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2005-1002-F

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Collection/Office of Origin:	National Security Council
Series:	H-Files
Subseries:	NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number:	90022
Folder ID Number:	90022-001

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	7	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: 25 March DC Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
01b. Memo	Jonathan T. Howe to Distribution List Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative (1 pp.)	3/24/92	(b)(1)	S
01c. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S
01d. Draft Memo	Jonathan T. Howe to Distribution List Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01e. Memo	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S
01f. Draft Memo	Jonathan T. Howe to Distribution List Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01g. Draft Memo	Jonathan T. Howe to Distribution List Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01h. Memo	Daniel Poneman to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative (2 pp.)	3/23/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
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Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Pinksheet Number: cap1647
OA/ID Number: 90022-001
Date Closed: 2/10/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01i. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S
01j. Draft Paper	Re: Framework: Ballistic Missile Treaty (BMT) (3 pp.)	1/20/92	(b)(1)	S
01k. Memo	Daniel Poneman to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Nonproliferation Initiative (1 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S
01l. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01m. Draft Paper	Page 2 of paper "A Nonproliferation Initiative" [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Daniel Poneman to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative (2 pp.)	3/23/92	(b)(1)	S
02b. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S
02c. Draft Paper	Re: Framework: Ballistic Missile Treaty (BMT) (3 pp.)	1/20/92	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	Daniel Poneman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Nonproliferation Initiative (1 pp.)	3/26/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03c. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the Deputies Committee (2 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	S
04. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the Deputies Committee (2 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	S
05a. Handwritten Note	Paul [Wolfowitz] to [Jonathan] Howe Re: [the tone] (1 pp.)	4/13/92	(b)(1)	
05b. Memo	W. Robert Pearson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Report on Nonproliferation Accomplishments and Ongoing Efforts (1 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	C
05c. Report	Re: Réport on Nonproliferation Accomplishments (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05d. Letter	From Robert M. Gates to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [list of accomplishments] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	4/16/92	(b)(1)	S
05e. Report	Re: Intelligence Community Accomplishments on Proliferation Issues (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05f. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (1 pp.)	4/6/92	(b)(1)	S
05g. Summary	Re: Summary of OSD Non-Proliferation Accomplishments (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05h. Letter	Barbara Hackman Franklin to Brent Scowcroft Re: [report] (1 pp.)	4/13/92	(b)(1)	C
05i. Report	Re: Non-Proliferation Export Control Achievements and On-Going Efforts U.S. Department of Commerce (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05j. Memo	Stephen R. Hanmer, Jr. to Brent Scowcroft Re: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (7 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	S
05k. Report	Re: Annex [ACDA] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05l. Memo	Victor E. Alessi to Susan Koch Re: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (1 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	S
05m. Report	Re: The Department of Energy's Accomplishments and Ongoing Efforts: Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05n. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Distribution List Re: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Daniel Poneman to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative (1 pp.)	3/23/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Pinksheet Number: cap1647
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Re-review Case #:
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06b. Memo	Daniel Poneman to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative (2 pp.)	3/23/92	(b)(1)	S
06c. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S
06d. Draft Paper	Re: Framework: Ballistic Missile Treaty (BMT) (3 pp.)	1/20/92	(b)(1)	S
07. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (8 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	S
08. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (8 pp.)	3/24/92	(b)(1)	S
09. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (8 pp.)	3/24/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Pinksheet Number: cap1647
OA/ID Number: 90022-001
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220213
RECEIVED: 19 MAR 92 16

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: HOWE

DOC DATE: 24 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION DC
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG NOTIFICATION FOR 25 MAR DC MTG RE NONPROLIFERATION - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: HOWE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 23 MAR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC 342 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY WSA DATE 3/24 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	HOWE	Z	92031913	FOR DECISION
001	PONEMAN	Z	92032020	FOR REVISION
002		X	92032416	HOWE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

National Security Council
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	K	
Bill Sittmann			✓
Jon Howe	2		✓
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	3		
West Wing Desk		RRA 3/24	
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Skinner Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Restricted DC

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: Rodes order Goldhaber - route? , updated?

National Security Council
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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ **DOCLOG** HEU **A/O** _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	K	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Jon Howe	3		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	3/23	A
NSC Secretariat			
Powers	5		FFA

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Skinner Other Hindle

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Please JM 3/23

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

20 MAR 92 11: 15

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: 25 March DC Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Date Closed: 2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:** 90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
AR Case #:	**MR Case #:**
AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

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DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 4

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN (Name) | 456-6534 (Phone Number) | _____ (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION 25 March DC Mtg

NSC#:20213

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
ACDA	ATTN: REED HANMER FOR RONALD LEHMAN		
JCS	ATTN: GEN SHALIKASHVILI FOR ADM JEREMIAH		
STATE	REGINALD. BARTHOLOMEW		
DOD	PAUL WOLFOWITZ		
ENERGY	LINDA STUNTZ		
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]		

REMARKS:

*** PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE ASAP ***

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CAP 2/10/10

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9220213
DATE 24 MAR 92

SUBJECT: MTG NOTIFICATION FOR 25 MAR DC MTG RE NONPROLIFERATION
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
JACKSON, K OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA LARRY BRANSCUM ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20500	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
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DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 24, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE KARL D. JACKSON
THE HONORABLE W. HENSON MOORE
THE HONORABLE RONALD F. LEHMAN II
ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH
THE HONORABLE REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
THE HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ
THE HONORABLE LINDA STUNTZ
THE HONORABLE JOHN HELGERSON

SUBJECT: A Nonproliferation Initiative (S)

The principals-only Deputies Committee meeting on Wednesday, March 25, is designed to discuss in a close-hold, senior forum potential initiatives to produce a more effective and proactive program for dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the meeting we will discuss your reactions to the attached paper and other ideas for curtailing WMD proliferation. (S)

Jonathan T. Howe
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/19/2022

Date Closed:	2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:**	90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-2314-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/25/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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A Nonproliferation Initiative

In his 1953 Atoms for Peace speech, President Eisenhower proposed that the United States would work to end the atomic arms race and provide atomic technology to others--through an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--in order to "serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." More than a decade later, this concept of a trade-off between military and peaceful uses of the atom was codified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT struck a bargain between the five nuclear weapon states and others. The non-nuclear weapon states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards, i.e., inspections of declared facilities. In exchange, the five nuclear "haves" agreed to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations and to assist the have-nots in developing the peaceful uses of the atom. (S)

The fabric of the NPT bargain soon began to fray. The 1974 Indian nuclear test showed that peaceful nuclear assistance (in that case from Canada and ourselves) could not be isolated from military uses, and that allegedly peaceful explosions could not be distinguished from military tests. The United States reacted by tightening its export controls through the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The focus on restricting technology availability slowed the efforts of some, but also drove programs underground, beyond the reach of export controls. At the same time, proliferation expanded beyond the nuclear sphere. Chemical and biological weapons, much easier to fabricate and hide than their nuclear counterparts, offered an alternate pathway to modern weaponry. Such an option was made even more tempting by the ready availability of cheap and simple ballistic missiles. (S)

New mechanisms arose to address the expanded proliferation problem. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention sought to address the demand side of proliferation through global norms and penalties. Most nonproliferation efforts, though, focused on the supply side. Multilateral nuclear-related export controls were strengthened through the NPT Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Australia Group did the same for CW; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) tackled ballistic missiles. (S)

This ad hoc nonproliferation regime met with some success. Dire predictions of a world with scores of nuclear powers proved false. Similarly, the spread and use of CBW has been more limited than it would have been absent export controls and the stigma attached to these weapons. Since the 1974 Indian nuclear test, no nation has openly tested (much less used in anger) a nuclear explosive device. France, China, and South Africa have come to support the NPT (now with 146 parties), leaving only

Algeria, Israel, India, and Pakistan as holdouts. In addition, the MTCR helped kill Argentina's Condor SRBM program. The MTCR and Australia Group have followed our lead in adopting tougher nonproliferation export controls. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa and Russia now seek to join the MTCR. (S)

There have also been disappointments. A dozen or more countries continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. 3.3(b)(6) This suggests that the underlying motivations to acquire special weapons persist. At a time when the United States is rethinking the political and military utility of nuclear weapons, many governments still see them as an avenue to prestige and influence. Pro-nuclear lobbies are strong in several countries. In others there is a consensus that nuclear weapons make strategic sense. There are a number of regions, notably South Asia, where the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. (S)

This desire by some states for weapons is inadequately constrained. The IAEA system is flawed, as the Iraqi experience underlined. Export controls are neither uniform nor leakproof. The danger has been aggravated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the withering of COCOM--and its loss of an ideological foundation--weakens export controls even as access to dual-use and advanced technologies increases dramatically. Existing nonproliferation supplier clubs exclude countries (Argentina, Brazil, India) that are targeted by export controls but are emerging as suppliers in their own right. (S)

We are not well organized to tackle the evolving challenge. Bureaucratic confusion on nonproliferation issues within the executive branch leaves priorities uncertain and execution uneven. Current legislation is unclear and fails to address the challenge posed by new, de facto nuclear weapons states. Three questions naturally emerge: (S)

First, should the President launch a nonproliferation initiative and, if so, when and where? Perhaps he could launch it in a speech this spring. (S)

Second, how should we work the initiative? We would need to hold this very close, beginning with a Small Group to review the substance of an initiative, followed by full NSC approval, high-level contacts with key allies, heads-ups to key members of Congress, and the speech. (S)

Third, what should the initiative contain? (It will focus on WMD and missiles. It will not cover conventional arms transfers.) The following ideas--some obvious, some needing scrutiny--are worth considering: (S)

1. Hemorrhage. A game plan to limit proliferation from the former USSR, beyond the International S&T Center. (S)

2. Ballistic Missile Treaty. Right now, missiles are the only proliferating weapons that are controlled only through a suppliers club. There is no over-arching demand-side norm akin to the NPT, the CWC, or the BWC. As a result, we lack a coherent framework for our efforts in this area--witness our ad hoc responses to missile developments in Israel, South Africa, and China. A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" could set out rights, obligations, and penalties. For example, in exchange for states forswearing surface-to-surface missile development and accepting inspections to verify commitments, the treaty might offer "non-missile parties" access to space for peaceful purposes, assistance with ground-based defensive systems such as PATRIOT, or protection by GPALS. (S)

3. Export control rationalization. We could propose creation of an international mechanism--perhaps beginning with the G-7--to harmonize the existing nonproliferation regimes in light of the transformation of COCOM. Domestically, this would be reflected in proposed omnibus export control legislation. (S)

4. New nonproliferation standard. In proposing new legislation, we could set a new standard for U.S. assistance in lieu of current proscriptions on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, i.e., in exchange for agreeing not to test a nuclear explosive and enforcing applicable export controls, states would be eligible for U.S. security assistance and other forms of economic support. The idea would be to cap national programs at a level we could monitor more confidently and constrain dangerous exports by emerging suppliers. (S)

5. Fissile material freeze. Freeze production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes. (S)

6. IAEA. Increase funding for IAEA safeguards, while calling for a much tougher approach to inspections. (S)

7. NPT and Tlatelolco. Call for universal adherence to the NPT and Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1995. (S)

8. Regional efforts. Call for continued regional efforts for Middle East, South and North Asia. (S)

9. Iraq. Call to maintain the special limits on Iraq. (S)

10. USG Organization. Consolidate disparate efforts in order to strengthen the central coordination of U.S. nonproliferation policy-making. (S)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

20213

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. GATES~~ John Negroponte
THE HONORABLE RONALD F. LEHMAN II
ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH
THE HONORABLE REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
THE HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ

This will change protocol order.

SUBJECT: A Nonproliferation Initiative (S)

I would like to meet with you to discuss the nonproliferation initiative proposed in the paper attached at Tab A at a principals-only meeting on Wednesday, March 25, at 11:15 a.m., in the Situation Rooom. (S)

The purpose of the meeting is to direct close-hold interagency development of such an initiative. We should not confine ourselves to the elements suggested in the attached paper. I would like to emphasize the need to keep this matter and the paper extremely close-hold for the time being. The last thing we need is a premature leak that could alarm friends and allies and dilute the initiative's impact. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2016

Jonathan T. Howe
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A Discussion Paper

The principals-only D.C on Wednesday, March 25, is designed to discuss ~~discuss~~ discuss potential initiatives to produce a more effective ~~defensive~~ and pro-active ~~re~~ program for dealing with the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. At the Meeting we will discuss ~~Please DA~~ Redacted ~~paper to~~ Redacted Paper

and other ideas for containing ~~the~~ WMD Proliferation

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01e. Memo	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Document Partially Declassified
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By MM on 12/9/2022

Date Closed:	2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:**	90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-2314-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/25/2016

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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A Nonproliferation Initiative

In his 1953 Atoms for Peace speech, President Eisenhower proposed that the United States would work to end the atomic arms race and provide atomic technology to others--through an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--in order to "serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." More than a decade later, this concept of a trade-off between military and peaceful uses of the atom was codified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT struck a bargain between the five nuclear weapon states and others. The non-nuclear weapon states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards, i.e., inspections of declared facilities. In exchange, the five nuclear "haves" agreed to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations and to assist the have-nots in developing the peaceful uses of the atom. (S)

The fabric of the NPT bargain soon began to fray. The 1974 Indian nuclear test showed that peaceful nuclear assistance (in that case from Canada and ourselves) could not be isolated from military uses, and that allegedly peaceful explosions could not be distinguished from military tests. The United States reacted by tightening its export controls through the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The focus on restricting technology availability slowed the efforts of some, but also drove programs underground, beyond the reach of export controls. At the same time, proliferation expanded beyond the nuclear sphere. Chemical and biological weapons, much easier to fabricate and hide than their nuclear counterparts, offered an alternate pathway to modern weaponry. Such an option was made even more tempting by the ready availability of cheap and simple ballistic missiles. (S)

New mechanisms arose to address the expanded proliferation problem. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention sought to address the demand side of proliferation through global norms and penalties. Most nonproliferation efforts, though, focused on the supply side. Multilateral nuclear-related export controls were strengthened through the NPT Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Australia Group did the same for CW; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) tackled ballistic missiles. (S)

This ad hoc nonproliferation regime met with some success. Dire predictions of a world with scores of nuclear powers proved false. Similarly, the spread and use of CBW has been more limited than it would have been absent export controls and the stigma attached to these weapons. Since the 1974 Indian nuclear test, no nation has openly tested (much less used in anger) a nuclear explosive device. France, China, and South Africa have come to support the NPT (now with 146 parties), leaving only

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Algeria, Israel, India, and Pakistan as holdouts. In addition, the MTCR helped kill Argentina's Condor SRBM program. The MTCR and Australia Group have followed our lead in adopting tougher nonproliferation export controls. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa and Russia now seek to join the MTCR. (S)

There have also been disappointments. A dozen or more countries continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. 3.3(b)(6) This suggests that the underlying motivations to acquire special weapons persist. At a time when the United States is rethinking the political and military utility of nuclear weapons, many governments still see them as an avenue to prestige and influence. Pro-nuclear lobbies are strong in several countries. In others there is a consensus that nuclear weapons make strategic sense. There are a number of regions, notably South Asia, where the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. (S)

This desire by some states for weapons is inadequately constrained. The IAEA system is flawed, as the Iraqi experience underlined. Export controls are neither uniform nor leakproof. The danger has been aggravated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the withering of COCOM--and its loss of an ideological foundation--weakens export controls even as access to dual-use and advanced technologies increases dramatically. Existing nonproliferation supplier clubs exclude countries (Argentina, Brazil, India) that are targeted by export controls but are emerging as suppliers in their own right. (S)

~~The United States bureaucracy is~~ We are not well organized to tackle the evolving challenge. Bureaucratic confusion on nonproliferation issues within the executive branch leaves priorities uncertain and execution uneven. Current legislation is ~~confused~~ unclear and fails to address the challenge posed by new, de facto nuclear weapons states. Three questions naturally emerge: (S)

First, should the President launch a nonproliferation initiative and, if so, when and where? Perhaps he could launch it in a speech this spring. (S)

Second, how should we work the initiative? We would need to hold this very close, beginning with a restricted Deputies Meeting to review the substance of an initiative, followed by full NSC approval, high-level contacts with key allies, heads-ups to key members of Congress, and the speech. (S)

Third, what should the initiative contain? (It will focus on WMD and missiles. It will not cover conventional arms transfers.) The following ideas--some obvious, some needing scrutiny--are worth considering: (S)

1. Hemorrhage. A game plan to limit proliferation from the former USSR, beyond the International S&T Center. (S)

2. Ballistic Missile Treaty. Right now, missiles are the only proliferating weapons that are controlled only through a suppliers club. There is no over-arching demand-side norm akin to the NPT, the CWC, or the BWC. As a result, we lack a coherent framework for our efforts in this area--witness our ad hoc responses to missile developments in Israel, South Africa, and China. A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" would set out rights, obligations, and penalties. For example, in exchange for states forswearing surface-to-surface missile development and accepting inspections to verify commitments, the treaty might offer "non-missile parties" access to space for peaceful purposes, assistance with ground-based defensive systems such as PATRIOT, or protection by GPALS. (S)

3. Export control rationalization. We could propose creation of an international mechanism--perhaps beginning with the G-7--to harmonize the existing nonproliferation regimes in light of the transformation of COCOM. Domestically, this would be reflected in proposed omnibus export control legislation. (S)

4. New nonproliferation standard. In proposing new legislation, we could set a new standard for U.S. assistance in lieu of current proscriptions on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, i.e., in exchange for agreeing not to test a nuclear explosive and enforcing applicable export controls, states would be eligible for U.S. security assistance and other forms of economic support. The idea would be to cap national programs at a level we could monitor more confidently and constrain dangerous exports by emerging suppliers. (S)

5. Fissile material freeze. Freeze production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes. (S)

6. IAEA. Increase funding for IAEA safeguards, while calling for a much tougher approach to inspections. (S)

7. NPT and Tlatelolco. Call for universal adherence to the NPT and Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1995. (S)

8. Regional efforts. Call for continued regional efforts for Middle East, South and North Asia. (S)

9. Iraq. Call to maintain the special limits on Iraq. (S)

10. USG Organization. Consolidate disparate efforts in order to strengthen the central coordination of U.S. nonproliferation policy-making. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE RONALD F. LEHMAN II
ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH
THE HONORABLE REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
THE HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ
THE HONORABLE JOHN HELGERSON

SUBJECT: A Nonproliferation Initiative (S)

The principals-only Deputies Committee meeting on Wednesday, March 25, is designed to discuss in a close-hold, senior forum potential initiatives to produce a more effective and proactive program for dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the meeting we will discuss your reactions to the attached paper and other ideas for curtailing WMD proliferation. (S)

Jonathan T. Howe
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A Discussion Paper

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WASHINGTON

W. HENSON MOORE
KARL D. JACKSON V.P.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE RONALD F. LEHMAN II
ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH
THE HONORABLE REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
THE HONORABLE PAUL WOLFOWITZ
THE HONORABLE LINDA STUNTZ
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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative

We recommend that you open the meeting by noting that in his September 27 nuclear initiative the President pledged that "we will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation." The discussion paper seeks to answer that call by proposing a comprehensive initiative. The proposed elements include some big ideas, in particular:

-- Export control harmonization, tying together reforms under consideration in three separate contexts: COCOM, competitiveness, nonproliferation.

-- A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" (see Tab II).

-- A new nonproliferation standard, agreeing to provide assistance to nations that refrain from testing and sign up to export controls.

The initiative also includes some small ideas, with a view to tying up various efforts already on track in a coherent framework.

After emphasizing the need to think creatively, we recommend you solicit views from around the table not only on the idea of an initiative and the elements suggested in the paper, but also on possible additions to an initiative. We recommend that you close the meeting by suggesting that NSC Staff chair a close-hold, fast-track review of the elements of a possible initiative for consideration of the Deputies.

With the exception of State, I expect people to be generally supportive of the idea of an initiative. Wolfowitz will be briefed to push for the appointment of an Armitage-like person to implement the initiative, once it is launched. We should not sign on to this, in part because it would doom the potential support of State, which sees itself in charge.

Attachments
Tab I Discussion Paper
Tab II Annotated Framework for Ballistic Missile Treaty

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A Nonproliferation Initiative

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This desire by some states for weapons is inadequately constrained. The IAEA system is flawed, as the Iraqi experience underlined. Export controls are neither uniform nor leakproof. The danger has been aggravated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the withering of COCOM--and its loss of an ideological foundation--weakens export controls even as access to dual-use and advanced technologies increases dramatically. Existing nonproliferation supplier clubs exclude countries (Argentina, Brazil, India) that are targeted by export controls but are emerging as suppliers in their own right. (S)

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5. Fissile material freeze. Freeze production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes. (S)

6. IAEA. Increase funding for IAEA safeguards, while calling for a much tougher approach to inspections. (S)

7. NPT and Tlatelolco. Call for universal adherence to the NPT and Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1995. (S)

8. Regional efforts. Call for continued regional efforts for Middle East, South and North Asia. (S)

9. Iraq. Call to maintain the special limits on Iraq. (S)

10. USG Organization. Consolidate disparate efforts in order to strengthen the central coordination of U.S. nonproliferation policy-making. (S)

DRAFT 1/20/92

FRAMEWORK: BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (BMT)

1. Parties agree not to transfer or receive transfer, directly or indirectly, ballistic missiles capable of carrying 500kg payloads at least 300km, or intended to carry any WMD, or of equipment, material, and technology for use in such systems.

[2. Parties agree not to use ballistic missiles offensively against another party in good standing.]

3. The Treaty shall not affect inalienable right of all Parties to have access to space for peaceful purposes, and Parties in a position to do so shall facilitate such access for other Parties.

4. Parties agree to adopt and implement effective export controls to fulfill commitments of Article 1. Parties shall seek to harmonize these controls as far as possible.

5. An International Space Authority (ISA), independent of but linked to UN (IAEA model), shall be established to verify the commitments undertaken under Article 1, facilitate access to space for peaceful purposes (Art. 4) and coordinate the adoption, implementation, and harmonization of export controls (Art. 5).

[6. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to presumption of approval in seeking technology related to enjoying the benefits of access to space for peaceful purposes so long as their export control systems are certified effective by the ISA.]

[7. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to the benefit of such defenses against missile attack as may be rendered through the ISA or other Parties.]

[8. Parties agree to ultimate goals of verifiable bans on ballistic missile flight-tests and on possession of ballistic missiles.]

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ANNOTATED FRAMEWORK: BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

1. Parties agree not to transfer or receive transfer, directly or indirectly, short- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying 500kg payloads at least 300km, or intended to carry any WMD, or of equipment, material, and technology for use in such systems.

> **Note:** This parallels the nuclear weapon prohibitions of NPT Articles 1 and 2, without "discriminating" between "haves" and "have-nots". In referring to transfers, Article 1 does not prohibit indigenous development or possession. Article 8, however, does look to an ultimate ban on missiles. The phrase "intended to carry any WMD" reflects recent moves by our MTCR Partners to seek a broader focus than on the 300km/500kg MTCR parameters, which are based on nuclear weapon delivery systems.

2. Parties agree not to use ballistic missiles offensively against another party in good standing.

> **Note:** This article <u>does</u> address indigenous missile forces. If its "no-first-use" cast creates problems, we could recast it as a bar against "offensive" use of missiles, though in the ACME talks and elsewhere we have maintained that attempting to distinguish "offensive" from "defensive" uses is time-consuming and futile.

3. The Treaty shall not affect inalienable right of all Parties to have access to space for peaceful purposes, and Parties in a position to do so shall facilitate such access for other Parties.

> **Note:** As with the NPT, the <u>real</u> deal will be less between haves and have-nots than among regional rivals who realize they will be better off without missiles. That said, the haves will probably have to offer guaranteed access to space as a sweetener to induce the have-nots to join. Access would be on commercial terms, although the surfeit of launch services available suggests that discounts could be offered to Parties over non-parties.

4. Parties agree to adopt and implement effective export controls to fulfill commitments of Article 1. Parties shall seek to harmonize these controls as far as possible.

> **Note:** These controls would be based on the MTCR Annex. At present, each MTCR Partner decides for itself how to fulfull its MTCR undertakings. Soon, however, export controls will need to be harmonized to ensure that American exporters are not universally harmed while would-be proliferants circumvent U.S. export controls by shopping elsewhere.

5. An International Space Authority (ISA), under aegis of UN Security Council, shall be established to facilitate access to space for peaceful purposes (Art. 4) and adoption, implementation, and harmonization of export controls (Art. 5).

Note: The ISA would serve several purposes: multilateral cover to avoid excessive "Americanization" of the proposal in eyes of potential MNT adherents; useful pass-through to permit access to space or defenses for Parties it would be awkward for the USG to assist directly; provide a permanent secretariat to facilitate better harmonization than is now possible in episodic MTCR meetings.

[6. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to presumption of approval in seeking technology related to enjoying the benefits of access to space for peaceful purposes so long as their export control systems are certified effective by the ISA.]

Note: US policy remains to refrain from assisting space-launch vehicle (SLV) development in possible proliferant countries. This policy smacks of "technology denial", though it makes some sense in that every missile proliferant state also claims to have an SLV program. This article addresses the SLV-v.-missile dilemma by promising the "benefits" of access to space without promising SLV technology itself. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, and India will surely press for access to such technology. This article could also be used to measure effective export controls in the missile area as a condition for access to items that remain on COCOM control lists.

[7. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to the benefit of such defenses against missile attack as may be rendered through the ISA or other Parties.]

Note: Protection through PATRIOT or, eventually, GPALS, is another sweetener. Again, the "benefit of" language provides basis on which to avoid transfering the systems themselves.

[8. Parties agree to ultimate goals of verifiable bans on ballistic missile flight-tests and on possession of ballistic missiles.]

Note: Without this article, the proposed MNT may appear too one-sided, in that all parties give up SNF and INF, but the superpowers do not give up anything on ICBMs. The structure of this item is designed to redress the apparent asymmetry, without actually giving up anything except a stick to beat up un ICBM-holding powers for noncompliance, i.e. it is analagous to NPT Art. 6 on disarmament negotiations. We could use this article as a fall-back to counter charges of discrimination if we do not include it in an initial U.S. proposal.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Jon
suggest you phone people to argue for limiting who sees this in their agencies.
RH

March 19, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: JOHN ~~GORDON~~/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Nonproliferation Initiative

Attached at Tab A is a new version of the initiative, revised slightly to accommodate the two substantive points you relayed from the BCS breakfast: (1) the initiative will focus on WMD, not conventional arms, and (2) the suggestion to revise ACDA's mandate will be dropped. (Mark-up of initiative at Tab II.)

If you approve, we envisage a restricted Deputies meeting with three objectives: (1) impress your counterparts with the importance of the initiative and the need to handle it discreetly, (2) get initial reactions at the Deputies' level to the form and content of the initiative, and (3) task a working group to review the content and present options for Deputies' consideration.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to your counterparts attached at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Adm —
pls look at addressee list —
Gates and Lehman? use them that might, but at the same time there is a "DC" reaction —

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab A Discussion Paper
Tab II Mark-up of Initiative Discussion Paper

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A Nonproliferation Initiative

In his 1953 Atoms for Peace speech, President Eisenhower proposed that the United States would work to end the atomic arms race and provide atomic technology to others--through an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--in order to "serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." More than a decade later, this concept of a trade-off between military and peaceful uses of the atom was codified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT struck a bargain between the five nuclear weapon states and others. The non-nuclear weapon states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards, i.e., inspections of declared facilities. In exchange, the five nuclear "haves" agreed to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations and to assist the have-nots in developing the peaceful uses of the atom.

The fabric of the NPT bargain soon began to fray. The 1974 Indian nuclear test showed that peaceful nuclear assistance (in that case from Canada and ourselves) could not be isolated from military uses, and that allegedly peaceful explosions could not be distinguished from military tests. The United States reacted by tightening its export controls through the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The focus on restricting technology availability slowed the efforts of some, but also drove programs underground, beyond the reach of export controls. At the same time, proliferation expanded beyond the nuclear sphere. Chemical and biological weapons, much easier to fabricate and hide than their nuclear counterparts, offered an alternate pathway to modern weaponry. Such an option was made even more tempting by the ready availability of cheap and simple ballistic missiles.

New mechanisms arose to address the expanded proliferation problem. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention sought to address the demand side of proliferation through global norms and penalties. Most nonproliferation efforts, though, focused on the supply side. Multilateral nuclear-related export controls were strengthened through the NPT Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Australia Group did the same for CW; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) tackled ballistic missiles.

This ad hoc nonproliferation regime met with some success. Dire predictions of a world with scores of nuclear powers proved false. Similarly, the spread and use of CBW has been more limited than it would have been absent export controls and the stigma attached to these weapons. Since the 1974 Indian nuclear test, no nation has openly tested (much less used in anger) a nuclear explosive device. France, China, and South Africa have come to support the NPT (now with 146 parties), leaving only

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come to support the NPT (now with 146 parties), leaving only Algeria, Israel, India, and Pakistan as holdouts. In addition, the MTCR helped kill Argentina's Condor SRBM program. The MTCR and Australia Group have followed our lead in adopting tougher nonproliferation export controls. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa and Russia now seek to join the MTCR. (S)

There have also been disappointments. A dozen or more countries continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. 3.3(b)(6) This suggests that the underlying motivations to acquire special weapons persist. At a time when the United States is rethinking the political and military utility of nuclear weapons, many governments still see them as an avenue to prestige and influence. Pro-nuclear lobbies are strong in several countries. In others there is a consensus that nuclear weapons make strategic sense. There are a number of regions, notably South Asia, where the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. (S)

This desire by some states for weapons is inadequately constrained. The IAEA system is flawed, as the Iraqi experience underlined. Export controls are neither uniform nor leakproof. The danger has been aggravated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the withering of COCOM--and its loss of an ideological foundation--weakens export controls even as access to dual-use and advanced technologies increases dramatically. Existing nonproliferation supplier clubs exclude countries (Argentina, Brazil, India) that are targeted by export controls but are emerging as suppliers in their own right. (S)

The United States bureaucracy is not well organized to tackle the evolving challenge. Bureaucratic confusion on nonproliferation issues within the executive branch leaves priorities uncertain and execution uneven. Current legislation is confused and fails to address the challenge posed by new, de facto nuclear weapons states. Three questions naturally emerge: (S)

First, should the President launch a nonproliferation initiative and, if so, when and where? Perhaps he could launch it in a speech this spring. (S)

Second, how should we work the initiative? We would need to hold this very close, beginning with a Small Group to review the substance of an initiative, followed by full NSC approval, high-level contacts with key allies, heads-ups to key members of Congress, and the speech. (S)

Third, what should the initiative contain? (It will focus on WMD and missiles. It will not cover conventional arms transfers.) The following ideas--some obvious, some needing scrutiny--are worth considering: (S)

1. Hemorrhage. A game plan to limit proliferation from the former USSR, beyond the International S&T Center. (S)

arching demand-side norm akin to the NPT, the CWC, or the BWC. As a result, we lack a coherent framework for our efforts in this area--witness our ad hoc responses to missile developments in Israel, South Africa, and China. A "Missile ~~Nonproliferation~~ Treaty" would set out rights, obligations, and penalties. For example, in exchange for states forswearing surface-to-surface missile development and accepting inspections to verify commitments, the treaty might offer "non-missile parties" access to space for peaceful purposes, assistance with ground-based defensive systems such as PATRIOT, or protection by GPALS.

3. Export control rationalization. We could propose creation of an international mechanism--perhaps beginning with the G-7--to harmonize the existing nonproliferation regimes in light of the transformation of COCOM. Domestically, this would be reflected in proposed omnibus export control legislation.

4. New nonproliferation standard. In proposing new legislation, we could set a new standard for U.S. assistance in lieu of current proscriptions on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, i.e., in exchange for agreeing not to test a nuclear explosive and enforcing applicable export controls, states would be eligible for U.S. security assistance and other forms of economic support. The idea would be to cap national programs at a level we could monitor more confidently and constrain dangerous exports by emerging suppliers.

5. Fissile material freeze. Freeze production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes.

6. IAEA. Increase funding for IAEA safeguards, while calling for a much tougher approach to inspections.

7. NPT and Tlatelolco. Call for universal adherence to the NPT and Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1995.

8. Regional efforts. Call for continued regional efforts for Middle East, South and North Asia.

9. Iraq. Call to maintain the special limits on Iraq.

10. USG Organization. ~~Transform ACDA's mandate into a primary focus on nonproliferation, thereby strengthening~~ central coordination of U.S. nonproliferation policy-making.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01m. Draft Paper	Page 2 of paper "A Nonproliferation Initiative" [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.).	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/19/2022

Date Closed:	2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:**	90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-2314-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/25/2016

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There have also been disappointments. A dozen or more countries continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. 3.3(b)(6) [redacted] This suggests that the underlying motivations to acquire special weapons persist. At a time when the United States is rethinking the political and military utility of nuclear weapons, many governments still see them as an avenue to prestige and influence. Pro-nuclear lobbies are strong in several countries. In others there is a consensus that nuclear weapons make strategic sense. There are a number of regions, notably South Asia, where the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.

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2. Missile ~~Nonproliferation~~ Treaty. Right now, missiles are the only proliferating weapons that are controlled only through a suppliers club. There is no over-

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220213
RECEIVED: 19 MAR 92 16

TO: HOWE

FROM: PONEMAN
GORDON
HAASS

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
LIMITED ACCESS

DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 25 MAR DC MTG ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 23 MAR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220244 9220278

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC342 CODES:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By caf NARA, Date 2/10/10

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	HOWE	Z	92031913	FOR DECISION
001	PONEMAN	Z	92032020	FOR REVISION
002		X	92032416	HOWE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003		X	92032719	HOWE APPROVED RECOM
004	HOWE	Z	92032312	FOR INFORMATION
004		X	92082915	OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOW
004		X	92111317	NOTED BY HOWE
004		X	92111317	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

National Security Council
The White House

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WSD

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Ken Hill	1	Copy	I
Bill Sittmann	2	Copy	
Jon Howe	3	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

92 MAR 24 P7:27

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Skinner Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Mtg package Restricted DC 3/25

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 23, 1992

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MM 2/25/2016

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative

We recommend that you open the meeting by noting that in his September 27 nuclear initiative the President pledged that "we will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation." The discussion paper seeks to answer that call by proposing a comprehensive initiative. The proposed elements include some big ideas, in particular:

-- Export control harmonization, tying together reforms under consideration in three separate contexts: COCOM, competitiveness, nonproliferation.

-- A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" (see Tab II).

-- A new nonproliferation standard, agreeing to provide assistance to nations that refrain from testing and sign up to export controls.

The initiative also includes some small ideas, with a view to tying up various efforts already on track in a coherent framework.

After emphasizing the need to think creatively, we recommend you solicit views from around the table not only on the idea of an initiative and the elements suggested in the paper, but also on possible additions to an initiative. We recommend that you close the meeting by suggesting that NSC Staff chair a close-hold, fast-track review of the elements of a possible initiative for consideration of the Deputies.

With the exception of State, I expect people to be generally supportive of the idea of an initiative. Wolfowitz will be briefed to push for the appointment of an Armitage-like person to implement the initiative, once it is launched. We should <u>not</u> sign on to this, in part because it would doom the potential support of State, which sees itself in charge.

Attachments
Tab I Discussion Paper
Tab II Annotated Framework for Ballistic Missile Treaty

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
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A Nonproliferation Initiative

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The fabric of the NPT bargain soon began to fray. The 1974 Indian nuclear test showed that peaceful nuclear assistance (in that case from Canada and ourselves) could not be isolated from military uses, and that allegedly peaceful explosions could not be distinguished from military tests. The United States reacted by tightening its export controls through the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The focus on restricting technology availability slowed the efforts of some, but also drove programs underground, beyond the reach of export controls. At the same time, proliferation expanded beyond the nuclear sphere. Chemical and biological weapons, much easier to fabricate and hide than their nuclear counterparts, offered an alternate pathway to modern weaponry. Such an option was made even more tempting by the ready availability of cheap and simple ballistic missiles. (S)

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This desire by some states for weapons is inadequately constrained. The IAEA system is flawed, as the Iraqi experience underlined. Export controls are neither uniform nor leakproof. The danger has been aggravated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the withering of COCOM--and its loss of an ideological foundation--weakens export controls even as access to dual-use and advanced technologies increases dramatically. Existing nonproliferation supplier clubs exclude countries (Argentina, Brazil, India) that are targeted by export controls but are emerging as suppliers in their own right. (S)

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1. Hemorrhage. A game plan to limit proliferation from the former USSR, beyond the International S&T Center. (S)

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2. Ballistic Missile Treaty. Right now, missiles are the only proliferating weapons that are controlled only through a suppliers club. There is no over-arching demand-side norm akin to the NPT, the CWC, or the BWC. As a result, we lack a coherent framework for our efforts in this area--witness our ad hoc responses to missile developments in Israel, South Africa, and China. A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" could set out rights, obligations, and penalties. For example, in exchange for states forswearing surface-to-surface missile development and accepting inspections to verify commitments, the treaty might offer "non-missile parties" access to space for peaceful purposes, assistance with ground-based defensive systems such as PATRIOT, or protection by GPALS. (S)

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4. New nonproliferation standard. In proposing new legislation, we could set a new standard for U.S. assistance in lieu of current proscriptions on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, i.e., in exchange for agreeing not to test a nuclear explosive and enforcing applicable export controls, states would be eligible for U.S. security assistance and other forms of economic support. The idea would be to cap national programs at a level we could monitor more confidently and constrain dangerous exports by emerging suppliers. (S)

5. Fissile material freeze. Freeze production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes. (S)

6. IAEA. Increase funding for IAEA safeguards, while calling for a much tougher approach to inspections. (S)

7. NPT and Tlatelolco. Call for universal adherence to the NPT and Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1995. (S)

8. Regional efforts. Call for continued regional efforts for Middle East, South and North Asia. (S)

9. Iraq. Call to maintain the special limits on Iraq. (S)

10. USG Organization. Consolidate disparate efforts in order to strengthen the central coordination of U.S. nonproliferation policy-making. (S)

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DRAFT 1/20/92

FRAMEWORK: BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (BMT)

1. Parties agree not to transfer or receive transfer, directly or indirectly, ballistic missiles capable of carrying 500kg payloads at least 300km, or intended to carry any WMD, or of equipment, material, and technology for use in such systems.

[2. Parties agree not to use ballistic missiles offensively against another party in good standing.]

3. The Treaty shall not affect inalienable right of all Parties to have access to space for peaceful purposes, and Parties in a position to do so shall facilitate such access for other Parties.

4. Parties agree to adopt and implement effective export controls to fulfill commitments of Article 1. Parties shall seek to harmonize these controls as far as possible.

5. An International Space Authority (ISA), independent of but linked to UN (IAEA model), shall be established to verify the commitments undertaken under Article 1, facilitate access to space for peaceful purposes (Art. 4) and coordinate the adoption, implementation, and harmonization of export controls (Art. 5).

[6. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to presumption of approval in seeking technology related to enjoying the benefits of access to space for peaceful purposes so long as their export control systems are certified effective by the ISA.]

[7. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to the benefit of such defenses against missile attack as may be rendered through the ISA or other Parties.]

[8. Parties agree to ultimate goals of verifiable bans on ballistic missile flight-tests and on possession of ballistic missiles.]

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ANNOTATED FRAMEWORK: BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

1. Parties agree not to transfer or receive transfer, directly or indirectly, short- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying 500kg payloads at least 300km, or intended to carry any WMD, or of equipment, material, and technology for use in such systems.

> **Note:** This parallels the nuclear weapon prohibitions of NPT Articles 1 and 2, without "discriminating" between "haves" and "have-nots". In referring to transfers, Article 1 does not prohibit indigenous development or possession. Article 8, however, does look to an ultimate ban on missiles. The phrase "intended to carry any WMD" reflects recent moves by our MTCR Partners to seek a broader focus than on the 300km/500kg MTCR parameters, which are based on nuclear weapon delivery systems.

2. Parties agree not to use ballistic missiles offensively against another party in good standing.

> **Note:** This article does address indigenous missile forces. If its "no-first-use" cast creates problems, we could recast it as a bar against "offensive" use of missiles, though in the ACME talks and elsewhere we have maintained that attempting to distinguish "offensive" from "defensive" uses is time-consuming and futile.

3. The Treaty shall not affect inalienable right of all Parties to have access to space for peaceful purposes, and Parties in a position to do so shall facilitate such access for other Parties.

> **Note:** As with the NPT, the real deal will be less between haves and have-nots than among regional rivals who realize they will be better off without missiles. That said, the haves will probably have to offer guaranteed access to space as a sweetener to induce the have-nots to join. Access would be on commercial terms, although the surfeit of launch services available suggests that discounts could be offered to Parties over non-parties.

4. Parties agree to adopt and implement effective export controls to fulfill commitments of Article 1. Parties shall seek to harmonize these controls as far as possible.

> **Note:** These controls would be based on the MTCR Annex. At present, each MTCR Partner decides for itself how to fulfull its MTCR undertakings. Soon, however, export controls will need to be harmonized to ensure that American exporters are not universally harmed while would-be proliferants circumvent U.S. export controls by shopping elsewhere.

5. An International Space Authority (ISA), under aegis of UN Security Council, shall be established to facilitate access to space for peaceful purposes (Art. 4) and adoption, implementation, and harmonization of export controls (Art. 5).

Note: The ISA would serve several purposes: multilateral cover to avoid excessive "Americanization" of the proposal in eyes of potential MNT adherents; useful pass-through to permit access to space or defenses for Parties it would be awkward for the USG to assist directly; provide a permanent secretariat to facilitate better harmonization than is now possible in episodic MTCR meetings.

[6. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to presumption of approval in seeking technology related to enjoying the benefits of access to space for peaceful purposes so long as their export control systems are certified effective by the ISA.]

Note: US policy remains to refrain from assisting space-launch vehicle (SLV) development in possible proliferant countries. This policy smacks of "technology denial", though it makes some sense in that every missile proliferant state also claims to have an SLV program. This article addresses the SLV-v.-missile dilemma by promising the "benefits" of access to space without promising SLV technology itself. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, and India will surely press for access to such technology. This article could also be used to measure effective export controls in the missile area as a condition for access to items that remain on COCOM control lists.

[7. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to the benefit of such defenses against missile attack as may be rendered through the ISA or other Parties.]

Note: Protection through PATRIOT or, eventually, GPALS, is another sweetener. Again, the "benefit of" language provides basis on which to avoid transfering the systems themselves.

[8. Parties agree to ultimate goals of verifiable bans on ballistic missile flight-tests and on possession of ballistic missiles.]

Note: Without this article, the proposed MNT may appear too one-sided, in that all parties give up SNF and INF, but the superpowers do not give up anything on ICBMs. The structure of this item is designed to redress the apparent asymmetry, without actually giving up anything except a stick to beat up un ICBM-holding powers for noncompliance, i.e. it is analagous to NPT Art. 6 on disarmament negotiations. We could use this article as a fall-back to counter charges of discrimination if we do not include it in an initial U.S. proposal.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220278
RECEIVED: 06 APR 92 17

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 06 APR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP RPT FOR 25 MAR DC MTG RE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION & MISSILE SYSTEMS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 09 APR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220213 9220244

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC342 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 4

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	92032612	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	92040617	SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003	PONEMAN	X	92041019	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004	PONEMAN	X	92041112	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

Nonproliferation Initiative

National Security Council
The White House

20278

PROOFED BY: JR

LOG # 2282

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AHW **A/O** _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	K	A
Bill Sittmann			
Jon Howe	2		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room		APNSA Has Seen	
West Wing Desk	3		D
NSC Secretariat	4		D

92 MAR 27 AM 7:31

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Skinner Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

[redacted]

27 MAR 92 10: 50

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9220278
DATE 06 APR 92

SUBJECT: PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION & MISSILE SYSTEMS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
BAKER, J DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7224 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1
DARMAN, R OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET VIA ROOM 260 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE (PRIORITY) ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 1

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN NSC (Name) 456-6534 (Phone Number) _____ (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PROLIFERATION OF WEAPOONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILE SYSTEMS NSC LOG # 20278

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	SECRETARY BAKER		
DOD	SECRETARY CHENEY		
COMMERCE	SECRETARY FRANKLIN		
ENERGY	SECRETARY WATKINS		
CIA	DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE		
JCS	CHAIRMAN		
ACDA	DIRECTOR		

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

CAP 2/10/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20278

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (U)

As you know, few national security challenges in the years ahead are more daunting than the prospect of the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. The President has called on all nations to redouble their efforts to stem the proliferation of these weapons. The United States has engaged in a wide-ranging effort to thwart proliferation on all fronts, an effort that has produced the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, and other actions. (S)

In order to establish a clear record of all U.S. efforts in this field and to ensure proper coordination among them, I would like to ask each of you to provide a succinct report on accomplishments of the past three years and ongoing efforts by April 10, 1992. (S)

Brent Scowcroft

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2314-MR
MM 12/14/2015

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~---2282---~~
20278

March 26, 1992

SIGNED
Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Nonproliferation Initiative

The Deputies Committee meeting on March 25 chaired by Admiral Howe on this subject produced consensus to direct a close-hold review of the contents of a possible Presidential initiative. (Draft Summary of Conclusions at Tab II.)

The Deputies also agreed that it would be helpful for the White House to task the agencies to submit a list of U.S. nonproliferation accomplishments. Such a list could be drawn upon to show our initiative rests on an already impressive foundation. The tasking would make no reference to any possible initiative in this area.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to your counterparts attached at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to Counterparts
Tab II Draft Summary of Conclusions from March 25 Deputies Committee Meeting

General
Although this sounds a bit like a campaign "defense," Deputies asked for something like this to give them cover and assistance while working the non-proliferation initiative.
Jon 3/27

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2016

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DRAFT

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of Deputies Committee
DATE: March 25, 1992
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on a Nonproliferation Initiative (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

State:
Reginald Bartholomew

White House:
Jonathan Howe

Defense:
Paul Wolfowitz

NSC:
Daniel Poneman

JCS:
John Shalikashvili

Energy:
Linda Stuntz

CIA:
John Helgerson

ACDA:
Read Hanmer

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

-- NSC Staff will chair a small group to conduct a close-hold interagency review of a possible nonproliferation initiative. The small group will produce an "inventory" of accomplishments already realized, define the challenges that remain, and develop the elements of an initiative. (S)

-- The small group will report promptly to the Deputies with a view toward a late spring announcement of a Presidential initiative. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2016

-- The small group will consider elements related to chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. (S)

-- Any initiative would be preceded by allied consultations. (S)

-- NSC will task agencies to report on U.S. nonproliferation accomplishments since 1989. (S)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220213
RECEIVED: 19 MAR 92 16

TO: HOWE

FROM: PONEMAN
GORDON
HAASS

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
LIMITED ACCESS

DC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 25 MAR DC MTG RE NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

ACTION: HOWE APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 23 MAR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220278

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC342 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN

DECLASSIFIED
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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 8/10/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9220213

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	HOWE	Z	92031913	FOR DECISION
001	PONEMAN	Z	92032020	FOR REVISION
002		X	92032416	HOWE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003		X	92032719	HOWE APPROVED RECOM

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/10/10

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 20213

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O 02

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1		A
Bill Sittmann	2		
Jon Howe	3		D
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	WWA 3/27	A
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Skinner Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20213 ADD-ON 2

March 25, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on a Nonproliferation Initiative

Attached for your review is a draft Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Meeting held on March 25, 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Meeting at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of Deputies Committee
DATE: March 25, 1992
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting on a Nonproliferation Initiative (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

State:
Reginald Bartholomew

Defense:
Paul Wolfowitz

JCS:
John Shalikashvili

Energy:
Linda Stuntz

CIA:
John Helgerson

ACDA:
Read Hanmer

White House:
Jonathan Howe

NSC:
Daniel Poneman

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

-- NSC Staff will chair a small group to conduct a close-hold interagency review of a possible nonproliferation initiative. The small group will produce an "inventory" of accomplishments already realized, define the challenges that remain, and develop the elements of an initiative. (S)

-- The small group will report promptly to the Deputies with a view toward a late spring announcement of a Presidential initiative. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2016

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

-- The small group will consider elements related to chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. (S)

-- Any initiative would be preceded by allied consultations. (S)

-- NSC will task agencies to report on U.S. nonproliferation accomplishments since 1989. (S)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220278
RECEIVED: 06 APR 92 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 10 APR 92
SOURCE REF: 9207871

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT ON NONPROLIFERATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS & ONGOING EFFORTS

ACTION: NFAR PER PONEMAN DUE DATE: 09 APR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220213 9220244

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC342 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSNGB DOC 4 OF 4

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	92032612	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	92040617	SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003	PONEMAN	X	92041019	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004	PONEMAN	Z	92041112	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004		X	92060413	NFAR PER PONEMAN

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220278
RECEIVED: 06 APR 92 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 10 APR 92
SOURCE REF: 9207871

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT ON NONPROLIFERATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS & ONGOING EFFORTS

ACTION: ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 09 APR 92 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220213

FILES: IFM O NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
PONEMAN		GORDON
		KOCH

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By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: DOC 4 OF 4

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220278
RECEIVED: 06 APR 92 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HANMER, S

DOC DATE: 10 APR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION & MISSILE SYSTEMS

ACTION: ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 09 APR 92 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220213

FILES: IFM O NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
PONEMAN		GORDON
		KOCH

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By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

NFAR
File for Record

COMMENTS:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Handwritten Note	Paul [Wolfowitz] to [Jonathan] Howe Re: [the tone] (1 pp.)	4/13/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Date Closed: 2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:** 90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F **Re-review Case #:** **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**	**Appeal Case #:** **Appeal Disposition:** **Disposition Date:**
AR Case #: **AR Disposition:** **AR Disposition Date:**	**MR Case #:** **MR Disposition:** **MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dan Poneman

For your use.

4/15

S/S 9207871

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

20278

April 10, 1992

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Report on Nonproliferation Accomplishments and Ongoing Efforts

The attached report (Tab 1) responds to your April 6 memo (Tab 2) requesting a report on accomplishments of the past three years and ongoing efforts in the nonproliferation area.

W. Robert Pearson
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Nonproliferation Report
Tab 2 - Memo Requesting Report

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2314-MR
MM 12/14/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
1992 APR 10 PM 11: 15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT ON NONPROLIFERATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS

US initiatives and leadership have produced significant nonproliferation accomplishments. The international nonproliferation regimes have been enlarged and strengthened and significant progress has been made in addressing regional proliferation concerns. Furthermore, the US has implemented comprehensive, interlocking nonproliferation controls and achieved broad multilateralization of these controls. Among the notable achievements:

- Expanded NPT. Important longtime holdouts such as China and South Africa have joined (or will soon join in the case of France) the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

- More Comprehensive US Export Controls. Pursuant to the President's December 1990 Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative, the US has adopted comprehensive new chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and missile-related export controls.

- Enhanced Multilateral Export Controls.

  -- The 27-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on a control list of dual-use nuclear-related equipment and technology.

  -- Membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has more than doubled, and several non-members (including Russia, China, and Israel) have agreed to adhere to the MTCR guidelines.

  -- Australia Group countries have quadrupled the number of controlled chemicals and agreed to expanded controls on chemical equipment and BW-related items.

  -- In response to US-led multilateral efforts, most East European nations are adopting strict CBW and missile-related controls and states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) have been receptive as well.

- Prevention of Soviet "Brain Drain." The US, Japan, and the EC have agreed to create science and technology centers in Russia and the Ukraine to provide peaceful work for former Soviet weapons scientists, thereby minimizing their temptation to work in countries seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

- End to Iraqi WMD Programs. We have set back Iraq's programs to develop WMD. Iraq's WMD were heavily damaged during the Gulf War, and those that remain are being destroyed under international supervision.

- Establishment of the ACME Process. As a result of President Bush's May 1991 initiative for Arms Control for the Middle East (ACME), the 5 major arms suppliers to the region have begun moving toward responsibility, transparency, and consultation on conventional arms transfers.

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2010-2314-MR
MM 12/14/2015

- Argentine and Brazilian Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons. Argentina and Brazil have renounced any nuclear ambitions and accepted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at all their facilities.

- Termination of Argentina's Condor Missile Program. After significant US and international pressure, Argentina ended its Condor missile program in May 1991.

In sum, we now have a substantially stronger institutional nuclear nonproliferation framework, all countries except North Korea have stopped exporting complete MTCR-class missile systems and most of the traditional sources of supply for CBW programs have been shut off.

The Record of Accomplishment

Expanded and Strengthened International Non-Proliferation Regimes

Nuclear. In addition to longtime holdouts joining the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** (NPT), Russia has assumed the NPT obligations of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Prospects also are favorable for the other states of the FSU to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. The **Nuclear Suppliers Group** (NSG) has not only expanded controls on dual-use nuclear items but also agreed to a long-standing US position requiring full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in non-nuclear-weapons states as a condition for any significant, new nuclear supply commitment. Finally, the **IAEA** Board of Governors confirmed the Agency's authority to carry out "special inspections," whereby it can inspect nuclear activities at any place in a country, not just at declared nuclear facilities.

CBW. The **Australia Group** (AG), which has cooperated to stem CBW proliferation since 1984, increased its membership to 22 nations in 1991. At US urging, all AG members now control exports of all 50 identified CW precursors. Moreover, the AG is now finalizing agreement on chemical equipment controls and, at its June 1992 plenary, will adopt a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins and equipment. Among non-AG members, Israel has adopted controls on all 50 CW precursors, and China and India have adopted some of them. In December 1990 and 1991, the AG held seminars on CBW for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As a result of these and US bilateral efforts, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Romania and Bulgaria have already applied, or are in the process of applying, controls comparable to those of the AG.

Progress also has been made in banning CW. In his May 1991 CW initiative, President Bush announced that the US would forswear the use of CW for any reason once the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force and committed the US to destroy all its CW stocks and former production facilities within ten years of entry into force. In addition, he called for completion of the CWC within a year and for the Conference on Disarmament's (CD) CW negotiations to

meet in continuous session. Last August, the CD endorsed conclusion of the CWC by the end of 1992 and meeting in continuous session to achieve this goal. These efforts give urgency and focus to the September 1989 **Canberra Government-Industry Conference Against CW,** which produced broad industry support for a CWC, and the January 1989 149-nation **Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons.** The latter, held at US suggestion, condemned CW use and proliferation and endorsed a CW Convention (CWC).

On the bilateral side, the US and Soviet Union have carried out the first phase of the September 1989 **Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding** (MOU), which provides for the exchange of CW data and bilateral visits to CW facilities. In June 1990, the US and Soviet Union signed a **bilateral CW destruction agreement** requiring each to reduce its CW stockpile to 5000 tons by the end of the decade. The US and Soviets also agreed in their June 1990 joint nonproliferation statement to cooperate in action against CW, nuclear, and missile proliferation.

In September 1991, the **Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference** (RevCon) largely adopted US proposals for strengthening the BWC. The RevCon agreed to eight new or revised confidence-building measures designed to enhance openness about biological research activities as well as measures for improving adherence and compliance. In addition, it endorsed the principle of BW-related export controls and urged all parties to adopt penal legislation against illegal BW activities that would apply to a country's citizens wherever they might be. The RevCon also elaborated the procedures for raising compliance concerns and obligated a party to provide a specific and timely response to such concerns. As agreed by the RevCon, a governmental experts meeting is now taking place in Geneva for the purpose of identifying and examining potential BWC verification measures from a technical and scientific standpoint.

Missiles. In November 1991, the **Missile Technology Control Regime** (MTCR) expanded to 18 members -- two more countries are expected to join this year -- and revised its annex of controlled equipment and technology. The parties also agreed on the desirability of extending the scope of the MTCR guidelines to missiles capable of delivering any WMD, including chemical and biological, as well as nuclear, warheads. In response to US pressure, various non-member countries have taken steps to bring their practices into conformity with the MTCR guidelines within the last year. In addition to Russia, China, and Israel, Argentina also has adopted MTCR-equivalent controls. An MTCR seminar in March of this year for Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the states of the former Soviet Union has moved several East European nations further toward adopting controls comparable to those of the MTCR.

Progress in Addressing Regional Proliferation Concerns

Iraq. In April 1991, the US led the UN Security Council in adopting Resolution 687, which calls for inspection and elimination of Iraq's WMD. Since then, the **UN Special Commission on Iraq** (UNSCOM) and the IAEA have conducted 31 inspections in Iraq. These

inspections have confirmed that Iraq was pursuing a multi-faceted nuclear weapons development program and provided a much better understanding of the magnitude of Iraq's CW and missile programs. Although the Iraqi WMD programs were significantly damaged during the Gulf War, UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of remaining missiles and related equipment declared by the Iraqis and significant amounts of CW.

The Middle East. In May 1991, President Bush launched his **Arms Control for the Middle East** (ACME) initiative to establish a formal program of arms restraint among suppliers and recipients. Among other things, it called for the five major suppliers of conventional arms to the Middle East to meet and discuss guidelines for restraining destabilizing transfers of conventional arms, WMD, and WMD-related equipment and technology. Two months later, the US, Soviet Union, China, France and the UK met and issued a communique supporting the President's proposal. They also agreed to meet again to develop their work further.

In October, the five governments adopted common guidelines for the export of conventional arms and agreed to inform each other about transfers to the Middle East of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels, and certain missile systems. They also agreed to make arrangements to permit meaningful consultation about such transfers.

Latin America. Substantial progress has been made in halting the proliferation threat in Latin America. In addition to termination of Argentina's Condor missile program and the renunciation of any nuclear weapons ambitions by both Argentina and Brazil, there have been two regional non-proliferation agreements completed in the last year. Last September, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed the **Mendoza Declaration**, which bans CBW in the three countries and commits them to becoming original signatories to the CWC. In December, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela followed suit and issued the **Cartagena Declaration on Renunciation of WMD.**

Other Regions. The establishment of the science and technology centers in Russia and Ukraine has helped ease fears that former Soviet scientists and engineers will provide a boon to countries seeking to employ them in developing WMD. Long-time concerns about South African nuclear weapons ambitions also have been alleviated. South Africa acceded to the NPT in July 1991 and promptly completed its NPT safeguards agreement. The US has begun a nonproliferation dialogue with Pretoria and encouraged the government to take nonproliferation measures that would enable the US to consider waiving current missile sanctions.

Finally, we have made an important start on the North Korean nuclear problem by strongly encouraging the North-South dialogue and nuclear inspection agreement and pressing North Korea to implement fully its nuclear obligations under the NPT.

Notable Interdiction Efforts. In late 1989, the US led the effort within the MTCR to persuade France not to sell Brazil technology for space-launch vehicles, including production

facilities that would have threatened the viability of the MTCR. After unamimous objection from its MTCR partners, France scaled back the proposed sale.

More recently, in the fall of 1991, the US led a campaign to stop the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO) from helping to construct a major chemical complex in Ghazvin, Iran that we thought would be used to produce CW. Demarches by the US and several other countries, as well as attempts to change the UNIDO charter to strengthen contributors' control over UNIDO projects, convinced UNIDO to withdraw from the project.

Finally, within the last few months, the US has acted to stop a Finnish firm from carrying out a contract with Libya to manufacture a biological research center -- which we had already persuaded a South Korean company not to build last year. The US called in the Finnish ambassador, briefed the Finnish Foreign Ministry and met with representatives from the Finnish firm. In addition, we asked five other nations to present bilateral demarches to Finland. After some initial hesitation, the Finnish firm has agreed to cancel the project entirely.

Greater US Unilateral Nonproliferation Efforts

Export Controls and Sanctions. In addition to leading the international effort to halt proliferation, the US has also taken steps to strengthen its own export controls. In November 1990, the President issued **Executive Order 12735**, mandating stronger controls on CBW and delivery system technology and establishing sanctions for illicit CBW use and proliferation. These sanctions were later mandated by law and their scope expanded. We are now considering potential CBW sanctions under the new authority.

Also in November 1990, Congress enacted legislation requiring economic sanctions against entities that are found to have transferred or facilitated the transfer of MTCR-controlled items contributing to missile projects in non-MTCR countries. Missile proliferation sanctions have been imposed on foreign entities in several nations, including China, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, and Iran. In March and August 1991, the US issued expanded export control regulations, pursuant to the the President's December 1990 **Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative** (EPCI). These regulations imposed licensing requirements for exports of all 50 identified CW precursors (prior to AG action), of dual-use CBW-related equipment, of whole chemical plants, and of knowing assistance to CBW or missile programs. As noted above, we have achieved broad multilateral agreement to adoption of comparable controls on most of these items.

Educating and Assisting Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics. The US has sensitized the countries of Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union to the importance of non-proliferation and persuaded many of them to adopt appropriate export controls and enforcement mechanisms. In July 1990, the US conducted a special visit to Eastern Europe focused on the need to

establish responsible and effective non-proliferation and defense trade controls. A follow-up visit to the region was made in October 1991. In February 1992, a US inter-agency team visited Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to discuss the need for effective export controls and to stress the importance of participating in the non-proliferation regimes.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we launched a fresh series of initiatives to meet the changed situation there. In January 1992, a US delegation visited four states of the FSU -- Russia, Byelarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan -- to brief on non-proliferation and defense trade controls and to encourage the new states to impose effective control systems. All have been receptive to the US approach. Russia, which benefits from the expertise and resources of the former Soviet Union, is the farthest along in having an effective control system.

The President also has appointed a Senior Coordinator in the State Department with responsibility for developing and implementing initiatives addressing the potential for intellectual proliferation from the states of the FSU. In addition, we are discussing how we can assist Russia in the safe, secure dismantlement of its nuclear weapons and have offered to help it destroy former Soviet CW stocks.

Pushing Nonproliferation in South Asia. South Asia is a concern primarily for nuclear proliferation reasons, but we are also worried about an Indo-Pakistani arms race involving CBW and missiles. In addition to discussing CBW and missile proliferation with both countries, therefore, the US has proposed a five-nation (US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan) conference to reduce tensions and deal with regional proliferation problems. All states have accepted the idea except India, which is still considering it. At US suggestion, India and Pakistan have discussed bilateral confidence-building measures and are maintaining a bilateral dialogue.

Ongoing Nonproliferation Work

Several ongoing efforts and upcoming events involving nonproliferation deserve special mention:

- Inspecting and Destroying Iraqi WMD. UNSCOM and IAEA are using the information they have gained to continue looking for undeclared WMD, as well as related equipment, technology and production facilities. Once all of Iraq's existing WMD capability is destroyed, long-term international monitoring will be necessary to ensure that Iraq does not attempt to redevelop this capability in the future.

- Implementing a Multilateral Export Control Policy for Iran. The US is seeking to establish multilateral export controls, agreed to in February within the USG, directed toward stemming proliferation to Iran. The US has presented demarches to its G-7 partners to press for adoption of such controls and raised the issue on the margins of COCOM, MTCR, and NSG meetings. We will continue to pursue this goal in the coming months.

- Completing the CWC. Australia has tabled a draft treaty text in Geneva in an effort to conclude the CWC. The US cannot accept the Australian text in its current form and is pressing the chairman of the negotiations to make the few essential changes in the text that it requires, as well as any other changes needed to achieve a broadly acceptable CWC this year. At the same time, we are continuing to work within the Western Group to resolve our remaining differences.

- Continuing US-Russian Bilateral CW Work. The Russians have agreed in principle to holding bilateral talks in Moscow on the problems they are encountering in their CW destruction program, and we are pressing for their agreement to hold the talks this month. We want to see where the US can provide concrete assistance so that Russia can begin destroying CW as soon as possible. We also want to finish the inspection protocol to the June 1990 bilateral CW destruction agreement and begin preparing for implementation of Phase II of the 1989 Wyoming MOU. Phase II provides for a more detailed data exchange as well as a number of routine and challenge inspections.

- Developing the G-7 Initiative on Dual-Use Export Controls. The US is exploring in the G-7 context the need to fill the gaps in dual-use export controls not covered in other multilateral fora, including controls on equipment and technology useful in developing conventional weapons. A G-7 working group is meeting to devise principles and specific elements to be controlled.

- Pursuing Middle East Arms Control. The next ACME plenary, likely to be held this spring, will address concrete proposals for exchanging information on arms transfers, and guidelines for transfers of WMD-related equipment and technology. In addition, the first substantive meeting of the arms control and regional security working group established under the multilateral phase of the Middle East peace process will take place in May.

- Further Expanding CBW Export Controls. In addition to finalizing CW equipment controls at its June plenary, the AG will work to harmonize implementation of BW-related export controls. It also will consider the question of expanding membership in the AG, particularly to include East European nations and states of the FSU.

- Strengthening the MTCR. Technical experts have begun work on implementing the extension of the MTCR guidelines to cover all WMD as agreed in November. They plan to make a recommendation at the next plenary in late June-early July. Representatives from the US and three other MTCR nations will visit Argentina and Brazil later this month to discuss the MTCR partners' concerns about missile proliferation, to learn more about missile-related developments there, and to provide information about MTCR policies and procedures. (Argentina has requested membership in the MTCR and Brazil has expressed interest.) The issue of expanding the MTCR to include East European nations and states of the FSU also is likely to arise in the near future.

- Encouraging Chinese Follow Through on MTCR. Following the March entry into force of China's MTCR commitment, the Administration is pursuing an assertive strategy to deepen Beijing's understanding of MTCR obligations, to ensure that missile nonproliferation is at the top of China's agenda, and to leave no doubt about the consequences of China's failure to follow through on its commitment to adhere to MTCR guidelines.

- Pressuring Regional Proliferators. The US is continuing to watch Libya closely to determine what is happening at Rabta and to keep it from receiving outside assistance in its CBW efforts. We are also maintaining significant pressure on North Korea to ratify and fully implement its IAEA safeguards agreement and to stop its missile exports. Similarly, we are intensifying our dialogue with the Indians to persuade them to stop supplying CBW-related items to suspect countries. We also are pushing them to agree to the 5-power conference we have proposed. Sanctions will continue to be a tool to deter proliferation activities and force countries to impose and enforce adequate export controls.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Letter	From Robert M. Gates to Brent Scowcroft, Re: [list of accomplishments] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	4/16/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 5/18/2022

Date Closed:	2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:**	90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-2314-MR(504.03)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/25/2015

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Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

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16 April 1992

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

As you requested, the enclosed package is a distillation of a long list of accomplishments by the Intelligence Community against the proliferation target. Except for monitoring the rapid changes in the CIS, our efforts to understand and track the world-wide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our highest priority.

We have demonstrated this by devoting considerable resources and manpower to the problem. Funding and personnel for proliferation-related collection, analysis and reporting in the Agency has increased steadily 1.4(c) [redacted]

This increase in resources and manpower has better equipped us to respond to a major increase in requests from policymakers and the Congress for intelligence reporting on proliferation issues. For example, last year the Directorate of Operations produced some 1.4(c) [redacted] Although this represents only a small percentage of the Directorate's total reporting, the quality and policy relevance were exceptional by any standard. Also, expanded intelligence collection is giving us a better fix on the extent and nature of proliferation programs and activities worldwide. Substantial enhancements currently in train promise to further improve those capabilities. Please let me know if there is anything further we can do.

Sincerely,

W.O. Studeman for

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

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2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2015

Enclosure

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05e. Report	Re: Intelligence Community Accomplishments of Proliferation Issues (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Date Closed: 2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:** 90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
AR Case #:	**MR Case #:**
AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (U)

As you know, few national security challenges in the years ahead are more daunting than the prospect of the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. The President has called on all nations to redouble their efforts to stem the proliferation of these weapons. The United States has engaged in a wide-ranging effort to thwart proliferation on all fronts, an effort that has produced the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, and other actions. (S)

In order to establish a clear record of all U.S. efforts in this field and to ensure proper coordination among them, I would like to ask each of you to provide a succinct report on accomplishments of the past three years and ongoing efforts by April 10, 1992. (S)

Brent Scowcroft

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by Mrs. M

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05g. Summary	Re: Summary of OSD Non-Proliferation Accomplishments (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

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THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

April 13, 1992

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2923

Honorable Brent Scowcroft
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20278

Dear Mr. ~~Scowcroft~~ Brent:

This is in response to your recent memorandum requesting a report on past and present ongoing Departmental efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems.

Enclosed is a fact sheet on the Department's nonproliferation programs. Please advise if you require additional information, I would be happy to have the Department's Bureau of Export Administration staff brief you or your staff on these critical programs.

Sincerely,

Barbara

Barbara Hackman Franklin

Enclosures

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Non-Proliferation Export Control Achievements and On-Going Efforts U.S. Department of Commerce

Missile Technology Export Controls

Participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has grown from the original seven countries to 18 countries today. Most countries with indigenous sources of MTCR-listed items are now participating.

In 1991, the MTCR made revisions to strengthen and clarify its control list ("Annex"), and these changes were implemented by Commerce. Also in 1991, agreement was reached to expand the scope of the MTCR from nuclear-capable delivery systems to include systems capable for use on all weapons of mass destruction.

Discussions regarding the scope of MTCR controls continue in 1992. In addition, Switzerland and Portugal are expected to formally join the MTCR. Discussions are proceeding with other countries, such as Israel and South Africa, countries that have not joined the MTCR, but have pledged to abide by MTCR guidelines.

Continuing challenges that face the MTCR are greater coordination of licensing decisions among partner countries, and the control status of Annex items within the European Community.

Supercomputer Export Controls

In June 1991, the U.S. entered into formal understandings between the United States and Japan regarding licensing requirements and safeguards applied to supercomputer exports. The U.S. is presently seeking the cooperation of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in applying similar controls on exports from those countries.

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative

Commerce issued implementing regulations for the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) in March and August 1991.

The March regulations expanded controls on chemical weapons precursors to an additional 39 chemicals. As a result, 50 chemicals, identified by the Australia Group as weapons precursors, are subject to worldwide control. In addition, controls were imposed on dual-use equipment and technical data related to the production of chemical and biological weapons. A list of special regions and countries to which these controls apply was also established.

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In August 1991, a rule was issued providing broad regulatory authority. Under the rule, a validated license is required for any export when the exporter knows that exports to listed destinations will be used for chemical or biological weapons (CBW) or missile delivery purposes. A list of missile destinations applicable to this rule will be published in the near future.

The regulations also provide that the Department may inform exporters that a validated license is required if an export presents an unacceptable risk of CBW or missile related use anywhere in the world. Implementation of this rule requires that BXA develop and implement interagency procedures to assess risks of biological or chemical weapons or missile related activity and to provide written notification to exporters when it is determined that a license requirement should be imposed.

The August rule also provides for restrictions on U.S. persons in the performance of contracts, services, or employment, and in participation and support activities, related to the design, development, production or use of missiles, or of chemical or biological weapons. Support activities include financing, freight forwarding, transporation and other comparable assistance by which a person facilitates an export, reexport or transfer. Moreover, the rule imposes restrictions on the participation of U.S. persons in the construction of whole plants to produce precursor chemicals in certain countries.

A denial policy was also adopted for exports of items already requiring a validated license, if BXA determines that an export could be destined for activities related to chemical or biological weapons or missile technology, or for a facility engaged in such activities.

Nuclear Export Controls

Commerce has maintained unilateral export controls on dual-use items with nuclear applications for over a decade. This list was improved in August 1991. This list was used as a basis for establishing an international control regime on dual-use nuclear items under the auspices of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). Formal NSG agreement to implement controls was reached on April 3, 1992, and includes participation by 27 countries, including Russia, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

Chemical and Biological Export Controls

The U.S. has been successful in persuading the 22 nation Australia Group to continue to strengthen cooperation in halting the spread of chemical and biological weapons, both in export control cooperation as well as in expanding the membership and concerns of the group.

In particular, the Australia Group has adopted controls on a list of 50 chemical precursors, and has agreed in principle to control related chemical manufacturing equipment, and biological organisms and certain biological related equipment.

The Department of Commerce is playing an ever increasing role in the area of chemical weapons disarmament. BXA is participating in efforts to forge a Chemical Weapons Convention and to improve implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, particularly from the standpoint of contributing to the objectives of U.S. export controls and from the standpoint of treaty verification in the industrial sector.

G-7 Initiative on Export Controls

G-7 partners are presently examining on a informal basis ways to improve coordination on export licensing decisions among countries that participate in the various international export control regimes. Discussions are focusing on the need for greater consultation among governments on individual transactions, a better understanding on destinations to which certain exports should not be permitted, (such as Iran), and greater commonality of control lists.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

APR 10 1992

THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (U)

As you requested, there follows a condensed report on the nonproliferation accomplishments and key ongoing activities of the Administration. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has played a significant role in these endeavors. In those areas in which there has been success to date, we are making every effort to consolidate these gains and to achieve more progress. An Annex is attached which briefly mentions some areas where ACDA has played a primary role. (U)

General

As you noted, the President has personally emphasized the importance the United States attaches to nonproliferation and has successfully placed this issue at the top of the international security agenda for the 1990s. In highlighting our successes in this area, we should also be proud of the fashion in which our arms control accomplishments have been complementary to nonproliferation. Our unilateral, bilateral, and regional efforts such as confidence building measures and the Treaty on Coventional Armed Forces in Europe have helped to reduce tension and to create a climate in which the political incentives to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been reduced and international support for nonproliferation norms has increased. These developments have helped to promote regional efforts in South Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere on ways to curtail WMD activities. Other aspects of our foreign and national security policies also contribute to nonproliferation objectives. (U)

U.S. defense programs and security guarantees promote stability and reduce incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States has refocused the Strategic Defense Initiative in response to the changing security environment to the concept known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes which is designed to offer protection against accidental, unauthorized,

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or limited ballistic missile strikes, regardless of source. Moreover, our support for human rights and democratic principles is important because the openness and public accountability of democracy can be an important bulwark against proliferation. The combination of these and other factors has led to many accomplishments and initiatives in the area of nonproliferation. (U)

Among the United States' proposals that have addressed the full spectrum of proliferation concerns is the President's Middle East Arms Control initiative announced in May 1991. (U)

While the circumstances were unique, our aggressive use of the UN Security Council in eliminating Iraq's WMD programs has also succeeded in establishing a precedent for collective action outside the framework of arms control for addressing proliferation activities that pose a threat to international peace and security. The January 31 statement issued by the Security Council on behalf of the fifteen Heads of State and Government further underlines the clear threat that proliferation poses and the recognition by the Council that it can play a very important role in addressing this threat. (U)

The most recent proliferation threat stems from the breakup of the Soviet Union. We have initiatives under way and are working with the newly independent states and our Allies to deal with the potential risks. As you know, we are seeking to ensure that no new nuclear weapon states emerge from this situation, that tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn to Russia and dismantled, and that the reductions called for in START and beyond are implemented. In addition, the START Treaty itself is designed to enhance nonproliferation. It obligates the sides not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty, except for existing patterns of cooperation. Moreover, the existence of the START Treaty, even before ratification, has helped bring a sense of restraint to the nuclear debate in the states of the former Sovet Union and has provided a framework for future reductions which can promote our nonproliferation objectives. (U)

We have offered assistance to the CIS in the safety, security, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons and have developed a comprehensive program, including offers of financial, technical, and material assistance. We have also engaged in preliminary discussions related to the disposition of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from dismantled weapons. We have undertaken a major effort to support the establishment of International Science and Technology Centers in both Russia and Ukraine to address the "brain-drain" issue. (C)

We are also studying ways to assist the CIS states in bringing about successful conversion of their defense industries, thus

helping to promote economic stability and reduce supply-side proliferation efforts. Indeed, one long-term benefit of the Science and Technology Centers may be to help ensure that technical experts remain in the CIS to provide leadership for activities such as defense industry conversion. (C)

In addition, we are encouraging the newly independent states to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards, to establish state systems for accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material, and to adopt responsible export controls. (U)

We have also offered assistance to Russia in the destruction of their chemical weapons (CW), as well as signed a bilateral agreement to this end, and are currently pressing Russia to make good on its commitments. Additionally, we issued a joint statement with the Soviets in 1990 on nonproliferation. Multilaterally, pursuant to the President's 1991 initiative, we are pressing for conclusion of the CW Convention early this summer. (C)

Nuclear Weapons

1. The number of NPT parties has increased to 148 and more are expected soon. (U)

2. South Africa has acceded to the NPT and has placed its substantial, previously undeclared inventory of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. (U)

3. Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement with the IAEA that calls for safeguards on all their nuclear activities. They, along with Chile, have jointly proposed amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that, if adopted, would result in their bringing the Treaty into force for themselves. (C)

4. China has acceded to the NPT and France should do so soon. (U)

5. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has renewed formal meetings. The NSG adopted a multilateral arrangement on the control of nuclear dual-use items, which should be implemented before the end of 1992. (U)

6. Japan, Germany, UK, and France adopted full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for any significant, new nuclear supply commitment to non-nuclear weapon states. Movement by these key states led to a consensus among all NSG members on this policy. (U)

7. IAEA safeguards are being strengthened in the wake of discoveries in Iraq. (U)

8. North and South Korea have concluded a bilateral agreement banning the production, possession, and receipt of nuclear weapons, as well as prohibiting reprocessing and enrichment facilities on the Korean peninsula. The agreement also provides for mutual verification. North Korea has ratified its NPT safeguards agreement and has notified the IAEA that all DPRK domestic requirements for entry-into-force of the safeguards agreement have been met. (S)

9. Each of the Baltic states acceded to the NPT promptly after independence. (U)

10. Preliminary consultations have begun in connection with preparations for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. (U)

11. Efforts to promote dialogue on regional nuclear CBMs for the Middle East and South Asia are continuing. (U)

12. We are encouraging supplier restraint on sales of nuclear materials and technology to the Middle East, with particular focus on Iran and on Chinese-Algerian cooperation. (U)

13. Active diplomacy continues with emerging nuclear suppliers (e.g., China, Argentina) to urge their acceptance of NSG Guidelines and other responsible export policies. Argentina is expected to announce shortly a comprehensive export policy related to WMD. (C)

Missile Proliferation

1. The MTCR membership grew to 18 countries. Additional countries are considering membership, and others including Israel, Argentina, Brazil, and China have stated their intention to observe MTCR's export guidelines. (U)

2. The United States hosted an MTCR Seminar in Warsaw for East and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Baltic states. (U)

3. Argentina has terminated its Condor missile development program. (U)

4. Brazilian firms have suspended or ceased their missile programs. (U)

5. Taiwan has decided to forego the development of an indigenous SLV program (which could have created a ballistic missile capability). (C)

6. South Korea has agreed not to develop or acquire missiles or sounding rockets with a range greater than 180km and a payload greater than 500kg. (S)

7. The former Soviet Government agreed to observe MTCR Guidelines and finally to cease the transfer of Scud missiles to Afghanistan. (U)

8. The United States gained the support of the UK, France, China, and Russia for supplier cooperation in furthering the creation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East. (U)

9. The United States has begun efforts to persuade North Korea to adopt South Korea's 180km/500kg range and payload standards for its missile production and transfer policies. Such a standard would end the export of North Korea's SCUD missiles to the Middle East and elsewhere. (S)

10. The United States used missile proliferation sanctions to secure Israeli and Chinese adoption of MTCR Guidelines and also imposed them on Pakistan and South African companies. (C)

Chemical/Biological Weapons Proliferation

1. A top priority of U.S. foreign policy is the early conclusion of a CW Convention. In 1991, President Bush called for completion of the Convention by May 1992 and demonstrated U.S. seriousness by making major concessions on some key issues. We have also supported the Australian initiative to conclude the negotiations. (U)

2. In view of the Russian inability to meet the destruction deadlines in either the bilateral or multilateral convention and their apparent inability to set up a destruction program, despite their commitments to do so, the United States continues to offer assistance and is pressing Russia for senior-level meetings in Moscow. (C)

3. We have provided technical support to UNSCOM CW-related activities. (U)

4. In 1991, the United States fully implemented the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) for CBW, imposing regulations extending export controls over chemicals, equipment, and other CBW-related assistance, and has undertaken vigorous efforts to obtain the support of other countries to this end. (U)

5. The United States contributed to the establishment of the Australia Group and continues to actively support it. (U)

6. The United States has efforts underway to eliminate its CW stockpile and is sharing its experience and technological information with others. (U)

7. Pursuant to the 1991 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the United States is participating in follow-on experts meetings to examine the feasibility of verification measures. We have passed legislation implementing the BWC, strongly supported CBMs designed to provide openness on biological activities, and participated in annual exchanges of data through the UN. (U)

Conventional Arms

1. The President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative produced agreement among the top five arms suppliers (G-5) on unprecedented export guidelines designed to prevent destabilizing arms transfers. (U)

2. Considerable progress has been made among the G-5 toward implementation of information exchange on their arms transfers to the Middle East, and toward exchanging information sufficiently in advance of transfers to have "meaningful consultations." (U)

Other Technology Control Issues

1. Space Policy: The new U.S. national space policy takes into account nonproliferation concerns. For example, the United States initiated negotiations with the former Soviet Union concerning the nonproliferation safeguards to be applied with respect to the proposed space port to be located at Cape York, Australia. (U)

2. COCOM: The United States and its MTCR partners improved missile technology controls while streamlining the COCOM lists. U.S. initiated efforts for intra-COCOM trade in dual-use MTCR Annex items. (U)

3. Supercomputers: The United States developed safeguards for the export of supercomputers to prevent their use in the development of WMD and ballistic missiles, negotiated the U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Agreement to control this technology, and initiated efforts to multilateralize this agreement to include the UK, France, and Germany. (C)

4. Nuclear-Powered Submarines: The United States initiated efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), particularly in South Asia. This initiative helped persuade the former Soviet Union to terminate its lease

of a nuclear submarine to India in 1991 and helped prevent the transfer of a Chinese SSN to Pakistan. (C)

Stephen R. Hammer, Jr.
Acting

Attachment:
As stated

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ANNEX

ACDA's influence has been felt in all U.S. initiatives and accomplishments in nonproliferation and related technology transfer issues. However, there are some areas in which ACDA has played a primary role. (U)

In nuclear nonproliferation, we have continued to lead U.S. efforts to encourage additional NPT adherence. Preparations for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference have begun under ACDA chairmanship. The renewal of formal activities by the Nuclear Suppliers Group has led to significant achievements in the area of nuclear dual-use controls and in full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. ACDA played a very significant role in both areas. U.S. efforts to promote regional dialogue in South Asia and the Middle East have benefitted from the direct participation of senior ACDA officials and from ACDA CBM initiatives. ACDA has taken a leading role in our nuclear diplomacy on the Korean peninsula. ACDA is contributing in many ways to the multifaceted effort to ensure that the breakup of the Soviet Union does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. (LOU)

In missile nonproliferation, we led the effort to persuade Taiwan to forego its SLV project, which could have been a guise for a ballistic missile development program. After South Korea announced its SLV development project, ACDA initiated efforts which eventually brought that project under control in the NHK-II missile and KARI Sounding Rocket Agreements with the ROKG. We also conceived the United States' effort to persuade Seoul to challenge Pyongyang to adopt the 180km range/500kg payload limit on missile development and export, agreed in the NHK-II and KARI accords, as the standard for North Korea as well. Pursuant to the ground rules you established, ACDA also advocated the first denial of high speed computers to China as result of China's support for Pakistan's missile program. (C)

In CBW, ACDA played a leading role in formulating U.S. policy in the Australia Group (AG) which contributed to the adoption by the AG of warning guidelines on dual-use equipment exports that could contribute to CBW. We also developed U.S. proposals for harmonization of export controls among AG and non-AG members. In EPCI, ACDA conceived the ideas of licensing controls on whole chemical plants and designs for chemical plants and of controls on any export or "assistance" that an exporter knows or is informed by the USG may be destined for use in missile or CBW programs. (C)

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In related technology transfer issues, ACDA formulated the option that the President chose in deciding to allow a U.S. company to participate in Australia's proposed Cape York spaceport where Soviet SLVs will be used; initiated interagency efforts to ensure that the COCOM Core List exercise did not result in loss of control over items of proliferation concern; led interagency efforts to define conditions for a substitute licensing system for trade in dual-use MTCR Annex items among MTCR members of COCOM; developed new safeguards for super-computer exports to preclude or minimize the risk of their use or diversion to nuclear-weapons programs or missile projects of concern; played a key role in the negotiation of the U.S.-Japan Supercomputer Agreement and efforts to multilateralize it to include the UK, France, and Germany; initiated comprehensive strategic trade and nonproliferation dialogues with Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, and the ROK; inspired the interagency and contributed substantially to the development of a strategy to press Argentina and Brazil to establish technology transfer and nonproliferation controls; led efforts to stem the proliferation of SSNs, which contributed to the former Soviet Union's decision to terminate its lease of an SSN to India in 1991 and curbed Pakistan's attempt to obtain a nuclear submarine from China. (C)

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DOCUMENT NO: DP-5.2100005192
DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 6 PAGES
CY NO. 1 OF 7 CYS. SERIES A

20278

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

APR 10 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR Susan Koch
Arms Control Staff
National Security Council

Subject: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (U)

Attached is the report on Department of Energy (DOE) accomplishments of the past three years and ongoing efforts in support of U.S. nonproliferation efforts requested by Brent Scowcroft.

for Victor E. Alessi
Director
Office of Arms Control
and Nonproliferation
Office of the Secretary

Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ONGOING EFFORTS: NONPROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILE SYSTEMS

SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE

The President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative calls for a cessation in the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons materials. In support of the President's initiative, a Department of Energy (DOE) task force produced a study on how to verify with minimal intrusion, that the nuclear reactor at Dimona in Israel, had ceased production of plutonium.

NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS OF IRAQ

DOE has been extensively involved in all aspects of the nuclear inspections, analysis, destruction, and planning for long term monitoring in Iraq. DOE has provided over 20 different inspectors for United Nations (UN) inspection teams; has provided major briefings to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN; played a key role in the analysis that determined that Iraq had a major nuclear weapons development program; and has assigned personnel to the UN, the Department of State (DOS), and the IAEA in Vienna. Very recently DOE has developed criteria for determining what nuclear-related equipment and facilities should be destroyed.

ASSISTANCE IN DISMANTLING FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS

DOE has provided the primary technical expertise for U.S. efforts to assist the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in dismantling nuclear weapons, in accordance with President Bush's offer. More than half of the experts who went to Moscow to discuss assistance were from DOE and its laboratories. Five proposals for U.S. assistance are being discussed. All involve increasing the safety and security of transporting and storing weapons and special nuclear material (SNM). If accepted, the primary burden of implementing them will fall to DOE.

ASSISTANCE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL (SAC) AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN THE FSU

DOE along with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is playing a lead role in U.S. efforts to assist the Republics of the FSU in establishing systems of nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. A game plan has been developed for providing U.S. assistance, and DOE is prepared to support its implementation.

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PREVENTING PROLIFERATION OF FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS

The elimination of thousands of nuclear weapons in the FSU will result in large quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (PU). Such quantities raise serious proliferation concerns. DOE has provided technical advice and issue papers as a basis for discussing this issue with the FSU. As a result, it has been agreed that no HEU will be used as reactor fuel. Rather, it will be blended down into Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for use in power reactors. DOE continues to play a leading role in U.S. policy discussions to identify acceptable options for disposal of the HEU and PU removed from FSU warheads.

"BRAIN DRAIN" FROM THE FSU

The possibility that former Soviet scientists and engineers with expertise in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons might emigrate to potential proliferant countries is a potentially serious proliferation threat. DOE has contributed substantially, both in personnel and in proposals, to the effort led by DOS to reduce that possibility by providing funds and meaningful joint scientific non-weapons projects in the FSU. Thirty-two proposals from DOE laboratories were forwarded to DOS. One of those, a nuclear safety project, was the first selected by DOS to be offered to the FSU through the new National Center for Science and Technology. DOE will provide direct funding for the project. In addition, a DOE laboratory expert is serving as the principal Deputy to Ambassador Galluci, who is leading the U.S. "brain drain" effort.

NUCLEAR INSPECTION OF NORTH KOREA

The gravest threat to security in North Asia is the possible nuclear weapons program of North Korea. North and South Korea have signed an accord which includes bilateral nuclear inspections. To prepare the Republic of Korea to conduct such inspections, DOE has trained Korean inspectors in the United States and South Korea, and will continue this training until the first inspection of the North, now scheduled for June. Training will include instrumentation training at Los Alamos National Laboratory, mock inspections at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and briefings on the activities and facilities of concern in North Korea.

INTERNATIONAL REGIME TO CONTROL DUAL-USE NUCLEAR EXPORTS

DOE has been intimately involved in the development of an international regime, subscribed to by the 27 states that are party to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, which controls the exports of nuclear dual-use exports of items such as flash x-ray machines used in weapons diagnostics and compressors used

in uranium enrichment. A signing ceremony in Warsaw in April culminated two years of negotiations. DOE led the subgroup that identified and developed the specific list of 60 items which, for the first time, will be under international controls.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

DOE and its laboratories have provided technical expertise to U.S. policy makers involved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. DOE experts also serve as advisors on the negotiating teams. Through its national laboratories, DOE is conducting a significant program to develop technologies which can help monitor a chemical weapons ban and detect clandestine chemical weapons production. Such technologies may be highly useful for other nonproliferation monitoring activities. Recently, DOE was asked to provide an expert to help prepare a technical study for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MCTR)

DOE provided technical papers which helped policy makers address the issues of changing payload weight and range (distance) capability criteria for the MCTR.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT FOR DETECTING AND CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

DOE has been instrumental in the development of the following technologies or programs related to the reduction of weapons of mass destruction: remote Atmospheric Monitoring Systems for nuclear debris detection; tags and seals for containment/control of weapons/material; systems for detection and characterization of nuclear radiation; satellite instrumentation for detection of nuclear detonations (endo- and exo-atmospheric); seismic systems for detection of underground nuclear tests; technology for identification of chemical munitions; remote detection of chemical munitions production; and unattended monitoring systems.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES FOR SOUTH ASIA

The possible nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan is the most significant issue in South Asia. To assist in the development of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between these two countries, DOE sponsored a conference at the University of Illinois which brought together experts from India and Pakistan to discuss verification technology with U.S. experts. The goal is to demonstrate that verification technology, such as seismic monitoring or aerial photography, can have a role in reducing regional tensions. DOE is continuing to support CBM's in South Asia by demonstrating how U.S.-developed verification technology can apply to regional arms control problems.

U.S. PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANT FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS (POTAS)

DOE provides technical leadership for POTAS, an interagency program for short-term technical assistance to the IAEA, and DOE national laboratories perform a majority of POTAS activities, including short-term equipment development, analyses, training, and assignment of technical advisors to the IAEA.

REDUCTION OF TRAFFIC AND INVENTORIES OF WEAPONS-GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIAL

DOE, through its Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor program, is promoting a program that will allow conversion of approximately 95 percent of nuclear research reactors fueled with HEU supplied by the United States to convert to LEU and is assisting reactor operators in the conversion of their reactors. Key among its accomplishments was that DOE arranged for the removal, to the United States, of the spent fuel inventory from a Taiwan research reactor containing a significant quantity of weapons usable plutonium.

PROLIFERATION INFORMATION NETWORK

To improve the application of DOE laboratory expertise to proliferation problems, DOE is establishing a classified computer network which will link together Headquarters and the DOE laboratories. Information on proposed U.S. exports, exports by other states, clandestine procurement networks, and unsafeguarded nuclear projects will be available. The network will expand to include other policy, intelligence, and enforcement agencies. DOE is also planning to create a similar network that can be used internationally by the U.S. and other supplier states. Such a system could be used to exchange information of proliferation concern as required by the various proliferation control regimes.

SUPERCOMPUTER EXPORT CONTROL REGIME

DOE has provided technical and policy support to the international effort to negotiate a regime to control the export of super computers which would be useful to advanced nuclear programs and missile delivery programs.

U.S. EXTRABUDGETARY ASSISTANCE FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS

DOE is in the process of providing to the IAEA $1 million extrabudgetary assistance, including technical support and safeguards equipment, to help achieve 1992 IAEA safeguards objectives jeopardized by IAEA funding shortfalls.

INTERNATIONAL TRAINING IN STATE SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL (SSAC) AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION

DOE sponsors, along with DOS and the IAEA, international courses on SSAC of Nuclear Materials, and on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. Safeguards professionals from over 50 countries have been trained in these courses, which are mandated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

U.S. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

DOE manages a safeguards and physical protection technology development program and participates under DOE bilateral agreements for cooperation in joint nonproliferation/safeguards activities, including research and development, training, equipment loans, system design, evaluations, testing, and demonstrations. DOE currently engages in safeguards cooperation with countries including: Argentina, Brazil, Euratom, France, Germany, Japan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

U.S. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION

DOE manages the U.S. interagency program of physical protection bilateral consultations with countries holding U.S.-origin SNM. DOE leads U.S. teams on site visits in foreign countries to review physical protection practices and systems and their consistency with international guidelines.

This document consist of 1 Pages.
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20278

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Systems (U)

As you know, few national security challenges in the years ahead are more daunting than the prospect of the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. The President has called on all nations to redouble their efforts to stem the proliferation of these weapons. The United States has engaged in a wide-ranging effort to thwart proliferation on all fronts, an effort that has produced the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, and other actions. (S)

In order to establish a clear record of all U.S. efforts in this field and to ensure proper coordination among them, I would like to ask each of you to provide a succinct report on accomplishments of the past three years and ongoing efforts by April 10, 1992. (S)

Brent Scowcroft

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FROM: PONEMAN
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HAASS

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
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SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 25 MAR DC MTG ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 23 MAR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220244 9220278

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001	HOWE	Z	92031913	FOR DECISION
001	PONEMAN	Z	92032020	FOR REVISION
002		X	92032416	HOWE SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES
003		X	92032719	HOWE APPROVED RECOM
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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 23, 1992

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative

We recommend that you open the meeting by noting that in his September 27 nuclear initiative the President pledged that "we will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation." The discussion paper seeks to answer that call by proposing a comprehensive initiative. The proposed elements include some big ideas, in particular:

-- Export control harmonization, tying together reforms under consideration in three separate contexts: COCOM, competitiveness, nonproliferation.

-- A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" (see Tab II).

-- A new nonproliferation standard, agreeing to provide assistance to nations that refrain from testing and sign up to export controls.

The initiative also includes some small ideas, with a view to tying up various efforts already on track in a coherent framework.

After emphasizing the need to think creatively, we recommend you solicit views from around the table not only on the idea of an initiative and the elements suggested in the paper, but also on possible additions to an initiative. We recommend that you close the meeting by suggesting that NSC Staff chair a close-hold, fast-track review of the elements of a possible initiative for consideration of the Deputies.

With the exception of State, I expect people to be generally supportive of the idea of an initiative. Wolfowitz will be briefed to push for the appointment of an Armitage-like person to implement the initiative, once it is launched.

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2010-2314-MR
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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March 23, 1992

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2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2016

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Restricted DC: Nonproliferation Initiative

We recommend that you open the meeting by noting that in his September 27 nuclear initiative the President pledged that "we will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation." The discussion paper seeks to answer that call by proposing a comprehensive initiative. The proposed elements include some big ideas, in particular:

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-- A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" (see Tab II).

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The initiative also includes some small ideas, with a view to tying up various efforts already on track in a coherent framework.

After emphasizing the need to think creatively, we recommend you solicit views from around the table not only on the idea of an initiative and the elements suggested in the paper, but also on possible additions to an initiative. We recommend that you close the meeting by suggesting that NSC Staff chair a close-hold, fast-track review of the elements of a possible initiative for consideration of the Deputies.

With the exception of State, I expect people to be generally supportive of the idea of an initiative. Wolfowitz will be briefed to push for the appointment of an Armitage-like person to implement the initiative, once it is launched. We should not sign on to this, in part because it would doom the potential support of State, which sees itself in charge.

Attachments
Tab I Discussion Paper
Tab II Annotated Framework for Ballistic Missile Treaty

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Paper	Re: A Nonproliferation Initiative [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/19/2022

Date Closed:	2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:**	90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-2314-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/25/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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3/19/92

A Nonproliferation Initiative

In his 1953 Atoms for Peace speech, President Eisenhower proposed that the United States would work to end the atomic arms race and provide atomic technology to others--through an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)--in order to "serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." More than a decade later, this concept of a trade-off between military and peaceful uses of the atom was codified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT struck a bargain between the five nuclear weapon states and others. The non-nuclear weapon states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards, i.e., inspections of declared facilities. In exchange, the five nuclear "haves" agreed to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations and to assist the have-nots in developing the peaceful uses of the atom. (S)

The fabric of the NPT bargain soon began to fray. The 1974 Indian nuclear test showed that peaceful nuclear assistance (in that case from Canada and ourselves) could not be isolated from military uses, and that allegedly peaceful explosions could not be distinguished from military tests. The United States reacted by tightening its export controls through the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The focus on restricting technology availability slowed the efforts of some, but also drove programs underground, beyond the reach of export controls. At the same time, proliferation expanded beyond the nuclear sphere. Chemical and biological weapons, much easier to fabricate and hide than their nuclear counterparts, offered an alternate pathway to modern weaponry. Such an option was made even more tempting by the ready availability of cheap and simple ballistic missiles. (S)

New mechanisms arose to address the expanded proliferation problem. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention sought to address the demand side of proliferation through global norms and penalties. Most nonproliferation efforts, though, focused on the supply side. Multilateral nuclear-related export controls were strengthened through the NPT Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Australia Group did the same for CW; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) tackled ballistic missiles. (S)

This ad hoc nonproliferation regime met with some success. Dire predictions of a world with scores of nuclear powers proved false. Similarly, the spread and use of CBW has been more limited than it would have been absent export controls and the stigma attached to these weapons. Since the 1974 Indian nuclear test, no nation has openly tested (much less used in anger) a nuclear explosive device. France, China, and South Africa have come to support the NPT (now with 146 parties), leaving only

Algeria, Israel, India, and Pakistan as holdouts. In addition, the MTCR helped kill Argentina's Condor SRBM program. The MTCR and Australia Group have followed our lead in adopting tougher nonproliferation export controls. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa and Russia now seek to join the MTCR. (S)

There have also been disappointments. A dozen or more countries continue to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. 3.3(b)(6) This suggests that the underlying motivations to acquire special weapons persist. At a time when the United States is rethinking the political and military utility of nuclear weapons, many governments still see them as an avenue to prestige and influence. Pro-nuclear lobbies are strong in several countries. In others there is a consensus that nuclear weapons make strategic sense. There are a number of regions, notably South Asia, where the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. (S)

This desire by some states for weapons is inadequately constrained. The IAEA system is flawed, as the Iraqi experience underlined. Export controls are neither uniform nor leakproof. The danger has been aggravated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the withering of COCOM--and its loss of an ideological foundation--weakens export controls even as access to dual-use and advanced technologies increases dramatically. Existing nonproliferation supplier clubs exclude countries (Argentina, Brazil, India) that are targeted by export controls but are emerging as suppliers in their own right. (S)

We are not well organized to tackle the evolving challenge. Bureaucratic confusion on nonproliferation issues within the executive branch leaves priorities uncertain and execution uneven. Current legislation is unclear and fails to address the challenge posed by new, de facto nuclear weapons states. Three questions naturally emerge: (S)

First, should the President launch a nonproliferation initiative and, if so, when and where? Perhaps he could launch it in a speech this spring. (S)

Second, how should we work the initiative? We would need to hold this very close, beginning with a Small Group to review the substance of an initiative, followed by full NSC approval, high-level contacts with key allies, heads-ups to key members of Congress, and the speech. (S)

Third, what should the initiative contain? (It will focus on WMD and missiles. It will not cover conventional arms transfers.) The following ideas--some obvious, some needing scrutiny--are worth considering: (S)

1. Hemorrhage. A game plan to limit proliferation from the former USSR, beyond the International S&T Center. (S)

2. Ballistic Missile Treaty. Right now, missiles are the only proliferating weapons that are controlled only through a suppliers club. There is no over-arching demand-side norm akin to the NPT, the CWC, or the BWC. As a result, we lack a coherent framework for our efforts in this area--witness our ad hoc responses to missile developments in Israel, South Africa, and China. A "Ballistic Missile Treaty" could set out rights, obligations, and penalties. For example, in exchange for states forswearing surface-to-surface missile development and accepting inspections to verify commitments, the treaty might offer "non-missile parties" access to space for peaceful purposes, assistance with ground-based defensive systems such as PATRIOT, or protection by GPALS. (S)

3. Export control rationalization. We could propose creation of an international mechanism--perhaps beginning with the G-7--to harmonize the existing nonproliferation regimes in light of the transformation of COCOM. Domestically, this would be reflected in proposed omnibus export control legislation. (S)

4. New nonproliferation standard. In proposing new legislation, we could set a new standard for U.S. assistance in lieu of current proscriptions on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, i.e., in exchange for agreeing not to test a nuclear explosive and enforcing applicable export controls, states would be eligible for U.S. security assistance and other forms of economic support. The idea would be to cap national programs at a level we could monitor more confidently and constrain dangerous exports by emerging suppliers. (S)

5. Fissile material freeze. Freeze production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes. (S)

6. IAEA. Increase funding for IAEA safeguards, while calling for a much tougher approach to inspections. (S)

7. NPT and Tlatelolco. Call for universal adherence to the NPT and Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1995. (S)

8. Regional efforts. Call for continued regional efforts for Middle East, South and North Asia. (S)

9. Iraq. Call to maintain the special limits on Iraq. (S)

10. USG Organization. Consolidate disparate efforts in order to strengthen the central coordination of U.S. nonproliferation policy-making. (S)

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DRAFT 1/20/92

FRAMEWORK: BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (BMT)

1. Parties agree not to transfer or receive transfer, directly or indirectly, ballistic missiles capable of carrying 500kg payloads at least 300km, or intended to carry any WMD, or of equipment, material, and technology for use in such systems.

[2. Parties agree not to use ballistic missiles offensively against another party in good standing.]

3. The Treaty shall not affect inalienable right of all Parties to have access to space for peaceful purposes, and Parties in a position to do so shall facilitate such access for other Parties.

4. Parties agree to adopt and implement effective export controls to fulfill commitments of Article 1. Parties shall seek to harmonize these controls as far as possible.

5. An International Space Authority (ISA), independent of but linked to UN (IAEA model), shall be established to verify the commitments undertaken under Article 1, facilitate access to space for peaceful purposes (Art. 4) and coordinate the adoption, implementation, and harmonization of export controls (Art. 5).

[6. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to presumption of approval in seeking technology related to enjoying the benefits of access to space for peaceful purposes so long as their export control systems are certified effective by the ISA.]

[7. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to the benefit of such defenses against missile attack as may be rendered through the ISA or other Parties.]

[8. Parties agree to ultimate goals of verifiable bans on ballistic missile flight-tests and on possession of ballistic missiles.]

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2010-2314-MR
MM 2/25/2016

ANNOTATED FRAMEWORK: BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

1. Parties agree not to transfer or receive transfer, directly or indirectly, short- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying 500kg payloads at least 300km, or intended to carry any WMD, or of equipment, material, and technology for use in such systems.

> **Note:** This parallels the nuclear weapon prohibitions of NPT Articles 1 and 2, without "discriminating" between "haves" and "have-nots". In referring to transfers, Article 1 does not prohibit indigenous development or possession. Article 8, however, does look to an ultimate ban on missiles. The phrase "intended to carry any WMD" reflects recent moves by our MTCR Partners to seek a broader focus than on the 300km/500kg MTCR parameters, which are based on nuclear weapon delivery systems.

2. Parties agree not to use ballistic missiles offensively against another party in good standing.

> **Note:** This article <u>does</u> address indigenous missile forces. If its "no-first-use" cast creates problems, we could recast it as a bar against "offensive" use of missiles, though in the ACME talks and elsewhere we have maintained that attempting to distinguish "offensive" from "defensive" uses is time-consuming and futile.

3. The Treaty shall not affect inalienable right of all Parties to have access to space for peaceful purposes, and Parties in a position to do so shall facilitate such access for other Parties.

> **Note:** As with the NPT, the <u>real</u> deal will be less between haves and have-nots than among regional rivals who realize they will be better off without missiles. That said, the haves will probably have to offer guaranteed access to space as a sweetener to induce the have-nots to join. Access would be on commercial terms, although the surfeit of launch services available suggests that discounts could be offered to Parties over non-parties.

4. Parties agree to adopt and implement effective export controls to fulfill commitments of Article 1. Parties shall seek to harmonize these controls as far as possible.

> **Note:** These controls would be based on the MTCR Annex. At present, each MTCR Partner decides for itself how to fulfull its MTCR undertakings. Soon, however, export controls will need to be harmonized to ensure that American exporters are not universally harmed while would-be proliferants circumvent U.S. export controls by shopping elsewhere.

5. An International Space Authority (ISA), under aegis of UN Security Council, shall be established to facilitate access to space for peaceful purposes (Art. 4) and adoption, implementation, and harmonization of export controls (Art. 5).

Note: The ISA would serve several purposes: multilateral cover to avoid excessive "Americanization" of the proposal in eyes of potential MNT adherents; useful pass-through to permit access to space or defenses for Parties it would be awkward for the USG to assist directly; provide a permanent secretariat to facilitate better harmonization than is now possible in episodic MTCR meetings.

[6. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to presumption of approval in seeking technology related to enjoying the benefits of access to space for peaceful purposes so long as their export control systems are certified effective by the ISA.]

Note: US policy remains to refrain from assisting space-launch vehicle (SLV) development in possible proliferant countries. This policy smacks of "technology denial", though it makes some sense in that every missile proliferant state also claims to have an SLV program. This article addresses the SLV-v.-missile dilemma by promising the "benefits" of access to space without promising SLV technology itself. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, and India will surely press for access to such technology. This article could also be used to measure effective export controls in the missile area as a condition for access to items that remain on COCOM control lists.

[7. Parties in good standing shall be entitled to the benefit of such defenses against missile attack as may be rendered through the ISA or other Parties.]

Note: Protection through PATRIOT or, eventually, GPALS, is another sweetener. Again, the "benefit of" language provides basis on which to avoid transfering the systems themselves.

[8. Parties agree to ultimate goals of verifiable bans on ballistic missile flight-tests and on possession of ballistic missiles.]

Note: Without this article, the proposed MNT may appear too one-sided, in that all parties give up SNF and INF, but the superpowers do not give up anything on ICBMs. The structure of this item is designed to redress the apparent asymmetry, without actually giving up anything except a stick to beat up un ICBM-holding powers for noncompliance, i.e. it is analagous to NPT Art. 6 on disarmament negotiations. We could use this article as a fall-back to counter charges of discrimination if we do not include it in an initial U.S. proposal.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220244
RECEIVED: 27 MAR 92 16

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: PONEMAN
GORDON
HAASS

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
MINUTES
LIMITED ACCESS
DC
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF DC MTG ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE 24 MAR

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 31 MAR 92 STATUS: C .

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: DC 342 CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO
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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

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342

March 30, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

NOTED

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Minutes of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Nonproliferation Initiative

Attached at Tab I are the minutes of the Deputies Committee meeting held on the above subject on March ~~24~~ 25, 1992.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached minutes be filed for record purposes.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment
Tab I Minutes of the March 24 Deputies Committee Meeting

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (8 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Date Closed: 2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:** 90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
AR Case #:	**MR Case #:**
AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9220244
RECEIVED: 27 MAR 92 16

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: PONEMAN
GORDON
HAASS

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
MINUTES
LIMITED ACCESS
DC
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF DC MTG ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE 24 MAR

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 31 MAR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		GORDON
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		PONEMAN

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SITTMANN	Z	92040109	FOR DECISION
001		X	92040208	SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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National Security Council
The White House

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Ken Hill	1	✓	A
Bill Sittmann			
Jon Howe			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
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West Wing Desk	2		N
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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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1 MAR 92 8 : 36

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

LIMITED ACCESS 20244

March 30, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

NOTED

SUBJECT: Minutes of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Nonproliferation Initiative

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Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

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Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
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AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

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TO: SITTMANN

FROM: PONEMAN
GORDON
HAASS

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
MINUTES
LIMITED ACCESS
DC
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES FOR 24 MAR DC MTG ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 31 MAR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF: 9220213 9220278

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC342 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		GORDON
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		PONEMAN

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 2/10/10

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
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By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

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TO: SITTMANN

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FROM: PONEMAN
GORDON
HAASS

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NON PROLIFERATION
MINUTES
LIMITED ACCESS

DC
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF DC MTG ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE 24 MAR

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 31 MAR 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN LOGREF:

FILES: IFM NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		GORDON
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		PONEMAN

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

LIMITED ACCESS 20244

March 30, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

NOTED

THROUGH: JOHN GORDON/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN

SUBJECT: Minutes of the NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Nonproliferation Initiative

Attached at Tab I are the minutes of the Deputies Committee meeting held on the above subject on March 24, 1992.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached minutes be filed for record purposes.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment
Tab I Minutes of the March 24 Deputies Committee Meeting

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 2/10/10

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (8 pp.)	3/24/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 342 - March 25, 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Non-Proliferation Initiative, Keywords: Non-Proliferation

Date Closed: 2/10/2010	**OA/ID Number:** 90022-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F **Re-review Case #:** **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**	**Appeal Case #:** **Appeal Disposition:** **Disposition Date:**
AR Case #: **AR Disposition:** **AR Disposition Date:**	**MR Case #:** **MR Disposition:** **MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information