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OA/ID Number: 90013
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Folder Title:

NSC/DC 100 - January 26, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Start Mobile ICBM Sublimits, Keywords: Start, Arms Control

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Distribution List Re: Deputies Committtee Meeting on START (1 pp.)	1/25/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Report	Re: Deployed Mobile ICBM Sublimits (13 pp.)	1/10/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	From Richard Davis to Robert Gates, Re: Deputies Committee Meeting, Friday, January 26, 1990, 2:00 p.m. -- Mobile ICBM Numerical Limits [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	1/25/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Report	Re: Deployed Mobile ICBM Sublimits (13 pp.)	1/10/90	(b)(1)	S
02c. Outline	Re: Conference on Disarmament: Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons Negotiating Mandate (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Agenda for January 26 Deputies Committee Meeting (1 pp.)	1/25/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 1

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File Location: NSC/DC 100 - January 26, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Start Mobile ICBM Sublimits, Keywords: Start, Arms Control

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020115
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TO: HUGHES

FROM: KANTER
DAVIS

DOC DATE: 24 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
DC

ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION MEMO DC MTG RE START 26 JAN

ACTION: DUE DATE: 24 MAR 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DAVIS

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC100

CODES:

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THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg.	1	1-25-90	1:38	<i>E. Mansueti</i>
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 25, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR

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Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

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
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Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ms. ANN LAVIN
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on START:
Friday, January 26, 1990, WHSR, 2:00 p.m. (S)

A meeting of the Deputies Committee will be held to discuss the issue of limits on Mobile ICBMs, on Friday, January 26, 1990, 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. This meeting will focus on the alternatives for the U.S. proposal in START with regard to numerical sublimits that would apply to deployed mobile ICBMs and their warheads. A discussion paper on this subject prepared by the Joint Staff has been distributed to the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee and is attached. Attendance at this meeting should be principals plus one. In addition, Ambassador Edward Rowny is invited to attend. (S)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Discussion Paper (S)

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10 Jan 90

DEPLOYED MOBILE ICBM SUBLIMITS

PURPOSE: To review the issue of sublimits on deployed mobile ICBMs and their associated launchers and warheads on such systems, and to provide options for a USG position, taking into account compatibility with US operational plans.

BACKGROUND: Prior to September 1989, the formal USG position was to ban mobile ICBMs in START. On the eve of the Wyoming Ministerial, the USG announced that it would allow mobile ICBMs, contingent upon Congressional funding of US mobile systems. In December 1989, the USG officially changed its position and directed that the Mobiles Joint Working Paper (JWP) be incorporated into the Joint Draft Treaty in Geneva. This will be accomplished during Round XIII; the US can expect that the subject of numerical limits on mobile ICBMs will be an issue.

USG AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON MOBILE ICBM LIMITS: With NSD 14, the President adopted a US ICBM modernization program consisting of rebasing existing silo-based Peacekeepers in a rail garrison mode and developing a small ICBM (SICBM) for deployment in a road-mobile mode in the late 1990's. Because of the formal USG ban on such systems in START, no formal positions on limits for such systems were proposed by the USG. As late as Round XII, instructions to the Delegation were to tell the Soviets (if asked) that, until agreement on a verification approach was reached, the USG would not discuss specific values, but that any US sublimit would be substantially smaller than the Soviet proposal of 1600 warheads on 800 mobile ICBM launchers.

ISSUES:

Although the President and the Congress have decided to deploy rail- and road-mobile ICBM, the final number and mix of rail Peacekeeper and SICBM is uncertain. Because of this uncertainty in how the balance between the systems might eventually be established, this paper deals primarily with numerical limits which would be applied to the warheads attributed to such mobile ICBMs rather than limits on the missiles or launchers (numerical limits for mobile launchers are addressed in an addendum to the paper).

The major issues requiring resolution are as follows:

1. Should there be a numerical limit on the number of warheads on mobile ICBMs in START?

A sublimit is intended to constrain Soviet deployment of

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mobile ICBMs to a level no greater than the US plans to deploy. Without treaty constraints, the largest number of mobile ICBM RVs the US would likely deploy is 800. On the other hand, the 1989 NIE projected Soviet force for 1998 without any START constraints could range from a low of 909 to a high of 1785 warheads on mobile systems. With START constraints, the NIE projected Soviet force for 1998 would consist of 1035 warheads on mobile systems. Without Treaty constraints, the Soviets would have a distinct advantage in survivable mobile ICBM systems in comparison with the US.

a. No sublimit. If there were no sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads, each side would be required only to ensure that its total for warheads of all types remains within the central treaty limit of 6000 and the 4900/3000* sublimits for SLBM/ICBM and ICBM. A situation in which both sides possess substantial mobile ICBM forces--and therefore a survivable, land-based second-strike capability--is considered relatively stabilizing. However, a situation in which one side possesses a substantial number of mobile ICBM and the other side possesses only a small number of such systems, could be perceived as destabilizing. Moreover, some believe that establishing mobile sublimits even based on current mobile ICBM deployment plans would limit US post-START force structure flexibility.

b. Impose a sublimit. The same factors which make the mobile ICBMs attractive from the standpoint of survivability make them difficult to target--which means that the US might not be able to achieve target coverage and damage goals against a Soviet mobile force unlimited in size. The least acceptable outcome assuming the existence of mobile ICBMs would be one in which the Soviets shifted major portions of their ICBMs into mobile basing, while the US maintained only a small percentage of its land-based ICBMs in a mobile (more survivable) mode. The resulting situation would create a force asymmetry which might have far-reaching effects on public perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance and face ratification problems on the Hill. A sublimit could also foreclose the possibility of a significant unilateral Soviet advantage in mobile ICBM warheads. Additionally, there may be some negotiating benefit to proposing a sublimit, since the Soviets have tabled their own (although much larger) sublimit on such systems.

* 3000 ICBM sublimit is a USG position not accepted by the Soviets.

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2. If a sublimit is imposed on mobile ICBMs, what should that sublimit be and how should it relate to other central Treaty limits?

During the NSR-14 process, there was general agreement among the agencies that, if a sublimit were proposed, it should be in the general range of 500-700 warheads. However, to protect the President's subsequent decision to field both rail- and road-mobile systems, and to accommodate the currently-envisioned US mobile ICBM program of 50 rail-mobile Peacekeeper missiles and 200-300 SICBM, it would appear that a value of 700-800 is compatible with both programs as currently projected. However, in view of the Soviet proposal for an sublimit of 1600, there is an important question of negotiating tactics required to arrive at the USG desired position of 700-800. One agency would suggest an entering proposal of a range substantially lower than the bottom line objective of 700-800 (e.g., 400-800). The issue then becomes one of how to treat the sublimit in relation to central limits of the Treaty.

One option would have the sublimit stand alone along with other sublimits within the Treaty limit of 6000 warheads. This option would give mobile ICBMs equal status among other systems, and would require no force adjustments by the deploying side other than those necessary to stay within the 6000 warhead limit and subordinate sublimits for IC/SLBM and ICBM (4900/3000 warheads). A variant of this option would require the same stand-alone sublimit for mobile ICBM warheads, but would also limit MIRVd mobile warheads to 500 within the 700-800 overall limit. Based upon substantially higher Soviet proposals for sublimits, a second variant would hope to come to closure more expeditiously by beginning with a larger (900-1100) overall sublimit for mobile ICBM warheads, and would also propose a range of 500-550 warheads as a limit for MIRVd mobile warheads within the overall mobile ICBM sublimit.

A second option would nest the mobile sublimit of 700-800 warheads within the 1540 warhead sublimit for heavy ICBMs. The Soviets would be allowed a total of 1540 warheads on heavy and mobile ICBMs, of which no more than 700-800 could be on mobile ICBMs. This approach would force the Soviets to trade heavy ICBMs for mobiles, thus forcing tradeoffs between the two systems of most concern to the US. If the Soviets were to accept this approach, either the first-strike threat from Soviet heavy ICBMs or the number of relocatable targets the US must hold at risk would be reduced; on the other hand, since the US possesses no heavy ICBMs, a treaty requirement to nest a mobile sublimit within a heavy sublimit would have no adverse effects on the US. Opponents of this approach could argue that the Soviets would clearly view this as a thinly-veiled attempt to further limit their SS-18 force, and would reject it on this

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basis alone. If they were inclined to negotiate such a sublimit, the Soviets might demand a heavy quid pro quo. For example, they might demand reciprocal nesting of US mobile warheads within an SLBM sublimit, a proposal clearly not in US interests. Additionally, some would find such an approach difficult, since it would appear to equate the SS-18, the most destabilizing Soviet system, with mobile systems, which some believe to be stabilizing. A variant of this option would, in addition to nesting all mobile ICBM warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads, also limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs to no more than 500.

A third option would propose treating MIRVd and non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs differently. Supporters would suggest nesting a sublimit of 500 warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBMs, while still limiting the overall number of warheads on mobile ICBMs to 700-800. This option would force the Soviets to trade heavy ICBMs for mobiles, although to a lesser extent than above. Moreover, some believe that highly fractionated mobile ICBMs do not have the same stability benefits as single-RV mobiles. Opponents of this option would argue that the Soviets would see it as only a slightly lesser attempt to further limit their SS-18 force, and might still demand a high price from the US as a quid pro quo.

A fourth option would account for the fact that if the US proposes its bottom line mobile warhead sublimit number, there is a chance that compromise with the Soviet proposal for a 1600 limit could result in a final value significantly above planned US deployments. For this reason, the fourth option would present the Soviets with a 400-800 range as an entering position. It would also nest the sublimit of 400-800 warheads on mobile ICBMs within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads as an initial negotiating position.

OPTIONS

All agencies agree that a sublimit on warheads for mobile ICBM must be a part of the START Treaty.

Option 1. Establish stand-alone sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

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- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs
- Soviets have also proposed a stand-alone limit, although higher.
- May promote ratification by foreclosing the possibility of unilateral Soviet advantages in mobile systems.

Disadvantages:

- US sublimit is substantially lower than the Soviet-proposed sublimit of 1600 and somewhat lower than the NIE post-START estimate, and therefore may present a difficult negotiating task.
- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.
- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

Option 1A. Within the stand-alone sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads, limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs to 500.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets have also proposed a stand-alone limit, although higher.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1.

Disadvantages:

- US sublimit is substantially lower than the Soviet-proposed sublimit of 1600 and somewhat lower than the NIE post-START estimate, and therefore may present a difficult negotiating task.

- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.

Option 1B. Establish stand-alone sublimit of 900-1100 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits; limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs to 500-550.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets have also proposed a stand-alone limit, although higher.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1.

Disadvantages:

- US sublimit is still lower than the Soviet-proposed sublimit of 1600, and therefore may present a difficult negotiating task.
- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.

Option 2. Establish a sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits; nest the mobile ICBM sublimit of 700-800 warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads.

Advantages:

- The Soviets would be required to make substantial reductions in their most threatening system (SS-18), or eschew large numbers of mobile ICBMs.
- If Soviets opt to preserve a large SS-18 force, could result in a US advantage in mobile ICBM warheads.
- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1.

Disadvantages:

- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.
- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

Option 2A. In addition to nesting the mobile ICBM sublimit of 700-800 warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads, limit warheads on MIRVd mobile systems to 500.

Advantages:

- The Soviets would be required to make substantial reductions in their most threatening system (SS-18), or eschew large numbers of mobile ICBMs.
- If Soviets opt to preserve a large SS-18 force, could result in a US advantage in mobile ICBM warheads.
- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1 and Option 2.
- Limits the number of MIRVd mobile systems which the Soviets might deploy.

Disadvantages:

- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.

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- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

Option 3. Establish a sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits; nest MIRVd Mobile ICBMs warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads, but have no limit on the number of non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs within the 700-800 sublimit for mobile ICBMs.

-Advantages:

- The Soviets would be required to make reductions in their SS-18 force or accept smaller numbers of mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- May be better received than nesting all mobile ICBM warheads within the heavy ICBM sublimit.
- May have ratification benefits on the Hill.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- A 700-800 sublimit limits Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

Disadvantages:

- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.
- The absence of a cap on the number of non-MIRVd mobile ICBM could increase the number of relocatable targets which the US must hold at risk.
- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

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Option 4: Propose a sublimit for mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits in the range of 400-800, but do not commit the US to a specific number or to accepting any Soviet-proposed number within this range; as an initial position, nest the sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBMs.

Advantages:

- Provides greater negotiating room to arrive at a 700-800 compromise limit on mobile ICBM warheads than a 700-800 entering position.
- The Soviets would be required to make reductions in their SS-18 force or accept smaller numbers of MIRVd mobile forces.
- May have ratification benefits on the Hill.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- A 700-800 sublimit limits Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

Disadvantages:

- If the Soviets respond by proposing a number lower than the currently projected US mobile ICBM program, it could be difficult to protect Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.
- The absence of a cap on the number of non-MIRVd mobile ICBM could increase the number of relocatable targets which the US must hold at risk.
- Although room for compromise is greater, a compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

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Although all agencies agreed that the USG position should include a sublimit for warheads on mobile ICBM, the following option was added in order to ensure that policy discussions early in the review of this document include the possibility of the absence of a sublimit.

Option 5: Within the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits, limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBM to 500. Propose no overall sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads within the central Treaty limits.

Advantages:

- Allows both sides to deploy a very large number of stabilizing non-MIRVd mobile ICBM.
- Stability would be enhanced if both sides deployed a substantial force of survivable, land-based second-strike systems.
- Protects U.S. flexibility to deploy more SICBM than currently planned.
- Imposes a limit on the MIRVd mobile systems.

Disadvantages:

- Allows the potential for Soviets to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Stability would be degraded if only the Soviets deployed a substantial land-based second-strike capability.
- May have ratification problems because the possibility of unilateral Soviet advantage in mobile systems is not foreclosed.
- May present negotiating problems since Soviets have proposed an overall mobile ICBM warhead sublimit.

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ADDENDUM: Sublimits on Mobile deployed ICBM and their associated launchers

A separate issue from that of sublimits for warheads on mobile ICBMs is the issue of numerical limits on deployed mobile ICBMs. In addition to their proposal to limit warheads on mobile ICBM to 1600, the Soviets have proposed an 800 sublimit on mobile launchers within the overall 1600 Strategic Offensive Delivery Systems (SODS) limit. A sublimit might constrain the Soviets from deploying mobile ICBMs at a level significantly higher than the US plans to deploy. Without Treaty constraints, the Soviets could have a distinct advantage in the number of survivable deployed mobile ICBM in comparison with the US.

Based on a Presidential decision to field both rail- and road-mobile systems, and the currently planned deployments of 50 rail-Peacekeeper and 200-300 SICBM, it would appear that a value of 350 deployed mobile ICBMs is compatible with both programs as currently projected.

a. No sublimit. If there were no limit on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs, a side would be free to deploy as many rail- and road-mobile ICBMs as they desired, as long as they remained within the overall SODS limit of 1600 and the sublimit on warheads on mobile systems. Some would argue that the absence of a limit on deployed mobile ICBMs might encourage the Soviets to deploy more non-MIRVd mobile ICBM, thereby creating a more stabilizing force, albeit a more difficult one to target. The absence of a sublimit would also allow the US to make significant force structure changes far into the future, when either system design characteristics, improvements in technology, or changes in the public interface concept for a side might make such changes attractive. The absence of a sublimit may be difficult to negotiate since the Soviets have proposed such a limit.

b. Impose a sublimit. A sublimit on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs would preclude a side from deploying very high numbers of such systems within the 1600 SODS limit. It could restrict the Soviets from deploying a significantly higher number of mobile ICBMs than the US, and therefore reduce the number of targets which the US must hold at risk. A numerical limit would also reduce the number of launchers available for refire. Opponents of a sublimit would argue that numerical limits on deployed mobile ICBMs might discourage de-MIRVing and therefore appear to support maintaining more destabilizing MIRVd systems. Additionally, imposing a sublimit under an option which required nesting of the MIRVd mobile ICBM sublimit within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM would appear to be at crossed purposes: whereas nesting the MIRVd mobile sublimit

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within the heavy sublimit would encourage the Soviets to deploy more single warhead mobiles in order to retain a larger number of SS-18s, a low sublimit on the number of launchers would favor deployment of MIRVd mobile ICBMs. Although the Soviets have proposed a sublimit, the gap between US and Soviet proposals may be difficult to resolve in negotiations.

OPTIONS

1. Given a sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads, do not impose a limit on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs and their associated launchers.

Advantages:

- Protects flexibility for US post-START force structure
- Allows the sides to deploy stabilizing (non-MIRVd) forces without numerical sublimits.

Disadvantages:

- Potentially increases the number of mobile targets which the US must hold at risk.
- Allows Soviets to shift a major portion of their strategic assets into survivable mobile systems while the US would find it difficult to increase numbers of such systems beyond current projections.
- Might be difficult to negotiate, since Soviets have proposed a sublimit.
- Would complicate ratification and be unpopular on the Hill among those who want to preclude the Soviets from having an asymmetric advantage in such forces.

Option 2. In addition to the sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads, impose a sublimit of 350 deployed mobile ICBMs and their associated launchers as a part of the 1600 SODS Treaty limit.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile systems.

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- Potentially reduces the number of mobile targets which the US must hold at risk.
- Limits Soviet refire/breakout capability.
- May promote ratification by foreclosing the possibility of unilateral Soviet advantage in numbers of deployed mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets have proposed a similar, although higher, sublimit.

Disadvantages:

- For warhead options which nest mobile ICBM warheads within the sublimit for heavy ICBMs (intended to encourage the Soviets to deploy more single warhead mobile ICBMs), limits the Soviets' ability to do so.
- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.

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20115

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 24, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH:

ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM:

RICHARD A. DAVIS *Rich*

SUBJECT:

Deputies Committee Meeting on START:
Friday, January 26, 1990, WHSR, 2:00 p.m.


SIGNED

The subject meeting is scheduled for Friday, January 26, from 2:00 - 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room.

The notification memorandum for the meeting is attached at Tab I and the Joint Staff-prepared options paper is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Executive Secretaries

Tab A Options Paper

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 11/3/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9020126
RECEIVED: 25 JAN 90 20

TO: GATES

FROM: KANTER
DAVIS
ROY, J

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ICMB
ARMS CONTROL

CW
DC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPERS FOR DC MTG ON 26 JAN RE START MOBILE ICBM
NUMERICAL LIMITS

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 14 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DAVIS

LOGREF: 9020115

FILES: IFM O

NSCP: DC100

CODES:

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 11/2/09

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DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DAVIS

Z 90012520 APPROPRIATE ACTION

001 GATES

X 90012521 FOR INFORMATION

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X 90051015 NOTED BY GATES

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
White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 11/2/09

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National Security Council The White House



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Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>APB</u>	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3/4</u>	<u>BMM /</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

cc msg on Jan. 26 at 2:00pm

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	From Richard Davis to Robert Gates, Re: Deputies Committee Meeting, Friday, January 26, 1990, 2:00 p.m. -- Mobile ICBM Numerical Limits [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	1/25/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: NSC/DC Meetings Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: NSC/DC 100 - January 26, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Start Mobile ICBM Sublimits, Keywords: Start, Arms Control

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**
By MM on 5/17/2023

Date Closed: 11/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 90013-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2005-1002-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-2066-MR(501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/9/2016

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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20126

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 25, 1990



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH:

ARNOLD KANTER *Rfor*

FROM:

RICHARD DAVIS *Rich*

NOTED

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting, Friday, January 26,
1990, 2:00 p.m. -- Mobile ICBM Numerical Limits

State requested this meeting to review the options for placing sublimits in START on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs and their warheads. The issue is important, but State has called the meeting largely because of the fallout from the Krasnoyarsk decision in which State did not participate at a senior level and did not prevail (until Baker's direct intervention). For the same reasons, State has added a last minute issue on CW arms control. You will need to decide whether to address that issue in this Deputies meeting. More generally, you will want to discourage this new tendency to have Deputies Committees meetings for what are largely bureaucratic reasons.

Mobile ICBM Sublimits

The issue of what kinds of mobile ICBM sublimits to propose, if any, and at what numerical levels, is a major gap in the U.S. START position. We have told the Soviets in Geneva only that any sublimits we propose would be substantially smaller than the Soviet proposal for a maximum of 1600 warheads on 800 mobile ICBMs.

1.4(c)

One way to bound that ^{1.4(c)} is to limit the size of the mobile ICBM infrastructure by placing limits on the number of mobiles. In other words, according to this argument, if the Soviets have the mobile missiles for 400 warheads, they would be able to expand their force less rapidly than if they started from a base of 800.

A related argument in favor of mobile sublimits derives from the political and budgetary constraints that bound the size of

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realistic U.S. mobile deployments. Some believe that the survivability of mobile ICBMs is stabilizing only if both sides deploy about the same number of systems. A significant disparity in numbers would lead to destabilizing asymmetries. This argument (and the visceral impulse to constrain the Soviets to whatever level we are willing/able to deploy) dominated the positions taken by many agencies in the PCC. 1.4(c)

In contrast, a U.S. program of 50 Peacekeeper and 200-300 SICBM would give us 700-800 mobile warheads. It should be emphasized, however, that the future, to say nothing of the future size, of our mobile deployments is highly uncertain.

A case can be made that we should be encouraging rather than limiting the Soviet shift to mobile ICBMs (within overall START limits) because they are more stabilizing than the same Soviet missiles in vulnerable silos. By the same logic, we should not insist on limiting Soviet mobile missiles to the same number we deploy. If you make such arguments, however, you probably will find that you are a voice in the wilderness.

Finally, there is a tension between the concept of tight constraints on mobiles and our efforts to gain Congressional approval for Peacekeeper and SICBM. This tension is most apparent in the position taken by several agencies in the PCC to "nest" mobile sublimits within the 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBM warheads. If we accept this logic, we would be linking the "stabilizing" systems for which we are seeking Congressional support, with the most "destabilizing" SS-18 which we are seeking to eliminate (more on this issue below).

Sublimits on Missiles

The Soviets have proposed a sublimit of 800 mobile ICBMs within the 1600 missile/launcher aggregate. All agencies in the PCC agreed that a sublimit on mobile missiles is not desirable because it tends to limit the number of single warhead systems, but does not constrain MIRVs. The breakout potential of single warhead mobiles was judged to be adequately addressed by the 1600 limit. You should confirm that no missile sublimit is desirable.

Sublimits on Warheads

All agencies in the PCC supported the concept of warhead sublimits on mobiles. (Arnie would be pleased if you challenged that consensus, but acknowledges that it would probably be a futile effort.) All also agreed that the size of prospective U.S. mobile deployments should guide the numerical level we propose (although State would permit a greater number of single warhead mobiles than other agencies). Although the issue paper at Tab A is organized around comprehensive options, there are three outstanding issues. These issues should structure the discussion. We recommend that you avoid a discussion of the specific options which are unwieldy and confusing.

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*Don't we
want to
discuss
mobiles?
How stabilizing?*

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3

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*Confirm
no limits
on missiles*

1. Should the U.S. propose a separate mobile ICBM warhead sublimit within the 4900 warhead aggregate limit, or should the sublimit be "nested" within the 1540 limit on heavy ICBM warheads?

The choice is between a separate limit that would simply cap the number of mobile warheads and a "nested" limit that would force the Soviets to eliminate one SS-18 warhead for each mobile warhead deployed.

OSD, JCS, ACDA and Ambassador Rowny advocated the nested approach in the PCC as a way to get deeper reductions in Soviet SS-18s and simultaneously address the two Soviet ICBMs of greatest concern to us (SS-18 and SS-24). You can expect OSD to be the most forceful proponent of this approach, although ACDA will likely argue strongly for including at least MIRVed mobile warheads under 1540. ^{1.4(c)}

[REDACTED]

State and DOE criticized the nested approach because it mixes two different U.S. negotiating objectives. Both supported continued efforts to get deeper cuts in SS-18s, but believe that effort should not be linked to mobiles. State further argued that the linkage would affect only the Soviets, and would thus not be negotiable.

NSC staff have serious reservations about the nested approach. First, it is a product of our longstanding negotiating approach that mobiles must be penalized in START. That misleading perspective may have served us well in Geneva in support of our proposed ban on mobiles, but it will feed criticism that START lacks a coherent strategic rationale as we try to explain why both of our ICBM modernization programs fall into the most tightly constrained category.

Second, it seems most unlikely the Soviets would accept a proposal to put mobiles under the heavy ICBM sublimit. We could rapidly be confronted with the choice of either withdrawing the proposal or raising the 1540 sublimit, or appearing to have created a major new issue. We could unravel the agreement on 50% reductions in SS-18s, or appear to walk back our agreement to permit mobiles. There are no benefits to nesting that come close to outweighing these pitfalls.

2. Should there be a separate sublimit on MIRVed mobile warheads?

The choice is between a simple numerical limit on all mobile warheads (whether single warhead or MIRV), or a limit on all mobile warheads of which no more than a certain number could be on MIRVed missiles.

State and DOE favored such a MIRV sublimit in the PCC. They

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// argued that MIRVed mobiles pose a particular verification problem that should be addressed with numerical constraints. State and DOE proposed an overall limit on mobiles and a sublimit of 500-550 on MIRVed mobiles. State would likely agree to eliminate the overall limit altogether in favor of a constraint only on MIRVed mobiles. ACDA expressed similar concerns about MIRVed mobiles, but proposed to constrain them by nesting only MIRVed mobile warheads in the 1540 sublimit (while maintaining an overall limit on all mobile warheads).

OSD, JCS and Ambassador Rowny have not proposed a sublimit on MIRVed warheads. All have proposed to nest mobiles under 1540. If a nested approach is not pursued, a MIRVed sublimit is generally consistent with their approach to mobile constraints.

NSC staff believe that a sublimit on MIRVed mobile warheads makes sense as part of a separate limit on mobiles, if we are willing to forego the option of a 2-warhead Small ICBM. A 2-warhead SICBM would drive our required number up to about 1000 warheads and we would lose any meaningful constraint on the SS-24. With a single warhead SICBM, however, a MIRV limit may be the only numerical constraint we need to propose for mobiles. It is too soon to make that decision, however, and our position in START should not be permitted to foreclose that modernization option.

Differences between existing single warhead and 10-warhead missiles may make alternative sublimits on large mobiles desirable, for example a sublimit on rail mobile warheads.

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[redacted] With regard to lighter MIRVed mobiles, which could be road-mobile (such as a 2-warhead SICBM or 3-warhead SS-25), the most serious breakout problem is the possibility of deploying additional RVs on existing missiles, a problem shared with fixed missiles.

Second, the symmetry between Peacekeeper and SS-24 may permit the negotiation of a limit of 500-600 warheads which protects any feasible Peacekeeper option and caps the Soviets [redacted]

[redacted] Such an approach would leave greater freedom for future changes in the SICBM program.

We recommend that you raise the alternative of a rail mobile warhead sublimit.

3. What should be the numerical levels of mobile ICBM sublimits?

OSD, JCS, DOE, and Ambassador ^{Rowny} have proposed sublimits of 700-800 warheads. These numbers correspond to 500 Peacekeeper warheads and 200-300 SICBMs. State has favored a more relaxed limit of 900-1100 warheads which is designed to accommodate projected Soviet levels and possible expanded future U.S. deployments. They argued that a higher level is consistent with our long-term stability goals. ACDA has favored a more tactical approach of

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proposing 400-800 warheads, but refusing to commit to a specific number at this time. They argued that the U.S. should maintain flexibility in the face of uncertainty in Congressional funding, but it is uncertain what Congressional decisions ACDA expects between now and the June Summit, when the President hopes to resolve all remaining START issues.

NSC staff believe this limit is primarily of political significance. There may be some value in the limit if the Soviets can agree to 700-800 warheads, but a significantly higher limit will be criticized (the Soviets have proposed 1600). **We may be better off with a limit only on rail mobiles at 500-600 warheads and discard any limit on all mobiles.**

On balance, we would propose going in with a limit of 700-800 warheads on all mobiles, of which no more than 500 can be on rail mobiles. If the Soviets negotiate for a much higher overall number, we would drop the overall number, but hang tough on a rail mobile sublimit in the 500-600 range.

Contingency Item on CW

The issue State may raise is whether to amend the CD negotiating mandate on chemical weapons for the 1990 session. It was discussed at the Thursday PCC meeting, with State being the odd man out. As with mobile ICBM sublimits, they have routinely escalated the issue to the Deputies Committee. Specifically, the issue is whether to drop or modify the current mandate to "...continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting...". The "except for its final drafting..." clause is the point of contention. The Western Group in the CD want to drop the clause, but we have insisted it be part of the mandate to highlight that there are many serious issues that must be resolved before we are close to a "final" stage. Our allies support as a fallback a modification such as "...in preparation for final drafting...".

State takes the position that we should agree to drop the clause entirely and have Steve Ledogar make a statement for the record that lays out the remaining substantive differences which prevent the negotiations from moving to the "final drafting" stage, and clarifies that final drafting would start only after sufficient progress has been made on resolving them. They believe such a move now would underscore the President's commitment to achieving a CW treaty.

All other agencies favor the fallback position. They believe that making that move would be sufficient to demonstrate increased commitment to achieving a treaty, but would leave in place a partial marker that there are important unresolved questions. They fear that dropping what has become a symbolic position implies we have finished internal policy reviews and are ready to resolve final issues. They prefer to leave one step, albeit psychological, before final negotiations.

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NSC Staff believe that it is not a critical issue. We think that the State position is more consistent with the President's desire to move the treaty process forward, and that continuing to limit somewhat artificially the negotiating mandate creates an unnecessary political price with allies and others in the CD. We feel that the way to dispel any illusions about remaining questions is in a strong, explicit statement by our ambassador.

RECOMMENDATION

That you read through the paper at Tab A and use the points outlined above in guiding the discussion of Mobile Sublimits.

RJF
Bob Blackwill and Philip Zelikow concur.

Attachment

Tab A	Discussion Paper on Mobile ICBM Sublimits
Tab B	Discussion Paper on CW Mandate

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DEPLOYED MOBILE ICBM SUBLIMITS

PURPOSE: To review the issue of sublimits on deployed mobile ICBMs and their associated launchers and warheads on such systems, and to provide options for a USG position, taking into account compatibility with US operational plans.

BACKGROUND: Prior to September 1989, the formal USG position was to ban mobile ICBMs in START. On the eve of the Wyoming Ministerial, the USG announced that it would allow mobile ICBMs, contingent upon Congressional funding of US mobile systems. In December 1989, the USG officially changed its position and directed that the Mobiles Joint Working Paper(JWP) be incorporated into the Joint Draft Treaty in Geneva. This will be accomplished during Round XIII; the US can expect that the subject of numerical limits on mobile ICBMs will be an issue.

USG AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON MOBILE ICBM LIMITS: With NSD 14, the President adopted a US ICBM modernization program consisting of rebasing existing silo-based Peacekeepers in a rail garrison mode and developing a small ICBM (SICBM) for deployment in a road-mobile mode in the late 1990's. Because of the formal USG ban on such systems in START, no formal positions on limits for such systems were proposed by the USG. As late as Round XII, instructions to the Delegation were to tell the Soviets (if asked) that, until agreement on a verification approach was reached, the USG would not discuss specific values, but that any US sublimit would be substantially smaller than the Soviet proposal of 1600 warheads on 800 mobile ICBM launchers.

ISSUES:

Although the President and the Congress have decided to deploy rail- and road-mobile ICBM, the final number and mix of rail Peacekeeper and SICBM is uncertain. Because of this uncertainty in how the balance between the systems might eventually be established, this paper deals primarily with numerical limits which would be applied to the warheads attributed to such mobile ICBMs rather than limits on the missiles or launchers (numerical limits for mobile launchers are addressed in an addendum to the paper).

The major issues requiring resolution are as follows:

1. Should there be a numerical limit on the number of warheads on mobile ICBMs in START?

A sublimit is intended to constrain Soviet deployment of

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mobile ICBMs to a level no greater than the US plans to deploy. Without treaty constraints, the largest number of mobile ICBM RVs the US would likely deploy is 800. On the other hand, the 1989 NIE projected Soviet force for 1998 without any START constraints could range from a low of 909 to a high of 1785 warheads on mobile systems. With START constraints, the NIE projected Soviet force for 1998 would consist of 1035 warheads on mobile systems. Without Treaty constraints, the Soviets would have a distinct advantage in survivable mobile ICBM systems in comparison with the US.

a. No sublimit. If there were no sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads, each side would be required only to ensure that its total for warheads of all types remains within the central treaty limit of 6000 and the 4900/3000* sublimits for SLBM/ICBM and ICBM. A situation in which both sides possess substantial mobile ICBM forces--and therefore a survivable, land-based second-strike capability--is considered relatively stabilizing. However, a situation in which one side possesses a substantial number of mobile ICBM and the other side possesses only a small number of such systems, could be perceived as destabilizing. Moreover, some believe that establishing mobile sublimits even based on current mobile ICBM deployment plans would limit US post-START force structure flexibility.

b. Impose a sublimit. The same factors which make the mobile ICBMs attractive from the standpoint of survivability make them difficult to target--which means that the US might not be able to achieve target coverage and damage goals against a Soviet mobile force unlimited in size. The least acceptable outcome assuming the existence of mobile ICBMs would be one in which the Soviets shifted major portions of their ICBMs into mobile basing, while the US maintained only a small percentage of its land-based ICBMs in a mobile (more survivable) mode. The resulting situation would create a force asymmetry which might have far-reaching effects on public perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance and face ratification problems on the Hill. A sublimit could also foreclose the possibility of a significant unilateral Soviet advantage in mobile ICBM warheads. Additionally, there may be some negotiating benefit to proposing a sublimit, since the Soviets have tabled their own (although much larger) sublimit on such systems.

* 3000 ICBM sublimit is a USG position not accepted by the Soviets.

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2. If a sublimit is imposed on mobile ICBMs, what should that sublimit be and how should it relate to other central Treaty limits?

During the NSR-14 process, there was general agreement among the agencies that, if a sublimit were proposed, it should be in the general range of 500-700 warheads. However, to protect the President's subsequent decision to field both rail- and road-mobile systems, and to accommodate the currently-envisioned US mobile ICBM program of 50 rail-mobile Peacekeeper missiles and 200-300 SICBM, it would appear that a value of 700-800 is compatible with both programs as currently projected. However, in view of the Soviet proposal for an sublimit of 1600, there is an important question of negotiating tactics required to arrive at the USG desired position of 700-800. One agency would suggest an entering proposal of a range substantially lower than the bottom line objective of 700-800 (e.g., 400-800). The issue then becomes one of how to treat the sublimit in relation to central limits of the Treaty.

One option would have the sublimit stand alone along with other sublimits within the Treaty limit of 6000 warheads. This option would give mobile ICBMs equal status among other systems, and would require no force adjustments by the deploying side other than those necessary to stay within the 6000 warhead limit and subordinate sublimits for IC/SLBM and ICBM (4900/3000 warheads). A variant of this option would require the same stand-alone sublimit for mobile ICBM warheads, but would also limit MIRVd mobile warheads to 500 within the 700-800 overall limit. Based upon substantially higher Soviet proposals for sublimits, a second variant would hope to come to closure more expeditiously by beginning with a larger (900-1100) overall sublimit for mobile ICBM warheads, and would also propose a range of 500-550 warheads as a limit for MIRVd mobile warheads within the overall mobile ICBM sublimit.

A second option would nest the mobile sublimit of 700-800 warheads within the 1540 warhead sublimit for heavy ICBMs. The Soviets would be allowed a total of 1540 warheads on heavy and mobile ICBMs, of which no more than 700-800 could be on mobile ICBMs. This approach would force the Soviets to trade heavy ICBMs for mobiles, thus forcing tradeoffs between the two systems of most concern to the US. If the Soviets were to accept this approach, either the first-strike threat from Soviet heavy ICBMs or the number of relocatable targets the US must hold at risk would be reduced; on the other hand, since the US possesses no heavy ICBMs, a treaty requirement to nest a mobile sublimit within a heavy sublimit would have no adverse effects on the US. Opponents of this approach could argue that the Soviets would clearly view this as a thinly-veiled attempt to further limit their SS-18 force, and would reject it on this

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basis alone. If they were inclined to negotiate such a sublimit, the Soviets might demand a heavy quid pro quo. For example, they might demand reciprocal nesting of US mobile warheads within an SLBM sublimit, a proposal clearly not in US interests. Additionally, some would find such an approach difficult, since it would appear to equate the SS-18, the most destabilizing Soviet system, with mobile systems, which some believe to be stabilizing. A variant of this option would, in addition to nesting all mobile ICBM warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads, also limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs to no more than 500.

A third option would propose treating MIRVd and non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs differently. Supporters would suggest nesting a sublimit of 500 warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBMs, while still limiting the overall number of warheads on mobile ICBMs to 700-800. This option would force the Soviets to trade heavy ICBMs for mobiles, although to a lesser extent than above. Moreover, some believe that highly fractionated mobile ICBMs do not have the same stability benefits as single-RV mobiles. Opponents of this option would argue that the Soviets would see it as only a slightly lesser attempt to further limit their SS-18 force, and might still demand a high price from the US as a quid pro quo.

A fourth option would account for the fact that if the US proposes its bottom line mobile warhead sublimit number, there is a chance that compromise with the Soviet proposal for a 1600 limit could result in a final value significantly above planned US deployments. For this reason, the fourth option would present the Soviets with a 400-800 range as an entering position. It would also nest the sublimit of 400-800 warheads on mobile ICBMs within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads as an initial negotiating position.

OPTIONS

All agencies agree that a sublimit on warheads for mobile ICBM must be a part of the START Treaty.

Option 1. Establish stand-alone sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

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- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs
- Soviets have also proposed a stand-alone limit, although higher.
- May promote ratification by foreclosing the possibility of unilateral Soviet advantages in mobile systems.

Disadvantages:

- US sublimit is substantially lower than the Soviet-proposed sublimit of 1600 and somewhat lower than the NIE post-START estimate, and therefore may present a difficult negotiating task.
- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.
- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

Option 1A. Within the stand-alone sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads, limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs to 500.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets have also proposed a stand-alone limit, although higher.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1.

Disadvantages:

- US sublimit is substantially lower than the Soviet-proposed sublimit of 1600 and somewhat lower than the NIE post-START estimate, and therefore may present a difficult negotiating task.

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- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.

Option 1B. Establish stand-alone sublimit of 900-1100 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits; limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBMs to 500-550.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets have also proposed a stand-alone limit, although higher.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1.

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Disadvantages:

- US sublimit is still lower than the Soviet-proposed sublimit of 1600, and therefore may present a difficult negotiating task.
- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.

Option 2. Establish a sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits; nest the mobile ICBM sublimit of 700-800 warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads.

Advantages:

- The Soviets would be required to make substantial reductions in their most threatening system (SS-18), or eschew large numbers of mobile ICBMs.
- If Soviets opt to preserve a large SS-18 force, could result in a US advantage in mobile ICBM warheads.
- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

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- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1.

Disadvantages:

- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.
- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

Option 2A. In addition to nesting the mobile ICBM sublimit of 700-800 warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads, limit warheads on MIRVd mobile systems to 500.

Advantages:

- The Soviets would be required to make substantial reductions in their most threatening system (SS-18), or eschew large numbers of mobile ICBMs.
- If Soviets opt to preserve a large SS-18 force, could result in a US advantage in mobile ICBM warheads.
- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- May have additional ratification benefit on the Hill compared to Option 1 and Option 2.
- Limits the number of MIRVd mobile systems which the Soviets might deploy.

Disadvantages:

- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.

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- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

Option 3. Establish a sublimit of 700-800 mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits; nest MIRVd Mobile ICBMs warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM warheads, but have no limit on the number of non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs within the 700-800 sublimit for mobile ICBMs.

-Advantages:

- The Soviets would be required to make reductions in their SS-18 force or accept smaller numbers of mobile forces.
- Protects Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- May be better received than nesting all mobile ICBM warheads within the heavy ICBM sublimit.
- May have ratification benefits on the Hill.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- A 700-800 sublimit limits Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

Disadvantages:

- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.
- The absence of a cap on the number of non-MIRVd mobile ICBM could increase the number of relocatable targets which the US must hold at risk.
- A compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

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Option 4: Propose a sublimit for mobile ICBM warheads as part of the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits in the range of 400-800, but do not commit the US to a specific number or to accepting any Soviet-proposed number within this range; as an initial position, nest the sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBMs.

Advantages:

- Provides greater negotiating room to arrive at a 700-800 compromise limit on mobile ICBM warheads than a 700-800 entering position.
- The Soviets would be required to make reductions in their SS-18 force or accept smaller numbers of MIRVd mobile forces.
- May have ratification benefits on the Hill.
- The absence of a sublimit on non-MIRVd mobile ICBMs may encourage a side to field a higher number of more stabilizing non-MIRVd systems.
- A 700-800 sublimit limits Soviet ability to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.

Disadvantages:

- If the Soviets respond by proposing a number lower than the currently projected US mobile ICBM program, it could be difficult to protect Presidential decision on fielding US mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets almost certainly would demand a heavy quid pro quo for accepting further constraints on their SS-18 force.
- The absence of a cap on the number of non-MIRVd mobile ICBM could increase the number of relocatable targets which the US must hold at risk.
- Although room for compromise is greater, a compromise between this position and the Soviet position could be greater than 700-800, and therefore give the Soviets the ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile forces.

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Although all agencies agreed that the USG position should include a sublimit for warheads on mobile ICBM, the following option was added in order to ensure that policy discussions early in the review of this document include the possibility of the absence of a sublimit.

Option 5: Within the 6000/4900/3000 Treaty limits, limit warheads on MIRVd mobile ICBM to 500. Propose no overall sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads within the central Treaty limits.

Advantages:

- Allows both sides to deploy a very large number of stabilizing non-MIRVd mobile ICBM.
- Stability would be enhanced if both sides deployed a substantial force of survivable, land-based second-strike systems.
- Protects U.S. flexibility to deploy more SICBM than currently planned.
- Imposes a limit on the MIRVd mobile systems.

Disadvantages:

- Allows the potential for Soviets to field asymmetric number of survivable mobile forces.
- Stability would be degraded if only the Soviets deployed a substantial land-based second-strike capability.
- May have ratification problems because the possibility of unilateral Soviet advantage in mobile systems is not foreclosed.
- May present negotiating problems since Soviets have proposed an overall mobile ICBM warhead sublimit.

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ADDENDUM: Sublimits on Mobile deployed ICBM and their associated launchers

A separate issue from that of sublimits for warheads on mobile ICBMs is the issue of numerical limits on deployed mobile ICBMs. In addition to their proposal to limit warheads on mobile ICBM to 1600, the Soviets have proposed an 800 sublimit on mobile launchers within the overall 1600 Strategic Offensive Delivery Systems (SODS) limit. A sublimit might constrain the Soviets from deploying mobile ICBMs at a level significantly higher than the US plans to deploy. Without Treaty constraints, the Soviets could have a distinct advantage in the number of survivable deployed mobile ICBM in comparison with the US.

Based on a Presidential decision to field both rail- and road-mobile systems, and the currently planned deployments of 50 rail-Peacekeeper and 200-300 SICBM, it would appear that a value of 350 deployed mobile ICBMs is compatible with both programs as currently projected.

a. No sublimit. If there were no limit on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs, a side would be free to deploy as many rail- and road-mobile ICBMs as they desired, as long as they remained within the overall SODS limit of 1600 and the sublimit on warheads on mobile systems. Some would argue that the absence of a limit on deployed mobile ICBMs might encourage the Soviets to deploy more non-MIRVd mobile ICBM, thereby creating a more stabilizing force, albeit a more difficult one to target. The absence of a sublimit would also allow the US to make significant force structure changes far into the future, when either system design characteristics, improvements in technology, or changes in the public interface concept for a side might make such changes attractive. The absence of a sublimit may be difficult to negotiate since the Soviets have proposed such a limit.

b. Impose a sublimit. A sublimit on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs would preclude a side from deploying very high numbers of such systems within the 1600 SODS limit. It could restrict the Soviets from deploying a significantly higher number of mobile ICBMs than the US, and therefore reduce the number of targets which the US must hold at risk. A numerical limit would also reduce the number of launchers available for refire. Opponents of a sublimit would argue that numerical limits on deployed mobile ICBMs might discourage de-MIRVing and therefore appear to support maintaining more destabilizing MIRVd systems. Additionally, imposing a sublimit under an option which required nesting of the MIRVd mobile ICBM sublimit within the 1540 sublimit for heavy ICBM would appear to be at crossed purposes: whereas nesting the MIRVd mobile sublimit

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within the heavy sublimit would encourage the Soviets to deploy more single warhead mobiles in order to retain a larger number of SS-18s, a low sublimit on the number of launchers would favor deployment of MIRVd mobile ICBMs. Although the Soviets have proposed a sublimit, the gap between US and Soviet proposals may be difficult to resolve in negotiations.

OPTIONS

1. Given a sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads, do not impose a limit on the number of deployed mobile ICBMs and their associated launchers.

Advantages:

- Protects flexibility for US post-START force structure
- Allows the sides to deploy stabilizing (non-MIRVd) forces without numerical sublimits.

Disadvantages:

- Potentially increases the number of mobile targets which the US must hold at risk.
- Allows Soviets to shift a major portion of their strategic assets into survivable mobile systems while the US would find it difficult to increase numbers of such systems beyond current projections.
- Might be difficult to negotiate, since Soviets have proposed a sublimit.
- Would complicate ratification and be unpopular on the Hill among those who want to preclude the Soviets from having an asymmetric advantage in such forces.

Option 2. In addition to the sublimit on mobile ICBM warheads, impose a sublimit of 350 deployed mobile ICBMs and their associated launchers as a part of the 1600 SODS Treaty limit.

Advantages:

- Precludes Soviet ability to field asymmetric numbers of survivable mobile systems.

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- Potentially reduces the number of mobile targets which the US must hold at risk.
- Limits Soviet refire/breakout capability.
- May promote ratification by foreclosing the possibility of unilateral Soviet advantage in numbers of deployed mobile ICBMs.
- Soviets have proposed a similar, although higher, sublimit.

Disadvantages:

- For warhead options which nest mobile ICBM warheads within the sublimit for heavy ICBMs (intended to encourage the Soviets to deploy more single warhead mobile ICBMs), limits the Soviets' ability to do so.
- Limits flexibility for US post-START force structure.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT: AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATING MANDATE

I. ISSUE

Whether to amend the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) on Chemical Weapons (CW) negotiating mandate for the 1990 CD session to reflect the commitment expressed by the President to achieve a chemical weapons convention.

BACKGROUND

Each year, when the CD re-establishes the CW AHC, its mandate is considered. The current mandate states the Ad Hoc Committee should "...continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting...".

In 1989, the U.S. blocked consensus on changing the mandate. There were two issues: dropping the restriction on final drafting and addition of a reference to a ban on all use of CW. The U.S. opposed any changes to the mandate on the argument that the previous mandate was satisfactory for the existing stage of negotiations and any efforts to improve the mandate would encourage other suggestions and provoke needless debate. During the December intersessional the U.S. took the position it could not accept deletion of the injunction against final drafting because it could give a misleading signal. In response to high-level requests that we reconsider our position, we recently told key allies that our position is under review.

During a recent meeting, key allies told us their first choice would be deletion of the phrase "...except for final drafting...". However, they were prepared to accept alternative language, along the lines previously suggested by the FRG, "...in particular, deciding on basic provisions in preparation for final drafting...".

Another element related to the mandate issue is the desire by some delegations (i.e., the Swedes) to include a description of prohibitions covered by the convention. Presently there is no description of prohibitions. The goal seems to be to build a foundation for precluding even retaliatory use of CW during the transition period. In the past the U.S. has opposed such inclusion and we continue to oppose such language.

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ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

What Position the U.S. Should Take on AHC CW Negotiating Mandate.

Option I:

-- Delete the Phrase "...except for final drafting..." From the CW AHC Mandate.

It is premature to totally delete the caveat concerning final drafting of a treaty. Entire sections of treaty text remain to be drafted, let alone discussed and agreement reached. Even with the best of intentions by all countries involved in the negotiations there is still much work to be done. Complete deletion of the caveat conveys the impression the talks are more advanced than is indeed the case. Pressure could be put on the U.S. to hurry the negotiations along thus leaving us vulnerable to unwarranted criticism.

Option II:

-- Modify the Current Mandate Language

Close allies would prefer deletion of the caveat, but are prepared to accept a modification of current language. The FRG recently proposed some alternative wording, which close allies find acceptable: "...in particular, deciding on basic provisions in preparation for final drafting...". The U.S. should agree to this modification or some variation, such as, simply, "...in preparation for final drafting...". Agreeing to this modification demonstrates our commitment to a CW treaty as articulated by the President. At the same time it does not convey the impression that the talks are at an advanced stage.

Option III:

-- Maintain Current U.S. Position

To continue to insist on the status quo, i.e., retention of the phrase "...except for final drafting" in the CW AHC negotiating mandate, would undermine U.S. credibility. It would be very difficult to continue to insist on the caveat in view of the President's initiatives and Ambassador Ledogar's report to close allies of his meeting with President Bush where the President emphasized that chemical weapons control issues are among his highest national security priorities. It would undermine the achievements of the past year. U.S. motives in all areas of the negotiations would be suspect. The U.S. would be isolated, thereby making it very difficult to get support on issues important to us.

Dropped
at the
PCC
1/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPUTY COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, JANUARY 26, 1990
2:00-3:00PM

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card (out of town)
Robert M. Gates

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Carnes Lord

NSC

Arnie Kanter or
Richard Davis

STATE

Reginald Bartholomew	2/17/36
Richard Clark	10/20/40

DOD

Paul Wolfowitz	12/23/43
Stephen Hadley	4/13/47

JCS

Howard Graves	8/15/39
Thomas Fox	7/8/34

CIA

Richard Kerr	10/4/35
Douglas MacEachin	7/24/39

OMB

William Diefendoerfer	(passholder)
+1 TBD	

ENERGY

W. Henson Moore	10/4/39
Victor Alesi	11/26/39

ACDA

Read Hanmer	8/15/33
Lucas Fischer	8/8/42



S/S 9001844

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


January 25, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Agenda for January 26 Deputies Committee Meeting

We would appreciate your putting an additional item on the agenda of the Deputies Committee meeting scheduled for 2 p.m. on January 26.

The item is the negotiating mandate for our delegation to the chemical weapons talks at the Conference on Disarmament. The issue has been discussed fully at the PCC level without resolution. We understand that it was agreed at the PCC Arms Control meeting today that the issue should be considered at the DC level.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

100-100000-100000
100-100000-100000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2066-MR
MM 3/17/2016

NSC TIME PLANNING SHEET

TYPE: <u>DC</u> NSC NSFG/PCG/PRG	DATE AND TIME: <u>1/26 2:00 PM</u>
LOCATION: <u>Sit Room</u>	DURATION: <u>1 hour</u>
SUBJECT: <u>START Mobile RCBM Sublimits</u>	

Participants	Invited	Agency Rep.	Date of Birth	Social Security Number	Confirm
VP	☒	<u>James Ford</u>			
STATE	☒	<u>David Holman</u> <u>Richard Clarke</u>			
TREASURY					
BAKER (PERSONAL)					
DOD	☒	<u>Paul Wolfowitz</u> <u>Stephen Hadley</u>	<u>13 Feb 47</u>		
JUSTICE					
MEESE (PERSONAL)					
JCS	☒	<u>Howard Graves</u> <u>Thomas Fox</u>	<u>8/15/39</u> <u>7/8/34</u>	<u>5K</u>	
CIA	☒	<u>Richard Kerr</u> <u>Douglas MacEachin</u>	<u>7/24/39</u>		
OMB	☒	<u>William Robert Howard</u>			
USIA	☒	<u>Henson Moore</u> <u>Victor Alessi</u>	<u>10/4/39</u> <u>11-26-39</u>	<u>586-6210</u>	
WALTERS (PERSONAL)					
ACDA	☒	<u>Read Hanmer</u> <u>Lucas Fischer</u>	<u>8-15-33</u> <u>8-8-42</u>	<u>697-8478</u> <u>6718 14</u>	
USEC	☒	<u>Card (not of team)</u> <u>Gates</u>			
H. BAKER					
STAR	☒	<u>Linden Brooks</u> <u>Star</u>	<u>4/15/38</u>		