

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2004-0416-F

FOIA Number:
2004-0416-F

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90020
Folder ID Number: 90020-005

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	06/04/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
01b. Form	Re: Request for Appointments [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	06/04/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
02a. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Robert Gates Re: Tuesday, June 4, 1600 Gulf DC (1 pp.)	06/04/1991	(b)(1)	S
02b. List	Re: Action Check List PCC of June 3, 1991 (1 pp.)	06/03/1991	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Richard Haass to Robert Gates Re: May 31 DC on the Gulf (2 pp.)	05/30/1991	(b)(1)	S
03b. Paper	Re: Impact of International Isolation on Iraq and Saddam Husayn (2 pp.)	05/24/1991	(b)(1)	S
03c. Paper	Re: Keeping Pressure on Saddam Hussein's Regime: Strategy and Actions (4 pp.)	05/24/91	(b)(1)	S
03d. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/31/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Pinksheet Number: DJC1328

OA/ID Number: 90020-005

Date Closed: 9/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2004-0416-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Memo	W. Robert Pearson to Brent Scowcroft, et.al. Re: Discussion Paper on Iraq [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/30/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
04b. Paper	Discussion Paper for May 31 DC Meeting Re: Keeping Pressure on Saddam Hussein's Regime: Strategy and Actions (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Paper	Re: JCS (PCC Level) Comments on Discussion Paper Keeping Pressure on Saddam Hussein (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05a. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the National Security Council [FOIA restrictions redacted] (10 pp.)	6/4/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
05b. Paper	Re: Options for Steps Following the Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces from Northern Iraq (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	6/4/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
06. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	06/04/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
07a. Cover Sheet	Re: Message no. 067641 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
07b. Paper	Re: Options for Steps Following the Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces from Northern Iraq (3 pp.)	06/04/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

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File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Date Closed:	9/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 1991
4:00PM - 5:00PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates
Andy Card (Invited but OOT)

NSC

Richard Haass

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
John Kelly

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Fredrick Smith

JCS

Henry Viccaglio
Merrill Ruck

CIA

Richard Kerr

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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01b. Form	Re: Request for Appointments [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	06/04/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

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Series: H-Files

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Tuesday, June 4, 19 91
for Mr Gates of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Robert Kimmitt	12/19/47
John Kelly	7/20/39
Paul Wolfowitz	12/23/43
Fredrick Smith	3/23/47
Henry Vicellio	8/4/40
Merrill Ruck	5/30/41
Richard Kerr	10/4/35

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

DRIVERS

John Davis	12/6/49
Matthew Turner	9/23/32
George Patrick	1/1/32

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House
Room No. Sit Room
Time of Meeting 4:00PM

Requested by Mary Emery
Room No. WWGflr Telephone 6536
Date of request 6/4/91

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120431
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 91 10

TO: GATES

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
TURKEY
DC

IRAQ
DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 4 JUN DC MTG RE PERSIAN GULF

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 07 JUN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9120414 9120418

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC286

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJL NARA, Date 09/04/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120431

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES
001

Z 91060411 FOR INFORMATION
X 91120914 NOTED BY GATES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DS NARA, Date 09/02/2009

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20431

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>I</u>
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20431

~~SECRET~~

June 4, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

FROM: Richard N. Haass 

SUBJECT: Tuesday, June 4, 1600 Gulf DC

As was the case last week, there are two issues, that of a diplomatic isolation strategy and the end-game in northern Iraq.

On the isolation strategy, the PCC met and agreed to a set of steps. They are enumerated at Tab A. I think we are finally in decent shape here; the only potential problem I see is that OSD or JCS might reopen the entire "why focus so much on Saddam" issue. If they do, I would remind them that we already have full NSC approval of the strategy as articulated in your May 7 speech.

As for withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq, there are several questions to settle: 1) what we do; 2) what we say publicly; 3) what we say to Iraq; and 4) what we say to Kurds/Shia.

Regarding 1/what we do, there seems to be agreement to leave as tasks are completed but without announcing a date in advance; to prepare contingency plans for strikes against Iraqi targets; to ensure Turks are on board with a policy of "no open pipeline until Saddam is gone"; and recce flights over northern Iraq.

I do not detect support for leaving U.S. troops behind in southern Turkey. There is the question of leaving equipment. There is also the question of whether we end the CAP and end all constraints on Iraqi air activity once we leave. Paul seems interested in a scheme where every now and then a small number of U.S. forces would pay a visit to northern Iraq to check things out. No one else likes this degree of involvement; the Turks will nix it anyhow. I suggest instead that we approach the Turks and agree to hold exercises in the south every few months. The Iraqis will get the message and it will help keep a capability.

On 2/what we say publicly, we would make a statement (White House?) that would say we'd left, that we expect Iraqis and Kurds to act peacefully, that we will watch developments closely, and that we would take unspecified steps if the situation warranted.

On 3/what we say to Iraq, we would not be more specific than we were in public.

On 4/what we say to Kurds/Shia, we would let them know that provocative actions on their part that get them into hot water would not generate a U.S. response.

Tab I Action Check List

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2256-MR

MM 11/23/2016

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ACTION CHECK LIST
PCC OF June 3, 1991

1. CIA Quick study of how Iraqi armed forces are being reconstituted.
2. IO Demarches on raising compensation percentage (ongoing).
3. NEA/NGA Cable to key allies (UK, France, Saudis and Egyptians) on how to keep pressure on Saddam, keep Iraq isolated.
4. NEA/NGA
(with RA & EGY) approach Egyptians on Arab League help on keeping Iraq isolated. (Possible follow up with Arab League SecGen)
5. NEA/NGA
(with RA & ARP) Coordinate with Saudis on what steps might be taken within OPEC to isolate Iraq. Possible follow on-approaches to other OPEC states.
6. CIA Is there imagery on damage to Shia shrines releasable to foreign govs or publishable.
7. NEA/RA
(with NEA/ARP) Discuss with Saudis asking OIC to investigate damage to Shia shrines, establish protection regime (using answer to No.5). Other addressees dependent on ARP advice on Saudi concerns and/or their response.
8. NEA/NGA Telegram demarche on Australian wheat deal with Iraq (if deal really signed).
9. NEA/NGA List of Iraqi opposition figures we have met and pros/cons of raising profile of meetings (not for DC).
10. Mr. Kelly Redo "After Withdrawal" options paper for DC of 6/4.
11. EUR/SE
(with NEA/NGA) Cable of what we suggest Ozal tell Tariz Aziz.
12. EUR/SE Instruction on renewing agreement for coalition forces in south Turkey from June 11 to Aug 11.
13. L Examine steps in environmental organizations on how to keep pressure on Iraq.
14. NEA/NGA
(with EUR/SOV) Ask Soviets (based on Izvestia article) to break or suspend friendship treaty with Iraq.

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2256-MR
MM 11/23/2016

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120414
RECEIVED: 30 MAY 91 16

TO: GATES

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 30 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
SANCTIONS
EXPORT CONTROLS

IRAQ
OIL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 31 MAY DC MTG ON PERSIAN GULF

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 03 JUN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9120418 9120422

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC286

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DS NARA, Date 09/02/2007

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSAJC

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9120414

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES

Z 91053107 FOR INFORMATION

001

X 91072910 INCORPORATED #9120418

001

X 91072910 NOTED BY GATES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By 502 NARA, Date 07/02/2009

~~SECRET~~

May 31 1000 Vntg
National Security Council
The White House *on brief*

PROOFED BY: WFA

LOG # 20414

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG WFA A/O _____

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

WFO
Ken Hill

1

K

I

Bill Sittmann

2

W

Bob Gates

3

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

4

N

NSC Secretariat

5

Bon

91 MAY 30 P 5: 13

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I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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20414

May 30, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

FROM: RICHARD HAASS 
SUBJECT: May 31 DC on the Gulf

Deputy Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

I would begin with the normal intelligence briefing, focusing on the refugee situation in both the North and the East, but also including such subjects as Saddam's internal strength, the impact and future of sanctions, and the effects inside and the prospects for a policy of economic and diplomatic isolation. The key issues--there are essentially two--are as follows:

Refugees: The refugees are heading home in large numbers. But there are a lot of loose ends. Here are some questions to raise:

- ✓-- When do U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq? When do we end restrictions on Iraqi aircraft? What must happen first?
- ✓-- What sort of force structure do we leave behind in Turkey?
- ✓-- What more needs be done with the UN? What is the status of the scheduled June 7 hand-off in the relief and protective areas? Is the current UN-Iraq accord on UN guards the last word?
- ✓-- What is status of the Kurdish-Iraq negotiation?
- ✓-- Most important, what is our posture vis-a-vis the post-refugee situation? What sort of markers/assurances do we lay down in order to deter renewed Iraqi assaults on Kurds and Shia?

On this last point, there are a few possibilities. One is to get the Turks (who strongly oppose a new Kurdish influx) to announce that the oil pipeline (now closed but at some point to reopen I fear) would be shut if Iraq caused a new refugee problem. A second idea is to get a statement by the Saudis to the same effect as regards their pipeline. (This should be doable as they plan to keep it closed so long as Saddam is around.) A third idea is to talk to the Turks about leaving some U.S./UK/French aircraft behind and keeping open the option of attacking certain Iraqi targets if the Saddam-led central government gets out of line. All of this could be told to the Iraqis to deter them.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0013-MR
SCS 8/22/13

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Weakening Saddam/Isolating Iraq: Sanctions are in place and we (and by "we" I mean thee and me) are on the record about Saddam. The problem is one of creeping normalization and gradual dilution of sanctions. There are some specific questions to raise:

- ✓-- When should we stop objecting to all oil sales?
- ✓-- What do we do if Iraq complies fully with 687? Given the complexity of the resolution, when might this be?
- ✓-- Where are we on compensation and getting a high figure?
- ✓-- What if anything do we do on war crimes now that Kuwait has made clear that they are not going to take the lead as we'd hoped?

Besides addressing the above, and besides getting our propaganda and other efforts off the ground, I have some specific suggestions about what we should be pressing others to do to isolate Iraq politically so as to complement economic sanctions. What I'd like to see is the group sign on to them and State tasked to do a cable sending in ambassadors in an effort to get governments to agree to:

- no upgrading of diplomatic relations with Iraq
- no new positions for Iraqis at UN/international organizations
- no visits by senior Iraqi officials
- no visits to Iraq by senior officials
- no new credits or IBRD/IMF/Paris Club help

And some other possible ideas:

- ask OPEC to suspend Iraqi participation?
- ask OIC to investigate damage to Shia shrines/establish protection regime?
- ask UN Human Rights Commission to establish effective monitoring of Iraqi human rights situation?
- ask Soviets to suspend their Treaty of Friendship?
- ask Egyptians if Arab League can take a step?
- push for some initiative to raise Iraqi destruction of Kuwaiti wells in environmental and health fora
- increase profile of U.S. meetings with Iraqi opposition?

Attached at TAB A is a CIA analysis of the impact of international isolation on Saddam. At TAB B is a "strategy" paper prepared by State that to be frank does not provide much guidance on these matters. Bob Kimmitt acknowledges this and has sent NEA back to the drawing board. If something new and better emerges before the meeting I'll get it to you.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 4/9/2014

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FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #: 1998-0099-F/4(158)	MR Case #:
AR Disposition: Released in Part	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 8/30/2010	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


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(b) (1)

(b) (1)

49

24 May 1991



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Impact of International Isolation on Iraq and Saddam Husayn

1. (b) (1) Saddam Husayn believes that eventually national self-interests--primarily economic--will bring Iraq restoration of full diplomatic and trade ties with Western Europe, the USSR, Japan, the Arabs, and even the United States. Saddam's media trumpets any diplomatic breakthroughs, no matter how minor, including the reopening of embassies in Baghdad, visits by prominent foreigners, and Iraq's recent participation in the Arab League to show that Iraq's strategy is working. Baghdad is proposing candidates for UN committee positions, (b) (1)

2.

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

Saddam

retained control after Desert Storm through his ability to intimidate potential opponents and by rallying the Arab Sunni heartland and the military to remain loyal, (b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The economy is Saddam's Achilles' heel. He must get sanctions removed, restore trade, and get economic and military reconstruction under way. To do this, he must restore international confidence in his regime, and he must sell oil. (b) (1)

3. Coalition offers to ease reparations, lift sanctions, and return an Iraq without Saddam to international legitimacy are incentives that could influence many Iraqis. Targeting his key constituencies--the Arab Sunni middle class and, more particularly, the military--with the message that only Saddam's removal will lead to substantial improvement in their lives and livelihoods will get their attention but may not be translated into action. Saddam will try to ensure that the basic needs of the Arab

2

(b) (1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

1998-0099-F/4
8/30/2010 MM

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(b)(1)

SUBJECT: Impact of International Isolation on Iraq and
Saddam Husayn

Sunnis and the Republican Guards are met and their interests protected. Most Iraqis are probably too afraid of his security and intelligence apparatus, however, and too co-opted by the promise of future favors to move against him now, but cracks could develop. (b)(1)

4. Saddam will try to persuade Iraqis that the country is returning to normal and that his remaining in power is not an impediment to their security or prosperity. Denial of normal trade and diplomatic ties would minimize their opportunities to advance personal or national interests. In being denied all forms of official contact, influential Iraqis would get a clear message that Saddam is not acceptable and remains the obstacle to their prosperity and national prestige. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

3
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

STATE
TAPER

Keeping Pressure on Saddam Hussein's Regime: Strategy and Actions

Our objective is to maintain the pressure for Saddam Hussein's removal and continually impress on other Iraqis in key positions that they and their country are paying a heavy price for Saddam's leadership. In focusing on Saddam, we want to avoid actions which could lead to Iraq's break-up or cause the current military and civilian leadership to rally behind him, as happened during the recent Shia and Kurdish revolts. We are actively looking for ways to turn the screw further that would have a high probability of success and hold coalition support.

Current Status

Many of our actions although officially accepted by the GOI, have the psychological effect of deliberately infringing upon Iraq's sovereignty. We believe this is creating a grinding irritant to the highly developed nationalism of Iraq's educated classes and the Baathist and military leadership. This is certainly the case with the maintenance of forces in northern Iraq. Our heaviest, direct pressure comes through the implementation actions of Resolutions 687 and 688 including intrusive inspections for nuclear and chemical weapons, the continued weakening of Iraq's military might and the financial pressures of the compensation fund. In our explanations of sanction and reparation policies we reiterate our intention to consider the policies, practices and character of the Iraqi Government.

We are also maintaining international pressure through the implementation mechanism to assure the Iraqi government has the motivation not to take retribution against either its civilian population or international relief workers.

Additional pressures are being brought to bear through:

- (1) Our public posture, with its constant reminder that things will not get better while Saddam remains in power;

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
1998-0099-F/4
8/16/99 MM

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

- (2) Visa restrictions which over time will increasingly grate on an Iraqi elite with a pent up appetite for travel;
- (3) The continued freeze on Iraqi assets in this country;
- (4) Refugee relief which limits Iraqi sovereignty and consolidation of Saddam's political power;
- (5) Contacts with the opposition which not only maintain pressure on Saddam but which help to transmit our message to whatever in-country contacts (particularly military) the various opposition groups maintain.

Future Actions

We could maintain forces in southern Turkey for an indefinite period, subject to agreement of the GOT, and continue our CAP over Iraq north of the 36th parallel until we believe international relief activities for the refugee population are not in imminent danger of Iraqi military retribution.

We are actively looking for ways to maintain the diplomatic price of Iraq's loss of status and influence in the world, particularly the Arab world in which Iraq aspires to a leadership role. New steps need to be carefully calibrated to avoid initiatives which are likely to lead to our suffering a diplomatic defeat or a break in coalition ranks.

For example, there will be a strong tendency for states to reestablish relations with Iraq. Our objective should be to minimize this trend. Nevertheless, we accept that we cannot wholly block or reverse it. Indeed we see value in the active protection role which we will want the Polish Ambassador to play on our behalf, especially as U.S. citizens continue to stray into Iraq despite our best efforts to discourage this travel. Further, as the security situation permits, we may assign a few U.S. diplomats to the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to enhance reporting and reliable, rapid, and direct communications with Iraq.

However, without seeking more than is achievable, we see a variety of steps to keep pressure on. These could include urging allies to:

- (1) Hold diplomatic relations at the Charge level;

~~SECRET~~

*4 sheets
17 Aug
all?*

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

- (2) Avoid visits of senior Iraqi envoys or, if they believe such visits are essential, to encourage meetings at less than ministerial level;
- (3) Continue reiterating at meetings with Iraqi officials the message that relations are not normal because of Saddam's continued role.

On the propaganda front, we have focused heavily on negative themes directed largely to the Iraqi elite, such as "Iraq a pariah" with Saddam in charge. Perhaps we should start to add to this public statements and a propaganda campaign directed to specific, positive things which would result for the general populace if Saddam leaves. Themes might include:

- (1) Facilitating rapid import of basic goods which would bring prices down;
- (2) Support lifting of sanctions on imports to rebuild Iraq's water systems, electrical grid and other facilities of benefit to the general population;
- (3) Imports of scarce cooking fuel until Iraq's refining capacity recovers;
- (4) Resumption of full Iraqi oil exports with a reduction of the percentage of revenues going to the compensation fund.

Risks to Keep in Mind

In maintaining the balance between pressure and the disintegration of the Iraqi state, we should continue to avoid being drawn deeply into Kurdish issues. The hard fact is that Kurdish security is a basic problem of the Iraqi state, not just of Saddam Hussein. There may be no long term fix and open-ended commitments could be endless. A similar danger area involves actions on behalf of the Shia population which would open the door to Iranian meddling in southern Iraq.

In the longer term, as President Bush has noted, we will at some point have to allow Iraq to sell oil in order to comply with the reparations. We should be careful that our position on relating these sanctions to Saddam's rule not lead to a position where consenting to future oil sales will have the appearance of a defeat for U.S. policy. For now, we are on safe ground in insisting on full Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions which provide a strong legal basis for a tough position on our part.

~~SECRET~~

Keeping Pressure on Saddam Hussein's Regime:

Drafted: NEA/NGA: RNeumann
5/24/91 x75692 SENGAGEN 3599

Cleared: NEA: DLMack
NEA/NGA: JMcGhee
NEA/RA: AKeiswetter
IO/UNP: MWilliamson (Sub)
INR: MCasey (Draft)
P: DPearce
S/P: SGrummon (Draft)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/31/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Date Closed: 9/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991
3:00PM - 4:00PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates
Andy Card

OVP

Karl Jackson

NSC

Richard Haass
Nancy Dyke

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
John Kelly

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Fredrick Smith

JCS

David Jeremiah
Merrill Ruck

CIA

Richard Kerr


(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120418
RECEIVED: 31 MAY 91 07

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PEARSON, W

DOC DATE: 30 MAY 91
SOURCE REF: 9109749

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CHEMICAL WARFARE
DC

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 31 MAY DC MTG ON PERSIAN GULF

ACTION: SEE 9120414 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 31 MAY 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9120414 9120422

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC286

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DTZ NARA, Date 07/02/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSAJC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120418

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HAASS
001

Z 91053107 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
X 91072910 SEE 9120414 FOR FINAL ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By JLZ NARA, Date 09/02/2009

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

RECEIVED

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 20418

ACTION OFFICER: HAASS

DUE: 12:00PM, 31 MAY

- ☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
☐ Prepare Memo For Brady
☐ Prepare Memo _____

- ☐ Appropriate Action
☐ Prepare Memo for Sittmann
to _____

URGENT

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 6900

Concur FYI

- ☐ ☐ Barth
☐ ☐ Basora
☐ ☐ Beers
☐ ☐ Broome
☐ ☐ Burns
☐ ☐ Canas
☐ ☐ Chamberlin
☐ ☐ Charles
☐ ☐ Davis
☐ ☐ Deal
☐ ☐ Dyke
☐ ☐ Frasure
☒ ☐ Fry
☒ ☐ Gordon
☐ ☐ Gompert
☐ ☐ Haass
☐ ☐ Hayden

Concur FYI

- ☐ ☐ Hewett
☐ ☐ Hutchings
☐ ☐ Johnson
☐ ☐ Kanter
☐ ☐ Kitchen
☐ ☐ Kuehne
☐ ☐ Lampley
☐ ☐ Laposa
☐ ☐ Lundsager
☐ ☐ Melby
☐ ☐ Menan
☐ ☐ Merchant
☐ ☐ Needles
☐ ☐ O'Leary
☐ ☐ Paal
☐ ☐ Pacelli
☐ ☐ Pavitt

Concur FYI

- ☐ ☐ Pilling
☐ ☐ Poneman
☐ ☐ Popadiuk
☐ ☐ Pryce
☐ ☐ Rademaker
☐ ☐ Rostow
☐ ☐ Tilley
☐ ☐ Tobey
☐ ☒ Van Eron
☐ ☐ Watson
☐ ☐ Welch
☐ ☐ Whitley
☐ ☐ Wilson
☐ ☐ Working

INFORMATION

- ☒ Sittmann
☒ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Hill

☒ Gates (advance)

☐ Exec Sec Desk

☒ Secretariat

COMMENTS

See #9120414 for final Action.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By STZ NARA, Date 09/02/2009

Logged By AC

~~SECRET~~

Return to Secretariat
379 OEOB

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Memo	W. Robert Pearson to Brent Scowcroft, et.al. Re: Discussion Paper on Iraq [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/30/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Date Closed: 9/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



9109/49 40410
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 30, 1991

~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Advisor
The White House

COLONEL JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

[REDACTED]
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR. USA
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: Discussion Paper on Iraq

Attached for your review is a discussion paper outlining strategy and actions towards Iraq for discussion at the Deputies Committee meeting May 31 at 3:00 pm.


W. Robert Pearson
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By DTL NARA, Date 09/02/2009

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Paper	Discussion Paper for May 31 DC Meeting Re: Keeping Pressure on Saddam Hussein's Regime: Strategy and Actions (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Date Closed:	9/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Paper	Re: JCS (PCC Level) Comments on Discussion Paper Keeping Pressure on Saddam Hussein (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Date Closed:	9/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120470
RECEIVED: 19 JUN 91 08

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
SOC

MINUTES
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES & SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR 4 JUN DC MTG ON IRAQ

ACTION: GATES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 22 JUN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC286

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DS NARA, Date 07/02/2001

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9120470

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SITTMANN

001 .

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91062112 FOR DECISION

X 91062119 GATES APPROVED RECOM

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DSL NARA, Date 09/02/2009

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

Sum of Concl: DE Mtg

PROOFED BY: RE

LOG # 20470

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG RE A/O _____

sfh bch
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann

91 JUN 21 12.17

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

K

A

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N

3

✓

4

9/21

D

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

RECEIVED
HOG SECRETARIAT

91 MAY 21 11:30

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

20470

June 20, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES


SUBJECT: Minutes and Summary of Conclusions for NSC
Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq, June 4, 1991

Attached at Tabs I and II are the Minutes and Summary of
Conclusions for the NSC Deputies Committee of June 4, 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Minutes and Summary of Conclusions be approved for
filing purposes.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Minutes

Tab II Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By JTC NARA, Date 09/02/2009

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the National Security Council [FOIA restrictions redacted] (10 pp.)	6/4/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 11/3/2016

Date Closed: 9/2/2009

OA/ID Number: 90020-005

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #: 2010-2256-MR(503)

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition: Released in Part

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date: 11/23/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20470



Meeting of the National Security Council

DATE: June 4, 1991

TIME: 4:07-5:10 p.m.

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Iraq (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

State

Robert Kimmitt

John Kelly

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz

Fredrick Smith

JCS

Henry Viccaglio

Merrill Ruck

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3)

White House

Mr. Gates

NSC

Richard Haass

Sandra Charles

Minutes

Mr. Gates: The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the endgame in northern Iraq and the further isolation of Iraq. The Chairman briefed the President yesterday on where we are headed with our troops. We are at a basic crunch point. As we leave, the question is how to convey to the Iraqis and the Kurds that we are not walking out on them. The situation has turned out to be positive, but our concern here is that there is potential for it to turn sour just as fast if Kurds are killed. We are inclined to agree with Colin that if the Kurds provoke something, it could complicate our lives. The question for discussion is the steps we should take privately and publicly, and what markers to lay down. Bob, do you want to begin walking us through the list?

(S)

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Mr. Kimmitt: John, I may ask you to do that. But first, I have three questions from looking at the list: (S)

First, when and under what conditions to leave, for example, what requirement do we need from Iraq before we go, like an agreement with the Kurds? Of course, who knows where Barzani is -- and I am not talking just politically. (S)

Second, what foreign presence should be left in Turkey or in the air over Iraq? (S)

And third, depending on the foreign presence, what would the conditions be for their return, and what marker should we lay down with Iraq for their return? (S)

John, you go ahead and review what the PCC decided. (S)

Mr. Kelly: We are talking about a couple of points that supplement the PCC paper. Everyone agrees that as tasks are completed the military group in northern Iraq should be allowed to evaporate. We think that is fine, but it doesn't address the question of residual presence. Another point is whether to make explicit warning to Iraq for example, for a specific zone and time period. Iraq may sense, on the idea of a zone for a period of time, that it implies outside a free zone, and after whatever date, it's okay to torture Kurds. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: I would add two things. We received General Shali's (Shalikhshvili) plan of a 30-45 day evaporation, starting June first. It quite rightly says that we don't want to set an end date. That reduces leverage for the Kurds. The UN contingent also raised the point. I think we are close to fulfilling the President's missions and we have to leave at some point -- whether it is a month or year from now. I don't see anything that suggests things would get better for us and the Kurds if we were to stay longer. (S)

If we are going to extract our forces, then I think General Powell is on the mark, because the Kurds will see a need for the long term to keep us there either through neglect or overt action. We need to make a clean break at the point our mission is accomplished. If he (Saddam) goes back in big, and the refugee flow starts up again, then it's a 688 issue in that regional security is upset again. In my judgment, and Paul, Buck, I would appreciate your professional judgments as well, we have the forces to do this without keeping our forces in or over Iraq. Unless we want to use our forces for leverage there, then we should come back in from a distance. You determine the options and we will support them politically. (S)

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If our principals decide that in 30-45 days, following the evaporation model, we're out by mid July, then we need to shape our political and diplomatic conditions in a way to lay down markers quickly so we will be able to leverage Iraq to the extent we can. One time period might be during the G-7 meeting between 15-17 July, with Gorby and three of the multinational force leaders there, there will be a lot of attention. That would make it harder for things to fall apart. Another problem we have to consider is that the Kurds, to maximize attention to their plight, might provoke something if U.S. forces are not there.

(S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: I agree we don't want to leave forces there, hostage to a process we can't control. But we would propose going to an intermediate, monitoring stage first. That would include flying over from time to time. We would make clear that we were moving into that phase. We should be vague on the date we will be gone. But we should move to a transition. How long that will last, it is too early to decide. I worry if we make too sharp a break -- we worried about that before and it turned out like this. (S)

Mr. Gates: We had prospects of a Sabra and Shatila with huge camps in Iraq forever. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: But it turned around. I am afraid about disengaging too fast. First, we could recreate old circumstances, although a lot has changed. We are more in control now as a result of our overt military response, and we can do target lists. We won't get to that point until things get out of control. We want the option to pressure Iraq short of that. It is hard to define what constitutes misbehavior. If the situation is coming apart, what would constitute a credible threat for coming back in? (S)

Mr. Gates: How do you define "credible threat"? (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: We are in a position of monitoring and overflying. We could stay in touch with the UN through forces in Turkey. As long as there is no real political hurdle to return, then Iraq will understand that you have the capability. The other side is the Kurds creating trouble and dragging us back in.

(S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Since the end of the war, did Saddam initiate offensive action against his people or was it in response to provocation? (S)

Mr. Kerr: It was initiated by someone else. But the response went beyond what was necessary to stop the uprisings in the north and south. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: What we are seeing is Saddam's charm campaign. He working on Ozal and others. There are some cracks in our front. I think the analogy of political constraints he feels on the Kurds and his acceptance in the world community is like Gorby and the Baltics. He'll do things, purges and things, with small coverage. (S)

It is not clear that we are working against Saddam or his potential against the Kurds. We'll lose control at some point. I don't see how we can make the break. (S)

Mr. Kelly: The PCC sense was there is no automatic guarantee that the Turks will agree to a residual force above NATO levels or to reengagement over Iraq. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: On punitive action, they are not the only ones with a big hurdle. (S)

The reason is not to create a situation where we are disengaging. (S)

Mr. Kerr: Bob's point is important. We may be at a high point of our ability. Violence over the last 3-4 days has increased. It has been precipitated by fear and our leaving. It will only increase. There is a risk of more confrontations and violence than we anticipated. But we would see indicators of Iraqi forces moving in north. Right now they are stripped down. It would take a while for them to build up, so we would see a change in their capability. We would see some action in advance of a move against the Kurds short of infiltration and their pulling them in one at a time. (S)

LTG Vacillio: General Powell strongly believes the disengagement should be viewed from a mission perspective. Humanitarian relief has been successfully concluded. He is nervous about getting mixed up in the aftermath. We feel Iraq will decide it is in its best interest to remain passive and non-belligerent for now. One marker to make effective our diplomatic markers and the lever of sanction, would be to have a force in the area that could be brought to bear. The point to make is if you want us out and want us to stay out, then let the UN administer these humanitarian activities. On residual forces, we agree with General Shali (Shalikashvili) on doing the retrograde along with the coalition forces. (S)

Mr. Gates: So we will be doing this simultaneously with the coalition. They also will be decreasing their forces at the same time. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Have we worked that out? (S)

LTG Vacillio: Yes, it has been worked out. The time table started with camps in Turkey closing as the first step. We can move fast over the next 30-45 days with no glitches. Dohuk improvements are finished. We are drawing back both mission and security forces from east to west into Turkey. We will do overflights as needed over the next 30-40 days, then make a decision and cease them. Ground and air forces are available in Batman and Silopi. ^{14(d)} [REDACTED] We should look at the situation before we complete the retrograde. It depends on the Turks whether we will be leaving forces. Our withdrawal should have a low profile, but we should lay down strong diplomatic markers. (S)

Mr. Haass: We have three goals: to avoid a Sabra and Shatila; to get Saddam out; and to avoid getting dragged in. If the Turks say no to our leaving forces in the south, then one thing we should ask for is periodic exercises. We will not be there all the time, but it will send a signal to Iraq if they do things. We should continue periodic reconnaissance flights to back up our markers. Our markers should not be explicit. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: We need to get the UK and the French involved. (S)

Mr. Haass: There was the NATO angle in the crisis. We should spread it around, including doing exercises in the Gulf. We won't have to say anything to signal Iraq. That way we would get the benefits without the drawbacks of keeping a presence. (S)

Mr. Gates: Let me recap what's been said. First, the premise is for a low-key, quiet withdrawal as tasks are completed, and accepting little likelihood that residual forces will remain in Turkey. Colin recommended this in a less direct manner. We should say to the Iraqis it is working now, so leave it alone. This should be done to not imply they would have a free hand elsewhere. (S)

Second, instead of leaving residual forces, taking Richard's point, we should ask the Turks about air and ground exercises, rotating them in. Then we do "six" (see attachment) before our forces are gone in the near future so that people get accustomed to the notion with the coalition presence still on the ground and in the event of an Iraqi reaction. (S)

LTG Vacillio: General Powell believes strongly that we need to get the message directly to Saddam. Diplomatic channels would be more effective than public. But also use public channels if you decide the public is also a target.

Mr. Gates: The issue is one of deterring Saddam. We should mention the issue to Saber and through him to Saddam and the military. And also raise it in Washington and New York. (S)

On "seven" (see attachment), the same thing, quietly and privately. (S)

On "eight" (see attachment), that's going on. "Nine" (see attachment) is also important. (S)

LTG Vacillio: Should we use something other than the MCC? (S)

Mr. Gates: We've sent a message already along those lines. (S)

Mr. Kerr: To the Kurds, not the Shia. (S)

Mr. Gates: Let's limit it to the Kurds for now. Then on "ten", "eleven" and doing the rest (see attachment), we should continue CAP north of the 36th parallel so long as our forces are there only. Once our troops are out of Iraq, then we pretty much have to stop. With the CAP withdrawal there should be another private message to Iraq. It should be along the lines of no matter whether rotary or fixed wing, don't use your aircraft against these people. What do you think about telling them we are withdrawing CAP, but that is not a license for use of fixed wing or rotary aircraft for combat purposes there? (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: I agree we should say something like that. We should think carefully of a formula. The less specific, the bigger the impact. Powell's formula that he used in the field is good -- it was basic. A message maybe saying we will be watching your actions, including use of fixed and rotary wing assets. (S)

Mr. Gates: I think Colin has the right approach. It's like dealing with a kid when you say never do that or else -- with "do", "that" and "else" being the variables. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: But then they might start salami slicing, like by moving in secret police. We have to keep that from happening. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: But we can't move the goalposts. The only way to prevent things like that is with a permanent presence. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: I don't think that's right. I think the last thing he wants is U.S. troops there back in again. If he thinks it's possible we might come back, that is our major leverage. As for Turkey, we are there now. Once we are out, it will hard to negotiate our way back in. There is a lot to be said for a transition period. In Turkey, we should maintain a contingency presence within a NATO context for if we get fed up and have to go back in. (S)

Mr. Gates: One approach would be a transition phase to do the things we've been talking about and to build on what you said. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: Once we are all the way out of Iraq, we might want to keep a small lethal representation there for 60-90 days at a couple of places. We could send them across the border to meet with the UN guys, and that would make clear to Iraq that we are just across the line. We would tell Turkey that it is not a long term residual presence. In fact, our troops are coming out faster than we originally thought two months ago. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: If he hassles the UN, then it will be easy to get an international community response. If he lets them operate, then it is a question of if we have political problems with his reassuming control in northern Iraq, because he will say he is putting administrative forces in northern Iraq. We can lay down the line and say no military, but it will be harder to say no police. But there may be no political problem if he is waging campaign of terror. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: If you are going to be saying don't do that, it will be easier to say if you are monitoring the situation. It's like pornography, you see it when it happens. If he moves in on these people, he goes down a road that is dangerous, and then the warning should have something to back it up. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Or say if you do something public then there will be pressure in the United States and Europe for us to go back in. The Kurds also could use the opportunity to provoke something and take advantage of ambiguity of the period of withdrawal. (S)

Mr. Gates: I think we are talking about doing all the items I went through plus a force at Batman and Silopi for a fixed period of 60-90 days. We would build on this with messages conveyed privately. Given the situation, the more ambiguous the message, the better. That works to our advantage. We agree that he wants us out and to stay out, but we won't be out that far. The Iraqis should understand they must restore order, let their people back in, work with the UN, and we will be across the border watching. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: And periodically crossing the border with both air and land forces. (S)

Mr. Gates: I think you might have a problem with Cheney on that. When we were talking over this issue, he said at some point we have to let go. It is a sovereign country. Our position is it should maintain its territorial integrity, and sovereignty. One way to do this could be to fly in UN logistical support, but that would have to be worked carefully. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: I agree that at some point we have to let go. The question is at what point? We should see how the situation goes during a transition period before we give him back sovereignty of the border area. (S)

Mr. Gates: Let's have Richard write up an agreed package of the steps I've outlined. Put in as a bracketed item as part of number two about the longer term doing exercises and rotations, but also having a transition presence in Silopi and Batman for 60-90 days to monitor the situation after the troops withdraw. Also in brackets the question should be open on these troops crossing the border. (S)

Mr. Haass: I have a factual question. What is there at these two bases normally? (C)

LTG Vacillio: Nothing. (U)

Mr. Gates: We should get this paper out tomorrow. (C)

Mr. Haass: It also is important that we have a public package. We need a public dimension. (C)

Mr. Kelly: Absolutely. I am scheduled to see Congress twice in the next few weeks. I need a statement to make on the withdrawal. (C)

Mr. Gates: John and Richard should work on a statement that can be used by the spokesmen and witnesses that explains what we are doing and saying to Iraq. (C)

Mr. Haass: We also need to talk about "five", the pipeline through Turkey reopening when 687 is completed. (S)

Mr. Gates: I don't want to make too much of the pipeline now. Our concern is that Ozal's position is too fragile. It also will depend on Saudi willingness to offset the loss of oil revenue. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: On the second question, it may be no. (C)

Mr. Kelly: Actually, because the Saudis want to keep the pressure on Saddam, it may be yes. But it still is \$1 billion a year. (S)

Mr. Gates: Let's go ahead and put together the package. (C)

LTG Vacillio: On the use of words, we think it would be better to call it a pause in our withdrawal rather than keeping a residual presence. (S)

Mr. Gates: Now on the isolation issue, there is a list of steps that has been agreed to interagency. I suggest we take the paper and show it to our bosses and see if they have any objections. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: On this, we don't want to make this us versus Saddam Hussein. First, it undercuts our effectiveness. Second, it set us up to not be able to achieve our goal of keeping the pressure on him. So we are thinking we should go to a core group of the Brits, France, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Turks and the Egyptians first to lay out what we are doing, get their reaction, and then go to other governments. (S)

Mr. Gates: We would have the core group do these things? (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Right. We would make a similar approach and try to lock them in, and also go to the Arabs with money in their pockets to help the ^(S) Turks. We need to do this soon. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: If the core group agrees that Iraq should resume oil sales, is there any reason why we shouldn't? (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: At some point we are going to have to confront as a political issue whether to permit oil sales for food and humanitarian items. There are already negotiations now by the Australians and the French with Iraq. We don't know how much money they have left. We want to keep oil turned off so long as the core group is together on it. I suspect though eventually it will be turned on in the north through Turkey. (S)

Mr. Gates: Dick, could you see what the UN has documented on the 3000 tons of flour that went to Tikrit and not to Mosul? The President is interested in this after hearing about it from the briefer this morning. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: If this is a problem, we should turn it back on them -- saying that's why giving this stuff to Iraq is not a good idea unless it is better monitored. In trying to decide what to do about granting food aid at the conference, our feeling is until there is monitoring they shouldn't send in food of any sort. We are talking about U.S. tax dollars. But we don't know other people's views. (S)

Mr. Gates: I think we should play it both ways. They need to step up to the plate. We should tell them the reason we have been reluctant to send in food is because of the monitoring problem. Without a monitoring mechanism we should drag our feet in general. We should explain about the flour being sent to Saddam's village. Saudi Arabia should put this story out on its radio into Iraq. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: We'll call Natsios, and tell him we are prepared to help women and children, but we want it monitored. (S)

Mr. Gates: At some point, the special commission on compensation and the percentage will be settled. Then it will be in our interest to allow oil to flow and let Iraq pay people. I would combine it. If they are going to buy food and humanitarian goods, then they should pump twice as much oil with half for food and half for compensation. When we begin to implement the compensation package we will reach that fork in the road, but probably not for another two or three months. But there should be no oil sold other than for humanitarian reasons. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: That is an important signal to send to Saudi Arabia and inside Iraq. (C)

Mr. Gates: To conclude, Richard will write the paper first thing and circulate it, and you should show your principals the action package on isolating Iraq. Operationally, on the second, there should be a cable prepared to go to the core group. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

Attachment

Options for Steps following the Withdrawal
of U.S. Forces from Northern Iraq

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Options for Steps Following the Withdrawal
of U.S. Military Forces from Northern Iraq

USG intention is to withdraw military forces as soon as feasible. This should be done in coordination with other coalition member governments which have forces present. The U.N. and PVO presence will remain, and U.S. steps should to the extent possible underpin their efforts in Northern Iraq.

Potential Steps

1. Advise Iraq not to move forces into certain defined areas (e.g., Dohuk). Downside is that such a step implies that Iraq has free military hand in areas outside of the defined zone.
2. Maintain a visible U.S. and coalition deterrent force (e.g., air assets) in Southeastern Turkey beyond normal peacetime presence. Downside is that Turks may resist this or be unwilling to permit employment of such forces if U.S. deems it necessary.
3. Maintain deterrent offshore (Mediterranean and Persian Gulf) and return to normal peacetime profile in Turkey. Downside, Turks may refuse overflight for combat mission and offshore presence may look less threatening to Saddam than troops on the border.
4. Ask other coalition members to join U.S. in declaratory statement that if ethnic fighting intensifies in Iraq, allies will react accordingly. Downside is that anti-regime forces in Iraq can then take initiatives to attempt to provoke U.S. and allied military re-engagement.
5. Declare that oil pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia will be kept closed (or shut down if pumping resumes) if ethnic reprisals are undertaken by Iraq. Downside is uncertain threshold which would trigger U.S. reaction and probability that Turks will refuse closing the pipeline again once it has been opened without new sanctions.
6. Issue general declaration, after coordination with allies, that coalition forces will be watching carefully internal events in Iraq and will take appropriate steps if situation requires. Downside is uncertainty regarding threshold which would trigger reaction.

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7. Be prepared to seek a new U.N. resolution if the situation worsens to bolster unified international action. Downside, may be hard to get the backing and goes into operation only after the situation worsens.
8. Confidentially identify and formulate contingency plans to strike military and/or economic targets in Iraq if the NCA so decides.
9. Inform Kurds (and Shia?) that provocative actions on their part will not generate U.S. response.
10. Publicize Iraqi reorganization and consolidation of military forces, Iraqi resource allocations for military, and what is known about Iraqi financial, food, and medical supply status.
11. Reiterate publicly themes in UNSC Resolution 688 concerning Iraqi treatment of its citizens. Underline that this will have a bearing on oil exports, sanctions lifting, and international relations with Iraq.
12. Tell Iraqis that they have the burden of proving both to their own citizens and to the U.N. that conditions are secure in regions evacuated due to civil strife. To this end, the Iraqi armed forces and security personnel must do nothing to interfere with international relief activities.
13. Continue CAP over Iraq north of 36th parallel while international relief activities continue. Downside is continued involvement of U.S. forces, need for Turkish acquiescence and need to change ROE and new mission statement if CAP is no longer supporting coalition forces on the ground.
14. Maintain reconnaissance coverage of Iraq including necessary overflights.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	6/4/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
Copy of By MM on 11/3/2022

Date Closed: 9/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2256-MR(503.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/23/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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20470

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: June 4, 1991
LOCATION: The Situation Room
TIME: 4:10 - 5:07 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of NSC Deputies Committee
Meeting on Iraq

PARTICIPANTS:

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
John Kelly

White House

Mr. Gates

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Fredrick Smith

NSC

Richard Haass
Sandra Charles

JCS

Henry Viscellio
Merrill Ruck

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3)

Summary of Conclusions

The Deputies Committee met to consider two issues: steps to further isolate Iraq and steps for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern Iraq. On the first issue, the DC endorsed the strategy and course of action proposed by the PCC. A cable outlining our proposed isolation strategy will be prepared and sent to a core group of countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, the UK and France) for consideration, and depending upon their reaction, would be disseminated more widely.

On the second issue, the DC agreed to the following strategy:

- The withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern Iraq should be low-key and quiet, with troops withdrawing as their tasks are completed, currently estimated to be by mid-July or sooner if events dictate. Suspend coalition combat air patrols north of 36 degrees once coalition forces have departed Iraq. These steps will be coordinated with our coalition partners.

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- Tell the Iraqis privately that the situation in northern Iraq is working now and they should leave it alone. The message would be conveyed in a general way to avoid implying that we are giving them a free hand elsewhere in Iraq, and to give us latitude to react to whatever Iraqi action we decide is provocative but with a strong warning of the consequences Iraq would face. The message would be issued to General Saber and through him to Saddam and the military. The message also would be delivered in New York and Washington to Iraqi diplomatic missions.
- Ask Turkey to conduct ground and air exercises in southern Turkey in a NATO context with U.S. forces that would rotate in. These exercises would complement exercises with the Gulf States. As noted earlier, we would withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq as tasks were completed, but pause in the redeployment of U.S. and coalition forces to monitor the post-withdrawal situation, provided the GOT agreed to keep limited numbers of U.S. military aircraft and personnel in country.
- Work quietly and privately with our allies to consider a new UN resolution if the situation deteriorates in order to bolster unified international action.
- Continue to formulate contingency plans to strike military and/or economic targets in Iraq if the NCA decides to do so.
- Inform the Kurds through the Military Coordinating Committee that provocative actions against Iraq on their part will not generate a U.S. response to support them. The Shia should not receive such a message for now.
- Publicize Iraq's reorganization and consolidation of military forces, Iraq's resource allocations for the military, what is known about Iraqi financial, food, and medical supply status, and the details of the recent diversion of humanitarian aid (flour) from Mosul to Tikrit. Also reiterate publicly themes in UNSC Resolution 688 on Iraqi treatment of its citizens, underlining that this will have a bearing on oil exports, sanctions lifting, and international relations with Iraq.
- State and NSC should prepare a written statement on our policy toward withdrawal from northern Iraq that can be used publicly and in congressional testimony.
- State is to approach Saudi Arabia to determine if it is prepared to continue to replace Iraqi oil for Turkey, estimated at \$1 billion per year.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	06/04/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Date Closed: 9/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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00286

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 1991
4:00PM - 5:00PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates
Andy Card (Invited but OOT)

NSC

Richard Haass

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
John Kelly

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Fredrick Smith

JCS

Henry Viscellio
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(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Cover Sheet	Re: Message no. 067641 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 286 - June 04, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraq, Keywords: Iraq

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
By DJC (NLGB) on 9/2/2009

Date Closed:	9/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	90020-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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DC 286

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067641

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ COVER + 3
FROM: A/S John H. Kelly NEA 647-7209 6242
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PAPER FOR TODAY'S (6/4) DC: OPTIONS FOR STEPS
FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM NORTHERN IRAQ

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

WH

Robert M. Gates

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(b)(3)

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FOR:

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
INFORMATION ☒

PER REQUEST ☐

COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CALL FOR PICK UP RIGHT AWAY. FOR A DC MEETING TODAY.

THANKS

S/S Officer: 

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON
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ATTACHMENTS

DOE 09/02/2009

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Options for Steps Following the Withdrawal
of U.S. Military Forces from Northern Iraq

USG intention is to withdraw military forces as soon as feasible. This should be done in coordination with other coalition member governments which have forces present. The U.N. and PVO presence will remain, and U.S. steps should to the extent possible underpin their efforts in Northern Iraq.

Potential Steps

- Exercise*
- ✓ 1. Advise Iraq not to move forces into certain defined areas (e.g., Dohuk). Downside is that such a step implies that Iraq has free military hand in areas outside of the defined zone.
 2. Maintain a visible U.S. and coalition deterrent force (e.g., air assets) in Southeastern Turkey beyond normal peacetime presence. Downside is that Turks may resist this or be unwilling to permit employment of such forces if U.S. deems it necessary.
 3. Maintain deterrent offshore (Mediterranean and Persian Gulf) and return to normal peacetime profile in Turkey. Downside, Turks may refuse overflight for combat mission and offshore presence may look less threatening to Saddam than troops on the border.
 4. Ask other coalition members to join U.S. in declaratory statement that if ethnic fighting intensifies in Iraq, allies will react accordingly. Downside is that anti-regime forces in Iraq can then take initiatives to attempt to provoke U.S. and allied military re-engagement.
 5. Declare that oil pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia will be kept closed (or shut down if pumping resumes) if ethnic reprisals are undertaken by Iraq. Downside is uncertain threshold which would trigger U.S. reaction and probability that Turks will refuse closing the pipeline again once it has been opened without new sanctions.
 - ✓ 6. Issue general declaration, after coordination with allies, that coalition forces will be watching carefully internal events in Iraq and will take appropriate steps if situation requires. Downside is uncertainty regarding threshold which would trigger reaction.

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- 2 -

- ✓ 7. Be prepared to seek a new U.N. resolution if the situation worsens to bolster unified international action. Downside, may be hard to get the backing and goes into operation only after the situation worsens.
- ✓ 8. Confidentially identify and formulate contingency plans to strike military and/or economic targets in Iraq if the NCA so decides.
- ✓ 9. Inform Kurds (and Shia?) that provocative actions on their part will not generate U.S. response.
- ✓ 10. Publicize Iraqi reorganization and consolidation of military forces, Iraqi resource allocations for military, and what is known about Iraqi financial, food, and medical supply status.
- ✓ 11. Reiterate publicly themes in UNSC Resolution 688 concerning Iraqi treatment of its citizens. Underline that this will have a bearing on oil exports, sanctions lifting, and international relations with Iraq.
- ✓ 12. Tell Iraqis that they have the burden of proving both to their own citizens and to the U.N. that conditions are secure in regions evacuated due to civil strife. To this end, the Iraqi armed forces and security personnel must do nothing to interfere with international relief activities.
13. Continue CAP over Iraq north of 36th parallel while international relief activities continue. Downside is continued involvement of U.S. forces, need for Turkish acquiescence and need to change ROE and new mission statement if CAP is no longer supporting coalition forces on the ground.
14. Maintain reconnaissance coverage of Iraq including necessary overflights.

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