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OA/ID Number: 91125
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Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (February - March 1990)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02. Letter	Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	2/21/90	(b)(1)	
03a. Memo	Lawrence S. Eagleburger to The Secretary Re: Impressions from Hungary, Poland, Austria, and Yugoslavia (6 pp.)	3/1/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Impressions from Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna and Belgrade (3 pp.)	3/2/90	(b)(1)	S
04a. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki (2 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1)	
04b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki (1 pp.)	3/9/90	(b)(1)	C
04c. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki (1 pp.)	3/8/90	(b)(1)	C
04d. Draft Letter	Re: Department of State Suggested Response to Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Pinksheet Number: cap1057
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04e. Letter	Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	2/21/90	(b)(1)	
04f. Letter	Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to President Bush [Polish] (4 pp.)	2/20/90	(b)(1)	

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His Excellency
Mr. George H. Bush
President,
The United States of America

PRES NOTED SUMMARY



Washington

Dear Mr. President,

I take the liberty of addressing you personally on matters of very high importance to Poland. Indeed, they can be decisive for whether we succeed in our efforts to sort out the economy and free it from the system under which it operated for 45 years.

Since the beginning of this year we have been engaged in an extremely difficult economic programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund and approved of by competent quarters in the West. The aim of the programme is to eliminate the hyperinflation and provide the foundations for a market economy based on the patterns of the developed nations. To transform a fully nationalized and centralized economy into a market one is an unprecedented task in which much is unknown. That is compounded by the burden of a classical stabilization operation. It becomes necessary, therefore, to concentrate all our resources on bringing the operation, which has put the society to enormous austerity and a very hard test of patience, to a successful conclusion.

It is of grave weight for us to make sure that Poland remains politically stable and the success of our changes offer experience for the other countries of the region, perhaps including even the Soviet Union.

The capability we have is insufficient to meet these objectives and the above reasons.

Hence my appreciation for the well-wishing attitude of yourself and of your Government and country as well as the other Western countries and Governments, manifested in declarations and decisions on a variety of assistance forms, including in many cases credit assistance. I see in it the solidarity with and the desire of helping Poland to become a good partner in international economic relations.

One of the most difficult problems and at the same time a huge burden is Poland's foreign debt. I am addressing you on the eve of a Paris Club meeting to be attended by representatives of my government, in the hope for your understanding and support for the following urgent decisions:

- the rescheduling of principal and interest arrears due for repayment at the end of 1989 and in the course of the current year;
- the rescheduling of all other maturities due this year;
- preventing the increase of Poland's debt as a result of late interest build-up.

To reach an agreement with the Paris Club, in which all of these decisions would be included, is in my opinion indispensable for this year's economic programme to be met. We are going to request similar measures from the other groups of Poland's creditors.

At the same time, I wish to raise another matter of extreme importance to us and one not easy to solve, of which I am aware. Namely: a long-term settlement of the Polish indebtedness, agreed upon with our creditors, leading to major reduction of the debt. What I have in mind is a solution which would open the way for Poland to economic growth, development of the domestic market and the latter's opening up to the influx of foreign capital and products as well as allow the country to become solvent.

To meet the past and future liabilities incurred by my government is and will continue to be for us the top criterion of Poland's financial reliability. There are the old obligations which we inherited. I would request you to consider the establishment of a working team at the Paris Club, with our participation, to try to find, in a joint effort with the International Monetary Fund, a way to bring down those Polish obligations.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for your friendly support for my country in its difficult yet promising return to an efficient economy and to democracy, as part of the rapprochement within the divided Europe. Hoping for your understanding and support for the above matters, I assure you of my deep consideration.

(s) Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

(Unofficial translation)
Warsaw, February 21, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

The unification of the German nation in a single State opens up a new period in the history of Europe. We cannot possibly enter that period with the security of all the States on the continent, particularly the neighbours of Germany, in their current borders, unassured.

According to the Ottawa statement of Feb. 13, 1990, the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will meet with the Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in order to discuss the various external aspects of the establishment of German unity, including the issues of security of the neighbouring States.

Poland welcomed the fact that the questions of the security of the neighbouring States had been referred to in the statement by the six Foreign Ministers.

The fact that the security of Germany's neighbours has been raised has two consequences: a substantive and a procedural one. Each of them is important.

Firstly, as regards the substantive aspect, the Ottawa communique means that the unification of the two German States and the attainment of constitutional unity by the German nation shall leave intact the security of the States adjacent to the unifying (and subsequently unified) German States. In other words, the unification shall in no way impair the present nor future security of the neighbours, particularly with respect to their territorial security and the permanence of their borders.

His Excellency
Mr. George H. Bush
President of the
United States of America
Washington, DC

These are extremely important issues. It is of vital concern for Poland to see an end to any equivocation with respect to the Polish-German border along the Odra-Lusatian Nysa rivers. A future treaty of peace has repeatedly been emphasized in the Federal Republic of Germany as the exclusive instrument by which that border could be settled. However, the legal and political reality is that despite the lack of peace settlement the Odra-Lusatian Nysa border has become part of the European order. Whoever questions that border in one form or another, or puts to question its permanent character - thereby defies the security and cooperation in Europe. I declare Poland's readiness to take part in the work on the peace treaty and her readiness to sign it. However, for reasons beyond Poland's control, work on the peace treaty is not envisaged at all at present or is being postponed until an unidentified point in time after German unification, thus giving some forces the opportunity to continuously consider the Polish-German border an open question. We cannot allow such state of affairs to persist after Germany is unified.

The German Democratic Republic has recognized the Odra-Lusatian Nysa border as the Polish-German state frontier (Zgorzelec Agreement of July 6, 1950). The Federal Republic of Germany has stated that the relevant line constitutes the western state border of the Republic of Poland (The Treaty of Warsaw, of Dec. 7, 1970). Therefore, if one acts in good faith, nothing can obstruct the present Polish-German borderline from becoming reaffirmed by a treaty concluded at the very beginning of the unification process. It is an essential issue for Poland as a neighbour of the German nation.

Secondly, by pointing to the security issues of the neighbouring States, the Ottawa communique indicates that in the discussions between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, there is room for the participation by the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned and adjacent to one or both German States.

The latter implication of the relevant clause in the Ottawa statement deserves closer elaboration.

The present international relationships in Europe are becoming increasingly democratic, with all the European States having the possibility to speak and take part in the conferences or other meetings where their interests, particularly the vital ones, are discussed. It is unthinkable today (and impracticable) for any European State, especially any of the six which adopted the Ottawa statement, to seek to exclude the voice of the neighbours of the German States from the discussion on these neighbours' security. The Polish Government did not allege and is not alleging the existence of such intentions on the part of any of the six States; it attaches great importance to having the best possible relations with each of these States.

Indeed, to exclude the voice of the neighbouring States concerned and to shut them off from the relevant stage of the discussion on the aspects of the German unification which affect the security of the neighbouring States - would be tantamount to a repetition of the Yalta formula of 1945. It would, indeed, mean discussing and deciding by some States about vital interests of others in the absence of the latter.

In view of the foregoing considerations, guided by her own interest as well as that of European cooperation, and by the desire for the best possible relations with her German neighbour - Poland states as follows:

- 1) We believe that the point of departure to the German unification is the final elimination of all doubt or equivocation with respect to the present course, delimitation and demarcation of the Polish-German border along the Odra-Lusatian Nysa rivers. The issue should never re-emerge; the elimination of doubt or equivocation will be equivalent to peace settlement and will have full effect in German law and that of other States. Poland proposes to conclude, at the outset of the unification, a treaty containing provisions to that effect and reaffirming the final and permanent status of the existing Polish-German

border. That border should not be changed in any way. The text of the treaty will be initialled by the two German States and Poland as a result of the discussions indicated by the Ottawa communique. The treaty will be signed by the unified German State and Poland upon the establishment of that unified German State. Poland will submit a draft of such a treaty.

2) Poland considers it indispensable to have a part in the discussion on the external aspects of the German unification in order to present her standpoint on the security issues, particularly those relating to the border and the proposed treaty. Poland makes it clear that she is not seeking a status identical with that of any of the Four Powers nor any of the two German States.

We believe that the discussion on the security issues of the neighbouring States should be held at an early stage of the conference as its separate part.

In conclusion, I wish to state as follows:

The prospect of the unification of the German nation in one State opens up a new chapter in the postwar history of Europe. Poland welcomes every form of national self-determination. The unification of Germany and its external aspects constitute an important part of the peace settlement on our continent. Every State concerned has the right to take part in that settlement. One such State is Poland. Our right stems from the imperatives of international morality, the international law, our historical experience of the last fifty years and our present legal and political situation.

I wish to inform you, Mr. President, that identical letters are being sent to the leaders of the French Republic, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

/-/ Tadeusz Mazowiecki

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TO: GATES

FROM: EAGLEBURGER, L

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United States Department of State
Deputy Secretary of State

March 3, 1990

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TO: NSC - Mr. Gates

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United States Department of State

Deputy Secretary of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

March 1, 1990

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Impressions from Hungary, Poland, Austria
and Yugoslavia

John Robson and I were in Hungary, Poland, and Austria from February 20-25 to discuss our Eastern European assistance efforts and to get a first-hand feel for the reform movement in the region. I went on to Yugoslavia on February 26-27. We took with us a delegation of experts from State, Treasury, Commerce and the NSC. We met with both top-level government officials and opposition leaders, and gained some new insights into political and economic reform processes throughout the region.

General Observations

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA, the Eastern Europeans are feeling that they are adrift. Even the Yugoslavs have lost most of the rationale for their non-alignment. All hope they will be accepted into the EC, but realism tells them that the unification of Germany will require that the next several years may be spent in "deepening, not widening" the EC.

The search for reassurance led Hungarian Foreign Minister Horn to suggest, half-seriously, that a new NATO could provide a political umbrella for Central Europe. The Poles, like the Czechs and many Hungarians, look to some sort of loose association along North/South lines with possible ties to EFTA, especially Austria and Scandinavia. All say they want to keep the United States involved in Europe, and suggest that our association with Eastern Europe is a potential counterweight to efforts by the French and Germans to establish political and economic spheres of influence.

There is also much interest in Eastern Europe and in Austria in "operationalizing" the CSCE mechanism by creating a permanent secretariat or creating a more action-oriented agenda.

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Finally, we found considerable sympathy for our argument that the continued existence of NATO would promote stability in Eastern Europe. No one objected to the concept that NATO forces should remain in the western part of a united Germany, although there are some fears that this could delay Soviet withdrawal from Poland and Hungary.

Hungary

We went to Budapest thinking that this was the most likely early success story, and came away with the feeling that it will take some time for the situation to shake down. At the moment the radical reform Communists -- Pozsgay, Nemeth, Horn and the entire senior level of the Hungarian Government -- are bitter at the prospect of their imminent rejection by the voters. They resent being criticized by the opposition and feel that their role in bringing about economic and political reform has not been sufficiently recognized or appreciated. It is thus uncertain how much they can be counted on to help with the transition to a new government.

The opposition, while fragmented and often mutually distrustful, has some strikingly able people -- some of whom will soon have to share power. They may overcome their mutual antipathies and work together in a coalition, but we came away with the feeling that coalition building will take some months to accomplish. At the moment, the major opposition parties, which differ hardly at all in their political platforms, are stressing their basic incompatibility, which bodes ill for their ability to work together to implement the tough austerity program mandated by the IMF.

In any case, the new Hungarian Government will no doubt clamor for increased levels of Western assistance, arguing that we should do more for them than for the Communists. We are already being asked by the EC to contribute \$200 million towards a \$1 billion balance of payments loan designed to keep the commercial banks in Hungary afloat. Debt rescheduling seems likely as well.

We will want to do more for Hungary on the margins, but major financial support is not in the cards. The inflow of private capital, particularly German capital, will probably make the Hungarian reform work, and the Hungarians do not resist this German connection the way the Poles or Yugoslavs would. U.S. capital will make a difference too, with over \$400 million already coming in from three major U.S. investments.

Poland

We came away more optimistic about Poland's economy than we expected, but also worried that failure to find a way to support adequately Poland's position on German unification could undermine the authority of the Mazowiecki government and thus its ability to carry through on the economic reform.

Mazowiecki and his economic team are impressive, and the patience of the Polish people is holding despite the severe shocks of a cold turkey economic reform that has caused industrial production to fall by 30 percent and real income by 20 percent. Inflation is falling fast, from 70 percent monthly in January to 16 percent (predicted) by the end of February. They want more help from us and presented us with a request for a new package of financial assistance, including debt reduction under the Brady plan and new lending to finance a buy-back of Poland's debt at market discount of 83 percent. In preparation for the March 21-23 Mazowiecki visit, they will be pursuing this request as well as:

- conclusion of a Comprehensive Business and Economic Agreement;
- opening of a consulate in Los Angeles;
- elimination of travel restrictions;
- relaxation of visa restrictions;
- new technical assistance; and
- reduction of COCOM controls.

But it is on the German question that the Poles will really be pushing for U.S. help. The issue of German unification is most virulent in Poland (with Yugoslavia not far behind). To date, the Germans have not handled the border question well. Magnanimity is not a common Germanic quality, particularly when things are going their way, and their conduct on this issue makes me wonder whether history has taught them anything. Hopefully we can bring Kohl around, and soon. But if the FRG does not develop a more sophisticated approach than it has exhibited thus far, we will need to stake out our position publicly. We must not remain the tail on Kohl's kite, and we cannot afford, in my view, to let the Soviets appear as Poland's only guarantors.

The essential point is to get the border issue out of the way as soon as possible. Resolution of this issue would, in my judgment, mitigate Polish calls to be at the "two plus four" table. However, the longer we wait to resolve borders, the

more this issue will fester and the less likely the Poles will be to settle for anything short of a place at the table. That, of course, might be something the Soviets would support, because it could be used to slow down the "two plus four" process.

Had the Germans handled the border issue properly in the first place, we would not have this problem. But we are stuck with it. Whether or not we can persuade the Germans to resolve this promptly, the situation presents us with an opportunity. In order to allay the concerns of our NATO allies (beyond the U.K., France, and the FRG), we should be advocating a broad consultative approach on the shape of the new Europe with a unified Germany. Hopefully in concert with the U.K., France, and the FRG, we should begin discussions now to solicit the views and concerns of other NATO countries. We can then take the sentiments of these countries fully into account when meetings of the "two plus four" occur. In this manner, the United States would be seen as defenders of the smaller NATO allies, playing a constructive role in the consultative process and building the sort of bridges to these allies that will preclude our being cut out of an EC bloc.

A similar opportunity exists with regard to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We should consult with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and others -- now, not later -- to listen to their concerns and to factor them into the process. We can try to do this with the neutrals as well -- Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland. The point is to seek to build confidence early in the process rather than after the fact with those countries of Europe outside the "two plus four." Most of them, in one form or another, fear a powerful Germany, and we can be a positive force in calming those fears and underlining the continued relevance of the U.S. role in Europe.

Austria

Our purpose in including Austria in our itinerary was to point out a role for the European neutrals in the "new Europe." Since they, too, already feel shut out of the "deepening" Common Market, they may provide a useful anchor for the fledgling Eastern European democracies. We found many Austrian "Westernizers" so fixated on the prospect of EC membership that they were unwilling to consider a larger role in what one described as the "swamp" of Eastern Europe. But if it is true that the EC is not ready for Austria, an alternative role as bridge to the East may once again become a theme of Austrian foreign policy. In any case, we should continue to stress to the neutrals and non-aligned that they have an interest both in keeping the United States in Europe and in extending a political helping hand to the Eastern Europeans.

In short, what we have to worry about in this new Europe is that a unified Germany does not push everyone into the old habits of spheres of influence, with the U.K. and France aligned, and with the smaller European states searching for larger partners. We are nowhere near such a situation, but it looms out there as a possibility still present in the memories of many of our European friends. The entire thrust of our policy must be to take advantage of situations as they present themselves, in order to maintain a U.S. presence and a U.S. influence throughout the European continent. In the last analysis, only we are viewed by many of the Europeans as the power least interested in asserting itself on the Continent and most able to be an honest broker and a true force of stability. It is through contact, consultation, and coordination that we can build new relationships throughout Europe in ways and on issues that were not available in the past. This web of relationships would place us in a position to mediate and advise on a wide range of issues in a Europe otherwise dominated by Germany and the EC.

Yugoslavia

I return from this trip much more worried about the potential disintegration of Yugoslavia than before. I gave Serbian leader Milosevic and his Slovenian counterpart, Janez Stanovnik, a tough message about the effect that rising nationalist chauvinism was having on Western support for Yugoslavia. I fear, however, that events are fast passing beyond the influence of outsiders. Prime Minister Markovic's reform package may in fact be better thought out than its Polish counterpart, but it may come too late.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia would be less a problem today than a few years ago, when it could have drawn NATO and the Warsaw Pact into the vacuum and U.S.-Soviet confrontation could have resulted. But the United States still has a strong interest in Yugoslav unity. Aside from the extreme danger of disunity in terms of the example it would provide to other countries with strong minorities (especially the Soviet Union), the bloody battles between national groups could eventually turn Yugoslavia into the Lebanon of the Balkans. The tendencies for fighting among the nationalities in Yugoslavia are there, and history bears out this possibility. For these reasons, we must take the issue of Yugoslavia much more seriously than we have to date, recognizing nonetheless that it will be difficult to justify assistance to the Yugoslavs because they probably will not have moved as far in terms of democratic reforms as other states in Eastern Europe.

Markovic and his chief economic adviser believe that the only solution to the nationalities problem lies in market-oriented economic reform and political pluralism which

will promote economic growth and give a greater voice to national minorities. They are right, on the assumption that economic reform can begin to produce results before political pluralism brings disintegration. I believe we have no choice but to give a high priority to supporting the Markovic reforms. This does not mean that we can or should bail out the Yugoslav banks, as we have been asked to do. But, in addition to mounting the technical assistance initiatives you have discussed with Markovic, I recommend that we give prompt support to favorable treatment for Yugoslavia in the Paris Club. We will be discussing this with Treasury and CEA on an urgent basis.



Lawrence S. Eagleburger

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA (Acting) *AAB*

SUBJECT: Impressions from Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna and Belgrade

MD
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

As you know I accompanied Larry Eagleburger on his February 20-27 trip to Poland, Hungary, Austria and Yugoslavia in his role as coordinator for assistance to Eastern Europe. The following are some of the highlights:

Poland

The most striking impression I came away with was the strong sense of purpose, action, and unity still being demonstrated by the Solidarity government and its legislative supporters. The austerity program is beginning to bite deeply. The hyper-inflation, after a sharp peak (78% in the month of January) seems to be decelerating rapidly. Real wages have plummeted and production has begun to drop. However, we are also seeing the first signs of emerging market mechanisms and entrepreneurship.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki, Finance Minister Balcerowicz and the other Solidarity leaders whom we saw appear to have grown substantially in confidence and experience in the three months since the Presidential Mission. Although some in Warsaw have begun to panic about falling production, Mazowiecki seems ready to continue with the difficult but necessary austerity program, and he has the necessary public support to do so, at least for the present. On the other hand, the Solidarity leaders are now much more acutely aware of the complexities of privatization and seem likely to move more slowly than they intended as of last fall. This could slow the development of a more competitive and modern economy, although some private competition is already emerging in the food sector and in other areas where individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit and little capital can realistically go into business on their own.

The World Bank will be opening an office in Warsaw on July 1, in keeping with the significant technical advisory role and the \$2.5 billion dollars that the Bank plans to provide over the next two or three years. Barber Conable was in Warsaw, simultaneously with our mission, to announce these plans. He told me during a

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reception that the Bank is ready to play a larger coordinating role if the Poles and the leading members of the Bank wish it to do so. The IMF also plans to open a Warsaw office by July 1, and so far it seems to have a good image and working relationship with the Polish Government.

Mazowiecki's overriding message to Eagleburger was not on economic assistance, however, but on the German border question. So powerful is the Polish fear of a reunited Germany that the issue is already beginning to distract the government's attention, and it could become intertwined with the economic reform and assistance agenda. If Mazowiecki is perceived as being too weak in defending Polish national interests, then the public support that his government now enjoys for economic reform could be undercut. Even if not, however, the Poles could feel increasingly vulnerable economically as they see East German living standards rise far more rapidly than their own -- right across their Western border -- as a result of GDR reunion with West Germany. Already creeping into their talks with us was the theme that Poland needed more U.S. economic assistance so as not to be subject to German domination. Among other things the Poles fear excessive German investment, which they say is currently flowing in strongly, particularly in Silesia and other previously German areas. Both economically and politically, the Poles will clearly be looking to the United States, and to a lesser extent to France and other Western European countries, as an offset to excessive German influence and power in the region.

Hungary

In Budapest, the dominant theme was uncertainty about the future, and bitterness and demoralization on the part of the current government, now that it is clear that the "Hungarian Socialist Party" will be swept out of office in the March 25th elections. The non-communist opposition is divided into at least three major parties, none of which seems likely to get much more than 20% of the vote. These parties have not been able to form a united movement and, even after the elections, they may have difficulty forming a solid coalition that can agree on an effective economic program. Although Hungary is clearly much further along economically than Poland, based on Budapest's partial reforms over the past twenty years, there is a real question mark as to how fast Hungary will continue to move on the necessary next steps.

Austria

The visit to Vienna was primarily to compare notes on Eastern Europe. The Austrians, with long experience in Eastern Europe, see the process of economic and political reform as slow and difficult, particularly in Poland and Hungary. They were somewhat more optimistic about Czechoslovakia, however, and mildly hopeful even with regard to Yugoslavia. The message that

came through loudest and clearest, however, was that Austria wants no part of a confederation or other regional grouping in Central and Eastern Europe. Their overriding concern is Austria's admission to the EC. While they thus see EFTA as having only limited temporary value for Austria, they would oppose admission of the Eastern European countries in order not to bring down EFTA's current high common economic denominator.

Deputy Foreign Minister Klestil and the other senior Austrian officials with whom we met were very interested in building a stronger bilateral relationship with the United States, including a continuing dialogue on Eastern Europe. Larry Eagleburger confirmed that there would be biannual U.S.-Austrian consultations, starting this spring in Vienna.

Yugoslavia

Economic and political reforms have finally reached Yugoslavia, although they may be too little too late. With the durability of the Federation very much in question, the key issue is whether political and economic reform will be rapid enough to stave off Yugoslavia's disintegration or major violence. Prime Minister Markovic's economic reform program makes good sense and it is already off to a promising start in attacking hyper-inflation. Banking reform and privatization of industry, for which the Yugoslavs are requesting \$1 billion in Western assistance, is likely to move more slowly. Furthermore, Markovic's political challenges are formidable and it is not clear for how long and with what vigor he will be able to follow through on his economic reform programs.

Upcoming elections in Slovenia and Croatia seem almost certain to produce non-communist governments with highly nationalist platforms. A key question is whether, once in power, these new leaders will find Belgrade sufficiently responsive to their demands for a looser Federation, and whether the Markovic reforms begin to show real promise of restoring prosperity. Also important is whether political reform elsewhere, particularly in Serbia, catches up with that in the Northern republics.

A major complicating factor in the equation is Serbian Republic President Milosevic, who is a zealous Serb nationalist and of doubtful commitment to political and economic reform. Since Serbia is by far the largest and most powerful Republic, Markovic's task is complicated to say the least. Larry Eagleburger came away very concerned that the Slovenes and the Croats could soon decide to secede from the Federation, precipitating a full-scale crisis or even civil war.

Attached for your convenience is a copy of Larry Eagleburger's report to Secretary Baker, which you also received separately.

Concurrences by: Tim Deal, Bob Hutchings

Attachment

Tab A Eagleburger's Report

(in draft) AAB

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1990



Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you very much for your letter of February 21, which I have read very carefully. I appreciate the depth of your concerns about the process of German unification and the legal status of the Polish-German border.

During the weekend of February 24-25, I discussed these matters at some length with Chancellor Kohl. I explained to the Chancellor the U.S. position that the present Western frontier of Poland should be the permanent border. I also made this point publicly at our joint press conference on February 25.


Like all states, Poland has a fundamental right to exist behind secure and legally-defined borders. This is a right to which the U.S. is fully committed. I am absolutely convinced that this problem can and will be solved.

As you know, on March 8 Chancellor Kohl presented to the Bundestag a draft resolution proposing that as soon as possible after the East German elections, both parliaments and governments make an identical declaration renouncing any territorial claims against Poland "now or in the future." In reaffirming the inviolability of the current Polish-German border, the resolution also calls for a treaty between a future all-German government and the Polish Government. I welcome, as I hope you do, the Chancellor's initiative as a positive and important step toward settling the border question on a legal and permanent basis.

Let me also address the concerns you expressed about the Two Plus Four process. As you know, Two Plus Four brings together the two German states with the four nations that retain residual post-War rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole. It will decide only those questions which derive directly from post-War rights and responsibilities, and which must be decided in order to restore full sovereign authority to the united German state over its territory, including Berlin. You may be assured that the United States will not be a party to any decisions which affect the vital interests of Poland or any other country without their involvement.

We should continue to stay in close touch on these matters. I very much look forward to welcoming you to Washington later this month and to the opportunity for further discussion on these and other issues of importance to our two nations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "G" and a stylized "B".

His Excellency
Tadeusz Mazowiecki
Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland
Warsaw

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9001595

REFERRAL

DATE: 13 MAR 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: MAZOWIECKI, TADEUSZ

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 12 MAR 90

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO PM MAZOWIECKI OF POLAND RE GERMAN / POLISH BORDER ISSUE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 13 MAR 90

COMMENT:

FOR

Walter E. Ains
GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3/10/90

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1990 MAR -9 PM 9 07

1595

CONFIDENTIAL

March 9, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS for*

SUBJECT: Letter to Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki

Purpose

To assure Mazowiecki that Poland's concerns on the German-Polish border issue will be fully represented as unification proceeds.

Background

Mazowiecki's very firm letter of February 21 expressed fears of a second Yalta, excluding Poland from deliberations on matters affecting its most basic security interests. Similar letters were sent to London, Paris, and Moscow.

Mazowiecki proposes that the two German states and Poland initial, "at the outset of unification," a treaty reaffirming the final and permanent status of the existing Polish-German border. The treaty would then be signed when Germany is formally unified. He also wants discussions of the security concerns of Germany's neighbors to be held in tandem with Two Plus Four discussions.

We must assume that the Poles may make public this letter. Your letter repeats the comments you made at Camp David, reassures Mazowiecki that the Two Plus Four process will not replace the extensive consultations that must take place among other interested countries, and agrees that Poland has a basic right to exist within secure and legally-defined borders. It also welcomes Chancellor Kohl's draft resolution, presented to the Bundestag March 8, as a positive and important step toward settling the border question.

The text has been coordinated with State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mazowiecki at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mazowiecki
Tab B Incoming from Mazowiecki

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2008.0730.MR

CAP 9/17/2010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1595

March 8, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *B*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RH*

SUBJECT: Letter to Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki

SIGNED

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President attaching a letter for his signature in reply to Mazowiecki's February 21 letter on the border issue. The text has been coordinated with State, though we still do not have a fully cleared version. The remaining differences in State -- mainly between the European Bureau and Policy Planning -- that have been holding up the draft for a week now are very minor, and we see no reason for further delaying the President's reply.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Mazowiecki
Tab B Incoming from Mazowiecki

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2008.0730.MR

CAP 9/17/2010

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20590

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 3/31/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BB

S/S #

C

MESSAGE NO

048066

CLASSIFICATION Unclassified

No. Pages 4

FROM

James P. Collins

S/S

647-5302

7224

(Office name)

(Office symbol)

(Extension)

(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Draft of letter to Prime Minister Mazowiecki

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

NSCS

Bob Hutchings

395-5732

OEOB 368

FOR

CLEARANCE ☐

INFORMATION ☐

PER REQUEST ☒

COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer:

J.P. Collins

James P. Collins

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED RESPONSE**

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of February 21, which I have read with care and sympathy. I appreciate the depth of your concerns about the process of German unification, and I would like to share with you my thoughts on the two main issues which you have addressed -- the Two Plus Four talks and the Polish-German border.

I wish to make clear at the outset that the United States will not reach any agreement that affects Poland's interests without Poland's involvement. If there is a lesson to be learned in the 20th century, it is that the security interests of countries must never be decided above their heads.

As you know, the Two Plus Four talks shall deal with the residual rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers in Germany, including Berlin, which derive from the occupation of Germany at the end of World War II and from agreements to which the Four Powers are signatories. We are now in the process of working out with the others precisely how the Two Plus Four

**His Excellency
Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
Prime Minister,
The Republic of Poland.**

talks will unfold. I would expect parallel consultations with other interested countries as well. I commit the US Government to close consultations with Poland throughout and regard this letter, and your letter to me, as part of that process.

With respect to the Polish-German border, I would like to reiterate the position of the U.S. Government. As I told Chancellor Kohl privately and stated during my February 25 press conference with him: the United States formally recognizes the current Polish-German border. Like all states, Poland has a fundamental right to exist behind secure and legally defined borders. This is a right which the United States fully supports.

I share your view that the unification of Germany opens a new period in the history of Europe. I also agree with you that this unification must be achieved in a way which assures the present and future security of Germany's neighbors. This remains one of our guiding principles.

I am absolutely convinced that this problem can and will be resolved. No responsible politician in Europe believes that the Polish-German border should be altered. I am sympathetic to your desire that Poland itself participate in the reaffirmation of its border with Germany, and I have expressed this point to the Federal Republic of Germany. I am therefore pleased with the recent announcement by the Bonn Government on this issue following my meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

Finally, I have been closely following events in your country and would like to express my deep admiration for your skill and courage in bringing Poland through this critical passage of history. I have no doubt that the change we are seeing in the world today owes much to the Polish people and to the leadership they have so wisely chosen.

I wish you warmest regards, and look forward to welcoming you to Washington later this month.

Sincerely,

Drafted: S/P: JHolmes/JFox: 71494
hdm: 3/8/90: SPEUR#1289

(Unofficial translation)
Warsaw, February 21, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

The unification of the German nation in a single State opens up a new period in the history of Europe. We cannot possibly enter that period with the security of all the States on the continent, particularly the neighbours of Germany, in their current borders, unassured.

According to the Ottawa statement of Feb. 13, 1990, the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will meet with the Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in order to discuss the various external aspects of the establishment of German unity, including the issues of security of the neighbouring States.

Poland welcomed the fact that the questions of the security of the neighbouring States had been referred to in the statement by the six Foreign Ministers.

The fact that the security of Germany's neighbours has been raised has two consequences: a substantive and a procedural one. Each of them is important.

Firstly, as regards the substantive aspect, the Ottawa communique means that the unification of the two German States and the attainment of constitutional unity by the German nation shall leave intact the security of the States adjacent to the unifying (and subsequently unified) German States. In other words, the unification shall in no way impair the present nor future security of the neighbours, particularly with respect to their territorial security and the permanence of their borders.

His Excellency
Mr. George H. Bush
President of the
United States of America
Washington, DC

These are extremely important issues. It is of vital concern for Poland to see an end to any equivocation with respect to the Polish-German border along the Odra-Lusatian Nysa rivers. A future treaty of peace has repeatedly been emphasized in the Federal Republic of Germany as the exclusive instrument by which that border could be settled. However, the legal and political reality is that despite the lack of peace settlement the Odra-Lusatian Nysa border has become part of the European order. Whoever questions that border in one form or another, or puts to question its permanent character - thereby defies the security and cooperation in Europe. I declare Poland's readiness to take part in the work on the peace treaty and her readiness to sign it. However, for reasons beyond Poland's control, work on the peace treaty is not envisaged at all at present or is being postponed until an unidentified point in time after German unification, thus giving some forces the opportunity to continuously consider the Polish-German border an open question. We cannot allow such state of affairs to persist after Germany is unified.

The German Democratic Republic has recognized the Odra-Lusatian Nysa border as the Polish-German state frontier (Zgorzelec Agreement of July 6, 1950). The Federal Republic of Germany has stated that the relevant line constitutes the western state border of the Republic of Poland (The Treaty of Warsaw, of Dec. 7, 1970). Therefore, if one acts in good faith, nothing can obstruct the present Polish-German border-line from becoming reaffirmed by a treaty concluded at the very beginning of the unification process. It is an essential issue for Poland as a neighbour of the German nation.

Secondly, by pointing to the security issues of the neighbouring States, the Ottawa communique indicates that in the discussions between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, there is room for the participation by the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned and adjacent to one or both German States.

The latter implication of the relevant clause in the Ottawa statement deserves closer elaboration.

The present international relationships in Europe are becoming increasingly democratic, with all the European States having the possibility to speak and take part in the conferences or other meetings where their interests, particularly the vital ones, are discussed. It is unthinkable today (and impracticable) for any European State, especially any of the six which adopted the Ottawa statement, to seek to exclude the voice of the neighbours of the German States from the discussion on these neighbours' security. The Polish Government did not allege and is not alleging the existence of such intentions on the part of any of the six States; it attaches great importance to having the best possible relations with each of these States.

Indeed, to exclude the voice of the neighbouring States concerned and to shut them off from the relevant stage of the discussion on the aspects of the German unification which affect the security of the neighbouring States - would be tantamount to a repetition of the Yalta formula of 1945. It would, indeed, mean discussing and deciding by some States about vital interests of others in the absence of the latter.

In view of the foregoing considerations, guided by her own interest as well as that of European cooperation, and by the desire for the best possible relations with her German neighbour - Poland states as follows:

- 1) We believe that the point of departure to the German unification is the final elimination of all doubt or equivocation with respect to the present course, delimitation and demarcation of the Polish-German border along the Odra-Lusatian Nysa rivers. The issue should never re-emerge; the elimination of doubt or equivocation will be equivalent to peace settlement and will have full effect in German law and that of other States. Poland proposes to conclude, at the outset of the unification, a treaty containing provisions to that effect and reaffirming the final and permanent status of the existing Polish-German

border. That border should not be changed in any way. The text of the treaty will be initialled by the two German States and Poland as a result of the discussions indicated by the Ottawa communique. The treaty will be signed by the unified German State and Poland upon the establishment of that unified German State. Poland will submit a draft of such a treaty.

2) Poland considers it indispensable to have a part in the discussion on the external aspects of the German unification in order to present her standpoint on the security issues, particularly those relating to the border and the proposed treaty. Poland makes it clear that she is not seeking a status identical with that of any of the Four Powers nor any of the two German States.

We believe that the discussion on the security issues of the neighbouring States should be held at an early stage of the conference as its separate part.

In conclusion, I wish to state as follows:

The prospect of the unification of the German nation in one State opens up a new chapter in the postwar history of Europe. Poland welcomes every form of national self-determination. The unification of Germany and its external aspects constitute an important part of the peace settlement on our continent. Every State concerned has the right to take part in that settlement. One such State is Poland. Our right stems from the imperatives of international morality, the international law, our historical experience of the last fifty years and our present legal and political situation.

I wish to inform you, Mr. President, that identical letters are being sent to the leaders of the French Republic, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

/-/ Tadeusz Mazowiecki



Szanowny Panie Prezydencie,

Państwowe zjednoczenie narodu niemieckiego otwiera nowy okres w dziejach Europy. W okres ten nie możemy wejść bez zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa wszystkich państw kontynentu, zwłaszcza sąsiadów Niemiec w ich aktualnych granicach.

Oświadczenie ogłoszone w dniu 13 lutego 1990 r. w Ottawie stwierdza, iż ministrowie spraw zagranicznych Republiki Federalnej Niemiec i Niemieckiej Republiki Demokratycznej spotkają się z ministrami spraw zagranicznych Republiki Francuskiej, Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki, Zjednoczonego Królestwa Wielkiej Brytanii i Północnej Irlandii oraz Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich celem odbycia dyskusji odnoszących się do różnych zewnętrznych aspektów zrealizowania jedności niemieckiej, łącznie z kwestiami bezpieczeństwa państw sąsiedzkich.

Polska z zadowoleniem przyjęła do wiadomości fakt, że oświadczenie sześciu ministrów spraw zagranicznych wymienia kwestie bezpieczeństwa państw sąsiedzkich.

Podniesienie bezpieczeństwa sąsiadów Niemiec ma dwa skutki: jeden merytoryczny, drugi proceduralny. Oba są istotne.

Po pierwsze, co się tyczy strony merytorycznej, komunikat ottawski oznacza, że zjednoczenie obu państw niemieckich i uzyskanie jedności państwowej przez naród niemiecki dokona się z zachowaniem bezpieczeństwa państw sąsiadujących z łączącymi się (a następnie zjednoczonymi) państwami niemieckimi. Innymi słowy - zjednoczenie nie naruszy w niczym obecnego i przyszłego bezpieczeństwa sąsiadów, w szczególności bezpieczeństwa terytorialnego i trwałości granic.

Jego Ekscelencja
Pan George H. Bush
Prezydent Stanów
Zjednoczonych Ameryki
Waszyngton, D.C.

Są to sprawy nader istotne. Dla Polski żywotnym interesem jest położenie kresu wszelkiej dwuznaczności, co się tyczy granicy polsko-niemieckiej na Odrze i Nysie Łużyckiej. W Republice Federalnej Niemiec wielokrotnie podkreślano wyłączość przyszłego traktatu pokoju do uregulowania tej granicy. Rzeczywistość prawna i polityczna jest jednak taka, że mimo braku regulacji pokojowej granica na Odrze i Nysie Łużyckiej stała się częścią porządku europejskiego. Kto tę granicę w tej lub innej formie podważa lub jej trwałość kwestionuje - ten działa przeciwko bezpieczeństwu i współpracy w Europie. Oświadczam, że Polska jest gotowa uczestniczyć w pracach nad traktatem pokoju i jest gotowa go podpisać. Jednak z przyczyn od Polski niezależnych prace nad traktatem pokoju albo nie są obecnie brane pod uwagę albo są odkładane do nieokreślonego momentu po państwowym zjednoczeniu narodu niemieckiego, co pewnym siłom daje asumpt do stałego uważania granicy polsko-niemieckiej jako sprawy otwartej. Nie możemy się zgodzić na to, aby po zjednoczeniu Niemiec ten stan rzeczy nadal się utrzymywał.

Niemiecka Republika Demokratyczna uznaje granicę na Odrze i Nysie Łużyckiej jako polsko-niemiecką granicę państwową (Układ Zgorzelecki z 6 lipca 1950 r.). Republika Federalna Niemiec stwierdziła, że odnośna linia stanowi zachodnią granicę państwową Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Układ Warszawski z 7 grudnia 1970 r.). Przy działaniu w dobrej wierze nie może więc być przeszkody, aby u progu procesu zjednoczenia w formie traktatowej potwierdzić granicę polsko-niemiecką w jej obecnym przebiegu. Jest to kwestia istotna dla Polski jako sąsiada narodu niemieckiego.

Po drugie, wskazanie w komunikacie ottawskim na kwestie bezpieczeństwa państw sąsiedzkich oznacza, że w dyskusjach pomiędzy ministrami spraw zagranicznych Niemieckiej Republiki Demokratycznej i Republiki Federalnej Niemiec z jednej strony a ministrami spraw zagranicznych czterech mocarstw z drugiej strony jest miejsce na udział ministrów spraw zagranicznych zainteresowanych państw, które sąsiadują z jednym lub dwoma państwami niemieckimi.

Ten drugi skutek odnośnego zdania w oświadczeniu ottawskim wart jest bliższego naświetlenia.

W dzisiejszych czasach stosunki międzynarodowe w Europie demokratyzują się i wszystkie państwa europejskie mają możliwość zabrania głosu i możliwość uczestnictwa w konferencjach lub innych spotkaniach, które dotyczą ich interesów, a zwłaszcza żywotnych interesów. Dziś jest nie do pomyślenia (a co dopiero do przeprowadzenia), aby jakiegokolwiek z państw europejskich, w szczególności zaś którekolwiek z sześciu państw przyjmujących oświadczenie ottawskie, mówiąc o kwestiach bezpieczeństwa sąsiadów państw niemieckich, chciało wykluczyć głos tych sąsiadów. Rząd polski takich intencji żadnemu z sześciu państw nie przypisywał i nie przypisuje, przywiązując wielkie znaczenie do jak najlepszych stosunków z każdym z tych państw.

Wykluczenie bowiem głosu zainteresowanych państw sąsiedzkich, wyłączenie ich z odpowiedniego etapu dyskusji na temat tych zewnętrznych aspektów jedności niemieckiej, które obejmują bezpieczeństwo państw sąsiedzkich - równałoby się powrotowi do formuły jałtańskiej z 1945 r. Byłoby bowiem dyskutowaniem i decydowaniem przez jedno państwo o żywotnych interesach innych państw bez udziału tych ostatnich.

Biorąc więc pod uwagę wszystkie powyższe okoliczności i kierując się interesem zarówno własnym i współpracy europejskiej jak dążeniem do jak najlepszych stosunków z naszym sąsiadem niemieckim - Polska stwierdza, co następuje:

1) Uważamy, że punktem wyjścia dla realizacji zjednoczenia niemieckiego jest ostateczne usunięcie wszelkich wątpliwości lub dwuznaczności podnoszonych wobec granicy polsko-niemieckiej na Odrze i Nysie Łużyckiej w jej obecnym przebiegu oraz obecnej delimitacji i demarkacji. Sprawa nie powinna być więcej podnoszona, usunięcie wątpliwości lub dwuznaczności będzie równoznaczne z regulacją pokojową oraz będzie miało pełne skutki w prawie niemieckim i prawie innych państw. Polska proponuje, aby na wstępie zjednoczenia zawrzeć traktat o powyższej treści potwierdzający ostateczność i trwałość istniejącej granicy polsko-niemieckiej, bez żadnych jej zmian. Tekst tego traktatu będzie parafowany przez dwa państwa niemieckie i Polskę, jako wynik dyskusji zapowiedzianych w komunikacie ottawskim. Traktat zostanie podpisany przez zjednoczone państwo niemieckie oraz Polskę w chwili powstania zjednoczonego państwa niemieckiego. Polska przedłoży projekt takiego traktatu.

2) Polska uważa za niezbędne swe uczestnictwo w dyskusji nad zewnętrznymi aspektami jedności niemieckiej celem przedstawienia swego punktu widzenia na kwestie bezpieczeństwa, w szczególności w związku z granicą i proponowanym traktatem. Polska wyjaśnia, że nie zabiega o status identyczny ani z żadnym z czterech mocarstw ani z żadnym z dwóch państw niemieckich.

Sądzimy, że dyskusja o kwestiach bezpieczeństwa państw sąsiedzkich winna odbyć się we wczesnym stadium konferencji jako jej osobna część.

Kończąc pragnę stwierdzić, co następuje.

Szanse na państwowe zjednoczenie narodu niemieckiego otwierają nowy rozdział w historii powojennej Europy. Polska wita z zadowoleniem wszelki przejaw samostanowienia narodowego. Zjednoczenie Niemiec i jego aspekty zewnętrzne są istotną częścią pokojowej regulacji na naszym kontynencie. W regulacji tej mają prawo uczestniczyć wszystkie zainteresowane państwa. Jednym z nich jest Polska. Prawo nasze wynika z nakazów moralności międzynarodowej, z prawa międzynarodowego, z naszych doświadczeń historycznych w ostatnim półwieczu oraz z naszej aktualnej sytuacji prawnej i politycznej.

Pozwalam sobie powiadomić Pana Prezydenta, że pismo identycznej treści kieruję do przywódców Republiki Francuskiej, Wielkiej Brytanii i Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich.

Z wyrazami najgłębszego szacunku.

