

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files

OA/ID Number: 91125
Folder ID Number: 91125-006

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (May 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Mandate of th G-24 (2 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Arpad Goncz, Acting President of Hungary (1 pp.)	5/17/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Outline	Re: Meeting with Arpad Goncz, Acting President of Hungary (3 pp.)	5/17/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Acting President Arpad Goncz of Hungary (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/4/90	(b)(1)	C
02e. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Background Paper and Points To Make for the President's Meeting with Acting President of Hungary Arpad Goncz (1 pp.)	5/16/90	(b)(1)	C
02f. Outline	Re: President's Meeting with Acting Hungarian President Goncz (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02g. Talking Points	Re: Points To Make (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (May 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1059
OA/ID Number: 91125-006
Date Closed: 3/31/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, May 25, 1990 (2 pp.)	5/24/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Cable	Re: CFE: Genscher Initiative on Personnel (4 pp.)	5/24/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003925
RECEIVED: 16 MAY 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BASORA
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 16 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BELGIUM
POLAND
EBRD

EUROPE EAST
HUNGARY
IMF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MANDATE OF G-24 MINISTERIAL MTG ON 22 MAY IN BRUSSELS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 19 MAY 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BASORA
BLACKWILL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/31/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9003925

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90051710 FOR INFORMATION
X 90060709 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/31/09

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3925

May 16, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AB*

SUBJECT: Mandate of the G-24

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

We are in the midst of preparing for the next G-24 Senior Officials meeting (May 22 in Brussels), which will be the last one before the G-24 Ministerial (tentatively July 3) and the Houston Economic Summit. The G-24 effort for Eastern Europe was conceived at the Paris Economic Summit, and it is thus timely to begin considering whether we want to renew, alter or put limits on its mandate for the next year and beyond.

The G-24 has achieved its original purpose of encouraging reform in Eastern Europe, but the limits of this particular group have also become apparent. The G-24 has been very successful in creating a pledging dynamic, leading to total bilateral commitments to Poland and Hungary of \$13 billion. In addition, the World Bank and IMF have earmarked over \$3 billion for these two countries, and the EBRD -- an offshoot of the G-24 effort -- will have \$12 billion available for Eastern Europe as a whole. The G-24 mechanism has also done some very useful work as a clearinghouse for information about what the individual donors are doing. It has not been very effective, however, in avoiding duplicative aid efforts and an avalanche of individual donor visits to Warsaw and Budapest. We will be encouraging the Commission to do more on this front.

The EC Commission has done a good job overall in coordinating the G-24 process thus far -- but its limitations are beginning to show, and potential turf problems loom. The aid-giving process has now gotten well beyond the moral support and the emergency relief and food assistance stages. The agenda now includes more complex and sensitive issues, such as economic stabilization, price reform, industrial restructuring, demonopolization and privatization. In other words, economic analysis and policy advice are becoming more central to the success of the assistance effort.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1014-MR
SCS 8/5/13

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 2 -

The Commission is not well equipped to provide the necessary staffwork and leadership in these areas and, even if it were, the U.S. interest is probably better served by having the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD take the lead. The time may well have come, therefore, to orchestrate a larger role for these organizations, thus pre-empting the ground that the EC Commission is already tempted to occupy. The G-24 would continue its work, but it would concentrate on pledging and on aid coordination rather than on macro-economic analysis, structural reform and policy advice.

An interagency consensus along these lines seems to be emerging and, unless you indicate to the contrary, our stance at the Senior Officials meeting in Brussels will be based on this approach.

Tim Deal and Bob Hutchings concur. *(in draft)* HAB

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9003927
RECEIVED: 16 MAY 90 17

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE



FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 17 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HUNGARY

AP

PERSONS: GONCZ, ARPAD

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ ACTING HUGARIAN PRES ARPAD GONCZ 18 MAY / TALKERS / BIO
/ PARTICIPANTS LIST

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 19 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF: 9003619 9003802

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
HUTCHINGS

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/31/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 3 OF 3

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3927

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1990


5-18-90

MEETING WITH ARPAD GONCZ, ACTING PRESIDENT OF HUNGARY

DATE: May 18, 1990

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 10:00 - 10:15 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0234-MR
SCS 1/4/12

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm your commitment to Hungary's democratic transition and establish personal contact with Hungary's first democratically elected President in over four decades.

II. BACKGROUND

The meeting is chiefly symbolic -- but symbols are important to the Hungarians, who paid close attention to your highly publicized meetings with Walesa, Havel, and Mazowiecki. This will be an ideal opportunity to underscore your keen awareness of Hungary's historic transition to multiparty democracy -- in some respects more extraordinary even than Poland's or Czechoslovakia's -- and reaffirming America's commitment to Hungary's future. Your naming of the Board for the Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund and your announcement of the creation of a Citizens Democracy Corps are two tangible expressions of that commitment.

Another East European playwright and former political prisoner turned President, Goncz (pronounced GERNTZ, more or less) is also noted for having translated into Hungarian your Looking Forward. You met him briefly at a reception in Budapest last July.

Goncz was elected Acting President by the new, democratically elected Hungarian parliament on May 2 and is expected to remain as President after the passage of new election laws this summer. A member of the opposition Alliance of Free Democrats, Goncz was supported for the Presidency by Jozsef Antall (of the Hungarian Democratic Forum), soon to be named Prime Minister. It seems to have been an inspired move, giving the principal opposition party a prominent role in the new Hungary as Antall forms his three-party coalition government.

Of the dozens of political parties that sprang up last year, only six gained representation in the new parliament. Three will form the new Government, while the Young Democrats and Socialists (formerly the Communists) will join Goncz's party

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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3927

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1990

MEETING WITH ARPAD GONCZ, ACTING PRESIDENT OF HUNGARY

DATE: May 18, 1990

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 10:00 - 10:15 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0234-MR
SCS 1/4/12

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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in opposition. This winnowing out process augurs well for a stable party system, though a great many unknowns remain -- particularly the tendency toward narrow-minded nationalism among the governing parties and questions about their commitment to economic reform. Goncz will have views worth hearing on Hungary's political future. As his party possesses most of the economic talent in Hungary today, he will also be able to give you a sense of the new Government's likely commitment to the deep economic reforms Hungary urgently needs.

Goncz told Bruce Gelb over lunch on May 17 that he would raise with you the question of relaxing U.S. import controls so that Hungary could export more agricultural products into the U.S. and other Western countries. You could remind Goncz that while there are some restrictions on a few categories of Hungarian agricultural products, the U.S. market is the freest and most open in the world.

Although we do not expect Goncz to raise the matter, you should know that his party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, introduced legislation calling, albeit in cautious terms, for Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Leaders of the coalition parties turned the resolution back, saying this was not an issue that needs to be addressed now, but it did put them in an awkward position. If asked, you can simply say this is a matter for Hungary to decide. If Goncz asks your support in expediting the removal of Soviet troops, it is probably best to reiterate your view that all Soviet forces should leave but to be noncommittal as to specific actions that you might take.

Although Goncz is not among the ultranationalists now surfacing in the new Hungary, he may raise the matter of the mistreatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Here you could note that we have raised this with the Romanian Government, making clear our condemnation of violence directed against national minorities and calling on Romania to guarantee the basic human rights of all its citizens. A gentle message to the Hungarians that they, too, should work to overcome national antagonisms might also be in order.

Finally, Goncz may raise the question of a visit by the new Hungarian Prime Minister. We have been waiting for Antall's confirmation before tendering an invitation, but we have recommended an official working visit in October. You might simply say that you look forward to an early meeting.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

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3

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and brief meeting

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ACTING PRESIDENT ARPAD GONCZ OF HUNGARY

- It is a great pleasure to welcome you to the White House. Your visit inaugurates a new era in relations between the United States and democratic Hungary.
- You know of my personal commitment to democratic change in Hungary. Since my visit last July, I have followed with admiration your peaceful path from one-party rule to multiparty democracy.
- The elections seemed to have brought about the beginnings of a stable party system, with a strong governing coalition and a strong opposition.
- Your own role, as a leader of the main opposition party, interests me. How do you see your role as President?
- I would also be interested in your impressions of the new Government. Will it be able to move ahead decisively, or should we expect an initial period of divisions and uncertainty?
- We are worried about the state of the Hungarian economy, as I know you are. There are some tough reform measures that will need to be taken. What is your reading of the new Government's commitment to push ahead with reform?
- We want to help, and will help. But our ability to do so will depend on the success of Hungary's own reforms.
- The steps Hungary has already taken has enabled us to promote American investment and increased trade through MFN status, OPIC guarantees, GSP (Generalized System of

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Preferences) treatment and other measures.

- American firms are beginning to show a real interest in Hungary, and I am confident that this will continue if the new government adopts sound economic policies.
- I am delighted that former Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead agreed to serve as Chairman of the Board for the Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund. He will be working hard both here and in Hungary to make this Fund a success.
- A few days ago, I announced creation of a Citizens Democracy Corps. Its objective is to mobilize and coordinate private voluntary assistance to central and eastern Europe.
- As you know, the private sector is the real source of our strength, creativity and initiative -- and money. In some areas, the American private sector can do more for Hungary than the Government ever could.
- On the political side, we recognize that free elections are the beginning, not the end, of building democracy in Hungary. We want to be involved -- through the Peace Corps, the National Endowment for Democracy, and many other programs -- to provide sustained assistance.
- Our goal in all this is quite simple and direct. We want Hungary to become a stable, prosperous, and independent state, able to stand on its own and find a secure place in the new Europe.
- And of course we want to develop strong and friendly ties with the new, democratic Hungary. We would like to develop an across-the-board dialogue on the issues that concern our two countries.

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- (U.S. IMPORT CONTROLS ON HUNGARIAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS -- IF ASKED) While there are certain restrictions on some categories of Hungarian food products, the American market is the freest and most open in the world. I understand that the EC has granted liberalized access to Hungarian agricultural products. We share your view that the EC market should be as open and accessible as possible.
- (HUNGARY'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WARSAW PACT -- IF ASKED) My view on the matter is straightforward. It is a matter for Hungary to decide.
- (WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS -- IF ASKED) My view is that all Soviet forces should leave. But there is a danger of pushing Gorbachev too hard on this.
- (HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA -- IF ASKED) We share your concerns. We have raised the matter directly with the Romanian Government, making it clear that we condemn violence directed against national minorities and calling on Romania to protect the rights of all its citizens. I hope Romanians and Hungarians alike will work hard to overcome the antagonisms of the past.
- (ANTALL VISIT -- IF ASKED) We have been awaiting the confirmation of the new Government of Prime Minister Antall. I look forward to meeting with him here in Washington as soon as our schedules permit.

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Director for European and Soviet
Affairs, NSC Staff

Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs,
NSC Staff

James F. Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs

Hungary

Arpad Goncz, Acting President

Gabor Horvath, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Bela Szombati, Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	5/4/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (May 1990)

Date Closed: 3/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91125-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 16, 1990

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Background Paper and Points to Make for the President's
Meeting with Acting President of Hungary Arpad Goncz

We understand the President will meet with Acting President
Goncz later this week. Attached are a Background Paper and
suggested Points to Make for that meeting.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1. Background Paper
- Tab 2. Points to Make
- Tab 3. Biographic Information

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Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), July 21, 1997
By CAF NARA, Date 5/25/12

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DECL: OADR

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President's Meeting with
Acting Hungarian President Goncz

Background

- o We expect Prime Minister-designate Jozsef Antall, leader of the centrist Democratic Forum party (MDF), to announce his Cabinet to Parliament around May 20.
 - Although all major parties agree on the need to move toward a more market-oriented economy, they disagree on the speed with which the reforms must be made.
- o Acting President Arpad Goncz, a member of the leading opposition party, the Free Democrats, was elected Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament on May 2. According to Hungarian law, he thereby became Acting President.
 - Antall, an old friend of Goncz, pushed for his election as a goodwill gesture to the Free Democrats.
 - The new Parliament will determine within several months whether the President of Hungary should be elected by direct popular vote or by Parliament.
- o A playwright and former political prisoner, Goncz is a popular national figure and a symbol of those who suffered during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.
 - Goncz is a self-effacing intellectual who often seems surprised at honors bestowed upon him. In a recent press interview, he said that as President, he would travel by streetcar from time to time because "it is necessary for my self-esteem that I should travel not only by Mercedes."
- o You met Goncz briefly at a reception in Budapest in July, 1989.
 - Goncz translated your autobiography Looking Forward into Hungarian.
- o While in the United States, Goncz will meet with Senate and House leaders, with heads of major Jewish organizations, and with Hungarian Enterprise Fund Chairman John Whitehead.

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2009-1014-MR
SCS 8/5/13

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(2)

Goncz' Objectives

- o He will thank you for the goodwill the United States has shown to Hungary in its transition to democracy.
- o He looks forward to the expansion of Hungarian-American relations, particularly in business and trade.

Your Objectives

- o Assure Goncz that the United States will continue to support Hungary's efforts to become a strong and stable democracy.
- o Note U.S. interest in enhancing U.S.-Hungarian political and economic relations.
- o Mention your recently announced initiative for a Citizens Democracy Corps which will transfer technical skills and expertise to the people of Central and Eastern Europe to help them develop democratic institutions and market-oriented economies.

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POINTS TO MAKE

HUNGARIAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

- o The United States Government stands behind Hungary's efforts to move toward a stable Parliamentary democracy. We want to be of assistance in every way possible.
- o In this context, I recently announced creation of a Citizens Democracy Corps. The objective of this program is to transfer technical skills and expertise to the people of Central and Eastern Europe to help develop democratic institutions and market-oriented economies.
- o I am delighted that former Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead will head up the Hungarian Enterprise Fund. Mr. Whitehead will be working closely with Hungarian political and economic leaders and businessmen to promote the development of free enterprise and business and trade contacts between Hungary and the United States.

ANTALL VISIT TO U.S. (if asked)

- o I would be pleased to have Prime Minister-designate Antall visit the United States, when scheduling permits.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004184
RECEIVED: 24 MAY 90 20

CHRON FILE



TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
BLACKWILL
KANTER

DOC DATE: 24 MAY 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
ANSA
USSR

CFE
GERMANY D R

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG W/ FRG FOMIN GENSCHER ON 25 MAY

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 28 MAY 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 3/31/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9004184

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90052511 FOR INFORMATION
X 90052907 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 3/24/09

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4184

May 24, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *BW AK*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, May 25, 1990

Genscher's purpose is to brief you on the results of his May 23 meeting with Shevardnadze in Geneva, about which we have only sketchy reports. Genscher has just come from Paris, where he debriefed Dumas. He will meet with Secretary Baker one-on-one from 10:45 to 11:45 a.m., just before your meeting. We have alerted Zoellick's office to give us a quick readout, but you may wish to speak with Secretary Baker directly.

Given the President's extended discussions with Kohl on May 17 and their upcoming meeting on June 8, we see no work to be done in your meeting with Genscher on coordinating our approaches at Two Plus Four. We suggest that you focus on the topic at hand -- the Genscher-Shevardnadze meeting -- probing particularly for any commitments made on agreeing to personnel limits on the Bundeswehr in the context of CFE. You will also want to hear whatever counsel Genscher may have for the President as he prepares for the Summit.

In press statements after the Genscher-Shevardnadze meeting, both supported an acceleration of the CFE talks, and Shevardnadze denied that Moscow was demanding that the German armed forces be cut before Moscow would negotiate reductions at CFE. We will have to see if Soviet positions on CFE match this rhetoric.

Shevardnadze also said that he had discussed with Genscher the size of the Bundeswehr after unification -- an issue that appears to be behind Genscher's planned CFE personnel initiative that was outlined to Jim Woolsey by Rudiger Hartmann, his FRG counterpart at CFE. (Woolsey's cable is at Tab I.) Genscher's idea is to offer a formal commitment in CFE I to negotiate a sufficiency rule on personnel in CFE II using specific numbers rather than a percentage of the overall total. Hartmann mentioned 400,000 troops in zone 4.3 (Central and Eastern Europe and the Western MDs).

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Such personnel limits (e.g., no more than 400,000 from any one country in a specified zone) would result in the cap on the Bundeswehr that the Soviets seek. The zone would be drawn in such a way as to capture Soviet manpower in the Western Military Districts, which among other things would avoid singularizing the Germans. Hartmann told Woolsey that Genscher is ready to make such a deal in CFE I if that is what it takes to close the deal, make progress in CFE, and remove a major roadblock in the Two Plus Four talks.

The Soviets now have about 1,000,000 men in this zone. The Genscher proposal would involve some intricate, if not dubious, arithmetic to describe how a nominal Soviet manpower limit of 400,000 might be achieved, including the exclusion of Soviet forces in the GDR because they will be "in transition," and the assumption that other Soviet forces will be withdrawn in any event from Eastern Europe. In brief, it is not obvious that the Soviet requirement for a cap on the Bundeswehr and the German requirement that they not be singularized can be readily reconciled by this Genscher proposal.

Despite Ambassador Woolsey's positive response to Hartmann in Vienna, we should not be too quick to endorse the Genscher initiative. Stoltenberg told you earlier this month: "We cannot accept a singularization, not just of Germany, but also of the Central region." We need to determine the status of this reported move with the German government, first in your (and Secretary Baker's) meetings with Genscher, and then with the Chancellery. Before we react, we also will need to consider carefully whether this move would open the door not to a deal but to negotiations on the size of the Bundeswehr in CFE I, starting with a Soviet counter-proposal that could -- for example -- ask for a lower cap (200,000?) and not include the Western MDs. We could then find ourselves bogged down in prolonged negotiations that could stall both CFE I and a Soviet decision to accept German membership in NATO.

Relatedly, it would be worth asking Genscher whether he and Shevardnadze had specific discussions related to Soviet forces in the GDR. As Tass reported that Shevardnadze also called for an intensification of the work of the Two Plus Four, you might ask Genscher what specifics Shevardnadze offered, if any.

Finally, it would be worth following up Lambsdorff's flat statement in his May 24 meeting with you that Kohl now favors all-German elections on December 2 or December 16. You might simply ask Genscher his thinking about the timing of elections and whether they would replace the FRG elections or supplement them (via concurrent GDR elections, as Kohl suggested) -- and whether the SPD and public reaction to the draft treaty on economic and monetary union has altered the coalition's plans.

Philip Zelikow concurs.

Attachment

Tab I Cable on Genscher's CFE Proposal

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<DIST>PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SDO SITTMANN SUNUNU
SIT: BENKO FRY FILE KANTER SIT VAX WILSONH BLACKWILL ZELIKOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUFHMB<DTG> 241554Z MAY 90
<ORIG>FM USMISSION-USVIENNA
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3077

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL

<TEXT>

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FOR THE SECRETARY

ALSO PASS TO SECDEF CHENEY, CJCS POWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR SCOWCROFT, ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN AND JUDGE WEBSTER
FROM AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY. FRG REP HARTMANN BRIEFED ME AND DEPREP
KAPLAN MAY 23 ON A CFE PERSONNEL INITIATIVE PLANNED BY
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER. IN A NUTSHELL, HARTMANN
SAID GENSCHER REMAINS OPPOSED TO DEALING WITH GERMAN
MILITARY FORCES IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS BUT SEEMS
PREPARED TO OFFER A FORMAL COMMITMENT IN CFE-I TO
NEGOTIATE A SUFFICIENCY RULE ON PERSONNEL IN CFE-II,
USING A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF PERSONNEL (RATHER THAN A
PERCENTAGE OF AN OVERALL TOTAL) WITHIN A SPECIFIC
ZONE; HARTMANN MENTIONED 400,000 TROOPS AND ZONE 4.3,
WHICH INCLUDES THE SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS
AS WELL AS BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY. HE SAID THE
GERMANS ALSO COULD CONSIDER ACCEPTING SUCH A
SUFFICIENCY RULE IN CFE-I, AS A FALLBACK, IF NECESSARY
TO CLOSE A DEAL. FRG REP SAID GENSCHER MIGHT RAISE
THESE IDEAS DURING HIS (NOW CONCLUDED) MAY 23 MEETING
WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN GENEVA AND HOPED THEY MIGHT
REMOVE SOVIET OBJECTIONS BOTH TO A CFE AGREEMENT AND
TO GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

3. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW THE FRG LEAD ON
ISSUES RELATED TO BUNDESWEHR LIMITS BUT ADDED, ON A
PERSONAL BASIS, THAT SUCH FORMAL COMMITMENTS,
SPECIFYING THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND SPECIFIC ZONE,
COULD LEAD WASHINGTON TO SEE SUCH A MOVE AS DEPARTING
FROM THE OTTAWA UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
OTHER PERSONNEL LIMITS IN CFE -- AN IMPORTANT PART OF
OTTAWA'S FRAMEWORK. THIS IN TURN COULD REQUIRE SOME
ADJUSTMENT OF THE OTTAWA PERSONNEL LIMITS IN ORDER TO
AFFORD MORE FLEXIBILITY FOR U-S- MANPOWER. HARTMANN
SAID THE FRG ALSO HAD BEEN THINKING ALONG THOSE
LINES. SEE COMMENT - PARA 16. SEPTTEL ADDRESSES FRG
VIEWS ON AIRCRAFT, THE SUFFICIENCY RULE AND OTHER
MATTERS. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

4. AMBASSADOR HARTMANN AND HIS DEPUTY MET WITH ME AND
DEPREP KAPLAN MAY 23 DIRECTLY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN
FROM BONN WHERE HE HAD CONFERRED WITH GENSCHER ALONE
FOR AN HOUR. HE FOUND GENSCHER CONCERNED THAT SOVIET
STALLING IN VIENNA, AND INSISTENCE ON COVERING GERMAN
MILITARY FORCES IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS, MIGHT
DELAY GERMAN UNIFICATION. GENSCHER WAS NOT PREPARED
TO ADDRESS THE BUNDESWEHR IN TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS. BUT
HARTMANN SAID GENSCHER NOW WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A
NEW INITIATIVE ON GERMAN PERSONNEL IN THE CFE CONTEXT.
5. ACCORDING TO HARTMANN, GENSCHER PLANNED TO

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EXPLORE WITH SHEVARDNADZE, IN GENEVA, A MUCH MORE CONCRETE FORMULATION IN CFE-I FOR DEALING WITH PERSONNEL IN CFE-II IN A WAY THAT WOULD LIMIT, INTER ALIA, BUNDESWEHR PERSONNEL. SPECIFICALLY, THE GERMANS WOULD OFFER A SUFFICIENCY RULE, CAST IN TERMS OF AN ABSOLUTE NUMBER (NOT AS A PERCENTAGE OF AN OVERALL TOTAL) AND A SPECIFIC ZONE, TO THE EFFECT THAT "NO COUNTRY MAY DEPLOY MORE THAN (SAY) 400,000 GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN ZONE 4-3-" THE GERMAN IDEA IS THAT THERE WOULD BE A FORMAL PROVISION IN A CFE-I TREATY OR PROTOCOL COMMITTING SIGNATORY STATES TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A SPECIFIC PROVISION IN CFE-II.

6. HARTMANN SAID THAT, SHOULD THIS PROPOSAL PROVE UNACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW, THE FRG MIGHT AGREE AS A FALLBACK TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE IN A CFE-I TREATY ITSELF. IN EXPLAINING THIS PROVISION, HARTMANN MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO DISGUISE GENSCHER'S READINESS TO MOVE TO SUCH A "FALLBACK" TO CLOSE A CFE DEAL AND REMOVE SOVIET OBSTACLES TO GERMAN UNIFICATION. HARTMANN ALSO SAID THAT GENSCHER HOPED SUCH A DEAL COULD REMOVE SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

7. HARTMANN POINTED OUT THAT A 400,000-MAN PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE, FOR ZONE 4.3, WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF CONCRETELY ACCOMMODATING THE SOVIET DESIRE TO PLACE AN UPPER LIMIT ON THE COMBINED MANPOWER OF A UNIFIED

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FOR THE SECRETARY

ALSO PASS TO SECDEF CHENEY, CJCS POWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT, ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN AND JUDGE WEBSTER FROM AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL GERMANY. IT ALSO WOULD LIMIT SOVIET PERSONNEL --

ABOUT 412,000, HE SAID -- IN THE SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS. FRENCH PERSONNEL -- NUMBERING ABOUT 384,000 -- WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE CUT. (UK REP LEVER TOLD ME AND KAPLAN EARLIER MAY 23 THAT BRITISH MANPOWER (150,000 GROUND AND 70,000 AIR) WOULD FALL WELL UNDER SUCH A NUMERICAL PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE; LEVER EXPECTED THE UK GROUND FORCE NUMBER TO FALL IN THE COMING YEARS TO ABOUT 100,000 AS THE SIZE OF THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE RHINE DECLINED.)

8. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO OUR CALCULATIONS, THE SOVIETS HAD SOME 1,000,000 PERSONNEL IN ZONE 4.3 BEFORE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BEGAN. THIS INCLUDES TROOPS IN HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR AND POLAND, AS WELL AS IN THE WMDS. THIS TOTAL WILL FALL, OF COURSE, AS FORCES ARE QULLED OUT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY, AND AS NOTED IN PARA. 12 BELOW, THE FRG FORESEES EXCLUDING SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE GDR FROM THE SUFFICIENCY RULE, GIVEN THEIR TRANSITION-ONLY STATUS. SOVIET PERSONNEL IN POLAND, HOWEVER, WOULD PRESUMABLY STILL COUNT; ADDED TO FORCES IN THE WMDS, THAT WOULD MAKE A TOTAL OF SOME 500,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL SUBJECT TO A 4.3 SUFFICIENCY RULE. IF THE SOVIETS RELOCATED FORCES BEING WITHDRAWN FROM EASTERN EUROPE IN THE WMDS, THIS FIGURE WOULD BE EVEN HIGHER. END COMMENT.

9. I TOLD HARTMANN THAT WE WOULD NOT BE OUT IN FRONT ON THIS ISSUE, LOOKING INSTEAD TO THE FRG. KAPLAN

SAID THE INITIATIVE DESCRIBED BY HARTMANN APPEARED TO BE VERY IMPORTANT--

10. I ALSO TOLD HARTMANN THAT, WHETHER AGREED IN CFE-I OR CFE-II, A FORMAL COMMITMENT TO SUCH A SPECIFIC NUMERICAL LIMIT ON THE BUNDESWEHR IN A SPECIFIC REGION, COULD BE READ AS A DEPARTURE FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OTTAWA UNDERSTANDING, WHICH CLEARLY RESTRICTED PERSONNEL LIMITS IN CFE TO U.S./SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER. SINCE THE BUNDESWEHR HAD BEEN -- AND REMAINED -- THE PRINCIPAL WESTERN SURGE FORCE, LIMITING ITS SIZE AND THUS CAPABILITY WOULD SEEM TO ALTER THE PREMISES UNDERLYING THE OTTAWA NUMBERS AND STRUCTURE. IT SEEMED TO SUGGEST THE NEED FOR SOMEWHAT GREATER FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING U.S.- STATIONED MANPOWER. HARTMANN SAID BONN WAS THINKING ALONG THESE LINES.

11. ONE POSSIBILITY, I CONTINUED, WAS THAT SUCH A DEPARTURE FROM THE OTTAWA FRAMEWORK COULD ENCOURAGE RECONSIDERATION OF THE EARLIER GORBACHEV PROPOSAL FOR EQUAL 195,000 OR 225,000 U.S./SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE. WE INITIALLY HAD PREFERRED TO OPT FOR THE 195,000/30,000 SPLIT BETWEEN AN ADJUSTED CENTRAL ZONE AND THE REST OF EUROPE IN ORDER TO COPE WITH THE NEED TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF U.S.-SOVIET ASYMMETRY. BUT THE SOVIETS SUBSEQUENTLY HAD INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH THE HUNGARIAN IDEA OF BANNING THE STATIONING OF FORCES WITHOUT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. IN THAT CASE, THE 30,000 PROVISION MIGHT NO LONGER BE REQUIRED, ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT THERE WAS GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE BASING OF THE 195,000 U.S. TROOPS. THIS WAS ONE IDEA; THERE MIGHT BE OTHERS.

12. HARTMANN SAID THE FRG ALSO WAS CONTEMPLATING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR CONCERNING SOVIET FORCES NOW STATIONED IN THE GDR IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE BASING OF PERSONNEL THERE WAS "LIMITED IN TIME"; SOVIET FORCES NOW STATIONED IN THE GDR, THEREFORE, WOULD NOT/NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE 4.3 SUFFICIENCY RULE. HARTMANN ADDED THAT BONN ALSO WAS INVESTIGATING THE LIKELY CONTENT OF THE PLANNED POLISH-SOVIET STATIONING AGREEMENT.

13. I COMMENTED THAT GENSCHER'S CONCEPT, AS REPORTED BY HARTMANN, WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IF

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FOR THE SECRETARY

ALSO PASS TO SECDEF CHENEY, CJCS POWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT, ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN AND JUDGE WEBSTER FROM AMBASSADOR WOOLSEY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KCFE, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: CFE: GENSCHER INITIATIVE ON PERSONNEL
IT ALSO SUCCEEDED IN REMOVING SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO GERMANY'S NATO MEMBERSHIP. KAPLAN ADDED THAT SUCH A BOLD STROKE ALSO COULD ACCORD A MAJOR POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE OVERALL EAST-WEST ATMOSPHERE.

14. HARTMANN CLOSED BY SAYING IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT A PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE APPLY TO ZONE 4.3 IN ORDER TO COVER SOVIET TROOPS IN THE WMDS AND TO AVOID SINGULARIZATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE WEST. A PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE, EXPRESSED IN AN ABSOLUTE NUMBER RATHER THAN A PERCENTAGE OF AN OVERALL TOTAL,

ALSO WOULD LESSEN THE PERCEPTION OF LIMITING ONLY GERMAN MANPOWER. FOR THE NUMBERS TO WORK, THE KIEV MD ALSO WOULD NEED TO BE PLACED OUTSIDE OF ZONE 4.3.

15. I CONCLUDED BY REITERATING THAT THE FRG HAD THE BALL AND THAT WE LOOKED FORWARD TO LEARNING ABOUT GENSCHER'S SOUNDINGS IN GENEVA. HARTMANN SAID HE HAD TOUCHED EARLIER ON THIS CONCEPT WITH GRINEVSKIY, WHO CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION OF SOMEONE WHO "DIDN'T KNOW WHERE MOSCOW STANDS," AN OBSERVATION ABOUT GRINEVSKIY ALSO MADE TO US EARLIER IN THE DAY BY THE NEW UK REP.

16. COMMENT. IT IS, OF COURSE, OF PARAMOUNT POLITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT GENSCHER'S IDEA REMAIN A GERMAN INITIATIVE. IF HE GOES FORWARD WITH A PERSONNEL SUFFICIENCY RULE OF THIS SPECIFICITY, AS A GERMAN PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS MAY SEE IT AS A WAY FORMALLY TO PLACE AN UPPER CEILING ON THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF A UNITED GERMANY, THEREBY REMOVING WHAT APPEARS TO BE A -- IF NOT THE -- CENTRAL SOVIET RESERVATION ABOUT A CFE AGREEMENT. SUCH AN INITIATIVE, IF ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS, SEEMS TO ME, AND APPEARS TO SEEM TO HARTMANN, TO REOPEN THE OTTAWA UNDERSTANDING AND THUS TO PROVIDE US WITH A CLEAR RATIONALE FOR REVIEWING THE OTTAWA PERSONNEL NUMBERS AND STRUCTURE, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF GORBACHEV'S EARLIER EUROPEAN-WIDE LIMITS FOR U.S./SOVIET STATIONED MANPOWER. I WOULD NOTE THAT THE UK REP ALSO URGED US EARLIER IN THE DAY TO TRY AND FIND A WAY TO DO THIS. END COMMENT. WOOLSEY

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