

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

FOIA Number:
2005-1002-F

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90020
Folder ID Number: 90020-034

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 312 - September 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Request	Re: Request for Appointments [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
02a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Report	Re: Yugoslavia Strategy for Consideration by the 9/18/91 DC (2 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(1)	S
03a. Distribution List	Re: DC Meeting Re Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/21/91	(b)(3)	
03b. Distribution List	Re: DC Meeting Re Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/21/91	(b)(3)	
03c. Distribution List	Re: DC Meeting Re Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/21/91	(b)(3)	
03d. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting - Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/21/91	(b)(3)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

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Office: National Security Council

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 312 - September 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Pinksheet Number: cap1618

OA/ID Number: 90020-034

Date Closed: 1/27/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03e. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/12/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
03f. Draft Summary	Re: [Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee] Page 2 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04. List	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(3)	
05a. List	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(3)	
05b. Report	Re: Yugoslavia Strategy for Consideration by the 9/18/91 DC (2 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (1 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(1)	S
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Date Closed:	1/27/2010	OA/ID Number:	90020-034
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on September 18, 19 91
for Robert M. Gates of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

STATE

Lawrence Eagleburger 8/1/30
Thomas Niles 9/22/39
Warren Zimmerman 11/14/34

DOD

J. D. Crouch 1/7/58
Darrel S. Johnson 12/24/37

JCS

David Jeremiah 2/25/34
David Hale 10/26/45

(b)(6)

CIA

~~Richard Kerr 10/4/35~~

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

Drivers:

Lee Young 3/17/47

Donald Wilson 9/29/55

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Room No. Sit Rm.

Time of Meeting 3:00 pm

Requested by Cathy Millison
Gd Flr

Room No. WW Telephone 6534

Date of request 9/18/91

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

SSF 2037 (03-81)

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

DC312

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE
REC CLASS: SECRET

RECORD ID: 9120719
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 91 14

TO: GATES

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 18 SEP 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
DC

EC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP PAPER FOR 18 SEP DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: OBE PER RECORDS MANAGEMENT

DUE DATE: 21 SEP 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF: 9120720 9120903

FILES: IFM C

NSCP: DC312

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 11/26/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9120719

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES
001

Z 91091814 FOR INFORMATION
X 92051214 OBE PER RECORDS MANAGEMENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 11/26/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20719

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

September 18, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *RW*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RW*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia

Attached is a paper we drafted on the basis of an interagency meeting we held yesterday. It argues for a somewhat more assertive U.S. approach as the best way of heading off a rush to recognition. It does not suggest our getting out front of the Europeans but rather of throwing our weight behind EC-led efforts lest they collapse and we be left holding the bag.

At Assistant Secretary level, there is general interagency support for this approach, although OSD and JSC are somewhat reluctant. We believe that earlier reservations about a visible U.S. posture have been overtaken (or soon will be) by the specter of a failed EC effort and much greater bloodshed.

We suggest that you circulate the paper at the beginning of the meeting and give Deputies time to read it. You might then turn to John Helgerson for an update and then to Warren Zimmermann for his assessment of where we are. Then we suggest you seek views on the basic approach -- a more assertive U.S. role in support of European efforts, coupled with stronger pressure on the Serbs -- and review the several elements of the strategy.

If there is broad agreement on the approach, State can take the lead in developing a plan for implementing it.

Attachment

Tab I Strategy Paper on Yugoslavia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2884-MR
SCS 12/17/13

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

2010-2884-112
25 017113

YUGOSLAVIA

Strategy for Consideration by the 9/18/91 DC

With the collapse of the latest EC-brokered cease-fire, European, Yugoslav, and Congressional attention will turn to us to see what we are prepared to do. This will come at the same time that the level of violence may become too much for U.S. and European publics to accept passively. There will especially be pressure to do something to assist the Croats, whose contribution to the crisis will be overshadowed by the fact that war is being waged on its territory with disproportionate force.

There are two models for the international response to Croatia's call for help: a recognition strategy and an isolation strategy.

Recognition Strategy. Absent a stronger U.S. role, the EC may agree with Carrington that this was the last chance and that there is nothing more to be done for now. The Germans, Italians, and others may argue that the time has come to recognize Croatian independence, as Chancellor Kohl warned the President on Monday.

Recognition would lead predictably to an escalation and extension of violence. Serbs and Croats would both escalate the conflict, the Serbs to grab territory and the Croats to bring in Western countries to their rescue. Violence would also spread to other parts of Yugoslavia, beginning with Bosnia and the Kosovo, and would inevitably involve neighboring countries. We could then be confronted with a general destabilization in the Balkans, as well as pressures to help defend newly recognized Croatia. Beyond the escalation that it could trigger, recognition would preclude an outcome involving Croatia in a loose confederation, which may be the only way to avoid endless conflict over the Serbian minority.

Isolation Strategy. The best way of heading off a premature rush to recognition is through an energetic strategy of isolating the Serbian leadership and the JNA, exerting maximum pressure on them to agree to an internationally supervised cease-fire and process of negotiation. Even if this approach does not bring them around in the near term, as it probably will not, it will mute the pressure for recognition, reduce the chances of much greater violence, and improve the prospects for resolving the conflict over the medium-term. The elements of the strategy are already in place, and the EC should remain in the lead. Success, however, will require a more assertive U.S. role in influencing and supporting European efforts, as well as in pressuring Serbia.

Nonrecognition policy. We need to reach agreement with the EC that neither we nor its members will recognize Croatian or Slovene independence. And we should make that clear to the Croats and Slovenes, pressing the latter to continue cooperating with EC-led efforts.

Isolating the Serbian and JNA leaderships. We need to call them to account directly and repeatedly, keeping them in the position of being the only holdouts to a peaceful resolution

of the crisis. We may also want to consider economic sanctions or the threat thereof. Milosevic is not immune to public pressure, and we may be able to erode his support within Serbia and begin altering his risk calculus. Similarly, we can exploit divisions within the JNA by having peacekeepers at the ready, thus removing the JNA's pretexts for intervention in Croatia. We should also propose such measures as a ban on aerial combat: if observed, this would level the playing field for Croatia; if not, it would further isolate the JNA.

Peacekeeping force. A peacekeeping force sufficient to the task needs to be ready to move in promptly if and when the conditions -- notably, ceasefire and JNA consent -- for its entry can be worked out. The very fact of such a force-in-waiting will exert positive leverage on the Serbian and JNA leaderships. We should consult with the EC and in NATO on the necessary composition of such a force, urge the WEU to take the lead in assembling it, push the idea in the CSCE (via NATO consultations), and indicate our readiness to offer logistic, intelligence, or other support.

Supporting the victims of aggression. While unequivocally opposing moves to supply military aid to Croatia, we should help organize humanitarian assistance and selectively lift economic sanctions so that the victims are not penalized. We should approach the EC and agree on specific measures.

Protecting minority rights. We and the EC should stress the international community's concern for the rights of all ethnic minorities, including Serbs in Croatia, and offer international supervision. For example, CSCE could launch a sustained effort to expose abuses and issue recommendations, beginning with a fact-finding mission to each republic. This also helps erode the JNA's pretext for its actions.

Involving other institutions. NATO should consult actively on peacekeeping forces and issue periodic statements. We should begin informal consultations in the UNSC. We should consider a CSCE emergency meeting at Ministerial level.

Third country involvement. We and the EC should go to all the neighboring countries as well as to Moscow, building a consensus around the strategy and urging Yugoslavia's neighbors to keep hands off. Moscow could be helpful by publicly announcing a cutoff of all military supplies.

U.S. envoy. We should consider sending a senior U.S. envoy to align U.S. and European approaches and to tell Milosevic that we intend to isolate and penalize him. That envoy, and possibly senior U.S. military officers, would also tell the JNA of our intentions and appeal to the military to abandon Milosevic.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120720
RECEIVED: 19 SEP 91 15

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 21 SEP 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA
NATO
DC

EC
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 18 SEP DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 23 SEP 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC312

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 1/26/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120720

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES

001

002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91091917 FOR DECISION

X 91092112 GATES APPROVED RECOMS

X 91092112 SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 1/26/10

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: JHM

LOG # 20720

URGENT NOT PROOFED:

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK:

DOCLOG JB A/O

WBR

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u> 1 </u>	<u> K </u>	<u> A </u>
Bill Sittmann	<u> 2 </u>	<u> W </u>	<u> </u>
Bob Gates	<u> 3 </u>	<u> 8 </u>	<u> </u>
Brent Scowcroft	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Bill Sittmann	<u> 4 </u>	<u> </u>	<u> Tab I </u>
Situation Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
West Wing Desk	<u> 5 </u>	<u> WSA 9/21 </u>	<u> X </u>
NSC Secretariat	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

91 SEP 19 19 02

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other

Should be seen by:
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

91 SEP 19 19 02

19 SEP 91 5:44



D
1512 38

P2:38

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: E. John

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2312

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PAGES

3

FROM

WILLIAM F. BITTMANN

WEA m

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA

NSC LOG #: 20720

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DOD

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

JCS

ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH

CIA

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



REMARKS

PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

1/26/10



SEP 21 12:38

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: **IMMEDIATE**
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASED: E. Johns
DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2316 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 3
FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN WEA
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)


MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA

NSC LOG # 20720

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
DOD	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
JCS	ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH		
CIA	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS _____
PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
CAP 1/26/10



12:38

12:38

ROOM

THE SITUATION ROOM

91 23 43

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: E. Johns

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 2316 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 3

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN WEA pr
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA

NSC LOG #: 20720

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>STATE</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>DOD</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
<u>JCS</u>	<u>ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH</u>	_____	_____
<u>CIA</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____	_____
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REMARKS _____

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP 1/26/10

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03a. Distribution List	Re: DC Meeting Re Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/21/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9120720
DATE 21 SEP 91

SUBJECT: DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

JACKSON, K
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
9/23	0400	pe
		COPY: 1

EAGLEBURGER, L
DEPT OF STATE
7TH FLOOR
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
9/23/91	9:20 AM	Anthony Tagli
		COPY: 1

JEREMIAH, D
JOINT CHIEFS STAFF
ROOM 2E860
PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
		L D X 'd
		COPY: 1

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
		L D X 'd
		COPY: 1

CROUCH, J
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY / DOD

Andy Card
WHITE HOUSE

DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
9/23	0400	PC
		Copy 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Distribution List	Re: DC Meeting Re Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/21/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 312 - Septmeber 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	1/27/2010	OA/ID Number:	90020-034
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9120720
DATE 21 SEP 91

SUBJECT: DC MTG RE YUGOSLAVIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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JOINT CHIEFS STAFF
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PENTAGON
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(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting - Yugoslavia [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/21/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 312 - September 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 1/27/2010	OA/ID Number: 90020-034
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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20720

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 21, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH
Vice Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff


MR. LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER
Deputy Secretary of State
Department of State

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]
Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

DR. J.D. CROUCH
Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: DC Meeting - Yugoslavia (U)

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions from the September 18
Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia. (S)


William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

cc: Andrew Card

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 1/26/10

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee [FOIA exemptions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/12/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 312 - Septmeber 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Partially Declassified
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By SCS on 5/29/14

Date Closed: 1/27/2010	OA/ID Number: 90020-034
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2884-MR (501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20720

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: October 12, 1990
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 3:40 p.m.



SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Yugoslavia (§)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office
Karl Jackson

White House
Andrew Card
Robert M. Gates

State
Lawrence Eagleburger
Thomas Niles
Warren Zimmerman

NSC
David Gompert
Robert Hutchings

DOD
J.D. Crouch
Darrell Johnson

JCS
David Jeremiah
David Hale

CIA
John Helgerson
(b)(1); (b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- We should continue our present course of encouraging and supporting EC efforts to broker a cease-fire and a process of negotiation.
- We should also indicate a willingness to be supportive if the Europeans decide to interpose a peacekeeping force when conditions permit (i.e., a cease-fire and consent of the parties) but will defer the question of what concrete support the U.S. would be willing to provide until the Europeans agree among themselves on a force.
- Consultations at NATO are needed before any EC or WEU decision is taken to dispatch peacekeeping forces can be implemented.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2884-MR
SCS 12/17/13

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2

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- The U.S. should continue its policy of not recognizing Slovenian or Croatian independence and should actively discourage others from doing so.
- Publicly, we should hold the Serbian and Yugoslav military leaderships chiefly responsible for escalating bloodshed and violence -- without, however, engaging in empty threats or gestures that may be turned to advantage by those we seek to isolate.
- Together with the EC, we should call on neighboring countries to act with restraint and not to involve themselves in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.
- We should use CSCE mechanisms to support EC-led efforts as well as to exert pressure on the Serbian leadership and the JNA.

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20720

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 19, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: September 18 Deputies Committee Meeting on
Yugoslavia

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions of the September 18 meeting. The Tab I memo from Sittmann transmits it to your agency counterparts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A.

Approve 8 Disapprove _____

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the Tab I memorandum transmitting the Summary to your agency counterparts.

Approve 8 Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memorandum to Agency Counterparts
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (3), September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 1/26/10

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2

- The U.S. should continue its policy of not recognizing Slovenian or Croatian independence and should actively discourage others from doing so.
- Publicly, we should hold the Serbian and Yugoslav military leaderships chiefly responsible for escalating bloodshed and violence -- without, however, engaging in empty threats or gestures that may be turned to advantage by those we seek to isolate.
- Together with the EC, we should call on neighboring countries to act with restraint and not to involve themselves in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.
- We should use CSCE mechanisms to support EC-led efforts as well as to exert pressure on the Serbian leadership and the JNA.
- Cabinet principals should be told that the situation in Yugoslavia is deteriorating dangerously and that EC-led efforts are unlikely to halt the slide to full-scale civil war. The Yugoslav crisis is likely to grow as a policy and political problem for us, including the prospect of a successful forcible change of borders. This might be averted only by a much larger and riskier international involvement than we are now prepared to advocate or become involved in -- but which may be forced onto our agenda in the coming year.

unnecessary

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2884-MR
32 3/15/12

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. List	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 312 - September 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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DC 312

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1991
3:00PM - 4:00PM
SVTS ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Robert M. Gates
Andy Card

OVP

Karl Jackson

STATE

Lawrence Eagleburger
Thomas Niles
Amb. Warren Zimmerman

DOD

J. D. Crouch
Darrel S. Johnson

JCS

David Jeremiah
David Hale

CIA

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

NSC

David Gompert
Bob Hutchings

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. List	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	9/18/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 312 - Septmeber 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1991
3:00PM - 4:00PM
SVTS ROOM

DC 312

WHITE HOUSE

Robert M. Gates
Andy Card

OVP

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JCS

David Jeremiah
David Hale

CIA

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

NSC

David Gompert
Bob Hutchings

YUGOSLAVIA
Strategy for Consideration by the 9/18/91 DC

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2884-MR
ES 6/17/13

With the collapse of the latest EC-brokered cease-fire, European, Yugoslav, and Congressional attention will turn to us to see what we are prepared to do. This will come at the same time that the level of violence may become too much for U.S. and European publics to accept passively. There will especially be pressure to do something to assist the Croats, whose contribution to the crisis will be overshadowed by the fact that war is being waged on its territory with disproportionate force.

There are two models for the international response to Croatia's call for help: a recognition strategy and an isolation strategy.

Recognition Strategy. Absent a stronger U.S. role, the EC may agree with Carrington that this was the last chance and that there is nothing more to be done for now. The Germans, Italians, and others may argue that the time has come to recognize Croatian independence, as Chancellor Kohl warned the President on Monday.

Recognition would lead predictably to an escalation and extension of violence. Serbs and Croats would both escalate the conflict, the Serbs to grab territory and the Croats to bring in Western countries to their rescue. Violence would also spread to other parts of Yugoslavia, beginning with Bosnia and the Kosovo, and would inevitably involve neighboring countries. We could then be confronted with a general destabilization in the Balkans, as well as pressures to help defend newly recognized Croatia. Beyond the escalation that it could trigger, recognition would preclude an outcome involving Croatia in a loose confederation, which may be the only way to avoid endless conflict over the Serbian minority.

Isolation Strategy. The best way of heading off a premature rush to recognition is through an energetic strategy of isolating the Serbian leadership and the JNA, exerting maximum pressure on them to agree to an internationally supervised cease-fire and process of negotiation. Even if this approach does not bring them around in the near term, as it probably will not, it will mute the pressure for recognition, reduce the chances of much greater violence, and improve the prospects for resolving the conflict over the medium-term. The elements of the strategy are already in place, and the EC should remain in the lead. Success, however, will require a more assertive U.S. role in influencing and supporting European efforts, as well as in pressuring Serbia.

Nonrecognition policy. We need to reach agreement with the EC that neither we nor its members will recognize Croatian or Slovene independence. And we should make that clear to the Croats and Slovenes, pressing the latter to continue cooperating with EC-led efforts.

Isolating the Serbian and JNA leaderships. We need to call them to account directly and repeatedly, keeping them in the position of being the only holdouts to a peaceful resolution

**National Security Council
The White House**

TODAY'S DC MTG
3:00 PM

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LOG # 20719

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Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>Copy</u> ✓	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			
_____	_____	_____	_____
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91 SEP 18 P2.19

A = Action	<u>I = Information</u>	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	------------------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DC mtg on Sept. 18 at 3:00pm

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

of the crisis. We may also want to consider economic sanctions or the threat thereof. Milosevic is not immune to public pressure, and we may be able to erode his support within Serbia and begin altering his risk calculus. Similarly, we can exploit divisions within the JNA by having peacekeepers at the ready, thus removing the JNA's pretexts for intervention in Croatia. We should also propose such measures as a ban on aerial combat: if observed, this would level the playing field for Croatia; if not, it would further isolate the JNA.

Peacekeeping force. A peacekeeping force sufficient to the task needs to be ready to move in promptly if and when the conditions -- notably, ceasefire and JNA consent -- for its entry can be worked out. The very fact of such a force-in-waiting will exert positive leverage on the Serbian and JNA leaderships. We should consult with the EC and in NATO on the necessary composition of such a force, urge the WEU to take the lead in assembling it, push the idea in the CSCE (via NATO consultations), and indicate our readiness to offer logistic, intelligence, or other support.

Supporting the victims of aggression. While unequivocally opposing moves to supply military aid to Croatia, we should help organize humanitarian assistance and selectively lift economic sanctions so that the victims are not penalized. We should approach the EC and agree on specific measures.

Protecting minority rights. We and the EC should stress the international community's concern for the rights of all ethnic minorities, including Serbs in Croatia, and offer international supervision. For example, CSCE could launch a sustained effort to expose abuses and issue recommendations, beginning with a fact-finding mission to each republic. This also helps erode the JNA's pretext for its actions.

Involving other institutions. NATO should consult actively on peacekeeping forces and issue periodic statements. We should begin informal consultations in the UNSC. We should consider a CSCE emergency meeting at Ministerial level.

Third country involvement. We and the EC should go to all the neighboring countries as well as to Moscow, building a consensus around the strategy and urging Yugoslavia's neighbors to keep hands off. Moscow could be helpful by publicly announcing a cutoff of all military supplies.

U.S. envoy. We should consider sending a senior U.S. envoy to align U.S. and European approaches and to tell Milosevic that we intend to isolate and penalize him. That envoy, and possibly senior U.S. military officers, would also tell the JNA of our intentions and appeal to the military to abandon Milosevic.

~~SECRET~~

DL 312

20719

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 18, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *RG for*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia

Attached is a paper we drafted on the basis of an interagency meeting we held yesterday. It argues for a somewhat more assertive U.S. approach as the best way of heading off a rush to recognition. It does not suggest our getting out front of the Europeans but rather of throwing our weight behind EC-led efforts lest they collapse and we be left holding the bag.

At Assistant Secretary level, there is general interagency support for this approach, although OSD and JSC are somewhat reluctant. We believe that earlier reservations about a visible U.S. posture have been overtaken (or soon will be) by the specter of a failed EC effort and much greater bloodshed.

We suggest that you circulate the paper at the beginning of the meeting and give Deputies time to read it. You might then turn to John Helgerson for an update and then to Warren Zimmermann for his assessment of where we are. Then we suggest you seek views on the basic approach -- a more assertive U.S. role in support of European efforts, coupled with stronger pressure on the Serbs -- and review the several elements of the strategy.

If there is broad agreement on the approach, State can take the lead in developing a plan for implementing it.

Attachment

Tab I Strategy Paper on Yugoslavia

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Strategy for Consideration by the 9/18/91 DC

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With the collapse of the latest EC-brokered cease-fire, European, Yugoslav, and Congressional attention will turn to us to see what we are prepared to do. This will come at the same time that the level of violence may become too much for U.S. and European publics to accept passively. There will especially be pressure to do something to assist the Croats, whose contribution to the crisis will be overshadowed by the fact that war is being waged on its territory with disproportionate force.

There are two models for the international response to Croatia's call for help: a recognition strategy and an isolation strategy.

Recognition Strategy. Absent a stronger U.S. role, the EC may agree with Carrington that this was the last chance and that there is nothing more to be done for now. The Germans, Italians, and others may argue that the time has come to recognize Croatian independence, as Chancellor Kohl warned the President on Monday.

Recognition would lead predictably to an escalation and extension of violence. Serbs and Croats would both escalate the conflict, the Serbs to grab territory and the Croats to bring in Western countries to their rescue. Violence would also spread to other parts of Yugoslavia, beginning with Bosnia and the Kosovo, and would inevitably involve neighboring countries. We could then be confronted with a general destabilization in the Balkans, as well as pressures to help defend newly recognized Croatia. Beyond the escalation that it could trigger, recognition would preclude an outcome involving Croatia in a loose confederation, which may be the only way to avoid endless conflict over the Serbian minority.

Isolation Strategy. The best way of heading off a premature rush to recognition is through an energetic strategy of isolating the Serbian leadership and the JNA, exerting maximum pressure on them to agree to an internationally supervised cease-fire and process of negotiation. Even if this approach does not bring them around in the near term, as it probably will not, it will mute the pressure for recognition, reduce the chances of much greater violence, and improve the prospects for resolving the conflict over the medium-term. The elements of the strategy are already in place, and the EC should remain in the lead. Success, however, will require a more assertive U.S. role in influencing and supporting European efforts, as well as in pressuring Serbia.

Nonrecognition policy. We need to reach agreement with the EC that neither we nor its members will recognize Croatian or Slovene independence. And we should make that clear to the Croats and Slovenes, pressing the latter to continue cooperating with EC-led efforts.

Isolating the Serbian and JNA leaderships. We need to call them to account directly and repeatedly, keeping them in the position of being the only holdouts to a peaceful resolution

of the crisis. We may also want to consider economic sanctions or the threat thereof. Milosevic is not immune to public pressure, and we may be able to erode his support within Serbia and begin altering his risk calculus. Similarly, we can exploit divisions within the JNA by having peacekeepers at the ready, thus removing the JNA's pretexts for intervention in Croatia. We should also propose such measures as a ban on aerial combat: if observed, this would level the playing field for Croatia; if not, it would further isolate the JNA.

Peacekeeping force. A peacekeeping force sufficient to the task needs to be ready to move in promptly if and when the conditions -- notably, ceasefire and JNA consent -- for its entry can be worked out. The very fact of such a force-in-waiting will exert positive leverage on the Serbian and JNA leaderships. We should consult with the EC and in NATO on the necessary composition of such a force, urge the WEU to take the lead in assembling it, push the idea in the CSCE (via NATO consultations), and indicate our readiness to offer logistic, intelligence, or other support.

Supporting the victims of aggression. While unequivocally opposing moves to supply military aid to Croatia, we should help organize humanitarian assistance and selectively lift economic sanctions so that the victims are not penalized. We should approach the EC and agree on specific measures.

Protecting minority rights. We and the EC should stress the international community's concern for the rights of all ethnic minorities, including Serbs in Croatia, and offer international supervision. For example, CSCE could launch a sustained effort to expose abuses and issue recommendations, beginning with a fact-finding mission to each republic. This also helps erode the JNA's pretext for its actions.

Involving other institutions. NATO should consult actively on peacekeeping forces and issue periodic statements. We should begin informal consultations in the UNSC. We should consider a CSCE emergency meeting at Ministerial level.

Third country involvement. We and the EC should go to all the neighboring countries as well as to Moscow, building a consensus around the strategy and urging Yugoslavia's neighbors to keep hands off. Moscow could be helpful by publicly announcing a cutoff of all military supplies.

U.S. envoy. We should consider sending a senior U.S. envoy to align U.S. and European approaches and to tell Milosevic that we intend to isolate and penalize him. That envoy, and possibly senior U.S. military officers, would also tell the JNA of our intentions and appeal to the military to abandon Milosevic.