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
*Truman
to
Reagan*

NSC System 1947-88

Prepared by:
Office of the
Executive
Secretary

National Security Council System

1947 - 1988



TRUMAN TO REAGAN

Prepared By: Office of the Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

December 9, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: NSC System

I have compiled the attached materials (all unclassified) in response to your recent request for presidential directives establishing the basic organization and operation of the NSC system since 1947. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Truman administrations, I found, are not well represented by formal presidential guidance. My predecessors in those periods did brief historical surveys that you might find useful, however; they are included among the enclosed.

The directives supplied here depict only the basic NSC system, and do not cover other organization matters related to crisis management, counterterrorism, covert action and the like. Please let me know if you need background materials on any of these more specialized concerns.

Attachment

Tab A: NSC System (Binder)

Reagan
Admin

Kennedy/
Johnson

Eisenhower
Admin

Truman
Admin

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SYSTEM

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June 9, 1987

National Security Council Interagency Process

Introduction

In National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 266, I directed that the recommendations of the President's Special Review Board, including the model for the National Security Council (NSC) system, be implemented in full. To that end, I chartered a review of the structure of senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups established pursuant to, or under the authority of, presidential Directives or applicable memoranda. This review was designed to identify such changes in the interagency process as might be necessary or desirable to realize fully and promptly in practice the Special Review Board's recommendations, including the specific recommendation that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the "National Security Advisor") chair the senior committees of the NSC. The present Directive reflects changes in the interagency process I have authorized as a result of that review.

Interagency Groups

Interagency groups can provide an effective medium for the development of advice and policy for consideration by the President. They achieve their goal when they provide thorough and clear analyses of all policy choices, coordinate policy implementation, and review policy in light of experience.

NSDD 2, dated January 12, 1982, established the senior interagency structure. It created three functional senior interagency groups (SIGs) -- one on foreign policy, chaired by the Secretary of State; one on defense policy, chaired by the Secretary of Defense; and one on intelligence policy, chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. Subsequent Directives and memoranda established some 22 additional SIGs and 55 interagency groups (IGs), including certain groups chaired by the National Security Advisor or members of the NSC staff. IGs

Declassified/Released on 6-17-87
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F87-412)
by N. Menan, National Security Council

Full Text of
NSDD 276

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in turn typically have established working groups and task forces to assist in, and support, their work.

After five years' experience, a review of the interagency process was due, even without the impetus of the Special Review Board's report. This review revealed that many interagency groups, although formally established, have not met or ceased to meet when the circumstances that brought them into being changed; and that new interagency groups have come into being to deal with contingencies as they have arisen. As the Special Review Board noted, these groups have not, in every case, served the goal of effective policy deliberation.

To improve the interagency process at large, and to implement the Special Review Board's recommendations, I therefore am directing or authorizing the following:

1. National Security Council. As specified in NSDD 266, the NSC shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security issues requiring presidential decision. The functions of, and participants in, the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and NSDD 266. The NSC shall meet at the direction of the President.

2. National Security Planning Group. The National Security Planning Group (NSPG) shall be a committee of the NSC. The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the National Security Advisor, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall attend NSPG meetings. The NSPG shall meet, as circumstances warrant, to monitor and review the development and implementation of national security policy on behalf of the NSC. The responsibilities of the NSPG with regard to covert action shall be as provided in a separate presidential Directive revising NSDD 159.

The National Security Advisor or the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the "Deputy National Security Advisor") shall be responsible for the attendance, agenda, and conduct of such meetings at my direction. The Directors of the United States Information Agency and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the heads of other Executive departments and agencies, and other advisors to the President shall be invited by the National

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Security Advisor, acting at my direction, to attend NSPG meetings as matters on the agenda of such meetings shall dictate.

3. Senior Review Group. A Senior Review Group (SRG) shall be the Cabinet level interagency group for the consideration of national security issues. The SRG shall be comprised of the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Security Advisor shall invite the attendance of heads of such other Executive departments or agencies, and of such senior officials within the Executive Office of the President, as matters on the agenda of SRG meetings shall dictate. The National Security Advisor shall chair the SRG, which shall meet at his request or the request of its standing members, to review, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national security policy on behalf of the NSC.

4. The Policy Review Group. The Policy Review Group (PRG) shall be the senior sub-Cabinet level interagency group. The PRG shall be comprised of the Deputy National Security Advisor, a representative of the Office of the Vice President, and an Under or Assistant Secretary or other senior official of equivalent rank of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and, as matters on the agenda of the PRG dictate, of the Executive Office of the President and other interested Executive departments and agencies. The Deputy National Security Advisor shall chair the PRG, which shall meet regularly at his request or the request of its standing members. The PRG's primary responsibility shall be to review and make recommendations concerning national security policy developed through the day-to-day functioning of the interagency process, including such senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups as may hereafter be formed or authorized to continue in existence as provided in paragraph 5 hereof. The PRG shall assume the functions described in NSDD 30 and previously exercised by the Crisis Pre-Planning Group and those described in NSDD 207 and previously exercised by the Terrorist Incident Working Group. The Planning and Coordination

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Group (PCG), as provided in a separate presidential Directive revising NSDD 159, shall continue to be the senior sub-Cabinet level interagency group responsible for covert action.

Matters considered and recommendations for follow-on action made by the PRG shall be referred to responsible Executive departments and agencies. Recommendations made by the PRG shall be submitted for consideration by the SRG, NSPG, or NSC, as appropriate.

5. Other Interagency Groups. Within their respective areas of authority as set forth in NSDD 266, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Director of the United States Information Agency may approve the continuation of existing senior interagency groups and regional or functional interagency groups to the extent necessary or desirable to promote an effective NSC process; by June 30, 1987, the National Security Advisor shall be notified of those interagency groups they have determined shall continue to function.

The National Security Advisor is authorized to approve or direct the formal establishment of additional senior interagency groups to the extent required for an effective NSC process, and to approve the continuation of such existing senior interagency groups as may be chaired by members of the NSC staff.

NSDD 2 and other presidential Directives and applicable memoranda, to the extent inconsistent with this Directive or with NSDD 266, are rescinded.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1987

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD

The President's Special Review Board submitted its Report on February 26, 1987. I addressed the Nation on March 4 and announced first, that I endorse the Board's recommendations; and second, that I intend to go beyond the Board's recommendations to put the National Security Council (NSC) process in even better order. This Directive spells out the specific steps I have approved to implement the letter and spirit of the Board's recommendations.

Many steps were taken even prior to the issuance of the Board's Report. The NSC staff was rebuilt and made subject to proper management discipline. A directive was issued on my instruction to prohibit the NSC staff itself from undertaking covert operations. A comprehensive legal and policy review of such operations, ordered by me, was already far advanced. Proper procedures for consultation with the Congress were reaffirmed and are being observed.

In light of the Board's Report, additional measures are required. This Directive sets forth the specific timetable according to which I expect all such measures to be completed. It is of utmost importance that the NSC -- including all members of, and advisors to, the NSC, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the NSC staff, and all other participants in the NSC process -- act decisively to accomplish my objectives fully.

I shall inform Congress of the nature and progress of these Executive branch efforts prior to the end of March; I also shall call upon Congress to heed the balance of the Board's recommendations, namely:

-- that no substantive change be made in the provisions of the National Security Act dealing with the structure and operation of the NSC system;

-- that the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not be made subject to Senate confirmation; and

-- that Congress replace the existing Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives with a new joint committee with a restricted staff to oversee the intelligence community.

These recommendations of the Board, which are addressed to Congress, I also strongly endorse.

I. Model for the National Security Council System

The structure and procedures of the National Security Council shall incorporate all aspects of the model of the NSC system described in the Report of the President's Special Review Board as the Board's principal recommendation. This directive implements that recommendation in each of the following respects:

- organizing for national security, including provision of appropriate guidelines to participants in the NSC process;
- the role and functions of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- the nature and responsibilities of the NSC staff; and
- the NSC and interagency process.

A. Organizing for National Security

The National Security Council shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring presidential decision. The function of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Broadly speaking, the NSC shall advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable Executive departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

Participation in the NSC shall be as provided by law and this Directive. Statutory members of the NSC are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Other heads of Executive departments and agencies and senior officials within the Executive Office of the President shall participate in the NSC as provided in this Directive.

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are statutory advisors to the NSC. The Director of Central Intelligence shall advise the NSC with respect to coordinating intelligence activities of Executive departments and agencies in the interest of national security and as otherwise provided by law. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

The Directors of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and United States Information Agency are special statutory advisors to the NSC. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall be principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on arms control and disarmament matters. The Director of the United States Information Agency shall be principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on international informational, educational, and cultural matters.

The Secretary of State shall be the President's principal foreign policy advisor. As such, the Secretary shall be responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, subject to review within the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, and for the execution of approved policy. I assign to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation, and the activities of Executive departments and agencies of the United States overseas. Such activities shall not include those of United States military forces operating in the field under the command of a United States area military commander, and such other military activities as I elect, as Commander in Chief, to conduct exclusively through military or other channels. Activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and that are not of such nature as to affect significantly the overall United States overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be activities covered within the meaning of this Directive.

The Secretary of Defense shall be the President's principal defense policy advisor. As such, the Secretary shall be responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, subject to review within the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, for policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. I assign to the Secretary of Defense authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to defense policy formulation.

The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the President's principal advisor on intelligence matters. As such, the Director shall be responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities, policy and proposals, subject to review within the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, as set forth in law and relevant Executive orders. I assign to the Director of Central Intelligence authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, Executive order, and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters.

Although taking part in the NSC system by virtue of official positions as heads of Executive departments or agencies or as senior officials within the Executive Office of the President, all NSC participants shall sit as advisors to the President in connection with the President's exercise of authority under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In their capacity as department and agency heads, NSC participants shall ensure the effective and expeditious execution and implementation of overall national security policies established by the President. Execution and implementation of such policies shall not be the responsibility of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or of the NSC staff except as the President specifically directs.

B. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ("National Security Advisor") shall have primary responsibility for day-to-day management of the National Security Council process, and shall serve as principal advisor on the President's staff with respect to all national security affairs. The National Security Advisor shall have access and report directly to the President, and shall keep the President and the Chief of Staff to the President fully and currently informed on all matters of substance.

As manager of the NSC process, the National Security Advisor shall ensure the following: that matters submitted for consideration by the NSC cover the full range of issues on which review is required; that those issues are fully analyzed; that a full range of options is considered; that the prospects and risks of each are examined; that all relevant intelligence and other information is available to NSC participants; that legal matters are addressed; and that difficulties in implementation are confronted. The National Security Advisor shall monitor policy implementation to ensure that policies are executed in conformity with the intent of presidential decisions. He shall initiate periodic reassessments of policies and operations, in light of changed circumstances or United States interests. The National Security Advisor shall keep NSC participants currently informed of presidential decisions. He shall ensure that NSC consultations and presidential decisions are adequately recorded, and that appropriate and timely preparations are made with respect to meetings convened under NSC auspices.

As the President's principal staff advisor on national security affairs, the National Security Advisor shall present his own views and advice and, at the same time, faithfully represent the views of other NSC participants.

C. The National Security Council Staff

The functions and responsibilities of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council shall be as provided by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The Executive Secretary heads the NSC staff and, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, appoints and fixes the compensation of personnel required to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the President, the NSC, or the National Security Advisor. The Executive Secretary shall establish procedures within the NSC Executive Secretariat for maximum effective support of the NSC and the National Security Advisor in performance of responsibilities assigned by the President. With the guidance and under the instruction of the National Security Advisor, the Executive Secretary shall develop and implement appropriate policies with respect to the overall size of the NSC staff, the background and experience of its members, the duration of their service, and the organization of staff offices. The objectives shall be twofold: first, an NSC staff that is small, highly competent, broadly experienced in the making of national security policy, and properly balanced from among Executive departments and agencies and persons drawn from within and outside government; and second, an NSC staff organization that imposes clear, vertical lines of control and accountability.

The Executive Secretary, through the National Security Advisor, shall recommend for my consideration specific measures designed to enhance the continuity of the functioning of the NSC, including measures to ensure adequate institutional recordkeeping from administration to administration. Specific recommendations for these purposes shall be made not later than June 30, 1987.

The NSC staff, through the Executive Secretary, shall assist the National Security Advisor in each aspect of his roles both as manager of the NSC process and as my principal staff advisor on national security affairs.

The NSC staff shall include a Legal Advisor whose particular responsibility it will be to provide legal counsel to the National Security Advisor, the Executive Secretary, and the NSC staff with respect to the full range of their activities, and to assist the National Security Advisor in ensuring that legal considerations are fully addressed in the NSC process and in interagency deliberations. The NSC Legal Advisor shall be accorded access to all information and deliberations as may be required for these purposes, and shall advise the National Security Advisor and Executive Secretary as appropriate on all matters within his responsibility. He shall work cooperatively with the Counsel to the President, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and with senior counsel to all other NSC members, advisors, and participants.

D. The National Security Council and Interagency Process

1. National Security Council Meetings

The National Security Council shall meet regularly to consider matters directed by the President or recommended by the National Security Advisor or by the other NSC members. The National Security Advisor shall attend all NSC meetings and shall be responsible for the agenda and conduct of such meetings under my direction. The statutory members of the NSC, and the Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall attend NSC meetings. In addition, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief of Staff to the President at my invitation shall attend NSC meetings. The special statutory advisors to the NSC, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the heads of other Executive departments and agencies shall be invited to attend such NSC meetings as relate to matters vested under their authority.

The National Security Advisor shall provide NSC participants advance notice of all NSC meetings and agenda therefor. To the extent practicable, the National Security Advisor shall circulate decision documents in advance of such meetings. The Executive Secretary of the NSC and the NSC staff shall assist the National Security Advisor in connection with appropriate preparations for, and follow-up to, NSC meetings, as directed by the President. Such assistance shall include preparation of meeting minutes and the development and dissemination of decision documents and, as appropriate, study directives. All decision documents shall be submitted for the President's review and action by the National Security Advisor. The National Security Advisor shall transmit decision documents to the President through the Chief of Staff to the President. National Security Decision Directives, intelligence findings, and similar decision documents shall be coordinated, in advance of their submission to the President, by the NSC Legal Advisor with the Counsel to the President.

2. The Interagency Process

To assist the NSC at large and its individual members and advisors in fulfilling their responsibilities, I previously directed or authorized the establishment of senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups. The purpose of such groups was to establish policy objectives, develop policy options, make appropriate recommendations, consider the implications of agency programs for foreign policy or overall national security policy, and undertake such other activities as may be assigned by the NSC.

The NSC, through the National Security Advisor, shall review the structure of senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups established pursuant to, or under authority of, presidential directives or applicable memoranda, and shall recommend all such changes thereto as may be necessary

or desirable to realize fully and promptly in practice the Special Review Board's recommended model for the NSC system, as well as all of the Board's other recommendations. These include establishment of an interagency process in which the National Security Advisor chairs the senior level committees of the NSC. The National Security Advisor shall present, for consideration by the NSC, a draft National Security Decision Directive for this purpose not later than April 30, 1987.

II. Covert Actions and Use of Non-Government Personnel

I have directed the National Security Council's Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) to review all covert action programs. This review is designed to ensure that such programs are commenced and pursued in accordance with law and are consistent with United States policy. The PCG shall complete this review on an expedited basis. It shall report its findings to the NSC on or before April 30, 1987. The NSC promptly shall review all such programs and seek my concurrence in their continuation as appropriate. The NSC, through the National Security Advisor, shall review current procedures for covert action policy approval and coordination and shall recommend such changes as may be necessary or desirable to ensure, among other things, the following:

- that proposed covert actions will be coordinated with NSC participants, including the Attorney General, and their respective recommendations communicated to the President;

- that all requirements of law concerning covert activities, including those requirements relating to presidential authorization and congressional notification, will be addressed in a timely manner and complied with fully;

- consistent with the foregoing, that covert activities will be subject to tightly restricted consideration, and measures to protect the security of all information concerning such activities will be enhanced;

- that the NSC staff itself will not undertake the conduct of covert activities; and

- that the use of private individuals and organizations as intermediaries to conduct covert activities will be appropriately limited and subject in every case to close observation and supervision by appropriate Executive departments and agencies.

This review shall take fully into account such changes as I have authorized by this Directive to the structure of the NSC. The National Security Advisor shall present, for consideration by the NSC, a revised National Security Decision Directive on procedures for covert action policy approval and coordination not later than April 30, 1987.

III. Intelligence Process

Maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process is an important goal of the United States intelligence effort. It demands, as the President's Special Review Board has stated, careful differentiation between the respective roles of foreign intelligence, on the one hand, and policy advocacy, on the other. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide such additional review of, guidance for, and direction to, the conduct of national foreign intelligence estimates as may be required to accomplish fully this objective. The Director of Central Intelligence shall review established procedures for the production of national foreign intelligence estimates and, not later than July 31, 1987, shall inform the NSC, through the National Security Advisor, of any modifications or additions thereto he may deem appropriate for this purpose.

IV. Reporting

The National Security Advisor shall keep me fully informed of progress on all aspects of the implementation of the recommendations of the President's Special Review Board.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

January 13, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: National Security Council Structure

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on National Security Council structure.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark
William P. Clark

Attachment

NSDD

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 2

January 12, 1982

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STRUCTURE

I. National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision.

The functions and responsibilities of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The NSC shall meet regularly. Those heads of Departments and Agencies who are not regular members shall participate as appropriate, when matters affecting their Departments or Agencies are considered.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the regular members of the NSC, shall be responsible for developing, coordinating and implementing national security policy as approved by me. He shall determine and publish the agenda of NSC meetings. He shall ensure that the necessary papers are prepared and -- except in unusual circumstances -- distributed in advance to Council members. He shall staff and administer the National Security Council.

Decision documents shall be prepared by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and disseminated by him after approval by the President.

II. NSC Responsibilities of the Secretary of State

The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the execution of approved policy.

I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation, and the activities of Executive Departments and Agencies of the United States overseas. Such activities do not include those of United States military forces operating in the field under the command of a United States area military commander, and such other military activities as I elect, as Commander-in-Chief, to conduct exclusively through military or other channels. Activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of

a single Department or Agency and which are not of such nature as to affect significantly the overall US overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be activities covered within the meaning of this Directive.

The Secretary of State is responsible for preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the foreign policy and foreign relations of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

III. NSC Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is my principal defense policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to me, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

I have assigned to the Secretary of Defense authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to defense policy formulation.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the defense policy of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

IV. NSC Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence is my principal advisor on intelligence matters. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities, policy, and proposals, as set forth in relevant Executive Orders. I have assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and Executive Order, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters.

The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the intelligence activities, policy, and proposals of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

V. Interagency Groups

To assist the NSC at large and its individual members in fulfilling their responsibilities, interagency groups are established as described herein. The focus of these interagency

groups is to establish policy objectives, develop policy options, make appropriate recommendations, consider the implications of agency programs for foreign policy or overall national security policy, and undertake such other activities as may be assigned by the NSC.

A. The Senior Interagency Group -- Foreign Policy (SIG-FP)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for foreign policy and foreign affairs matters, the SIG-FP is established. The SIG-FP shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State (Chairman); the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

When meeting to consider arms control matters, the Group will be augmented by the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The SIG-FP will:

1. Ensure that important foreign policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic consideration;
2. Deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member or referred to it by subordinate interagency groups, or, if such matters require higher-level consideration, report them to the Secretary of State for decision or referral to the NSC;
3. Assure a proper selectivity of the foreign policy/foreign affairs areas and issues to which the United States applies its efforts;
4. Monitor the execution of approved policies and decisions; and
5. Evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the State Department augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the Departments and Agencies represented on the SIG-FP, shall be established.

B. The Senior Interagency Group -- Defense Policy (SIG-DP)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for defense policy and defense matters, the SIG-DP is established. The SIG-DP shall consist of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy or an Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Chairman); and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

The SIG-DP will:

1. Ensure that important defense policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic consideration;
2. Deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member or referred to it by subordinate inter-agency groups, or if such matters require higher-level consideration, report them to the Secretary of Defense for decision or referral to the NSC; and
3. Monitor the execution of approved policies and decisions.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the Department of Defense augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the Departments and Agencies represented on the SIG-DP, shall be established.

C. The Senior Interagency Group -- Intelligence (SIG-I)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for intelligence policy and intelligence matters, the SIG-I is established. The SIG-I shall consist of Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman); the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies will attend on invitation by the Chairman when such Departments and agencies have a direct interest in intelligence activities under consideration.

When meeting to consider sensitive intelligence collection activities referred by the Director of Central Intelligence, the membership of the Group shall be augmented, as necessary, by the head of each organization within the Intelligence Community directly involved in the activity in question. When meeting to consider counterintelligence activities, the Group shall be augmented by the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director, National Security Agency.

The SIG-I will:

- (1) Establish requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence;
- (2) Review such National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget proposals and other matters as are referred to it by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (3) Review proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations referred by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (4) Develop standards and doctrine for the counterintelligence activities of the United States; resolve interagency differences concerning the implementation of counterintelligence policy; and develop and monitor guidelines, consistent with applicable law and Executive orders, for the maintenance of central counterintelligence records;
- (5) Consider and approve any counterintelligence activity referred to the Group by the head of any organization in the Intelligence Community;
- (6) Submit to the NSC an overall annual assessment of the relative threat to United States interests from intelligence and security services of foreign powers and from international terrorist activities, including an assessment of the effectiveness of the United States counterintelligence activities;
- (7) Conduct an annual review of ongoing sensitive national foreign intelligence collection operations and sensitive counterintelligence activities and report thereon to the NSC; and
- (8) Carry out such additional coordination review and approval of intelligence activities as the President may direct.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the Departments and Agencies represented on the SIG-I, shall be established.

D. Regional and Functional Interagency Groups

To assist the SIG-FP, Interagency Groups (IGs) shall be established by the Secretary of State for each geographic region corresponding to the jurisdiction of the geographic bureaus in the Department of State, for Political-Military Affairs, and for International Economic Affairs. Each IG shall be comprised of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State (Chairman); and a designated representative of the Secretary of Defense. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman. The IG for International Economic Affairs will, in addition to the above membership, include representatives of the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the U.S. Trade Representative.

IGs for arms control matters will, in addition to the above membership, include a representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arms control IGs will be chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State or the representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in accordance with guidelines to be provided by the SIG-FP.

To assist the SIG-DP, IGs shall be established by the Secretary of Defense corresponding to the functional areas within the Department of Defense. Each IG shall be comprised of the appropriate Under or Assistant Secretary of Defense (Chairman); a representative of the Secretary of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

Under and Assistant Secretaries, in their capacities as Chairmen of the IGs, will assure the adequacy of United States policy in the areas of their responsibility and of the plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy. They will be responsible for the conduct of interagency policy studies within the areas of their responsibility for consideration by the SIG.

The Regional IGs also shall prepare contingency plans pertaining to potential crises in their respective areas of responsibility. Contingency planning will be conducted in

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coordination with the Chairman of the Political-Military IG, with the exception of the military response option for employment of forces in potential crises, which will remain within the purview of the Department of Defense and will be developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To deal with specific contingencies, the IGs will establish full-time working groups, which will provide support to the crisis management operations of the NSC. These groups will reflect the institutional membership of the parent body, together with such additional members as may be required to respond to the contingency with the full weight of available expertise.

To assist the SIG-I, IGs shall be established by the Director of Central Intelligence. The IG for Counterintelligence shall consist of representatives of the Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, National Security Agency; and a representative of the head of any other Intelligence Community organization directly involved in the activities under discussion. The IG for Counterintelligence will be under the chairmanship of the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with guidelines to be provided by the SIG-I.

The operational responsibility or authority of a Secretary or other Agency head over personnel from the Department or Agency concerned serving on IGs -- including the authority to give necessary guidance to the representatives in the performance of IG duties -- is not limited by this Directive.

Ronald Reagan

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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February 25, 1981

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVES

The following two directive series are hereby established to inform the Departments and Agencies of Presidential actions:

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE (NSDD)

This series shall be used to promulgate Presidential decisions implementing national policy and objectives in all areas involving national security. All decision directives in this series shall be individually identified by number and signed by the President.

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY DIRECTIVE (NSSD)

This series shall be used to direct that studies be undertaken involving national security policy and objectives.

The Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) and Presidential Decision (PD) series are hereby discontinued. An NSDD will be issued setting forth the status and disposition of existing PRMs, PDs and other NSC directives.

Ronald Reagan

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
July 8, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Council Directives

The President has formally approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on National Security Council Directives.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group

For purposes of clarification, members of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) are:

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Counsellor to the President
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chief of Staff to the President
The Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

By special invitation, the Attorney General and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff will attend certain meetings of the NSPG.

Principals only will attend meetings. Staff will not attend.

The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may be designated to attend to take notes.

Richard V. Allen

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, #2017-03
By RB NARA, Date 9/3/9

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on June 17, 1987

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GDS

January 20, 1977

Presidential Directive/NSC-2

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense


ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Attorney General
 The United States Representative to the
 United Nations
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget
 The Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs
 The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
 The Administrator, Agency for International
 Development
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency
 The Director, United States Information Agency
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Administrator, Energy Research and
 Development Administration

SUBJECT: The National Security Council System

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the reorganization of the National Security Council system. The reorganization is intended to place more responsibility in the departments and agencies while insuring that the NSC, with my Assistant for National Security Affairs, continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.

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DECLASSIFIED
Auth: EO 11652
Date: 22 April 1977
By: Michael Hornblow
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~a. The National Security Council (NSC)

The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the National Security Council shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. In addition, other senior officials, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the United States Representative to the United Nations, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration, shall attend appropriate NSC meetings.

The National Security Council shall be the principal forum for international security issues requiring Presidential consideration. The NSC shall assist me in analyzing, integrating and facilitating foreign, defense, and intelligence policy decisions. International economic and other interdependence issues which are pertinent to national security shall also be considered by the NSC.

The Council shall meet regularly. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and, when appropriate, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and insuring that the necessary papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council staff, as provided by law.

b. NSC Policy Review Committee

An NSC Policy Review Committee is hereby established to develop national security policy for Presidential decision in those cases where the basic responsibilities fall primarily within a given department but where the subject also has important implications for other departments and agencies. This Committee shall deal with such matters as:

-- foreign policy issues that contain significant military or other interagency aspects;

-- defense policy issues having international implications and the coordination of the annual Defense budget with foreign policy objectives;

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~~CONFIDENTIAL GDS~~
UNCLASSIFIED

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-- the preparation of a consolidated national intelligence budget and resource allocation for the Intelligence Community (thus assuming under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence the functions and responsibilities of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence); and

-- those international economic issues pertinent to U. S. foreign policy and security, with staffing of the underlying economic issues through the Economic Policy Group.

I shall designate for each meeting the appropriate Chairman of the Policy Review Committee and attendance, depending on the subject matter being considered. Membership, in addition to the statutory members of the NSC and the Assistant for National Security Affairs, shall include, as appropriate, other senior officials.

c. The NSC Special Coordination Committee

A second NSC Committee, the Special Coordination Committee, is hereby established to deal with specific cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the implementation of Presidential decisions. The Committee shall deal with such matters as: the oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, such as covert operations, which are undertaken on Presidential authority; arms control evaluation; and it will assist me in crisis management.

The Special Coordination Committee shall be chaired by the Assistant for National Security Affairs. Membership shall include the statutory members of the NSC, or their representatives, and other senior officials, as appropriate.

d. NSC Interdepartmental Groups

Existing NSC Interdepartmental Groups, chaired by a designated senior departmental official, are to continue as needed under the direction of the NSC Policy Review Committee.


The membership of the Interdepartmental Groups shall include the agencies represented on the NSC Policy Review Committee. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Policy Review Committee.

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J.C.

e. National Security Council Ad Hoc Groups

When appropriate, I intend to appoint NSC Ad Hoc Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend departmental boundaries.


Jimmy Carter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memorandum	For Distribution list Re: Executive Order 11905 and PD/NSC 2 (2 pp.)	1/26/77	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: H-Files
Subseries: Transition Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Council System, 1947-1988: Truman to Reagan

Date Closed: 9/3/2019	OA/ID Number: 99015-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2019-1493-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Presidential Directive NSC-2

In Presidential Directive NSC-2 the Director of Central Intelligence will be appointed Chairman of those Policy Review Committee meetings convened to address National Foreign Intelligence Program and Budget matters.

The President has directed that you continue to carry out your responsibilities and functions previously assigned to you as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence in Executive Order 11905. For the time being you are expected to continue the same working arrangements as established in the past year.

The President desires that membership from the Defense and State Departments be included in these deliberations. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will be my representative. You will inform the Assistant for National Security Affairs when you judge that a meeting is necessary to carry out your responsibilities.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of State

(R) 5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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January 20, 1977

Presidential Directive/NSC-1

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Attorney General
 The United States Representative to the
 United Nations
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget
 The Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs
 The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
 The Administrator, Agency for International
 Development
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency
 The Director, United States Information Agency
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Administrator, Energy Research and Development
 Administration

SUBJECT: Establishment of Presidential Review and Directive
 Series/NSC

The following instrumentalities are hereby established to direct the work of the National Security Council and participating agencies and to inform the departments and agencies of Presidential directives:

- Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM)/NSC
This series will be used to direct that reviews and analyses be undertaken by the departments and agencies.

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Auth: EO 11652

Date: 22 April 1977

By: Michael Hornblow


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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-- Presidential Directive (PD)/NSC

This series will be used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters.

The National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) series are hereby abolished. A PD/NSC will be issued shortly setting forth the status and disposition of existing NSDM's and other NSC directives.



Jimmy Carter

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 9, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 265

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Secretary of the Interior
 The Secretary of Agriculture
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The National Security Council System

The provisions of NSDM 1 and NSDM 2, dated January 20, 1969, as amended and extended by subsequent National Security Decision Memoranda, which set forth the organization and procedures of the National Security Council System, are reaffirmed and remain in effect.

The National Security Council System shall assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for national security affairs and the National Security Council shall continue to be the principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The operation of the National

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Declassified/Released on 12-7-88
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by N. Menan, National Security Council

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- 2 -

Security Council System will continue to be under the direction of the Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs). Communications to me relating to national security matters shall be transmitted through the Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs).

Henry A. Kissinger is hereby designated as Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs).

Ronald R. Ford

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Administrator, Federal Energy Administration
Administrator, Agency for International Development
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Executive Director, Council for International Economic Affairs

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 21, 1976

National Security Decision Memorandum 326

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Functions and Organizations of National
 Security Council Sub-Groups

I have reviewed the organization and functions of the various sub-groups of the National Security Council and have made the following determinations:

The functions of the Senior Review Group will remain as described in the second and third paragraphs of National Security Decision Memorandum 85. It will continue to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership will include:

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

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Declassified/Released on 12-7-88
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F88-1665)
by N. Menon, National Security Council

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2

The Verification Panel will continue to perform the basic technical analysis to help develop choices and proposals for strategic arms limitation, approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, and other major arms control subjects. This analysis will include the verification requirements which must accompany arms limitations and the capabilities of weapons systems whose limitation is being considered. It will be chaired by the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will include:

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Those portions of the Memorandum of July 21, 1969, signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and of National Security Study Memoranda 92 and 123 which relate to the organization or functions of the Verification Panel are superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

The Defense Program Review Committee, established by National Security Council Memorandum 26, shall be reconstituted as the Defense Review Panel. The Panel will review major defense policy and program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic and economic implications in relation to overall national priorities. The Defense Review Panel will be chaired by the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will include:

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Office of Management and Budget *

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[*For consideration of matters having budgetary implications.]

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

National Security Decision Memorandum 26 is hereby superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

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The Washington Special Actions Group will continue to develop options for implementation of decisions during crises and for integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action. It will be chaired by the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will consist of:

- The Deputy Secretary of State
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

That portion of the Memorandum of May 16, 1969, signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which relates to the organization and functions of the Group is superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

The 40 Committee, is hereby abolished. It is replaced by the Operations Advisory Group, established by Executive Order 11905 of February 18, 1976.

This group will review and advise the President on covert operations and certain sensitive foreign intelligence collection missions. It will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership will be as follows:

- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Observers:

- The Attorney General
- The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Intelligence Committee, established by the President's Memorandum of November 5, 1971, is hereby abolished.

The Committee on Foreign Intelligence was established by Executive Order 11905 and its duties are as described in the Executive Order.

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It is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and its membership consists of:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The functions and membership of the Under Secretaries Committee will remain as described in National Security Decision Memoranda 2 and 8. It will be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State.

The functions and membership of the six standing Interdepartmental Groups will remain as described in National Security Decision Memorandum 2. The five geographic Groups will be chaired by the appropriate geographic Assistant Secretary of State. The Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs will be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense.

David R. Ford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1969

National Security Decision Memorandum 2

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the National Security Council System

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct that the National Security Council system be reorganized as follows:

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

The functions, membership and responsibilities of the National Security Council shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The National Security Council shall be the principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The nature of the issues to be considered may range from current crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning.

The Council shall meet regularly, and discussion will--except in unusual circumstances--be limited to agenda subjects.^{1/} The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary

- 1/ The Director of Central Intelligence will brief the NSC on each agenda item prior to its consideration.

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Declassified/Released on 4-24-83
under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F83-423)
by E. Reger, National Security Council

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papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council Staff, as provided by law.

B. The National Security Council Review Group

An NSC Review Group is hereby established to examine papers prior to their submission to the NSC. These papers may be received from NSC Interdepartmental Groups^{2/}, from NSC Ad Hoc Groups^{2/}, or from Departments (at their discretion).

The role of the Review Group shall be to review papers to be discussed by the NSC to assure that: 1) the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention; 2) all realistic alternatives are presented; 3) the facts, including cost implications, and all department and agency views are fairly and adequately set out. The Review Group shall also be empowered to assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC Ad Hoc Groups, as appropriate.

The membership of the Review Group shall include:

- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman);
- The representative of the Secretary of State;
- The representative of the Secretary of Defense;
- The representative of the Director of Central Intelligence;
- The representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

C. The National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee shall consider:

1. Issues which are referred to it by the NSC Review Group.

^{2/} Discussed below.

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-3-

2. Matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas:

- which are of an operational nature ^{3/} (in distinction to matters involving a substantial security policy question); and
- on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach agreement, or which are of a broader nature than is suitable to any such group; and
- which do not require consideration at Presidential or NSC level; and
- which are then referred to it by the Secretary of State.

The results of NSC Under Secretaries Committee consideration of the matters listed in 2. above, will be submitted to the Secretary of State.

3. Other operational matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The membership of the Under Secretaries Committee shall include:

- The Under Secretary of State (Chairman);
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- The Director of Central Intelligence;
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

3/ Determination shall be made jointly by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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D. National Security Council Interdepartmental Groups

Existing Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the existing Political-Military Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State, are hereby reconstituted as part of the National Security Council structure. The Interdepartmental Groups shall perform the following functions: 1) discussion and decision on interdepartmental issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; 2) preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC; 3) preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for review by the NSC.

The membership of the interdepartmental regional groups shall include the agencies represented on the NSC Review Group. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

E. National Security Council Ad Hoc Groups


When appropriate, I intend to appoint NSC Ad Hoc Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend regional boundaries.

* * * * *

The operational responsibility or authority of a Secretary over personnel from his Department serving on interdepartmental committees--including the authority to give necessary guidance to his representatives in the performance of interdepartmental group duties--is not limited by this NSDM. Nor does this NSDM limit the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State for those interdepartmental matters assigned to him by NSDM 3.

Copies of reports of the interdepartmental groups shall be transmitted to the heads of Departments and Agencies simultaneously with their submission to the NSC Review Group.

NSAM 341 is hereby rescinded.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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July 3, 1969

National Security Decision Memorandum 19

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Washington Special Actions Group

The President has directed that henceforth political-military contingency plans prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups in accordance with NSDM 8 shall be forwarded to the NSC Washington Special Actions Group. The Washington Special Actions Group was created by Presidential decision reported to you in my memorandum of May 16, 1969.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Declassified/Released on 12-7-88
under provisions of E.O. 12053 (F88-1665)
by N. Menan, National Security Council

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1969

National Security Decision Memorandum 2

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the National Security Council System

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct that the National Security Council system be reorganized as follows:

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

The functions, membership and responsibilities of the National Security Council shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The National Security Council shall be the principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The nature of the issues to be considered may range from current crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning.

The Council shall meet regularly, and discussion will--except in unusual circumstances--be limited to agenda subjects. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary

1/ The Director of Central Intelligence will brief the NSC on each agenda item prior to its consideration.

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under provisions of E.O. 12356 (F83-423)
by E. Rieger, National Security Council

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papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council Staff, as provided by law.

B. The National Security Council Review Group

An NSC Review Group is hereby established to examine papers prior to their submission to the NSC. These papers may be received from NSC Interdepartmental Groups^{2/}, from NSC Ad Hoc Groups^{2/}, or from Departments (at their discretion).

The role of the Review Group shall be to review papers to be discussed by the NSC to assure that: 1) the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention; 2) all realistic alternatives are presented; 3) the facts, including cost implications, and all department and agency views are fairly and adequately set out. The Review Group shall also be empowered to assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC Ad Hoc Groups, as appropriate.

The membership of the Review Group shall include:

- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman);
- The representative of the Secretary of State;
- The representative of the Secretary of Defense;
- The representative of the Director of Central Intelligence;
- The representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

C. The National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee shall consider:

1. Issues which are referred to it by the NSC Review Group.

^{2/} Discussed below.

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-3-

2. Matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas:

- which are of an operational nature ^{3/} (in distinction to matters involving a substantial security policy question); and
- on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach agreement, or which are of a broader nature than is suitable to any such group; and
- which do not require consideration at Presidential or NSC level; and
- which are then referred to it by the Secretary of State.

The results of NSC Under Secretaries Committee consideration of the matters listed in 2. above, will be submitted to the Secretary of State.

3. Other operational matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The membership of the Under Secretaries Committee shall include:

- The Under Secretary of State (Chairman);
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- The Director of Central Intelligence;
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

3/ Determination shall be made jointly by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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D. National Security Council Interdepartmental Groups

Existing Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the existing Political-Military Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State, are hereby reconstituted as part of the National Security Council structure. The Interdepartmental Groups shall perform the following functions: 1) discussion and decision on interdepartmental issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; 2) preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC; 3) preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for review by the NSC.

The membership of the interdepartmental regional groups shall include the agencies represented on the NSC Review Group. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

E. National Security Council Ad Hoc Groups

When appropriate, I intend to appoint NSC Ad Hoc Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend regional boundaries.

* * * * *

The operational responsibility or authority of a Secretary over personnel from his Department serving on interdepartmental committees--including the authority to give necessary guidance to his representatives in the performance of interdepartmental group duties--is not limited by this NSDM. Nor does this NSDM limit the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State for those interdepartmental matters assigned to him by NSDM 3.

Copies of reports of the interdepartmental groups shall be transmitted to the heads of Departments and Agencies simultaneously with their submission to the NSC Review Group.

NSAM 341 is hereby rescinded.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

July 3, 1969

National Security Decision Memorandum 19

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Washington Special Actions Group

The President has directed that henceforth political-military contingency plans prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups in accordance with NSDM 8 shall be forwarded to the NSC Washington Special Actions Group. The Washington Special Actions Group was created by Presidential decision reported to you in my memorandum of May 16, 1969.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Declassified/Released on 12-7-88
under provisions of E.O. 12065 (F88-1665)
by N. Menan, National Security Council

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

January 20, 1969

National Security Decision Memorandum 1

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Administrator of the Agency for
 International Development
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of the US Information Agency
 The Director of the Office of Emergency
 Preparedness
 The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT: Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda
 Series

At the direction of the President, the following two memoranda series are hereby established to inform the Departments and Agencies of Presidential action:

- National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM)
This series shall be used to report Presidential decisions (whether the result of NSC meetings or appropriate consultation with the Department head concerned).
- National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM)
This series shall be used to direct that studies be undertaken (normally for NSC consideration).

* * * * *

The National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) series is hereby abolished. An NSDM to be issued shortly will describe the status of existing NSAMs.

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Declassified/Released on 12-1-88
under provisions of E.O. 12065 (F88-1665)
by N. Menan, National Security Council

Note:

The Kennedy-Johnson organization is not well documented, at least in NSC's policy or institutional files.

Attached are excerpts from Bromley K. Smith's Study on NSC Structure.

UNCLASSIFIEDCOPY NO. 25

RECORD OF ACTIONS
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
at its
FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING
held on
February 1, 1961
(Approved by the President on February 2, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting. The secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Director-designate, U. S. Information Agency, the Under Secretary of State, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, and the Military Aide to the President attended the meeting. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, attended the meeting for NSC Actions Nos. 2396 and 2397.

→ 2401.

ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that in response to the President's desires a different organization and procedures would henceforth be used in the work of the National Security Council, involving fewer and smaller staff groups composed of more senior personnel. Policy recommendations would be brought to the NSC without being obscured by inter-agency processing but with adequate previous consultation and the presentation of counter-proposals. The preparation of such recommendations would require the full cooperation of all agencies in providing access to essential information.

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDA (NSAM)

In the early days of the Kennedy Administration, a large amount of the president's national security business was carried on with the departments and agencies by means of memoranda or "minutes." These papers became institutionalized as National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM). The first six NSAMs were written by Bundy following the first National Security Council meeting. Reflecting presidential decisions, they supplemented and later replaced NSC Records of Action. During the eight years of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, there were 372 NSAMs — 272 in the years 1961–1963 and 100 in the years 1963–1969.

President Kennedy signed 94 NSAMs. In the beginning, he dictated "minutes" to his secretary who dispatched them directly to the secretaries or agency heads concerned. Copies were later retrieved from the recipients or from the president's secretary, given an NSAM number by the NSC staff and circulated to the original addressees and other offices as appropriate. A numbered follow-up system was thus gradually established.

The majority of NSAMs, however, were written and signed by Bundy, usually in the President's name after clearance with him. Most were classified.

NSAMs covered almost every aspect of national security business. Some were specific instructions to department and agency heads and in one case, to Bundy himself. Others requested that specific studies be undertaken. Some were presidential questions which required answers from the bureaucracy. Others created task forces or interdepartmental committees. Some asked for recommendations on revised or new programs and still others were presidential statements of national security policy.

In August 1961, Secretary Rusk explained to Senator Jackson that careful records were made of presidential decision.

- Our present practice is to put these matters in writing so the responsible departments will better be able to follow up on the action to be taken. But some care has to be taken not to let their action papers get imprisoned, because those very pieces of paper themselves need constant monitoring to be sure they continue to be relevant to the situation. ...Mr. Bundy, for example, after a meeting at the White House, circulates a note to make clear to everybody exactly what was decided. If there are differences of understanding as to what was decided, that is straightened out.

During the Johnson Administration, NSAMs became more limited. A footnote in President Johnson's autobiography reads: "A National Security Action Memorandum was a formal notification to the head of a department or other government agency informing him of a presidential decision in the field of national security affairs and generally requiring follow-up action by the department or agency addressed."

INTERIM REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM, SEPTEMBER 1961

In July 1961, Senator Jackson wrote to McGeorge Bundy informing him that the Senate sub-committee on National Policy Machinery was bringing to a close "its nonpartisan study of how our Government can best staff and organize itself to develop and carry out the kind of national security policies required to meet the challenge of world communism." The Senator asked whether the present Administration could furnish official memoranda which would be the current equivalent of memoranda given us by the Eisenhower Administration.

Bundy replied on September 4 by giving an interim report on how the Kennedy Administration had changed the previous national security system. There is no more authoritative description of the new system, including not only the Council but also its staff, than this reply which reads in part:

This Administration has been revising these arrangements [the large and complex series of processes of the previous Administration] to fit the needs of a new President, but the work of revision is far from done, and it is too soon for me to report with any finality upon the matters about which you ask.

Much of what you have been told in the reports of the previous Administration about the legal framework and concept of the Council remains true today. There has been no recent change in the National Security Act of 1947. Nor has there been any change in the basic and decisive fact that the Council is advisory only. Decisions are made by the President.

Finally, there has been no change in the basic proposition that, in the language of Robert Cutler, 'the Council is a vehicle for a President to use in accordance with its suitability to his plans for conducting his great office.' As Mr. Cutler further remarked, 'a peculiar virtue of the National Security Act is its flexibility,' and 'each President may use the Council as he finds most suitable at a given time.' It is within the spirit of this doctrine that a new process of using the NSC is developing.

The specific changes which have occurred are three. First, the NSC meets less often than it did. There were 16 meetings in the first 6 months of the Kennedy Administration. Much that used to flow routinely to the weekly meetings of the Council is now settled in other ways—by separate meetings with the President, by letters, by written memoranda, and at levels below that of the President. President Kennedy has preferred to call meetings of the NSC only after determining that a particular issue is ready for discussion in this particular forum.

I know you share my understanding that the National Security Council has never been and should never become the only instrument of counsel and decision

available to the President in dealing with the problems of our national security. The National Security Council is one instrument among many; it must never be made an end in itself.

But for certain issues of great moment, the NSC is indeed valuable. President Kennedy has used it for discussion of basic national policy toward a number of countries. He has used it both for advice on particular pressing decisions and for recommendations on long-term policy. As new attitudes develop within the Administration, and as new issues arise in the world, the NSC is likely to continue as a major channel through which broad issues of national security policy come forward for Presidential decision.

Meanwhile, the President continues to meet at very frequent intervals with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other officials closely concerned with problems of national security. Such meetings may be as large as an NSC meeting or as small as a face-to-face discussion with a single Cabinet officer. What they have in common is that a careful record is kept, in the appropriate way, whenever a decision is reached. Where primary responsibility falls clearly to a single Department, the primary record of such decisions will usually be made through the Department. Where the issue is broader, or where the action requires continued White House attention, the decision will be recorded through the process of the National Security Council. Thus the business of the National Security Council staff goes well beyond what is treated in formal meetings of the National Security Council. It is our purpose, in cooperation with other Presidential staff officers, to meet the President's staff needs throughout the national security area.

The second and more significant change in the administration of the National Security Council and its subordinate agencies is the abolition by Executive Order 10920 of the Operations Coordinating Board. This change needs to be understood both for what it is and for what it is not. It is not in any sense a downgrading of the tasks of coordination and follow-up; neither is it an abandonment of Presidential responsibility for these tasks. It is rather a move to eliminate an instrument that does not match the style of operation and coordination of the current Administration.

From the point of view of the new Administration, the decisive difficulty in the OCB was that without unanimity it had no authority. No one of its eight members had authority over any other. It was never a truly Presidential instrument, and its practices were those of a group of able men attempting, at the second and third levels of Government, to keep large departments in reasonable harmony with each other. Because of good will among its members, and unusual administrative skill in its secretariat, it did much useful work; it also had weaknesses. But its most serious weakness, for the new Administration, was simply that neither the President himself nor the present Administration as a whole conceives of operational coordination as a task for a large committee in which no one man has authority. It was and is our belief that there is much to be done that the OCB could not do, and that the things it did do can be done as well or better in other ways.

The most important of these other ways is an increased reliance on the leadership of the Department of State. The President has made it very clear that he does not want a large separate organization between him and his Secretary of State. Neither does he wish any question to arise as to the clear authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department, and not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid and information policy, but also as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations.

The third change in the affairs of the NSC grows out of the first two and has a similar purpose. We have deliberately rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation which governed the administrative structure of the NSC staff in the last Administration. This distinction, real enough at the extremes of the daily cable traffic and long-range assessment of future possibilities, breaks down in most of the business of decision and action. This is especially true at the level of Presidential action.

Mr. Bundy concluded his letter by saying: "I have been conscious... of the limits which are imposed upon me by the need to avoid classified questions, and still more by the requirement that the President's own business be treated in confidence."

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

By September 1961, McGeorge Bundy, the new president's special assistant for national security affairs, had revised the mission and replaced the personnel of the National Security Council's staff. In his letter to Senator Jackson referred to earlier, Bundy stated that the NSC staff, "which is essentially a presidential instrument, should be composed of men who can serve equally well in the process of planning and in that of operational follow-up. The President's interests and purposes can be better served if the staff officer who keeps in daily touch with operations in a given area is also the officer who acts for the White House staff in related planning activities."

As to the role of the Presidential staff as a whole in national security affairs, Bundy said this staff would be smaller than it was in the last Administration and "more closely knit." "The president uses in these areas a number of officers holding White House appointment, and a number of others holding appointments on the National Security Council staff. He also uses extensively the staff of the Bureau of the Budget. These men are all staff officers. Their job is to help the President, not to supersede or supplement any of the high officials who hold line responsibilities in the executive departments and agencies. Their task is that of all staff officers: to extend the range and enlarge the direct effectiveness of the man they serve. ..."

One major change gradually developed which greatly increased the responsibilities of the NSC staff. Bundy took over the management of the president's day-to-day foreign policy and national security business. This activity had been handled for President Eisenhower by the White House Staff Secretary while the special assistant dealt primarily with longer-range Council papers and Council meetings.

In 1953, the mission of the career NSC staff had been set out in the report written by Robert Cutler and approved by President Eisenhower. Part of the enlarged NSC staff was a small special staff with specific duties such as independent analysis and review of each Planning Board report before its submission to the Council; continuous examination of the totality of national security policies with a view to determining if gaps existed which should be filled and if important issues or anticipated developments were sufficiently explored; and continuing integrated evaluation of the capabilities of the free world versus the capabilities of the Soviet and Satellites and estimates of the situation, in order to bring such evaluations and estimates before the Council. As envisaged by Cutler, the entire NSC staff, beginning with the Executive Secretary on down, would be career personnel, but the Special Assistant, as a political figure, would go out with each administration.

The staff emphasis in the 1950s was on the formulation and coordination of foreign and national security policy for Council and presidential consideration. Bundy made clear that the business of the revised national security staff would go well beyond what would be treated in formal meetings of the Council. "It is our purpose," he wrote,

"in cooperation with other Presidential staff officers, to meet the President's staff needs throughout the national security area."

The mission of the NSC staff as described by Bundy remained much the same during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. The staff's work went to the presidents through the special assistants and almost always in the name of Bundy or later Walt Rostow. Four officers handled the four geographic areas corresponding to State Department regional offices. Functional policies were handled by additional officers. Daily staff meetings kept all staff officers informed of their colleagues' work and permitted the special assistant to manage the entire operation. Because the Council was used less, the special assistants spent a great deal of their time, and that of the staff, in arranging and preparing meetings for the president on specific national security issues which were not formal Council meetings.

The special assistants and the NSC staff played the dominant role in activities which were uniquely presidential such as summit conferences, visits of foreign heads of state to Washington, trips of the presidents abroad and correspondence with heads of foreign states. Approval of presidential instructions to heads of delegations was another area of intense activity. Arms control, nuclear testing, NATO meetings—all required presidential guidance for U.S. negotiators.

Only rarely did the special assistants and NSC staff officers engage directly in implementing policies. They were considered and considered themselves to be presidential staff officers, giving advice or becoming line officers only when asked by the president.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS — EXCOM

The October–November 1962 Cuban crisis was a major test of the system President Kennedy used when dealing with national security problems. The first phase of the operation, October 15–20, involved the procedures used in getting intelligence to the President and in preparing recommendations to him for formal consideration before decision.

Photographic evidence of the construction of Soviet offensive missiles sites in Cuba reached ranking government officials late in the evening of October 15. The following morning, before the President began his working day, Bundy summarized for him the intelligence community's findings. For the next four weeks, the President received every day, and sometimes twice a day, either written summaries of the photographic "readout" or enlarged pictures of the Soviet sites under construction in Cuba. During the last two weeks of October, the United States Intelligence Board produced numerous estimates covering many subjects such as the impact in Latin America and worldwide of the deployment to Cuba of Soviet missiles.

The planning of the U.S. response to the mounting evidence of the Soviet missile deployment began Tuesday morning, October 16. A working senior committee of advisers comprising the President's *de facto* choice of individuals was established. During four days, these officials, meeting sometimes off-the-record with the President, but often in the State Department without him, drafted alternative ways of dealing with the problem, including lists of political, military and economic actions to be taken under each alternative. The group included the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. Because the planning had reached the point of presidential decision and because additional evidence of the rapidity of the Soviet missile build-up was at hand, the group asked the President to meet with them on October 20. The President, on an out-of-town trip which he had not cancelled, in an effort to keep secret the existence of a crisis, returned to Washington feigning a minor illness.

On the afternoon of October 20, a secret meeting of the National Security Council was held in the White House, thus initiating the second organizational phase of the Cuban crisis. This meeting, presided over by the President, was opened with a visual presentation of the extensive photographic evidence resulting from the increased number of reconnaissance missions flown over Cuba during the preceding days. Papers outlining the alternative responses to the Soviet initiative, including argumentation in support of each, were presented and discussed in detail.

A second meeting of the NSC, held on Sunday, October 21, centered on the draft of a speech in which the President would inform the American people of the

situation—their first knowledge of it—and of his plan of action. Numerous policy decisions were made by the President in the course of agreeing on the specific wording of the draft. A detailed diplomatic plan, including our tactics in the United Nations, consultations with the Organization of American States, with NATO and with other Allies, non-committed or neutral, was presented and discussed. Military questions were raised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense and discussed by the Council.

The third NSC meeting, held October 22, reviewed the measures already taken to place the military forces in a posture to respond to any contingency as well as to carry out any course of action decided by the President. The objectives of the response to the Soviet action were decided upon, the mechanics of a possible quarantine were settled, consultations with Congressional leaders and other national leaders were agreed upon, and public information guidelines were approved.

By action of the President on October 22, the informal group working on the Cuban problem was formally established as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, usually referred to as EXCOM. The President's memorandum reads:

"I hereby establish, for the purpose of effective conduct of the operations of the Executive Branch in the current crisis, an Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This committee will meet, until further notice, daily at 10:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. I shall act as Chairman of this committee and its additional regular members will be as follows: the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ambassador-at-Large, the Special Counsel and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The first meeting of this committee will be held at the regular hour on Tuesday, October 23rd, at which point further arrangements with respect to its management and operation will be decided."

Additional officials who regularly were invited to attend later EXCOM meetings included the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Counselor of the State Department, and the Executive Secretary of the NSC. Numerous other officials attended some meetings. Among these were the Assistant Secretaries of State for Inter-American Affairs, for International Organization Affairs, and for Public Affairs; the President's Press Secretary and the U.S. Representative to the UN.

To facilitate the work of EXCOM, three interdepartmental sub-committees were established. The first, chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze, worked on Berlin contingencies. The second, chaired by the Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, Walt W. Rostow, did advance planning, and the third, chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, William H. Orrick, Jr., addressed itself to establishing an effective worldwide communications system to meet the requirements of a crisis.

On October 29, after the Russians had agreed to withdraw their missiles from Cuba, the President established a coordinating committee to give full time to matters involved in concluding the Cuban crisis. It served as a link between EXCOM and the negotiations underway in New York with the Soviet representatives and with the Acting Secretary General of the UN. John J. McCloy, a member of the U.S. Mission to the UN, was named Chairman. Other members were the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. After the crisis was over, it was dissolved by the President on January 11, 1963, along with the two other sub-committees of EXCOM, the Sub-committee for Berlin Contingencies and the Sub-committee on Advance Planning.

EXCOM meetings usually began with an intelligence briefing by the CIA Director. In addition, the latest intelligence on the Cuban situation was circulated in writing by means of a "Crisis Memorandum" prepared especially for EXCOM. The intelligence material often gave rise to policy discussions.

Next on the committee's regular agenda was a report by the Secretary of State on political developments. Discussion and presidential decisions on diplomatic matters usually followed.

Military questions were then raised by the Secretary of Defense. Operational problems involved in carrying out the Cuban quarantine and in conducting aerial reconnaissance were presented and decided.

The remainder of each meeting was spent on a wide variety of crisis problems as diverse as directives to USIA, curtailing the "leaking" of information to the press, and civil defense preparations.

EXCOM met with the President 42 times from the date of its creation, October 22, until it ceased operations on March 29, 1963. During the first month, when it dealt only with the Cuban crisis, it met 30 times. Although the Vice President was an active participant, he presided, at the President's request, at only one meeting and then, only until the President arrived. For one meeting, EXCOM members flew to Hyannis Port to meet with the President.

Bundy, who was given total responsibility by the President for the operation of EXCOM, made this half-serious comment in a speech in 1963. "I have sometimes thought that my own principal contribution in those days was to see to it that a large amount of carefully prepared and excellent advice did not get to the President. It is very easy, when a government is full of able and energetic men, for any officer to be so overwhelmed with good advice that he has no time to think his own thoughts and hammer out his own decisions."

The only subjects dealt with by EXCOM, other than Cuba, were policies toward Brazil, the Congo, Europe, and South Asia; the multilateral nuclear European force, and Assistant Secretary of State Harriman's mission to India and Pakistan. Even these subjects were discussed at meetings which also dealt with Cuba. One subject, the reappraisal of policy toward Europe, started out in EXCOM but ended up being discussed in a formal NSC meeting.

Several times, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cabinet secretaries suggested that the EXCOM be used to deal with other major problems. In August 1963, both

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara thought that EXCOM should be reconstituted. However, in a memorandum to the President, Bundy recommended against their suggestion. He wrote: "EXCOM, with you and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on hand, is a good instrument for major interdepartmental decision. It is not so good for lesser matters of coordination, and it has not proved effective at all, except during the extraordinary week of October 16-22 (sic), in the process of forward planning."

THE NSC STANDING GROUP

At the end of the first year of the Kennedy Administration, Bundy set up a group, under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to "organize and monitor the work of the National Security Council and to take up such other matters as may be presented to the group by its members." The group, meeting weekly in the White House Situation Room, was regularly composed of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Executive Secretary of the NSC was to participate in the work of the group and organize its staffing. Depending on the agenda, representatives of other agencies of the government would be invited to participate.

The group met 15 times between January 1962 and August 1962 during its eight-month life. Its usefulness varied, but lack of driving support from the State Department representative resulted in a rather desultory life. It dealt with policy issues for countries such as Algeria, the Congo, Angola, Syria, Iran, Korea, and Japan. It discussed papers on functional subjects such as nuclear testing, civil aviation policy toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc, US-USSR cooperation in outer space, export trade policy and the military aid program.

The following Spring, April 1963, the Standing Group was revived, but about all that remained the same as the earlier group was the name and the weekly meeting place—the White House Situation Room. Bundy became chairman and the membership was expanded.

In a preliminary memorandum to the President in early April 1963, Bundy called the new organization the "Plans and Operations Committee of the National Security Council." The name soon changed to the Standing Committee, and finally the earlier name was revived—the NSC Standing Group. Bundy presented the organizational plan to the President this way:

As you know, there has been considerable discussion in recent months of the need for strengthening interdepartmental planning and coordination on major national security issues. ...I have talked at some length with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, Averell Harriman, and others, in an effort to find a new pattern which would help in both planning and operations. I have come out with the following guidelines:

- One new committee should be responsible for planning and operations at the level short of your own controlling judgment. We have done well in this Administration not to let planning get separated from the responsibility for action, and vice versa. ...We should not abandon this principle now.
- The committee should be established at a sufficiently senior level so that it is not merely a staff exercise. In my judgment, this means that with four

exceptions its membership should be parallel to that of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. It should include such men as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, Ed Murrow (USIA), John McCone (CIA) and probably (General) Max Taylor. The people it should *not* include, in my judgment, are the President and Vice President, and the two Cabinet officers with a final responsibility for policy advice to you, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

Neither of these two Cabinet officers can speak in committee without engaging the whole weight of a great advisory department, and both of them have preferred not to be pinned to any procedure in which their direct responsibilities to you might somehow be absorbed in a committee process.

- The Plans and Operations Committee should be chaired from the White House, presumably by me, but it should rely mainly upon State, Defense and CIA for staff work. For this reason, it is of the greatest importance that the State representative be a man with a broad and continuous operational responsibility, but also with time and energy for this particular assignment. ...
- The committee should meet weekly, and it should have as little continuing infrastructure as possible. Except for State, Defense, and CIA—its members should attend as individuals and not as representatives of agencies. If a man cannot come, in other words, no one automatically comes in his place—except in the case of State, Defense and CIA, where the departments simply have to be included.

My recommendation is that its initial composition should be as follows:

- The political Under Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Director for State, Defense and CIA, respectively; the following as members by your personal appointment: Douglas Dillon, Robert Kennedy, Edward Murrow, Dave Bell (Budget), Maxwell Taylor, Theodore Sorensen, and (Ambassador-at-Large) Llewellyn Thompson. The chairman of this committee should be myself, and its administrative support should be provided by Bromley Smith.
- The Plans and Operations Committee should *not* occupy itself with business better handled through other channels. In particular, it should not try to get on the cables or to replace the manifold arrangements through which your own executive business is now conducted. Still less should it be concerned with matters of daily Departmental operation. It should, instead, be alert to planning problems that are a little less ripe than today's required decisions—like Cuba a year from now—or China in 1965. It should serve as a ready medium for review of ongoing programs with strongly interdepartmental aspects: I think of overseas base planning, of counter-insurgency support, and of information policy as examples. It should be used for occasional discursive review of drastic alternatives to existing policy, and its members should be encouraged to table unorthodox ideas for such review. It would be a logical place for occasional review of intelligence estimates in progress, from the point of view of their relevance to plans and operations.

Ten days later, Bundy reported to the President that the establishment of the committee had been agreed around town and would begin operations in a week. "...We intend to have absolutely no publicity about it in order to avoid useless chatter about seizing the initiative from the State Department or restoring the OCB, or otherwise reorganizing ourselves in the spring of our discontent."

At the organizing meeting, Bundy outlined the Group's area of work as (a) planning problems—and longer range, and (b) review of on-going programs, such as overseas base planning and information policy.

In the final list of members, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large were deleted while the Administrator of AID was added. The Secretary of the Treasury was concerned about being a member of a committee which included the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, so he was replaced as a member by the Under Secretary of the Treasury.

Only members were to attend meetings. A maximum of one or two experts could be invited during discussions involving their expertise. A representative of an agency not on the committee could be invited if the subject for discussion was of primary interest to that agency, such as the Atomic Energy Commission or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

At its second meeting, when the subject of Cuba was on the agenda, the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury attended as did the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America.

The group spent most of its time dealing with interdepartmental papers which were on their way to the President for decision. Nine full meetings and parts of two more involved policy and programs toward Cuba. Other subjects were Spanish bases, the test ban treaty, Israeli arms, Iran, Africa, military aid for India and Pakistan.

As once before, the Group meetings declined in number and its work was taken over by informal *ad hoc* committees.

TUESDAY LUNCHEON MEETINGS

Early in the Johnson Administration there developed alongside the NSC system an informal grouping which came to be known as the Tuesday lunch. Never formally established by Executive Order or presidential memorandum, it grew out of the President's desire to discuss major national security and related political issues with the small number of officials responsible for carrying out his policies in this field.

The first luncheon meeting was held in the second floor sitting room and adjoining family dining room of the White House in August 1964. Joining the President were only the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Further luncheons were scheduled irregularly at first with month-long lapses, but later, almost every Tuesday, sometimes immediately following scheduled NSC meetings. Over the years, several other officials were regularly invited, including the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's press secretary and, in the final years, a presidential aide who took full notes of the discussions for the President's use only.

From the beginning there was an agenda for each meeting prepared by the Special Assistant which included items suggested by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Only decisions were reported to aides of the two Secretaries—not details of the discussions.

President Johnson preferred the smaller grouping of the luncheons to the larger formal NSC meetings, one reason being that there were no leaks to the press of what went on. Although Vietnam was very often on the agenda, many other national security decisions were taken by the President after a discussion at lunch. In fact, the NSC during the Johnson Administration dealt primarily with upcoming problems, while the luncheons discussed immediate presidential decisions.

NSC AS MANAGED BY ROSTOW

From April 1966 to the end of the Johnson Administration, the use of the NSC machinery was decided in large part by Walt W. Rostow, who had replaced Bundy as the President's special assistant for national security affairs.

Rostow believed that formal NSC meetings served a variety of purposes, such as those to formalize a decision already arrived at by the president; to hear a report from a returning Ambassador or special emissary; or to debate an issue which the president would soon have to decide. He concluded that "there were two kinds of NSC meetings to be avoided. First, a meeting on an important matter at which the president would be under pressure to make a major decision. A formal session in the Cabinet Room with some dozen men around the table and another dozen or more behind them along the walls is not a good setting for a final decision." The second kind to be avoided was "a session dealing with problems that might be interesting and important but on which the president was not likely to have to act soon, if ever. A president generally dislikes using his scarce working time, and that of his senior advisers, for formal meetings that have no operational content."

"...I suggested to Johnson that the NSC be used primarily for generating and exposing a series of major problems on which decisions would be required of the President, not at the moment but in some foreseeable time period. Johnson agreed. Some 20 NSC meetings of this anticipatory type were held. They proved useful in forcing the departments to present a coherent picture of a problem and of the alternatives confronting the President as seen in the bureaucracy. Even more important was the chance to hear the President's initial reactions and to reshape staff work, if necessary.

"Typical NSC meetings of this type were, for example: a review of developments in Indonesia over the previous year in anticipation of the annual meeting at The Hague of countries assisting economic development in Indonesia; a review of the food-population balance in the world over a ten-year period—a review which, in fact, once led to a decision on the spot to expand United States wheat acreage. ..."

THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT'S ROLE — 1969

The role of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs varied with each of the two Presidents and with each of the two officers who held that position from 1961 to 1969. In the Eisenhower Administration, the assistant and the NSC staff provided staff support to the President. In the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the assistants and the staff took on many additional responsibilities as directed by the Presidents.

A summary of the duties of the special assistant and the NSC staff as seen from the White House in the final year of the Johnson Administration reveals how much had changed in eight years.

I. Operation of the National Security Council

- A. Organizing Council meetings, e.g., drawing up the agenda, arranging intelligence presentations, recording decisions.
- B. Reviewing departmental papers presented for discussion.
- C. Briefing the president on the substance of the scheduled discussion.

II. Interdepartmental National Security Committees

- A. Tuesday luncheon meeting--prepared agenda, attends meeting and follows through on actions taken.
- B. Chairman of the following groups:
 - 1. Intelligence Coordinating Committee
 - 2. Underground nuclear tests committee
- C. White House representative on the following groups:
 - 1. Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)
 - 2. Vietnam cabinet-level group
 - 3. Disarmament cabinet-level group (Committee of Principals)
- D. Organization and management of presidential committees or certain task forces, such as the Presidential Consultants on Foreign Policy.

III. Working with Presidential Consultants and Advisors

- A. Advisory groups such as the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
- B. Individuals such as General Taylor, special consultant on Vietnam.

IV. Visits of Foreign Government Leaders

- A. Supervising the substantive preparations for presidential discussions with heads of state, heads of governments, and other ranking officials visiting Washington.
- B. Meeting with foreign officials the president is unable to see when the State Department so recommends.

V. Working with U.S. Government Officials

- A. Interviewing U.S. Ambassadors and other U.S. officials in Washington on official business.
- B. Organizing substantive preparations for presidential visits abroad.
- C. Relaying to officials presidential instructions and requests.
- D. Follow-up on presidential instructions.
- E. Participating in cabinet-level discussions on national security problems prior to meetings with the president.

VI. Supervising Presidential Correspondence with Leaders of Foreign Governments

- A. Private communications with heads of major powers.
- B. Supervision of exchange of correspondence with leaders of smaller powers.

VII. Assignments as Presidential Agent

- A. As a member of an interdepartmental negotiating team, e.g., trip to the Dominican Republic.
- B. As a member of a presidential inspection group, e.g., trip to South Vietnam.
- C. As a member of party accompanying the president on a foreign trip, e.g., European trip.
- D. Confidential assignments involving meetings with private individuals.
- E. Assignments involving meetings with Congressmen and Senators.

VIII. Papers for the President

- A. Preparation of summary information memoranda recommending a presidential meeting or outlining courses of action needing discussion.
- B. Preparation of analytical memoranda on the policy recommendations of Departments and Agencies requiring presidential decision.
- C. Writing substantive contributions to draft presidential speeches.

IX. Press, Radio and TV

- A. Receiving U.S. and foreign correspondents for background interviews.
- B. Assisting in substantive preparations for presidential press conferences and presidential press statements.
- C. Public appearances as an Administration spokesman on national security policy.

X. Direction of NSC Staff

- A. Presides over tri-weekly meetings of senior NSC staff officers for discussion of current problems and planning of staff work.
- B. Receives formal as well as oral reports from staff officers on problems which may require presidential attention. To make these reports, senior officers keep in close touch with officers at the assistant secretary level in the Department of State, AID and the Department of Defense. Each senior officer keeps up-to-date on all problems involving his geographic or functional area.
- C. Reviews and signs for transmittal to the president memoranda and recommendations prepared for him by senior staff officers.
- D. Assigns to staff officers special projects which may arise out of a presidential request for information on a specific situation.

XI. Information and Intelligence for the President

- A. Supervision of the White House Situation Room.
- B. Selecting and monitoring materials for presidential reading.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: ✓ Adapting the National Security Council Organization to
Existing Needs

Without altering the President's present methods of carrying out his work in the international field, there is need to make the following changes in the existing National Security Council machinery.

1. The National Security Council

- ✓ a. The Council will meet regularly, at least every other week, with a formal agenda set as far in advance as possible.
- ✓ b. The participants will be more-or-less the same as those who have attended recent meetings. An effort will be made to reduce the size of these meetings.
- ✓ c. The record of actions of the meeting will continue to be a short, specific directive which assigns actions approved by the President to the appropriate department and agency heads. There will be no other NSC documents.

2. National Security Council Deputies

The existing Thursday informal luncheon meeting would be converted into a formal group and responsible for facilitating the making and carrying out of Presidential decisions in the international field.

- a. The membership will be generally the same as that of the Council but the representatives of the departments and agencies will be at the Under Secretary level, nominated by the departments ✓ but named by the President. The Director of AID should also be

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Authority: EO 12065
Date: 6/21/79
By: B. Zweiben
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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a full participant. Council advisers (the Directors of CIA and USIA, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs) would sit with the Deputies or name alternates.

Others would be invited to participate in the Deputies meetings when problems of special concern to them were under consideration. ✓ For example, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Chairman of Economic Advisers, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

✓ b. The Deputies would be chaired by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as the President's representative. Other White House staff members would participate in the consideration of papers of interest to them. For example, the Deputy Special Assistant ✓ for National Security Affairs and the Military Representative of the President.

c. The functions of the Deputies would be as follows:

- (1) Act as a steering group for the Council;
- (2) { Review situation reports, status reports and planning studies and National Intelligence Estimates to recommend which should be presented to the Council and which should serve as the basis for Presidential decisions.
- (3) Provide for the monitoring of follow-up actions taken by the departments and agencies in response to Presidential decisions;
- (4) Recommend to the President the creation of temporary Ad Hoc Task Forces to meet urgent requirements for governmental action in specific situations, including approval of terms of reference of such groups; (see below)
- (5) Meet jointly each month with the Planning Group.
(See below)

3. Special Projects Group of the Deputies would be composed of the Military Representative of the President as Chairman, the Special Assistant

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for National Security Affairs, the State and Defense Department Deputies, and the Director of Central Intelligence. This group would coordinate and supervise certain activities authorized by the National Security Council.

4. The Planning Group

The weekly informal planning luncheons would be continued under the guidance of the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs. In general, the Group's present operations would continue unchanged. Its papers and suggestions would be closely related to, or provide the basis for policy recommendations being prepared for the Deputies for Council discussion and Presidential decision.

5. Task Forces

Under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretaries, Task Forces would operate in general as they now do. However, when their recommendations have been considered by the President, they would disband or be converted into Standing Groups.

All Task Force reports would be presented to the Deputies before being considered by the Council. The Deputies would not approve the paper, thereby committing their departments and agencies, but would decide that the report and its recommendations were of sufficient importance to be presented to the President, directly or through the NSC, and was in such form as to facilitate the President's decision.

NSC/White House representatives would closely follow the implementation of Presidential decisions made following consideration of Task Force reports.

6. Standing Groups

New interdepartmental groups would be created by the President on the recommendation of the Deputies. Such groups would be directed by a full time Chairman and be established on a continuing basis to deal with major problems, i. e., Vietnam. The new name is used to distinguish such groups from temporary Task Forces and to permit a different type of organization and membership required by the continuing nature of a major problem. The terms of reference of such groups would state what reports should be made by the Standing Group.

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The above changes require Presidential support even though his method of dealing with international affairs would be affected only slightly. The purpose of the changes would be to help the departments respond better to Presidential direction as well as to improve ways of ensuring that Presidential decisions in the international field are carried out in a consistent manner.

Bromley Smith

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C O P Y

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

March 17, 1953



Dear Mr. Cutler:

I am returning your letter to me dated March 16, 1953, with its enclosed report of recommendations regarding the National Security Council. I understand that in the preparation of this report you have had the assistance of the Director and Staff of the Bureau of the Budget and of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization.

I approve both your letter and the recommendations, and direct that they be circulated promptly to the Council for information and guidance.

Please call the special attention of Council Members to Part VI of the Report ("Planning Board of the Council"). It is my wish that you bring to me as soon as you conveniently can the names of persons nominated by department and agency heads as Members or Advisers of the Planning Board, who are approved by you, so that I can decide on their appointments and the Planning Board can begin to function. I place great emphasis on the selection of men of high calibre for these positions, able to devote plenty of time to their Planning Board functions; for thereby the Council will be better able to operate promptly and effectively.

You will submit the appropriate budget amendments for FY 1954 to the Bureau of the Budget and take up with Mr. Steffan the arrangement for necessary space in the Executive Offices Building, capable of being made into a restricted security area.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

Mr. Robert Cutler
The White House

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

7 Return to Robert
Cutler
White House

March 17, 1953



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Recommendations Regarding the National
Security Council

At the direction of the President his enclosed letter and its attachments consisting of a memorandum for the President from Mr. Cutler and his report on the subject are circulated herewith for the information and guidance of the National Security Council. Special attention is called to the third paragraph of the President's letter, about which Mr. Cutler will confer with you individually.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Acting Director of Defense Mobilization
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Bureau of the Budget

DFJ
FOI 79-145

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Declassified/Released on Nov 30, 1981
By the National Security Council
under provisions of E.O. 12065
by Brenda Reger EO-81217

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16 March 1953

REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS
RELATIVE TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Part I	Statutory Functions of the Council
Part II	The Council Machinery
Part III	Membership in the Council
Part IV	Council Meetings
Part V	Executive Officers of the Council
Part VI	Planning Board of the Council
Part VII	The NSC Staff
Part VIII	Estimated Council Budget
Part IX	Summary of Principal Recommendations

ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant to the President

Oct 1983
Declassified / Released on
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by B. Regier, National Security Council

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PART I. STATUTORY FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL

1. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes: (Title I) the National Security Council,* the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board; and (Title II) the National Military Establishment. The preamble to the Act declares "the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security...."

2. Title I of the Act, titled "Coordination for National Security," states the functions of the Council:

a. "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."

b. to perform "such other functions as the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security."

c. from time to time to "make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it seems appropriate or as the President may require."

Title I further states that "it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council:

a. to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

b. to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security,

*Since the 1949 amendment, the NSC has been a part of the Executive Office of the President.

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and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith."

3. Other parts of Title I provide that the Central Intelligence Agency is "under the direction of" the Council, and that the Atomic Energy Commission may communicate restricted data to other nations, provided that the President makes a determination based on a "written recommendation" of the Council.

4. Explicit or implicit in the governing statute are these basic concepts:

a. NSC deals only with issues affecting the national security;

b. NSC is advisory; by advice and recommendations to the President, it aids him to resolve the executive will;

c. NSC seeks to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies so as to enable Government agencies to cooperate more effectively in national security matters;

d. NSC acts, according to Presidential direction, to coordinate more effectively policies and functions of Government agencies relating to the national security;

e. NSC is concerned with both our actual and our potential military power;

f. NSC is not limited to areas of agency agreement; on its own initiative, NSC may seek out areas of agency conflict or omission to act, so as to present alternative or new courses of action for executive decision.

5. The Council is a mechanism to aid the President in formulating national security policy. In that area, it should perform whatever functions the President thinks will help him best. It is believed that a proper appreciation and application of the foregoing concepts will make the NSC operate effectively. No revision of the statutory statement of functions is required.

PART II. THE COUNCIL MACHINERY

The National Security Council now operates through the following mechanisms:

1. The Council itself

- a. Council Meetings
- b. Special Committee on Atomic Energy -
Secretary of State, Chairman
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- c. Special Committee on COMINT (Supervises USCIB)
Secretary of State, Chairman
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General (on matters affecting FBI)
- d. Ad hoc Committees and Consultants

2. The Council Staff Organization

- a. The Senior Staff
- b. The Permanent Staff

3. Advisory Committees appointed by the Council:

- a. Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference -

Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Chairman
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director of Special Investigations,
U.S. Air Force
(NSC Representative on Internal
Security - adviser)

- b. Interdepartmental Committee on Internal
Security -

Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, Chairman
Director, Office of Controls, State
Department

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Director, Continental U.S. Defense
Planning Group, Department of
Defense
Chief Coordinator, Treasury
Enforcement Agencies, Treasury
Department
(NSC Representative on Internal
Security - adviser)

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff:
 - a. "principal military advisers" to the NSC
5. The Central Intelligence Agency:
 - a. established "under" the Council
 - b. functions "under the direction of" the Council
 - c. intelligence adviser to the Council
6. Psychological Strategy Board:
 - a. reports to the Council on its activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned.

PART III. MEMBERSHIP IN THE COUNCIL

1. In order to make possible a genuine exchange of ideas and foster free discussion, there should not, as a general rule, be more than eight persons who have the right formally to participate as Council members. This number includes Statutory Members and standing-request and ad hoc Participant Members; but does not include Advisers, Observers, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and NSC Staff Members.

2. Statutory Members. An ideal statute would provide that the Council should consist of the President, the Vice-President, and such other Members as the President from time to time might designate. However, in view of legislative history and present circumstances, it may be practicable to amend the statute only by (a) eliminating the provision requiring Senate confirmation of persons additionally designated by the President to the Council, (b) adding the Secretary of the Treasury, (c) transferring the Council membership of the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (which Board is to be merged into ODM) to the Director of Defense Mobilization. It will be desirable for the immediately ensuing future that the functions of the Treasury, of Mutual Security, and of Defense Mobilization be represented on the Council, either through Statutory Membership or standing-request Participant Membership. Therefore, pending final decision as to statutory change, this report does not distinguish between Statutory and Permanent-Request Membership in stating those who regularly attend Council Meetings as follows:

President	Secretary of Defense
Vice President	Director for Mutual Security*
Secretary of State	Director of Defense Mobilization
Secretary of the Treasury	

3. Participant Members. In addition to Statutory Members, the President should be free to invite such other officials of Government to attend as Participant Members, as his convenience and the agenda items at a particular Meeting make desirable. Such invitations may be either on standing-request or ad hoc basis. A standing-request Participant Member attends all Meetings until the President otherwise

*The present title for the head of the Mutual Security function is used in this report. It is understood that this title may later be changed.

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decides. An ad hoc Participant Member attends only such Meeting, or part of a Meeting, as he may be specifically invited to attend.

4. Advisers, Observers, Staff. In addition to Statutory and Participant Members, there will be in attendance at each Council meeting the following persons who do not formally participate as Council Members:

a. Advisers: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ✓
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Special Assistant to the President
for Cold War Planning

b. Observers: Such person or persons as the President may desire to attend for the purpose of observing, but not participating, - like his Military Liaison Officer. Observers are not seated at the table.

c. Staff: Special Assistant to the President
Executive Secretary
Deputy Executive Secretary

5. a. Civilians without departmental responsibilities should not be invited to sit as Participant Members.

b. In order to bring to the Council deliberations a fresh, frequently-changing civilian point of view and to gain public understanding of national security problems through the use of civilians of stature, from time to time the President should appoint on an ad hoc basis one or more Civilian Consultants or small Civilian Committees as informal Advisers to the Council. This mechanism should be so used that no public impression arise that any persons or committees have been interposed between the President and his responsible Cabinet Ministers. Therefore, as a general rule, a Civilian Consultant should not formally participate in a Council Meeting and a Civilian Committee should appear at a Council Meeting only when its report is presented.

c. Examples of potential usefulness of Civilian Consultants or Civilian Committees -

(1) to consider and report to the Council on some specific new proposal or some long-range general project, after which its report would be reviewed by the departments and agencies concerned.

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(2) to review for the Council some proposal developed and recommended by the Policy Planning Board.

PART IV. COUNCIL MEETINGS

1. A regular Council Meeting time should be established and maintained, except in emergency or when omitted; such as Wednesdays from 10:30 a.m. until luncheon. Special Council Meetings should be called by the Special Assistant at the request of the President.

2. The agenda for a Council Meeting should be determined by the President, acting through the Special Assistant. Selectivity and discretion must be used in composing the agenda.

3. Each Statutory and Participant Member and each Adviser should attend every Council Meeting in person. If substitution is necessary, the identity of the substitute should be cleared with the Special Assistant before the Meeting in sufficient time for Presidential consideration.

4. If the President is unable to attend a Meeting, he should designate to preside in his place (in priority): The Vice-President; the Secretary of State. The Special Assistant never presides.

5. The President as Chairman should lead the discussion at Council Meetings. He should exercise that leadership by asking for views around the table so as to bring out conflicts and so as to create a sense of team participation among those present in making the policy which they must later carry out. The Presidential decision may be announced at a Meeting or upon further consideration of the recommendations made to him at such Meeting.

6. Members of the Congress should not be asked to attend meetings of the National Security Council.

PART V. EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF THE COUNCIL

1. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should be the principal executive officer of the National Security Council and should serve as Chairman of the Council's Planning Board. He should not have status as a Statutory or Participant Member or preside at Council Meetings. He should be appointed by the President on the White House Staff and compensated at \$20,000 a year.

2. There should be an Executive Secretary and a Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, appointed by the President and compensated respectively at \$15,000 and \$14,000 a year. Under the supervision of the Special Assistant, the Executive Secretary should be the head of the NSC Staff, act for the Special Assistant in his absence, and advise and aid him in the performance of his duties.

3. The principal duties of the Special Assistant should include:

a. Determination of agenda for, and presentation of material for discussion at, Council meetings.

b. Briefing the President during the afternoon before each Council Meeting on matters covered by the agenda, assisted by the Executive Secretary.

c. Determination of agenda and scheduling of work for Planning Board meetings.

d. Presiding at, and participating in, Planning Board meetings.

e. Responsibility for the rate of flow of work through the Planning Board, and the manner of presentation and quality of such work.

f. Appointment of ad hoc Staff groups and ad hoc Civilian or Civilian-Staff committees.

g. Bringing to the attention of the President, with recommendations for appropriate action, lack of progress on the part of an agency in carrying out a particular policy which has been assigned to it;

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where it is not possible to expedite performance at the Planning Board level.*

h. Supervision, through the Executive Secretary, of the work of the NSC Staff (See Part VII).

*The Council is an advisory, not an operational, body. It is not appropriate for its permanent Staff to follow-up on policy performance, beyond the valid requirements now in effect for periodic progress reports and semi-annual status of projects reports.

Once a policy is assigned among Cabinet members for performance, each such Cabinet member is responsible to the President for accomplishing his assignment. Because the President himself has not the time to undertake the various follow-ups, the Special Assistant should bring to his attention situations where progress is delayed, with recommendations for action. The Special Assistant's function should be to inspect, not to evaluate or direct. Upon receiving the Special Assistant's report and recommendations, the President should decide whether to put the matter on the Council agenda for an ensuing meeting, appoint an ad hoc Council Committee, appoint an ad hoc Civilian Committee, or deal otherwise directly or indirectly with the problem.

PART VI. PLANNING BOARD OF THE COUNCIL

1. At present, the principal body for formulation and transmission of policy recommendations to the Council is called the "Senior Staff". Composed of Members and Advisers from departments and agencies concerned with national security, it has these functions:

a. To anticipate and identify problems and situations affecting the security objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States, and initiate action to provide the required analyses and draft policy statements for the consideration of the Council.

b. To facilitate the formulation of policies, during the process of drafting policy recommendations, by marshaling the resources of the respective departments and agencies; by identifying the possible alternatives; by endeavoring to achieve acceptable agreements; by discussing differences; by avoiding undesirable compromises which conceal or gloss over real differences; and by reducing differences to as clearly defined and narrow an area as possible prior to reference to the Council.

2. The name, "Senior Staff", should be changed to Planning Board. This Board should have the same functions, be strictly limited as to membership, and be composed of persons from these offices:

<u>Members</u>	Special Assistant to the President (Chairman) Department of State Department of the Treasury Department of Defense Director for Mutual Security Office of Defense Mobilization
<u>Advisers</u>	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Central Intelligence Agency Psychological Strategy Board
<u>Staff</u>	Executive Secretary Deputy Executive Secretary Coordinator, Board Assistants

a. Each Adviser has the full right to have included in any report sent up to the Council, in his own words, any disagreement on the part of his department or agency with any part of such report.

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b. Other departments and agencies may be asked by the Board's Chairman to attend meetings of the Board on an ad hoc basis, in accordance with the agenda to be taken up at a particular meeting.

3. The effective functioning of the Council is directly related to the calibre of the Planning Board personnel and to the amount of time which each Member or Adviser devotes to his Planning Board work. To that end, a Member or Adviser should:

a. be nominated by the head of the department or agency to the President;

b. be appointed by the President, upon approval by the Special Assistant; with the title of "Special Assistant to the (Secretary of State) for NSC Affairs";

c. have as his principal responsibility, which overrides all other duties and with which no other duty can interfere, his work with the Board, including preparation for and attendance at meetings; yet at the same time continue to be sufficiently in the stream of activity of his department or agency so as to be capable of representing its views;

d. have direct access to and the personal confidence of the head of his department or agency;

e. have the authority of the head of his department or agency to utilize its resources to perform his Board function;

f. have an unbreakable engagement to brief the head of his department or agency before every Council Meeting;

g. have such Assistants as the size and demands of his department or agency require;

h. have access to a study room at the NSC offices.

4. The Planning Board is assisted in the drafting of papers by the Assistants (4-g above), acting under a Coordinator selected from the NSC Staff.

5. The Special Assistant, as Chairman, should preside at Board Meetings. He should set the frame of reference and analyze the problem at the outset. He should lead the

discussion in such manner as to bring out the most active participation by all present and the most expeditious dispatch of business.

6. In order for the Board properly to function, each Board Member and Adviser should be prepared promptly to state to the Board the views of his department or agency as to a report being prepared in its final form for submission to the Council.

7. Since each Board Member or Adviser must express and stand by his honest views, those views, if substantial conflicts cannot be fairly resolved, may never be suppressed or compromised, but should be reported to the Council.

8. The traffic of ideas to the Board may be either (a) from the Council downward for study and report back with recommendations, or (b) from any department or agency, or (c) from any Member or Adviser of the Board. Good ideas may germinate at any level. It is important that the Board be constantly made aware of the matters in which the Council is interested and desires to have worked upon in priority. It is also important that if an idea germinates other than in a department or agency which is concerned with the general area, such department or agency should be consulted in establishing the frame of reference.

9. Papers sent up from the Board to the Council for action, if longer than a few pages (which may well be necessary for background material) should be preceded by a summary or the specific recommendations (referring to numbered paragraphs in the longer text).

PART VII. THE NSC STAFF

1. The NSC Staff will continue to perform the following duties -

a. Furnishing the secretariat for the Council, including the preparation of the agenda, record of actions and status of projects, reproducing and distributing papers for the Council, and maintaining the official Council files.

b. Acting as the official channel of communication for the Council, including notifying agencies of assignments to carry out approved policies.

c. Briefing the Vice-President before each Council Meeting on matters covered by the agenda, and providing him with such other staff assistance on NSC matters as he may desire.

d. Matters related to personnel, pay and office facilities.

e. Preparation of the Budget.

f. The operations of the Reporting Unit.

2. The present NSC Staff consists of:

- (a) Executive (7) Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive Secretary, Administrative Officer, 3 secretaries, 1 chauffeur-messenger
- (b) Internal Security (2) - Internal Security Officer, 1 secretary
- (c) Registry (8) - Assistant to Executive Secretary, Administrative Assistant, 6 secretarial-clerical
- (d) Reporting Unit (3) - Assistant Executive Secretary, 1 Assistant, 1 secretary
- (e) Staff Assistants (3) - Coordinator of Staff Assistants, Research Assistant, 1 secretary

This total personnel (23) is fully engaged in carrying on necessary staff work.

3. There has been too great a time-lag between the initiation of a project and action upon it by the Council. As of February 16, 1953 20 projects were before or on their way up to the Council, after time-lapse as follows -

<u>Number of Projects</u>	<u>Pending Final Action</u>
3	over 20 months
3	over 10 months
5	over 4 months
1	over 2 months
8	less than 1 month

This time-lag can be reduced by a strengthened Planning Board, by provision of a directing executive with ready access to the President, and by adding three Special Staff personnel.

4. The NSC Staff should be strengthened by the creation of a small Special Staff to assist in performing, among other, the following duties -

a. independent analysis and review of each Planning Board report before its submission to the Council by -

(1) examination of all documents (such as intelligence estimates, JCS papers, evaluations by theater commanders, etc.) referred to in the report in order to verify the reference.

(2) examination of the report to determine that it states the issues comprehensively and clearly; that it develops the subject logically and presents, as a standard procedure, the alternative courses of action and the factors which support and which oppose each alternative; and that the conclusions reached are meaningful as operational guidances.

(3) amendment of the report, in conformity with (1) and (2), before final approval and forwarding by the Planning Board. If the reviewing function cannot be completed by a deadline, the report should be forwarded marked "tentative" and later be fully reviewed before the subject is considered disposed of.

b. continuous examination of the totality of national security policies with a view to determining if gaps exist which should be filled and if important issues or anticipated developments are sufficiently explored.

c. continuing integrated evaluation of the capabilities of the free world versus the capabilities of the Soviet and satellites, and estimates of the situation, in order to bring such evaluations and estimates before the Council.

d. providing a chairman or member of, or observer with, ad hoc civilian or civilian-staff committees, and assistance, in recruiting such committees.

e. keeping currently informed on the status of all national security programs and seeing that reports and pertinent information thereon are currently available (thus incorporating the present functions of the Reporting Unit).

5. a. Members of this Special Staff should be employed (full or part-time) by the Executive Secretary, subject to the approval of the Special Assistant. The annual compensation, depending upon age and experience, should be between \$6,000 and \$14,800.

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b. The ideal person for the Special Staff should have intellectual breadth and acuity, general experience, capacity for work, selflessness, tact and ability to work with others, rather than any specialized knowledge in a particular field. It will be desirable that one member of the Special Staff have an experience background in scientific problems.

c. The Deputy Executive Secretary should be a member of and supervise the Special Staff, and be responsible for its assignments, work load, and functioning.

6. The Internal Security Officer should be provided with a Staff Assistant, because of his work load and responsibility.

7. The permanent Council Staff, upon carrying into effect the above recommendations, would consist of 28 persons:

- (a) Executive (6) - Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive Secretary, Administrative Officer, 1 Administrative Assistant, 1 secretary, 1 chauffeur-messenger
- (b) Internal Security (3) - Internal Security Officer, 1 Assistant, 1 secretary
- (c) Registry (8) - Assistant to the Executive Secretary, 1 Administrative Assistant, 6 secretarial-clerical
- (d) Board Assistants (3) - Coordinator of Board Assistants, Research Assistant, 1 secretary
- (e) Special Staff (8) - 3 Staff members, 2 Staff Assistants, 1 Administrative Assistant, 2 secretaries

The above tabulation does not include the Special Assistant to the President and his secretary, who are members of the White House Staff.

8. There should be allocated in the Executive Offices Building space sufficient to accommodate the personnel described in this report, including the Special Assistant to the President and his secretary. Such space should be so located as to be capable of being made a restricted security area.

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PART VIII. ESTIMATED COUNCIL BUDGET

	<u>Truman Budget Estimate FY 1954</u>	<u>Revised Budget Estimate FY 1954</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>Increase</u>
01 Personal Services	150,500	202,000	/	51,500 *
02 Travel	500	5,000	/	4,500 *
04 Communication Services	2,300	2 500	/	200
06 Printing and Reproduction	500	1,000	/	500
07 Other Contractual Services	1,740	2,000	/	260
08 Supplies and Material	2,000	2,500	/	500
09 Equipment	2 460	5,000	/	2.540
Total	\$160,000	\$220 000	/	\$60,000

* Principal additional items: increase for Deputy Executive Secretary - \$800; increase for Internal Security Officer - \$1200; provision of Assistant Internal Security Officer - \$5940; provision for Special Staff of two high calibre Staff Members - (\$25 000), one Staff Assistant - \$8350; and one secretary - \$3410; additional allowance for consultants' compensation - \$10,000 (making \$14,800 total); additional allowance for consultants' travel - \$4500 (making \$5000 total).

Notes: (1) The above Revised Budget Estimate FY 1954 does not include the following items to be included in the White House Budget FY 1954: Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (\$20,000 - at present \$15,000); Secretary (\$5,060 - at present, same).

(2) Recommendations for compensation increases will become effective July 1, 1953. To the extent that other recommendations can be implemented during the remainder of FY 1953, funds therefor should be made available from participating NSC agencies.

PART IX. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (Part I) The statutory statement of NSC functions is satisfactory.
2. (Part II) As a general rule, not more than eight persons who participate in discussions should attend Council Meetings.

Attendance at Council Meetings should be as follows:

<u>Statutory Members</u> (amended statute)	}	1. President
<u>Participant Members</u> (standing-request)		2. Vice President
		3. Secretary of State
		4. Secretary of Treasury
		5. Secretary of Defense
		6. Director for Mutual Security
		7. Director of Defense Mobilization
<u>Participant Members</u> (ad hoc).....		(Such other Government officials as the President may from time to time invite, in accordance with his convenience and the agenda items)
<u>Advisers</u>	8.	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
	9.	Director, Central Intelligence Agency
	10.	Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning
<u>Staff</u>	11.	Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
	12.	Executive Secretary
	13.	Deputy Executive Secretary
<u>Observers</u>		(Such other persons as the President may invite to observe but not to participate)

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3. (Part III) Civilians without departmental responsibilities should not be invited to NSC Meetings as Participant Members. Civilian advice and counsel should be obtained through the appointment of civilians, on an ad hoc Consultant or Committee basis, as Advisers to the Council.
4. (Part IV) Members of the Congress should not attend NSC Meetings.
5. (Part IV) A regular Council Meeting time (Wednesdays, 10:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.) should be established.
6. (Part IV) The President should designate to preside in his place (in priority): the Vice-President, the Secretary of State.
7. (Part IV) The President may announce his decision upon a policy recommendation at a Meeting, or, upon further consideration, at any time after a Meeting.
8. (Part V) The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should be the principal executive officer of the Council; should preside as Chairman at and actively participate in meetings of the Council's Planning Board; should be appointed on the White House Staff by the President; and should be compensated at \$20,000 a year.
9. (Part V) Subject to the Special Assistant, the Executive Secretary should head the NSC Staff; should act for the Special Assistant in his absence; and should advise and aid the Special Assistant in the performance of his duties. The Executive Secretary should be appointed by the President and should be compensated at \$15,000 a year.
10. (Part V) The Deputy Executive Secretary should head the NSC Special Staff; should be appointed by the President; and should be compensated at \$14,000 a year.
11. (Part V) During the afternoon before each Council Meeting, the President should be briefed by the Special Assistant, assisted by the Executive Secretary.
12. (Part V) The Special Assistant should bring to the President's attention, with recommendations for appropriate action, lack of progress on the part of a department or agency in carrying out a particular policy.

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13. (Part VI) The principal body for the formulation and transmission of policy recommendations to the Council should be a Planning Board, with strictly limited membership. The Board (now called the "Senior Staff") should be composed of personnel from departments and agencies, as follows:

<u>Members</u>	1. Special Assistant to the President (Chairman)
	2. Department of State
	3. Department of the Treasury
	4. Department of Defense
	5. Director for Mutual Security
	6. Office of Defense Mobilization
<u>*Advisers</u>	7. Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff
	8. Central Intelligence Agency
	9. Psychological Strategy Board
<u>Staff.</u>	10. Executive Secretary
	11. Deputy Executive Secretary
	12. Coordinator, Board Assistants
<u>Ad hoc Members</u> . . .	Such other departments and agencies as the Board Chairman may from time to time invite, in accordance with agenda items.

* Each Adviser has the right to have included in any report sent up to the Council any disagreement on the part of his department or agency, expressed in his own words.

14. (Part VI) A Member or Adviser of the Planning Board must:

a. be nominated by the head of the department or agency to the President;

b. be appointed by the President, upon approval by the Special Assistant; with the title of "Special Assistant to the (Secretary of State) for National Security Affairs";

c. have as his principal responsibility, which overrides all other duties and with which no other duty can interfere, his work with the Board; yet at the same time continue to be sufficiently in the stream of activity of his department or agency so as to be capable of representing its views;

d. have direct access to and the personal confidence of the head of his department or agency;

e. have the authority of the head of his department or agency to utilize its resources to perform his Board function;

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- f. have an unbreakable engagement to brief the head of his department or agency before every Council Meeting;
- g. have such Assistants as the size and demands of his department or agency require;
- h. have access to a study room at the NSC offices.
- 15. (Part VI) The Chairman of the Planning Board should lead the discussion at Board Meetings in such manner as to bring out the most active participation by all present and the most expeditious dispatch of business.
- 16. (Part VI) Each Planning Board Member and Adviser should be prepared promptly to state to the Board the views of his department or agency as to any report being prepared in its final form for submission to the Council.
- 17. (Part VII) The NSC Staff should be responsible for briefing the Vice-President before each Council Meeting, and providing him with such other staff assistance on NSC matters as he may desire.
- 18. (Part VII) The NSC Staff should be strengthened by the creation of a small Special Staff, under the Deputy Executive Secretary, to perform, in addition to the Reporting Unit function, important functions not hitherto performed: (a) independent analysis and review of Policy Planning Board reports before submission to the Council; (b) continuous examination of the totality of NSC policies to discover gaps, insufficiencies, etc.; (c) continuing integrated evaluation of free world versus Soviet-satellite capabilities; (d) service on ad hoc committees; etc. To this Special Staff should be added 2 high calibre Staff members, 1 Staff Assistant, and 2 secretaries.
- 19. (Part VII) The NSC Staff should be strengthened by adding an Assistant for the Internal Security Officer.
- 20. (Part VIII) Approval of all recommendations contained in this report will call for an increase for FY 1954 Budget, over the Truman Estimate FY 1954 Budget, of \$60,000 for the Council and \$5,000 for the White House. Additional funds required for the balance of FY 1953 should be made available from participating NSC agencies.

Note:

The Truman documentation is not available in NSC's policy or institutional files.

Attached are excerpts from the James S. Lay Study of June 30, 1960, on Truman's NSC Structure.

June 30, 1960

AN ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL*

By James S. Lay, Jr. and Robert E. Johnson

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In a little less than thirteen years the National Security Council has been transformed from a brief statement of purposes in the National Security Act of 1947 into a well-established part of the governmental machinery. Two Presidents have endorsed, supported and fully utilized it. The organization and procedures of the Council have been adjusted to meet the individual needs and desires of each of the Presidents who have presided over it as well as the requirements of a changing world situation. However, the Council mechanism has also evolved continuously; each stage in its development has been built upon the stage before.

Even in advance of World War II there were individuals who saw the need for improved means of correlating our foreign policy with our military and economic capabilities. However, it was the deficiencies exposed by the pre-Pearl Harbor period of diplomatic and military maneuver, the handling of wartime problems involving relationships between foreign, military and domestic policies, and the development of policies for the postwar period that demonstrated to many individuals, in and out of government, the need for better machinery for relating our foreign and our military policies. During the wartime period General George C. Marshall is understood to have been an early advocate of improved top-level coordinating machinery.

* This history deals only with the unclassified organization and procedures of the National Security Council. It does not include the substance of papers or discussions on national security matters within the NSC organization because they are of a confidential nature involving matters of Presidential privilege and because most of them must remain classified for security reasons. Obviously, it would be inappropriate for this history to contain any individual appraisal of the many distinguished officials who have been associated with the NSC organization. However, it should be recognized that the organization and procedures described herein were largely governed by the requirements of the subject matter and of the individuals involved in the work of the Council during the various stages of its history. In fact, the purpose of the organization and procedures on which this history concentrates is to serve the officials of the Council in dealing with the substantive problems and issues affecting the security of the United States now and in the foreseeable future.

The genesis of the National Security Council has, however, many sources. One such source was U.S. wartime participation with the British in combined committees, and more particularly, our experience with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In these committees the U.S. participants became familiar with British development and use of committees and committee secretariats. In the course of their collaboration with the British, U.S. officials also became familiar with the British Committee of Imperial Defense which had been established in 1904 as a means of assuring high-level coordination of national security matters.

U.S. officials recognized that any similar U.S. organizations would have to be adapted to the requirements of the U.S. Presidential system which are, of course, in important respects different from those of the British Parliamentary system. The experience of the United States with the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was applied during the war to the development of the organizational structure of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to the development of the staff and sub-committee structure of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), established late in 1944 to provide a more regular channel of communication between the State Department and the U.S. military on politico-military matters.*

The "Committee of Three" which was established during World War II and subsequently abolished was, in a sense, one of the predecessors of the National Security Council. This committee was composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and was designed to facilitate consultation among these Presidential advisers on politico-military matters.

In the immediate post-war period numerous individuals and groups studied the problem and advocated some kind of high-level coordinating mechanism. One of the more comprehensive of these studies, and the first one to suggest the name "National Security Council", was the report prepared by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt for Secretary of the Navy Forrestal in September 1945 as a result of the controversy over unification of the armed services.**

So many different individuals and organizations contributed to the development of the concept and the specific legislative proposals relating to the National Security Council that analysis of this phase of the Council's history could readily provide the basis for a separate study. It is necessary in this short history of the Council, therefore, to concentrate essentially upon developments which began with the

* SWNCC was reconstituted as the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) following the end of the war. For discussion of the relationship of SANACC to the NSC see infra, p. 17.

** Unification of War and Navy Departments and Post-war Organization for National Security, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of Navy. (Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, 79th Congress, First session), pp. 7-8, 55.

enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. Even for the period covered, this history does not pretend to be completely comprehensive, but it does attempt to cover all major developments.

The National Security Act, passed by a Republican Congress and approved by a Democratic President, is best known as the legislation that provided for "unification" of the armed services. However, it was the intent of Congress in passing the act "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States"* and Title I of the Act provides coordinating mechanisms in three other areas of national security activity -- i. e., the areas of national security policy; of intelligence; and of military, industrial and civilian mobilization. The National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) were created to coordinate the various activities of the existing Executive departments and agencies in these three fields.**

The Act provided that the function of the Council should be to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." It further stated that, subject to the direction of the President, the Council should:

"a. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

"b. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and . . . make recommendations to the President in connection therewith."

The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the same Act, was placed under the Council.***

* National Security Act of 1947, Section 2.

** The Eberstadt report had also proposed creation of a CIA and an NSRB.

*** Section 102(a). The relationship is spelled out in Section 102(d). A predecessor organization, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), had been established on January 22, 1946 by Presidential Directive. CIG was, in September 1947, therefore a functioning organization and provided the organizational base upon which CIA was built. The Presidential Directive of 1946 also created the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) (composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and a personal representative of the President) to seek to ensure that the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S. Government were "planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of

(Continued on the next page)

The Act specified that the Council should be composed of the President, Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, but authorized the President to designate the Secretaries of executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board as Council members. The Act further stated that the President should preside over Council meetings, but provided that, in his absence, he might designate a member of the Council to preside in his place. Finally, the Act provided for the establishment of a career staff headed by a civilian Executive Secretary appointed by the President.

It is possible to identify three distinct phases in the Council's evolution: (a) an initial phase (September 1947-June 1950) during which the Council was organized and established itself as a useful part of the governmental machinery; (b) a second phase (June 1950-January 1953) during which the Council was reorganized in the light of operational experience and to meet the greatly increased demands placed upon it by the Korean War; and (c) a third phase (January 1953 to date) during which the Council mechanism was further strengthened and adjusted to the requirements of a new President.

the intelligence mission related to the national security". The Director of Central Intelligence, who headed CIG, performed his responsibilities "under the direction and control" of the NIA (11 Federal Register 1337-39, February 5, 1946). NIA was, in turn, closely associated with the so-called "Committee of Three" which had the same membership as NIA (except that it did not include a President's representative) but a broader role. Mr. Sidney Souers, who was named as the first Director of Central Intelligence, was subsequently the first NSC Executive Secretary.

II. THE INITIAL PHASE (SEPTEMBER 1947-JUNE 1950)

Introduction

Those who participated in the initial organization and work of the Council were motivated by certain key principles. Central to everything else was their recognition of and emphasis upon the Council's role as a policy advisory body to the President.

At the time the Council was organized there were some within the Executive Branch who favored a somewhat different emphasis. They did not deny that the Council was fundamentally an advisory body to the President. But they believed that when, in the absence of the President, there was consensus within the Council on a particular matter; when the departments or agencies represented on the Council were able to carry out the decision reached; and when that decision was within the scope of previously approved Presidential policies, it would not be necessary to take the matter to the President for decision.

It was decided, however, that the Council's role should be limited strictly to advising the President. The advisory character of the Council was the principal theme of a statement of the "Concept" of the Council approved by the President in July 1948.* The only qualification placed upon this proposition was the recognition that, under the statute, the Council members had certain corporate responsibilities for issuing general directives concerning the organization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies as relate to the national security. Even this is not truly an exception, for the President retains the ultimate power of decision within the Executive Branch.

Corollary to this emphasis upon the advisory character of the Council was the acceptance of the principle that divergencies of view as to national security policy should not be suppressed, but should be clearly reflected at each stage in the development of a policy. This principle has been applied to the Council's work throughout its history and regularly resulted in presentation to the President of what have come to be known as "split" policy recommendations.

Within the broad and basic concept as to the advisory character of the Council, the officials responsible for organizing the Council's work faced certain immediate practical decisions as to what kinds of problems should be tackled first. The Council's functions, as stated in the statute, were very broad indeed. It was believed, however, that the Council could most quickly establish itself as an organization of recognized usefulness to the President and to the departments and agencies if, initially, instead of concentrating on some of the broader, longer-range national security problems, it were to make

* The immediate occasion for the preparation of the "Concept" was an appearance by the Executive Secretary before a Hoover Commission Task Force. However, it was based upon and codified similar statements that had been made upon earlier occasions.

itself available to the Council agencies for the development of policies to deal with problems which were of immediate, current concern to those agencies and which required Presidential decision. Finally, it was recognized that the Council was likely, under the circumstances existing at that time, to be concerned in very considerable measure with problems involving foreign affairs and that, accordingly, the State Department would play a major role within the organization.*

The Organization of the Council

The National Security Act of 1947 was approved by the President on July 26, 1947. Mr. Sidney Souers, the Executive Secretary Designate, began assembling a small permanent Council Staff in August.** The Council held its first meeting on the effective date of the Act, Friday, September 26, 1947. Mr. Souers was sworn in as Executive Secretary just prior to the meeting, together with the heads of two other new agencies established by the Act, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board.

Certain basic organizational decisions were made at the first meeting of the Council. It was decided that the permanent membership should be restricted to those officials specified by the Act and that attendance of other officials would be only with the approval of the presiding officer. The heads of other agencies were regularly invited for items of interest to them.*** It was agreed that the Director of Central Intelligence should attend all Council meetings as an adviser and observer. It was decided that no set schedule of meetings should be established, but that meetings should be arranged as required. The Council at this inaugural meeting also approved recommendations of the Executive Secretary, developed in consultation with the participating agencies, with respect to the functions and composition of the NSC Staff and with respect to the initial study assignment to the Staff. It was agreed that CIA should initially furnish necessary administrative services to the NSC (e. g., fiscal, personnel and supply services).

* On this last point see Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formulation and National Security". The American Political Science Review Vol. XLIII, No. 3 (June 1949) p. 536.

** On the day the Council held its first meeting the Council had, in addition to the Executive Secretary, three employees, all detailed by participating agencies. One of these was the present Executive Secretary, Mr. James S. Lay, Jr..

*** It would not be useful to list for the period 1946-50, or for subsequent periods covered in this history, all of the other officials who participated in Council meetings on an ad hoc basis. However, it may be of interest to note that the following participated on this basis during the period September 1947 to December 1948: The Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce and Labor; the Attorney General; the Economic Cooperation Administrator and the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.

Although President Truman presided at the first Council meeting and occasional meetings thereafter, he did not regularly attend such meetings until the beginning of the Korean War.* The President's decision not to attend Council meetings was based upon his concern that the discussion might be terminated prematurely by too early an expression of his own views** and upon his view that in this way he could best preserve his full freedom of action with respect to the policy recommendations of the Council, including any dissents thereto.

There were those who argued that, in view of the statement in the statute that "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security", he should preside in the President's absence.*** However, the President decided that the Secretary of State, as the second ranking member of the Council as then constituted, would preside. This decision was also consistent with the concept that, under the circumstances then existing, the State Department would play a major role in the organization.

The Council's recommendations were brought to the President for his consideration following the meeting, ordinarily by the Executive Secretary who served, in effect, as an Administrative Assistant to the President for national security matters. The President was kept regularly informed of the status of Council business through regular briefings by the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary saw the President daily to brief him on the latest foreign intelligence as well as on Council matters.**** Even though the President did not regularly preside, Council meetings were, from the beginning, held in the Cabinet Room of The White House.

During this period certain changes occurred in the initial arrangements regarding meetings and Council participation. In May 1948 the Council agreed that meetings should be regularly scheduled twice a month. However, a meeting might be cancelled if there was no business to transact and special meetings might be scheduled as required. These rules prevailed until the beginning of the Korean War. Two significant changes in membership occurred in the period. In January 1949 the President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury attend all Council meetings. On August 19, 1949, the President approved amendments to the National Security Act which created the Department of Defense as

* President Truman presided at twelve of the 57 Council meetings which were held during the period from September 26, 1947 through June 23, 1950.

** Souers, op. cit. p. 541.

*** National Security Act of 1947, Section 202 (a). In 1949 this section was amended to provide that "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense".

**** With the retirement of Admiral William H. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, on March 26, 1949, the Executive Secretary assumed full responsibility for briefing the President daily on politico-military affairs, a task he had previously performed in cooperation with Admiral Leahy.

an Executive Department and greatly strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense giving him clear primacy over the Service Secretaries.* These amendments also eliminated the Service Secretaries from the Council membership and added the Vice President. The same amendments made the Joint Chiefs of Staff military advisers to the Council. The Chairman, JCS, thereafter attended all Council meetings. By Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, effective August 20, 1949, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President, thus formalizing a de facto situation.**

A Council staff and committee structure to deal with U. S. internal security problems was developed as a result of Council action initiated in April 1948. At that time the Council employed Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, former Chief of the Internal Security Division of the FBI, as a consultant. Mr. Coyne, who was recommended to the Council by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, undertook at the Council's request a survey of the problem of internal security. His report, submitted to the Council in August, concluded that a more thoroughly coordinated and integrated effort was required in this field. To this end, he proposed creation of a Special Assistant on Internal Security to the National Security Council who would be charged with responsibility for making an assessment and appraisal of the over-all internal security program on a continuing basis and who would arrange through interested agencies for studies of particular internal security problems with a view to developing agreed solutions to such problems. In carrying out this function this individual was to work closely on a consultative, advisory and mutually cooperative basis with the representatives of the interested Executive departments and agencies. The Council adopted the conclusions of this report, but deferred action on the recommendation with respect to a Special Assistant.

After further consideration of the problem the NSC in March 1949 approved a directive establishing the already existent Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) as a committee of the NSC and creating a new Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS).*** Specific charters for the two

* Public Law 210, 81st Congress.

** The Council offices were from the beginning located in the Executive Office Building. There were those who, at the time the Council was getting organized, favored locating Council offices in the Pentagon. In fact, office space was provided for the Executive Secretary in the Pentagon, but never occupied. The decision to locate the Council offices in the Executive Office Building reflected a conscious recognition of the Council's role as a staff arm to the President.

*** At the time it was established as a committee of the NSC, the IIC was made up of Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice; the Director of the Intelligence Division of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and the Director, Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force. The membership today is the same except that the title of the Army representative is now "Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army" and, of the Air Force representative, "Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Headquarters U. S. Air Force". The ICIS was, and continues to be, composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and the National Military Establishment (now, the Department of Defense).

committees were approved subsequently by the Council. The IIC was already responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. The ICIS was made responsible for coordination of all other internal security matters.

The directive of March 1949 also created an NSC Representative on Internal Security who, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, was responsible for (a) assisting and advising the NSC in coordinating the activities of the IIC and the ICIS; (b) assisting and advising the IIC and the ICIS in carrying out their responsibilities; (c) submitting to the IIC and the ICIS questions which, in his opinion, required their consideration; (d) participating, as the representative of the NSC, as an observer and adviser in all meetings of the IIC and the ICIS; (e) submitting for NSC consideration any problems which could not be resolved by the IIC and the ICIS, outlining divergent solutions proposed and making his own recommendation; and (f) reporting to the NSC at least quarterly on progress being made in the provision of adequate internal security. It was specified, however, that he should have no power of instruction, direction or supervision over the IIC or the ICIS. Mr. Coyne was designated as the NSC Representative on Internal Security.

When, acting within its Presidentially-approved charter, either of the committees reached an agreement on a particular course of action, that agreement could be referred to the appropriate agency for implementation without prior reference of the matter to the NSC. The NSC Representative on Internal Security sought to ensure that matters that did appear to require Council action were brought to the Council's attention. The Council was kept regularly informed of the committees' activities through reports on those activities.

Beginning with this initial period and thereafter throughout its history, the Council has from time to time established other standing committees or subcommittees. Such standing committees occasionally include members from non-Council agencies. However, they have characteristically been created to deal with some particularly sensitive subject or with a subject of direct interest to only a few of the agencies that participate in the Council's work.*

* It may be useful here to compare the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the "Hoover Commission") regarding the NSC with the organizational changes described above. The Hoover Commission in 1949 recommended inter alia: (a) that the President be given authority to determine the membership of the Council; (b) that better working level relationships be established between the JCS organization and the NSC and other agencies; (c) that internal security planning be improved; (d) that CIA be improved and strengthened; and (e) that the Council be placed formally within the President's Office. The 1949 statutory changes helped ease some of the immediate problems with respect to membership by limiting the military establishment to a single Council representative. The statutory change with respect to the JCS relationship to the Council eased, but did not completely solve, the problem referred to in (b); further organizational changes effected in 1950 did, however, largely solve this problem (infra, p. 22). The surveys of internal security and

(Continued on the next page)

The Organization of the Staff

A major consideration in the initial organization of the Council's staff was stated as follows by the first Executive Secretary of the Council:

"In organizing the staff, an effort has been made to steer a middle course between two undesirable extremes. If the personnel were entirely composed of permanent Council employees, there would be a tendency to reach 'ivory tower' conclusions out of step with operational developments. On the other hand, if the personnel were solely officers detailed from the participating departments, unavoidable turnover might cause a loss of continuity. The staff, therefore, is a mixture of these two types."*

That part of the staff organization drawn from the agencies that participate in the Council's work has, throughout the Council's history, performed two basic functions. On the one hand, the individuals who comprise this part of the staff have been individually responsible for bringing the resources of their respective departments and agencies to bear upon the Council's work. On the other hand, these individuals have, as a group, prepared the papers considered by the Council. The permanent career staff of the Council has provided certain central services and has been a source of independent analysis of the subjects before the Council and its subordinate interdepartmental staff groups.

The Council Staff, as initially organized, had three principal components: (a) the Office of the Executive Secretary; (b) a Secretariat which performed such usual secretariat duties as circulating papers, preparing agenda and recording Council actions; and (c) a unit called "The Staff" which developed studies and policy recommendations for Council consideration. The office of the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat were composed entirely of permanent Council employees. "The Staff", on the other hand, initially consisted wholly of officials detailed on a full-time basis by the departments and agencies represented on the Council, though it was assisted by permanent staff members. Because, as earlier noted, it was anticipated that the majority of problems dealt with by the Council under then-existing conditions would relate primarily to foreign affairs, the State Department was asked to provide an official to head this Staff. This official was called the "Coordinator of the Staff". In December, 1947, a permanent Council employee was added to "The Staff". Obtained by permanent transfer from State, he was designated "Assistant to the Coordinator". Immediately following the first Council meeting, full-time members of "The Staff" were designated by State, Army,

intelligence activities (on the latter see infra, pp. 12-13), which had already been undertaken by the Council, together with the Council actions flowing therefrom, covered the matters mentioned in (c) and (d). Placement of the NSC in the Executive Office of the President dealt with the recommendation referred to in (e).

* Souers, op cit, p. 537.

Navy, Air Force and CIA. The State Staff Member was not initially the same individual as the "Coordinator". The Secretary of Defense, who was not at this time represented on "The Staff", designated a Special Assistant to maintain liaison with the Executive Secretary. Because it was itself in process of organization during this period, the NSRB did not designate a Staff member until February 1948. Non-members of the Council were represented at meetings of "The Staff" on an ad hoc basis when subjects of concern to them were being considered. Members of "The Staff" were generally of the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel (Navy: commander or captain) or equivalent Civil Service rank; the Coordinator was a senior Foreign Service Officer.

It might be noted here that the changes that have occurred during the life of the Council in the terminology applied to the different parts of the Council staff organization have been a source of some confusion to those outside the organization. Thus initially, as indicated, the term "The Staff" was applied to the principal interdepartmental component of "The NSC Staff".* Following the 1950 reorganization the interdepartmental components, the "Senior NSC Staff" and the "Staff Assistants", were formally still considered a part, along with the permanent career staff, of "The NSC Staff". However, in practice it became customary to apply the latter term to the permanent career staff only. This practice was formalized at the time of the 1953 reorganization.

In November 1947 a fourth component was added to the Council staff structure. As a result of a meeting of the Four Secretaries (Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force) attended by Mr. Souers, the chiefs of the plans and operations divisions in the three military services were designated "Consultants" to the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of State similarly agreed to designate the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff as the State Consultant to Mr. Souers. A Consultant was named by NSRB in June 1948, and the Director of Central Intelligence performed this function for CIA. In addition, the Secretary of Defense designated the Director of the Joint Staff to advise the Executive Secretary. Although a number of important changes have been made in the Council staff organization since 1947, the basic pattern of a two-level interagency staff organization, established in 1947, has persisted down to the present day.

Only relatively minor changes occurred in this staff organization during the period under review. In April 1949, after Mr. Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense, he named a Member for "The Staff" and formally designated the Director of the Joint Staff as his NSC Consultant. The position of State Member of "The Staff" and the position of the Coordinator of "The Staff" were combined in July 1949. After the National Security Act was amended in August 1949, the three members of "The Staff" from the military services were redesignated "Advisers" and the representative of the Secretary of Defense became the sole member from the Defense Department. The Service Advisers continued, however, to participate fully in the work of "The Staff".

* Hereafter when reference is made to this interdepartmental staff component of the 1947-50 period, it will be identified as "The Staff" in quotation marks.

Staff and Council Procedures

Something of the character of the problems with which the Council was concerned during this period, as well as during subsequent periods, may be suggested by a brief description of the four principal categories of policy papers considered by the Council. First and most important are the basic over-all policy papers which cover a wide range of national security problems and contain related political, economic and military strategy. Second are the papers covering individual foreign countries or larger geographical regions. A third category might be called "functional" policies. These cover such national security policy matters as mobilization, atomic energy, Free World-Sino-Soviet Bloc trade, and regulation and control of armaments. Organizational policies constitute the final category. These include, among others, policies relating to the Council's own organization, internal security organization and the general policy directives relating to the organization and coordination of foreign intelligence activities which are issued by the Council pursuant to the National Security Act.

The Council at its first meeting, on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, made the assessment of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks in relation to actual and potential U. S. power a continuing, long-range study assignment of the NSC Staff. However, in accordance with the basic approach described earlier, it was decided very early that this assignment should be tackled initially through studies of certain critical areas of the world. It was agreed that these studies should subsequently be incorporated in an over-all appraisal of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks.

During much of the period 1947-50, therefore, the great majority of the policies considered by the Council were policies dealing with particular foreign countries or larger geographical regions which presented problems of critical significance at the time. Initially papers of this kind were focused on single (though major) problems and in some cases provided quite detailed policy guidance for dealing with those problems. Papers dealing with a single foreign country did not attempt to deal with all aspects of U. S. relations with the country, but only with certain key aspects. However, as the months and years passed the Council and its staff progressively tackled broader, longer-range problems and broadened the scope and coverage of country and regional policy papers. The first paper of a broad over-all character dealing with the basic national security problems facing the United States was adopted by the Council in November 1948.

In this initial phase of the Council's existence relatively few policies of the "functional" variety were acted upon by the Council. However, because the Council was establishing many of its basic organizational arrangements during this period and was also making recommendations for organizational change in areas of governmental activity related to the Council's work, organizational policies constituted an important proportion of the Council's business. For example, the Council began in December 1947 to discharge its responsibilities under the National Security Act for issuing general policy directives concerning the organization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies as relate to the national security. In January 1948 the Council initiated a general survey of foreign intelligence

activities. This survey was made by a group of consultants from outside the government and marks the first such use of outside consultants by the Council.* The recommendations made by this survey group were subsequently considered in the Council.

Some reorientation was given to the work of the Council and "The Staff" when, on May 4, 1949, not long after the beginning of President Truman's second Administration, the Executive Secretary met with the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff and other State Department officials to discuss the work of the Staff, and, in particular, the type of reports that the Staff had been preparing. On the basis of the conclusions reached in that discussion, the Executive Secretary on May 26 issued instructions to the Coordinator of "The Staff" requesting "The Staff" (a) to conduct a periodical review of all current national security policies in order to determine what revisions were necessary; and (b) to undertake a program of studies on major policy problems which would appraise the national security aspects of those problems and analyze alternative courses of action open to the United States, without, however, making policy recommendations. These instructions thus initiated two new types of staff activity--a general review of existing policies, and the preparation of papers which discussed policy alternatives without recommending a particular policy.** Both types of activity have been a recurrent feature of Council business in the period since 1949.

From the beginning, proposals for Council projects could and did originate in a variety of different ways. In the first year of the Council's operation, for example, State was the most important single source of the Council's agenda subjects but the Secretary of Defense, the Army and the Air Force together originated nearly as many Council projects. In fact, a striking feature of the Council's early activities was the leading role which the late Mr. Forrestal played in initiating Council projects during the period that he was Secretary of Defense. The NSC Staff, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee,*** CIA and Commerce were other sources of projects during the first year.

Members of "The Staff", though assigned to the Council on a full-time basis and physically located together in the NSC offices, also maintained offices in, and regular contact with, their respective agencies. Meetings of "The Staff" were conducted on an informal basis with the Coordinator serving as chairman. The first step in the preparation of a paper was a meeting of "The Staff" to discuss the policy problem and to define the scope of the particular report. Although the principal participants in these Staff discussions were the members detailed by the agencies, certain members of the permanent career staff also participated. While the latter did not make policy recommendations, they did raise questions, suggest additional issues, and often prepared redrafts of papers on the basis of the Staff discussions.

* One of the members of this survey group was Mr. Allen W. Dulles, the present Director of Central Intelligence.

** The review of policies was undertaken immediately; the first Staff report analyzing policy alternatives was discussed in the Council in August 1949.

*** On the relationships between the Council and SANACC see infra, p. 17.

Each Staff member obtained the staff-level views of his respective department or agency with respect to the matter under review. These views were sometimes submitted in writing. After one or more Staff discussions, in the course of which the agencies represented on "The Staff" further clarified their views on the subject, one member of "The Staff" was ordinarily requested to prepare a draft report. In the usual case, the first draft of the report was prepared by the State Department member. As a variant of this procedure, utilized particularly in the early days of the Council, the members of "The Staff" were requested to prepare individual agency contributions which were subsequently integrated into a single report.

The usual policy paper prepared by "The Staff" during this period consisted of three basic elements: (a) a very brief and quite general statement of the problem to which the paper was addressed; (b) an analysis of the problem; and (c) conclusions. The analysis normally included such elements as a statement of U. S. objectives, a statement of existing policies and commitments, an estimate of the situation and possible future developments, and an analysis of the alternative courses of action open to the United States. The "Conclusions" were the only section of the paper normally acted upon by the Council. The paper as a whole was ordinarily very brief.

After several meetings of "The Staff" on a policy draft, it was sent to the Consultants for concurrences. The Consultants were not requested to concur in a paper in all of its particulars, but only to indicate their views as to whether the paper was in such condition as to be suitable for Council consideration. Although ordinarily these concurrences were obtained without a meeting of the Consultants, meetings were occasionally called by the Executive Secretary, particularly when there was a difference of view among the Consultants. Following such clearance, the paper, including any continuing divergences of view, was submitted to the Council for its consideration.* The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were obtained by the Secretary of Defense on any papers having military implications and were circulated to the Council prior to its consideration of the paper.

Ordinarily the policy proposals acted upon by the Council were prepared by "The Staff". In these cases where a Council member submitted a policy proposal directly to the Council for consideration, it was usually referred, sometimes after preliminary Council discussion, to "The Staff" for preparation of a report and recommendations. Nonetheless, there were a number of instances in which the Council acted directly upon a report submitted by one of its members (generally the Secretary of State). Upon occasion the Secretary of State submitted reports for the information, rather than for the consideration, of the Council. Such reports, stating the current U. S. foreign policy position on some subject, were often discussed in Council meetings and were occasionally concurred in by the Council and the President.**

* The first policy paper prepared by "The Staff" was submitted to the Council in mid-October, 1947, and considered and adopted in November. Since this paper was prepared before there were Consultants, it went directly to the Council.

** Souers, op cit, p. 539.

One of the features of the latter part of the period under review was the increasing use by the Council of ad hoc committees to prepare reports for its consideration. Such committees were generally, at least in original membership, composed of higher-level agency representatives than was "The Staff". They often included representatives of agencies which were not regularly represented on "The Staff". Ad hoc committees were assigned responsibility for recommending policies on some of the more critical problems during the latter part of this period.

The Council agenda from the start included a variety of different types of report. Some were submitted for consideration as the basis for policy recommendations to the President. Others were submitted solely for Council information though, when scheduled on a Council agenda, they might provoke a Council discussion. Some reports were specifically designed to serve as the basis for Council discussion. Some Council papers were submitted by Council members, some by "The Staff", some by non-members of the Council, and others by special committees or by consultants. In some instances these were regular periodic reports, in other cases they were prepared in response to specific request or because of some development or anticipated development. The agenda also included both oral and written reports.

Certain regular reports were a standing feature of the Council agendas. Thus in the first year of the Council's existence a written current intelligence report was regularly placed on the agenda for the Council's information. Subsequently this report was submitted and scheduled monthly. In 1950 it was dropped altogether as an agenda item. Instead, the Director of Central Intelligence would from time to time in the course of Council discussion call the Council's attention to intelligence information which had a bearing on the policy papers under consideration or which was otherwise of interest to the Council. Beginning in May 1948 a report prepared by the NSC Secretariat on the current status of work on Council and Staff projects also became a regular agenda item.

In the Council meeting, the Executive Secretary introduced each subject on the agenda, but generally did not attempt to summarize the contents of the reports before the Council on the assumption that each participant had done his "homework" in advance. The presiding officer was sometimes the first to comment upon a policy paper; on other occasions he called first upon the other Council members for comment. A general discussion of the policy paper followed.

A decision was made at the beginning of the Council's existence not to prepare written minutes which would reflect the Council discussion. It was believed that to do so would have an undesirable inhibiting effect upon the discussion. Therefore, throughout the Council's history, the only permanent official record that has been made is a record of the Council's action on the various subjects it has considered. During the period 1947-53, this record was prepared by the Executive Secretary on the basis of his understanding of the Council's actions, but was not normally circulated to the Council members for clearance in advance of its submission to the President. Council members could, of course, raise questions as to the Executive Secretary's interpretation of what had occurred in the meeting, following circulation of the approved record. Such action was seldom taken, however.

It should be noted that occasionally, when it did not appear necessary to have a formal Council discussion of a report, the Council acted upon it by memorandum approval. This practice, originating in the earliest months of the Council's activity, continues to the present though it is used infrequently.

A day or two after the Council meeting the Executive Secretary submitted to the President the record of the Council's actions and the policy papers as amended and adopted by the Council, including any remaining differences of view. He also submitted any Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the paper. The President acted upon the Council's recommendations, deciding any remaining differences of view. The President approved only the "Conclusions" of the policy paper; these became the national security policy on the subject.

Following the President's action upon them, the record of the Council's actions and the approved policy papers were circulated to all Council participants. From the beginning, when the President approved policy recommendations submitted to him by the Council, he directed that they be implemented "by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination" of the department or agency head who had the primary responsibility for implementation of the policy involved. In most cases this was the Secretary of State. The head of a department or agency which had been assigned responsibility by the President for implementation of a Council action or for the coordination of implementation of a policy paper was informed of his responsibility by individual memorandum from the Executive Secretary. It was the responsibility of the coordinating agency to notify all other departments and agencies of the actions for which each was responsible in implementation of the paper, and to ensure that such actions were taken in a coordinated manner. The coordinating agency was also responsible for ensuring appropriate dissemination of the policy, or extracts from it, to agencies of the government which were not members of the NSC.

The Council in 1948 established an ad hoc committee to re-examine procedures for the implementation of national security policies. That committee recommended, and the Council in October 1948 approved, continuation of existing procedures with the additional provision that the "coordinating agency" would submit progress reports at appropriate intervals which summarized the implementation of the policy. These reports were circulated to the Council for its information and scheduled on the agenda of a Council meeting. Thus an opportunity was provided for discussion at the Council level of the implementation of approved policies. Progress reports were quite brief (generally no more than one or two single-spaced pages). They sometimes reported on implementation on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis but initially there was no standard format. In the early period they were sometimes submitted as frequently as every month or two, though four to six months was the more usual time period.

Subsequently the instructions relating to the implementation of national security policies were amended to provide further that, if the coordinating agency and another participating agency differed as to interpretation of the policy or as to methods of implementation and were unable to resolve their differences, the divergent views would be submitted in writing through the Executive Secretary to the President for his decision.

The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee

In late 1944, as noted earlier, there had been established, by agreement between the Secretaries concerned, a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). When the Air Force was established as a separate department by the National Security Act of 1947 it was added to the membership of the committee and the committee was re-christened the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). Although SANACC dealt with a broad range of problems, those relating to occupied areas constituted its most important single field of activity.

Soon after the Council was organized SANACC began to submit policy papers to it for its consideration. These were generally referred to the Staff for revision following preliminary Council consideration. Occasionally the Council in turn requested SANACC to prepare a report for it. The Executive Secretary of the Council maintained regular contact with the secretariat of SANACC and received SANACC papers. In this way, duplication of effort was avoided. However, it was evident that SANACC's functions closely paralleled, if they did not indeed in many respects duplicate, the functions of the NSC Staff.* An important difference (and one of the reasons that SANACC was temporarily continued) was the fact that, unlike the Council or its staff, it could, through action by its members, initiate implementation of its decisions, provided, of course, that the subject was within its terms of reference and that Presidential consideration was not required.**

An ad hoc committee of the Council was established in March 1948 to study the relationship between SANACC and the Council. That committee proposed interim terms of reference for SANACC which the Council approved in August 1948. Those terms of reference provided that SANACC's principal functions would be (a) to advise and assist the NSC, preparing reports and studies requested by it; and (b) to coordinate matters referred to SANACC by any of its members or by the NSC. Thus SANACC was, in effect, recognized as being a part of the Council's staffing mechanism while at the same time it continued to perform coordinating functions on matters which did not come before the Council.

In accordance with the interim terms of reference, the Council made a further review of SANACC six months after approval of the terms of reference. That review resulted in action by the Council to dissolve SANACC as of June 30, 1949.

* The Eberstadt report had recommended that the NSC take over the functions of SWNCC (op cit p. 7; see pp. 53-54 of that report for a brief description of SWNCC organization and activities).

** In this respect SANACC was somewhat similar in character to the internal security committees of the Council established in 1949 and to the Operations Coordinating Board established in 1953.

III. THE SECOND PHASE (June 1950-January 1953)

Introduction

Though by the time of the Korean War the Council was a well-established, functioning organization, certain problems relating to the initial organizational arrangements began to become apparent. Attendance at the Council meetings, originally confined to the Council members themselves, gradually broadened to include the Consultants and other departmental advisers. This tended at times to have an inhibiting effect upon discussion and to result in undue reliance by Council members upon departmental advisers during the Council discussion. The absence of the President from the Council table, though it had been thought desirable for certain reasons noted earlier, tended to produce a less sharply focused discussion than if the President had been present, and action on important points at issue was sometimes deferred or was taken later outside the Council. Though the Council discussion was subsequently summarized for the President by the Executive Secretary, the President's absence from the meeting deprived him of the opportunity of hearing the Council members' direct expression of their own views, and of the opportunity to ask questions and to engage personally in the interchange of views around the Council table. Council members, lacking an opportunity to present their respective positions directly to the President in Council meetings, sometimes took occasion to do so individually following the meeting.

Moreover, detailed members of "The Staff", working as a group in the NSC staff offices, tended increasingly to be looked upon as "foreigners" by their respective agencies. On the other hand, the Consultants, all of whom had heavy departmental responsibilities, tended over time to give less and less attention to NSC matters. These tendencies toward the isolation of "The Staff" members from their agencies and toward the increased absorption of the Consultants in agency work produced two additional results: (a) the tendency of Council members to submit policy recommendations directly to the Council, by-passing "The Staff"; and (b) the tendency of the Council to refer many problems to ad hoc Council committees.

Experience had shown that direct referral of departmental papers to the Council, without joint staff work, led generally to delay. In the absence of such staff work which exposed pertinent facts, viewpoints and alternative policies and which clearly defined the issues in advance of the Council meeting, the Council generally found it necessary to refer such papers to "The Staff" or to an ad hoc committee for interdepartmental staffing prior to final Council action.

Ad hoc committees were sometimes a useful and occasionally a notably successful device, but regular referral of problems to such committees often also delayed work unduly. Such delays were the results of such factors as (a) the heavy departmental responsibilities of many of the members of such committees; (b) the difficulties such committees have in arranging meetings and meeting deadlines (contrasted with staff groups that have regular, fixed meeting times and work programs); (c) the unfamiliarity of many of the members of such groups with Council requirements as to substance, format and procedure; and (d) finally, and most important, the frequent inability of such committees to relate their

work on a particular policy problem to other pertinent approved national security policies. Ad hoc committee members also tended to approach problems primarily as representatives of their respective agencies.

Another problem was the lack of a Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on "The Staff". This lack made it very difficult to anticipate and take into account probable JCS views on a subject under discussion in advance of receipt of their formal written views. Such views, which were submitted only after staff work had been completed and the paper circulated to the Council for consideration, frequently required referral of the paper back to "The Staff" for reconsideration.

A final problem related to the chairmanship of the Council's major interdepartmental staff groups. As noted earlier, the State Department was from the beginning assigned a major role in the Council because of State's leading role in foreign affairs and because of the expectation that the Council's major concerns would be in the foreign affairs field. As an application of this principle, a State representative had been made Coordinator (chairman) of "The Staff". As the Council developed, the matters which were of concern to it gradually broadened to include many problems which did not relate solely or even primarily to foreign affairs, though many of these problems had important foreign affairs aspects, e. g., military, defense mobilization, internal security and atomic energy problems. This gradual development was accelerated by the beginning of hostilities in Korea, which increased the importance and urgency of military and defense mobilization problems and the role of the military and defense mobilization representatives in the Council organization. In other words, while the majority of the policy papers with which the Council continued to be concerned were papers dealing with foreign affairs and while the State Department continued to play the major role in the development of these policy papers, the number of subjects involving direct, major responsibilities of other departments and agencies increased and with it, their role. In these changed circumstances the dual role of the State Coordinator of "The Staff", as an impartial chairman and as advocate of a State Department position, became increasingly difficult. Over time the feeling grew that other departments and agencies would cooperate more effectively in the work of the Council in matters directly affecting their own responsibilities if the major interdepartmental staff groups were chaired by someone without departmental ties. Finally, and of great importance, was the recognition that the work of the interdepartmental staff group which prepared reports for the NSC could be fully effective in serving the Council only if the chairman of the group was personally cognizant, through regular contact with the President, of his desires and requirements regarding the work of the Council.

Reorganization of the Council and the Staff

All of these problems had been under consideration for some time by the Executive Secretary and others associated with the organization. They were provided with an opportunity to do something about them in connection with a general review of basic U. S. security policies in the winter and spring of 1950 which produced, as an early by-product, a general recommendation for a revised and strengthened staff organization. In response to

this recommendation, the Executive Secretary* on April 17, 1950, submitted his proposals for the reconstitution and strengthening of the NSC Staff. He proposed the creation of a senior staff group composed of one representative designated by each Council member, with a military adviser designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an intelligence adviser designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, other agency heads invited by the President to participate in Council work might, when appropriate, designate an ad hoc representative on this staff. The members of this senior staff group were to be individuals who could fully and accurately reflect the views of their principals and were to have such departmental status and freedom from other duties as to permit them to devote a large part of their time to Council work. The existing Staff members were to become assistants to the senior staff group so as to take full advantage of their experience and background and to ease the transition to the new organization.

One objection that was soon raised to these proposals related to the matter of JCS representation. It was argued that it was impossible for an individual "adviser" to represent a corporate body like the Joint Chiefs of Staff in such a staff organization.

In May 1950 the whole problem was referred by the Council to a special NSC committee, consisting of representatives of State, Defense, and NSRB, for the preparation, in collaboration with the Executive Secretary, of appropriate recommendations. However, the Korean hostilities began before the committee was ready to submit its report. Immediately following the beginning of the Korean War, President Truman began presiding regularly at all Council meetings except for occasional instances when he was unable to attend.** In those instances the Secretary of State presided. At about this same time the President directed that the Council meet regularly every Thursday and that all important recommendations relating to national security policy be coordinated through the Council and its staff.

On July 19, 1950, the President issued a directive with respect to the reorganization and strengthening of the Council and its staff. Once more he emphasized that all major national security policies should be recommended to him through the Council. He directed that Council attendance be restricted to the statutory members of the Council plus the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. W. Averell Harriman (Special Assistant to the President), Mr. Souers, and the Executive Secretary. He further directed that participation of other officials be only with his specific approval. He requested the Secretaries of State

* Mr. Souers resigned as Executive Secretary effective January 15, 1950, and was succeeded by Mr. Lay. Mr. Souers was appointed a Special Consultant to the President and continued to attend all Council meetings until January 1953.

** President Truman presided at 62 (or 87%) of the 71 Council meetings held from June 28, 1950, through January 9, 1953.

and Defense, the Chairman, NSRB, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence each to nominate a member for a senior staff group. The President himself designated the members of the senior staff group on the basis of these nominations. Finally, he named the Executive Secretary, NSC, chairman of the senior staff group.

Members of the senior staff group, or the "Senior NSC Staff" as it was soon called, were quickly nominated and, at the Senior Staff meeting on August 11, 1950, they in turn designated their assistants. Shortly thereafter Mr. Harriman also nominated a representative for the Senior Staff. Mr. Marion W. Boggs, a member of the career NSC Staff and former Assistant to the Coordinator of the Staff, was named Coordinator (i. e., chairman) of the Staff Assistants. He also served as the executive secretary of the Senior Staff. The functions of these two interdepartmental staff groups continued to be those functions that the Council had assigned "The Staff" at the first Council meeting in 1947. On August 10, 1950, the Council directed that the Senior Staff assume responsibility for projects formerly assigned to ad hoc committees of the Council.

These changes were directed toward solving the problems noted above. The relationship between the changes in Council arrangements and the problems noted earlier is obvious and direct. The relationship between the changes and the problems at the staff level needs some elaboration, however. At the senior level the agency representatives on the Senior Staff were drawn much more fully and actively into the work of the Council than their predecessors, the Consultants. Whereas the Consultants had played a largely passive role, the Senior Staff replaced "The Staff" as the principal staff arm of the Council and absorbed the assignments of existing ad hoc committees. The members of the Senior Staff were generally of Assistant Secretary level or above and met as a group approximately twice a week (sometimes more frequently) during the first year. Thus the Council was provided continuous staff support by a high-level interdepartmental staff group.

Meanwhile, the Staff Assistants, unlike the members of "The Staff", no longer spent almost full time in NSC offices, but instead maintained offices only in their respective agencies where they could play a more active role in the development of agency views on papers before the Senior Staff and the Council. The Staff Assistants as a group, however, continued to do much of the pick and shovel work of redrafting papers for the Senior Staff. Thus, while their semi-estrangement from their agencies was ended, they continued, as a group, to look at national security problems from more than an agency perspective and to take, as did the Senior Staff and the Council, a national point of view.

Another change of considerable significance was the arrangement with respect to the chairmanship of the two major interdepartmental staff groups. The April proposals of the Executive Secretary had made no recommendations on this point. The selection by the President of the Executive Secretary as the Chairman of the Senior Staff provided the principal staff body with a chairman who, as head of the permanent NSC

Staff in the Executive Office of the President, was an official without departmental ties. Although he maintained a neutral position as to policy recommendations, he participated actively in leading the discussion in an effort to bring out all relevant facts and viewpoints and to explore all feasible alternative policies. Of greatest significance was the fact that the Executive Secretary, because of his daily contact with the President, was in a position to know or to ascertain the President's desires and requirements with respect to problems before the Senior Staff and the Council. Selection of a member of the permanent Council staff as the chairman of the Staff Assistants was a change of parallel significance.

The 1950 changes also improved considerably the relationship between the Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the staff level by placing a JCS representative on both of the new interdepartmental staff groups. Finally, the changes provided the Secretary of the Treasury who, as previously noted, had been a regular Council participant since 1949, with representation at the staff level.

Subsequent Changes in the Council and Staff Organization

Two major changes in Council membership and staff participation occurred during the period following the 1950 reorganization. Immediately after the beginning of the Korean War, the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) was created to coordinate mobilization activities immediately connected with the war, as contrasted with general long-range mobilization planning, the responsibility for which continued to reside in NSRB. In December 1950 the President requested that the Director of Defense Mobilization participate in all Council meetings and in March 1951 the Director nominated a Senior Staff Member. The Economic Cooperation Administration had participated on an ad hoc basis in Council activities at both the Council and staff levels since 1948. However, the foreign assistance organization began participating in all Council activities in October 1951 when the Mutual Security Act of 1951* amended the National Security Act to make the Director for Mutual Security (a newly created office) a statutory member of the Council. He, in turn, nominated a member for the Senior Staff.**

In August 1951 the Bureau of the Budget designated an individual to serve as its representative in a purely advisory role at meetings of the Senior Staff and as its channel of communication with the Senior Staff. This representative did not attend all Senior Staff meetings. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, did not normally attend Council meetings.

* Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, Title V, Section 501-(e)-(1) (effective October 10, 1951).

** Since Mr. Harriman, who was designated Director for Mutual Security, had been attending Council meetings as a Presidential assistant and since he had a representative on the Senior Staff, the change in the statute did not affect attendance at Council and Senior Staff meetings though it did change the status of Mr. Harriman and his Senior Staff representative.

In August 1951 an additional function was assigned to the permanent career staff of the Council. The President at that time, in connection with his action on a report relating to the status of current national security programs, directed the Executive Secretary to create, as a part of the NSC Staff, a small reporting unit to work with the responsible departments and agencies to ensure that reports on the status of such programs were made available promptly to the Council or to the President. Initially two members of the NSC Staff were assigned to this function. They concentrated primarily upon the development and improvement, in cooperation with the agencies concerned, of regular semi-annual (later annual) status reports to the Council. These reports have regularly covered the military, mutual security, atomic energy, civil defense, mobilization, foreign information (now USIA), foreign intelligence, and U. S. internal security programs.* After the basic job of organizing this work had been done, the unit required only the part-time services of one individual. Apart from this addition and the designation of the Coordinator of Staff Assistants from the membership of the permanent career staff of the Council, the career staff was not basically changed as to function or organization during this period. However, members of the permanent career staff assisted the Executive Secretary in his roles as Chairman of the Senior Staff and as an assistant to the President for NSC matters by such means as suggesting questions with respect to papers before the Senior Staff, redrafting papers to reflect Senior Staff discussion, and suggesting deficiencies in existing policy coverage.

Senior Staff and Council Procedures

During the last half of 1950 and the first half of 1951 the Senior Staff and Council were very active, largely on policy matters relating to Korea and other problems arising out of the generally tense international situation. Questions relating to the strengthening of major national security programs occupied a significant proportion of the time of the Senior Staff and the Council during this period. As has been indicated, the Senior Staff met approximately twice a week and sometimes met more frequently during the first few months of its existence. The Council was meeting an average of three times a month.

The latter part of 1951 and all of 1952 were characterized by a resumption of a regular pattern of Council business. The Senior Staff reviewed existing policies and prepared policies on new subjects in response to changes in the situation or anticipated developments. It met on an average of about once a week.** Though a weekly NSC meeting continued to be scheduled, the scheduled meetings were sometimes cancelled and the Council met an average of somewhat less than twice a month during this period.

* Recently a report on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration programs has been added.

** In addition, as indicated below, Senior Staff steering committees were meeting during this period.

Also during the period 1950-51, as a result of Congressional passage of the "Cannon Amendment" on September 27, 1950, and the "Kem Amendment" which superseded it on June 2, 1951,* the Council was given new statutory responsibilities of a rather unprecedented character. In essence, the Cannon Amendment provided that, during any period in which the armed forces of the United States were engaged in active hostilities carrying out a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, no financial or economic assistance (other than military assistance) could be provided to a foreign country whose trade with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries was found by the NSC to be contrary to U. S. security interests. This legislation did not require reports to Congress. The Kem Amendment spelled out in somewhat more detail what kinds of commodities fell under the trade prohibition and required the Secretary of Defense to prepare a specific list of such commodities. It required certifications by the countries receiving U. S. assistance that they had not been engaging in such trade, but provided that exceptions could be made to these requirements upon official determination by the NSC that such an exception was in the security interests of the United States. The Council was required to report any such exception, with the reasons therefore, immediately to the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. The Council was also required to make a quarterly review of such determinations and to report the results of its review to these committees. Finally, the Kem Amendment specified that each of these reports should contain an analysis of the trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc of the countries covered by the reports.

A Special Council Committee on East-West Trade undertook the required Staff work.** The Council made an initial over-all determination under the Cannon Amendment in December 1950 but directed its Special Committee to make a continuing review and recommendations as required. The Council approved its second (and last) determination under the Cannon amendment in February 1951 and directed the Special Committee to continue its review. Twenty determinations affecting thirty-six countries were prepared by the Special Committee under the Kem Amendment and submitted through the Senior Staff to the Council which approved them, transmitted them to the specified Congressional committees and released them publicly.*** The Committee also prepared, and the Council approved, a final report and review of its determinations. The legislative requirement for such Council determinations was eliminated when the Kem Amendment was superseded by the Mutual Defense Assistance

* Section 1304, Public Law 843, 81st Congress, September 27, 1950, and Section 1302, Public Law 45, 82nd Congress, June 2, 1951.

** Membership of this committee consisted of representatives of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, NSRB, ODM, ECA, JCS, CIA, Export-Import Bank, and Mr. Harriman's office.

*** A number of additional countries provided the required certifications thus obviating the need for Council determinations to cover them.

Control Act (the "Battle Act") on October 26, 1951.* Following the 1950 reorganization the State Department continued to be the source of first drafts of foreign country and regional policy papers which continued to constitute a major share of the Council's business. As in the past, other departments were the source of a first draft where the subject fell primarily within their area of responsibility and sometimes drafts were prepared in the Staff Assistants or in the Senior Staff on the basis of contributions from several agencies. After a preliminary discussion in the Senior Staff, a draft policy paper was ordinarily referred to the Staff Assistants for redrafting in the light of the discussion. The Staff Assistants' redraft was circulated to the Senior Staff for further consideration. This process was sometimes repeated one or more times before the paper was submitted to the Council. When the nature of a problem and the timing of action so dictated, the Senior Staff's work on a paper could, of course, be considerably speeded up. During the discussion of a draft policy paper in the Senior Staff, any Senior Staff member could suggest new ideas or alternative policies. The many ideas and policy alternatives generated by this process of interchange in the Senior Staff frequently provided the basis either for agreed or for "split" policy recommendations to the Council.

Toward the end of this period an increasing amount of the preliminary preparation of papers was done in steering committees of restricted membership from the Senior Staff and Board Assistants prior to consideration by the full membership of these groups. A principal objective of this arrangement was to permit greater frankness of interchange on sensitive subjects among the representatives of those agencies which had the most direct concern with the particular subject matter.

In September 1950, shortly after the Council reorganization, the Senior Staff agreed to a new format for Council policy papers. What had formerly appeared at the end of the paper as "Conclusions" was now placed at the front of the paper as a draft "Statement of Policy". This Statement of Policy contained the Council's policy advice to the President and was the only part of the paper that the Council adopted and the President subsequently approved. The Statement of Policy was followed by an "NSC Staff Study" which normally included four major sections: (a) a statement of the problem; (b) an analysis, which usually included such elements as a statement of approved policies and other relevant facts bearing on the problem, an assessment and appraisal of U. S. objectives, commitments and risks in relation to actual and potential U. S. military power, an estimate of the situation and probable future developments, and other more particular factors bearing on the problem; (c) an enumeration and analysis of alternative courses of action; and (d) conclusions. During this period the format of the Statement of Policy went through a further evolution. By the end of the period it typically included three elements: (a) general considerations which consisted essentially of a summary statement of the elements contained in the analysis section

* Public Law 213, 82nd Congress.

of the staff study; (b) a statement of U. S. objectives; and (c) courses of action.

With staff work completed, the paper was circulated to the Council in advance of the Council meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordinarily submitted their views on the paper in advance of the meeting and these too were usually circulated. Each Senior Staff member was responsible for briefing his principal in advance of the meeting on the subjects before the Council; the Executive Secretary similarly briefed the President. The Council's agenda, which was determined by the President in consultation with the Executive Secretary, continued to include a variety of different kinds of reports and presentations. In the Council meeting the Executive Secretary, as Chairman of the Senior Staff, presented the Senior Staff's papers. Other procedures remained basically unchanged. Though the President now presided at Council meetings, he continued to reserve his own decision on Council policy recommendations until after the Council meeting when those recommendations were presented to him by the Executive Secretary for approval together with the record of the Council's actions.

When the President approved a policy recommended to him by the Council, he continued to designate the department or agency which had primary responsibility for action to coordinate its implementation. During this period he sometimes designated two agencies, (e.g., State and Defense) as joint coordinators. The coordinating agency continued to submit progress reports; in the case of policies under joint coordination these were joint reports. Toward the end of the 1950-52 period, progress reports were often submitted less frequently than every six months.

The format for progress reports, as it had developed by this time in the Council's history, contained two basic elements: (a) a summary of important U. S. actions to implement the policy, and important developments which had favorably or unfavorably affected the policy or its implementation; and (b) a brief assessment of the effectiveness, adequacy and timeliness of the policy and its implementation. Progress reports did not propose specific changes in policy, but indicated the respects, if any, in which the policy was inadequate and needed review. If the Council recommended, on the basis of the information in a progress report, that a policy be reviewed and if the President approved that recommendation, the review itself was undertaken by the Senior Staff.

The Psychological Strategy Board

The Council had, virtually since its inception, regularly considered problems relating to the organization of psychological (including foreign information) activities. As a result of one such discussion in January 1951 the President requested Mr. Souers, his Special Consultant, and the Bureau of the Budget to make a further study and recommendations. Based upon this study the President in the Spring of 1951 issued a directive

establishing the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB).* With a basic membership of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and with a fulltime Director and staff, the PSB was responsible for the "formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort". Although the PSB was established outside the NSC structure, the Board was directed to report to the Council "on its activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned". The Director of the PSB was invited to attend Council meetings as an Observer and was represented by an Adviser on the Senior Staff.**

* White House Press Release, June 20, 1951.

** Mr. Gordon Gray was one of the Directors of PSB who attended Council meetings as an Observer and Mr. Robert Cutler was one of those who served as PSB Adviser to the Senior Staff. Both of these individuals were later to serve as Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs.