

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2004-0416-F; 2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F; 2009-0536-F

FOIA Number:  
S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.**

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 90019  
**Folder ID Number:** 90019-017

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**Folder Title:**  
NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

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Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/08/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING  
MONDAY, APRIL 8, 1991  
2:00PM - 3:00PM  
SVTS ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Mr Gates

OVP

Karl Jackson

NSC

Ginny Lampley

Sandy Charles

Nancy Dyke

STATE

Robert Kimmitt

Princeton Lyman

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz

Henry Rowen

JCS

David Jeremiah

~~John Jumper~~ *ADM Ruck*

Henry Viccellio

CIA

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

AID

Mark Edelman

Dayton Maxwell

OMB

William Diefenderfer

~~Bruce Sasser~~

*Bruce Sasser*

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

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02. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	04/08/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

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**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
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<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING  
MONDAY, APRIL 8, 1991  
2:00PM - 3:00PM  
SVTS ROOM

WHITE HOUSE  
Mr Gates

OVP  
Karl Jackson

NSC  
Ginny Lampley  
Sandy Charles  
Nancy Dyke

STATE  
Robert Kimmitt  
Princeton Lyman

DOD  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Henry Rowen

JCS  
David Jeremiah  
John Jumper  
Henry Viccellio

CIA  
[REDACTED]

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

AID  
Mark Edelman  
Dayton Maxwell

OMB  
William Diefenderfer  
~~Bruce Sasser~~

TO: GATES

FROM: DYKE  
BEERS

DOC DATE: 01 MAY 91  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ  
DC

REFUGEES  
SOC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR 8 APR DC MTG ON IRAQI REFUGEES

ACTION: GATES APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 04 MAY 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O NSCP: DC268 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
BEERS  
DYKE  
NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By DJL NARA, Date 02/24/2005

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSDAI *[Signature]* DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES  
001

Z 91050118 FOR DECISION  
X 91050308 GATES APPROVED RECOM

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DJL NARA, Date 08/24/2009

Sum of Concl - DC - 8 Apr

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: MPM

LOG # 20326

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG WEA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

WEA

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Ken Hill \_\_\_\_\_

Bill Sittmann 1 W A

Bob Gates 2 J \_\_\_\_\_

Brent Scowcroft \_\_\_\_\_

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

Bill Sittmann \_\_\_\_\_

Situation Room \_\_\_\_\_

West Wing Desk 3 N

NSC Secretariat 4 Room R

RECEIVED  
31 APR 31 P 6: 54

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

31 MAR 1 12: 40

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

RECEIVED

RECEIVED  
NSC SECRETARIAT

91 MAY 1 P5:49



21 MAY 1954

ADA

Dear Sir  
15  
4

Deputy High Sec. Y. G. J. S.

hit

30338

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

20326

May 1, 1991

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: R. RAND BEERS, <sup>RA</sup>ACTING

FROM: NANCY BEARG <sup>NBD</sup>DYKE

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on  
Iraqi Refugees, April 8, 2:00-3:00 p.m.,  
SVTS Room

Attached at Tab I for the record is the Summary of Conclusions of  
the DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees, held on April 8.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Summary of Conclusions be filed for the record.

Approve 8 Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

cc: Richard Haass

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By DJZ NARA, Date 08/24/2009

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

20326

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1932-MR

MM 9/16/2015

Summary of Conclusions

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: April 8, 1991  
LOCATION: SVTS Room  
TIME: 2:00 PM - 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees  
(S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Vice President's Office:

Karl Jackson

State:

Robert Kimmitt  
Princeton Lyman

DOD:

Paul Wolfowitz  
Henry Rowen

OMB:

William Diefenderfer  
Bruce Sasser

CIA:

David Carey

JCS:

Admiral David Jeremiah  
Admiral Merrill Ruck  
Henry Viccellio

AID:

Mark Edelman  
Dayton Maxwell

White House:

Robert Gates

NSC:

Virginia Lampley  
Sandra Charles  
Nancy Dyke

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The imperative expressed by Secretary Baker and endorsed by the President is to move fast and do more in supplying refugee relief to the Kurds. (S)
- The President should call Perez de Cuellar re appointing a refugee coordinator. (S)
- Urgent supplemental to Congress is necessary, but we should hold off a few days until the needs are better known. OMB to provide paper to Gates today on sums

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

left in current accounts that could be drawn down for the immediate emergency. (U)

-- US troop presence should remain in Iraq until the refugee situation clarifies. (S)

**Actions between now and Tuesday morning:**

- o Prepare draft message to Iraqis telling them we will keep CAP in place until the situation clarifies. (S)
- o Plan how one would create a safe haven in the north. (S)
- o Urgently move tents, blankets, etc. from Italy to Turkey for airdrop to refugees. (U)
- o Gates will get guidance on whether all US forces should pull back to 10 km zone after ceasefire is accepted and on the rules of engagement. (S)
- o Relief supply donations will be accepted from private organizations, and the US will offer to fly such supplies to the area. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

89228

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-Apr-1991 13:06 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

( UHL )

FROM:

Sandra Charles  
(CHARLES)

SUBJECT:

April 8 SVTS DC

Please pass the two attachments to Bob for Monday's April 8  
DC. thanks!

CC: Wilma G. Hall

( HALL )

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By 377 NARA, Date 05/24/2009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1991 07:13 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

( UHL )

FROM:

Sandra Charles  
(CHARLES)

SUBJECT:

Interception Operations

Bob,

I don't know if you cleared this message or not. It was my understanding from Richard that continuing intercept operations to support implementing UNSC Res 687 was one of the topics to be discussed by the DC, presumably today.

CC: Wilma G. Hall

( HALL )

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-MR

MM 5/9/2016

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-Apr-1991 15:18 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: (WHSR\_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCE

<DIST>  
SIT: CHARLES DEAL MELBY VAX

<PREC>  
IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<OSRI>  
RUEHC

<DTG>  
062013Z APR 91

<ORIG>  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>  
TO RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHTH/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MANAMAN IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-UR  
um 5/9/2016

RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUIPAAA/USCINCCENT RIYADH IMMEDIATE  
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHSN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>

DEMARCHE ON MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCE

<TEXT>

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 111689

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCE

REFS: A) STATE 107316 B) STATE 100305

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WITH THE PASSAGE OF UNSCR 687 (REF A), THE SANCTIONS REGIME WHILE MODIFIED, WILL CONTINUE, PERHAPS WITH OCCASIONAL AMENDMENT, INTO THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE MULTINATIONAL NAVAL INTERCEPTION FORCE (MNIF), AN IMPORTANT PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS, HAS BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UN SANCTIONS REGIME. HOWEVER. THE JOB IS NOT DONE AND WE WISH TO CALL ON PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS TO CONTINUE PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE MNIF.

3. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD THEREFOR DEIV R THE FOLLOWING DEMARCHE TO HOST GOVERNMENT

-- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE MULTINATIONAL NAVAL INTERCEPTION FORCE PARTICIPANTS CAN FEEL JUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF THE SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIP IN ENFORCING THE UN SANCTIONS REGIME.

-- WHILE THE PASSAGE OF UNSCR 687 RAISES THE PROSPECT OF LIFTING THE SANCTIONS REGIME AT SOME POINT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE REGIME WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE IN FORCE FOR THE TIME BEING, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY ITEMS TO IRAQ. THUS THE MNIF TASK IS NOT COMPLETED.

-- OUR HOPE IS THAT THE NEED FOR ACTUAL INTERCEPTIONS WILL DECREASE OVER TIME. THE KEY TO THIS WILL BE THE VIGOROUS INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE EFFORTS BY ALL UN MEMBERS (INCLUDING IRAQ) TO OBSERVE THE SANCTIONS. HOWEVER THIS WILL NOT REDUCE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MNIF.

-- WE SEE GREAT MERIT IN CONTINUING MNIF AS IT NOW EXISTS, WITH EXPERIENCED PARTNERS. WE HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE PARTICIPATION IN THIS MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. OUR NAVAL AUTHORITIES MAY UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS AS WAS AGREED DURING THE BAHRAIN NAVAL CONFERENCE.

4. IN GENERAL, POSTS SHOULD AVOID DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON ARRANGEMENTS TO COORDINATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME NOTING THAT THESE SHOULD GO FORWARD IN ESTABLISHED MILITARY CHANNELS AGREED TO AT THE BAHRAIN

NAVAL CONFERENCE. IN ADDITION, THE BURDENSARING OF THIS OPERATION SHOULD CONTINUE UNCHANGED.

5. FOR NATO ADDRESSEES. YOU SHOULD MAKE THE ADDITIONAL POINTS BELOW WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, AS APPROPRIATE.

EMBASSY LONDON SHOULD ALSO BRIEF WEU SYG VAN EEKELEN.

-- UNSCR 687 GIVES ADDITIONAL WEIGHT TO THE POINTS WE MADE RECENTLY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A CONTINUED WEU ROLE IN SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT IN THE GULF.

-- EUROPEAN NAVAL PRESENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE MULTINATIONAL EFFORT OF CARRYING OUT THE UNSC MANDATE.

-- WE URGE THAT COUNTRIES WITH APPROPRIATE CAPABILITIES -- SUCH AS THOSE NOW OPERATING UNDER WEU AUSPICES IN THE GULF -- CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN NAVAL VESSELS THERE FOR SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT

6. FOR RIYADH IN ADDITION TO MAKING THE DEMARCHE PARA 3 TO SAG, REQUEST YOU MAKE A PARALLEL REPRESENTATION TO THE GCC SECRETARIAT EMPHASIZING THE CONTINUED NEED FOR GCC COOPERATION IN SUPPORT OF THE MNIF TO INCLUDE

REFUELING FACILITIES, MAINTENANCE FACILITIES, PORT VISITS, AND DIVERSION PORT ACCESS.

7. FOR BUENOS AIRES. STATE 98802 REMAINS YOUR OPERABLE INSTRUCTION. KIMMITT

BT

#1689

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

1689

<TOR>

910406151428 MSG000292259668

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1991 07:21 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

( UHL )

FROM:

Sandra Charles  
(CHARLES)

SUBJECT:

Update on UN Observer Force

Bob,

The attached cable provides updated information on the UN SyG's plan for UNIKOM - UN Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission for today's DC.

CC: Wilma G. Hall

( HALL )

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Do2 NARA, Date 08/24/2009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

06-Apr-1991 22:52 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: (WHSR\_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 687: MANDATE FOR UNIKOM

<DIST>

PRT: SIT  
SIT: CHARLES MONTGOMERY PAVITT ROSTOW WHSR\_IRAQ WORKING SIT SUM VAX

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<OSRI>

RUEHC

<DTG>

070330Z APR 91

<ORIG>

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>

TO RUEHSD/UN SEC IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE  
INFO ZEN/KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0859-60  
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000  
ZEN/CINCCENT IMMEDIATE  
ZEN/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6858-9  
ZEN/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1559-60

<SUBJ>

IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 687: MANDATE FOR UNIKOM

<TEXT>

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 111710

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL UNSC KU IZ

SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 687: MANDATE FOR UNIKOM

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

UNIKOM

-----

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-MR

mm 5/9/2016

2. ON 4/6 THE SYG PRESENTED HIS PLAN FOR THE UN IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVER MISSION (UNIKOM) TO THE COUNCIL. KEY POINTS IN THE PLAN ARE:

-- UNIKOM WILL BE COMPRISED OF ARMED AND UNARMED MILITARY PERSONNEL, AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE ONLY IN SELF DEFENSE, DRAWN FROM MEMBER STATES OF THE UN.

-- UNIKOM WILL MONITOR, OBSERVE, AND REPORT, AND NOT TAKE PHYSICAL ACTION TO PREVENT THE ENTRY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL INTO THE DMZ.

-- THE SYG ASSUMES THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF KUWAIT AND IRAQ WILL CARRY OUT ALL ASPECTS OF CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PART OF THE DMZ, INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER.

-- ESPECIALLY DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD, THE SYG IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE OBSERVERS INCLUDING RISKS FROM THE UNSETTLED SITUATION AND THE PRESENCE OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE DMZ.

-- HE IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF MINES AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE IN THE ZONE.

-, TO ACCOMPLISH HIS MISSION AND TO PROVIDE FOR SECURITY FOR THE OBSERVERS, THE SYG RECOMMENDS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF:

- 300 MILITARY OBSERVERS.

- AN AIR UNIT WITH FIXED WING AND LIGHT HELICOPTERS.

- A LOGISTIC UNIT.

- FIVE COMPANIES OF INFANTRY BORROWED FROM EXISTING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN THE AREA FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF FOUR WEEKS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE OBSERVERS, AFTER WHICH THE CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER WOULD REPORT TO THE SYG ON WHETHER HE SAW A CONTINUING NEED FOR IT.

- IF THE CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER DID RECOMMEND A CONTINUING NEED, THE SYG WOULD REPLACE THE BORROWED UNITS WITH ONE OR MORE BATTALIONS ON A MORE PERMANENT BASIS.

- IF THE SYG FINDS SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH MINES AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE, HE WOULD (BUT HAS NOT YET) ASKED FOR AN ENGINEERING UNIT.

-- THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT WOULD TOTAL 1,440 MEN (OF WHOM 680 WOULD BE TEMPORARY INFANTRY).

-- UNIKOM'S HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE WITHIN THE DMZ, WITH A LOGISTIC BASE IN KUWAIT AND LIASON OFFICES IN KUWAIT CITY AND BAGHDAD. INITIALLY, THERE WILL BE A LIASON OFFICE WITH THE COALITION FORCES.

UNSCR 687 MANDATE FOR UNIKOM - BACKGROUND

-----  
3. PARAGRAPH 5 OF UNSCR 687 REQUIRES THE SYG TO REPORT REGULARLY TO THE COUNCIL ON THE OPERATIONS OF UNIKOM AND IMMEDIATELY IF THERE ARE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OR POTENTIAL THREATS TO PEACE. THE RESOLUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE RENEWAL OF THE FORCE NOR DOES IT SPECIFY AN END TO ITS OPERATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE FORCE WILL CONTINUE ITS EXISTENCE INDEFINITELY INTO THE FUTURE, UNTIL THE COUNCIL TAKES EXPLICIT ACTION TO TERMINATE IT OR TO CHANGE ITS MANDATE. THE REASON FOR THIS UNIQUE MANDATE, AS WAS MADE

CLEAR IN THE COUNCIL'S DISCUSSIONS, IS THAT THIS RESOLUTION TAKES UNPRECEDENTED ACTION IN GUARANTEEING THE INVIOABILITY OF THE BORDER BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ AND AUTHORIZING, AS APPROPRIATE, ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO THAT END UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER (PARAGRAPH 4). AS UNIKOM WILL PROVIDE THE EYES AND EARS OF THE COUNCIL AND GIVE IT THE ASSURANCE THAT ITS GUARANTEES ARE NOT THREATENED, NEITHER THE REGULAR REPORTS OF THE SYG NOR ANY OTHER CONDITIONS WOULD REQUIRE RENEWAL OF ITS MANDATE OR BRING ITS WORK TO AN END.

ACTION REQUESTED

-----  
4. COUNCIL CAPITALS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HAVANA, ARE REQUESTED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF UNIKOM'S UNIQUE MANDATE WITH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND REPORT BACK TO THE DEPARTMENT, PRIOR TO MONDAY'S 3:30 MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE SYG'S PLAN FOR UNIKOM, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE COUNCIL WILL BE MEETING ON MONDAY AFTERNOON TO APPROVE THE PLAN OF THE SYG FOR UNIKOM.

-- UNSCR 687 SET NO END TO THE MANDATE FOR THIS FORCE NOR DOES IT REQUIRE PERIODIC RENEWAL.

-- THIS LANGUAGE WAS INTENTIONAL.

-- IN DRAFTING OF THE OBSERVER UNIT SECTION OF UNSCR 687, MEMBERS CONSIDERED THE COUNCIL'S UNPRECEDENTED STEP OF GUARANTEEING THE INVIOABILITY OF THE BORDER BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ AND AUTHORIZING, AS APPROPRIATE, ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO THAT END UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER 4, AND FOR THIS REASON THE GUARANTEE WOULD NEED TO BE MAINTAINED BY A PERMANENT FORCE IN THE FIELD.

, - THEY WANTED TO ENSURE THE FUTURE OF THE FORCE BY REQUIRING POSITIVE ACTION OF THE COUNCIL TO CHANGE OR TERMINATE IT.

-- NEITHER THE REGULAR REPORTS OF THE SYG NOR ANY OTHER CONDITION WOULD REQUIRE RENEWAL OF ITS MANDATE OR BRING ITS WORK TO AN END AND, CONSEQUENTLY, UNIKOM WILL CONTINUE IN EXISTENCE UNLESS THE COUNCIL EXPLICITLY TAKES ACTION TO REVISE ITS MANDATE OR TO TERMINATE IT.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. KIMMITT

BT

#1710

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

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1710

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

June 21, 1991

*Hold*

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC - MR. GATES  
CIA - MR. KERR  
STATE - MR. KIMMITT  
JCS - ADMIRAL JEREMIAH  
DOD - MR. WOLFOWITZ

FROM: NSC - RICHARD HAASS 

SUBJECT: Message on Northern Iraq Strategy

Attached for your approval is the substance of what came out of the June 19 Small Group meeting and what we would share with the UK, France and others. Please get back to me as soon as possible with your reaction. Thanks (and sorry for the delay).

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-UR

MM 10/17/2016

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Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

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Substance of Draft Message to UK and France

1. We have considered carefully your suggestions about the pace and timing of withdrawing coalition ground units from northern Iraq. We agree that we ought to avoid doing anything that might produce a sense of abandonment of the Kurds or signal Iraq that it now enjoys a free hand to do what it might. We also do not wish to undermine prospects for an accord between the Kurds and Iraq's central government. We also recognize that the UN needs additional time to fill out the guard force. At the same time, we believe that we must be careful to limit the duration and extent of our involvement in Iraq, recognizing that with or without a formal pact between the Kurds and Saddam there is unlikely ever to be a time that we could depart fully confident that peace will prevail inside a country known for its internal struggles.

2. In light of the above, we are comfortable adhering to a schedule that would continue to have coalition ground units now in northern Iraq phase out in a gradual fashion, with this process being completed by the middle of July. In order to maximize chances for maintaining order inside Iraq, this decision should also be accompanied by the following:

- a message from coalition partners in the next few days to the Iraqi government that makes clear our interest in peace and order within Iraq and our readiness to respond militarily to Iraqi actions which disturb the peace, as the situation warrants;
- message in the next few days to the Kurds that explains what we doing to promote their well-being (warnings to and restrictions on Iraq coupled with our continued ability to respond should events warrant) while at the same time warning them that we will not respond should they be the ones to provoke Iraqi action;
- public re-statement of these messages closer to the time of actual ground-unit withdrawal;
- continued U.S./coalition military presence, including air and land forces in Turkey and carrier-based forces off-shore;
- continued prohibition on Iraqi use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft above the 36th parallel, coupled with a prohibition on Iraqi military and special/secret police entering the security zone;

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Declassify on: OADR

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- regular overflight (armed reconnaissance) by coalition aircraft over the security zone; and
- weekly meetings in Iraq between coalition military personnel and Iraqi military personnel.

3. As the above makes clear, we are contemplating not so much a withdrawal as a restructuring of coalition military presence allowing us to monitor and if need be respond to developments within Iraq. We believe the best way to bring about Iraqi compliance is through deterrence. We are not prepared to offer incentives to the Iraqis (such as promising relief from sanctions) as this would be inconsistent with our other objectives of seeing full compliance with all relevant UN resolutions and in encouraging a change in Iraq's leadership.

4. We are continuing to plan potential responses to scenarios inside Iraq and how we might best respond. We would welcome your thoughts on this proposal and look forward to consulting with you as we get further along in our planning.

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~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Sunday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 5/17/2022

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-1176-MR(500)
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 7/13/2015

### RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions


- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



May 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: SUNDAY'S MEETINGS

I had a long meeting with Assad in which he basically back-tracked from his agreement on a UN observer and on a consent rule for reconvening the conference. I went at him hard on the importance of not missing this opportunity, particularly given the attitude and approach of this Administration. <sup>(b) (7)(D)</sup> all the arguments I mustered had little effect on him. I did try out one idea, and he said he would consider it. But at this point I have low expectations.

My meeting with Sasha Bessmertnykh tonight was a good deal more upbeat. He's hopeful that we can put the conference together. I previewed privately with him the kind of announcement or invitation we might send out and he agrees with the general approach. He also agrees that keeping this confidential until we actually send it out is important to making this work.

Between my meeting with Assad and the meeting with Bessmertnykh, I saw Abdel Meguid and had a chance to chat with him as we rode in from the airport in Cairo. Interestingly enough, he, too, was rather upbeat. First, he wasn't surprised by what I heard in Syria (Osama al Baz had just been to Damascus a couple of days ago and had heard much the same thing.) Meguid suggested that this is Assad's way, and in any case, the Egyptian discussions with Abu Mazin of the PLO leaves them confident that the Palestinian representation issue can be handled successfully. In Meguid's view, that's the big issue, not the two outstanding modalities questions on a conference. I'll hear more from the Egyptians when I see Mubarak tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1176-MR  
MM 7/3/2015

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Assad Meeting

With Assad our six hour meeting was, as always, characterized by a lot of repetition. The first inkling of trouble came when Shara rode in with me last night from the airport and raised the need for the conference to be reconvened without the agreement of all the parties. I told him the Syrians had already given me a positive answer on the question of reconvening by consensus of the parties and on that basis I had gone to you on the issue of providing a security guarantee. Shara didn't pursue it further with me in the car, but then asked this morning to see Djerejian before my meeting with President Assad. With Djerejian, he said there was not an agreement on the issue of reconvening a conference on the basis of the consent rule. In addition, he said that Syria had modified its position on the UN's role at a conference, downgrading the UN's role from that of sponsorship to that of "full participant". Ed reminded him of the conversations that he had with Shara on the two questions we posed and the positive answer which Shara had given. The position he was now hearing had very little resemblance to what we'd heard last week. He got nowhere and I faced pretty much the same with Assad.

When I went in to see Assad, I went through and actually read him parts of the transcript of our last conversation in which I had been very explicit in posing the questions of whether Assad would accept the UN observer and whether he would agree that the conference could reconvene on the basis of an agreement by all the parties. I read him the part that not only spelled out the questions, but also the part that made it clear that I would not go to you with a proposal on a security guarantee of the Syrian-Israeli border unless I first knew that he would answer yes to both of these questions. We had received such a positive response, and now I was finding that the yes was not really a yes. (You may recall that I told you that I wasn't putting money in the bank on the Syrian response.)

I asked Assad what I should now tell President Bush. Assad said that he'd made a major concession by accepting UN full participation as opposed to sponsorship. He was less clear on the question of reconvening, but he then went on to say that he thought that we were guaranteeing Israel's total withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Here again, I read him a passage from the transcript that said the security guarantee of the border is only possible, and could only go into effect, after Israel and Syria had come to a negotiated agreement.

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He raised the extraneous issue of our opposition to the Czech tank sale to Syria. He wondered whether that opposition wasn't merely a sign of our trying to pressure Syria to make concessions on the peace process. I then went through and explained the two were entirely unrelated. I noted that the Czechs had raised the tank sale with us, we had not raised it with them. I said they had probably raised it with us because they were concerned about political fallout in the Congress and its possible effect on US-Czech relations. I made it clear we had told the Czechs in response to their inquiry, that we preferred that they not make the sale, but we in no way threatened our relationship with them if they did. We could do no less than voice our preference, particularly given our desire to restrain the sale of weaponry to the area as a whole. We were not singling Syria out, but our Congress would create a major problem for us, if we had not responded to the Czechs in the way we did. This was probably not going to prevent the Czechs from selling the tanks to the Syrians.

I made it clear to Assad that we wanted to see further improvement in our relations with Syria, but Assad would make a big mistake if he passed on this opportunity to make progress and peace because of a preoccupation with form over substance. I argued that the label the UN had at a conference ("full participant" versus "observer") would not have any effect on his ability to get the Golan back. Similarly, I said whether a conference met on a continuing basis or met only on a basis of the agreement of the parties, could also have no effect on the restoration of the Golan to Syria. The only thing that could possibly restore the Golan to Syria would be a continuing US commitment to the process and a US security guarantee to Israel that would deny Israel a security argument for holding on to the Golan Heights.

I said that by offering to guarantee the border against aggression on either side -- once there was agreement between Israel and Syria -- we were taking a step that was nearly unprecedented for us. We were in effect offering Syria a security guarantee that had really until now only been offered to US allies. Assad should not underestimate the value of this. Indeed, I said if he now preferred to focus on form and not substance, he would surely be the loser and the Golan would become even more densely settled by Israel. The more that happened, the less he'd ever have a chance of seeing the Golan Heights restored to Syria.

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Near the end of our conversation, I suggested a new idea on how to handle the UN role. I said rather than having an observer, it might make more sense for the co-sponsors to make clear that they would undertake to keep the Secretary General regularly informed of the progress in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The fact is that would surely have more weight than a simple observer. And, in reality, would mean more than having the UN as a "full participant" -- whatever that meant. Assad said, "this is a new idea, I will consider it", but he did not give me any reason to believe that he would consider it positively.

The bottom line is that Assad retreated. Maybe he thought we were getting too close. It is also possible that Assad reflected on what the guarantee was and wasn't (i.e., it wasn't a guarantee of Golan's return), he decided it wasn't worth the price of the modalities concessions. Maybe he thought I'll produce something more out of Shamir and he'll wait to see that before making any real concessions to us. Or maybe in the end he's really not interested in negotiations, merely in us delivering Israel.

#### Bessmertnykh

Tonight we covered only the Middle East. We'll go through non-Middle East issues tomorrow morning. I suspect that discussion will prove more interesting because of the conversation you had with President Gorbachev.

On the Middle East, Bessmertnykh was generally upbeat as he gave me a briefing on what had happened in each of his stops. He feels he saw a seriousness on the need to move towards peace in every discussion he had in the area. For example, he said he thought Assad might be prepared to move and might be more flexible on the UN issue than he was revealing at this time. He also felt Shamir genuinely understood that this was the time to move. His perception after this, his first tour of the area, was that the main issues out there were mainly the ones that I had identified for him previously: the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. (The one additional issue he identified as a possible timebomb was that of settlements.)

In part, I suspect his more upbeat assessment results from his having had rather general, not specific, discussions in each of his meetings. In part, also, I suspect it emerges from his view that these modality questions are simply not serious enough to block the process, particularly if there is a good chance to resolve the Palestinian representation issue.

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By the way, he told me that he will be seeing Arafat in Geneva relatively soon. I said it was very important that such a meeting not have such a high profile or be given much publicity at this point. There was a real danger, I said, that Arafat would seize on such a meeting to hype his role and to give him a reason to have a more prominent role in the process. Bessmertnykh said that wasn't the purpose of the meeting. On the contrary, he would see Arafat for the express purpose of managing the PLO in a way that made this process possible -- namely, ensuring that the PLO would not seek to block this process. He told me he had mentioned to Shamir that he would be seeing Arafat and he'd drawn no response.

In general, we have no differences with the Soviets on how to proceed. Bessmertnykh told me the Soviets would now work very hard on Assad to get him to be more flexible on the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. He likes the idea of our trying to further narrow the differences on these two issues. Once we've made the effort, he agrees that we should go ahead and issue a joint US-Soviet invitation to the conference in order to put everybody on the spot to respond. Either that would produce the conference or it would bring this effort to a clear-cut conclusion.

In the meantime, I'll see Mubarak tomorrow, and I'll probe to see why the Egyptians are apparently confident that the Palestinian representation issue is close to resolution. I'll see Hussein the day after that, both to pin him down on his attendance and to go through the details on how to actually produce the Palestinian part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. At that point, I should have a better fix on the prospects for actually seeing a conference take place.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings (7 pp.)	05/13/1991	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]	FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
<p>P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]            P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]            P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]            P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]            P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]            P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]</p> <p>C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.</p> <p>PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.</p>	<p>(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]            (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]            (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]            (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]            (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]            (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]            (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]            (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information</p>

May 15, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *elt*  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Tuesday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/14/91	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**Document Partially Declassified  
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 5/16/2022

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b> 2013-0833-MR(503)
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 5/26/2015

### RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*  
SUBJECT: TUESDAY'S MEETINGS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0833-MR  
MM 5/26/2015

As I reported before, this effort to try to put together a real peacemaking process is characterized by ups and downs. Today was more of an up day than a down one. I had a very good meeting with King Hussein. As I told you on the phone, he's clearly leaning towards moving without Syria and he understands well that this will make the peace process possible. He also realizes that Jordan for its own reasons badly needs such a process. He told me that he is prepared to take risks that he has never taken before, provided he is not left alone and provided that his isolation in the region ends.

After driving from Amman to Jerusalem -- going across the Allenby Bridge and through the West Bank -- I saw three Palestinians. For at least part of my meeting with them, I felt that there was some regression in their approach. I almost felt that Bessmertnykh's meeting today with Arafat actually made two of them more reticent than in previous conversations, especially since Arafat's meeting tended to enhance his prominence. Nevertheless, as our talks today neared their conclusion, Faisal Husseini, at least, began to focus more practically on certain assurances that we might provide about America's policy positions -- not Israel's -- as we enter the negotiating process. All in all, I remain convinced that Hussein and the Palestinians in the territories are desperate for a negotiating process and that just might make one possible.

#### Hussein Meeting

My meeting with King Hussein was interesting as we started out alone, moved to a larger group (where for the first time some of his aides were very forward-leaning) and concluded with a small group discussion where we really got much closer to the essence of what the King is prepared to do. The upshot is that the King feels he is going to have to make some changes very soon in Jordan. He recounted for me how disastrous the economic situation has become. And he went on to say that he is on a "collision course with the Muslim brethren." He said some of

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his problems stem from his economic and political isolation in the region, but he also said that some of them stem from Saudi financial support for the Muslim brethren and Hamas -- the fundamentalists in the Occupied Territories who he said are also beginning to undermine stability in Jordan. (I think we need very quickly to talk to the Saudis about this.)

The King knows he must end his isolation. He knows he must "tie things together" in Jordan. And, as he said to me, he is convinced that his involvement in an active, productive peace process now is essential to his domestic objectives. He strongly believes that the best chance to make peace is now. And he fears that if it is lost, it will be catastrophic for Jordan and the region. Indeed, his main fear is that if we miss this opportunity, if we don't have an active peace process, the fundamentalists will be able to make a big comeback in the region.

I sense from his comments that he believes there is an historic opportunity now because of the US standing in the region; because the PLO and Arafat are too weak to block him; because the Gulf states having committed to directly participate in this process, create Arab cover for him; and perhaps, also, because he has apparently struck up an interesting, if covert, relationship with Shamir.

What he seeks from us is help in ending his isolation and in getting political and economic support. That support is essential, he argues, if he is to make some tough decisions both at home and in the peace process. I told him that the only way we could help repair his position with the Gulf states was if we were able to say that he were truly indispensable to the peace process. And that indeed, if they were serious about making peace possible, they would need to give him economic and political support. I said rather directly, while we understood his needs, we would simply not be able to press the Gulf states successfully unless he had already committed Jordan to come to the conference even if the Syrians didn't and unless he also helped to sort out the issue of Palestinian representation in the conference and in the subsequent negotiations.

He said his own incentives for producing a process now were very great. He said if there is no hope for peace, Jordan might implode. However, if there was hope generated by a real peace process, he could overcome domestic difficulties and the fundamentalist weight in Jordan would be diminished. He noted that he had spoken to Assad on the phone yesterday, and Assad had been somewhat positive on the process. Nevertheless, he wouldn't let Assad make Jordan's decision. He couldn't say today that he would come to the conference if Syria refused to participate. But he did say that if that is what it took to produce this process, it would be time for Jordan to make an historic decision.

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On the issue of joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, he basically agreed on its need and on the importance of keeping the PLO in the background. He said he still needed Palestinians to ask him for such a joint delegation, but he felt that with Soviet and Egyptian help, such a request might be forthcoming. Significantly Taher al-Masri and Adnan Abu Odeh both indicated they are now talking to Palestinians in the territories and both have basically accepted the idea for how to handle East Jerusalem in the delegation -- e.g., have Jordanian citizens currently living in Jordan who come from well-known Jerusalem families serve on the Jordanian side of the joint delegation. I think Shamir will accept this and both Masri and Abu Odeh already had specific suggestions on names. The fact that these two are more forward-leaning than they have been is a clear-cut sign of their perception of the King's position.

Should we assume that we can count on the King? My guess is probably not yet.

Perhaps one reason that things may be different this time is that his circumstances and his needs are different. He has more of a stake in acting and seems more aware of the costs to him of having no peace process. That may explain why, interestingly enough, his position seems closer to Shamir's than Assad's on both the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. On the former, he seems to feel that having 242 and 338 in the Terms of Reference for the conference, and having the Security Council bless agreements that are reached, is good enough. And, on the latter, having the conference reconvene to ratify any agreements is sufficient. Maybe he will change these positions after he sees Assad.

To push him in the right direction, I think he needs to know we will repair our relations with him if he actually moves. He should be told that we will unfreeze the assistance pipeline once he commits, regardless of Syria's position, to coming to the conference. He should understand as well that our ability and our inclination to really push the Gulf states on his behalf will depend on (1) his being at the conference; and (2) his sorting out the Palestinian representation issue along the lines that I discussed with him today. Taking those steps will demonstrate his indispensability -- and in truth the Gulf states will owe him at that point.

As I mentioned to you, I think we should move quickly to shore-up his inclination and let him know that we will help end his isolation and be there for him if he commits to the conference very soon. I think a call from you today would reinforce the meeting that I had with him. I'm even thinking of making a quick stop in Amman on my way back to the States to push him and to highlight our connection.

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In your call, I'd emphasize a number of points:

- The time to move is now. This is an historic moment. The one he has often said leaders must measure up to.
- You were personally committed to taking advantage of this moment and you're counting on him and his sense of history to help make it happen.
- You know it will not be easy for him, but we will be there for him.
- Both on our own and with others, we will be able to do much more for Jordan once we can point to the King's clear, unequivocal commitment to going to the conference and his efforts to actually pull it off.
- The key is not letting Assad determine whether or not we have a process.
- We'll stay in touch and will work to redaeem our relationship, but the time for decision is measured in days, not weeks.

#### Palestinian Meeting

I won't go into too much detail on this meeting because there was a fair amount of repetition in it. The Palestinians probed on whether we could give them more on substance, by way of commitments on outcomes (e.g., total Israeli withdrawal) or principles (e.g., publicly acknowledging the right of Palestinian self-determination). I told them that we could not guarantee the outcome of the process, but we could guarantee that the process would be serious. I told them that self-determination was a codeword for a state, and we could not support that, though we did support the fulfillment of the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians. In this connection, I said we envision that the outcome would be more than autonomy, but less than an independent state. My guess is that there would be some kind of confederal arrangement.

Then they probed on whether there was some further flexibility on procedures, hoping to expand the role and weight of the UN in the process. I told them that the UN's presence as a sponsor or as an observer would have very little impact on whether Palestinians achieve their needs and rights. Rather than focusing on a symbol that could have little substantive impact, they should be focusing first and foremost on producing actual negotiations with the Israelis. That represents their only hope.

They also probed to see whether there was any chance to renew our dialogue with the PLO, and I suspect that this probe occurred because of the Bassmertnykh-Arafat meeting today.

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I was negative on renewing the dialogue, and at that point they began to get more practical in their discussions. What they're most interested in are guarantees that would permit them to highlight to Palestinians what this process will actually produce. I told them I could give them guarantees that our position on territory for peace and on the need to ensure that the process doesn't stop with interim arrangements would remain constant. I could not guarantee particular outcomes in advance of negotiations. That's what negotiations were all about. They reacted to this by asking for written assurances that our policy positions will remain constant and that we will not retreat from them during the course of negotiations.

Like Shamir, and perhaps Assad, the closer we get to actually producing the process, the more their fears begin to emerge. In the Palestinian case, however, they understand well what the absence of the process would mean for them. My hope is that their fear of the consequences of no process will exceed their fear of stepping up to the plate.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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LIMITED ACCESS

April 26, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT:

The Peace Process Beyond the Third Baker Mission

Although we do not yet have all the details, it would seem that Secretary Baker is returning from the Middle East having made some progress but not yet enough to predict with any certainty whether we will be able to convene a regional meeting (or conference if you prefer). The following modalities seem to be either nailed down or in the realm of the doable:

- a conference co-sponsored by the United States and the USSR (if the Soviets restore diplomatic relations with Israel) based upon UNSCRs 242 and 338 (no further definition) with the purpose of bringing about in stages a comprehensive peace in the region;
- attendees to include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and possibly Syria;
- attendees also to include Palestinians from the territories, either alone or jointly, but not the PLO;
- the EC Presidency in some role;
- the UN SecGen at most as an observer;
- the initial conference meeting would probably occur in Cairo; and
- the plenary could only be reconvened if all parties agreed and then only for the purpose of offering a forum, not to impose outcomes.

A number of key questions remain:

- Will Syria accept a limited role for the plenary and the UN?  
Will Israel accept even a limited role for either?

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- Could one have a conference without Syria? (We did years ago at Geneva, but it is not clear the Arabs would go along now.)
- Can one find a formula on Palestinian representation that all parties can live with?

What the key unanswered questions suggest is the possibility that it might prove impossible to hold a conference because of Syria, Israel, or both. Some things to ponder:

--If Syria will not budge, we have to look at the possibility of doing a full-blown affair without them (the Soviets could help a lot here) or doing something smaller, possibly with an Israeli-Palestinian focus.

--If Israel will not budge on the East Jerusalem issue, we have to be careful not to make this the point at issue. There is no way we can win either here or in Israel if Jerusalem is at the center of the debate. If we are to have a showdown with the Israelis, it should be over substance (say settlements) not procedure, and at all costs not Jerusalem. The real danger now is that the current U.S. effort is beginning to resemble what Shultz tried in 1988 and what Baker did last year.

--Given Syrian behavior and the Saudi decision to opt out, we cannot simply point the finger at Shamir if things do not work.

What, then, are our options? Here are some possibilities:

1. Let them stew: One idea would be to give up for now, making it clear that we had given it our best shot and that we would wait until the locals showed a bit more enthusiasm. We could try to distribute responsibility in the hope that this might stimulate some political pressures. The downside is that this would simply reward those with no interest in peace-making and create a diplomatic vacuum others would be sure to fill.

2. Go to the UNSC: A second approach, or one that could easily flow from the first, would be to throw the problem into the Security Council. The Arabs would love it, and it just might persuade the Israelis to be more forthcoming. More likely is that it would persuade the Israelis to dig in and place us in the no-win position of supporting Israel or sanctions.

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3. 4th Baker mission: The Secretary could saddle up and return for a fourth go-around. He could take with him a specific TOR for a conference and try to sell it along the lines listed at the top, making clear this was the last effort. He could explore Arab willingness to attend without Syria, and Israeli willingness to finesse the East Jerusalem issue by agreeing to a joint delegation with Jordanians. The advantage of going this route is that we are making progress, it shows determination, and that if we can get over this procedural hurdle we will have the opportunity to address substance with some momentum on our side. The disadvantage of what would essentially be more of the same is that we could squander our surviving post-war windfall on futile procedural efforts that get us nowhere.

4. Autonomy Plus: Rather than walking away, going to New York or trying again, we could begin a new tack. This would emphasize the Palestinian issue and on bringing about improvements in the situation in the territories. In short, we would resurrect the 1982 autonomy effort led by Sol Linowitz and endorsed by such people as Begin and Sharon. The focus would be on a good many functional areas of interaction (education, land use, housing, employment, policing, etc...we had 25 such areas in 1982) that affect much of day to day life. This is akin to what I take to be your thinking. The attraction is that it gets us away from all this procedural talk and might actually change things on the ground. One problem would be in figuring out how to get Israelis and Palestinians to sit down with one another, although this could possibly be accomplished by just having the Israelis responsible (in the Civil Administration and/or the IDF) meet with their functional counterparts on the Palestinian side. Another drawback is that by changing course it might appear we lacked staying power. In order to preserve the second, state-to-state track, we could suggest in tandem a specific package of state-to-state CBMs, such as no settlements for an end to the boycott, and/or participation in our arms control initiative.

5. A Washington Event: There is some enthusiasm in NEA and in at least one local think tank for the United States (if at all possible with the Soviets) simply to ignore all the problems with modalities and just issue invitations to the key players, daring them not to show up. (We'd handle the Palestinian angle by inviting King Hussein and then privately working with him and the Egyptians to come up with Palestinians, including at least one with a tie to Jerusalem). The advantage of this approach is its drama and its attempt to overcome procedural stalemate; the drawback is that we may fail to get people here or worse yet have it blow up if they did come.

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Depending upon what Secretary Baker reports, I would support either option 3, i.e., his going back for a fourth round, or option 4, shifting our focus to autonomy plus. In short, we are back to the same basic choices we considered seven weeks ago.

A Wild card? One tool we have yet to turn to that would affect the prospects of any of the above approaches would be a major presidential speech. Such a speech should not point fingers or communicate a sense of frustration and despair. Rather, a speech should make clear why peace is necessary; why the war provides opportunity; why we tried what we did, where there was consensus and where there was not; and where we propose to go from here, both procedurally and to some extent substantively. I think we should spell out in some detail our views regarding interim arrangements and something more than we did on March 6 regarding final status and we are prepared to do to make it worth making compromises. This might also be the place to propose something dramatic, for example a simultaneous suspension of settlement activity, the intifada, and the boycott. We could use the speech to announce the regional arms control package, but we may want to do this separately, possibly as a statement in the briefing room next week.

At the risk of repeating myself, a Presidential speech is a must at this point regardless of what we do. I would go so far as to suggest that Baker should not return to the region absent one. Yes, there is risk, but the only way I know of generating political capital is to spend some. The time has come to engage the boss. This is the only way to communicate that we are serious and not to be trifled with; it is the best way to create support here and in Israel; and it is the best way to assure Arabs and Israelis alike that their worst nightmares as to where this is all leading are groundless.

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## THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 25, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: THURSDAY'S MEETINGS

I had a very good meeting with Sasha Bessmertnykh in Kislovodsk. The City of Kislovodsk is in an area just north of the Caucasus. It's known for its mineral waters, it's extremely picturesque, very fertile, and a well-known retreat for the elite. When one sees an area like this in the Soviet Union, it's hard not to believe that this vast country doesn't have enormous potential. The question remains can that potential be unlocked?

In the meetings, we spent most of our time on the Middle East. Our discussion was extremely good on the peace process and I got the strong impression that the Soviets are looking for a way to demonstrate that they will be positive and constructive in this effort. Over lunch, we discussed CFE, BW, the Summit, START and Afghanistan very briefly, and also the domestic situation in the Soviet Union.

Peace Process

Bessmertnykh was very forthcoming on our initiative. He accepted not only our basic approach, but he also agreed with the way we were looking at the modalities. He was sensitive to the need to deal with Europe and give the Europeans a sense of inclusion. He particularly liked our idea of having the EC presidency at the conference. Like us, he feels the French will have to be managed and he too evinced some surprise at Dumas' meeting with Arafat.

On the question of whether or not the conference should be reconvened, he clearly understood Israel's concerns but felt there had to be more than one meeting. He liked the notion of there being a consensus rule for any reconvening of the conference. He suggested that we propose that the co-sponsors would convene the conference when they deem it necessary, provided all the parties agreed.

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On the UN, he pushed for a more prominent role, but seemed to buy off on my argument that I could not get more than observer status -- and that would take a major effort with the Israelis given their allergy to the UN. He seemed persuaded that the need for UN role could be satisfied by the combination of observer status and reference to UNSC 242 and 338 in the terms of reference and our agreeing to deposit at the UN agreements worked out by the bilateral negotiating groups.

When we began to talk about the Palestinian representation issue he told me he had just seen Abu Mazin of the PLO and had worked him very hard on the need not to block this process; on the importance of not having Palestinians at the conference stand up and say they are there under instructions from the PLO; and on the value of dealing with the Palestinian representation issue through the mechanism of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He said Abu Mazin had been flexible, but that they would continue to work the PLO.

He agreed with me that the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was the way to handle delicate issues like East Jerusalem and Palestinians from outside the territories. (Indeed, the concept of having Jordanian citizens who happen to fit those categories was one which he felt provided a very strong argument for having a joint delegation.) He went so far as to suggest the following idea for working out the actual Palestinians who are coming to the conference: have Jordan work out the joint delegation with Palestinians, present the list to the co-sponsors, and have the co-sponsors circulate the list to all the parties starting with Israel. As he put it, in these circumstances Israel would not be selecting the Palestinians who came to the conference and subsequent negotiations, but Israel would be put in a position where it would not have to sit with anyone that it felt unable to meet with. I told him I thought the idea was a good one, but it would be very important that Arafat not show up in Amman, be embraced by the King, and have the list emerge immediately after that. He said he understood that very well and that the whole issue would have to be handled delicately.

In addition to talk about the modalities of the conference and of Palestinian representation, Bessmertnykh also raised the question of restoring relations with Israel. He left little doubt that the Soviets would restore this relationship, but he did not want the restoration to look like a precondition for Soviet co-sponsorship of the conference. He was planning to go to the Middle East the week after next and he made it clear there was a good chance that he would stop in Israel. No final decision had been made, but he would be talking this over with Gorbachev shortly.

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Lastly, he raised the question of location of the conference. He was uneasy about having the conference in Washington because he felt it might create problems for Gorbachev, particularly if you were opening the conference. As a co-sponsor, he would want to be there as well, but it created problems for Gorbachev politically if he had to come back to Washington before you had made a visit to Moscow. Bessmertnykh preferred the idea of Cairo, but wondered out loud whether Gorbachev would break away to go to Cairo. I told him I thought if you came to Cairo that that might well provide Gorbachev an incentive to do likewise. What we've been thinking of is a ministerial-level conference which you and Gorbachev might open as the co-sponsors.

All in all, I believe Bessmertnykh is prepared to take steps to contribute to our effort. And the reality is, that the Soviets can in fact be quite helpful to us on Palestinian and also Syrian participation. Their help may prove essential in these two cases.

#### Other Issues

(1) CFE: Bessmertnykh told me that the response to your letter on CFE would be coming very soon. He said your response to Gorbachev's earlier letter had been very helpful and that with the exception of naval infantry, all your proposals had been accepted. For example, they agreed to your suggestions on equipment east of the Urals, on destruction rules, and verification procedures. He added that it had not been easy to get this done. He said he had taken on the military, but had gone as far as he could go. On the issue of naval infantry, the military was absolutely united; he said that preserving the principle of the naval infantry was very important to the military. Notwithstanding the fact that the numbers now involved were small -- 120 tanks, 753 APC's, and 234 artillery pieces.

I said that if the numbers were indeed small, why couldn't the Soviets respond to your proposal of keeping the naval infantry intact, but reducing the equivalent number of tanks, APC's, and artillery pieces from regular army units. His answer to this was that their drawdown from regular units to meet the problem on coastal defense forces had reduced the numbers available in their regular units, especially on the flanks. He said the military just was not prepared to go further. And he repeated what Gorbachev had proposed in his letter to you, "couldn't all the signatories to the treaty simply exclude their naval infantry or marine units from the treaty?" I told him I thought this would be a very hard thing to do.

Echoing what we had been saying for some time, he said it was very important for us to get this issue behind us if we were to put arms control back on the right track and get to a summit. I told him I couldn't agree more, and that you had presented a proposal which we felt went a long ways towards meeting their needs.

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He concluded by saying that he thought it might help at this point to bring Moiseyev together with our experts, putting him in a position where he would have to explain his position and defend it. I suspect that the response we will be receiving will be a proposal where the experts at the Moiseyev level get together. Having boosted this issue up to you and Gorbachev, I'm not sure we can solve this problem below that level. But it is clear that Bessmertnykh believes that getting the experts together may strengthen his hand.

(2) BW: I reminded Bessmertnykh that we would have to go to the Congress very soon and brief them on this very sensitive issue. I told him that it was very important if we were going to manage what could be a very explosive issue for us to have a Soviet response to the concerns we had raised. Indeed, we needed a Soviet response that addressed these concerns concretely and with a number of corrective steps. He said that we would be getting a response to the specific points we had raised very soon and he hoped we would defer going to the Congress at least until we'd received his response and our experts had gotten together. He emphasized that it was especially important for our experts to meet because no one at the political level on either side really understood the issues. He felt that if our experts got together, we could raise each of the specific points that were a source of real concern to us and their experts could provide a full explanation on each point. He said that should satisfy the concerns we had. Indeed, if their explanations under these circumstances were not sufficient, he implied there might well be a problem on their side.

So, I presume, the response that we will receive will propose that our experts meet.

I told him I could only support such a meeting if I knew it would take place within the next several days. I said we really were in a position where we had to go to the Congress very soon, so we did not have the luxury of letting much more time go by. If such a meeting of experts could take place within the next several days, I'd be prepared to recommend our going ahead with it.

(3) Summit: Bessmertnykh asked about timing for a possible summit. And I told him that at this point it was very hard to see you going to Moscow for a full-fledged summit without there being a START agreement. I said that did not necessarily have to rule out a meeting in a third country if a START agreement weren't going to be available for some time to come. Clearly, if we were able to put together the Middle East peace conference, that could provide an opportunity for a meeting.

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(4) START: Perhaps because he would like to get to a summit soon, Bessmertnykh proposed that we revive the negotiations in Geneva. He said he would be willing to raise the level of his negotiators to spur movement, noting that it would be good to put ourselves in the position to resolve START quickly in the event that we put CFE behind us. I told him I'd think about whether there was any value in trying to give the START negotiations in Geneva a push at this point.

(5) Afghanistan: I raised Afghanistan very briefly with him. I gave him a letter in which I proposed that we'd consider taking part in an international conference on Afghanistan, something the Soviets had long wanted, if they in turn agreed to set a date for the implementation of bilateral negative symmetry. Bessmertnykh said this was an interesting idea, and he'd think about it. However, he also noted that the task from his end had become a little more difficult because of the fall of the city of Khost. That had made some in Moscow less willing now to cut off arms to Kabul than before. Having said that, he nonetheless added that he would think about this proposal and get back to me.

(6) Domestic Situation: When I raised questions about the Plenum Bessmertnykh suggested that Gorbachev would face a challenge, but he evidenced little concern about that challenge. He didn't say it was insignificant, but the clear impression was that Gorbachev would be able to handle this. Interestingly enough, Bessmertnykh observed that Soyuz (the right wing group of deputies) was actually helping Gorbachev right now in calling for his resignation and announcing an intention to form a party. The fear of Soyuz was creating a potential for coalescence of other groups and had contributed very directly to a productive meeting that Gorbachev had had the other day with nine republic leaders, including Yeltsin. I asked whether this increased the prospect for a coalition with Yeltsin, reformers, and some from the center right on the political spectrum. He noted that "personalities" prevented that at this point, but he felt there was a growing degree of realism about the need to work together. Those words sound good, but I'm afraid the drift continues. That said, I do think we may be seeing the first stirrings of a possible new coalition: one that might join conservatives who realize there must be some change with reformers who realize they need a better program to thwart the threat from the right. This may be another argument for us to expand not only our contacts with the republics, but also with some of the key players in the center.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN  
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NODIS BABYLON FOR AMB PICKERING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, USUN, IR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR AL-ANBARI

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3 HAVE BEEN COORDINATED IN CAPITALS WITH THE UK AND THE FRENCH. THE POINTS ARE TO BE DELIVERED TO IRAQI PERMREP AL-ANBARI TONIGHT IN A JOINT DEMARCHE WITH YOUR UK AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES, WHO SHOULD BE RECEIVING SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS. YOU SHOULD STRESS TO AL-ANBARI THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS MESSAGE BEING CONVEYED PROMPTLY TO BAGHDAD.

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS

-- U.S. AND OTHER POWERS ARE CONDUCTING A STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ IN THE FRAMEWORK OF UNSC RESOLUTION 688.

-- THE CAMP CONSTRUCTION IN THE ZAKHU AREA IS PROGRESSING.

-- INITIAL OPERATIONS TO CONSTRUCT THE HUMANITARIAN CAMP HAVE BROUGHT OUR FORCES INTO CLOSE CONTACT.

-- HOWEVER, NO UNTOWARD INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE ZAKHU AREA. WE NOTE FURTHER THAT IRAQI FORCES ARE GETTING REPOSITIONED TO PRECLUDE AN UNINTENDED INCIDENT.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

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-- AT THE SAME TIME, A LARGE NUMBER OF IRAQI SECURITY PERSONNEL HAVE RECENTLY ARRIVED IN ZAKHU.

-- THE NET EFFECT HAS BEEN TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF DISCOMFORT, UNEASINESS AND INTIMIDATION IN THE LOCAL POPULATION THAT HAS DETERRED THE KURDS FROM LEAVING THE HILLS, FRUSTRATING OUR HUMANITARIAN GOALS.

-- WE HAVE BOTH AGREED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO CREATE CONDITIONS THAT WILL ALLOW THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TURNOVER OF THESE HUMANITARIAN CAMPS TO APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODIES.

-- MOREOVER JUST AS IT HAS PROVEN SENSIBLE TO CREATE A BUFFER BETWEEN FORCES CONDUCTING HUMANITARIAN WORK AND YOUR FORCES IN THE AREA, SO ALSO MUST WE INSIST THAT THE RECENTLY INTRODUCED IRAQI SECURITY PERSONNEL BE WITHDRAWN FROM ZAKHU AND ITS ENVIRONS.

-- THIS WITHDRAWAL NEEDS TO BE UNDERTAKEN PROMPTLY (NLT 260300Z APR 91) AND COMPLETED NLT 270300Z APR 91 SO THAT WE MAY PROCEED WITH REFUGEE RELOCATION AND RELIEF OF SUFFERING.

-- AS WE EXPAND OUR SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN SUCH A WAY TO ENABLE US TO ACCOMPLISH OUR HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVE, WE WILL ADVISE ALL IRAQI MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL THAT THEY WILL BE DENIED ENTRY INTO THE NEW SECURITY AREA WITHOUT PROPER COORDINATION WITH THE MILITARY COORDINATION CENTER (MCC). THIS NEW SECURITY AREA IS INTERPRETED TO MEAN AN AREA 30 KM. AROUND (REPEAT AROUND) ZAKHU, AS MANDATED BY LTG SHALIKASHVILI 19 APRIL.

-- WE EXPECT THIS PROCESS TO BE COMPLETED BY 270300Z APR 91.

-- WE URGE PROMPT RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST. WE NEED TO CONDUCT THIS HUMANITARIAN EFFORT QUICKLY IN ORDER TO SAVE LIVES AND RETURN THE AREA TO NORMALCY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- IF AN IRAQI SHOULD EXHIBIT HOSTILE INTENT AGAINST FORCES OR INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

HUMANITARIAN EFFORT, WE WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO  
CONTROL THE SITUATION.

END TALKING POINTS

EAGLEBURGER

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Talking Points	Re: Begin Talking Points (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 95

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 6

DTG 230911Z APR 91

RELEASER \_\_\_\_\_

FROM / LOCATION: SECSTATE

ACTION / LOCATION:

- 1. WHSR D.O. Scowcroft
- 2. GATES
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. \_\_\_\_\_
- 5. \_\_\_\_\_
- 6. \_\_\_\_\_

TIME OF RECEIPT

230934Z

*[Signature]*

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS:

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By DR NARA, Date 08/24/2009

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

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SENT:

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RCYD:

**FAX**

**USDEL SECRETARY**

*ELIZABETH LINEBERRY*

**FROM: SPECIAL ASST. TO SEC. BAKER**

**DECLASSIFIED**

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By DTL NARA, Date 08/27/00

**TO: White House SIT. RM, SENIOR D.O.**

THIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11a. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings (4 pp.)	04/22/1991	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 98

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 5

DTG 240739Z APR 91

RELEASER \_\_\_\_\_

FROM / LOCATION: LINESBERRY

AJ  
ACTION / LOCATION:

1. WHSR D.O. Scowcroft

2. GATES

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

5. \_\_\_\_\_

6. \_\_\_\_\_

TIME OF RECEIPT

240749Z

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By 201 NARA, Date 08/24/2009

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

~~SECRET~~



SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:  
**FAX**  
**USDEL SECRETARY**

**DECLASSIFIED**

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By DR NARA, Date 06/24/2005

**FROM:** ELIZABETH LINESBERRY  
SPECIAL ASST. TO SECRETARY BAKER

**TO:** WHITE HOUSE SITROOM  
SENIOR DUTY OFFICER

THIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

April 23, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *EL*  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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MANY THANKS.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11b. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Tuesday's Meetings (3 pp.)	04/23/1991	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11c. Handwritten Notes	Re: UN or US or Multilateral (2 pp.)	4-23	(b)(1)	

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Talking Points	Re: Proposed Demarche for Iraq (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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No. 30104

COPY WORKING PAPER

#

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By JT2 NARA, Date 08/21/2009

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CODEWORD~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12b. Paper	Re: Iraq (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
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P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
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~~SECRET~~  
(CLASSIFICATION)

# FACSIMILE COVER SHEET



TOP / TOT  
 19 APR / 19 APR  
 AFPEH  
 24  
 1910Z

DATE: 19 APR	FAX TELEPHONE: 227-4800
(NAME)	(OFFICE SYMBOL) (TELEPHONE NUMBER)
FROM: LT COL FOREST	ECCAT 430-5065
TO: DIRECTOR OF JOINT STAFF	AV 223-5471
SUBJECT: MIL-MIL MEETING WITH [IRAQI]	
REMARKS: PLEASE CALL WITH ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.	

COVER PLUS 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-MR  
MM 3/23/2015

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13b. Memo	BG Potter to MG Jamerson Re: Comments on Meeting with Iraq (3 pp.)	04/19/91	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** H-Files

**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Sunday's Meetings (3 pp.)	04/21/1991	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
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<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Saturday's Meetings (5 pp.)	04/20/1991	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Cable	White House to NIACT Re: Deputies Committee second session on Iraq (3 pp.)	04/20/91	(b)(1)	TS

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b>
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b>
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>PRT: SIT  
SIT: CHARLES DYKE WHSR IRAQ MONTGOMERY SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED<OSRI> RUCNDT<DTG> 060255Z APR 91  
<ORIG>FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4696  
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHVV/ISLAMIC CONF COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHAL/AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA 0317  
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0410  
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1280  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9410  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0010  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5598

<SUBJ> SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS RESOLUTION ON IRAQI  
-- KURDS

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01117

E.O.12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, KPAL, TU, IR, IZ, UNSC

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS RESOLUTION ON IRAQI

-- KURDS

1. SECURITY COUNCIL APRIL 5 ADOPTED RESOLUTION 688 ON  
IRAQI KURDS. VOTE WAS 10-3-2. CUBA, YEMEN, AND Q  
ZIMBABWE VOTED AGAINST. INDIA AND CHINA ABSTAINED.  
BELGIUM, FRANCE, U.S., AND UK WERE COSPONSORS.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF UNSCR 688:

--THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

--MINDFUL OF ITS DUTIES AND ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER  
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF  
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

--RECALLING ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE CHARTER OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS,

--GRAVELY CONCERNED BY THE REPRESSION OF THE IRAQI  
CIVILIAN POPULATION IN MANY PARTS OF IRAQ, INCLUDING  
MOST RECENTLY IN KURDISH POPULATED AREAS WHICH LED TO A  
MASSIVE FLOW OF REFUGEES TOWARDS AND ACROSS  
INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS AND TO CROSS BORDER INCURSIONS,  
WHICH THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE  
REGION,

--DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE HUMAN  
SUFFERING INVOLVED,

--TAKING NOTE OF THE LETTERS SENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVES  
OF TURKEY AND FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS DATED 2 APRIL  
1991 AND 4 APRIL 1991, RESPECTIVELY (S/22435 AND  
S/22442),

--TAKING NOTE ALSO OF THE LETTERS SENT BY THE PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS DATED 3 AND 4 APRIL 1991, RESPECTIVELY  
(S/22436 AND S/22447),

--REAFFIRMING THE COMMITMENT OF ALL MEMBER STATES TO THE  
SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL  
INDEPENDENCE OF IRAQ AND OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA,

--BEARING IN MIND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 20

--1. CONDEMNS THE REPRESSION OF THE IRAQI CIVILIAN POPULATION IN MANY PARTS OF IRAQ, INCLUDING MOST RECENTLY IN KURDISH POPULATED AREAS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION;

--2. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ, AS A CONTRIBUTION TO REMOVE THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION, IMMEDIATELY END THIS REPRESSION AND EXPRESS THE HOPE IN THE SAME CONTEXT THAT AN OPEN DIALOGUE WILL TAKE PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THE HUMAN AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF ALL IRAQI CITIZENS ARE RESPECTED;

--3. INSISTS THAT IRAQ ALLOW IMMEDIATE ACCESS BY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO ALL THOSE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE IN ALL PARTS OF IRAQ AND TO MAKE AVAILABLE ALL NECESSARY FACILITIES FOR THEIR OPERATIONS;

--4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PURSUE HIS HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS IN IRAQ AND TO REPORT FORTHWITH, IF APPROPRIATE ON THE BASIS OF A FURTHER MISSION TO THE REGION, ON THE PLIGHT OF THE IRAQI CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE KURDISH POPULATION, SUFFERING FROM THE REPRESSION IN ALL ITS FORMS INFLICTED BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES;

--5. REQUESTS FURTHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE ALL THE RESOURCES AT HIS DISPOSAL, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, TO ADDRESS URGENTLY THE CRITICAL NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED IRAQI POPULATION;

--6. APPEALS TO ALL MEMBER STATES AND TO ALL UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01117 E.O.12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, KPAL, TU, IR, IZ, UNSC  
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS RESOLUTION ON IRAQI HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THESE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS;

--7. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THESE ENDS;

--8. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF AMBASSADOR PICKERING'S EXPLANATION OF VOTE:

--THE UNITED STATES IS PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PLIGHT OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS IN IRAQ, WHO ARE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF THE BRUTALITY OF THE IRAQI REGIME. THIS PROBLEM HAS TRAGIC HUMAN CONSEQUENCES AND PRESENTS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. WE ARE GRATIFIED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS ADDRESSED IT ON AN URGENT BASIS. THIS IS OF COURSE A SPECIFIC CASE WHICH HAD ARISEN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF CRISIS.

--PRESIDENT BUSH HAS CONDEMNED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED ATTACKS AGAINST ITS OWN CITIZENS -- KURDS AND SHIIA AND ALL THE OTHERS, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN, SEEKING TO FLEE REPRESSION. WE HAVE CALLED ON IRAQ'S LEADERS TO HALT THESE ATTACKS IMMEDIATELY AND TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS TO HELP THESE DESPERATE PEOPLE. WE HAVE DEMANDED THAT IRAQ FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ENSURE THAT VITAL HUMANITARIAN AID REACHES THOSE IN NEED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

Pres. deputies  
76

DC 4-18-91

Airdrops

4-8 12

57.

4-17 71 mostly helos 293.

Incircle prin. hq. → Ajayabaki  
Batman → Silopi

General McCarty - 350-400,000

DZ-1 - 80000 from Zakhu. for them back + others.  
Capitalize on existing structures there.

fix bridge

600 short tons daily - need. 300 now.

up to need by 22nd.

Other sites?

Needs - tents

→

- internat admin. (ICRC will administer  
at Zakhu)

- bulk food

Military to military

Canadians to have joined up

→ In South - put heat <sup>on</sup> UNHCR

→ " " Saudis - Raqqa

Use of bases for mil. acty

→ Role w. Insurgents - discourage or spl.

Turkish help

→ PVOs

→ UNHCR lethargy

ICRC → UN (Zakhu)

Other troop contributions? Yes, if self-sustaining  
mil-mil → CINCEUR

DOD msg to Iraqis

mil-mil Friday

30K S. of Zakhu

UN- Pres. statement must be unanimous

Iran - direct AF jets offered

Oil sale - Iraq. No enthusiasm EC. No relax.  
til Saddam leaves.

(use existing reserves for food)

Personal assets?

WMD report due today.

Supplemental

Allied contributions

George Santorum committee - unanimous vote  
everyone has a veto

OMB chair wking sp on financial aspects  
today or tomorrow.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Apr-1991 18:50 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

( UHL )

FROM:

Richard N. Haass  
(HAASS)

SUBJECT:

Thurs, Apr 18 0930 Gulf Video DC

Bob: here's an agenda for the Thursday am meeting

1. JCS implementation of encampments

- ✓--coord with UK and France
- ✓--details re speed, size, cost of effort
- ✓--roe; other operational issues
- ✓--efforts to keep Kurds from using camps as military bases
- ✓--Turkish role in supply train/logistics
- ✓--efforts to persuade Kurds to come to camps

2. State: follow-up in UNSC

- ✓--getting UN involved in management and protection of camps  
(approaches to UNSC members, PDC and staff)
- UNIKOM extension? other?

3. State: Approaches to Congress for \$, authorities

4. State: Approaches to other governments for funds

5. AID/State: other refugee-related issues/problems

6. State: response to Iraqi request to Sanctions Committee for partial relief from sanctions

CC: Dona F. Proctor  
CC: Nancy B. Dyke

( PROCTOR )  
( DYKE )

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-MR

MM 10/17/2016

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-M/E

MM 10/17/2016

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-Apr-1991 08:13 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

( UHL )

FROM:

Nancy B. Dyke  
(DYKE)

SUBJECT:

Update for DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees

CC: Virginia A. Lampley

( LAMPLEY )

CC: Richard N. Haass

( HAASS )

CC: Robert R. Beers

( BEERS )

For Bob Gates:

Medical - I recommend that you follow up on your request of April 5 that military medical units help out in the border area. (The President announced it too.) At this time there is little or no US medical assistance on the ground. The deployment plan calls for 6 4-person teams, a Canadian field ambulance, a medical logistical detachment, 6 aircraft air ambulances, and a 250-bed medical unit. They are scheduled to go in between April 19 and 26. Are 6 4-person teams enough to meet the current emergency until PVOs and the UN can take over?

On Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS), the military system is responding extremely slowly, thinking more in the long term of medical supplies for the new sites and not about the immediate emergency of children dying. There are 130,000 packets in the US pipeline. UNICEF reports having shipped 2 million packets to Turkey, and the Danes sent 100,000, totaling a ten-day supply, but we have no word yet on whether or how it is being distributed. Some PVOs seem to be distributing ORS, but neither PVOs nor the UN are geared up yet or present in large numbers. I recommend you call Dave Jeremiah and also give guidance in the meeting to get the military involved immediately in distribution of ORS, reporting back to you about a strategy by COB.

Supplemental - State will recommend a \$127 million supplemental (\$100 ERMA and \$27 AID plus PL-480), presumably to be paid out of the Desert Storm money (DCA). OMB seems fixed on a smaller number or no supplemental at all. The Hill is gearing up for its own supplemental, so we are behind the curve. I believe that the new commitment of US forces and effort makes an even more compelling case than before that this should be paid for by Desert Storm funds. Also, some of the authorities tapped for drawdown are at

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2238-MR

u u 10/17/2016

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Apr-1991 19:30 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

( UHL )

FROM:

Nancy B. Dyke  
(DYKE)

SUBJECT:

ORS/Roadgraders

Bob,

In answer to your questions:

Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) - At this point from the information I have, the US is not moving ORS into the theatre or delivering it to refugees.

I began last week trying to urge large-scale delivery of Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) to refugees in the north because we were receiving reports of diarrhea, which can lead to death quickly in young children. Delivery of ORS requires clean water and someone who can explain how to use it, so getting it into the field is more complicated than dropping it like blankets. I contacted OSD, JCS, OFDA, and UNICEF re their plans for ORS and other medical assistance.

So far, OFDA and JCS are tied up in assessments, not wanting to move or procure medical items until they are sure of what is needed. I suggested to OFDA last week that certainly the need for ORS is known and we can get moving on that. At this point, the assessment is still being awaited. OFDA stocks of ORS are still in the warehouse in Italy.

I suggested to UNICEF that it move quickly to get some of the \$270 million pledged to the refugee cause so they could move ORS into the area, suggesting that our medical teams, PVOs, and others could deliver it. As of this morning, UNICEF had none of the UN money to move on this. I hope it broke loose during the day, but I could not reach my contact tonight.

JCS is just now getting its medical assessment teams on the ground. At this time the only US military medical personnel on the ground in the north are about a 20-person team. Five teams of 40 each are expected to be in the camps by April 18. I had inquired last Friday about how soon we would be getting the assessments because we really needed to get on with providing direct medical assistance. This really should be moved faster.

Though some of the UN's prepositioned refugee supplies contained ORS, no one seems to know whether the ORS is being distributed. Also, UN organizations and PVOs are having a rough time getting established in the area to deliver necessities like ORS.

The EUCOM medical concept of operations cable is on its way, JCS says, and in it will be the medical delivery plan.

Roadgraders, bulldozers, and four-wheel drive vehicles - Because DOD has been focusing on air delivery, plans for engineer support on the ground are just completed and will be in the same cable as the medical information. Most likely, according to JCS and OSD, we do not have equipment like that on the ground yet. Probably the Turks are the only ones operating roadwork equipment right now.

Comment - I agree with you that we need to focus hard now on the medical side, especially ORS, because lives are being lost and the death rate will rise dramatically. The more we can get US uniformed medical personnel out there with ORS, etc. the better.

CC: Richard N. Haass ( HAASS )  
CC: C. David Welch ( WELCH )  
CC: Robert R. Beers ( BEERS )

4/16

395-1724

Presidential Call to Pres. Ozal

--I wanted to get back to you quickly on the matter we discussed yesterday.

--I share your sense of urgency. Your description of the situation was extremely distressing. Despite all our best efforts, the fact is that we are not getting enough food and medicine to those who need it. Hundreds are dying daily.

--Our military and the relief organizations fully subscribe to your view that we must get these people off the mountains and into lowlands in Iraq where we can deliver and distribute food, medicine and shelter on the necessary large scale.

--Obviously, there is the security problem. Although I doubt Saddam would interfere, and we will warn him not to, we will only convince people to move if they are confident of their safety.

--What I have in mind is something ambitious that builds upon your own thinking. The long-term goal is to get all the Kurds to return home, safely. But there is the immediate need to persuade the refugees to return to the lowland areas in northern Iraq, just inside the border. Our own military is best suited to build these temporary encampments in a hurry. We would like to work with your people and others in creating the supply train.

--As for security, U.S. air forces operating out of southern Turkey could provide cover. But I think we would also need a ground presence, primarily to reassure the Kurds that they can move into Iraq without fear. No amount of Iraqi promises will do. I've spoken to both Major and Mitterrand, and they are prepared to supply troops for this purpose, [as are we].

*military presence*

[if Ozal raises a Turkish military role inside Iraq: I appreciate the offer. ~~Let me discuss this further with my military and with the British and French.~~ My initial thinking is that a Turkish military presence might be misunderstood, and that it might be better for you to focus your resources on the situation within Turkey and on moving supplies into Iraq.]

--It will be essential to get the UN involved in running these camps. I am confident that this is consistent with UNSC Resolution 688. I phoned Perez de Cuellar, who was positive. I urged him to push his bureaucracy to get more active inside Iraq.

--I plan to announce something today. I just want you to know how much I appreciate what Turkey is doing to assist. I also want you to know that we stand ready to continue helping you through this difficult situation.

4/16

Presidential Call to UN SecGen Perez de Cuellar

--I am calling to discuss the plight of the Iraqi refugees, especially the Kurds in southern Turkey and northern Iraq.

--I feel a real sense of urgency. The most recent reports we are receiving are extremely distressing. Despite all our best efforts, the fact is that we are not getting enough food and medicine to those who need it. Hundreds are dying daily.

--President Ozal phoned me yesterday. To be frank, he is extremely anxious. He will take in 40-50,000 refugees, but there are hundreds of thousands more in the mountain areas he cannot take and who will not be able to survive indefinitely there.

--His view, one that our military and the relief organizations fully subscribe to, is that we must get these people off the mountains and into lowlands where we can deliver and distribute food, medicine and shelter on the necessary large scale.

--Obviously, there is the related problem of security. Although I doubt Saddam would interfere, we will only convince these people to move if they are confident they will be safe.

--What I have in mind is something ambitious that builds upon the thinking of Major, Mitterrand, and others. The long-term goal is to get all the Kurds to return home, safely. But there is the immediate need to encourage the refugees to return to the lowland areas in northern Iraq, just inside the border. Our own military is best suited to build these temporary encampments in a hurry. We will work with Turkey and others in creating the supply train.

--As for security, U.S. air forces operating out of southern Turkey could provide cover. But I think we would also need a ground presence, primarily to reassure the Kurds that they can move into Iraq without fear. No amount of Iraqi promises will do. Our idea is that the UK and France and subsequently others would supply troops for this purpose.

--It is essential for the UN to be involved in running these camps. I believe this effort is consistent with UNSC Resolution 688. What is your view? What is needed is for all the relief agencies to act quickly. Anything you could do to urge a rapid response on both sides of the border would be greatly appreciated.

--I'd also be interested in anything you have about the refugees in Iran and about what Sadruddin is hearing in Baghdad.

--I would like to announce something later today, if it can be worked out.

Apr. 16

Calls to Major and Mitterrand

--I am calling to discuss the plight of the Iraqi refugees, especially the Kurds in southern Turkey and northern Iraq.

--I feel a real sense of urgency. The most recent reports we are receiving are extremely distressing. Despite all our best efforts, the fact is that we are not getting enough food and medicine to those who need it. Hundreds are dying daily.

--President Ozal phoned me yesterday. To be frank, he is extremely anxious, almost desperate. He will take in some tens of thousands of refugees, but there are hundreds of thousands more in the mountain areas who will not be able to survive.

--His view, one that I have come to subscribe to, is that we must get these people off the mountains and into lowlands where we can deliver and distribute food, medicine and shelter on the necessary large scale.

--Obviously, there is the related problem of security. Although I doubt Saddam would interfere, we will only convince these people to move if they are confident they will be safe.

--What I have in mind, and it is entirely consistent with what I take to be your own thinking, is to encourage the refugees to return to the lowland areas in northern Iraq, just inside the border. Our own military is best suited to provide massive relief in a hurry. We will work with the Turks and your people.

--As for security, U.S. air forces operating out of southern Turkey could provide cover. But I think we would also need some ground presence, in part to reassure the Kurds, in part to discourage them from using these encampments to mount operations against Iraq. Would you be willing to supply troops to this?

--I will confess to some concern that building these large encampments in northern Iraq raises the danger that the refugee population could become permanent. It will be important to stress that this is temporary, and that the goal remains to see them return to their homes as soon as it is safe to do so.

--In this vein, it will be essential to get the UN involved in running these camps. I am confident that we could demonstrate that all this is consistent with UNSC Resolution 688. But I will also be calling Perez de Cuellar to see if I can get him to endorse this effort and energize the international bureaucracy.

--I'd like to get in touch with de Cuellar and get back to Ozal and then announce something. Do you agree with all this?

Wall on line

Want me to start

til you can pick up

DL  
Tuesday, April 9

Kaifu letter

Iran

Drawdown on emergency acc'ts  
- emerg funds avail/replenish. in supp.

4 camps outside zone in South  
3 - 2700 people each  
1 - 5000 (Saudi camp)  
Safwan - 10-15,000

UNIKOM - fully deployed 5-10 days

Iraq msg.

Backlog at Incirlik

French flying into Iran

17 jets today 10-5-2 (UK)

Supplies PVOs/US mil. Spec. Ops Forces 100 or less  
border crossing } action by Most  
hub base

De facto arrangements - safe havens

# DLA ASSETS AVAILABILITY GENERAL SUPPLIES

• BLANKETS	500 K	• COTS	7 K
• GYM SHOES	150 K	• COLD WTHR COATS	80 K
• SHEETS	60 K	• MED WTHR COATS	1400 K
• SLEEPING BAGS	25 K	• RAIN COATS	10 K
• TENTS	2 K		

# DLA ASSETS AVAILABILITY FOOD

300K PEOPLE / 30 DAYS

- RICE
- FLOUR
- GRITS
- CANNED MEATS
- NON-FAT MILK
- CANNED VEGETABLE
- RAISINS
- COFFEE
- CANNED FRUIT
- ORANGE JUICE

## OTHER ASSETS AVAILABILITY OFDA OFFERS

- PLASTIC 1500 ROLLS (DHAHRAN)
- BLANKETS 40 K (LEGHORN)  
60 K (CONUS)
- TENTS 1 K (LEGHORN)
- PLASTIC WATER JUGS 8 K (LEGHORN)

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**B**

S/S #

*[Handwritten signature]*

MR 91 2: 11

MESSAGE NO. 065221 CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ No. Pages 23

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT P 647-2471 7240  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION \_\_\_\_\_

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>ROBERT GATES</u>	<u>456-2257</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

**URGENT**

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

S/S Officer: R. A. LA MANTIA J.

*[Handwritten signature]*



United States Department of State  
Office of the  
*Under Secretary of State*  
*for Political Affairs*

NOTE FOR BOB GATES

4/8/91

Subject: Funds for Refugee Relief

Bob Kimmitt asked that I send you  
the attached first cut at identifying  
existing fund sources for refugee  
relief.

Ken Brill



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 8, 1991

To: Bob Kimmitt

From: Bob Bauerlein 

Subject: Existing Funds Available for Refugee Relief

*\$450M*  
Per your request, the following is a list of the sources of funds and/or goods and services that the President could tap quickly in order to provide additional emergency relief to Iraqi refugees. Unless otherwise specified, the assumption is that these funds would be replenished in the emergency supplemental if used for the current refugee crisis.

- S*  
1. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Section 506(a)(2) -- This is one of the sources used over the weekend for the airlift. An additional \$50 million of DOD goods and services could be provided during the remainder of this fiscal year under this authority. (Up to \$25 million was authorized over the weekend.) These funds would not have to be replenished in the supplemental and the authority for additional drawdowns will not be available again until the start of the next fiscal year.
- 20*  
2. Refugee Emergency Fund (ERMA) -- This fund was also used over the past weekend for \$10 million. An additional \$30 million remains available in ERMA, although State now has before OMB a request for a Presidential drawdown of \$15 million (of the \$30 million) for emergencies in Africa. Some funds may also be available in the assistance and admissions portions of the regular refugee account, although I do not have a good figure, and there might not be much there.
- S*  
3. Disaster Assistance Borrowing Authority -- AID has the authority to borrow up to \$50 million annually from its other development assistance programs for disaster assistance (OFDA). To date, none of the \$50 million worth of authority has been used, although AID is working on a memo that would make \$10 million of it available for emergencies in Africa. Technically, all \$50 million could be used for the Middle East. It may not be prudent to do so, however, given other disaster situations elsewhere in the world. \$30 million would be a more reasonable amount.

- 250
4. PL 480 Food Aid -- Approximately \$54.5 million in Title I loan funds (reserve, Pakistan set aside and other programs not yet approved) could be transferred to Title II and provided for refugee assistance on a grant basis. An additional \$139.8 million in Title III grant assistance has not yet been locked in for specific country programs. Finally, \$36 million of Title II grant funds are still available, although AID has a list of potential claimants on this assistance that totals \$185 million. If we really wanted to break some china, we could probably do more in each of these categories.
  
  5. Wheat Reserve -- Under the Food Security Wheat Reserve Act, 300,000 tons of wheat can be drawn out of CCC stocks and provided on an emergency basis, along with transportation (estimated value approximately \$125 million).
  
  6. Section 416 Food Assistance -- Substantial amounts of corn, sorghum and butter could be provided, along with transportation, on a grant basis if these commodities turn out to be suitable for the refugee population under consideration.
  
  7. Non-lethal Excess Defense Articles -- Under Title 10, excess non-lethal DOD supplies (e.g., medical equipment, trucks, etc.) could be provided for humanitarian relief purposes, but probably only to a country (i.e., Turkey). DOD would have to identify the supplies and the lawyers would have to determine how and to whom they could be delivered.
  
  8. Special FAA authorities -- The Foreign Assistance Act contains a number of special and/or emergency authorities that would allow funds to be made available for Middle East emergency refugee assistance, either directly or through transfers. These include Sections 451, 610, and 614. Each of these have their own procedures and limitations that would have to be developed more fully if we decided to pursue them. The key point, however, is that we would have to identify where the money would come from in order to make it available for this purpose. Developing these would take some time and would break some china (e.g., take money from Pakistan, Jordan, Philippines, etc.), but it could be done.

125-

There are other funds (and possible services) available and other authorities that could be used for peacekeeping activities. I will save those for another time.

DC 4-8-91

# Refugees

Refugees vs. Rebels

- ✓ Status of airlift + supplies
- ✓ Other international efforts
- ✓ Supplemental except. need vice "fair share"
- ✓ UN planning
- ✓ Protected areas in south + north
- ✓ Reaction from Iran? Japan? Others
- ✓ Medical unit, supplies

UN protection? CAP?

1) UNIKOM 2) UN Relief 3) US out

→ Logic on <sup>UN</sup>CAP after acceptance of ceasefire

## UNSC Res. 687

\$30-35m. observer force

Mandate UN acts on his proposal

- ✓ UNIKOM (US participation) - planning, training
- ✓ Commission for WMD, Ball. mtd. destruction
  - Intell Comm: monitoring
- ✓ Compensation fund
- ✓ MNF - sanctions
- x. Border demarcation

Acceptance of CAP? intel - if it's win's by

handover zone in north

1. Supplies - UN/US/European
  2. Ceasefire / CAP
  3. UN to help
  4. UN to Japan
  5. Plan for safe haven in N.
  6. Plan for safe haven in S.
  7. Plan for safe haven in E.
  8. Plan for safe haven in W.
- \* 6. Plan for safe haven in S. - South - refugees.

Baker - 10<sup>50</sup> to Denver -

disaster - must worse  
do more

more very fast 325,000 along border  
no med, <sup>fast track</sup> <sub>limited water</sub> human disaster

Also, more coming

- 1) P or JB call Laris de Cuellar -  
appt <sup>with</sup> comd. now

~~2)~~ need US people in T. now How it  
N. Cas.

2) coalition appt to pledge more,  
pay promptly Mexican need,

~~3)~~ 3) to Cong - urgent supplemental  
challenge - <sup>com.</sup> pot. disaster  
put chg as has <sup>in</sup> experts to pay.  
→ same appt as put coalition together.  
pittance so far,  
sys. death of people

Prot. internat community  
rides from Ogd.

Very concerned. NST forming back of  
border - Refugee zone in N. 678 <sup>thousand</sup> <sub>country</sub>

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~John~~

1. Pres - de C
2. Supply - hold off few days  
take init → fair share ←
3. US troop presence + CAP  
will remain in Iraq  
until up. Sit. clarifies
4. Accept ceasefire
5. msg. to Iraqis - CAP.
6. ~~Peacekeeping~~ <sup>Peace zone</sup> in North
7. How much available in  
emergency funds.

ROES - hostile  
in front  
North:  
5-10 days  
to 10 km from  
from acceptance

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Luxembourg - Steven Wall

PM - 4 pt prop

- 1) generous response @  
150 ecu / 150 m.
- \* 2) de mou - stop.  
UN safehaven in North
- 3) go back to UNSC if actions  
cont.
- 4) arms control - abil. to  
acq. high-tech / vol. beyond  
defense. Register of arms  
sales at U.N - monitor  
sales.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Apr-1991 21:54 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Gates

( GATES )

FROM:

Nancy B. Dyke  
(DYKE)

SUBJECT:

Corrected copy of Refugee Supplies Memo

Please use this version, which includes corrected JCS information.

CC: Sandra Charles

( CHARLES )

CC: Robin A. Uhl

( UHL )

*Sham -  
UN Spec.  
Evelyn*

Information available up to 8:00 p.m. Monday, April 8. More complete reports will be available from the agencies tomorrow.

US airdropped (this may not be a complete list - JCS trying to fill it out)

- 40 tents complete with cots and heaters
- 6,000 cases of MREs

France airdropped today

- 10 tons of blankets
- 29 tons of food

US military items available for air delivery, within next 24 hours - we think much of this is arriving in Turkey tomorrow, as 1 C-141, 8 C-5s, and 2 C-130s are due into Incirlik with supplies

- 90,000 blankets coming out of Camp Darby and Aviano, Italy
- 89,000 cases of MREs
- 381 medium tents
- more tents from Incirlik (quantity unknown)
- 200 tent heaters
- 40 30-kw and 50- kw generators
- unspecified quantity of mess gear

Total: \$5.7 million

- 300 tents are being trucked to Incirlik now
- 1 million MREs are being trucked to Incirlik now

OFDA has available for immediate pickup - we think it was picked up today and can be delivered tomorrow to refugees

- 40,000 blankets in Leghorne, Italy
- 8,790 blankets in New Windsor, Maryland
- 1,073 tents in Leghorne

Will know more from OFDA tomorrow morning

We will have a report tomorrow morning on blankets available in UNICEF's Copenhagen warehouse and on the market within Europe. Money donated to the UN can be used to buy blankets if blanket/tent contributions fall short of need. Other UN system information will be available tomorrow too.

Private US donations will be explored further by OFDA tomorrow.

General Galvin is doing a new op plan and it will be available early tomorrow morning. I understand from JCS and Princeton Lyman in Turkey that delivery to refugees by helicopters flying out of Diyarbakir or Batman AFB will begin.

Aid experts say that once an international appeal/effort such as ours is launched, the supplies come in generously. At this point,

the State solicitation cable to get goods delivered into Incirlik  
is being looked at by General Galvin.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
23. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Wednesday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 5/16/2022

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-1183-MR(502)
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 3/23/2015

### RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

202/395-2000

April 10, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
22. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Tuesday Meetings (4 pp.)	04/10/1991	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 1/29/2015

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
<b>Re-review Case #:</b>	<b>Appeal Disposition:</b>
<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-1932-MR(501)
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 10/28/2013

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1991



## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*  
SUBJECT: TUESDAY MEETINGS

I had an interesting and very full day of meetings with Levy, Shamir, Arens and a group of Palestinians. I don't know if we're going to get where we want to go, but there is no doubt that everyone I have been talking to has been thinking seriously. My discussions with all that I met with were very detailed, especially with Shamir.

It's clear to me that Levy is pushing very hard to try to make something happen. (b)(1)

[REDACTED] My public response was that we had a long ways to go and much work remains -- with Arabs and Israelis.

With Shamir, I heard very detailed responses to some of the questions that we had posed after my first trip and I have to say we had a very serious exchange. There are areas of agreement and areas where we still have gaps between us on what I feel is essential if we're going to make this process work. We're going to meet tomorrow to see if we can overcome the gaps we still have on some of the key issues -- issues I will summarize below.

My meeting with Arens focused principally on what the Israelis could do to demonstrate that they are prepared to positively alter the atmosphere in the territories. Anticipating pressure from me, Arens had set the stage rather well for our meeting, because he announced, as we were landing in Israel, that Israel was going to release 1,200 Palestinian prisoners (300 of whom had been administrative detainees). He's being attacked rather harshly by some of the Likud, but he seems quite prepared to try and respond to our concerns for a wide range of confidence-building measures. For example, he told me that he's making a systematic effort to open the schools -- and that, in fact, of the 29 colleges and universities in the territories 25 are now open. Beyond this, however, he is willing to launch two other significant efforts, efforts that I think, if successful, would get at the concern that Brent had.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1932-MR

10/28/2013 MH

First, he is willing to push an extensive program of economic liberalization in the territories. For the first time, the development of Palestinian economic institutions -- a necessary condition for greater independence -- will be encouraged. Onerous restrictions on investment, construction, industrial development, and even land use by Palestinians, are to be relaxed. This is a fundamentally different approach for Israel, but we will have to see how it actually develops.

Second, he is willing to push for "Emergency Municipal Councils" to be run by the Palestinians to take over the functions of the IDF in cities and towns. While seeking a formal negotiation to end the civil administration, he favors the Palestinians actually assuming governing responsibilities in the cities. And if they do, both the civil and security functions of the Israeli military could be gradually removed. He acknowledged the difficulty of doing this, because the threats to local Palestinians make few willing to assume this role. Nonetheless, he is hopeful about being able to proceed very soon in Gaza City (population 250,000), and also Nablus, one of the bigger towns on the West Bank.

To be sure, the very legitimate grievances Palestinians emphasized in my meeting with them indicated there is still a long ways to go. But there is little doubt that for now Israel is willing to seek to move in the territories in a way that could have a very practical and positive effect on the lives of Palestinians. This may not be the substitute for a political process, but with the right kind of economic support from the outside, it could well underpin any political process we produce.

In my meeting with Palestinians, I was struck by the almost total absence of any polemics or of any mention of the PLO. Instead of posturing or focusing on symbols, what I heard was a specific set of practical concerns about Israeli behavior in the territories (especially on settlements and land confiscations). Questions were then posed on whether there might be a halt of such activities or a freeze on them once negotiations were underway.

In addition, questions were also posed about how the regional meeting would work, how Palestinians would be represented, and how and what might be negotiated in the self-government phase of the negotiations. More than anything else, there was a kind of poignancy in the meeting. These Palestinians, who were criticized for meeting with me again, made it clear they want to be a part of the process. When I asked them if they would agree that Palestinians who take part

should be willing to accept (1) our two-track approach, (2) the phased approach to negotiations that I had outlined, and (3) the need to make peace with Israel, they all said they would agree to each of these points. That alone is a good indicator of the change of mood and attitude among potential Palestinian leaders in the territories.

By the way, Hussein asked if Shamir would be present. I said it was possible since the President was interested in attending. It became clear at that point that he was uneasy about having heads of state attend since this would build pressure to involve Arafat. He clearly wasn't interested in that, knowing it would preempt, not begin the process.

Issues to be discussed with Shamir tomorrow


Tomorrow I'll try to nail down some understandings with Shamir. Shamir has already accepted the idea of a regional meeting co-hosted by the US and Soviet Union. Surprisingly, he even agreed to consider at least observer status of the EC President at the meeting. I don't know that he'll accept this, but I emphasized to him that it could well be in Israel's interest to go along with a role for the European countries. We'll see what his response is tomorrow, (b)(1)

Of the other key issues on which I want to get a response, I sensed varying degrees of difficulty.

First, on 242/338 being the basis for permanent status negotiations, I think that we have narrowed the gap, but we are not quite there yet. Shamir wants to be able to say that 242 and 338 is the basis as agreed at Camp David. If, as he acknowledged, the Arabs wouldn't say that, he hoped a formula taking note of different interpretations of 242 and 338 was possible. I told him (b)(1)

Second, on the issue of the form of Palestinian representation at the meeting or conference, Shamir prefers that the Palestinians be there as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He sees this as a way to diminish the PLO role and I suspect to set the basis for future permanent status discussions. The latter (b)(1)

Third, is which Palestinians are going to come. Shamir repeated to me that he had never approved the seven or eight names that we had discussed with Rabin last year. He said that there may have been a misunderstanding between he and Rabin. I told him, well let's look to the future, not the past, and let's focus instead on the principles that are to guide the participation of Palestinians. And here, I outlined the three points I'd raised in my meeting with Palestinians: that they accept the two tracks; that they accept the negotiating phases of the process (first, interim arrangements for self-government, then permanent status); and that they be committed to living in peace with Israel.




Let me sum up today by saying that we clearly still have a ways to go and we may not get there. But I don't believe we have ever had Likud or the Palestinians in the territories as poised to move as they seem to be today. We'll see if that's enough to get us over the threshold.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *J.A. Baker*

SUBJECT: WEDNESDAY MEETINGS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-1183-MR  
mm 3/23/2015

I had another interesting day of meetings. I feel that we're making progress and that I have moved Prime Minister Shamir on a number of issues. The movement is not as much as I might have wanted, but clearly enough at this point to impress Mubarak. I know we have a long ways to go, but we're moving in the right direction. I expect some of the difficulties that we'll face over time will be highlighted in my meetings with Assad tomorrow. For now, I see a consensus developing among the Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians on a regional meeting/conference that will pursue the two-track approach, and a phased approach to negotiations.

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR

As a follow up to my meeting yesterday, Shamir came in with a number of answers. He basically agreed to what I was asking for on 242 and 338 -- namely, that these resolutions would serve as the basis of permanent status negotiations. Shamir will say publicly that he is accepting 242 and 338 as agreed to in Camp David. The Arabs will say they accept these resolutions as the basis because they see them as meaning "territory for peace." If asked, we will state U.S. policy and point out that the parties have differing interpretations of these resolutions, and that these differing interpretations will be resolved in the talks.

While each of the parties may say something different internally to their own domestic audiences, they will all agree that the basis of the meeting is to launch a phased approach to direct negotiations. The initial focus will be on "interim self-government arrangements" (this is the new term I've gotten Shamir to use in place of autonomy). And then the focus will shift to permanent status negotiations which will be based on 242 and 338.

In addition to working out an understanding on 242 and 338 as the basis, Shamir also agreed to the regional meeting and accepted that Palestinians could be represented in the meeting either by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation or by some other means, including a separate Palestinian delegation. While not yet deciding on whether the EC presidency could participate, Shamir did say I could tell Jacques Poos when I see him on Friday that Israel will consider this possibility.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

On the Palestinians who can come, Shamir agreed in principle to some of the names we had discussed last year. But he wanted us to run the names past the Jordanians. He implied the Jordanians would have ideas on these names and might well suggest some additional ones. He agreed as well to our criteria for determining the Palestinians who could participate -- e.g., that they accept the two-track approach, the phased approach to negotiations, and the importance of living in peace with Israel.

But it was at this point that we hit our one major area of disagreement. Shamir wanted to add to our criteria for Palestinian participation an additional element. He wanted a commitment put in writing to us by the Palestinians that they would refrain either from saying they were representatives of the PLO or were under orders from the PLO.

I turned this down flatly. I said if you force these people to put this in writing, you'd be putting them at great risk. I emphasized that they were already putting themselves at risk merely by being willing to commit themselves to this process, particularly because the principles embodied in it ran directly counter to the PLO agenda. Indeed, their willingness to accept the criteria we were establishing was itself a measure of their conviction and their commitment to negotiating peace.

I said I was willing to tell the Arabs and the Palestinians that if the Palestinians in the meeting made a big issue to the effect that they either were representatives of the PLO or under PLO instructions, Israel would probably walk out and there would be no process. If the Arabs and Palestinians were as genuinely desirous of a process as they were conveying to me, then they would not want to risk that process by behavior that would guarantee its end.

(b)



We went back and forth on this and I finally said I needed to know what the bottom line was -- that I did not want to leave this issue hanging. I told Shamir that I wanted an answer before I left the region. I said that I would not agree to seek a letter from the Palestinians on this issue. I said Shamir could, if it would make it easier for him, send a letter to us explaining Israel's position and outlining the circumstances under which it would walk away from the process. However, any such letter could not contain requirements that would in effect impose an impossible condition. This may provide a way out, but that will only happen if Israel does not seek to exclude the possibility that some of the Palestinians at the table may say that they've been authorized by the PLO to be there.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

(S)

[REDACTED]

#### MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

I outlined for President Mubarak what Shamir had agreed to on the regional meeting, including the possibility of accepting an EC President's role, 242/338 as the basis for permanent status, and the criteria for Palestinian representation. To put it simply, Mubarak said he was amazed that Shamir had moved this much. (He actually told me this in private noting he didn't want to say that in front of others.)

Even Shamir's problem with Palestinians saying they were PLO, ironically, didn't seem to create a problem for Mubarak. He said the best way to proceed was for Palestinians at the meeting to say nothing about the PLO -- and that would also reduce the need for Israel to say anything about the PLO. I suspect that the PLO and Israel each fear possible embarrassment: the PLO because Israel will say openly they're not in the process, and Israel because they fear Palestinians will make it look as if the Israelis are dealing with the PLO. The net effect is that both for their own reasons may want silence on the issue, and Mubarak seems to think this is possible.

I hope Mubarak is right, but I'm not sure he is. If he is, we're likely to find that this issue is not that difficult to finesse. One other area where Mubarak shared Shamir's preference was on the issue of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He seemed to feel such a delegation might solve a lot of problems and might be the easiest way to get Palestinians to step forward. (S)

[REDACTED]

In short, on the question of peace, Mubarak was clearly optimistic. He told me he had worried about a regional conference before, but now he had a better idea of what we had in mind and he wanted us to pursue it. He directed Foreign Minister Meguid in our press conference to speak of progress, to endorse our efforts, and to say that a regional conference was an interesting idea that should be discussed and considered.

Mubarak also raised the issue of Libya. He had just returned from Libya early this morning and mentioned that he'd actually been to Rabta. I asked him why so many SAMs were needed to protect the aspirin there, and while laughing about the question, he acknowledged that he'd seen the SAMs. He also said Egypt was planning to send, with Qadhafi's approval, specialists to Rabta to help manage the plant and ensure that it was not producing -- and indeed could not produce -- chemical weapons. Mubarak once again made a point of saying that he thought he could moderate Qadhafi.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

I told him we continued to have great problems with Qadhafi and that I'd give him a list of those. In any case, Mubarak emphasized that having Qadhafi remain quiescent over the next several months would be very important to the success of our efforts on peace.

He made one request and that was that the families of five Libyan officers who had gone first to Kenya and were now in the United States be permitted to visit them there. I told him we'd have no problems with such a visit provided the officers wanted it. Similarly, I said I didn't see any problem with taking up Mubarak's offer of asylum for these men and their families in Egypt if that's what they wanted.

Mubarak said this would help him with Qadhafi and I said we would be responding to him, not to Qadhafi. I noted that his efforts with Qadhafi did seem to effect Libyan behavior during the course of the Gulf crisis, but we still had many problems with Qadhafi and had absolutely no impulse to draw closer to him. Mubarak said he understood that.

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 7

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # ~~03~~ 03

DTG 120745Z APR 91

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

RELEASER \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTINE

RECORD # \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION

1. SAM 973 SEC. STATE AIRCRAFT

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHSR / GEN. SCOWCROFT

2. GATES

3. Kimmit

4. TOR: 120017Z

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

CAMP DAVID COMM CTR PASSED MSG FROM AIRCRAFT TO WHSR

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997  
By JT2 NARA, Date 08/24/2007

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

CLASSIFIED DATAFAX FROM THE SECRETARY

SECRETARY'S AIRCRAFT

FOR: Senior Duty Officer WH Sit Room

Fax Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Tel Number: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: SAM 56973 Sec State Acft

Fax Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Tel Number: \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS: Eyes only memo to General Scowcroft for the President

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By 257 NARA, Date 05/24/2009

Number of pages to follow: 6

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

April 12, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By DOJ NARA, Date 08/24/2009

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
24. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Thursday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	4/12/91	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** H-Files  
**Subseries:** NSC/DC Meetings Files

**Document Partially Declassified  
(Copy of Document Follows)  
By MM on 5/16/2022**

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** NSC/DC 268 - April 08, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Iraqi Refugees via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Refugees

<b>Date Closed:</b> 8/24/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 90019-012
<b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2004-0416-F	<b>Appeal Case #:</b>
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<b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>	<b>Disposition Date:</b>
<b>AR Case #:</b>	<b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-1183-MR(501)
<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 3/23/2015

### RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*


SUBJECT: THURSDAY MEETINGS

I had another full day starting with Prince Saud in Cairo this morning, moving on to Ben Yahya, the Tunisian Foreign Minister in Damascus, and concluding with another marathon session with Assad. The Saud and Ben Yahya meetings highlighted the continuing impulse that countries in the area have for looking to us. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Tunisia meeting was characterized by the Foreign Minister clearly emphasizing that they want to see our good relations restored. The Assad meeting, like my meetings on the peace process with Shamir, were detailed and involved a very extensive and serious exchange. The road ahead with Assad is likely to be difficult, but my sense is he wants to be a part of this process.

Saud Meeting

Saud was interested in two subjects: the peace process and support for Iraqi opposition. He listened carefully to my brief on the peace process, paying close attention as I described how Shamir had moved, what we were seeking to do with a regional meeting, how negotiations might proceed, and how the Saudis might be helpful. With regard to the latter, I noted that they could support Palestinians in the territories politically and economically; they could help to keep the PLO from undercutting the process; they could work to get the Syrians to come to the meeting; and they could think about issuing a general statement, perhaps with the members of the GCC, on their commitment to peace with Israel once Palestinian needs and rights were addressed and satisfied.

Saud responded



DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

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- 2 -


(b) (1) (d)



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- 3 -

1.4(b), 1.4(d)

Ben Yahya

The most noteworthy point of our meeting was that the new Tunisian Foreign Minister put an absolute premium on restoring our relations. He made a point of saying that all of the things that his President had said to you in your meeting in 1989, they now stood by. They were determined to renew strong ties, even though they recognized that we had been disenchanted with their position during the Gulf crisis.

I wouldn't say that Ben Yahya was contrite, but he clearly did recognize why we had problems with some of their behavior. He tried hard to explain those behaviors, but above all else he said let's look to the future and renew the strong ties that have always served our mutual interest. I told him that we're not in the habit of holding grudges and we're prepared to look to the future and not be preoccupied with the past. But I also said that I wouldn't be honest if I didn't tell him that we really did feel deeply disappointed by the positions his government had adopted during the crisis.

I said one way Tunisia could begin to restore our good relations would be for them to use their special relationship with Arafat to convince him that the PLO needs to stay out of the peace process if there is to be a process. I said that no process is possible with the PLO, but it is increasingly clear a very credible one is possible without it. I said, how about doing what you can to keep the PLO outside the process? He responded by saying, they would use all their moral and political influence with Arafat for this purpose. They understood how important this could be for pursuing our mutual interests. We'll see if this offers any help.

Assad


My session with Assad covered five and a half hours. We met for three hours to begin with, broke for dinner, and came back for a remaining two and a half hours. In the first part of our discussion, I spent about an hour explaining why it was very important to us from a bilateral standpoint for him to ease the harsh punishment of Syrian Jews for travel violations and restrictions on the emigration of Syrian Jews. At a minimum, I asked how about permitting unification of families with relatives in the United States. He adopted a hardline on permitting men to emigrate on the grounds that they could go to Israel and go into the army. There was no give in this position -- and there isn't likely to be as long as Syria is in a state of war with Israel -- but he did agree to look favorably on granting visas to unmarried single Jewish women. (That is an advance that will be welcomed by Steve Solarz, one of those most concerned with the Syrian Jewry issue.)

On terrorism, we agreed to Ambassador Busby's visit in early May for discussions on combatting terrorism with Syrian officials at the political and security levels. This visit may prove helpful in continuing to narrow our differences on this very key issue.

On the peace process, he listened with great interest to my description of how Shamir moved. However, rather than getting into what Shamir had done, he preferred to focus on the conference and the terms and modalities of that conference. He outlined four reservations:

First, he wanted to maintain the reference to an international conference. He didn't see the need to change it to a regional conference. After a good deal of give and take, he suggested rather than calling it a regional conference, that we simply call it a peace conference. (b) (7)(D)

(b) (7)(D)



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- 5 -

14(b); 14(d)

He asked me to work on his reservations and in return he would think about all the points I'd made. I told him he hadn't made it impossible for me, but he'd made it very difficult. To which he answered, "that's not my intent, I really want this to work."

Things went about the way I expected with Assad. There's no doubt that there's a lot of hard work to be done, and the gaps between Israelis and Syrians on getting this process started are real. But when you cut through it all,

Right now, I think it might not be a bad thing to let a few days go by in both Israel and Syria. Early next week, we might want to activate a little phone diplomacy to try to nail down some things before more face to face meetings take place. After a week or so, I might want to come back to the area with some things in writing to ensure that we have the necessary understandings in hand in order to proceed.

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HOW TO MEET VARIOUS SPECIAL NEEDS

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS</u>				
Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service account (State)	14.2 (7)	Competition for funds from other emergency needs.	Not applicable.	Principal account used for evacs.
Salaries & Expenses account (State)	1,900 (45)	Legal opinion and 15-day reprogramming notification needed.	Not applicable.	OMB GC and State believe can be used. \$450 thousand obligated for Kuwait evacs. at end of FY 1990.
Economic Support Fund account (State/AID)	3,400 (1,905) \$91 million unapportioned and unearmarked	Usually used for security aid to foreign governments. Legal opinion and reprogram- ming notifi- cation needed.	FAA Sec.614 determination probably needed.	Although never used for evacs before, OMB GC believes can be used.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS (Cont'd)</u>				
International Disaster Assistance account (AID)	45.9 (35.4)	Usually used for aid to foreign countries for relief from natural and manmade disasters. Funds must be provided to countries, international organizations or private and voluntary organizations.	Can use \$50 million of bilateral development aid funds (\$1.9 billion in 1990); \$22 million already used; \$28 million available.	Although never used for evacs before OMB GC believes can be used via private organizations.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS (Cont'd)</u>				
Family Support payments to states (HHS)	1 (?)	Limited to \$1 million annual cap.	None.	HHS can provide funds for temporary assistance to American citizens returning from abroad once they are in the United States.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>HUMANITARIAN RELIEF</u>				
International Disaster Assistance (see above page 2)				
FAA Sec. 506(a) (2) Drawdown of U.S. military goods/services	Not applicable.	Requires Presidential determination and congressional consultation. Annual \$75 million limit on drawdown.	Provision also allows use for refugee and narcotics assistance.	None of the \$75 million has been used so far in FY 1991.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>HUMANITARIAN RELIEF (Cont'd)</u>				
P.L. 480 Title II account (USDA/AID/ State/OMB)	696 ✓ (36)	Only for agricultural commodities and ancillary costs of transport and administration. Can take 1 to 2 months for delivery.	Can transfer up to 15% of P.L. 480 Title I program level to supplement Title II or III resources (for Title I and III, see balance of payments item below).	Can create disincentives to recipients domestic production.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>HUMANITARIAN RELIEF (Cont'd)</u>				
Section 416(b) authority (USDA)	No advance appropriation required. (Funded by Commodity Credit Corporation.)	Limited to providing commodities in CCC stocks -- currently corn and sorghum -- and delivery and distribution costs. Any local currency derived by sale of commodities in recipient government must be used for helping needy people.	\$50 million transportation cap (OMB imposed). \$3.6 million used to date. Current 416 commitments expected to consume the full \$50 million.	None.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>REFUGEE ASSISTANCE</u>				
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account (State)	486 (132)     ↗	Requires 15-day reprogramming.	FAA 506(a)(2) (see above).	Unobligated balances committed for other high priority humanitarian needs, but could be reprogrammed.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>REFUGEE ASSISTANCE (Cont'd)</u>				
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account (State)	35 (41)	Requires a Presidential determination that an unexpected urgent refugee and migration need exists.	Not applicable.	Administration considering a request to drawdown \$25 million of the unobligated balances, of this drawdown \$10 million is for refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East. Could leave \$15 million in unobligated balances.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>REFUGEE ASSISTANCE (Cont'd)</u>				
Refugee and Entrant Assistance (HHS)	411 (?)	Only applies to refugees who qualify for admission to United States.	None.	HHS can provide funds to offset State share of welfare costs of refugees and provide funds for special federal programs.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>SUPPORT FOR INT'L PEACEKEEPING FORCES</u>				
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account (State)	115 (45)	Requires 15-day reprogramming.	Not applicable.	Account authorized to pay U.S. <u>assessed share</u> (31%) of <u>UN</u> <u>sanctioned</u> peacekeeping forces.  Unobligated balance inlcudes \$24 million in arrears payment and \$20 million appropriated but not used for the Iran- Iraq Peacekeeping Force (mandate

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account (State)	33 (0)	Not applicable.	Could be augmented by Section 552(c) authority -- see below.	expired) which could be reprogrammed for Middle East peacekeeping.  Funds voluntary contribution to UN and other peacekeeping forces. No funds left available.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>SUPPORT FOR INT'L PEACEKEEPING FORCES</u>				
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account (State)	788 (668)	Requires 15-day reprogramming.	Not applicable.	Account authorized to pay U.S. <u>assessed share</u> (25%) of <u>UN</u> and other international organizations budgets.  Unobligated balance includes \$36 million in arrears payment for UN which could be directed to special needs.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>SUPPORT FOR INT'L PEACEKEEPING FORCES (Cont'd)</u>				
FAA 552(c) (1) Transfer from Economic Support Fund for peacekeeping.	3,400 (1,905) \$91 million unapportioned and unearmarked	Transfer limited to \$15 million per year. Requires use of FAA Section 610 and determination that transfer is important to national interests.	--	--
FAA 552(c) (2) Transfer of commodities and services from any U.S. government agency.		Transfer limited to \$25 million. Determination needed that immediate provision of resources is required.	--	None of the \$25 million has been used this year.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE MILITARY GOODS &amp; SERVICES TO FOREIGN GOV'TS OR INT'L ORGS.</u>				
Foreign Military Financing account (State/DOD)	4,663 (2,671)	Over 86% of account is earmarked for certain countries or programs.  Part of Arms Export Control Act; has certain conditions on provisions of assistance.	Sections 610 and 614. Permits transfers of funds to the same country for develop. asst. funding level limitations.	\$92 million is available for reprogramming or transfer from Pakistan; \$20 million from Jordan.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE MILITARY GOODS &amp; SERVICES TO FOREIGN GOV'TS OR INT'L ORGS. (Cont'd)</u>				
FAA 506(a)1 Drawdown of DOD goods and services	--	\$75 million cap on annual draw- down. Presi- dent must determine an emergency exists requir- ing military aid but need cannot be met under other FAA and AECA authorities.	--	All of this authority has been already used this year (Israel and Turkey).

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT</u>				
Economic Support Fund account (State/AID)	3,400 (1,905) \$91 million unapportioned and unearmarked	Account heavily earmarked.  Charges to Section 653 report on intended use filed early in 1990 require 15 days notice before programs can be executed.  Central America programs must be proportional.	Section 610,614, and 451.	--

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT (Cont'd)</u>				
P.L. 480, Title I (USDA)	511.5 (316.0)	Loans of up to 30 years can be used only for purchase of commodities and the costs of transport. Can take 1 or 2 months for deliveries. Can create disincentives for domestic production.	None.	Only \$17.5 million of the \$316 unobligated funds are not specifically associated with a particular country program. The \$17.5 million of unallocated funds are in "reserve" so reduction of other country programs may not be required.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT (Cont'd)</u>				
P.L. 480, Title III (AID)	368.5 (0)	Commodity grants to gov'ts. Can take 1 or 2 months for deliveries.	Eligible countries must meet WB civil works preference (annual GNP per country below \$580) or be a "food deficit country."	New program, AID has allocated all funds but no agreements have been signed to date.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT (Cont'd)</u>				
Section 1110(a) Food for Progress (USDA/AID)	Relies on funding from other sources.	Limited to providing commodities and transport. Only countries which are committed to policies that promote economic freedom and the private sector.	Can use P.L. 480 or CCC funds.	None.

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE DEVELOPMENT AID</u>				
Special Assistance Initiative account (AID)	570 (446)	Appropriated for use in Philippines.	Sections 610 and 614 permit transfer of up to 10% of SAI funds to other accounts.	--
Development Assistance account (AID)	1,281 (1,021)	Appropriations made to specific functional (agriculture, AIDS) accounts. Reprogramming between countries, activities, etc., must be notified to Congress 15 days in advance.	Sections 610, 614, and 109 permit up to 15% of funds to be transferred between, but not out of, functional accounts.	--

<u>Purpose/ Sources of Funds</u>	<u>FY 1991 Approp. Unoblig.bal. (in paren) (\$ in millions)</u>	<u>Limitations</u>	<u>Special Authorities/ Flexibility</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>PROVIDE</u>				
<u>DEVELOPMENT AID</u>				
<u>(Cont'd)</u>				
Development Fund for Africa account (AID)	809 (688)	15-day congressional notification period for reprogramming between countries.	Same as development assistance.	--

## BROAD FLEXIBILITY AUTHORITIES

### 1. Provision:

Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA, which is the basic foreign aid law).

### Authority Provided:

Permits assistance under the FAA and under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) without regard to any other (restrictive) provision of the FAA, AECA, foreign aid appropriation or related legislation. NOTE: The AECA provides authority for the foreign military financing program of grants and concessional credit for military exports and also authorizes non-aid-financed export sales.

### Limitations on Authority:

- Can cover the use of no more than \$250 million of combined FAA and AECA aid in any one fiscal year and \$750 million in foreign military sales in any year.
- Not more than \$50 million of assistance can be provided to any one country per year unless it is a victim of active communist aggression and not more than \$500 million of assistance plus sales can be provided to any country annually.
- Does not apply to grants under AECA.
- There must be prior consultation with and written justification to the authorizing and appropriations committees and a formal national interest determination.

## BROAD FLEXIBILITY AUTHORITIES

- Does not waive limitations on transfers under Section 610 of the FAA (see below).
- FAA funds use requires determination that use is important to U.S. security interests.
- AECA funds use requires determination that use is vital to U.S. national security interests.

Comment: Used very sparingly; any controversial use of this provision would lead to repeal.

### 2. Provision:

Section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

#### Authority Provided:

Permits transfers of funds among FAA accounts when President determines it is necessary for the purposes of the FAA.

#### Limitations on Authority:

- Generally, no more than 10 percent may be transferred out of an account and receiving accounts cannot increase more than 20 percent. But military aid funds may be shifted to development aid within the same country without limitation.
- Funds cannot be used to increase the military assistance account or AID's operating expenses.

## BROAD FLEXIBILITY AUTHORITIES

- Funds cannot be transferred out of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
- Related provision (FAA Section 109) prohibits transfer of AID's bilateral development assistance funds (nine different accounts) to other purposes.
- No formal requirement for consultation or reporting.

### 3. Provision:

Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act (Contingency funds).

#### Authority Provided:

Permits the President to transfer up to \$10 million of certain FAA development and humanitarian funds (Part 1) for emergency purposes under other development and humanitarian provisions. Not subject to section 610 limitations or any other provision of law.

#### Limitations on Authority:

- Funds cannot be taken from the bilateral development assistance accounts.
- Security assistance accounts cannot be augmented.
- Must follow provisions of law applicable to the account receiving the transfer.
- Prompt reporting to Congress required, but no prior consultation.

Saddam's legislature,  
~~The~~ National  
Assembly voted  
to accept the  
resolution not  
the RCC. Nor  
was the letter  
signed by Saddam.

One problem -- the RCC  
never ratified the  
1963 Iq-Kuwait  
border agreement.

Should we demand  
RCC acceptance of  
UNSC Res 687 so there  
is no doubt about the  
→





Dec 4-6-91

EC  
Class  
Japan

Don't Pull CAP  
til Pres. directs  
sec. 7 forces  
Auth. for use of force

✓ Message to Iran

✓ State of play with Turks

UN Japan  
✓ Other consultations: UK, France, USSR, EC, etc.  
msgs: ann. in Calif, not Wash; update on UN reso.

✓ State of military preparations / when start  
ROEs: protection of a/c; attacks on refugees

✓ UN-planning for refugee adminis - South + North

✓ PAs - to Pres.

✓ Legislation - no supp - just replenish from DCA

✓ ERMA - \$10m. - Kurds + Shia? <sup>only</sup>

✓ Congressional consultations?

✓ msg to Iraq

✓ MASH unit

✓ What do we do in South after we leave

Status of implementation of 687

UK, 3 \*  
Fr, 1  
US tactical

0900 Z  
Sum.  
85 a/c \*  
CAP  
30 130s  
AWACS

No fly NWK  
of 36 N.

Notary or  
fixed  
shoot on  
hostile  
intent or  
fire

Ceasefire  
implied  
for CAP

Week or  
two

location of refugees

✓ Turkish clearances (both sides of border)

MREs vice beans + rice