

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

FOIA Number:  
2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

# FOIA MARKER

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 90010  
**Folder ID Number:** 90010-017

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**Folder Title:**  
NSC/DC 038 - June 21, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Limitations on Nuclear Testing, Keywords:  
Nuclear Testing

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| Stack: | Row: | Section: | Shelf: | Position: |
|--------|------|----------|--------|-----------|
| V      | 15   | 2        | 3      | 2         |

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type         | Subject/Title                                                                                                                      | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 01. Minutes             | Re: Minutes of DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing Limitations (4 pp.)                                                                   | 6/21/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 02. Summary             | Re: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing (3 pp.)                                                                | 6/21/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03a. Memo               | John Gordon to Robert M. Gates<br>Re: Deputies Committee on Nuclear Testing Wednesday, June 21, 10:00 a.m., Situation Room (3 pp.) | 6/20/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03b. Report             | Re: Nuclear Testing Issues Paper (3 pp.)                                                                                           | 6/20/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03c. Draft Instructions | Re: Draft Instructions for U.S. Delegation to NTT on Step-by-Step (1 pp.)                                                          | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03d. Report             | Re: Further Instructions on Nuclear Testing (10 pp.)                                                                               | 5/3/89  | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 04a. Memo               | G. Philip Hughes to Distribution List<br>Re: Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.)                                                    | 6/20/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 04b. Agenda             | Re: Deputies Committee Meeting Nuclear Testing Policy Review (1 pp.)                                                               | 6/21/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 04c. Report             | Re: Nuclear Testing Issues Paper (3 pp.)                                                                                           | 6/20/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |

Page 1 of 2

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 038 - June 21, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Limitations on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1437

**OA/ID Number:** 90010-017

**Date Closed:** 10/20/2009

**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2005-1002-F

**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type         | Subject/Title                                                             | Date | Restriction | Classification |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|----------------|
| 04d. Draft Instructions | Re: Draft Instructions for U.S. Delegation to NTT on Step-by-Step (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | S              |

Page 2 of 2

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

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**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 038 - June 21, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Limitations on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1437

**OA/ID Number:** 90010-017

**Date Closed:** 10/20/2009

**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2005-1002-F

**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8921069  
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 89 09

TO: HUGHES

FROM: GORDON  
KANTER

DOC DATE: 11 SEP 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MINUTES  
NUCLEAR TESTING

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF DC MTG 21 JUN RE NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 30 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF: 8920692 8920704

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC038

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GORDON  
KANTER

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 10/20/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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OPENED BY: AC

CLOSED BY: LF

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 8921069

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HUGHES  
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 89091209 FOR DECISION  
X 89091212 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 10/20/09

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**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY:                     

LOG # 21069

URGENT NOT PROOFED:                     

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK:                     

DOCLOG                      A/O                     

|                             | SEQUENCE TO                 | HAS SEEN                    | DISPOSITION                 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Dep Exec                    | <u>1</u>                    | <u>                    </u> | <u>A</u>                    |
| Philip Hughes               | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| Bob Gates                   | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| Brent Scowcroft             | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| Philip Hughes               | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| Situation Room              | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| West Wing Desk              | <u>2</u>                    | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| NSC Secretariat             | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |
| <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> | <u>                    </u> |

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other                     

Should be seen by:                       
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

*Re Minutes - 6/21*

COMMENT 2

RECEIVED  
NSC SECRETARIAT

89 SEP 11 P 8:18

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

21069

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

September 11, 1989

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *G*

SUBJECT: Minutes of DC Meeting, June 21, 1989

Attached (Tab I) are the minutes of the Deputies Committee meeting on nuclear testing limitations held on June 21, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That you accept for the record the attached minutes.

Attachment  
Tab I Minutes

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 10/20/07

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Declassify on: OADR

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                           | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 01. Minutes              | Re: Minutes of DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing Limitations<br>(4 pp.) | 6/21/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 038 - June 21, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Limitations on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

**Date Closed:** 10/20/2009

**OA/ID Number:** 90010-017

**FOIA/SYS Case #:** 2005-1002-F

**Appeal Case #:**

**Re-review Case #:**

**Appeal Disposition:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

**Disposition Date:**

**AR Case #:**

**MR Case #:**

**AR Disposition:**

**MR Disposition:**

**AR Disposition Date:**

**MR Disposition Date:**

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8920704  
RECEIVED: 21 JUN 89 20

TO: GATES

FROM: KANTER  
GORDON

DOC DATE: 21 JUN 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR TESTING  
SOC

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR JUN 21 DC MTG ON NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: GATES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 22 JUN 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF: 8920692 8921069

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC038

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
GORDON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By cap NARA, Date 10/20/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: GD

CLOSED BY: CM

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 8920704

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES  
001

Z 89062120 FOR DECISION  
X 89091817 GATES APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 10/20/07

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# National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: 27

LOG # 20704

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG 27 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN   | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| Dep Exec        | <u>6</u>    | <u>W</u>   | <u>A</u>    |
| Philip Hughes   | <u>2</u>    | <u>APB</u> |             |
| Bob Gates       |             |            |             |
| Brent Scowcroft |             |            |             |
| Philip Hughes   |             |            |             |
| Situation Room  |             |            |             |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>8</u>    |            | <u>2</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat |             |            |             |
|                 |             |            |             |
|                 |             |            |             |
|                 |             |            |             |

89 SEP 18 P 2: 20

A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: GAD

LOG # 20704

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG GAD A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN           | DISPOSITION        |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dep Exec        | <u>2</u>    | <u>[Signature]</u> | <u>A</u>           |
| Philip Hughes   | <u>2</u>    | <u>[Signature]</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> |
| Bob Gates       | <u>3</u>    | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____              |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____              | _____              |
| Philip Hughes   | _____       | _____              | _____              |
| Situation Room  | <u>1</u>    | _____              | _____              |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>4</u>    | <u>GAD G/22</u>    | <u>N</u>           |
| NSC Secretariat | _____       | _____              | _____              |
| <u>Gordon</u>   | <u>5</u>    | _____              | <u>77A</u>         |

89 JUN 21 P 8: 06

A = Action      I = Information      D = Dispatch      R = Retain      N = No further Action

cc:      VP      Sununu      Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

minutes/conclusions 6/21  
re on nuclear testing

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20704

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 21, 1989

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for June 21 Deputies  
Committee Meeting on Nuclear Testing

At Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions document for today's Deputies Committee meeting. I have intentionally left off the discussion about how fast to proceed with studies for examining other possible limitations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you accept the attached Summary of Conclusions.

Approve

*8*

Disapprove

\_\_\_\_\_

Attachments  
Tab I

Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By CAP NARA, Date 10/20/09

*As revised.  
Scowcroft wants to  
see draft instructions*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20704

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for  
Deputies Committee

DATE: June 21, 1989  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 10:00 AM -11:00 AM

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Nuclear Testing  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:  
Carnes Lord

White House:  
Robert Gates

State:  
Allen Holmes  
Reginald Bartholomew  
Edward Rowny

NSC:  
John Gordon

Defense:  
Donald Atwood  
Robert Joseph

OMB:  
William Diefenderfer  
Robert Howard

Energy:  
John Tuck  
Victor Alessi

CIA:  
Richard Kerr  
Douglas MacEachin

JCS:  
Robert Herres  
Nels Running

ACDA:  
George Murphy  
John King

Summary of Conclusions

A Deputies Committee meeting was held on June 21 to discuss the U.S. policy on the "step-by-step" approach to nuclear testing. The principal issue was whether to retain, modify or reject the policy established during the last Administration with respect of

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2001-MR  
mm 3/23/2016

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how we would deal with the follow-on negotiations with the Soviet Union once the TTBT and PNET are ratified. (S)

Representatives of all agencies agreed that as a practical matter, the U.S. will not be in a position to move toward a CTB as long as we depend on nuclear weapons for deterrence. It was noted that we have not yet identified any further limitations that are in our interest and that a reduced number of nuclear weapons does not result in a requirement for fewer tests or tests of lower yield. (S)

With that in mind, the Committee members recognized that the issue underlying the step-by-step approach was one of tactics: what do we say to the Soviets and how do we explain our policy to Congress? After considerable discussion, members reached the consensus that now is not the right time to change or repudiate previous policy, but we must be clear in our own minds that we have not identified the conditions necessary for further limitations on testing. The general approach should be that we say as little about the step-by-step as possible, suggesting that if we do not make it an issue with the Congress, it will not become one. (S)

With respect to the draft instructions to the NTT Negotiator, the Committee reached consensus that they should be rewritten to reflect the approach outlined above. The thrust of the instructions will be that:

- it is first necessary to ratify the PNET and TTBT
- with that understanding, and with all appropriate caveats, the U.S. reaffirms the language in the 1987 ministerial joint US-USSR statement on step-by-step
- at the appropriate time the negotiator will tell the Soviets that a period of observing the implementation of these treaties is required (S)

It was agreed that:

- The U.S. will continue with the stated policy of step-by-step as defined in President Reagan's 1988 Report to Congress, but that this matter will be handled in a low-key fashion without calling attention to it in Geneva or on the Hill
- State will redraft instructions in accordance with the discussions and circulate them for clearance
- No NSC meeting is required at this time (S)

how we would deal with the follow-on negotiations with the Soviet Union once the TTBT and PNET are ratified. (S)

Representatives of all agencies agreed that as a practical matter, the U.S. will not be in a position to move toward a CTB in the foreseeable future, and that we need to be extremely cautious with respect to further limitations on nuclear testing. It was noted that we have not yet identified any <sup>further</sup> limitations that are in our interest and that a reduced number of nuclear weapons does not result in a requirement for fewer tests or tests of lower yield. (S)

*as long as  
we depend  
on nuclear  
weapons  
for  
deterrence*

With that in mind, the Committee members recognized that the issue underlying the step-by-step approach was one of tactics: what do we say to the Soviets and how do we explain our policy to Congress? After considerable discussion, members reached the consensus that now is not the right time to change or repudiate ~~this~~ policy, but we must be clear in our own minds that we have not identified the conditions necessary for further limitations on testing. The general approach should be that we say as little about the step-by-step as possible, suggesting that if we do not make it an issue with the Congress, it will not become one. (S)

*previous*

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8920692  
RECEIVED: 20 JUN 89 17

TO: GATES

FROM: GORDON  
KANTER

DOC DATE: 20 JUL 89  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR TESTING  
AGENDA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR DC MTG ON 21 JUN RE NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 28 JUL 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF: 8920704 8921069

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC038

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR INFO

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By CAP NARA, Date 10/20/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: CM

CLOSED BY: AC

DOC 3 OF 3

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RECORD ID: 8920692

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HUGHES  
002  
003 GATES  
003

Z 89062017 FOR SIGNATURE  
Z 89072019 HUGHES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES  
Z 89062019 ADD-ON / FOR INFORMATION  
X 89110712 NOTED BY GATES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 10/20/09

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**National Security Council  
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|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN    | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Dep Exec        | <u>1</u>    | <u>✓</u>    | <u>I</u>    |
| Philip Hughes   | <u>2</u>    | <u>10/6</u> | _____       |
| Bob Gates       | <u>3</u>    | _____       | _____       |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____       | _____       |
| Philip Hughes   | _____       | _____       | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____       | _____       |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>4</u>    | _____       | <u>2</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat | _____       | _____       | _____       |
| _____           | _____       | _____       | _____       |
| _____           | _____       | _____       | _____       |

89 JUN 20 7:54

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|------------|------------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|
| A = Action | <u>I = Information</u> | D = Dispatch | R = Retain | N = No further Action |
|------------|------------------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

DC mtg on June 21 at 10:00am  
(Nuclear Testing)

Red  
20 June 89  
1942

12:19 PM '89

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20692  
Add-on

June 20, 1989

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee on Nuclear Testing  
Wednesday, June 21, 10:00 a.m., Situation Room

Linton Brooks had earlier forwarded a package seeking a decision on U.S. policy regarding our step-by-step approach to further nuclear testing limits. This is fundamentally a political issue which deserves vetting at the Deputies Committee and, perhaps, the NSC.

When initially put forth for decision, there was sharp interagency disagreement on whether the U.S. should reaffirm its commitment to step-by-step. At the PCC meeting leading up to this Deputies meeting, the issues were muddled:

Those who want to retain step-by-step made clear that they recognize that we do not know what the further steps there might be and that we cannot enter into further negotiations until we can define our objectives and specific limits we might be willing to accept. Those who would modify or reject step-by-step recognize that there has been some utility to the policy in a political sense. They seem to be willing to accept a reaffirmation of the policy, provided we make clear that we don't now have any next steps in mind.

Despite some convergence on how to deal with the question in Geneva, the basic policy question has been obfuscated and should be discussed a higher level. We have scheduled an NSC meeting on Friday. One decision that needs to come out of the Deputies meeting is whether this issue requires an NSC meeting at this time.

Brent also has concerns, but different than those yet expressed by others. He disagrees with the statement in step-by-step that a comprehensive test ban is a long term objective of the United States. We believe that any change to the policy as stated by the previous Administration will have political fallout.

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To help with the meeting, we have developed and distributed a short issues paper (Tab A). It is not an interagency product and has not been through the PCC. At Tab B is the earlier decision paper. While it may no longer accurately represent agency views, it is a solid description of the issues and the long history behind them.

We recommend that you structure the meeting along the lines of the paper at Tab A. It poses three questions:

- should we retain the policy of step-by-step?
- how should we deal with step-by-step in Geneva?
- should we modify the statement in the policy defining a comprehensive test ban as a long-term goal of th U.S.?

#### Step-By-Step

Our current policy is captured in the President's 1988 Report to Congress: "Once these verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the United States would immediately propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing." It is important to underscore that this is official U.S. policy, stated clearly by President Reagan, used with the Congress to address a very real political problem, and presented to the Soviets as U.S. policy at the negotiations.

At issue is whether this policy serves the U.S. interests. We have not agreed among ourselves if there are further testing limits that are in our interest. Some doubt that there are. Some argue that we need to be clear in our policy statements that we do not know how to implement any next step since there is nowhere to go in further negotiations. Others will point out that to walk away from this policy now will cause dire problems on the Hill and with our allies.

Perhaps the real question is what, if anything, we have to decide now. The current policy seems to do little harm, the TTBT negotiations will drag on for awhile with gory technical discussions and we can take time to seriously examine the impacts of possible options for further limitations. On balance, that is where we come out. We believe testing is required, see no prospects for the conditions that take us to a CTB (recognizing that the slope will get slippery sometime), and do not see a need to get beat up by Congress or to give the Soviets a new propaganda opening.

If the Deputies agree that we should retain a step-by-step policy, we recommend the PCC be directed to undertake a real

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examination of possible further steps. This will be a touchy subject -- if there are any, DoE and perhaps others will be very reluctant to admit to them.

#### Instructing our Negotiator

The second issue is what we say in Geneva when the Soviets ask under what conditions we have returned to the negotiations. The PCC has agreed on a draft set of instructions that restate our commitment to step-by-step, but go a step beyond where we are now by explicitly putting down a marker that the timing of when we proceed is entirely a U.S. decision. While this is a reasonable approach, we need to take it with our eyes wide open, knowing that some on the Hill will see it as footdragging, and that the Soviets may react similarly.

Because of the complexity of the issue and the theology surrounding this question, you may wish to use the instructions as a means to crystalize the issue and focus discussions.

#### Goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban

The President's 1988 Report to Congress made clear that U.S. policy is that "a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States." There are lots of caveats on that statement, including that "such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence..." It is well understood that this rhetoric does not translate into a call for a CTB. Rather it reflects an attempt by the previous Administration to respond to what was at least perceived as a real political problem.

No one in the interagency has raised this explicitly. Brent, however, has said to us that this simply is wrong and does not reflect our policy. He said, in effect, that a CTB is not in our interest and we should not say that it is. You may wish to raise this as an item at the meeting to see where others stand. We agree that a CTB is not likely to be in our interest in the foreseeable future. But before we change these words, we need to decide if the political ramifications are worth the cost. Our gut tells us to leave this as it is for awhile.

#### NSC

If the Deputies are in agreement that our approach to Geneva is acceptable, we recommend removing this topic from ~~today's~~ NSC meeting. The Geneva approach buys time to develop a more cogent approach for NSC consideration. *Friday's*

*Robert Blackwill - concur*  
Robert Blackwill and Condi Rice concur.

#### Attachments

|       |                |
|-------|----------------|
| Tab A | Issues Paper   |
| Tab B | Decision Paper |

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June 20, 1989

### Nuclear Testing Issues Paper<sup>1</sup>

The Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) resume in Geneva on June 26. The nuclear testing working group of the Arms Control PCC has been working on outstanding negotiating issues and is drafting instructions for the negotiator. When complete, these instructions will be forwarded to agencies for clearance. At this point, the upcoming round will be devoted to highly technical issues: tabling of a U.S. hydrodynamic yield measurement section for the TTBT protocol, discussions on non-standard geometry tests, and perhaps later in the round, the issue of on-site inspection and the inclusion of anti-intrusiveness devices for hydrodynamic yield measurements.

The Deputies Committee discussion will focus on the basic U.S. policy on the steps for further limitations on nuclear testing beyond the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the so-called step-by-step approach. In the immediate future, we need to decide how to instruct our negotiator on this issue since the Soviets will certainly ask.

It may also be appropriate to address step-by-step to determine if it is still in our interest to retain this as policy in the Bush administration, and, if so, do we want to retain the entire formulation, including reiteration of the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons.

The attached paper, "Further Limits on Nuclear Testing," was developed for another purpose, but provides useful background on the history of step-by-step and the arguments for and against retaining it.

There are three issues:

- is it in our interest to retain, change, or repudiate the policy of step-by-step negotiations on nuclear testing?
- how should the U.S. negotiator respond to questions from the Soviets about our policy?
- should the U.S. modify our commitment to a comprehensive test ban as a long term goal?

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was prepared by the NSC staff as an aid to the Deputies Committee discussions on nuclear testing. It has not been reviewed or approved by any agency.

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### Step-by-Step

The core of the U.S. policy on step-by-step is a complex formulation designed to fend off congressional criticism as well as Soviet demands for a comprehensive test ban negotiation: "once our verification concerns were satisfied and the existing treaties ratified, the United States would immediately propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a parallel program of reducing and ultimately ending nuclear testing." (1988 President's Report to Congress)

This declaratory policy has proven useful. It seems to have deflected Congressional calls for immediately entering into negotiations for a CTB, and has been useful in the negotiations by demonstrating to the Soviets some intent to move beyond the TTBT and PNET when the verifications measures we seek are agreed and the treaties ratified. It also has been useful in multilateral fora where it has helped deflect calls for a CTB and has helped governments support the U.S. in those fora, even if they have specific governmental policies opposing nuclear testing.

That said, some find the commitment to follow-on negotiations to be at best hollow, and potentially harmful. We have not identified any further restriction on nuclear testing that would be in our security interest. Thus some believe the current policy is disingenuous and inconsistent with current and foreseeable deterrent strategy, even in an environment of significantly reduced numbers of nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration as yet has taken no action to affirm or deny this as a policy. It is fundamentally a political decision at this time. That is, all agree that we must and will continue nuclear testing and that as long as we depend upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, nuclear testing will be required. At issue is whether we should be candid with the Congress and with the Soviets on how far we can go down the road beyond the TTBT and PNET. (We note that further restrictions are technically possible. Examples are a limit on the number of tests above a certain yield and/or a lowering of the current 150kt yield limit. There is as yet no agreement among agencies that such restrictions would be in our interest.)

### Instructing our Negotiator

The PCC has developed a formulation that would allow us to respond to the Soviets during the upcoming round of negotiations, essentially reiterating our willingness to continue with step-by-step, after ratification and implementation of the treaties, but also making clear to the Soviets that we have not yet defined our objectives for future negotiations. In effect, this approach points to the 1987 US-USSR joint statement as our policy, notes

that we are still studying how to proceed and what the U.S. objectives for such negotiations will be, and that we will inform the Soviet of our positions when we have completed the process. As such, it modifies our previous position on step-by-step by adding a new milestone ("implementation" of TTBT and PNET) and putting down a marker that the timing of when we proceed with step-by-step is entirely a U.S. decision.

This formulation glosses over the underlying differences in approach. Thus, while it has potential for use this round, we will eventually have to come to grips with our declaratory policy. We also need to assess the likely Congressional reaction to what may be seen as a backing away from a previous commitment -- made by President Reagan -- to negotiations beyond the TTBT and PNET.

The draft instruction on step-by-step are attached.

#### Goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban

If we decide that the retention of the step-by-step policy is to our benefit at this time, it may be appropriate to look at the full language accompanying it. In particular, the 1988 Report to Congress includes: "A comprehensive test-ban remains a long-term objective of the United States....such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep, and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification procedures, expanded confidence building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces."

The question is whether we want to continue to state that a comprehensive test ban is a long-term objective of the United States when, as a practical matter, it is not. On one hand, it can be argued that the conditions in this statement are so limiting that the commitment is meaningless. On the other, it can be argued that this simply is not an accurate portrayal of our policy, now or in the future, and that this creates the wrong tone and atmosphere in our dealings on nuclear testing with all parties.

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**Draft Instructions  
for U.S. Delegation to NTT on Step-by-Step:**

The following statements will be the basis for any discussion by delegation members with the Soviets on Step-by-Step:

- 1) The United States reaffirms the language of the September 1987 ministerial on Step-by-Step approach in nuclear testing.
- 2) The U.S. believes it will be necessary to proceed first with ratification of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and Threshold Test Ban Treaties and their respective protocols. Moreover, some period of observation of implementation of those two treaties will be necessary before proceeding to the next stage of negotiations in nuclear testing.
- 3) The U.S. is studying the question of further limitations beyond PNET and TTBT constraints. When we have identified actual limitations which we would seek within the step-by-step approach, we will notify you.

FYI for U.S. Delegation:

U.S. willingness to enter into negotiations which establish further limitations on nuclear testing will depend on our ability to identify further restrictions on our testing which would be consistent with U.S. security

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| 03d. Report              | Re: Further Instructions on Nuclear Testing (10 pp.) | 5/3/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

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**File Location:** NSC/DC 038 - June 21, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Limitations on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

|                               |             |                             |           |
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| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 10/20/2009  | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 90010-017 |
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released about 4:30, 9/17/87

September 17, 1987

- U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT  
NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS

The US and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the US-USSR Treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

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DC

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STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

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| THE SECRETARY OF HHS<br>200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F                                    |      |      |      |                         |
| THE SECRETARY OF HUD<br>451 7th Street SW, Room 10000                                             |      |      |      |                         |
| THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION<br>400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181                                  |      |      |      |                         |

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 10/20/09

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: WEST WING DESK, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

Page 1 of \_\_\_\_ Pages

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 6

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES (NAME) \_\_\_\_\_ (EXTENSION) \_\_\_\_\_ (ROOM NUMBER) \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG 20 JUN RE NUCLEAR TESTING LOG # 20692

| TO (AGENCY)         | DELIVER TO:             | DEPT/ROOM NO.      | EXTENSION |
|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------|
| <u>STATE</u>        | <u>Stapleton Roy</u>    | <u>EXEC SEC</u>    | _____     |
| <u>DOD</u>          | <u>GEORGE COLE</u>      | <u>EXEC SEC</u>    | _____     |
| <u>ENERGY</u>       | <u>William Vitale</u>   | <u>EXEC SEC</u>    | _____     |
| <u>CIA</u>          | <u>LAWRENCE SANDALL</u> | <u>EXEC SEC</u>    | _____     |
| <u>JCS</u>          | <u>ANTHONY MANESS</u>   | <u>EXEC ASST</u>   | _____     |
| <u>STATE (ACDA)</u> | <u>BARBARA STARR</u>    | <u>A. EXEC SEC</u> | _____     |

REMARKS \_\_\_\_\_

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 10/20/09

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                       | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 04a. Memo                | G. Philip Hughes to Distribution List<br>Re: Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.) | 6/20/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 038 - June 21, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Limitations on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 10/20/2009  | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 90010-017 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2005-1002-F | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                            | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 04b. Agenda              | Re: Deputies Committee Meeting Nuclear Testing Policy Review (1 pp.) | 6/21/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 038 - June 21, 1989 - NSC/DC Meeting on Limitations on Nuclear Testing, Keywords: Nuclear Testing

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 10/20/2009  | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 90010-017 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2005-1002-F | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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June 20, 1989

### Nuclear Testing Issues Paper<sup>1</sup>

The Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) resume in Geneva on June 26. The nuclear testing working group of the Arms Control PCC has been working on outstanding negotiating issues and is drafting instructions for the negotiator. When complete, these instructions will be forwarded to agencies for clearance. At this point, the upcoming round will be devoted to highly technical issues: tabling of a U.S. hydrodynamic yield measurement section for the TTBT protocol, discussions on non-standard geometry tests, and perhaps later in the round, the issue of on-site inspection and the inclusion of anti-intrusiveness devices for hydrodynamic yield measurements.

The Deputies Committee discussion will focus on the basic U.S. policy on the steps for further limitations on nuclear testing beyond the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the so-called step-by-step approach. In the immediate future, we need to decide how to instruct our negotiator on this issue since the Soviets will certainly ask.

It may also be appropriate to address step-by-step to determine if it is still in our interest to retain this as policy in the Bush administration, and, if so, do we want to retain the entire formulation, including reiteration of the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons.

The attached paper, "Further Limits on Nuclear Testing," was developed for another purpose, but provides useful background on the history of step-by-step and the arguments for and against retaining it.

There are three issues:

- is it in our interest to retain, change, or repudiate the policy of step-by-step negotiations on nuclear testing?
- how should the U.S. negotiator respond to questions from the Soviets about our policy?
- should the U.S. modify our commitment to a comprehensive test ban as a long term goal?

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was prepared by the NSC staff as an aid to the Deputies Committee discussions on nuclear testing. It has not been reviewed or approved by any agency.

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### Step-by-Step

The core of the U.S. policy on step-by-step is a complex formulation designed to fend off congressional criticism as well as Soviet demands for a comprehensive test ban negotiation: "once our verification concerns were satisfied and the existing treaties ratified, the United States would immediately propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a parallel program of reducing and ultimately ending nuclear testing." (1988 President's Report to Congress)

This declaratory policy has proven useful. It seems to have deflected Congressional calls for immediately entering into negotiations for a CTB, and has been useful in the negotiations by demonstrating to the Soviets some intent to move beyond the TTBT and PNET when the verifications measures we seek are agreed and the treaties ratified. It also has been useful in multilateral fora where it has helped deflect calls for a CTB and has helped governments support the U.S. in those fora, even if they have specific governmental policies opposing nuclear testing.

That said, some find the commitment to follow-on negotiations to be at best hollow, and potentially harmful. We have not identified any further restriction on nuclear testing that would be in our security interest. Thus some believe the current policy is disingenuous and inconsistent with current and foreseeable deterrent strategy, even in an environment of significantly reduced numbers of nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration as yet has taken no action to affirm or deny this as a policy. It is fundamentally a political decision at this time. That is, all agree that we must and will continue nuclear testing and that as long as we depend upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, nuclear testing will be required. At issue is whether we should be candid with the Congress and with the Soviets on how far we can go down the road beyond the TTBT and PNET. (We note that further restrictions are technically possible. Examples are a limit on the number of tests above a certain yield and/or a lowering of the current 150kt yield limit. There is as yet no agreement among agencies that such restrictions would be in our interest.)

### Instructing our Negotiator

The PCC has developed a formulation that would allow us to respond to the Soviets during the upcoming round of negotiations, essentially reiterating our willingness to continue with step-by-step, after ratification and implementation of the treaties, but also making clear to the Soviets that we have not yet defined our objectives for future negotiations. In effect, this approach points to the 1987 US-USSR joint statement as our policy, notes

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that we are still studying how to proceed and what the U.S. objectives for such negotiations will be, and that we will inform the Soviet of our positions when we have completed the process. As such, it modifies our previous position on step-by-step by adding a new milestone ("implementation" of TTBT and PNET) and putting down a marker that the timing of when we proceed with step-by-step is entirely a U.S. decision.

This formulation glosses over the underlying differences in approach. Thus, while it has potential for use this round, we will eventually have to come to grips with our declaratory policy. We also need to assess the likely Congressional reaction to what may be seen as a backing away from a previous commitment -- made by President Reagan -- to negotiations beyond the TTBT and PNET.

The draft instruction on step-by-step are attached.

#### Goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban

If we decide that the retention of the step-by-step policy is to our benefit at this time, it may be appropriate to look at the full language accompanying it. In particular, the 1988 Report to Congress includes: "A comprehensive test-ban remains a long-term objective of the United States....such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep, and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification procedures, expanded confidence building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces."

The question is whether we want to continue to state that a comprehensive test ban is a long-term objective of the United States when, as a practical matter, it is not. On one hand, it can be argued that the conditions in this statement are so limiting that the commitment is meaningless. On the other, it can be argued that this simply is not an accurate portrayal of our policy, now or in the future, and that this creates the wrong tone and atmosphere in our dealings on nuclear testing with all parties.

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**Draft Instructions  
for U.S. Delegation to NTT on Step-by-Step:**

The following statements will be the basis for any discussion by delegation members with the Soviets on Step-by-Step:

- 1) The United States reaffirms the language of the September 1987 ministerial on Step-by-Step approach in nuclear testing.
- 2) The U.S. believes it will be necessary to proceed first with ratification of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and Threshold Test Ban Treaties and their respective protocols. Moreover, some period of observation of implementation of those two treaties will be necessary before proceeding to the next stage of negotiations in nuclear testing.
- 3) The U.S. is studying the question of further limitations beyond PNET and TTBT constraints. When we have identified actual limitations which we would seek within the step-by-step approach, we will notify you.

FYI for U.S. Delegation:

U.S. willingness to enter into negotiations which establish further limitations on nuclear testing will depend on our ability to identify further restrictions on our testing which would be consistent with U.S. security

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20692

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*  
FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*  
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting to Discuss Further  
Limitations on Nuclear Testing

The subject meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, June 21 at  
10:00 AM-11:00 AM in the White House Situation Room.

The notification memorandum for the meeting is attached at Tab I,  
the agenda at Tab A and the NSC staff prepared policy paper at  
Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

|       |                                     |
|-------|-------------------------------------|
| Tab I | Memorandum to Executive Secretaries |
| Tab A | Agenda                              |
| Tab B | Discussion Paper                    |

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By cap NARA, Date 6/20/09

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