

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2005-1002-F; 2008-1289-F

FOIA Number:
2005-1002-F

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

OA/ID Number: 90014
Folder ID Number: 90014-030

Folder Title:
NSC/DC 141 - June 15, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on International Broadcasting, Keywords: Broadcasting

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	15	2	4	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Minutes	Re: Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (8 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	C
02. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee (2 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Distribution Record	Re: DC Meeting on US Government International Broadcasting/Agenda/Summary [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(3)	
03b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	C
03c. Agenda	Re: U.S. Government International Broadcasting (1 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	C
03d. Paper	Re: NSR 24: U.S. Government International Broadcasting Interagency Group Paper (11 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	C
03e. Paper	Re: NSR 24: U.S. Government International Broadcasting Interagency Group Paper (23 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	C
04a. Memo	Nancy Bearg Dyke to Robert M. Gates Re: Deputies Committee Meeting on International Broadcasting, June 15, 3:00 - 4:00 p.m., Situation Room (3 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: NSC/DC 141 - June 15, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on International Broadcasting, Keywords: Broadcasting

Pinksheet Number: cap1510
OA/ID Number: 90014-030
Date Closed: 11/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Deputies Committee Meeting on U.S. Government International Broadcasting (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04c. Paper	Re: NSR 24: U.S. Government International Broadcasting Interagency Group Paper (11 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	C
04d. Paper	Re: NSR 24: U.S. Government International Broadcasting Interagency Group Paper (23 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	C
04e. Draft	Re: Task Force on International Broadcasting Terms of Reference (2 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 141 - June 15, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on International Broadcasting, Keywords: Broadcasting

Pinksheet Number: cap1510

OA/ID Number: 90014-030

Date Closed: 11/30/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2005-1002-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020752
RECEIVED: 21 JUN 90 09

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: DYKE
MILLER

DOC DATE: 21 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BROADCASTING
DC

MINUTES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF DC MTG ON 15 JUN RE INTL BROADCASTING

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 25 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF: 9020702

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC141

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DYKE
MILLER
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 11/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9020752

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SITTMANN
001

Z 90062115 FOR DECISION
X 90062119 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 11/30/09

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LOG # 20752

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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N = No further Action

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ONS: ~~SECRET~~

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NSC SECRETARIAT

90 JUN 21 P2:17

RECEIVED

90 JUN 21 P3:13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

20752

June 21, 1990

NOTED
NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR. ^{NBD for}

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE ^{NBD}

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Deputies Committee Meeting,
June 15, 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab I are the Minutes of the Deputies Committee meeting on USG International Broadcasting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and file the Minutes (Tab I) for the record.

Approve *UM* Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Minutes

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 11/30/09

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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20752

Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: June 15, 1990
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Minutes of NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on
U.S. Government International Broadcasting (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:

Carnes Lord

JCS

David Jeremiah
Merrill Ruck

State:

Robert Kimmitt
Gerald Helman

USIA

Eugene Kopp
Jeremy Curtin
Robert Coonrod (VOA)

DOD:

Henry Rowen
Lewis Anderson

BIB

Bruce Porter

OMB

William Diefenderfer
Robert Howard

White House

Robert M. Gates

CIA:

Fritz Ermarth

NSC

David C. Miller, Jr.
Nancy Bearg Dyke

Minutes

Mr. Gates: We will start with a briefing by Bob Coonrod, Deputy Director of VOA, on where our broadcasting reaches now and in 1993. (U)

Mr. Coonrod: (Showed two maps and explained coverage.) (U)

Mr. Gates: Nancy Bearg Dyke will summarize the findings of the review. (U)

Mrs. Dyke: In response to NSR 24, the Interagency Group has met several times and produced this paper on US Government international broadcasting. This is an important subject at a time of world change. It will be important for us to move forward on these issues within the Executive branch, as tasked by the President because if we do not, Congress will. As you may

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1532-NR

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know, members of Congress, including Dante Fascell, have shown much interest in this. (Ø)

Basically, the review paper reaffirms the need for a US Government global broadcasting capability to carry out US foreign policy objectives. The interagency group believes changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union require continuing broadcasts there -- with provisions for phase out of surrogate broadcasting as certain conditions are met. I might just mention that VOA broadcasts news and information about the US; RFE/RL provides a "home" service with local and national information primarily for denied populations. The group was careful to not imprudently recommend giving up assets or capabilities that will be needed for our continued presence and influence during a period of transition -- and probably continued upheaval -- in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the paper recommends eventually phasing out US taxpayer support for individual Radio Free Europe services, consolidation of assets, and eventually moving to a single broadcasting entity. Phasing out taxpayer support implies, correctly, that Radio Free Europe services might continue in some fashion. One possibility mentioned in the paper is that the name and some assets be given to local broadcasters in the Eastern European countries. It would be appropriate for BIB to look into different possibilities. (Ø)

The phase down of Radio Free Europe and eventually, we hope, Radio Liberty would be managed by a new PCC on International Broadcasting, with recommendations by the appropriate regional PCCs. A Commission or preferably a Task Force -- but not an elaborate blue ribbon panel -- is recommended to follow on to this review, especially to recommend the most appropriate future organizational structure for USG broadcasting and the timing and steps to reach it. We should discuss this more later in the meeting. (Ø)

A major emphasis of the interagency group, which may not be strong enough in the paper, is the need for US Government broadcasting to areas and populations now not well reached, such as Muslims. It is in our interest to increase the US global broadcasting capability. The paper reviews the missions of our broadcasting and reaffirms them as well as setting out principles to guide USG broadcasting over the next few years. These would go into a NSD. (Ø)

We are in an era of change and transition both politically and technically, during which we must manage change in our international broadcasting to ensure its effectiveness. The Interagency Group recommends establishment of a PCC on International Broadcasting to:

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- o Manage the transition in US Government broadcasting contained in this review, including moving to greater coordination among broadcasting assets and programming.
- o Develop and coordinate long-term strategy for US Government broadcasting activities, including priorities among languages, countries and regions.
- o Provide a standing forum to increase dialogue among policymakers, USIA policy guidance staff and broadcasters, including VOA, USIA/TV and BIB, keeping in mind the need to maintain the credibility and autonomy of program content.
(P)

Mr. Gates: My understanding is that the Interagency Group has agreed on the following. Please speak up if you do not agree.
(U)

1. Need for USG global broadcasting capability under the authority of the Executive branch. Agreed. (P)
2. An NSD should be issued on the mission and principles and other recommendations as appropriate. Agreed. (P)
3. We need more broadcasting to underserved areas of South Asia, Middle East, Africa. Need better means of reaching the Arab World and drug-producing countries. The paper intimates that there is a "broadcast dividend," which is probably not true. We need to be realistic. (P)

Mr. Porter: The Israel relay station would be cut \$24 million, but it lays out slowly. (P)

Mr. Kopp: We are in an "offset mode," not a peace dividend. (U)

Mr. Diefenderfer: Savings should go into the deficit or maybe within 150. You should not take it as a given that international broadcasting is a priority. (P)

Mr. Kimmitt: We would not want it outside of 150. We do need to take a better look at our priorities, as we move into the '90s. Number three does mention the targets for the '90s. (P)

On the NSD, let us not set that in concrete until we are through.
(P)

Mr. Gates: Increasing broadcasting to underserved areas needs to be flagged as an issue. How do we pay for it? (P)

4. Consolidate assets where possible. Agree. (P)

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5. US broadcasting should move to a single entity, in steps and over time. Do you all agree? Agreed. Commission would recommend the organization. (Ø)

6. Phase out US taxpayer support for RFE as criteria are met in individual countries. RFE assets may go to the East Europe countries. The PCC on Europe should recommend when RFE individual services phase out. (Ø)

Mr. Ermarth: This is a very sober paper; the criteria are strict. But the tone in the paper that events are moving our way is more optimistic than the intelligence community. So, the phasing out is not likely to be fast. (Ø)

Mr. Gates: That is realistic. We can say phasing out taxpayer support "if and as" the criteria are met. (Ø)

7. RFE should eliminate repeat programming to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland once it is determined that such programming is no longer essential for fulfilling the RFE mission -- in consultation with relevant US embassies. I understand that repeat programming is playing the same programs over and over again. (Ø)

Mr. Porter: Yes. Only one-third of the programming is original. (U)

Mr. Diefenderfer: What if Poland asks us to stop broadcasting? (Ø)

Mr. Gates: We are more likely to have them ask us to stay. (Ø)

Mr. Kimmitt: We should be there as long as they want us. (Ø)

Mr. Gates: 8. Keep RFE/RL research service. (Ø)

Mr. Ermarth: Why keep RFE/RL research service? Is it useful with no broadcasting? (Ø)

Mr. Porter: Yes. And, we would keep it because it is first rate. (Ø)

Mr. Ermarth: With phase out of RFE/RL, we need to see how we can sustain the relevance. (Ø)

Mr. Gates: We should make clear as we consolidate and phasing-out takes place, that we must reexamine how the RFE/RL research service fits and its budget priority. (Ø)

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Mr. Gates: 9. Establish PCC on International Broadcasting. Question remains of chairmanship. Agreed. (✓)

10. Reduce Israel relay station by \$24 million. Thereafter, transmitters and antennae are to be shared by BIB and VOA. Agreed. (✓)

11. Increase political and economic content of VOA Europe. Agreed. (✓)

12. No new independent surrogate stations now but increase VOA targeted coverage to specific countries. Agreed. (✓)

13. More emphasis on television, as it becomes feasible to reach larger priority audiences. Agreed. (✓)

14. USIA/TV and VOA to coordinate programming and planning. Agreed. (✓)

15. PCC review "editorial" policy. Here is one. (✓)

Mr. Kopp: Yes, we should review it. We do have an editorial program, which seems to work smoothly now. (✓)

Mr. Kimmitt: I think it is straight delivery but if one editorializes at all, you can get a question of whether VOA is propagandistic. Yes, we should review it. (✓)

Mr. Kopp: The background of this is that a panel of the "Fourth Estate" recommended that VOA do editorials, clearly labeled as US policy. (✓)

Mr. Ermarth: We need to gather data in the field about whether the editorials do communicate properly about US views. Are the editorials valuable? (✓)

Mr. Porter: You do have to ask whether there is an audience appeal. (✓)

Mr. Gates: There is no disagreement on having the PCC review editorial policy. (✓)

Mr. Gates: 16. On the question of whether any savings should stay within the broadcasting account, as recommended by the interagency group, we need to advance three options to the President: a) keep within the broadcasting account, b) compete within the 150 account, which State favors, 3) savings would be divided among competing priorities, which OMB seems to favor. Views? (✓)

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Mr. Rowen: We like 150. (✓)

Admiral Jeremiah: No view. (✓)

Mr. Gates: 17. Reaffirm the streamlined modernization plan.
Agreed. (✓)

18. Set up a Presidential commission or task force to recommend the best way and timing on moving to a single entity. The groups would also consider technology questions. This will need more discussion on the modalities. (✓)

There are two other issues: the form of the commission and chairmanship of the PCC. On the chairmanship, Bob Kimmitt, would you please start? (✓)

Mr. Kimmitt: Page 2 of the Executive Summary clearly states the rationale for State chairing the PCC. It says, "improved coordination of broadcasting with overall foreign policy planning and objectives, including establishment of a PCC on International Broadcasting." (✓)

Mr. Rowen: We have no strong opinion. (✓)

Admiral Jeremiah: We have no strong opinion either. (✓)

Mr. Kopp: We believe the NSC should be in the chair. State's views will be covered by their regional PCCs. This is a classic case needing NSC to be a neutral chair. (✓)

Mr. Gates: Why is NSC perceived as a more neutral chair than State on this? (✓)

Mr. Kopp: There are technical issues that concern Commerce, Treasury, State. It is not all foreign policy. (✓)

Mr. Kimmitt: State chairmanship would only be at the PCC level. At the Deputies Committee, it becomes more neutral. (✓)

Mr. Diefenderfer: Which would spend less? Either State or NSC is okay. (✓)

Mr. Ermarth: No specific view. (✓)

Mr. Gates: My personal view is that State should chair it. My only concern is that State is too thin in this area; State needs to pay more attention. (✓)

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Mr. Kimmitt: Yes, we need to pay more attention and are thin at the top, but you do not want us to get too large in this area. (✓)

Mr. Gates: If the President decides that State should chair it, State needs to do more; but you are in a better position than NSC. (✓)

Mr. Ermarth: With State chairmanship, diplomatic relations with countries may take precedence over broadcasting management. (✓)

Mr. Gates: I expect an environment of creative tension. (✓)

Commission. I am aware of internecine warfare in the past on this issue among interested parties, and I am concerned that we not open up all aspects of broadcasting to the press. It does not take much to get a story on this issue. The government needs to do its work, then specific questions of structure and technology can be reviewed by an outside group. They will have to have clear guidelines, with questions as specific as possible to get a useful conclusion. I go along with the paper and with Nancy's comment that this should be a task force, not a blue ribbon panel. (✓)

Mr. Kimmitt: I am more inclined toward it as you describe it. Could it be an advisory group to the PCC? (✓)

Mr. Gates: I would like to go with the "task force" concept. (✓)

Mr. Kimmitt: Even if you call it a task force, if the PCC is working correctly, the task force should fall within the PCC. Could you set it up as an advisory group to the PCC? Keep it in the PCC track. Don't let them carve out too much of an independent role for themselves. (✓)

Mr. Gates: I wonder if it would be just as good if the people were told to answer these specific questions. I wonder if you don't get just as good of people if you tell them that the task force will be clearly linked to the policy process. Question: To what degree do we have a political need to have outsiders involved? (✓)

Mr. Kimmitt: Yes, this is a way to help preempt outside, separate position-taking. Fascell has had ideas, wants something to be done. What do we get in return from him if we do a commission? (✓)

Mr. Kopp: I can associate myself with the comments of both Gates and Kimmitt. Yes, we need to throw Fascell a bone. He would

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like to have a commission. He has supported broadcasting, and he is an ally. (✓)

Mr. Porter: There is more than a need to throw a bone. Fascell will do his own thing if there is no report by spring. (✓)

Mr. Ermarth: A weighty group is needed. For example, Bob Strauss. (✓)

Mr. Kimmitt: A PCC has to do the basic work. (✓)

Mr. Kopp: We give Fascell an opportunity for statesmanship. (✓)

Mr. Ermarth: One of the missions is democracy-building. It will clearly be a case of BBC model versus keeping it in USIA. We need political heavyweights on this to provide political cover on the decision. (✓)

Mr. Gates: We face the prospect of running a Model T on a super highway if we do not move ahead in broadcasting. (✓)

Mr. Porter: The structure is the most important question. (✓)

Mr. Gates: I will review where we are. We have gone through the issues, and they are agreed. It is true that, as billed, the interagency group had reached agreement. We will bracket as decisions in the memo to the President: 1. Where should the savings go? To the broadcasting account, 150 account, or general treasury. 2. Should NSC or State chair the PCC? 3. Should the commission be a) an independent task force or b) an advisory committee that is tightly tied to the Executive Branch. Either one would have a specific set of issues to address, acknowledging as a basis that we will form a single broadcasting entity. How do we get there? It is worthy of fairly senior people to sit on it. (✓)

I would caution you that when we are talking about reshaping administrative structures, you are talking about lives, careers, etc. There should be no leaks. We don't want erroneous information floating around. This is a long-range process of consolidation. It can cause pain and heartburn. Please continue to show the discretion that the interagency group has shown. (✓)

Mr. Kopp: This has been a well-done exercise. (U)

-- End of Meeting --

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020749
RECEIVED: 20 JUN 90 16

TO: GATES

FROM: DYKE
MILLER

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BROADCASTING
SOC

DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON 15 JUN RE INTL BROADCASTING

ACTION: GATES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 23 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF: 9020702 9020752

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC141

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DYKE
MILLER
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 11/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAMM

CLOSED BY: NSAJC

DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9020749

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90062018 FOR DECISION
X 90062209 GATES APPROVED RECOM

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 11/30/07

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [Signature]

LOG # 20749

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG [Signature] A/O _____

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bill Bill Sittmann

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Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

3

✓

NSC Secretariat

4

WMS 6/15

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RECEIVED

20 JUN 20 16:37

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

SOC - DC - June 15

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20749

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

June 20, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR. *NSD for*

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE *NSD*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the NSC Deputies
Committee Meeting, June 15, 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.,
Situation Room

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Attached at Tab I is the Summary of Conclusions of your DC
Meeting on USG International Broadcasting, June 15.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions.

Approve 8 Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 11/30/09

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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20749

Summary of Conclusions for
NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: June 15, 1990
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on U.S. Government
International Broadcasting (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The Vice President's Office:
Carnes Lord

JCS
David Jeremiah
Merrill Ruck

State:
Robert Kimmitt
Gerald Helman

USIA
Eugene Kopp
Jeremy Curtin
Robert Coonrod (VOA)

DOD:
Henry Rowen
Lewis Anderson

BIB
Bruce Porter

OMB
William Diefenderfer
Robert Howard

White House
Robert M. Gates

CIA:
Fritz Ermarth

NSC
David C. Miller, Jr.
Nancy Bearg Dyke

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- The recommendations of the interagency group contained in the NSR paper on the direction of U.S. Government international broadcasting for the 1990s were affirmed by the Deputies, with some difference of opinion on PCC chairmanship, reassignment of budget savings, and type of outside group to do further work on structure and technology. (C)
- The need for a U.S. Government global broadcasting capability to carry out U.S. foreign policy objectives should be reaffirmed, and an NSD should outline the agreed missions and principles. (C)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2106-MR

MM 5/3/2016

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- Changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union require continuing broadcasts there -- with provisions for phase-out of U.S. taxpayer support for individual Radio Free Europe services, as certain criteria are met. (C)
- We should consolidate assets, eliminate redundancies, and eventually move to a single broadcasting entity. (C)
- The phase-down of Radio Free Europe and eventually Radio Liberty, as well as management of other consolidation and development of regional broadcast strategies, should be managed by a new PCC on International Broadcasting, with recommendations by the appropriate regional PCCs. The chairmanship, State or NSC, will need to be decided by the President. (C)
- The U.S. Government must broadcast to areas and populations now not well reached, such as Muslims. It is in our interest to increase the U.S. global broadcasting capability, though funding is uncertain. (C)
- Any savings should either A) stay within broadcasting account, B) stay within 150, or C) go to the treasury. The President should decide. (C)
- An outside group is recommended to follow on to NSR-24, especially to recommend the most appropriate future organizational structure for U.S. Government broadcasting and the timing and steps to reach it. The President must decide whether it should be an independent task force or an advisory group tied to the PCC. (C)
- A memorandum to the President will be written covering this review and requesting his decisions. (C)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020702
RECEIVED: 11 JUN 90 09

TO: GATES

FROM: MILLER

DOC DATE: 14 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BROADCASTING
SOC
AGENDA

NSR
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR 15 JUN DC MTG ON INTL BROADCASTING W/ NSR 24
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STUDY RESPONSE / TERMS OF REFERENCE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE: 14 JUN 90

STATUS: IX

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF: 9020752

FILES: IFM 0

NSCP: DC141

NSR0024

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GATES

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 11/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY:

DOC 3 OF 3

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
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20702

June 12, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

BGEN THOMAS E. WHITE, JR.
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency


MR. ROBERT E. HOWARD
Associate Director for National
Security & International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. BRUCE PORTER
Executive Director
Board for International
Broadcasting

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on U.S. Government
International Broadcasting, Friday, June 15,
3:00 - 4:00 p.m., White House Situation Room (✓)

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on NSR-24, USG
International Broadcasting, chaired by Robert M. Gates, on
Friday, June 15, 3:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room.
(✓)

The agenda is attached at Tab A; Tab B is the NSR Executive
Summary; Tab C is the complete NSR paper. Attendance is limited
to principals plus one. Please phone names and birthdates of
attendees to my office, tel. 456-6534, by close of business,
Thursday, June 14. (✓)


William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSR-24 Executive Summary
Tab C NSR-24

cc: Andrew H. Card, Jr.

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DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: June 15, 1990
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Agenda

- I. Opening Statement Robert M. Gates
- II. Background Briefing on USG International
Broadcasting Coverage Robert Coonrod
- III. Introduction to Discussion Robert M. Gates
- IV. Discussion All Participants
- V. Summary Robert M. Gates

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By MM NARA, Date 2/14/2014

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June 12, 1990

NSR 24: U. S. Government International Broadcasting
Interagency Group Paper

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since during World War II, U.S. Government broadcasting has had an important role in achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals. With the passing of the Cold War, this role does not end. Rather, U.S. international broadcasting retains its importance during a time of transition and beyond in solidifying democratic gains and carrying U.S. presence and policies, buttressed by objective news and information, around the world. It is a military projection of U.S. influence that is more important than before, as ideas and economics begin to dominate the world scene.

The Eastern European political revolutions of 1989 testify to the power of communications and the success of Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. The political revolutions were accompanied and facilitated by a communications revolution which is opening up closed societies around the world and creating a potential global marketplace of information and ideas. Both revolutions require that U.S. Government international broadcasting be responsive to this competitive environment if it is to remain a useful and effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy. Although the impetus may come from Europe, this clearly is a global requirement.

NSR 24 recommends ways to manage USG broadcasting in a period of historic change, while reaffirming the necessity of a global broadcasting capability to help maintain active U.S. engagement worldwide. Given current budgetary constraints, we cannot expect major infusions of new funding to broadcasting. Within current funding levels, therefore, we must increase efficiency and clarify priorities to ensure that our broadcasting resources are used to best effect. We must do more with the same resources.

As directed by the President, agencies have examined the mission, activities and resources of U.S. Government international broadcasting, in particular the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), USIA/TV (Worldnet), and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin, in light of current political and technological developments. Agencies considered budgetary constraints under which all USG programs operate. We also noted the strong Congressional interest in reviewing the role of USG broadcasting in the context of developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

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Agencies reached five main conclusions, which concern 1) confirming the need for and the missions of USG international broadcasting and setting out principles, 2) a desirable consolidation and reorientation of broadcasting operations, including eventually moving to a single broadcasting entity, 3) improved coordination of broadcasting with overall foreign policy planning and objectives, including establishment of a new Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting, 4) budget, and 5) need for follow-on work by an independent bipartisan commission or group.

Mission Relevance: USG international broadcasting has four missions:

- to present and explain to foreign audiences USG policies and actions;
- to describe and explain American society, thought and institutions;
- to provide objective and reliable news, commentary and information about U.S. and international events;
- to provide surrogate programming where local governments curtail the free flow of information to their people, and where surrogate programming is in the U.S. interest.

Dramatic events of the past year in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and elsewhere **validate the need for these missions.** Though audiences in Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union have increasing access to free indigenous and Western media, the ability of the USG to reach these and other foreign audiences directly via broadcasting remains important to U.S. national security interests worldwide. **A U.S. global broadcasting capability remains a foreign policy necessity.**

The easing of East-West competition does not end the challenge to U.S. interests abroad or the need for active U.S. public diplomacy. If anything, our international challenges are becoming more complex and variable as dominating bipolar military concerns are balanced or replaced by multipolar economic, cultural, environmental and other transnational concerns at the center of international attention.

U.S. policy is not to retreat from this new world but to engage it. As long as we exercise international leadership, the U.S. Government will need the ability to take its positions and views directly to foreign societies in messages suited to their cultural perspectives and expressed in their languages. The

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spread of democracy and more open societies makes this ability more rather than less important.

U.S. Government broadcasting does not become obsolete when a society develops its own media or gains access to Western media sources. USG broadcasting has a particular mission in advancing U.S. national interests which commercial broadcasters do not share. Even when private sector broadcasters provide extensive news services, they follow commercial criteria in program selection and emphasis different from those followed by VOA and USIA/TV, which, by mandate, emphasize issues and events of concern to the U.S. Government. For example, through programming on topics related to democratic political institutions, rule of law, and free enterprise, we can help build foundations that enable fledgling democracies to stabilize and survive. Democracy-building is a vital mission of U.S. Government international broadcasting, made more important than ever by the worldwide trend toward political and economic liberalization.

To ensure that it effectively advances U.S. foreign policies, **USG international broadcasting should remain under the authority of the Executive branch foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus.**

Agencies recommend that the President issue a National Security Directive reaffirming the continued need for a global broadcasting capability to advance U.S. foreign policy worldwide and the missions of USG broadcasting and elaborating the following principles to guide its activities:

1. The U.S. Government should maintain a global radio and television broadcasting capability, broadcasting to leaders, elites, and general populations in all geographic areas to serve and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.
2. U.S. Government international broadcasting should be directly connected to the U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus. It should remain under the authority of the Executive branch.
3. In order to keep U.S. Government broadcasting competitive, all U.S. Government broadcasting assets should be coordinated to the fullest extent possible, keeping in mind current differences in the missions of VOA and USIA/TV, on the one hand, and RFE/RL, on the other. Especially in allocation of technical resources and programming, redundancy should be avoided.
4. To be more effective and to better utilize resources, at a future point, the U.S. Government should have only one broadcast entity.

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5. Recognizing budgetary constraints, broadcasting priorities should reflect overall U.S. foreign policy priorities in determining which areas should be covered most heavily, and which languages should receive priority. The U.S. should broadcast in the vernacular languages of the receiving countries, as well as in English.

6. Given the current international political environment, it is especially important that U.S. Government broadcasting further the process of democracy-building by describing democratic institutions and practices, and otherwise assisting political and economic liberalization.

7. U.S. Government broadcasting should not conflict with the growth of U.S. private sector telecommunications and broadcasting enterprises in the international arena. Where possible, U.S. Government broadcasting activities should help private sector enterprises to become established in foreign markets.

8. In order to compete in an increasingly sophisticated international media environment, the U.S. Government must frequently reevaluate its broadcasting technology and programming on the basis of audience survey research to ensure the most effective technical means of delivery and mix of programming for reaching the greatest number of priority audiences.

9. U.S. Government international broadcasting should actively and directly support non-traditional U.S. foreign policy priorities, such as the war on drugs, the fight against terrorism and efforts to improve the global environment.

Consolidation/Reorientation: At this time, RFE/RL and VOA compete with each other for listeners, and the distinctions in programming are blurring as democracy-building content increases. As surrogate broadcasting decreases and as programming of VOA and RFE/RL become more alike, their assets should be rationalized, i.e., the transmitting assets should be viewed as a common pot to be used most effectively. As an overall coordinated broadcasting strategy is designed, it will be possible to distinguish where redundancy causes ineffectiveness or waste and where redundancy is necessary in order to meet U.S. objectives. Rationalization of assets cannot be accomplished overnight, but it is a goal that should be a factor in decisions about budgets.

To make the most of limited resources and to be competitive, the **U.S. should begin to consolidate its broadcasting operations, eliminate redundancy and increase flexibility in managing assets during an extended period of international change. Over time and in steps, without withdrawing from countries in transition and**

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without sacrificing valuable assets and influence, we should move to a single broadcasting entity. At the same time, as far as permitted by budgetary restraints, USG broadcasting services should be expanded in areas now underserved, including South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

For the single broadcasting entity, we recommend neither a timetable nor an appropriate organization. There are several models, such as an entity within USIA or State, a separate USG entity, or an organization like the BBC, which is autonomous on content, but is funded by the British government and given Foreign Office guidance on languages and apportionment of time to each. We believe that an independent commission or group outside the government bureaucracy should recommend the best organization.

What is envisioned is a process of steps -- over time as appropriate under international political and other conditions -- to pull the broadcasting elements and assets closer together until there is only one. This is not a submerging of one in the other. For example, the first step is closer coordination of equipment use, such as joint use of some transmitters. We envision that for some time programming would be distinctly separate and clearly identified as Radio Free Poland and VOA Poland, for example. Over time, some current RFE country services would phase out. We expect that Radio Liberty would continue to broadcast for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, and this might be while Radio Liberty was still broadcasting, there would be a single agency with a new name, coordinating all the assets and the budget but most likely with distinct services -- such as Radio Marti, Radio Liberty -- under it.

As democratic change takes hold and certain criteria are met in Eastern European countries, Radio Free Europe should phase out U.S.-sponsored broadcasting services, as its role will have been fulfilled. The same applies to Radio Liberty, at the appropriate time. Eventually, U.S. taxpayer support for RFE/RL would end.

The U.S. Government could end support for surrogate broadcasting to a particular Eastern European country when:

- Free indigenous media are protected by law and established in practice in that country to provide consistent, objective news and discussion, unfettered by government censorship, about domestic and international affairs.

- The free flow of information into and out of the country is established so that people have access to Western media as well as their own.

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-- No one party enjoys a monopoly or overwhelming dominance of information media. Individuals and diverse political interests have access to media to disseminate their points of view.

-- Journalists have access to information sources and the freedom to report undeterred by government control or restrictions.

Establishment of democracy in Eastern Europe will be a long and uneven process. RFE broadcasts to some countries in the region will probably be justified for many years to come. In other cases, especially Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, conditions for ceasing RFE broadcasts could be met in the next few years. RL broadcasts will probably be needed to fill gaps in the Soviet media environment for a decade and more.

The name "Radio Free Europe, RFE" and the credibility it has built up over 40 years are of significant value to both the U.S. and the fledgling democratic governments which were once the opposition. As the mission for U.S.-sponsored surrogate services ends, it is possible that the name, frequency, and some facilities of RFE Poland, Hungary, etc. could be turned over to local broadcasters -- with government agreement -- to continue broadcasting as a home service. This type of option should be explored further by the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting.

The RFE/RL research service, a valuable resource in its own right, should be maintained.

The opening up of Eastern Europe, though incomplete, offers opportunities to begin consolidating some RFE and VOA technical resources now. The first task of consolidation should be to prepare to phase out RFE programming to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland as conditions in those countries end the need for U.S.-funded surrogate stations. **The first step in phasing down RFE would be to eliminate repeat programming in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland,** once it is determined that such programming is no longer essential for fulfilling the mission of RFE. The timing would be determined by the new PCC on Broadcasting after consultation through the State Department with embassies in the countries involved. RFE audience researchers believe that most listeners would be retained, as broadcasting would continue in prime listenership time.

Throughout Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Soviet Union, **democracy-building programs should be emphasized by VOA, RFE/RL, and USIA/TV,** customized to the situation in each country.

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The Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Eastern Europe, chaired by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs of the Department of State, **should** monitor developments in individual Eastern European countries and **make recommendations on when criteria for ending U.S.-sponsored surrogate broadcasting have been met.**

The U.S. radio relay station now under construction in Israel will be a valuable and much-needed resource for U.S. international broadcasting, providing critical coverage to three continents, including such areas as Soviet Central Asia, South Asia, eastern Africa, and central Africa. We reaffirm the U.S. commitment to this project. Nevertheless, in view of urgent budget requirements elsewhere in U.S. international broadcasting and in the light of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the planned size and scope of the station can be downscaled by roughly 10 percent. The project **should be reduced in budget by \$24 million, with the bulk of the cuts taken from transmitters and antennas intended for use in Eastern Europe.** BIB and VOA should jointly work out the exact distribution of the cuts, subject to approval by NSC and OMB. Scaling back, as outlined here, will not impair our ability to reach key audiences effectively. The remaining transmitters and antennae in the project should be operated and programmed jointly. VOA and BIB also should share broadcasting capability to Eastern Europe on BIB assets other than Israel beginning in 1993 after phase-out of certain other current VOA transmitters. The sharing should be possible in light of probable cutback or phase-out of U.S.-sponsored RFE services to Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as reduced need for shortwave broadcasting as shortwave listenership continues to decline and we reach audiences through other media means.

Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin is a special asset directly affected by East-West change. The rationale for RIAS will end with German unification, but the need for U.S. media presence in Germany, as it grows in size and influence in central Europe, will increase during this period of transition in Europe and in the future as one means of continuing U.S. presence and influence. There is a specific need to explain more about NATO and its evolving role. We have indicated to the Bonn government that we would like to continue U.S. participation in RIAS if acceptable terms can be negotiated, including increased U.S. influence in programming within current funding levels. We expect a German response in late June. If the German government decides against continued U.S. partnership, we should try to negotiate some arrangement that will allow us to continue to reach these populations.

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While retaining its original intent of reaching the "successor generations" in Western Europe with VOA Europe, VOA should increase the political and economic content of that service, seeking to expand its present audience in both size and composition. Such programming would be appropriate for Eastern Europe, too.

Technological as well as political change dictates consolidation in USG broadcasting activities. In particular, shortwave radio, which has been the mainstay of international broadcasting for 40 years, has given way in some areas to alternative means of program delivery. This has long been true in Western Europe and Latin America; it is beginning to happen now in some Eastern European countries. In such areas, USG broadcasters, both VOA and USIA/TV, increasingly depend upon placement and cooperative network arrangements instead of direct broadcasting to reach priority audiences. To be effective, USG broadcasting needs maximum flexibility and a full range of media options to offer to highly competitive foreign markets. For this reason, **USIA should coordinate more closely the planning and programming of its own broadcasting activities, VOA and USIA/TV, in order to better match the most effective medium to specific media conditions abroad.**

Furthermore, it is expected that television will increase in importance in developed countries and that opportunities for USIA/TV likewise will increase. **Greater emphasis should be placed on developing the potential of USIA/TV in consonance with opportunities to reach larger priority audiences.**

To reach audiences most effectively, USG broadcasting must have a full range of media options which are well understood and creatively pursued. Placement and cooperative arrangements could well be the key to future success. **Emphasis should be maintained on creative placement and cooperative arrangements, along with expanded media research and audience surveys to ensure most effective carrying of U.S. messages.**

No major breakthrough in new technology is likely to transform international broadcasting in the next 10-15 years. The questions of technology and being able to compete should be constantly reviewed by the new PCC with recommendations by the State Department's International Communications and Information Policy Bureau. The commission recommended in this review should also make recommendations regarding technologies affecting USG international broadcasting.

Due to budgeting and the fact that VOA can and does provide targeted programming to denied populations, no new independent surrogate stations should be established at this time. Guided by

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appropriate PCCs, VOA should increase the targeted character of its programming to denied/totalitarian countries, e.g., Southeast Asia, China (including Tibet), Albania, Iran, and Libya.

VOA services to underserved populations, especially Muslims, and those in the Balkans and Africa, should be increased as part of a global strategy developed by the new PCC on International Broadcasting described below.

In order to provide overall coordination and strategic guidance for USG international broadcasting, a new Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting should be established. This PCC should manage transitions in broadcasting activities dictated by political or technological change. The PCC should recommend ways in which to realize efficiencies through consolidation of broadcasting assets, including those of VOA, USIA/TV and RFE/RL. The PCC should coordinate strategic planning, as described below, to ensure that broadcasting activities reflect U.S. foreign policy priorities. The PCC should be chaired by A) State, B) NSC, or C) co-chaired by State and NSC.

Policy Coordination: While it must maintain credibility as an objective and reliable information source if it is to attract and hold priority audiences abroad, USG broadcasting should be coordinated more closely with U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives. In particular, strategic decisions setting priorities among languages, countries and geographical regions for VOA and USIA/TV should be regularly coordinated by USIA, the Department of State, OMB, DOD, and the NSC through the PCC on International Broadcasting.

The PCC on International Broadcasting should recommend, in coordination with appropriate regional PCCs, broadcast strategies within five months of its establishment to ensure appropriate and adequate coverage in all geographic regions, expanding some and reducing or reorienting others. In particular, the PCC should take into account the need to increase programming to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa where shortwave remains a primary means of reaching priority audiences. In this context, the importance of large Muslim populations in these areas should be considered. The PCC should also consider whether some radio broadcasting resources could be shifted from Europe to these areas to meet this need.

Dialogue among the State Department's policy staff, USIA's policy guidance staff, and those responsible for broadcasts, including the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) responsible for RFE/RL, should be increased to minimize the possibilities of inflaming sensitivities that run counter to our policies. The

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practice of VOA editorials should be reviewed by the PCC, to consider whether closer coordination is required with the State Department or, indeed, whether it would be better to rely on programming and news to publicize U.S. foreign policy positions. Some argue that editorials give VOA a propagandistic quality and reduce credibility, while supporters argue that they are essential for carrying American messages.

Budget: Because of the continued importance of USG international broadcasting worldwide and the expansions recommended by this review in surrogate and regional broadcasting, **we recommend that any budget savings from consolidation be reallocated to higher priority broadcasting needs** (combined VOA, USIA/TV, TV Marti, Radio Marti, and BIB budgets). Though large savings are not anticipated, we recommend as priorities to receive the savings by transfer to:

- the VOA budget to meet its deficit;
- to the Worldnet budget for expanding its ability to transmit to and place programming on Western and Eastern European stations;
- some expansion of VOA programming to priority populations now not well reached;
- increased audience research; and
- improved, basic maintenance of the current VOA shortwave system to reduce the need for major refurbishment in the next decade.

Any significant reallocation of funding must be approved by Congress, which often has its own priorities for USG broadcasting, including demands for new language services. Any shifts in resources or strategy for USG broadcasting must, therefore, be accompanied by close consultation with appropriate Congressional interests.

We reaffirm the currently approved FY 1991-1994 VOA and BIB modernization plan and budget with the exception of the Israel relay station modest downsizing.

We recommend that the President appoint a bipartisan commission or group to study the future of U.S. Government international broadcasting beyond the parameters of NSR 24. In particular, the commission should examine and make recommendations to the President within six months on the following issues in the overall context of U.S. public diplomacy:

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- a. Organization and structure of U.S. Government broadcasting activities: What is the most appropriate organizational structure under which eventually all USG international broadcasting would be combined into a single entity? When and how should this occur?
- b. New technologies in light of the need for U.S. Government broadcasting to remain effective and competitive. This should include strategies for the best use of U.S. funding for new technologies.
- c. The role of U.S. Government broadcasting in a changing environment in which a variety of information delivery means is becoming available.. How can the U.S. Government deliver its message most effectively and assure continuing access to target populations?

The commission should be appointed quickly and should be as informal as possible without sacrificing influence.

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June 12, 1990

NSR 24: U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
Interagency Group Paper

For 40 years and more, international broadcasting has served as a basic instrument of U.S. foreign policy, advancing American interests worldwide. U.S. Government radio and, in recent years, television have reached into other societies, bringing them news of the United States and the world at large and, where necessary, also bringing them news of events inside their own countries. Established during World War II and the Cold War, the Voice of America (1942), Radio Free Europe (1949) and Radio Liberty (1951), Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS, 1946), and USIA TV (Worldnet, 1983) have a distinguished history of broadcasting to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and -- in the case of VOA and Worldnet -- the world. Since 1985, Radio Marti has broadcast to Cuba; TV Marti began test operations in 1990.

Dramatic though uneven political change, especially the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe which owe so much to Radio Free Europe and VOA, as well as technological change, require that the U.S. review its broadcasting activities to ensure that they remain relevant and effective in advancing U.S. interests in the future, in an era of change beyond the Cold War. Although the impetus may come from Europe, this is a global requirement. Given current budgetary constraints, we cannot expect major infusions of new funding to broadcasting. Therefore, within current funding levels (allowing for inflation), we must increase efficiency and clarify priorities to ensure that our broadcasting resources are used to the best effect. We must do more with the same resources.

Current Environment

The combination of political, economic and technological changes, demonstrated most dramatically in Eastern Europe, are destined to lead to a proliferation of information sources, including broadcasting. New strategies, tactics and techniques will be required to sustain the message of the USG into the information stream in this environment.

In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, listeners have varying degrees of access to state radio and television stations that are more open and trusted, commercial enterprises -- both local and cooperative with Western companies -- CNN or other satellited Western-source news, and unjammed shortwave international

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broadcasters, including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe or Radio Free Liberty, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Moscow, and others. Although commercial broadcasting has yet to develop to an appreciable degree, increased competition from a variety of reliable, technically superior media is already beginning to make shortwave obsolete in some Eastern European countries. Television is of increasing importance. CNN news can be received in almost every country and has become something of an information common denominator among country leaders; however limited numbers in the general population receive it.

Broadcast situations in the rest of the world range from free radio and television media to continued denial of free information. U.S. policy has been to provide US government broadcasting where people need information, be it about world affairs, our policies, or their own national matters, though tight budgets have inhibited our reach and flexibility. More open access in some parts of the world to information will not change this mission, though greater access and shifts away from shortwave to AM/FM and TV, delivered by cooperative agreements with local media and satellite, will change our means of delivery.

Mission/Relevance

U.S. international broadcasting has four interrelated missions:

- o to present and explain to foreign audiences U.S. Government policies and actions;
- o to describe and explain American society and institutions;
- o to provide objective news, commentary and information about the U.S. and international events;
- o to provide surrogate programming where local governments curtail the free flow of information to their people and where it is clearly in the U.S. foreign policy interest to do so.

We believe that these missions as stated in the VOA and RFE/RL Charters remain valid today and are likely to remain valid in the future. The details of their execution, however, are certain to change and are changing already.

VOA and RFE/RL have been instruments in a Cold War carrying out these missions, both in advancing American global interests through positive actions and in helping to counter hostile Soviet influence around the world. **The relevance of U.S. broadcasting does not end with the Cold War, though. It is as important as before.**

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The easing of East-West competition does not end the challenge to U.S. interests abroad or the need for active U.S. public diplomacy. The world is not suddenly safe and simple. If anything, our international challenges are becoming more complex and variable as dominating bipolar military concerns are balanced or replaced by multipolar economic, cultural, environmental and other transnational concerns at the center of international attention. Eastern Europe is on the front pages, but other populations too are important to us because they have the potential to affect world events and U.S. interests. The best example is 800 million Muslims among whom the fundamentalists are hostile to the U.S. and do not understand our policies, especially political and religious. We have a stake in being heard and being understood by these populations.

U.S. policy is not to retreat from this new world but to engage it. As the President said on March 23, 1990, "The world is changing dramatically, and we must meet the challenges in every region with equal commitment and equal dedication." Secretary Baker said on March 30, "Now that the adversaries of democracy are weaker, some say we should retire, mission accomplished, to tend to our problems at home. I am not among them. In the new world struggling to be born, like the old world now rapidly passing away, there is no substitute for American leadership."

As long as we exercise international leadership, the U.S. Government will need the ability to take its positions and views directly to foreign societies in messages suited to their cultural perspectives and expressed in their languages. The spread of democracy and more open societies makes this ability more rather than less important. For where decision-making and centers of influence are decentralized, and ordinary citizens affect the decisions of their governments -- decisions which, in turn, may affect American interests -- the U.S. Government must reach beyond those governments to communicate with the people as well. Radio and television broadcasting are uniquely able to do this on the mass level.

Some believe that U.S. Government broadcasting becomes obsolete whenever a society develops its own media or gains access to Western media sources. Agencies disagree with this view. USG broadcasting has a particular mission in advancing U.S. national interests which commercial broadcasters do not share. Even when private sector broadcasters provide extensive news services, they follow commercial criteria in program selection and emphasis different from those followed by VOA and USIA/TV, which, by mandate, emphasize issues and events of concern to the U.S. Government.

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For commercial reasons, private sector broadcasters are also unlikely to develop vernacular services into many of the countries of interest to the U.S. Government and into which VOA and RFE now send vernacular programming. Similarly, U.S. private sector broadcasters currently lack the area expertise and the experience in cross-cultural communications required to communicate with foreign audiences.

Because of our history and because of what we are, emerging democracies look to the U.S. for guidance on democracy-building. Through programming on topics related to democratic political institutions, rule of law, and free enterprise, we can help build foundations that enable fledgling democracies to stabilize and survive. Broadcasting reaches millions of people in government and the private sector with this vital information. Democracy-building is a vital mission of U.S. Government international broadcasting, made more important than ever by the worldwide trend toward political and economic liberalization. Democracy-building is an intrinsic part of the VOA charter, which specifies that "VOA will....present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions." We recommend that the proposed NSD, in elaborating principles for international broadcasting, emphasize that democracy-building should be a priority function of all USG broadcasting activities, television as well as radio.

Some have questioned whether U.S. Government broadcasting should either become a private sector enterprise or should carry advertising to defray costs. In order to remain responsive to U.S. policies and to be removed from commercial competition, it should remain a U.S. Government preserve. As an instrument of an activist foreign policy, USG international broadcasting assets should be an integral part of the overall foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus. We recommend that **USG international broadcasting remain under the authority of the Executive branch.** The current organization, with USIA/TV and VOA as elements of USIA, the agency responsible for overall USG public diplomacy, and with RFE/RL operated separately under BIB, should be retained for the time being. The advertising question should be considered separately.

In order to carry out its missions most effectively within a budget not expected to increase in real terms and to have a clear, single voice, **at a future point, the U.S. Government should have only one broadcast entity, reached by evolutionary stages.** This is addressed further in the section on consolidation/reorientation and is listed as a principle of broadcasting below.

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In today's global environment, considering the impact of continuing political, economic, and technological change, **U.S. Government international broadcasting should carry out the missions described above in accordance with the following principles as guidelines**, some of which are described in more detail later in this review document.

1. The U.S. Government should maintain a global radio and television broadcasting capability, broadcasting to leaders, elites, and general populations in all geographic areas to serve and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.
2. U.S. Government international broadcasting should be directly connected to the U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus. It should remain under the authority of the Executive branch.
3. In order to keep U.S. Government broadcasting competitive, all U.S. Government broadcasting assets should be coordinated to the fullest extent possible, keeping in mind current differences in the missions of VOA and USIA/TV, on the one hand, and RFE/RL, on the other. Especially in allocation of technical resources and programming, redundancy should be avoided.
4. To be more effective and to better utilize resources, at a future point, the U.S. Government should have only one broadcast entity.
5. Recognizing budgetary constraints, broadcasting priorities should reflect overall U.S. foreign policy priorities in determining which areas should be covered most heavily, and which languages should receive priority. The U.S. should broadcast in the vernacular languages of the receiving countries, as well as in English.
6. Given the current international political environment, it is especially important that U.S. Government broadcasting further the process of democracy-building by describing democratic institutions and practices, and otherwise assisting political and economic liberalization.
7. U.S. Government broadcasting should not conflict with the growth of U.S. private sector telecommunications and broadcasting enterprises in the international arena. Where possible, U.S. Government broadcasting activities should help private sector enterprises to become established in foreign markets.
8. In order to compete in an increasingly sophisticated international media environment, the U.S. Government must frequently reevaluate its broadcasting technology and programming

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on the basis of audience survey research to ensure the most effective technical means of delivery and mix of programming for reaching the greatest number of priority audiences.

9. U.S. Government international broadcasting should actively and directly support non-traditional U.S. foreign policy priorities, such as the war on drugs, the fight against terrorism and efforts to improve the global environment.

Agencies recommend that the President issue a National Security Directive reaffirming the continued need for a global broadcasting capability to advance U.S. foreign policy worldwide and the missions of USG broadcasting and elaborating the above principles to guide its activities.

Capability/Current Programming

The Voice of America broadcasts today a total of 1200 hours per week in 43 languages on shortwave and medium wave (AM) transmitters. The estimated audience is 127 million. The coverage is global though inadequate in some regions, such as Africa. Modernization programs (discussed below) are intended to strengthen our ability to reach all populations by radio.

VOA programming has long been news and cultural information items. With the acceleration of varying degrees of democratic change and the spread of freer media, VOA broadcasts to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have increasingly stressed practical democracy-building programs about democratic institutions and free market structures. Specific "how to" series have been developed to explain the Western political, economic and social experience to emerging democracies. VOA has developed cooperative arrangements with Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak radio services which carry U.S. programming over local systems. These cooperative arrangements also help to introduce Eastern European broadcasters to the methods and standards of Western media. VOA has also opened news bureaus in Warsaw and Prague and has correspondents or stringers in Moscow and throughout Eastern Europe and the Baltics. VOA has served some functions of surrogate programming, e.g., targeting broadcasts of local news and information to people where free flow of information is denied. Radio Marti, broadcasting 24 hours a day to Cuba, but now being jammed, is a very popular station and funnel for information about world developments and Cuba.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcast 1132 hours per week in 23 languages as full surrogate radio stations to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. An additional service is Radio Free Afghanistan. Broadcasting in the vernacular, RFE/RL operates "home" radio services for countries which lack their own free

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media. Though funded by the U.S. through the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), RFE/RL is not a U.S. Government radio station but an independent corporation based in Munich. As expressed in the 1987 professional code, "The essence of RFE/RL's mission is the practice of independent, professional, and responsible broadcast journalism in order to provide uncensored news, information, and ideas to audiences whose governments systematically deny fundamental freedoms of communication and contact." RFE/RL does not represent the U.S. Government but rather the people of the target country. Though RFE/RL is not legally part of the U.S. Government structure, it performs a role in support of U.S. foreign policy.

RFE/RL programming has changed in countries experiencing democratic change just as has VOA's programming, with more emphasis on democracy-building. RFE has opened bureaus in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw and has stringers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

USIA TV, called Worldnet, was established in 1983. Worldnet international satellite television service gives USIA the ability to transmit timely video information and official U.S. views about breaking news events. USIA/TV's efforts are largely devoted to satellite delivery of up-to-date news, policy statements, and current events analysis about the United States, as well as cultural and documentary programs, for placement on local broadcast stations overseas. Programs delivered via Worldnet are now a regular feature on television in many countries around the world.

Worldnet programming is a combination of USIA-produced news and teleconferencing programs and selections on public affairs, culture, and science from American private sector television. The substance is in line with other VOA programming and with RFE/RL in the democracy-building area. Much of Worldnet programming is in English, but daily clips on news, current events, and Administration policy are produced in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic.

Worldnet is received at 200 U.S. embassies and facilities overseas, from which it is recorded and provided to local stations. This is a treasured service in some parts of the world, but audiences are quite limited unless placement takes place. Where satellite dishes are located on television stations in host countries, including the USSR, Worldnet programs can be received directly. Due to budget constraints, this is a fledgling effort, but one which holds promise.

Like Radio Marti, TV Marti is a part of VOA and an effort to expand upon the success of Radio Marti in providing information

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to the Cuban population. TV Marti is in a test stage, and policy concerning its future is being handled by the Latin America PCC.

Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin is a joint U.S.-German radio and TV operation charged with providing uncensored and unbiased information about the U.S., the FRG and events inside East Germany to East Berlin and to the large part of East Germany which can receive its signals. With German unification, the legal status and mission of RIAS -- organized under occupation law to broadcast to Communist East Germany -- must change. Although legally controlled by USIA, RIAS is now managed and directed by a German general manager and receives most of its funding, 97 percent from the FRG government. The USG has little influence over its management or programming, which is a mix of news, entertainment, and public affairs. Surveys show high listenership, with RIAS the "favorite station" of 54 percent of East Germans and 46 percent of Berliners.

Additionally, DOD is capable of complementing or augmenting other USG international broadcasting operations in some circumstances. If spare transmitters are available, DOD can provide relief during consolidation of USG broadcasting assets through the use of loaned 50K AM radio transmitters. In addition, should a shortfall in equipment availability warrant their call, DOD also possesses limited radius air transportable mobile radio and TV. Should VOA be required to reasonably broaden its broadcasting requirements, particularly in the third world, these DOD assets could again provide valuable relief. The transmission equipment can be moved quickly to the needed site and can begin operation upon arrival using DOD operators, or could fully support station management and operation by VOA employees. While not a permanent fix for potential equipment shortages, DOD assets have provided valuable relief for VOA operations in the third world in the past and should not be excluded in any comprehensive review of overall USG broadcasting activities and capabilities.

In addition, DOD operates the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), which broadcasts in English to American forces in 123 countries worldwide. AFRTS is not covered by this review, which focuses on U.S. Government broadcasting to foreign audiences, not American citizens. AFRTS does represent significant global broadcasting capability, however, by radio and television satellites. The signal is rebroadcasts to concentrations of U.S. forces, but it can be received by local populations in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Berlin Tokyo (radio only), Panama, Madrid (radio only), Cuba (radio only), and South Korea. While recognizing that AFRTS is limited by Status of Forces agreements and law, the PCC for International Broadcasting, in which DOD will participate, should consider, as it develops

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regional strategies, how the AFRTS byproduct of local reception contributes to transmitting the American message overseas.

Surrogate Broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

Though the requirement for surrogate broadcasting via RFE/RL to at least some Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union likely will continue into the next century, the extent and shape of that requirement is already changing. The USG should be prepared to manage the change. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were created and funded by the U.S. Government (through BIB since 1973) to provide the specific service of surrogate broadcasting. **When the need ends for surrogate broadcasting, country by country as freedom spreads, this vital mission -- accomplished highly successfully -- will have been fulfilled and the service should be phased out.**

The decision whether a particular surrogate service has completed its mission should be based on specific criteria. The U.S. Government could end support for surrogate broadcasting to a particular Eastern European country when:

- Free indigenous media are protected by law and established in practice in that country to provide consistent, objective news and discussion, unfettered by government censorship, about domestic and international affairs.
- The free flow of information into and out of the country is established so that people have access to Western media as well as their own.
- No one party enjoys a monopoly or overwhelming dominance of information media. Individuals and diverse political interests have access to media to disseminate their points of view.
- Journalists have access to information sources and the freedom to report undeterred by government control or restrictions.

Although, in theory, free media might exist in a non-democratic society, in practice, RFE surrogate broadcasting will become unnecessary only as a target country makes progress toward political pluralism, based on free and fair elections and the end to the monopoly of the Communist Party. Until the above criteria are met, RFE credibility creates a reality check for those listening now to local stations.

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If current trends toward democracy continue, RFE broadcasts to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland could phase out within a few years. Each of those countries has made significant progress toward democracy, including toward free elections and democratically elected parliaments. Each is developing, at its own pace, free indigenous media, and access to western media is increasing. While the traditions and infrastructure of free media are not yet established, legal and political constraint have for the most part been removed. RFE services to Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic Republics will remain relevant longer. RL to the Soviet Union will remain important for a decade and more.

The course of reform in Eastern Europe could be slowed and, in some cases, even reversed. RFE programming should not be ended precipitately to any country, but it can be phased down where appropriate, i.e., where change is occurring. The first step in phasing down RFE would be to eliminate repeat programming in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, once it is determined that such programming is no longer essential for fulfilling the mission of RFE. The timing would be determined by the new PCC on International Broadcasting after consultation through the State Department with embassies in the countries involved. RFE audience researchers believe that most listeners would be retained, as cuts would be in repeat broadcasts transmitted during periods of low listenership. Repeat broadcasts were important when RFE and VOA were being jammed but are unnecessary now that jamming has ceased. Overall U.S. coverage in these three countries would still be heavy. **Savings from the RFE cutback**, as well as from any other recommendations in this review that result in savings, **should remain within the broadcasting account.**

Cessation of RFE services should not be presented as withdrawal but rather as affirmation of the progress made in establishing democracy in Eastern European countries. Phasing out and cessation should be coordinated with overall U.S. policy toward the individual countries involved. **The PCC on Eastern Europe should recommend when each RFE broadcasting service should phase down**, with BIB attending the relevant meetings. **The new PCC, described below, should coordinate the best use of technical and other broadcasting facilities during the transition to fewer surrogate services.**

While the broadcasts of RFE/RL may someday be unneeded, the research operations, firmly established in Munich, will remain important. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty research departments form the largest center in the West for the analytical study of contemporary Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Indeed, as the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet

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Union become progressively integrated into the West, there will be an even greater need for timely and comprehensive political, economic, and social analyses. Also, journalists and scholars from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will find the rich archival resources of RFE/RL indispensable for their own work. **The RFE/RL research service should continue.** Its location in Munich will facilitate travel, contacts, and monitoring of East European and Soviet media. This research center can be operated either as a U.S. institute or as a joint U.S.-German organization. The latter arrangement may prove to be a good way of maintaining close and cooperative U.S.-German relations at a time of diminishing U.S. presence in Europe.

The name "Radio Free Europe, RFE" and the credibility it has built up over 40 years are of significant value to both the U.S. and the fledgling democratic governments which were once the opposition. As the mission for U.S.-sponsored surrogate services ends, it is possible that the name, frequency, and some facilities of RFE Poland, Hungary, etc. could be turned over to local broadcasters -- with government agreement -- to continue broadcasting as a home service. This type of option should be explored further by the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting.

Redundancy/Consolidation

To make the most of limited resources, **the U.S. should begin to consolidate its broadcasting operations**, eliminate redundancy, and increase flexibility in managing assets during an extended period of international change **with the goal of moving to a single broadcasting entity.**

For the single broadcasting entity, we recommend neither a timetable nor an appropriate organization. There are several models, such as an entity within USIA or State, a separate USG entity, or an organization like the BBC, which is autonomous on content, but is funded by the British government and given Foreign Office guidance on languages and apportionment of time to each. We believe that an independent commission or group outside the government bureaucracy should recommend the best organization.

What is envisioned is a process of steps -- over time as appropriate under international political and other conditions -- to pull the broadcasting elements and assets closer together until there is only one. This is not a submerging of one in the other. For example, the first step is closer coordination of equipment use, such as joint use of some transmitters. We envision that for some time programming would be distinctly separate and clearly identified as Radio Free Poland and VOA

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Poland, for example. Over time, some current RFE country services would phase out. We expect that Radio Liberty would continue to broadcast for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, and this might be while Radio Liberty was still broadcasting, there would be a single agency with a new name, coordinating all the assets and the budget but most likely with distinct services -- such as Radio Marti, Radio Liberty -- under it.

At this time, RFE/RL and VOA compete with each other for listeners, and the distinctions in programming are blurring as democracy-building content increases. As surrogate broadcasting decreases and as programming of VOA and RFE/RL becomes more alike, their assets should be rationalized, ie, the transmitting assets should be viewed as a common pot to be used most effectively. As an overall coordinated broadcasting strategy is designed, it will be possible to distinguish where redundancy causes ineffectiveness or waste and where redundancy is necessary in order to meet U.S. objectives. Rationalization of assets cannot be accomplished overnight, but it is a goal that should be a factor in decisions about budgets.

USIA radio and television operations are currently separated. But as television becomes an increasingly more important part of USG and world broadcasting, it is logical that USIA radio and TV should eventually merge. The 9 to 1 ratio of budget support of VOA over USIA/TV will necessarily shift as the USG seeks to reach audiences in increasingly sophisticated and competitive media environments. (If BIB budget is considered, the imbalance is even more dramatic, with radio over television 20 to 1.) If all of USIA's broadcasting assets were managed together rather than as separate and competing entities, flexibility would be increased and more creative opportunities for reaching audiences would result. It would be more likely that the media mix and the message USIA broadcasts for USG to each country would be more efficiently and effectively delivered.

Thus, we recommend that USIA coordinate VOA and USIA/TV planning and programming activities more closely in order to better match the most effective medium to specific media conditions abroad. Television is not as far-reaching or flexible yet as shortwave radio, but it should be recognized, for developed areas of the world, as an important direction for USG broadcasting. Greater emphasis should be placed on developing the potential of USIA/TV, including in the selective use of Direct Broadcast by Satellite (DBS) technology, in Western Europe, Japan and, eventually, Eastern Europe, in consonance with opportunities to reach larger priority audiences. **Providing satellite dishes to local television stations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere so USIA/TV can be received should be pursued and should be a priority for an increase in the USIA/TV budget.**

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Consolidation and reorientation efforts responding to change in Eastern Europe and, to some extent, the Soviet Union also permit a modest downsizing of the current Israel relay station project. This is discussed below.

Israel Relay Station

The Israel relay station is a joint BIB-USIA project which will increase VOA and RFE/RL audibility and, therefore, listenership, in vast areas presently served only by weak signals, including all of Soviet Central Asia, India, Pakistan, East Africa, West Central Africa, and Eastern Europe. Major construction on the project will commence once the Israeli National Planning Committee approves the environmental plan; completion is expected in 1993.

Because its central location provides favorable signal paths to three continents, the **Israel station** will be a vital asset regardless of any political change. Nevertheless, in view of urgent budget requirements elsewhere in U.S. international broadcasting and in light of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the planned size and scope of the station can be downscaled by roughly 10 percent. **The project should be reduced in budget by \$24 million, with the bulk of the cuts taken from transmitters and antennae intended for use in Eastern Europe.** BIB and VOA should jointly work out the exact distribution of the cuts, subject to approval by NSC and OMB. Scaling back, as outlined here, will not impair our ability to reach key audiences effectively. The remaining transmitters and antennae in the project should be operated and programmed jointly. VOA and BIB also should share broadcasting capability to Eastern Europe on BIB assets other than Israel, beginning in 1993 after phase-out of certain other current VOA transmitters. The sharing should be possible in light of probable cutback or phase-out of U.S.-sponsored RFE services to Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as reduced need for shortwave broadcasting as shortwave listenership continues to decline and we reach audiences through other media means.

VOA and BIB engineers should be directed to develop a working plan immediately to scale down the Israel project by \$24 million. Coverage capability of the Israel project for Soviet Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia is reaffirmed. We recommend, however, a policy of flexibility in the use of project assets, and we endorse enhancing VOA and RFE/RL cooperation and common use of project capabilities. As RFE and later, hopefully, RL services phase out, it will be important to increasingly coordinate and rationalize with VOA the programming and use of RFE/RL assets in Israel and elsewhere.

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Budget savings of \$24 million (out of the \$290 million total cost) from the directed scaling down of the project from 16 transmitters to 13 to 14 should be used to improve VOA coverage to other important areas currently underserved or for other priorities in international broadcasting discussed below.

Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin

With German unification, the status of RIAS must change. With German unification, a broadcasting capability in Berlin and Eastern Germany could contribute to sustaining an American presence and influence in the center of Europe, as our military presence diminishes, as well as providing information on the evolving role of NATO.

Because the U.S. pays only 3 percent of the bill, the Germans with their 97 percent funding control the management and programming. If RIAS is to serve as an American broadcasting asset in Europe, active American participation in the station's programming and decision-making will have to be increased and assured. Enhanced American influence would probably require increasing the USG contribution to RIAS. USIA is not prepared to increase its annual contribution above this current \$3 million level. On the other hand, the U.S. does hold considerable capital investment in land and equipment, as well as other resources which might be used to increase the USG contribution without increased funding.

Through Embassy Bonn, we have informed the German government that we would like to continue U.S. participation in RIAS if an agreeable formula can be reached. The Germans will probably inform us of their position by late June. If they seek continued USG involvement, we will seek to negotiate terms bilaterally, not as part of the two-plus-four process. If they decide to terminate USG involvement, we should try to negotiate some arrangement that will allow us to continue to reach these populations.

VOA Europe

As World War II recedes, and as we enter a new age in Europe, we must continue the VOA Europe effort to reach the successor generations in Western Europe -- those who are not familiar with U.S. values and our role during and after World War II. Knowledge of this background can result in greater respect for the U.S. and ultimately our leadership and policies.

VOA Europe is a system of cooperative arrangements with Western European stations, with 24 hour-a-day coverage interspersed with

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advertising by the broadcasting stations. Program content is intended to tell the post-World War II generations about America, including news and economics, but at this point well over half of every hour is rock music designed to draw in the young listeners.

We recommend that VOA Europe increase its economic, business, and political programming to diversify and increase its audience to include more businessmen and a more sophisticated and politically-aware and influential audience. Programming should be created for several age groups. The youth programming could be positive demonstrations of U.S. values, in a teen context, e.g., anti-drug, youth sports, United Nations, exciting volunteerism. The rock music content would be decreased, keeping in mind the need to provide programming attractive to the intended audience. The VOA Europe programs would be appropriate for Eastern Europe, too.

The enhanced program content should be drawn from or draw on other VOA and commercial U.S. programs in an effort to avoid budget increases. Placement should be sought on both radio and television, and placement could be broadened beyond the stations now used, creating scheduled spots that may draw more listenership than the current disappointing 2-6 percent. Careful research will be required to create programming that meets the goals of VOA Europe. It may be necessary to do some programming in the European languages.

Surrogate Programming Broadcasting Beyond Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union:

Although surrogate broadcasting is most often and clearly associated with RFE/RL in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the U.S. Government through VOA provides important elements of the surrogate services to other parts of the world as well. During the 1989 democracy demonstrations in China, VOA's Chinese Service increased its coverage and became the major source of news for the Chinese people about events in China and about U.S. and world reaction. VOA broadcasts to such closed societies as Iran, Libya, Burma, Ethiopia and North Korea make available to the people of those countries a source of information and news alternative to the official line. This need continues.

VOA does not operate purely as a surrogate radio station. It represents the U.S. Government and the American people, not the people of the targeted country. But, VOA does cover significant events in the target countries and reports news of those events back to targeted audiences. VOA increases or decreases such targeted coverage as events and U.S. policy priorities warrant.

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The continuing need for some kind of surrogate or targeted programming in various parts of the world underscores a unique quality of shortwave technology. For reaching into politically-denied areas, shortwave is usually the only technology available to foreign broadcasters. This capability to transcend national borders and reach important audiences directly is one of the main reasons shortwave will remain an essential element of U.S. Government broadcasting far into the future.

Due to budgeting and the fact that VOA can and does provide targeted programming to denied populations, **at this time, the U.S. Government should not establish specific independent surrogate stations, equivalent to RFE/RL, in other parts of the world.** Where necessary, VOA can provide the essential elements of surrogate programming to these areas. Where the need increases, additional programming can most effectively take place within existing VOA structure and capabilities. **Specifically, VOA should increase surrogate programming to denied/totalitarian countries, e.g., of Southeast Asia, China (including the new Tibetan service), Albania, Iran, and Libya.**

Policy Coordination

Political changes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and changes in broadcasting technology in the coming decade will require continual coordination among relevant agencies to ensure maximum efficiency in USG international radio and television assets in support of our foreign policy objectives.

A new PCC on International Broadcasting should be established, charged with three primary responsibilities.

First, the PCC should develop and coordinate long-term strategy for USG broadcasting capability by region within five months, including priorities among languages, countries and regions for broadcasts. PCC considerations in this regard should be based upon policy priorities established by the Department of State and the NSC.

Second, the PCC should manage the transitions in USG broadcasting posited in this review, including coordination among VOA (with Radio and TV Marti), USIA/TV, and RFE/RL to eliminate overlap in technical and program resources. As a first order of business, the PCC should oversee from a policy perspective rationalization of USG assets broadcasting to Eastern Europe.

Third, the new PCC will provide a useful forum for enhancing dialogue between policymakers and broadcasters. At a time of sensitivity such as this, for example, in the Soviet Union it is critical that USG broadcasts accurately reflect U.S. policy in

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substance and nuance. It would be counterproductive if U.S. broadcasting inadvertently encouraged situations counter to our interests and current policies. Without dictating to broadcasters, NSC and State should provide policy guidance on U.S. policies. Over time it will be apparent whether this is most effectively done through the PCC or through increased informal contacts.

"Editorials" have been a feature of VOA broadcasts as a means of explaining U.S. policy. Some argue that these editorials take a toll on the station's credibility, as they are clearly U.S. government material and not an independent view. As editorials must be timely, it has been difficult to have them appropriately coordinated and occasionally problems have arisen. Statements representing the official views of the USG must be fully coordinated with the policy-making and policy guidance apparatus in order to assure the accuracy of their representation in fact and nuance. If the news and features, including interviews with policy officials and excerpts from Presidential speeches and press conferences, are comprehensive in their coverage of priority issues, the policy editorials may be unnecessary.

We recommend that the practice and coordination of VOA editorials be reviewed by the PCC on International Broadcasting.

Response to Change in Delivery Means

Along with political change, technological advances require constant reevaluation of the technologies used by USG international broadcasting if it is to remain competitive.

Historically, the USG has relied most heavily on shortwave to reach foreign audiences. Shortwave remains the dominant transmission method for international radio today and its dominance is likely to continue in much of the world for the foreseeable future. At the same time, USIA is developing alternatives to shortwave in both radio and television programming. The next decade and more will see a shifting mix of shortwave and medium wave radio, FM, satellite, television broadcasting and, increasingly, placement and cooperative networking arrangements between USG and foreign broadcasters and cable companies.

Shortwave will remain important especially in Africa, in South and Southeast Asia and in the Soviet Union, where domestic broadcasters use shortwave to reach far-flung audiences. The USG also needs to maintain a shortwave capability which can be turned on in times of crisis, when areas once open might suddenly close.

In Western Europe and, increasingly, Latin America, where indigenous media and other technologies offer superior signal quality, shortwave has given way to alternative means of program delivery. There is evidence that shortwave listenership is already falling substantially in some Eastern European countries. In areas where shortwave cannot compete, USG radio broadcasters rely extensively on cooperative arrangements to place programming on local stations and networks. Such arrangements will become increasingly common in the future for both radio and television, and US broadcasting should actively seek to expand such arrangements.

USIA/TV is becoming better established through cooperative arrangements which feed programming via satellite directly to foreign television broadcasters for rebroadcast. USIA/TV also employs direct broadcasting to television receiving dishes around the world for "interactive" interviews between policymakers and experts in the U.S. and journalists abroad. The interactive is the primary vehicle for taking U.S. policy positions to foreign television audiences. USIA's global satellite and TVRO system also provides foreign broadcasters in Eastern Europe and elsewhere with coverage of state visits and other policy related events in the U.S. of particular interest to their national audiences.

The proliferation of satellite-fed cable systems, hook-ups and private conventional terrestrial broadcast stations offers USG international television broadcasting an ever-increasing number of outlets, which can be reached at a sustainable funding level, for programming in foreign societies. Under current budget conditions, USIA's TV strategy foresees concentrating on arrangements necessary to exploit this resource. If more funding became available, however, USIA/TV could take fuller advantage of the possibilities for functional Direct Broadcast by Satellite (DBS) technology, first in Europe, later Japan. For example, for \$5-8 million, USIA/TV could acquire necessary satellite capability (via the Astra satellite currently over Europe or the new generation Eutelsat) for a full eight-hour cable program schedule and substantial promotion effort to tap the priority European market. **The PCC on International Broadcasting should examine the European media environment and make recommendations for the potential of increased television programming within the overall USG broadcasting strategy.**

USIA is also actively pursuing other technologies of increasing sophistication. Of particular note is the use of hybrid technology to send radio signals via satellite and television receiving dishes to cooperating radio stations around the world. This kind of "joint venture," which uses in-place technology and facilities, is promising. To overcome Chinese jamming of

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shortwave during the 1989 democracy demonstrations, VOA and USIA/TV sent VOA's radio signal into China via direct satellite link to TV receiving dishes at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and elsewhere around the country. Although such dishes are rare in China and usually controlled by the Chinese government or military, the radio-TV hook-up underscored the U.S. commitment to the free flow of information to the Chinese people.

For USG broadcasting overall, the best strategy is to organize assets to achieve the greatest coordination and flexibility, so that it can respond in the most effective way to varying media conditions in different parts of the world, including emphasis on creative arrangements to place radio and television pieces.

New Technology

USIA is monitoring and, in some cases, encouraging developments in other advanced broadcasting technologies. Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) technology exists today for sending radio signals straight to foreign audiences without going through local control points. However, DBS radio is unlikely to become a significant factor in international radio broadcasting in the near term because appropriate UHF frequencies are not available and no marketable DBS receiver is being produced. DBS cannot be received on shortwave or AM/FM receivers. A technical breakthrough or decision by a major country like India or Brazil to adopt DBS radio on a nationwide basis could change that prospect. But DBS radio is a least fifteen years away, if it comes at all. If it does develop, it will do so unevenly in different parts of the world depending on local media environments. It is not possible to predict how or whether this will happen.

DBS TV is in operation in Europe and Japan, not broadcasting into individual home receivers but indirectly through cable and other intermediary systems. As noted above, USIA/TV exploits this technology through placement of programs; with a budget increase, USIA/TV could develop a regular schedule of programs to offer to these markets. Beyond Europe and Japan, we see little prospect that DBS TV will become a reality within the next two decades.

No major technical breakthrough is likely to transform international broadcasting in the next ten to fifteen years. The global media environment will change incrementally as existing technologies and variations like cable and small-area systems spread into new areas. Flexibility will be the key to effectiveness in such a situation.

The question of technology and being able to compete should be constantly reviewed by the new PCC. The State Department's

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International Communications and Information Policy Bureau, in close consultation with Commerce, USIA, NSC, and other interested agencies should make recommendations when necessary regarding new technologies affecting the future of international broadcasting and continue with its special responsibility on spectrum allocation, including U.S. participation in the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1992. The bipartisan commission recommended later in this review to consider the public diplomacy context and the specific organizational structure of USG international broadcasting should also consider the implications of technological developments for international broadcasting.

USG and Commercial Broadcasting

The issue of USG international broadcasting is closely related, at times confused with, private sector interest in potential foreign telecommunications and broadcasting markets, particularly in Eastern Europe. Especially in television, as opposed to radio, both sectors are only now developing international programs. USG and the private sector share an interest in managing frequencies and otherwise keeping foreign broadcast areas open for U.S. involvement.

In some cases, USIA/TV can and should facilitate entry of U.S. commercial broadcasters into foreign areas. USIA/TV currently provides top quality, privately-produced programs, for example, "The MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour," "Adam Smith's Money World" and the science series "Innovation," to foreign broadcasters on a trial bases. Such syndication arrangements should prove most useful in less-developed countries, which in media terms now includes Eastern Europe. Eventually, U.S. private sector television companies will establish their own connections, and the USG will phase out its facilitative assistance. Even then, however, USG television, like radio, will have a special role not covered by the private sector in providing policy-related materials, such as full news conferences, interviews and speeches, as well as pertinent public affairs programs on issues which commercial broadcasters would not cover.

Finally, the U.S. private sector is especially interested in the potential market in Eastern Europe for telecommunications equipment and systems such as telephone and data processing networks. This areas is beyond the scope of this review but is being studied by several government agencies and in the private sector.

Modernization

The Administration has approved a VOA and BIB modernization plan, which is a streamlined and affordable version of an earlier, more ambitious proposal. The plan calls for completing three high-priority new relay stations and placing emphasis on refurbishing existing ones to improve network coverage.

Key elements of the modernization are:

- Completion of new shortwave stations in Morocco, Thailand, and Israel and a medium wave station in Belize.
- Completion of the Satellite Interconnect System, which will link VOA studios with all of VOA's major shortwave and medium wave stations. This method of satellite delivery will provide much greater flexibility in delivering signals to relay stations and enhance the quality and reliability of the VOA delivery system.
- Refurbishment of the shortwave relay stations in Liberia, Ohio, and Sri Lanka and the medium wave relay station in Botswana.
- Upgrade of BIB's Portugal shortwave station.
- Maintenance and repairs to the entire system.

The modernization budget is reaffirmed, except that a scale back of the Israel project is recommended earlier in this review.

Budget

The international broadcasting budget is \$659 million (in budget authority) for Fiscal Year 1990, apportioned roughly at:

BIB	\$373.0 million
VOA	255.0
USIA/TV	<u>31.5</u>
	\$659.5 million

The FY 91 budget request is somewhat smaller at \$556.2 million, since the bulk of the Israel project is funded in FY 90.

Several of the recommendations in this review would save money. **We recommend that any savings remain within the broadcasting account, to be shifted to higher priority needs.** This applies to FY 90 or 91 savings, as well as savings in later years, such as from cessation of taxpayer support for RFE services. USG

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international broadcasting will continue to play an important role in US foreign policy. Reshaping the elements of the broadcasting budget by reallocation of resources within the account will strengthen the effectiveness of this tool in today's world.

Though large savings are not anticipated, we recommend as priorities to receive the savings by transfer to:

- the VOA budget to meet its deficit;
- to the Worldnet budget for expanding its ability to transmit to and place programming on Western and Eastern European stations;
- some expansion of VOA programming to priority populations now not well reached;
- increased audience research; and
- improved, basic maintenance of the current VOA shortwave system to reduce the need for major refurbishment in the next decade.

Any significant reallocation of funding must be approved by Congress, which often has its own priorities for USG broadcasting, including demands for new language services. Any shifts in resources or strategy for USG broadcasting must, therefore, be accompanied by close consultation with appropriate Congressional interests.

Bipartisan Commission on International Broadcasting

In order to examine several issues beyond the point of this document, we recommend establishment of a bipartisan commission, as also recommended by Chairman Dante Fascell of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Though this review covers policy and sets up mechanisms for management of broadcasting through an era of change, it does not address longer-term issues, such as the appropriate organization for the recommended single broadcast entity and approaches to new technology. It is appropriate that an independent commission or group, rather than an interagency group, examine and make recommendations on these issues. An independent, bipartisan commission or group should be able to consider U.S. Government international broadcasting in a historic context and in the overall context of US public diplomacy.

We recommend that the commission be mandated to review and make recommendations to the President within six months of its

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establishment on the following issues in the overall context of U.S. public diplomacy:

- a. Organization and structure of U.S. Government broadcasting activities: What is the most appropriate organizational structure under which eventually all USG international broadcasting would be combined into a single entity? When and how should this occur?
- b. New technologies in light of the need for U.S. Government broadcasting to remain effective and competitive. This should include strategies for the best use of U.S. funding for new technologies.
- c. The role of U.S. Government broadcasting in a changing environment in which a variety of information delivery means is becoming available. How can the U.S. Government deliver its message most effectively and assure continuing access to target populations?

The commission should be appointed quickly and should be as informal as possible without sacrificing influence.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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20702

June 12, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR.

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE ^{NBD}

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on USG International
Broadcasting, Friday, June 15, 3:00-4:00 p.m.,
Situation Room

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum, notifying invited agencies of the subject DC meeting and transmitting an agenda as well as the NSR paper.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab	I	Memorandum to Agencies
Tab	A	Agenda
Tab	B	NSR-24 Executive Summary
Tab	C	NSR-24

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 11/30/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020702
RECEIVED: 11 JUN 90 09

TO: GATES

FROM: MILLER

DOC DATE: 14 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BROADCASTING
SOC
AGENDA

NSR
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR 15 JUN DC MTG ON INTL BROADCASTING W/ NSR 24
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STUDY RESPONSE / TERMS OF REFERENCE

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 14 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF: 9020749 9020752

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC141

NSR0024

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 11/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9020702

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 11/30/09

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National Security Council The White House

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Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

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Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

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A = Action

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D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

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Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Re Mtg on June 15 at 3:00pm
(Intel Broadcasting)

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec See office has diskette

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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20702 Add-on

June 14, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR. *DM*

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE *NBD*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on International
Broadcasting, June 15, 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.,
Situation Room



In response to the NSR-24 tasker on US Government International Broadcasting, an interagency group chaired by David Miller and a working group chaired by me have produced the Executive Summary (Tab II) and the longer NSR-24 paper (Tab III) for consideration by the Deputies Committee. Agencies who participated are State, USIA, Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), DOD, JCS (barely), CIA, and NSC.

The review efforts focused on the mission and future role of US Government broadcasting, as mandated by the NSR. The main effort was to define whether and why and where we need US-sponsored broadcasting, recommend how to proceed through a time of world political and technical change, and set up mechanisms for managing the transition. We recommend a Presidential NSD to reaffirm the missions and set out guidelines and internal procedures for managing change. Then, a Presidential commission or task force, working on that foundation would tackle the bureaucratically-difficult question of the best way to organize, specifically: when and how to move to a single broadcast entity.

The interagency group agrees on most issues and the direction this review takes us. Your talking points (Tab I) outline points of apparent agreement and issues for discussion. The primary issues for discussion will be the chairmanship of the PCC and what to do about a commission.

We strongly believe that a PCC on International Broadcasting is necessary, as the broadcasting issues will continue to be important and there must be a mechanism for managing phasing down of Radio Free Europe as appropriate and for consolidation. State would like to chair it. USIA, BIB, and OMB prefer NSC, though OMB may accept joint State-NSC chairmanship. We prefer joint State-NSC chairmanship, as State has finally designated a point

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of contact on public diplomacy (Gerry Helman) and has an obvious interest in management of these foreign policy assets in overall strategies. In fact, State's feet should be held to the fire to take more leadership on these issues. Co-chairmanship with NSC makes sense for holding feet to the fire and to bring a neutral player into the lead. Our chairmanship of the review was necessary and effective in getting as far as we have come on these quite controversial issues.

It is possible that Cary Lord will raise the question of how much the Administration should decide and how much should be left for a follow-on independent commission or task force. We strongly believe that the President asked in the NSR for a policy review and recommendations and this is properly to be done by the Administration. Congress has an interest in this too, which is another reason to make decisions ourselves. Congress will gladly legislate it, a point worth making in the meeting. The Interagency Group recommendation is to ask an independent group to answer questions of organizational structure and technology, beginning on the foundation of missions, guidelines, and other policy decisions about how USG international broadcasting should proceed. This commission -- or preferably, task force -- should be informal but still Presidentially appointed, with a tight terms of reference (draft at Tab IV) and an end date. It would be constituted under the same law as the Pan Am 103 commission but could be called a task force. It would have to be sponsored for space and funding by an agency; we recommend State.

Do we even need a commission? Yes, to solve the knotty and bureaucratically-difficult issue of where USG broadcasting should lodge. The options, as mentioned in the paper, are: at USIA, at State, or as an independent agency with US funding and guidance from the foreign policy apparatus. Naturally, USIA wants it to remain as part of USIA, feeling that the rationale for USIA disappears if broadcasting is not part of it. BIB would probably like to see an independent organization much like the BBC, with an autonomous board like BIB's board. Historically, there have been at least two independent commissions that made major contributions on these issues. In fact, one led to the creation of BIB and a way out of the dilemma of leadership for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty after the CIA cover was blown. With high-quality, experienced members on the commission and specific guidelines, we believe a reasonable recommendation would be made. Even if the recommendation ran counter to judgments within the government, the safety valve is that the NSC apparatus and the President will have the final decision.

Strategy for meeting: We have arranged for Bob Coonrod, Acting Director of Voice of America, to brief the Deputies on where our broadcasting reaches now and in 1993 and a bit on the

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terminology. You would introduce him right at the beginning. Then, we suggest you outline what the review has concluded, specifying points of agreement within the Interagency Group. Some of the Deputies may, of course, not agree. If you can then discuss and reach agreement on chairmanship of the PCC and the shape of a commission, you can task the NSD to be written.

FYI. The Executive Summary is designed to stand alone, but we recommend you read the longer paper too for the full background and supporting information.

Attachments

Tab I	Talking Points
Tab II	Executive Summary of NSR-24
Tab III	Longer NSR-24 Paper
Tab IV	Draft of Terms of Reference

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
ON U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

- In response to NSR 24, the Interagency Group has met several times and produced this paper for us on US Government international broadcasting.
- It will be important for us to move forward on these issues within the Executive branch, as tasked by the President because if we do not, Congress will. As you may know, members of Congress, including Dante Fascell, have shown much interest in this.
- Basically, the review paper reaffirms the need for a US Government global broadcasting capability to carry out US foreign policy objectives. (Note that first page erroneously points to "military" projection of US influence -- it is of course "non-military.")
- The interagency group believes changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union require continuing broadcasts there -- with provisions for phase out of surrogate broadcasting as certain conditions are met. The group was careful to not imprudently recommend giving up assets or capabilities that will be needed for our continued presence and influence during a period of transition -- and probably continued upheaval -- in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
- Nevertheless, the paper recommends eventually phasing out US taxpayer support for individual Radio Free Europe services,

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consolidation of assets, and eventually moving to a single broadcasting entity.

- o Phasing out taxpayer support implies, correctly, that Radio Free Europe services might continue in some fashion. One possibility mentioned in the paper is that the name and some assets be given to local broadcasters in the Eastern European countries. It would be appropriate for BIB to look into different possibilities.

- The phase down of Radio Free Europe and eventually, we hope, Radio Liberty would be managed by a new PCC on International Broadcasting, with recommendations by the appropriate regional PCCs.

- A Commission or preferably a Task Force is recommended to follow on to this review, especially to recommend the most appropriate future organizational structure for USG broadcasting and the timing and steps to reach it. We should discuss this more later in the meeting.

- A major emphasis of the interagency group, which may not be strong enough in the paper, is the need for US Government broadcasting to areas and populations now not well reached, such as Muslims. It is in our interest to increase the US global broadcasting capability.

- The paper reviews the missions of our broadcasting and reaffirms them as well as setting out principles to guide

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USG broadcasting over the next few years. These would go into a NSD.

-- We are in an era of change and transition both politically and technically, during which we must manage change in our international broadcasting to ensure its effectiveness.

-- The Interagency Group recommends establishment of a PCC on International Broadcasting to:

- o Manage the transition in US Government broadcasting contained in this review, including moving to greater coordination among broadcasting assets and programming.
- o Develop and coordinate long-term strategy for US Government broadcasting activities, including priorities among languages, countries and regions.
- o Provide a standing forum to increase dialogue among policymakers, USIA policy guidance staff and broadcasters, including VOA, USIA/TV and BIB, keeping in mind the need to maintain the credibility and autonomy of program content.
- o This paper does not include it, but the PCC might look at the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service assets (AFRTS). What do you think (JCS and DOD)?

-- My understanding is that the Interagency Group has agreed on the following: (Read, see if everyone agrees)

-- Need for USG global broadcasting capability under the authority of the Executive branch;

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-- A NSD should be issued on the mission and principles and other recommendations as appropriate.

*-- We need more broadcasting to underserved areas of South Asia, Middle East, Africa. Need better means of reaching Muslims and drug countries.

✓-- Consolidate assets where possible.

✓-- US broadcasting should move to a single entity, in steps and over time. No one objected in interagency meeting. Do all agree? Commission would recommend the organization.

✓-- Phase out US taxpayer support for RFE as criteria are met in individual countries. RFE assets may go to the East Europe countries. PCC on Europe recommend when RFE individual services phase out.

✓-- RFE eliminate repeat programming to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland once it is determined that such programming is no longer essential for fulfilling the RFE mission - in consultation with US embassies.

✓-- Keep RFE/RL research service

✓-- Establish PCC on International Broadcasting. Question remains of chairmanship.

✓-- Reduce Israel relay station by \$24 million. Thereafter, transmitters and antennae to be shared by BIB and VOA.

✓-- Increase political and economic content of VOA Europe

✓-- No new independent surrogate stations now but increase VOA targeted coverage to specific countries

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- ✓ -- More emphasis on television, as it becomes feasible to reach larger priority audiences
- ✓ -- USIA/TV and VOA to coordinate programming and planning
- ✓ -- PCC review "editorial" policy
- ✓ -- Any savings stay within broadcasting account. Paper includes best notional thoughts of Interagency Group on priorities.
- ✓ -- Reaffirm streamlined modernization plan
- ✓ -- Set up Presidential commission or task force to recommend best way and timing on moving to single entity; also technology. This will need more discussion.

REMAINING ISSUES

- ✓ -- Chairmanship of PCC. What are your suggestions?
- Type of commission or task force - how to keep it as informal as possible while still giving it some clout. I like the idea of calling it a Task Force.
 - o It would be established under the law that governs Presidential advisory commissions but could be fairly informal once it is established.
 - o It would have to be a new group with a beginning and end, not one of the existing advisory groups.
 - o It should have a well-defined mandate, beginning on the foundation of the work we do here. (Draft mandate at Tab IV, if you want to go into it. We will have copies.)

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- o It has to be supported by an agency with office space and budget. The law requires that it be funded by one agency -- cannot be divided among several.
- o Comments?

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June 12, 1990

NSR 24: U. S. Government International Broadcasting
Interagency Group Paper

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since during World War II, U.S. Government broadcasting has had an important role in achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals. With the passing of the Cold War, this role does not end. Rather, U.S. international broadcasting retains its importance during a time of transition and beyond in solidifying democratic gains and carrying U.S. presence and policies, buttressed by objective news and information, around the world. It is a military projection of U.S. influence that is more important than before, as ideas and economics begin to dominate the world scene.

The Eastern European political revolutions of 1989 testify to the power of communications and the success of Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. The political revolutions were accompanied and facilitated by a communications revolution which is opening up closed societies around the world and creating a potential global marketplace of information and ideas. Both revolutions require that U.S. Government international broadcasting be responsive to this competitive environment if it is to remain a useful and effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy. Although the impetus may come from Europe, this clearly is a global requirement.

NSR 24 recommends ways to manage USG broadcasting in a period of historic change, while reaffirming the necessity of a global broadcasting capability to help maintain active U.S. engagement worldwide. Given current budgetary constraints, we cannot expect major infusions of new funding to broadcasting. Within current funding levels, therefore, we must increase efficiency and clarify priorities to ensure that our broadcasting resources are used to best effect. We must do more with the same resources.

As directed by the President, agencies have examined the mission, activities and resources of U.S. Government international broadcasting, in particular the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), USIA/TV (Worldnet), and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin, in light of current political and technological developments. Agencies considered budgetary constraints under which all USG programs operate. We also noted the strong Congressional interest in reviewing the role of USG broadcasting in the context of developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

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Agencies reached five main conclusions, which concern 1) confirming the need for and the missions of USG international broadcasting and setting out principles, 2) a desirable consolidation and reorientation of broadcasting operations, including eventually moving to a single broadcasting entity, 3) improved coordination of broadcasting with overall foreign policy planning and objectives, including establishment of a new Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting, 4) budget, and 5) need for follow-on work by an independent bipartisan commission or group.

Mission Relevance: USG international broadcasting has four missions:

- to present and explain to foreign audiences USG policies and actions;
- to describe and explain American society, thought and institutions;
- to provide objective and reliable news, commentary and information about U.S. and international events;
- to provide surrogate programming where local governments curtail the free flow of information to their people, and where surrogate programming is in the U.S. interest.

Dramatic events of the past year in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and elsewhere **validate the need for these missions**. Though audiences in Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union have increasing access to free indigenous and Western media, the ability of the USG to reach these and other foreign audiences directly via broadcasting remains important to U.S. national security interests worldwide. **A U.S. global broadcasting capability remains a foreign policy necessity.**

The easing of East-West competition does not end the challenge to U.S. interests abroad or the need for active U.S. public diplomacy. If anything, our international challenges are becoming more complex and variable as dominating bipolar military concerns are balanced or replaced by multipolar economic, cultural, environmental and other transnational concerns at the center of international attention.

U.S. policy is not to retreat from this new world but to engage it. As long as we exercise international leadership, the U.S. Government will need the ability to take its positions and views directly to foreign societies in messages suited to their cultural perspectives and expressed in their languages. The

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spread of democracy and more open societies makes this ability more rather than less important.

U.S. Government broadcasting does not become obsolete when a society develops its own media or gains access to Western media sources. USG broadcasting has a particular mission in advancing U.S. national interests which commercial broadcasters do not share. Even when private sector broadcasters provide extensive news services, they follow commercial criteria in program selection and emphasis different from those followed by VOA and USIA/TV, which, by mandate, emphasize issues and events of concern to the U.S. Government. For example, through programming on topics related to democratic political institutions, rule of law, and free enterprise, we can help build foundations that enable fledgling democracies to stabilize and survive. Democracy-building is a vital mission of U.S. Government international broadcasting, made more important than ever by the worldwide trend toward political and economic liberalization.

To ensure that it effectively advances U.S. foreign policies, **USG international broadcasting should remain under the authority of the Executive branch foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus.**

Agencies recommend that the President issue a National Security Directive reaffirming the continued need for a global broadcasting capability to advance U.S. foreign policy worldwide and the missions of USG broadcasting and elaborating the following principles to guide its activities:

1. The U.S. Government should maintain a global radio and television broadcasting capability, broadcasting to leaders, elites, and general populations in all geographic areas to serve and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.
2. U.S. Government international broadcasting should be directly connected to the U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus. It should remain under the authority of the Executive branch.
3. In order to keep U.S. Government broadcasting competitive, all U.S. Government broadcasting assets should be coordinated to the fullest extent possible, keeping in mind current differences in the missions of VOA and USIA/TV, on the one hand, and RFE/RL, on the other. Especially in allocation of technical resources and programming, redundancy should be avoided.
4. To be more effective and to better utilize resources, at a future point, the U.S. Government should have only one broadcast entity.

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5. Recognizing budgetary constraints, broadcasting priorities should reflect overall U.S. foreign policy priorities in determining which areas should be covered most heavily, and which languages should receive priority. The U.S. should broadcast in the vernacular languages of the receiving countries, as well as in English.

6. Given the current international political environment, it is especially important that U.S. Government broadcasting further the process of democracy-building by describing democratic institutions and practices, and otherwise assisting political and economic liberalization.

7. U.S. Government broadcasting should not conflict with the growth of U.S. private sector telecommunications and broadcasting enterprises in the international arena. Where possible, U.S. Government broadcasting activities should help private sector enterprises to become established in foreign markets.

8. In order to compete in an increasingly sophisticated international media environment, the U.S. Government must frequently reevaluate its broadcasting technology and programming on the basis of audience survey research to ensure the most effective technical means of delivery and mix of programming for reaching the greatest number of priority audiences.

9. U.S. Government international broadcasting should actively and directly support non-traditional U.S. foreign policy priorities, such as the war on drugs, the fight against terrorism and efforts to improve the global environment.

Consolidation/Reorientation: At this time, RFE/RL and VOA compete with each other for listeners, and the distinctions in programming are blurring as democracy-building content increases. As surrogate broadcasting decreases and as programming of VOA and RFE/RL become more alike, their assets should be rationalized, i.e., the transmitting assets should be viewed as a common pot to be used most effectively. As an overall coordinated broadcasting strategy is designed, it will be possible to distinguish where redundancy causes ineffectiveness or waste and where redundancy is necessary in order to meet U.S. objectives. Rationalization of assets cannot be accomplished overnight, but it is a goal that should be a factor in decisions about budgets.

To make the most of limited resources and to be competitive, the U.S. should begin to consolidate its broadcasting operations, eliminate redundancy and increase flexibility in managing assets during an extended period of international change. Over time and in steps, without withdrawing from countries in transition and

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without sacrificing valuable assets and influence, we should move to a single broadcasting entity. At the same time, as far as permitted by budgetary restraints, USG broadcasting services should be expanded in areas now underserved, including South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

For the single broadcasting entity, we recommend neither a timetable nor an appropriate organization. There are several models, such as an entity within USIA or State, a separate USG entity, or an organization like the BBC, which is autonomous on content, but is funded by the British government and given Foreign Office guidance on languages and apportionment of time to each. We believe that an independent commission or group outside the government bureaucracy should recommend the best organization.

What is envisioned is a process of steps -- over time as appropriate under international political and other conditions -- to pull the broadcasting elements and assets closer together until there is only one. This is not a submerging of one in the other. For example, the first step is closer coordination of equipment use, such as joint use of some transmitters. We envision that for some time programming would be distinctly separate and clearly identified as Radio Free Poland and VOA Poland, for example. Over time, some current RFE country services would phase out. We expect that Radio Liberty would continue to broadcast for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, and this might be while Radio Liberty was still broadcasting, there would be a single agency with a new name, coordinating all the assets and the budget but most likely with distinct services -- such as Radio Marti, Radio Liberty -- under it.

As democratic change takes hold and certain criteria are met in Eastern European countries, Radio Free Europe should phase out U.S.-sponsored broadcasting services, as its role will have been fulfilled. The same applies to Radio Liberty, at the appropriate time. Eventually, U.S. taxpayer support for RFE/RL would end.

The U.S. Government could end support for surrogate broadcasting to a particular Eastern European country when:

- Free indigenous media are protected by law and established in practice in that country to provide consistent, objective news and discussion, unfettered by government censorship, about domestic and international affairs.

- The free flow of information into and out of the country is established so that people have access to Western media as well as their own.

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-- No one party enjoys a monopoly or overwhelming dominance of information media. Individuals and diverse political interests have access to media to disseminate their points of view.

-- Journalists have access to information sources and the freedom to report undeterred by government control or restrictions.

Establishment of democracy in Eastern Europe will be a long and uneven process. RFE broadcasts to some countries in the region will probably be justified for many years to come. In other cases, especially Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, conditions for ceasing RFE broadcasts could be met in the next few years. RL broadcasts will probably be needed to fill gaps in the Soviet media environment for a decade and more.

The name "Radio Free Europe, RFE" and the credibility it has built up over 40 years are of significant value to both the U.S. and the fledgling democratic governments which were once the opposition. As the mission for U.S.-sponsored surrogate services ends, it is possible that the name, frequency, and some facilities of RFE Poland, Hungary, etc. could be turned over to local broadcasters -- with government agreement -- to continue broadcasting as a home service. This type of option should be explored further by the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting.

The RFE/RL research service, a valuable resource in its own right, should be maintained.

The opening up of Eastern Europe, though incomplete, offers opportunities to begin consolidating some RFE and VOA technical resources now. The first task of consolidation should be to prepare to phase out RFE programming to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland as conditions in those countries end the need for U.S.-funded surrogate stations. **The first step in phasing down RFE would be to eliminate repeat programming in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland,** once it is determined that such programming is no longer essential for fulfilling the mission of RFE. The timing would be determined by the new PCC on Broadcasting after consultation through the State Department with embassies in the countries involved. RFE audience researchers believe that most listeners would be retained, as broadcasting would continue in prime listenership time.

Throughout Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Soviet Union, **democracy-building programs should be emphasized by VOA, RFE/RL, and USIA/TV,** customized to the situation in each country.

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The Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Eastern Europe, chaired by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs of the Department of State, **should monitor developments in individual Eastern European countries and make recommendations on when criteria for ending U.S.-sponsored surrogate broadcasting have been met.**

The U.S. radio relay station now under construction in Israel will be a valuable and much-needed resource for U.S. international broadcasting, providing critical coverage to three continents, including such areas as Soviet Central Asia, South Asia, eastern Africa, and central Africa. We reaffirm the U.S. commitment to this project. Nevertheless, in view of urgent budget requirements elsewhere in U.S. international broadcasting and in the light of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the planned size and scope of the station can be downscaled by roughly 10 percent. **The project should be reduced in budget by \$24 million, with the bulk of the cuts taken from transmitters and antennas intended for use in Eastern Europe.** BIB and VOA should jointly work out the exact distribution of the cuts, subject to approval by NSC and OMB. Scaling back, as outlined here, will not impair our ability to reach key audiences effectively. The remaining transmitters and antennae in the project should be operated and programmed jointly. VOA and BIB also should share broadcasting capability to Eastern Europe on BIB assets other than Israel beginning in 1993 after phase-out of certain other current VOA transmitters. The sharing should be possible in light of probable cutback or phase-out of U.S.-sponsored RFE services to Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as reduced need for shortwave broadcasting as shortwave listenership continues to decline and we reach audiences through other media means.

Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin is a special asset directly affected by East-West change. The rationale for RIAS will end with German unification, but the need for U.S. media presence in Germany, as it grows in size and influence in central Europe, will increase during this period of transition in Europe and in the future as one means of continuing U.S. presence and influence. There is a specific need to explain more about NATO and its evolving role. We have indicated to the Bonn government that we would like to continue U.S. participation in RIAS if acceptable terms can be negotiated, including increased U.S. influence in programming within current funding levels. We expect a German response in late June. If the German government decides against continued U.S. partnership, we should try to negotiate some arrangement that will allow us to continue to reach these populations.

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While retaining its original intent of reaching the "successor generations" in Western Europe with VOA Europe, VOA should increase the political and economic content of that service, seeking to expand its present audience in both size and composition. Such programming would be appropriate for Eastern Europe, too.

Technological as well as political change dictates consolidation in USG broadcasting activities. In particular, shortwave radio, which has been the mainstay of international broadcasting for 40 years, has given way in some areas to alternative means of program delivery. This has long been true in Western Europe and Latin America; it is beginning to happen now in some Eastern European countries. In such areas, USG broadcasters, both VOA and USIA/TV, increasingly depend upon placement and cooperative network arrangements instead of direct broadcasting to reach priority audiences. To be effective, USG broadcasting needs maximum flexibility and a full range of media options to offer to highly competitive foreign markets. For this reason, **USIA should coordinate more closely the planning and programming of its own broadcasting activities, VOA and USIA/TV, in order to better match the most effective medium to specific media conditions abroad.**

Furthermore, it is expected that television will increase in importance in developed countries and that opportunities for USIA/TV likewise will increase. **Greater emphasis should be placed on developing the potential of USIA/TV in consonance with opportunities to reach larger priority audiences.**

To reach audiences most effectively, USG broadcasting must have a full range of media options which are well understood and creatively pursued. Placement and cooperative arrangements could well be the key to future success. **Emphasis should be maintained on creative placement and cooperative arrangements, along with expanded media research and audience surveys to ensure most effective carrying of U.S. messages.**

No major breakthrough in new technology is likely to transform international broadcasting in the next 10-15 years. The questions of technology and being able to compete should be constantly reviewed by the new PCC with recommendations by the State Department's International Communications and Information Policy Bureau. The commission recommended in this review should also make recommendations regarding technologies affecting USG international broadcasting.

Due to budgeting and the fact that VOA can and does provide targeted programming to denied populations, **no new independent surrogate stations should be established at this time.** Guided by

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appropriate PCCs, VOA should increase the targeted character of its programming to denied/totalitarian countries, e.g., Southeast Asia, China (including Tibet), Albania, Iran, and Libya.

VOA services to underserved populations, especially Muslims, and those in the Balkans and Africa, should be increased as part of a global strategy developed by the new PCC on International Broadcasting described below.

In order to provide overall coordination and strategic guidance for USG international broadcasting, a new Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting should be established. This PCC should manage transitions in broadcasting activities dictated by political or technological change. The PCC should recommend ways in which to realize efficiencies through consolidation of broadcasting assets, including those of VOA, USIA/TV and RFE/RL. The PCC should coordinate strategic planning, as described below, to ensure that broadcasting activities reflect U.S. foreign policy priorities. The PCC should be chaired by A) State, B) NSC, or C) co-chaired by State and NSC.

Policy Coordination: While it must maintain credibility as an objective and reliable information source if it is to attract and hold priority audiences abroad, USG broadcasting should be coordinated more closely with U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives. In particular, strategic decisions setting priorities among languages, countries and geographical regions for VOA and USIA/TV should be regularly coordinated by USIA, the Department of State, OMB, DOD, and the NSC through the PCC on International Broadcasting.

The PCC on International Broadcasting should recommend, in coordination with appropriate regional PCCs, broadcast strategies within five months of its establishment to ensure appropriate and adequate coverage in all geographic regions, expanding some and reducing or reorienting others. In particular, the PCC should take into account the need to increase programming to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa where shortwave remains a primary means of reaching priority audiences. In this context, the importance of large Muslim populations in these areas should be considered. The PCC should also consider whether some radio broadcasting resources could be shifted from Europe to these areas to meet this need.

Dialogue among the State Department's policy staff, USIA's policy guidance staff, and those responsible for broadcasts, including the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) responsible for RFE/RL, should be increased to minimize the possibilities of inflaming sensitivities that run counter to our policies. The

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practice of VOA editorials should be reviewed by the PCC, to consider whether closer coordination is required with the State Department or, indeed, whether it would be better to rely on programming and news to publicize U.S. foreign policy positions. Some argue that editorials give VOA a propagandistic quality and reduce credibility, while supporters argue that they are essential for carrying American messages.

Budget: Because of the continued importance of USG international broadcasting worldwide and the expansions recommended by this review in surrogate and regional broadcasting, **we recommend that any budget savings from consolidation be reallocated to higher priority broadcasting needs** (combined VOA, USIA/TV, TV Marti, Radio Marti, and BIB budgets). Though large savings are not anticipated, we recommend as priorities to receive the savings by transfer to:

- the VOA budget to meet its deficit;
- to the Worldnet budget for expanding its ability to transmit to and place programming on Western and Eastern European stations;
- some expansion of VOA programming to priority populations now not well reached;
- increased audience research; and
- improved, basic maintenance of the current VOA shortwave system to reduce the need for major refurbishment in the next decade.

Any significant reallocation of funding must be approved by Congress, which often has its own priorities for USG broadcasting, including demands for new language services. Any shifts in resources or strategy for USG broadcasting must, therefore, be accompanied by close consultation with appropriate Congressional interests.

We reaffirm the currently approved FY 1991-1994 VOA and BIB modernization plan and budget with the exception of the Israel relay station modest downsizing.

We recommend that the President appoint a bipartisan commission or group to study the future of U.S. Government international broadcasting beyond the parameters of NSR 24. In particular, the commission should examine and make recommendations to the President within six months on the following issues in the overall context of U.S. public diplomacy:

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- a. Organization and structure of U.S. Government broadcasting activities: What is the most appropriate organizational structure under which eventually all USG international broadcasting would be combined into a single entity? When and how should this occur?
- b. New technologies in light of the need for U.S. Government broadcasting to remain effective and competitive. This should include strategies for the best use of U.S. funding for new technologies.
- c. The role of U.S. Government broadcasting in a changing environment in which a variety of information delivery means is becoming available. How can the U.S. Government deliver its message most effectively and assure continuing access to target populations?

The commission should be appointed quickly and should be as informal as possible without sacrificing influence.

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June 12, 1990

NSR 24: U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
Interagency Group Paper

For 40 years and more, international broadcasting has served as a basic instrument of U.S. foreign policy, advancing American interests worldwide. U.S. Government radio and, in recent years, television have reached into other societies, bringing them news of the United States and the world at large and, where necessary, also bringing them news of events inside their own countries. Established during World War II and the Cold War, the Voice of America (1942), Radio Free Europe (1949) and Radio Liberty (1951), Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS, 1946), and USIA TV (Worldnet, 1983) have a distinguished history of broadcasting to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and -- in the case of VOA and Worldnet -- the world. Since 1985, Radio Marti has broadcast to Cuba; TV Marti began test operations in 1990.

Dramatic though uneven political change, especially the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe which owe so much to Radio Free Europe and VOA, as well as technological change, require that the U.S. review its broadcasting activities to ensure that they remain relevant and effective in advancing U.S. interests in the future, in an era of change beyond the Cold War. Although the impetus may come from Europe, this is a global requirement. Given current budgetary constraints, we cannot expect major infusions of new funding to broadcasting. Therefore, within current funding levels (allowing for inflation), we must increase efficiency and clarify priorities to ensure that our broadcasting resources are used to the best effect. We must do more with the same resources.

Current Environment

The combination of political, economic and technological changes, demonstrated most dramatically in Eastern Europe, are destined to lead to a proliferation of information sources, including broadcasting. New strategies, tactics and techniques will be required to sustain the message of the USG into the information stream in this environment.

In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, listeners have varying degrees of access to state radio and television stations that are more open and trusted, commercial enterprises -- both local and cooperative with Western companies -- CNN or other satellited Western-source news, and unjammed shortwave international

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broadcasters, including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe or Radio Free Liberty, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Moscow, and others. Although commercial broadcasting has yet to develop to an appreciable degree, increased competition from a variety of reliable, technically superior media is already beginning to make shortwave obsolete in some Eastern European countries. Television is of increasing importance. CNN news can be received in almost every country and has become something of an information common denominator among country leaders; however limited numbers in the general population receive it.

Broadcast situations in the rest of the world range from free radio and television media to continued denial of free information. U.S. policy has been to provide US government broadcasting where people need information, be it about world affairs, our policies, or their own national matters, though tight budgets have inhibited our reach and flexibility. More open access in some parts of the world to information will not change this mission, though greater access and shifts away from shortwave to AM/FM and TV, delivered by cooperative agreements with local media and satellite, will change our means of delivery.

Mission/Relevance

U.S. international broadcasting has four interrelated missions:

- o to present and explain to foreign audiences U.S. Government policies and actions;
- o to describe and explain American society and institutions;
- o to provide objective news, commentary and information about the U.S. and international events;
- o to provide surrogate programming where local governments curtail the free flow of information to their people and where it is clearly in the U.S. foreign policy interest to do so.

We believe that these missions as stated in the VOA and RFE/RL Charters remain valid today and are likely to remain valid in the future. The details of their execution, however, are certain to change and are changing already.

VOA and RFE/RL have been instruments in a Cold War carrying out these missions, both in advancing American global interests through positive actions and in helping to counter hostile Soviet influence around the world. **The relevance of U.S. broadcasting does not end with the Cold War, though. It is as important as before.**

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The easing of East-West competition does not end the challenge to U.S. interests abroad or the need for active U.S. public diplomacy. The world is not suddenly safe and simple. If anything, our international challenges are becoming more complex and variable as dominating bipolar military concerns are balanced or replaced by multipolar economic, cultural, environmental and other transnational concerns at the center of international attention. Eastern Europe is on the front pages, but other populations too are important to us because they have the potential to affect world events and U.S. interests. The best example is 800 million Muslims among whom the fundamentalists are hostile to the U.S. and do not understand our policies, especially political and religious. We have a stake in being heard and being understood by these populations.

U.S. policy is not to retreat from this new world but to engage it. As the President said on March 23, 1990, "The world is changing dramatically, and we must meet the challenges in every region with equal commitment and equal dedication." Secretary Baker said on March 30, "Now that the adversaries of democracy are weaker, some say we should retire, mission accomplished, to tend to our problems at home. I am not among them. In the new world struggling to be born, like the old world now rapidly passing away, there is no substitute for American leadership."

As long as we exercise international leadership, the U.S. Government will need the ability to take its positions and views directly to foreign societies in messages suited to their cultural perspectives and expressed in their languages. The spread of democracy and more open societies makes this ability more rather than less important. For where decision-making and centers of influence are decentralized, and ordinary citizens affect the decisions of their governments -- decisions which, in turn, may affect American interests -- the U.S. Government must reach beyond those governments to communicate with the people as well. Radio and television broadcasting are uniquely able to do this on the mass level.

Some believe that U.S. Government broadcasting becomes obsolete whenever a society develops its own media or gains access to Western media sources. Agencies disagree with this view. USG broadcasting has a particular mission in advancing U.S. national interests which commercial broadcasters do not share. Even when private sector broadcasters provide extensive news services, they follow commercial criteria in program selection and emphasis different from those followed by VOA and USIA/TV, which, by mandate, emphasize issues and events of concern to the U.S. Government.

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For commercial reasons, private sector broadcasters are also unlikely to develop vernacular services into many of the countries of interest to the U.S. Government and into which VOA and RFE now send vernacular programming. Similarly, U.S. private sector broadcasters currently lack the area expertise and the experience in cross-cultural communications required to communicate with foreign audiences.

Because of our history and because of what we are, emerging democracies look to the U.S. for guidance on democracy-building. Through programming on topics related to democratic political institutions, rule of law, and free enterprise, we can help build foundations that enable fledgling democracies to stabilize and survive. Broadcasting reaches millions of people in government and the private sector with this vital information. Democracy-building is a vital mission of U.S. Government international broadcasting, made more important than ever by the worldwide trend toward political and economic liberalization. Democracy-building is an intrinsic part of the VOA charter, which specifies that "VOA will....present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions." We recommend that the proposed NSD, in elaborating principles for international broadcasting, emphasize that democracy-building should be a priority function of all USG broadcasting activities, television as well as radio.

Some have questioned whether U.S. Government broadcasting should either become a private sector enterprise or should carry advertising to defray costs. In order to remain responsive to U.S. policies and to be removed from commercial competition, it should remain a U.S. Government preserve. As an instrument of an activist foreign policy, USG international broadcasting assets should be an integral part of the overall foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus. We recommend that **USG international broadcasting remain under the authority of the Executive branch.** The current organization, with USIA/TV and VOA as elements of USIA, the agency responsible for overall USG public diplomacy, and with RFE/RL operated separately under BIB, should be retained for the time being. The advertising question should be considered separately.

In order to carry out its missions most effectively within a budget not expected to increase in real terms and to have a clear, single voice, **at a future point, the U.S. Government should have only one broadcast entity, reached by evolutionary stages.** This is addressed further in the section on consolidation/reorientation and is listed as a principle of broadcasting below.

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In today's global environment, considering the impact of continuing political, economic, and technological change, **U.S. Government international broadcasting should carry out the missions described above in accordance with the following principles as guidelines**, some of which are described in more detail later in this review document.

1. The U.S. Government should maintain a global radio and television broadcasting capability, broadcasting to leaders, elites, and general populations in all geographic areas to serve and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.
2. U.S. Government international broadcasting should be directly connected to the U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy apparatus. It should remain under the authority of the Executive branch.
3. In order to keep U.S. Government broadcasting competitive, all U.S. Government broadcasting assets should be coordinated to the fullest extent possible, keeping in mind current differences in the missions of VOA and USIA/TV, on the one hand, and RFE/RL, on the other. Especially in allocation of technical resources and programming, redundancy should be avoided.
4. To be more effective and to better utilize resources, at a future point, the U.S. Government should have only one broadcast entity.
5. Recognizing budgetary constraints, broadcasting priorities should reflect overall U.S. foreign policy priorities in determining which areas should be covered most heavily, and which languages should receive priority. The U.S. should broadcast in the vernacular languages of the receiving countries, as well as in English.
6. Given the current international political environment, it is especially important that U.S. Government broadcasting further the process of democracy-building by describing democratic institutions and practices, and otherwise assisting political and economic liberalization.
7. U.S. Government broadcasting should not conflict with the growth of U.S. private sector telecommunications and broadcasting enterprises in the international arena. Where possible, U.S. Government broadcasting activities should help private sector enterprises to become established in foreign markets.
8. In order to compete in an increasingly sophisticated international media environment, the U.S. Government must frequently reevaluate its broadcasting technology and programming

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on the basis of audience survey research to ensure the most effective technical means of delivery and mix of programming for reaching the greatest number of priority audiences.

9. U.S. Government international broadcasting should actively and directly support non-traditional U.S. foreign policy priorities, such as the war on drugs, the fight against terrorism and efforts to improve the global environment.

Agencies recommend that the President issue a National Security Directive reaffirming the continued need for a global broadcasting capability to advance U.S. foreign policy worldwide and the missions of USG broadcasting and elaborating the above principles to guide its activities.

Capability/Current Programming

The Voice of America broadcasts today a total of 1200 hours per week in 43 languages on shortwave and medium wave (AM) transmitters. The estimated audience is 127 million. The coverage is global though inadequate in some regions, such as Africa. Modernization programs (discussed below) are intended to strengthen our ability to reach all populations by radio.

VOA programming has long been news and cultural information items. With the acceleration of varying degrees of democratic change and the spread of freer media, VOA broadcasts to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have increasingly stressed practical democracy-building programs about democratic institutions and free market structures. Specific "how to" series have been developed to explain the Western political, economic and social experience to emerging democracies. VOA has developed cooperative arrangements with Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak radio services which carry U.S. programming over local systems. These cooperative arrangements also help to introduce Eastern European broadcasters to the methods and standards of Western media. VOA has also opened news bureaus in Warsaw and Prague and has correspondents or stringers in Moscow and throughout Eastern Europe and the Baltics. VOA has served some functions of surrogate programming, e.g., targeting broadcasts of local news and information to people where free flow of information is denied. Radio Marti, broadcasting 24 hours a day to Cuba, but now being jammed, is a very popular station and funnel for information about world developments and Cuba.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcast 1132 hours per week in 23 languages as full surrogate radio stations to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. An additional service is Radio Free Afghanistan. Broadcasting in the vernacular, RFE/RL operates "home" radio services for countries which lack their own free

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media. Though funded by the U.S. through the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), RFE/RL is not a U.S. Government radio station but an independent corporation based in Munich. As expressed in the 1987 professional code, "The essence of RFE/RL's mission is the practice of independent, professional, and responsible broadcast journalism in order to provide uncensored news, information, and ideas to audiences whose governments systematically deny fundamental freedoms of communication and contact." RFE/RL does not represent the U.S. Government but rather the people of the target country. Though RFE/RL is not legally part of the U.S. Government structure, it performs a role in support of U.S. foreign policy.

RFE/RL programming has changed in countries experiencing democratic change just as has VOA's programming, with more emphasis on democracy-building. RFE has opened bureaus in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw and has stringers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

USIA TV, called Worldnet, was established in 1983. Worldnet international satellite television service gives USIA the ability to transmit timely video information and official U.S. views about breaking news events. USIA/TV's efforts are largely devoted to satellite delivery of up-to-date news, policy statements, and current events analysis about the United States, as well as cultural and documentary programs, for placement on local broadcast stations overseas. Programs delivered via Worldnet are now a regular feature on television in many countries around the world.

Worldnet programming is a combination of USIA-produced news and teleconferencing programs and selections on public affairs, culture, and science from American private sector television. The substance is in line with other VOA programming and with RFE/RL in the democracy-building area. Much of Worldnet programming is in English, but daily clips on news, current events, and Administration policy are produced in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic.

Worldnet is received at 200 U.S. embassies and facilities overseas, from which it is recorded and provided to local stations. This is a treasured service in some parts of the world, but audiences are quite limited unless placement takes place. Where satellite dishes are located on television stations in host countries, including the USSR, Worldnet programs can be received directly. Due to budget constraints, this is a fledgling effort, but one which holds promise.

Like Radio Marti, TV Marti is a part of VOA and an effort to expand upon the success of Radio Marti in providing information

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to the Cuban population. TV Marti is in a test stage, and policy concerning its future is being handled by the Latin America PCC.

Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin is a joint U.S.-German radio and TV operation charged with providing uncensored and unbiased information about the U.S., the FRG and events inside East Germany to East Berlin and to the large part of East Germany which can receive its signals. With German unification, the legal status and mission of RIAS -- organized under occupation law to broadcast to Communist East Germany -- must change. Although legally controlled by USIA, RIAS is now managed and directed by a German general manager and receives most of its funding, 97 percent from the FRG government. The USG has little influence over its management or programming, which is a mix of news, entertainment, and public affairs. Surveys show high listenership, with RIAS the "favorite station" of 54 percent of East Germans and 46 percent of Berliners.

Additionally, DOD is capable of complementing or augmenting other USG international broadcasting operations in some circumstances. If spare transmitters are available, DOD can provide relief during consolidation of USG broadcasting assets through the use of loaned 50K AM radio transmitters. In addition, should a shortfall in equipment availability warrant their call, DOD also possesses limited radius air transportable mobile radio and TV. Should VOA be required to reasonably broaden its broadcasting requirements, particularly in the third world, these DOD assets could again provide valuable relief. The transmission equipment can be moved quickly to the needed site and can begin operation upon arrival using DOD operators, or could fully support station management and operation by VOA employees. While not a permanent fix for potential equipment shortages, DOD assets have provided valuable relief for VOA operations in the third world in the past and should not be excluded in any comprehensive review of overall USG broadcasting activities and capabilities.

In addition, DOD operates the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), which broadcasts in English to American forces in 123 countries worldwide. AFRTS is not covered by this review, which focuses on U.S. Government broadcasting to foreign audiences, not American citizens. AFRTS does represent significant global broadcasting capability, however, by radio and television satellites. The signal is rebroadcasts to concentrations of U.S. forces, but it can be received by local populations in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Berlin Tokyo (radio only), Panama, Madrid (radio only), Cuba (radio only), and South Korea. While recognizing that AFRTS is limited by Status of Forces agreements and law, the PCC for International Broadcasting, in which DOD will participate, should consider, as it develops

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regional strategies, how the AFRTS byproduct of local reception contributes to transmitting the American message overseas.

Surrogate Broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

Though the requirement for surrogate broadcasting via RFE/RL to at least some Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union likely will continue into the next century, the extent and shape of that requirement is already changing. The USG should be prepared to manage the change. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were created and funded by the U.S. Government (through BIB since 1973) to provide the specific service of surrogate broadcasting. **When the need ends for surrogate broadcasting, country by country as freedom spreads, this vital mission -- accomplished highly successfully -- will have been fulfilled and the service should be phased out.**

The decision whether a particular surrogate service has completed its mission should be based on specific criteria. The U.S. Government could end support for surrogate broadcasting to a particular Eastern European country when:

- Free indigenous media are protected by law and established in practice in that country to provide consistent, objective news and discussion, unfettered by government censorship, about domestic and international affairs.

- The free flow of information into and out of the country is established so that people have access to Western media as well as their own.

- No one party enjoys a monopoly or overwhelming dominance of information media. Individuals and diverse political interests have access to media to disseminate their points of view.

- Journalists have access to information sources and the freedom to report undeterred by government control or restrictions.

Although, in theory, free media might exist in a non-democratic society, in practice, RFE surrogate broadcasting will become unnecessary only as a target country makes progress toward political pluralism, based on free and fair elections and the end to the monopoly of the Communist Party. Until the above criteria are met, RFE credibility creates a reality check for those listening now to local stations.

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If current trends toward democracy continue, RFE broadcasts to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland could phase out within a few years. Each of those countries has made significant progress toward democracy, including toward free elections and democratically elected parliaments. Each is developing, at its own pace, free indigenous media, and access to western media is increasing. While the traditions and infrastructure of free media are not yet established, legal and political constraint have for the most part been removed. RFE services to Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic Republics will remain relevant longer. RL to the Soviet Union will remain important for a decade and more.

The course of reform in Eastern Europe could be slowed and, in some cases, even reversed. RFE programming should not be ended precipitately to any country, but it can be phased down where appropriate, i.e., where change is occurring. The first step in phasing down RFE would be to eliminate repeat programming in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, once it is determined that such programming is no longer essential for fulfilling the mission of RFE. The timing would be determined by the new PCC on International Broadcasting after consultation through the State Department with embassies in the countries involved. RFE audience researchers believe that most listeners would be retained, as cuts would be in repeat broadcasts transmitted during periods of low listenership. Repeat broadcasts were important when RFE and VOA were being jammed but are unnecessary now that jamming has ceased. Overall U.S. coverage in these three countries would still be heavy. **Savings from the RFE cutback, as well as from any other recommendations in this review that result in savings, should remain within the broadcasting account.**

Cessation of RFE services should not be presented as withdrawal but rather as affirmation of the progress made in establishing democracy in Eastern European countries. Phasing out and cessation should be coordinated with overall U.S. policy toward the individual countries involved. **The PCC on Eastern Europe should recommend when each RFE broadcasting service should phase down, with BIB attending the relevant meetings. The new PCC, described below, should coordinate the best use of technical and other broadcasting facilities during the transition to fewer surrogate services.**

While the broadcasts of RFE/RL may someday be unneeded, the research operations, firmly established in Munich, will remain important. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty research departments form the largest center in the West for the analytical study of contemporary Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Indeed, as the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet

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Union become progressively integrated into the West, there will be an even greater need for timely and comprehensive political, economic, and social analyses. Also, journalists and scholars from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will find the rich archival resources of RFE/RL indispensable for their own work. **The RFE/RL research service should continue.** Its location in Munich will facilitate travel, contacts, and monitoring of East European and Soviet media. This research center can be operated either as a U.S. institute or as a joint U.S.-German organization. The latter arrangement may prove to be a good way of maintaining close and cooperative U.S.-German relations at a time of diminishing U.S. presence in Europe.

The name "Radio Free Europe, RFE" and the credibility it has built up over 40 years are of significant value to both the U.S. and the fledgling democratic governments which were once the opposition. As the mission for U.S.-sponsored surrogate services ends, it is possible that the name, frequency, and some facilities of RFE Poland, Hungary, etc. could be turned over to local broadcasters -- with government agreement -- to continue broadcasting as a home service. This type of option should be explored further by the Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting.

Redundancy/Consolidation

To make the most of limited resources, **the U.S. should begin to consolidate its broadcasting operations**, eliminate redundancy, and increase flexibility in managing assets during an extended period of international change **with the goal of moving to a single broadcasting entity.**

For the single broadcasting entity, we recommend neither a timetable nor an appropriate organization. There are several models, such as an entity within USIA or State, a separate USG entity, or an organization like the BBC, which is autonomous on content, but is funded by the British government and given Foreign Office guidance on languages and apportionment of time to each. We believe that an independent commission or group outside the government bureaucracy should recommend the best organization.

What is envisioned is a process of steps -- over time as appropriate under international political and other conditions -- to pull the broadcasting elements and assets closer together until there is only one. This is not a submerging of one in the other. For example, the first step is closer coordination of equipment use, such as joint use of some transmitters. We envision that for some time programming would be distinctly separate and clearly identified as Radio Free Poland and VOA

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Poland, for example. Over time, some current RFE country services would phase out. We expect that Radio Liberty would continue to broadcast for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, and this might be while Radio Liberty was still broadcasting, there would be a single agency with a new name, coordinating all the assets and the budget but most likely with distinct services -- such as Radio Marti, Radio Liberty -- under it.

At this time, RFE/RL and VOA compete with each other for listeners, and the distinctions in programming are blurring as democracy-building content increases. As surrogate broadcasting decreases and as programming of VOA and RFE/RL becomes more alike, their assets should be rationalized, ie, the transmitting assets should be viewed as a common pot to be used most effectively. As an overall coordinated broadcasting strategy is designed, it will be possible to distinguish where redundancy causes ineffectiveness or waste and where redundancy is necessary in order to meet U.S. objectives. Rationalization of assets cannot be accomplished overnight, but it is a goal that should be a factor in decisions about budgets.

USIA radio and television operations are currently separated. But as television becomes an increasingly more important part of USG and world broadcasting, it is logical that USIA radio and TV should eventually merge. The 9 to 1 ratio of budget support of VOA over USIA/TV will necessarily shift as the USG seeks to reach audiences in increasingly sophisticated and competitive media environments. (If BIB budget is considered, the imbalance is even more dramatic, with radio over television 20 to 1.) If all of USIA's broadcasting assets were managed together rather than as separate and competing entities, flexibility would be increased and more creative opportunities for reaching audiences would result. It would be more likely that the media mix and the message USIA broadcasts for USG to each country would be more efficiently and effectively delivered.

Thus, we recommend that USIA coordinate VOA and USIA/TV planning and programming activities more closely in order to better match the most effective medium to specific media conditions abroad. Television is not as far-reaching or flexible yet as shortwave radio, but it should be recognized, for developed areas of the world, as an important direction for USG broadcasting. Greater emphasis should be placed on developing the potential of USIA/TV, including in the selective use of Direct Broadcast by Satellite (DBS) technology, in Western Europe, Japan and, eventually, Eastern Europe, in consonance with opportunities to reach larger priority audiences. Providing satellite dishes to local television stations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere so USIA/TV can be received should be pursued and should be a priority for an increase in the USIA/TV budget.

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Consolidation and reorientation efforts responding to change in Eastern Europe and, to some extent, the Soviet Union also permit a modest downsizing of the current Israel relay station project. This is discussed below.

Israel Relay Station

The Israel relay station is a joint BIB-USIA project which will increase VOA and RFE/RL audibility and, therefore, listenership, in vast areas presently served only by weak signals, including all of Soviet Central Asia, India, Pakistan, East Africa, West Central Africa, and Eastern Europe. Major construction on the project will commence once the Israeli National Planning Committee approves the environmental plan; completion is expected in 1993.

Because its central location provides favorable signal paths to three continents, the **Israel station** will be a vital asset regardless of any political change. Nevertheless, in view of urgent budget requirements elsewhere in U.S. international broadcasting and in light of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the planned size and scope of the station can be downscaled by roughly 10 percent. **The project should be reduced in budget by \$24 million, with the bulk of the cuts taken from transmitters and antennae intended for use in Eastern Europe.** BIB and VOA should jointly work out the exact distribution of the cuts, subject to approval by NSC and OMB. Scaling back, as outlined here, will not impair our ability to reach key audiences effectively. The remaining transmitters and antennae in the project should be operated and programmed jointly. VOA and BIB also should share broadcasting capability to Eastern Europe on BIB assets other than Israel, beginning in 1993 after phase-out of certain other current VOA transmitters. The sharing should be possible in light of probable cutback or phase-out of U.S.-sponsored RFE services to Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as reduced need for shortwave broadcasting as shortwave listenership continues to decline and we reach audiences through other media means.

VOA and BIB engineers should be directed to develop a working plan immediately to scale down the Israel project by \$24 million. Coverage capability of the Israel project for Soviet Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia is reaffirmed. We recommend, however, a policy of flexibility in the use of project assets, and we endorse enhancing VOA and RFE/RL cooperation and common use of project capabilities. As RFE and later, hopefully, RL services phase out, it will be important to increasingly coordinate and rationalize with VOA the programming and use of RFE/RL assets in Israel and elsewhere.

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Budget savings of \$24 million (out of the \$290 million total cost) from the directed scaling down of the project from 16 transmitters to 13 to 14 should be used to improve VOA coverage to other important areas currently underserved or for other priorities in international broadcasting discussed below.

Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) of Berlin

With German unification, the status of RIAS must change. With German unification, a broadcasting capability in Berlin and Eastern Germany could contribute to sustaining an American presence and influence in the center of Europe, as our military presence diminishes, as well as providing information on the evolving role of NATO.

Because the U.S. pays only 3 percent of the bill, the Germans with their 97 percent funding control the management and programming. If RIAS is to serve as an American broadcasting asset in Europe, active American participation in the station's programming and decision-making will have to be increased and assured. Enhanced American influence would probably require increasing the USG contribution to RIAS. USIA is not prepared to increase its annual contribution above this current \$3 million level. On the other hand, the U.S. does hold considerable capital investment in land and equipment, as well as other resources which might be used to increase the USG contribution without increased funding.

Through Embassy Bonn, we have informed the German government that we would like to continue U.S. participation in RIAS if an agreeable formula can be reached. The Germans will probably inform us of their position by late June. If they seek continued USG involvement, we will seek to negotiate terms bilaterally, not as part of the two-plus-four process. If they decide to terminate USG involvement, we should try to negotiate some arrangement that will allow us to continue to reach these populations.

VOA Europe

As World War II recedes, and as we enter a new age in Europe, we must continue the VOA Europe effort to reach the successor generations in Western Europe -- those who are not familiar with U.S. values and our role during and after World War II. Knowledge of this background can result in greater respect for the U.S. and ultimately our leadership and policies.

VOA Europe is a system of cooperative arrangements with Western European stations, with 24 hour-a-day coverage interspersed with

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advertising by the broadcasting stations. Program content is intended to tell the post-World War II generations about America, including news and economics, but at this point well over half of every hour is rock music designed to draw in the young listeners.

We recommend that VOA Europe increase its economic, business, and political programming to diversify and increase its audience to include more businessmen and a more sophisticated and politically-aware and influential audience. Programming should be created for several age groups. The youth programming could be positive demonstrations of U.S. values, in a teen context, e.g., anti-drug, youth sports, United Nations, exciting volunteerism. The rock music content would be decreased, keeping in mind the need to provide programming attractive to the intended audience. The VOA Europe programs would be appropriate for Eastern Europe, too.

The enhanced program content should be drawn from or draw on other VOA and commercial U.S. programs in an effort to avoid budget increases. Placement should be sought on both radio and television, and placement could be broadened beyond the stations now used, creating scheduled spots that may draw more listenership than the current disappointing 2-6 percent. Careful research will be required to create programming that meets the goals of VOA Europe. It may be necessary to do some programming in the European languages.

Surrogate Programming Broadcasting Beyond Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union:

Although surrogate broadcasting is most often and clearly associated with RFE/RL in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the U.S. Government through VOA provides important elements of the surrogate services to other parts of the world as well. During the 1989 democracy demonstrations in China, VOA's Chinese Service increased its coverage and became the major source of news for the Chinese people about events in China and about U.S. and world reaction. VOA broadcasts to such closed societies as Iran, Libya, Burma, Ethiopia and North Korea make available to the people of those countries a source of information and news alternative to the official line. This need continues.

VOA does not operate purely as a surrogate radio station. It represents the U.S. Government and the American people, not the people of the targeted country. But, VOA does cover significant events in the target countries and reports news of those events back to targeted audiences. VOA increases or decreases such targeted coverage as events and U.S. policy priorities warrant.

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The continuing need for some kind of surrogate or targeted programming in various parts of the world underscores a unique quality of shortwave technology. For reaching into politically-denied areas, shortwave is usually the only technology available to foreign broadcasters. This capability to transcend national borders and reach important audiences directly is one of the main reasons shortwave will remain an essential element of U.S. Government broadcasting far into the future.

Due to budgeting and the fact that VOA can and does provide targeted programming to denied populations, **at this time, the U.S. Government should not establish specific independent surrogate stations, equivalent to RFE/RL, in other parts of the world.** Where necessary, VOA can provide the essential elements of surrogate programming to these areas. Where the need increases, additional programming can most effectively take place within existing VOA structure and capabilities. **Specifically, VOA should increase surrogate programming to denied/totalitarian countries, e.g., of Southeast Asia, China (including the new Tibetan service), Albania, Iran, and Libya.**

Policy Coordination

Political changes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and changes in broadcasting technology in the coming decade will require continual coordination among relevant agencies to ensure maximum efficiency in USG international radio and television assets in support of our foreign policy objectives.

A new PCC on International Broadcasting should be established, charged with three primary responsibilities.

First, the PCC should develop and coordinate long-term strategy for USG broadcasting capability by region within five months, including priorities among languages, countries and regions for broadcasts. PCC considerations in this regard should be based upon policy priorities established by the Department of State and the NSC.

Second, the PCC should manage the transitions in USG broadcasting posited in this review, including coordination among VOA (with Radio and TV Marti), USIA/TV, and RFE/RL to eliminate overlap in technical and program resources. As a first order of business, the PCC should oversee from a policy perspective rationalization of USG assets broadcasting to Eastern Europe.

Third, the new PCC will provide a useful forum for enhancing dialogue between policymakers and broadcasters. At a time of sensitivity such as this, for example, in the Soviet Union it is critical that USG broadcasts accurately reflect U.S. policy in

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substance and nuance. It would be counterproductive if U.S. broadcasting inadvertently encouraged situations counter to our interests and current policies. Without dictating to broadcasters, NSC and State should provide policy guidance on U.S. policies. Over time it will be apparent whether this is most effectively done through the PCC or through increased informal contacts.

"Editorials" have been a feature of VOA broadcasts as a means of explaining U.S. policy. Some argue that these editorials take a toll on the station's credibility, as they are clearly U.S. government material and not an independent view. As editorials must be timely, it has been difficult to have them appropriately coordinated and occasionally problems have arisen. Statements representing the official views of the USG must be fully coordinated with the policy-making and policy guidance apparatus in order to assure the accuracy of their representation in fact and nuance. If the news and features, including interviews with policy officials and excerpts from Presidential speeches and press conferences, are comprehensive in their coverage of priority issues, the policy editorials may be unnecessary.

We recommend that the practice and coordination of VOA editorials be reviewed by the PCC on International Broadcasting.

Response to Change in Delivery Means

Along with political change, technological advances require constant reevaluation of the technologies used by USG international broadcasting if it is to remain competitive.

Historically, the USG has relied most heavily on shortwave to reach foreign audiences. Shortwave remains the dominant transmission method for international radio today and its dominance is likely to continue in much of the world for the foreseeable future. At the same time, USIA is developing alternatives to shortwave in both radio and television programming. The next decade and more will see a shifting mix of shortwave and medium wave radio, FM, satellite, television broadcasting and, increasingly, placement and cooperative networking arrangements between USG and foreign broadcasters and cable companies.

Shortwave will remain important especially in Africa, in South and Southeast Asia and in the Soviet Union, where domestic broadcasters use shortwave to reach far-flung audiences. The USG also needs to maintain a shortwave capability which can be turned on in times of crisis, when areas once open might suddenly close.

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In Western Europe and, increasingly, Latin America, where indigenous media and other technologies offer superior signal quality, shortwave has given way to alternative means of program delivery. There is evidence that shortwave listenership is already falling substantially in some Eastern European countries. In areas where shortwave cannot compete, USG radio broadcasters rely extensively on cooperative arrangements to place programming on local stations and networks. Such arrangements will become increasingly common in the future for both radio and television, and US broadcasting should actively seek to expand such arrangements.

USIA/TV is becoming better established through cooperative arrangements which feed programming via satellite directly to foreign television broadcasters for rebroadcast. USIA/TV also employs direct broadcasting to television receiving dishes around the world for "interactive" interviews between policymakers and experts in the U.S. and journalists abroad. The interactive is the primary vehicle for taking U.S. policy positions to foreign television audiences. USIA's global satellite and TVRO system also provides foreign broadcasters in Eastern Europe and elsewhere with coverage of state visits and other policy related events in the U.S. of particular interest to their national audiences.

The proliferation of satellite-fed cable systems, hook-ups and private conventional terrestrial broadcast stations offers USG international television broadcasting an ever-increasing number of outlets, which can be reached at a sustainable funding level, for programming in foreign societies. Under current budget conditions, USIA's TV strategy foresees concentrating on arrangements necessary to exploit this resource. If more funding became available, however, USIA/TV could take fuller advantage of the possibilities for functional Direct Broadcast by Satellite (DBS) technology, first in Europe, later Japan. For example, for \$5-8 million, USIA/TV could acquire necessary satellite capability (via the Astra satellite currently over Europe or the new generation Eutelsat) for a full eight-hour cable program schedule and substantial promotion effort to tap the priority European market. **The PCC on International Broadcasting should examine the European media environment and make recommendations for the potential of increased television programming within the overall USG broadcasting strategy.**

USIA is also actively pursuing other technologies of increasing sophistication. Of particular note is the use of hybrid technology to send radio signals via satellite and television receiving dishes to cooperating radio stations around the world. This kind of "joint venture," which uses in-place technology and facilities, is promising. To overcome Chinese jamming of

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shortwave during the 1989 democracy demonstrations, VOA and USIA/TV sent VOA's radio signal into China via direct satellite link to TV receiving dishes at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and elsewhere around the country. Although such dishes are rare in China and usually controlled by the Chinese government or military, the radio-TV hook-up underscored the U.S. commitment to the free flow of information to the Chinese people.

For USG broadcasting overall, the best strategy is to organize assets to achieve the greatest coordination and flexibility, so that it can respond in the most effective way to varying media conditions in different parts of the world, including emphasis on creative arrangements to place radio and television pieces.

New Technology

USIA is monitoring and, in some cases, encouraging developments in other advanced broadcasting technologies. Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) technology exists today for sending radio signals straight to foreign audiences without going through local control points. However, DBS radio is unlikely to become a significant factor in international radio broadcasting in the near term because appropriate UHF frequencies are not available and no marketable DBS receiver is being produced. DBS cannot be received on shortwave or AM/FM receivers. A technical breakthrough or decision by a major country like India or Brazil to adopt DBS radio on a nationwide basis could change that prospect. But DBS radio is a least fifteen years away, if it comes at all. If it does develop, it will do so unevenly in different parts of the world depending on local media environments. It is not possible to predict how or whether this will happen.

DBS TV is in operation in Europe and Japan, not broadcasting into individual home receivers but indirectly through cable and other intermediary systems. As noted above, USIA/TV exploits this technology through placement of programs; with a budget increase, USIA/TV could develop a regular schedule of programs to offer to these markets. Beyond Europe and Japan, we see little prospect that DBS TV will become a reality within the next two decades.

No major technical breakthrough is likely to transform international broadcasting in the next ten to fifteen years. The global media environment will change incrementally as existing technologies and variations like cable and small-area systems spread into new areas. Flexibility will be the key to effectiveness in such a situation.

The question of technology and being able to compete should be constantly reviewed by the new PCC. The State Department's

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International Communications and Information Policy Bureau, in close consultation with Commerce, USIA, NSC, and other interested agencies **should make recommendations when necessary regarding new technologies affecting the future of international broadcasting and continue with its special responsibility on spectrum allocation, including U.S. participation in the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1992. The bipartisan commission recommended later in this review to consider the public diplomacy context and the specific organizational structure of USG international broadcasting should also consider the implications of technological developments for international broadcasting.**

USG and Commercial Broadcasting

The issue of USG international broadcasting is closely related, at times confused with, private sector interest in potential foreign telecommunications and broadcasting markets, particularly in Eastern Europe. Especially in television, as opposed to radio, both sectors are only now developing international programs. USG and the private sector share an interest in managing frequencies and otherwise keeping foreign broadcast areas open for U.S. involvement.

In some cases, USIA/TV can and should facilitate entry of U.S. commercial broadcasters into foreign areas. USIA/TV currently provides top quality, privately-produced programs, for example, "The MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour," "Adam Smith's Money World" and the science series "Innovation," to foreign broadcasters on a trial bases. Such syndication arrangements should prove most useful in less-developed countries, which in media terms now includes Eastern Europe. Eventually, U.S. private sector television companies will establish their own connections, and the USG will phase out its facilitative assistance. Even then, however, USG television, like radio, will have a special role not covered by the private sector in providing policy-related materials, such as full news conferences, interviews and speeches, as well as pertinent public affairs programs on issues which commercial broadcasters would not cover.

Finally, the U.S. private sector is especially interested in the potential market in Eastern Europe for telecommunications equipment and systems such as telephone and data processing networks. This areas is beyond the scope of this review but is being studied by several government agencies and in the private sector.

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Modernization

The Administration has approved a VOA and BIB modernization plan, which is a streamlined and affordable version of an earlier, more ambitious proposal. The plan calls for completing three high-priority new relay stations and placing emphasis on refurbishing existing ones to improve network coverage.

Key elements of the modernization are:

- Completion of new shortwave stations in Morocco, Thailand, and Israel and a medium wave station in Belize.
- Completion of the Satellite Interconnect System, which will link VOA studies with all of VOA's major shortwave and medium wave stations. This method of satellite delivery will provide much greater flexibility in delivering signals to relay stations and enhance the quality and reliability of the VOA delivery system.
- Refurbishment of the shortwave relay stations in Liberia, Ohio, and Sri Lanka and the medium wave relay station in Botswana.
- Upgrade of BIB's Portugal shortwave station.
- Maintenance and repairs to the entire system.

The modernization budget is reaffirmed, except that a scale back of the Israel project is recommended earlier in this review.

Budget

The international broadcasting budget is \$659 million (in budget authority) for Fiscal Year 1990, apportioned roughly at:

BIB	\$373.0 million
VOA	255.0
USIA/TV	<u>31.5</u>
	\$659.5 million

The FY 91 budget request is somewhat smaller at \$556.2 million, since the bulk of the Israel project is funded in FY 90.

Several of the recommendations in this review would save money. **We recommend that any savings remain within the broadcasting account, to be shifted to higher priority needs.** This applies to FY 90 or 91 savings, as well as savings in later years, such as from cessation of taxpayer support for RFE services. USG

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international broadcasting will continue to play an important role in US foreign policy. Reshaping the elements of the broadcasting budget by reallocation of resources within the account will strengthen the effectiveness of this tool in today's world.

Though large savings are not anticipated, we recommend as priorities to receive the savings by transfer to:

- the VOA budget to meet its deficit;
- to the Worldnet budget for expanding its ability to transmit to and place programming on Western and Eastern European stations;
- some expansion of VOA programming to priority populations now not well reached;
- increased audience research; and
- improved, basic maintenance of the current VOA shortwave system to reduce the need for major refurbishment in the next decade.

Any significant reallocation of funding must be approved by Congress, which often has its own priorities for USG broadcasting, including demands for new language services. Any shifts in resources or strategy for USG broadcasting must, therefore, be accompanied by close consultation with appropriate Congressional interests.

Bipartisan Commission on International Broadcasting

In order to examine several issues beyond the point of this document, we recommend establishment of a bipartisan commission, as also recommended by Chairman Dante Fascell of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Though this review covers policy and sets up mechanisms for management of broadcasting through an era of change, it does not address longer-term issues, such as the appropriate organization for the recommended single broadcast entity and approaches to new technology. It is appropriate that an independent commission or group, rather than an interagency group, examine and make recommendations on these issues. An independent, bipartisan commission or group should be able to consider U.S. Government international broadcasting in a historic context and in the overall context of US public diplomacy.

We recommend that the commission be mandated to review and make recommendations to the President within six months of its

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establishment on the following issues in the overall context of U.S. public diplomacy:

- a. Organization and structure of U.S. Government broadcasting activities: What is the most appropriate organizational structure under which eventually all USG international broadcasting would be combined into a single entity? When and how should this occur?
- b. New technologies in light of the need for U.S. Government broadcasting to remain effective and competitive. This should include strategies for the best use of U.S. funding for new technologies.
- c. The role of U.S. Government broadcasting in a changing environment in which a variety of information delivery means is becoming available. How can the U.S. Government deliver its message most effectively and assure continuing access to target populations?

The commission should be appointed quickly and should be as informal as possible without sacrificing influence.

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Task Force on International Broadcasting
Terms of Reference

In light of today's international political and technological change and consistent with the principles elaborated in NSR-24 and NSD ##, the Task Force on International Broadcasting should examine all U.S. Government international broadcasting activities, specifically the Voice of America (including Radio and TV Marti), USIA/TV, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The Task Force should consider broadcast's global role. On the basis of this study, the Task Force should make recommendations to the President, within six months, concerning the future of U.S. Government broadcasting.

The Task Force should consider, but not be limited to, the following questions:

-- What is the most appropriate organizational structure under which all U.S. Government international broadcasting eventually would be combined into a single entity?

- o All radio and TV activities placed under USIA?
- o All under State?
- o All under a new Executive agency?
- o All under an autonomous board, funded by the U.S. Government but independent from the foreign policy apparatus?
- o All under an autonomous board, funded by the U.S. Government but with significant foreign policy guidance.

-- When and how should consolidation of U.S. Government broadcasting activities under a single entity occur? Consider appropriate phasing.

-- What should be the relationship between U.S. Government broadcasting activities and U.S. foreign policy? To what extent and how policymakers provide guidance or otherwise influence program content?

-- What technological developments are likely to affect international broadcasting over the next 10 to 20 years? How can U.S. Government broadcasting remain competitive in light of these changes?

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-- On what technologies should U.S. Government broadcasting concentrate in developing long-term construction and refurbishment programs?

- o Will shortwave radio remain internationally competitive?
- o What is the future for Direct Broadcasting by Satellite for both radio and television?

-- How can the U.S. Government deliver its message most effectively and assure continuing access to target populations in the changing environment in which a variety of information delivery means are becoming available?

-- What should be the relationship between radio and TV broadcasting as U.S. Government assets?

-- What should be the relationship between U.S. Government broadcasters and American private sector broadcasting and telecommunications firms operating internationally?

- o Should U.S. Government broadcasting carry advertising to help defray costs?

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