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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files

OA/ID Number: 91124
Folder ID Number: 91124-009

Folder Title:
Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (October 1989) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	3	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Summary	Re: [Head of State Correspondence Summary] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01b. Message	Prime Minister Thatcher to President Bush (4 pp.)	10/9/89	(b)(1)	
01c. Cable	Re: Letter from EC Commission President Delors to President Bush (4 pp.)	10/7/89	(b)(1)	C
01d. Letter	Prime Minister Mulroney to President Bush (1 pp.)	10/5/89	(b)(1)	C
01e. Letter	President Ozal to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/4/89	(b)(1)	
01f. Letter	President Jean-Pascla Delamuraz to President Bush (1 pp.)	10/3/89	(b)(1)	
01g. Letter	Prime Minister Kaifu to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/2/89	(b)(1)	
01h. Letter	President Mubarak to President Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
01i. Letter	Prime Minister Thatcher to President Bush (4 pp.)	9/27/89	(b)(1)	S
01j. Letter	King Fahd to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
01k. Letter	King Fahd to President Bush [Arabic] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (October 1989) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1052
OA/ID Number: 91124-009
Date Closed: 3/20/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01l. Cable	Re: Letter from Premier Swan to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/3/89	(b)(1)	
01m. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush [English Translation] (1 pp.)	9/89	(b)(1)	
01n. Statement	Re: Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Crisis in Panama [English Translation] (1 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	
01o. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush [German] (1 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	
01p. Statement	Re: Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Crisis in Panama [German] (1 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	
01q. Letter	President Sarney to President Bush [Portuguese] (2 pp.)	9/4/89	(b)(1)	
01r. Letter	President Sarney to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	9/4/89	(b)(1)	
01s. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcrot Re: Heads of State Correspondence (1 pp.)	10/12/89	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	Adrian Basora/Condi Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Restoring the Spotlight on Eastern Europe (3 pp.)	10/11/89	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03. Memo	Re: Deane E. Hoffmann to Brent Scowcroft and Robert M. Gates Re: IEPR Breakfast, October 13, 1989 (1 pp.)	10/13/89	(b)(1)	S
04a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (2 pp.)	10/18/89	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for One-on-One Meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04e. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Working Visit of President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, October 18-20, 1989 (3 pp.)	10/16/89	(b)(1)	S
04f. Memo	Adrain Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Official Working Visit of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, Thursday, October 19, 1989, 11:00-13:15 (2 pp.)	10/14/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Presidential Mission to Poland (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05b. List	Re: Presidential Mission to Poland (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany (1 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	C
06b. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (1 pp.)	10/20/89	(b)(1)	C
06c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary (3 pp.)	10/31/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07e. Memo	Adrain Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary (1 pp.)	10/24/89	(b)(1)	S

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4

Letter from Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain - October 9, 1989

Prime Minister Thatcher is encouraged by your October 4th letter. She confirms that British ideas on how to support reform in Eastern Europe are very similar to your own. Britain supports all efforts to secure a strong and sustainable IMF program for Poland. Thatcher approves of your contingent grant and states that she plans to provide a comparable contribution once the IMF provides information on Poland's precise needs. She hopes that the U.S. team to Poland will visit the UK to discuss cooperative efforts and how to best use the grants. Finally, she suggests that the U.S. and UK join together in support for Hungary.

Cable from EC Commission President Delors - October 7, 1989

EC Commission President Delors acknowledges your October 4th letter and agrees that the new Polish Government's plans for economic reform should be strongly encouraged. He claims that agreement with the IMF is an early priority and that U.S. support for the "Action Plan" is most welcome and helpful. Delors agrees that the private sector plays a vital role in supporting the economic reform programs in both Poland and Hungary. Delors welcomes your commitment to a common assistance strategy and looks forward to continued coordination of our efforts. He is relying on you to encourage other industrialized countries to commit themselves to the Plan.

Letter from Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada - October 5, 1989

Prime Minister Mulroney agrees that Western governments must encourage Poland's reform process. He has instructed his officials to consider how to and to what extent Canada can contribute to this process. Meanwhile, Canada is preparing a package of food aid, technical and managerial assistance, and measures to facilitate investment and joint ventures to promote Polish exports. He expects to announce this package soon.

Letter from President Ozal of Turkey - October 4, 1989

President Ozal is strongly opposed to the Congressional resolution on the "Armenian question". He believes that it wrongly seeks to legislate history and that passage of this resolution could severely damage Turkish - U.S. relations.

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Letter form President Delamuraz of Switzerland - October 3, 1989

President Delamuraz, on behalf of the Swiss Government, invites you and Mrs. Bush for an official visit to Switzerland in 1990. He states that no U.S. President has ever visited Switzerland on a bilateral basis.

Letter from Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan - October 2, 1989

Prime Minister Kaifu welcomes your decision to place a higher priority on achieving a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons. He hopes that the U.S. and Japan will strengthen their cooperation and maintain close consultations while seeking a global and verifiable convention. He is also encouraged by your recent bilateral talks with the USSR.

Letter from President Mubarak of Egypt - October 2, 1989

President Mubarak thanks you for your warm reception and generous hospitality during his recent visit. He feels that your meeting provided a good opportunity for coordinating and reactivating efforts aimed at accelerating the Middle East peace process.

Letter from Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain - September 27, 1989

Prime Minister Thatcher summarizes her discussions during her meeting with Gorbachev. Her letter is filled with information on various subjects and merits your personal review. Please see Tab H for the original letter.

Letter from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia - September 26, 1989

King Fahd thanks you for your letter of praise for the students of the Saudi Islamic Academy. He was very touched by your visit to the Saudi Arabian exhibition and is pleased with the special relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Cable from Premier Swan of Bermuda - September 26, 1989

Premier Swan acknowledges your letter of July 1st. He believes that Mr. Ebersole Gaines will prove to be an excellent Consul General. He also wishes you success in your fight against illegal drugs and states that he will continue the fight in Bermuda, as well.

Letter from Chancellor Kohl of the FRG - September 21, 1989

Chancellor Kohl acknowledges your August 22nd letter on Panama and informs you that the FRG condemns Noriega's actions and strongly supports the efforts of the OAS. He has included with his letter an official FRG statement which reiterates the OAS's declaration. He states that there will be serious repercussions to bilateral relations with Panama if no government is formed in accordance with the Panamanian constitution.

Letter from President Sarney of Brazil - September 4, 1989

President Sarney shares your concern over Panama and states that the consolidation of democracy in the Americas is the main goal and is not to be neglected. He reiterates his support for the Special OAS Mission to Panama and renews his willingness to maintain an open dialogue with you.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Brent

Does this letter from

Margaret Thatcher

need a reply ?

GB GB

A reply is being prepared per Bob Blackwell

TEXT OF A MESSAGE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1989
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

Begins

Dear George,

I was encouraged by your letter of 4 October about Poland. It confirms that our views are very close, and that the West is working well together to support reform in Eastern Europe.

You will have seen that the EC Foreign Ministers meeting on 3 October approved a substantial package of help for Poland and Hungary. Under this, the Community will expand access to our markets for Poland and Hungary. We shall also spend 200 million ecu from next year's EC budget, mainly to promote reform of agriculture in Poland and to finance management training and environmental protection in both countries. This matches what they need with what Europe can best offer.

Like you, we are impressed with the economic policies which the Poles have outlined and with their determination to carry them through. We shall give the fullest backing to efforts to secure a strong and sustainable programme with the IMF. This is the key to unlock the further help we can all give. In particular, we need the guidance of the Fund on the scale and timing of Poland's external financing needs, to which the IMF itself, the World Bank and Poland's friends and supporters would respond.

/ I -

I welcome most warmly your decision to contribute $200 million, contingent on the conclusion of an IMF agreement, and which would go towards a total of $1 billion in Western assistance for Poland. Your action provides a good lead. I hope, as you do, that it will be matched by others. We have already committed outselves to substantial aid to Poland, both through the community and bilaterally by our $40 million "Know-How Fund". But I confirm that we are ready to do more and provide a further British contribution as part of a collective Western effort. I would prefer not to set a precise figure until we know more from the IMF about Poland's precise needs. But our contribution would certainly be proportionate to yours.

I agree with you that it is right to offer grants, not loans, so as not to increase Poland's heavy debt. We note that your proposed stabilisation fund differs from the Poles' proposal for a stabilisation loan, aimed at building up international reserves and supporting a newly unified and convertible currency. We should be interested to learn more of the intended uses of the stabilisation fund and the period envisaged for disbursement.

We should think carefully about how these grants are used, to ensure good value both for the Poles and ourselves. My own view is that the priority objectives should be:-

- to promote the conversion of state-owned firms into market-based ones. Finance Minister Balcerowicz especially asked Nigel Lawson for help in this.

/ - to -

- to encourage Western private sector involvement in Poland.

- to improve the quality of Polish management.

We need ways of bringing together capital and expertise from many sources - Western and Polish, multilateral and bilateral, public and private - for these purposes. One method might be an investment consortium, which would bring together Polish enterprises and potential investors. This might be developed into an Investment Bank, drawing equity both from the Poles and from the West, which would take shares in state firms being privatised and help to turn them into profit-making operations. At every stage, the skill and experience of the International Finance Corporation would be invaluable and I believe they would be ready to help. We would want to pursue these ideas further with you and other Western participants, as well as with the Poles themselves. I hope that the team you propose to send to Poland could visit London en route to exchange ideas.

The transformation of Eastern Europe is only just beginning. So in helping Poland, we should be mindful of other East European countries embarking on similar reforms to escape from the straightjacket of Communism, whether now or in the future. This especially applies at present to Hungary. Hungary's political reforms are in some ways as ambitious as Poland's. Economically, they need to get back into close relations with the IMF and to correct their fiscal and external deficits. But their economy is certainly healthier than

/ Poland's:

Poland's: they have so far serviced their debts; they can feed themselves; they have gone further towards a market economy. The EC will help Hungary, through its recent decisions, and you announced measures of assistance when you visited Budapest. But we should also give more thought to how the West can together help the Hungarian reforms.

I am writing in this sense to all our G7 colleagues and to Jacques Delors.

Warm regards,

Yours ever,

Margaret

Ends

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: DONLEY GATES SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT: BASORA BLACKWILL BENKO FILE HUTCHINGS PRES MSGS SIT SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071110Z OCT 89

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7153

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 12952
FROM USEC
FOR EUR-DAS JOHNSON
DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC
E.O.: 12356: N/A
TAGS: EEC, PREL, PL, HU
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM EC COMMISSION PRESIDENT
DELORS TO PRESIDENT BUSH

1. THE AMBASSADOR ON OCTOBER 7 RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM EC COMMISSION PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER ABOUT THE DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND AND THE SCALE OF THE WESTERN EFFORT NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE ECONOMIC REFORM IS CARRIED THROUGH SUCCESSFULLY. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE GOALS ARE AMBITIOUS, BUT IT IS ALSO BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR TO ME THAT THE EXISTING SITUATION IS CONSIDERABLY MORE SERIOUS THAN WAS INITIALLY APPRECIATED.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED IN ITS BOLD AND FAR-REACHING PLANS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM. AN EARLY PRIORITY IS AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF. I WELCOME YOUR DECISION TO SEEK FROM CONGRESS A USD 200 MILLION GRANT FOR STABILIZATION PURPOSES, AND NOTE THAT YOUR CALCULATIONS CONFIRM THAT A USD 1 BILLION IN

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1006-MR
2/25/2014 MM

STABILIZATION FUNDS IN THE FORM OF GRANTS MAY BE NECESSARY.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
THE FIRM SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE ACTION PLAN WHICH THE COMMISSION PROPOSED TO THE GROUP OF 24 COUNTRIES AT ITS MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 26 SEPTEMBER WAS MOST HELPFUL. AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THAT MEETING THE COMMUNITY'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS THIS WEEK GAVE THEIR STRONG SUPPORT TO THIS ACTION PLAN AND NOTABLY TO THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR AN ADDITIONAL TWO HUNDRED MILLION ECU FROM THE COMMUNITY BUDGET FOR ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING PROJECTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE COUNTERPART FUND WHICH HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED BY THE PROCEEDS OF EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPLIES PROVIDED BY THE COMMUNITY TO POLAND. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A GOOD RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL THAT MEMBER STATES SHOULD ADD TO THE VOLUME OF THIS AID FROM THEIR OWN BUDGETS. I KNOW I CAN RELY ON YOU TO JOIN THE COMMUNITY IN ENCOURAGING OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, WHICH HAVE NOT YET DONE SO, TO ANNOUNCE CONCRETE COMMITMENTS TO OUR COMMON EFFORT.
AS YOU KNOW, I ENTIRELY SHARE YOUR CONVICTION THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAS A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY IN THE ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING OF POLAND AND HUNGARY. THIS WILL BE MAJOR PRIORITY IN THE LENDING FACILITIES WHICH THE COMMISSION HAS PROPOSED SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK, WITH A GUARANTEE FROM THE COMMUNITY BUDGET. THIS PROPOSAL HAS ALSO BEEN WELCOMED BY THE MEMBER STATES IN THE COUNCIL.
I NOTE THAT YOU PROPOSE TO SEND AN EXPERTS' MISSION SOON TO POLAND WHICH WILL MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE IMMEDIATE STABILIZATION NEEDS, AND THAT LATER A FURTHER MISSION WILL GO SO AS TO FORMULATE A DETAILED LONGER TERM PLAN. THE IMF WILL ALSO OF COURSE BE SENDING AN ECONOMIC TEAM, AND WE HAVE SENT FACT-FINDING MISSIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT AS FAR AS

POSSIBLE WE SHOULD CO-ORDINATE THESE EFFORTS SO AS TO AVOID DUPLICATION AND OVERBURDENING THE POLIOSH AUTHORITIES.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNITY'S ACTION PLAN AND YOUR NEW ANNOUNCEMENT. I WELCOME YOUR COMMITMENT TO A COMMON ASSISTANCE STRATEGY ON THE BASIS OF THE PRIORITIES IDENTIFIED BY THE GROUP OF 24 AND LOOK FOWARD TO THE CONTINUED COORDINATION OF OUR EFFORTS.
WITH WARM REGARDS.
SINCERELY.
JACQUES DELORS
BT
#2952
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 BRUSSELS 12952
FROM USEC
FOR EUR-DAS JOHNSON
DEPT PLEASE PASS NSC
E.O.: 12356: N/A
TAGS: EEC, PREL, PL, HU
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM EC COMMISSION PRESIDENT
END, TEXT.
2. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE TONE IS VERY POSITIVE AND STRESSES COOPERATION, DELORS' LETTER AVOIDS THE QUESTION OF AN EC PARTICIPATION IN THE STABILIZATION PACKAGE. WE SHOULD COME BACK TO THE COMMISSION AND MEMBER STATES QUICKLY ON THIS POINT, WHILE TAKING UP THE VALID OBSERVATION THAT OTHER COUNTRIES (AND HERE DELORS IS CLEARLY THINKING OF JAPAN IN PARTICULAR) NEED SOME ENCOURAGMENT AS WELL. IN DISCUSSING THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT WITH MEMBERS OF DELORS' STAFF, THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE STABILIZATION GRANT WAS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM THE 300 MILION ECU EC PACKAGE ANNOUNCED ON SEPTEMBER 26. DELORS LETTER DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN THIS POINT AND WE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WILL HAVE TO RETURN TO IT. END COMMENT.
NILES
BT
#2952

ADVANCE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 5, 1989

"Dear George,

Thank you for your message today on the economic situation in Poland and the momentous reform programs which the new government there is trying to launch. I entirely agree on the historic importance and very real opportunity this situation presents and that there is a responsibility on Western governments to encourage the reform process. The suggestion of a billion dollar stabilization grant fund is a bold one and I have instructed my officials to consider, on an urgent basis, how and to what extent Canada can participate. I would hope to advise you further very soon.

In the interim, as you will be aware from reports of the Group of 24 coordination meetings, Canada is putting together a package of food aid, technical and managerial assistance, measures to facilitate investment and joint ventures and to promote Polish exports, which we would expect to announce soon.

Yours sincerely,

Brian"

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-1006-MR
2/25/2014 MM

October 4, 1989

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

This is to thank you once again for your kind assurances as well as to expand on the considerations and concerns which prompted me to call you yesterday.

The so-called "Armenian question" dates back to the last century and the allegations are mostly on events which took place during the First World War.

I am sure you will agree with me that study of such events of the past should be left to historians. When I came to power, the Ottoman archives were closed to the public. The Armenian propaganda used to exploit this against us. As you know, it was my government which opened the archives for academic research. This should also facilitate an objective and factual assessment of the events in question. There has never been an intention on our part to distort the truth. Now it is up to the scholars to bring the facts to light. The Turkish government can only welcome it.

It would be totally wrong for politicians to pass judgement on these historical events, especially at a time when they are under academic scrutiny.

I am distressed that Senator Dole's proposal is co-sponsored by 56 other Senators. The fact that many Senators friendly to Turkey should figure among the co-sponsors leads me to believe that there is misconception in the minds of many as to the real nature and possible consequences of such a resolution.

I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that on this question which provokes profound national sensitivity, the Turkish nation in its entirety is of one mind.

In the past, the opposition of the previous Administration and the efforts of the Members of Congress, forestalled the passage of a resolution similar to Senator Dole's proposal on no less than three occasions. The U.S. Administration and the Congress showed the wisdom to stand against it because they did not want to take sides in a historical controversy and because they valued the friendship of a reliable ally.

./..

We are very pleased that the strong Turkish-American relations are getting even stronger and wider in scope under your Administration. But the stakes are no less high now than they were before.

I am confident, Mr. President, that you will use all the means at your disposal to defeat this wrongful proposal, which seeks to legislate history and which could only severely damage the excellent relations that we both value so highly.

Turgut Özal

LE PRÉSIDENT
DE LA CONFÉDÉRATION SUISSE

Berne, 3 October, 1989

Mr. President,

The Swiss Government is honored to invite you and Mrs. Bush for an official visit to Switzerland in the course of the year 1990.

We are convinced that the friendly relations and the rich variety of links between our two countries call for such an event, all the more so since no President of the United States of America has so far visited Switzerland on a bilateral basis.

I therefore sincerely hope that you will be able to consider favorably this undertaking. We would then proceed to seek appropriate dates through the usual diplomatic channels.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration.

Delamuraz

Jean-Pascal Delamuraz
President of the Swiss Confederation

The President
The White House

Washington, D.C.

Tokyo, October 2, 1989

Dear George,

I thank you very much for your letter dated September 25 concerning a ban on chemical weapons.

I heartily welcome your decision to place an even higher priority on achieving a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. I believe that your commitment in concrete terms to a dramatic cut in your chemical weapons stockpile is an important step forward toward the total elimination of chemical weapons, and highly appreciate it.

Building a workable verification regime, however, is so a daunting task, as you have pointed out in your letter, that the road to a conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Convention will not be an easy one.

The Japanese Government has long wished for an early conclusion of the Convention and therefore positively participated in the negotiations for that purpose. It now feels encouraged by the progress registered during the recent series of negotiations on the Convention, which was given impetus by the Paris International Conference against Chemical Weapons, the achievements made at the Government-Industry Conference recently held in Canberra, and the progress brought about by your own initiative during the U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral talks.

I wish to see that our two countries strengthen their cooperation in order to maintain their close consultations at Geneva and elsewhere and to realize an early conclusion of a global and verifiable convention against chemical weapons.

Sincerely,

/S/

Toshiki

PRESIDENCY OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC
OF EGYPT

H.E. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
WASHINGTON.

EXCELLENCY,

WHILE LEAVING THE TERRITORY OF YOUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY, HAVING ATTENDED PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERED THE SPEECH OF AFRICA THERE, AS WELL AS FOLLOWING OUR FRUITFUL MEETING TOGETHER, IT IS WITH IMMENSE PLEASURE THAT I EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MOST SINCERE THANKS FOR THE WARM RECEPTION AND GENEROUS HOSPITALITY WHICH TRULY REFLECT THE DEEP BONDS OF CLOSE FRIENDSHIP BINDING OUR TWO PEOPLES TOGETHER.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE POSITIVE TALKS WE HAVE HAD IN AN ATMOSPHERE PREVAILED OVER BY A SPIRIT OF FULL FRANKNESS AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING PROVIDED A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR COORDINATING AND REACTIVATING THE EXERTED EFFORTS AIMED AT ACCELERATING THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE DRIVE, SO AS TO ATTAIN ITS ASPIRED GOALS, AND SO THAT ALL PEOPLES OF THE AREA MAY ENJOY A FREE DIGNIFIED LIFE.

KINDLY ACCEPT, DEAR FRIEND, MY MOST SINCERE REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR YOUR GOOD HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AS WELL AS FOR CONSTANT PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY OF YOUR FRIENDLY PEOPLE.

WITH MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND APPRECIATION.

MOHAMED HOSNY MUBARAK

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01i. Letter	Prime Minsiter Thatcher to President Bush (4 pp.)	9/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: USSR Chronological Files
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Date Closed:	3/20/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91124-009
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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(UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

It is with great pleasure that I extend to you my best wishes, along with positive feelings of friendship. At the same time, I would like to express my appreciation for your letter dated August 16, 1989 which contained your kind praise for the students studying at the Saudi Islamic Academy in your friendly country.

I was very touched by your visit to the Saudi Arabian exhibition which was held in Washington, D.C. The contribution of time you committed to see the exhibition is undoubtedly a reflection of the strong relations which bind our two friendly nations. We were very pleased with your reactions to the exhibition and those of the friendly American people who are bound to the people of Saudi Arabia through a strong relationship based on trust and friendship. I am confident that the special relationship between our two countries will remain a vivid example reflecting their desires for understanding and cooperation in various fields of mutual interests as well as their concerns for international peace, security and stability.

Once again, I wish to convey my best wishes to you personally for your continued good health and well-being, and to the friendly American people for continued progress and prosperity.

With best regards,

Your Friend,

Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Jeddah, September 26, 1989
Safar 26, 1410 Hijrah

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

صاحب الفخامة الرئيس جورج بوش
رئيس الولايات المتحدة الامريكية

عزيزي الرئيس:

تحية طيبة وبعد.. فيسرني ان ابعث لفخامتكم أطيب التمنيات مع مشاعر الود والصداقة. واقدر في الوقت نفسه بالغ التقدير ماتضمنته رسالتكم المؤرخة في السادس عشر من اغسطس ١٩٨٩، من عبارات ودية وشعور كريم تجاه طلاب الاكاديمية الاسلامية السعودية الذين يحضون بالرعاية في بلدكم الصديق.

لقد كان لزيارة فخامتكم لمعرض المملكة العربية السعودية في مدينة واشنطن اكبر الوقع في نفسي ولاشك ان اعطاء شيىء من وقتكم للاطلاع على هذا المعرض يعبر عن عمق العلاقة القائمة بين بلدينا الصديقين. وان مما يسرنا ان ينال هذا المعرض اعجابكم واعجاب الشعب الامريكي الذي تربطه بشعب المملكة العربية السعودية علاقة وثيقة تقوم على الود والصداقة. واني واثق بان هذه العلاقة بين بلدينا ستبقى كما هي دائما مثالا حيويا يعكس رغبتهما في التفاهم والتعاون في اطار مصلحتهما المشتركة واهتمامهما بالأمن والسلام والرخاء الدوليين.

ومرة اخرى ابعث لكم اطيب التمنيات راجيا لكم شخصيا دوام السعادة وللشعب الامريكي الصديق دوام القوة والرخاء.

وتقبلو تحياتي،،،

صدر بقلم
خادم الحرمين الشريفين

فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود
ملك المملكة العربية السعودية

جده في ٢٦ صفر ١٤١٠هـ
الموافق ٢٦ سبتمبر ١٩٨٩م

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT. VANERON

PREC ROUTINE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 031256Z OCT 89

FM AMCONSUL HAMILTON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC 9933

UNCLAS HAMILTON 0891
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, ODIP, PREL, BD
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PREMIER SWAN TO PRESIDENT BUSH
1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 26 FROM PREMIER JOHN SWAN TO PRESIDENT BUSH. THE LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL OCTOBER 2 TO BE FORWARDED TO THE WHITE HOUSE.
BEGIN TEXT
DEAR GEORGE,
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR KIND NOTE OF 1ST JULY WHICH I HAVE ONLY NOW BEEN ABLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE.
IT WAS VERY KIND OF YOU TO PROVIDE SUCH A WARM INTRODUCTION OF MR. EBERSOLE GAINES AND HIS CHARMING WIFE, SHEILA, WHO WILL SHORTLY BE ARRIVING IN BERMUDA TO REPRESENT YOU AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
HAVING MET MR. GAINES DURING THE ENCAMPMENT AT THE BOHEMIAN CLUB
PAGE 02 RUCOSGG8387 UNCLAS HAMILTON 0891
EARLIER THIS SUMMER, I HAVE FOUND HIM TO BE A PERSON OF GREAT WARMTH, ENORMOUS INTEGRITY AND SOMEONE WHOM I BELIEVE WILL PROVE TO BE AN EXCELLENT APPOINTEE AS UNITED STATES CONSUL GENERAL IN BERMUDA.
I CAN ASSURE THE NEW UNITED STATES CONSUL GENERAL FOR BERMUDA AND HIS WIFE A VERY WARM WELCOME ON THEIR ARRIVAL AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL MAINTAIN AND, INDEED STRENGTHEN THE LONG AND FRIENDLY TIES WHICH HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THOSE IN BERMUDA.
IN CLOSING, AND RECOGNIZING THE INCREASINGLY PERSUASIVE NATURE OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE, PERMIT ME TO WISH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES MUCH SUCCESS IN YOUR WAR ON DRUGS EVEN AS WE IN BERMUDA CONTINUE

PAGE 02 OF 02

TO TAKE UP ARMS IN A SMALLER BUT NO LESS REAL FIGHT HERE IN THESE ISLANDS.
WITH KINDEST PERSONAL REGARDS.
YOURS SINCERELY.
"JOHN"
JOHN W. SWAN
END TEXT
2. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL IS BEING POUCHED TO EUR/NE.
RUSSELL
PAGE 03 RUCOSGG8387 UNCLAS HAMILTON 0891
BT
#8387

Translation

The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, September 1989

His Excellency
Mr George Bush,
President of the United States
of America,

Washington, D.C.

Dear George,

Thank you very much for your letter of 22 August on the situation in Panama. I too have been following with growing concern the continuing refusal to respect the fundamental rules of democracy, the moral crisis besetting the armed forces, and the lack of respect for human rights in that country.

As you perhaps know, my government has publicly and strongly condemned the rigging and annulment of the election result of 7 May. It welcomed the efforts of the Organization of American States to play an intermediary role and to elaborate elements of a peaceful and democratic solution.

I share your view that the community of all democratic States must now react unequivocally to the failure of those efforts, which was intended by those who hold power in Panama. Please find enclosed the statement which my government issued on 1 September. Our Ambassador in Panama communicated it formally to the Panamanian Foreign Ministry. My government is in regular contact with our European partners in order to discuss the options for joint responses.

Sincerely,

(sgd) Helmut Kohl

Translation

Bonn, 1 September 1989

Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the crisis in Panama

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is following with growing concern the heightened crisis of democracy and human rights in Panama.

It recalls the joint statement by the Twelve of 11 May 1988 and strongly appeals once more to the present rulers of Panama to open the way for internal peace and democracy.

The Federal Government remains convinced that only a peaceful settlement can be considered and that the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) on 17 May as well as the statement by the Chairman of the OAS Council of 20 July indicate the right path to follow.

These declarations based on the consensus of all OAS members envisage the following steps:

- General Noriega's withdrawal from his current position of power,
- formation of a transitional government on 1 September 1989,
- new elections without delay,
- termination of the measures taken by the US Government in the light of the crisis in Panama.

The OAS resolutions underscore a fundamental principle: The continued denial of basic democratic rights cannot be justified in any way, not even by invoking the legitimate interest in preserving national sovereignty.

If no government is formed in accordance with the constitution, this will have repercussions on our bilateral relations with Panama.

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 21. September 1989

Seiner Exzellenz
dem Präsidenten der Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika
Herrn George Bush

Washington, D.C.

Lieber George,

für Ihren Brief vom 22. August 1989 zur Lage in Panama danke ich Ihnen sehr. Auch ich habe die fortgesetzte Verweigerung der Wahrung demokratischer Grundregeln, die moralische Krise des Militärs und die mangelnde Achtung der Menschenrechte in diesem Land mit wachsender Sorge verfolgt.

Wie Sie vielleicht wissen, hat meine Regierung die Verfälschung und Annullierung der Wahlen vom 7. Mai 1989 öffentlich mit allem Nachdruck verurteilt. Sie hat das Engagement der Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten, vermittelnd zu wirken und Elemente einer friedlichen und demokratischen Lösung auszuarbeiten, begrüßt.

Wie Sie bin ich der Meinung, daß die Gemeinschaft aller demokratischen Staaten jetzt unmißverständlich auf das von den Machthabern in Panama gewollte Scheitern dieser Bemühungen reagieren muß. Ich füge die Erklärung bei, die die von mir geführte Bundesregierung am 1. September 1989 herausgegeben hat. Unsere Botschaft in Panama hat diese Erklärung dem dortigen Außenministerium förmlich übermittelt. Meine Regierung steht im übrigen weiterhin mit unseren europäischen Partnern in Kontakt, um über die Optionen gemeinsamer Reaktionen zu beraten.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Bonn, den 1. September 1989

Erklärung der Bundesregierung zur Krise in Panama

Die Bundesregierung verfolgt mit wachsender Sorge die verschärfte Krise der Demokratie und der Menschenrechte in Panama.

Sie erinnert nochmals an die gemeinsame Erklärung der Zwölf vom 11. Mai 1988 und appelliert erneut eindringlich an diejenigen, die jetzt in Panama die Macht ausüben, den Weg zum inneren Frieden und zur Demokratie freizumachen.

Die Bundesregierung tritt weiter dafür ein, daß nur eine friedliche Lösung in Betracht kommt und daß die Resolution der Organisation der Amerikanischen Staaten (OAS) vom 17. Mai und die Erklärung des Ratsvorsitzenden der OAS vom 20. Juli den richtigen Weg weisen.

Diese von allen Mitgliedern der OAS im Konsens getragenen Erklärungen sehen die folgenden Schritte vor:

- Verzicht General Noriegas auf seine jetzige Machtposition
- Bildung einer Übergangsregierung am 1. September 1989
- Neuwahlen in kürzester Frist
- Beendigung der von der US-Regierung im Hinblick auf die Krise in Panama getroffenen Maßnahmen.

Die Resolutionen der OAS unterstreichen eine fundamentale Norm:

Die fortgesetzte Verweigerung demokratischer Grundrechte ist durch nichts zu rechtfertigen, auch nicht durch Berufung auf das berechtigte Anliegen der Wahrung der nationalen Souveränität.

Falls keine Regierung entsprechend der Verfassung gebildet wird, wird dies Auswirkungen auf unsere bilateralen Beziehungen zu Panama haben.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01q. Letter	President Sarney to President Bush [Portuguese] (2 pp.)	9/4/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (October 1989) [2]

Date Closed:	3/20/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91124-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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01r. Letter	President Sarney to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	9/4/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
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AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8023

October 12, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON

SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence

Brent:
I "sat" on Von this morning to keep these letters moving -- unless we do we'll have to reconsider the idea of this twice weekly summary and compilation. Von has re-assigned his people and I don't think we'll go 9 days again before seeing another report!
Philip

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence materials received by the Secretariat since Tuesday, October 3rd.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary (Tab I) to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Summary for the President
- Tab A Thatcher - Britain
- Tab B Delors - EC Commission
- Tab C Mulroney - Canada
- Tab D Ozal - Turkey
- Tab E Delamuraz - Switzerland
- Tab F Kaifu - Japan
- Tab G Mubarak - Egypt
- Tab H Thatcher - Britain
- Tab I Fahd - Saudi Arabia
- Tab J Swan - Bermuda
- Tab K Kohl - Germany
- Tab L Sarney - Brazil

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1006-MR
2/25/2014 MM

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908871
RECEIVED: 02 NOV 89 19

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: CZARNIECKI, ZDZISLAW

DOC DATE: 10 OCT 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND AP

4

PERSONS: JARUZELSKI, WOJCIECH

SUBJECT: LTR PROTESTING AGAINST INVITATION OF JARUZELSKI TO VISIT US

ACTION: NFAR PER HUTCHINGS DUE DATE: 06 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD CLOSED BY: NSJRP DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

CHRON FILE

USC

Solidarność Na Emigracji

(Solidarity In Exile)

3157-59 Thompson St.
Philadelphia, PA 19134

8871

HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

October 10,1989

Dear Mr. President,

We are vigorously protesting against the invitation of General Wojciech Jaruzelski to visit The United States. We are requesteing the reversal of this decision. General Jaruzelski is not a representative of The Polish People. Conversly he is their enemy. It was his decision that caused the collapse of the Polish economy. He is responsible for the death of Father Popieluszko and many Polish patriots, for their incarcerations, beat up and exiles.

It was he, who declared war on his own people introducing Martial Law on December 13, 1981. Among others he is guilty of supresing the Democratic Movement in Czekoslovakia in 1968. It was he, who appearing at hearing of a Solidarity Parliamentary Committee testified that all of these decisions were made by him and that he does not regret them.

If you chose to invite such a man to the U.S.A. why would you not invite Kadafi or Noriega?

Respectively Yours,

Zdzislaw Czarniecki
President

Organizacja zarejestrowana w Departamencie Stanu 23 maja 1988 pod nr 1037194
The Organization has been registered in The State Department on May 23, 1988. Reg. # 1037194

45 PRINCIPLES OF ENSLAVEMENT

[The following document is an English translation of Russian instructions which were just recently made public in one of Poland's opposition publications. The document was originally found in the chancery of Boleslaw Bierut, president of Poland's first post-war communist regime. From the instructions, one can clearly deduce that they were addressed to the local KGB section. A copy of the document somehow made its way to Poland's communist authorities. The path may not have been very convoluted considering that Bierut was a known agent of the NKVD (the predecessor to the KGB) in the years preceding World War II.

From the perspective of the past four decades, and in view of Poland's devastating economic tragedy, the text reveals the root of the existing intolerable conditions. It is horrifying to observe the uncanny precision with which a previously sovereign nation became totally subjugated to the wishes of its neighboring power. The detailed instructions were followed to the letter in the destruction of Poland's economy and the devastation of her natural environment; the subversion of all independent initiative and the defeat of self-determination of her people.]

Strictly Confidential
K.AA/OC 113

Moscow, June 2, 1947

INSTRUCTION NK/003/47

[Translation of a document found in the chancery of B. Bierut]

1. The Embassy shall not serve for the purpose of meeting with native informers. Meetings with these people are to be coordinated by our special services in public places. Information shall be delivered to the Embassy by means of our special services.

2. Special care must be taken to prevent any contacts between our military and the local civilian population. It shall be specifically prohibited to allow visitations by our officers corps in the homes of the natives, or any contacts by our troops with local women, the populace or native troops.

3. Expedite the liquidation of all natives associated with the following organizations which were founded outside of our initiative: KPP, PPS, the "Walterites", KZMP, AK, BCH and others. Utilize as a pretext the existence of armed resistance.

4. See to it that all members of the former Kosciuszko Army [Polish Army under Soviet Command during WWII] are selectively delegated to first line combat duty. Carry out their total liquidation.

5. Expedite the unification of all political parties under one organization, and see to it that all key positions are filled with individuals certified by our special services.

6. Carry out the unification of all youth organizations under one group and fill all positions from County level and higher with individuals certified by our special services. Until complete unification, liquidate all known Scouting leaders.

7. See to it that the mandates of party delegates to Party Congresses do not exceed the term of office of their elected Party Authorities. In any event, the delegates must not be allowed to conduct inter-enterprise meetings. In cases necessitating such meetings, it is imperative to eliminate all individuals who have actively demonstrated a capacity to propose ideas and present demands. In all successive Congresses, elect new candidates (by way of managed grass-roots movements) who are to be selected by our special services.

8. It is necessary to take special note of all individuals who demonstrate unique organizational skills and who display the capacity to attract popularity. Such individuals must be won over. In the event of refusal, they must not be allowed to attain higher positions.

9. Take definitive steps such that all government positions (except for the police and the mining industry) are low paying. Especially in the case of the health services, the justice and education departments, and managerial positions of all levels.

10. Install those collaborating with our special services in all sections of government (without the knowledge of the domestic authorities).

11. It is necessary to take special care that the local press does not report the quantities and the types of goods sent to our country. Also, this must not be referred to as trade. See to it that the local press does emphasise the overall quantities of goods sent by us to the local populace as part of bilateral trade.

12. Influence the domestic authorities to preclude the conveyance of property ownership, and instead, replace it with qualified grants.

13. Direct the policies dealing with private farming such that the operation of family farms becomes unprofitable and their productivity continually decreases. In the next phase, introduce forced collectivization. In the event of strong opposition, decrease supplies to the rural areas while, simultaneously, increasing obligations to the state. If this doesn't help, take steps which will prevent the agricultural sector from fully covering the needs of the local populace, and bring about the dependence of the country on imported agricultural commodities.

14. Take specific steps such that the language of all decrees , and judicial, economic, and organizational acts (with the exception of the military) is purposefully vague.

15. Take steps such that in all matters, multiple commissions and public institutions are formed. However, none of them shall have the authority to implement its decisions without consulting with the other institutions. (This does not include the mining industry).

16. Workers' self-governing bodies cannot be permitted to have any impact on the decisions of their respective enterprises. They may only be allowed to consider those matters dealing with the implementation of their assigned tasks.

17. Labor unions cannot be permitted to question management's orders. Labor unions must be burdened with other assignments such as: organization of workers' vacations, the management of material supplies, activity in the fields of recreation and education, and the organization of group tours. In addition, they must be made responsible for the distribution of sought-after goods and the acknowledgment of management's opinions and its decisions.

18. Steps must be taken to selectively advance the careers of those workers and managers who flawlessly execute their assigned responsibilities, and who do not exhibit any inclination towards analyzing those matters beyond their immediate sphere of activity.

19. Specific conditions must be created which will allow all native individuals at all managerial levels within the Party, government, as well as the economic sectors to discredit themselves by their own actions in the eyes of their subordinates, and thus precluding any attempt on their part to return to their indigenous environments.

20. The native officers corps can be permitted to fill positions of responsibility only in cases where our special services have previously penetrated the area of interest.

21. Extreme care must be taken to guard all ammunition supplies. Keep

careful records of its disbursement for training purposes.

22. All research laboratories and scientific research institutes must be kept under strict surveillance.

23. Special attention must be focused on all aspects of innovations and the patent processes through their active support. All inventions must be carefully documented and forwarded to the central authorities. Only those inventions which serve the purpose of further development of the mining industries, semi-finished products, and those addressed in special Instructions are allowed to be implemented. Those innovations which would aid the increase in productivity, or to disregard the execution of specific directives cannot be allowed to be implemented. In cases of well-publicized inventions, cause the sale of their rights to foreign buyers. No detailed documentation, nor any press releases describing the effective value of various inventions may be allowed to reach the public.

24. Create disorder in the time schedules of the transport industry (except in the case of those sectors specifically addressed in Instruction NK-522-46).

25. Popularize special problem-solving conferences and document all resolutions, proposals, as well as record the names of their originators. However, continue to implement policies detailed in specific Instructions.

26. Popularize interviews with workers focusing on burning production-related issues and which result in expressed criticism of past practices and current trouble spots. However, causes of said concerns must not be addressed.

27. Public statements by the natives may contain materials with historical highlights but they cannot lead to the unification of the spirit of the nation.

28. Take special pains in preventing the construction of new water works projects based on independent water supplies. All previously constructed water works must be systematically liquidated.

29. During the construction and expansion of industrial projects, take active measures to direct all discharges into potential sources of water supplies.

30. The housing industry cannot be allowed to construct auxiliary structures near apartment blocks which could shelter livestock or be used to stockpile sizable food supplies.

31. Take all necessary steps such that all private industry and crafts receive only inferior quality raw materials, and the prices for their products are higher than the corresponding state-produced items.

32. State bureaucracy at all levels must continue to grow at its maximum. Criticism of the administration may be allowed, but the bureaucracy cannot be allowed to be diminished or its efficiency improved.

33. Planned production levels in the mining industries and those sectors detailed in special Instructions must be fulfilled, without allowing its benefits to reach the consumer market.

34. The Church must be carefully monitored while the efforts of the media and educational sectors directed so as to create a general loathing of the institution. All Church-operated print shops, libraries, archives, sermons, carols, and religious education and funeral rites must be especially monitored and controlled.

35. Take steps to eliminate popular educators from elementary and technical schools, and especially high schools and institutes of higher learning. Their places must be filled with special appointees. Take active measures to eliminate any correlation between educational subjects; limit the publication of source materials; and eliminate classes in Latin, Greek, philosophy, logic, and genetics from high school curriculums. The teaching of history must preclude all references to the accomplishments or proposed intent of past

rulers for the good of the country, and instead, it must stress the tyranny of its rulers and class struggle. Vocational schools must focus on narrow specializations.

36. Stimulate the trend towards official celebrations of the struggle of the natives against the partitioning powers (with the exception of the struggle against Russia), and especially against the Germans, and all struggle towards socialism.

37. Any publications relating the experiences of the natives who stayed in our country - up to and including the Revolution and World War II - must not be allowed.

38. In case of the emergence of any organization in support of the alliance with our country but attempting to gain control of the official economic decision-making process, immediate steps must be taken (regardless of the actions of the domestic authorities) to condemn these groups of nationalism and chauvinism. Proposed form of activity: destruction of our monuments and cemeteries; publication of leaflets deriding our nation, our culture, and the merits of existing international accords. The propaganda activities should enlist the help of the natives by exploiting their hatred towards us.

39. Attention must be focused on the construction of an extensive network of bridges, roads and other means of access which in the event requiring military intervention may allow for rapid access to all points of concentration of the opposing forces.

40. Secure the arrest of all political opponents. Identify all opponents who exhibit an air of authority among the natives. Liquidate them by means of so-called accidental situations before they become famous, or force their early arrest based on criminal charges.

41. Those convicted in political trials, cannot be allowed to be rehabilitated. In instances necessitating rehabilitation, this may be allowed only under the condition that the case is attributed to judicial error, and no counter suit is brought forth with associated indictments of those guilty of the error (judges, witnesses, accusers, informers).

42. Those in managerial positions who were nominated by the Party cannot be allowed to be prosecuted as a result of their actions which had caused economic losses or the alienation of their subordinates. In extreme cases, they must be discharged and transferred to other localities with equal or higher level of authority. In extremely rare instances, they must be recalled from their assignments and treated as reserve material for future transfers.

43. The trials of those individuals in managerial positions (the military, ministerial level, central management, the educational sector) accused of crimes against the people, against socialism, and against industrialization, must be widely publicized. This will rally the vigilance of the working masses.

44. Take steps towards the managerial advancement of those individuals with the lowest qualifications.

45. Initiate measures which will generate the influx of people from the lowest social groups to the institutes of higher learning, and who do not exhibit any professional interests but only want to secure a college diploma.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 11, 1989

4

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA/CONDI RICE AAB CR

SUBJECT: Restoring the Spotlight on Eastern Europe

The President's October 4 intitiatives on Poland and Hungary, along with the active work of recent days on Capitol Hill, have begun restoring Presidential leadership on Eastern Europe. However, the events in Panama last week stole the limelight and precluded the President's making the announcement concerning Poland personally. As you agreed, we need to do more to raise public awareness of the Administration's policy with regard to Eastern Europe. This requires enhancing the President's personal role and visibility.

Coming up over the next several weeks are a number of events that can help spotlight the President's personal involvement and support for reform in Eastern Europe:

October 11: Cossiga visit; the arrival statement already includes some focus on Eastern Europe, and the press statement at the end of the visit can be used to highlight President's campaign to enlist European support for the $1 billion balance of payments support fund for Poland.

October 19: Gonzalez visit; use can be made of the Spanish and US statements to the press at the end of the visit, or we could work towards a joint statement on Eastern Europe. Spain's recent, highly successful transition to democracy is a directly pertinent peg.

announce mission to Poland. Appropriate candidates

Late October: presentation of the Republican initiative on Poland and Hungary in the Senate, and/or the President's action to bestow permanent MFN on Hungary. The latter could involve a signing ceremony and remarks by the President in the presence of interested Congressmen and leaders from the two ethnic groups.

Late October: the dispatching of the Presidential Mission to Poland can also serve for remarks by the President to wish the Mission well, as part of their White House briefing session.

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Late October: the naming by the President of a US Coordinator for Poland and Hungary can serve as the occasion for a White House Press Office statement highlighting his mandate and the importance the President attaches to it.

November 3: the Poszgay visit offers obvious opportunities to show the President's interest in reform. To highlight it further, the President could offer Poszgay lunch and/or walk out with him at the end of the visit to encounter the press jointly.

November 13-15: Walesa visit; also offers evident opportunities, but we should be careful to ensure that the President, not Walesa, is seen as being in the driver's seat.

Late November: the Group of 24 meeting currently scheduled for this period could be raised to a more senior level, perhaps sending Larry Eagleburger rather than a Deputy Assistant Secretary.

In addition to these events already in the pipeline, there are two or three other possibilities for November or December: a major speech by Secretary Baker or by the President, a visit by Mazowiecki to the US, and a ministerial-level pledging session of the G-24 (already agreed in principle for late December if the Poles and the IMF have reached agreement by then).

Assuming that you agree, and the President concurs, with the idea of making full use of the events already in the pipeline, there remain two additional options:

1. A fuller events strategy. This would involve seeking out or designing additional events in November and December, such as sessions with journalists, meetings with Americans of Eastern European ethnic background, etc. The target would be to have the President take, and be seen as taking, at least 30 minutes a week on Eastern Europe for the next two or three months. For those weeks in which no pertinent event was already scheduled, an attempt would be made -- without stretching -- to design one. On balance, we are inclined towards this option, which fits with a suggestion Jim Cicconi has discussed informally with Condi.

2. A major Presidential speech. At present, there is no natural occasion in sight, although a forum could easily be created at the Council on Foreign Relations or elsewhere. However, with no new initiatives to present, the President would have to deliver a

conceptual speech. An alternative might be a speech by Secretary Baker. In either case, it would be hard to ensure dominant news attention.

Tim Deal and Ginny Lampley concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve option 1.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 13, 1989

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: DEANE E. HOFFMANN DH

SUBJECT: IEPR Breakfast, October 13, 1989

Philippines: Baker asked State and NSC to find out what was going on with the debt for bases plan. Everyone agreed it seemed like a bad idea both in the individual case and as a precedent. (I will talk with Karl Jackson.)

Poland: Brady was unhappy that a tentative list of individuals for the Poland mission went forward without his approval. We did talk with Treasury about names prior to forming the list. I assured Brady that Treasury would have final say. He was also concerned about CEA involvement critiquing the Polish economic package; it is properly a Treasury issue in his view. We faxed the private sector list to Treasury and sent copies to CEA, Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce for comment. We may want to have a small Deputies meeting next week with Sununu to give the list a final scrub.

Costa Rican Debt: Treasury said that there was less than a 50 percent chance for a deal prior to the Summit. Baker said there were enough agenda items that debt would not dominate.

Ivory Coast: Baker seemed to get Treasury concurrence for a yes vote on a World Bank loan.

cc: Karl Jackson
David Miller
Bill Pryce
Adrian Basora

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2009-1007-MR
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1989

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SCS 6/13/13

10/19/89 4 1/3

MEETING WITH
SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ

DATE: October 19, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office/Cabinet Room
TIME: 11:00 am - 12:30 pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To further consolidate US-Spanish relations, to enlist Gonzalez in our efforts to aid reform in Poland and Hungary, and to assure his continuing help on Panama and Nicaragua.

II. BACKGROUND

Although he has been Prime Minister for seven years, Gonzalez has made only one official visit to Washington (1983). He was initially distrustful of the US and his relationship with the Reagan Administration was strained. The resolution of our base negotiations last fall, however, has removed the primary bilateral irritant. Since the agreement was signed (December 1), Gonzalez has clearly wanted to turn over a new leaf. Defense Minister Serra stressed this point during his call on me last week, and our Embassy in Madrid reports that the Spaniards are implementing fairly the new base agreement and seeking in general to be accommodating in the bilateral relationship.

Felipe Gonzalez has steadily grown in the job and gradually become more committed to integrating Spain fully into Europe and, more hesitantly, into the Western alliance. He has also increasingly sought a statesman's role in both Europe and Latin America. Spain's EC Presidency earlier this year won high praise, and Gonzalez hopes that his visit to Washington will help to project him even further as an important player, not only on Latin America but on East-West and West-West issues as well.

Your own agenda on Poland and Hungary, and on the Soviet Union, fits nicely with this goal and with Gonzalez' need to prepare for a Gorbachev visit early in 1990. Also, King Juan Carlos was in Poland earlier this month. In view of Spain's own successful and recent transition to democracy and away from a statist economy, Spain could well make a significant substantive input to the reform effort. Spain's

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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financial contribution to the $1 billion stabilization fund will presumably be modest based on the level of its economy. However, it is worth pushing for as generous as possible a contribution, as well as encouraging Spain to do all it can in terms of training and other forms of experience-sharing. Gonzalez could also be an advocate for generous aid by the more affluent members of the EC Twelve.

You will also want to discuss US-Soviet relations, your security and arms control agenda, US-EC relations, and Panama, Nicaragua and Colombia. Gonzalez in turn may raise the Middle East peace process. Should he raise the issue of the timing of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing's transfer from Torrejon AFB to Crotone, Italy, you should indicate awareness of our commitment to move it by May 1992, but imply that any delays in preparation of the new base are a matter for discussion within NATO.

Gonzalez has been very responsive to the personal attention you have paid him in recent months. If he senses in this visit that you see him as an important interlocutor not only on Latin America but also on major trans-Atlantic issues, he could prove to be quite helpful in both areas.

On September 1, Gonzalez called elections for October 29, eight months before required. He clearly hopes to ride to a third consecutive legislative majority on the strength of Spain's booming economy, his own high standing in the polls, and the weakness and division of the opposition. His chances of success are excellent, and his visit to Washington is likely to further enhance them.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.


IV. PRESS PLAN

-- Open photo, writing pool
-- White House photographer
-- Open Press
-- Oval Office meeting
-- Cabinet Room meeting
-- Departure

V. SEQUENCE

-- One-on-one meeting in the Oval Office
-- Expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room
-- Departure statements at Diplomatic Entrance

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography
Tab D Secretary of State Memo


DOOR
DOOR
DOOR
Basora
Gates
Aviles-Casco
Scowcroft
Conde
Cheney
Fernandez-Ordonez
Baker
Gonzalez
The President
Solchaga
The Vice President
Santamaria
Brady
Mirapeix
Sununu
Yanez
Zappala
Seitz
The Cabinet Room

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH

PRIME MINISTER GONZALEZ

GENERAL

-- I attach great importance to a strong relationship with Spain and welcome our close dialogue on a wide spectrum of global and regional issues.

-- I am delighted you could come now, in spite of the election campaign. How do you see the election shaping up?

SPAIN'S EC PRESIDENCY

-- I congratulate you on a very able EC Presidency. Your cooperation with the United States was superb and much appreciated.

-- As a result, we strengthened our ties with the Community and deepened our bilateral relations.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

-- We have entered an era of historic transition in Europe.

-- Our relationship with the Soviet Union has as an objective to move beyond containment to increasingly greater cooperation.

-- We have reassured the Soviets that although we fully support the process of political and economic reform in Eastern Europe, we do not want these changes to be a threat to anyone, including the Soviet Union.

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-- The Soviets have accepted that explanation. They have told us they do not intend to use force to block reform in Eastern Europe. They have also said they do not intend to use force to put down agitation by Soviet nationalities.

-- While we welcome their increasing independence in foreign policy, for our part, we have not urged Poland or Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact.

-- We are faced with an historic opportunity to encourage and assist change in Eastern Europe. Western aid is critical to maintain the momentum for reform; we should focus on programs which will promote long-term, sustainable change.

-- The EC Commission is off to a good start in coordinating our efforts. The September 26 "Group of 24" meeting in Brussels was very useful in helping to ensure that we find the resources, collectively and individually, to see these historic experiments through to success.

-- The Poles have requested a $1 billion fund to back up their economic stabilization plan. I have requested a $200 million grant from Congress for this fund, contingent upon agreement on an IMF program.

-- I hope that Spain will contribute generously to this fund and encourage the other major EC countries to contribute very generously as well.

-- Given Spain's successful transition to democracy and its rapid economic modernization, I would think you could offer the Poles and Hungarians invaluable insights and learning opportunities.

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- I appreciate your counsel and assistance on Central America and Panama.

-- I welcome your recent initiative to put forward new ideas on Panama. We want a democratic solution there as soon as possible.

-- For this to happen, Noriega must go. I have exercised restraint, and have taken a lot of criticism here at home for it. In view of that, it is more important than ever to keep up international pressure on Noriega, and Spain's role is important.

-- In Nicaragua, the February election could be a turning point, but only if it is an honest referendum. International observers from Spain and other European countries will play a vital role in ensuring the free exercise of the will of the people.

-- New economic aid to the Nicaraguan Government should wait until after the February election if there is to be any good prospect for an honest contest in which the opposition has a fair chance to compete.

-- However, direct and indirect aid to the Chamorro/Godoy ticket is critical to leveling the playing field in Nicaragua. We hope Spain can help.

-- The Soviets have assured us that they have ended the direct supply of arms to Nicaragua. They are technically complying thus far, but large amounts of Soviet Bloc arms and materiel continue to go to Nicaragua.

-- We pointed out to Defense Minister Yazov that this supply of weapons makes a mockery of the Soviet position.

-- Bloc and Cuban arms are also still reaching the Salvadoran guerrillas through Nicaragua.

-- The Sandinistas pledged to stop the supply at the Tela summit. We need to convince them that aid for subversion runs counter to the Esquipulas process and dims prospects for peace.

-- Ending such support is a prerequisite for improved relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR EXPANDED MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER GONZALEZ

GENERAL

-- Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to welcome you.

-- I am pleased to see you and your Foreign Minister again.

-- We have a lot to cover. Let me briefly address bilateral relations before turning to security and other issues.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

-- I consider our partnership with Spain very important. We want to continue to strengthen our ties on many fronts.

-- The new defense agreement has put our security relationship on a solid footing. We will work with you closely to implement the agreement in a true spirit of cooperation.

-- The Culture and Education Agreement we signed in May gives us a basis for increased cultural exchanges. We hope our negotiators can resolve remaining differences on a similar agreement for science and technology cooperation.

-- As I discussed with Crown Prince Felipe last month, the Columbus Quincentenary is an ideal field for joint cooperation.

-- We look forward to continuing to work together on counter-terrorism assistance for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and the Seville Expo.

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NATO SECURITY ISSUES/CFE

-- The visit of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze last month moved U.S.-Soviet relations forward with progress on START verification, stability measures and chemical weapons, a positive Soviet response to our "Open Skies" initiative, and an "Open Lands" initiative.

-- I appreciate your recent letter noting Spain's support for our efforts to conclude an agreement on chemical weapons.

-- At the May summit, the Alliance seized the initiative in the CFE negotiations. We need to maintain this momentum.

-- We have already tabled a full set of proposals in Vienna, which meet Spain's concerns that paramilitary forces be excluded, with only a few gaps on verification remaining to be put to the East.

-- We need to work hard in the Alliance to resolve open issues. We will then have a complete Alliance proposal on the table.

-- The East has shown clearly that it intends to negotiate in earnest. We can meet the timetable we set out in the May summit to achieve a CFE accord in six to twelve months with reductions to be implemented by 1992 or 1993.

-- At the same time we pursue arms reductions, we must also seek to strengthen NATO's defense capabilities.

-- In that regard, we welcome the progress Spain is making toward greater military participation in the Alliance.

U.S.- EC RELATIONS

-- We want to work closely with you and your EC colleagues to ensure that 1992 brings our economies even closer together and that European markets become more, rather than less, open.

-- I also want to further strengthen the overall partnership between the U.S. and the EC, both by resolving disputes amicably and by cooperating in common endeavors, such as Poland and Hungary.

COLOMBIA/ANTI-NARCOTICS COOPERATION

-- We are deeply concerned at the expansion of narcotics trafficking and related corruption throughout the region.

-- We hope Spain will play a leading role in mobilizing European support directed to the Andean countries, particularly to assist Colombia in its current offensive.

-- Our joint discussions on anti-narcotics cooperation have been useful. We share concern over the rise of narco-terrorism and the efforts to intimidate the government and judiciary of Colombia.

-- Your strong support for President Barco is important.

-- I encourage you to provide concrete assistance to Colombia. Spain's CASA 235 aircraft could make a vital contribution at this particular moment in Colombia's courageous battle against the drug traffickers.

-- With your experience in combatting Basque terrorists, Spain could also be particularly helpful in providing police training and judicial assistance to Colombia.

401ST TFW RELOCATION (If raised by Gonzalez only)

-- We are mindful of our obligations under the new defense agreement.

-- Questions related to the relocation to Italy of the 401st TFW are best discussed by the entire Alliance, since the decision to transfer the 401st TFW to Italy was taken by NATO.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
Joseph Zappala, U.S. Ambassador to Spain
Adrian Basora, Director for European Economic Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

Spain

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Fernandez Ordonez, Foreign Minister
Francisco Carlos Solchaga, Finance Minister
Rosa Conde, Minister/Government Spokesperson
Julian Santamaria, Spanish Ambassador to U.S.
Fernando Gomez Aviles-Casco, Secretary General of Commerce
Eudaldo Mirapeix, Foreign Ministry Director General for North America
Juan Antonio Yanez, International Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister and Notetaker
Mr. Lucarelli, Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: USSR Chronological Files
Subseries: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Soviet Power Collapse in Eastern Europe (October 1989) [2]

Date Closed:	3/20/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91124-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III

SUBJECT: Official Working Visit of President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, October 18-20, 1989

I. SETTING

- Bilateral relations are on the upswing following last year's contentious base negotiations. We have stepped up dialogue in key areas (Latin America, counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics efforts), with good results.

- Since Gonzalez last visited Washington in 1983, Spain has moved much closer to us and relations are generally good. But, relations are still surprisingly shallow for a NATO ally. Gonzalez wants a close dialogue with us on Latin America, and also seeks to be a valued interlocutor on a broad spectrum of issues, including East-West concerns.

- Entering the third year of an economic boom, Spain is becoming increasingly prosperous and self-confident. In 1992, the Columbus Quincentenary year, Spain will host the Summer Olympics in Barcelona and Expo '92 in Seville.

- Gonzalez arrives in the middle of a political campaign. Seeking a new mandate before taking measures to slow down the overheated Spanish economy, he just called snap elections for October 29.

- Seven years in office have tarnished some of Gonzalez's luster, but the opposition remains weak and fragmented. Gonzalez is sure to retain control of the government, but could lose his parliamentary majority.

- If he falls short, Gonzalez may form a minority government rather than enter into a coalition. A weakened Socialist government would be a more difficult partner on security issues, but that would not jeopardize our new eight-year base agreement.

- For the first time since Franco's death, "U.S. bases" are not a hot electoral issue. Under our new defense

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agreement, we will maintain forces at Spanish bases in Rota, Zaragoza and Moron, but withdraw the 401st TFW from Torrejon outside Madrid.

- o NATO agreed to build a new base in Crotone, Italy, in order to keep the 401st TFW in Europe. Our agreement with Spain mandates removal from the Torrejon base by May 1992. With Crotone not ready until 1996, interim basing is a problem.

II. OBJECTIVES

- o Reinvigorate bilateral relations, while promoting effective follow-through on our base agreement and closer security cooperation in NATO.
- o Encourage Spanish support for Hungary and Poland.
- o Underscore the value of an open European market.
- o Engage Spain constructively in Latin America, particularly on Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia.
- o Seek Spanish support for a greater European role in anti-narcotics cooperation with the Andean nations.

III. STRATEGY

- o The base negotiations took a toll on bilateral relations, which your personal contacts with Gonzalez have helped to overcome. Unfortunately, our nearly exclusive focus on divisive issues for over two years has obscured other common ground.
  - -- Gonzalez will echo your desire for closer ties. He may seek your aid to wrap up negotiations for a science and technology agreement, now hung up on differences over intellectual property rights.
- o A major achievement of the base agreement was to put Spain's Socialists on record in favor of a strong U.S. military presence. But, securing equitable Spanish follow-through on the accord will be difficult.
  - -- Gonzalez needs to know of your interest in cooperating closely on implementation. If he raises the 401st TFW, I recommend that you deflect discussion of its relocation to Crotone by suggesting that the issue be handled within NATO.

- o Spain is moving toward greater military cooperation with NATO while remaining outside the integrated command structure. Gonzalez favors a strong European defense pillar to reduce U.S. dominance of NATO.

  -- Gonzalez will welcome your desire to enhance political consultations in NATO. Your quiet encouragement can reinforce the trend toward Spanish military participation in the Alliance.

- o Spanish-Soviet relations are improving. Gorbachev will visit Madrid in early 1990. Gonzalez will want your views on U.S.-Soviet relations, and he may argue that Gorbachev needs greater Western support to survive. Spain believes its transition has lessons for Hungary and Poland. We should point Spain toward economic and trade support of reform in Eastern Europe.

- o Spain won good marks for its first EC presidency this year. At the EC summit, Gonzalez's diplomacy overcame differences concerning the European Monetary System.

- o Spain worries that U.S. efforts to reduce agricultural subsidies and open markets could hurt its farmers. Gonzalez may raise Trade Act "unilateralism."

  -- You could emphasize the benefits of reducing trade barriers everywhere and that LDCs would particularly gain from reduced farm subsidies.

- o Your efforts with Gonzalez have begun to narrow our differences on Latin America. Supportive of the U.S. on Panama and Colombia, Spain is more tolerant of Nicaragua and Cuba than we would like. Spain declined to sponsor a new European donors conference for Nicaragua, but may be prepared to participate if another host is found.

  -- Gonzalez needs to hear our concerns that Nicaragua's election be honest and that all parties have an equitable chance to compete. At Spain's request, we asked the Dominican Republic to expel Basque terrorists. We, in turn, should ask Gonzalez to press Nicaragua and Cuba to stop arming the Salvadoran guerrillas. You should seek his latest ideas on Panama.

- o We recently established joint consultations with Spain and Italy on anti-narcotics support for Colombia. Gonzalez will be open to an appeal for Spain to stimulate EC assistance to Andean drug producer nations.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 14, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA AAB

SUBJECT: Official Working Visit of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, Thursday, October 19, 1989, 11:00-13:15

Attached at Tab I is your memo to the President for the visit. In keeping with our suggestion that the President's support for reform in Poland and Hungary be spotlighted as suitable occasions arise, we concur in State's proposal for a departure statement. Although the statement touches upon some of the other issues to be discussed with Gonzalez, the emphasis is on Poland and Hungary. Spain's recent transition to democracy and towards a fully market-based economy makes this appropriate, as does Gonzalez' interest in being seen as a statesman with an international role beyond Latin America.

As you know, the President's personal attentions to Gonzalez and his genuinely consultative style have had a real impact. A gesture that the President could make this time would be to spend longer than the scheduled 10 minutes in the one-on-one portion of their meeting, preferably 30 minutes or more. This is Gonzalez' own style when he receives foreign leaders at the Moncloa, and his advance team stressed how much he would appreciate it if the President did the same.

Now that our difficult base negotiations are resolved, the way is clear for a much more positive bilateral relationship. While Gonzalez' instincts on East-West relations are still rather Genscherite, his mind is not closed and in any case he wants Spain to be seen as part of the responsible majority within the NATO alliance. It is therefore worth engaging him substantially on East/West and alliance issues.

If the issue of possible delays in the transfer of the 401st TFW should arise, the President should indicate his awareness of our commitment, but also say that any such problem should be a matter for discussion within NATO.

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On Latin America, Gonzalez sees current US policy as being considerably closer to his own views than was the previous Administration. Nevertheless, he tends to place heavy reliance on persuasion rather than military or economic pressure, and on "Latin American solutions". It will thus be a tricky matter to get more active Spanish support for our objectives in Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador, yet probably worth trying.

In addition to his time at the White House, Gonzalez will have separate sessions with Secretaries Baker and Brady, and breakfast with the Vice President.

Concurrences by: Arnie Kanter, Tim Deal, William Pryce, Condi Rice, Richard Haass and David Miller } (all in draft) AHB

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography
Tab D Secretary of State Memo to the President

CHRON FILE

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908112
RECEIVED: 11 OCT 89 11

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TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MISSION TO POLAND

ACTION: OBE PER SECRETARIAT DUE DATE: 20 OCT 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL LOGREF: 8908469 8908636

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BLACKWILL
		DEAL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/20/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGAD CLOSED BY: NSJRP DOC 5 OF 5

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Presidential Mission to Poland

Purpose

To obtain your decisions on the leadership and composition of the Presidential mission to Poland.

Background

In response to Poland's urgent request for Western economic assistance, you approved sending a Presidential mission to Poland to help formulate a program for economic recovery. The principal tasks of this mission would be to:

-- establish a framework for channeling U.S. expertise, public and private, into sectors where it is needed and likely to prove most effective;

-- assess the Polish stabilization program and recommend how the $200 million in U.S. grants for stabilization purposes that you approved for Poland might be used most effectively;

-- develop a plan for longer-term assistance to Poland; and

-- recommend follow-up programs with specific time lines and goals.

Poland's economic future will depend on the success of the new Polish government in overcoming serious structural problems in such areas as: agriculture, financial services, transportation, environment, industry, construction, and worker services.

It was agreed at last week's NSC meeting to put together a group of prominent representatives from business and the academic world who are expert in these and other areas crucial to Poland's recovery. They would spend several days in Poland and through meetings with government officials and others assess Poland's

cc: The Vice President
Chief of Staff

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SCS 6/3/13

needs in broad terms. Their report would, among other things, identify ways to develop plans for follow-up missions and potential investors in each priority sector over the next 6 months and the medium-term (1-3 years). The mission would report its findings to you and also share them with the 24-nation Concerted Action Group.

To launch this mission in the next two weeks, however, we need your decisions on several matters:

1. Mission Leadership: There are two possibilities: (a) a mission headed by Cabinet officers (Secretaries Yeutter, Mosbacher, and Dole and CEA Chairman Boskin), or (b) one led by Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger with participation at the Deputy/Under Secretary level in other agencies. I believe that the mission is likely to be more successful, and certainly more visible, if Cabinet members take part.

2. Private Sector Participation: Regardless of who heads the mission, I believe we should aim for private sector participation by CEOs and senior economists and other experts. A Presidential mission to an important country in the throes of historic change should be able to attract top-level representatives. A proposed list of such participants is at Tab A.

3. U.S. Coordinator: To ensure coordinated follow-up to the mission, you need to designate a Coordinator. The Coordinator would oversee public and private sector efforts and be the main point of contact with Poland and the G-24 countries, relevant international organizations, the Congress, and the media. While the Coordinator need not be a government official, I believe that it makes sense to designate someone in the Administration to watch closely the follow-on work. Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger would be a logical choice because of his extensive governmental and private sector experience and his key position within the Administration. Given his other responsibilities at State, Eagleburger will need a senior deputy to work full time on coordination and follow-up efforts in Poland.

4. Public Projection: The statement announcing the mission and the $200 million grant received only minimal press coverage because of the media focus on Panama. We could draw more public attention to the mission and your initiatives in Poland by having you greet the mission leaders and then offer remarks about your expectations for the mission. We would like your agreement to meet mission leaders for a brief photo opportunity and press session before they leave for Poland.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you invite Secretaries Yeutter, Mosbacher and Dole and CEA Chairman Boskin to head the mission to Poland.

   Approve _____

   Or, that Deputy Secretary Eagleburger lead it.

   Approve _____

2. That you approve (subject to their availability) the proposed list of private sector participants attached at Tab A.

   Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. That you designate Deputy Secretary Eagleburger as the U.S. Coordinator.

   Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. That you agree to meet the leaders of the mission before their departure for Poland.

   Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Proposed List of Private Sector Participants

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Presidential Mission to Poland

Leaders

Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Labor
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Deputy Secretary of State

Other USG Representatives

Treasury, Under Secretary for International Affairs
NSC, Deane Hoffmann

Private Sector Representatives

Agriculture	-	Ray Goldberg, Harvard D. Gale Johnson, University of Chicago Michael Harper, Chairman and CEO, ConAgra Inc.
Construction	-	James Rouse, former CEO, the Rouse Company
Economic Policy	-	Herbert Stein, American Enterprise Institute Arnold Harberger, University of Chicago
Energy	-	W. S. White, CEO, American Electric Power Roger Sant, CEO, Applied Energy Services
Environment	-	William Ruckelshaus, Chairman and CEO, Brown-Ferris Industries
Financial Services	-	John Reed, Chairman, Citicorp
Industry	-	David Roderick, Recent Chairman & CEO, USX Pa ul O'Neill, CEO, Alcoa John Akers, Chairman and CEO, IBM
Investment	-	Peter Peterson, Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations
Labor	-	Lane Kirkland, AFL-CIO
Light Industry	-	Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Ltd.
Management	-	Theodore Levett, Harvard Business School
Mining	-	Robert Quenan, President, Peabody Coal
Telecommunications	-	Paul Kozlowski, President and CEO, Contel Cellular
Transport	-	Drew Lewis, Chairman and CEO, Union Pacific Corporation
Other	-	Thomas Carroll, Chief Executive Officer, International Executive Service Corps

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CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1989 OCT 23 AM 7:41

October 23, 1989

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FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany

DATE: October 23, 1989

PURPOSE: To receive Chancellor Kohl's call and use the occasion to reiterate your request for a major FRG contribution to the $1 billion Polish stabilization fund

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: To be supplied by State Department

PHONE NUMBER: WHCA Head of State circuit -- Bonn

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +5

SUGGESTED TIME: 9:00 a.m. EDT October 23, 1989

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: The Chancellor's office mentioned only "general East-West issues"

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be made

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ADRIAN A. BASORA (Acting) AAB

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany

The FRG Chancellery has told us that Chancellor Kohl would like to call the President at 9:00 a.m. EDT Monday, October 23, to discuss "general East-West issues." These presumably include the recent convulsions in the GDR but may also be in response to the President's letter on aid to Poland (which the President should raise in any case). Kohl may also allude to press speculation about German reunification and the need for close consultation in responding to new developments.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

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2009-1007-MR
SCS 6/3/13

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR KOHL

-- I am delighted that you are recovering from your operation. I hope all is well with you.

-- I want to thank you for offering to send your specialized unit to help in San Francisco. It was a prompt and gracious offer -- communicated privately, between friends -- that has touched us all very deeply.

-- I have just returned from the San Francisco area. We are awaiting the results of the damage assessment before deciding what further assistance would be useful. We will let you know just as soon as those results are in.

-- On Poland, as I explained in my letter, I have asked our Congress to approve a $200 million grant, which will be our contribution to the $1 billion stabilization fund the Polish Government has requested.

-- We consider it vitally important to help Poland as it undertakes the very difficult economic reforms associated with an IMF agreement.

-- I hope the Federal Republic will make a major contribution to the stabilization fund, since the concept will be effective only if fully funded. (FYI: We believe an FRG contribution of $150-$200 million will be needed to generate the requisite support elsewhere.)

-- We are following developments in the GDR with great interest. I would be interested in hearing your impressions.

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SCS 6/13/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8721

October 30, 1989

coordination w/ mission leaders?

4

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA AHB

SUBJECT: Themes and Objectives for Presidential Mission to Poland

As Bob Gates requested, we have developed a set of points for use by private sector participants in the Mission as they respond to press and other inquiries. The points emphasize the basic purposes and mandate of the Mission and its relationship to the President's overall assistance program for Poland.

If you approve the transmittal of the themes and objectives paper to the participants, we would propose also to attach a few additional background items for their use: the Hamtramck speech, the October 4 White House Press Secretary Statement on aid to Poland, the President's October 30 remarks, and the Fact Sheet issued by the Press office the same day (all at Tab II).

Tim Deal concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve for transmittal to Mission participants the Themes and Objectives paper at Tab I, as well as the materials at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Themes and Objectives Paper
Tab II Background Items

THEMES AND OBJECTIVES FOR PRESIDENTIAL MISSION TO POLAND

-- Overall purposes of Mission:

-to provide President with recommendations as to the most effective use of U.S. assistance to Poland;

-to assist the Poles in refining their own economic restructuring program.

-- Timeframe: November 28-December 2 for Mission itself, with a report to the President promptly upon return.

-- Organization: Mission led by Secretaries Yeutter, Mosbacher, Dole and CEA Chairman Boskin; the group will consist of about 20 private sector chief executives, economists and other experts; it will break down into subgroups during its stay in Poland.

-- Mandate: to examine key sectors of the Polish economy in which the U.S. could help most, such as agriculture, business management, financial services and portions of industry, and to determine how reforms and improvements in these sectors relate to each other and to the overall Polish structural, macroeconomic and price reform program; to support privatization measures in the Polish economy.

-- Relationship to the President's assistance package for Poland: the Mission is in no sense a substitute for or a reason to delay the assistance program which the President has already sent to Congress; instead, the Mission will make recommendations to ensure that this assistance is used to best possible effect.

-- Follow-up: in addition to reporting to the President, the Mission will recommend possible sectoral follow-up actions and other ways to enhance the involvement of the American private sector in Poland's economic redevelopment.

-- Philosophy: as the President said on October 30, the President is committed to sustained support of the Polish reform effort; the Mission is an integral part of that effort, as is the $400 million-plus assistance package which he has sent to Congress.

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VERSION)

THEMES AND OBJECTIVES FOR PRESIDENTIAL MISSION TO POLAND

-- Overall purposes of Mission:
-to provide President with recommendations as to the most effective use of U.S. assistance to Poland;
-to assist the Poles in refining their own economic restructuring program.

-- Timeframe: November 29-December 2 for Mission itself, with a report to the President promptly upon return.

-- Organization: Mission led by Secretaries Yeutter, Mosbacher, Dole and CEA Chairman Boskin; the group will consist of 15-18 private sector chief executives, economists and other experts; it will break down into subgroups during its stay in Poland.

-- Mandate: to examine key sectors of the Polish economy in which the U.S. could help most, such as agriculture, business management, financial services and portions of industry; also, to study the overall Polish structural, macroeconomic and price reform program.

-- Relationship to the President's assistance package for Poland: the Mission is in no sense a substitute for or a reason to delay the assistance program which the President has already sent to Congress; instead, the Mission will make recommendations as to how best to ensure that this assistance is used to best possible effect.

-- Follow-up: in addition to reporting to the President, the Mission will recommend possible sectoral follow-up missions and other ways to enhance the involvement of the American private sector in Poland's economic redevelopment.

-- Philosophy: as the President said on October 30, the President is committed to sustained support of the Polish reform effort; the Mission is an integral part of that effort, as is the $400 million-plus assistance package which he has sent to Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 30, 1989

FACT SHEET

Presidential Mission to Poland

Since the beginning of this Administration, the President has taken a deep interest in the political and economic reforms occurring in Eastern Europe. In his April 17 speech at Hamtramck, Michigan, the President outlined U.S. support of the then-nascent reform process.

In July, after the first partially free elections in 40 years, the President traveled to Poland and pledged additional support for the reforms. In early September, he asked Congress for a $100 million Enterprise Fund for Poland, a $4 million technical assistance and labor training package, and a $15 million environmental assistance program. In addition, the President has extended an additional $108 million in emergency food aid at the urgent request of the new Polish government.


Reform in Poland has been dramatic. The government is now headed by a non-communist Prime Minister and it plans major economic reforms, some of which are already being implemented. In this respect, Poland has requested $1 billion in Western economic aid to stabilize the economy when the new government puts the more radical stabilization measures into effect early next year. In response, the President has requested of Congress $200 million in grants as the U.S. contribution to that stabilization fund, which will be tied to Poland's expected agreement with the IMF. The total Presidential assistance package for Poland is thus well in excess of $400 million.

In his continuing efforts to assist Polish reform, the President today announced the formation of a Presidential Mission to travel to Poland at the end of November to examine the new government's economic plan and to advise the President on the best ways of assuring the effective use of U.S. assistance. The Mission will be led by Secretaries Yeutter, Mosbacher and Dole and CEA Chairman Boskin. It will consist primarily of corporate and labor leaders, economists, and other experts from the private sector, including, among others, Lane Kirkland, Murray Wiedenbaum, Michael Harper (CONAGRA), John McGillacuddy (Manufacturers Hanover), Gale Johnson and Arnold Harberger (University of Chicago), Robert Giorgine (AFL-CIO), and Edward Moskal (Polish-American Congress).

The Mission will focus on those economic sectors where U.S. expertise and experience can be of greatest assistance -- agriculture, business management, industry, financial services -- as well as studying Poland's overall plan of structural, macroeconomic and price reforms. The Presidential Mission will report its findings to the President, and share them with the EC Commission and with others in the 24-nation "Group for Economic Assistance to Poland and Hungary." The Mission will depart on November 29 and return on December 2.

This initial Mission will be followed by experts' missions in key economic sectors. In addition, Administration economists will examine urgently the structural economic challenges Poland will face now and in the years ahead so that we can provide the most effective help possible to the Polish people in their reform efforts.

# # #



THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 30, 1989

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT CEREMONY FOR POLISH AMERICAN HERITAGE MONTH

The Rose Garden

1:20 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: To Secretary Yeutter and Secretary Mosbacher, Secretary Dole, Secretary Derwinski and Chairman Boskin, Ambassador Kinost, Ambassador Ed Rowny, it's a pleasure to be here. It's a great pleasure to see Lane Kirkland and Bob Georgine, Gale Johnson and Ed Moskal here.

The congressional delegation, I think, has been a little waylaid, but I was told that Mickey Edwards is going to be here and John Dingell, Robert Borski.

But let me just welcome you all to the Rose Garden on this beautiful fall day into an occasion marking the conclusion of Polish American Heritage Month, which links two people bound by admiration and affection. In one sense, we meet this afternoon to salute the values which united the United States and Poland, values like faith in God, respect for the family and hard work, and the belief that free expression will conquer tyranny. But in a larger way, we're here to honor the tide toward democracy that these values make possible. For in Poland, as elsewhere, the tide toward oppression is running out. The tide toward liberty is running in. The voice of freedom is the voice of Poland, and the voice of Poland is the voice of tomorrow.

When I was in Poland -- visited Poland last July, I heard the opportunity and self-government that make all things possible for a nation and a people. The Polish national anthem captured this when it proclaims, "Poland is not lost while Poles still live." And today it stirs the shopkeepers of Buffalo and the factory workers of Poznan. The small girl that I saw on a street corner in Gdansk -- tearful, joyous, an American flag stretched upward from her hand -- and she, too, knew that voice. And so does the aging woman in Chicago, teaching her grandchildren the languages of the two countries that she loves. She's the voice of Poland, resolute and proud.

In recent months, this voice has found new power. For by forming a noncommunist government, the first in Eastern Europe in more than 40 years, Poland herself has moved toward a new beginning. Historic political changes are leading to dramatic economic reforms, building new foundations of hope and prosperity, opening new boundaries of market and mind.

Let me say, we are inspired by these historic changes and also add, from the first, our administration has supported them by word and by deed. And that is why on April 17th at Hamtramck, shortly after the signing of the Roundtable Agreement in Poland, we announced a series of initiatives to open U.S. markets and encourage private investment and private sector loans there in Poland. And why, during my visit to Poland in July, we announced an additional package of measures to assist Poland's economic and political revival.

In Paris this summer, I proposed, and our economic summit partners agreed to, a plan for concerted Western action. In September, we asked Congress for a $100 million enterprise fund for

MORE

Poland and extended another $108 million in emergency food aid for Poland.

A good beginning? Yes. Certainly. But Poland needs -- and will have -- not only concerted Western action, but also sustained support for its democratic transition. For its turn towards democracy is historic: A crucial step, we hope, toward a Europe that is whole and free. And unprecedented. For never before has a communist country successfully changed from a state-controlled system to political pluralism, self-determination, and a market economy.

Last month, members of our administration met with key ministries in the new Polish government. They detailed their bold reform plan. And we asked the ministers how best to support them. And they requested as an essential part of their program $1 billion in Western economic aid to stabilize the economy as these radical reforms are implemented.

Our response took two forms. First, I asked Congress to approve $200 million in grants -- fully $1 in every $5 in Western stabilization funds requested by the Poles themselves. And we are urging our Western economic partners to make major contributions to this fund since the effort will work only if it is fully funded. And second, I announced that we would send to Warsaw a presidential mission, including U.S. officials, business and labor leaders, and experts to help ensure that Poland's economic recovery becomes a reality and assess how the United States can best help Poland help itself.

This must be and will be a bipartisan effort of the United States government. And today, I'm pleased to announce that this mission will be led by the Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher, Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole, and Council of Economic Advisors Michael Boskin. (Applause.)

And they will be joined by at least 15 outstanding chief executive officers, labor leaders, economists and other experts from the U.S. private sector. Several of them are with me on the dais today. And our team will meet with the key ministers of the Polish government and others involved in stimulating Poland's private sector and recommend to me how the economic support we will extend can best be utilized. It will focus on economic sectors where U.S. expertise and cooperation can indeed make a difference -- such as agriculture and business management and financial services.

And it will also look at Poland's overall economic situation and at the structural changes needed to make Poland prosper. For this we know: Poland's struggle has always been America's struggle. Maybe that's why it seems that Polish hearts and American hearts beat as one.

Historically -- for more than 200 years -- and geographically -- from Washington to Warsaw, and Krakow to Chicago -- Americans have echoed the voice of Poland. And we do so now, echoing her love of freedom and opportunity. And warmed by the glow from Poland's new flame of democracy, linking the lands of Chopin and Jefferson, Lincoln and Paderewski.

Let us keep that flame alive and use it to burn bright the friendship between our peoples so that Polish American Heritage Month symbolizes a better, richer life. A better life for all our children. A richer life for those who believe, as we do, in the liberty which sets men free.

Thank you very much. God bless Poland. And God bless the United States of America. Thank you all very, very much for coming. (Applause.)

END 1:28 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Hamtramck, Michigan)

For Immediate Release April 17, 1989

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO CITIZENS OF HAMTRAMCK

Hamtramck City Hall
Hamtramck, Michigan

11:53 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all very, very much. Cardinal Szoka, Your Eminence. Bob, thank you for the warm greeting to your wonderful community. Governor Blanchard -- it's an honor to have the Governor of the great state here. And I want to pay my respects to the members of the Michigan congressional delegation that came out here with me -- Senator Riegle, and several distinguished members of the House of Representatives sitting over here -- and also to Senator John Engler, who is the Majority Leader of the Michigan State Senate, and to other leaders -- elected leaders not only from your community, but in other parts of this state.

I'm delighted to be here. Bread and salt are both of the earth, an ancient symbol of a life leavened by health and prosperity. And in this same spirit, I wish you all the same. And now, if I may, I want to address at this important gathering the health and prosperity of a whole nation -- the proud people of Poland. (Applause.)

You know, we Americans are not mildly sympathetic spectators of events in Poland. We are bound to Poland by a very special bond -- a bond of blood, of culture, and shared values. And so it is only natural that as dramatic change comes to Poland we share the aspirations and excitement of the Polish people.

In my Inaugural Address, I spoke of the new breeze of freedom gaining strength around the world. "In man's heart," I said, "if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient leafless tree." (Applause.) I spoke of the spreading recognition that prosperity can only come from a free market and the creative genius of individuals. And I spoke of the new potency of democratic ideals -- of free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will.

And we should not be surprised that the ideas of democracy are returning with renewed force in Europe -- the homeland of philosophers of freedom whose ideals have been so fully realized in our great United States of America. And Victor Hugo said, "An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come." My friends, liberty is an idea whose time has come in Eastern Europe. And make no mistake about it. (Applause.)

For almost half a century, the suppression of freedom in Eastern Europe, sustained by the military power of the Soviet Union, has kept nation from nation, neighbor from neighbor. And as East and West now seek to reduce arms, it must not be forgotten that arms are a symptom, not a source, of tension. The true source of tension is the imposed and unnatural division of Europe.

How can there be stability and security in Europe and the world as long as nations and peoples are denied the right to determine their own future -- a right explicitly promised by

MORE

agreements among the victorious powers at the end of World War II? How can there be stability and security in Europe as long as nations, which once stood proudly at the front rank of industrial powers, are impoverished by a discredited ideology and stifling authoritarianism? The United States -- and let's be clear on this -- has never accepted the legitimacy of Europe's division. We accept no spheres of influence that deny the sovereign rights of nations. (Applause.)

And yet the winds of change are shaping a new European destiny. Western Europe is resurgent and Eastern Europe is awakening to yearnings for democracy, independence and prosperity. In the Soviet Union itself we are encouraged by the sound of voices long silent and the sight of the rulers consulting the ruled. We see new thinking in some aspects of Soviet foreign policy. We are hopeful that these stirrings presage meaningful, lasting and far more-reaching change.

So let no one doubt the sincerity of the American people and their government in our desire to see reform succeed inside the Soviet Union. We welcome the changes that have taken place and we will encourage -- continue to encourage greater recognition of human rights, market incentives, and free elections. (Applause.)

East and West are now negotiating on a broad range of issues, from arms reductions to the environment. But the Cold War began in Eastern Europe, and if it is to end, it will end in this crucible of world conflict -- and it must end. The American people want to see East and Central Europe free, prosperous and at peace. With prudence, realism and patience, we seek to promote the evolution of freedom -- the opportunities sparked by the Helsinki Accords and the deepening East-West contact.

In recent years, we have improved relations with countries in the region, and in each case, we looked for progress in international posture and internal practices -- in human rights, cultural openness, emigration issues, opposition to international terror.

While we want relations to improve, there are certain acts we will not condone or accept -- behavior that can shift relations in the wrong direction -- human rights abuses, technology theft and hostile intelligence or foreign policy actions against us.

Some regions are now seeking to win popular legitimacy through reforms. In Hungary, a new leadership is experimenting with reforms that may permit a political pluralism that only a few years ago would have been absolutely unthinkable. And in Poland, on April 5th, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and Interior Minister Kiszczak signed agreements that, if faithfully implemented, will be a watershed in the postwar history of Eastern Europe.

Under the auspices of the Roundtable Agreements, the free trade union Solidarnosc was today -- this very day, under those agreements -- Solidarnosc was today formally restored. (Applause.) And the agreements also provide that a free opposition press will be legalized, independent political and other free associations will be permitted, and elections for a new Polish Senate will be held. These agreements testify to the realism of General Jaruzelski and his colleagues, and they are inspiring testimony to the spiritual guidance of the Catholic Church, the indomitable spirit of the Polish people, and the strength and wisdom of Lech Walesa. (Applause.)

Poland faces, and will continue to face for some time, severe economic problems. A modern French writer observed that communism is not another form of economics. It is the death of economics. In Poland, an economic system crippled by the inefficiencies of central planning almost proved the death of initiative and enterprise. Almost. But economic reforms can still give free rein to the enterprising impulse and creative spirit of the great Polish people.

MORE

The Polish people understand the magnitude of this challenge. Democratic forces in Poland have asked for the moral, political and economic support of the West. And the West will respond. My administration is completing now a thorough review of our policies toward Poland and all of Eastern Europe. And I've carefully considered ways that the United States can help Poland. And we will not act unconditionally -- we're not going to offer unsound credits. We're not going to offer aid without requiring sound economic practices in return. And we must remember that Poland still is a member of the Warsaw Pact. And I will take no steps that compromise the security of the West.

The Congress, the Polish-American community -- and I support, I endorse strongly Ed Moskal and what he is doing in the Polish American Congress, I might say, and I'm delighted he's here. Good Chicago boy right here in Hamtramck. (Applause.) That the Congress, the Polish-American community, the American labor movement, our allies and international financial institutions -- our allies all must work in concert if Polish democracy is to take root anew and sustain itself. And we can and must answer this call to freedom. And it is particularly appropriate here in Hamtramck for me to salute the members and leaders of the American labor movement for hanging tough with Solidarity through its darkest days. Labor deserves great credit for that. (Applause.)

Now, the Poles are now taking steps that deserve our active support. And I have decided as your President on specific steps to be taken by the United States, carefully chosen to recognize the reforms underway and to encourage reforms yet to come now that Solidarnosc is legal:

I will ask Congress to join me in providing Poland access to our Generalized System of Preferences, which offers selective tariff relief to beneficiary countries.

We will work with our allies and friends in the Paris Club to develop sustainable new schedules for Poland to repay its debt, easing a heavy burden so that a free market can grow.

I will also ask Congress to join me in authorizing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to operate in Poland, to the benefit of both Polish and U.S. investors.

We will propose negotiations for a private business agreement with Poland to encourage cooperation between U.S. firms and Poland's private businesses. Both sides can benefit.

The United States will continue to consider supporting, on their merits, viable loans to the private sector by the International Finance Corporation.

We believe that the Roundtable agreements clear the way for Poland to be able to work with International Monetary Fund on programs that support sound, market-oriented economic polices.

We will encourage business and private nonprofit groups to develop innovative programs to swap Polish debt for equity in Polish enterprises; and for charitable, humanitarian and environmental projects.

We will support imaginative educational, cultural and training programs to help liberate the creative energies of the Polish people.

You know, when I visited Poland in September of 1987, I was then Vice President, and I told Chairman Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa that the American people and government would respond quickly and imaginatively to significant internal reform of the kind that we now see. Both of them valued that assurance. So it is especially

gratifying for me today to witness the changes now taking place in Poland and to announce these important changes in U.S. policy. The United States of America keeps its promises. (Applause.)

If Poland's experiment succeeds, other countries may follow. And while we must still differentiate among the nations of Eastern Europe, Poland offers two lessons for all. First, there can be no progress without significant political and economic liberalization. And second, help from the West will come in concert with liberalization. Our friends and European allies share this philosophy.

The West can now be bold in proposing a vision of the European future: We dream of the day when there will be no barriers to the free movement of peoples, goods and ideas. We dream of the day when Eastern European peoples will be free to choose their system of government and to vote for the party of their choice in regular, free, contested elections. (Applause.) And we dream of the day when Eastern European countries will be free to choose their own peaceful course in the world, including closer ties with Western Europe. And we envision an Eastern Europe in which the Soviet Union has renounced military intervention as an instrument of its policy -- on any pretext. We share an unwavering conviction that one day, all the peoples of Europe will live in freedom. And make no mistake about that. (Applause.)

Next month, at a summit of the North Atlantic Alliance, I will meet with the leaders of the Western democracies. The leaders of the Western democracies will discuss these concerns. And these are not bilateral issues just between the United States and the Soviet Union. They are, rather, the concern of all the Western allies, calling for common approaches. The Soviet Union should understand, in turn, that a free democratic Eastern Europe as we envision it would threaten no one and no country. Such an evolution would imply and reinforce the further improvement of East-West relations in all dimensions -- arms reductions, political relations, trade -- in ways that enhance the safety and well-being of all of Europe. There is no other way.

What has brought us to this opening? The unity and strength of the democracies, yes. And something else -- the bold, new thinking in the Soviet Union, the innate desire -- the innate desire for freedom in the hearts of all men. We will not waver in our dedication to freedom now. And if we're wise, united and ready to seize the moment, we will be remembered as the generation that made all Europe free.

Two centuries ago, a Polish patriot, Thaddeus Kosciuskzko, came to these American shores to stand for freedom. Let us honor and remember this hero of our own struggle for freedom by extending our hand to those who work the shipyards of Gdansk and walk the cobbled streets of Warsaw. Let us recall the words of the Poles who struggled for independence: "For your freedom and ours." (Applause.) Let us support the peaceful evolution of democracy in Poland. The cause of liberty knows no limits; the friends of freedom, no borders.

God bless Poland. God bless the United States of America. Thank you all very much. "Nieck Zyje Polska." (Let Poland Live.) Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END 12:14 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 4, 1989

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The world has watched with wonder as Poland has moved -- swiftly and peacefully -- to form a new government under Prime Minister Mazowiecki, the first non-Communist government in Eastern Europe in more than forty years. We salute Prime Minister Mazowiecki, President Jaruzelski, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and so many other distinguished Polish leaders for their courage and wisdom in helping bring about a new beginning for Poland.

From the very start of this Administration, President Bush has taken the lead in supporting reform in Poland and Hungary. At Hamtramck, Michigan, in April, on the day of the signing of the Roundtable Agreement in Poland, the President announced a set of measures to open U.S. markets and encourage private sector loans and investments. In July, he visited Poland and Hungary and spoke before the Polish parliament, as well as to a massive gathering at the Solidarity monument in Gdansk. He announced a further comprehensive package of assistance measures to support Poland's economic and political regeneration, a package which took account of the fact that Poland did not yet have its new government or its new economic policies in place. He announced a similar program during his visit to Hungary, which is also embarked on a promising path of political and economic reform. A few days later, at the Paris Economic Summit, the President proposed and our Summit partners agreed to a plan for concerted Western action to encourage and assist economic reform and democratic change in Poland and Hungary.

In early September, the Administration submitted to Congress a comprehensive legislative proposal that would create a $100 million Enterprise Fund for Poland and a $25 million Fund for Hungary, as well as a Labor Initiative and an Environmental Initiative together totalling $20 million. In addition to this $145 million proposal, and other initiatives taken by reprogramming existing resources, we have offered $100 million in emergency food aid to Poland in the coming fiscal year, in addition to $8 million in FY 89. In dollar terms, this total package already involves over $250 million.

We have also moved to encourage new trade and investment, by proposing that Congress grant both Poland and Hungary access to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences and that it authorize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to operate in both countries. On September 18, the President

- more -

announced that he would grant Hungary permanent Most Favored Nation status, contingent upon passage by the Hungarian parliament of new emigration legislation, which has since occurred.

We have engaged the resources and creativity of the private sector, recognizing that the U.S. Government alone could not, and should not, render all the support Poland and Hungary require. On the eve of his trip to those countries in July, the President hosted a White House Symposium in which he urged leaders from the American private sector -- labor leaders, businessmen, educators, and others -- to be actively engaged in supporting economic and political change in Eastern Europe. Labor Secretary Dole visited Poland in August and signed an agreement providing for U.S. technical assistance and bilateral exchanges in the labor field. In mid-September, Commerce Secretary Mosbacher led a U.S. investment mission to Poland and Hungary, where he and American businessmen developed concrete proposals to encourage new private investments, joint ventures, and other forms of expanded U.S. business involvement in redeveloping these two economies.

The dramatic changes in Poland over the past two months have lent new urgency to our efforts. What Poland is doing is historic, in the largest sense of the word. It holds the promise not only of a peaceful transition to democratic rule in Poland, but also of the beginning of the end of Europe's division, toward a Europe whole and free. It is also unprecedented: never before has a country attempted a successful transformation of a state-controlled economic and political system into one of political pluralism, democracy and a market economy. The new Polish government under Prime Minister Mazowiecki has a chance to consolidate the public trust that is needed for the difficult economic steps ahead, but it faces major economic problems.

There is no disagreement that both Poland and Hungary need, and will have, strong U.S. support. There is no disagreement that the U.S. needs to play a leading role in developing a concerted Western approach to Poland's economic recovery. The question is how best to achieve our goal. We believe, as do our Western economic partners, that Poland can best go forward by reforming its economy and becoming creditworthy again by reaching early agreement with the IMF on an economic reform plan. We also support a prompt and generous Paris Club rescheduling of Poland's international debt. This, along with agreement with the IMF, will make Poland eligible for IMF and World Bank loans totalling hundreds of millions of dollars annually. It will also give confidence to official and commercial lenders and to investors, whose participation in Poland's recovery is vital.

Poland is taking important steps toward reforming its economy. The Administration had a series of meetings last week with key Ministers in the new Polish government and reviewed the outlines of their economic reform program. It is an ambitious and bold

plan, calling for radical economic reform and rapid movement toward agreement with the IMF. An integral part of the plan is an urgent request for Western economic assistance in helping to stabilize the Polish economy as reforms are implemented. In the context of an agreement with the IMF, the Poles seek, in addition to IMF and World Bank support, $1 billion in stabilization funds from the Western industrialized countries.

In response to Poland's request, the President has decided on two major new steps.

He will ask Congress to approve a $200 million grant for stabilization purposes, which would be the U.S. contribution to the $1 billion in Western assistance the Poles have requested. The grant would be contingent upon conclusion of an IMF agreement, and upon the recommendations of an experts' mission that the President will send to Poland soon. The U.S. will be working closely with the Summit Seven and its other allies to make certain that the entire $1 billion is available to Poland for this stabilization fund since the concept can be effective only if the fund is fully financed. A program for use of the $200 million U.S. contribution will be developed with the Polish government. The President wants to work with Congress to develop a strong bipartisan approach toward the common goal of providing prompt and effective support to the government and people of Poland.

It is important to complete development of a strategy to assist Poland's recovery. Toward that end, the President will send to Warsaw within the next few weeks a Presidential Mission including senior U.S. officials, business leaders and experts to discuss with the Polish government its economic plans and evaluate its needs. This mission will make recommendations to the President based on their own findings and their deliberations with experts from the twenty-four nation "Group for Economic Assistance to Poland and Hungary" as to the most effective use of the $1 billion stabilization fund. This mission will also focus on those economic sectors where U.S. expertise and experience can be of greatest assistance -- agriculture, business management, financial services and others, pinpointing areas for reform and for productive use of assistance resources. The Congress can certainly be helpful in this endeavor. This initial mission will be followed by experts' missions in key economic sectors. In addition, Administration economists will examine urgently the structural economic challenges Poland will face now and in the years ahead so that we can provide the most effective help possible to the Polish government.

As the President has said, the futures of Poland and Hungary depend on concerted and sustained Western action. These efforts must be complementary, not duplicative, and must be coordinated with the efforts of the IMF and World Bank. That is why the President called on our G-7 economic partners at the Paris

Economic Summit to establish new mechanisms for coordinating our efforts. The resulting 24-nation group has already met three times under the chairmanship of the EC Commission. The EC on October 3 committed itself to $330 million in additional assistance, over and above the $271 million in emergency food aid already pledged by the U.S., the EC and other donors. It has also begun to develop a common assistance strategy for Poland and Hungary, along with working groups on food aid, environment, manpower training and other specific areas of assistance. The goal is to set clear priorities, avoid redundant efforts and assume maximum aid effectiveness.

West Germany, France, Britain, Japan, and several other countries have already announced their intention to provide substantial bilateral assistance. The IMF has indicated it will move quickly in assisting Poland to develop an overall economic stabilization and reform program, and the World Bank is prepared to extend promptly major new credits once an IMF program is in place, and to develop additional loans.

Finally, in order to continue the dialogue with Poland's leaders that he began in July, the President is inviting President Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Mazowiecki to visit Washington at times convenient for each of them.

These are the steps the Administration has taken and will be taking in support of democratic change in Poland and Hungary: economic assistance conditioned upon real progress toward reform, business and technical assistance, the opening of investment and trade opportunities, and concerted Western action in conjunction with other industrialized democracies and the international financial institutions. These combined measures constitute an international recovery program that provides broad and substantial Western support for the historic changes now underway in Poland and Hungary.

# # #

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8721

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1		OBE
NSC Secretariat	2		N/OBE

89 NOV 10:08

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

National Security Council
The White House

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Dep Exec	1	✓	
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates	2	✓	
Brent Scowcroft	3	✓	
Philip Hughes			
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908769
RECEIVED: 01 NOV 89 08

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: COVERDELL, P

DOC DATE: 31 OCT 89
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: HUNGARY
ECONOMICS
PEACE CORPS
POLAND
ENVIRONMENT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT ON PEACE CORPS ACTIVITIES IN HUNGARY & POLAND

ACTION: NFAR PER HUTCHINGS DUE DATE: 04 NOV 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSEF CLOSED BY: NSJRP DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

CHRON FILE
8769

THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES PEACE CORPS
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1989

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

TO: Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
National Security Council

FROM: Paul D. Coverdell

RE: Report on Peace Corps Activities in Hungary and Poland

HUNGARY

On October 17th, the Minister of Education and Culture, Ferenc Glatz and I signed a memorandum of understanding in contemplation of sixty-five Peace Corps Volunteers entering Hungary in June 1990. There is broad excitement in Hungary regarding this program.

POLAND

On October 18th, I met with the Deputy Minister of National Education, the Acting Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, the Acting Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation and the Deputy Minister Agriculture, Forestry and Food Economy and the Deputy Foreign Minister. In each case discussions of potential Peace Corps activity took place. There is great need for Peace Corps in Poland in the fields of education, environment, health and small business development. We agreed to send a task force to Poland in November to continue discussions regarding the potential of a Peace Corps mission.

[I have read of the delegation being sent by the White House to Poland and wanted to raise a question as to whether Peace Corps should be included in the light of our extensive discussions.]

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW
IMMEDIATE
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MODE
SECURE FAX #
ADMIN FAX # 587

PAGES 2
DTG 3/2026Z
RELEASER

FROM/LOCATION
1. Peace Corps

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
1. Seowcroft
2. Blackwill
3. TOR: 3120292
4.
5.
6.
7.

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
1.
2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

DATE 10/31/89 TIME 3:20 p.m.

TO Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
395-5221

FROM Paul D. Coverdell
Director, U.S. Peace Corps

OFFICE PHONE NO. 254-7970

FAX PHONE NO. 254-4010

INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY CODE

TELEPHONE NO.

Number of pages in transmission: 1
(excluding this page)

Urgent message: YES ___ NO X

SUBJECT

REMARKS

PC-304 (12/87)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908522
RECEIVED: 24 OCT 89 12

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 31 OCT 89
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: POLAND
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
HUNGARY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF AID TO POLAND & HUNGARY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 27 OCT 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASORA
		BLACKWILL
		SUNUNU
		VICE PRES

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 3/20/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGAD CLOSED BY: NSMDC DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ RECORD ID: 8908522

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	89102417	FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	89103108	FOR DECISION
002		X	89110211	NOTED BY PRES

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 3/20/09

National Security Council
The White House

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Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	10/31 RC 11/1 OMD	D
NSC Secretariat	2	MK 11/2	R

OCT 31 8:23

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1989

[redacted]

Mr. President:

Secretary Brady favors Option 2, he can live with Option 1, and he strongly opposes Option 3. Secretary Baker prefers Option 3.

Brent Scowcroft

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1989 OCT 31 AM 8:58

October 31, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1007-MR
SCS 6/3/13

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary

Purpose

To decide the best means of assuring effective US government coordination of its assistance to Poland and Hungary.

Background

The farther we have proceeded in developing the assistance program for Poland/Hungary, **the clearer the need for a senior US Coordinator has become.** Substantial work continues with Congress, several different USG departments and agencies are planning missions or other visits to Poland and/or Hungary, and systematic coordination has become increasingly essential with the EC and others in the Group of 24, and with the IMF and the World Bank. Merely keeping track of the dozens of program initiatives, visits, and policy issues is beyond the capacity of the regular structure.

With the departure of the Presidential Mission to Poland now approaching, **the naming of a senior coordinator has become the next important step.** Taking account of the different interagency approaches to the position of Coordinator, the main options are set forth below.

Options for Coordinator

Option I: Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam)

No. 1

Pro: facilitates private sector involvement; demonstrates importance of task by designation of capable national figure.

Con: lesser degree of USG control over the Coordinator; potentially weakens the interagency coordination process; without a bureaucratic home, Coordinator could have difficulty carrying out his mission.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Option 2: Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators, with Chairman, CEA as third Co-Coordinator or as Vice Coordinator

Pro: recognizes the equal importance of the political and the economic aspects of the coordination function.

Con: divided authority could lead to confusion, split recommendations and delay in making decisions; also, could put CEA in a lesser role.

Option 3: Appoint Deputy Secretary of State as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of Treasury and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; involvement of a White House agency in a prominent role; assurance of full attention to foreign policy considerations by the Coordinator.

Con: economic considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively .

Option 4: Appoint Deputy Secretary of Treasury as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of State and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; White House agency involved; assurance of full attention to international financial policy and IMF/World Bank institutional considerations.

Con: foreign policy considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively.

Reporting Arrangements

These four options technically leave open the question of to whom the Coordinator would report. Two alternatives come to mind.

Option A: Coordinator Reports to Secretaries of State and Treasury and National Security Adviser

Pro: gives equal role to importance of political and economic aspects.

Con: cumbersome not to have one single line of authority; additional drain on the time of overloaded Cabinet-level officials.

Option B: Coordinator Works under General Guidance of Deputies Committee

Pro: uses an existing mechanism; clear lines of authority; retains national security focus.

Con: increases workload of Deputy NSA and of other members of DC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate your choice among Options 1 through 4, and between Options A and B.

Option 1. Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam).

Approve_____ Disapprove__X__

Option 2. Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators, with Chairman CEA as third Co-Coordinator or as Vice-Coordinator.

Approve_____ Disapprove__X__

Option 3. Appoint Deputy Secretary of State as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of Treasury and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve__X__ Disapprove__ Have Sec. Treas. designate which is to serve

Option 4. Appoint Deputy Secretary of Treasury as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of State and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove__X__

Option A: Coordinator Reports to Secretaries of State and Treasury and National Security Adviser.

Approve__X__ Disapprove_____

Option B: Coordinator Works under General Guidance of Deputies Committee.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8522

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG RL A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates	APNSA	Has Seen	
Brent Scowcroft	2	✓	A
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1/3	10/26 RL	D
NSC Secretariat	4		

89 OCT 26 All: 27

Please dispatch ASAP.
Return outgoing memo and original of attachment to Florence Gantt. Thanks.

10/26 Cathy Millison

NSC/S:

This package has been redone & submitted to Scowcroft on 10/30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10/25/89
1427

Brent --

I have continued and completed the editing of this memo in the spirit of your earlier effort.

If you need to make further fixes, I attach the disk. Let me know if I can be of further help.

Bob Blackwill

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS F. BRADY
The Secretary of the Treasury

Is this okay to go to the President?

Brent Scowcroft

SECRET Attachment

~~SECRET~~

8522

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary

Purpose

To decide the best means of assuring effective US government coordination of its assistance to Poland and Hungary.

Background

The farther we have proceeded in developing the assistance program for Poland/Hungary, the clearer the need for a senior US Coordinator has become. Substantial work continues with Congress, several different USG departments and agencies are planning missions or other visits to Poland and/or Hungary, and systematic coordination has become increasingly essential with the EC and others in the Group of 24, and with the IMF and the World Bank. Merely keeping track of the dozens of program initiatives, visits, and policy issues is beyond the capacity of the regular structure.

With the departure of the Presidential Mission to Poland now approaching, the naming of a senior coordinator has become the next important step. Taking account of the different interagency approaches to the position of Coordinator, the main options are set forth below.

Options for Coordinator

Option 1: Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam)

Pro: facilitates private sector involvement; demonstrates importance of task by designation of capable national figure.

Con: lesser degree of USG control over the Coordinator; potentially weakens the interagency coordination process; without a bureaucratic home, Coordinator could have difficulty carrying out his mission.

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1007-MR
SCS 6/3/13

Option 2: Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators, with Chairman, CEA as third Co-Coordinator or as Vice Coordinator

Pro: recognizes the equal importance of the political and the economic aspects of the coordination function.

Con: divided authority could lead to confusion, split recommendations and delay in making decisions; also, could put CEA in a lesser role.

Option 3: Appoint Deputy Secretary of State as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of Treasury and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; involvement of a White House agency in a prominent role; assurance of full attention to foreign policy considerations by the Coordinator.

Con: economic considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively .

Option 4: Appoint Deputy Secretary of Treasury as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of State and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; White House agency involved; assurance of full attention to international financial policy and IMF/World Bank institutional considerations.

Con: foreign policy considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively.

Option 5: Appoint no Coordinator and Task European PCC with the Coordination Task

Pro: uses existing interagency mechanism; encourages foreign policy focus.

Con: PCC mechanism can be slow and cumbersome; interagency disagreements can cause deadlock and frequent escalation of disputes to Deputies Committee or NSC level; no single, clear point of contact or leadership of day-to-day coordination process; economic considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively.

Option 6: Appoint no Coordinator and Task International Economic PCC with the Coordination Task

Pro: uses existing interagency mechanism; encourages focus on economic issues and on overall US policy toward international financial institutions.

Con: PCC mechanism cumbersome; disagreements likely to escalate often to DC and NSC level; foreign policy considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively.

Supervisory Arrangements

The first four options above all technically leave open the question of to whom the Coordinator would report. Two alternatives come to mind.

Option A: Secretaries of State, Treasury and National Security Adviser Provide Guidance for Coordinating Activities of Coordinator

Pro: gives equal role to importance of political and economic aspects.

Con: cumbersome not to have one single line of authority; additional drain on the time of overloaded Cabinet-level officials.

Option B: Deputies Committee Provides Guidance for Coordinating Activities of Coordinator

Pro: uses an existing mechanism; clear lines of authority; retains national security focus.

Con: increases workload of Deputy NSA and of other members of DC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate your choice among Options 1 through 6, and between Options A and B.

Option 1. Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam).

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 2. Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators, with Chairman CEA as third Co-Coordinator or as Vice-Coordinator.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 3. Appoint Deputy Secretary of State as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of Treasury and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 4. Appoint Deputy Secretary of Treasury as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of State and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 5. Appoint no Coordinator and Task European PCC with the Coordination Task.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 6: Appoint no Coordinator and Task International Economic PCC with the Coordination Task.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option A: Coordinator Reports to Secretaries of State and Treasury and National Security Adviser.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option B: Coordinator Works under General Guidance of Deputies Committee.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 8522

Date October 26, 1989

Subject: POLAND & HUNGARY

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	#CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed for By
THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	1			
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422	1			
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION % ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION % ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, VA				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg.				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S W, Room 800				
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 18th & E Street N W, Room 6151				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th S W, Room 200A				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St. NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 1500 C Street, Room 828				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S W.				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F				
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 451 7th Street SW, Room 10000				
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: WEST WING DESK, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS F. BRADY
The Secretary of the Treasury

Is this okay to go to the President?

Brent Scowcroft

SECRET Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary

Purpose

To decide the best means of assuring effective US government coordination of its assistance to Poland and Hungary.

Background

The farther we have proceeded in developing the assistance program for Poland/Hungary, the clearer the need for a senior US Coordinator has become. Substantial work continues with Congress, several different USG departments and agencies are planning missions or other visits to Poland and/or Hungary, and systematic coordination has become increasingly essential with the EC and others in the Group of 24, and with the IMF and the World Bank. Merely keeping track of the dozens of program initiatives, visits, and policy issues is beyond the capacity of the regular structure.

With the departure of the Presidential Mission to Poland now approaching, the naming of a senior coordinator has become the next important step. Taking account of the different interagency approaches to the position of Coordinator, the main options are set forth below.

Options for Coordinator

Option 1: Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam)

Pro: facilitates private sector involvement; demonstrates importance of task by designation of capable national figure.

Con: lesser degree of USG control over the Coordinator; potentially weakens the interagency coordination process; without a bureaucratic home, Coordinator could have difficulty carrying out his mission.

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2009-1007-MR
SCS 6/13/13

Option 2: Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators, with Chairman, CEA as third Co-Coordinator or as Vice Coordinator

Pro: recognizes the equal importance of the political and the economic aspects of the coordination function.

Con: divided authority could lead to confusion, split recommendations and delay in making decisions; also, could put CEA in a lesser role.

Option 3: Appoint Deputy Secretary of State as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of Treasury and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; involvement of a White House agency in a prominent role; assurance of full attention to foreign policy considerations by the Coordinator.

Con: economic considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively .

Option 4: Appoint Deputy Secretary of Treasury as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of State and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; White House agency involved; assurance of full attention to international financial policy and IMF/World Bank institutional considerations.

Con: foreign policy considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively.

Option 5: Appoint no Coordinator and Task European PCC with the Coordination Task

Pro: uses existing interagency mechanism; encourages foreign policy focus.

Con: PCC mechanism can be slow and cumbersome; interagency disagreements can cause deadlock and frequent escalation of disputes to Deputies Committee or NSC level; no single, clear point of contact or leadership of day-to-day coordination process; economic considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively.

Option 6: Appoint no Coordinator and Task International Economic PCC with the Coordination Task

Pro: uses existing interagency mechanism; encourages focus on economic issues and on overall US policy toward international financial institutions.

Con: PCC mechanism cumbersome; disagreements likely to escalate often to DC and NSC level; foreign policy considerations and coordination could be handled less effectively.

Supervisory Arrangements

The first four options above all technically leave open the question of to whom the Coordinator would report. Two alternatives come to mind.

Option A: Secretaries of State, Treasury and National Security Adviser Provide Guidance for Coordinating Activities of Coordinator

Pro: gives equal role to importance of political and economic aspects.

Con: cumbersome not to have one single line of authority; additional drain on the time of overloaded Cabinet-level officials.

Option B: Deputies Committee Provides Guidance for Coordinating Activities of Coordinator

Pro: uses an existing mechanism; clear lines of authority; retains national security focus.

Con: increases workload of Deputy NSA and of other members of DC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate your choice among Options 1 through 6, and between Options A and B.

Option 1. Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam).

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 2. Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators, with Chairman CEA as third Co-Coordinator or as Vice-Coordinator.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 3. Appoint Deputy Secretary of State as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of Treasury and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 4. Appoint Deputy Secretary of Treasury as Coordinator, with Deputy or Under Secretary of State and CEA Chairman as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 5. Appoint no Coordinator and Task European PCC with the Coordination Task.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 6: Appoint no Coordinator and Task International Economic PCC with the Coordination Task.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option A: Coordinator Reports to Secretaries of State and Treasury and National Security Adviser.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option B: Coordinator Works under General Guidance of Deputies Committee.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [illegible] LOG # 8522

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	1	/	A
Philip Hughes	2	[illegible]	
Bob Gates	3	8	
Brent Scowcroft	4	✓	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	GAD 11/1	N
NSC Secretariat	6		R

89 OCT 24 P4:11

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS [illegible] of Aid [illegible] & Hungary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary

Purpose

To decide the best means of assuring effective US government coordination of its assistance to Poland and Hungary.

Background

The further along we have gotten in developing the assistance program for Poland/Hungary, the clearer the need for a senior US coordinator has become. Substantial work continues with Congress, several different USG departments and agencies are planning missions or other visits to Poland and/or Hungary, and systematic coordination has become increasingly essential with the EC and others in the Group of 24, and with the IMF and the World Bank. Merely keeping track of the dozens of program initiatives, visits, and policy issues is beyond the capacity of the existing structure.

With the departure of the Presidential Mission to Poland now approaching, the naming of a senior coordinator has become urgent. Taking account of current interagency differences, we have listed the main options below.

Options for Coordinator

Option 1: Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam)

Pro: could minimize friction between State and Treasury by choosing a person not from either agency; facilitates private sector involvement.

Con: lesser degree of USG control over the Coordinator; potentially weakens the interagency coordination process; without a bureaucratic home, Coordinator could have difficulty carrying out his mission.

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2009-1007-MR
MM 3/23/2016

Option 2: Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators

Pro: splits the interagency difference between State and Treasury.

Con: divided authority can lead to continuing squabbles, split recommendations and delay in making decisions; also, puts CEA in a lesser role.

Option 3: Appoint Deputy Secretary Eagleburger as Coordinator, with Deputy Secretary Robson and CEA Chairman Boskin as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; involvement of a White House agency in a prominent role; assurance of full attention to foreign policy considerations by the Coordinator.

Con: Treasury would object to less than equal standing.

Option 4: Appoint Deputy Secretary Robson as Coordinator, with Eagleburger and Boskin as Deputy Coordinators

Pro: clear lines of authority; White House agency involved; assurance of full attention to international financial policy and IMF/World Bank institutional considerations.

Con: undercuts State role; risks subordination of foreign policy considerations to international financial policy concerns.

Option 5: Appoint no Coordinator and Task European PCC with the Coordination Task

Pro: uses existing interagency mechanism; encourages foreign policy focus.

Con: PCC mechanism can be slow and cumbersome; interagency disagreements can cause deadlock and frequent escalation of disputes to Deputies Committee or NSC level; no single, clear point of contact or leadership of day-to-day coordination process.

Option 6: Appoint no Coordinator and Task International Economic PCC with the Coordination Task

Pro: uses existing interagency mechanism; encourages focus on economic issues and on overall US policy toward international financial institutions.

Con: PCC mechanism cumbersome; disagreements likely to escalate often to DC and NSC level; risks subordination of foreign policy considerations to international financial policy concerns.

Reporting Arrangements

The first four options above all technically leave open the question of to whom the Coordinator would report. In order to try to minimize interagency differences, two alternatives come to mind.

Option A: Coordinator Reports to Secretaries of State and Treasury and National Security Adviser as Co-equals

Pro: avoids choosing between Secretaries of State and Treasury and gives the National Security Adviser the adjudicating role if disputes arise.

Con: cumbersome not to have one single line of authority; additional drain on the time of overloaded Cabinet-level officials.

Option B: Coordinator Works under General Guidance of Deputies Committee

Pro: uses an existing mechanism; clear lines of authority; retains national security focus.

Con: increases workload of Deputy NSA and of other members of DC.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate your choice among Options 1 through 6, and between Options A and B.

Option 1. Recruit a Coordinator from Outside the Administration (for example, Bill Brock, John Whitehead or Ken Dam).

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 2. Appoint the Deputy Secretaries of State and of Treasury as Co-Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 3. Appoint Deputy Secretary Eagleburger as Coordinator, with Deputy Secretary Robson and CEA Chairman Boskin as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 4. Appoint Deputy Secretary Robson as Coordinator, with Eagleburger and Boskin as Deputy Coordinators.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 5. Appoint no Coordinator and Task European PCC with the Coordination Task.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option 6. Appoint no Coordinator and Task International Economic PCC with the Coordination Task.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option A. Coordinator Reports to Secretaries of State and Treasury and National Security Advisor as Co-equals.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Option B. Coordinator Works under General Guidance of Deputies Committee.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

8522

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA AAB

SUBJECT: Coordination of Aid to Poland and Hungary

Attached is the options memo that you discussed last night with Bob Blackwill regarding a senior coordinator for USG assistance to Poland and Hungary.

Deane Hoffmann does not concur in these options and will be sending you a separate memo.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President

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