief effort.

Project total contribution for FY 1993 from MRA:	\$25 million
<u>Total contribution for FY 1993 from ERMA, to date:</u>	<u>\$1.5 million</u>
Total RP projected contributions for FY 1993	\$26.1 million

Budget Summary: State/AID FY 1993 Expenditures

AID/FHA/OFDA	\$53.3 million ¹
AID/FHA/FFP	\$79.2 ²
STATE/IO	\$62.3 ³
STATE/RP	<u>\$26.1⁴</u>
TOTAL	\$220.9 million

¹ OFDA's projected budget includes at least \$25 million from the FY 1993 Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill. The Appropriation Bill includes a \$100 million line item for disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the total, \$25 million is earmarked for use in Somalia. This appropriation represents a new account; these funds will be administered jointly by the AID's Food and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau and AID's Africa Bureau.

OFDA's projected budget also includes \$10 million in local currency generated by PL 480 Title II food aid monetization programs. These funds will be used for rehabilitation activities.

² These funds include the 174,000 MT of food already authorized plus an additional \$10 million worth of food which is under consideration.

³ This amount represents an estimated assessed contribution for peacekeeping operations.

⁴ A portion of the estimated State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs funds will be used to assist Somali refugees in neighboring countries.

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TO: T - FRANK WISNER
FROM: AID/OFDA - JIM KUNDER
SUBJECT: FOOD NEEDS AND EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA

In August 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that food deliveries of 52,000 MT per month would be needed to meet food needs in Somalia.

- This estimate, and the following information, focus on emergency food needs in the southern and central parts of Somalia. Populations in the north do not need emergency food aid.
- We estimate that 37,000 MT of relief food are entering the country each month, 70 percent of what is needed. The ICRC and the World Food Program (WFP) are responsible for moving and handling this food.
- Despite the amount of food that has been committed to the relief effort, we believe we are only reaching 50 percent of the people in need (estimated to be 1.5 million) because of the difficult security conditions.
- Large amounts of food remain in the ports. Relief organizations are unable to move it because of the threat of banditry and looting.

The U.S. government has pledged to contribute 212,000 MT of food in FY 1993. The EC, the other major donor, pledged 185,000 MT of food in 1992.

- The majority of the FY 1993 U.S. pledges and the 1992 EC commitments are scheduled to arrive in Somalia over the next several months.
- Together, these contributions account for 57 percent of the emergency food aid needed for the year.
- Other donor commitments are expected to meet some portion of the needs cited by ICRC.

Of the 37,000 MT being delivered per month:

- 70 to 80 percent is being transported by boat to both large and small Somali ports along the central and southern coast.

- 10 to 15 percent (on the order of 5,000 MT) is being airlifted by the international community.
- As of November 12, DOD planes have transported 13,638 MT to Baidoa, Belet Weyne, Hoddur, Bardera, Uegit, Gialalassi in Somalia; and, Wajir in northern Kenya.
- Two additional commercial C-130s, funded by AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, carry food for ICRC and WFP to Mogadishu and other sites as needed. These planes have transported a total of 4,645 since they began flying in September.
- A very small percentage of the relief food has been "airdropped" -- loaded on pallets and pushed out of the back of cargo planes -- by the WFP. As of November 9, WFP had airdropped 588 MT in the Hoddur and Uegit areas. The recovery rates for the airdrops vary widely, from 50 percent to 95 percent, depending on how well the food has been packed, how well reception on the ground has been coordinated, and the prevailing security conditions at the airdrop site.

Some food is coming in overland by truck, mainly from Kenya. Truck deliveries, which are a relatively efficient way to handle relief food, are still constrained by security conditions, both cross-border and within southern and central Somalia.

- CARE has sent several convoys from Mogadishu to Baidoa over the last month, all of which have experienced some looting. The most recent convoy from Baidoa succeeded in reaching the outskirts of Baidoa where CARE's trucking contractors attempted to loot the convoy, provoking a gun battle. Only one of the 34 trucks reached the city; the remaining trucks returned to Mogadishu, 125 miles away.

A food monetization program has begun in the north and will be initiated in the south in the coming weeks, bringing some food in through Somali commercial channels.

- In early November, 500 MT were sold to Somali traders for distribution in the Berbera area in northwest Somalia under this program. A trial using 250 MT of wheat is underway in southern Somalia.

- We plan to monetize a total of 45,000 MT in FY 1993.

There are several mechanisms for distributing food to those who need it:

- ICRC administers over 600 kitchens throughout southern and central Somalia, which feed one million people cooked meals daily.

- The World Food Program, in cooperation with a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including CARE, and the ICRC, distribute dry rations to families and individuals.

- UNICEF, ICRC and several NGOs run intensive feeding centers for malnourished children and adults in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Belet Weyne, Hoddur, Kismayu, Gialalassi and other key towns.

It is very difficult to derive a comprehensive figure for the amount of food that is looted from the relief effort. The value of the food aid, security conditions at the site or along the route the food travels, and the ability of local authorities to ensure equitable food distribution, all affect the amount of looting that occurs.

- WFP representatives estimate that 25 percent of their food is looted, while the ICRC estimates that 10 percent of its food aid is stolen.

- Other observers believe that theft rates may be as high as 40 to 50 percent.

- All routes into Somalia, by boat, plane, or overland, are vulnerable to bandits. At the same time, feeding kitchens report low losses to bandits since the food is prepared and can not easily be resold. Food convoys are particular targets; the American relief agency CARE reports that it has lost both food and vehicles on several occasions.

- Some food is also used to pay security guards for convoys and other humanitarian relief activities. ICRC estimates that it uses 10 percent of its food shipments for this purpose.

Even with all these efforts, we know we are not reaching all of those in need. Relief workers believe that there are pockets of people in desperate condition in the rural areas who have not received any assistance. Even in areas targeted for food deliveries, we are barely stabilizing populations, due to the frequent interruptions in the food supply caused by security incidents.

In order to make significant progress towards decreasing the death rates in Somalia, relief convoys would need to have free access to the area bounded by Luuq, Kismayu, Mogadishu, and Belet Weyne, and to cross-border routes from Kenya into Somalia. While the details of such a plan will have to be filled in from the field, it is abundantly clear that without greater security, the relief effort will only have intermittent access to starving Somalis, and thousands of people will continue to die.

KEY ROUTES AND AREAS FOR FOOD AID DISTRIBUTION SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA


Map Key:



Entry routes for food aid



Secured area



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Outline	Re: A Greater UN Role in Somalia (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

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UN Request

10/30

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DEPT OF STATE FOR IO/UNP: JCS FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS,
JS/MEAF(LTC ARNOLD), OSD-ISA-GA FOR MARC PALIVITZ;
DA/DAMO-OSO FOR COL CAMPBELL

E.O. 12358: N/A

TAGS: MARR, MOPS, UNSC

SUBJECT: UN REQUEST FOR MILITARY PLANNER SUPPORT

1. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE.

2. SUMMARY: THE UN SECRETARIAT IS REQUESTING THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN OFFICER WITH A BACKGROUND IN THE LOGISTICS OF SHIP OPERATIONS AND PREFERABLY WITH EXPERIENCE IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS OR RELATED MISSIONS FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS. THE OFFICER IS NEEDED TO ASSIST THE FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION (FOD) WITH THE PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES FOR PEACE-KEEPING AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS. THE UN SECRETARIAT HIGHLY RECOMMENDS THE SELECTION OF LT(JG) PHILIP EMANUEL, USNR, SSN: 100-62-1827, MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND, FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT SINCE HE HAS PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE. LT(JG) EMANUEL SERVED AS A MILITARY PLANNER FOR FOD FROM NOV 91 TO JUL 92. THE UN IS REQUESTING THE OFFICER REPORT NLT 4 NOVEMBER 1992.

3. TEXT OF UN REQUEST FOLLOWS:

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND HAS THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THE PROVISION OF A MILITARY OFFICER FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO ASSIST THE FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION THROUGH THE MILITARY ADVISER IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS WITH THE PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES FOR PEACE-KEEPING AND OTHER UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS.

- IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE IS A SPECIFIC

INFO FOR: GEN POWELL/CJCS

INFO FOR: LTG VICELLO/EJS

INFO FOR: LTG LELAND/JS

INFO FOR: LTC ARNOLD/JSMEAF

FINAL DISTR ADDED FOR JCS PER MAJ MCCLELLAN/SJS

INFO: JG WILLIS/J1

LTG BRANDTNER/J3

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION

INFO

CJCS(1) J1(1) J3(3) J5(2) SECDEF-N(1)

USDA:JP(2) ASD:PA(1) USDP:ISA(1) USDP:FMRA(1)

USDP:TW(1) USDP:MX(1) USDP:CF&CP(2) USDP:GLOBAL(1)

USDP:ISA(1)

*OSCA WASHINGTON DC

*USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE

*USDP:D7SA

*COMUSC F1 BRAGE NW/JZ/1

(M.C)

19

REQUIREMENT FOR THE SERVICES OF A QUALIFIED OFFICER WITH A BACKGROUND IN THE LOGISTICS OF SHIP OPERATIONS AND PREFERABLY WITH EXPERIENCE IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS OR RELATED MISSIONS. SPECIFICALLY, LT(JG) PHILIP EMANUEL WHO WAS PROVIDED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR SIX MONTHS EARLIER THIS YEAR AND WHO WORKED ON DEPLOYMENTS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA WOULD BE IDEAL. THE OFFICER WOULD BE TASKED WITH PLANNING AND COORDINATING DEPLOYMENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. IT IS KINDLY REQUESTED THAT THE OFFICER BE PROVIDED FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS.

THE SECRETARIAT AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ITS APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR ITS CONTINUED VALUABLE SUPPORT OF THE PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO RENEW TO THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

28 OCTOBER 1992

4. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST APPROVE/DISAPPROVE THE UN REQUEST FOR ASSIGNMENT OF AN OFFICER, PREFERABLY LT(JG) PHILIP EMANUEL, TO THE UN SECRETARIAT, FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION, FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS. THE REQUESTED REPORT DATE FOR THE OFFICER IS NLT 4 NOVEMBER 1992.

5. USUN POC IS COL KEARNEY OR SGA BURBACK. COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE (212) 415-4154 OR DSH 790-0127 PERKINS BT

MCN=92304/00538

TOR=92304/01502

TAD=92304/10327

CDSN=M47705

PAGE 1 OF 1

DC # 295

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9221037
DATE 13 NOV 92

SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 17 NOV DC MTG ON SOMALIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

JACKSON, K
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

16 Nov

0650

[Signature]

COPY: 1

✓ ZOELLICK, R

13 Nov 92

11:42

[Signature]

COPY: 1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

HOWARD, R
OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
ROOM 238 OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

11/13/92

11:50

[Signature]

COPY: 1

WOLFE, J
AGENCY FOR INTL DEVELOPMENT
ROOM 5897, NEW STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20523

11/13/92

2:25 p.m.

[Signature]

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CONNELL, M
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
ROOM 822, USIA BUILDING
301 4TH STREET, SW
WASHINGTON, DC 20547

11/13/92

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DC 395

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SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 17 NOV DC MTG ON SOMALIA
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9221049
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 92 14

TO: HOWE

FROM: ORDWAY
CLARKE

DOC DATE: 19 NOV 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 20 NOV DC MTG ON SOMALIA

ACTION: NOTED BY HOWE

DUE DATE: 17 NOV 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF: 9220859 9221037

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC395

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CLARKE
NSC CHRON
ORDWAY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/15/10

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9221049

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HOWE
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 92111916 FOR INFORMATION
X 92112016 NOTED BY HOWE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
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ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/15/10

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National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 210419

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SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

W
Ken Hill

1

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II

Bill Sittmann

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Jon Howe

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Brent Scowcroft

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

3

11/20

N

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

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Other _____

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COMMENTS:

19 NOV 92 4:10

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Paper	Re: Improving US-UN Military-to Military Communications (1 pp.)	11/10/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
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- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Paper	Re: Improving US-UN Military-to Military Communications [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(6)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By M.M. on 11/8/2022

Date Closed: 3/15/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2373-MR(501.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/3/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Improving US-UN Mil-to-Mil Communications

1. **Purpose.** To review current initiatives undertaken to enhance communications between the US military and the UN Military Adviser with respect to Somalia. Recent actions include a meeting between Joint Staff representatives and the UN Military Adviser and assignment of an additional military planner to the UN.

2. **Visit to UN Headquarters.**

Rear Admiral Bowman, DDPMA, Joint Staff met with Brigadier General Baril, Military Adviser to the UN Secretary-General at UN Headquarters in New York on 2 November 1992. BG Baril had requested the meeting to provide the Joint Staff information on the UN operation in Somalia and his estimate on future deployment of additional forces.

Admiral Bowman stated clearly at the beginning of the meeting that he was in New York to obtain information on the UN operation in Somalia and neither could nor would make any commitment for support to the UN on behalf of the US government. He repeated this at the end of the meeting. Admiral Bowman and the other Joint Staff representatives were able to seek clarification on several points that BG Baril made, but raised no substantive new issues.

BG Baril made the following points:


- The Somalia operation is extremely dangerous and complex. The situation is not being helped by those who foster the perception that the UN Secretary-General is preparing to "invade" Somalia by introducing troops without the consent of the parties.
- The Secretary-General has not changed course. The UN is not attempting to turn Somalia into a peace enforcement operation. It is a peacekeeping operation with complex diplomatic, military, logistical, and local political factors. Additional troops will be introduced only with the consent of the parties. "No country has been asked to fight. Nobody."
- All deployments are on hold until the new UN Special Representative arrives in Somalia and is able to meet with the parties. BG Baril estimated that no deployments will take place for at least 10 to 15 days.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2373-MR
MM 10/3/2016


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1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)




- BG Baril described Shaheen as a very cool, composed individual who has been accurately estimating the situation since his arrival. His confidence in Shaheen is high.

1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)




- The UN is anxious to start the sealift of heavy equipment to Somalia, even if this means ships standing off the coast waiting for an agreement to permit unloading. The Secretary-General does not want to lose time after an agreement is reached for the ships to sail to Somalia. At the same time, the Secretary-General does not want the sealift to be misinterpreted as an intention to introduce troops without consent of the parties.

1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)



1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)




- BG Baril recognized and supported the need for direct liaison between nations deploying military contingents to Somalia and any nation which might be deploying them. He described this as practical military necessity. Joint Staff representatives raised the point that the UN Field Operations Division had been unhappy with such direct liaison during the deployment of the Pakistani battalion. BG Baril explained that the concern arose because UN officials in Mogadishu did not know what was arriving on each flight and that such knowledge was necessary in order to placate the local warlords and prevent them from shooting at aircraft.

- BG Baril said he could not comment authoritatively on the humanitarian relief part of the Somalia operation as that was outside his military scope of responsibility.

- UNDP will be responsible for management and reconstruction of the ports and longer term resupply and reconstruction of the Somali infrastructure.

- The 100 Day Plan has started, but BG Baril could not say exactly when it started.

1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)



3. **Assignment of a Military Planner.** In response to a recent UN request*, USG will be reassigning Lt(jg) Philip Emanuel to the UN's Field Operations Division for a period of three months to plan and coordinate deployments for peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Mozambique.

- The UN specifically asked for Lt(jg) Emanuel because of his experience with peacekeeping operations obtained during a six-month tour at the UN earlier this year in support of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Prepared by: Lt Col (b)(6) [REDACTED] USMC
J-5/MEAF X51322

LESLIE H. GELB

Shoot to Feed Somalia

"If the Somali war chiefs read in the newspapers that U.S. or U.N. forces are coming to their country to blow their heads off, will they start slaughtering relief workers or start behaving?" asked a senior Bush Administration official. Neither he nor his colleagues have any idea. But they will soon find out.

Key Bush aides will gather in the White House tomorrow to tell the President that he should not duck the mass slaughter and starvation of Somalia's civil war and then dump the problem on Bill Clinton. They will urge him to energize the U.N. now to provide more food, more transport and most importantly more troops with more powerful weapons and a mandate to be aggressive — using

under the load of a dozen mostly new peacekeeping operations.

Even if the U.N. does get its act together somewhat, member nations are not likely to give U.N. forces in Somalia the necessary freedom to fight. As of now, the 500 Pakistanis already there and the 3,000 more promised can only fire if fired upon. That is insufficient. So are the light weapons authorized for those troops.

Yet U.N. officials and members hesitate to go further. Interfering massively without host government approval and without a cease-fire would violate U.N. dogma. But legalistic scruples make no sense in Somalia, which has no government and is in a state of anarchy.

Even if the Security Council overcomes such nitpicking, the nations providing the forces may not want to fight. The Egyptians, Canadians and Belgians, who have offered to fill the additional 3,000 "guard" billets, do not seem keen about combat. It has been weeks since they volunteered, and their soldiers are not near departure.

This is where the Kassebaum approach comes in. Even if the U.N. does give the green light for tougher military action, she anticipates that its members might resist risking combat, especially without direct U.S. help. If so, the U.S. should volunteer its own forces.

More likely, however, the U.N. will just dither. In that case, bring on the Cuny plan. Before working in Somalia, Mr. Cuny was deeply involved in Operation Provide Comfort, which protected the Kurds in northern Iraq against Saddam Hussein and fed them. His plan for the Somalis worked for the Kurds against a far more formidable foe than the Somali war chiefs — with few U.S. troops, with little bloodshed and without the U.S. sinking into a military quagmire.

Mr. Cuny wants U.S. forces to set up a security zone in southern Somalia, where the starvation is most severe. He thinks that job can be done by no more than 2,500 U.S. marines with air and naval support plus about 1,000 troops from other nations. "We can't impose a peace," he sensibly acknowledges, "but we can create a safe haven to allow the voluntary relief organizations to strike at the heart of the famine." Conscience demands no less.

Administration officials already admit they need a "shoot-to-feed" policy. Now they should act on what many of them privately believe — our own forces must do the shooting, and, if the U.N. dawdles, go it alone. □

U.S. arms with or without the U.N.

U.S. forces for logistical support only.

For many following the Somali crisis, this plan does not go far or fast enough. Some, like Senator Nancy Kassebaum, Republican of Kansas, would work through the U.N. but stiffen U.N. forces with U.S. firepower. Many others, including disaster relief experts like Fred Cuny, feel the situation is so dire and the U.N. so slow and ineffectual that U.S. forces should intervene immediately without waiting for U.N. approval.

My instincts are that the Bush team is being too slow and too cautious — and that many thousands more will die while the U.S. fiddles with the U.N. I would start with the Kassebaum approach and see if the U.N. is willing to act swiftly and decisively. If not, I would go with the Cuny proposal within weeks.

Administration officials and Senator Kassebaum share one good point. The U.S. cannot simply dispatch forces and ignore the Security Council. Washington has been trying to nurture the U.N.'s peacekeeping role for two years now, and properly so.

I would like nothing better than for the U.N. to do the job it should be doing in Somalia. But the organization has shown almost no interest in the Somali nightmare. Its inefficient bureaucracy is already sputtering

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Paper	Re: Somalia Discussion Paper (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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2006-0860-MR
SCS 8/22/13

November 19, 1992

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia,
November 20, 1992

Does Pak need assistance

The Meeting

As Les Gelb made painfully and publicly obvious today (Tab IV), the principal focus of this meeting will be to establish a U.S. policy on the security issue. The fundamental issue you will face is whether we favor an adequate international force that will provide security with or without the consent of the warlords.

The next most important issue is the future of the civilian airlift, and how to pay for it. The Deputies could also usefully discuss the long-term political strategy, and a possible UN "receivership" for Somalia.

Security

Approach: Frank Wisner has secured Larry Eagleburger's blessing for a much stronger U.S. leadership role in pressing the UN to mount a credible security force in Somalia, regardless of whether the environment is permissive or non-permissive. I am told that the Gelb piece galvanized Colin Powell, who has called a meeting in his office for J-2, J-3 and J-5 for this afternoon.

We generally agree with State's analysis and direction. However, we do not agree that any significant coalition can be assembled if the U.S. is not prepared to participate on the ground in a meaningful way. This issue needs to be confronted now, not after we go to the UN and our well-to-do OECD friends asking for significant troop contributions to what will probably be a manageable but still quite dangerous operation.

DC Objectives: We suggest you aim for several specific goals that can be agreed at the DC level. (Also attached at Tab VII in case you wish to distribute it to help focus discussion.)

- Immediate agreement to the UN request Wednesday to transport 75 additional Pakistanis and their equipment, without quibbling over payment (i.e., we do this one for free).

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Declassify on: OADR

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- Begin immediately to seek an "all necessary means" resolution at the UN.
- Move the ARG into the area to maximize our capability and flexibility. (We'll have to devise a public affairs strategy.)
- Urge the UN to deploy all the currently authorized forces to Mogadishu as a first step. The Pakistanis, Canadians and Belgians together would be a credible force of 2000+ troops. *where*
- Seek approval of principals to inform the UN that the U.S. is prepared to lift (by air or sea as militarily appropriate) those forces into Mogadishu, over local armed opposition if necessary.
- Agree to seek with the UN and internationally a credible and sufficient security force, prepared to operate in a non-permissive environment.
- Consult with principals (and schedule a meeting if necessary) on whether the U.S. should participate on the ground in a coalition.

Making the UN Work: It is increasingly obvious that the only way in which we can get food to the people is by providing the food convoys and distribution centers with UN protection. To do that we need to make several fundamental changes in the UN approach:

- The UN forces need to provide protection to food operations, whether or not the local warlords approve; the UN must make clear that its ROE permit the use of force if needed to achieve this. *"fulfilled"*

- It also means deploying many more UN forces in the south than are now present or are planned; those forces must be deployed whether or not the local warlords approve.

Getting more UN forces in without warlord approval may be difficult. While the Pakistanis are now at the Mogadishu airport, their presence there is contested, they are out-gunned in the area, and they do not control the region around the airport from which fire could be directed at reinforcing flights.

Delivering the Troops: Aideed will not agree to the deployment of 1500+ UN troops in Mogadishu. Any significant reinforcement of the Pakistanis will have to be accomplished over his objections. Whether he would resist such a deployment militarily is less certain, but we would have to be prepared to deal with that contingency if we agreed to provide lift in a non-permissive environment. Only the U.S. is likely to have the force posture needed to accomplish such a task. If we agreed to do this, it would probably entail some risk to U.S. forces, and we would have to be prepared to use force to accomplish the task. The threat alone of U.S. involvement for that purpose might persuade the

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warlords to be compliant in a successful effort in Mogadishu could pave the way for a similar operation in Kismayo.

The mission would be limited to securing (or reinforcing) the airport or port, countering any hostile action, delivering the troops, and leaving. This U.S. effort would be limited in scope, nature and exposure -- although we might have to keep naval and naval aviation assets in the region for contingencies (non-permissive, in extremis extractions and for general deterrence.) Providing air cover for the PKO/food security operation is another possible requirement. A commitment to accomplish this would not necessarily imply a commitment to contribute any ground forces either to this force or subsequent forces. We would probably have at least an implied commitment to retrieve the forces we have brought in, if necessary. This could involve a fairly long-term commitment to keep sufficient force to meet such contingencies available on reasonable notice.

A Greater U.S. Role: An expanded UN PKO contingent, appropriately armed should be able to provide adequate food security. The UN, however, cannot introduce those forces on their own into a non-permissive environment. Thus, in the case of Mogadishu it might be necessary for the U.S. to help UN forces secure the airport and vicinity. The threat alone of U.S. involvement for that purpose might persuade the warlords to be compliant. A successful effort in Mogadishu could pave the way for a similar operation in Kismayo.

Using U.S. force to open up an airhead for UN forces would greatly increase our involvement, but without the deployment of many more UN forces, the massive starvation will continue unabated. This U.S. effort would be limited in scope, nature, and exposure -- although we might have to keep naval and naval aviation assets in the region for contingencies (non-permissive, in extremis extractions and for general deterrence. Providing air cover for the PKO/food security operation is another possible requirement.

There will be War Power Resolution implications. Indeed, the question of prior congressional authority will arise.

Budget/Humanitarian Air Lift

At the last PCC, AID distributed a paper that proposed eliminating the civilian replacement airlift on February 25 -- one month after DOD leaves. I pointed out this was contrary to the DC decision, and absolutely unacceptable. AID's viewpoint was that road convoys are the preferred delivery means, and they were "assuming" them by that date. Moreover (and more to the point), AID didn't have the money to keep the airlift going to the end of the fiscal year.

Eagleburger has ordered that an effort be made to find the resources to keep the airlift going from existing resources, and seek a supplemental only as a last resort. I strongly suggest that you lay down a marker that we will not tolerate a situation where we do not have the resources to respond to disasters

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elsewhere. (The money for Somalia will undoubtedly come out of an account Congress intended for overall African drought relief - and far more people are at risk in southern African than in Somalia.) You might want to have Bob Howard lead a group to take a realistic look at the likely requirements for the rest of the fiscal year and start planning for a supplemental, if needed, well before the cash box is completely empty.

Political Strategy and Limited Receivership

With the focus on security, there has not been much attention paid to the long-term strategy (including UN receivership (an idea that is highly controversial among international lawyers)), and there may not be much time for it at this meeting either. Kittani is still getting his feet on the ground, and we should probably get de Vos out to the region to get a better reading on the situation before reaching any firm conclusions.

Concurrences by: Nick Rostow, Nancy Bearg Dyke

Attachments

Tab I	Agenda
Tab II	NSC Think Piece
Tab III	State Department Discussion Paper
Tab IV	Les Gelb Op-Ed Piece
Tab V	CIA Analysis of Pakistani Position at Airport
Tab VI	DC Objectives
Tab VII	NIO Analysis of UN Mission

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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: November 20, 1992

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 am - 12:00 pm

SOMALIA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Jonathan Howe
- II. Assessment
 - Security Situation William Studeman
 - Political Update Frank Wisner
- III. Policy Options
 - Security Options Frank Wisner
 - Long Term Political Strategy Frank Wisner
 - Relief and Budget Outlook. Frank Wisner
 - UN Limited Receivership Frank Wisner
 - U.S.-UN Military Communications Barry McCaffery
- IV. Discussion All Participants
- V. Summary Jonathan Howe

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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02h. Paper	Somalia Discussion Paper (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

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By ga on 5/2/14

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
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AR Disposition Date:	11/30/2010	MR Disposition Date:	

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
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SOMALIA DISCUSSION PAPER

There are three interlocked aspects to resolving the Somalia crisis:

- Supply and delivery of humanitarian relief to prevent starvation and alleviate suffering.
- Assuring security for humanitarian relief activities.
- Re-establishing stability and political order so that Somalia can become relatively self-sufficient and the international community will not need to undertake any further extraordinary measures.

As graphically demonstrated in the JCS flow chart provided at the last Deputies meeting, these aspects are interdependent. Actions in one area can affect progress in others. Failure to move in one area will undoubtedly hinder success in the others.


At the November 17 meeting, the Deputies will have an opportunity to review progress (or lack of it) in all three areas, and consider whether we need to adjust U.S. policy. The PCC will be preparing papers on:

- Improving mil-to-mil contacts with the UN
- Budgetary outlook
- "Limited receivership," whereby the UN would assume a role in helping govern Somalia.

This discussion paper will outline three approaches for dealing with the Somalia security situation -- the most controversial issue, and the most important for the U.S. right now. In any case, it will be important for us to move rapidly to implement our chosen strategy. If the international community is to mount a serious security effort, it will require rapid deployment of sufficient forces.

Security Options

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
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STATE DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

THE NEED FOR ACTION IN SOMALIA

CURRENT SITUATION:

Despite a major international relief effort spearheaded by the U.S., the situation in Somalia is catastrophic. It has deteriorated further in the past several weeks. Somali General Aideed's challenge to the UN over the weekend and the resignation of Ambassador Sahnoun have exacerbated the situation. There is no government; regional warlords contend for power oblivious to the suffering around them; armed thugs prowl the countryside. Three hundred thousand Somalis have already perished from starvation and the diseases of hunger. Hundreds continue to die every day. The great tragedy of Somalia is that the food is there, in the ports or on ships ready to dock. But because of the warring, the looting and the violence it cannot be delivered to those who need it most.

We have approached the Somali crisis in support of the UN in three ways: (1) providing food, (2) introducing outside security and (3) beginning the long task of rebuilding a Somali national political structure without which the famine and insecurity would continue unabated. For more than a year we have provided food and other contributions far surpassing that of any other country. In August, the U.S. military began airlifting food supplies into needy but relatively safe areas of Somalia. It is to continue until the end of January. Our effort, frequently involving over 20 flights per day, is by far the largest component in a considerable international airlift operation which we in fact catalyzed. Despite periodic interruptions due to violence on the ground, we have managed to airlift over 19 thousand metric tons to date.

Despite this effort, however, at most only half of the population threatened with starvation is being reached. This is not an indictment of the airlift effort. The airlift was never intended as a solution to the famine in Somalia. The airlift is an expensive, extremely inefficient means of delivering food supplies that is dwarfed by the need on the ground. DOD may have committed more than \$30 million to finance its portion of the airlift. In addition, AID has budgeted \$25 million to fund the transition to civilian airlift that is itself slated to begin winding down in late February. The problem is that both agencies are running short on funds.

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The airlift was originally planned as an interim measure to feed as many people as possible until a more efficient and cost effective land convoy system could be established. To protect these convoys in the lawless Somali environment, the UN planned to put 3500 troops into the country to provide for food security. We flew the first contingent of 500 Pakistanis into Mogadishu in late September. The UN subsequently requested that we fly in the remaining detachments of an expanded UNOSOM, but some potential participants are now backing out.

Unfortunately, the 500 Pakistanis in Mogadishu have been pinned down since arrival by General Aideed and could be attacked by superior forces at any time. Deployments to truly needy areas are being held hostage to fighting on the ground. The sad fact is that UN planning is woefully inadequate to the task at hand. The November 12 PCC reached the consensus that a much larger force will be needed to safely transport food from the ports to the areas in the interior that need it. DOD has noted that three thousand troops would be needed to safely deliver food from Mogadishu to just one major distribution point in the interior.

Urgent action is required now if we are to avoid greater tragedy in Somalia. We need to find the money to keep the airlift going, pressure the UN to quickly develop a security plan that will work and step up efforts to find a political solution that will end the anarchy that reigns in Somalia.

ISSUE ONE : KEEPING THE AIRLIFT GOING

DISCUSSION

Per agreement at an earlier Deputies Committee meeting, the DOD food airlift is being phased down and will end on January 25. It is being replaced by a much more cost-efficient AID-funded civilian operation involving seven aircraft. AID estimates that seven aircraft will be needed to duplicate the DOD effort in lift capacity. Unfortunately, the AID effort was itself predicated on a smooth transition to a land convoy system by early 1993. They had hoped to be able to reduce their operation from seven aircraft to two by the end of February and to keep the remaining two aircraft flying until the end of FY 1993. The projected cost of this plan would be \$25 million, which is equal to the entire earmark for Somalia appropriated in a new \$100 million Africa disaster assistance account in the FY 1993 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

To keep seven planes flying to the end of the fiscal year would cost over \$70 million and AID would have to find the money from other foreign assistance accounts or seek a supplemental appropriation from Congress. While funding should be sought from existing resources in the first instance, the option of seeking permission to request a supplemental appropriation at a later date should be retained.

CONCLUSION:

The AID Somali food airlift should be continued until transition to an effective land convoy delivery system can be established. AID should seek to fund the airlift from existing resources, while retaining the option of seeking permission to request a supplemental appropriation at a later date should circumstances warrant.

ISSUE TWO : ENHANCING SECURITY IN SOMALIA

DISCUSSION:

In order to institute a reliable food convoy system in Somalia a much more robust security effort would be required. Although DOD has not yet made an estimate of the total force that would be required -- to do this they will need an estimate from AID of the number of locations in the interior that would need to be reached -- their conclusion that 3000 troops would be needed to safely establish just one convoy route from the coast to the interior clearly suggests that a much larger force than the 3500 troops now in the UN pipeline, appropriately equipped and supported, would be needed to establish safe food corridors to needy areas in the Somali interior.

In order to insure the success of its mission this force would need to be prepared to use force, both in establishing its presence in the ports and at interior reception areas and in convoying relief supplies between them. Any such operation would be extremely expensive and would clearly put lives at risk. We would see no need at this point to commit U.S. ground troops to such an operation. We believe the UN could find willing participants elsewhere, if they were authorized to use force. The quid pro quo for any such participation, however, would be active U.S. logistical support. Since this could involve flying or sailing into non-permissive environments, U.S. lives could be put at risk.

Should the U.S. decide to support such an approach, we would need to take the following steps:

W. Brown
-- Have a high level envoy tell UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali we do not believe the current UN plan will work and that a much larger force, prepared to operate in a non-permissive environment, will be required to provide security for the needed land convoy system. Offer to share our planning.

-- Offer to work with him to put together a coalition of nations prepared to participate in such a force and to secure any required UNSC resolutions authorizing its use.

-- Underscore to Boutros that this coalition would be financed by participating countries rather than U.N. assessment. X

-- Assure him that the U.S. will be prepared to provide logistical support for the force, but tell him that we do not foresee a role for U.S. ground forces.

-- Inform Boutros that, if appropriate, we will deploy a MARG off the Somali coast to deter attacks on the U.N. humanitarian operation.

The alternative to augmenting the UN force and authorizing its operation in a non-permissive environment to do what is necessary to safeguard food deliveries, would be to continue with the current UN plan, which DOD believes is woefully inadequate to the task of providing food convoy security. This would mean accepting the continuation of largescale starvation in Somalia, and, assuming that we sustain our commitment to the current food airlift effort, the continuing expense of the AID airlift effort. Simply augmenting the size of the projected 3500 troop UN force under the current rules of engagement, would merely be a variation on the current failed plan. The additional forces would either not be deployed due to the absence of a permissive environment, risk being pinned down like the Pakistanis in Mogadishu or be forced to fight to carry out their mission.

CONCLUSION

We strongly believe that the world community cannot sit idly by while the means exist to end the catastrophic suffering in Somalia. While we are aware of the probable expense of such a venture, and the physical risk to participants in a force authorized to take and hold ground, we believe these factors are outweighed by moral considerations and by the need to demonstrate that the UN can act decisively in the post-Cold War world to end suffering where it is feasible to do so. We therefore recommend that we approach the UN Secretary General as outlined above with a proposal to put together a much larger UN-backed force, prepared to use force to establish a workable land convoy relief system in Somalia.

ISSUE THREE: PROMOTING A POLITICAL SOLUTION**DISCUSSION**

The new UN envoy, Ismat Kitani, is preoccupied with the deployment of additional UNOSOM food security guards. He will need to begin addressing the reconciliation process immediately if we are to progress beyond the tourniquet stage of treating the Somali crisis. The Sahnoun plan of seeking local and regional accommodations and reconstituting civil administration (police, medical services, etc.) remains valid but requires greater elaboration and vigorous pursuit. We should urge the UN to reconstitute a police force trained, paid for, and directed by the UN, as a number one priority.

A follow on meeting to the Geneva donor's conference is planned for Addis Ababa the first week of December. Leaders of the various Somali clans will be invited to the meeting and their cooperation sought in implementing the U.N. 100 Day Action Plan. The first stage of a National Reconciliation Conference is being talked about as early as January 1993. We are prepared to assist in promoting reconciliation through our delegates to the planned meetings and the activities of our special envoy for Somalia. We do not, however, want to get out in front of the UN on the political front and will have to generate more planning and activity by the UN lest the political reconciliation process receive inadequate attention.

CONCLUSION:

We should urge Boutros Ghali to develop a more detailed strategy for reconstituting civil administration in Somalia and a plan for transferring its direction to representative Somali leadership.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02j. Memo	Re: Somalia: The Threat to the UN's Pakistani Battalion in Mogadishu (4 pp.)	11/18/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Document Partially Declassified
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 By *JS* on 5/2/14

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AR Case #:	1998-0101-F(592.05)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/25/2008	MR Disposition Date:	

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(b)(1)



18 November 1992

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Somalia: The Threat to the UN's Pakistani
Battalion in Mogadishu

Background

1. Somali warlord General Aideed, who has suffered several military setbacks against rivals in recent weeks, appears to have concluded that the United Nations (UN) is contributing to the threat to his tenuous control of southern Mogadishu and helping to undermine his military position elsewhere. He has responded with an anti-UN campaign in Mogadishu and throughout the south. (b)(1)

2. His attack on the Pakistani contingent guarding Mogadishu Main Airport on 13 November--triggered by his displeasure over being excluded from a recent deal between the Hawadle clan and the UN over expanding the Pakistani role there--signaled a significant escalation in this campaign. Two days later, he organized a demonstration outside UNOSOM's Mogadishu headquarters to protest foreign intervention, and in several recent radio broadcasts he has claimed that the UN is preparing to take over Somalia. He probably was also behind the attacks on a group of personnel from foreign non-government organizations (NGOs) at a Mogadishu beach on Sunday in which a French volunteer was wounded. (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

Balance of Forces

3. The 500-man Pakistani force at the airport is no match for the Somali forces under Aideed. (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

(b)(1) The Pakistani battalion is equipped only with machineguns and lightly armored APCs, while Aideed's forces have tanks, medium artillery, recoilless rifles, antitank missiles, and jeep-mounted antiaircraft guns. (b)(1)

The Extent of the Threat

4. Aideed wants the UN to revert to dealing solely with him in trying to establish a reliable and secure relief delivery process for Somalia. He is opposed to any UN effort to negotiate directly with local powers in other parts of the country for deploying UN guard contingents, and we believe he will continue to escalate his campaign until the UN agrees to his conditions or withdraws from Mogadishu. We judge, based on his previous efforts to cow both the UN and the Red Cross into complying with his demands, that he will continue to harass the UN through his propaganda campaign and by testing the Pakistanis' resolve with hit-and-run raids. This will almost certainly include continued violence against unarmed NGO personnel, who Aideed calculates will look to the UN for protection. The Pakistanis would be hard pressed to counter a concerted effort directed at foreigners. (b)(1)

5. In our view, the ball is in the UN's court. A decision to "tough it out" at Mogadishu airport or to try to move ahead with the deployment of guard contingents elsewhere in the country--especially in Chisimayu--will prompt Aideed to escalate his current harassment campaign and to carry out more indirect or small-scale attacks on the Pakistanis. (b)(1)

6. Any signal that the UN intends to reinforce the Pakistanis could convince Aideed that the UN is planning to cut off his access to the port and the airport. This would probably spur him to bombard the airport and Pakistani bivouac area in a bid to force an evacuation. (b)(1)

7. An all-out assault designed to seize the airport and preempt further UN deployments is less likely. Despite his advantages in weapons and troop strength, Aideed almost certainly believes--and his key advisers almost certainly are telling him--that a direct assault could precipitate a strong international retaliation. Even if he stops short of an all-out assault, there is a better than even chance that the Pakistanis would be unable to defend the airport and would be forced to withdraw, either to Provisional President Ali Mahdi's northern Mogadishu enclave or to the nearby beach. (b)(1)

8. Recognizing that Aideed's longer range artillery could render their position at the airport untenable, the

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(b)(1)

Comparison of UNOSOM and Aided Forces in Mogadishu

Pakistani Forces:

- 500 troops, including: 20-man headquarters element, 150-man headquarters company, and three 110-man line companies
- 20 US-made M-113 APCs mounted with Soviet 12.7 mm machineguns
- 60-mm mortars, smoke and illumination rounds only
- AK-47s, AK-74s, and G3s
- RPG-7s
- Miscellaneous support vehicles: 15 2/12-ton trucks, 5 Land Rovers, 2 Toyota pickup trucks, 5 trailers, 6 water trucks, 3 ambulances, 1 light recovery vehicle, 1 large recovery vehicle, 1 POL truck
- 60 days of food starting from late September; water purification equipment

Aided Forces:

- 2,000 troops (in southern Mogadishu area)
- Numerous "technical" vehicles, typically mounted with 23- and 37-mm antiaircraft artillery
- Small number of T-54, T-55, and M-48 tanks
- 152-mm 1937 howitzers; 155-mm M-198 howitzers (rarely used, due to lack of trained crews)
- 106-mm recoilless rifles
- 23-mm ZU-23s and 37-mm Quad antiaircraft guns
- Milan antitank missiles
- 120-mm mortars
- RPG-7s
- Wide range of machineguns, including .50 cal. and 14.5-mm
- Miscellaneous grenades
- Numerous small arms, including AK-47s and G3s

3

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

Pakistanis might try to forestall the threat from Aideed by trying to clear the area around the airport of his forces. Although outnumbered, the Pakistanis are more disciplined and better trained than Aideed's troops. Furthermore, Aideed has already tried and failed to wrest control of the airport from the Hawadle guard force currently cooperating with the Pakistanis. With the cooperation of Hawadle forces, it is possible, though unlikely, that the Pakistanis could hand Aideed a defeat sufficient to force him to back down. (b)(1)

Risks to Extracting the Pakistanis

9. The Pakistani battalion could almost certainly be extracted without incident if an evacuation were coordinated with the local Hawadle guards and Aideed. We do not believe Aideed would run the risk of retaliation by allowing any untoward incidents to mar an evacuation-- particularly if done by US forces, which the Somalis appear to fear. (b)(1)

10. In a hostile environment, the airport would be extremely vulnerable to indirect fire from artillery, as well as direct fire from crew-served weapons and small arms. Evacuation under such circumstances would require that the Pakistanis move from the airport and that extraction forces provide at least some suppressive fire for demonstration effect. While Aideed would almost certainly be satisfied with a UN pullout, he could misperceive arriving forces in these circumstances as reinforcements for the Pakistanis. In this event, he would probably respond by engaging them. (b)(1)

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OBJECTIVES

- Immediate agreement to the UN request Wednesday to transport 75 additional Pakistanis and their equipment, without quibbling over payment (i.e., we do this one for free).
- Begin immediately to seek an "all necessary means" resolution at the UN.
- Move the ARG into the area to maximize our capability and flexibility. (We'll have to devise a public affairs strategy.)
- Urge the UN to deploy all the currently authorized forces to Mogadishu as a first step. The Pakistanis, Canadians and Belgians together would be a credible force of 2000+ troops.
- Seek approval of principals to inform the UN that the U.S. is prepared to lift (by air or sea as militarily appropriate) those forces into Mogadishu, over local armed opposition if necessary.
- Agree to seek with the UN and internationally a credible and sufficient security force, prepared to operate in a non-permissive environment.
- Consult with principals (and schedule a meeting if necessary) on whether the U.S. should participate on the ground in a coalition.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

1998-0101-F
11/30/2010 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02L. Report	Re: Can United Nations Forces Successfully Carry Out Their Mission in Somalia? (4 pp.)	11/10/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By SP on 5/2/14

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1998-0101-F(592.07)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	6/17/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



National Intelligence Council Memorandum

Can United Nations Forces Successfully Carry Out Their Mission in Somalia?

Key Points

The UN is unlikely to be able to ensure that humanitarian relief supplies reach the two million or so Somalis at risk from starvation. A force far larger than the 3,500 troops currently envisaged by the UN would be needed to provide sufficient security for such an endeavor.

If the United States transports the troops into areas in which local agreement has been obtained, we do not expect a serious threat, although the risk from random shootings is ever-present.

If they are inserted, tremendous logistical difficulties will be encountered in maintaining UN troops in Somalia, particularly in inland towns and in areas where the nearby port is not secured. Moreover, such operations will tax the already fragile infrastructure.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

1998-001-F
6/17/2009 MM

This memorandum was prepared by the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa for a Policy Coordinating Committee meeting. It is based on a videoconference among Intelligence Community analysts held on 9 November. It was coordinated with representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA, with participation by DoD/JCS (J-3, J-4, and J-5).

All portions classified Secret (b)(1)

NIC 00310/92
10 November 1992

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

Can United Nations Forces Successfully Carry Out Their Mission in Somalia?

What Is the Mission of United Nations Troops in Somalia?

As presently understood, the UN peacekeeping troops are charged with ensuring that humanitarian relief supplies reach the 2 million or so Somalis at risk from starvation. They are to secure the delivery points at ports and airports and provide security for truck convoys and feeding centers.

In our judgment, the UN is unlikely to be able to carry out this mission with its current force levels and operational strategy. We have little reason to expect further UN deployments to have more success--except in Bosaso and perhaps Berbera--than the 500 Pakistani (b)(1)

Is the Strategy Developed by the UN To Carry Out This Mission Viable?

The current UN plan to insert additional peacekeeping contingents from Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Nigeria, and Norway, in several Somali towns--including ports and inland towns--and to tactically deploy to accomplish its mission is seriously flawed.

The Intelligence Community agrees that a force far larger than the 3,500 troops currently envisaged by the UN would be needed to carry out its mandated mission. Moreover, the program depends on obtaining prior agreement from the various warlords, including General Aideed, who has lately grown increasingly hostile toward the UN and its presence in Somalia.

- o Even with the agreement of local warlords, US military planners suggest that for the Mogadishu to Baidoa corridor

alone, at least 3,000 troops would be needed to secure Mogadishu's airport and port, and safe convoy transport twice weekly by road to Baidoa and its feeding centers.

- o Aided is likely to be the major obstacle to a national agreement on further deployment, especially as military pressure on him increases. He probably would harass the 500-man Pakistani battalion in Mogadishu in retaliation for UN deployments--to Bardera, for example--that he perceives as aiding his enemies.
- o We believe the UN will be able to obtain some local agreements to deploy troops, but a few factions--especially those not in control of intended UN destinations--will remain opposed to accepting peacekeepers. Moreover, these agreements are apt to be unreliable and will take time to negotiate. Warlords may shift alliances and not honor their promises to cooperate with the United Nations. Even if they are inclined to cooperate, most warlords have poor command and control and may be incapable of restraining troublemakers.

Can the UN Peacekeeping Forces Be Inserted Successfully?

If the United States transports the troops into areas in which local agreement has been obtained, we do not expect a serious threat, although the risk from random shootings is ever-present.

- o The US military is widely respected and feared, but bandit gangs or profiteers might still create incidents.
- o The UN, however, enjoys little respect or support from most local warlords.

Can the UN Troops Carry Out Their Relatively Limited Relief Mission?

UN planners have placed operational limits on the peacekeeping forces that will undermine their ability to achieve their objectives.

- o Vague rules of engagement remain a major hindrance. Although recently published rules do not prohibit peacekeepers from firing first, the UN's emphasis on negotiating to obtain the cooperation of local armed factions will continue to undermine the willingness of commanders to use force.
- o The peacekeepers are susceptible to attack from factions with long-range artillery. Some Somali factions have heavy armaments, including 105mm to 155mm artillery and BM-21 rocket launchers, and even tanks and APCs. However, the UN--conscious of political factors and reluctant to appear as an aggressor--has restricted its forces to short-range defensive weapons.
- o By working with local warlords and local guard forces, the peacekeepers risk undermining their neutrality by being perceived as siding with one of the factions.

Can a Relief Mission Be Sustained Within the Parameters Set Up by the United Nations?

If they are inserted, tremendous logistical difficulties will be encountered in maintaining the troops in Somalia, particularly in inland towns and in areas where the nearby port is not secured, and will tax the already fragile infrastructure.

- o The operation in Bardera, for example, would be dependent on cooperation from Kenya for staging and resupply. Until road access is available from Kismayo, all resupply to forces there must be by airlift. This would be in addition to the 30 chartered relief flights a month now flying into Bardera. Such a level of activity on a marginal airfield would require a dedicated rapid runway repair capability. Moreover, the only way to evacuate the troops would be by air.
- o There is a high likelihood that at least one or another of the groups inserted by the United States at the behest of the UN would require evacuation from a potentially hostile situation. For now, the United States does not have sufficient assets in the region to conduct such operations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02m. Draft Paper	Re: Discussion on Somalia (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed: 3/15/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9221037
RECEIVED: 12 NOV 92 08

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA
AGENDA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 17 NOV DC MTG ON SOMALIA

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 16 NOV 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF: 9220859 9221049

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC395

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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DOC 2 OF 2

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Summary	Re: Action Data Summary Report (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9221037

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HOWE
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 92111214 FOR DECISION
X 92111310 HOWE APPROVED RECOM
X 92111310 SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 921113 JACKSON, K
002 921113 PEARSON, W
002 921113 SHERFIELD, M
002 921113 HOWARD, R
002 921113
002 921113
002 921113 WOLFE, J
002 921113 CONNELL, M

ZOELICK, R

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

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3/15/10

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Bill Situation Room

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AW 11/13

X

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

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Other

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

Agenda for Nov 17 DC

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*Admirals have
changes made!*

12 NOV 92 23 21

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Agenda & Discussion Paper for 17 November DC Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 8 /
FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN ^{AWJ} 456-6534 _____
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Agenda & Discussion Paper for 17 Nov DC mtg
on Somalia

NSC Log # 21037

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TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	Mr. W. Robert Pearson	Exec Sec	
DEFENSE	Col. Michael B. Sherfield	Exec Sec	
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	Exec Sec	
JCS	Capt. H.L. Sheffield	Secretary	

REMARKS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9221037
DATE 13 NOV 92

SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 17 NOV DC MTG ON SOMALIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/13/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff


MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (U)

Attached is the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on
Somalia scheduled for November 17. Attendance is limited to
principal plus one. *let*

Also attached is an informal thinkpiece to guide discussion of
security options. *let*


William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 3/15/10

cc: Bob Zoellick

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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21037

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: November 17, 1992

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:00 pm - 3:00 pm

SOMALIA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Jonathan Howe
- II. Assessment
 - Security Situation William Studeman
 - Political Update Frank Wisner
- III. Policy Options
 - Security Options Frank Wisner
 - Long Term Political Strategy Frank Wisner
 - Relief and Budget Outlook. Frank Wisner
 - UN Limited Receivership Frank Wisner
 - U.S.-UN Military Communications Barry McCaffery
- IV. Discussion All Participants
- V. Summary Jonathan Howe

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By MM NARA, Date 4/12/2014

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Paper	Re: Somalia Discussion Paper (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 5/2/2014

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1998-0101-F(592.01)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	11/30/2010	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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SOMALIA DISCUSSION PAPER

There are three interlocked aspects to resolving the Somalia crisis:

- Supply and delivery of humanitarian relief to prevent starvation and alleviate suffering.
- Assuring security for humanitarian relief activities.
- Re-establishing stability and political order so that Somalia can become relatively self-sufficient and the international community will not need to undertake any further extraordinary measures.

As graphically demonstrated in the JCS flow chart provided at the last Deputies meeting, these aspects are interdependent. Actions in one area can affect progress in others. Failure to move in one area will undoubtedly hinder success in the others.


At the November 17 meeting, the Deputies will have an opportunity to review progress (or lack of it) in all three areas, and consider whether we need to adjust U.S. policy. The PCC will be preparing papers on:

- Improving mil-to-mil contacts with the UN
- Budgetary outlook
- "Limited receivership," whereby the UN would assume a role in helping govern Somalia.

This discussion paper will outline three approaches for dealing with the Somalia security situation -- the most controversial issue, and the most important for the U.S. right now. In any case, it will be important for us to move rapidly to implement our chosen strategy. If the international community is to mount a serious security effort, it will require rapid deployment of sufficient forces.

Security Options

(b) (1)



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
PER E.O. 13526

1998-0101-F


11/30/2010 MM

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(b)(1)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21037

November 12, 1992

Deputy Assistant Secretary
has seen

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: TED MCNAMARA *TM*

FROM: JOHN M. ORDWAY *JO*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia November 17

We have prepared an agenda (Tab A) for Wednesday's Deputies Committee meeting and a discussion paper (Tab B) on the security issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to transmit the agenda and discussion paper to his counterparts.

Approve *JA*

Disapprove _____

*(as modified)
Tab I and page 2, 3 of Tab A)*

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Counterparts
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 3/15/10

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Draft Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed:	3/15/2010	OA/ID Number:	90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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21037

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of the Vice President

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (U)

Attached is the agenda for the Deputies Committee meeting on
Somalia scheduled for November 17. Attendance is limited to
principal plus one. *(U)*

Also attached is ~~an NSC drafted discussion paper~~ *of security options*
~~an informal memo piece to guide~~ *(U)*

William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

cc: Bob Zoellick

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 3/5/10

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03g. Draft Paper	Re: [Somalia Discussion Paper] Pages 2 and 3 (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220859
RECEIVED: 02 OCT 92 08

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 19 NOV 92
SOURCE REF: 9223918

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 20 NOV DC MTG ON SOMALIA

ACTION: NFAR PER ORDWAY

DUE DATE: 23 NOV 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF: 9221037 9221049

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC395

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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CAP

3/15/10

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9220859

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 ORDWAY
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 92111914 APPROPRIATE ACTION
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 3/15/10

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FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 19 NOV 92
SOURCE REF: 9223918

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE PAPER FOR DC MTG ON 20 NOV RE SOMALIA

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 23 NOV 92 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ORDWAY

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ORDWAY

FOR CONCURRENCE
MCNAMARA

FOR INFO
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HOWE
MERCHANT
TANNER

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ATTACHMENTS

CAP

3/15/10

COMMENTS:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Memo	W. Robert Pearson to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia (1 pp.)	11/19/92	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec.6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 395 - November 20, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Somalia, Keywords: Somalia

Date Closed: 3/15/2010	OA/ID Number: 90024-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9223918

20859

November 19, 1992

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MEMORANDUM TO:

MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Affairs Advisor
The White House

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. MARY ELLEN CONNELL
Executive Secretary
United States Information Agency

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
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Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

CPT H.L. SHEFFIELD, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff


MS. JOAN WOLFE
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Somalia

Please transmit to members of the Deputies Committee the attached paper on "The Need for Action in Somalia" which sets out State Department recommendations for responding to the continuing crisis in Somalia, and which we would like to have discussed at the November 20 Deputies Committee meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By CAP NARA, Date 3/15/10


W. Robert Pearson
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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Drafted:T:JSchmidt✓
11/19/92 SEEB 5235 7-0068

Cleared:AF:RHoudek
AF/E:RJParDon✓

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DECL:OADR

STATE DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

THE NEED FOR ACTION IN SOMALIA

CURRENT SITUATION:

Despite a major international relief effort spearheaded by the U.S., the situation in Somalia is catastrophic. It has deteriorated further in the past several weeks. Somali General Aideed's challenge to the UN over the weekend and the resignation of Ambassador Sahnoun have exacerbated the situation. There is no government; regional warlords contend for power oblivious to the suffering around them; armed thugs prowl the countryside. Three hundred thousand Somalis have already perished from starvation and the diseases of hunger. Hundreds continue to die every day. The great tragedy of Somalia is that the food is there, in the ports or on ships ready to dock. But because of the warring, the looting and the violence it cannot be delivered to those who need it most.

We have approached the Somali crisis in support of the UN in three ways: (1) providing food, (2) introducing outside security and (3) beginning the long task of rebuilding a Somali national political structure without which the famine and insecurity would continue unabated. For more than a year we have provided food and other contributions far surpassing that of any other country. In August, the U.S. military began airlifting food supplies into needy but relatively safe areas of Somalia. It is to continue until the end of January. Our effort, frequently involving over 20 flights per day, is by far the largest component in a considerable international airlift operation which we in fact catalyzed. Despite periodic interruptions due to violence on the ground, we have managed to airlift over 19 thousand metric tons to date.

Despite this effort, however, at most only half of the population threatened with starvation is being reached. This is not an indictment of the airlift effort. The airlift was never intended as a solution to the famine in Somalia. The airlift is an expensive, extremely inefficient means of delivering food supplies that is dwarfed by the need on the ground. DOD may have committed more than \$30 million to finance its portion of the airlift. In addition, AID has budgeted \$25 million to fund the transition to civilian airlift that is itself slated to begin winding down in late February. The problem is that both agencies are running short on funds.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

1998-0101-F
4/30/2009 MM

The airlift was originally planned as an interim measure to feed as many people as possible until a more efficient and cost effective land convoy system could be established. To protect these convoys in the lawless Somali environment, the UN planned to put 3500 troops into the country to provide for food security. We flew the first contingent of 500 Pakistanis into Mogadishu in late September. The UN subsequently requested that we fly in the remaining detachments of an expanded UNOSOM, but some potential participants are now backing out.

Unfortunately, the 500 Pakistanis in Mogadishu have been pinned down since arrival by General Aideed and could be attacked by superior forces at any time. Deployments to truly needy areas are being held hostage to fighting on the ground. The sad fact is that UN planning is woefully inadequate to the task at hand. The November 12 PCC reached the consensus that a much larger force will be needed to safely transport food from the ports to the areas in the interior that need it. DOD has noted that three thousand troops would be needed to safely deliver food from Mogadishu to just one major distribution point in the interior.

Urgent action is required now if we are to avoid greater tragedy in Somalia. We need to find the money to keep the airlift going, pressure the UN to quickly develop a security plan that will work and step up efforts to find a political solution that will end the anarchy that reigns in Somalia.

ISSUE ONE : KEEPING THE AIRLIFT GOING

DISCUSSION

Per agreement at an earlier Deputies Committee meeting, the DOD food airlift is being phased down and will end on January 25. It is being replaced by a much more cost-efficient AID-funded civilian operation involving seven aircraft. AID estimates that seven aircraft will be needed to duplicate the DOD effort in lift capacity. Unfortunately, the AID effort was itself predicated on a smooth transition to a land convoy system by early 1993. They had hoped to be able to reduce their operation from seven aircraft to two by the end of February and to keep the remaining two aircraft flying until the end of FY 1993. The projected cost of this plan would be \$25 million, which is equal to the entire earmark for Somalia appropriated in a new \$100 million Africa disaster assistance account in the FY 1993 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

To keep seven planes flying to the end of the fiscal year would cost over \$70 million and AID would have to find the money from other foreign assistance accounts or seek a supplemental appropriation from Congress. While funding should be sought from existing resources in the first instance, the option of seeking permission to request a supplemental appropriation at a later date should be retained.

CONCLUSION:

The AID Somali food airlift should be continued until transition to an effective land convoy delivery system can be established. AID should seek to fund the airlift from existing resources, while retaining the option of seeking permission to request a supplemental appropriation at a later date should circumstances warrant.

ISSUE TWO : ENHANCING SECURITY IN SOMALIA

DISCUSSION:

In order to institute a reliable food convoy system in Somalia a much more robust security effort would be required. Although DOD has not yet made an estimate of the total force that would be required -- to do this they will need an estimate from AID of the number of locations in the interior that would need to be reached -- their conclusion that 3000 troops would be needed to safely establish just one convoy route from the coast to the interior clearly suggests that a much larger force than the 3500 troops now in the UN pipeline, appropriately equipped and supported, would be needed to establish safe food corridors to needy areas in the Somali interior.

In order to insure the success of its mission this force would need to be prepared to use force, both in establishing its presence in the ports and at interior reception areas and in convoying relief supplies between them. Any such operation would be extremely expensive and would clearly put lives at risk. We would see no need at this point to commit U.S. ground troops to such an operation. We believe the UN could find willing participants elsewhere, if they were authorized to use force. The quid pro quo for any such participation, however, would be active U.S. logistical support. Since this could involve flying or sailing into non-permissive environments, U.S. lives could be put at risk.

Should the U.S. decide to support such an approach, we would need to take the following steps:

-- Have a high level envoy tell UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali we do not believe the current UN plan will work and that a much larger force, prepared to operate in a non-permissive environment, will be required to provide security for the needed land convoy system. Offer to share our planning.

-- Offer to work with him to put together a coalition of nations prepared to participate in such a force and to secure any required UNSC resolutions authorizing its use.

-- Underscore to Boutros that this coalition would be financed by participating countries rather than U.N. assessment.

-- Assure him that the U.S. will be prepared to provide logistical support for the force, but tell him that we do not foresee a role for U.S. ground forces.

-- Inform Boutros that, if appropriate, we will deploy a MARG off the Somali coast to deter attacks on the U.N. humanitarian operation.

The alternative to augmenting the UN force and authorizing its operation in a non-permissive environment to do what is necessary to safeguard food deliveries, would be to continue with the current UN plan, which DOD believes is woefully inadequate to the task of providing food convoy security. This would mean accepting the continuation of largescale starvation in Somalia, and, assuming that we sustain our commitment to the current food airlift effort, the continuing expense of the AID airlift effort. Simply augmenting the size of the projected 3500 troop UN force under the current rules of engagement, would merely be a variation on the current failed plan. The additional forces would either not be deployed due to the absence of a permissive environment, risk being pinned down like the Pakistanis in Mogadishu or be forced to fight to carry out their mission.

CONCLUSION

We strongly believe that the world community cannot sit idly by while the means exist to end the catastrophic suffering in Somalia. While we are aware of the probable expense of such a venture, and the physical risk to participants in a force authorized to take and hold ground, we believe these factors are outweighed by moral considerations and by the need to demonstrate that the UN can act decisively in the post-Cold War world to end suffering where it is feasible to do so. We therefore recommend that we approach the UN Secretary General as outlined above with a proposal to put together a much larger UN-backed force, prepared to use force to establish a workable land convoy relief system in Somalia.

ISSUE THREE: PROMOTING A POLITICAL SOLUTION**DISCUSSION**

The new UN envoy, Ismat Kitani, is preoccupied with the deployment of additional UNOSOM food security guards. He will need to begin addressing the reconciliation process immediately if we are to progress beyond the tourniquet stage of treating the Somali crisis. The Sahnoun plan of seeking local and regional accommodations and reconstituting civil administration (police, medical services, etc.) remains valid but requires greater elaboration and vigorous pursuit. We should urge the UN to reconstitute a police force trained, paid for, and directed by the UN, as a number one priority.

A follow on meeting to the Geneva donor's conference is planned for Addis Ababa the first week of December. Leaders of the various Somali clans will be invited to the meeting and their cooperation sought in implementing the U.N. 100 Day Action Plan. The first stage of a National Reconciliation Conference is being talked about as early as January 1993. We are prepared to assist in promoting reconciliation through our delegates to the planned meetings and the activities of our special envoy for Somalia. We do not, however, want to get out in front of the UN on the political front and will have to generate more planning and activity by the UN lest the political reconciliation process receive inadequate attention.

CONCLUSION:

We should urge Boutros Ghali to develop a more detailed strategy for reconstituting civil administration in Somalia and a plan for transferring its direction to representative Somali leadership.

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