

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2003-0261-F; 2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90019
Folder ID Number: 90019-019

Folder Title:

NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East,
Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. List	Deputy Committee Meeting' Attendee List. [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(3)	
01b. Appointment Request	Mary Emery to Appointments Center [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(3)	
02a. Memo	Daniel Poneman through Arnold Kanter to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Meeting on WMD in the Middle East, April 10, 11 a.m., Situation Room [redacted] (5 pp.)	04/09/1991	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points to be made for Deputies Committee Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East [redacted] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region [redacted] (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02e. List	Re: ARCA / WMD Gameplan (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02f. Memo	Re: ARCS / WMD Initiative Gameplan (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Pinksheet Number: DJC1144

OA/ID Number: 90019-014 *019*

Date Closed: 4/9/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2003-0261-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02g. List	Deputy Committee Meeting Attendee List [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(3)	
02h. Outline	Background Re: arms sales (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03a. Summary	Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee (2 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(1)	S
03b. Meeting Minutes	Meeting of the Deputies Committee (7 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
04a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Stapleton Roy, et.al Re: April 10 Deputies Committee Meeting on Mideast Arms Control [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
04b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Mr. Karl Jackson, et.al. Re: April 10 Deputies' Committee Meeting on Mideast Arms Control [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/09/1991	(b)(3)	
04c. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region [redacted] (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region [redacted] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 1991
11:15AM - 12:15PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates
Andy Card

OVP

Karl Jackson

NSC

Arnold Kanter
Sandra Charles

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
Richard Clarke

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Henry Rowen

JCS

David Jeremiah
Edwin Leland

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3)

OMB

William Diefenderfer
Daniel Taft

ACDA

Ronald Lehman
Bradley Gordon

ENERGY

John Tuck
Victor Alessi

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEGB

Please admit the following appointments on Wednesday, April 10, 1991
for Mr Gates of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Robert Kimmitt	12/19/47
Richard Clarke	10/30/50
Paul Wolfowitz	12/23/43
Henry Rowen	10/11/25
David Jeremiah	2/25/34
Edwin Leland	5/3/39
Richard Kerr	10/4/35
<u>(b)(3)</u>	
Ronald Lehman	3/25/46
Bradley Gordon	5/22/49
John Tuck	5/28/45
Victor Alessi	11/26/39

DRIVERS:

George Patrick	1/1/32
Matthew Turner	9/23/32
Larry Wineglass	5/3/58
John Davis	12/6/49
Vincent Jackson	7/15/48

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Room No. Sit Room

Time of Meeting 11:15AM

Requested by Mary Emery

Room No. WW Gf1 Telephone 6536

Date of request 4/10/91

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEGB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120262
RECEIVED: 10 APR 91 07

TO: GATES

FROM: PONEMAN
KANTER

DOC DATE: 09 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PERSIAN GULF

MIDDLE EAST
IRAQ
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR 10 APR DC MTG RE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN MIDDLE
EAST

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 13 APR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC270

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
KANTER
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By JS NARA, Date 04/09/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSEF

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9120262

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91041007 FOR INFORMATION
X 91072613 NOTED BY GATES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DL NARA, Date 04/09/2009

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

20262

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20262

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM ~~PR~~ NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG DD A/O _____

Mike

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

1

14

I

Bill Sittmann

2

Bob Gates

3

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

4

24.7/26

N

NSC Secretariat

5

[Signature]

91 APR 10 A 7: 05

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

P = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	Daniel Poneman through Arnold Kanter to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Meeting on WMD in the Middle East, April 10, 11 a.m., Situation Room [redacted] (5 pp.)	04/09/1991	(b)(1)	S

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**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By RA on 10/12/13

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-1231-MR (500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/6/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20262

2572

CHRON FILE

April 9, 1991

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT: Deputies Meeting on WMD in the Middle East,
April 10, 11 a.m., Situation Room



Attached at Tab II are State-drafted, interagency-cleared papers proposing a series of steps toward a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and surface-to-surface missile (SSM) initiative for the Middle East. (The paper defines WMD to exclude SSMs.) They include an "executive version" of the proposal, a "longer analytical" version thereof, and a "gameplan" for developing and unveiling a combined proposal on WMD and Additional Restraints on Conventional Arms (ARCA).

Background and your objectives for the meeting

You will recall that, in your meeting with Baker, Cheney, and Powell, you decided that the ARCA needed to be embedded in the larger framework of a combined WMD/ARCA package. In such a package, it is desirable to be comprehensive -- anything else may look incomplete. Nevertheless, some proposed initiatives are more feasible than others, while some initiatives depend on others.

The interrelationships among initiatives run in many directions. Israelis have made clear that their cooperation on WMD measures depends on curbing conventional arms transfers to their traditional Arab adversaries. (b)(1)

(b)(1) Supplier governments may link their restraint in WMD-related exports to greater opportunities to export conventional arms.

This regional initiative also needs to be related to the Iraq-specific package of measures recently adopted by the UNSC. Since we are unlikely to be able to obtain anything nearly so draconian on a region-wide (i.e. voluntary) basis, the Iraq-specific measures may serve as a benchmark against which to measure other proposals.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

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Declassify on: OADR

2001-1949-F
SCS 9/6/12

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The papers presented also do not adequately address the foregoing issues, or the constraints these initiatives must overcome to succeed. The papers also leave unclear the role the Principals are to play in consideration of the package, while proposing a gameplan that assumes that the USG will present the package as a fait accompli to the world rather than consult with key allies and Congressional leaders prior to a Presidential decision. The gameplan does not adequately spell out the concrete steps needed to bring the initiatives, if approved, to fruition.

Therefore we recommend that you use this meeting to achieve four objectives:

1. Weave the initiatives into a package that conveys a sense of feasibility and priorities.
2. Embed the WMD initiative in the existing, Iraq-specific effort.
3. Clarify the gameplan, both bureaucratically and diplomatically.
4. Scrub the initiatives for merit and feasibility.

Suggested talking points appear at Tab I.

Objectives of the package

These can be boiled down from the State draft to (1) reducing the military risk to U.S. and allied forces and territories, and (2) supporting broad regional objectives -- attaining Arab-Israeli peace, preserving access to oil, containing ambitious regional powers, and promoting regional stability. The package should generate public and Congressional support for these objectives, including the conventional arms transfers to the region that help accomplish them.

Initiatives and constraints

The Deputies need to satisfy themselves that the proposed initiatives promise a reasonable prospect of success, to avoid their denunciation by their intended beneficiaries and consequent embarrassment to the Administration. (In any case we should avoid overselling them.) Confidence-building measures may help bridge the gap between proposal and achievement of the major goals.

Supplier Constraints. This proposal cuts across the weapon-specific measures, and is a good idea for three reasons:

- (1) The proposal will reinforce existing efforts in the Australia Group, MTCR, and various nuclear fora to restrain dangerous exports.

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- (2) The proposal would bring China and the Soviet Union further into the emerging consensus in favor of export constraints without raising the awkward questions arising from formal membership in the existing regimes. securing Chinese and Soviet agreement not to transfer missiles or related production facilities alone would be a major accomplishment.
- (3) The proposal may be achievable, though securing effective Soviet and Chinese enforcement of agreed guidelines will be difficult.

One point that appears merely semantic in fact is substantive: we should avoid the term "clubs" -- a phrase that, if it sticks, will by its bad history (e.g., the "London Club" of nuclear suppliers from the 1970s) stigmatize these arrangements as cartels and thereby undermine their effectiveness.

The key constraint is that supplier agreements can be undercut by renegade suppliers. North Korea is the most intractable offender,

The Deputies should consider the level of supplier adherence needed to ensure that the security benefits of restraints are not outweighed by the opportunity costs of lost exports.

Another constraint is the difficulty of enforcing supplier guidelines for dual-use technologies. Guidelines to restrict the export of complete weapon systems or specialty components are more feasible, but covert procurement networks combined with the widespread availability and low technology of many CBW-related items often frustrate export control efforts.

The international gray market provides another source of "foreign availability" that should be considered.

Missiles. The initiative envisions a regional ban (including the elimination of missiles already in the region), perhaps preceded by an interim freeze on testing, production, or acquisition. The initiative would be pathbreaking. While supplier restraints exist through the MTCR, in the missile world there is no comprehensive norm intended to restrain the demand side of the equation (vice the NPT, BWC, and CWC for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, respectively).

One key constraint is the difficulty in overcoming the existing view that missiles are a legitimate element in national arsenals, as reflected by the widespread (and fairly overt) missile acquisition to date. The SCUD campaign in the Gulf War has sown

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
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4

the seed of a new view (that missiles are weapons of terror), but one that has not yet rooted.

A second constraint




Given these constraints, one option is to urge only a freeze now, before promoting (and possibly overselling) a complete SSM ban for the region.

CWC. The WMD package would be enhanced by a major initiative on CW that is being addressed separately. In the regional context, we can call on all states in the area to become original parties to the CWC and to adopt appropriate provisions of the CWC now, as confidence-building measures. The WMD and CWC initiatives are being closely coordinated.

BWC. Given the problems in verifying or enforcing the BWC, the most we can hope for may be a package of enhancements to be pursued at the September Revcon and further efforts to broaden membership. The Arms Control PCC is looking at a package of such measures.

Nuclear. The initiative calls for a regional ban on the production of weapon-usable material, and reiteration of our existing policy (a) calling for NPT adherence and full-scope safeguards adoption by all regional states and (b) endorsing a region-wide nuclear weapon-free zone.



These constraints alter the feasibility, but not the desirability, of this (admittedly modest) initiative.

Gameplan

The "gameplan" included in the package provides a D-Day for Presidential announcement of the package of April 22: the British and French are informed on D - 5, the Soviets and Chinese on

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D - 3, and Congressional and regional leaders on D - 1. Presumably this schedule reflects a desire to preclude leaks and seize the moment, but it also precludes serious consultations with either Congressional or foreign allies. The Deputies should consider whether the President ought to present the package, whether and when (i.e. before or after the President decides) we need meaningful consultations and with whom, as well as the timing of the package generally. They should also request further elaboration of the concrete steps needed to implement the package, once unveiled.

Concurrence by: *DP for (draft)* Sandra Charles

Attachments

Tab I Talking Points
Tab II WMD Proposals and Gameplan

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
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DEPUTIES MEETING ON
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

- The State Department has pulled together a series of proposals on limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The idea is to combine a WMD package, conventional arms restraint, and the Iraq-specific actions already under way into an integrated package, and to get it out quickly.
- While I agree that we need to present a comprehensive package publicly, we need to acknowledge that some of these initiatives are more feasible than others, and many are interrelated. (b)(1)

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- We need to sort out these interrelationships and weave a package together for our principals that conveys a sense of feasibility and priorities. Which initiatives shall we push hardest, and how?
- We also need to embed this initiative in the existing, Iraq-specific effort. The ceasefire resolution can provide a checklist and a benchmark for regional efforts.
- In this meeting I would also like to review the specific initiatives and the gameplan for their implementation.

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OBJECTIVES

- It will be crucially important in generating support for our initiative that we have clear objectives, and that we can sell these objectives to the public and the Congress.
- In reading the discussion paper, it seems to me that our WMD objectives can be boiled down to two: (1) reducing the military risk to U.S. and allied forces and territories, and (2) supporting broad regional objectives -- Arab-Israeli peace, preserving access to Persian Gulf oil, promoting regional stability.

[Solicit views]

- I would suggest that State redraft the objectives of this initiative for presentation to the Principals with these comments in mind.

INITIATIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

- One general point: we need to be satisfied that each initiative that we recommend has a reasonable prospect of success. Otherwise we risk embarrassing the President if their intended beneficiaries reject them as "dead on arrival."
- We should also avoid overselling any initiative.

Supplier Constraints

- On supplier constraints, I think the idea is a good one. Indeed it may turn out to be the most feasible of all the initiatives and therefore our highest priority.

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- But I would urge that we get away from calling these arrangements "clubs," a term that can needlessly turn a push for responsible export policies into a divisive North-South issue.
- The key question is whether we are going to get enough suppliers to go along with us to make the constraints effective. This is hard enough for major weapon systems and even tougher when it comes to dual-use exports. What are the prospects of getting the Perm-5 to agree? What about the other major suppliers?

[Solicit discussion]

- The paper notes that "renegade suppliers" can threaten the effectiveness of supplier restraint. How serious is that threat and what should we do to meet it?

[Solicit discussion and draw conclusions]

Missiles

- The proposal for a ban on SSMS in the region is ambitious, and will be difficult to achieve for at least two reasons: (1) many states, especially in this region, still see SSMS as a legitimate element in their national defense strategies, and (2) the question of a missile ban in the Middle East brings us face-to-face with our space-launch vehicle policy, particularly in the case of Israel.
- Is this the time and Israel the place to tackle the issue of missile proliferation v. peaceful access to space? How do

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we engage the issue, if we need to? What are the consequences if we do not?

[Solicit views]

- One option would be to push hard for a missile freeze now, leaving open the option for a ban, and simultaneously to initiate a fast-track reconsideration of the SLV issue by an NSC-chaired group, for consideration by this group, say, in three weeks time.

CWC

- As you know, there is a major CWC initiative under consideration elsewhere. It is being closely coordinated with this initiative, and I see no reason to take it up at this meeting unless somebody thinks otherwise.


BWC

- The proposal is to enhance the Biological Weapons Convention at the September Review Conference and to urge its early application throughout the region.
- The Arms Control PCC is looking at a package of such measures and will report to the Deputies shortly.

[Solicit views]

Nuclear

- The proposal here is necessarily modest, since the nuclear issue cannot be truly resolved outside of the Arab-Israeli peace process.



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[Solicit views and frame conclusion]

GAMEPLAN

- The gameplan is, to say the least, ambitious.
- One missing element is what concrete steps can be taken on the initiatives, once they are unveiled, to bring them to fruition. Confidence-building measures could provide stepping stones to the larger goals.
- The gameplan also assumes that the President will announce this package, and that Congressional leaders and key foreign governments will simply be informed of its contents after a Presidential decision has been taken but before the unveiling.
- Since so much of the success of our Gulf policy has depended on frequent and serious consultation with all concerned, I must admit that this proposal gives me pause.
- I think we need to break down the gameplan by parts and consider whether the President ought to present the package publicly, and whether and when we should have meaningful consultations and with whom? If there are consultations, should they precede or follow the President's decision?

[Solicit views and frame conclusion; recap other conclusions]

- I would like to ask State to take the lead on incorporating

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the conclusions of this meeting in a new paper for
consideration by our principals by [INSERT DATE].

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Document Partially Declassified
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By SL on 10/12/13

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-1231-MR (500.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/6/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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A US Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region

In reviewing the proposal for Additional Restraints on Conventional Arms (ARCA) transfers to the Middle East, the Principals Committee requested that a US initiative be developed on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and surface to surface missiles in the region.

This paper contains the objectives and elements of such an initiative. A longer analysis of the initiative is attached. There was agreement in the senior interagency group that developed this paper that these elements comprise a comprehensive and realistic US proposal. The announcement of the WMD initiative should be folded together with the ARCA proposal to form an initial arms control package for the Middle East.

Many of the elements of the package would require commitment of the regional parties to a step-by-step confidence building process designed to realize the goals of our initiatives. Further analytical work will be needed to develop detailed proposals that take into account the evolving attitudes of regional countries. There was agreement, however, that the issues are sufficiently well known that the US can articulate an initiative now without having finalized our negotiating positions on some elements of the package.

Setting and Objectives

High level consultations with countries in the region and with other major powers has indicated a widespread sense that something should and can be done now to address weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the region. There is a willingness to begin a process.

US leadership and initiative is required, however, for something to happen. Overly ambitious plans will not work, but packages which do not appear to address WMD comprehensively or even-handedly will also fail.

US objectives on this question are well agreed:

--to add arms control to our means of increasing stability in the region, by achieving some initial results and creating an atmosphere and commitment to a process in which further and more ambitious arms control may be possible later;

--to reduce the risk to US forces and friendly states by starting a process that might reduce, and eventually eliminate, the threat of WMD and missiles in the region;

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--to do so consistent with our global security requirements and arms control positions;

--to do so without creating a net effect that diminishes the security of friendly states;

--to coordinate US moves on WMD in the region with our other regional priorities: the peace process, regional security structures in the Gulf, containment of post-war Iraq, and reducing the probability of new destabilizing conventional arms build-ups.

The WMD Package

The US proposal envisioned (summarized on page six) would contain both supplier restraints on all WMD and calls for action by regional states on each of the four types of weapons: missiles, CW, BW, and nuclear.

1. Iraq-Specific: The first element of our WMD package is already underway, i.e. the elimination of Iraq's remaining WMD through the UN Special Commission's activity.

o Evaluation: Iraq has apparently accepted UNSCR 687. The effectiveness of the Special Commission, however, will depend upon Iraq's willingness to permit the intrusive verification required.

2. Suppliers Constraints: To deal with conventional arms transfers to the region, we envision convoking the five major suppliers (who are also the Perm Five, P-5) and seeking an informal suppliers club that would, at a minimum, agree on guidelines for future transfers. These guidelines could also include agreement not to transfer weapons of mass destruction, their components, precursors, and means of manufacture, and to exercise restraint in the transfer of related technology. We could also ask the Perm-5 to make full-scope safeguards a condition for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

The guidelines we would propose would be based on the existing suppliers clubs in which the US, UK, and France participate now. As with the conventional arms guidelines, we would begin with the P-5 and perhaps involve other suppliers at a later stage. The P-5 would also address ways to effect the behaviour of renegade states such as North Korea.

o Evaluation: The P-5 are likely to agree to the export guidelines because they already have similar systems in place, with the possible exception of the Chinese. China's reluctance to join the existing clubs, however, may stem in part from their lack of involvement in their creation.

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3. Missiles: Most states in the region have surface-to-surface missiles. These missiles can carry nuclear, chemical and biological warheads. The mobility of launchers and short missile flight time make it hard to destroy them on the ground or in flight; thus, they are the most destabilizing element in the military equation. As a first step toward eliminating all WMD in the region, we could propose the elimination of all surface-to-surface missiles in the region (similar to the INF treaty). As an interim step, the US could also propose a freeze on all testing and perhaps on production and acquisition.

The US would be prepared to facilitate negotiation and CBMs, acting as a go-between and advisor. We would also be willing to participate directly in verification.

One issue that requires further work is whether the proposal should include the elimination of space launch vehicles (SLV) or whether we can develop a verification system that would satisfy regional states that SLVs did not have military capability.

o Evaluation: This proposal is ambitious, but it stands a better chance of success now than any other "free zone" proposal. No state will accept the proposal unless the states threatening it with missiles also do. Nor will they accept unless their potential enemies agree to intrusive inspection, a concept with which no state in the area has any experience. The success of this proposal will depend heavily upon active, high level US involvement. If it could be implemented, it would enhance the security of our friends and create an atmosphere for further steps. Few states are likely to agree to the interim step of a freeze of production and acquisition. A freeze on tests may be possible, largely because most states import missiles tested by others outside the region.

4. Chemical Weapons: The most effective way of dealing with CW in the region is by finalizing the global CW Convention (CWC) and by developing early confidence building measures in the region. A separate paper is being prepared on a major US initiative in the CW treaty negotiation. Depending upon the progress of that initiative, the US could be more or less specific about the CWC in its announcement on WMD in the region.

At a minimum, however, the US could include in the regional WMD proposal a call for the early completion of the CWC, our intention to make a major and detailed proposal when the negotiations resume, and a call for regional states to

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engage in early confidence building measures such as bilateral trial inspections (with the US or others).

o Evaluation: A major US push on the CWC stands a good chance of resulting in its successful conclusion in the next year. Most regional states will agree with the concept of proceeding on CW through a global approach. Some are likely to agree to trial inspections of some facilities. Syria, however, is extremely unlikely to give up its CW force.

5. Biological Weapons: Many states in the region have or are developing BW. These weapons pose a major threat because they can be delivered covertly and are difficult to counter. As with CW, BW is best approached globally first. The existing BW convention (BWC) has done little to date to prevent the proliferation of this class of weapon.

While it is impossible to develop an acceptable verification system for BW, there are steps that can be taken to improve the existing treaty. The Arms Control PCC is addressing a range of ideas and we are consulting with our allies in preparation for a treaty review conference (Revcon) in September.

Although we are not yet prepared to state what modifications of the BWC we will propose or support, we can say that we will work to improve the treaty at the Revcon and urge regional states to adopt CBMs.

o Evaluation Controlling BW through arms control may not be very successful, but we may be able to make the situation marginally better than it is now by tighter implementation of existing BWC provisions and including a small, permanent secretariat and some CBMs.


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
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In packaging this proposal, we would want to reiterate our existing policy calling for NPT adherence and full-scope safeguards by all regional states, and endorsing a region-wide nuclear weapons free zone (we have traditionally joined Egypt and Israel in supporting a Middle East NWFZ resolution in the UNGA).

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Elements of WMD Initiative

1. Iraq-Specific: Eliminate all WMD and put in place long term monitoring through the UN Special Commission.

2. Suppliers Constraints: Seek P-5 agreement on export guidelines to the region of WMD and surface to surface missiles in conjunction with ARCA restraints and CBMs; call for Perm-5 agreement on full scope safeguards as a condition for significant nuclear exports.

3. Missiles: Call for a zone free of surface to surface missiles; offer to facilitate agreement and assist in verification. Call for an interim freeze on production, acquisition, and testing.

4. CW: Call for early completion of the global treaty, announce US intention to make a comprehensive proposal when the talks resume, and suggest early confidence building measures (e.g. bilateral trial inspections) in the region.*

5. BW: Call for the enhancement of the existing global BW treaty and announce that we will make proposals at the September Review Conference.

6. Nuclear: Call for a verifiable ban on the production in the region of enriched uranium or separated plutonium; call for all nuclear facilities in the region to be placed under safeguards.

*The proposal could be more specific if the US initiative on the CWC is decided in time.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region [redacted] (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By SA on 10/19/13

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-1121-MR (500.03)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/6/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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A US Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region

This paper examines what might be the elements of a US initiative on weapons of mass destruction (WMD)* and surface to surface missiles (SSMs) in the Middle East. It is a companion piece to the paper on Additional Constraints on Conventional Arms (ARCA) transfers and is based upon discussions in a senior interagency group.

I. Objectives

There is a broad consensus that U.S. objectives in pursuing a WMD/SSM initiative are:

--to add arms control to our means of increasing stability in the region, by achieving some initial results and creating an atmosphere in which further and more ambitious arms control may be possible later;

--to reduce the risk to US forces and friendly states by starting a process that might reduce, and eventually eliminate, the threat of WMD and SSMs in the region;

--to do so consistent with our global security requirements and arms control positions;

--to do so without creating a net effect that diminishes the security of friendly states;

--to coordinate US moves on WMD in the region with our other regional priorities: the peace process, regional security structures in the Gulf, containment of post-war Iraq, and reducing the probability of new destabilizing conventional arms build-ups.

II. Assumptions

For the sake of simplifying the analysis, the paper makes several assumptions about which there has been interagency consensus:

* WMD in this paper means chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

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--Timing: The immediate post-war period provides a unique opportunity to have proposals on WMD/SSMs in the region well received;

--US Role: No proposal is likely to succeed without US leadership in its formulation, negotiation, and implementation;

--Relationship to ARCA: Any announcement of a US initiative on ARCA should be accompanied by proposals on WMD/SSMs in the region, given the greater problem posed by WMD/SSMs;

--Iraq: One key element of our approach to WMD/SSMs in the region is the elimination of Iraqi WMD/SSMs capability through the UN Special Commission, a subject not further addressed in this paper;

--Types of WMD: The US proposal should encompass all types of WMD/SSMs, including nuclear weapons, even if all of the US proposals are not equally ambitious or pursued with similar vigor;

--Region: Because of WMD/SSM developments in each of the subregions and because of the political salience of WMD/SSMs in each, the proposals need to cover the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Gulf. Thus, the region ought to be from Morocco to the Iranian/Pakistani border.

--Global/Regional: Some types of proliferation are best dealt with on a global basis, with some effort at special regional application (e.g. bans on chemical and biological weapons because more work has already been done on a global approach). Others may be best pursued regionally (e.g. SSM ban) because their global application could provide us with both political and security problems.

--Suppliers/Recipients: The approach should be characterized by U.S. leadership of multilateral efforts involving both suppliers and other regional states.

III. Elements of a Proposal

The building blocks of a US proposal are initiatives on each of the three components of WMD and SSMS, plus whatever overarching arrangements can be made on these through constraints on suppliers .

A. Suppliers Constraints

The proposal: To deal with additional restraints on conventional arms transfers to the region, we envision convoking the five major suppliers (i.e., the Perm-5) and

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seeking an informal agreement on guidelines. These guidelines could include agreement not to transfer weapons of mass destruction, their components, precursors, and means of manufacture.

o What Guidelines: To be effective, there would have to be agreement among the five on defining components, precursors, and means of manufacture. Three of the five (US, UK, and France) already agree on:

--SSM components and supporting technologies, through the MTCR annexes;

--chemical weapons precursors and dual use CBW equipment, through the Australia Group list of chemicals and watch list on equipment.

Four of the five (all but China) also agree on nuclear components and technology through the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines.

The Soviets, in the Washington Summit Joint Statement on Proliferation, said that they would support the MTCR guidelines. The partners are now embarking upon talks with the Soviets to complete that process. Although they are not members of the Australia Group, the Soviets already have good controls in place on CBW exports.

The Chinese do not belong to any existing suppliers groups.

Thus, rather than create de novo export guidelines, the US could propose supply guidelines consistent with those already in place.

Two questions that arise in using the existing guidelines are: 1) should we perfect them first, and 2) can we accept different guidelines with the Five Powers than we have with the G-7 plus like-minded countries?

--Perfecting the Guidelines: We have just concluded reviews of the existing guidelines in each of the three suppliers clubs.

Moreover, the process within the USG of modifying the existing guidelines before presenting them at a Five Power meeting could be time consuming.

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--Two Sets of Guidelines: If as a result of negotiation among the Five Powers, guidelines were adopted that were less stringent than those of the existing suppliers clubs, the US (and the UK and France) would implement those rules that were the most stringent. We already have some national export rules that are more stringent than those of the suppliers clubs of which we are a member.

o Relationship to Existing Groups: If we were to create a Five Power suppliers club that covered all types of WMD/SSMs, should we then seek to expand it to other members and to have it replace the existing suppliers clubs, or to become some sort of umbrella group under which the others would operate? We need not answer that question now in order to propose that the Five Powers agree on WMD/SSMs export guidelines. If we succeed with the Five Powers and are satisfied with their performance thereafter, expanded arrangements could be considered in consultation with the other partners of the existing groups. We are, however, generally satisfied with the performance of the existing groups and would not want to risk damaging their effectiveness by altering them.

The existing Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines call only for restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology; a multilateral dual-use technology regime is currently being negotiated. Western suppliers in practice have in place extensive dual-use controls implemented through their national systems. We would continue to pursue multilateral agreement in this area, and seek PRC commitment to apply the Guidelines.

A new initiative would be to seek Perm 5 agreement to require full-scope IAEA safeguards (i.e. safeguards on all nuclear facilities, whether indigenous or imported) as a condition for significant nuclear exports. This is currently required by US law, but not the policy of any of the other members of the group. There appears, however, to be growing momentum behind such an approach to nuclear trade, with Germany recently announcing a full-scope safeguards policy and the French reportedly considering it.

o Renegade States: The problem of WMD/SSM exports to the region would not be entirely solved by Five Power restraint, even if augmented by the existing groups. Renegade states, over which the Perm-5 have little leverage, will continue to be a problem. North Korea, the obvious example, is exporting SSMS and turn-key missile plants. The US could propose that the Five Powers undertake a commitment to use trade policy and economic assistance to induce non-member states to refrain from exporting WMD/SSMs to the region. Ultimately, the US could propose the use of economic sanctions against renegade states. Making such a proposal explicit at the outset, however, might make it more difficult to obtain Five Power agreement to a suppliers club.

B. Surface to Surface Missiles

The proposal: SSMs can easily carry nuclear, chemical and biological warheads. They have a short time of flight, and are hard to destroy before or after they are launched. As a result, these weapons are the most destabilizing element in the military equation. They were used in the recent Kuwait War, and earlier in the Iran-Iraq War, on civilian population centers. As a first step toward eliminating all WMD/SSMs in the region and building upon the US experience in the INF Treaty, we could propose the elimination of all SSMs by states in the region, and a ban on exports of SSMs, their components or technology to the region. As an interim step toward elimination of all SSMs in the region, the US could also propose a freeze on all testing and perhaps on production and acquisition.

o Regional Receptivity: Most states in the region have SSMs and would be required to destroy all (or part) of their inventory under the US proposal. There would be, therefore, some equality of obligation among the principal states. Nonetheless, we would be asking them to give up something on which they had spent large amounts. The fact that the Iraqis used SSMs in the war without any real military effect might help to persuade regional states to destroy their SSMs (if everyone else did) as a first step toward regional arms control.

--Israel might be persuaded to give up its Jericho series SSMs if all of the possible threat states also destroyed their SSMs. The IDF might well conclude a net assessment that it would be better off in a region without SSMs. Until Israel has a robust ATBM system (at great cost), it cannot stop Arab SSMs. It could, however, achieve high confidence defense against attacking Arab aircraft. Israel can deliver its own offensive weapons without SSMs, using its F-15/F-16 fleet, jamming aircraft, and aerial refuellers. Israel also has a Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) program, which it would want to maintain, even if it agreed to participate in a regional SSM ban.

--Syria has short range SS-21s and mid-range SCUDs. It is acquiring SCUD production capability from North Korea. (b)(1)

--The Saudis acquired the expensive and antiquated CSS-2 from China to deter Iranian (and Iraqi) missile attack. They would probably be willing to give up their small and inaccurate SSM force if they believed that states threatening them were also doing so.

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--Iran has nascent biological and nuclear weapons programs, a proven chemical capability, and used Scuds in the Iran-Iraq War. In view of its interest in acquiring additional types of SSMS from North Korea and China, Iran's willingness to participate in a regional SSM ban is questionable. However, the destruction of Iraq's capabilities may make Iran somewhat more amenable to the concept.

--Egypt cancelled its participation in the joint Condor/Vector/Badr missile project with Argentina and Iraq for financial and political reasons. It has, nonetheless, proceeded with an indigenous Scud factory in cooperation with North Korea. Its chief concern is Libya, which has short range Chinese SSMS and is attempting development of an indigenous system. If Israel were to participate, the motivations which led to the cancellation of the Badr might elicit Egypt's participation in a regional SSM ban.

o The US Role: The US does not have SSMS permanently stationed in the region. Thus, the US role would be to call upon the regional states to act. The US could facilitate that action in a number of ways:

--acting as a go between among states that would not sit down at a negotiating table together, i.e. negotiating parallel adherence to an agreement by a number of regional states.

--doing verification as a service to the regional states, acting as an honest broker for those states that would not want other regional states doing on-site verification;

--providing missile defense to those states that agreed to give up their offensive capabilities (see below);

--assisting with space launch capabilities either through the provision of US launches (perhaps at reduced rates) for satellites of states that agree to give up SSMS, or verifying that indigenous SLV capabilities did not have offensive surface to surface capability (see below).

o Which Missiles? The US proposal could call for the elimination of all surface to surface missiles (SSMS), or only those with a certain range. Given the short distances between regional centers, many states in the region (particularly Israel) would consider any SSM, even the 120 km range SS-21, a serious threat.

In addition to definition by range, there are further definitional issues regarding rockets and defensive missiles:

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
- 7 -

--Rockets are unguided projectiles that follow a ballistic trajectory from surface to surface; they are not missiles, which are guided and tend to have longer ranges. The 70 km range Soviet FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) is widespread throughout the region. Multiple rocket launchers with ranges of 20-40 kms are also common. The US MLRS is one such system. A variant of the US MLRS, however, is known as ATACMS and fires missiles 300 kms. Thus, to protect MLRS and destroy the FROG, for example, those systems that we would seek to eliminate could be defined as those with ranges above 50kms. Alternatively, we could define those systems to be eliminated as missiles, not rockets. That approach would permit both the MLRS and the FROG. Under neither approach, however, would the ATACMS be permitted. The US has no plans to sell ATACMS in the region, but it did deploy them with US forces during the war.

--Defensive missiles, whether against aircraft or other SSMs, can be adapted to have offensive surface-to-surface capability. The South Koreans have done this with the Nike Hercules and the Chinese have done it with the Soviet-origin SA-2. The Israeli ARROW, under US funded development, could also have such capability. We would not propose the elimination of defensive missiles, but would have to ban their testing in a surface-to-surface mode and might propose verification of SAMs and ATBMs to insure they had no offensive capability.

o Verification: Key to any state's acceptance of a ban would be its confidence in the destruction of other states' SSMs. Because the regional states are unlikely to grant each other the right of on site inspection (OSI), the proposal would probably have to involve third party inspection by the US, the US and USSR, the Perm Five, or some UN entity. The US would probably also have to provide a bilateral commitment to some states that it would give high priority to its own monitoring with National Technical Means. Three types of OSI would be required: (1) monitoring destruction, (2) monitoring peaceful uses (e.g. SLVs), and (3) challenge inspection of suspect sites. The challenge inspection regime would be difficult to negotiate successfully because of its technical complexity and the highly intrusive nature of its requirements.

o Space Launch Vehicles (SLV):



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o ATBM Coverage: An incentive to destroy SSMs might be the extension of ATBM protection to those who agree to eliminate their SSM force. Alternatively, we may want to consider offering ATBM protection whether or not a regional state eliminates its SSM capability. In either case, however, there are very significant barriers to the US making a blanket offer of ATBM protection to those who comply with our call to eliminate SSMs.

--the US has only the limited PATRIOT ATBM available for the foreseeable future;

--the US has already transferred the PATRIOT ATBM to Saudi Arabia and Israel, two states that possess SSMs.

--we would not be willing to provide PATRIOT to such states as Syria and Iran, because it has significant anti-air capability and the technology transfer risks would be substantial.

Nonetheless, the SDI program is being altered to emphasize regional protection through the GPALS initiative. Toward the end of the decade, GPALS might be able to offer regional protection under US control. Some states might not, however, believe that the US would actually use GPALS to protect them, particularly from Israel.

C. Chemical Weapons

The proposal: The US could call for the completion of the global ban on chemical weapons, the CW Convention, by the end of the year. To achieve that end, it could offer a package of proposals to modify its position in the CWC. It could call upon the negotiation to stay in session in Geneva until completion. Finally, it could call for early application of the CWC in the region.

o A Major US Move at Geneva: A separate paper is being developed with the elements of a new US position on the CWC.

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- 9 -

Among the elements being reviewed are a) a change in our position on challenge inspection, to permit the monitoring agency to penetrate the perimeter of any USG or USG-related facility, b) altering our requirement on universality of adoption prior to the elimination of all US CW, c) renunciation of our position on right of retaliation in favor of a no-use pledge, and d) decoupling our CW destruction from that of the Soviets.

Decisions on the US position on the CWC should be timed so that they can be announced as part of the articulation of the US initiative on conventional weapons and WMD in the region.

o Early Application in the Region: The CWC would not go into effect until some minimum number of states had ratified it and the new international agency required comes into existence. In the interim, there are a number of steps that could be taken in the region. The US could offer to work with the regional states to create a CW destruction center, using the same technology that we employ. We have already determined that the technology can (with the possible exception of robotics) be transferred to the Soviet Union. Thus, if funding and a host nation could be found, the US could offer a turn-key plant.

In addition, the regional states could:

--announce their intention to sign the treaty upon its satisfactory completion. Most Arab states have in the past refused to do so

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--invite international trial inspection of their chemical plants and some weapon storage facilities, to demonstrate their willingness to participate and to help them to learn about verification.

D. Biological Weapons

The proposal could be for the enhancement of the existing Biological Weapons Convention at the September Review Conference and its early application in the region.

Several states in the region have BW programs. Others appear to be starting such efforts. American and British forces were inoculated for some types of BW during the Kuwait War, but the US did not have adequate supplies of vaccine and some types of BW may be designed in such a way that vaccine would not work.

The existing BWC does not provide for monitoring. It would be extremely difficult to achieve high confidence

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
- 10 -

monitoring, if not impossible. Nonetheless, a number of proposals for confidence building (not verification) are being reviewed by parties to the treaty in preparation for the Revcon. It is likely that the US would be able to propose some modifications to the convention.

o Regional Application: Several significant regional states, including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, and Syria have either not signed or not ratified the BWC. We could urge them to join the treaty in time for the 1992 Revcon. We could also propose as a confidence-building measure that regional states declare, and open to international visitation, any biomedical research facilities with biohazard containment sufficient to permit work with BW. The UN could also create a standing investigation mechanism under UNSC auspices similar to that already developed for CW.

E. Nuclear Weapons:

The proposal: We would call on regional states to implement a verifiable ban on the production of weapons-usable nuclear material (enriched uranium or separated plutonium) in the region. It would focus on those nuclear activities most uniquely related to weapons capability. In packaging this proposal, we would want to reiterate our existing policy calling for NPT adherence and full-scope safeguards by all regional states, and endorsing a region-wide nuclear weapons free zone. (We have traditionally joined Egypt and Israel in supporting a Middle East NWFZ resolution in the UNGA.)



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- 11 -

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o Verification: Methodology developed for safeguards purposes could be employed for on-site inspections without formally invoking IAEA or other safeguards.

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IV. Evaluating the Package

In examining the proposals that the US might make, the senior interagency group believed it was important to judge them on a number of criteria:

--Efficacy: The US should not make broad and bold appeals that would have little chance of success in the foreseeable future, such as the Mubarak Plan for the creation of a Zone Free of WMD in the Middle East. The US plan should include elements that have some chance of being attainable over the next 12-24 months.

--US Security: Any US proposal should not have a net detrimental effect on our own military capabilities. Thus, we should not propose constraints that would prohibit us from deploying weapons that we believe are necessary or engaging in arms control regimes that we would not otherwise find acceptable. Nor should it result in technology transfer that could diminish our technical superiority.

--Friendly/Allied Security: The net effect of the adoption of the US proposals should not be the diminution of the security of states friendly or allied to us relative to the threats facing them.

The Package

The US could state its support of the concept behind the Mubarak Plan for a Zone Free of WMD, and then offer an interim six point plan:

--Elimination of Iraq's WMD/SSMs through the UN Special Commission;

--Perm Five agreement on non-transfer of WMD/SSM related material to the region, as part of their agreement on transfer policy for conventional arms;

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- 12 -

--A call by the US for regional states to eliminate their SSMS, and to freeze their development, production and deployment as an interim step; the US to be willing to facilitate agreement and verify compliance;

--A package proposal to conclude the CWC this year and a call by the US for its early application in the region, initially through states declaring their willingness to sign the CWC and their participating in confidence building measures;

--A US commitment to improve the BWC this year and a call for states in the region to ratify it and engage in confidence building measures;

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o Evaluation: The three key parts of the package are the expansion of suppliers guidelines, the US push for the CWC, and the new proposal for a missile free zone.

The package meets the criterion of touching on all three types of WMD and SSMS. The Perm Five suppliers are likely to express general support for the no WMD/SSM transfer proposal, but they will all have difficulty with the nuclear provisions. China could also have problems with the CW and SSM provisions.

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If the package were adopted, the security of US forces would not be reduced and might be enhanced. The security of our friends and allies in the region would not be diminished and could be increased if all states in the region complied with the proposed elimination of SSMS. If some states retained SSMS and some US friends destroyed theirs, it is possible that deterrence might be decreased.

Overall, the package would be welcomed by the Congress, our G-7 partners, and by most states in the region. It would be seen as a constructive, reasonably comprehensive, and realistic initiative with some chance of success. Its actual chance of success would be heavily dependent upon the degree of activism that we subsequently applied to seeking its achievement. No one part of it can be easily achieved. To obtain the three core elements, the US would have to place continuous high level support behind them. Specifically, we would begin by:

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- 13 -

--Convening a meeting of the Perm Five and seeking additional meetings until agreement were reached on WMD/SSM (and conventional arms) guidelines;

--Urging the CWC to stay in session and augmenting our delegation as necessary, and perhaps agreeing to a Foreign Ministers level session in the Fall if issues can be narrowed;

--Dispatching a high level team to the Middle East to discuss the elimination of SSMS.

V. Priorities

Although a comprehensive approach may be desirable in presenting a coherent package to the public, we will need to determine priorities in implementation. Priority should be based on an assessment of how quickly concrete results can be achieved. Based on this criteria, the U.S. should focus on:

--Rapid closure on the CWC and early application in the region. The U.S. is already committed to signing the CWC. (A separate paper for DC consideration presents options for achieving this objective this year). Early implementation could entail trial inspections and declarations by regional states of their intention to sign.

--Guidelines on transfer of WMD/SSMs. Promulgation of export guidelines for suppliers would not require the cooperation of regional recipients and could be agreed upon by the Perm-5 in the near term.

--Middle East Missile Free Zone. An initiative with a regional focus is essential to the credibility of the package. An MFZ could address a source of instability without having to grapple with the question of

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Date Closed: 4/9/2009

OA/ID Number: 90019-014

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

ARCA/WMD GAMEPLAN

D - 12	(4/10)	DC Reviews WMD options paper and gameplan; transmits both to NSC, which forwards papers for Cabinet approval
D - 8	(4/14)	WMD paper combined with ARCA paper into framework for single initiative Core State/Defense/NSC/ACDA team begins drafting prepositioned items required for implementation
D - 6	(4/16)	ARCA/WMD initiative forwarded to President for approval
D - 5	(4/17)	Package pre-briefed to British and French
D - 3	(4/19)	Presidential letter to Gorbachev/Yang (Li Peng)
D - 2	(4/20)	Press kit, text of aldac, instructions, presentations completed
D - 1	(4/21)	Secretary briefs Congressional leadership Presidential letters to Shamir, Mubarak, Ozal, Fahd, Assad Ambassadors brief GCC reps, Hussein (or Abu Odeh), Maghreb governments on main themes
D	(4/22)	Presidential announcement Release of press kit, release of aldac
D + 1	(4/23)	U.S. calls first meeting of ARCA/WMD suppliers group to take place within 30 days
D + 5	(4/27)	Briefing teams depart for Cairo, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Damascus, Riyadh, Japan, Australia, Germany, Canada

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ARCA/WMD Initiative Gameplan

This memorandum outlines a gameplan for moving the ARCA/WMD initiative forward during the month of April.

Step 1. Consolidation and Approval of the Initiatives

The ARCA paper would be combined with the WMD options paper into the framework for a single initiative. Once the initiative has been approved by the Cabinet, a core State/DoD/NSC/ACDA team would begin work on prepositioned items required for implementation. The basic package, including the consolidated paper and date and venue for the presentation of the initiative would be forwarded to the President for approval by April 16.

Step 2. Consultations with Friends and Allies

Upon the President's approval, the package would be briefed on a close-hold basis to the British and French. Having done this, we would share the broad outline of the initiative with the Soviets and Chinese in the context of letters from the President. The gist of the initiative would then be shared with Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states along these lines:

-- The President would send letters to Shamir, Mubarak, Ozal, Fahd, and Assad describing the elements of the initiative, outlining our objectives, and underscoring the involvement of the other major suppliers. These letters could be followed by phone calls, if necessary.

-- The GCC states apart from Saudi Arabia would be briefed by Ambassadors on the broad outlines of the initiative once the leaders listed above have received the President's letters.

-- Jordan and the Maghreb states would be informed of the speech and main themes just before the President speaks.

This process should be completed by April 21.

Step 3. Completion of Package for Presentation

By April 20, the core group will have completed work on, and obtained NSC approval of the press kit, aldac, instructions for posts, and text of detailed briefings on implementation to be used in the wake of the President's announcement.

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- 2 -

Step 4. Briefing Congressional Leadership

The Secretary briefs selected Congressional leaders on the contents of the initiative the day before the announcement (April 21).

Step 5. Presidential Announcement of the Package on 4/22.

The venue and text of speech to be provided by the White House.

Step 6. Release of Press Kits and Aldac Cable

This would be done simultaneously with the President's speech.

Step 7. Immediate Follow-Up

Immediately after the President's speech, the U.S.:

-- calls for the first meeting of the ARCA/WMD suppliers' group, to take place in Vienna within 30 days; and

-- announces its intention to send interagency teams within one week to the Middle East to brief the President's initiative and present the U.S. concept for a process leading to a regional Missile Free Zone. To ensure that capitals are visited more-or-less simultaneously, two-three teams would be used to cover Israel, Cairo, Ankara, Riyadh, Damascus, and the GCC. (In the GCC case, SYG Bishara would be asked to arrange the presence of representatives of non-Saudi GCC countries in Riyadh to meet with the leader of the U.S. team.) Teams would also brief Tokyo, Canberra, Bonn, and Ottawa.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02g. List	Deputy Committee Meeting Attendee List [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 1991
11:15AM - 12:15PM
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates
Andy Card

OVP

Karl Jackson

NSC

Arnold Kanter
Sandra Charles

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
Richard Clarke

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Henry Rowen

JCS

David Jeremiah
Edwin Leland

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3)

OMB

William Diefenderfer
Daniel Taft

ACDA

Ronald Lehman
Bradley Gordon

ENERGY

John Tuck
Victor Alessi

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02h. Outline	Background Re: arms sales (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120271
RECEIVED: 11 APR 91 17

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS
KANTER

DOC DATE: 23 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
CBW
SOC

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
MINUTES
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES & SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION FOR 10 APR DC MTG ON WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION IN MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: HILL APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 15 APR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF: 9120261 9120286

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC270

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
HAASS
KANTER
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DTL NARA, Date 04/09/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSAJO *[Signature]*

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9120271

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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X 91042509 HILL APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DTL NARA, Date 04/09/2009

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 20271

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

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Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

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Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

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BSM

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A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

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Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9120271

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SITTMANN
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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91042419 FOR DECISION
X 91042509 HILL APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By 352 NARA, Date 04/07/2009

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20271

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 23, 1991

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS / ~~ARNOLD~~ KANTER

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ CHARLES

SUBJECT: Minutes and Summary of Conclusions for NSC
Deputies Committee Meeting on Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Middle East, April 10, 1991,
11:21 a.m. - 12:06 p.m.

Attached at Tabs I and II are the Minutes and Summary of
Conclusions for the NSC Deputies Committee which was held
April 10, 1991.

Arnold Kanter concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Minutes and Summary of Conclusions at Tabs I and II be
filed for the record.

Approve KJA/for

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Summary of Conclusion
Tab II Minutes

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By JL NARA, Date 04/10/2009

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20271

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1934-MR

MM 9/23/2015

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR
MEETING OF NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

DATE: April 10, 1991
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:21 a.m. - 12:06 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:

Karl Jackson

White House:

Bob Gates

Andy Card

State:

Robert Kimmitt

Richard Clarke

NSC:

Arnold Kanter

Sandra Charles

DOD:

Paul Wolfowitz

Henry Rowen

CIA:

Richard Kerr

Gordon Oehler

JCS:

David Jeremiah

Edwin Leland

ACDA:

Ronald Lehman

Bradley Gordon

OMB:

William Diefenderfer

Daniel Taft

Energy:

John Tuck

Victor Alessi

Summary of Conclusions

- The Deputies Committee agreed that the papers represented a thoughtful analysis of the issues and options available for controlling and eliminating weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. (S)
- The Deputies agreed that focussing on suppliers regimes and eliminating and banning missiles in the region offered the best areas for success. (S)

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- The Deputies agreed that the timetable should allow sufficient time for real consultations with our key allies and the Congress on our proposal for WMD as well as constraints on conventional arms transfers since both will need to focus on suppliers in order to be successful. The time required might push back the announcement of the initiative until early-to-mid May. (S)
- The Chairman suggested that the Principals meet as early as Monday, April 15 to discuss the WMD proposal, combined with the conventional arms restraint proposal and the Iraqi specific program; a strategy we should pursue to implement the proposal focused on supplier regimes and ballistic missiles as its centerpiece; and the gameplan for proceeding with consultations, the public announcement, and next steps. (S)
- The Deputies also agreed that the Principals consider the possible implications of suppliers and missile regimes for the United States more broadly, specifically whether they might constrain U.S. military operations in the region and elsewhere. (S)
- The Deputies directed that, separately from preparations for the Principals meeting, an assessment be done of the implications for the United States in implementing the monitoring, verification, and destruction provisions of UNSC resolution 687. (S)
- The Deputies also agreed to add Iran to the gameplan. (S)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Meeting Minutes	Meeting of the Deputies Committee (7 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Date Closed:	4/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 09 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
ARMS CONTROL

KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 10 APR DC MTG ON MIDEAST ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 12 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KANTER

LOGREF: 9120271 9120286

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Bob Gates	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>GH 4/9</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>Bob</u>	<u>R</u>
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Charles W. Alexander

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Coversheet	William F. Sittmann to Stapleton Roy, et.al Re: April 10 Deputies Committee Meeting on Mideast Arms Control [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION APRIL 10 DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON
MIDEAST ARMS CONTROL

LOG # 20261

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	
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ENERGY	ANN LAVIN	DIR, EXEC SEC	
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(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION APRIL 10 DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON

MIDEAST ARMS CONTROL

LOG # 20261

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
ACDA	MS. MARY FLAGG	ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	

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04b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Mr. Karl Jackson, et.al. Re: April 10 Deputies' Committee Meeting on Mideast Arms Control [Name Redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/09/1991	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

Date Closed: 4/9/2009

OA/ID Number: 90019-014

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20261

April 9, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

COLONEL GEORGE SUMRALL, JR.
Deputy Secretary, Joint
Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs

COLONEL JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


MS. MARY FLAGG
Acting Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

(b)(3)

SUBJECT: April 10 Deputies' Committee Meeting on Mideast
Arms Control (U)

Attached are papers drafted by the State Department on dealing
with Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East/Gulf. They
will form the basis for discussion at the meeting. (C)


William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments
as Stated :

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DJC NARA, Date 04/10/2009

cc: Andrew Card
Office of Chief of
Staff

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A US Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region

This paper examines what might be the elements of a US initiative on weapons of mass destruction (WMD)* and surface to surface missiles (SSMs) in the Middle East. It is a companion piece to the paper on Additional Constraints on Conventional Arms (ARCA) transfers and is based upon discussions in a senior interagency group.

I. Objectives

There is a broad consensus that U.S. objectives in pursuing a WMD/SSM initiative are:

- to add arms control to our means of increasing stability in the region, by achieving some initial results and creating an atmosphere in which further and more ambitious arms control may be possible later;

- to reduce the risk to US forces and friendly states by starting a process that might reduce, and eventually eliminate, the threat of WMD and SSMs in the region;

- to do so consistent with our global security requirements and arms control positions;

- to do so without creating a net effect that diminishes the security of friendly states;

- to coordinate US moves on WMD in the region with our other regional priorities: the peace process, regional security structures in the Gulf, containment of post-war Iraq, and reducing the probability of new destabilizing conventional arms build-ups.

II. Assumptions

For the sake of simplifying the analysis, the paper makes several assumptions about which there has been interagency consensus:

* WMD in this paper means chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

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2001-1949-F
SCS 9/6/12

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region [redacted] (13 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

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By 31 on 10/17/13

Date Closed: 4/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 90019-014
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2003-0261-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-1231-MR (501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/6/2012

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--Timing: The immediate post-war period provides a unique opportunity to have proposals on WMD/SSMs in the region well received;

--US Role: No proposal is likely to succeed without US leadership in its formulation, negotiation, and implementation;

--Relationship to ARCA: Any announcement of a US initiative on ARCA should be accompanied by proposals on WMD/SSMs in the region, given the greater problem posed by WMD/SSMs;

--Iraq: One key element of our approach to WMD/SSMs in the region is the elimination of Iraqi WMD/SSMs capability through the UN Special Commission, a subject not further addressed in this paper;

--Types of WMD: The US proposal should encompass all types of WMD/SSMs, including nuclear weapons, even if all of the US proposals are not equally ambitious or pursued with similar vigor;

--Region: Because of WMD/SSM developments in each of the subregions and because of the political salience of WMD/SSMs in each, the proposals need to cover the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Gulf. Thus, the region ought to be from Morocco to the Iranian/Pakistani border.

--Global/Regional: Some types of proliferation are best dealt with on a global basis, with some effort at special regional application (e.g. bans on chemical and biological weapons because more work has already been done on a global approach). Others may be best pursued regionally (e.g. SSM ban) because their global application could provide us with both political and security problems.

--Suppliers/Recipients: The approach should be characterized by U.S. leadership of multilateral efforts involving both suppliers and other regional states.

III. Elements of a Proposal

The building blocks of a US proposal are initiatives on each of the three components of WMD and SSMS, plus whatever overarching arrangements can be made on these through constraints on suppliers .

A. Suppliers Constraints

The proposal: To deal with additional restraints on conventional arms transfers to the region, we envision convoking the five major suppliers (i.e., the Perm-5) and

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- 3 -

seeking an informal agreement on guidelines. These guidelines could include agreement not to transfer weapons of mass destruction, their components, precursors, and means of manufacture.

o What Guidelines: To be effective, there would have to be agreement among the five on defining components, precursors, and means of manufacture. Three of the five (US, UK, and France) already agree on:

--SSM components and supporting technologies, through the MTCR annexes;

--chemical weapons precursors and dual use CBW equipment, through the Australia Group list of chemicals and watch list on equipment.

Four of the five (all but China) also agree on nuclear components and technology through the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines.

The Soviets, in the Washington Summit Joint Statement on Proliferation, said that they would support the MTCR guidelines. The partners are now embarking upon talks with the Soviets to complete that process. Although they are not members of the Australia Group, the Soviets already have good controls in place on CBW exports.

The Chinese do not belong to any existing suppliers groups.

Thus, rather than create de novo export guidelines, the US could propose supply guidelines consistent with those already in place.

Two questions that arise in using the existing guidelines are: 1) should we perfect them first, and 2) can we accept different guidelines with the Five Powers than we have with the G-7 plus like-minded countries?

--Perfecting the Guidelines: We have just concluded reviews of the existing guidelines in each of the three suppliers clubs.

Moreover, the process within the USG of modifying the existing guidelines before presenting them at a Five Power meeting could be time consuming.

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--Two Sets of Guidelines: If as a result of negotiation among the Five Powers, guidelines were adopted that were less stringent than those of the existing suppliers clubs, the US (and the UK and France) would implement those rules that were the most stringent. We already have some national export rules that are more stringent than those of the suppliers clubs of which we are a member.

o Relationship to Existing Groups: If we were to create a Five Power suppliers club that covered all types of WMD/SSMs, should we then seek to expand it to other members and to have it replace the existing suppliers clubs, or to become some sort of umbrella group under which the others would operate? We need not answer that question now in order to propose that the Five Powers agree on WMD/SSMs export guidelines. If we succeed with the Five Powers and are satisfied with their performance thereafter, expanded arrangements could be considered in consultation with the other partners of the existing groups. We are, however, generally satisfied with the performance of the existing groups and would not want to risk damaging their effectiveness by altering them.

The existing Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines call only for restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology; a multilateral dual-use technology regime is currently being negotiated. Western suppliers in practice have in place extensive dual-use controls implemented through their national systems. We would continue to pursue multilateral agreement in this area, and seek PRC commitment to apply the Guidelines.

A new initiative would be to seek Perm 5 agreement to require full-scope IAEA safeguards (i.e. safeguards on all nuclear facilities, whether indigenous or imported) as a condition for significant nuclear exports. This is currently required by US law, but not the policy of any of the other members of the group. There appears, however, to be growing momentum behind such an approach to nuclear trade, with Germany recently announcing a full-scope safeguards policy and the French reportedly considering it.

o Renegade States: The problem of WMD/SSM exports to the region would not be entirely solved by Five Power restraint, even if augmented by the existing groups. Renegade states, over which the Perm-5 have little leverage, will continue to be a problem. North Korea, the obvious example, is exporting SSMS and turn-key missile plants. The US could propose that the Five Powers undertake a commitment to use trade policy and economic assistance to induce non-member states to refrain from exporting WMD/SSMs to the region. Ultimately, the US could propose the use of economic sanctions against renegade states. Making such a proposal explicit at the outset, however, might make it more difficult to obtain Five Power agreement to a suppliers club.

B. Surface to Surface Missiles

The proposal: SSMs can easily carry nuclear, chemical and biological warheads. They have a short time of flight, and are hard to destroy before or after they are launched. As a result, these weapons are the most destabilizing element in the military equation. They were used in the recent Kuwait War, and earlier in the Iran-Iraq War, on civilian population centers. As a first step toward eliminating all WMD/SSMs in the region and building upon the US experience in the INF Treaty, we could propose the elimination of all SSMs by states in the region, and a ban on exports of SSMs, their components or technology to the region. As an interim step toward elimination of all SSMs in the region, the US could also propose a freeze on all testing and perhaps on production and acquisition.

o Regional Receptivity: Most states in the region have SSMs and would be required to destroy all (or part) of their inventory under the US proposal. There would be, therefore, some equality of obligation among the principal states. Nonetheless, we would be asking them to give up something on which they had spent large amounts. The fact that the Iraqis used SSMs in the war without any real military effect might help to persuade regional states to destroy their SSMs (if everyone else did) as a first step toward regional arms control.

--Israel might be persuaded to give up its Jericho series SSMs if all of the possible threat states also destroyed their SSMs. The IDF might well conclude a net assessment that it would be better off in a region without SSMs. Until Israel has a robust ATBM system (at great cost), it cannot stop Arab SSMs. It could, however, achieve high confidence defense against attacking Arab aircraft. Israel can deliver its own offensive weapons without SSMs, using its F-15/F-16 fleet, jamming aircraft, and aerial refuellers. Israel also has a Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) program, which it would want to maintain, even if it agreed to participate in a regional SSM ban.

--Syria has short range SS-21s and mid-range SCUDs. It is acquiring SCUD production capability from North Korea. (b)(1)

--The Saudis acquired the expensive and antiquated CSS-2 from China to deter Iranian (and Iraqi) missile attack. They would probably be willing to give up their small and inaccurate SSM force if they believed that states threatening them were also doing so.

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--Iran has nascent biological and nuclear weapons programs, a proven chemical capability, and used Scuds in the Iran-Iraq War. In view of its interest in acquiring additional types of SSMS from North Korea and China, Iran's willingness to participate in a regional SSM ban is questionable. However, the destruction of Iraq's capabilities may make Iran somewhat more amenable to the concept.

--Egypt cancelled its participation in the joint Condor/Vector/Badr missile project with Argentina and Iraq for financial and political reasons. It has, nonetheless, proceeded with an indigenous Scud factory in cooperation with North Korea. Its chief concern is Libya, which has short range Chinese SSMS and is attempting development of an indigenous system. If Israel were to participate, the motivations which led to the cancellation of the Badr might elicit Egypt's participation in a regional SSM ban.

o The US Role: The US does not have SSMS permanently stationed in the region. Thus, the US role would be to call upon the regional states to act. The US could facilitate that action in a number of ways:

--acting as a go between among states that would not sit down at a negotiating table together, i.e. negotiating parallel adherence to an agreement by a number of regional states.

--doing verification as a service to the regional states, acting as an honest broker for those states that would not want other regional states doing on-site verification;

--providing missile defense to those states that agreed to give up their offensive capabilities (see below);

--assisting with space launch capabilities either through the provision of US launches (perhaps at reduced rates) for satellites of states that agree to give up SSMS, or verifying that indigenous SLV capabilities did not have offensive surface to surface capability (see below).

o Which Missiles? The US proposal could call for the elimination of all surface to surface missiles (SSMS), or only those with a certain range. Given the short distances between regional centers, many states in the region (particularly Israel) would consider any SSM, even the 120 km range SS-21, a serious threat.

In addition to definition by range, there are further definitional issues regarding rockets and defensive missiles:


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
--Rockets are unguided projectiles that follow a ballistic trajectory from surface to surface; they are not missiles, which are guided and tend to have longer ranges. The 70 km range Soviet FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) is widespread throughout the region. Multiple rocket launchers with ranges of 20-40 kms are also common. The US MLRS is one such system. A variant of the US MLRS, however, is known as ATACMS and fires missiles 300 kms. Thus, to protect MLRS and destroy the FROG, for example, those systems that we would seek to eliminate could be defined as those with ranges above 50kms. Alternatively, we could define those systems to be eliminated as missiles, not rockets. That approach would permit both the MLRS and the FROG. Under neither approach, however, would the ATACMS be permitted. The US has no plans to sell ATACMS in the region, but it did deploy them with US forces during the war.

--Defensive missiles, whether against aircraft or other SSMs, can be adapted to have offensive surface-to-surface capability. The South Koreans have done this with the Nike Hercules and the Chinese have done it with the Soviet-origin SA-2. The Israeli ARROW, under US funded development, could also have such capability. We would not propose the elimination of defensive missiles, but would have to ban their testing in a surface-to-surface mode and might propose verification of SAMs and ATBMs to insure they had no offensive capability.

o Verification: Key to any state's acceptance of a ban would be its confidence in the destruction of other states' SSMS. Because the regional states are unlikely to grant each other the right of on site inspection (OSI), the proposal would probably have to involve third party inspection by the US, the US and USSR, the Perm Five, or some UN entity. The US would probably also have to provide a bilateral commitment to some states that it would give high priority to its own monitoring with National Technical Means. Three types of OSI would be required: (1) monitoring destruction, (2) monitoring peaceful uses (e.g. SLVs), and (3) challenge inspection of suspect sites. The challenge inspection regime would be difficult to negotiate successfully because of its technical complexity and the highly intrusive nature of its requirements.

o Space Launch Vehicles (SLV):





o ATBM Coverage: An incentive to destroy SSMs might be the extension of ATBM protection to those who agree to eliminate their SSM force. Alternatively, we may want to consider offering ATBM protection whether or not a regional state eliminates its SSM capability. In either case, however, there are very significant barriers to the US making a blanket offer of ATBM protection to those who comply with our call to eliminate SSMs.

--the US has only the limited PATRIOT ATBM available for the foreseeable future;

--the US has already transferred the PATRIOT ATBM to Saudi Arabia and Israel, two states that possess SSMs.

--we would not be willing to provide PATRIOT to such states as Syria and Iran, because it has significant anti-air capability and the technology transfer risks would be substantial.

Nonetheless, the SDI program is being altered to emphasize regional protection through the GPALS initiative. Toward the end of the decade, GPALS might be able to offer regional protection under US control. Some states might not, however, believe that the US would actually use GPALS to protect them, particularly from Israel.

C. Chemical Weapons

The proposal: The US could call for the completion of the global ban on chemical weapons, the CW Convention, by the end of the year. To achieve that end, it could offer a package of proposals to modify its position in the CWC. It could call upon the negotiation to stay in session in Geneva until completion. Finally, it could call for early application of the CWC in the region.

o A Major US Move at Geneva: A separate paper is being developed with the elements of a new US position on the CWC.

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Among the elements being reviewed are a) a change in our position on challenge inspection, to permit the monitoring agency to penetrate the perimeter of any USG or USG-related facility, b) altering our requirement on universality of adoption prior to the elimination of all US CW, c) renunciation of our position on right of retaliation in favor of a no-use pledge, and d) decoupling our CW destruction from that of the Soviets.

Decisions on the US position on the CWC should be timed so that they can be announced as part of the articulation of the US initiative on conventional weapons and WMD in the region.

o Early Application in the Region: The CWC would not go into effect until some minimum number of states had ratified it and the new international agency required comes into existence. In the interim, there are a number of steps that could be taken in the region. The US could offer to work with the regional states to create a CW destruction center, using the same technology that we employ. We have already determined that the technology can (with the possible exception of robotics) be transferred to the Soviet Union. Thus, if funding and a host nation could be found, the US could offer a turn-key plant.

In addition, the regional states could:

--announce their intention to sign the treaty upon its satisfactory completion. Most Arab states have in the past refused to do so (b)(1)

--invite international trial inspection of their chemical plants and some weapon storage facilities, to demonstrate their willingness to participate and to help them to learn about verification.

D. Biological Weapons

The proposal could be for the enhancement of the existing Biological Weapons Convention at the September Review Conference and its early application in the region.

Several states in the region have BW programs. Others appear to be starting such efforts. American and British forces were inoculated for some types of BW during the Kuwait War, but the US did not have adequate supplies of vaccine and some types of BW may be designed in such a way that vaccine would not work.

The existing BWC does not provide for monitoring. It would be extremely difficult to achieve high confidence

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
monitoring, if not impossible. Nonetheless, a number of proposals for confidence building (not verification) are being reviewed by parties to the treaty in preparation for the Revcon. It is likely that the US would be able to propose some modifications to the convention.

o Regional Application: Several significant regional states, including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, and Syria have either not signed or not ratified the BWC. We could urge them to join the treaty in time for the 1992 Revcon. We could also propose as a confidence-building measure that regional states declare, and open to international visitation, any biomedical research facilities with biohazard containment sufficient to permit work with BW. The UN could also create a standing investigation mechanism under UNSC auspices similar to that already developed for CW.

E. Nuclear Weapons:

The proposal: We would call on regional states to implement a verifiable ban on the production of weapons-usable nuclear material (enriched uranium or separated plutonium) in the region. It would focus on those nuclear activities most uniquely related to weapons capability. In packaging this proposal, we would want to reiterate our existing policy calling for NPT adherence and full-scope safeguards by all regional states, and endorsing a region-wide nuclear weapons free zone. (We have traditionally joined Egypt and Israel in supporting a Middle East NWFZ resolution in the UNGA.)

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o Verification: Methodology developed for safeguards purposes could be employed for on-site inspections without formally invoking IAEA or other safeguards. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

IV. Evaluating the Package

In examining the proposals that the US might make, the senior interagency group believed it was important to judge them on a number of criteria:

--Efficacy: The US should not make broad and bold appeals that would have little chance of success in the foreseeable future, such as the Mubarak Plan for the creation of a Zone Free of WMD in the Middle East. The US plan should include elements that have some chance of being attainable over the next 12-24 months.

--US Security: Any US proposal should not have a net detrimental effect on our own military capabilities. Thus, we should not propose constraints that would prohibit us from deploying weapons that we believe are necessary or engaging in arms control regimes that we would not otherwise find acceptable. Nor should it result in technology transfer that could diminish our technical superiority.

--Friendly/Allied Security: The net effect of the adoption of the US proposals should not be the diminution of the security of states friendly or allied to us relative to the threats facing them.

The Package

The US could state its support of the concept behind the Mubarak Plan for a Zone Free of WMD, and then offer an interim six point plan:

--Elimination of Iraq's WMD/SSMs through the UN Special Commission;

--Perm Five agreement on non-transfer of WMD/SSM related material to the region, as part of their agreement on transfer policy for conventional arms;

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--A call by the US for regional states to eliminate their SSMS, and to freeze their development, production and deployment as an interim step; the US to be willing to facilitate agreement and verify compliance;

--A package proposal to conclude the CWC this year and a call by the US for its early application in the region, initially through states declaring their willingness to sign the CWC and their participating in confidence building measures;

--A US commitment to improve the BWC this year and a call for states in the region to ratify it and engage in confidence building measures;

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o Evaluation: The three key parts of the package are the expansion of suppliers guidelines, the US push for the CWC, and the new proposal for a missile free zone.

The package meets the criterion of touching on all three types of WMD and SSMS. The Perm Five suppliers are likely to express general support for the no WMD/SSM transfer proposal, but they will all have difficulty with the nuclear provisions. China could also have problems with the CW and SSM provisions.

(b)(1)

If the package were adopted, the security of US forces would not be reduced and might be enhanced. The security of our friends and allies in the region would not be diminished and could be increased if all states in the region complied with the proposed elimination of SSMS. If some states retained SSMS and some US friends destroyed theirs, it is possible that deterrence might be decreased.

Overall, the package would be welcomed by the Congress, our G-7 partners, and by most states in the region. It would be seen as a constructive, reasonably comprehensive, and realistic initiative with some chance of success. Its actual chance of success would be heavily dependent upon the degree of activism that we subsequently applied to seeking its achievement. No one part of it can be easily achieved. To obtain the three core elements, the US would have to place continuous high level support behind them. Specifically, we would begin by:

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--Convening a meeting of the Perm Five and seeking additional meetings until agreement were reached on WMD/SSM (and conventional arms) guidelines;

--Urging the CWC to stay in session and augmenting our delegation as necessary, and perhaps agreeing to a Foreign Ministers level session in the Fall if issues can be narrowed;

--Dispatching a high level team to the Middle East to discuss the elimination of SSMS.

V. Priorities

Although a comprehensive approach may be desirable in presenting a coherent package to the public, we will need to determine priorities in implementation. Priority should be based on an assessment of how quickly concrete results can be achieved. Based on this criteria, the U.S. should focus on:

--Rapid closure on the CWC and early application in the region. The U.S. is already committed to signing the CWC. (A separate paper for DC consideration presents options for achieving this objective this year). Early implementation could entail trial inspections and declarations by regional states of their intention to sign.

--Guidelines on transfer of WMD/SSMs. Promulgation of export guidelines for suppliers would not require the cooperation of regional recipients and could be agreed upon by the Perm-5 in the near term.

--Middle East Missile Free Zone. An initiative with a regional focus is essential to the credibility of the package. An MFZ could address a source of instability without having to grapple with the question of

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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04d. Paper	Re: A U.S. Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region [redacted] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 270 - April 10, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Middle East, Keywords: Middle East, Arms Control, CBW, Nuclear Weapons

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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A US Proposal for Dealing with WMD in the Region

In reviewing the proposal for Additional Restraints on Conventional Arms (ARCA) transfers to the Middle East, the Principals Committee requested that a US initiative be developed on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and surface to surface missiles in the region.

This paper contains the objectives and elements of such an initiative. A longer analysis of the initiative is attached. There was agreement in the senior interagency group that developed this paper that these elements comprise a comprehensive and realistic US proposal. The announcement of the WMD initiative should be folded together with the ARCA proposal to form an initial arms control package for the Middle East.

Many of the elements of the package would require commitment of the regional parties to a step-by-step confidence building process designed to realize the goals of our initiatives. Further analytical work will be needed to develop detailed proposals that take into account the evolving attitudes of regional countries. There was agreement, however, that the issues are sufficiently well known that the US can articulate an initiative now without having finalized our negotiating positions on some elements of the package.

Setting and Objectives

High level consultations with countries in the region and with other major powers has indicated a widespread sense that something should and can be done now to address weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the region. There is a willingness to begin a process.

US leadership and initiative is required, however, for something to happen. Overly ambitious plans will not work, but packages which do not appear to address WMD comprehensively or even-handedly will also fail.

US objectives on this question are well agreed:

--to add arms control to our means of increasing stability in the region, by achieving some initial results and creating an atmosphere and commitment to a process in which further and more ambitious arms control may be possible later;

--to reduce the risk to US forces and friendly states by starting a process that might reduce, and eventually eliminate, the threat of WMD and missiles in the region;

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--to do so consistent with our global security requirements and arms control positions;

--to do so without creating a net effect that diminishes the security of friendly states;

--to coordinate US moves on WMD in the region with our other regional priorities: the peace process, regional security structures in the Gulf, containment of post-war Iraq, and reducing the probability of new destabilizing conventional arms build-ups.

The WMD Package

The US proposal envisioned (summarized on page six) would contain both supplier restraints on all WMD and calls for action by regional states on each of the four types of weapons: missiles, CW, BW, and nuclear.

1. Iraq-Specific: The first element of our WMD package is already underway, i.e. the elimination of Iraq's remaining WMD through the UN Special Commission's activity.

o Evaluation: Iraq has apparently accepted UNSCR 687. The effectiveness of the Special Commission, however, will depend upon Iraq's willingness to permit the intrusive verification required.

2. Suppliers Constraints: To deal with conventional arms transfers to the region, we envision convoking the five major suppliers (who are also the Perm Five, P-5) and seeking an informal suppliers club that would, at a minimum, agree on guidelines for future transfers. These guidelines could also include agreement not to transfer weapons of mass destruction, their components, precursors, and means of manufacture, and to exercise restraint in the transfer of related technology. We could also ask the Perm-5 to make full-scope safeguards a condition for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

The guidelines we would propose would be based on the existing suppliers clubs in which the US, UK, and France participate now. As with the conventional arms guidelines, we would begin with the P-5 and perhaps involve other suppliers at a later stage. The P-5 would also address ways to effect the behaviour of renegade states such as North Korea.

o Evaluation: The P-5 are likely to agree to the export guidelines because they already have similar systems in place, with the possible exception of the Chinese. China's reluctance to join the existing clubs, however, may stem in part from their lack of involvement in their creation.

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3. Missiles: Most states in the region have surface-to-surface missiles. These missiles can carry nuclear, chemical and biological warheads. The mobility of launchers and short missile flight time make it hard to destroy them on the ground or in flight; thus, they are the most destabilizing element in the military equation. As a first step toward eliminating all WMD in the region, we could propose the elimination of all surface-to-surface missiles in the region (similar to the INF treaty). As an interim step, the US could also propose a freeze on all testing and perhaps on production and acquisition.

The US would be prepared to facilitate negotiation and CBMs, acting as a go-between and advisor. We would also be willing to participate directly in verification.

One issue that requires further work is whether the proposal should include the elimination of space launch vehicles (SLV) or whether we can develop a verification system that would satisfy regional states that SLVs did not have military capability.

o Evaluation: This proposal is ambitious, but it stands a better chance of success now than any other "free zone" proposal. No state will accept the proposal unless the states threatening it with missiles also do. Nor will they accept unless their potential enemies agree to intrusive inspection, a concept with which no state in the area has any experience. The success of this proposal will depend heavily upon active, high level US involvement. If it could be implemented, it would enhance the security of our friends and create an atmosphere for further steps. Few states are likely to agree to the interim step of a freeze of production and acquisition. A freeze on tests may be possible, largely because most states import missiles tested by others outside the region.

4. Chemical Weapons: The most effective way of dealing with CW in the region is by finalizing the global CW Convention (CWC) and by developing early confidence building measures in the region. A separate paper is being prepared on a major US initiative in the CW treaty negotiation. Depending upon the progress of that initiative, the US could be more or less specific about the CWC in its announcement on WMD in the region.

At a minimum, however, the US could include in the regional WMD proposal a call for the early completion of the CWC, our intention to make a major and detailed proposal when the negotiations resume, and a call for regional states to

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engage in early confidence building measures such as bilateral trial inspections (with the US or others).


o Evaluation: A major US push on the CWC stands a good chance of resulting in its successful conclusion in the next year. Most regional states will agree with the concept of proceeding on CW through a global approach. Some are likely to agree to trial inspections of some facilities. Syria, however, is extremely unlikely to give up its CW force.

5. Biological Weapons: Many states in the region have or are developing BW. These weapons pose a major threat because they can be delivered covertly and are difficult to counter. As with CW, BW is best approached globally first. The existing BW convention (BWC) has done little to date to prevent the proliferation of this class of weapon.

While it is impossible to develop an acceptable verification system for BW, there are steps that can be taken to improve the existing treaty. The Arms Control PCC is addressing a range of ideas and we are consulting with our allies in preparation for a treaty review conference (Revcon) in September.

Although we are not yet prepared to state what modifications of the BWC we will propose or support, we can say that we will work to improve the treaty at the Revcon and urge regional states to adopt CBMs.

o Evaluation Controlling BW through arms control may not be very successful, but we may be able to make the situation marginally better than it is now by tighter implementation of existing BWC provisions and including a small, permanent secretariat and some CBMs.



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
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In packaging this proposal, we would want to reiterate our existing policy calling for NPT adherence and full-scope safeguards by all regional states, and endorsing a region-wide nuclear weapons free zone (we have traditionally joined Egypt and Israel in supporting a Middle East NWFZ resolution in the UNGA).



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Elements of WMD Initiative

1. Iraq-Specific: Eliminate all WMD and put in place long term monitoring through the UN Special Commission.

2. Suppliers Constraints: Seek P-5 agreement on export guidelines to the region of WMD and surface to surface missiles in conjunction with ARCA restraints and CBMs; call for Perm-5 agreement on full scope safeguards as a condition for significant nuclear exports.

3. Missiles: Call for a zone free of surface to surface missiles; offer to facilitate agreement and assist in verification. Call for an interim freeze on production, acquisition, and testing.

4. CW: Call for early completion of the global treaty, announce US intention to make a comprehensive proposal when the talks resume, and suggest early confidence building measures (e.g. bilateral trial inspections) in the region.*

5. BW: Call for the enhancement of the existing global BW treaty and announce that we will make proposals at the September Review Conference.

6. Nuclear: Call for a verifiable ban on the production in the region of enriched uranium or separated plutonium; call for all nuclear facilities in the region to be placed under safeguards.

*The proposal could be more specific if the US initiative on the CWC is decided in time.

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ARCA/WMD GAMEPLAN

D - 12	(4/10)	DC Reviews WMD options paper and gameplan; transmits both to NSC, which forwards papers for Cabinet approval
D - 8	(4/14)	WMD paper combined with ARCA paper into framework for single initiative Core State/Defense/NSC/ACDA team begins drafting prepositioned items required for implementation
D - 6	(4/16)	ARCA/WMD initiative forwarded to President for approval
D - 5	(4/17)	Package pre-briefed to British and French
D - 3	(4/19)	Presidential letter to Gorbachev/Yang (Li Peng)
D - 2	(4/20)	Press kit, text of aldac, instructions, presentations completed
D - 1	(4/21)	Secretary briefs Congressional leadership Presidential letters to Shamir, Mubarak, Ozal, Fahd, Assad Ambassadors brief GCC reps, Hussein (or Abu Odeh), Maghreb governments on main themes
D	(4/22)	Presidential announcement Release of press kit, release of aldac
D + 1	(4/23)	U.S. calls first meeting of ARCA/WMD suppliers group to take place within 30 days
D + 5	(4/27)	Briefing teams depart for Cairo, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Damascus, Riyadh, Japan, Australia, Germany, Canada

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ARCA/WMD Initiative Gameplan

This memorandum outlines a gameplan for moving the ARCA/WMD initiative forward during the month of April.

Step 1. Consolidation and Approval of the Initiatives

The ARCA paper would be combined with the WMD options paper into the framework for a single initiative. Once the initiative has been approved by the Cabinet, a core State/DoD/NSC/ACDA team would begin work on prepositioned items required for implementation. The basic package, including the consolidated paper and date and venue for the presentation of the initiative would be forwarded to the President for approval by April 16.

Step 2. Consultations with Friends and Allies

Upon the President's approval, the package would be briefed on a close-hold basis to the British and French. Having done this, we would share the broad outline of the initiative with the Soviets and Chinese in the context of letters from the President. The gist of the initiative would then be shared with Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states along these lines:

-- The President would send letters to Shamir, Mubarak, Ozal, Fahd, and Assad describing the elements of the initiative, outlining our objectives, and underscoring the involvement of the other major suppliers. These letters could be followed by phone calls, if necessary.

-- The GCC states apart from Saudi Arabia would be briefed by Ambassadors on the broad outlines of the initiative once the leaders listed above have received the President's letters.

-- Jordan and the Maghreb states would be informed of the speech and main themes just before the President speaks.

This process should be completed by April 21.

Step 3. Completion of Package for Presentation

By April 20, the core group will have completed work on, and obtained NSC approval of the press kit, aldac, instructions for posts, and text of detailed briefings on implementation to be used in the wake of the President's announcement.

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Step 4. Briefing Congressional Leadership

The Secretary briefs selected Congressional leaders on the contents of the initiative the day before the announcement (April 21).

Step 5. Presidential Announcement of the Package on 4/22.

The venue and text of speech to be provided by the White House.

Step 6. Release of Press Kits and Aldac Cable

This would be done simultaneously with the President's speech.

Step 7. Immediate Follow-Up

Immediately after the President's speech, the U.S.:

-- calls for the first meeting of the ARCA/WMD suppliers' group, to take place in Vienna within 30 days; and

-- announces its intention to send interagency teams within one week to the Middle East to brief the President's initiative and present the U.S. concept for a process leading to a regional Missile Free Zone. To ensure that capitals are visited more-or-less simultaneously, two-three teams would be used to cover Israel, Cairo, Ankara, Riyadh, Damascus, and the GCC. (In the GCC case, SYG Bishara would be asked to arrange the presence of representatives of non-Saudi GCC countries in Riyadh to meet with the leader of the U.S. team.) Teams would also brief Tokyo, Canberra, Bonn, and Ottawa.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20261

SIGNED

April 9, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

SUBJECT: Deputies' Meeting on Mideast Arms Control,
Wednesday, April 10, 1991 -- 11:15 A.M.

Attached are papers dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East/Gulf, which form the basis for discussion at tomorrow's Deputies' Meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to your counterparts.

Attachment

Tab I Discussion Papers for DC Meeting

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DE NARA, Date 04/11/2009

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