

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):

2004-0416-F

FOIA Number:

2004-0416-F

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90018
Folder ID Number: 90018-031

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 252 - January 29, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Iraq

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	6	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. List	Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	01/29/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
02a. Handwritten Note	Sandy to Bob Re: POW's and Pilots (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Robin A. Uhl Re: Tuesday, Jan 29 Gulf Video (1 pp.)	01/29/1991	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	White House Situation Room Memo Re: Cable from USMISSION New York to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., et.al. - Security Council Action on the Gulf Crisis Next Steps (4 pp.)	01/28/1991	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	To Director of Central Intelligence Re: Iraqi CBW (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Paper	Re: Iraqi CW Agents (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 252 - January 29, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Iraq

Pinksheet Number: DJC1308

OA/ID Number: 90018-031

Date Closed: 8/18/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2004-0416-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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01. List	Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	01/29/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 252 - January 29, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Iraq

Date Closed: 8/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 90018-031
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

<p>Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]</p> <p>P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA] P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA] P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA] P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA] P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA] P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]</p> <p>C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.</p> <p>PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.</p>	<p>Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]</p> <p>(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information</p>
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DEPUTY COMMITTEE (SVTS) MEETING
TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1991
4:30 PM - 5:30 PM

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card (Invited)
Robert Gates

OVP

Carnes Lord

NSC

Richard Haass

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
John Kelly

TREASURY (here)

John Robson (OUT OF TOWN)

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz
Henry Rowen

JUSTICE

William Barr
Dan Levin

JCS

Michael Carnes
Merrill Ruck

CIA

Richard Kerr
[REDACTED]

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

OMB (here)

William Diefenderfer
Bob Howard

ENERGY (here)

W. Henson Moore
John Tuck

10/4/39

5/28/45

Bob -

My propaganda
group also has
recommended
DoD publicly
ask for the
*dead POW's body
back - and
any other bodies
of pilots killed
in crashes they
may have. Don't
know if they
have done so.

Sandy

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Jan-1991 09:26 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

(UHL)

FROM:

Richard N. Haass
(HAASS)

SUBJECT:

Tuesday, Jan 29 Gulf Video

robin: pls pass to bob for today's meeting. thanks.

- ✓1. intell and military updates
- ✓2. iran: status of planes? assurances?
- ✓3. UNSC: anything more to be done?
- ✓4. countering Saddam re damage to mosques
- 5. oil slick issues?
- λ6. provide SOTU preview (up to you)

CC: C. David Welch
CC: Sandra Charles

(WELCH)
(CHARLES)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0966-MR
MM 6/2/2015

DE 252

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Jan-1991 11:34 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

(UHL)

FROM:

Richard N. Haass
(HAASS)

SUBJECT:

attached re unsc and gulf crisis

robin: pls pass to bob. we should raise at tuesday dc

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DJ NARA, Date 08/18/2009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Jan-1991 09:57 EDT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0966-MR
MM 6/2/2015

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: (WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: TFKU01: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE GULF

<DIST>

PRT: BOOK SIT
SIT: DYKE HAASS CHARLES PAVITT ROSTOW WELCH WHSR_IRAQ WORKING SIT SUM
VAX

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

RUCNDT

<DTG>

281435Z JAN 91

<ORIG>

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

<TO>

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3339
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0127
RUFHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5175
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 8864
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 6507
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 2216

<SUBJ>

TFKU01: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE GULF
- CRISIS NEXT STEPS

<TEXT>

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00278

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, IZ, YE, UNSC

SUBJECT: TFKU01: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE GULF

- CRISIS NEXT STEPS

REF: USUN 00276

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT).

-
2. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL COUNCIL PRESIDENT BAGBENI (ZAIRE) INTENDS TO CONTINUE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE MAGHREBI, SUDAN AND YEMEN REQUESTS FOR A FORMAL SC MEETING ON THE GULF CRISIS AND TO MAKE A PROPOSAL AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, JANUARY 28, AS TO THE TIME OF AND THE FORM FOR SUCH A MEETING.

-
3. WE ARE CERTAIN THAT DURING THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE, YEMEN AND CUBA WILL INSIST ON SCHEDULING A FORMAL PUBLIC MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. IF THEY SUCCEED IN FORCING SUCH A MEETING, AND THIS IS SOMETHING THEY CAN INSIST ON, OUR ONLY RECOURSE WILL BE TO SEEK TO BLOCK IT BY SECURING ENOUGH VOTES IN THE FORMAL (PUBLIC) MEETING TO PREVENT THE AGENDA FROM BEING ADOPTED. A NUMBER OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY ABSTAINING OR VOTING AGAINST THE ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA PUBLICLY. WHILE SUCH A TACTIC MAY SUCCEED ONCE, THE PRESSURE WILL ONLY INCREASE AND AT SOME POINT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE A FORMAL COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE GULF CRISIS WILL BE HELD OR YEMEN AND OTHERS WILL SEEK TO TAKE THE ISSUE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SIMPLY PUT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE THE VOTES TO PREVENT A PUBLIC MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OR ALTERNATIVELY THE INFLUENCE TO PREVENT MOVES TO OPEN UP A DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY RESORTING TO TACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL STONEWALLING.

-
4. FOR THIS REASON, THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE IDEA OF PROPOSING A CLOSED FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. YEMEN AND CUBA WOULD VOCIFEROUSLY OBJECT TO SUCH A MOVE BUT MOST OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT. USUN BELIEVES THAT THE IDEA OF A CLOSED MEETING ON THE GULF CRISIS HAS ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IF PROPERLY STRUCTURED IT WOULD THWART ATTEMPTS TO MOVE THE COUNCIL INTO A FORMAL PUBLIC MEETING ON THE GULF OR MOVES TO BRING IT UP IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME. SECOND, IT WOULD ENABLE US AND OTHERS TO CHARACTERIZE THE CLOSED MEETINGS AS A SERIOUS COUNCIL INITIATIVE TO SEE WHAT STEPS THE COUNCIL AND OTHERS SHOULD BE TAKING TO BRING BAGHDAD ALONG IN COMPLYING WITH RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

-
5. CLOSED MEETINGS HAVE IN THE PAST BEEN USED TO ENABLE COUNCIL MEMBERS TO PROBE THE INTENTIONS OF THOSE GOVERNMENTS SEEKING COUNCIL ACTION. THE FIRST SERIES OF CLOSED MEETINGS COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS THE INITIAL TRANCHE OF A NEW PHASE OF COUNCIL ACTIVITY AND ATTENDANCE COULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE COUNCIL MEMBERS,

THE FIVE MAGHREBI STATES AND SUDAN WHO WANT A FORMAL OPEN MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AND THE MEMBERS OF THE GULF COOPERATIVE COUNCIL WHO ARE FIRMLY OPPOSED. IN SUCH A SETTING WE AND OTHERS WOULD BE ABLE TO QUESTION THE YEMENIS AND OTHERS ABOUT THEIR RATIONALE FOR A FORMAL OPEN COUNCIL MEETING. SINCE THEY CLAIM THEY HAVE NO PLANS TO PROPOSE ANY SPECIFIC COUNCIL ACTION, WE COULD HAMMER AWAY AT THE POINT THAT THE COUNCIL IS NOT A FORUM FOR MAKING SPEECHES BUT A PLACE FOR CONSIDERED ACTION.

6. ONCE THE INITIAL CLOSED MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD WE WOULD HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF INVITING ADDITIONAL STATES TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS UNDER THE SAME FORMAT. AS A RESULT THE COUNCIL WOULD REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE ISSUE BUT IN A MANNER WHICH AVOIDS A MESSY AND DIFFICULT SERIES OF OPEN MEETINGS IN WHICH ALMOST EVERY MEMBER OF THE UN WOULD WANT TO SPEAK.

7. FINALLY, FARTHER DOWN THE ROAD, IF IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT ALL THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CONTAINING DEBATE ON THE GULF IN CLOSED MEETINGS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED AND A FORMAL SIMPLE RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING PREVIOUS COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND CALLING UPON IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THEM FORTHWITH. WE COULD PUSH SUCH A RESOLUTION TO A VOTE PROMPTLY WITHOUT AMENDMENT AND ARE CONFIDENT THAT IT

BT

#0278

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00278

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, IZ, YE, UNSC

SUBJECT: TFKU01: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE GULF WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY MOST OF THE COUNCIL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF YEMEN AND CUBA. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO ASSURE THAT OUR RESOLUTION GETS TABLED FIRST.

8. COMMENT: USUN BELIEVES THE IDEA OF HOLDING STRUCTURED CLOSED MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL TO DISCUSS THE GULF WAR HAS MERIT. IT PREVENTS THE YEMENIS, THE SUDAN AND THE MAGHREBIS FROM USING A PUBLIC FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO ENGAGE IN DAMAGING POLITICAL THEATER OR TO PUSH FOR A GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE TO ACHIEVE THE SAME OBJECTIVE. IT GIVES US AND OTHERS A CHANCE TO EXPOSE THE REAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THEIR ACTIONS AND ABOVE ALL IT BUYS US TIME. END COMMENT.

9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PICKERING

BT

#0278

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 02

<SSN>

0278

<TOR>
910128095023 MSG000286365023

<SECT>
SECTION: 02 OF 02

<SSN>
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910128095032 MSG000286365032

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	To Director of Central Intelligence Re: Iraqi CBW (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 11/6/13

File Location: NSC/DC 252 - January 29, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Iraq

Date Closed: 8/18/2009	OA/ID Number: 90018-031
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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0966-MR (502)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 1/18/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.



~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

DC 252
Put in [unclear]
[unclear]

OSWR-014-91

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Robert L. Foord
Director of Scientific and Weapons Research
SUBJECT: Response to Questions Concerning Iraqi CBW
(b)(1)

1. Action Requested: None required. This memorandum addresses your questions of 22 January. (b)(1)

2. We continue to assess that the Iraqis have at least a limited number of chemical warheads for their Scud and modified-Scud missiles. This assessment is based on previous reporting of Iraqi CW missile testing and the relatively straightforward modifications required for missile adaptation. The nonpersistent nerve agent sarin and the semipersistent nerve agent GF would be the most likely fills for such warheads. The Iraqis might even have some warheads filled with the persistent nerve agent VX, although
(b)(1)

3. If a US Patriot air defense missile were to intercept an Iraqi chemical warhead, there probably would be minimal or no ground-level CW hazard (b)(1)

4. We have no evidence that suggests Iraqi BW agents are being sent to terrorists (b)(1)

5. If Allied forces were to bomb CW or BW storage facilities, the resulting toxic contamination would be very localized. Most agents would not pose a significant hazard beyond a distance of a few kilometers from the facilities. In contrast,

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0966-MR
SCS 1/18/12

NOFORN
~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Concerning Iraqi CBW [REDACTED]

the BW agent anthrax could be carried considerable distances from the facilities by winds and form a long-term hazard over an extended area. [REDACTED]

6. Suspect Iraqi CW and BW storage facilities are widely scattered throughout the country. In addition, recent reporting has suggested that the Iraqis may be relocating some CW stocks to a number of previously unidentified locations. [REDACTED]

Robert L. Foord

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**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 4/6/13**

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0966-MR (503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/15/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


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Shelf-Life of Iraqi CW Agents

[redacted] (b)(1)

- CIA and DIA both agree that Iraq had problems with the stability and purity of its nerve agents during the Iran-Iraq war. [redacted] (b)(1)
- CIA believes that Iraq has solved this problem by moving to binary nerve agents. With the binary system, the two components are mixed just prior to use, eliminating problems that might be caused by impurities. We do not believe the Iraqis have problems with the stability of mustard.
- DIA believes that Iraq has small quantities of binary nerve agent, but still has problems with the purity of its unitary nerve agents. A current DIA assessment states that Saddam may soon use chemical weapons because all of Iraq's chemical agents have a short shelf-life and must be used before they deteriorate.

During the October 1990 [redacted] (b)(1) CBW meeting, the purity and stability of Iraq's chemical warfare agents was the subject of debate [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1)

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SCS 5/15/12