

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2003-0261-F

FOIA Number:
2003-0261-F

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90020
Folder ID Number: 90020-003

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords:
Middle East, Export Controls

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. List	Deputy Committee Meeting Re: Attendee List [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/31/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
01b. Appointment Request	Mary Emery to Mr. Gates Re: Attendees [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/31/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
02a. Handwritten Note	Jim to Bob Re: pre-brief for this meeting (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02b. Memo	Richard Barth through Timothy Deal to Robert M. Gates, Re: Deputy Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, 2:00 P.M. May 31, 1991 [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	5/30/91	(b)(1)	S
02c. Talking Points	Re: Points to be made for DC meeting on Middle East Export Control (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02d. Paper	Re: Middle East Export Control Policy (10 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02e. List	Deputy Committee Meeting Re: Attendee List [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/31/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Page 1 of 3

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	National Security Council
Series:	H-Files
Subseries:	NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls
Pinksheet Number: DJC1145	
OA/ID Number: 90020-003	
Date Closed: 4/10/2009	
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2003-0261-F	
Re-review Case #:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
04a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
04b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/24/91	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
04c. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/24/91	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
04d. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
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04f. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et al. Re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, May 30, 1991 [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/24/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Page 2 of 3

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04g. Paper	Re: Middle East Export Control Policy (10 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
06. Letter	Joan M. McEntee to Reginald Bartholomew Re: export licensing options (3 pp.)	05/29/1991	(b)(1)	S

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Collection: Record Group: Bush Presidential Records Office: National Security Council Series: H-Files Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files WHORM Cat.: File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls	
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FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991
4:00PM - 5:00PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates
Andy Card

OVP

Karl Jackson

NSC

Richard Barth
Timothy Deal
Sandy Charles

STATE

Reginald Bartholomew
Allan Wendt

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Peter Sullivan

JCS

David Jeremiah
Kevin Cummings

CIA

Richard Kerr
[REDACTED]

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

OMB

Robert Howard

COMMERCE

Joan McEntee
Michael Galvin

DC 284

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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01b. Appointment Request	Mary Emery to Mr. Gates Re: Attendees [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/31/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
Collection: Record Group: Bush Presidential Records Office: National Security Council Series: H-Files Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files WHORM Cat.: File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls				
Date Closed: 4/10/2009		OA/ID Number: 90020-003		
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F		Appeal Case #:		
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:		
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:		
AR Case #:		MR Case #:		
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:		
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:		
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REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, May 31, 19 91
for Mr Gates of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Reginald Bartholomew	2/17/36
Allan Wendt	11/8/35
Peter Sullivan	8/18/45
Kevin Cummings	4/26/47

Joan McEntee	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6] 6/3/48
Michael Galvin	7/8/52

DRIVERS:

Ephriam Williams	1/16/41
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Bernard Jackson	6/12/25
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MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Room No. Sit Room

Time of Meeting 4:00PM

Requested by Mary Emery

Room No. WWGflr Telephone 6536

Date of request 5/31/91

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120407
RECEIVED: 30 MAY 91 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BARTH
DEAL

DOC DATE: 30 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
AGENDA
LIBYA

EXPORT CONTROLS
DC
IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKERS W/ AGENDA FOR 31 MAY DC MTG ON MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL
POLICY

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 03 JUN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BARTH

LOGREF: 9021250 9021255

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC284

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BARTH
DEAL
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By JS NARA, Date 04/10/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSAJC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120407

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91053109 FOR INFORMATION
X 91072914 NOTED BY GATES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DR NARA, Date 04/10/2009

~~SECRET~~



National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20407

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG Re A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>Bo</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 MAY 31 A 8:46

I = Information

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bob:

If you can spare a few moments, a pre-brief for this meeting would be desirable. It might also spare you the agony of wading through the longest interagency paper.

I believe we can ~~also~~ bring this experience to a sensible conclusion if the non-proliferation types can contain their desire to control everything. Bartholomew's talking points, for example, reportedly include a call for a massive supplementary list (an element in option II) that would be an administrative nightmare, totally impossible to negotiate multilaterally, and self-defeating given foreign availability. State's expert control people knew that, but the non-proliferation camp may have carried the internal argument.

Tim

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Memo	Richard Barth through Timothy Deal to Robert M. Gates, Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, 2:00 P.M. May 31, 1991 [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	5/30/91	(b)(1)	S
Collection: Record Group: Bush Presidential Records Office: National Security Council Series: H-Files Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files WHORM Cat.: File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls Document Partially Declassified (Copy of Document Follows) By <u>MM</u> on <u>5/25/2022</u>				
Date Closed: 4/10/2009		OA/ID Number: 90020-003		
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F		Appeal Case #:		
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:		
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:		
AR Case #:		MR Case #: 2011-1232-MR(500.01)		
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition: Released in Part		
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date: 6/8/2015		
RESTRICTION CODES				
<u>Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]</u> (b)(1) National security classified information (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells <u>Deed of Gift Restrictions</u> C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information * C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C] PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile <u>Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]</u> P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA] P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]				

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



20407

May 30, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: TIMOTHY DEAL *TD*

FROM: RICHARD BARTH *B*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, 2:00 PM May 31, 1991

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

A PCC ad hoc working group has completed a review of our export control policy towards the Middle East. The group developed three options for enhancing our controls on dual-use exports for Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria (Tab III). As the paper indicates, the group did not believe that any change in our policy toward other countries in the region was either necessary or desirable.

Background on Options

The paper presents three options covering these key issues:

- what to control;
- whether to implement supplemental controls on certain end-users; and
- what efforts are required to make sure that the controls are multilateral to the extent possible.

Option I, the most restrictive, would control (but not embargo) all non-food/humanitarian items. Option II would continue to use the COCOM lists, reduced by recent Core List decisions, as the basis for controls for these countries. It would be supplemented by a "safety net" control prohibiting any export to a military or police agency and require licenses for a number (yet to be determined) of items that could be militarily enabling for these destinations. Option III, the least restrictive, is the same as Option II, but without the supplemental list of militarily enabling items

Agency Positions

State and Defense will likely press for Option II because it allows for continued reliance on the COCOM lists, an administrative advantage, while giving them the option of the supplemental list of problematical goods and technologies focused on the military needs of the countries in this region.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-1232-MR
MM 6/8/2015

~~SECRET~~

2

Commerce recognizes the merits of this option, but has been unwilling to commit to it for several reasons. First, Commerce believes the recent improvements to the nonproliferation regimes, particularly in respect to these four countries, will result in denial of licenses for any items of significant strategic concern. Further, the safety net, as identified above, would prevent politically embarrassing shipments such as those that have embroiled Commerce in the post-Desert Storm finger-pointing on the Hill.

Commerce also is apprehensive about the yet-to-be-identified supplemental list, particularly if it ends up taking months to define, or attempts to control too many items. (State, to a large extent, shares the concerns on the supplemental list.)

1.4(6)

Trucks, Planes and Other Cases

Not surprisingly, the policy discussion will likely include reference to a number of pending export license cases that could be affected by the Deputies Committee decisions. The Commerce-chaired process should be encouraged to promptly deal with the cases within the time frames specified in NSD-53. Nonetheless, for your information, the following synthesizes some pending, high-priority cases.

Trucks - Heavy duty, on-the-road trucks for Iran for use in hauling earthquake relief material have never been controlled according to all agencies. However, despite NSC and State recommendations to clarify the status of these trucks as not controlled, and allow the shipment, Commerce has been unwilling to bite the bullet in the face of DOD's concern that the trucks could be used to haul SCUD launchers. This issue has been "in play" for over six months. Meanwhile Volvo seems to be filling the orders. Commerce is under strong domestic political pressure to allow the trucks to be shipped. An added factor is that it is highly unrealistic to expect to reach a multilateral consensus to control such trucks, making any U.S. controls unilateral in nature. Admiral Zumwalt, a board member of the exporter, calls us weekly on this issue.

Commercial Jets - Airbus is seeking to fill an order to ship commercial planes to Iran, but U.S. control of the GE jet engines is preventing such shipments. The U.S. components of the jets total about 17% of the aircraft value, which is within the range of "approvable" sales to Iran under current U.S. policy. Mitterrand will likely press the President to approve this shipment in the near future. Meanwhile, Airbus threatens to engineer-out GE from its next generation of planes as a result of this problem.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

RECOMMENDED APPROACH

We believe that any of the three options would adequately protect national security and would provide adequate guidance to industry and licensing officials. But Option I would be impossible to "sell" multilaterally.

If State and Defense lay down strong markers for Option II, Commerce is likely to agree and seek constraints on the length of the supplemental list. We recommend that you support reasonable constraints on the supplemental list if a consensus emerges for Option II. Your talking points suggest several points to that end:

- The list shall be developed by the PCC-Technology Transfer within 30 days.
- It should contain a limited number of technologies (e.g., 10 - 15); and national security justifications for each shall be provided by Defense.
- State must make every effort to make the supplemental list multilateral and should report to the Deputies on the results of its efforts within six months; if the list remains unilateral, the Deputies should reconsider the list.

Concurrences by: Sandra Charles and Daniel Poneman

Attachment (s)

Tab I	Agenda
Tab II	Talking Points
Tab III	Middle East Policy Paper

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: May 30, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

Agenda

- | | | |
|------|---|------------------|
| I. | Opening Statement | Robert Gates |
| II. | Discussion of Working Group Paper | All Participants |
| III. | Summary | Robert Gates |

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJL NARA, Date 07/10/2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DC MEETING ON
MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL

OPENING COMMENTS

- The policy paper developed by the working group looks at Middle East export control policy from nearly every angle. The group has, however, narrowed the options to three.
- Option I would control all but food and humanitarian items. It includes a presumption of denial for all problematical end-users or uses.
- Option II continues reliance on the diminished COCOM lists, but allows for a supplemental list of items that we know could be helpful to the military aspirations of these countries. It also includes a safety net that would embargo shipment of any items to a military or police entity.
- Option III is the same as Option II, without the supplemental list.

IF CONSENSUS DEVELOPS FOR OPTION II

- Option II makes sense from a political and national security view. However, we must be careful to avoid encumbering a sensible decision with nonsensical practical difficulties.
- What is State's assessment of the negotiability of a supplemental list?
- What are the likely reactions from industry and Congress?
- Practically speaking, what can the market bear?
- I believe we need to place some careful constraints on the development of the supplemental list.
- The list should be developed by the PCC-Technology Transfer within 30 days.

Opt I
Libya
Opt II
Syria
Iran

- . It should contain not more than ten to fifteen items or technologies, and national security justifications for each must be provided by Defense.
- State must make every effort to make the supplemental list multilateral and should report to the Deputies on the results of its efforts within six months; if the list remains unilateral, the Deputies should reconsider the list.

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991
4:00PM - 5:00PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates
Andy Card

OVP

Karl Jackson

NSC

Richard Barth
Timothy Deal
Sandy Charles

STATE

Reginald Bartholomew
Allan Wendt

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Peter Sullivan

JCS

David Jeremiah
Kevin Cummings

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

OMB

Robert Howard

COMMERCE

Joan McEntee
Michael Galvin

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120429
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 91 10

TO: GATES

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
SOC

EXPORT CONTROLS
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 31 MAY DC MTG ON MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
CONTROL POLICY

ACTION: GATES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 07 JUN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9021250 9021255

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC284

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DJL NARA, Date 04/10/2007

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSAJC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120429

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91060608 FOR DECISION
X 91060707 GATES APPROVED RECOM

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DS NARA, Date 04/10/2009

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Sum of Concl. - DC May 31

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 20429

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG WEA A/O _____

WFO

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

1

K

A

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

2

8

I

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

3

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NSC Secretariat

4

Bm

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91 JUN 5 P 6: 05

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

WP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20429

June 5, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for DC Meeting
on Middle East Export Control Policy

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions for the May 31 DC meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy.

Concurrence by: Sandra Charles

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached Summary of Conclusions for the files.

Approve 8

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJL NARA, Date 04/10/2009

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Document Declassified

COPY OF (Document Follows)

By MM on 5/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/10/2009

OA/ID Number: 90020-003

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #: 2011-1232-MR(501)

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition: Released in Full

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date: 6/8/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
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- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20429

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 31, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:00-5:00 P.M.



SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Middle East
Export Control Policy (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Karl Jackson

CIA:
Richard Kerr
(b)(3)

State:
Reginald Bartholomew
Allan Wendt

JCS:
David Jeremiah
Kevin Cummings

Defense:
Paul Wolfowitz
Peter Sullivan

White House:
Robert Gates
Andy Card

Commerce:
Joan McEntee
Michael Galvin

NSC:
Timothy Deal
Sandra Charles

OMB:
Robert Howard

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- DC members should consult Principals to determine their attitudes toward the possible liberalization of the export control regime for Syria and Iran resulting from COCOM's recent adoption of the Core list, which reduced the number of controlled items. (S)
- If the Principals support such liberalization, then COCOM's Core List should provide the basis for an export control regime for Syria and Iran. (S)
- If the Principals do not support such liberalization, then agencies should agree to a supplementary list of militarily enabling goods and technologies to add to the Core List. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-1231-MR
MAY 6/8/2015

- In developing any supplementary list, U.S. agencies should take account of the special needs of Syria and Iran. The Core List was developed with the USSR in mind, and the threshold for approving the export of militarily enabling goods and technology to these countries may need to be correspondingly lower. (S)
- State should be prepared to report to the DC on the stricter system of export controls adopted by Germany. (S)
- The USG should strive to obtain multilateral support for whatever control regime is established. (S)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120395
RECEIVED: 23 MAY 91 10

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS
AGENDA

MIDDLE EAST
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
CONTROL POLICY

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 27 MAY 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9021250 9021255

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC284

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DSZ NARA, Date 04/10/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120395

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SITTMANN
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91052412 FOR SIGNATURE
X 91052415 SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DO2 NARA, Date 04/10/2009

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20395

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 210 A/O _____

SL

Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

91 MAY 24 12:05

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1
2

✓
N

A

3

WMSK4 DN/R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

NOM - DC - May 30

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9120395
DATE 24 MAY 91

SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

5/24/91

TIME

4:15 PM

SIGNATURE

Anthony Taph

COPY: 1

HOWARD, R

OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
ROOM 238 OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

5/24/91

1613

J. Graves

COPY: 1

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LOG 9120395
DATE 24 MAY 91

SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

5/24

5:00PM

Charles W. Alexander

COPY: 1

HOWARD, R
OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
NATL SECURITY & INTL AFFAIRS
ROOM 238 OEOb
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

COPY: 1

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DJL 04/10/2009

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

c 5/24

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9120398
DATE 25 MAY 91

SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL PCC MTG NOTICE ON 30 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

5/25/91

TIME

1645

SIGNATURE

J. Zelm

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DTC 04/10/2009

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Date Closed: 4/10/2009

OA/ID Number: 90020-003

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



D
1625

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Defer

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0826

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~PAGES 14

FROM

WILLIAM F. BITTMANN

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG

RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

LOG # 20395

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

STATE

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY

EXEC SEC

DoD

COL. JOHN A. DUBIA

EXEC SEC

COMMERCE

MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE

CHIEF OF STAFF/

ASS. SEC

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

CIA

JCS

COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC

REMARKS

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DZ 04/10/2009

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/24/91	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Date Closed: 4/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE **IMMEDIATE**
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *[Signature]*

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0826 CLASSIFICATION~~SECRET~~PAGES 14FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG

RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

LOG # 20395

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

STATE

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY

EXEC SEC

DoD

COL. JOHN A. DUBIA

EXEC SEC

COMMERCE

MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE

CHIEF OF STAFF/
ASST. SEC

CIA

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

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COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/24/91	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Date Closed: 4/10/2009

OA/ID Number: 90020-003

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Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

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THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE **IMMEDIATE**
PRIORITY
 ROUTINE

RELEASER: Rife

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0826

CLASSIFICATION

SECRETPAGES 14

FROM

WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG

RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

LOG # 20395

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

STATE

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY

EXEC SEC

DoD

COL. JOHN A. DUBIA

EXEC SEC

COMMERCE

MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE

CHIEF OF STAFF/
SEC. SEC

CIA

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

JCS

COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC

REMARKS

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 REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
 ATTACHMENTS

DJL 04/10/2009

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Date Closed: 4/10/2009

OA/ID Number: 90020-003

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

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TIME OF RECEIPT



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: Rife

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0826

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~PAGES 14

FROM

WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG

RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

LOG # 20395

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

STATE

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY

EXEC SEC

DoD

COL. JOHN A. DUBIA

EXEC SEC

COMMERCE

MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE

CHIEF OF STAFF/
AGG. SEC

CIA

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

JCS

COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL SEC

REMARKS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

DZ 04/10/2009

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04e. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al. Re: Agenda and Discussion Paper for 30 May DC Meeting [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Date Closed: 4/10/2009

OA/ID Number: 90020-003

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE **IMMEDIATE**
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *Rife*

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0826 CLASSIFICATION~~SECRET~~PAGES 14FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTGRE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICYLOG # 20395

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	MR. J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	
DoD	COL. JOHN A. DUBIA	EXEC SEC	
COMMERCE	MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE	CHIEF OF STAFF/ ASS. SEC	
CIA	[REDACTED]	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
JCS	COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL	SEC	

REMARKS _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

DJZ 04/10/2007

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04f. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, et.al. Re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, May 30, 1991 [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	05/24/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Date Closed:	4/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

20395

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. THOMAS COLLAMORE
Chief of Staff and Assistant
Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

[REDACTED] (b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export
Control Policy, May 30, 1991 ~~(S)~~

There will be an NSC Deputies Committee meeting on Middle East
Export Control Policy at 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 30, 1991, in
the White House Situation Room. An agenda and discussion paper
are attached at Tabs A and B. ~~(S)~~

Attendance is principals plus one. Please phone my office at
202-456-6534 with the names and dates of birth of your attendees.
(U)


William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DJZ NARA, Date 04/10/2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: May 30, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

Agenda

- I. Opening Statement Robert Gates
- II. Discussion of Working Group Paper All Participants
- III. Summary Robert Gates

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DSL NARA, Date 04/10/2009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04g. Paper	Re: Middle East Export Control Policy (10 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

Date Closed: 4/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 90020-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

20395

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 23, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the agencies forwarding an agenda and discussion paper for the May 30 DC meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy.

Concurrences by: ~~Sandy~~ Charles

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Agencies
Tab A Agenda
Tab B Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *DT* NARA, Date *04/12/2009*

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120430
RECEIVED: 04 JUN 91 10

TO: GATES

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
MINUTES

EXPORT CONTROLS
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF DC MTG ON 31 MAY RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

ACTION: HILL APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 07 JUN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9021250 9021255

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC284

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DJ2 NARA, Date 04/10/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAJC

CLOSED BY: NSAJC

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120430

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SITTMANN
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91060608 FOR DECISION
X 91060609 HILL APPROVED RECOM

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By 552 NARA, Date 04/10/2009

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WTA

LOG # 20430

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

WTA

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

1

K

A

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

2

N

NSC Secretariat

91 JUN 5 P 6. 12

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20430

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 4, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TE*

SUBJECT: Minutes of DC Meeting on Middle East

NOTED

Attached at Tab I are the minutes of the May 31 DC meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy.

Concurrence by: Sandy *Charles*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached minutes for the files.

Approve *KSA* Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Minutes

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *DZ* NARA, Date *04/10/2009*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 284 - May 31, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control Policy, Keywords: Middle East, Export Controls

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 5/25/2022

Date Closed: 4/10/2009

OA/ID Number: 90020-003

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #: 2011-1232-MR(503)

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition: Released in Part

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date: 6/8/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20430



Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: May 31, 1991

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00-5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Minutes of DC Meeting on Middle East Export Control
Policy (C)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:

Karl Jackson

State:

Reginald Bartholomew

Allan Wendt

Defense:

Paul Wolfowitz

Peter Sullivan

Commerce:

Joan McEntee

Michael Galvin

OMB:

Robert Howard

CIA:

Richard Kerr

(b)(3)

JCS:

David Jeremiah

Kevin Cummings

White House:

Robert Gates

Andy Card

NSC:

Timothy Deal

Sandra Charles

Minutes

Mr. Gates: The Working Group has completed a study of our Middle East export control policy and developed three options:

-- Option I would control all but food and humanitarian items. It includes a presumption of denial for all problematical end-users or uses.

-- Option II continues reliance on the diminished COCOM lists, but allows for a supplemental list of items that we know could be helpful to the military aspirations of these countries. It also includes a safety net that would embargo shipment of any items to a military or police entity.

-- Option III is the same as Option II, without the supplemental list. (S)

I would like to go around the table. But first let me throw out an idea. Basically, we are talking about four countries. In effect, Option I is what we have in place for Iraq and Libya. Option II then is aimed at Iran and Syria. It calls for a supplementary list of technologies to be added to the COCOM Core

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2011-1232-MR
MM 6/8/2015

List. We would try to get multilateral agreement to these controls. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: I would refine Option II in the case of Syria and Iran. I assume that when you talk about the Core List you are talking about a presumption of denial for military end-uses and end-users and case-by-case review for civilian end-users. (S)

We would then attempt to seek multilateral approval of controls for Syria and Iran which would encompass the Core List and a supplementary list of technologies. We can add unilaterally any important items dropped from the Core List. (S)

In seeking multilateral agreement, it's important to recognize that we have never had one before for Syria and Iran. In other COCOM countries exporters had to go to the licensing authorities for exports to Syria and Iran of items on the COCOM list, but approval of the licenses was pro forma. Thus, we will be breaking new ground. (S)

Mr. Gates: In certain cases we must be prepared to go it alone. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: We always have that option. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: I would like some clarification. Are you talking about a presumption of approval for civilian end-users? (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: No. Simply case-by-case review. (S)

Mr. Wendt: In COCOM there is generally approval for controlled items going to bonafide civilian end-users. The allies would oppose a presumption of denial. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: But we are not saying a presumption of approval either. (S)

Mr. Wendt: The Germans are far ahead of us. They are not shipping certain items to any end-users. (S)

Mr. Gates: In the case of Iran, Japan and others are going to ship regardless of what we do. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: At the present time we have no way of "looking at" what Britain, for example, will ship to these countries. With a multilateral agreement, they would have to come in for case-by-case review. (S)

Ms. McEntee: I recommend that we keep the current total embargo in place for Iraq and Libya. (S)

Mr. Gates: We would be prepared to keep that in place even if we were alone. (S)

Ms. McEntee: Commerce has regulations for commodity classifications. We are getting into a bind. We are getting

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3

calls from exporters concerning dual-use, but non-sensitive goods destined for these countries. We have looked to the interagency group for guidance, for example, on heavy duty trucks for Iran. There is some sensitivity on the part of some agencies because of the part of the world in which these trucks would be used. (S)

Option II is well-intentioned, but inappropriate. It doesn't solve the problem of the heavy duty trucks which, for example, might be used to transport SCUDs. We feel strongly that with the new non-proliferation regimes we are covered adequately. There is therefore no need for a new regime. We do not know what a new list would look like or even why we need it. (S)

Regarding the multilateral approach, let's recall that we couldn't get the Australia Group to agree to limit exports of the 50 chemicals. The Nuclear Suppliers Group can't agree on limits either. (S)

Going to COCOM and seeking agreement to control exports to Syria and Iran of computers with a PDR of 62 or certain machine tools is unrealistic. This doesn't get at the problem and would prove more onerous for U.S. exporters. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: Isn't the problem the shrinkage of the Core List? (S)

Mr. Gates: We have had to undertake a massive effort to get others to agree to the proliferation controls, much less dual-use items. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: If you develop a supplementary list, we will be asking our allies to do even more than they are doing now for Iran and Syria. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: We are not getting them to adopt a multilateral regime, but to impose a national licensing requirement. (S)

Mr. Gates: There are two basic decisions: our own policy and our desire to get multilateral agreement. The first is more important. (S)

Ms. McEntee: We favor Option III. With the Core List, other export control regimes, and the safety net for military end-uses and end-users, we have an adequate system. (S)

Mr. Gates: Before the war, would the regime that Commerce is proposing have caught dual-use or CBW material for Iraq? Dennis Kloss made a pitch for regional security for MTCR items. Does the suggested approach spread the net wide enough to catch the kinds of stuff that went to Iraq? (S)

(S)(b)(3)

Mr. Gates: Would Option II have gotten them? (S)

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Mr. Bartholomew: Option II will require fewer licenses. That in itself is a political statement. Option II says essentially take the Core List and add things that really count. (S)

Ms. McEntee: Other countries won't add to the list. We will end up having to drop things from our list or end up with unilateral controls. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: The Germans are now controlling items that are not on the new COCOM Core List, for example, the hydraulic parts of weapons -- the "big gun"; heavy presses; items used in gas centrifuge. These are not controlled on the COCOM list. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: What about the titanium furnace? (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: We would get that through the provision concerning whether an exporter "knows or is informed" about a questionable export. This is EPCI. (S)

Ms. McEntee: Yes, EPCI is a new control regime, but we can't get the regulations out. (U)

Mr. Bartholomew: Even if we take all the non-proliferation lists, there are certain things that are not controlled that were used to build Iraq's war machine. (S)

Mr. Wendt: The only difficulty with the supplementary list will be obtaining multilateral agreement. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: What about heavy duty trucks? (U)

Ms. McEntee: If heavy duty trucks are the target, we need a new regime. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: The basic fact is that we are decontrolling items, civil aircraft, for example. (S)

Mr. Gates: Yes and because of prior controls Airbus is engineering out GE parts from Airbus aircraft shipped to these countries. (S)

Ms. Charles: The fact is that we have not looked at our policy toward these countries since the end of the war. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: The controls imposed on Syria and Iran were not for national security reasons. They were imposed because of those countries' support for terrorism, to inflict pain. If we go all the way to Option III, we are in effect making a decision that the items controlled are controlled not for national security, but for terrorism purposes. Some in State would therefore like to reimpose the old set of controls. (S)

Mr. Gates: That means in effect that we would have a tougher policy for a recent ally than for the USSR. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: Let's recall that these countries are on the list for terrorism. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: It's not just a question of trucks. Reducing the Core List is the problem. These countries are a long way behind the USSR, and machine tools that are of little use to the USSR may be a big help to Iranian and Syrian weapons programs. (S)

Mr. Wendt: And we could put advanced computers and semiconductor technology in the same category. (S)

Ms. McEntee: I come back to what I said before. If we want to catch such items, you have to have tighter controls. But if we go back to the old COCOM list, we will not have multilateral cooperation. (S)

Mr. Wendt: The issue is whether it's worthwhile to get any kind of multilateral controls on these countries. (S)

Mr. Gates: France, Germany and others want relations with Iran. Going back to them to tighten controls would be useless. I have no problem in maintaining controls for punitive reasons, but I am not sure the Principals are on board. There is no chance of getting agreement to reinstate the old COCOM list for these countries. And if we can't get agreement here whether trucks should be on the list, it's likely to be a long list. People are going to be conservative to avoid adverse press publicity. (S)

Mr. Bartholomew: Again, using the COCOM list was for foreign policy and terrorism purposes. (S)

Ms. McEntee: But despite the terrorism designation, we have no controls to these countries for dynamite or hand guns. But we have controls on word processors. (S)

Mr. Gates: We have raised two key issues, and you should all go back and talk to your Principals about them:

1. This discussion has brought to our attention that we have been using the COCOM list for controls for punitive purposes. With the Core List exercise, we are, in effect, moving to liberalize trade with these countries. Are our Principals ready to do that? If the answer is yes, then the Core List alone will serve our purposes for a control regime. If the answer is no, then we have to have a supplementary list to move back toward where we were before. (S)

2. If we are going to try to make such controls multilateral, how do we do it? And what is the potential for it? (S)

I don't believe that we need an NSR on this subject, but it will depend on whether we have any disagreement. (S)

Mr. Wolfowitz: There is a third point. Even though items on the control lists may not be significant militarily to the USSR, they

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6

may be to Iran and Syria. And if the Core List is our only list, we could find ourselves in the position where our control regime is more liberal than Germany's. (S)

Mr. Gates: Can we clarify the German controls? Talk to your Principals, and we will get together again in the middle of next week. (C)

-- End of Meeting --

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PERSONS: BARTHOLOMEW, R

SUBJECT: COMMERCE COMMENTS ON DUAL USE EXPORT LICENSING TO MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: NFAR PER BARTH

DUE DATE: 03 JUN 91

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STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

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COMMENTS:

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20416
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Under Secretary for Export Administration
Washington, D.C. 20230

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May 29, 1991

Honorable Reginald Bartholomew
Under Secretary for International Security Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Reggie,

I understand that we will soon be asked to make a recommendation on the following issue: How should we manage dual-use export licensing to Iran, Libya and Syria now and Iraq later if sanctions are ever lifted? The NSC has distributed an options paper on this subject.

This letter seeks your support for Option III. This approach would embargo all products that appear on any one of the seven control lists maintained by Commerce and State. It would further add an additional safety net authorizing denial of any exports or reexports to any military end-users. No new control lists would be formed other than the seven product lists already implemented and in the process of being strengthened multilaterally. The attached chart diagrams how Option III would work in the context of the other seven principal export control regimes.

There are four principal reasons why the Administration should adopt this approach:

1. Option III announces to the world and U.S. industry that this Administration presumptively disapproves of any export trade with the Iranian, Libyan or Syrian military. The Administration's presumption of disapproval would be overriding and blunt all criticism of duplicity.
2. Option III would essentially embargo all truly enabling technology that is crucial to developing a meaningful defense industrial base around CBW, nuclear, missile or other sophisticated munitions programs.
3. Option III holds the best promise for coordinated multilateral adoption because most of our allies have already begun to implement end-user driven approaches (e.g. Germany, U.K., France, Italy, Spain). This was confirmed at last week's Australia Group meeting.
4. Controls on the dual-use products not already listed on one of the existing control lists would be meaningless because they are widely available from numerous foreign sources. These sources include not only the member countries of these multilateral regimes but numerous non-member states as well.

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
Options I and II are well-intentioned but inappropriate. Option I calls for licensing practically every export into these countries regardless of strategic criticality or the end user. If U.S. unwillingness to accept the strategic risk of selling dual-use word-processors or hand-held calculators is so high as to require this level of review regardless of the end-user, then the administration should impose a Cuba-style embargo and not waste scarce available licensing and enforcement resources on this overly burdensome exercise.

Option II calls for the creation of yet another "enabling technologies" control list. This new list would consist of dual-use products that our multilateral partners (and interagency list review experts) have already determined not to be strategically critical. If we want to strengthen control lists, then the Administration should do so through one or a number of the seven multilateral control regimes that are already being strengthened or are in formation.

Neither Option I nor II solves the real issue: Whether to approve lesser strategic but sophisticated dual-use exports licenses to even legitimate commercial end-users due to non-specific and speculative concerns about risk of diversion scenarios. Examples include heavy trucks to oil exploration companies, commercial passenger planes to state airlines and computers to schools and hospitals, all of which could conceivably be diverted to military use at some future date. Under Options I and II, case-by-case processing of these lesser strategic but sophisticated export licenses in the context of these unspecified diversion concerns means that the NSC will be asked for country policy clarification on a continuing and frequent basis.

For all of these reasons, I urge your consideration of Option III as the most strategically responsible and multilaterally acceptable approach.

Sincerely,




Joan M. McEntee

cc: Robert M. Gates

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OPTION III: CURRENT COMBINED CONTROLS WITH SAFETY NETS



- SAFETY NETS require a license, with presumption of denial, for *any* exports or reexports to *any* chemical, biological, nuclear, missile, or *any* other military projects.

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DC 287

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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SUBJECT: AGENDA & DISCUSSION PAPER FOR 30 MAY DC MTG RE MIDDLE EAST EXPORT
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