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2004-0416-F; 2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90015
Folder ID Number: 90015-029

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 170 - August 10, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait,
Persian Gulf

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Minutes	Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee Re: Gulf Crisis (4 pp.)	08/10/1990	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Don Pilling through Richard Haass to Robert M. Gates Re: August 10 DC Meeting (1 pp.)	08/10/1990	(b)(1)	S
02b. Paper	Re: Multilateralization (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Paper	Re: Multinational Forces in the Persian Gulf Area (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Chart	Re: Fully Integrated Force (1 pp.)	08/90	(b)(1)	S
02e. Chart	Re: National Forces (1 pp.)	08/90	(b)(1)	S
02f. Chart	Re: Combined MQF / MFSA Alternative (1 pp.)	08/90	(b)(1)	S
02g. List	Re: Annex E (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	08/10/1990	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	
04. Form	NSC Time Planning Sheet (1 pp.)	8/10/90	(b)(3)	

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 170 - August 10, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf

Pinksheet Number: DJC1272

OA/ID Number: 90015-029

Date Closed: 8/3/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2004-0416-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9120544
RECEIVED: 17 JUL 91 09

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 OCT 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
DESERT STORM
DC

KUWAIT
MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF MINUTES FOR 10 AUG DC MTG ON IRAQ

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 20 JUL 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF: 9020950 9120541

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC170

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By 252 NARA, Date 08/03/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9120544

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001
001

X 92102913 SEE 9220975 FOR FINAL ACTION
X 92111919 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By DJZ NARA, Date 02/03/2009

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20975

October 27, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 


SUBJECT: Minutes for DC Meetings on the Gulf Crisis from
August 1990 - May 1991

Attached at Tabs I through IX are minutes for DC meetings held during August 1990 through May 1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis. A list of typical participants during the early days of the crisis is provided at Tab A.

Due to the high tempo of operations and heavy workload during this past year, these records were reconstructed by Sandra Charles from her notes prior to her departure. As a result, these minutes are not always consistent with the prescribed NSC formats and are provided for record purposes only.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the DC minutes at Tabs I through IX for record purposes.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I August 1990 Meetings
Tab A Participants List
Tab II September 1990 Meetings
Tab III October 1990 Meetings
Tab IV December 1990 Meetings
Tab V January 1991 Meetings
Tab VII February 1991 Meetings
Tab VIII April 1991 Meetings
Tab IX May, 1991 Meeting and Summary of Conclusions

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By JS NARA, Date 08/03/2009

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Minutes	Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee Re: Gulf Crisis (4 pp.)	08/10/1990	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 170 - August 10, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf

Date Closed: 8/3/2009	OA/ID Number: 90015-026
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020950
RECEIVED: 10 AUG 90 08

TO: GATES

FROM: PILLING
HAASS

DOC DATE: 10 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA
SANCTIONS

UN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LISTING OF ISSUES / DRAFT PAPER RE 10 AUG DC MTG

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 14 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PILLING

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM C

NSCP: DC170

CODES:

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9020950

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 GATES

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X 91020816 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By 222 NARA, Date 08/03/2009

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020950
RECEIVED: 10 AUG 90 08

TO: GATES

FROM: PILLING
HAASS

DOC DATE: 10 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA
SANCTIONS

UN
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LISTING OF ISSUES / DRAFT PAPER RE 10 AUG DC MTG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE: 14 AUG 90

STATUS: IX

STAFF OFFICER: PILLING

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

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By DTL NARA, Date 08/03/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSAJC CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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National Security Council

DATE: 12 Sep 1990

Memorandum for: PILLING

From: NSC/S

CREATE DATE: 900810

Subject: DC MTG ON 10 AUG

Log #9020950 has been issued to your office

We need the necessary data/copies in order to maintain the active suspense file or index the item for further reference and tracking purposes.

Your help is needed. Thanks.

Check as may be appropriate:

- ☐ Action completed, file attached.
- ☐ Action still pending, copy attached.
- ☐ Action transferred to _____.
- ☐ Action sent forward, copy attached.
- ☐ Cannot find, will continue to check.
- ☐ Log Number not used.
- ☐ Other: _____.

Please return to NSC/S.

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August 10, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: RICHARD HAASS
FROM: DON PILLING
SUBJECT: August 10 DC Meeting

At Tab II is a draft paper put together by State, Defense, and JCS for this morning's meeting. It is a reasonable effort to develop a concept of operation for the dual missions of defense of Saudi Arabia and enforcement of the UN economic sanctions. However, the recommendations section leans fairly far forward in proposing a number of actions without addressing some critical issues which require resolution. For example, the recommendations would have us declare that we are going to implement a quarantine without addressing the question of when such a quarantine would be appropriate. At Tab I is a listing of issues which we believe should be addressed at the DC meeting to provide focus for decisionmaking and to ensure some implicit assumptions in the paper are recognized by the participants.

Concurrence by: David Welch

Attachments

Tab I Listing of Issues
Tab II Draft Paper

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
03/28/2005 MM

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Multilateralization

Action on the Ground

What we need to know

- What are Saudi requirements for political cover?
- Who have the Saudis asked? Who are they likely to ask?
- How would NATO, ASEAN, and larger non-aligned states react to a Saudi request for military assistance?
- What kind of contribution would these states be willing or able to make?
- Is UK participation and support from the GCC, Morocco, and Egypt, and a UNSC mandate enough cover for us? Do we need to drum up additional participation?
- If a small presence of well-trained (European) forces meets immediate U.S. and Saudi political objectives, should a larger number of less capable UN member forces be encouraged to participate a later stage?
- Assuming we execute our op plan, will Saudi infrastructure be able to absorb significant third country participants?
- What are the logistical, operational, and command and control problems of a large number of foreign contingents?

Immediate Actions. To answer these questions, we should consider sending the following messages:

- To Riyadh asking what their requirements are for multinational participation and what they intend to do.
- To USNATO asking what Alliance members would consider contributing to a multinational force.

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9/22/2014 MM

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- 2 -

On a Blockade

What We Need to Know

-- How badly would the sanctions have to leak for a blockade to be triggered? Do we expect a blockade to be established regardless of the state-of-play on sanctions?

-- Time is especially important:

When should a blockade be established? The Saudis believe a blockade would be especially provocative (if Iraq has not already taken offensive steps) and could trigger retaliation. Hence, they do not want a blockade until there is an effective defensive force in the Kingdom. This suggests holding off for a at least 30 days.

How long does it take to establish a blockade? Are diplomatic and legal factors the main impediments to rapid implementation, or are military factors more important?

How soon do we need to start getting multinational forces to the region?

-- Will there be a requirement to enforce the sanctions on all traded commodities, or would the blockade focus on oil exports?

-- How would a blockade be set up?

Which points would need to be blocked? If the Turkish and Saudi pipelines were dry, operations would not include Yanbu and Iskendum. Operations would include Aqaba/Strait of Tiran, Umm Qasr -Shuweiba/Strait of Hormuz.

Could the blockade be deployed so that it was both effectiveness and out of range of Iraqi attack?

How much firepower would be required to enforce the blockade if Iraqi attack was not a factor?

-- Under whose auspices would the blockade be organized? What is the proper U.S. role?

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- 3 -

-- How big a force would be required to implement a blockade if Turkey and Yanbu were not included? What if Turkey and Yanbu were included?

-- Would coordination be loose or formal? Would there be coordinated rules of engagement?

-- Which countries have naval forces that could sustain a blockade? Do any of these countries have assets in the Indian Ocean now? How long would it take to get them there?

Immediate Actions

-- Without appearing as though we were getting out in front of Kuwait and organizing a blockade before the effectiveness of sanctions was clear, need to sound out the Allies and other powers with blue-water naval capabilities on what they could or would contribute.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA

This paper discusses the political and military issues involved in establishing and running two multinational efforts in response to the situation in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq:

(a) a multinational force with land, sea, and air components, to deter and, if necessary, defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression.

(b) a multinational naval effort to enforce the sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions 660 and 661.

These two multilateral efforts should initially be kept separate, since they have different objectives and since it is not clear whether or not Saudi Arabia will want to be involved in the use of force to carry out economic sanctions against Iraq.

There is adequate legal basis in Article 51 of the UN Charter and in UNSC Resolution 661 for both of these efforts. The various legal issues involved are addressed in Annex A.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA

Objectives

The objectives of the Multinational Force in Saudi Arabia (MFSA) will be to deter aggression by Iraq against Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Gulf region, to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the Gulf region, to conduct exercises and training to enhance the proficiency of Saudi forces in the defense of Saudi Arabia, and to take any measures necessary to ensure the safety of the nationals, armed forces, and assets of the countries united in this effort.

Organizational Mechanism

The MFSA should be established by a multilateral agreement among the Saudi and US Governments and the governments of other countries that have already agreed to provide forces for the defense of Saudi Arabia. The agreement should provide for additional participation by countries acceptable to the SAG. Proposed criteria for participation are discussed below. The agreement should also leave open the possibility of bringing the MFSA under UN auspices in the future should doing so prove desirable in order to attract support from countries who would

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DECLASSIFY ON OADR

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1999-0578-F
05/17/2006 MM

otherwise be averse to participation. There are pros and cons to UN auspices for this operation. The key point is to ensure that, if it becomes a UN operation, it does so on terms acceptable to US military commanders, i.e., that there not be a typical UN staff made up of officers from marginally competent countries attempting to command US forces. This concern reinforces the importance of getting a multinational command structure established and operating before seeking UN approval if we should decide to do so.

Selection of Participants

So far, besides the US, the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the UK have announced willingness to send troops to Saudi Arabia. Morocco is expected to follow suit, possibly together with Egypt. Arab participation may turn out to depend upon Arab League establishment of a Pan Arab force. If so, the agreement will have to make provision for such a force. Political and military criteria should be developed for selection of further countries whose involvement should be actively solicited. Although we will not want to decline any assistance that might be offered (provided that the offering country is acceptable to the SAG), it will be necessary to coach the Saudis in identifying which contributions would be most useful and which countries would be best able to provide them. Furthermore, it is quite likely that many countries that volunteer to support the effort as it unfolds would be unable to support their forces in the manner demanded by the environment or that their forces would be unable to carry their weight in the combined effort. We will work with the SAG to identify tasks that can be usefully carried out by these countries' forces, so that we gain the maximum political advantage without placing an inordinate drag on the actual military effort against Iraq.

We believe the following countries, in addition to those discussed above who have already expressed an interest, should be actively solicited for contributions to the MFSA:

Arab and Islamic Countries: Tunisia, Syria, Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia.

NATO and Other US Allies: Canada, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Australia, Norway, Denmark, Korea, Thailand.

Others: India, Latin American countries, Kenya and other African countries, Eastern European countries (less USSR), China. It may be desirable to accept Soviet participation if offered. However, we do not believe the value of such a contribution would offset the political disadvantages of a

Soviet presence on the ground in Saudi Arabia and do not recommend that Soviet participation in this effort be actively solicited. The same applies to Iran; it would probably be useful to encourage Iranian pressure against Iraq's eastern border to pin down Iraqi troops, but it is unlikely that the Saudis would welcome an actual Iranian presence in their country. (See Annex E for a proposed list of participants and what they might be expected to provide).

Command Relationships

Unity of command, effort, and aim are critical organizational factors which contribute to success of the operation. This could prove politically difficult because individual national aims may run counter to group goals as well as conflict with other individual nations. This delicate political issue must be continually addressed by a high-level political committee of participating nations. The following is provided as a proposed concept for combined command relationships:

(1) Multinational Political Committee. A committee of the heads of government of the participating nations should be established, to be chaired by King Fahd. The committee will establish the political objectives of the MFSA. Members will be the heads of government of the participating countries as well as the Supreme Allied Commander and his military deputy.

(2) Supreme Allied Commander Saudi Arabia (SACSA). As the operation is being conducted in defense of Saudi Arabia and under its invitation, the SACSA should be a senior Saudi, either King Fahd himself or the Minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan. We should not accept a Saudi military officer in this role, since he will not be able to make decisions quickly without royal approval and will probably undermine the Military Deputy's authority with Saudi and possibly other Arab forces.

(3) Military Deputy Commander/Combined Task Force Commander (CTFC). The United States should make the greatest effort to ensure that USCINCENT is designated as the CTFC, reporting separately to the US NCA for US-only matters. The CTFC would provide combined military objectives for approval of SACSA and exercise command over the MFSA. CTFC would maintain the military cohesion of the MFSA, to include the unity of command and unity of effort of the military forces provided. He would have under his authority a Ground Component Commander, Air Component Commander, and a Naval Component Commander (in charge of naval forces being employed in the defense of Saudi Arabia but not of those being employed in the enforcement of economic sanctions).

against Iraq, which would be conducted separately). A diagram showing the proposed command relationships with notional participants is attached as Annex B.

A modification to this approach is to organize the MFSA into a Combined Islamic Force and a Combined Non-Islamic force as depicted in Annex C.

(1) The Combined Islamic Force will demonstrate Arab solidarity in deterring Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia. This organization will make it difficult for any of the participating Arab nations from withdrawing from the combined effort and will eliminate any public perception that the Arab nations are involved in principally a US operation and under US command.

(2) The Combined Non-Islamic Force will provide a public perception that the non-Islamic nations are BACKING UP an Arab effort to deter Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia. The nations providing forces to the Combined Non-Islamic Force will be able to withdraw their forces as the situation stabilizes, eventually leaving behind an Arab military organization that can continue to ensure stability in the region.

(3) This alternative sacrifices unity of command, effort, and aim in favor of political cohesion. Specific tasks and responsibilities assigned to each force will be difficult because of the vast difference in capabilities and force structures between the potential Combined Islamic and Combined Non-Islamic Forces. Additionally, the transition to war will be more difficult than the arrangement depicted in Annex B. However; the degree of solidarity achieved in the Arab world with this arrangement will provide a greater deterrence against an Iraqi aggression, which may offset the transition to war problems.

Employment and Support of Forces

We envision employing the leading foreign forces--US, US Allies, and Arab League--in conjunction with Saudi and Kuwaiti forces on a sector basis across the northern area of Saudi Arabia. This would minimize language, doctrinal, and similar difficulties. This concept will have to be balanced with the need to employ each country's distinctive capabilities most effectively militarily. Other contributors might be employed in rear area tasks or in securing other areas of the country, such as the Yemeni border, the approaches from Israel (important to the Saudis for political reasons), and, in the case of Muslim units, air defense of the holy cities.

Individual nations will have to provide maximum logistical support for their own units. National commanders will identify logistics shortfalls to CTFC, who will have the authority to transfer assets between national commands or, at a minimum, to request the NCA of the country from which supplies are to be transferred for approval of the transfer. We should also look at the feasibility of establishing logistic support pools based on origin of equipment, under the supervision of the country that is best able to support the equipment.

NAVAL ENFORCEMENT OF UN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Objectives

The purpose of multinational naval enforcement of UN economic sanctions is to end Iraqi aggression against the sovereign state of Kuwait, force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and restore Kuwait's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. To this end, the participating countries will conduct operations to prevent the export of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait, regardless of port of embarkation or transshipment point, and to prevent the shipment to Iraq or Kuwait, regardless of declared port of destination or transshipment point, of any commodities or supplies whose provision to Iraq or Kuwait is contrary to UNSC Resolutions 660 and 661.

Organizational Mechanism

The multinational naval effort to enforce UN economic sanctions should also be established through a multilateral agreement among the Governments of Kuwait and the United States and any other nations choosing to participate in the operation. Here again, we would leave the agreement open to further participation by additional countries that are willing to provide forces and acceptable to Kuwait and the other participants. We would also leave the question open as to whether the effort should be brought under explicit UN auspices at some point.

Selection of Participants

The Kuwaiti Government will play a key role in initiating the quarantine and in inviting and approving participants in it. From a practical point of view, only nations with reasonably powerful navies, and specifically with the ability to arrange their own logistic support for prolonged periods of time in the region, will be able to participate in this operation. The number of navies participating could be maximized by rotating national contingents over time, with (for example) French forces

relieved by Dutch, who would in turn be relieved by Japanese. In addition, we should seek the strongest possible contribution by the Kuwaiti, Saudi, Omani, and UAE navies. Potential candidates for involvement include:

Arab and Islamic Countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Egypt, Pakistan, Djibouti, Turkey.

NATO and Other US Allies: UK, France, Italy, Netherlands, Greece, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada

Other Countries: USSR, China, India

Command Relationships

For the purposes of providing policy guidance to the Multinational Quarantine Force (MQF), we envision the creation of an MQF Political Committee chaired by the Emir of Kuwait and consisting of the heads of government of the participating countries. For actual control of quarantine operations, a Commander in Chief, MQF would be established; the US should ensure that USCINCCENT is assigned to this position. A distinct MQF with specific enforcement responsibilities can provide a powerful framework for effective international cooperation in operations to enforce UN sanctions. Under the CINCMQF's command would be a Commander, Naval Quarantine Forces, also a US admiral, with control over two quarantine sectors: the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea. Each of these two sectors would be commanded by an allied flag officer. A diagram showing proposed command relationships is attached as Annex D.

Quarantine vs Blockade

There are pros and cons with respect to both the blockade and quarantine options as methods of enforcing economic sanctions. The principal advantage of a quarantine is that a blockade is, under international law, an act of war; a quarantine is not. However, in the present case, where the objective is the interdiction of virtually all exports and imports to and from Iraq, the line is an extremely fine one. Iraq is almost certain to view any naval enforcement of the sanctions as an act of war, regardless of the terminology used, and to respond accordingly. A blockading force seeks to prevent by force vessels of all states from entering or leaving specified enemy coastal areas. A quarantining force would seek to divert rather than to sink or capture ships attempting to enter the quarantined area. However, it may become an act of war if there is an attempt to run the quarantine and the quarantining fleet responds with the use of force. For the purposes of this paper, we have used the term

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"quarantine" as the less aggressive option. The mechanisms, structures, and force requirements for either a quarantine or a blockade are essentially the same.

Employment and Support of Forces

We would envision setting up two main quarantine areas, one in the northern Red Sea and the other outside the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf of Oman. National forces contributed to the MQF would be assigned to specific sectors under the overall command of CINCMQF and the Naval Force commander.

Contributing countries would be expected to provide or arrange in concert with other contributors their own logistic support.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommend that the Deputies Committee approve the following courses of action:

- Implementation of the concept of multinational operations outlined above incorporating foreign powers supporting the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and an economic quarantine on goods bound for Iraq or Kuwait and incorporating the command arrangement depicted in Annex C.

- Implementation of a quarantine on goods bound to or from Iraq or Kuwait. The force will be multinational in character and under the direction of the US force commander.

- Use of US forces in a multinational force with land, air and sea components to deter, and if necessary, to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression; and to support a multinational naval effort to enforce the sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions 660 and 661.

- Release the following declaratory statement:


The United States will cooperate with Kuwait along with any other nations to implement a quarantine of goods bound for Iraq and territory occupied by Iraq.

Recommend the Deputies Committee task the State Department to urge Kuwait to ask for assistance in implementing the quarantine.

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FULLY INTEGRATED FORCE

COMBINED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
MIDDLE EAST MULTI-NATIONAL TASK FORCE

- NOTES:
- MULTI-NATIONAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHES POLITICAL OBJECTIVES FOR SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
 - USCINCENT DUAL-HATTED OVERALL "COMBINED TASK FORCE CMR"
 - USARCENT DUAL-HATTED AS DEP GROUND COMPONENT CMR
 - USCINAF DUAL-HATTED AS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER
 - USNACENT DUAL-HATTED AS NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER NAVAL COMPONENT CMR DUAL-HATTED AS ARABIAN GULF CMR.
 - ACFT CARRIERS ARE STRATEGIC ASSETS OF NAVAL COMPONENT CMR
 - FUNCTIONAL AREAS WITHIN COMPONENT CMDS WILL REQUIRE SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS (SP OPS, AIR DEF, SEA CONT, ETC.)

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AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
01/05/2005 MM


~~SECRET~~

ANNEX B

NATIONAL FORCES

INTEGRATED THROUGH C3C

MULTINATIONAL FORCE SAUDI ARABIA (MFSA)
COMBINED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS



C31C

COORDINATION / CONTROL / COMMUNICATIONS / INTELL CENTER

- NAIL CMD AUTHORITIES DEVELOP POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND ACCEPTABLE MILITARY CONCEPTS
- MILITARY CMDRS. DEVELOP MILITARY STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES
- C3IC IS STAFFED WITH REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH PARTICIPATING NATION, APPROPRIATE TO CONTRIBUTION OF FORCES
- C3IC PROVIDES FACE-TO-FACE COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF ALL OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS
- PROBLEM RESOLUTION IS ACCOMPLISHED AT LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL

C3IC / MILITARY CMDRS / NATL CMD AUTHORITIES

100200(L) AUG 00

SECRET


DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
01/05/2005 MM

ANNEX C

~~SECRET~~

COMBINED MQF / MFSa ALTERNATIVE

MULTINATIONAL QUARRANTINE FORCE (MQF)
COMBINED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS



- COMMANDERS TRIPLE-HATTED: MULTINATIONAL FORCE SAUDI ARABIA
MULTINATIONAL QUARANTINE FORCE
NATIONAL COMMANDS

001000(L) AUG 80

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
01/05/2005 MM

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX D

ANNEX E

This information is provided INFORMALLY and DOES NOT represent either the official position of the country involved OR a commitment on the part of the USG to accept such forces.

UNITED KINGDOM: Up to 10 ships
Ground forces NOT ruled out--5th Abn Bde (2 Para Bns, Recon Bn Arty Bn) and 3D Commando Bde (Royal Marines)
One squadron of Tornado F3 A/C and one squadron of Jaguar A/C
Air Defense unit (Rapier)

EGYPT: Special Forces unit
Air Defenses
Air Force assets
One Bde of ground forces (armored)
(NB: President Mubarak has announced that Egypt is not participating; these units are those that could be expected to be provided IF Mubarak agrees to participate).

PAKISTAN: At TABUK (Northwest Saudia Arabia)
130 French AMC Tanks
85 MK 113 APCs
Force of 5000 Pakistanis
Funded by Saudis
No known request by Saudis to activate
No request for Pakistan to send the force

MOROCCO 2nd Para Bde (Ben Gurier)
Will not participate in multinational force, BUT will sent the unit as a result of a bilat agreement with the Saudis

DUTCH: One M and one L class frigate

CANADA: Offered one Heli Destroyer & one AOR (Oil Replenisher)--willing to modify both ships w/CIWS.

OTHER GCC: Expect maximum participation to include land forces

JAPAN: Naval support to include support ships, ground forces, and some air units.

KOREA: Will watch Japan and take its lead from them.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. List	Re: Deputy Committee Meeting [Name redaction.] (1 pp.)	08/10/1990	(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 170 - August 10, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf

Date Closed:	8/3/2009	OA/ID Number:	90015-026
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPUTY COMMITTEE (SVTS) MEETING
FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1990
10:00 - 11:00 AM

updated

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card
Robert Gates

OVP

Carnes Lord

NSC

Richard Haass

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
Jock Covey

DOD

Henry Rowen
Fred Smith

JUSTICE

William Barr

JCS

David Jeremiah
Merrill Ruck

CIA

Richard Kerr
[REDACTED]

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6]

Energy

Henson Moore

10/04/39

OMB

William Diefenderfer
Robert Howard

(passholder)
(passholder)

Treasury

John Robson

06/21/30

*Wolfowitz may be not able to attend

attended...OSD, State, CIA, and JCS participated.

Aug 10 -- Friday

10:00am-12:05pm DC on Kuwait/Iraq Chaired by Gates...Lord (OVP), Card Haass, Charles, Moore (DOE), Diefender (OMB), Howard (OMB), and Robson (Treasury) attended...OSD, State, CIA, JCS, and DOJ participated.

Aug 10 -- Friday

4:00-5:05pm DC on Liberia Chaired by Gates from Kennebunkport over secure voice...Amb. Miller, Frasure, and Howard (OMB) attended...OSD, State, CIA, and JCS participated.

Aug 13 -- Monday

5:10-5:35pm DC on Kuwait-Iraq Chaired by Gates via Secure Voice...Haass, Diefenderfer (OMB), Salvetti, and Card via secure voice K-Port attended...OSD, State, CIA, JCS, and DOJ participated.

Aug 14 -- Tuesday

9:30-10:40am DC on Kuwait-Iraq Chaired by Gates via Secure Voice...Haass, Diefenderfer (OMB), Howard (OMB), Charles, Kristol (OVP), Moore (DOE), and Robson (Treasury), and Card via Secure Voice K-Port attended...OSD, State, CIA, JCS, and DOJ participated.

Aug 17 -- Friday

4:10-4:40pm DC on Liberia Chaired by Gates via Secure Voice...Amb Miller, Frasure, Howard (OMB), and Card via Secure Voice K-Port attended...OSD, State, CIA, and JCS participated.

Aug 17 -- Friday

4:45-6:20pm DC on Kuwait-Iraq Chaired by Gates via Secure Voice...Haass, and Card via Secure Voice K-Port attended...OSD, State, CIA, and JCS participated.

Aug 18 -- Saturday

11:50am-2:00pm DC on Kuwait-Iraq Chaired by Gates via Secure Voice...Haass, and Card via Secure Voice K-Port attended...OSD, State, CIA, and JCS participated.

Aug 19 -- Sunday

1:35-2:45pm DC on Kuwait-Iraq Chaired by Gates via Secure

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Form	NSC Time Planning Sheet (1 pp.)	8/10/90	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 170 - August 10, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Gulf Crisis via SVTS, Keywords: Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf

Date Closed:	8/3/2009	OA/ID Number:	90015-029
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2004-0416-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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DC 170

NSC TIME PLANNING SHEET

TYPE:

DC - \$US

DATE - TIME:

2/10 10:00

LOCATION:

DURATION:

1 hour

SUBJECT:

Gulf Crisis

Participants	Invited	Agency Rep.	Date of Birth	Social Security Number	Confirm
VP	✓	Jard			
STATE	✓	Robert Kunitz			
TREASURY	✓	John Roberts			
BAKER (PERSONAL)					
DOD	✓	W. H. Rumsfeld			
JUSTICE	✓	William Barr			
JCS	✓	Adm. J. J. B. ...			
CIA	✓	...			
OMB	✓	...			
USIA	✓	...			
DOE	✓	...			
ACDA					
USIA					
COMMENTS:					

DOTD is
Jim Woods
now

0935

☐ Principals Plus 1