Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files

OA/ID Number: 91125
Folder ID Number: 91125-011

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (February - April 1991)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: G-24 Progress on Aid to Eastern Europe (2 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Polish Interest in a Joint Statement (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Polish Interest in a Joint Statement (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia (1 pp.)	2/25/91	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Havel (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03c. Memo	Robet L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia (1 pp.)	2/20/91	(b)(1)	S
03d. Memo	Robet L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (February - April 1991)

Pinksheet Number: cap1063
OA/ID Number: 91125-011
Date Closed: 4/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. - Polish Statement (1 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	C
04b. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Polish Interest in a Joint Statement (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable	Re: Poland: Letter to President Bush from Prime Minsiter Bielecki (3 pp.)	2/25/91	(b)(1)	C
06a. Memo	Robert Hutchings/Stephen Rademaker to Brent Scowcroft Re: Security Assistance Eligibility for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	C
06b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Security Assistance Eligibility for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06c. Memo	Stephen Rademaker to Brent Scowcroft Re: Security Assistance Eligibility for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (1 pp.)	3/19/91	(b)(1)	
07a. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Lech Walesa of Poland (3 pp.)	3/20/91	(b)(1)	S
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for One-on-One Meeting with President Lech Walesa of Poland (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Expanded Meeting with President Lech Walesa of Poland (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (February - April 1991)

Pinksheet Number: cap1063
OA/ID Number: 91125-011
Date Closed: 4/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07d. Memo	Robert M. Kimmitt to POTUS Re: State Visit of President Lech Walesa March 19-22, 1991 (4 pp.)	3/15/91	(b)(1)	S
07e. Memo	Nicholas F. Brady to POTUS Re: Official Debt Reduction for Poland (2 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	
07f. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: State Visit of President Lech Walesa of Poland, March 20, 1991 (1 pp.)	3/18/91	(b)(1)	S
08a. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message from Lanxade (1 pp.)	3/29/91	(b)(1)	S
08b. Message	For Admiral Lanxade from General Scowcroft (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08c. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Scowcroft (3 pp.)	3/30/91	(b)(1)	S
09a. Cable	Re: Secretary's Reply to Romanian Foreign Minister (1 pp.)	4/4/91	(b)(1)	C
09b. Cable	Re: Letter to President Bush from Prime Minister Roman (7 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	C
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia (1 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (February - April 1991)

Pinksheet Number: cap1063
OA/ID Number: 91125-011
Date Closed: 4/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Havel (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
10c. Letter	President Havel to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)	2/27/91	(b)(1)	
10d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from President Havel of Czechoslovakia, April 11 or 12, 1991 (1 pp.)	4/8/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (February - April 1991)

Pinksheet Number: cap1063
OA/ID Number: 91125-011
Date Closed: 4/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100903
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 91 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BASORA

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST
EC
HUNGARY
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
IMF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: G-24 PROGRESS ON AID TO TO EASTERN EUROPE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 08 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASORA
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9100903

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	91020520	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	91042913	NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 4/1/09

G-24 Request on Aid to Eastern Europe

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 0903

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1		A
Bill Sittmann	2		
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft	4	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	E 7 4/29	D
NSC Secretariat	6		NIR

WED

SI FEB 5 P8:32

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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0903

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 5, 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA AAB

SUBJECT: G-24 Progress on Aid to Eastern Europe

As I mentioned at yesterday's staff meeting, the January 30 Senior Officials' Meeting of the G-24 produced credible results.

The EC Commission's tally of cumulative financial commitments to date now totals $38 billion. Bilateral aid (the measure used in previous reports) stands at more than $21 billion. To this, the Commission is now adding the several billion dollars of paid-in capital pledged to the EBRD, plus additional large amounts in the pipeline from the World Bank and other multilateral institutions.

Particularly in the case of the multilateral lending, actual outlays and cash flows into Eastern Europe will start up slowly and be spread over several years. Furthermore, part of the $21 billion in bilateral pledges consists of export credits and loan guarantees that are not always easily or quickly usable. At the January meeting the U.S. got Commission support for greater emphasis on aid effectiveness, and on tallying actual drawdowns.

The January 30 meeting virtually clinched funding for a $1 billion loan to Czechoslovakia, plus $500 million for Hungary. Both loans are for immediate balance of payments support in connection with upcoming IMF programs. They are based on the two countries' serious reform programs and the impact of the Gulf crisis and of deteriorating trade conditions with the USSR.

Whereas a year ago the U.S. had contributed 20% of the $1 billion stabilization fund for Poland, this time we were able to come up with only 1.5% and 2.0 % respectively for Poland and Hungary. A Saudi/Kuwaiti pledge of $110 million helped to fill the gap left by the U.S. Other G-24 donors seemed reluctantly to accept our argument that the U.S. could put up only a token share this time in view of the costs we are incurring in the Gulf. By the Commission's current estimate, the U.S. share of total financial pledges has now dropped to 8.5% -- although we still provide 13.4% of the nearly $8 billion in the important category of grants.

Despite evident disappointment regarding declining U.S. funding, the EC Commission was responsive to virtually all of our

requests, including the laying down of clear markers to the Romanians and the Yugoslavs about the political conditionality of G-24 assistance. In contrast to its earlier turf-aggressiveness, the Commission also responded well to our insistence on carefully respecting the organizational roles of the World Bank, the OECD and the IEA. Once the Gulf war is behind us, however, it may prove difficult to maintain our role as the EC's primary partner in managing the G-24 unless we are able to return to a commensurate level of funding.

cc: Tim Deal

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101224
RECEIVED: 19 FEB 91 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 19 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: POLAND
USSR
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
EUROPE EAST

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: POLISH INTEREST IN JOINT STATEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 22 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF: 9101252 9101330

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Polish interest in Joint Statement

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: TAS LOG # 1224

URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG AIO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	✓	I
Bill Sittmann	2	✓	
Bob Gates	3	✓	
Brent Scowcroft	4		
Bill Sittmann		APNSA Has Seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	3/31/22	N
NSC Secretariat	6		N/R

A = Action (I = Information) D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 19, 1991

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen



MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: Polish Interest in a Joint Statement

As David Gompert mentioned to you, the Poles are interested in a joint statement to be issued during Walesa's State Visit March 20. Without committing to such a statement, we have been exploring with the Poles what they have in mind.

They have two objectives. Politically, they see this as a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval, to show the Polish public that economic and political reform is bringing Poland into the community of democratic nations. It is especially important for the Poles to feel that their American connection reduces their dependence on the relationships with their two powerful immediate neighbors.

Second, because of their anxieties over the conservative revival in the Soviet Union, the Poles are looking for language expressing or implying a security commitment. This is more problematic; such a statement could stimulate further the very reactionary trends they worry about in the USSR. If they want a joint statement, the Poles will have to accept our view that offering a security commitment would be counterproductive.

If this potential problem is resolved, we are inclined at this point to favor issuing a joint statement. We would want to emphasize the importance of Poland's continuing economic reform, but we should not be hesitant about stating that we have an interest in preserving Poland's new-found independence.

If we do agree to such a statement with the Poles, others will request the same treatment -- as the Czechoslovaks have already done in the context of a possible Havel visit next fall. However, as Hungarian Prime Minister Antall's visit is already behind us, and given that Bulgarian, Romanian or Yugoslav State Visits are highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, Havel's request may be the last one that we need to consider.

On the broader question of East European security concerns, a restricted interagency group is being convened to review how to respond to pressures for stronger security links at NATO and bilaterally. We will report the recommendations to you shortly.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 19, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

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~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101234
RECEIVED: 19 FEB 91 14

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: GATES

DOC DATE: 25 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
IRAQ
USSR
PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT
TELCALL

PERSONS: HAVEL, VACLEV

SUBJECT: TELCALL FM PRES HAVEL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON 26 FEB / TALKING POINTS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 22 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

Telcon from Pres Vaclav Havel of Czech. Feb 26

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JBB LOG # 1234

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	K	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3	[illegible]	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	2/25 K	D
NSC Secretariat	5		NIR

WED.

91 FEB 20 P8:06

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP ~~Quayle~~ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Noted By Pres

ONR

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

26 Feb.

RAN

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1234

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann	1	✓	✓
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	2.4.25	A
NSC Secretariat			
Hutchings	3		FFA (See note below)

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DISP

Date: 2/25

TO: Bill Sittmann

FROM: JOHN S. GARDNER
Special Assistant to the President
and Assistant Staff Secretary

The point on the ground war is obviously OBE. Can you please redo and return to us?

Thanks,

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

1234 Brady

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NOTED

91 FEB 25 PM 4:18

February 25, 1991

91 FEB 25 AM 9:22

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT BS for

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia

DATE: February 26, 1991

PURPOSE: To open a channel of occasional telephonic contact with Havel and thank him for his continued strong support for the Gulf effort.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line

INTERPRETER: To be supplied by the State Department

PHONE NUMBER: 011-422-2101 Ext. 2101

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIME: February 26, 1991, 6:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon (Havel will accommodate to your time of of availability.)

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Gulf Situation
2. Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact's military structure. (Havel expects Soviet agreement in principle at a February 25 Warsaw Pact meeting, and may want to brief you on the outcome.)

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

TAB A

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL

GULF SITUATION

-- We appreciate your strong support for the multinational effort to liberate Kuwait. I regret that one of your countrymen is among the casualties of the conflict. (FYI: One of Czechoslovakia's small anti-CW contingent died in an accident in the early phases of the conflict.)

-- We are of course open to a diplomatic solution that would bring the war to an end, but there can be no compromise on the fundamental issue: Iraq must withdraw fully and unconditionally from Kuwait.

-- The air campaign has succeeded in destroying much of Iraq's armor, and I hope the ground war will not be protracted and will not involve as many coalition casualties as the press had been predicting.

-- Despite what the Iraqi propaganda would have you believe, the coalition forces are taking extraordinary measures to avoid civilian loss of life. We are not targeting civilians, and we are not trying to destroy Iraq.

CZECHOSLOVAK SECURITY ISSUES -- IF RAISED

-- How do you see the Soviet situation? Are you satisfied that the Soviets will withdraw their forces on time and agree with the majority that wants to dissolve the military side of the Warsaw Pact? How do you judge the results of the Polish-Hungarian-Czechoslovak summit last Friday?

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2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

-- There can be no doubt that the West attaches great importance to your freedom and independence. This is not 1938, or 1948, or 1968. The transformation that helped you regain your independence is irreversible.

-- At the same time, we want to avoid saying or doing anything that would provoke the very reactionary forces in Moscow that give you cause to worry.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

-- The best thing we and our Western economic partners can do right now is to provide the assistance you need to build a strong economic and political system.

-- In that regard, I want you to know that despite the enormous costs of the Gulf operation, the budget I have proposed for next year calls for a substantial increase over last year's budget request for central and eastern Europe.

-- Are you satisfied with the public response to your economic reform program so far?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1234
REDO

February 20, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak Embassy has inquired whether the President could receive a call from Havel on February 26 or as soon thereafter as possible. Although Havel will want to discuss the Gulf and brief the President on negotiations to dissolve the Warsaw Pact's military structure, his main purpose is to establish a means of being in touch periodically by telephone.

In addition to opening a new channel of communication (which we are confident Havel will not abuse), we think this a good occasion for the President to reiterate his appreciation for Havel's continuing strong support for the effort in the Gulf.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Talking Points

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 19, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak Embassy has inquired whether the President could receive a call from Havel toward the end of the week of February 19-22. Although Havel will probably want to discuss the Gulf and may raise the Soviet situation, his main purpose is to establish a means of being in touch periodically by telephone.

In addition to opening a new channel of communication (which we are confident Havel will not abuse), we think this a good occasion for the President to reiterate his appreciation for Havel's continuing strong support for the effort in the Gulf.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Talking Points

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101330
RECEIVED: 22 FEB 91 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 23 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: POLAND
USSR
ECONOMICS
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
EUROPE EAST
INTL TRADE

PERSONS: ZIOLKOWSKI, JANUSZ

SUBJECT: US / POLISH STATEMENT

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 26 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF: 9101224

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECORD ID: 9101330

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	91022508	FOR DECISION
001		X	91022513	NOTED BY GATES W/ COMMENT
001		X	91022513	SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 4/1/09

US Polish Start

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 1330

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	HAS COPY		
Bill Sittmann	HAS COPY		
Bob Gates		8	
Brent Scowcroft	1		A
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	APNSA Has Seen 2/2/25		
NSC Secretariat	3		N/R

91 FEB 23 P1:36

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2/23/91

Florence —

Please note that we need the General's reaction by 11:00 a.m., Monday, February 25.

Thanks

Bob Hutchings

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor has seen 1330

February 23, 1991

[redacted]

Brent - This would be a good opportunity to put such a statement on the record. Attached for your review. RLH

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: U.S.-Polish Statement

As we anticipated (Tab II), the Poles have given us a proposed Joint Declaration which is too programmatic and which contains one or two sentences that would imply a security relationship. They have stressed that this is just notional, however, and will be responsive to whatever we might counterpropose.

We suggest the following approach. We will tell the Poles that what we have in mind is a quite different kind of document and offer them an alternative working draft, making it clear that something very close to this is all we can consider and that we have no desire to enter into detailed negotiations.

Our draft (Tab I) would be a simple statement by the two Presidents, laying out the nature of our relationship. It notes the importance we attach to Poland's democracy and independence but contains no language that could be construed as a security relationship or commitment, and it shifts the onus back on Poland to continue the process of economic and political reform as the essential elements of Polish stability and security. Larry Eagleburger has reviewed the draft and supports it.

If you agree, we will table this draft with the Polish advance team next week. We will need your reaction by 11:00 a.m. on Monday, February 25, before meetings with the Poles begin at State. (You will also be meeting the leader of the Polish delegation, Janusz Ziolkowski, at 2:00 p.m. on the 25th.)

Adrian Basora concurs. AAB

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to proceed as outlined above, working with the Polish side toward an agreed ad referendum text.

Approve [signature] Disapprove _____

Tab I Draft Statement on U.S.-Polish Relations
Tab II Our Memorandum of February 19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT ON U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS
BY PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH OF THE UNITED STATES
AND PRESIDENT LECH WALESA OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

For over 200 years the American and Polish people have been bound by shared values and a commitment to the principles of democracy, human liberty, economic freedom, and the rule of law. The American Constitution of 1789 and the Polish Constitution of 1791 are enduring symbols of this special bond, which survived even during the long periods in which Poland's independence and liberty were denied. Our relations have been further sustained and enriched by the millions of Americans of Polish descent who over the generations helped create a free and prosperous society in the United States.

Just as Poles supported America's quest for freedom and liberty more than two centuries ago, so has America stood by Poland during her long years of darkness. When the Polish people began to reassert control over their national destiny, the United States committed itself to supporting their pioneering efforts to secure their freedom and to build a market economy and stable democratic rule.

Today, relations between the United States and Poland have entered a new era of cooperation and partnership. Our relations are based on the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, including the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, non-intervention in internal affairs, and the rule of law. The United States attaches great importance to the consolidation and safeguarding of Poland's democracy and independence, which are an integral part of the new Europe, whole and free.

Poland and the United States also share the conviction that the development of a market economy, which will attract the trade and investment needed for economic prosperity and facilitate Poland's full access to the global market, is an essential element of Poland's stability and security. The United States reaffirms its strong support for Poland's courageous program of economic transformation. The Polish Stabilization Fund, the Polish-American Enterprise Fund, and the landmark Business and Economic Agreement are tangible signs of that support. Poland's firm commitment to an economic reform program that enjoys the endorsement and support of the International Monetary Fund has also made possible the mobilization of substantial new financial and other economic assistance from the international community.

The United States and Poland are committed to developing their new partnership through an enhanced political dialogue, strengthened economic relations, and closer human and cultural contacts at all levels. They are convinced as well that U.S.-Polish relations are an integral element of the broader partnership that bind the United States and Europe and of a new world order based on democratic values and the rule of law.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 19, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: Polish Interest in a Joint Statement

As David Gompert mentioned to you, the Poles are interested in a joint statement to be issued during Walesa's State Visit March 20. Without committing to such a statement, we have been exploring with the Poles what they have in mind.

They have two objectives. Politically, they see this as a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval, to show the Polish public that economic and political reform is bringing Poland into the community of democratic nations. It is especially important for the Poles to feel that their American connection reduces their dependence on the relationships with their two powerful immediate neighbors.

Second, because of their anxieties over the conservative revival in the Soviet Union, the Poles are looking for language expressing or implying a security commitment. This is more problematic; such a statement could stimulate further the very reactionary trends they worry about in the USSR. If they want a joint statement, the Poles will have to accept our view that offering a security commitment would be counterproductive.

If this potential problem is resolved, we are inclined at this point to favor issuing a joint statement. We would want to emphasize the importance of Poland's continuing economic reform, but we should not be hesitant about stating that we have an interest in preserving Poland's new-found independence.

If we do agree to such a statement with the Poles, others will request the same treatment -- as the Czechoslovaks have already done in the context of a possible Havel visit next fall. However, as Hungarian Prime Minister Antall's visit is already behind us, and given that Bulgarian, Romanian or Yugoslav State Visits are highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, Havel's request may be the last one that we need to consider.

On the broader question of East European security concerns, a restricted interagency group is being convened to review how to respond to pressures for stronger security links at NATO and bilaterally. We will report the recommendations to you shortly.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101348
RECEIVED: 25 FEB 91 10

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: BIELECKI, JAN

DOC DATE: 28 FEB 91
SOURCE REF: 9103284

KEYWORDS: POLAND HS
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

4

PERSONS: BIELECKI, JAN

SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PM BIELECKI RE POLAND & ECONOMIC AID

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 28 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9004004 9100011

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CHRON FILE

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9103284

Date February 28, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush

From: Polish Prime Minister Jan Bielecki

Date: Poland and U.S. Economic Aid.

Subject: Cable to the Pres. from PM Bielecki re Poland and Economic Aid.

WH Referral Dated: 2/25/91
NSCS ID# (if any): 9101348

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

XXX We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:
According to instructions from Dr. Robert Hutching from NSC.

for Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9101348

REFERRAL

DATE: 25 FEB 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: BIELECKI, JAN

DATE: 22 FEB 91

SUBJ: CABLE TO PRES FM PM BIELECKI RE POLAND & ECONOMIC AID

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUEDATE: 28 FEB 91

COMMENT:

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PRT: VANERON
SIT BASORA RICE GOMPERT HUTCHINGS PRES_MSGS VAX

PREC PRIORITY CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 251340Z FEB 91

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1875
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEATRS/DEPTREASURY WASHDC
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7781

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ WARSAW 02961
DEPT. ALSO FOR C - ZOELLICK AND
D - AMB. BARRY/MR. JUSTER
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR CEA/BOSKIN AND NSC/BASORA
TREASURY FOR ROBSON/DALLARA
BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EFIN, EAID, PL
SUBJECT: POLAND: LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH
- FROM PRIME MINISTER BIELECKI
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
--
2. PRIME MINISTER BIELECKI PASSED THE
FOLLOWING LETTER TO ME TODAY FOR TRANSMISSION
TO PRESIDENT BUSH:
--
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
YOUR AMBASSADOR TO POLAND, MR. SIMONS, HAS PASSED
ON TO ME THE MESSAGE YOU DELIVERED TO THE ECONOMIC
CLUB IN NEW YORK IN FEBRUARY. I APPRECIATE VERY
MUCH YOUR WARM WORDS ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE AND PARTICULARLY YOUR REFERENCE TO THE
MARSHALL PLAN. I TOO SEE THE VISION OF THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

MARSHALL PLAN AS STILL RELEVANT TODAY.
THE ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES IS PROVIDING
TO POLAND IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST
TO ME, FOR I HAVE, FOR SOME TIME, BEEN HEAVILY
INVOLVED AT BOARD LEVEL IN THE POLISH-AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE FUND - AN EXCELLENT AMERICAN
INITIATIVE. IT IS ONE OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONS
HELPING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN POLAND.
YOU WILL PROBABLY KNOW THAT NEXT MONTH WILL BE
OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO US. A SOLUTION TO
THE DEBT PROBLEM NEEDS TO BE ACHIEVED BY MID-
MARCH. WE ARE HOPING THAT, ONCE AGAIN, THE
UNITED STATES WILL GIVE A LEAD ON THIS ISSUE.
IN MANY WAYS THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE REGION
DEPENDS ON POLAND'S ECONOMIC SUCCESS - SO MANY
OF OUR NEIGHBORS ARE LOOKING TO POLAND AS THE
EXAMPLE TO FOLLOW. AND WE OURSELVES HAVE
TRIED TO ADOPT THE UNITED STATES' APPROACH
TO INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY.
CERTAINLY A DEBT SOLUTION IS A VITAL
INGREDIENT IN MAINTAINING STABILITY AND
ACHIEVING ECONOMIC SUCCESS.
I HOPE ONE DAY TO BE ABLE TO THANK YOU

PERSONALLY FOR YOUR SUPPORT, BUT PLEASE BE
ASSURED THERE IS A SPECIAL PLACE IN POLAND'S
HEART FOR THE UNITED STATES.
MY BEST PERSONAL REGARDS,
/S/
JAN KRZYSZTOF BIELECKI
HIS EXCELLENCY
GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WARSAW,
THE 22ND OF FEBRUARY, 1991-

END TEXT OF LETTER.
SIMONS
BT
#2961

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101202
RECEIVED: 16 FEB 91 09

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: RADEMAKER
ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 19 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
POLAND
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
HUNGARY
FMS
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA / HUNGARY & POLAND

ACTION: SEE 9108792 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE DATE: 20 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF: 9108792

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAMM CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Asst Eli for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, & Poland

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 1202

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

DOCLOG AC NO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	K	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3	g	
Brent Scowcroft	4	~~APNSA Has Seen~~	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	4/AC	D
NSC Secretariat			
Rademaker	6		FFA

A = Action I = Inform ... N = No further Action

See me

cc: VP

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

01-May-1992 09:33 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Walter E. Avis (AVIS)

FROM: Joan S. Hunerwadel
(HUNERWADEL)

SUBJECT: 1202 -- Security Assistance Eligibility . . .

Walter, I found the original of this package in Steve's file. He is on emergency leave today and will be back on Wednesday. I will keep the package here until he gets back to see why he is still holding it. Hutchings may have done another package on the same thing as they are prone to do.

Walter —
I was right - Hutchings did another package # 8752, FMS Poland, 31 Dec 91. Close this — Thanks

1

RADEMAKER - Please check your files for the original of this package. Our system indicates it is in your office.

If you find the package and it should be closed, please forward it to Secretariat for close out and filing.

If you can't find it, but it should be closed, please let me know with an E-mail note or check here - _____ and return to 371

Thank you very much!

Walter Avis
NSC/S
x3723

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1202
Re-do

April 9, 1991

AKON FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/NICHOLAS ROSTOW

FROM: ROBERT HUTCHINGS/STEPHEN RADEMAKER

SUBJECT: Security Assistance Eligibility for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President transmitting for his signature Presidential Determinations that would permit Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to participate in modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. This would add these three to a very large group of countries around the world with which we pursue friendly but limited military relationships. It would keep us well behind our European allies, many of whom already have Poles, Hungarians, and others enrolled in their military schools.

Extending IMET to the new central European democracies is one element of the evolutionary strategy we developed last fall of expanding bilateral and multilateral contacts in the security field. The approach, including military training of this kind, was blessed at NATO in November. In the policy review we conducted in preparation for Walesa's visit here and Havel's to NATO headquarters, we concluded that the cautious, step-by-step approach we were taking bilaterally was about right. We also agreed that we could do more to strengthen CSCE and flesh out the liaison relationships at NATO, so long as none of these measures interfered with the primary goal of securing the timely withdrawal of Soviet forces from central Europe.

Secretary Baker's recommendation that the President sign the Determinations (Tab II) has been thoroughly vetted interagency.

The proposed determination has been revised since the original package to make clear it covers education only. In the event a broader defense relationship were deemed appropriate, a new determination would be required.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Presidential Determinations at Tabs A, B and C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Presidential Determination with respect to Czechoslovakia with Justification
Tab B Presidential Determination with respect to Hungary with Justification
Tab C Presidential Determination with respect to Poland with Justification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1202

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Security Assistance Eligibility for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland

Purpose

To sign the Presidential Determinations necessary to make Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland eligible to receive United States security assistance.

Background

In order to provide United States security assistance to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, it is necessary for you to determine that such assistance will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." Secretary Baker recommends, and I concur, that you make such limited determinations with respect to these countries in order to permit them to participate in modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and to permit them to purchase educational materials through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system in connection with their participation in the IMET programs. No sales of significant military equipment to these countries is contemplated at this time. In the event such sales are deemed appropriate in the future, a new determination will be required.

Extending IMET to the new central European democracies is one element of the cautious, evolutionary strategy we have developed for expanding bilateral and multilateral contacts in the security field. The approach, including military training of this kind, was blessed at NATO in November. Your Determinations would add Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to a very large group of countries around the world with which we pursue friendly but limited military relationships. Many of our European allies already have Poles, Hungarians, and others enrolled in their military schools.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Presidential Determinations at Tabs A, B and C.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MM

Attachments

Tab A Presidential Determination with respect to Czechoslovakia with Justification

Tab B Presidential Determination with respect to Hungary with Justification

Tab C Presidential Determination with respect to Poland with Justification

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Eligibility of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to be Furnished Defense Articles and Services under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act

The objectives set forth in section 2(b)(1)(E) of the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. 5401(b)(1)(E), will be advanced by provision of training with respect to the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian control of the military. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311(a), and section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2753(a)(1)), I hereby find that furnishing such defense training, materials, and services to the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are authorized and directed to report this finding to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO BE FURNISHED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 AND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act require, as a condition of eligibility to acquire defense articles and services from the United States, that the President find the furnishing of such articles and services to the country concerned will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

One of the objectives stated in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Section 2(b)(1)(E), is the "establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces." This objective will certainly strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. To contribute toward that objective, the Department of State has allocated $50,000 in Fiscal Year 1991 funds to the creation of a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The purpose of this program is to provide training to military and civilian personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The program would feature instruction on the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, as well as provide technical training.

A Presidential determination of eligibility for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to receive defense articles and services is necessary for the Czechoslovaks to purchase educational materials (such as extra textbooks, training equipment, and English language learning aids) through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system for the IMET program. The Department of State is not now prepared, however, to consider the sale of significant military equipment to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic completed the first phase of its transition to democracy by holding free and open parliamentary elections in June 1990. These elections capped a six-month period that began with the toppling of the communist government. Led by President Vaclav Havel, this "Velvet Revolution" has created a foundation for a liberal democratic system. Broad political reforms have been implemented, and the country now has an excellent human rights record. At the same time, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has taken the first steps necessary to institute market-oriented economic reforms.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Eligibility of the Republic of Hungary to be Furnished Defense Articles and Services under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act

The objectives set forth in section 2(b)(1)(E) of the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. 5401(b)(1)(E), will be advanced by provision of training with respect to the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian control of the military. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311(a), and section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2753(a)(1)), I hereby find that furnishing such defense training, materials, and services to the Government of the Republic of Hungary will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are authorized and directed to report this finding to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION
OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF HUNGARY
TO BE FURNISHED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES
UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
AND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) require, as a condition of eligibility to acquire defense articles and services from the United States, that the President find the furnishing of such articles and services to the country concerned will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

One of the objectives stated in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Section 2(b)(1)(E), is the "establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces." This objective will certainly strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. To contribute toward that objective, the Department of State has allocated $50,000 in Fiscal Year 1991 funds to the creation of a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Hungary. The purpose of this program is to provide training for military and civilian personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The program would feature instruction on the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, as well as provide technical training.

A Presidential determination of eligibility for Hungary to receive defense articles and services is necessary for the Hungarian government to purchase educational materials (such as extra textbooks, training equipment, and English language learning aids) through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system for the IMET program. The Department of State is not now prepared, however, to consider the sale of significant military equipment to Hungary.

Hungary held its first free and contested parliamentary and municipal elections in 1990. Prime Ministry Antall has assembled a coalition government and became the first freely elected Hungarian prime minister to visit the United States. The Hungarian government recently adopted, after considerable debate, a far-reaching economic reform package that came into effect on January 1, 1991. Hungary also has a significantly improved human rights record.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Eligibility of the Republic of Poland to be Furnished Defense Articles and Services under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act

The objectives set forth in section 2(b)(1)(E) of the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. 5401(b)(1)(E), will be advanced by provision of training with respect to the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian control of the military. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2311(a), and section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2753(a)(1)), I hereby find that furnishing such defense training, materials, and services to the Government of the Republic of Poland will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are authorized and directed to report this finding to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF POLAND TO BE FURNISHED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 AND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) require, as a condition of eligibility to acquire defense articles and services from the United States, that the President find the furnishing of such articles and services to the country concerned will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

One of the objectives stated in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Section 2(b)(1)(E), is the "establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces." This objective will certainly strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. To contribute toward this objective, the Department of State has allocated $50,000 in Fiscal Year 1991 funds to the creation of a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Poland. The purpose of this program is to provide training to military and civilian personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The program would feature instruction on the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, as well as provide technical training.

A Presidential determination of eligibility for Poland to receive defense articles and services is necessary for the Polish government to purchase educational materials (such as extra textbooks, training equipment, and English language learning aids) through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system for the IMET program. The Department of State is not now prepared, however, to consider the sale of significant military equipment to Poland.

In December 1990, Lech Walesa was elected President of Poland in first free and contested Presidential elections in that country's history. In the same year, the Polish government implemented the most radical economic reform program ever adopted by a former Soviet client state. The Polish people now enjoy unprecedented political freedoms, and the country's human rights record has vastly improved as the democratic system, long promoted by Solidarity, takes root.

1202

S/S 9102491

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 15, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III

SUBJECT: Security Assistance Eligibility for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland

I recommend that you sign the attached Determinations indicating that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are eligible to receive defense articles and services from the United States. The Determinations state that furnishing defense articles and services to these countries will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

The immediate purpose of this determination is to allow participation of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs that provide training to military and civilian personnel assigned to the defense ministries in these countries. The programs would feature instruction on the role of military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, increase awareness of internationally recognized human rights, and provide technical training.

The Determination is needed to permit these governments to purchase educational materials through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system in connection with their participation in the IMET program. Materials such as textbooks, training equipment, and English language learning aids would be sold; however, we are not considering the sale of significant military equipment to these countries at this time.

Attachments: Presidential Determinations and Justifications for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO BE FURNISHED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 AND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act require, as a condition of eligibility to acquire defense articles and services from the United States, that the President find the furnishing of such articles and services to the country concerned will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

One of the objectives stated in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Section 2(b)(1)(E), is the "establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces." This objective will certainly strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. To contribute toward that objective, the Department of State has allocated $50,000 in Fiscal Year 1991 funds to the creation of a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The purpose of this program is to provide training to military and civilian personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The program would feature instruction on the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, as well as provide technical training.

A Presidential determination of eligibility for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to receive defense articles and services is necessary for the Czechoslovaks to purchase educational materials (such as extra textbooks, training equipment, and English language learning aids) through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system for the IMET program. The Department of State is not now prepared, however, to consider the sale of significant military equipment to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic completed the first phase of its transition to democracy by holding free and open parliamentary elections in June 1990. These elections capped a six-month period that began with the toppling of the communist government. Led by President Vaclav Havel, this "Velvet Revolution" has created a foundation for a liberal democratic system. Broad political reforms have been implemented, and the country now has an excellent human rights record. At the same time, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has taken the first steps necessary to institute market-oriented economic reforms.

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Eligibility of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to be Furnished Defense Articles and Services under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, I hereby find that the furnishing of defense articles and services to the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are authorized and directed to report this finding to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION
OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF HUNGARY
TO BE FURNISHED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES
UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
AND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) require, as a condition of eligibility to acquire defense articles and services from the United States, that the President find the furnishing of such articles and services to the country concerned will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

One of the objectives stated in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Section 2(b)(1)(E), is the "establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces." This objective will certainly strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. To contribute toward that objective, the Department of State has allocated $50,000 in Fiscal Year 1991 funds to the creation of a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Hungary. The purpose of this program is to provide training for military and civilian personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The program would feature instruction on the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, as well as provide technical training.

A Presidential determination of eligibility for Hungary to receive defense articles and services is necessary for the Hungarian government to purchase educational materials (such as extra textbooks, training equipment, and English language learning aids) through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system for the IMET program. The Department of State is not now prepared, however, to consider the sale of significant military equipment to Hungary.

Hungary held its first free and contested parliamentary and municipal elections in 1990. Prime Ministry Antall has assembled a coalition government and became the first freely elected Hungarian prime minister to visit the United States. The Hungarian government recently adopted, after considerable debate, a far-reaching economic reform package that came into effect on January 1, 1991. Hungary also has a significantly improved human rights record.

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Eligibility of the Republic of Hungary to be Furnished Defense Articles and Services under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, I hereby find that the furnishing of defense articles and services to the Government of the Republic of Hungary will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are authorized and directed to report this finding to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION
OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF POLAND
TO BE FURNISHED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES
UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
AND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (the Act) require, as a condition of eligibility to acquire defense articles and services from the United States, that the President find the furnishing of such articles and services to the country concerned will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

One of the objectives stated in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Section 2(b)(1)(E), is the "establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces." This objective will certainly strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. To contribute toward this objective, the Department of State has allocated $50,000 in Fiscal Year 1991 funds to the creation of a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Poland. The purpose of this program is to provide training to military and civilian personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The program would feature instruction on the role of the military in a democratic society and the importance of civilian oversight of the armed services, as well as provide technical training.

A Presidential determination of eligibility for Poland to receive defense articles and services is necessary for the Polish government to purchase educational materials (such as extra textbooks, training equipment, and English language learning aids) through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system for the IMET program. The Department of State is not now prepared, however, to consider the sale of significant military equipment to Poland.

In December 1990, Lech Walesa was elected President of Poland in first free and contested Presidential elections in that country's history. In the same year, the Polish government implemented the most radical economic reform program ever adopted by a former Soviet client state. The Polish people now enjoy unprecedented political freedoms, and the country's human rights record has vastly improved as the democratic system, long promoted by Solidarity, takes root.

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Eligibility of the Republic of Poland to be Furnished Defense Articles and Services under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, I hereby find that the furnishing of defense articles and services to the Government of the Republic of Poland will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are authorized and directed to report this finding to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1202

March 19, 1991

Brent - This is penny ante, but does it send a dangerous signal to the Gors which work the direction we are headed in EE. I worry we will slow the Soviet withdrawal

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: NICHOLAS ROSTOW NL

FROM: STEPHEN RADEMAKER SR

SUBJECT: Security Assistance Eligibility for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland

Before the United States may provide security assistance to any country, the President is required to determine that such assistance will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." The State Department has proposed (Tab II) that the President make such determinations with respect to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

Such determinations will permit these countries to participate in modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and will permit them to purchase educational materials through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system in connection with their participation in the IMET programs. No sales of significant military equipment to these countries is contemplated at this time.

Concurrences by: Bob Hutchings, Mike Hayden, Wendy Chamberlin and Ginny Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I transmitting the proposed Presidential Determinations.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Presidential Determination with respect to Czechoslovakia with attached Justification
- Tab B Presidential Determination with respect to Hungary with attached Justification
- Tab C Presidential Determination with respect to Poland with attached Justification

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101929
RECEIVED: 15 MAR 91 07

CHRON FILE

4

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 20 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND
IMF
EUROPE
VISIT
USSR
CSCE

PERSONS: WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PRES WALESA OF POLAND ON 20 MAR / TALKING POINTS / BIOS / PARTICIPANTS LIST / JOINT DECLARATION

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 19 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF: 9101573

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSMJT DOC 4 OF 4

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
3/20/91
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

March 20, 1991

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT LECH WALESA OF POLAND
DATE: March 20, 1991
LOCATION: Oval Office/Cabinet Room
TIME: 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To turn the spotlight back on eastern Europe, solidify Poland's commitment to economic reform, and stimulate private sector interest in Poland.

II. BACKGROUND

This is your first major foreign policy event in a long time that is not dominated by the Gulf crisis. It is therefore an ideal occasion for turning the spotlight back on a centerpiece of your foreign policy agenda: support for economic reform, democratic change, and independence in eastern Europe. The visit can also underline the parallel between Walesa's strong support for the Gulf effort and the support the international community is giving Poland.

The visit comes at a critical time for Poland and indeed for the entire region. Economic problems -- as you have heard from Havel, Mazowiecki, Antall and others -- are fueling social dissatisfaction and weakening the political consensus behind radical (but essential) economic reform. Poland is key: if Lech Walesa cannot persuade the Polish people that the current austerity is essential for future prosperity, who can? And if Poland falls off its reform course, Hungary and Czechoslovakia may do the same.

Having put his prestige behind Poland's courageous economic reforms, Walesa urgently needs to show the Polish people that he can deliver Western understanding and support. The initiatives you will announce at the arrival ceremony -- a major debt reduction package that we pushed through the G-7 and Paris Club, a new American Business Initiative, a program of improved trade access, and a joint declaration on U.S.-Polish relations -- will help him do just that. And they will solidify Walesa's commitment to staying the course, even as the Polish reforms exact further pain in the form of factory closings and worker layoffs.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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The trickiest element of the visit is Poland's search for Western, especially U.S., security assurances. You should leave it to Walesa to raise this. We have conditioned the Poles not to expect us to offer a security assurance, but Walesa may confront you with his concerns.

Like the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, the Poles are worried about the conservative backlash in the Soviet Union. To guard against a resumption of menacing Soviet behavior, they are looking to us and to NATO for security guarantees. Indeed, the Poles wanted such assurances included in a joint declaration on U.S.-Polish relations. We agreed to a declaration because Walesa considers it important for strengthening Poland's Western orientation and commitment to democracy. But we did not accept any language that would imply a security relationship. The agreed text, which you and Walesa will sign at the beginning of the expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room, is at Tab F.

You can usefully reinforce these points with Walesa, assuring him that we and our allies attach great importance to the consolidation and safeguarding of Poland's democracy and independence. You might also say that while we share their concern about the situation in the Soviet Union, we see no evidence that the Soviets are trying to turn back the clock in central and eastern Europe. Above all, the Poles need to understand that the surest guarantee of their security is the economic and political development of their country. This is where we and the Poles should focus our energy.

As you heard from ex-Prime Minister Mazowiecki at the UNGA and again in Paris, Poland's economy has been hit hard by the loss of Soviet and east German markets, reduced Soviet oil supplies and Soviet demands for hard currency payments, and the impact of the Gulf crisis. These problems, coupled with the austerity associated with the reform program, contributed to the drubbing Mazowiecki received in the December elections. Walesa capitalized on this voter discontent to win the Presidency. But to his credit he has reaffirmed his support for Poland's pioneering economic reforms -- sealed by Poland's recent agreement with the IMF on a three-year standby program. His performance as President has exceeded our expectations.

Walesa nonetheless feels the public heat and urgently wants to show that he can deliver Western support and hold out real prospects of future prosperity. That is why the debt reduction package delivered by Nick Brady and David Mulford is so timely. Your demarche to Mulroney in Ottawa removed the last major holdout, permitting Paris Club agreement on March 15. All Paris Club creditors agreed to reduce future Polish payments due by at least 50% (30% in the next three years), and they are invited to "consider" an additional 10% reduction. The U.S. will provide a total of 70% debt

relief, with 10% going to fund a Polish environmental foundation. The total reduction of Poland's official debt will thus be over 50%.

The other major economic program you will announce -- a $45 million American Business and Investment Initiative -- underscores the message that the Polish economy has turned the corner and that Poland now offers attractive opportunities for U.S. trade and investment. The initiative includes creation of an American Business Center and a consortium of American businesses in Eastern Europe. With our encouragement, Walesa and his economic advisors will be meeting with a wide cross-section of key American business leaders in Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. We have told the Poles they should do all they can to attract blue chip U.S. companies, because other firms will tend to follow their lead. You can help get the message through to Walesa that private investment is crucial and that he and his countrymen need to be aggressive in attracting interest in Poland.

Finally, this will be an important occasion to cement your good personal relationship with Walesa. He is, as you know, a headstrong, mercurial and emotional politician, who relies more than most on personal relationships. Your very warm letter of congratulations upon his election as President made a strong impression on him, as did your meeting at his home in Gdansk in July 1989, and he sees his personal relationship with you as an important element of his political standing.

You should use your brief private meeting with Walesa to assure him of your commitment to Poland's success. This setting would also be the best place to respond to the security concerns he may raise.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

One-on-one followed by expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biographies
Tab D	Acting Secretary Kimmitt's Memorandum
Tab E	Secretary Brady's Memorandum
Tab F	Text of Joint Declaration

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT LECH WALESA OF POLAND

-- It is an honor to welcome you back to the White House, this time not as a symbol of Polish democracy but as its leader.

-- I know what difficulties you face, and I want you to know how important it is to us that you succeed.

-- Poland was first to break the Communist grip, and first to undertake the historic leap from a centrally planned economy to a free market.

-- You know that my first major foreign policy speech as President was on Poland. The United States has made a commitment to your success. I have made a personal commitment.

-- The next steps you must take will not be easy. You know that Poland must stick to its economic reform, and that it will be up to you to sell the program to the Polish people.

-- I want you to know that we are with you.

-- We have budget problems that don't allow us to do all we would like in outright assistance, but we will do as much as we can. And we will use our weight in the international community to keep your cause high on the agenda.

-- It is also critical that both of us do all we can to stimulate more investment. Look at Singapore or Taiwan. Once private investment takes hold -- and that hasn't started yet in Poland -- your economy will turn around.

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-- I am confident Poland will make it -- that your leadership can do what has never been done before -- and that Poland can find a secure place in the new Europe.

SECURITY CONCERNS -- IF RAISED

-- Given your history and the instability in the Soviet Union, I can understand your concerns.

-- We are all worried about the Soviet situation. The Soviets have gotten more difficult to deal with on several issues. They are digging in their heels on START, and backtracking on essential elements of the CFE Treaty.

-- Gorbachev has clearly allied himself with conservative elements in the military, KGB, and the Party. Whether he can return to a course of reform is hard to say.

-- But I continue to find him reasonable and capable of keeping his commitments. Despite all the rumblings from the military, the Soviets signed and ratified the Two Plus Four Treaty, voted yes 13 times at the UN Security Council, and agreed to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military structure. So far as we can tell, they are honoring their commitments to withdraw their troops from central Europe.

-- In short, we see no evidence that the Soviets are trying to turn the clock back in central and eastern Europe. Even the most militant hard-liners seem to accept that those changes are irreversible.

-- Certainly, we would be gravely concerned if the Soviet Union sought to reestablish itself in central Europe through pressure or intimidation. The Soviets know that we have an interest in your democracy and independence.

-- The first priority is the withdrawal, on schedule, of Soviet troops. We don't want to say anything that Soviet hardliners could exploit.

-- What we do want to do is to build up the substance of your links to the West. Your visit here and all the other U.S.-Polish ties we are establishing are steps on that path.

-- We also want to develop further the liaison relationships with NATO. We support your growing ties with other multilateral institutions like the Council of Europe, the OECD, and the EC. And we will support the further development of CSCE in ways that will help you.

-- We are very encouraged by the cooperation you have developed with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is important to break down the conflicts that have plagued this region in the past, and also to reinforce your common commitment to democracy and independence.

-- All these add up to a network of links that will help bring Poland into the mainstream. The Soviets will see it, but they will not be provoked by it.

-- Finally, we believe that the surest guarantee of Poland's security is the development of a strong market economy and stable democracy. This should be the highest priority.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR EXPANDED MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT LECH WALESA OF POLAND

-- Let me welcome you all. This is an historic moment. It is the first State Visit by a Polish President, and the first visit by President Lech Walesa -- Poland's first democratically elected President -- to the United States.

-- The Joint Declaration we just signed is another "first" -- it marks a new beginning in our relations.

-- Let me also express my appreciation for Poland's strong support for the multinational effort in the Persian Gulf. As a Nobel Laureate, President Walesa's words carried special importance. Your medical assistance units and personnel were a tangible sign of Poland's commitment.

-- Your visit comes at the right time. The Gulf crisis, as you know, has rivetted our attention for many months. But we did not forget about you. Indeed, one reason I wanted to bring the crisis to a conclusion was the toll it was taking in Poland and the other new democracies.

-- I will be glad to discuss the Gulf situation with you, but since our time is limited I wanted first to discuss your situation.

POLISH ECONOMY AND U.S. ASSISTANCE

-- Your visit is the first major foreign event here since the war ended, and it is a fitting way of returning our attention to the vitally important task of helping assure Poland's success.

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-- I know how difficult this period is for you economically and politically.

-- You have an excellent and bold economic program. And you should continue courageously to stick with it. Your success is crucial for Poland and indeed for the entire region.

-- You can count on our support.

-- Despite the enormous costs of the Gulf operation, the Administration's budget request for the coming year is 50% higher than last year's request -- roughly $500 million.

-- The U.S. assistance program for Poland will accelerate in the second half of 1991, thereby providing additional visible support for your reform program.

-- Our strong support for your program is reflected in the Polish-American Enterprise Fund which will receive about $70 million this year. Contracts will be awarded soon for much more technical assistance in such areas as privatization, management training, energy efficiency, the environment, agricultural restructuring, and small business formation.

-- Poland is by far the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Eastern Europe. The principal and interest from the $200 million U.S. contribution to the Polish stabilization fund remains available for your use this year.

POLISH DEBT

-- We are very pleased with the March 15 Paris Club agreement for a substantial reduction of Poland's official debt burden.

-- As you are aware, getting the rest of the Paris Club to agree to significant debt reduction for Poland was very difficult indeed.

-- Secretary Brady and Secretary Baker worked long and hard to forge a consensus. The U.S. itself will reduce by 70%, and we will push other creditors to go beyond the 50% level.

-- Ten percent of the additional U.S. reduction will be used to fund a new Polish environmental foundation.

-- Poland's agreement with the IMF on an extended fund facility for 1991-1993 was a precondition for this reduction, and it is essential that Poland's economic reform stay on track.

-- Your determination to resist inflationary wage increases or subsidies to money-losing enterprises is critical in making the plan work and restoring the confidence of creditors and potential investors in the Polish economy.

ATTRACTING U.S. BUSINESS TO POLAND

-- We are committed to doing all we can to encourage our business to be more active on the Polish market. The recent announcements of new investments by several major U.S. corporations (such as Coca Cola and Stanley) are positive, but only a start.

-- We are announcing an American Business and Private Sector Development initiative in connection with your visit. This will provide some $45 million in programs to encourage trade, investment, and joint ventures in Poland and the rest of the region. It will also create an American Business Center in Warsaw, which we hope will encourage U.S. firms to

get engaged.

-- However, you need to take action also. I will tell you frankly, our businessmen continue to report that Poland is less attractive to trade and investment than other countries of the region. They complain about excessive red tape and an unclear regulatory situation.

-- We also note that the Business and Economic Treaty which I signed along with former Prime Minister Mazowiecki last March, and which the U.S. ratified in October 1990 has still not been ratified by the Polish parliament.

-- It is urgent to ratify this treaty and to address other concerns of our businesses. U.S. firms will take an active interest in Poland only if the business conditions are made clear, attractive and reliable.

-- Poland's economic success will depend on export growth, and I know that is inhibited by several factors, including relatively small quotas in sensitive sectors such as textiles.

-- I am prepared to send to Poland a team of experts to undertake with your specialists an intensive review of both internal and external impediments to expanded trade, and to propose solutions.

SOVIET UNION/BALTIC SITUATION

-- We share your concerns about the Soviet situation.

-- Yet, despite all the rumblings from the military, the Soviets signed and ratified the Two Plus Four Treaty, voted yes 13 times at the UN Security Council, and agreed to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military structure. So far

as we can tell, they are honoring their commitments to withdraw their troops from central Europe.

-- As to the Baltics, we are continuing to press the Soviet leadership to take concrete steps to defuse the crisis and to move toward peaceful dialogue.

-- We have told the Soviets that the February 9 and March 3 Baltic polls on independence were clear expressions of the will of the Baltic peoples, and as such must be taken into account by Moscow.

-- During Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's visit here last month, he conveyed undertakings from Gorbachev to refrain from further use of force and to seek a peaceful outcome. He also said that some of the Soviet military units sent to the Baltic states in January would be withdrawn.

-- Moscow has since named negotiating delegations for talks with all three Baltic states.

-- I would be very interested in hearing your views of the situation in the Baltic states and your thinking about the Soviet Union.

GULF SITUATION

-- Secretary Baker has just come back from an intensive round of discussions with the key Arab countries and Israel on Gulf security and the Arab-Israeli problem.

-- We think there is a window of opportunity now in the wake of the war to build on our success and to advance progress on both of these problems.

-- We believe now that the countries of the region may be willing to move forward. We have a long way to go.

-- Our approach is based on several objectives:

- o We want to provide for <u>security in the Gulf</u> by arranging an effective cease-fire and creating a longer-term security arrangement.
- o We would like to find ways to curb the regional <u>proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</u> (chemical, biological, nuclear) and the conventional arms race.
- o <u>Regional economic cooperation</u> will be essential for long-term stability--there may be a role for a regional development bank.
- o Finally, we are ready to stimulate the parties to produce progress on the <u>Arab-Israeli peace process</u> based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338.

PARTICIPANTS FOR OVAL OFFICE MEETING

U.S.

The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Poland

Lech Walesa, President
Slawomir Siwek, Secretary of State
Michal Rozycki, Interpreter

PARTICIPANTS FOR CABINET ROOM MEETING

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Thomas W. Simons, Ambassador to Poland
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Special Assistant to the President
for European and Soviet Affairs
Interpreter

Poland

Lech Walesa, President
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Foreign Minister
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, Ambassador to the U.S.
Dariusz Ledworowsi, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations
Janusz Lewandowski, Minister of Privatization
Janusz Ziolkowski, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Slawomir Siwek, Secretary of State
Janusz Sawicki, Deputy Minister of Finance
Michal Rozycki, Interpreter

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 15, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt, Acting R.M.K.

SUBJECT: State Visit of President Lech Walesa
March 19-22, 1991

I. SETTING

o Lech Walesa arrives in Washington three months after becoming Poland's first post-Communist elected President. His trip is designed to symbolize Poland's dramatic reorientation to the West and its values. He wants to identify Polish democracy with the United States and so strengthen it.

o Walesa's start in office has been difficult, and his honeymoon with the voters may prove short.

-- Despite his promises to accelerate Poland's economic and political transition, improvement in the economy has been slow.

-- Already his handpicked government under Prime Minister Bielecki has had to confront the trade unions -- including Solidarity -- over economic policy.

-- Strikes are on the increase, and the public is restless and looking for more visible signs of change.

o The Poland Walesa leads is no longer flush with the euphoria which propelled the events of 1989. With communism gone, infighting within the democratic movement has grown more intense.

-- The absence of clearly defined political and institutional roles, especially the failure to resolve the relative powers of the presidency, the prime minister, and parliament, has complicated the policy process.

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-- Walesa has sought to remain above the fray, distancing himself from the political coalition that helped elect him while reaching out to members of the Mazowiecki camp. His efforts to reward different factions may make him more presidential, or they could undermine valuable support from some key constituencies who believe they deserve more.

o Despite problems and an uncertain political system, Walesa comes as an enormously self-confident politician who enjoys tremendous popularity in Poland -- and in the United States.

o As he arrives in Washington, Walesa has a lot on his mind.

-- For him and for many Poles, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Soviet crackdown in the Baltics brought into vivid focus the problem of security for a country with a larger, more powerful neighbor.

-- Events in the Soviet Union have had other effects as well. Polish elites, who had cautioned against leaving the Soviets behind on the road to the new Europe, have now concluded that the prospects for Soviet reform are increasingly clouded, and that the Soviet Union will probably not become a part of the new Europe.

o To address Poland's sense of strategic isolation, Walesa has moved on several fronts. Poland's foreign policy pronouncements have shifted perceptively from grand strategies of future European architecture. Instead, Walesa has:

-- Intensified political and economic cooperation with fellow East Europeans, specifically Hungary and Czechoslovakia;

-- Pressed for formal treaties of friendship with Germany, Italy, and France;

-- Sought to intensify relations with NATO, including scheduling a visit to NATO headquarters during the spring; and

-- Strived for closer ties to multilateral institutions, including the EC, the OECD and the Council of Europe.

o Walesa comes to Washington with two overall goals in mind:

-- To demonstrate to the Polish people that Poland and the United States enjoy a special relationship which includes an implicit security dimension.

-- To encourage much greater U.S. business and economic interest in Poland.

o In courting us, Walesa will want to show, above all, that he and his government are responsibly handling Poland's complex relations with the Soviet Union and Germany, including the troop withdrawal issue. He may seek to share views on developments in the USSR. He may also describe the progress in Polish-German relations in the wake of the signing of the border treaty. He may gently criticize Chancellor Kohl on the question of Germany minority rights in Poland, which has slowed progress on the bilateral friendship treaty.

o You can also expect to hear many warm words of praise and gratitude.

-- He will commend the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf, and probably let you know that the U.S. -- and you personally -- enjoy tremendous popularity among the Polish public for the Gulf policy. (During his visit to Arlington Cemetery he will lay a wreath at the gravesite of a serviceman killed in the Persian Gulf war.)

-- He will express thanks for what the Poles believe to be the pivotal U.S. role in gaining their participation in the negotiations on German unification. As many Poles describe it, the border treaty with Germany at last freed Poland from the legacy of Yalta which made the Soviet Union the guarantor of the Polish-German border.

-- He may also express appreciation for U.S. aid and leadership in obtaining multilateral assistance for Poland's transition to a market economy. He may note our role on debt relief, though we understand he is disappointed at the level of up-front debt stock reduction which the G-7 have agreed upon.

II. <u>OBJECTIVES</u>

o In public, our top priority is to address Poland's concern about strategic isolation without making statements which could be interpreted as security guarantees.

o With popular support eroding for market economic reforms in Poland, we also need to renew our strong commitment to that program, and to Poland's economic success. We should take credit for engineering major, multilateral debt relief and emphasize that it responds to the sacrifice the Poles are making to continue the reforms.

careful review of whether Poland is staying with its program. This was also the case in Congress' consideration of debt reduction for Poland.

- We will announce steps to encourage U.S. business involvement in the region; we should urge Walesa to reciprocate with specific Polish measures to encourage investment.

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1991

This was approved by the Secretary for transmittal, but not signed due to his absence.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Nicholas F. Brady

SUBJECT: Official Debt Reduction for Poland

We have achieved a major success with regard to Polish debt reduction. After your meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, the Paris Club announced that all creditor governments are prepared to reduce Polish debt by 50% on a net present value (NPV) basis. The package also contains additional elements that may result in final debt reduction levels somewhat above 50%. The agreed package will be formally adopted by the Paris Club once Poland's economic reform program with the IMF has been approved (expected in April).

The Paris Club Package

The restructuring will occur in two stages, involving:

- 30% debt relief on a net present value basis in the first stage, including a commitment to reduce Poland's interest payments by 80% for 3 years on a cash flow basis; and
- 20% debt relief on a net present value basis beginning in the fourth year, upon successful completion of the IMF program.

The package allows creditor governments to choose among a menu of options at each stage. These options include debt reduction, interest reduction, or capitalization of interest at reduced interest rates.

In addition, provisions have been included which would (a) allow governments to provide additional bilateral relief beyond the consensus level of 50%, and (b) encourage governments to reduce Polish obligations further on a voluntary basis through the conversion of up to 10 percent of outstanding claims via debt/equity, debt-for-nature, or other debt swaps.

Additional U.S. Measures

We have existing statutory authority to reduce our Polish debt beyond the 50% level. During the negotiations, the U.S. agreed privately with the Polish Government to do additional debt

reduction to bring the total debt reduction by all Paris Club creditor countries to 51%. This will require us to reduce our debt by about two-thirds on a net present value basis.

We also recommend that the U.S. take the leadership role in fully exercising the debt swap option. Specifically, we would suggest contributing 10 percent of the stock of U.S. obligations to a Polish environmental fund. Such an action could be announced during the arrival ceremony for President Walesa's visit this week. We are now working with other agencies to coordinate this initiative and to provide the necessary papers for such an announcement.

The combined effect of these various measures would raise the U.S. level of debt reduction for Poland to 70%, and would raise the total debt reduction for Poland under the Paris Club agreement to 52%. We should encourage other countries to follow our lead in providing debt relief beyond the 50% level reached in the Paris Club agreement.

DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

For over 200 years the United States and Poland have been bound by shared values and a commitment to the principles of democracy, human liberty and the rule of law. The American Constitution of 1789 and the Polish Constitution of 1791 are enduring symbols of this special bond, which survived even during the long periods when Poland's independence and liberty were denied. Our relations have been further sustained and enriched by the millions of Americans of Polish descent who over the generations have helped create a free and prosperous society in the United States.

Just as Poles supported America's quest for freedom and liberty more than two centuries ago, so has America stood by Poland during her long years of darkness. When the Polish people began to reassert control over their national destinies, the United States committed itself to supporting their pioneering efforts to secure their freedom and to build a market economy and stable democratic rule.

Poland and the United States share an interest in maintaining stability and security in the new Europe, and in working for the further strengthening of peace on the continent. Our relations are based on the United Nations Charter and principles of the Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, non-intervention in internal affairs, and the rule of law. The United States attaches great importance to the consolidation and safeguarding of Poland's democracy and independence, which it considers integral to the new Europe, whole and free.

Relations between Poland and the United States have entered a new era of cooperation and partnership. The United States and Poland are committed to developing their new partnership through an enhanced political dialogue and regular contacts in areas of common interest.

Poland and the United States share the conviction that the development of a market economy in Poland is essential to its stability and security. The United States reaffirms its continued strong support for Poland's courageous program of economic reform. The Polish Stabilization Fund, the Polish-American Enterprise Fund, and U.S. support in international financial institutions are among the tangible signs of that commitment.

Poland's firm commitment to an economic reform program that enjoys the endorsement and support of the International Monetary Fund has made possible the mobilization of substantial new financial and other economic assistance from the international community. The United States and Poland have concluded an agreement on Business and Economic Relations and other key agreements that should facilitate trade and investment needed for economic growth and prosperity.

Poland is engaged in an economic transformation of historic proportions in which its economic partners also have a key role in assuring success. We therefore welcome the ~~general~~ agreement of the Paris Club on the substantial reduction of Poland's foreign debt obligations, which represents an historic and exceptional step by the international community to reinforce Poland's progress toward democracy and the free market.

The United States and Poland are also committed to developing their new partnership through closer cultural, educational, and scientific contacts.

The United States and Poland are convinced that these principles will further strengthen the bonds of lasting friendship and cooperation between both states, as an integral element of the broader partnership that binds the United States and Europe and of a new world order based on democratic values and the rule of law.

Washington, the _____ day of March, 1991

George Bush
President of
the United States
of America

Lech Walesa
President of
the Republic of
Poland

~~SECRET~~ 1929

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 18, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT RZH for DG

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RZH

SUBJECT: State Visit of President Lech Walesa of Poland, March 20, 1991

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meetings with President Walesa. Two points are worth highlighting.

First, we have attached (Tab F) the text of the Joint Declaration which the President and Walesa will sign, without fanfare, at the opening of the expanded meeting. The Poles did not press further for language that hinted at a security commitment, and they agreed to a sentence in which both welcome the March 15 agreement for a reduction of Poland's debt burden. (As the Poles had been pressing for an 80% reduction, we wanted to ensure that they welcomed publicly the 50% reduction package we helped secure.)

Second, the President will announce in his arrival statement the debt agreement and an additional bilateral reduction of Polish debt via debt-for-environment swap, along with a new $45 million American Business Initiative for central and eastern Europe and a trade enhancement program to improve access of Polish exports to the U.S. These will help answer the complaints of U.S. neglect of eastern Europe that are resurfacing in the press (now rediscovering the region).

RZH for

Concurrences by: Adrian Basora, Tim Deal and Nicholas Burns

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Points to be Made
- Tab B Participants List
- Tab C Biographies
- Tab D Acting Secretary Kimmitt's Memorandum
- Tab E Secretary Brady's Memorandum
- Tab F Text of Joint Declaration

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1019-MR
9/22/2014 MA

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102300
RECEIVED: 28 MAR 91 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BASORA
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 28 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
EC

POLAND

PERSONS: LANXADE, JACQUES

WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MSG FM ADM LANXADE RE WH PERSPECTIVE ON WALESA VISIT

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 01 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASORA
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 9102300

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	91032916	FOR DECISION
001		X	91040120	SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

msg from Lanxade

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JEB LOG # 230

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	K	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft	4	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			D
West Wing Desk	5	3/1	
NSC Secretariat	6		NIR

91 MAR 29 P5:16 RECEIVED

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS: Lanxade needs to receive msg

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: by Monday

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 2300

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 29, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA

SUBJECT: Message from Lanxade

Admiral Lanxade has asked that I pass you the message that he would be very grateful for a brief White House assessment of the Walesa visit. He is particularly interested in what financial commitments were requested by Walesa and what the U.S. agreed to, since he expects Walesa to try to use this as leverage on the French.

A Blue Channel message responsive to Lanxade's request is at Tab I.

Concurrence by: Robert Hutchings and Meg Lundsager

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmission of the message at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1020-MR
SCS 5/15/13

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BLUE CHANNEL FOR ADMIRAL LANXADE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Dear Jacques:

I received your message requesting a White House perspective on the Walesa visit.

I believe the visit was highly successful, both in reassuring Walesa of continuing strong Western support and in reinforcing his commitment to the difficult but necessary economic reforms in which Poland is engaged.

On debt relief, we presented Walesa with the 50 percent-plus Paris Club reduction package that we had negotiated with the strong cooperation and support of your Finance Ministry. We had made it clear in advance to Walesa and his advisors that, even though their objective had been an 80 percent reduction, this Paris Club package was in fact a very generous one and it was essential that the Polish Government take a thoroughly positive view of it. As you know, the Paris Club agreement calls for creditors to consider additional reductions beyond the minimum 50 percent agreed to by all, and the U.S. will in fact reduce Poland's debt burden by 70 percent. Ten percent of this will be used by the Polish Government to create, with local currency, an environmental fund. We would hope that other creditors might be interested in a similar additional reduction, with possible participation in the environmental fund.

Walesa seemed most appreciative of the special efforts being made by Poland's creditors, and he seemed to understand the importance of keeping to the economic stabilization program recently negotiated with the IMF. He also indicated his desire to accelerate privatization and other structural reforms needed to create an effective market economy, an attitude which we very much encouraged.

Walesa did not make any new requests for financial assistance and instead repeatedly stressed cooperation rather than just aid. He did, however, raise the dilemma of the Polish armaments industry, and specifically of the tank exports which we have opposed. Our discussions of what might be done to convert these industries was left inconclusive.

The two Presidents also signed a Joint Declaration, which will be sent to you separately. The Poles had initially proposed a much lengthier document containing clearly implied security guarantees. However, when we made it clear that we were not prepared to consider language of that kind, Walesa's representatives quickly acquiesced in the much more general statement that we proposed.

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2009-1020-MR
SCS 5/15/13

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

During his seven-day visit to the U.S., Walesa met with top business leaders in New York, Chicago and Washington, in each case making a strong plea for increased private investment. Our businessmen and senior administration officials stressed, in their turn, the large number of legal and bureaucratic obstacles and rigidities that must still be removed before Poland can become a truly attractive place to invest. These comments seemed to have an impact, and we plan to follow them up in our continuing dialogue with Walesa and other members of his government.

During the visit, we also agreed to send a team of experts to Poland to explore pragmatically how that country's exports might be increased through the removal of barriers both within Poland and in U.S. and European markets.

Walesa seems absolutely committed to joining the West as fast as possible, both economically and politically. He clearly feels a need for closer ties to, and support from, the West. However, he is also quite aware of Soviet sensitivities.

I hope that these comments will be of use to you. Should you wish more detailed information on the economic or other aspects of the visit, please do not hesitate to have your deputy contact Adrian Basora.

I hope that the Walesa visit to Paris will prove equally successful, and I would be most interested in your assessment.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE OUT

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 302207Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
0000
-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LANXADE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
-
DEAR JACQUES:
I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE REQUESTING A WHITE HOUSE PERSPECTIVE ON THE WALESA VISIT.
-
I BELIEVE THE VISIT WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL, BOTH IN REASSURING WALESA OF CONTINUING STRONG WESTERN SUPPORT AND IN REINFORCING HIS COMMITMENT TO THE DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY ECONOMIC REFORMS IN WHICH POLAND IS ENGAGED.
-
ON DEBT RELIEF, WE PRESENTED WALESA WITH THE 50 PERCENT-PLUS PARIS CLUB REDUCTION PACKAGE THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED WITH THE STRONG COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF YOUR FINANCE MINISTRY. WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN ADVANCE TO WALESA AND HIS ADVISORS THAT, EVEN THOUGH THEIR OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN AN 80 PERCENT REDUCTION, THIS PARIS CLUB PACKAGE WAS IN FACT A VERY GENEROUS ONE AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TAKE A THOROUGHLY POSITIVE VIEW OF IT. AS YOU KNOW, THE PARIS CLUB AGREEMENT CALLS FOR

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2009-1020-MR
SCS 5/15/13

CREDITORS TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS BEYOND THE MINIMUM 50 PERCENT AGREED TO BY ALL, AND THE U.S. WILL IN FACT REDUCE POLAND'S DEBT BURDEN BY 70 PERCENT. TEN PERCENT OF THIS WILL BE USED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO CREATE, WITH LOCAL CURRENCY, AN ENVIRONMENTAL FUND. WE WOULD HOPE THAT OTHER CREDITORS MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A SIMILAR ADDITIONAL REDUCTION, WITH POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL FUND.

-

WALESA SEEMED MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE SPECIAL EFFORTS BEING MADE BY POLAND'S CREDITORS, AND HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING TO THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM RECENTLY NEGOTIATED WITH THE IMF. HE ALSO INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO ACCELERATE PRIVATIZATION AND OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS NEEDED TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE MARKET ECONOMY, AN ATTITUDE WHICH WE VERY MUCH ENCOURAGED.

-

WALESA DID NOT MAKE ANY NEW REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND INSTEAD REPEATEDLY STRESSED COOPERATION RATHER THAN JUST AID. HE DID, HOWEVER, RAISE THE DILEMMA OF THE POLISH ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY, AND SPECIFICALLY OF THE TANK EXPORTS WHICH WE HAVE OPPOSED. OUR DISCUSSIONS OF WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO CONVERT THESE INDUSTRIES WAS LEFT INCONCLUSIVE.

-

THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO SIGNED A JOINT DECLARATION, WHICH WILL BE SENT TO YOU SEPARATELY. THE POLES HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED A MUCH LENGTHIER DOCUMENT CONTAINING CLEARLY IMPLIED SECURITY GUARANTEES. HOWEVER, WHEN WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER LANGUAGE OF THAT KIND, WALESA'S REPRESENTATIVES QUICKLY ACQUIESCED IN THE MUCH MORE GENERAL STATEMENT THAT WE PROPOSED.

-

DURING HIS SEVEN-DAY VISIT TO THE U.S., WALESA MET WITH TOP BUSINESS LEADERS IN NEW YORK, CHICAGO AND WASHINGTON, IN EACH CASE MAKING A STRONG PLEA FOR INCREASED PRIVATE INVESTMENT. OUR BUSINESSMEN AND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS STRESSED, IN THEIR TURN, THE LARGE NUMBER OF LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES

AND RIGIDITIES THAT MUST STILL BE REMOVED BEFORE POLAND CAN BECOME A TRULY ATTRACTIVE PLACE TO INVEST. THESE COMMENTS SEEMED TO HAVE AN IMPACT. AND WE PLAN TO FOLLOW THEM UP IN OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH WALESA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

-

DURING THE VISIT, WE ALSO AGREED TO SEND A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO POLAND TO EXPLORE PRAGMATICALLY HOW THAT COUNTRY'S EXPORTS MIGHT BE INCREASED THROUGH THE REMOVAL OF BARRIERS BOTH WITHIN POLAND AND IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN MARKETS.

-

WALESA SEEMS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO JOINING THE WEST AS FAST AS POSSIBLE, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. HE CLEARLY FEELS A NEED FOR CLOSER TIES TO, AND SUPPORT FROM, THE WEST. HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO QUITE AWARE OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES.

-

I HOPE THAT THESE COMMENTS WILL BE OF USE TO YOU. SHOULD YOU WISH MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE ECONOMIC OR OTHER ASPECTS OF THE VISIT, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO HAVE YOUR DEPUTY CONTACT ADRIAN BASORA.

-

I HOPE THAT THE WALESA VISIT TO PARIS WILL PROVE EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND I WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN YOUR ASSESSMENT.

-

-

SINCERELY,

-

BRENT SCOWCROFT

-

END TEXT

-

DECL: OADR

#0068

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102204
RECEIVED: 26 MAR 91 09

CHRON FILE

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 04 APR 91
SOURCE REF: 9105336

4

KEYWORDS: ROMANIA HS
AP

PERSONS: ROMAN, PETRE

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM ROMAN RE COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY / POSSIBLE VISIT IN APR

ACTION: ANSWERED BY STATE CABLE 107556 DUE DATE: 29 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9101870 9102218

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

BUSH FILE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9105336 xr 9104910

Date April 4, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

E X D I S

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush

From: Prime Minister Roman

Date: March 23, 1991

Subject: Commitment to Democracy/possible visit in April

WH Referral Dated: March 26, 1991
NSCS ID# (if any): 9102204

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

X
_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: Secretary Baker responded on behalf of President Bush in State cable 107556, dated April 4, 1991. A copy is attached.

for Brandi Sullis
Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

Decl: OADR

PAGE 01 STATE 107556 040655Z 026832 SS05180
ACTION: EUR (02)

INFO: P (02) T (01) C (01) L (01) SSO (01) SSI (01) INR (01)
OCT (01) SP (01) PA (01) PM (01) MR (01) IO (01) UNA (01)
NST (01) CFE (01) D (02) S (03) SSC (01) SSSA (01) TRIP (01)
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INFO: X (01) SS (01) JSR (01) EUR (01)
---------- 04/0656Z A1 MLY (TOTAL COPIES: 004)
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /001R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/EEY: REHANSEN
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
EUR: JFDOBBINS P: AWOLFF HA/BA: MARIETTI (INFO) S/S: JCARR
EUR: CWKAMMAN (SUBST) D: KJUSTER D/EEA: KSMITH S/S-O: JJA
EUR/EEY: JRHOOPER C: RWILSON (INFO) DOC: JBURGESS (SUBS)
EUR/RPM: MGUEST S/P: JFOX NSC: KHILL
----------559902 040655Z /38

P 040654Z APR 91
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 107556

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGSL: PREL, OVIP, PHUM, ECON RO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S REPLY TO ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

A. BUCHAREST 2777 B. BUCHAREST 2443

1. ~~X~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER TO FOREIGN MINISTER NASTASE THE LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY IN PARA. 4, WHICH RESPONDS BOTH TO NASTASE'S LETTER OF MARCH 12 (REF

B) AND PRIME MINISTER ROMAN'S RECENT LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT (REF A).

3. NASTASE'S MARCH 12 LETTER CITED ROMANIA'S INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN KUWAIT RECONSTRUCTION. IN DELIVERING THE SECRETARY'S REPLY, THE EMBASSY SHOULD NOTE THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE ROMANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WHICH IS THE APPROPRIATE USG POINT OF CONTACT ON THIS MATTER. THE EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO ADVISE THE GOR THAT ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION IN KUWAITI RECONSTRUCTION IS PRIMARILY A MATTER BETWEEN ROMANIA AND KUWAIT. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TOLD THE GOK THAT ITS DECISION TO GIVE RECONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

PRIORITY TO KEY COALITION PARTNERS IS SOUND, AND WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT ROMANIA'S SUPPORT IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN CRUCIAL TO COALITION SUCCESS.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT HAS BRIEFED ME ON YOUR APRIL 1 CONVERSATION WITH HIM ABOUT PRIME MINISTER ROMAN'S PRIVATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES THIS MONTH. LET ME REITERATE OUR APPRECIATION FOR ROMANIA'S STEADFAST SUPPORT IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN DEMONSTRATING TO IRAQ THAT NAKED AGGRESSION WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND WILL NOT GO UNCHECKED.

STATE 107556 040655Z 026832 SS05180
I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON APRIL 10. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEVOTE

PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN ROMANIA. THE KEY TO ADVANCING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS ROMANIA'S ACHIEVING DEMOCRATIZATION; PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS OR ETHNIC MINORITIES; AND IMPLEMENTING MARKET REFORM. OUR DISCUSSIONS WOULD COMPLEMENT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON EUROPEAN AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST WHICH YOU SUGGESTED IN YOUR LETTER TO ME OF MARCH 12.

PRESIDENT BUSH HAS ASKED ME ALSO TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION FOR PRIME MINISTER ROMAN'S RECENT LETTER TO HIM, IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBES ROMANIA'S EFFORTS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY. WE SUPPORT GENUINE STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION.

SINCERELY,

JAMES A. BAKER, III BAKER

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1020-MR
SCS 5/15/13

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9105336

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9102204

REFERRAL

DATE: 26 MAR 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: ROMAN, PETRE

DATE: 23 MAR 91

SUBJ: CABLE TO PRES RE COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY / POSSIBLE VISIT IN APRIL

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUEDATE: 29 MAR 91

COMMENT:

Lisa M. Salvetti

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Received in S/S-IRM/RM
3/26 at 4:00 pm (cb)

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT FILE GOMPERT HUTCHINGS PRESSMSGS SANNER SIT VAX

PREC PRIORITY CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 251155Z MAR 91

FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9399

EXDIS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 02777

EXDIS

E O. 12356. N/A

TAGS: PREL. RO

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM PRIME MINISTER ROMAN

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MARCH 23, THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPOKESMAN BOGDAN BALTAZAR INVITED CHARGE TO HIS MFA OFFICE TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER ROMAN TO PRESIDENT BUSH (TEXT OF THE LETTER, WHICH IS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH, FOLLOWS IN PARA 4, SIGNED ORIGINAL IS BEING POUCHED TO EUR/EEY). THE LETTER ACKNOWLEDGES AMERICAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT "THE NEW ROMANIA" AND RECOGNIZES THAT GOR MISTAKES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS "LACK OF TRUST" BY THE ADMINISTRATION. ROMAN GOES ON, HOWEVER, TO ASSERT HIS GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND ITS DESIRE FOR AMERICAN HELP IN ACHIEVING THAT OBJECTIVE. ROMAN STRESSES ROMANIA'S SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE GULF CRISIS AND CLAIMS TO HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN SHAPING THAT POLICY. FINALLY, ROMAN STATES TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO "BRIEF YOU PERSONALLY" ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ROMANIA AND TO DISCUSS IMPROVEMENT OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THIS FINAL POINT IS, OF COURSE, A REFERENCE TO ROMAN'S REQUEST TO PAY A

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1020-MR
SCS 5/15/13

BRIEF CALL ON THE PRESIDENT DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROJECTED PRIVATE VISIT TO THE U.S. IN APRIL (NOTE THE TEXT OF THE LETTER IS TRANSMITTED AS RECEIVED. E.G. WITH OCCASIONAL AWKWARDNESS OF SYNTAX AND USAGE RESULTING FROM THE ABSENCE OF A ROMANIAN LANGUAGE TEXT.)

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3. COMMENT AND ACTION RECOMMENDED: EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT MEETINGS BETWEEN ROMAN AND THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY BAKER WOULD FURTHER OUR OBJECTIVES OF PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, A MARKET ECONOMY, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN ROMANIA. BALTAZAR SAID THAT ROMAN HAD DECIDED TO CANCEL HIS PRIVATE TRIP, CENTERED ON HIS PARTICIPATION AT A STANDFORD UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE, IF HE WERE UNABLE TO MEET WITH TOP ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. AS BALTAZAR EXPLAINED IT, ROMAN KNEW THAT THE GOR'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY PRICE HIKES SET FOR APRIL 1, WOULD GENERATE POPULAR UNREST. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMAN FELT HE SHOULD TRAVEL ONLY IF HE COULD MAKE THE GOR'S CASE TO TOP AMERICAN LEADERS. END COMMENT AND ACTION RECOMMENDED.

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4. BEGIN TEXT OF ROMAN'S LETTER.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

YOUR ADDRESS BEFORE THE WHITE HOUSE "CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND MARKET ECONOMICS EDUCATION", TO WHICH I HAD THE HONOR TO ADDRESS MYSELF A SHORT MESSAGE, WAS RECEIVED WITH GREAT INTEREST AND SATISFACTION IN MY COUNTRY. YOUR MOMENTOUS REMARKS GIVE US HOPE THAT ROMANIA, ALONGSIDE WITH THE OTHER YOUNG DEMOCRACIES IN EASTERN EUROPE. WILL BENEFIT FROM THE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE WHICH THE UNITED STATES, AFTER HAVING LED THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION TO THE VICTORY OF JUSTICE IN THE GULF CRISIS. IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE TO OUR REGION.

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EXDIS

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IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT, FULLY AWARE OF THE AWESOME BURDEN THAT HAS BEEN LAYING ON YOUR SHOULDERS AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT THE HELM OF YOUR GREAT NATION, OF THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN THE HARD TIMES OF CRISIS AND WAR, THAT I HESITATED UNTIL NOW TO WRITE TO YOU ABOUT THE ISSUES THAT SERIOUSLY CONCERN ME, AS HEAD OF THE ROMANIAN EXECUTIVE. WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND THE FUTURE OF OUR TIES AS THEY CONSIDERABLY BEAR UPON THE VERY DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN ROMANIA.

-

ALTHOUGH A STEADY ALBEIT SLOW PROGRESS IS DEVELOPING IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, THE OBVIOUS U.S. RESERVATIONS, A CERTAIN LACK OF TRUST OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION IN THE NEW ROMANIA, MAKE ME FEEL SERIOUSLY CONCERNED FOR THE FATE OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, AS ITS WELFARE LIES, TO A GREAT EXTENT, GREATER THAN YOU MAY THINK, IN AN AMPLE AND SOLID RELATION OF MUTUAL TRUST AND COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.

-

I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT ROMANIA, ITS PRESENT GOVERNMENT ARE STRONGLY AND IRREVERSIBLY COMMITTED TO THE TRUE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY AND OF THE MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY, BASED ON FULL

BT

#2777

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 02777

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, RO

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM PRIME MINISTER

RESPECT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AS THE CORNERSTONE OF ANY FREE SOCIETY, WORTHY OF THIS NAME. OUR TRACK RECORD BEARS TESTIMONY TO OUR COMMITMENT TO THE ABOVE EFFECT AND TO THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED

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THEREOF

-

HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT MADE EQUAL GOOD PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS. WE ARE SAILING ON UNCHARTED SEAS, FIGHTING WITH THE DISASTROUS MORAL AND MATERIAL INHERITANCE LEFT BY MORE THAN FOUR DECADES OF THE HARSHEST VARIETY OF TOTALITARIANISM THE MODERN WORLD HAS KNOWN. WE STARTED ON THE NIGHT OF THE 22ND OF DECEMBER 1989 WITH A VERY GENEROUS PROGRAM AND WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS.

-

YOU MAY HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF OUR ACHIEVEMENTS AS WELL AS OF OUR SETBACKS, OF WHICH THE 19-20 MARCH 1990 INTER-ETHNIC CLASHES IN TIRGU MURES AND THE 13-15 OF JUNE 1990 EVENTS IN BUCHAREST ARE THE ONES WE REGRET MOST. WE WERE SUBMITTED TO SOME EXTREME PROVOCATIONS BUT IT IS ALSO FAIR TO SAY THAT WE MADE MORE THAN OUR SHARE OF MISTAKES.

IT IS HOWEVER UNDENIABLE THAT TREMENDOUS PROGRESS HAS BEEN ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THE FIELD OF THE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS, INCLUDING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, THE FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, PETITION, AND OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENTS HAVE BEEN SCORED IN PROMOTING THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO ETHNIC MINORITIES.

AS A RESULT OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, WE HAVE PUT THE BASIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF ROMANIA, ACTING UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: A PLURALISTIC MULTIPARTY PARLIAMENT, A DEMOCRATICALLY DESIGNATED EXECUTIVE AND AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY SYSTEM.

WORK ON A NEW, TRULY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION IS PROCEEDING WELL IN PARLIAMENT, ACTING AS A CONSTITUANT (SIC)-ASSEMBLY. IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS OF THE REFORM, I HAVE TO SAY THAT ROMANIA IS SECOND TO NONE IN CENTRAL

EXDIS

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AND EASTERN EUROPE.

-

WE HAVE A FULLY FREE PRESS, HINDERED ONLY BY THE MATERIAL BACKWARDNESS OF OUR PRINTING FACILITIES AND OF OUR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AS WELL AS BY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NEWSPRINT AND OF OTHER MATERIAL INPUTS. RADIO STATIONS AND THE TELEVISION ARE INDEPENDENT OF ANY GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP OR INTERFERENCE AND I HAVE RECENTLY REITERATED OUR SUPPORT FOR HE SETTING UP OF NEW TV STATIONS, WITH THE BACKING OF PRIVATE CAPITAL- LOCAL OR FOREIGN.

EXDIS

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CONCERNING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AS ALL MY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND DEEDS BEAR WITNESS, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF OUR REVOLUTION I HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN CALLING FOR AN ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN ASSISTING AND ADVISING US ALONG THE WAY OF DEMOCRACY AND OF A MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY, IN TRAINING OUR FUTURE MANAGERS, IN LAW DRAFTING (INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, LIKE THE ONES ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, ON THE MASS-MEDIA, ON THE PROMOTION AND GUARANTEE OF INVESTMENTS AND OTHERS).

EXDIS

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IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, I HAVE REPEATEDLY CONVEYED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT'S REPRESENTATIVES AS WELL AS TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS. OUR FIRM DESIRE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO REMAIN CLOSELY INVOLVED AND EVEN INCREASE ITS COMMITMENT TO THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE AND EASTERN EUROPE IN PARTICULAR.

EXDIS

I ALSO TAKE PRIDE IN THE FACT THAT FROM THE DAY OF THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT I WAS THE CHIEF FACTOR IN SHAPING UP OUR POLICY IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER FORA WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERNATIONAL ACTION

BT

#2777

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 02777

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL RO

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM PRIME MINISTER AIMED AT THWARTING AGRESSION AND RESTORING LAWFULNESS IN THE GULF.

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EXDIS

IN VIEW OF ALL THE ABOVE, I WOULD CONSIDER IT A GREAT PRIVILEGE TO BE ABLE TO BRIEF YOU PERSONALLY ON THE PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ROMANIA, OF OUR INTENTIONS AND COMMITMENTS CONCERNING THE FUTURE, BUT CHIEFLY TO BENEFIT FROM YOUR INVALUABLE ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTEREST, ON HOW BEST TO ACT FOR THE FULL NORMALIZ
TION OF OUR
BILATERAL TIES.

-

EXDIS

NOT TO COURT YOUR GOODWILL BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT AT TIMES TENDS TO BE OVERLOOKED, MAY I STRESS THAT WE IN ROMANIA HAVE HAD NINE MONTHS, MAY I REPEAT, ONLY NINE, OF LEGITIMATE DEMOCRACY. IN THE TURMOIL OF THIS BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY, AT TIMES OVERWHELMED BY THE HEAVY TASKS OF GIVING DIRECTION AND GOVERNMING THIS EXTREMELY COMPLEX, POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROCESS, I MAY STAND ACCUSED, AND MAYBE RIGHTLY SO, OF HAVING BEEN TOO HASTY, OF HAVING LEFT CERTAIN DESIGNS UNFINISHED AND CERTAIN PATHS UNEXPLORED BUT NEVER OF INCONSISTENCY OR LACK OF SINCERITY IN MY COMMITMENT TO TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY.

EXDIS

PLEASE REGARD THIS LETTER, MR. PRESIDENT, AS A GENUINE EXPRESSION OF SUCH A COMMITMENT, AS AN ACT OF FAITH.

SINCERELY YOURS,

PETRE ROMAN.

END TEXT NAPPER
BT
#2777

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP

~~EXDIS CONFID~~
(Classification/Downgrader)

DATE: 3/27

DATE DUE IN S/S BY: 3/29 RE MCHY

S/S CONTROL NO.

9105336

ACTION ASSIGNED TO: EUR

ACTION REQUESTED:

✓ STATE TO NSC MEMO (CR)

✓ PRESIDENTIAL

___ CONGRESSIONAL

✓ HIGH PRIORITY ITEM

___ STATE TRANSMITTAL FORM TO NSCS ___ OVP ___ (CR)

___ TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

___ PROVIDE INFO COPY OF DIRECT REPLY

✓ WITH DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE BY: DTCS

✓ WITH COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION

✓ IF NO SIGNED ORIGINAL IS NECESSARY, PREPARE CROSS – HATCH CABLE.

✓ AFTER CROSS – HATCHING, SEND A COMEBACK COPY OF OUTGOING STATE CABLE AND ORIGINAL WH CORRESPONDENCE, UNDER COVER OF A TRANSMITTAL FORM, BACK TO WH.

✓ IF NO REPLY IS NECESSARY, RETURN ORIGINAL WH CORRESPONDENCE UNDER COVER OF A TRANSMITTAL FORM.

___ PROVIDE COMEBACK FOR ___

___ DIRECT REPLY ON BEHALF OF ___

___ REPLY FOR SIGNATURE BY ___

___ RECOMMENDATION FOR ___ UNDER COVER OF AN ACTION MEMO

___ WITH MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ___ WITH REPLY FOR SIGNATURE

___ FOR APPROPRIATE HANDLING ___ FOR YOUR INFORMATION

STARS-UP
NOV 27 1991

REMARKS/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 4/1/09

CLEAR WITH:

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FROM: PKillespie
S/S – S
TEAM: A ___ B ___
EXT: 7 – 8062/8063/8339/8348 5804/5805/8338/8349

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102576
RECEIVED: 08 APR 91 18

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 11 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON FM HAVEL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 11 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HUTCHINGS
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 4/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSMJT DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2576

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

April 11, 1991

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia

DATE: April 12, 1991

PURPOSE: To receive Havel's call and encourage a prompt resolution of Czech-Slovak differences so that priority attention can be given to economic reform and democratic consolidation.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line

INTERPRETER: To be provided by the State Department

PHONE NUMBER: 422-3115933 or 422-3115934
POC: Alexander Vondra, 422-531703

CONTACT PERSON: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIME: April 12, 9:30 a.m.

TOPIC OF DISCUSSION:

1. Havel's letter of late February (Tab B)
2. Czech-Slovak problems
3. Funding for Radio Free Europe
4. April 15-16 visit of Foreign Minister Dienstbier
5. Possible Havel visit in the fall

Attachments
Tab A Points to be made
Tab B Letter from Havel

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1020-MR
SCS 5/15/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL

HAVEL'S LETTER

-- I appreciated the letter you sent after our last telephone conversation. I greatly value the strong position you have taken on the Gulf crisis from the very beginning.

-- What you wrote about Czechoslovakia's place in Europe and its relations with the U.S. coincides very closely with my own thinking.

  o Your visit to NATO headquarters last month was an example of the cooperative ties we want to see developed further.

  o I am also encouraged by the cooperation that has developed among Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.

  o I share your concerns about the Soviet situation, but I am persuaded that even the most conservative elements there understand that the clock cannct be turned back in central Europe.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DIENSTBIER -- IF RAISED

-- I understand that General Scowcroft will be meeting with him next week. Since you have asked, I will try to meet with him as well.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND U.S. ASSISTANCE

-- We are very encouraged by the economic reforms you began this January. We want to be helpful in any way we can.

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Declassify on: OADR

-- Several of the initiatives we announced during President Walesa's visit apply to Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well as to Poland. In particular, we want to stimulate U.S. trade and investment and to help you gain access to the U.S. and European markets.

CZECH-SLOVAK RELATIONS -- IF RAISED

-- I recall our discussions about this in Prague. I also spoke very openly about it with the leaders of the Czech and Slovak Republics.

-- It seems to us that this long debate is detracting from the urgent business of economic reform and democratic consolidation.

-- Is there anything you would like the U.S. to do?

FUNDING FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE -- IF RAISED

-- No decisions have been taken to close the Radios, although I understand their broadcast time has been reduced somewhat.

-- We do foresee an eventual end to their broadcasts, as Radio Free Europe's mission is fulfilled. But we want to consult with your Government as to how and when to begin that process.

HAVEL VISIT -- IF RAISED

-- I would very much like to arrange for you to visit Washington again. We will be in touch as soon as my schedule for the remainder of the year is worked out. (FYI: We expect to be recommending a State visit in the fall.)

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

27 February 1991

Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your kind letter of 17 January and for the attention that is paid by both yourself and your administration to visits from our country and to the development of cooperation and partnership between the United States and Czechoslovakia. I am also very pleased with our yesterday´s telephone conversation and it will be a great honour and pleasure to me if such a direct contact, when there is need for it, becomes a good and useful tradition. During our conversation, I promised to mention some details in a letter. Let me therefore use this opportunity now.

I am glad I can address you right at this time that is so dramatic for you, at a time when, after using all peaceful means, the international community had to make Iraq implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions by means of force. All the inconsistent peace plans, including the Soviet one, were unacceptable for Czechoslovakia either: nobody, that means not even Saddam Hussein, can be allowed to change the act of gross aggression against a small country into his own political victory. We regret blood that was shed but we know that the Iraqi President is to blame for the bloodshed. That is why I want to assure you that I continue to fully support the actions of international forces demanding the implementation of all the twelve resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.

At the same time I am firmly convinced that as soon as the armed conflict is drawn to a successful end, the international community will help solve all complicated problems

of the Middle East quickly and comprehensively. For this purpose, political talks seem to be the only possible means that is acceptable to all so that a necessary consensus may be reached and the most important problems of the whole area: the Palestinian question, a new security system and control of arms production and trade, may be solved. Czechoslovakia is ready, if requested, to offer its modest means for the benefit of these talks just as it had supported the allies some time ago by sending its anti-chemical unit. In this context, we would like to know the view of the United States on a future security system in the Middle East. Czechoslovakia is also ready to take part in economic reconstruction in the occupation-hit Kuwait.

I have been filled with serious concern about the developments in the Soviet Union. According to all reports available for me, it is probable that the process of perestroika and democratization is halted, maybe for quite a long time. At the same time, I am firmly convinced that in a long-term prospect, the reform process in this huge and complicated country is irreversible and that it will be successful similarly as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We try to take all political steps with regard to this. On the one hand, it is necessary to try to behave prudently towards the current leadership in the Soviet Union, not to provoke and to have a longer perspective on our mind. On the other hand, however, we must try to eliminate to the greatest extent all possible risks that proceed from the unstable situation in the Soviet Union. And last but not least, to give prudent support to those democratic forces that have a future in the Soviet Union and its republics.

I attach great importance to the recent summit of representatives of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in Visegrád, Hungary, and the signing of the joint declaration, which defines the extent of common interests and the will for cooperation of these three countries. The aim of this cooperation is neither a new military grouping nor any alternative to the present European institutions but quite specified cooperation in tackling some common problems. As regards security problems, we have paid certain attention to the preparation of new bilateral agreements between the three countries. Each of them is supposed to contain a certain mechanism of consultations in case of imminent danger.

I think cooperation of these three countries have helped, to a great extent, liquidate the military structures of the Warsaw Treaty, including the joint command. We intend to continue to coordinate our actions so that the political part of the Warsaw Treaty may also be dissolved - if possible with consent of all the member countries - at the end of the year 1991.

It will be necessary to arrange our relations with the Soviet Union with the help of a new agreement. This agreement should be of purely non-alliance character, based on the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki process. It would contain the pledge not to use force nor territory, nor any other assistance in preparing aggression against the other party. We cannot, however, accept the Soviet demand not to join any other alliance in the future.

We pay great attention to our relations with European institutions. In February, the Czech and Slovak Federal

Republic was accepted to the Council of Europe and in the course of this year, it should conclude - similarly as Hungary and Poland - an association agreement with the European Communities. I am convinced that gradual integration into European democratic organizations will significantly contribute to the stability of Czechoslovakia and the whole Central European region as well.

I have recently participated in the opening of the CSCE secretariat in Prague. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic will thus participate in a specific way in further extension of the Helsinki process on which we have set great hopes mainly in connection with the prepared Helsinki follow-up meeting.

I am invited to give a speech at the NATO headquarters in Brussels in March and I would like to use this precious opportunity to sign a joint declaration between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and NATO which would reflect further development of cooperation both in the spirit of the London declaration and in view of the changed situation in the world. Czechoslovakia´s draft for this declaration, appreciating the role of NATO also as a security factor for Central and Eastern Europe, has already been conveyed to all NATO member countries.

I am convinced that in present as well as future Europe, transatlantic cooperation will be an important factor of stability. That is why I attach great significance to our cooperation with the United States. In my opinion, one of good prerequisites in this field is common policy stemming from the respect for human rights and freedoms of citizens.

In the spring, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier should visit Washington. I would be very grateful to you, Mr President, if you will spare time for a short meeting with him. He will surely have some topics for our further cooperation. He intends, inter alia, to discuss Czechoslovakia´s draft declaration on relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia, a declaration that would sum up general principles of Czechoslovak-American cooperation and that could be signed during my next visit to your country.

Mr President, please allow me to express my sincerest thanks for continuing attention you pay to Czechoslovakia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Let me thank you also for the assistance in which the United States participates, both in the framework of the IMF, the G-24 group or quite independently and about which you informed me shortly during our telephone conversation. This assistance contributes to the conviction of Czechs, Slovaks and other citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic that they are not alone on their uneasy road towards stabilized democratic society.

Sincerely yours,

Václav Havel

George Bush
President of the United States
Washington

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 8, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Havel of Czechoslovakia, April 11 or 12, 1991

The Czechoslovak Embassy has asked whether the President could receive a call from President Havel on April 11 or 12. Continuing the pattern established in their previous telephone conversation (in late February), Havel wants this time to brief the President on Czech-Slovak relations and urge continued funding for Radio Free Europe. He may also ask the President to meet with Foreign Minister Dienstbier during the latter's April 15-16 visit to Washington. (We have given the President a noncommittal talking point on the topic. The President is scheduled for Admin time during your meeting with Dienstbier and so could drop by your office if he wishes to accommodate Havel.)

Given the importance Havel attaches to his relationship with the President and the magnitude of the challenges he faces, we recommend that the President agree to receive his call. In addition to hearing Havel's concerns, the President can use the opportunity to make some points in response to the Havel's letter of late February (Tab B), dampen Czechoslovak anxiety over the situation in the Soviet Union, and encourage Havel to stay the course on economic reform.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Letter from Havel

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