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Reagan-Bush Transition Briefing Book: Background on NSC Organization and Administration

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. List	Re: Interagency Bodies for National Security Affairs (8 pp.)	11/3/88	(b)(1)	S
02. Paper	Re: Intelligence Programs Directorate (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

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File Location: Reagan-Bush Transition Briefing Book: Background on NSC Organization and Administration

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NATIONAL
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Reagan

*Bush
Transition
Briefing
Book*


Background on NSC
Organization and Administration

Prepared by:
Office of the
Executive
Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Reagan - Bush Transition

Briefing Book



Background on NSC Organization and Administration

November 1988

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

Prepared By: Office of the Executive Secretary

MC 11/23

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7972

November 9, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS *PS*

SUBJECT: NSC Transition

Attached for your review and approval is the first of our transition briefing books. This volume documents the current organization of the staff, the division of responsibilities among my office and the various directorates, the existing interagency process, and NSC budget, staffing and administration. I believe it is substantially complete, but invite you to consider whether there are any matters that have been left out or deserve more or different treatment. Note that this volume has been classified SECRET. The Information Policy Directorate believes this appropriate in view of the numerous references to NSDDs contained in the material. As with all the transition materials in preparation, I will look to you for guidance about when and to whom this volume should be provided to assist in the transition.

The second installment, our "issues book," should be available for your review on Monday, November 14th.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the attached volume for use in connection with the NSC transition.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachment
Tab A

Reagan-Bush Transition Briefing
Book: Background on NSC Organization
And Administration

*How do we reflect
front office personnel
Mc, John, Feb, DP,
K2, Lurie?*

~~SECRET~~

REAGAN-BUSH TRANSITION
BRIEFING BOOK
BACKGROUND ON
NSC ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

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- I. African Affairs Directorate
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Establishment

The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 - 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). By the Reorganization Plan of 1949, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.

Function

The National Security Council is the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring presidential decision. The NSC advises the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security, to enable Executive departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively. For the purpose of making recommendations to the President, the NSC also assesses the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, and considers policies on matters of common interest to the Executive departments and agencies concerning national security.

Membership

Statutory members of the NSC are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. He formulates foreign policy, in conjunction with the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, and executes approved policy. The Secretary of State has the authority and responsibility for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation, and the activities of Executive departments and agencies overseas.

The Secretary of Defense is the President's principal defense policy advisor. He is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy in conjunction with the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, for policy related to all matters of direct primary concern to the Department of Defense.

Membership (continued)

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are statutory advisors to the NSC. The Director of Central Intelligence advises the NSC with respect to coordinating intelligence activities of Executive departments and agencies in the interest of national security and otherwise, as provided by law. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

The Directors of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the United States Information Agency are special statutory advisors to the NSC. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on arms control and disarmament. The Director of the United States Information Agency is the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on public diplomacy. In addition, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief of Staff to the President attend NSC meetings at the President's invitation. As the meeting agenda dictates, heads of other Executive departments and agencies and senior officials of the Executive Office of the President participate in NSC meetings.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ("National Security Advisor") has primary responsibility for the day-to-day management of the NSC and the interagency coordination process. He serves as principal White House staff advisor to the President with respect to all national security affairs. In this capacity, the National Security Advisor presents his own views and advice as well as the views of other NSC participants.

The National Security Council Staff


The NSC staff, through the Executive Secretary, assists the National Security Advisor in his roles both as manager of the NSC process and as the President's principal White House staff advisor on national security affairs.

The staff is composed of personnel broadly experienced in national security affairs. Staffing has sought to achieve a balance among personnel drawn from Executive departments and agencies and the private sector. The NSC staff organization is designed to establish clear, vertical lines of control and accountability to the National Security Advisor and his Deputy, through the Senior Director of each directorate. The NSC Legal Adviser, a staff position first established in 1987, helps ensure that actions of all staff directorates conform to applicable legal requirements.

Interagency Mechanisms


To assist the NSC and its individual members and advisors in fulfilling their responsibilities, the President has authorized the establishment of various interagency bodies. These are designed to consider policy objectives, develop policy options, make recommendations, evaluate the implications of agency programs for national security policy, and undertake such other activities as may be assigned by the NSC in its coordination role or by Cabinet officers in discharging their departmental responsibilities.

National Security Council Staff




White House Situation Support Staff (WHSSS)

**NSC Deputy Executive Secretary
(Situation Support) &
Senior Director, WHSSS**




Executive Office of the President



The White House Office

(AS OF APRIL 21, 1988)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 266

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD

The President's Special Review Board submitted its Report on February 26, 1987. I addressed the Nation on March 4 and announced first, that I endorse the Board's recommendations; and second, that I intend to go beyond the Board's recommendations to put the National Security Council (NSC) process in even better order. This Directive spells out the specific steps I have approved to implement the letter and spirit of the Board's recommendations.

Many steps were taken even prior to the issuance of the Board's Report. The NSC staff was rebuilt and made subject to proper management discipline. A directive was issued on my instruction to prohibit the NSC staff itself from undertaking covert operations. A comprehensive legal and policy review of such operations, ordered by me, was already far advanced. Proper procedures for consultation with the Congress were reaffirmed and are being observed.

In light of the Board's Report, additional measures are required. This Directive sets forth the specific timetable according to which I expect all such measures to be completed. It is of utmost importance that the NSC -- including all members of, and advisors to, the NSC, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the NSC staff, and all other participants in the NSC process -- act decisively to accomplish my objectives fully.

I shall inform Congress of the nature and progress of these Executive branch efforts prior to the end of March; I also shall call upon Congress to heed the balance of the Board's recommendations, namely:

-- that no substantive change be made in the provisions of the National Security Act dealing with the structure and operation of the NSC system;

-- that the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not be made subject to Senate confirmation; and

-- that Congress replace the existing Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives with a new joint committee with a restricted staff to oversee the intelligence community.

These recommendations of the Board, which are addressed to Congress, I also strongly endorse.

I. Model for the National Security Council System

The structure and procedures of the National Security Council shall incorporate all aspects of the model of the NSC system described in the Report of the President's Special Review Board as the Board's principal recommendation. This directive implements that recommendation in each of the following respects:

- organizing for national security, including provision of appropriate guidelines to participants in the NSC process;
- the role and functions of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- the nature and responsibilities of the NSC staff; and
- the NSC and interagency process.

A. Organizing for National Security

The National Security Council shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring presidential decision. The function of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Broadly speaking, the NSC shall advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable Executive departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

Participation in the NSC shall be as provided by law and this Directive. Statutory members of the NSC are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Other heads of Executive departments and agencies and senior officials within the Executive Office of the President shall participate in the NSC as provided in this Directive.

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are statutory advisors to the NSC. The Director of Central Intelligence shall advise the NSC with respect to coordinating intelligence activities of Executive departments and agencies in the interest of national security and as otherwise provided by law. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

The Directors of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and United States Information Agency are special statutory advisors to the NSC. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall be principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on arms control and disarmament matters. The Director of the United States Information Agency shall be principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on international informational, educational, and cultural matters.

The Secretary of State shall be the President's principal foreign policy advisor. As such, the Secretary shall be responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, subject to review within the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, and for the execution of approved policy. I assign to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation, and the activities of Executive departments and agencies of the United States overseas. Such activities shall not include those of United States military forces operating in the field under the command of a United States area military commander, and such other military activities as I elect, as Commander in Chief, to conduct exclusively through military or other channels. Activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and that are not of such nature as to affect significantly the overall United States overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be activities covered within the meaning of this Directive.

The Secretary of Defense shall be the President's principal defense policy advisor. As such, the Secretary shall be responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, subject to review within the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, for policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. I assign to the Secretary of Defense authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to defense policy formulation.

The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the President's principal advisor on intelligence matters. As such, the Director shall be responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities, policy and proposals, subject to review within the NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, as set forth in law and relevant Executive orders. I assign to the Director of Central Intelligence authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, Executive order, and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters.

Although taking part in the NSC system by virtue of official positions as heads of Executive departments or agencies or as senior officials within the Executive Office of the President, all NSC participants shall sit as advisors to the President in connection with the President's exercise of authority under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In their capacity as department and agency heads, NSC participants shall ensure the effective and expeditious execution and implementation of overall national security policies established by the President. Execution and implementation of such policies shall not be the responsibility of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or of the NSC staff except as the President specifically directs.

B. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ("National Security Advisor") shall have primary responsibility for day-to-day management of the National Security Council process, and shall serve as principal advisor on the President's staff with respect to all national security affairs. The National Security Advisor shall have access and report directly to the President, and shall keep the President and the Chief of Staff to the President fully and currently informed on all matters of substance.

As manager of the NSC process, the National Security Advisor shall ensure the following: that matters submitted for consideration by the NSC cover the full range of issues on which review is required; that those issues are fully analyzed; that a full range of options is considered; that the prospects and risks of each are examined; that all relevant intelligence and other information is available to NSC participants; that legal matters are addressed; and that difficulties in implementation are confronted. The National Security Advisor shall monitor policy implementation to ensure that policies are executed in conformity with the intent of presidential decisions. He shall initiate periodic reassessments of policies and operations, in light of changed circumstances or United States interests. The National Security Advisor shall keep NSC participants currently informed of presidential decisions. He shall ensure that NSC consultations and presidential decisions are adequately recorded, and that appropriate and timely preparations are made with respect to meetings convened under NSC auspices.

As the President's principal staff advisor on national security affairs, the National Security Advisor shall present his own views and advice and, at the same time, faithfully represent the views of other NSC participants.

C. The National Security Council Staff

The functions and responsibilities of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council shall be as provided by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The Executive Secretary heads the NSC staff and, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, appoints and fixes the compensation of personnel required to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the President, the NSC, or the National Security Advisor. The Executive Secretary shall establish procedures within the NSC Executive Secretariat for maximum effective support of the NSC and the National Security Advisor in performance of responsibilities assigned by the President. With the guidance and under the instruction of the National Security Advisor, the Executive Secretary shall develop and implement appropriate policies with respect to the overall size of the NSC staff, the background and experience of its members, the duration of their service, and the organization of staff offices. The objectives shall be twofold: first, an NSC staff that is small, highly competent, broadly experienced in the making of national security policy, and properly balanced from among Executive departments and agencies and persons drawn from within and outside government; and second, an NSC staff organization that imposes clear, vertical lines of control and accountability.

The Executive Secretary, through the National Security Advisor, shall recommend for my consideration specific measures designed to enhance the continuity of the functioning of the NSC, including measures to ensure adequate institutional recordkeeping from administration to administration. Specific recommendations for these purposes shall be made not later than June 30, 1987.

The NSC staff, through the Executive Secretary, shall assist the National Security Advisor in each aspect of his roles both as manager of the NSC process and as my principal staff advisor on national security affairs.

The NSC staff shall include a Legal Advisor whose particular responsibility it will be to provide legal counsel to the National Security Advisor, the Executive Secretary, and the NSC staff with respect to the full range of their activities, and to assist the National Security Advisor in ensuring that legal considerations are fully addressed in the NSC process and in interagency deliberations. The NSC Legal Advisor shall be accorded access to all information and deliberations as may be required for these purposes, and shall advise the National Security Advisor and Executive Secretary as appropriate on all matters within his responsibility. He shall work cooperatively with the Counsel to the President, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and with senior counsel to all other NSC members, advisors, and participants.

D. The National Security Council and Interagency Process

1. National Security Council Meetings

The National Security Council shall meet regularly to consider matters directed by the President or recommended by the National Security Advisor or by the other NSC members. The National Security Advisor shall attend all NSC meetings and shall be responsible for the agenda and conduct of such meetings under my direction. The statutory members of the NSC, and the Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall attend NSC meetings. In addition, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief of Staff to the President at my invitation shall attend NSC meetings. The special statutory advisors to the NSC, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the heads of other Executive departments and agencies shall be invited to attend such NSC meetings as relate to matters vested under their authority.

The National Security Advisor shall provide NSC participants advance notice of all NSC meetings and agenda therefor. To the extent practicable, the National Security Advisor shall circulate decision documents in advance of such meetings. The Executive Secretary of the NSC and the NSC staff shall assist the National Security Advisor in connection with appropriate preparations for, and follow-up to, NSC meetings, as directed by the President. Such assistance shall include preparation of meeting minutes and the development and dissemination of decision documents and, as appropriate, study directives. All decision documents shall be submitted for the President's review and action by the National Security Advisor. The National Security Advisor shall transmit decision documents to the President through the Chief of Staff to the President. National Security Decision Directives, intelligence findings, and similar decision documents shall be coordinated, in advance of their submission to the President, by the NSC Legal Advisor with the Counsel to the President.

2. The Interagency Process

To assist the NSC at large and its individual members and advisors in fulfilling their responsibilities, I previously directed or authorized the establishment of senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups. The purpose of such groups was to establish policy objectives, develop policy options, make appropriate recommendations, consider the implications of agency programs for foreign policy or overall national security policy, and undertake such other activities as may be assigned by the NSC.

The NSC, through the National Security Advisor, shall review the structure of senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups established pursuant to, or under authority of, presidential directives or applicable memoranda, and shall recommend all such changes thereto as may be necessary

or desirable to realize fully and promptly in practice the Special Review Board's recommended model for the NSC system, as well as all of the Board's other recommendations. These include establishment of an interagency process in which the National Security Advisor chairs the senior level committees of the NSC. The National Security Advisor shall present, for consideration by the NSC, a draft National Security Decision Directive for this purpose not later than April 30, 1987.

II. Covert Actions and Use of Non-Government Personnel

I have directed the National Security Council's Planning and Coordination Group (PCG) to review all covert action programs. This review is designed to ensure that such programs are commenced and pursued in accordance with law and are consistent with United States policy. The PCG shall complete this review on an expedited basis. It shall report its findings to the NSC on or before April 30, 1987. The NSC promptly shall review all such programs and seek my concurrence in their continuation as appropriate. The NSC, through the National Security Advisor, shall review current procedures for covert action policy approval and coordination and shall recommend such changes as may be necessary or desirable to ensure, among other things, the following:

- that proposed covert actions will be coordinated with NSC participants, including the Attorney General, and their respective recommendations communicated to the President;

- that all requirements of law concerning covert activities, including those requirements relating to presidential authorization and congressional notification, will be addressed in a timely manner and complied with fully;

- consistent with the foregoing, that covert activities will be subject to tightly restricted consideration, and measures to protect the security of all information concerning such activities will be enhanced;

- that the NSC staff itself will not undertake the conduct of covert activities; and

- that the use of private individuals and organizations as intermediaries to conduct covert activities will be appropriately limited and subject in every case to close observation and supervision by appropriate Executive departments and agencies.

This review shall take fully into account such changes as I have authorized by this Directive to the structure of the NSC. The National Security Advisor shall present, for consideration by the NSC, a revised National Security Decision Directive on procedures for covert action policy approval and coordination not later than April 30, 1987.

III. Intelligence Process

Maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process is an important goal of the United States intelligence effort. It demands, as the President's Special Review Board has stated, careful differentiation between the respective roles of foreign intelligence, on the one hand, and policy advocacy, on the other. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide such additional review of, guidance for, and direction to, the conduct of national foreign intelligence estimates as may be required to accomplish fully this objective. The Director of Central Intelligence shall review established procedures for the production of national foreign intelligence estimates and, not later than July 31, 1987, shall inform the NSC, through the National Security Advisor, of any modifications or additions thereto he may deem appropriate for this purpose.

IV. Reporting

The National Security Advisor shall keep me fully informed of progress on all aspects of the implementation of the recommendations of the President's Special Review Board.

Ronald Reagan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90476

June 9, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 276

National Security Council Interagency Process (C)

Introduction

In National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 266, I directed that the recommendations of the President's Special Review Board, including the model for the National Security Council (NSC) system, be implemented in full. To that end, I chartered a review of the structure of senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups established pursuant to, or under the authority of, presidential Directives or applicable memoranda. This review was designed to identify such changes in the interagency process as might be necessary or desirable to realize fully and promptly in practice the Special Review Board's recommendations, including the specific recommendation that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the "National Security Advisor") chair the senior committees of the NSC. The present Directive reflects changes in the interagency process I have authorized as a result of that review. (C)

Interagency Groups

Interagency groups can provide an effective medium for the development of advice and policy for consideration by the President. They achieve their goal when they provide thorough and clear analyses of all policy choices, coordinate policy implementation, and review policy in light of experience. (U)

NSDD 2, dated January 12, 1982, established the senior interagency structure. It created three functional senior interagency groups (SIGs) -- one on foreign policy, chaired by the Secretary of State; one on defense policy, chaired by the Secretary of Defense; and one on intelligence policy, chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. Subsequent Directives and memoranda established some 22 additional SIGs and 55 interagency groups (IGs), including certain groups chaired by the National Security Advisor or members of the NSC staff. IGs

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in turn typically have established working groups and task forces to assist in, and support, their work. (C)

After five years' experience, a review of the interagency process was due, even without the impetus of the Special Review Board's report. This review revealed that many interagency groups, although formally established, have not met or ceased to meet when the circumstances that brought them into being changed; and that new interagency groups have come into being to deal with contingencies as they have arisen. As the Special Review Board noted, these groups have not, in every case, served the goal of effective policy deliberation. (C)

To improve the interagency process at large, and to implement the Special Review Board's recommendations, I therefore am directing or authorizing the following:

1. National Security Council. As specified in NSDD 266, the NSC shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security issues requiring presidential decision. The functions of, and participants in, the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and NSDD 266. The NSC shall meet at the direction of the President.

2. National Security Planning Group. The National Security Planning Group (NSPG) shall be a committee of the NSC. The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the National Security Advisor, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall attend NSPG meetings. The NSPG shall meet, as circumstances warrant, to monitor and review the development and implementation of national security policy on behalf of the NSC. The responsibilities of the NSPG with regard to covert action shall be as provided in a separate presidential Directive revising NSDD 159.

The National Security Advisor or the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the "Deputy National Security Advisor") shall be responsible for the attendance, agenda, and conduct of such meetings at my direction. The Directors of the United States Information Agency and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the heads of other Executive departments and agencies, and other advisors to the President shall be invited by the National

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Security Advisor, acting at my direction, to attend NSPG meetings as matters on the agenda of such meetings shall dictate.

3. Senior Review Group. A Senior Review Group (SRG) shall be the Cabinet level interagency group for the consideration of national security issues. The SRG shall be comprised of the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Security Advisor shall invite the attendance of heads of such other Executive departments or agencies, and of such senior officials within the Executive Office of the President, as matters on the agenda of SRG meetings shall dictate. The National Security Advisor shall chair the SRG, which shall meet at his request or the request of its standing members, to review, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of national security policy on behalf of the NSC.

4. The Policy Review Group. The Policy Review Group (PRG) shall be the senior sub-Cabinet level interagency group. The PRG shall be comprised of the Deputy National Security Advisor, a representative of the Office of the Vice President, and an Under or Assistant Secretary or other senior official of equivalent rank of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and, as matters on the agenda of the PRG dictate, of the Executive Office of the President and other interested Executive departments and agencies. The Deputy National Security Advisor shall chair the PRG, which shall meet regularly at his request or the request of its standing members. The PRG's primary responsibility shall be to review and make recommendations concerning national security policy developed through the day-to-day functioning of the interagency process, including such senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups as may hereafter be formed or authorized to continue in existence as provided in paragraph 5 hereof. The PRG shall assume the functions described in NSDD 30 and previously exercised by the Crisis Pre-Planning Group and those described in NSDD 207 and previously exercised by the Terrorist Incident Working Group. The Planning and Coordination

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Group (PCG), as provided in a separate presidential Directive revising NSDD 159, shall continue to be the senior sub-Cabinet level interagency group responsible for covert action.

Matters considered and recommendations for follow-on action made by the PRG shall be referred to responsible Executive departments and agencies. Recommendations made by the PRG shall be submitted for consideration by the SRG, NSPG, or NSC, as appropriate.

5. Other Interagency Groups. Within their respective areas of authority as set forth in NSDD 266, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Director of the United States Information Agency may approve the continuation of existing senior interagency groups and regional or functional interagency groups to the extent necessary or desirable to promote an effective NSC process; by June 30, 1987, the National Security Advisor shall be notified of those interagency groups they have determined shall continue to function.

The National Security Advisor is authorized to approve or direct the formal establishment of additional senior interagency groups to the extent required for an effective NSC process, and to approve the continuation of such existing senior interagency groups as may be chaired by members of the NSC staff. (P)

NSDD 2 and other presidential Directives and applicable memoranda, to the extent inconsistent with this Directive or with NSDD 266, are rescinded. (P)

Ronald Reagan

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Recommendations

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD

FEBRUARY 26, 1988

"Not only . . . is the Federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).

Whereas the ultimate power to formulate domestic policy resides in the Congress, the primary responsibility for the formulation and implementation of national security policy falls on the President.

It is the President who is the usual source of innovation and responsiveness in this field. The departments and agencies—the Defense Department, State Department, and CIA bureaucracies—tend to resist policy change. Each has its own perspective based on long experience. The challenge for the President is to bring his perspective to bear on these bureaucracies for they are his instruments for executing national security policy, and he must work through them. His task is to provide them leadership and direction.

The National Security Act of 1947 and the system that has grown up under it affords the President special tools for carrying out this important role. These tools are the National Security Council, the National Security Advisor, and the NSC Staff. These are the means through which the creative impulses of the

President are brought to bear on the permanent government. The National Security Act, and custom and practice, rightly give the President wide latitude in fashioning exactly how these means are used.

There is no magic formula which can be applied to the NSC structure and process to produce an optimal system. Because the system is the vehicle through which the President formulates and implements his national security policy, it must adapt to each individual President's style and management philosophy. This means that NSC structures and processes must be flexible, not rigid. Overprescription would, as discussed in Part II, either destroy the system or render it ineffective.

Nevertheless, this does not mean there can be no guidelines or recommendations that might improve the operation of the system, whatever the particular style of the incumbent President. We have reviewed the operation of the system over the past 40 years, through good times and bad. We have listened carefully to the views of all the living former Presidents as well as those of most of the participants in their own national security systems. With the strong caveat that flexibility and adaptability must be at the core, it is our judgment that the national security system seems to have worked best when it has in general operated along the lines set forth below.

Organizing for National Security. Because of the wide latitude in the National Security Act, the President bears a special responsibility for the effective performance of the NSC system. A President must at the outset provide guidelines to the members of the National Security Coun-

cil, his National Security Advisor, and the National Security Council staff. These guidelines, to be effective, must include how they will relate to one another, what procedures will be followed, what the President expects of them. If his advisors are not performing as he likes, only the President can intervene.

The National Security Council principals other than the President participate on the Council in a unique capacity.¹ Although holding a seat by virtue of their official positions in the Administration, when they sit as members of the Council they sit not as cabinet secretaries or department heads but as advisors to the President. They are there not simply to advance or defend the particular positions of the departments or agencies they head but to give their best advice to the President. Their job—and their challenge—is to see the issue from this perspective, not from the narrower interests of their respective bureaucracies.

The National Security Council is only advisory. It is the President alone who decides. When the NSC principals receive those decisions, they do so as heads of the appropriate departments or agencies. They are then responsible to see that the President's decisions are carried out by those organizations accurately and effectively.

This is an important point. The policy innovation and creativity of the President encounters a natural resistance from the executing departments. While this resistance is a source of frustration to every President, it is inherent in the design of the government. It is up to the politically appointed agency heads to ensure that the President's goals, designs, and policies are brought to bear on this permanent structure. Circumventing the departments, perhaps by using the National Security Advisor or the NSC Staff to execute policy, robs the President of the experience and capacity resident in the departments. The President must act largely through them, but the agency heads must ensure that they execute the President's policies in an expeditious and effective manner. It is not just the obligation of the National Security Advisor to see that the national security

process is used. All of the NSC principals—and particularly the President—have that obligation.

This tension between the President and the Executive Departments is worked out through the national security process described in the opening sections of this report. It is through this process that the nation obtains both the best of the creativity of the President and the learning and expertise of the national security departments and agencies.

This process is extremely important to the President. His decisions will benefit from the advice and perspective of all the concerned departments and agencies. History offers numerous examples of this truth. President Kennedy, for example, did not have adequate consultation before entering upon the Bay of Pigs invasion, one of his greatest failures. He remedied this in time for the Cuban missile crisis, one of his greatest successes. Process will not always produce brilliant ideas, but history suggests it can at least help prevent bad ideas from becoming Presidential policy.

The National Security Advisor. It is the National Security Advisor who is primarily responsible for managing this process on a daily basis. The job requires skill, sensitivity, and integrity. It is his responsibility to ensure that matters submitted for consideration by the Council cover the full range of issues on which review is required; that those issues are fully analyzed; that a full range of options is considered; that the prospects and risks of each are examined; that all relevant intelligence and other information is available to the principals; that legal considerations are addressed; that difficulties in implementation are confronted. Usually, this can best be accomplished through interagency participation in the analysis of the issue and a preparatory policy review at the Deputy or Under Secretary level.

The National Security Advisor assumes these responsibilities not only with respect to the President but with respect to all the NSC principals. He must keep them informed of the President's thinking and decisions. They should have adequate notice and an agenda for all meetings. Decision papers should, if at all possible, be provided in advance.

The National Security Advisor must also ensure that adequate records are kept of NSC consultations and Presidential decisions. This is

¹ As discussed in more detail in Part II, the statutory members of the National Security Council are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. By the phrase "National Security Council principals" or "NSC principals," the Board generally means those four statutory members plus the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

essential to avoid confusion among Presidential advisors and departmental staffs about what was actually decided and what is wanted. Those records are also essential for conducting a periodic review of a policy or initiative, and to learn from the past.

It is the responsibility of the National Security Advisor to monitor policy implementation and to ensure that policies are executed in conformity with the intent of the President's decision. Monitoring includes initiating periodic reassessments of a policy or operation, especially when changed circumstances suggest that the policy or operation no longer serves U.S. interests.

But the National Security Advisor does not simply manage the national security process. He is himself an important source of advice on national security matters to the President. He is not the President's only source of advice, but he is perhaps the one most able to see things from the President's perspective. He is unburdened by departmental responsibilities. The President is his only master. His advice is confidential. He is not subject to Senate confirmation and traditionally does not formally appear before Congressional committees.

To serve the President well, the National Security Advisor should present his own views, but he must at the same time represent the views of others fully and faithfully to the President. The system will not work well if the National Security Advisor does not have the trust of the NSC principals. He, therefore, must not use his proximity to the President to manipulate the process so as to produce his own position. He should not interpose himself between the President and the NSC principals. He should not seek to exclude the NSC principals from the decision process. Performing both these roles well is an essential, if not easy, task.

In order for the National Security Advisor to serve the President adequately, he must have direct access to the President. Unless he knows first hand the views of the President and is known to reflect them in his management of the NSC system, he will be ineffective. He should not report to the President through some other official. While the Chief of Staff or others can usefully interject domestic political considerations into national security deliberations, they should do so as additional advisors to the President.

Ideally, the National Security Advisor should not have a high public profile. He should not try to compete with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense as the articulator of public policy. They, along with the President, should be the spokesmen for the policies of the Administration. While a "passion for anonymity" is perhaps too strong a term, the National Security Advisor should generally operate off-stage.

The NSC principals of course must have direct access to the President, with whatever frequency the President feels is appropriate. But these individual meetings should not be used by the principal to seek decisions or otherwise circumvent the system in the absence of the other principals. In the same way, the National Security Advisor should not use his scheduled intelligence or other daily briefings of the President as an opportunity to seek Presidential decision on significant issues.

If the system is to operate well, the National Security Advisor must promote cooperation rather than competition among himself and the other NSC principals. But the President is ultimately responsible for the operation of this system. If rancorous infighting develops among his principal national security functionaries, only he can deal with them. Public dispute over external policy by senior officials undermines the process of decision-making and narrows his options. It is the President's responsibility to ensure that it does not take place.

Finally, the National Security Advisor should focus on advice and management, not implementation and execution. Implementation is the responsibility and the strength of the departments and agencies. The National Security Advisor and the NSC Staff generally do not have the depth of resources for the conduct of operations. In addition, when they take on implementation responsibilities, they risk compromising their objectivity. They can no longer act as impartial overseers of the implementation, ensuring that Presidential guidance is followed, that policies are kept under review, and that the results are serving the President's policy and the national interest.

The NSC Staff. The NSC staff should be small, highly competent, and experienced in the making of public policy. Staff members should be drawn both from within and from

outside government. Those from within government should come from the several departments and agencies concerned with national security matters. No particular department or agency should have a predominate role. A proper balance must be maintained between people from within and outside the government. Staff members should generally rotate with a stay of more than four years viewed as the exception.

A large number of staff action officers organized along essentially horizontal lines enhances the possibilities for poorly supervised and monitored activities by individual staff members. Such a system is made to order for energetic self-starters to take unauthorized initiatives. Clear vertical lines of control and authority, responsibility and accountability, are essential to good management.

One problem affecting the NSC staff is lack of institutional memory. This results from the understandable desire of a President to replace the staff in order to be sure it is responsive to him. Departments provide continuity that can help the Council, but the Council as an institution also needs some means to assure adequate records and memory. This was identified to the Board as a problem by many witnesses.

We recognize the problem and have identified a range of possibilities that a President might consider on this subject. One would be to create a small permanent executive secretariat. Another would be to have one person, the Executive Secretary, as a permanent position. Finally, a pattern of limited tenure and overlapping rotation could be used. Any of these would help reduce the problem of loss of institutional memory; none would be practical unless each succeeding President subscribed to it.

The guidelines for the role of the National Security Advisor also apply generally to the NSC staff. They should protect the process and thereby the President. Departments and agencies should not be excluded from participation in that process. The staff should not be implementors or operators and staff should keep a low profile with the press.

Principal Recommendation

The model we have outlined above for the National Security Council system constitutes

our first and most important recommendation. It includes guidelines that address virtually all of the deficiencies in procedure and practice that the Board encountered in the Iran/Contra affair as well as in other case studies of this and previous administrations.

We believe this model can enhance the performance of a President and his administration in the area of national security. It responds directly to President Reagan's mandate to describe the NSC system as it ought to be.

The Board recommends that the proposed model be used by Presidents in their management of the national security system.

Specific Recommendations

In addition to its principal recommendation regarding the organization and functioning of the NSC system and roles to be played by the participants, the Board has a number of specific recommendations.

1. *The National Security Act of 1947.* The flaws of procedure and failures of responsibility revealed by our study do not suggest any inadequacies in the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 that deal with the structure and operation of the NSC system. Forty years of experience under that Act demonstrate to the Board that it remains a fundamentally sound framework for national security decision-making. It strikes a balance between formal structure and flexibility adequate to permit each President to tailor the system to fit his needs.

As a general matter, the NSC Staff should not engage in the implementation of policy or the conduct of operations. This compromises their oversight role and usurps the responsibilities of the departments and agencies. But the inflexibility of a legislative restriction should be avoided. Terms such as "operation" and "implementation" are difficult to define, and a legislative proscription might preclude some future President from making a very constructive use of the NSC Staff.

Predisposition on sizing of the staff should be toward fewer rather than more. But a legislative restriction cannot foresee the requirements of future Presidents. Size is best left to the discretion of the President, with the admo-

dition that the role of the NSC staff is to review, not to duplicate or replace, the work of the departments and agencies.

We recommend that no substantive change be made in the provisions of the National Security Act dealing with the structure and operation of the NSC system.

2. Senate Confirmation of the National Security Advisor. It has been suggested that the job of the National Security Advisor has become so important that its holder should be screened by the process of confirmation, and that once confirmed he should return frequently for questioning by the Congress. It is argued that this would improve the accountability of the National Security Advisor.

We hold a different view. The National Security Advisor does, and should continue, to serve only one master, and that is the President. Further, confirmation is inconsistent with the role the National Security Advisor should play. He should not decide, only advise. He should not engage in policy implementation or operations. He should serve the President, with no collateral and potentially diverting loyalties.

Confirmation would tend to institutionalize the natural tension that exists between the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor. Questions would increasingly arise about who really speaks for the President in national security matters. Foreign governments could be confused or would be encouraged to engage in "forum shopping."

Only one of the former government officials interviewed favored Senate confirmation of the National Security Advisor. While consultation with Congress received wide support, confirmation and formal questioning were opposed. Several suggested that if the National Security Advisor were to become a position subject to confirmation, it could induce the President to turn to other internal staff or to people outside government to play that role.

We urge the Congress not to require Senate confirmation of the National Security Advisor.

3. The Interagency Process. It is the National Security Advisor who has the greatest interest in

making the national security process work, for it is this process by which the President obtains the information, background, and analysis he requires to make decisions and build support for his program. Most Presidents have set up interagency committees at both a staff and policy level to surface issues, develop options, and clarify choices. There has typically been a struggle for the chairmanships of these groups between the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff on the one hand, and the cabinet secretaries and department officials on the other.

Our review of the operation of the present system and that of other administrations where committee chairmen came from the departments has led us to the conclusion that the system generally operates better when the committees are chaired by the individual with the greatest stake in making the NSC system work.

We recommend that the National Security Advisor chair the senior-level committees of the NSC system.

4. Covert Actions. Policy formulation and implementation are usually managed by a team of experts led by policymaking generalists. Covert action requirements are no different, but there is a need to limit, sometimes severely, the number of individuals involved. The lives of many people may be at stake, as was the case in the attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran. Premature disclosure might kill the idea in embryo, as could have been the case in the opening of relations with China. In such cases, there is a tendency to limit those involved to a small number of top officials. This practice tends to limit severely the expertise brought to bear on the problem and should be used very sparingly indeed.

The obsession with secrecy and preoccupation with leaks threaten to paralyze the government in its handling of covert operations. Unfortunately, the concern is not misplaced. The selective leak has become a principal means of waging bureaucratic warfare. Opponents of an operation kill it with a leak; supporters seek to build support through the same means.

We have witnessed over the past years a significant deterioration in the integrity of process. Rather than a means to obtain results more

satisfactory than the position of any of the individual departments, it has frequently become something to be manipulated to reach a specific outcome. The leak becomes a primary instrument in that process.

This practice is destructive of orderly governance. It can only be reversed if the most senior officials take the lead. If senior decision-makers set a clear example and demand compliance, subordinates are more likely to conform.

Most recent administrations have had carefully drawn procedures for the consideration of covert activities. The Reagan Administration established such procedures in January, 1985, then promptly ignored them in their consideration of the Iran initiative.

We recommend that each administration formulate precise procedures for restricted consideration of covert action and that, once formulated, those procedures be strictly adhered to.

5. *The Role of the CIA.* Some aspects of the Iran arms sales raised broader questions in the minds of members of the Board regarding the role of CIA. The first deals with intelligence.

The NSC staff was actively involved in the preparation of the May 20, 1985, update to the Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. It is a matter for concern if this involvement and the strong views of NSC staff members were allowed to influence the intelligence judgments contained in the update. It is also of concern that the update contained the hint that the United States should change its existing policy and encourage its allies to provide arms to Iran. It is critical that the line between intelligence and advocacy of a particular policy be preserved if intelligence is to retain its integrity and perform its proper function. In this instance, the CIA came close enough to the line to warrant concern.

We emphasize to both the intelligence community and policymakers the importance of maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process.

6. *Legal Counsel.* From time to time issues with important legal ramifications will come

before the National Security Council. The Attorney General is currently a member of the Council by invitation and should be in a position to provide legal advice to the Council and the President. It is important that the Attorney General and his department be available to interagency deliberations.

The Justice Department, however, should not replace the role of counsel in the other departments. As the principal counsel on foreign affairs, the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State should also be available to all the NSC participants.

Of all the NSC participants, it is the Assistant for National Security Affairs who seems to have had the least access to expert counsel familiar with his activities.

The Board recommends that the position of Legal Adviser to the NSC be enhanced in stature and in its role within the NSC staff.

7. *Secrecy and Congress.* There is a natural tension between the desire for secrecy and the need to consult Congress on covert operations. Presidents seem to become increasingly concerned about leaks of classified information as their administrations progress. They blame Congress disproportionately. Various cabinet officials from prior administrations indicated to the Board that they believe Congress bears no more blame than the Executive Branch.

However, the number of Members and staff involved in reviewing covert activities is large; it provides cause for concern and a convenient excuse for Presidents to avoid Congressional consultation.

We recommend that Congress consider replacing the existing Intelligence Committees of the respective Houses with a new joint committee with a restricted staff to oversee the intelligence community, patterned after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that existed until the mid-1970s.

8. *Privatizing National Security Policy.* Careful and limited use of people outside the U.S. Government may be very helpful in some unique cases. But this practice raises substantial questions. It can create conflict of interest problems. Private or foreign sources may have dif-

ferent policy interests or personal motives and may exploit their association with a U.S. government effort. Such involvement gives private and foreign sources potentially powerful leverage in the form of demands for return favors or even blackmail.

The U.S. has enormous resources invested in agencies and departments in order to conduct the government's business. In all but a very few

cases, these can perform the functions needed. If not, then inquiry is required to find out why.

We recommend against having implementation and policy oversight dominated by intermediaries. We do not recommend barring limited use of private individuals to assist in United States diplomatic initiatives or in covert activities. We caution against use of such people except in very limited ways and under close observation and supervision.

Epilogue

If but one of the major policy mistakes we examined had been avoided, the nation's history would bear one less scar, one less embarrassment, one less opportunity for opponents to reverse the principles this nation seeks to preserve and advance in the world.

As a collection, these recommendations are offered to those who will find themselves in situations similar to the ones we reviewed: under stress, with high stakes, given little time, using incomplete information, and troubled by premature disclosure. In such a state, modest improvements may yield surprising gains. This is our hope.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. List	Re: Interagency Bodies for National Security Affairs (8 pp.)	11/3/88	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: Transition Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Reagan-Bush Transition Briefing Book: Background on NSC Organization and Administration

Date Closed: 11/1/2023

OA/ID Number: 99015-001

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2019-1493-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

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AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

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RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

LTG Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President
Amb. John D. Negroponte, Deputy Assistant to the President
Florence E. Gantt, Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President
Kay Zerwick, Confidential Assistant
Lilly Roots-Wiggins, Secretary
Dona F. Proctor, Secretary

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has a dual responsibility -- as advisor to the President on matters relating to foreign, defense and intelligence policy, and as the director of the national security policy process, the NSC system.

In the role of advisor he is on call to the President, bringing to his attention events of importance as they occur, sitting in on meetings with foreign visitors and with Cabinet officers (State, Defense and CIA) and traveling with the President. Most important, however, is his responsibility to provide counsel to the President on long-term and day-to-day policy issues.

As the director of the NSC system he is responsible for timely initiation of interagency reviews of the full range of foreign and defense policy issues, and for assuring that such reviews are concluded in a timely fashion. When completed, he must assure that they are thorough, that they represent the best that can be gleaned from the departments and agencies in the national security community -- in short, that they represent a valid basis for decision making by the President.

In addition, he is responsible for assuring effective oversight of established policies; that is, for taking and monitoring measures to ensure that the daily actions of each of the departments and agencies are consistent with the President's policy.

In addition to these policy planning and management responsibilities, he is also responsible for supporting the President during crisis situations, again ensuring the integration of the views of each of the President's principal advisors and the preparation of timely, thorough options for U.S. political, diplomatic or military action as the crisis evolves.

In carrying out his responsibilities as director of the NSC system, he is assisted by a staff drawn predominately from departments/agencies within the national security community. The NSC staff is organized along regional and functional lines

roughly corresponding to the organization of State, Defense and CIA. Through daily contacts with counterparts throughout the national security community, the NSC staff brings to the attention of the National Security Advisor and his Deputy events of importance to U.S policy. The staff provides the support necessary for interagency meetings, the President's meetings with foreign leaders, and the NSC decision-making process.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Paul Schott Stevens, Executive Secretary
Robert M. Perito, Deputy Executive Secretary
(Operations)
Marybel Batjer, Deputy Executive Secretary
(External Affairs)
Michael Donley, Deputy Executive Secretary (WHSS)
Cathy L. Millison, Special Assistant
Jacqueline A. Murphy, Administrative Assistant
Elaine M. Mitsler, Administrative Assistant
Brenda I. Hilliard, Administrative Assistant
Mary Kay Stults, Administrative Assistant
Diane G. Ross, Administrative Assistant

Background

By statute, the Executive Secretary "heads" the NSC staff, and serves as the chief management/administrative officer of the National Security Council. Acting personally or through his deputies, the Executive Secretary assists in directing the activities of the NSC staff -- on the broad range of defense, intelligence and foreign policy matters -- in support of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), the NSC, and the President. His office tasks, reviews and insures proper coordination of all information and action memoranda submitted by the NSC staff to the President, the APNSA and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (DAPNSA). It is responsible for the scheduling of and supervises preparations for all meetings of the National Security Council, the National Security Planning Group, the Policy Review Group and the Planning and Coordination Group. It supervises staff preparations for diplomatic and other NSC events involving the President; the operation of the White House Situation Room and other activities of the White House Situation Support Staff; and the work of the NSC Secretariat, Administrative Office, Information Policy Directorate and Security Office. The Executive Secretary is a principal point of contact between the National Security Council and other government agencies and elements in the Executive Office of the President. He directly supports the APNSA and the DAPNSA (who are members of the White House Staff) in their responsibilities, frequently attending White House Senior staff, scheduling, and planning meetings on their behalf.

Responsibilities

Operations:

- Issue taskings and maintain a suspense List of Critical Items due to the President, the APNSA and the DAPNSA,

tracking all such items from receipt to completion/dispatch.

- Review all papers prepared for the President, APNSA, DAPNSA and the Executive Secretary for accuracy, content, format and style.
- Coordinate the final preparation of briefing books for diplomatic and other events involving the President.
- Schedule meetings of the National Security Council, National Security Planning Group, Policy Review Group, and Planning and Coordination Group (including notification of participating agencies, circulation of agenda, clearance of participants through White House Security, preparation of seating charts and meeting materials).
- Coordination of foreign travel for representatives of other government agencies; maintenance of whereabouts list for NSC officials.

External Affairs:

- Identify, plan and prepare for diplomatic and other meetings and other events in which the President's participation will help to advance his national security policy objectives.
- Coordinate NSC events on the President's calendar with other White House offices and government agencies.
- Ensure the President is informed and prepared for meetings sponsored by the NSC through provision of briefings, meeting memoranda and selected reading.
- Maintain a six month agenda of the Official and Working Visits of heads of state and governments.
- Coordinate major international Presidential events including summits, attendance at the UN General Assembly, and foreign visits.

Situation Support:

- Through the Situation Room, provide 24-hour alerting for White House and NSC Staff concerning international and domestic events.
- Produce current intelligence summaries and provide tailored intelligence support to NSC Staff.
- Provide secure Automated Data Processing, teleconferencing and information services to the NSC staff and the APNSA.

- Represent the NSC in the planning and implementation of continuity of government activities.
- Oversee inter-agency National Security Information and Situation Management Systems.

Secretariat:

- Provide overall supervision and guidance to the Secretariat staff which assigns action on all incoming material, controls the flow of such material and is responsible for the management and maintenance of NSC records. (See Tab 1)

Information Policy:

- Supervise the Information Policy Directorate which responds to all requests for documents from other agencies, Congress, and the public, including responses to requests received under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act and Executive Order 12356. (See Tab 4)

Administration:

- Provide guidance to the Administrative Office which is responsible for management, personnel, budget, supply and other services. (See Tab 3)

Security:

- Supervise the work of the Security Office which is responsible for setting security standards, security education, personnel clearances and physical security. (See Tab 5)

Inter-agency Groups

The Executive Secretary or his deputy chairs interagency groups concerned with preparations for Summit meetings and other major diplomatic events involving the President.

NSC SECRETARIAT

George Van Eron	Director
Brian T. Merchant	Deputy Director
B.J. Burson	Secretary

Systems Officers

John W. Ficklin	Shift Supervisor & Special Programs
Lonnie Ford	Status Officer
Julie Madison Porta	West Wing Desk Officer
Gary L. Moore	Intelligence Coordinator

Staff Information Assistants

DAY SHIFT	EVENING SHIFT
Theresa Clark	Richard Boehnlein
Ralph Bellamy	James W. Davis
Amy Korpeck	Christopher Featherston
Christopher George	Thomas Sculimbrene
Elise Neil (Legal Asst.)	Gregory Dahl
	Joanne Curtiss

West Wing Desk

Anita Craig	Maria D. Clark
	Carol Mitchell

Registry

Willie Lawson	Arthur Pridemore
Phillip Dunn	

Background

The NSC Secretariat provides the information management support for the National Security Council. It directly assists the Executive Secretary and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA).

Secretariat processes between 12-15,000 documents a year. Five systems have been developed to process, control and track this material. All systems are cleared for the processing of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

- System I handles the majority of correspondence received or generated by the NSC staff. This includes the day-to-day activities of the White House and NSC on national security matters, e.g., head of state correspondence, appointment requests with the President, First Lady and National Security Advisor.
- System II processes the NSC Policy and Meeting data and all other particularly sensitive items.
- System IV processes documents on sensitive intelligence matters and covert activities.

-- System V handles special access programs.

For more detailed information on these systems, see the Correspondence Manual.

Responsibilities

The Secretariat is divided into a number of specialized sections. Staff members are cross-trained and their functions overlap. The basic components are: Management, Correspondence Tracking and Processing, NSC Policy Coordination, Special Programs, System IV, West Wing Desk Coordination, and the Registry.

The purpose of each function is described below:

A. Correspondence Control

- Responsible for the correspondence control of Presidential and NSC records on foreign policy. The materials are recorded and tracked through Systems I, II, IV, and V. System II is augmented by an NSC Policy File to track and record major policy papers in detail.
- These functions consist of logging, computer indexing, tracking, controlling, researching, dispatching and filing of official action and information memoranda and correspondence to and from the President, APNSA, the Executive Secretary, the NSC Staff, the White House Staff units of the EOP, Congress, other government agencies, and the public.
- Responsible for proof reading all memoranda going to the Executive Secretary, APNSA, and the President.

B. West Wing Desk Coordination

- Provides operational liaison between the Secretariat and NSC Staff in the OEOP with the offices of the Executive Secretary, APNSA, President and other White House offices. This activity is located adjacent to the White House Situation Room. The Desk facilitates movement of staff originated memoranda to the National Security Adviser and the President. The staff also processes close-hold and sensitive NSC Policy papers.

C. NSC Institutional File

- Maintains the NSC Institutional File which includes the major NSC policy papers. File consists of detailed

cross-indexed national security data such as NSC meeting data, studies, decisions and Presidential Directives. It provides the NSC staff and Secretariat with an in-depth research tool for current and historical NSC Policy decisions.

D. Legal Support

- Provides information management support to the NSC Legal Advisor's office. Under its guidance, performs document production in response to court orders, litigation and official access requests. Also maintains official records associated with such efforts, each of which requires logging, computer indexing and extensive research.

E. Registry

- Provides control, receipt, dissemination and delivery of highly sensitive memoranda, correspondence and intelligence publications. The registry ensures delivery of urgent and critical papers to and from the APNSA and the Executive Secretary.

F. Records Management

- Responsible for the records management functions of the NSC. Provides a centralized, secure facility to store and preserve Presidential and NSC records which is supplemented by storage in a classified off-site facility. Provides support for the transfer of Presidential records at the end of the Administration.

G. Cable Support

- Provides essential on-line computer support for receiving and distributing cable traffic from agencies. Maintains computer "profiles" to facilitate staff research for relevant cables. Provides limited hard-copy cable support to the NSC staff and maintains the XMP laser cable printing system as well as an on-line VAX GE Cable system.

H. Telecommunications & Computer Support

- Performs, together with the White House Situation Support Staff and the White House Communications Agency, the maintenance and development of NSC computer support for the NSC. The Secretariat is equipped with an on-line input and output computer data management system.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION SUPPORT STAFF

Michael B. Donley, Deputy Executive Secretary/
Senior Director, WHSSS
Paul J. Lebras, Director, Situation Room
James W. Koehler, Director, Operations
Richard E. Broome, Director, Systems Support
James F. Purdon, Director, Emergency Planning
Joseph E. Laposa, Director, Technical Plans
Vacant, Director, Resource Management

Background

The White House Situation Support Staff (WHSSS) is an element of the NSC Executive Secretary's Office, reporting to the Deputy Executive Secretary for Situation Support and Senior Director of the WHSSS. (U)

- The staff is comprised of 53 non-reimbursable detailees from multiple agencies, roughly half civilian and half military, divided into six directorates (as listed above).
- The mission of the WHSSS is to provide an inter-agency information and situation management support system responsive to the needs of the NSC and the APNSA.
- Key elements of this mission include: (1) ensuring a constant flow of intelligence information and effective support to officials within the White House complex, and (2) managing the inter-agency policy initiatives necessary to ensure an effective support mechanism across the community of Washington-area operations and intelligence centers.
- The WHSSS has a budget of \$7 million, which is funded through the Defense Communications Agency. (U)

Responsibilities

- The Situation Room provides 24-hour alerting concerning international and domestic events; current intelligence summaries based upon message traffic and inter-agency input; management of voice, hard copy, and special electronic data bases; and selected communications support to the White House complex and to the APNSA when traveling separate from the President.
- The Operations Directorate staffs and augments the Situation Room with intelligence analysts; provides tailored current intelligence support to NSC Senior Directors and staff; manages crisis archives; coordinates NSC approval of military exercises; and supports politico-military simulations, and NSC/inter-agency exercises.

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- The Systems Directorate manages secure Automated Data Processing (ADP) services to the NSC staff via VAX computer cluster and IBM desk-top work-stations; provides network/database management and applications software development; and manages secure conference facilities, including secure graphics, mapping, audio visual, and teleconferencing support.
- The Director of Technical Planning does program planning, budgeting and procurement for NSC secure telecommunications and ADP; and provides technical leadership to inter-agency systems development.
- The Director of Emergency Planning supports NSC and inter-agency policy development related to continuity of government and continuity of the presidency. (U)

Involvement in EOP Working Groups and Inter-agency Groups

- Within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the WHSSS represents the NSC in several working groups, including: the EOP Telecommunications/ADP Roles and Missions Study Group, the Automated Information Systems Security Group, the Staff Coordinating Group for Continuity of the Presidency, and the EOP Procurement Policy Group. (U)
- In addition, the WHSSS has funded and managed the engineering design for an OEOB emergency power system, significant office renovation projects, and implementation of extensive electronic security measures throughout the White House complex. (U)
- The WHSSS has the NSC lead in staffing inter-agency policy issues relating to crisis management and the information system supporting crisis managers. In this regard, the Senior Director, WHSSS chairs monthly meetings of the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG). The CMWG includes 22 departments and agencies whose mission is to provide for an effective National Security Information & Situation Management System (NSI & SMS) in accordance with NSDD 314. The CMWG includes three subgroups: an Operations Center Subgroup, Continuity of Government (COG) Subgroup, and Systems Subgroup. In addition, the Senior Director, WHSSS chairs the CMWG Steering Group, which provides for pre-crisis coordination among operations and intelligence centers. (C)
- The Senior Director, WHSSS also chairs the Direct Communications Link (DCL) Operational Oversight Committee. This inter-agency group is chartered by NSDD 186 to provide operational supervision/oversight and continuing review of technical parameters relating to the "Hotline" between Washington and Moscow. (U)

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

Carol A. Paquette, Director
William D. Van Horn, Deputy Administrative Officer.
Helen Pahlke, Personnel/Travel Coordinator
Bronya Hartness, Accounting Coordinator/Travel Assistant
George Robinson, General Services Assistant

Background

The NSC Administrative Office's mission is responsive support and service across the spectrum of personnel, budget, logistics, printing, communications, manpower and financial management. The NSC Administrative Office currently provides service to approximately 190 personnel assigned or detailed to the NSC.

Responsibilities

- The Director is charged with the day-to-day administrative functioning of the NSC staff. Reports directly to the NSC Executive Secretary on all administrative matters, to include: budget, accounting, personnel, general services, and management. Prepares budget submissions and establishes NSC policy for all administrative matters. Serves as NSC liaison with EOP and department/agency counterparts responsible for administration and support.
- The Deputy Administrative Officer acts as backup for all functions of the Director of Administration. Coordinates and maintains various studies, reports and listings vital to the administrative operation of the NSC staff. Also provides backup for the three Coordinator positions within the Administrative Office.
- The Personnel/Travel Coordinator is the main NSC point of contact concerning all personnel matters. This includes processing personnel joining or departing the NSC, appraisal and quarterly promotion system, time and attendance reporting, and liaison with other personnel offices. Is responsible for the monitoring and completion of all travel orders, advance requests and travel vouchers. Also monitors the status of the NSC travel budget.
- The Accounting Coordinator/Travel Assistant is responsible for all accounting matters; to include preparation and processing of all purchase order requisitions and vendor invoices, coordinating and maintaining all necessary contracts including all maintenance agreements, reviewing invoices and deliveries for accuracy, and performing as the NSC point of contact for all vendors. Responsible for the preparation of travel orders, requests for advances, and travel vouchers.

- The General Services Assistant is responsible for all general services matters; to include processing all requests for building services, monitoring and maintaining the physical appearance of all NSC office and hallway spaces, maintaining an inventory management system for furniture and equipment, serving as liaison with vendors for all service requests, and coordinating repair calls for all equipment. Serves as the NSC point of contact for all military-personnel related matters.

Inter-agency Groups

The Administrative Office represents the NSC on the EOP ADP Security Implementation Group and the EOP Procurement Policy Group.

INFORMATION POLICY DIRECTORATE

Nancy V. Menan, Senior Director
Kenneth R. Johnson, Director, FOI/PA Litigation
Donna M. Sirko, FOI/Mandatory Review Officer
Linda J. Ebben, FOI/Mandatory Review Officer
Fredrick J. Graboske, FOI/Mandatory Review Officer
Jeffrey T. Rathbun, Administrative Assistant
Charlene C. Bolinski, Secretary

Background

The Information Policy Directorate (IPD) has the primary responsibility of classifying and declassifying, in accordance with applicable Executive Order (currently EO No. 12356), all national security information originated by the National Security Council. Many of the Directorate's tasks involve legal affairs, legislative affairs, and liaison with numerous other departments and agencies. Its primary functions are to:

- Respond to requests from individuals, or requests referred from other agencies, made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Privacy Act (PA), or Executive Order 12356, for NSC records or records in which the NSC has primary interest (i.e., White House records containing national security information).
- Process appeals for documents under the above item for the Executive Secretary to whom appeal authority has been delegated in writing by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA).

Responsibilities

Along with the basic duties outlined above, the IPD handles matters submitted from a variety of government agencies, and the general public. Such responsibilities involve:

- Lawsuits, subpoenas, and other investigative or judicial actions, involving document production or classification review (discovery motions as well as FOIA/PA); handled through the IPD system in conjunction with the Legal Advisor's office.
- Access requests by former government officials and other agency historical offices.
- Review of manuscripts by former government officials.
- Review of manuscripts, speeches, etc., of current officials, in conjunction with appropriate staff offices; IPD maintains

statistical information on such requests.

- Access requests by Congressional Committees and/or GAO; handled by IPD in conjunction with the NSC Legal Advisor and Legislative Affairs offices.
- Review of documents requested for publication in State's Foreign Relations of the United States series. (Because the President has periodically emphasized the importance of the series, such review is handled on a priority basis.)
- Systematic review for declassification purposes, as provided in applicable law (EO No. 12356). IPD maintains liaison with Presidential Libraries for such review purposes, and provides policy direction in implementing the Executive Order.
- Research for current needs: Assistance to the staff and to other agencies in gaining access to material in the Presidential Libraries. Contacts are maintained with former Presidents and APNSAs to facilitate this access.

Inter-agency Groups

The IPD office is the NSC liaison with the Information Security Oversight Office which, by Executive Order 12356, takes its policy direction from the NSC; the IPD is responsible for training and guidance to the staff on marking classified documents. Some other inter-agency responsibilities include:

- Providing policy guidance on NSC records systems, records management, scheduling, retiring, and disposing of records.
- Preparing reports FOI, PA, EO and other matters as directed or as required by law.
- Unofficial Advisor: Because most units in the EOP have no full time FOIA people, IPD assists OA, OMB, IOB, PFIAB, OSTP, etc. in processing records requests or referrals.

DIRECTORATE FOR SECURITY PROGRAMS
AND
NSC SECURITY OFFICE

James T. McCue, Director, Security Programs
Arlene Dona, Assistant Security Officer

Background

The Director of NSC Security Programs (D/NSCSP), who doubles as the NSC Security Officer, reports to and advises the Executive Secretary on all matters relating to the internal security of the NSC. Responsibilities include developing and maintaining personnel, physical, document, and Automated Information System (AIS) security programs through implementation of existing Executive Orders, National Security Decision Directives, Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs), and other guidance, as appropriate.

Responsibilities

- Develops security requirements and standards for determining the eligibility of candidates for appointment or detail to the NSC staff.
- Develops policies and standards for security classification management program.
- Develops and manages a program of security education, training and orientation for the NSC.
- Maintains an effective physical security program to prevent unauthorized access to NSC office space, and AIS or communications systems; works closely with other agencies, including the United States Secret Service (USSS), to maintain an effective NSC internal physical security program.
- Works closely with the USSS and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on technical accreditation of NSC's SCI Facilities.

Administrative Functions

The NSC Security Office staff performs the following functions:

- Conducts security interviews of candidates for appointment or detail to the NSC. Submits to the Executive Secretary a written summary of findings and recommendations to assist in the selection of candidates.

- Obtains completed security forms and initiates Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) background investigations of candidates. Adjudicates the results of the investigations and issues security clearances, as appropriate.
- Serves as the control office for the indoctrination of NSC personnel for access to SCI.
- Serves as control office for (i) notifying Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, and their contractors, of the level of security clearance(s) held by visiting NSC staff and (ii) receiving classified visitors to the NSC.
- Serves as the control office for the investigation of unauthorized disclosure of national security information.

Inter-agency Groups

The D/NSCSP is the NSC staff representative on the ADP Security Implementation Group chaired by the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Technical Services Division, USSS. Consisting of representatives of the various agencies in the EOP, this group addresses ADP and other security issues affecting the White House.

NSC COUNSELOR

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Counselor
A. Blair Dorminey, Director for Policy Development
Joan C. Ritter, Secretary

Background

The NSC Counselor's primary function is advisory --i.e., providing the National Security Advisor and, through him, the President with overviews and analysis on a full range of foreign policy, arms control, strategic analysis and other issues where problems are often anticipated.

Responsibilities

The NSC Counselor has assumed a variety of staff responsibilities, among them:

- Analysis of issues that cut across regional or bureaucratic lines, e.g., Soviet policy in Third World regional conflicts.
- Analysis of issues that lie at the intersection of law and policy, e.g., war powers; treaty interpretation; NSC institutional role; other issues of Presidential prerogative.
- Preparation of briefing materials for the President.
- Participating as the National Security Advisor's representative in diplomatic meetings.
- Taking part in working groups on U.S. intelligence programs.
- NSC operational responsibility for Presidential speeches (coordinating among White House speechwriters, NSC staff, Cabinet departments; occasional drafting).
- Primary responsibility for drafting of speeches for National Security Advisor and Deputy, particularly when subject matter cuts across directorate lines.
- Special projects; memoranda on forward planning, priority issues, etc.
- Challenging regional Directorates; providing second opinion on key issues when warranted; gadfly.

Interagency Groups

Contact with a variety of outside agencies is vital to providing accurate overviews on global issues. Therefore, frequent correspondence is maintained by the Counselor, who acts as a liaison on various issues, with:

- The State Department Policy Planning Staff
- The National Intelligence Council
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

LEGAL ADVISER

Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser
Daniel Levin, Deputy Legal Adviser
Robin Frank, Assistant Legal Adviser
Mitchell Reiss, White House Fellow
Kay LaPlante, Executive Assistant
Jo Hunerwadel, Secretary

Background

In 1987, the President's Special Review Board recommended an enhanced stature and role for legal counsel on the NSC staff. The President implemented the Board's recommendation in NSDD 266, which described the NSC Legal Adviser's responsibilities as follows:

- To provide legal counsel to the National Security Advisor, the Executive Secretary, and the NSC staff with respect to the full range of their activities;
- To assist the National Security Advisor in ensuring that legal considerations are fully addressed in the NSC process and inter-agency deliberations; and
- To work cooperatively with the Counsel to the President, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and with senior counsel to all other NSC members, advisors, and participants.

NSDD 266 also directed that the Legal Adviser "be accorded access to all information and deliberations as may be required for these purposes, and ... advise the National Security Advisor and Executive Secretary as appropriate on all matters within his responsibility." Since its inception, this directorate has consisted of a Deputy and Assistant Legal Adviser, in addition to the Legal Adviser himself. In 1988-89, a White House Fellow also joined the Office.

Responsibilities

Within the NSC staff, the Legal Adviser is charged with reviewing all major presidential decision documents (NSDDs, NSSDs, intelligence findings, presidential determinations, and the like) and coordinating them with the Counsel to the President prior to submission to the President. He has had particularly thorough-going involvement in covert action, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), counter-terrorism and other intelligence matters, working closely for these purposes with the Intelligence

Directorate.

The work of the Office has not readily lent itself to division of responsibility by subject matter. The Legal Adviser has attended meetings of NSC inter-agency groups on a wide variety of subjects, serving particularly as a legal representative for Policy Review Group (PRG) purposes and as liaison with Counsel to the President (whose staff meetings he attends regularly) and the Department of Justice. The Deputy Legal Adviser assists in these activities and has had primary responsibility for dealings with the Independent Counsel investigating the Iran-Contra matter. The Assistant Legal Adviser assists in these activities and has primary responsibility for Freedom of Information Act and other litigation involving the NSC.

The Legal Adviser also serves as the NSC's Designated Agency Ethics Officer (DAEO). All members of the Office assist in discharging the Office's responsibilities with respect to ethics matters, including giving advice and guidance on financial disclosure, gifts, travel, and ethics matters generally and providing ethics briefings for all new and departing employees.

Inter-agency Groups

By presidential directive, the legal adviser attends meetings of the Planning and Coordination Group (PCG). He also is a member of the Coordinating Sub-Group (CSG) which meets weekly on counterterrorism; the SIG/War Powers, consisting of senior counsel at the White House, Justice, State, Defense, JSC and CIA; and a variety of intelligence-related committees and working groups. As noted above, he has regularly attended meetings of the Policy Review Group (PRG) and, as matters on its agenda have dictated, of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG).

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

Alison B. Fortier, Senior Director
G. Michael Andricos, Director
Christina L. Funches, Secretary
Beverly L. Petchel, Secretary

Background

The role of the Office of Legislative Affairs is to serve as the primary liaison between the NSC staff and the U.S. Congress. The Senior Director and the Director are responsible for keeping the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (DAPNSA) informed of legislation in Congress which may impact U.S. national security. The office prepares the APNSA and DAPNSA for meetings with Members of Congress and accompanies them to such meetings. The office also works with other NSC staff in their interactions with the Hill.

Responsibilities

The NSC staff's interaction with Congress is not typical of other departments and agencies. Unlike State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, CIA, and other departments and agencies, the NSC has no line responsibility for national security policies and programs.

With the exception of the Executive Secretary, a statutory official, members of the NSC staff, including the APNSA, do not testify before Congress. The Executive Secretary testifies annually on the NSC budget request.

For these reasons, interactions of the APNSA and his staff with the Hill are highly important, but informal and selective. Typically they have involved issues of special importance to the President (e.g., U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance and the INF Treaty ratification), issues which relate directly to Presidential authority (War Powers and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988), issues in which there is inter-agency disagreement (Bermuda Tax Treaty), and issues where the parent agency has asked specifically for assistance because of continued problems with Congress (arms sales).

Inter-agency Groups

The NSC Office of Legislative Affairs performs a coordinating role among the legislative offices of State, DOD, CIA, Treasury, etc. and the White House Legislative Affairs (WHLA) Office on national security issues and legislation.

The Senior Director and the Director meet daily with WHLA to keep it informed of upcoming issues, problems and possible solutions.

There are two ongoing inter-agency legislative groups.

- The National Security Legislative Group, is chaired by the Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs in the White House. This group consists of representatives of WHLA, the NSC Legislative Senior Director and Director, and the heads of the legislative offices of the Departments of State and Defense, OMB, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This group is convened irregularly, and addresses a broad range of issues.
- The Inter-agency Security Assistance Group, is convened by the State Department Legislative Affairs Office on a weekly basis. The focus of this group is on security assistance and foreign operations programs. WHLA, Defense, AID, OMB, Treasury, NSC, and various State Department bureaus are represented.

In addition, legislative groups frequently have been established on an ad hoc basis to deal with specific legislative priorities. Such a group was established for INF Treaty ratification, chaired first by the Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, and later co-chaired by the Assistant to the President for Operations and the DAPNSA.

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SOVIET AND EUROPEAN DIRECTORATE

Nelson C. Ledsy, Senior Director
Rudolf V. Perina, Director
Lisa Jameson, Director
Barry Lowenkron, Director
Vacant, Director
Baerbel K. Houck, Secretary
Lois A. Jago, Secretary
Delores M. Wilson, Secretary
Vacant, Secretary

Background

This Directorate is responsible for all of the countries of Europe plus Iceland, Canada and Bermuda. It is the Directorate most closely concerned with the East-West relationship and matters affecting our closest Allies and our major adversary. Because NATO is more than just a military Alliance, primary responsibility for it is within the European and Soviet Directorate. The Directorate also has lead responsibility for human rights issues pertaining to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and for East-West negotiations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Responsibilities

The Directorate's policy staff typically has consisted of a Senior Director who supervises the office, and four Directors who work under him. Two of the Directors have generally specialized in NATO, Western European, and Canadian affairs, and two have focused on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Due to the large number of issues which span Eastern and Western Europe, however, this division is difficult to make precisely. Work in the Directorate requires versatility and a broad understanding of East-West issues. The current division of responsibility is in part based on the background and particular interest of staff members:

Nelson C. Ledsy:

Atlantic-European Relations, Austria, Berlin, Cyprus, Denmark, France, West Germany, East Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Soviet-U.S. Relations, Sweden, Turkey, UK.

Rudolf V. Perina:

Belgium, Bermuda, CSCE, COCOM, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe, East-West Economic Relations, Hungary, NATO, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union (Embassy, Internal Politics, Science, Space Cooperation), Switzerland.

Barry Lowenkron:

Arctic, Arms Control (Conventional, Nuclear), Canada, Greenland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Scandinavia, Space Station, Spain.

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Lisa R. Jameson:

Albania, Baltic States, Bulgaria, Finland, Iceland, Soviet Union (Active Measures, Defectors, Exchanges, Human Rights, Nationalities, Public Diplomacy), Yugoslavia.

Inter-agency Groups

Because of the nature and scope of U.S. relations with NATO and the Soviet Union, the Directorate participates in many inter-agency groups and is often involved with issues which fall to other NSC offices. On arms control and defense issues, the Directorate works closely with the Arms Control and Defense Policy Directorates and participates in inter-agency meetings on such matters as base renewal negotiations, security assistance to southern-flank countries, and development within NATO of Western arms control positions. Likewise, on East-West and U.S.-European economic issues, the Directorate works closely with the International Economic Affairs Directorate. Technology transfer, refugee, and security related issues also fall to other NSC Directorates but involve participation and coordination with the European and Soviet Directorate. The Directorate participates in the inter-agency group on CSCE chaired by the State Department.

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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA DIRECTORATE

William Burns, Senior Director
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Director
Sandra Charles, Director
(Vacant), Director
Marilyn Shapiro, Secretary
Barbara Browne, Secretary
Linda Crowell, Secretary

Background

The Near East/South Asia directorate has responsibility for a region that stretches geographically from Morocco to Bangladesh. The directorate ensures that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the President are kept fully informed on key regional issues; works closely with other agencies to produce a complete and cohesive set of policy options for White House decision; monitors the implementation of policy; and serves as an independent source of advice and ideas for the APNSA and the President.

Responsibilities

The directorate normally includes a Senior Director and three Directors. One of the Director positions is currently vacant and will remain so through the end of the Administration. Consequently, Mr. Burns holds primary responsibility for Middle East/North Africa issues, in addition to his overall supervision of the office. Ms. Tahir-Kheli focuses on South Asia issues; Ms. Charles has primary responsibility for Persian Gulf policy. Key issues in each of these areas include:

- Middle East/North Africa: Arab-Israeli peace process; U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-Egyptian relationships; Lebanon; U.S. and Syria; Libya; Maghreb integration.
- Persian Gulf: Iran-Iraq peace talks; U.S. relationships with Iraq and Iran; U.S. relations with GCC countries, especially security cooperation; arms sales policy.
- South Asia: Afghanistan; U.S. relationships with Pakistan and India.

Inter-agency Groups

The Policy Review Group has served as the principal inter-agency coordinating mechanism for Persian Gulf and South Asia issues over the past eighteen months. The PRG has dealt less frequently with Middle East/North Africa issues, but inter-agency coordination on those questions has been close and generally effective. Following are the principal sub-PRG groups in which

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the directorate participates:

- Persian Gulf secure conference call (twice weekly, involves State, OSD/ISA, JCS, CIA, and NSC staff; was held daily in 1987 and first half of 1988).
- Persian Gulf Contingency Planning Group (chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage).
- U.S.-India Senior Inter-agency Group (chaired by Under Secretary of State Armacost).
- Libya Inter-agency Task Force (chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Murphy).
- Afghanistan Inter-agency Group (chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Williamson).
- Egyptian Economic Working Group (chaired by State/NEA).

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ASIAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

James A. Kelly, Senior Director
Richard T. Childress, Director
Douglas H. Paal, Director
Florence Bagnall, Secretary
Janet Jeffers, Secretary
Peggy Jordan, Secretary

Background

The Asian Affairs directorate has responsibility for a region that stretches geographically from Burma to Indonesia to Korea, and across the Pacific. The directorate ensures that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the President are kept fully informed on key regional issues; works closely with other agencies to produce a complete and cohesive set of policy options for White House decision; monitors the implementation of policy; and serves as an independent source of advice and ideas for the APNSA and the President.

Responsibilities

The directorate includes a senior director and two directors. The senior director has primary responsibility for Japan and Korea, in addition to his overall supervision of the office. One of the directors focuses on Southeast Asia issues, and has had functional responsibility for Prisoner of War/Missing in Action issues and refugee affairs. The other director focuses primarily on China, including Taiwan, as well as Australia, New Zealand and Pacific islands, including Freely Associated States/Trust Territory concerns. Each of the three directors stays conversant with matters throughout the region to provide the around-the-clock responsiveness necessary for members of the NSC staff. Specific responsibilities involve:

- U.S.-East Asia Trade/Economic Issues: Touches the U.S. relationship with every country of this dynamic region. Market access, exchange rates, intellectual property rights, and many more specific issues increasingly frame the political and security aspects of our relationships.
- U.S.-Japan Alliance: Interplay of security, economics and political affairs.
- Korean Peninsula: Democratization and economic strains in a security-threatened atmosphere.
- Cambodia: Supporting ASEAN allies and a free Cambodia should Vietnam withdraw.
- Philippines: Base rights and national development.

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- China: A budding relationship with a reforming giant.
- Taiwan: Preserving traditional but unofficial ties with an Asian dynamo.
- ASEAN: Tailored but improving relationships with a diverse group of friends and allies.
- ANZUS: Keeping U.S.-Australia relations strong while New Zealand stands outside for a time.
- POW/MIA: Working toward fullest possible accounting of all our missing. This and related humanitarian issues with Vietnam and Laos.
- Soviet Union: Managing and responding to a more complex Soviet policy toward Asia and the Pacific while preserving deterrence against even larger Soviet forces.

Inter-agency Groups

Following are principal IAG's in which the directorate participates:

- POW/MIA
- Cambodia
- Philippines Base Negotiations
- China Military IG/Working Group
- Antarctica
- Freely Associated States
- Guam Commonwealth
- Refugees

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AFRICAN DIRECTORATE

Herman J. Cohen, Senior Director
William L. Jacobsen, Jr., Director
Karen L. Ogle, Secretary

Background

The African Directorate is responsible for coordinating the development and overseeing the implementation of U.S. national security policy in Africa south of the Sahara Desert. (The North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are covered by the Middle East Directorate.) The professional staff members in the Directorate keep the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), and through him the President, apprised of significant developments in Africa that impact on U.S. interests. They work closely with interested departments and agencies to assure that the National Security Council is provided complete and comprehensive policy options on all issues requiring Presidential decisions. They oversee the activities of other agencies to make sure that Presidential directives are followed and correctly interpreted.

Responsibilities

The Directorate is comprised of one Senior Director and one Director. Both of these professional staff members work on the same issues. There is no formal division of labor. They have been concentrating on the following subjects:

- Southern Africa: Participation in the quadripartite negotiations for the independence of Namibia and the total withdrawal of Cuban military forces from Angola; coordination of assistance to South Africa's neighbors; assistance to the victims of apartheid in South Africa; efforts to bring about negotiated solutions to civil conflicts in Angola and Mozambique; efforts to block the passage of economic sanctions legislation beyond those measures enacted by the Congress in 1986..
- Economic Reform: Concentration of U.S. assistance in African countries willing to adopt policies conducive to economic growth through free market systems; coordination of the President's "Program to End Hunger in Africa by the Year 2000;" participation in the Africa Debt Working Group.

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- U.S. Strategic Interests: Protection of U.S. military access rights in Somalia and Kenya (related to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf); assistance to Chad and other countries immediately south of the Sahara for defense against Libyan aggression; diplomatic pressures to prevent Libyan adventurism and support to terrorism in Africa.

Inter-agency Groups

The Directorate participates in the following inter-agency groups and meetings:

- Inter-agency Group on Africa (IG) chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
- The Africa Debt Working Group chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
- Weekly coordinating meeting between the NSC Senior Director for Africa and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
- The "Wheeler Group" to coordinate economic assistance policy in Africa chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Economic) for African Affairs.
- The Coordinating Committee for the President's "Program to End Hunger in Africa by the Year 2000" chaired by the Administrator of A.I.D.

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LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

Robert S. Pastorino, Senior Director
Clarke M. Brintnall, Director
David A. Pacelli, Director
Wilma G. Hall, Secretary
Virginia Runion, Secretary

Background

The primary responsibility of the Latin American and Caribbean Directorate is to coordinate the development and oversee the implementation of U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. It advises the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) on all regional issues. Its members work closely with interested departments and agencies to ensure that the NSC is provided complete and comprehensive policy options on all issues requiring Presidential Decision, and represent the APNSA at interagency and other meetings for this purpose.

Responsibilities

The Directorate is headed by a Senior Director and is comprised of two Directors.

In addition to management of the directorate and overall policy responsibility for the region, Mr. Pastorino has particular responsibility for the Caribbean and Mexico. Major current issues in that area include:

- U.S.-Mexico Relations
- Haiti
- U.S. Policy toward Cuba
- The Caribbean Basin Initiative

Mr. Pastorino also deals with regional economic issues, in coordination with the Economic Directorate.

Mr. Brintnall is responsible for South America and Panama. His major current issues include:

- Panama and its Future
- Stability in Brazil
- Chile: The Transition to Democracy
- Argentina-U.S. Relations
- Colombia-U.S. Relations
- Peru-U.S. Relations
- Ecuador-U.S. Relations

Mr. Pacelli is responsible for Central America. Principal current issues in this area include:

- The Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
- Support for Democracy in El Salvador
- Political Stability in Guatemala
- U.S. Policy toward Nicaragua
- U.S. Policy toward Honduras
- The Central American Peace Process

Inter-agency Groups

The Policy Review Group (PRG) process has been used, but only infrequently, to deal with the Haiti, Central American and Panamanian issues. The Latin American and Caribbean Directorate participates in other PRGs on drugs and economic issues.

Inter-agency coordination on other issues is conducted in different ways. Mr. Pastorino chairs a Central American Working Group, used principally to treat the issue of assistance to the Democratic Resistance, and a weekly Working Group on Panama. Mr. Pastorino and Mr. Pacelli attend a weekly IG meeting chaired by State/ARA on other Central American issues. Mr. Brintnall attends periodic meetings on various South American issues, usually chaired by State. Mr. Pastorino also attends a periodic public/private sector Working Group on the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Paper	Re: Intelligence Programs Directorate (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: H-Files

Subseries: Transition Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Reagan-Bush Transition Briefing Book: Background on NSC Organization and Administration

Date Closed:	11/1/2023	OA/ID Number:	99015-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2019-1493-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS/TECHNOLOGY AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

Tyrus W. Cobb, Senior Director
Jeremy F. Curtin, Director
Jerry W. Leach, Director
Andres D. Onate, Director
Donald C. Tice, Director
Richard M. Saunders, Deputy Director
Mary Cooper, Secretary
Kathy A. Gibbs, Secretary
Cynthia Sweeney, Secretary
Patty A. Daniel, Secretary

Background

The International Programs and Technological Affairs Directorate coordinates the development, and oversees the implementation, of U.S. policy in a variety of areas, ranging from Technology Transfer and Export Controls, to Environmental Issues, to Political Affairs. The Directorate serves as a monitor and a source of information and advice to the APNSA and the President.

Responsibilities

The Senior Director, four Directors, and one Deputy Director handle the following responsibilities:

Technology Transfer and Export Controls:

- Coordinate policy development and monitor execution of technology transfer and export control issues; when required, take lead in resolving disputed individual export control cases.
- Oversight and inter-agency coordination in implementation of NSDD 315 on missile non-proliferation.

Oceans, Environment and Scientific Issues:

- Bilateral and multilateral science and technology issues
- International environmental questions
- Nuclear non-proliferation
- Oceans and Fisheries
- Population issues

Public Diplomacy and International Communications:

- Coordinate public diplomacy programs developed by agencies, including international education and information programs.

Multilateral Political Affairs:

- United Nations reforms and funding
- United Nations peacekeeping operations
- Other international organizations
- Inter-regional security issues
- Inter-regional human rights issues

Arms Transfers:

- Coordinate policy development and monitor execution of arms transfers; when required, take lead in resolving disputes over disposition of cases.
- Coordinate development of congressional notification strategy.

Foreign Affairs Funding (Function 150):

- Bilateral foreign assistance
- Operating funds of the foreign affairs agencies (State, USIA, AID, Peace Corps, etc.)
- U.S. contributions to international organizations, including the UN and its associated agencies.
- Development Assistance
- PL-480
- International Financial Institutions

Security Assistance (i.e., MAP, IMET, FMSCR, and ESF):

- Coordinate budget and programmatic issues to ensure that resource allocations accord with national security strategy.
- Ensure coordination between security assistance programs and Low Intensity Conflict strategy.

International Telecommunications Policy:

- International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
- International carriers, including INTELSAT and INMARSAT
- Satellite Sound Broadcasting

Inter-agency Groups

The Directorate chairs and participates in a variety of Inter-agency Groups, Committees, and a number of ad hoc meetings. In specific, the Directorate:

- Chairs the Technology Transfer Steering Group (TTSG) and ad hoc inter-agency meetings, as needed.
- Chairs the Committee on Science Related Agreements with Warsaw Pact Countries (SIG) (meets bi-monthly).
- Chairs the Magnetic Fusion Working Group (IG) (meets sporadically).
- Participates in the Inter-agency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) (IG).
- Participates in the Committee on Science, Engineering and Technology (CISSET) (SIG).
- Participates in the Joint Committee for World Oceans Agreement.
- Participates in the Working Group on Energy, Natural Resources and Environment.
- Provides an NSC liaison with USIA, VOA, Board for International Broadcasting, National Endowment for Democracy, and other non-governmental public diplomacy organizations.
- Participates in Inter-agency Groups on terrorism, human rights, Afghanistan, Philippines base rights, and arms control.
- Participates in the Inter-agency Group on the Conference on Disarmament.
- Chairs ad hoc inter-agency meetings to resolve conflicts on priorities and tactics of arms transfers.
- Chairs ad hoc meetings to resolve allocation disputes; participates in State-chaired reviews of resource allocations in regard to security assistance.
- Chairs ad hoc inter-agency groups on satellite sound broadcasting.
- Participates in the Senior Inter-agency Group on Communications and Information Policy.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

Stephen P. Farrar, Senior Director
Eric D. K. Melby, Director
Vacant, Director
Vacant, Director
Patricia A. Battenfield, Secretary
Betty A. Marshall, Secretary

Background

The professional staff members of the International Economic Affairs Directorate share broad responsibility for coordinating the development and overseeing the implementation of U.S. international economic policy worldwide. Working with other directorates in the NSC, the Economic Directorate ensures that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the President are kept fully informed on key international economic issues and that they are aware of the close linkage between national security and economic policy.

The Directorate works closely with the key economic agencies (particularly State, Treasury, U.S. Trade Representative, Commerce, Agriculture, Council of Economic Advisers) to develop coherent policy options for the President which integrate national security and economic policy objectives; it monitors implementation of policy and serves as an independent source of advice and ideas for the APNSA and the President.

Responsibilities

The Directorate consists of a Senior Director and three Directors. Because of personnel moves, two of the Director positions are vacant and will remain so until the end of the Administration. In addition to overall supervision of the Directorate, Mr. Farrar has primary responsibility for finance, debt, multilateral development banks, agriculture and commodity issues. Mr. Melby handles trade, energy, bilateral economic issues and the annual Economic Summit.

Key issues in the Directorate are:

- Financial: Latin American and sub-Saharan African debt; multilateral development bank policies; financial status of major debtors, e.g., Philippines, Mexico.
- Trade/Economic: Uruguay Round negotiations; U.S.-EC issues including the 1992 internal market; U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement; U.S. economic relationship with Japan, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; bilateral trade problems, such as those arising in "unfair trade practices" cases brought under Section 301 of the Trade Act.

- Economic Summits: The Senior Director is the White House member of the Sherpa team which prepares the President for the annual Economic Summits. The 1989 Summit will be in Paris on July 14-16.

Inter-agency Groups

The Directorate is responsible for NSC participation in the Economic Policy Council (EPC) and the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG), which are the principal inter-agency groups for coordinating international trade and economic policy. Where national security issues are important, the Directorate has chaired inter-agency reviews of economic policy issues, elevating them to the Policy Review Group (PRG), if necessary.

The Directorate also participates in:

- International Economic Policy breakfasts (chaired alternately by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury).
- Inter-agency group (State, Treasury, NSC) responsible for preparations for the annual Economic Summit.
- International Energy Security Group (chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs).

ARMS CONTROL DIRECTORATE

Robert E. Linhard, Senior Director
Linton F. Brooks, Director
G. William Heiser, Director
Donald A. Mahley, Director
Judy E. Mandel, Director
William H. Tobey, Director
Sandra L. Kelly, Secretary
Rita P. O'Flinn, Secretary
Mary Cox, Secretary

Background

The Arms Control Directorate is comprised of a Senior Director and five Directors. The Office serves as a secretariat for the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) and chairs the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG). The general responsibilities of the Directorate include:

- Monitoring the work of all arms control inter-agency groups (IGs), inter-agency working groups, backstopping groups, and ad hoc groups associated with arms control issues (e.g., START, INF, Defense and Space, Nuclear Testing, Chemical Weapons, Conventional Arms Control, the Standing Consultative Commission, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, Compliance and Verification, etc.).
- Chairing the inter-agency steering group which supports the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission.
- Responsibility for inter-agency final coordination of all Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS).

Responsibilities

There are many specific responsibilities which the Directorate monitors and chairs. The following is a list of subjects and associated duties.

SDI Responsibilities include:

- Monitoring the SDI program.
- Chairing weekly staff-level inter-agency group on SDI issues.
- IAW NSDD 172, provides final USG review on all articles, speeches or testimonies on the SDI program.

Arms Control, SDI & Nuclear Policy Public Diplomacy Responsibilities include:

- Chairing an inter-agency arms control, SDI and nuclear issues public diplomacy group which meets on a weekly basis to review and coordinate all publications, releases and public diplomacy plans related to these topics.
- Coordinating USG press guidance as needed on a daily basis.

Inter-agency Groups

The Arms Control Directorate maintains many contacts with a number of agencies. Some specific areas and programs which are closely monitored are as follows:

Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Program

- Final coordination of the annual U.S. Nuclear Weapons Deployment Plan.
- Monitors the safety and security of DoD nuclear facilities and assets.

NATO Nuclear Weapons Program

- Final U.S. coordination of the annual SACEUR Nuclear Weapons Requirement Study.
- Participates in the NATO High Level Group (HLG).
- Supports meetings of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).
- Monitors the safety and security of NATO's nuclear stockpile.
- Participates in the NATO Senior Level Weapons Protection Group (SLPG).
- Chairs compartmented group that coordinates sensitive issues associated with NATO and Allied nuclear security.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Control Procedures

- Monitors sensitive U.S. nuclear weapons control procedures.
- Chairs compartmented group that coordinates issues associated with this subject within the USG.

Department of Energy Defense Program

- Monitors the Department of Energy Defense Program.
- Final coordination of the annual U.S. Nuclear Test Program.
- Final coordination of the annual U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Memorandum.
- Monitors the safety and security of DoE nuclear facilities.

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DEFENSE POLICY DIRECTORATE

Roger G. Dekok, Senior Director	Vacant, Director Space Programs
Eugene M. Ebner, Director	Norma D. Schillaci, Secretary
William J. Grant, Director	Flora B. Paoli, Secretary
John G. Grimes, Director	Angelyn D. Moody, Secretary
James F. Miskel, Director	Mary Quinn, Secretary
Don M. Snider, Director	Barbara A. Desina, Secretary
*Judyt E. Mandel, Director	* (Assigned also to Arms Control Directorate)
*Donald A. Mahley, Director	
*Linton F. Brooks, Director	

Background

The Defense Group of the National Security Council is responsible for all aspects of defense policy, budget, planning and programs; the integration of defense, foreign policy, and international economic policy into U.S. National Security Strategy; and the articulation of that strategy. It also deals with military contingency planning and operations; JCS activities; and military relationships with U.S. allies (including NATO strategy and doctrine).

Responsibilities

The Directorate is comprised of one Senior Director, five Defense Policy Directors, one Space Policy Director (whose position is currently vacant), and three Arms Control Directors. The Senior Director is responsible for all Defense Group Staff activities and represents the NSC on the Defense Resources Board. The Defense Group has responsibility over the following:

National Security Telecommunications Policy:

- Policy oversight and activities of the NSEP Telecommunications Policy (E.O. 12472/NSDD 97) to include the coordination of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) activities chartered under E.O. 12383.
- Oversight of Strategic C3 programs and nuclear C2 policy (NSDD 281). ~~(e)~~
- Oversight of . . . Communications (NSDD 286) and Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NSDD 301).
- Oversight of national telecommunications and information systems security policy (NSDD 145).
- Oversight of Continuity of Government communications systems operations.

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PER NSC WAIVER, #2021-02
By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21

- Co-chairman of the U.S.-Canadian Civil Emergency Committee for Telecommunications.

Defense Policy:

- Development of the President's annual Report on U.S. National Security Strategy.
- Coordination of the fundamental diplomatic, economic and defense elements of national security strategy.
- Participation in the interagency "Burdensharing" panel.
- Interagency activities relating to alliance relationships, particularly NATO, and the overseas military base structure.
- Liaison for JCS actions and presentations to the President.

Space Policy:

- Chairing the Interagency Group for Space (IG-Space), responsible for coordinating the national security, civil, and commercial sectors of national space policy.
- Participation in the Economic Policy Council's Commercial Space Working Group.
- Chairing various IG(Space) working groups on Space Station Technology Transfer, U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation, Antisatellite Programs and Satellite Export.

National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP):

- NSEP policy issues encompassing domestic response to a broad range of contingencies, from major natural calamities and industrial mobilization, to attack on the nation.

Strategic and Classified Programs:

- Offensive and defense strategic planning.
- Strategic programs and modernization.
- Strategic procurement and R&D policy.
- Nuclear weapons employment policies.
- Sensitive (classified) acquisition programs.

Budget Matters:

- National security strategy and resource requirements.
- Overseeing NSC input on major budget issues affecting national security programs and strategy.

- Defense fiscal and manpower issues within the NSC.
- Legislative activity affecting national security programs; policy coordination with OMB through the budget cycle.

Inter-agency Groups

The Defense Group participates in numerous SIGs, IGs, and Working Groups. The following Senior Inter-agency Groups (SIGs) are chaired by the Senior Director:

- SIG(Space): Chartered under NSDD 293, SIG(Space) provides a forum for all Federal agencies to review and advise on changes to national space policy and to provide for orderly and rapid referral of space policy issues to the President, as necessary. SIG(Space) meets at the call of the Chairman. Meetings have averaged approximately every 2-3 months over the past 18 months.
- SIG(NSEP): NSDD 188 established this SIG for National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) to advise and assist the NSC in establishing NSEP policy objectives, developing policy options, and referring issues to the President for resolution, as necessary. Meetings have averaged every 2-3 months over the past two years.
- SIG(LIC): NSDD 277 establishes the charter for the SIG for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) which is the principal interagency forum for LIC policy and strategy. Meetings have averaged every 3-4 months over the past two years.
- SIG on U.S.-Soviet Defense and Military Relations: NSDD 311 charters this SIG which is the principal interagency forum for addressing policy aspects of U.S.-Soviet defense and military-to-military interaction. Meetings have averaged twice per quarter.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BUDGET SUMMARY

The National Security Council budget submission encompasses three entities: The National Security Council Staff (NSC), The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB). The execution of allotments of PFIAB and PIOB is administered by the boards themselves, not the NSC.

As evidenced by the second chart, which reflects only the NSC, the major portion (66-68%) of the (NSC) budget is devoted to personnel. This includes salaries, benefits, overtime and cash awards. The next largest portion is the Standard Level Users Charge (SLUC) which basically is the rent that the NSC pays to the General Services Administration (GSA) for office space, parking facilities and messing facilities.

The National Security Council Budget*

(In thousands)


FY89

Total Appropriated: \$ 5,100

PFIAB: 330

PIOB: 59

NSC: 4,711




FY90

Total Programmed: \$ 5,169

PFIAB: 331

PIOB: 60

NSC: 4,778



* The NSC budget submission includes PFIAB and PIOB (two advisory boards) as a matter of administrative convenience. The execution of the PFIAB and PIOB allotments is administered by the boards themselves, not by the NSC.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PERSONNEL SUMMARY

The current total strength of the National Security Council Staff (NSC) is 195. This includes both NSC direct payroll (63 billets) and 132 detailees from other Government Agencies. The current NSC allocation of 63 billets is Congressionally approved. The billets are all excepted service, Schedule A positions. There is currently a limit of 16 super grades (GS-16 and above). This number is established by OPM in response to NSC requests. The next submission to OPM is scheduled for December 1988. While there is no stated limit on the number of detailees to the NSC, this category of personnel is closely monitored by Congress.

Under this Administration, the NSC has been allotted 15 Special Assistant titles. This number is controlled by the White House Office and requires an APNSA request for each one.

At present, there are 11 NSC consultants; these resources are used on an intermittent, as required basis, not as quasi-staff.



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
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


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NSC Personnel Summary (Total: 195)



NSC BILLETS - 63



DETAILEES - 132

