

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

FOIA Number:
2005-1002-F

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90018
Folder ID Number: 90018-029

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	6	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia (2 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Paper	Yugoslavia: Army Moving to Crackdown [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)	S
01c. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(3)	
02a. Coversheet	From William F. Sittmann Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia on December 23, 1991 [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
02b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, December 23, 1991 [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	12/20/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
02c. Agenda	Re: Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	12/23/91	(b)(1)	S
02d. Paper	Re: Yugoslavia: Policy Paper (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02e. Paper	Re: US Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Yugoslavia [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/91	(b)(1); (b)(6)	C

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Pinksheet Number: cap1580

OA/ID Number: 90018-029

Date Closed: 1/6/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. List	Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	01/29/1991	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
02a. Handwritten Note	Sandy to Bob Re: POW's and Pilots (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Robin A. Uhl Re: Tuesday, Jan 29 Gulf Video (1 pp.)	01/29/1991	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	White House Situation Room Memo Re: Cable from USMISSION New York to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., et.al. - Security Council Action on the Gulf Crisis Next Steps (4 pp.)	01/28/1991	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	To Director of Central Intelligence Re: Iraqi CBW (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05. Paper	Re: Iraqi CW Agents (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 252 - January 29, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Iraq

Pinksheet Number: DJC1308

OA/ID Number: 90018-031

Date Closed: 8/18/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2004-0416-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02f. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Jonathan T. Howe Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, December 23, 1991 (1 pp.)	12/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Pinksheet Number: cap1580

OA/ID Number: 90018-029

Date Closed: 1/6/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120249
RECEIVED: 05 APR 91 11

TO: GATES

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR DC MTG ON 25 JAN RE YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 09 APR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC250

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 1/5/10

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120249

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES
001

Z 91040511 FOR INFORMATION
X 91040513 NOTED BY GATES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 1/5/10

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 20249

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>24.4/5</u>	<u>N/R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>MS 4/9</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

RECEIVED
91 APR 5 AM 47

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch P = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Paper	Yugoslavia: Army Moving to Crackdown [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 12/12/2016

Date Closed: 1/6/2010	OA/ID Number: 90018-029
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2012-0109-MR(663)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/28/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

SECRET (b)(3)

SPOT COMMENTARY

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
500.01
2010-2883-MR

25 January 1991
1000 EST

Yugoslavia: Army Moving to Crackdown

The Yugoslav Army (JNA) appears to be making its long-threatened move against the rebellious northern republic of Croatia, and it may also be moving against Slovenia.

1.4(c) [redacted] infantry and MP battalions are forming up in Zagreb and 78 armored vehicles are lined up ready to move out at the headquarters of a mechanized brigade in Dugo Selo, 25 kilometers southeast of the city. CNN also reports that tanks are approaching Zagreb. 1.4(c) [redacted]

the Army is fully prepared for the consequences of taking on Croatia: "If it comes to violence and bloodshed, so be it!" An MP battalion that was on alert in Ljubljana last weekend has moved out of garrison. The Slovene Interior Minister said last night that Slovene militia have gone on alert as well. (b)(3) [redacted]

Comment: The JNA believes it has a mandate to halt the disintegration of Yugoslavia and probably calculates that it must move now against Croatia or forfeit any opportunity to control events. The JNA troops in Slovenia may only be on alert to forestall a move by Ljubljana to follow through on its recently agreed mutual assistance pact with Zagreb. (b)(3) [redacted]

(b)(3) [redacted]

Scawcroft	Gornpert	JVP
Gates	O'Leary	
SUNUNU	Sigler	
Card	SPO	
SITMANA	ABO	
Hill	ANL	
Hutchings	Wtss	

(b)(3); (b)(6) [redacted]

Prepared by:

SECRET (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0109-MR
MM 9/28/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed: 1/6/2010

OA/ID Number: 90018-029

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE (SVTS) MEETING
FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1991
1:30PM - 2:00PM

WHITE HOUSE

Robert Gates
Andy Card (Invited)

OVP

Carnes Lord

NSC

David Gompert
Robert Hutchings

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
James Dobbins

DOD

Stephen Hadley
Bruce Weinrod

JCS

LtGen Edwin Leland, Jr. (J5 planning)
Lt Col John Dullahan

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120933
RECEIVED: 20 DEC 91 11

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 20 DEC 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA ON 23 DEC

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 24 DEC 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 11/5/10

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY *SM* DATE 13/20 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9120933

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HOWE
002

Z 91122017 FOR DECISION
X 91122018 SITTMANN SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 1/5/10

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: JB

LOG # 20933

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Jon Howe	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>Sign Tab I</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u> <u>12/20</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: **VP** **Skinner** **Other** _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS
Diskette w/ Exec Sec

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

20 NOV 91 2:08



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 15FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN ^{11/23}
(Name) _____ (Phone Number) _____ (Room No.) _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION AGENDA FOR 23 DEC DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA

LOG # 20933

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
JCS	COL GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.	SECRETARY	
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS **PLEASE DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE ASAP**

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS**URGENT**

CAP 1/5/10

Please Add to
File --
Closed out 12/20
Thanks!

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Coversheet	From William F. Sittmann Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia on December 23, 1991 [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Date Closed:	1/6/2010	OA/ID Number:	90018-029
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION **SECRET** PAGES 15

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN EXEC SEC NSC
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA ON DECEMBER 23, 1991

LOG #: 20933

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	W. ROBERT PEARSON	EXEC SEC	
DOD	JOHN A. DUBIA	EXEC SEC	
CIA	(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]	EXEC SEC	
JCS	GEORGE L. SUMRALL	SECRETARY	

REMARKS ***PLEASE DELIVER***

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP

1/5/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9120933
DATE 20 DEC 91

SUBJECT: DC MTG ON YUGOSLAVIA ON 23 DEC
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

JACKSON, K
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
VIA LARRY BRANSCUM
ROOM 292, OEOB
WASHINGTON, DC 20500

COPY: 1

PEARSON, W
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

20249

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


~~SECRET~~

January 25, 1991

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT 

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS 

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia

You should drive the meeting to decision on several limited steps that the U.S. should take immediately, in hopes of heading off or containing violent conflict in Yugoslavia. Eruption of major conflict will shift the Yugoslav situation markedly, and we would need to revisit policy promptly.

A Europe PCC meeting this morning agreed that our basic aims at this point are to issue clear public and private warnings against the use of force and to push the EC to take the lead, either jointly with us or independently, in addressing the Yugoslav situation.

I. ASSESSMENT. We suggest that you turn first to Dick Kerr for an update. He can help distinguish fact (federal military convoys out of barracks in Croatia) from rumor (tanks on the streets of Zagreb, reported by CNN but denied by our Consul there). The key question is whether the military, if it moves, will confine itself to rounding up arms held by "paramilitary organs" or whether it will go after the political leadership itself. (If Croatian resistance turns into major violence, of course, the question will become moot.) There is no substantial difference among agencies on the gravity of the situation, through CIA believes the situation is already hopeless.

II. REVIEW OF US POLICY. You should then turn to Bob Kimmitt for a very brief review of steps we have taken in the past two weeks. These include demarches Ambassador Zimmermann has made to President Jovic, Prime Minister Markovic, Defense Minister Kadijevic, and others; demarches to European allies and friends, especially the EC, urging them to deliver messages along the same lines and speak out publicly; consultations at NATO; Kimmitt's meeting with Ambassador Mujezinovic today and David Gompert's meeting with him yesterday; and press guidance urging non-violence. State will also issue a travel advisory.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2883-MR
SCS 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

A first - I'm about to
fall asleep in a meeting,
I'm channing.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

III. NEXT STEPS. The PCC identified a list of immediate steps for consideration by the DC:

✓ **Press Statement.** State has prepared a press statement for release today. The White House should hold fire for now, but the Press Office is armed with guidance to respond to questions.

✓ **Letter to the Yugoslavs.** State has prepared a letter from Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Loncar. We recommend that the letter go from the President to Yugoslav President Jovic, who is relevant to the present crisis in a way that Loncar is not. There was no objection at the PCC, but you should seek DC agreement for the idea.

✓ **Raise the issue in CSCE.** The PCC agreed that we should raise our concerns over Yugoslavia at Valletta as well as the CSCE senior officials meeting on January 28 in Vienna (which will be chaired, as luck would have it, by Yugoslavia.)

✓ **Getting the EC to take the lead.** The PCC agreed that we should follow up on our earlier demarches and urge the EC, even before Luxembourg Foreign Minister Poos visits (in his EC Presidency capacity) on January 29. You should see whether the DC agrees that we should urge the EC to (1) issue a statement along the lines of today's State Department release, (2) support a thorough discussion of Yugoslavia at the CSCE meetings, (3) consider a joint U.S.-EC statement on Yugoslavia following Secretary Baker's meeting with Poos, and (4) take a strong and active role generally, including an offer to mediate should the parties in Yugoslavia request such mediation. State (Jim Dobbins) was not enthusiastic about this fourth point, but we strongly feel that it is important for the international community to let the Yugoslavs know this option is available. It is a nonstarter right now, except for Croatia and Slovenia, but the idea might gain currency in Yugoslavia if things get messy.

Markovic visit. The PCC was unanimous that we should not agree to Markovic's request for an invitation to visit the U.S. However, we have Ambassador Zimmermann tell Markovic (as Kimmitt told the Yugoslav Ambassador) that we will be receptive to the idea if and only if the Yugoslavs find ways to settle their differences peacefully. This might induce Markovic to use his waning influence more effectively.

In the event of major violence, the DC should agree to meet promptly to consider next steps.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, December 23, 1991 [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	12/20/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)

By JS on 10/21/13

Date Closed: 1/6/2010	OA/ID Number: 90018-029
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2883-MR(501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/18/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20933

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 20, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KARL JACKSON
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BG JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

(b)(3)

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL GEORGE L. SUMRALL, JR.
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2883-MR
JL 6/18/12

SUBJECT: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, December 23, 1991

Attached are the agenda for the December 23 Deputies Committee meeting and background papers on the recognition issue and support for UN peacekeeping efforts. The meeting should come to decision on the following issues: (S)

1. Recognition. Should we change our approach? Several alternatives have been suggested: fall into line with the EC, adopt a more independent set of U.S. criteria, or maintain a low profile until we see how the situation develops in Yugoslavia. Should we consult now with the EC and try to urge more stringent application of criteria for recognition? (S)
2. Selective sanctions. Should we reconsider our approach and move now to join the EC in exempting all but Serbia and Montenegro from economic sanctions? (S)
3. Peacekeeping. Should we tangibly and visibly step up our support for UN peacekeeping efforts? What kinds of lift, intelligence, and other support would we consider providing to a UN operation? Should we communicate this to UN authorities? (S)
4. Enlarged Consultations. Given the risks of an escalation of violence and involvement of neighboring countries, including NATO

~~SECRET~~


Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

allies, should we open quiet consultations at NATO on the security implications of the conflict? How should we begin thinking about our role in what may be a prolonged crisis? (S)



William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B U.S. Approach toward Recognition (State)
Tab C U.S. Support for Peacekeeping (Defense)

cc: Andrew Card

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: December 23, 1991
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 10:30 a.m.

YUGOSLAVIA

Agenda

- I. Opening Statement..... Admiral Howe
- II. Brief Update of Situation in Yugoslavia..... Mr. Kerr
- III. Brief Update on Vance and Carrington Missions... Mr. Kanter
- IV. Policy Discussion..... All Participants
 - A. Recognition Issue
 - B. Sanctions
 - C. Peacekeeping
 - D. Enlarged Consultations
- V. Summary..... Admiral Howe

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2883-MR
31 6/18/12

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

YUGOSLAVIA: POLICY PAPER

ISSUE

The evolution of EC policy on Yugoslavia has put us on the spot. In early November both we and the EC were moving together to apply sanctions on all of Yugoslavia, and linking recognition to a general settlement. The EC has now moved to selective sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (December 2) and to earned recognition for all eligible Yugoslav republics (December 16). Despite the concern of many EC members that their move to earned recognition would widen the conflict and jeopardize the Vance/Carrington effort, the EC approach reflects the judgment that maintaining EC unity, especially on the heels of Maastricht, outweighs those concerns.

We need to be able to state our policy positively, not just negatively. Not that we won't recognize unless, but rather that we will recognize provided... We face two dilemmas:

- (1) If we join the EC on earned recognition, we might go over the cliff with them if our predictions about intensification of the conflict prove accurate.
- (2) If we sit tight, we remain unable to articulate our posture vis-a-vis the EC or on recognition and sanctions. Our position could become untenable; we could become part of the problem. Also, the gap with the EC will widen.

THE U.S. APPROACH ON RECOGNITION

The EC has decided on earned recognition, and is almost certain to formally recognize and establish diplomatic relations with several Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and perhaps Bosnia) on January 15.

Maintaining a U.S. policy of non-recognition absent a general settlement isolates us from the EC and undermines the pressure the EC is trying to apply against the Serbian and Yugoslav military leadership. It would put the spotlight on U.S. policy by begging the question of what we are doing to resolve the Yugoslav crisis if not supporting the EC's efforts, whereas we continue to believe the Europeans should be in the lead. It would be inconsistent with our approach in the Soviet Union, and would face strong criticism in the Congress.

Joining the EC on earned recognition avoids those disadvantages. It reinforces the impact of EC's stance against the Serbian use of force to redraw borders.

The main risk is that the Serbian and military leadership may not be deterred from using force to try to carve up other republics (Croatia now, Bosnia soon) even after outside states

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

promise or give those republics recognition. The situation in Bosnia could explode within days if the republic opts for recognition. Outside states will then face the question of what to do about that. It is also possible that the EC approach will finish the Vance/Carrington efforts.

The EC criteria for earned recognition for Yugoslav republics are based on our five principles with Yugoslav-specific additions. The Hague Conference Arbitration Commission (five senior EC jurists) will determine compliance, although EC political decisions will be overriding. The criteria do not include the traditional one of effective control of national territory (which would rule out Croatia and, prospectively, Bosnia); they do include:

- respect for UN and CSCE principles and norms, especially on rule of law, democracy, and human rights;
- guarantees for the rights of all national groups in accord with CSCE commitments;
- respect for all borders, which can only be changed by peaceful means and mutual agreement;
- acceptance to all relevant commitments on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, security and regional stability;
- commitment to settle by agreement, including if appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all issues of state succession and regional disputes;
- acceptance of the provisions, especially with regard to minority rights, under consideration at the Hague Conference;
- continued support for the UNSYG's efforts (i.e., peacekeeping) and for continuation of the Hague Conference.

We can join the EC's earned recognition approach to Yugoslav republics without departing from our approach in the USSR, although we might want to add commitment to free market reform and to lay a heavier emphasis on commitment to UN efforts.

We can reinforce the degree to which recognition will be earned by Yugoslav republics (rather than bestowed on them by overeager Europeans) by establishing a U.S. evaluation process separate from that of the EC, e.g. by sending a U.S. envoy to conduct bilateral talks with each interested Yugoslav republic and to consult with the EC before and after his or her mission. Our example could encourage a more rigorous EC approach to recognition and might increase U.S. ability to deter the Croatian leadership from the temptation of pursuing the military option.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

We should make it clear that the quality of U.S. relations with recognized Yugoslav republics will be determined by their continued compliance with our recognition criteria, and our expectation that they will remain committed to seeking a degree of association among themselves commensurate with the intermingling of nationalities across their borders, and with economic rationality.

We should also express continuing U.S. support for applying the UN arms embargo to all Yugoslav republics, and our view that stronger sanctions against ceasefire violators make more sense than arming those who are party to the conflict; and deliver strong warnings to the Serbian and Croatian leaderships against using the prospect of recognition as a pretext for escalated fighting.

PRESENTING U.S. POLICY

We should explain a U.S. earned recognition approach for Yugoslav republics in terms of our longstanding support for the EC's CSCE-mandated lead role in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, our support for the key principles the EC is seeking to uphold (no forceful changes in borders, strong guarantees for human rights), and our continuing support for UN efforts to establish the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation.

We should endorse the EC criteria for recognition in the Yugoslav case as consistent with U.S. criteria in the Soviet Union, and with the strong support of both the EC and the U.S. for the UNSYG's exploration of peacekeeping and for continuation of the Hague Conference.

At the same time, we should emphasize that the U.S. will be making its own evaluation, with sharp attention to commitment to UN efforts and to continued negotiation at the Hague Conference on human rights issues as well as the nature of post-recognition ties among the Yugoslav republics.

Finally, we should (unlike the EC) make explicit reference to legitimate Serbian concerns for the welfare of minorities in the other republics.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE IN THE BALKANS

An EC/U.S. earned recognition approach in Yugoslavia confronts us both with a repressive and aggressive Serbian and Serbianized Yugoslav military leadership.

Earned recognition may deter Serbian use of force, and pave the way for insertion of a UN peacekeeping force and genuine negotiations at the Hague Conference. In this scenario, UN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

peacekeeping could become a crucial political escape-hatch for the Serbian and military leadership.

This scenario would require early decisions on concrete U.S. support for UN peacekeeping, and a series of decisions on how the U.S. would use its leverage (in the context of recognition and subsequent political, economic, and assistance relations) with the various republics to influence their approach to deployment of UN peacekeepers and to continued negotiations on outstanding issues of succession in the Hague.

It is more likely, however, that the Serbian and Yugoslav military leadership will continue to try to carve out by force a "Greater Serbia" or "Small Yugoslavia" including the territory they now control in Croatia plus large parts of Bosnia. This effort is likely to continue as long as they can muster sufficient human and material resources to fight. They are likely to continue negotiating with UNSYG envoys in the hope of securing a peacekeeping force that would buffer and consolidate Serbian territorial gains, but to stiff both the Hague Conference and the EC earned recognition process.

The Serbian leadership will be sharply isolated in this scenario, in that (i) neither the U.S. or EC are accepting its claim to inherit Yugoslavia's international status; and (ii) it cannot meet present EC or prospective U.S. criteria for recognition. To do so, the Serbian leadership would have to retreat from aggression outside Serbia, and move away from authoritarianism and repression within Serbia applied to both moderate Serbs and non-Serbian minorities (especially the Kosovo Albanians, who will be seeking independence from Serbia after four years of intensive repression). Such policy changes would probably cause the downfall of the Serbian leadership, which has no effective policy program or basis of support aside from extreme Serbian nationalism.

In this scenario, the U.S. and EC would face the following issues:

- What degree and kind of support to give to newly recognized republics: a peaceful Slovenia; a Croatia partially occupied by and still at defacto war with the "Yugoslav" military; a Bosnia-Hercegovina which could be imploding into civil war pitting Moslems and Croats against the 31% Serbian minority, backed by the "Yugoslav" military; and a Macedonia with a large and restive ethnic Albanian minority and a heavy economic dependence on Serbia.
- Heightened and widened conflict in newly recognized republics will raise pressures for outside military intervention or arms supplies to "aggressed" republics.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

- The need for humanitarian assistance will continue to escalate.
 - All newly recognized republics would press hard for rapid economic assistance and the development of economic relations.
 - How to deal with Kosovo, a potential flashpoint where the 2 million ethnic Albanian majority will seek independence from a repressive Serbian "pariah republic" and unification with neighboring Albania. This is the most likely area of international spillover of the Yugoslav crisis.
 - What kind of relationship and diplomatic presence, if any, to maintain with Belgrade as the capital of a dissolved Yugoslavia and non-recognized Serbia, and with Montenegro.
 - Where to go on economic sanctions. For the EC the immediate question will be how to toughen its sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, e.g. with a trade or oil embargo. For the U.S., the immediate issue is moving to selective sanctions.
 - It makes more sense to move to selective sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro before we move to earned recognition. It is an easier decision and would signal the latter policy without committing us to it.
- It would also avoid a scenario where our "Yugoslav" sanctions would later apply only to Serbia and Montenegro, lending credence to their claim of inheriting Yugoslavia's name.

POLICY IMPACT OUTSIDE OF YUGOSLAVIA

With regard to the Soviet Union, U.S. earned recognition in the Yugoslav case sends several signals: (i) that we are prepared under extreme circumstances to offer recognition in the absence of a negotiated settlement; (ii) that we are not prepared to accept forceful changes in republic borders; and (iii) that we see the Yugoslav crisis more in terms of the dissolution of a multinational state than in terms of secession of certain republics from a continuing state entity. None of these signals are inconsistent with our objectives in the USSR.

More generally, earned recognition in the Yugoslav case would set two troublesome precedents: recognition in the absence of national control of territory; and recognition of entities whose political and economic viability as states is unclear (this applies particularly to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Paper	Re: US Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Yugoslavia [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/20/91	(b)(1); (b)(6)	2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 250 - January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia

**Document Declassified
(Document Follows)**

By MM (NLGB) on 9/11/2015

Date Closed: 1/6/2010	OA/ID Number: 90018-029
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2883-MR (501.03)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 10/29/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

ADVANCE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 December 1991

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: US Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Yugoslavia

1. (U) Purpose. To provide Joint Staff input to OSD regarding considerations and potential US contributions in support of UN Peacekeeping Operations in Yugoslavia (UN PKO-Y).

2. (C) Background. Potential US support to UN PKO-Y was discussed at a Deputies Committee (DC) meeting on 13 December. ADM Howe requested that Joint Staff prepare a paper on the subject to be used as a vehicle for discussion at a subsequent meeting (now scheduled for 231030 Dec 91). PDAS John Wolf, International Organization Affairs (IO), State, chaired an interagency meeting 19 December, to further discuss the issue. BG Hale, ADDPMA, J-5, represented the Joint Staff. This paper identifies questions and considerations that must be answered to determine the level and type US support that might be provided to UN PKO-Y.

3. (U) Key Points.

a. (C) Before decisions are made on the level and type US support to be provided, several policy questions and issues must be answered:

- What are USG national interests and objectives in Yugoslavia?
- Under what circumstances should PK forces be deployed? (Vance prerequisites -- all parties agree to a ceasefire and deployment of a PK force; a clear and practical mandate is developed and agreed to by all parties; PKO is adequately financed and supported by UNSC.)
- What are USG interests and objectives in supporting UN PKO-Y?
- What is the intended level of support? Symbolic? Substantive? Enough to "guarantee" success?
- How will US support be financed? Would DoD support be provided on a reimbursable basis from State or from UN? Credited against our UN contributions?
- What will be the role of the Europeans and other potential donors in UN PKO-Y?
- Will US support to UN undercut previous/concurrent support to EC efforts in Yugoslavia? Will UN support indicate lack of US confidence in EC?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

6010-2883MR
28 10/29/14

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-5
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

①

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Is there a role for NATO? Could the UN request support from NATO allies and ask the NATO headquarters to coordinate its transfer to PK forces? Many NATO countries may be prohibited from contributing actual forces, but their support "on the margins" might be acceptable.
- A written mandate or protocol for the operation of the force is normally written, agreed upon by all parties, and used as a guide to implement PKO. Such mandates are usually negotiated in political channels with military coordination.

b. (✓) Before a logistics support concept can be developed, a detailed operational plan must be written and coordinated. Some essential items military planners will need to know ASAP:

- What is the mission of the PK force? How will it operate? (Probably highly decentralized.) Is the mission to observe the peace or enforce the peace? Where exactly are "UN Protected Areas" (UNPAs)? What is command and control structure? What are rules of engagement (right to self-defense)?
- What is the situation on the ground? Status of ceasefire -- are factions still armed? Will Yugoslav Armed Forces (OSJ) continue to withdraw from Croatia? Will remaining blockades of OSJ garrisons by Croatian Defense Forces (CDF) be lifted? What's the degree of control (or lack of control) of extremist factions on both sides?
- Terrain. Where will the force operate? What are the status and availability of road networks, airfields, ports, buildings for headquarters, supply and equipment storage sites? Other support available from host nation/infrastructure?
- What troops are available? Size, composition, and equipment of the force? Which nations will contribute contingents to the force and what equipment will they bring (and not bring)? Organizational structure?
- Time. What are the time-lines for deployment to theater and employment of the force? Turn-over of areas and assumption of control should be synchronized throughout the UNPAs. Must be coordinated and agreed by all parties and should be accompanied by a civil affairs effort to ensure the local populace is informed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c. (Ø) Given the above questions and considerations are resolved, the next step is to determine requirements for support:

- Military contingents from various nations should deploy to Yugoslavia with their own organizational equipment to accomplish the mission and sustain operations.
- Where gaps in capabilities exist, US traditionally provides US-unique support (i.e., strategic airlift, overhead intelligence products).
- Other UN members also have capability to provide support to make-up shortfalls. Their assets should be requested.
- Some nations will be precluded by UN from contributing forces on the ground in Yugoslavia; however, these nations (particularly European neighbors) should be asked to contribute support "on the margins" to UN PKO-Y.

d. (Ø) The analytical process described above is incomplete and many details of the Vance Plan are unknown. With specific UN requests considered on a case-by-case basis, some potential US support could be identified for UN PKO-Y:

- Expertise in military planning could be provided on a temporary duty basis to augment the staff at UN New York and to develop details of the operational concept, personnel, intelligence, and logistics support plans.
- Strategic airlift could be offered for personnel and equipment from countries contributing contingents to the PK force. It would be most efficient to focus on equipment and cargo on USAF MAC missions and fly personnel on commercially chartered carriers. Number of departure locations should be minimized by national/regional consolidation.
- Intratheater airlift could be used to move PK equipment and supplies from contributing nations in Europe.
- Overhead intel collection products could be provided to the PK force HQ to assist in monitoring the withdrawal of OSJ units from Croatia and the general disengagement of combatants.
- Excess medical supplies, equipment, (field hospital?) could be provided to support the PK force. (Could also augment humanitarian assistance efforts -- although this is better left to international relief organizations.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- For contingents using US equipment, repair parts for aircraft, weapons, communications equipment, and vehicles could be provided.

- Although contingents could deploy with organic transportation and command and control vehicles, US could provide selected transport such as fuel and water tankers (and on-the-ground storage for fuel and water in pods and blivets).

- Ammunition unique to PK operations could be provided: pyrotechnics, flares, and tear gas.

e. (C) Other Considerations:

- Vance Plan should be reviewed and validated by military planners, particularly by the PK HQ staff, when designated. Are forces adequate for the mission? Are there too many?

- Planning should include contingency actions if the situation changes...withdrawal plan if fighting escalates; extraction plan if PK forces become decisively engaged in combat.

- Remember the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking. The promise of EC recognition of Croatia has already built unrealistic expectations and diminished Tudjman's enthusiasm for PK forces. Milosevic has lost all respect for EC efforts but still wants PK forces.

Prepared by: LTC (b)(6) USA
 EURDIV, J-5, X49431
 EURPNFWP 4084

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20933

December 20, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JONATHAN T. HOWE

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, December 23, 1991

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to agencies transmitting the agenda for Monday's DC meeting, along with papers from State on the recognition issue and related matters and from DoD on notional U.S. contributions to a UN peacekeeping operation. We will send you a separate briefing paper with recommendations for driving the meeting toward decision on the key issues.

Concurrence by: Jane Holt *JH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the Tab I memorandum to agencies.

Approve *JA* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to Agencies
Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	U.S. Approach toward Recognition (State)
Tab C	U.S. Support for Peacekeeping (Defense)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2883-MK
32 6/18/12

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR