

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2004-0416-F

FOIA Number:
2004-0416-F

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90017
Folder ID Number: 90017-0²⁰18

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 223 - November 23, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	5	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Minutes	Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee, Re: Gulf Crisis [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	11/23/1990	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
02. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	11/23/1990	(b)(3)	
03a. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	11/23/1990	(b)(3)	
03b. Memo	Sandra Charles through Richard N. Haass to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Committee Teleconference on the U.S. Presence in Kuwait, Iraq and the Region; Friday, November 23, 1990; 11:00 - 12:00 noon [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	11/20/1990	(b)(1)	S
03c. Paper	Re: R/PCC on the Future Embassies of Kuwait and Baghdad (4 pp.)	11/23/1990	(b)(1)	S
03d. Paper	Re: R/PCC Consideration of Regional Drawdown (5 pp.)	10/30/90	(b)(1)	S
03e. List	Re: Number of Official and Non-Official Americans In-Country (1 pp.)	10/30/90	(b)(1)	
04a. Cover Sheet	Fax Cover Sheet from Robert M. Kimmitt (1 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(3)	
04b. Paper	Re: R/PCC Consideration of Regional Drawdown (4 pp.)	11/21/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Cover Sheet	Fax Cover Sheet from Robert M. Kimmitt (1 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(3)	

Page 1 of 2

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 223- November 23, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait

Pinksheet Number: DJC1299

OA/ID Number: 90017-018 020

Date Closed: 8/4/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2004-0416-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05b. Paper	Re: R/PCC on the Future of Embassies Kuwait and Baghdad [FOIA exemptions redacted] (6 pp.)	11/20/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Page 2 of 2

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Date Closed: 8/4/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2004-0416-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120579
RECEIVED: 19 JUL 91 10

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 OCT 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
DESERT STORM
DC

KUWAIT
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF MINUTES FOR 23 NOV DC MTG ON IRAQ

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 23 JUL 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF: 9020950 9120541

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC223

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DTL NARA, Date 02/04/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9120579

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 92102916 SEE 9220975 FOR FINAL ACTION

001

X 92112116 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DSZ NARA, Date 08/04/2009

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20975

October 27, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 


SUBJECT: Minutes for DC Meetings on the Gulf Crisis from
August 1990 - May 1991

Attached at Tabs I through IX are minutes for DC meetings held during August 1990 through May 1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis. A list of typical participants during the early days of the crisis is provided at Tab A.

Due to the high tempo of operations and heavy workload during this past year, these records were reconstructed by Sandra Charles from her notes prior to her departure. As a result, these minutes are not always consistent with the prescribed NSC formats and are provided for record purposes only.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the DC minutes at Tabs I through IX for record purposes.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I August 1990 Meetings
Tab A Participants List
Tab II September 1990 Meetings
Tab III October 1990 Meetings
Tab IV December 1990 Meetings
Tab V January 1991 Meetings
Tab VII February 1991 Meetings
Tab VIII April 1991 Meetings
Tab IX May, 1991 Meeting and Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DE NARA, Date 02/04/2009

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Declassify on: OADR

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**Document Declassified
(Document Follows)**
By MM (NLGB) on 8/27/2015

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 90017-018
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #: 1998-0099-F/2(527)	MR Case #:
AR Disposition: Released in Full	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 1/27/2014	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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: 20579



Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (SVTS)

DATE: November 23, 1990
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Minutes of DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis (SVTS) (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Office of the Vice President
Carnes Lord

State
Robert Kimmitt
Jock Covey

DOD
Henry Rowen
Frederick Smith

JCS
David Jeremiah
Merrill Ruckk

White House
Andy Card
Robert Gates

NSC
Sandra Charles

Justice
William Barr

CIA
Richard Kerr



Minutes

Mr. Gates: The Deputies will meet once a week on Tuesdays beginning next week. The PCC will be held as needed to consider specific issues raised by the DC. (S)

Mr. Covey: On Embassy Kuwait, the embassy can sustain itself into early January at the outside. We need to consider under what circumstances to take our people out or do we keep them there to improve moral support for the American citizens trapped in Kuwait? In theory, we have an opportunity now to go for a reprovisioning resolution. If it fails, we can do it unilaterally. We need to think about how hard to press 1) staying in Kuwait; 2) getting all 19 out; or 3) surrendering. (S)

In Baghdad, it's harder given the Iraqi government decision on detainees. The liability is theirs but we still have little leverage with them to do anything unless Iraq thinks this is a major outrage and a casus belli for us. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

1998-0099-F/2
1/27/2014 MM

Mr. Kimmitt: It would take a major effort to get a reprovisioning resolution. The Secretary General has made a decision on reprovisioning by individually or collectively negotiating for Kuwait alone or Kuwait and Baghdad with the Iraqi government. As a quid, we would close our Embassy. We can hold out until January with food, fuel and water but while psychologically morale appears to be good, it's hard to judge. The Embassy still can communicate via TACSAT. There is regular phone service within Kuwait City but not internationally. (S)

Mr. Covey: Iraq would like a deal to get our Embassy out of Kuwait, but they may think they only need to wait us out. We need to raise the profile of this; but it will be hard if Iraq holds out. (S)

Mr. Rowen: We should start reprovisioning with Kuwait and then if that works go to a Kuwait and Iraq scenario. Psychologically there may be a restraint to negotiating. We have made the point but now it may be time to have a negotiation. (S)

Mr. Gates: It will be hard to negotiate if they think the end is near. We need to consider the impact on Americans in hiding if the Embassy closes. (S)

Mr. Rowen: The question is when do we have to face it. (S)

Mr. Gates: Also should we close it voluntarily or when there is no other alternative. One possibility if we get the UNSC resolution on use of force that will turn up the temperature on Iraq. Then we could make an initiative on replenishment. If Saddam thinks that would be a possible provocation for us he may allow us to reprovision the embassy or evacuate our personnel. So it may make sense right after we get a UN use of force resolution to then try a reprovisioning effort. That makes the most sense tactically for the reasons Jock (Covey) mentioned and if Iraq thinks the hostage issue is working against them already. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: If we go down your path, it would improve our ability to deal for the release of the American citizens at the Embassy and in hiding, especially if he thinks this is a threat if he doesn't comply. If we can get a number of our people out, that would be good. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: Do American citizens have to go out via Baghdad? (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Yes, but the deal should be that we want to take them out of Kuwait directly. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: That would be better. We need to put more teeth into that, but at some point we would agree that they should come out one way or the other. We need to orchestrate this so that we end up with the smart way out. The choice in the first scenario is we want to reprovision the embassy, and if that doesn't work, then get them out directly from Kuwait and as a fallback from Baghdad. (S)

Mr. Kerr: Another issue is whether the people are holding out well. We should use the plan we are talking about here to get as many people out as directly and quickly as we can. We will reach a point where we have no leverage, especially if we can't resupply the embassy. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: That's a good point. If we resupply, how about the emotional condition of the people in the Embassy? (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Those in the embassy need to know our gameplan. Once they know, I think they'll be prepared to stay. We also need to have the British views. They still have two diplomats in Kuwait that are supposed to leave early next year. They have no citizens on the premises. If we have to, we can let our people depart via Baghdad. They are convinced that there will be hostilities in the new year, so we want us to get our numbers down. (S)

Mr. Barr: We should use the reprovisioning strategy as a casus belli. If we decide to pull our people out, it will have a negative perception. (S)

Mr. Gates: There are two ways the situation could come out: first, we can hope they last long enough with or without replenishment so they can be rescued; or two, they negotiate their way out at some point consistent with our policy and principles. We should wait until after the next UNSC resolution, and then decide whether to go for reprovisioning. If that fails, then we negotiate for release of all American citizens out of Kuwait directly with the hope that our military buildup and the new resolution will lead Saddam to avoid a casus belli. If option two fails, then we fall back to option one. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: I think that's good. Do we also look at Baghdad if we go with negotiations? If we feel we have some leverage, then we should add our people in Baghdad. (S)

Mr. Gates: If there is a shifting value of the hostages in Baghdad, then maybe we should add the Iraqi detainees. (S)

Mr. Kerr: We want to keep the linkage with the diplomats from Kuwait now in Iraq. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: If we can only get a smaller group out, then we should include those in Baghdad. (S)

Mr. Gates: Let's talk to our principals, and set the scene for them. This is very sensitive, so it should be kept close hold. I know most people's principals feel very strongly on this issue. The next principals' meeting should be mid to late next week. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: The first option is only for the Embassy Kuwait people. (S)

Mr. Gates: On a drawdown of U.S. personnel in the region, the question is whether to keep people in those countries where the governments are aligned with Iraq and they can't or won't control their populations. An offsetting concern is not to take steps that causes Aramco personnel to want to go home. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: These concerns stretch from Morocco to Bangladesh. Our concerns reactions elsewhere with the possibility of terrorism if hostilities break out. We should put out a warning focusing on USG personnel in the Middle East and North Africa. (S)

We took stock of an ordered departure from Yemen. We also are looking at the different missions, like Sudan, that may be oversized. The question is what to do in the region to make sure we get people out of harms way without causing a mass exodus. (S)

The British will decide in the next week or two when school kids from the UK are to return to the Gulf. They are worried about the CW threat, and are inclined to reduce their presence, but there is no decision yet. (S)

Mr. Covey: There are some distinctions that need to be made: one is the threat from the loss of control over public order which could happen in Jordan, Yemen and the Sudan. So we have a good reason to draw down there. They are less likely for Saddam to target as well, so the real risk of hostilities spreading there is small. The risk is higher in Jordan than in Riyadh, although the eastern province is a problem. Advice to our citizens on this should be dropped at the right time as part of a larger scenario. Christmas travel is a possibility. We could advise people to go outside the region for holiday reunions. Still that may heighten the sense that we are preparing for hostilities, but they not be as alarmed. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: With the British decision coming, it will be good for us to make a decision. (S)

Mr. Gates: The paper is good. There is not much more we can do on the terrorist threat, and it makes a differentiation about public order. Rather than a general drawdown, we should consider targeting Yemen, Jordan, Mauritania and the Sudan. That way we would limit their potential vulnerability.

Mr. Rowen: Let me underscore the problem DoD will face with hostilities and then being called upon to evacuate people from place. (S)

Mr. Covey: It makes sense to avoid mass evacuations in favor of limited drawdowns. (S)

Mr. Gates: We need to look at how would we cope with hostilities and evacuations. Delta Force will be hard pressed to respond. That's why we focus on the countries we do and are not focusing on countries that will help our embassies. I am not sure about the practical application. (S)

Mr. Rowen: We should do what the paper says and draw down from dangerous places. (S)

Mr. Gates: There is something to be said for that option in the paper, but from the Gulf so it won't attract attention. That would not have the same political impact as a Gulf drawdown. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: We would want to do what is appropriate to draw down so that it will look like we were prepared in hindsight. (S)

Mr. Gates: Have we issued a general travel advisory? (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Yes, but with forces there it is more secure. We have warned travelers but are not being alarmist. We may issue some holiday advisories but we know that may raise concerns. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: In the event of hostilities, it will be hard to do NEO operations in Tunis if we are doing them in the Middle East. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: In Tunis there is also a significant chance of unrest. (S)

Admiral Jeremiah: So the right answer is in the paper. (S)

Mr. Kerr: I think it would be prudent planning to draw down where it is essential. It will be hard to plan a forced evacuation. We should work aggressively but without panicking people in the areas that are most vulnerable. (S)

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Mr. Gates: We should carefully manage drawdowns in those four places. (S)

Mr. Kerr: Others, too. Those areas where civil disorder could get out of hand endangering Americans also should be considered. (S)

Mr. Gates: Let's talk to our principals on this particularly given the broader political implications of it. The principals should talk about this next week. We need to be comfortable that this will not precipitate a mass exodus from the eastern province. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: We may need to move quicker on Sudan. (S)

Mr. Gates: I'll talk to Brent (Scowcroft), and if he and Jim Baker agree, then okay. Any other issues? (S)

Mr. Rowen: Yes, truck tires from Michelin going to Iran for Iraq. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: We have sent demarches to Bonn and Paris. The question is whether we should send a message to Iran via the Swiss saying "don't screw around". We need to make sure our intelligence is good first. (S)

Mr. Gates: Maybe we should call in the Michelin rep here or in Europe and deliver a strong demarche. We also should look into the legalities, the provisions in the law. (S)

On reconstruction in Kuwait, do we need a directive to DoD and HUD with more specifics on what needs to be done post-crisis? If we need a general directive, then a text should be sent over.

Admiral Jeremiah: Civil affairs Army planners are working with the Kuwaiti government. It will be a \$500 million program. State and DoD are chairing the steering group. But maybe a memo to other agencies would help. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: We need OSD and JCS response to the Dutch, Greeks and Canadians on aircraft beddown. (S)

Mr. Kerr: We should use Iraq's presence overseas as leverage to get what we want in Kuwait. (S)

-- End of Meeting --

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02. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	11/23/1990	(b)(3)	

Collection:

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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DEPUTY COMMITTEE (SVTS) MEETING
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1990
11:00AM - 12:00NOON

DC 223

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card (Invited)
Robert Gates

OVP

Carnes Lord

NSC

Sandra Charles

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
Jock Covey

DOD

Henry Rowen
Frederick Smith

JUSTICE

William Barr

JCS

David Jeremiah
Merrill Ruck

(b)(3)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9021293
RECEIVED: 20 NOV 90 17

TO: GATES

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

DOC DATE: 20 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF

IRAQ
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR DC MTG ON 23 NOV RE US PRESENCE IN
KUWIAT / IRAQ & REGION

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 23 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC223

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO
CHARLES
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By DT NARA, Date 08/04/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSLMS

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9021293

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES
001

Z 90112113 FOR INFORMATION
X 90120410 NOTED BY GATES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DTL NARA, Date 02/04/2009

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 21293

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 54 A/O _____

Bob

Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

90 NOV 21 P12:32

1

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J

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Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

WMS 11/23

I

N

R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DL Meeting 11/23 11:00 AM

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1990
11:00AM - 12:00NOON

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card (Invited)
Robert Gates

OVP

Carnes Lord

NSC

Sandra Charles

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
Jock Covey

DOD

Henry Rowen
Frederick Smith

JUSTICE

William Barr

JCS

David Jeremiah
~~Howard Graves~~
Mural Rock

[REDACTED] (b)(3) [REDACTED]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Memo	Sandra Charles through Richard N. Haass to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Committee Teleconference on the U.S. Presence in Kuwait, Iraq and the Region; Friday, November 23, 1990; 11:00 - 12:00 noon [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	11/20/1990	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 223- November 23, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By SCS on 3/9/2015

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 90017-018
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0957-MR (501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21293

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

November 20, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *W/r*
FROM: SANDRA CHARLES *W/r*
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Teleconference on the U.S.
Presence in Kuwait, Iraq and the Region; Friday,
November 23, 1990; 11:00 - 12:00 noon

The purpose of this meeting is to raise DC (and eventually NSC) consciousness on the prickly issue of what we should be doing about the U.S. presence in Kuwait, Iraq and the region at large if hostilities are likely. Another question for consideration is whether these should be linked or handled separately.

I. U.S. Presence in Kuwait (Tab A): There are several tough questions the DC (and eventually an NSC) needs to consider:

- a. should we replenish the embassy in order to keep it open; and if so, should we also seek permission to feed the Americans in hiding;
- b. should we seek permission to evacuate personnel from the Embassy instead; and if so, should we try to get out both our diplomats and the private citizens in the Embassy? should we also attempt to get the Americans in hiding out?
- c. should we work this in conjunction with the British? under the auspices of the UN?
- d. if Iraq refuses our replenishment and evacuation requests, how would we respond?
- e. what should we do if the Embassy is replenished or if Americans at the Embassy are evacuated but not those in hiding, and the Americans in hiding are forced out from starvation and detained or some in hiding die of starvation, medical problems?

Discussion: By mid December the American Embassy will exist with degraded communications capability and food of marginal nutritional value. Assuming our main objective is to keep the Embassy open, the PCC recommended a sequential approach as follows:

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- 1) In keeping with our declared desire to keep open the Embassy, petition the UN Sanctions Committee, along with the British and possibly others, to allow us to replenish our Embassy and provide food to Americans in hiding with the understanding that they would not be taken hostage during that process;
- 2) If Iraq refuses the above in full or in part, we would then ask for permission to evacuate all U.S. citizens from Kuwait in keeping with UNSC Resolution 674, and Iraq's decision to free hostages beginning December 25th.
- 3) If Iraq refuses the above, we should then decide how to respond to the inevitable detention of Americans from Kuwait as "human shields", i.e., closing Iraqi diplomatic missions here and abroad, again preferably as a concerted UN action.

The PCC agreed that whatever approach we undertake, we should raise the public profile on this issue.

II. U.S. Presence in Iraq (Tab A): The major issue is how to reduce our presence before hostilities erupt: 1) by getting U.S. detainees/hostages released, (or if not, at least cared for properly by the UN or ICRC, and 2) by helping other Americans to escape. On this latter issue, we have not actively encouraged private Americans to escape; [REDACTED]

Another issue is whether to link this issue with the American presence in Kuwait since those in hiding in Kuwait are potential detainees for Baghdad.

Discussion: The PCC believed that we should try to link both these issues, again by petitioning the UN to obtain access to the hostages either by a UN team or a Red Cross team. The PCC also thought a UN-sponsored, high level multilateral demarche delivered by senior representatives of the Perm Five countries, particularly if the French and Soviets agree to participate, to obtain the release of more hostages before the December 25 "deadline" should be considered. If this demarche failed, it would strengthen the debate on the use of force resolution.

III. U.S. Presence Elsewhere in the Region (Tab B): In keeping with the desire to reduce our presence to minimize the number of U.S. civilians, both government and non-government, that would need to be evacuated or kept out of harms way should hostilities erupt, the issue is whether to encourage departures from other countries in the region before hostilities start. If so, other questions to be addressed include: when such drawdowns should begin, from which countries, how to transport them out of theater before and during hostilities, and how to avoid creating a panic among the expatriate community that military action is imminent, and a mass departure that jeopardizes oil production and Saudi military readiness.

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Discussion: The PCC evaluated this issue using three threat criteria: whether the country would be involved in hostilities, whether public disorder threatening Americans was likely in the event of hostilities, and the possibility of terrorist acts against Americans.

On the first, other than the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, the PCC believed it was unlikely that any other regional country, including Israel and Jordan, would be directly involved in hostilities. On public disorder, Jordan was the primary concern, and to a lesser extent, Yemen (where our presence is relatively small), Algeria, Morocco, Sudan and Mauritania. As for terrorism, we agreed that was too tough to call and could happen anywhere in the region from Morocco to Pakistan.

Given the threat situation, the PCC also weighed the pros and cons of a "visible" drawdown, particularly in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province which depends heavily on U.S. labor for Saudi ARAMCO. The major "pro" would be the strong signal of imminent hostilities this would send to Saddam. The "con" would be the departure of expatriate labor that could affect oil production and prices, as well as Saudi military readiness.

Ultimately, the PCC judged that any decision on this issue would have to be made by the President and the NSC, given the serious policy implications of such a decision. A possible strategy would be to use Christmas leaves to discourage people from returning to certain countries, like Jordan. At some future date, a second phase drawing down "non-essential" people could be considered, with a final third phase drawdown when hostilities occur.

In the meantime, the PCC believed that we should begin contingency planning for such drawdowns by evaluating the status of personnel at those locations we believe should be reduced first, and determining how to transport these people out of theater both before and in the event of hostilities.

Attachments

Tab A	PCC Memo on Embassies Kuwait and Baghdad
Tab B	PCC Memo on Regional Presence Issue
Tab C	Table on U.S. Presence in Region

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Discussion Paper for NSC/DC, November 23, 1990

R/PCC on the Future of Embassies Kuwait and Baghdad

BACKGROUND

Our current estimate is that Embassy Kuwait will run out of fuel on December 15. Battery powered radios, food, and water are available to the end of the year, but the end of its ability to send and receive cable traffic will further reduce its already limited ability to assist the remaining private Amcits population, and the difficult living conditions for those living on the compound will rapidly deteriorate.

Conditions are much better at Embassy Baghdad, but the 36 Embassy Kuwait staff members and 16 private Amcits living on Embassy property are a drain on the mission's limited resources and present a potential morale problem that will only increase as time goes on.

The Iraqis would like to close our Embassy and the U.K. Embassy -- the last remaining open in Kuwait. This may provide some leverage with regard to the 19 Amcits civilians on our compound and other U.S. and U.K. nationals in hiding in Kuwait. This leverage is a wasting asset, however, and we must use it before it is gone. The NEA R/PCC has identified two basic strawman scenarios for diplomatic approaches to Iraq on this issue.

SCENARIO 1: FOCUS ON KUWAIT

This option would begin with renewed, higher-profile pressure -- here, in London and Baghdad, and through the U.N. -- to induce Iraq to allow resupply of Embassy Kuwait, per UNSCR 674. We assume the Iraqis will not agree to this (although they may try to avoid outright rejection to play for time). We would then demand that all U.S. and U.K. nationals remaining in Kuwait (including at the Embassy) should be permitted to leave, with safe passage out of the region. The Iraqis will probably block this as well, but there is a reasonable chance they would permit out Embassy staff and the 19 private Amcits remaining on the Embassy Kuwait compound be permitted to depart. Note that all 19 are now documented as USG employees and are accredited as diplomatic staff by the Government of Kuwait -- a designation Iraq might accept in order to close the book on the embassies in Kuwait. It is possible, however, that the Iraqis might try to hang tough, permitting our diplomats to go only as far as Baghdad and detaining the other 19.

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This approach has the advantage of simplicity in that it would require close coordination with only the U.K. The drawback is that the Iraqis might see it as a clear sign that Embassy Kuwait was at the end of its tether. Giving the initiative wide international publicity would force the Iraqi Government to consider the possibility that we might take refusal as a serious provocation. It would also raise the stakes on our side, however. If we go this route, we must determine in advance how to respond to an Iraqi stonewall/starveout.

SCENARIO 2: KUWAIT AND IRAQ:

This option would treat as a single issue our concerns for all Americans in Iraq and Kuwait -- diplomats, detainees, and those in hiding and on embassy property, seeking the diplomatic support of all countries that have (or have had) citizens similarly stranded. Through coordinated threats to severely restrict the size and activities of key Iraqi diplomatic missions -- coming in quick succession from the UNSC Perm Five, other Europeans, and the Japanese -- it would seek to pressure Saddam Hussein to move up his timetable for the release of hostages and allow all foreigners to depart Kuwait and Iraq before the end of the year. If we were to choose such an approach, initial consultations should begin quickly, so that a final decision could be taken when the Perm Five meet in New York next month.

To date, Iraq has not demonstrated much concern about limitations on its diplomatic missions abroad. Nonetheless, some of these embassies (in Moscow, Peking, the U.S., Western Europe, and key Arab states) are important to Iraq's international propaganda efforts, for intelligence collection, and possibly as bases for a terrorist offensive in case of war. In addition, this approach would not require Saddam Hussein to reverse his policy but merely to move up the timing of an action he has already promised to take.

Note, however, that the Soviets, the Arabs, and even our allies showed little enthusiasm for action against Iraqi diplomatic missions when we proposed it two months ago. This approach would require intense prior consultations for proper coordination, and these might take several weeks, which would have the effect of postponing any effort focused on Americans in Kuwait while any leverage there evaporated. Moreover, Saddam Hussein's strong preference is to deal with countries individually in hopes of playing them off against each other. The initiative would therefore have to be closely controlled in order to ensure that the Iraqis did not open negotiations simultaneously on several fronts and thereby turn it into a time-buying operation.

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CONCLUSION

The likelihood of achieving all our goals is not high for either approach. A majority of R/PCC participants felt that the second scenario, though potentially riskier (as a test of the political cohesion of the anti-Iraq coalition) stood a better chance of success.

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Kuwait (Status of Embassies)

UK Two officers at Chancery and "working"

Sri Lanka Two people

India Two people

Bahrain Working out of houses, interested
in taking care of nationals in country

US

8 official Americans

19 private Americans on compound (plus one Pakistani)

US Embassy Baghdad

Official Americans 5 Embassy Baghdad

Official Americans 36 Embassy Kuwait

Private Americans Baghdad 14

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DISCUSSION PAPER

R/PCC Consideration of Regional Drawdown

BACKGROUND

Threats to the security of U.S. Government personnel and private Amcits in the Middle East and North Africa remain high and could increase, should the U.S. appear to move closer to war with Iraq or hostilities actually begin. Increased threats to U.S. citizens come in three varieties:

-- Extension of Hostilities: A desperate Saddam Hussein could lash out at neighboring countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Turkey or Israel) with little warning, endangering Americans who presently appear to be out of harm's way.

-- Breakdown of Public Order: Unrest is a threat in a number of countries where popular support for Iraq is high. The highest risk currently is in Jordan, but the threat also exists in Yemen, across the Maghreb, Sudan, the Horn, and Pakistan.

-- Terrorism: It is clear that Iraq and its terrorist allies are planning for terrorist actions against U.S. targets. The Iraqis could set a terrorist offensive in motion without warning. This threat is not necessarily greater for Americans in the area than elsewhere, such as Europe.

Individually and collectively these threats argue for further reduction of U.S. exposure (both official and private). State (M and CA) is moving toward deeper cuts first in those areas where the risk of public unrest is the primary problem (particularly Sudan, Yemen, and Jordan). State is also considering a travel advisory urging U.S. citizens who expect dependents to visit in the region for the holidays (particularly kids on school vacations) to consider spending the holidays elsewhere. For such an announcement to be useful, it should be made before families have locked themselves into advance ticket purchases. In addition, State is reviewing post evacuation planning, particularly to assure how adequate lift would be obtained and that evacuation operations would not conflict with military operations.

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Issues for Guidance

Drawdowns in Africa or even Jordan would probably have little impact in Baghdad. The announcement of major drawdowns in the Peninsula and the Gulf, however, could be seen by Iraq as evidence we are clearing the decks. Such a signal could re-enforce the message conveyed by the troop buildup. On the other hand, it could also rattle U.S. and other expatriate workers critical to oil production and defense in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. It also risks triggering military aggression from Iraq. The timing of any travel advisories or drawdowns would be important; also the sequence in which such steps were taken, relative to troop buildup, actions in the UNSC, etc. The R/PCC therefore recommends a small interagency group (to include NEA, M, and CA, in addition to the interested agencies) to coordinate planning and implementation of any drawdown in that part of the theatre. This coordination process should cover such issues as: whether to

- Begin an initial ordered withdrawal of dependents.
- Identify, in conjunction with chiefs-of-mission, additional non-essential personnel, and follow with an ordered drawdown.
- Issue strongly-worded travel advisories, tailored to specific countries, warning against non-essential or holiday travel to the region and recommending departure of dependents and non-essential U.S. civilian personnel.
- Contact CEO's of major U.S. firms operating in the region to discuss company evacuation plans and to ensure that personnel essential to key operations in military support functions, medical services, and in the oil industry, stay on.
- Coordinate with Defense to ensure that the drawdown does not interfere with military movements.
- Brief Congress, and when.

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AMERICANS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT - ESTIMATES

IRAQ

	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>	<u>CHILDREN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CONFIRMED DETAINEES:	100	21	0	104 101
UNCONFIRMED DETAINEES:	25	9	0	26* 34*
EMBASSY PRIVATE AMCITS:	16	0	0	16
EMBASSY OFFICIALS:	43	1	0	44
IN HIDING:	84	39	70	193
TOTAL:	272 268	51 50	70	393 388

* - Names received from various sources whose whereabouts cannot be determined. We have received no inquiries from families of these individuals.

KUWAIT

	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>	<u>CHILDREN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DETAINEES:	Most detainees are believed to be in Iraq and are included in the detainee figures for Iraq.			
PRIVATE AMCITS:	19	0	0	19
OFFICIALS:	4	4	0	8
IN HIDING:	165	59	189	413
TOTAL:	188	63	189	440

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COUNTRY	POST	EMPLOYEES/ EVACUEES	DEPENDENTS/ EVACUEES	STATUS	PRIVATE AMCITS	TRAVEL ADVISORY
Iraq	Baghdad	46/18*	1/16	ORD. DEP.	327	Yes
Kuwait	Kuwait	27/42	0/45	ORD. DEP.	440	Yes
GULF						
Bahrain	Manama	18	25/35	AUTH. DEP.	900	Yes
Oman	Muscat	52	41		1,065	
Qatar	Doha	7	18/2	AUTH. DEP.	650	Yes
Saudi Arabia	Dhahran	17	4/24	AUTH. DEP.	5,547	Yes
Saudi Arabia	Jeddah	71	47		7,736	
Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	159	236		9,098	
United Arab Emirates	Abu Dhabi	58	90/38	AUTH. DEP.	2,050	Yes
	Dubai	8	8/2	AUTH. DEP.	1,355	Yes
Yemen	Sanaa	81/72**	0/57	ORD. DEP.	530	Yes
LEVANT						
Jordan	Amman	92/18	77/67	AUTH. DEP.	4,870	Yes
Syria	Damascus	42	38		1,236	
Turkey	Adana	4	3		120	
	Ankara	1700	730		830	
	Istanbul	530	350		19,000	
	Jerusalem	29	49		25,935	Yes (West Bank)
Israel	Tel Aviv	153	178		57,938	
NORTH AFRICA						
Algeria	Algiers	38	37		192	
Algeria	Oran	2	3			
Egypt	Cairo	545	512		12,200	
Egypt	Alexandria	17	7		860	
Morocco	Casablanca	41	34		800	
Morocco	Rabat/Tangier	328	228		1,425	
Tunisia	Tunis	133	106		750	

*BAGHDAD: 2 Employees out
1 TDY Employee in

**SANAA: 1 OMC Employee Evacuated this week

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AS 03: 11/19/92

Number of Official & Non-Official Americans In-Country

<u>Post</u>	<u>USG Personnel & Dependents</u>	<u>Private Amcits & Dependents</u>
A. Baghdad	9	327 (16, 104)
B. Kuwait	8	440
C. Saudi Arabia (Total)	1,113	20,200
D. Dhahran	30	6,700
E. Jeddah	149	5,000
F. Riyadh	934	8,500
G. UAE (Total)	194	3,600
H. Abu Dhabi	179	2,100
I. Dubai	15	1,500
J. Manama	81	900
K. Doha	18	700
L. Amman	191	5,050
M. Oman	137	900
N. Sanaa	77	430
O. Damascus	79	1,228
P. Turkey (Total)*		
Q. Adana		
R. Izmir		
S. Istanbul		
T. Ankara		

New F-77s are due November 1, 1990 from all posts.
*Updated figures on Turkey have been requested.

10/30/90
CAGEN #1652

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
FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt P 647-2471 7240
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>White House</u>	<u>Robert Gates</u>	<u>436-2257</u>	_____
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Richard Haass</u>	<u>456-2292</u>	_____
	<u>Paul Wolfowitz</u>	<u>697-7200</u>	_____
<u>DOD/USDP</u>	<u>Henry Rowen</u>	<u>695-4351</u>	_____
<u>CJCS</u>	<u>ADM David Jeremiah</u>	<u>694-8948</u>	_____
			<u>(b)(3)</u>
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>John Robson</u>	<u>566-2801</u>	_____

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REMARKS: _____

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DTC 08/24/2009

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DISCUSSION PAPER

R/PCC Consideration of Regional Drawdown

BACKGROUND

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- 2 -

Issues for Guidance

Drawdowns in Africa or even Jordan would probably have little impact in Baghdad. The announcement of major drawdowns in the Peninsula and the Gulf, however, could be seen by Iraq as evidence we are clearing the decks. Such a signal could re-enforce the message conveyed by the troop buildup. On the other hand, it could also rattle U.S. and other expatriate workers critical to oil production and defense in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. It also risks triggering military aggression from Iraq. The timing of any travel advisories or drawdowns would be import; also the sequence in which such steps were taken, relative to troop buildup, actions in the UNSC, etc. The R/PCC therefore recommends a small interagency group (to include NEA, M, and CA, in addition to the interested agencies) to coordinate planning and implementation of any drawdown in that part of the theatre. This coordination process should cover such issues as: whether to

- Begin an initial ordered withdrawal of dependents.
- Identify, in conjunction with chiefs-of-mission, additional non-essential personnel, and follow with an ordered drawdown.
- Issue strongly-worded travel advisories, tailored to specific countries, warning against non-essential or holiday travel to the region and recommending departure of dependents and non-essential U.S. civilian personnel.
- Contact CEO's of major U.S. firms operating in the region to discuss company evacuation plans and to ensure that personnel essential to key operations in military support functions, medical services, and in the oil industry, stay on.
- Coordinate with Defense to ensure that the drawdown does not interfere with military movements.
- Brief Congress, and when.

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- 3 -

Drafted: NEA/NGA:JMcGhee//NEA:JCovey

SEFOPDAS #196

x77207

11/21/90

Clearances:

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COUNTRY	POST	EMPLOYEES/ EVACUEES	DEPENDENTS/ EVACUEES	STATUS	PRIVATE AMCITS	TRAVEL ADVISORY?
Iraq	Baghdad	46/18*	1/16	ORD. DEP.	327	Yes
Kuwait	Kuwait	27/42	0/45	ORD. DEP.	440	Yes
<u>GULF</u>						
Bahrain	Manama	18	25/35	AUTH. DEP.	900	Yes
Oman	Muscat	52	41		1,065	
Qatar	Doha	7	18/2	AUTH. DEP.	650	Yes
Saudi Arabia	Dhahran	17	4/24	AUTH. DEP.	5,547	Yes
Saudi Arabia	Jeddah	71	47		7,736	
Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	159	236		9,098	
United Arab Emirates	Abu Dhabi	58	90/38	AUTH. DEP.	2,050	Yes
	Dubai	8	8/2	AUTH. DEP.	1,355	Yes
Yemen	Sanaa	81/72**	0/57	ORD. DEP.	530	Yes
<u>LEVANT</u>						
Jordan	Amman	92/18	77/67	AUTH. DEP.	4,870	Yes
Syria	Damascus	42	38		1,236	
Turkey	Adana	4	3		120	
	Ankara	1700	730		830	
	Istanbul	530	350		19,000	
	Jerusalem	29	49		25,935	Yes (West Bank)
Israel	Tel Aviv	153	178		57,938	
<u>NORTH AFRICA</u>						
Algeria	Algiers	38	37		192	
Algeria	Oran	2	3			
Egypt	Cairo	545	512		12,200	
Egypt	Alexandria	17	7		860	
Morocco	Casablanca	41	34		800	
Morocco	Rabat/Tangier	328	228		1,425	
Tunisia	Tunis	133	106		750	

*BAGHDAD: 2 Employees out
1 TDY Employee in

**SANAA: 1 OMC Employee Evacuated this week

SECRET

AS 23: 11/19/70

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Cover Sheet	Fax Cover Sheet from Robert M. Kimmitt (1 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 223- November 23, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	90017-018
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 23 2000

URGENT

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CB
S/S #

NOV 23 14:28

MESSAGE NO. 059123 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 6
FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt P 647-2471 7240
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>White House</u>	<u>Robert Gates</u>	<u>456-2257</u>	_____
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Richard Haass</u>	<u>456-2292</u>	_____
<u>DOD/USDP</u>	<u>Paul Wolfowitz</u>	<u>697-7200</u>	_____
<u>CJCS</u>	<u>Henry Rowen</u>	<u>695-4351</u>	_____
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>ADM David Jeremiah</u>	<u>694-2948</u>	_____
	<u>John Robson</u>	<u>566-2801</u>	_____

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: [Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

DSL 08/04/2009

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Paper	Re: R/PCC on the Future of Embassies Kuwait and Baghdad [FOIA exemptions redacted] (6 pp.)	11/20/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 223- November 23, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords: Persian Gulf, Iraq, Kuwait

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 9/1/14

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 90017-018
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-0957-MR (503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



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Discussion Paper for NSC/DC, November 23, 1990

R/PCC on the Future of Embassies Kuwait and Baghdad

BACKGROUND

Our current estimate is that Embassy Kuwait will run out of fuel on December 15. Battery powered radios, food, and water are available to the end of the year, but the end of its ability to send and receive cable traffic will further reduce its already limited ability to assist the remaining private Amcit population, and the difficult living conditions for those living on the compound will rapidly deteriorate.

Conditions are much better at Embassy Baghdad, but the 36 Embassy Kuwait staff members and 16 private Amcits living on Embassy property are a drain on the mission's limited resources and present a potential morale problem that will only increase as time goes on.

The Iraqis would like to close our Embassy and the U.K. Embassy -- the last remaining open in Kuwait. This may provide some leverage with regard to the 19 Amcit civilians on our compound and other U.S. and U.K. nationals in hiding in Kuwait. This leverage is a wasting asset, however, and we must use it before it is gone. The NEA R/PCC has identified two basic strawman scenarios for diplomatic approaches to Iraq on this issue.

SCENARIO 1: FOCUS ON KUWAIT

This option would begin with renewed, higher-profile pressure -- here, in London and Baghdad, and through the U.N. -- to induce Iraq to allow resupply of Embassy Kuwait, per UNSCR 674. We assume the Iraqis will not agree to this (although they may try to avoid outright rejection to play for time). We would then demand that all U.S. and U.K. nationals remaining in Kuwait (including at the Embassy) should be permitted to leave, with safe passage out of the region. The Iraqis will probably block this as well, but there is a reasonable chance they would permit out Embassy staff and the 19 private Amcits remaining on the Embassy Kuwait compound be permitted to depart. Note that all 19 are now documented as USG employees and are accredited as diplomatic staff by the Government of Kuwait -- a designation Iraq might accept in order to close the book on the embassies in Kuwait. It is possible, however, that the Iraqis might try to hang tough, permitting our diplomats to go only as far as Baghdad and detaining the other 19.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2011-0957-MR

SCS 9/17/13

~~SECRET~~

-2-

This approach has the advantage of simplicity in that it would require close coordination with only the U.K. The drawback is that the Iraqis might see it as a clear sign that Embassy Kuwait was at the end of its tether. Giving the initiative wide international publicity would force the Iraqi Government to consider the possibility that we might take refusal as a serious provocation. It would also raise the stakes on our side, however. If we go this route, we must determine in advance how to respond to an Iraqi stonewall/starveout.

SCENARIO 2: KUWAIT AND IRAQ:

This option would treat as a single issue our concerns for all Americans in Iraq and Kuwait -- diplomats, detainees, and those in hiding and on embassy property, seeking the diplomatic support of all countries that have (or have had) citizens similarly stranded. Through coordinated threats to severely restrict the size and activities of key Iraqi diplomatic missions -- coming in quick succession from the UNSC Perm Five, other Europeans, and the Japanese -- it would seek to pressure Saddam Hussein to move up his timetable for the release of hostages and allow all foreigners to depart Kuwait and Iraq before the end of the year. If we were to choose such an approach, initial consultations should begin quickly, so that a final decision could be taken when the Perm Five meet in New York next month.

To date, Iraq has not demonstrated much concern about limitations on its diplomatic missions abroad. Nonetheless, some of these embassies (in Moscow, Peking, the U.S., Western Europe, and key Arab states) are important to Iraq's international propaganda efforts, for intelligence collection, and possibly as bases for a terrorist offensive in case of war. In addition, this approach would not require Saddam Hussein to reverse his policy but merely to move up the timing of an action he has already promised to take.

Note, however, that the Soviets, the Arabs, and even our allies showed little enthusiasm for action against Iraqi diplomatic missions when we proposed it two months ago. This approach would require intense prior consultations for proper coordination, and these might take several weeks, which would have the effect of postponing any effort focused on Americans in Kuwait while any leverage there evaporated. Moreover, Saddam Hussein's strong preference is to deal with countries individually in hopes of playing them off against each other. The initiative would therefore have to be closely controlled in order to ensure that the Iraqis did not open negotiations simultaneously on several fronts and thereby turn it into a time-buying operation.

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-3-

CONCLUSION

The likelihood of achieving all our goals is not high for either approach. A majority of R/PCC participants felt that the second scenario, though potentially riskier (as a test of the political cohesion of the anti-Iraq coalition) stood a better chance of success.

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Baghdad/Kuwait Embassies

DRAFT: NEA/NGA:JRMcGhee
SENGAGEN 1527 11/20/90 x76111

CLEAR: NEA:DLMack
TFK-1:MRyan
NEA:AGlaspie
NEA/EX:EBoswell
NSCS:SCharles

(b)(1);(b)(3)

DoD/ISA:AHughes
JCS:ADMRuck

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AMERICANS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT - ESTIMATES

IRAQ

	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>	<u>CHILDREN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CONFIRMED DETAINEES:	100	21	0	121
UNCONFIRMED DETAINEES:	25	9	0	34*
EMBASSY PRIVATE AMCITS:	16	0	0	16
EMBASSY OFFICIALS:	43	1	0	44
IN HIDING:	84	39	70	193
TOTAL:	272 268	51 50	70	393 388

* - Names received from various sources whose whereabouts cannot be determined. We have received no inquiries from families of these individuals.

KUWAIT

	<u>MEN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>	<u>CHILDREN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DETAINEES:	Most detainees are believed to be in Iraq and are included in the detainee figures for Iraq.			
PRIVATE AMCITS:	19	0	0	19
OFFICIALS:	4	4	0	8
IN HIDING:	165	59	189	413
TOTAL:	188	63	189	440

11/19/90
TF1/CA

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Kuwait (Status of Embassies)

UK Two officers at Chancery and "working"

Sri Lanka Two people

India Two people

Bahrain Working out of houses, interested
in taking care of nationals in country

US

8 official Americans

19 private Americans on compound (plus one Pakistani)

US Embassy Baghdad

Official Americans

5 Embassy Baghdad

Official Americans

36 Embassy Kuwait

Private Americans Baghdad 14

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