

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

FOIA Number:
2005-1002-F

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OA/ID Number: 90021
Folder ID Number: 90021-013

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Jane E. Holl to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Report	Re: Report (3 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	S
01c. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S
01d. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S
01e. Map	Re: Map (1 pp.)	12/1991	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
01f. Tables	Re: Energy Situation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	S
02a. List	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	
02b. Request	Re: Request for Appointments [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
02c. List	Re: Dc Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	
03a. Memo	Jane E. Holl to Jonathan T. Howe Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	S

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WHORM Cat.:)

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Pinksheet Number: cap1631

OA/ID Number: 90021-013

Date Closed: 2/2/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03b. Report	Re: Report (3 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	S
03c. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S
03d. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S
03e. Map	Re: Map (1 pp.)	12/1991	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
03f. Tables	Re: Energy Situation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	S
04a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	
04b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	
04c. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	
04d. Memo	From William F. Sittmann to Karl Jackson et al re: Meeting (1 pp.)	12/19/91	(b)(3)	
04e. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of Deputies Committee [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

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04f. Draft Summary	Re: [Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of Deputies Committee] [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
05a. Cover Sheet	From William F. Sittmann (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(3)	
05c. Paper	Re: Background Paper [Yugoslavia] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05d. Report	Re: Report (3 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	S
05e. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S
05f. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S
05g. Map	Re: Map (1 pp.)	12/1991	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
05h. Tables	Re: Energy Situation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	S
05i. Draft Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Background Paper for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Re-review Case #:

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120909
RECEIVED: 11 DEC 91 20

TO: HOWE

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 11 DEC 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
DC

EC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 13 DEC DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

DUE DATE: 14 DEC 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9120719 9120720

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC325

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 2/2/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNGB

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9120909

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HOWE

Z 91121120 FOR INFORMATION

001

X 92051214 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

001

X 92111316 NOTED BY HOWE

001

X 92111316 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 2/2/10

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National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 20909

URGENT NOT PROOFED: MS

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG MS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>Copy</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>Copy</u>	
Jon Howe	<u>3</u>	<u>Deputy Natl Sec Advisor</u>	
Brent Scowcroft		<u>has seen</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Skinner Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20909

December 11, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *MS*

FROM: JANE E. HOLM *X*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia

The issues for discussion and decision at your Firday meeting fall into three general categories: You will want to direct this meeting to decisions on some of these issues and consensus on others.

Recognition: What strategy should we pursue in advance of possible recognition by EC member states? (They meet Monday specifically to take up this issue.)

What strategy should we pursue if one or more European actors recognize the Republics?

Peacekeeping: If the decision is taken by the U.N. to introduce peacekeepers, are we prepared to support? If so, what are we prepared to do? *Should we signal stronger support for peacekeeping now?*

Sanctions: Should we adopt selective sanctions?

Should we rachet up the pressure further on Serbia/JNA? With a full trade embargo? An oil embargo? When should we take these steps?

The questions at the end of the background paper are intended to frame the discussion, expose related issues, and lead to decisions where feasible.

Attachments

Tab A Implications of International Recognition
Tab B Where Do We Go From Here?
Tab C Impact of an Oil Embargo

JH: The 2 CIA papers are worth reading.

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A010-2885-MR
SCS 8/7/12

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Declassify on: OADR

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(Copy of Document Follows)
 By EX on 5/21/15

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2885-MR (500.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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
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Directorate of Intelligence
11 December 1991



Yugoslavia: Implications of International Recognition

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Summary

At least some EC and other European states--led by Germany--are likely to recognize Slovenia and Croatia within the next few weeks. Depending on how and by whom recognition is extended, we believe this move need not hinder a settlement of the conflict between Serbia and Croatia over Serb-populated areas of Croatia. Recognition nonetheless probably would increase the prospects for near-term violence in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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2012-0089-MR
EJ 2/25/14

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of European Analysis.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed

1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

EUR M-91-20141

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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Western Europe Grudgingly Moving Toward Recognition

German pressure and perceived Serbian intransigence are pushing reluctant West European governments toward recognition of Croatia and Slovenia later this month. Final action will reportedly not be taken until a special EC foreign ministers meeting in mid-December, but at that time members opposing recognition are likely to face unpalatable alternatives: either an open split in the Community only days after proclaiming commitment to European political unity, or perceptions of following a German lead in according recognition. [REDACTED] 1.4(c); (b)(3)

The ongoing recognition debate is also increasing calls for greater US involvement. Several West European governments have indicated that only US pressure offers a slim chance that Kohl might agree to delay his self-imposed Christmas deadline for recognition. And if recognition does take place, Germany and other West European allies may look for more direct US engagement. Bonn probably calculates that the threat that recognition will transform a civil war into an international conflict will force the Serbs to accept a settlement largely within previous borders or at least limit their ambitions to areas already under Serbian control. If Belgrade calls the German bluff, however, neither Bonn nor its partners will offer the Slovenes or Croats military aid without a UN Security Council endorsement and participation in enforcing a cease-fire. [REDACTED] 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Will Serbs Respond With New Attacks?

Serbian leaders are probably resigned to Slovenia and Croatia gaining recognition. We believe the Serbian reaction is likely to be relatively mild if a large number of states recognize Croatia, emphasize the need for Croatia to protect minority rights, and make no explicit commitments to alter the de facto Serb control over Serb-majority areas in Croatia. Serbia--and Serb forces--are more likely to launch new attacks, however, if only Germany and a few other states extend recognition and appear committed to helping Croatia roll back Serb control of Serb-majority areas. [REDACTED] 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Will Recognition Make Zagreb More Obstinate?

Recognition--provided Croatians are not convinced that they will receive military assistance to roll back Serb gains--could strengthen Tudjman's hand vis-a-vis hardliners. This would facilitate compromises that might enable agreement with Serbia on terms for a UN peacekeeping force. Tudjman no doubt realizes that, even if Croatia is recognized, it would have difficulty obtaining financial assistance and weapons if it is viewed as obstinate. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Tudjman has been on the defensive against hardliners in part because his moderation has not yet produced the promised recognition from the West. With cover from the EC, Tudjman also may be more able to work out a deal with Serbia over the disputed Serb-populated enclaves. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Conflict and Tension Likely to Spread South

Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, combined with Macedonia's pursuit of similar recognition, probably will convince Muslim and Croat factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina to seek independence rather than to remain part of "Serboslavia." Serbs in Bosnia, who already have formed five autonomous provinces, will resist such a move and may attempt to secede. Because of the quilt-like ethnic mix in the republic, serious violence is a near certainty. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

No Easy--Or Bloodless--Answers

Continued refusal to grant recognition to Croatia might postpone the day of reckoning in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it could lead to heightened violence in Croatia. Croatian hardliners could gain the upper hand in demanding a more aggressive posture against remaining Army forces in the republic. Serbia also would have less incentive to negotiate a settlement with Croatia. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

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 By BOs on 5/21/15

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2885-MR (500.02)
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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

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Directorate of Intelligence
10 December 1991



The Yugoslav Crisis: Where Does It Go From Here?

Summary

Germany and several other European countries are poised to extend diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia within the next few weeks. Depending on how recognition is qualified, this development could trigger either an intensification of the conflict or movement toward a political solution, although it would almost certainly be an imperfect one. In any event, the movement towards recognition has the potential to transform the Yugoslav crisis into one with ramifications going well beyond the Balkans to touch on broader European issues. These include relationships within European institutions, between a powerful Germany and its often anxious partners, and between the United States and its European allies. Although the Europeans and the Yugoslav actors want to remain the arbiters of their own fate, most still look to the US to play an essential balancing and stabilizing role in Europe. If the US was not engaged, particularly in UN-sponsored actions flowing from recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, some US interests in Europe could be jeopardized.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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PER E.O. 13526

2012 0089-MR
EJ 2/25/14

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

EURA

1.4(c); (b)(3)

EUR M-20240

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany and several other European countries now appears almost inevitable in the next few weeks. The impact of this development on the conflict between Serbia and Croatia is likely to depend on the terms under which recognition is extended and whether recognition is perceived by the warring parties as a step towards a possible settlement.

- We believe a scenario in which only Germany and a few other states moved to extend recognition, or one in which recognition was linked to a commitment to support the restoration of Croatia's old borders, would be most likely to trigger a Serbian military response against Croatia.
- Similarly, recognition linked to hints or promises of military assistance would be likely to make the embattled Tadjman government in Croatia less open or able to compromise and to prolong the fighting.
- If these conditions can be avoided, diplomatic recognition could strengthen Tadjman against more radical domestic opponents and pave the way for a political and territorial compromise with Serbia.
- Tadjman has been vulnerable to criticism that his relatively restrained conduct of the war has gained Croatia nothing in foreign capitals and cost it heavily on the battlefield. Recognition would be the first tangible fruit of that policy.
- We have ample evidence that Tadjman is willing to consider writing off Serb majority territory in return for political guarantees and possible territorial compensation elsewhere.
- Consideration of referenda allowing local inhabitants to express their wishes would be one way of leaving this possibility open. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe Serbian leader Milosevic would consider the consequences carefully before escalating the conflict. His goal is a Greater Serbia, not the total annihilation of Croatia. He would have to consider whether an intensification of the fighting would leave him closer or farther from that goal.

- He probably would intensify the fighting if he thought the recognizing powers intended to force a humiliating retreat on him. If convinced this was not the case, we believe Milosevic is likely to try to preempt foreign intervention by moving toward a political settlement. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe the main complication arising from diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is the difficulty of insulating Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia from the process. Diplomatic recognition of these two republics--which will be difficult to avoid once the precedent has been set--will set the stage for serious violence in areas hitherto free of significant conflict.

- Multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbs have already made it clear that they will not accept the rule of a government dominated by Bosnia's Slavic Muslim plurality. Bosnian Croats, meanwhile, almost certainly will opt for union with an independent Croatia.
- This will leave three heavily armed, antagonistic, and intermingled populations facing the problem of how to separate themselves without violence. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

The odds of avoiding violence in Macedonia, which has only a miniscule Serbian minority, are better. If it erupts, however, the consequences are potentially much more serious. If independence triggered a Serbian effort to reassert its political control through force, it would risk a spillover of the conflict into Albania and Bulgaria.

- Most Bulgarians regard Macedonians as their ethnic kin, and the Bulgarian Government--although not keen on a confrontation with Serbia--would find it difficult to seal its borders and prevent volunteers and material assistance from crossing over.
- Albanians, whose countrymen make up more than twenty percent of Macedonia's population, would face the same dilemma. Moreover, any conflict pitting Serbs against Albanians in Macedonia would almost certainly spill over into Kosovo. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Risks for the United States

The United States is likely to find it difficult--if not impossible--to stand aside from the situation. The best case outcome of diplomatic recognition would be quick movement toward a workable cease-fire monitored by UN peacekeepers and parallel movement toward a political settlement between Serbia and Croatia.

- This would confront the United States with the obligation to bear a major share of the financial and logistical burden of maintaining a UN force, a burden that is likely to be both significant and prolonged.

- Given the historical and ethnic complexities of the region, it is probably unreasonable to expect any political "solution" to be more than a bandaid capable of keeping violence at a low level. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

If the US was not engaged in UN-sponsored actions, we believe this could risk damage to US influence in Europe. The Europeans would be likely to increasingly question the desire and ability of the United States to play a stabilizing role in Europe. Over time this could even be a factor eroding the European conviction that a US military presence is needed. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

The worst case outcome--an intensification and widening of the conflict--could have much more serious consequences for the United States. The most dangerous scenario would come about if a peacekeeping force were to become embroiled in hostilities in its efforts to separate Yugoslav combatants. In this case, it almost certainly would look to the US for support; for example, to use the aircraft of the Sixth Fleet to interdict JNA air and naval forces. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Even if it did not come to this, larger interests than the United States' limited direct stake in the Balkans could be at risk. A European entanglement in the Yugoslav crisis without the participation of the United States, in addition to sparking a debate over the post-Cold War role of the United States in Europe, could work against European political cohesion. There are already some signs of incipient political discord:

- Of the countries of the European Community, Germany, Italy, and Greece are already heavily involved in the Balkan crisis, the first two favoring Croatia and the latter leaning toward Serbia. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

An intensification of the conflict would put these differences into bolder relief, especially since Germany's constitutional prohibition against dispatching troops abroad would insulate it from the military costs of a peacekeeping operation. At the very least, these differences would make more difficult the halting progress towards European political unity. At worst, they could breathe new life into some of Europe's old rivalries, particularly if Germany isolated itself from its principal European partners or--more likely--managed simply to dominate EC policy.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

- Historical links and strong pro-Croatian and pro-Slovenian sentiment in the country could open up a wider gap between Germany and its principal allies if the Yugoslav conflict widens.
- Some Europeans see Germany's policies as an unwelcome revival of the bad old ideas of national solutions to European problems. We believe it would be inimical to both US and European interests if the habit of unilateralism were to be resurrected in Europe. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe it significant that several European governments have made it clear that they look to Washington to influence Bonn. While we believe it unlikely that broader US engagement can deter German recognition of Croatia, it would reassure other EC states.

- US leverage over Germany would increase if Bonn believed that at some point Washington would be willing to throw its weight onto the scales to force a solution, even of the temporary variety. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In sum, the impulse toward recognition of the breakaway republics is transforming the Yugoslav problem into one which has implications not only for the Balkans, but for broader relationships in Europe. As the situation evolves, the responses of the United States will clearly take on greater importance than heretofore, even though the Germans, other Europeans, and the Yugoslav actors themselves will want to remain the major arbiters of the outcome. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Directorate of Intelligence
10 December 1991



Yugoslavia: Impact of an Oil Embargo

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Summary

Of the various economic levers available to the West, an oil embargo has probably the best chance for pressuring Serbia and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to consider a political settlement. Prior to the beginning of fighting in June, Serbia received over 80 percent of its oil supplies from imports through the Croatian port of Rijeka, via the Adria pipeline. Both have been cut off from Belgrade since mid-September. The JNA almost certainly has priority access to available oil supplies and will be the last to feel the impact of fuel shortages. Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, is likely to feel the effects of an oil embargo most acutely. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In the Yugoslav case, the key factor in implementing an effective oil embargo is Serbia's ability to transport oil into the republic. In this regard, principal pressure points are Greece and Romania, which currently account for the bulk of what oil supplies are flowing into Serbia and neighboring Yugoslav republics. Greek support probably will be a relatively low-cost item: approximately \$15 million in compensation for revenues lost from transshipment fees. This would be in addition to whatever amount Athens requests as compensation for supporting EC trade sanctions

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0089-MR
EG 2/25/14

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of European Analysis.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

EURA

1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

EUR M-91-10041

1.4(c); (b)(3)

REF ID: A66557

against Serbia and Montenegro. The EC could probably secure Romanian cooperation by tying the oil issue to progress on an association agreement with the Community. The EC has other leverage it could use against Romania if needed, including withholding \$250 million in proposed balance of payments support, or offering to purchase the oil destined for Yugoslavia. 14(c); (b)(3)

Already Looking for Alternatives

Federal officials have indicated that, as a result of the loss of facilities in Croatia, Belgrade is trying to double the volume of refined products imported this year from one to two million tons (40,000 barrels per day). Such a level would cover less than half of Serbia's normal petroleum needs of approximately 90,000 b/d. The share drops to less than one-third if adding in an additional 40,000 b/d to cover pre-war requirements of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro (see tables for more detailed data on Yugoslav energy consumption). 14(c); (b)(3)

Currently, Serbia apparently is bringing oil supplies primarily from two external sources as well as drawing on limited domestic production. Under optimal circumstances, these various routes could cover Serbia's needs, but would leave little if any for the other republics.

- One external route involves rail transport from the Greek port of Thessaloniki to the refinery at Skopje, capital of Macedonia. Capacity of this route is approximately 40,000 b/d, according to official Greek data.
- Another external route requires rail and river barge up the Danube through Romania, terminating at the Serbian refineries of Pancevo and Novi Sad. Capacity of this route is approximately 22,000 b/d, according to federal officials.
- Almost 22,000 b/d are available from domestic oilfields in the autonomous province of Vojvodina, 14(c); (b)(3)
- 14(c); (b)(3) nearly 7,000 b/d can be brought by rail/road combination from the industrial port of Bar in Montenegro. 14(c); (b)(3)

Utilizing these various alternatives has already generated significant problems for Belgrade, however. As a result, the two refineries in Serbia have been periodically shut down since early September, and the Macedonian facility has operated only sporadically.

- Bottlenecks reportedly have appeared in offloading crude from tankers in Romania and transshipping onto barges for transit up the Danube. Barges also are in short supply. Moreover, the Serbians have encountered problems getting barges past the giant Djerdap dam on the river.
- The Greek route is suffering from a shortage of tanker trucks and railcars. [REDACTED] since the closure of the Adria pipeline, only one shipment of crude--120,000 tons--has reached Yugoslavia from Greece. [REDACTED]

Who Is Feeling the Squeeze?

[REDACTED] the JNA traditionally kept its oil reserves at about 75 to 80 percent of its capacity of 18 million barrels. The JNA has not been conducting operations in a manner indicating a concern about serious fuel shortages, however, and we assume that the military has first priority on all fuel supplies. [REDACTED]

The civilian sector is feeling the oil squeeze considerably more than the JNA. [REDACTED] Serbians are experiencing six-hour lines at local gas stations. Even drivers of commercial vehicles previously able to procure supplies through private channels are experiencing shortages. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is even more acute. The republic is at the end of the current "pipeline" and has no access to direct sources of supplies. [REDACTED] severe shortages of gasoline and heating oil in the republic's ethnic Muslim regions, [REDACTED] industrial production has almost entirely shut down due to a lack of fuel. [REDACTED]

Getting the Neighbors on Board

Unlike most international oil embargoes, one targeted against Serbia does not require getting producers on board. Instead, Belgrade's vulnerability is its limited ability to develop viable alternatives for bringing oil into the country. Any effort to cut off Serbian access to world oil supplies will have Athens and Bucharest as key players. A cutoff of the Greek and Romanian routes would leave Belgrade with the Montenegrin port of Bar, whose capacity would cover less than 10 percent of Serbia's needs. [REDACTED]

Athens, despite its proclaimed affinity for Serbia in the ongoing conflict, has indicated in the past that its main opposition to an oil blockade is lost revenue from oil shipments. [REDACTED] they would lose approximately \$15 million in transshipment fees, a figure that looks plausible based on official Greek data. This amount would be in addition to whatever Athens claims as compensation for honoring EC trade sanctions already in effect against Serbia and Montenegro. [REDACTED]

Bucharest also would almost certainly insist on reimbursement for what it receives from Belgrade for shipping oil up the Danube. To keep the Romanians from "bowing to temptation," the EC could agree to pay for the oil now going to Yugoslavia, and allow Romania to keep the shipments to meet its own desperate energy needs. The EC could also use as leverage Romania's ardent desire for an association agreement. The Community could also threaten to withhold \$250 million in proposed balance of payments support. [REDACTED]

Ramifications of an Oil Embargo

An oil embargo against Serbia would have both positive and negative implications as a pressure point to bring Belgrade to the negotiating table.


- A cut-off of fuel would have obvious implications for the JNA's ability to conduct any kind of a mobile campaign, particularly if the JNA undertakes operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo. The loss of aviation fuel would also deprive Belgrade of a key weapon against Croatia--uncontested air superiority.
- The realization that Serbs could be facing a winter with severe fuel shortages might be the catalyst that would generate a groundswell movement to remove Milosevic. In the short run, however, Milosevic--a proven manipulator of Serbian xenophobia--almost certainly would use the embargo to try to garner additional popular support. He also probably will try to divert fuel from the military to civilian consumers if the domestic situation deteriorates rapidly. [REDACTED]

On the negative side, an embargo would adversely affect two other republics that so far have tried to sit out the current conflict.

- An embargo would accelerate the already severe economic decline underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina, possibly triggering a violent breakup of the republic.
- Loss of the Greek oil route would deprive Macedonia, one of Yugoslavia's poorest republics, without oil and a source of income. On

the other hand, should the West exempt Macedonia from the embargo and allow oil deliveries to the refinery, Belgrade almost certainly would launch a military strike to seize the facility. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01e. Map	Re: Map (1 pp.)	12/1991	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By SCS on 9/15/15

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2885-MR (500.04)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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
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Yugoslav Oil Infrastructure, December 1991



Confidential 14(C) (b) (3)

722620 (40-4648) 12-91

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0089-MR
SCS 2/25/14

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01f. Tables	Re: Energy Situation (2 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~ ; (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
By EL on 2/21/15

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2885-MR (500.05)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(3)

Yugoslav Energy Situation, 1990 and 1991 by Quarter

Table 1:

Crude Oil (including condensate) Imports by Country of Origin, 1990

<u>Country</u>	<u>b/d</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total	239,916	100
USSR	121,658	51
Iraq#	37,012	15
Libya	27,601	12
Angola	25,434	11
United Kingdom	12,150	5
Saudi Arabia	5,585	2
Egypt	4,578	2
Norway	4,335	2
United States	1,530	1
Liberia	34	NEGL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262012-0089-MR
EJ 2/25/14Table 2:

Natural Gas Imports by Country of Origin, 1990

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total	100
USSR	97
United States	2
Hungary	1

Table 3:Energy Imports by Republic, 1 January-31 July, 1991
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Coal and Coke</u>	<u>Crude Oil</u>	<u>Petroleum Products</u>
Total	NA	190,217	32,102
Bosnia-			
Hercegovina	5,893	15,921	3,277
Montenegro	NA	0	3,876
Croatia	11,210	61,077	7,118
Macedonia	NA	14,635	2,326
Slovenia	NA	16,338	6,625
Serbia	NA	82,247	8,880

In 1991, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries have replaced oil imports from Iraq.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

Table 4:Consumption of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	1,009,850	451,430	302,820	125,800	129,800
1991/I	941,320	418,840	257,440	101,940	163,100
1991/II	932,160	340,680	250,770	134,100	206,610

Table 5:Production of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	649,240	406,790	62,900	47,810	131,740
1991/I	680,850	404,530	58,560	52,730	165,030
1991/II	635,300	323,760	58,400	44,360	208,780

Table 6:Imports of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	402,380	49,640	259,920	77,990	14,830
1991/I	302,100	19,310	218,880	49,210	14,700
1991/II	337,010	21,920	212,370	89,740	12,980

Table 7:Exports of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	41,770	5,000	20,000	0	16,770
1991/I	41,630	5,000	20,000	0	16,630
1991/II	40,150	5,000	20,000	0	15,150

These Tables are

(b)(3)

* Data for 1990 are quarterly averages.

(b)(3)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. List	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	2/2/2010	OA/ID Number:	90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1991
1:00 - 2:00 PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Jonathan Howe
Andy Card

OVP

Karl Jackson

STATE

Lawrence Eagleburger
Arnie Kanter

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
J.D. Crouch

JCS

David Jeremiah
John Jumper

CIA

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

NSC

David Gompert
Jane Holl

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DC325

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Request	Re: Request for Appointments [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3); (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-Charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on December 13, 1991

for Jonathan Howe of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

STATE

Lawrence Eagleburger
Arnold Kanter

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
J.D. Crouch

JCS

David Jeremiah
John Jumper

CIA

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

Drivers:

Lee Young
John Davis
Matthew Turner
Robert Stanley

(b)(6)

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Room No. Situation Room

Time of Meeting 1:00 p.m.

Requested by Cathy Millison

Room No. Grd Flr/WW Telephone 6534

Date of Request December 12, 1991

(Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. List	Re: Dc Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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TYPE OF MEETING: DC Mtg		DATE: 12/13	TIME & DURATION: 1:00 - 2:00 pm	
SUBJECT OF MEETING: Yugoslavia			LOCATION: Sit Rm	
PARTICIPANTS	INVITED	AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE	DOB:	SSN:
X OFFICE OF THE VP	X	Karl Jackson		
X CHIEF OF STAFF OFFICE	X	Andy Card		
X STATE	X	~~Eagleburger~~		
		Kanter / Kauzlarich		
X DEFENSE	X	Wolfowitz		
		Crouch, J.D.		
X JCS	X	Jeremiah		
		Jumper		
X CIA	X	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]		
OMB	X			
NSC POC:				
☐ PRINCIPALS ONLY ☒ PRINCIPALS PLUS ONE				

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Driver for Jeremiah
Robert Stanley 11/13/65

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE
REC CLASS: SECRET

RECORD ID: 9120909
RECEIVED: 11 DEC 91 20

TO: HOWE

FROM: HOLL

DOC DATE: 11 DEC 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
DC

EC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 13 DEC DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DUE DATE: 14 DEC 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9120719 9120720

FILES: IFM C

NSCP: DC325

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9120909

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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X 92051214 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOW

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20909

December 11, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *MG*
FROM: JANE E. HOLD *X*
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia

The issues for discussion and decision at your Firday meeting fall into three general categories: You will want to direct this meeting to decisions on some of these issues and consensus on others.

Recognition: What strategy should we pursue in advance of possible recognition by EC member states? (They meet Monday specifically to take up this issue.)

What strategy should we pursue if one or more European actors recognize the Republics?

Peacekeeping: If the decision is taken by the U.N. to introduce peacekeepers, are we prepared to support? If so, what are we prepared to do? *Should we signal stronger support for peacekeeping now?*

Sanctions: Should we adopt selective sanctions?

Should we ratchet up the pressure further on Serbia/JNA? With a full trade embargo? An oil embargo? When should we take these steps?

The questions at the end of the background paper are intended to frame the discussion, expose related issues, and lead to decisions where feasible.

Attachments

Tab A Implications of International Recognition
Tab B Where Do We Go From Here?
Tab C Impact of an Oil Embargo

JH: The 2 CIA papers are worth reading.

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2010-2885-MR
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03b. Report	Re: Report (3 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By EL on 5/25/15

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

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
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1.4(c); (b)(3)



Directorate of Intelligence
11 December 1991



Yugoslavia: Implications of International Recognition

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Summary

At least some EC and other European states--led by Germany--are likely to recognize Slovenia and Croatia within the next few weeks. Depending on how and by whom recognition is extended, we believe this move need not hinder a settlement of the conflict between Serbia and Croatia over Serb-populated areas of Croatia. Recognition nonetheless probably would increase the prospects for near-term violence in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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2012-0089-MR
E8 2/25/14

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Western Europe Grudgingly Moving Toward Recognition

German pressure and perceived Serbian intransigence are pushing reluctant West European governments toward recognition of Croatia and Slovenia later this month. Final action will reportedly not be taken until a special EC foreign ministers meeting in mid-December, but at that time members opposing recognition are likely to face unpalatable alternatives: either an open split in the Community only days after proclaiming commitment to European political unity, or perceptions of following a German lead in according recognition.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

The ongoing recognition debate is also increasing calls for greater US involvement. Several West European governments have indicated that only US pressure offers a slim chance that Kohl might agree to delay his self-imposed Christmas deadline for recognition. And if recognition does take place, Germany and other West European allies may look for more direct US engagement. Bonn probably calculates that the threat that recognition will transform a civil war into an international conflict will force the Serbs to accept a settlement largely within previous borders or at least limit their ambitions to areas already under Serbian control. If Belgrade calls the German bluff, however, neither Bonn nor its partners will offer the Slovenes or Croats military aid without a UN Security Council endorsement and participation in enforcing a cease-fire.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Will Serbs Respond With New Attacks?

Serbian leaders are probably resigned to Slovenia and Croatia gaining recognition. We believe the Serbian reaction is likely to be relatively mild if a large number of states recognize Croatia, emphasize the need for Croatia to protect minority rights, and make no explicit commitments to alter the de facto Serb control over Serb-majority areas in Croatia. Serbia--and Serb forces--are more likely to launch new attacks, however, if only Germany and a few other states extend recognition and appear committed to helping Croatia roll back Serb control of Serb-majority areas.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Will Recognition Make Zagreb More Obstinate?

Recognition--provided Croatians are not convinced that they will receive military assistance to roll back Serb gains--could strengthen Tudjman's hand vis-a-vis hardliners. This would facilitate compromises that might enable agreement with Serbia on terms for a UN peacekeeping force. Tudjman no doubt realizes that, even if Croatia is recognized, it would have difficulty obtaining financial assistance and weapons if it is viewed as obstinate. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Tudjman has been on the defensive against hardliners in part because his moderation has not yet produced the promised recognition from the West. With cover from the EC, Tudjman also may be more able to work out a deal with Serbia over the disputed Serb-populated enclaves. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Conflict and Tension Likely to Spread South

Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, combined with Macedonia's pursuit of similar recognition, probably will convince Muslim and Croat factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina to seek independence rather than to remain part of "Serboslavia." Serbs in Bosnia, who already have formed five autonomous provinces, will resist such a move and may attempt to secede. Because of the quilt-like ethnic mix in the republic, serious violence is a near certainty. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

No Easy--Or Bloodless--Answers

Continued refusal to grant recognition to Croatia might postpone the day of reckoning in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it could lead to heightened violence in Croatia. Croatian hardliners could gain the upper hand in demanding a more aggressive posture against remaining Army forces in the republic. Serbia also would have less incentive to negotiate a settlement with Croatia. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

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Document Partially Declassified
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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

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Directorate of Intelligence
10 December 1991



The Yugoslav Crisis: Where Does It Go From Here?

Summary

Germany and several other European countries are poised to extend diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia within the next few weeks. Depending on how recognition is qualified, this development could trigger either an intensification of the conflict or movement toward a political solution, although it would almost certainly be an imperfect one. In any event, the movement towards recognition has the potential to transform the Yugoslav crisis into one with ramifications going well beyond the Balkans to touch on broader European issues. These include relationships within European institutions, between a powerful Germany and its often anxious partners, and between the United States and its European allies. Although the Europeans and the Yugoslav actors want to remain the arbiters of their own fate, most still look to the US to play an essential balancing and stabilizing role in Europe. If the US was not engaged, particularly in UN-sponsored actions flowing from recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, some US interests in Europe could be jeopardized. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

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2012-0089-MR
Eg 2125114

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

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Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany and several other European countries now appears almost inevitable in the next few weeks. The impact of this development on the conflict between Serbia and Croatia is likely to depend on the terms under which recognition is extended and whether recognition is perceived by the warring parties as a step towards a possible settlement.

- We believe a scenario in which only Germany and a few other states moved to extend recognition, or one in which recognition was linked to a commitment to support the restoration of Croatia's old borders, would be most likely to trigger a Serbian military response against Croatia.
- Similarly, recognition linked to hints or promises of military assistance would be likely to make the embattled Tadjman government in Croatia less open or able to compromise and to prolong the fighting.
- If these conditions can be avoided, diplomatic recognition could strengthen Tadjman against more radical domestic opponents and pave the way for a political and territorial compromise with Serbia.
- Tadjman has been vulnerable to criticism that his relatively restrained conduct of the war has gained Croatia nothing in foreign capitals and cost it heavily on the battlefield. Recognition would be the first tangible fruit of that policy.
- We have ample evidence that Tadjman is willing to consider writing off Serb majority territory in return for political guarantees and possible territorial compensation elsewhere.
- Consideration of referenda allowing local inhabitants to express their wishes would be one way of leaving this possibility open. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe Serbian leader Milosevic would consider the consequences carefully before escalating the conflict. His goal is a Greater Serbia, not the total annihilation of Croatia. He would have to consider whether an intensification of the fighting would leave him closer or farther from that goal.

- He probably would intensify the fighting if he thought the recognizing powers intended to force a humiliating retreat on him. If convinced this was not the case, we believe Milosevic is likely to try to preempt foreign intervention by moving toward a political settlement. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe the main complication arising from diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is the difficulty of insulating Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia from the process. Diplomatic recognition of these two republics--which will be difficult to avoid once the precedent has been set--will set the stage for serious violence in areas hitherto free of significant conflict.

- Multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbs have already made it clear that they will not accept the rule of a government dominated by Bosnia's Slavic Muslim plurality. Bosnian Croats, meanwhile, almost certainly will opt for union with an independent Croatia.
- This will leave three heavily armed, antagonistic, and intermingled populations facing the problem of how to separate themselves without violence. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

The odds of avoiding violence in Macedonia, which has only a miniscule Serbian minority, are better. If it erupts, however, the consequences are potentially much more serious. If independence triggered a Serbian effort to reassert its political control through force, it would risk a spillover of the conflict into Albania and Bulgaria.

- Most Bulgarians regard Macedonians as their ethnic kin, and the Bulgarian Government--although not keen on a confrontation with Serbia--would find it difficult to seal its borders and prevent volunteers and material assistance from crossing over.
- Albanians, whose countrymen make up more than twenty percent of Macedonia's population, would face the same dilemma. Moreover, any conflict pitting Serbs against Albanians in Macedonia would almost certainly spill over into Kosovo. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Risks for the United States

The United States is likely to find it difficult--if not impossible--to stand aside from the situation. The best case outcome of diplomatic recognition would be quick movement toward a workable cease-fire monitored by UN peacekeepers and parallel movement toward a political settlement between Serbia and Croatia.

- This would confront the United States with the obligation to bear a major share of the financial and logistical burden of maintaining a UN force, a burden that is likely to be both significant and prolonged.

- Given the historical and ethnic complexities of the region, it is probably unreasonable to expect any political "solution" to be more than a bandaid capable of keeping violence at a low level. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

If the US was not engaged in UN-sponsored actions, we believe this could risk damage to US influence in Europe. The Europeans would be likely to increasingly question the desire and ability of the United States to play a stabilizing role in Europe. Over time this could even be a factor eroding the European conviction that a US military presence is needed. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

The worst case outcome--an intensification and widening of the conflict--could have much more serious consequences for the United States. The most dangerous scenario would come about if a peacekeeping force were to become embroiled in hostilities in its efforts to separate Yugoslav combatants. In this case, it almost certainly would look to the US for support; for example, to use the aircraft of the Sixth Fleet to interdict JNA air and naval forces. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Even if it did not come to this, larger interests than the United States' limited direct stake in the Balkans could be at risk. A European entanglement in the Yugoslav crisis without the participation of the United States, in addition to sparking a debate over the post-Cold War role of the United States in Europe, could work against European political cohesion. There are already some signs of incipient political discord:

- Of the countries of the European Community, Germany, Italy, and Greece are already heavily involved in the Balkan crisis, the first two favoring Croatia and the latter leaning toward Serbia. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

An intensification of the conflict would put these differences into bolder relief, especially since Germany's constitutional prohibition against dispatching troops abroad would insulate it from the military costs of a peacekeeping operation. At the very least, these differences would make more difficult the halting progress towards European political unity. At worst, they could breathe new life into some of Europe's old rivalries, particularly if Germany isolated itself from its principal European partners or--more likely--managed simply to dominate EC policy.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

- Historical links and strong pro-Croatian and pro-Slovenian sentiment in the country could open up a wider gap between Germany and its principal allies if the Yugoslav conflict widens.
- Some Europeans see Germany's policies as an unwelcome revival of the bad old ideas of national solutions to European problems. We believe it would be inimical to both US and European interests if the habit of unilateralism were to be resurrected in Europe. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe it significant that several European governments have made it clear that they look to Washington to influence Bonn. While we believe it unlikely that broader US engagement can deter German recognition of Croatia, it would reassure other EC states.

- US leverage over Germany would increase if Bonn believed that at some point Washington would be willing to throw its weight onto the scales to force a solution, even of the temporary variety. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In sum, the impulse toward recognition of the breakaway republics is transforming the Yugoslav problem into one which has implications not only for the Balkans, but for broader relationships in Europe. As the situation evolves, the responses of the United States will clearly take on greater importance than heretofore, even though the Germans, other Europeans, and the Yugoslav actors themselves will want to remain the major arbiters of the outcome. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

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AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.03)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

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
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Directorate of Intelligence
10 December 1991



Yugoslavia: Impact of an Oil Embargo

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Summary

Of the various economic levers available to the West, an oil embargo has probably the best chance for pressuring Serbia and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to consider a political settlement. Prior to the beginning of fighting in June, Serbia received over 80 percent of its oil supplies from imports through the Croatian port of Rijeka, via the Adria pipeline. Both have been cut off from Belgrade since mid-September. The JNA almost certainly has priority access to available oil supplies and will be the last to feel the impact of fuel shortages. Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, is likely to feel the effects of an oil embargo most acutely. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In the Yugoslav case, the key factor in implementing an effective oil embargo is Serbia's ability to transport oil into the republic. In this regard, principal pressure points are Greece and Romania, which currently account for the bulk of what oil supplies are flowing into Serbia and neighboring Yugoslav republics. Greek support probably will be a relatively low-cost item: approximately \$15 million in compensation for revenues lost from transshipment fees. This would be in addition to whatever amount Athens requests as compensation for supporting EC trade sanctions

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2012-0089-MR
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1.4(c); (b)(3)

against Serbia and Montenegro. The EC could probably secure Romanian cooperation by tying the oil issue to progress on an association agreement with the Community. The EC has other leverage it could use against Romania if needed, including withholding \$250 million in proposed balance of payments support, or offering to purchase the oil destined for Yugoslavia. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Already Looking for Alternatives

Federal officials have indicated that, as a result of the loss of facilities in Croatia, Belgrade is trying to double the volume of refined products imported this year from one to two million tons (40,000 barrels per day). Such a level would cover less than half of Serbia's normal petroleum needs of approximately 90,000 b/d. The share drops to less than one-third if adding in an additional 40,000 b/d to cover pre-war requirements of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro (see tables for more detailed data on Yugoslav energy consumption). 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Currently, Serbia apparently is bringing oil supplies primarily from two external sources as well as drawing on limited domestic production. Under optimal circumstances, these various routes could cover Serbia's needs, but would leave little if any for the other republics.

- One external route involves rail transport from the Greek port of Thessaloniki to the refinery at Skopje, capital of Macedonia. Capacity of this route is approximately 40,000 b/d, according to official Greek data.
- Another external route requires rail and river barge up the Danube through Romania, terminating at the Serbian refineries of Pancevo and Novi Sad. Capacity of this route is approximately 22,000 b/d, according to federal officials.
- Almost 22,000 b/d are available from domestic oilfields in the autonomous province of Vojvodina, 1.4(c); (b)(3)
- 1.4(c); (b)(3) nearly 7,000 b/d can be brought by rail/road combination from the industrial port of Bar in Montenegro. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Utilizing these various alternatives has already generated significant problems for Belgrade, however. As a result, the two refineries in Serbia have been periodically shut down since early September, and the Macedonian facility has operated only sporadically.

- Bottlenecks reportedly have appeared in offloading crude from tankers in Romania and transshipping onto barges for transit up the Danube. Barges also are in short supply. Moreover, the Serbians have encountered problems getting barges past the giant Djerdap dam on the river.
- The Greek route is suffering from a shortage of tanker trucks and railcars. [REDACTED] since the closure of the Adria pipeline, only one shipment of crude--120,000 tons--has reached Yugoslavia from Greece. [REDACTED]

Who Is Feeling the Squeeze?

[REDACTED] the JNA traditionally kept its oil reserves at about 75 to 80 percent of its capacity of 18 million barrels. The JNA has not been conducting operations in a manner indicating a concern about serious fuel shortages, however, and we assume that the military has first priority on all fuel supplies. [REDACTED]

The civilian sector is feeling the oil squeeze considerably more than the JNA. [REDACTED] Serbians are experiencing six-hour lines at local gas stations. Even drivers of commercial vehicles previously able to procure supplies through private channels are experiencing shortages. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is even more acute. The republic is at the end of the current "pipeline" and has no access to direct sources of supplies. [REDACTED] severe shortages of gasoline and heating oil in the republic's ethnic Muslim regions, [REDACTED] industrial production has almost entirely shut down due to a lack of fuel. [REDACTED]

Getting the Neighbors on Board

Unlike most international oil embargoes, one targeted against Serbia does not require getting producers on board. Instead, Belgrade's vulnerability is its limited ability to develop viable alternatives for bringing oil into the country. Any effort to cut off Serbian access to world oil supplies will have Athens and Bucharest as key players. A cutoff of the Greek and Romanian routes would leave Belgrade with the Montenegrin port of Bar, whose capacity would cover less than 10 percent of Serbia's needs. [REDACTED]

Athens, despite its proclaimed affinity for Serbia in the ongoing conflict, has indicated in the past that its main opposition to an oil blockade is lost revenue from oil shipments. [REDACTED] they would lose approximately \$15 million in transshipment fees, a figure that looks plausible based on official Greek data. This amount would be in addition to whatever Athens claims as compensation for honoring EC trade sanctions already in effect against Serbia and Montenegro. [REDACTED]

Bucharest also would almost certainly insist on reimbursement for what it receives from Belgrade for shipping oil up the Danube. To keep the Romanians from "bowing to temptation," the EC could agree to pay for the oil now going to Yugoslavia, and allow Romania to keep the shipments to meet its own desperate energy needs. The EC could also use as leverage Romania's ardent desire for an association agreement. The Community could also threaten to withhold \$250 million in proposed balance of payments support. [REDACTED]

Ramifications of an Oil Embargo

An oil embargo against Serbia would have both positive and negative implications as a pressure point to bring Belgrade to the negotiating table.


- A cut-off of fuel would have obvious implications for the JNA's ability to conduct any kind of a mobile campaign, particularly if the JNA undertakes operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo. The loss of aviation fuel would also deprive Belgrade of a key weapon against Croatia--uncontested air superiority.
- The realization that Serbs could be facing a winter with severe fuel shortages might be the catalyst that would generate a groundswell movement to remove Milosevic. In the short run, however, Milosevic--a proven manipulator of Serbian xenophobia--almost certainly would use the embargo to try to garner additional popular support. He also probably will try to divert fuel from the military to civilian consumers if the domestic situation deteriorates rapidly. [REDACTED]

On the negative side, an embargo would adversely affect two other republics that so far have tried to sit out the current conflict.

- An embargo would accelerate the already severe economic decline underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina, possibly triggering a violent breakup of the republic.
- Loss of the Greek oil route would deprive Macedonia, one of Yugoslavia's poorest republics, without oil and a source of income. On

the other hand, should the West exempt Macedonia from the embargo and allow oil deliveries to the refinery, Belgrade almost certainly would launch a military strike to seize the facility. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Map	Re: Map (1 pp.)	12/1991	(b)(1), (b)(3) -	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By SCS on 9/15/15

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.04)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



Yugoslav Oil Infrastructure, December 1991



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72300 (4-84) 12-91

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PER E.O. 13526
2012-0089-MR
SCS 2/25/14

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Tables	Re: Energy Situation (2 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~ ; (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

**Document Declassified
(Document Follows)**

By Ch on 6/21/15

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.05)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

Yugoslav Energy Situation, 1990 and 1991 by Quarter

Table 1:

Crude Oil (including condensate) Imports by Country of Origin, 1990

<u>Country</u>	<u>b/d</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total	239,916	100
USSR	121,658	51
Iraq#	37,012	15
Libya	27,601	12
Angola	25,434	11
United Kingdom	12,150	5
Saudi Arabia	5,585	2
Egypt	4,578	2
Norway	4,335	2
United States	1,530	1
Liberia	34	NEGL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262012-0089-MR
EJ 2/25/14Table 2:

Natural Gas Imports by Country of Origin, 1990

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total	100
USSR	97
United States	2
Hungary	1

Table 3:Energy Imports by Republic, 1 January-31 July, 1991
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Coal and Coke</u>	<u>Crude Oil</u>	<u>Petroleum Products</u>
Total	NA	190,217	32,102
Bosnia-			
Hercegovina	5,893	15,921	3,277
Montenegro	NA	0	3,876
Croatia	11,210	61,077	7,118
Macedonia	NA	14,635	2,326
Slovenia	NA	16,338	6,625
Serbia	NA	82,247	8,880

In 1991, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries have replaced oil imports from Iraq. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

Table 4:Consumption of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	1,009,850	451,430	302,820	125,800	129,800
1991/I	941,320	418,840	257,440	101,940	163,100
1991/II	932,160	340,680	250,770	134,100	206,610

Table 5:Production of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	649,240	406,790	62,900	47,810	131,740
1991/I	680,850	404,530	58,560	52,730	165,030
1991/II	635,300	323,760	58,400	44,360	208,780

Table 6:Imports of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	402,380	49,640	259,920	77,990	14,830
1991/I	302,100	19,310	218,880	49,210	14,700
1991/II	337,010	21,920	212,370	89,740	12,980

Table 7:Exports of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	41,770	5,000	20,000	0	16,770
1991/I	41,630	5,000	20,000	0	16,630
1991/II	40,150	5,000	20,000	0	15,150

These Tables are

(b)(3)

* Data for 1990 are quarterly averages.

(b)(3)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120919
RECEIVED: 17 DEC 91 18

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
SOC

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 13 DEC DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED & SGD

DUE DATE: 20 DEC 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9120903 9120909

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC325

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 2/2/10

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DOC 2 OF 2

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9120919

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HOWE
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91121912 FOR DECISION
X 91121912 SITTMANN APPROVED & SGD

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 2/2/10

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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SEQUENCE TO

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DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

1

16

A

Bill Sittmann

2

W

Jon Howe

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

3

JB 12/19

JD

91 DEC 17 07:53

A

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Skinner

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DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

91 DEC 17 03

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 2/2/2010 **OA/ID Number:** 90021-013

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


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THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Cherry

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2826 CLASSIFICATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGES

3FROM William F. Sihmann

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

#20919

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

STATEMr. W Robert Pearson Exec SecDEFENSEB G John Dubia Exec SecCIA

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

Exec SecJCSCol. George Sumrall Secretary JCS

REMARKS _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

2/2/10

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 2/2/2010 **OA/ID Number:** 90021-013

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



DEC 19 2 05 PM '91

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINERELEASER: Cheney

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2826 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 3FROM William F. Sitmann

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

#20919

TO (Agency) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. PHONE NUMBER

STATE Mr. W Robert Pearson Exe. Sec

DEFENSE B6 John Dubia Exec Sec

CIA (b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] Exec Sec

JCS Col. George Sumran Secretary JCS

REMARKS _____

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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
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DELTA
1413

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: CK

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2826 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 3

FROM William F. Sitmann
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA
#20919

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>STATE</u>	<u>Mr. W Robert Pearson</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>B G John Dubia</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>CIA</u>	<u>(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	
<u>JCS</u>	<u>Col. George Sumrall</u>	<u>Secretary, JCS</u>	

REMARKS _____

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REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

2/2/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9120919
DATE 19 DEC 91

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR DC MTG
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

JACKSON, K
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VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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CARD, A
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WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20919

December 17, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

FROM: JANE HOLM ✓

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of December 13 DC on
Yugoslavia

The summary of conclusions of you DC on Yugoslavia is attached at
Tab A. We recommend you authorize Bill Sittmann to disseminate
this summary to the participants.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Participants

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 2/2/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Memo	From William F. Sittmann to Karl Jackson et al re: Meeting (1 pp.)	12/19/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	2/2/2010	OA/ID Number:	90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


20919

December 19, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BG JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense



(b)(3)

COL GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (e)

The attached summary of conclusions of the December 13 DC on
Yugoslavia is forwarded for your use. (e)

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'William F. Sittmann'.

William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

cc: Andrew Card

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 2/2/10

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04e. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of Deputies Committee [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By 3A on 10/21/13

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2885-MR (501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 8/7/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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20919

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of Deputies Committee

DATE: December 13, 1991

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:00 - 2:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Yugoslavia (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:

Karl Jackson

White House

Jonathan Howe

Andrew Card

State:

Arnold Kanter

Richard Kauzlarich

NSC:

David C. Gompert

Jane R. Holl

DoD:

Paul Wolfowitz

J.D. Crouch

CIA:

John Helgerson

(b)(1); (b)(3)

JCS:

Admiral Jeremiah

BG John Jumper

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The U.S. favors recognition under criteria to be worked out (i.e., 'earned recognition'). The U.S. does not favor unconditional recognition and further believes recognition at this time to be unhelpful and potentially harmful to the situation in Yugoslavia. (C)
- State will develop the criteria that constitute 'earned recognition.' (C)
- Going into the EC ministerial of December 16-17 on Yugoslavia, the Germans do not appear to be flexible on this issue -- they will convey recognition regardless of what the rest of the Community does. (C)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2885-MR
SCS 8/7/12

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- CIA will further evaluate the consequences (i.e., for a wider war) that the recognition of the Yugoslav republics by one or all members of the EC would have. (C)
- The U.S. supports the Vance and Carrington missions, and specifically would support a peacekeeping operation under UN auspices. (C)
- OSD/JCS will develop a notional support package for such peacekeeping operations, including logistical, communications and intelligence support, given current information on hand regarding its potential size, intended disposition, etc. (C)
- State will evaluate current U.S. humanitarian assistance and explore ways to expand this effort, including both governmental and private assistance. (C)
- The U.S. will not, at this time, propose an oil embargo, but may revisit this issue in future. (C)
- No decisions on additional or modified sanctions were taken. (C)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04f. Draft Summary	Re: [Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of Deputies Committee] [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By  on 10/21/13

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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RESTRICTION CODES

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20919



SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR
MEETING OF DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

DATE: December 13, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Yugoslavia (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Karl Jackson

White House
Jonathan Howe
Andrew Card

State:
Arnold Kanter
Richard Kauzlarich

NSC:
David C. Gompert
Jane E. Holl

DoD:
Paul Wolfowitz
J.D. Crouch

CIA:
John Helgerson
(b)(1); (b)(3)

JCS:
Admiral Jeremiah
BG John Jumper

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

- The U.S. favors recognition under criteria to be worked out (i.e. 'earned recognition'). The U.S. does not favor unconditional recognition and further believes recognition at this time to be unhelpful and potentially harmful to the situation in Yugoslavia.
- State will develop the criteria that constitute 'earned recognition.'
- Going into the EC ministerial of December 16-17 on Yugoslavia, the Germans do not appear to be flexible on this

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2

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issue -- they will convey recognition regardless of what the rest of the Community does.

- CIA will further evaluate the consequences (i.e. for a wider war) that the recognition of the Yugoslav republics by one or all members of the EC would have.
- The U.S. supports the Vance and Carrington missions, and specifically would support a peacekeeping operation under UN auspices.
- OSD/JCS will develop a notional support package for such peacekeeping operations, including logistical, communications and intelligence support, given current information on hand regarding its potential size, intended disposition, etc.
- State will evaluate current U.S. humanitarian assistance and explore ways to expand this effort, including both governmental and private assistance.
- The U.S. will not, at this time, propose an oil embargo, but may revisit this issue in future.
- No decisions on additional or modified sanctions were taken.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120903
RECEIVED: 11 DEC 91 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 11 DEC 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG NOTIFICATION & AGENDA FOR 13 DEC DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 14 DEC 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HOLL

LOGREF: 9120909 9120919

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC325

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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
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SYSTEM PRS NSC **INT**

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 Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Jon Howe			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>AWD 12/11</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>WEM</u>	<u>N/12</u>

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP **Skinner** **Other** _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Memo of Notification - DC
mtg on Yugoslavia - Dec 13*

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THE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 25

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN ^{12/11}
 (Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NOTIFICATION W/ BACKGROUND PAPER & AGENDA

DOR DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA ON 13 DEC

LOG #

20903

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	PEARSON	EXEC SEC	
DEFENSE	JOHN A. DUBIA	EXEC SEC	
CIA	JAMES R. PITTMANN	EXEC SEC	
JCS	GEORGE L. SUMRALL	EXEC SEC	

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WASHINGTON, DC 20500

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<u>12 Dec</u>	<u>0630</u>	<u>Jay/H. Brown</u>
COPY: 1 _____		

PEARSON, W
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
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DATE

TIME

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12 Dec

0630

Larry Branscum

COPY: 1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	2/2/2010	OA/ID Number:	90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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20903

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BG JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]


Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (S)

The NSC Deputies Committee will meet on Friday, December 13, 1:00 - 2:00 pm in the Situation Room. The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss Yugoslavia. Attendance will be principal plus one. Attached are background papers and an agenda for the meeting.

(S)


William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

cc: Andrew Card

Attachments

Tab A Background Paper
Tab B Agenda
Tab C CIA Analyses of Recognition
Tab D CIA Analysis of an Oil Embargo

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 2/2/00

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Background Paper

The current cease-fire for Yugoslavia has not proven any more durable than its predecessors. Although the Croats have generally proceeded with deblocking JNA casernes and the latter's withdrawal from these deblocked casernes is almost complete, the violence and shelling go on. Irregular forces on both sides continue to operate and the ICRC estimates approximately 300,000 displaced persons to be in Slovenia and Croatia. (Ø)

After a week in Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance has returned to New York for consultations with the UNSYG. Current conditions do not favor the introduction of peacekeeping forces. In The Hague, Lord Carrington has reopened discussions with representatives from the six republics. On Sunday, the Arbitration Commission set up by Carrington found that Yugoslavia was dissolving and that the question of inherited legitimacy remains an issue for the Republics to resolve. (Ø)

For the members of the EC who have just concluded their meeting in Maastricht, the issue of recognition for one or more of the Republics confronts them squarely. The Germans have clearly stated their intent to proceed with recognition of Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas with or without EC consensus (unless there is a breakthrough in the Vance mission or Hague process, in which case they would probably hold off). Both Vance and Carrington have spoken out against recognition, claiming that it undermines their efforts; neither of them are prepared to throw in the towel. But the Summit at Maastricht, the special EC ministerial on December 16, and the German's Christmas deadline represent markers against which the Europeans will measure Vance and Carrington's success. So strong is the German pressure that the EC will likely find a formula to permit members to recognize before the new year rather than risk straining the union agreements achieved in Maastricht. (Ø)

Recognition may be an ill-advised strategy. It is not at all clear that it addresses any root cause of the conflict. Moreover, the newly recognized republics -- Croatia, in particular -- will no doubt follow recognition with an immediate request for arms and munitions to mount a more capable stand against the JNA. States that recognize Croatia, particularly Germany, Austria, and Italy may find it difficult to resist calls for aid just as they could not resist calls to recognize. If the warring parties have access to arms in this way, the violence could extend indefinitely. (Ø)

Although success seems unlikely, we can still attempt to forestall recognition. Capitalizing on Vance and Carrington's rejection of the calls to recognize, we could take a more active role to encourage their mediation efforts. In Carrington's view, the belligerents are anxious to get peacekeepers on the ground. We may be able to exploit this desire to get the kind of cease-fire that would be the stable basis from which to pursue talks. We would ask our European allies to withhold recognition until a

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true breakthrough were achieved or until it had become clear from Vance and Carrington that these processes were futile. We have outlined our own criteria we believe necessary for a successful peacekeeping operation, but with a strategy of active support, if Vance accepts conditions to support peacekeepers, we should endorse that decision with a complement of logistical, communications and intelligence support. Thus, by being more active in our political support and making more clear our readiness to support peacekeeping operations, our efforts may give the Vance effort more life plus have the added effect of putting off recognition. (Ø)

The failure of the Vance and Carrington missions may cast the issue of recognition in a different light; if recognition is followed by offers of military aid to the recognized republics, a wider war will likely result. On the other hand, recognition may create greater negotiating flexibility for Croatia. Unable to recapture its lost territory, it may agree to settle for some losses, backed up by the international assurance of sovereignty. Other tradeoffs exist; the CIA analyses at Tab C explore more fully the advantages and disadvantages of recognition in the absence of a breakthrough in the negotiation process. (Ø)

Realistically, it would be very difficult for the U.S. to resuscitate the Vance effort to the point that it would appear so promising that the Europeans would hold off on recognition. We should therefore consider a strategy of applying more pressure on the belligerents. The most significant step would be an oil embargo. We would want to design the embargo to achieve maximum pressure and impact on the JNA while minimizing the effects on innocent Republics and peoples. The CIA analysis at Tab D explores this option which we would want to pursue in the right forum. CSCE is preferable to the UN, but we would have to find a way around the consensus rule. Bypassing Yugoslavia would be difficult but not impossible because of the lack of legitimacy and authority of Federal representatives and institutions. If CSCE proves too difficult, we could promote this option as a voluntary regime, ungoverned by any international organization. However, anything less than a complete oil embargo may damage the general populace without effectively reaching the JNA. (Ø)

If we cannot forestall recognition through either or both of these techniques, we face at least four options: recognize some or all of the republics using the formula worked out by the EC to permit its members to recognize; establish our own formula of "earned recognition" based on the Baker 5 points, such as we have used with Ukraine; tie our own recognition to the Vance and Carrington missions, irrespective of what the Europeans do, until these missions clearly fail; or stonewall on the issue -- even if we cannot persuade the Europeans to buy an alternative approach and even if the Vance and Carrington missions fail, we could still adhere to a non-recognition policy, although pressure to recognize would become extreme. An increase in our humanitarian assistance may help to alleviate this pressure. (Ø)

A final issue remains regarding the linkage between U.S. and EC policy on Yugoslavia. As this crisis has unfolded, the U.S. has stayed in close step with the EC. We have already put some distance between ourselves and the EC by not imposing selective sanctions. If movement in step with the EC is desirable, we can narrow this gap with a decision to follow suit and lift sanctions against 'innocent republics.' If we do not, a different policy on recognition -- such as delay -- would put further distance between our positions. (Ø)

Questions for Discussion and Decision: (Ø)

1. Is there more we can do to support and improve prospects for the Vance effort on its own merits and as a way to defer recognition of the republics?
2. Assuming no progress on peacekeeping or peacemaking is made, should we propose an oil embargo to starve the JNA and punish Serbia. If so, what would the approach be? Should we adopt selective sanctions and/or a full trade embargo as interim steps?
3. If neither of these measures lets us stave off European recognition, what should we do? Should we urge the Europeans to attach conditions to recognition? If we proceed to recognize, what would our own conditions be?

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 13, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:00pm

YUGOSLAVIA

Agenda

- I. Opening Statement and Introduction.....Admiral Howe
- II. Discussion and Agency Comments on Questions
Contained in Background Paper All Participants
- III. Summary.....Admiral Howe

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 2/2/10

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Report	Re: Report (3 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By EL on 5/21/15

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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

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Directorate of Intelligence
11 December 1991



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1.4(c); (b)(3)

Yugoslavia: Implications of International Recognition

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Summary

At least some EC and other European states--led by Germany--are likely to recognize Slovenia and Croatia within the next few weeks. Depending on how and by whom recognition is extended, we believe this move need not hinder a settlement of the conflict between Serbia and Croatia over Serb-populated areas of Croatia. Recognition nonetheless probably would increase the prospects for near-term violence in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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PER E.O. 13526
2012-0089-MR
Eg 2/25/14

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

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Western Europe Grudgingly Moving Toward Recognition

German pressure and perceived Serbian intransigence are pushing reluctant West European governments toward recognition of Croatia and Slovenia later this month. Final action will reportedly not be taken until a special EC foreign ministers meeting in mid-December, but at that time members opposing recognition are likely to face unpalatable alternatives: either an open split in the Community only days after proclaiming commitment to European political unity, or perceptions of following a German lead in according recognition. [REDACTED] 1.4(c); (b)(3)

The ongoing recognition debate is also increasing calls for greater US involvement. Several West European governments have indicated that only US pressure offers a slim chance that Kohl might agree to delay his self-imposed Christmas deadline for recognition. And if recognition does take place, Germany and other West European allies may look for more direct US engagement. Bonn probably calculates that the threat that recognition will transform a civil war into an international conflict will force the Serbs to accept a settlement largely within previous borders or at least limit their ambitions to areas already under Serbian control. If Belgrade calls the German bluff, however, neither Bonn nor its partners will offer the Slovenes or Croats military aid without a UN Security Council endorsement and participation in enforcing a cease-fire. [REDACTED] 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Will Serbs Respond With New Attacks?

Serbian leaders are probably resigned to Slovenia and Croatia gaining recognition. We believe the Serbian reaction is likely to be relatively mild if a large number of states recognize Croatia, emphasize the need for Croatia to protect minority rights, and make no explicit commitments to alter the de facto Serb control over Serb-majority areas in Croatia. Serbia--and Serb forces--are more likely to launch new attacks, however, if only Germany and a few other states extend recognition and appear committed to helping Croatia roll back Serb control of Serb-majority areas. [REDACTED] 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Will Recognition Make Zagreb More Obstinate?

Recognition--provided Croatians are not convinced that they will receive military assistance to roll back Serb gains--could strengthen Tudjman's hand vis-a-vis hardliners. This would facilitate compromises that might enable agreement with Serbia on terms for a UN peacekeeping force. Tudjman no doubt realizes that, even if Croatia is recognized, it would have difficulty obtaining financial assistance and weapons if it is viewed as obstinate. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Tudjman has been on the defensive against hardliners in part because his moderation has not yet produced the promised recognition from the West. With cover from the EC, Tudjman also may be more able to work out a deal with Serbia over the disputed Serb-populated enclaves. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Conflict and Tension Likely to Spread South

Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, combined with Macedonia's pursuit of similar recognition, probably will convince Muslim and Croat factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina to seek independence rather than to remain part of "Serboslavia." Serbs in Bosnia, who already have formed five autonomous provinces, will resist such a move and may attempt to secede. Because of the quilt-like ethnic mix in the republic, serious violence is a near certainty. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

No Easy--Or Bloodless--Answers

Continued refusal to grant recognition to Croatia might postpone the day of reckoning in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it could lead to heightened violence in Croatia. Croatian hardliners could gain the upper hand in demanding a more aggressive posture against remaining Army forces in the republic. Serbia also would have less incentive to negotiate a settlement with Croatia. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05e. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By EL on 5/21/15

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

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
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Directorate of Intelligence
10 December 1991



The Yugoslav Crisis: Where Does It Go From Here?

Summary

Germany and several other European countries are poised to extend diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia within the next few weeks. Depending on how recognition is qualified, this development could trigger either an intensification of the conflict or movement toward a political solution, although it would almost certainly be an imperfect one. In any event, the movement towards recognition has the potential to transform the Yugoslav crisis into one with ramifications going well beyond the Balkans to touch on broader European issues. These include relationships within European institutions, between a powerful Germany and its often anxious partners, and between the United States and its European allies. Although the Europeans and the Yugoslav actors want to remain the arbiters of their own fate, most still look to the US to play an essential balancing and stabilizing role in Europe. If the US was not engaged, particularly in UN-sponsored actions flowing from recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, some US interests in Europe could be jeopardized. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2012-0089-MR
EJ 8/25/14

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Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany and several other European countries now appears almost inevitable in the next few weeks. The impact of this development on the conflict between Serbia and Croatia is likely to depend on the terms under which recognition is extended and whether recognition is perceived by the warring parties as a step towards a possible settlement.

- We believe a scenario in which only Germany and a few other states moved to extend recognition, or one in which recognition was linked to a commitment to support the restoration of Croatia's old borders, would be most likely to trigger a Serbian military response against Croatia.
- Similarly, recognition linked to hints or promises of military assistance would be likely to make the embattled Tadjman government in Croatia less open or able to compromise and to prolong the fighting.
- If these conditions can be avoided, diplomatic recognition could strengthen Tadjman against more radical domestic opponents and pave the way for a political and territorial compromise with Serbia.
- Tadjman has been vulnerable to criticism that his relatively restrained conduct of the war has gained Croatia nothing in foreign capitals and cost it heavily on the battlefield. Recognition would be the first tangible fruit of that policy.
- We have ample evidence that Tadjman is willing to consider writing off Serb majority territory in return for political guarantees and possible territorial compensation elsewhere.
- Consideration of referenda allowing local inhabitants to express their wishes would be one way of leaving this possibility open. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe Serbian leader Milosevic would consider the consequences carefully before escalating the conflict. His goal is a Greater Serbia, not the total annihilation of Croatia. He would have to consider whether an intensification of the fighting would leave him closer or farther from that goal.

- He probably would intensify the fighting if he thought the recognizing powers intended to force a humiliating retreat on him. If convinced this was not the case, we believe Milosevic is likely to try to preempt foreign intervention by moving toward a political settlement. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe the main complication arising from diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is the difficulty of insulating Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia from the process. Diplomatic recognition of these two republics--which will be difficult to avoid once the precedent has been set--will set the stage for serious violence in areas hitherto free of significant conflict.

- Multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbs have already made it clear that they will not accept the rule of a government dominated by Bosnia's Slavic Muslim plurality. Bosnian Croats, meanwhile, almost certainly will opt for union with an independent Croatia.
- This will leave three heavily armed, antagonistic, and intermingled populations facing the problem of how to separate themselves without violence. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

The odds of avoiding violence in Macedonia, which has only a miniscule Serbian minority, are better. If it erupts, however, the consequences are potentially much more serious. If independence triggered a Serbian effort to reassert its political control through force, it would risk a spillover of the conflict into Albania and Bulgaria.

- Most Bulgarians regard Macedonians as their ethnic kin, and the Bulgarian Government--although not keen on a confrontation with Serbia--would find it difficult to seal its borders and prevent volunteers and material assistance from crossing over.
- Albanians, whose countrymen make up more than twenty percent of Macedonia's population, would face the same dilemma. Moreover, any conflict pitting Serbs against Albanians in Macedonia would almost certainly spill over into Kosovo. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Risks for the United States

The United States is likely to find it difficult--if not impossible--to stand aside from the situation. The best case outcome of diplomatic recognition would be quick movement toward a workable cease-fire monitored by UN peacekeepers and parallel movement toward a political settlement between Serbia and Croatia.

- This would confront the United States with the obligation to bear a major share of the financial and logistical burden of maintaining a UN force, a burden that is likely to be both significant and prolonged.

- Given the historical and ethnic complexities of the region, it is probably unreasonable to expect any political "solution" to be more than a bandaid capable of keeping violence at a low level. 1.4(c), (b)(3)

If the US was not engaged in UN-sponsored actions, we believe this could risk damage to US influence in Europe. The Europeans would be likely to increasingly question the desire and ability of the United States to play a stabilizing role in Europe. Over time this could even be a factor eroding the European conviction that a US military presence is needed. 1.4(c), (b)(3)

The worst case outcome--an intensification and widening of the conflict--could have much more serious consequences for the United States. The most dangerous scenario would come about if a peacekeeping force were to become embroiled in hostilities in its efforts to separate Yugoslav combatants. In this case, it almost certainly would look to the US for support; for example, to use the aircraft of the Sixth Fleet to interdict JNA air and naval forces. 1.4(c), (b)(3)

Even if it did not come to this, larger interests than the United States' limited direct stake in the Balkans could be at risk. A European entanglement in the Yugoslav crisis without the participation of the United States, in addition to sparking a debate over the post-Cold War role of the United States in Europe, could work against European political cohesion. There are already some signs of incipient political discord:

- Of the countries of the European Community, Germany, Italy, and Greece are already heavily involved in the Balkan crisis, the first two favoring Croatia and the latter leaning toward Serbia. 1.4(c), (b)(3)

1.4(c), (b)(3)

An intensification of the conflict would put these differences into bolder relief, especially since Germany's constitutional prohibition against dispatching troops abroad would insulate it from the military costs of a peacekeeping operation. At the very least, these differences would make more difficult the halting progress towards European political unity. At worst, they could breathe new life into some of Europe's old rivalries, particularly if Germany isolated itself from its principal European partners or--more likely--managed simply to dominate EC policy.

1.4(c), (b)(3)

- Historical links and strong pro-Croatian and pro-Slovenian sentiment in the country could open up a wider gap between Germany and its principal allies if the Yugoslav conflict widens.
- Some Europeans see Germany's policies as an unwelcome revival of the bad old ideas of national solutions to European problems. We believe it would be inimical to both US and European interests if the habit of unilateralism were to be resurrected in Europe. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

We believe it significant that several European governments have made it clear that they look to Washington to influence Bonn. While we believe it unlikely that broader US engagement can deter German recognition of Croatia, it would reassure other EC states.

- US leverage over Germany would increase if Bonn believed that at some point Washington would be willing to throw its weight onto the scales to force a solution, even of the temporary variety. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In sum, the impulse toward recognition of the breakaway republics is transforming the Yugoslav problem into one which has implications not only for the Balkans, but for broader relationships in Europe. As the situation evolves, the responses of the United States will clearly take on greater importance than heretofore, even though the Germans, other Europeans, and the Yugoslav actors themselves will want to remain the major arbiters of the outcome. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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05f. Report	Re: Report (5 pp.)	12/10/91	(b)(1)	S

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(Copy of Document Follows)
 By ek on 5/21/15

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.03)
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
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Directorate of Intelligence
10 December 1991



Yugoslavia: Impact of an Oil Embargo

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Summary

Of the various economic levers available to the West, an oil embargo has probably the best chance for pressuring Serbia and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to consider a political settlement. Prior to the beginning of fighting in June, Serbia received over 80 percent of its oil supplies from imports through the Croatian port of Rijeka, via the Adria pipeline. Both have been cut off from Belgrade since mid-September. The JNA almost certainly has priority access to available oil supplies and will be the last to feel the impact of fuel shortages. Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, is likely to feel the effects of an oil embargo most acutely. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

In the Yugoslav case, the key factor in implementing an effective oil embargo is Serbia's ability to transport oil into the republic. In this regard, principal pressure points are Greece and Romania, which currently account for the bulk of what oil supplies are flowing into Serbia and neighboring Yugoslav republics. Greek support probably will be a relatively low-cost item: approximately \$15 million in compensation for revenues lost from transshipment fees. This would be in addition to whatever amount Athens requests as compensation for supporting EC trade sanctions

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-0089-MR
SCS 2/25/14

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

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1.4(c); (b)(3)

against Serbia and Montenegro. The EC could probably secure Romanian cooperation by tying the oil issue to progress on an association agreement with the Community. The EC has other leverage it could use against Romania if needed, including withholding \$250 million in proposed balance of payments support, or offering to purchase the oil destined for Yugoslavia. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Already Looking for Alternatives

Federal officials have indicated that, as a result of the loss of facilities in Croatia, Belgrade is trying to double the volume of refined products imported this year from one to two million tons (40,000 barrels per day). Such a level would cover less than half of Serbia's normal petroleum needs of approximately 90,000 b/d. The share drops to less than one-third if adding in an additional 40,000 b/d to cover pre-war requirements of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro (see tables for more detailed data on Yugoslav energy consumption). 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Currently, Serbia apparently is bringing oil supplies primarily from two external sources as well as drawing on limited domestic production. Under optimal circumstances, these various routes could cover Serbia's needs, but would leave little if any for the other republics.

- One external route involves rail transport from the Greek port of Thessaloniki to the refinery at Skopje, capital of Macedonia. Capacity of this route is approximately 40,000 b/d, according to official Greek data.
- Another external route requires rail and river barge up the Danube through Romania, terminating at the Serbian refineries of Pancevo and Novi Sad. Capacity of this route is approximately 22,000 b/d, according to federal officials.
- Almost 22,000 b/d are available from domestic oilfields in the autonomous province of Vojvodina, 1.4(c); (b)(3)
- 1.4(c); (b)(3) nearly 7,000 b/d can be brought by rail/road combination from the industrial port of Bar in Montenegro. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Utilizing these various alternatives has already generated significant problems for Belgrade, however. As a result, the two refineries in Serbia have been periodically shut down since early September, and the Macedonian facility has operated only sporadically.

- Bottlenecks reportedly have appeared in offloading crude from tankers in Romania and transshipping onto barges for transit up the Danube. Barges also are in short supply. Moreover, the Serbians have encountered problems getting barges past the giant Djerdap dam on the river.
- The Greek route is suffering from a shortage of tanker trucks and railcars. [REDACTED] since the closure of the Adria pipeline, only one shipment of crude--120,000 tons--has reached Yugoslavia from Greece. [REDACTED]

Who Is Feeling the Squeeze?

[REDACTED] the JNA traditionally kept its oil reserves at about 75 to 80 percent of its capacity of 18 million barrels. The JNA has not been conducting operations in a manner indicating a concern about serious fuel shortages, however, and we assume that the military has first priority on all fuel supplies. [REDACTED]

The civilian sector is feeling the oil squeeze considerably more than the JNA. [REDACTED] Serbians are experiencing six-hour lines at local gas stations. Even drivers of commercial vehicles previously able to procure supplies through private channels are experiencing shortages. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is even more acute. The republic is at the end of the current "pipeline" and has no access to direct sources of supplies. [REDACTED] severe shortages of gasoline and heating oil in the republic's ethnic Muslim regions, [REDACTED] industrial production has almost entirely shut down due to a lack of fuel. [REDACTED]

Getting the Neighbors on Board

Unlike most international oil embargoes, one targeted against Serbia does not require getting producers on board. Instead, Belgrade's vulnerability is its limited ability to develop viable alternatives for bringing oil into the country. Any effort to cut off Serbian access to world oil supplies will have Athens and Bucharest as key players. A cutoff of the Greek and Romanian routes would leave Belgrade with the Montenegrin port of Bar, whose capacity would cover less than 10 percent of Serbia's needs. [REDACTED]

Athens, despite its proclaimed affinity for Serbia in the ongoing conflict, has indicated in the past that its main opposition to an oil blockade is lost revenue from oil shipments. [REDACTED] they would lose approximately \$15 million in transshipment fees, a figure that looks plausible based on official Greek data. This amount would be in addition to whatever Athens claims as compensation for honoring EC trade sanctions already in effect against Serbia and Montenegro. [REDACTED]

Bucharest also would almost certainly insist on reimbursement for what it receives from Belgrade for shipping oil up the Danube. To keep the Romanians from "bowing to temptation," the EC could agree to pay for the oil now going to Yugoslavia, and allow Romania to keep the shipments to meet its own desperate energy needs. The EC could also use as leverage Romania's ardent desire for an association agreement. The Community could also threaten to withhold \$250 million in proposed balance of payments support. [REDACTED]

Ramifications of an Oil Embargo

An oil embargo against Serbia would have both positive and negative implications as a pressure point to bring Belgrade to the negotiating table.


- A cut-off of fuel would have obvious implications for the JNA's ability to conduct any kind of a mobile campaign, particularly if the JNA undertakes operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo. The loss of aviation fuel would also deprive Belgrade of a key weapon against Croatia--uncontested air superiority.
- The realization that Serbs could be facing a winter with severe fuel shortages might be the catalyst that would generate a groundswell movement to remove Milosevic. In the short run, however, Milosevic--a proven manipulator of Serbian xenophobia--almost certainly would use the embargo to try to garner additional popular support. He also probably will try to divert fuel from the military to civilian consumers if the domestic situation deteriorates rapidly. [REDACTED]

On the negative side, an embargo would adversely affect two other republics that so far have tried to sit out the current conflict.

- An embargo would accelerate the already severe economic decline underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina, possibly triggering a violent breakup of the republic.
- Loss of the Greek oil route would deprive Macedonia, one of Yugoslavia's poorest republics, without oil and a source of income. On

the other hand, should the West exempt Macedonia from the embargo and allow oil deliveries to the refinery, Belgrade almost certainly would launch a military strike to seize the facility. 1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)



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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05g. Map	Re: Map (1 pp.)	12/1991	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 9/15/15

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.04)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


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
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Yugoslav Oil Infrastructure, December 1991



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2012-0089-MR
SCS 2/25/14

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05h. Tables	Re: Energy Situation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1); (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 325 - December 13, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Declassified

(Document Follows)

By EL on 5/21/15

Date Closed: 2/2/2010	OA/ID Number: 90021-013
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: dup 2010-2885-MR (500.05)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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(b)(3)

Yugoslav Energy Situation, 1990 and 1991 by Quarter

Table 1:

Crude Oil (including condensate) Imports by Country of Origin, 1990

<u>Country</u>	<u>b/d</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total	239,916	100
USSR	121,658	51
Iraq#	37,012	15
Libya	27,601	12
Angola	25,434	11
United Kingdom	12,150	5
Saudi Arabia	5,585	2
Egypt	4,578	2
Norway	4,335	2
United States	1,530	1
Liberia	34	NEGL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262012-0089-MR
EJ 2/25/14Table 2:

Natural Gas Imports by Country of Origin, 1990

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total	100
USSR	97
United States	2
Hungary	1

Table 3:Energy Imports by Republic, 1 January-31 July, 1991
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Coal and Coke</u>	<u>Crude Oil</u>	<u>Petroleum Products</u>
Total	NA	190,217	32,102
Bosnia-			
Hercegovina	5,893	15,921	3,277
Montenegro	NA	0	3,876
Croatia	11,210	61,077	7,118
Macedonia	NA	14,635	2,326
Slovenia	NA	16,338	6,625
Serbia	NA	82,247	8,880

In 1991, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries have replaced oil imports from Iraq.

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

Table 4:Consumption of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	1,009,850	451,430	302,820	125,800	129,800
1991/I	941,320	418,840	257,440	101,940	163,100
1991/II	932,160	340,680	250,770	134,100	206,610

Table 5:Production of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	649,240	406,790	62,900	47,810	131,740
1991/I	680,850	404,530	58,560	52,730	165,030
1991/II	635,300	323,760	58,400	44,360	208,780

Table 6:Imports of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	402,380	49,640	259,920	77,990	14,830
1991/I	302,100	19,310	218,880	49,210	14,700
1991/II	337,010	21,920	212,370	89,740	12,980

Table 7:Exports of Primary Energy
(b/d oil equivalent)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Coal</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Gas</u>	<u>Electricity</u>
1990*	41,770	5,000	20,000	0	16,770
1991/I	41,630	5,000	20,000	0	16,630
1991/II	40,150	5,000	20,000	0	15,150

These Tables are

(b)(3)

* Data for 1990 are quarterly averages.

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20903

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

December 11, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH:

DAVID GOMPERT

FROM:

JANE E. HOLLY

SUBJECT:

DC Meeting on Yugoslavia on Friday, December 13,
at 1pm

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the agencies transmitting a background paper for the DC meeting on Yugoslavia scheduled for December 13, 1991, at 1pm in the Situation Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agencies

Tab A Agenda

Tab B CIA Analyses of Recognition

Tab C CIA Analysis of an Oil Embargo

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By caP NARA, Date 2/2/10

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20903

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BG JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES R. PITTMAN
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Background Paper for the Deputies Committee
Meeting on Yugoslavia (8)

The current cease-fire for Yugoslavia has not proven any more durable than its predecessors. Although the Croats have generally proceeded with deblocking JNA casernes and the latter's withdrawal from these deblocked casernes is almost complete, the violence and shelling go on. Irregular forces on both sides continue to operate and the ICRC estimates approximately 300,000 displaced persons to be in Slovenia and Croatia. (C)

After a week in Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance has returned to New York for consultations with the UNSYG. Current conditions do not favor the introduction of peacekeeping forces. In The Hague, Lord Carrington has reopened discussions with representatives from the six republics. On Sunday, the Arbitration Commission set up by Carrington found that Yugoslavia was dissolving and that the question of inherited legitimacy remains an issue for the Republics to resolve. (C)

For the members of the EC who have just concluded their meeting in Maastricht, the issue of recognition for one or more of the Republics confronts them squarely. The Germans have clearly stated their intent to proceed with recognition of Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas with or without EC consensus (unless there is a breakthrough in the Vance mission or Hague process, in

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which case they would probably hold off). Both Vance and Carrington have spoken out against recognition, claiming that it undermines their efforts; neither of them are prepared to throw in the towel. But the Summit at Maastricht, the special EC ministerial on December 16, and the German's Christmas deadline represent markers against which the Europeans will measure Vance and Carrington's success. So strong is the German pressure that the EC will likely find a formula to permit members to recognize before the new year rather than risk straining the union agreements achieved in Maastricht. (Ø)

Recognition may be an ill-advised strategy. It is not at all clear that it addresses any root cause of the conflict. Moreover, the newly recognized republics -- Croatia, in particular -- will no doubt follow recognition with an immediate request for arms and munitions to mount a more capable stand against the JNA. States that recognize Croatia, particularly Germany, Austria, and Italy may find it difficult to resist calls for aid just as they could not resist calls to recognize. If the warring parties have access to arms in this way, the violence could extend indefinitely. (Ø)

Although success seems unlikely, we can still attempt to forestall recognition. Capitalizing on Vance and Carrington's rejection of the calls to recognize, we could take a more active role to encourage their mediation efforts. In Carrington's view, the belligerents are anxious to get peacekeepers on the ground. We may be able to exploit this desire to get the kind of cease-fire that would be the stable basis from which to pursue talks. We would ask our European allies to withhold recognition until a true breakthrough were achieved or until it had become clear from Vance and Carrington that these processes were futile. We have outlined our own criteria we believe necessary for a successful peacekeeping operation, but with a strategy of active support, if Vance accepts conditions to support peacekeepers, we should endorse that decision with a complement of logistical, communications and intelligence support. Thus, by being more active in our political support and making more clear our readiness to support peacekeeping operations, our efforts may give the Vance effort more life plus have the added effect of putting off recognition. (Ø)

The failure of the Vance and Carrington missions may cast the issue of recognition in a different light; if recognition is followed by offers of military aid to the recognized republics, a wider war will likely result. On the other hand, recognition may create greater negotiating flexibility for Croatia. Unable to recapture its lost territory, it may agree to settle for some losses, backed up by the international assurance of sovereignty. Other tradeoffs exist; the CIA analyses at Tab B explore more fully the advantages and disadvantages of recognition in the absence of a breakthrough in the negotiation process. (Ø)

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Realistically, it would be very difficult for the U.S. to resuscitate the Vance effort to the point that it would appear so promising that the Europeans would hold off on recognition. We should therefore consider a strategy of applying more pressure on the belligerents. The most significant step would be an oil embargo. We would want to design the embargo to achieve maximum pressure and impact on the JNA while minimizing the effects on innocent Republics and peoples. The CIA analysis at Tab C explores this option which we would want to pursue in the right forum. CSCE is preferable to the UN, but we would have to find a way around the consensus rule. Bypassing Yugoslavia would be difficult but not impossible because of the lack of legitimacy and authority of Federal representatives and institutions. If CSCE proves too difficult, we could promote this option as a voluntary regime, ungoverned by any international organization. However, anything less than a complete oil embargo may damage the general populace without effectively reaching the JNA. (S)

If we cannot forestall recognition through either or both of these techniques, we face at least four options: recognize some or all of the republics using the formula worked out by the EC to permit its members to recognize; establish our own formula of "earned recognition" based on the Baker 5 points, such as we have used with Ukraine; tie our own recognition to the Vance and Carrington missions, irrespective of what the Europeans do, until these missions clearly fail; or stonewall on the issue -- even if we cannot persuade the Europeans to buy an alternative approach and even if the Vance and Carrington missions fail, we could still adhere to a non-recognition policy, although pressure to recognize would become extreme. An increase in our humanitarian assistance may help to alleviate this pressure. (C)

A final issue remains regarding the linkage between U.S. and EC policy on Yugoslavia. As this crisis has unfolded, the U.S. has stayed in close step with the EC. We have already put some distance between ourselves and the EC by not imposing selective sanctions. If movement in step with the EC is desirable, we can narrow this gap with a decision to follow suit and lift sanctions against 'innocent republics.' If we do not, a different policy on recognition -- such as delay -- would put further distance between our positions. (C)

Questions for Discussion and Decision: (C)

1. Is there more we can do to support and improve prospects for the Vance effort on its own merits and as a way to defer recognition of the republics?
2. Assuming no progress on peacekeeping or peacemaking is made, should we propose an oil embargo to starve the JNA and punish Serbia. If so, what would the approach be? Should we adopt selective sanctions and/or a full trade embargo as interim steps?

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3. If neither of these measures lets us stave off European recognition, what should we do? Should we urge the Europeans to attach conditions to recognition? If we proceed to recognize, what would our own conditions be?

William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B CIA Analyses of Recognition
Tab C CIA Analysis of an Oil Embargo

cc: Andrew Card

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